

ACT Mid-Programme Outcome Evaluation

Civil society strengthened to effectively
support and contribute to the peace process

The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this report are entirely those of the evaluators. They do not necessarily represent the view of UNDP or USAID.

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ACT MID-PROGRAMME OUTCOME EVALUATION

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April-May, 2009.

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between 2005 and 2008, UNDP pursued a programme called “Action for Cooperation and Trust”, or ACT I, to promote trust and cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, working with civil society as strategic partners. In 2008, Cypriot leaders re-engaged in a process of negotiations, under UN auspices, with a view to resolving the Cyprus Problem. Consequently, UNDP engaged in a transition exercise for ACT I that led to ACT II – a more focused programme. That exercise benefitted from the inputs of partners, academics and opinion leaders, and from the guidance of UN leaders and departments, and USAID.

This mid-programme evaluation was commissioned to identify those lessons learned from ACT I, with a view to assuring that ACT II had benefitted fully from these. Additionally, the evaluation sought to assure that ACT II was relevant to the changed environment and that further opportunities to build cooperation and trust were not being missed.

The goal of ACT II was established as **“Capacities of Cypriots to actively participate in a process of reconciliation strengthened”** and three outcomes were identified to support the achievement of this goal as follows:

- Civil society strengthened to effectively support and contribute to the peace process;
- Opportunities for Cypriots to promote social and policy change on issues of common concern enhanced, and;
- Mechanisms to promote cooperation, common understanding and reconciliation fostered and demonstrated.

ACT II reflects a process where, as a general rule, strengths were retained and critical changes made. **The result has been a significant shift in emphasis: from some 120 disparate small projects to eight individual but interrelated theme areas; from many partners to a much smaller collection of interlocking civil society networks that could have the greatest impact; from a collection of similar but essentially parallel efforts in both communities to issue driven civil society networks working on common issues and participating together across the community divide. The tightened definition of inter-communal collaboration to the point of programmatic jointness promises new challenges but also new and improved results, through a better defined set of outcomes, outputs and indicators.**

In summary, the evaluators found as follows:

- **ACT II focuses civil society** on the settlement and reconciliation processes in a coordinated and interrelated fashion. The programme is now poised to be much more strategic and impactful than ever.
- **ACT has followed a model transition process** between Phase I and II, as demonstrated by inclusiveness, transparency and the incorporation of recommendations made in the 2007 evaluation. Impressively, the processes used and the eventual content and partnerships contained in ACT II reflect international good practices and are validated by credible models and principles, including focus and local ownership.
- **ACT II occupies a highly relevant and crucial niche**, in the context of the Cyprus Problem and the search for its solution, as manifested by the renewed negotiation process.
- **ACT has a healthy reputation** for high quality work and the use of respectful processes.
- **Major challenges remain** that highlight the not insignificant challenge of operating in a conflicted society.
- **Cutting edge practices** have been demonstrated in the process of arriving at ACT II, and in the content of ACT II itself. These are worthy of further examination, analysis, articulation and sharing.

The evaluators offered 14 recommendations to ACT for consideration.

- i. **Update Communications:** As a matter of urgency, ACT is encouraged to reach out to partners and other constituents of the programme, to inform them of the changes that have occurred.
- ii. **Review Project Names:** ACT is encouraged to work with partners to ensure that project names effectively communicate the underlying thrust of the project.
- iii. **Review Project RRFs:** We recommend a thorough review of the Results and Resources Frameworks (RRFs) for the projects and adjustments that would emphasise both output and outcome indicators.
- iv. **Establish an informal advisory group:** We suggest that key local partners be brought together into an informal advisory group that could advise ACT at both the macro and micro levels.

- v. Establish a Partners Forum:** To increase synergies and impact, it is proposed that a mechanism be established where programme partners are routinely engaged.
- vi. Adjust Management and Project Architecture:** The preceding recommendations, if implemented, would be assisted by a graphical adjustment of the ACT management and project architecture.
- vii. Establish a Civil Society Agenda on Reconciliation:** ACT might consider supporting the establishment of civil society agenda that is broader than ACT itself. Here, ACT could also engage those members of civil society not currently part of ACT, including mass-based organizations, women's groups and members of the diaspora.
- viii. Strengthen Leaders:** ACT could usefully consider ways of engaging civil society leaders, particularly those working on ACT projects, with a view to developing and sustaining their capacities.
- ix. Support ACT Team:** Mechanisms for dealing with the stresses arising from operational, social and political pressures, particularly for local staff, have been used in the past and should be maintained, even deepened, going forward.
- x. Extract and Share Good Practices:** The cutting-edge nature of ACT II and its transition processes from ACT I will aid other peacebuilders globally. The lesson-learning process ought to simultaneously contribute to the strengthening of local practice.
- xi. Reach Across the Aisle:** Those who are uncomfortable with ACT in one way or another will probably resist being engaged. Strategies for engagement can be developed using programme processes, e.g. the Advisory Committee and the Partners Forum.
- xii. Explore UNDP's Future Role:** UNDP should engage local and international partners to examine options regarding UNDP's future presence, role, and exit strategies in Cyprus.

2. BACKGROUND

A. Introduction

Between 2005 and 2008, UNDP pursued a programme called “Action for Cooperation and Trust”, or ACT I, to promote trust and cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, working with civil society as strategic partners. In 2008, Cypriot leaders re-engaged in a process of negotiations, under UN auspices, with a view to resolving the Cyprus Problem. Consequently, UNDP engaged in a transition exercise for ACT I that led to ACT II – a more focused programme, with the goal of *building the capacities of Cypriots to actively participate in a process of reconciliation*, which was taking place in a more helpful political environment.

This mid-programme evaluation was commissioned to identify those lessons learned from ACT I, with a view to assuring that ACT II had benefitted fully from these.

Additionally, the evaluation sought to assure that ACT II was relevant to the changed environment and that further opportunities to build cooperation and trust were not being missed. The strategic lens for this evaluation was the programme objective/corporate UNDP outcome: *civil society strengthened to effectively support and contribute to the peace process*.

A two-person team was engaged by UNDP and USAID, the principal donor to the programme, to review documentation and to meet key programme partners. The team visited Cyprus from April 29 to May 11, 2009.

This evaluation took place at a time of high consequence for the peace process

This evaluation took place at a time of high consequence for the peace process, which has been ongoing with greater or lesser intensity over the past 46 years. Indeed many consider the negotiations now under way as the best chance for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in a number of years. In this context the UNDP ACT programme is playing a crucial role in supporting the UN in the negotiation efforts.

The outcome of negotiations obviously cannot be known at this time. In this connection there is good and bad news. The good news is that Cyprus has not experienced active conflict for the past 35 years and most observers believe that it is extremely unlikely to return to hostilities in the future. The bad news is that a peaceful status quo may translate into a lack of urgency at both the political and social levels. One consequence is that the benefits of reaching a settlement are not readily apparent to those who would benefit most from it. Another is that civil society has only managed to build a limited momentum for participation in the process.

B. Historical Background

A brief historical background is in order. For the past forty-six years Cyprus has been locked in a political stalemate. Despite significant internal political shifts on both the Greek Cypriot (GC) and Turkish Cypriot (TC) sides, there has been no physical change in the end-game state. Violence between the two communities in 1963 led to the arrival of a peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, the United Nations Forces in Cyprus. By 1964, both communities had been physically separated. A Greek-inspired coup in 1974 prompted Turkish military intervention that effectively annexed northern Cyprus (approximately 38% of the island). In 1983, after successive negotiations to resolve the problem failed, the TC authorities declared a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This unilateral declaration of independence was recognized only by Turkey who continues to support the TC community (TCC) through various means. The Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognised authority on the island and the Government refuses to acknowledge the legality of the TC authorities.

After protracted discussions with both GC and TC negotiators, the so-called “Annan Plan” - a settlement proposal sponsored by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan - was put to a referendum on both sides of the island on April 24, 2004. The TCC voted in favour of the plan (65%) while the GC community (GCC) overwhelmingly voted to reject it (76%). The favourable TC vote, occasioned in large part by a coming to the fore of a younger leadership (Mr. Talat), was echoed in 2006 by a defeat of the political leadership on the GC side and the advent of new leadership (Mr. Christofias) that had repeatedly mentioned that the main reason for his candidacy would be to reach a settlement on the island.

Despite the turn-down of the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan, the EU permitted the Government of Cyprus to accede to the Common Market, despite the Government’s *de facto* lack of control over the TCC. This admission has both complicated subsequent negotiations, even while providing incentives for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Among the challenges faced in the current context is the relative economic strength of the GCC (per capita GDP of ~US\$33,000¹) in comparison to the TCC (estimated at ~US\$11,000), and the significant role played by Turkey in economic, political and social matters in the TCC.

Notwithstanding the failure of the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan to win support in the GCC, GC and TC leaders were encouraged back to the negotiating table by the United Nations.

¹ IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2009.

Since September 2008 the two principal negotiators (Mssrs. Talat and Christofias) backed by 13 working groups and technical committees have been engaged in discussions under the auspices of the United Nations. The political landscape underlying these discussions - on both sides – is highly dynamic and the outcome of the talks extremely uncertain.

C. ACT in Context

It is against this backdrop that the ACT programme has developed. UNDP initially opened a country office in 1966 to provide primarily humanitarian assistance. Relief efforts increasingly switched to developmental efforts in the 1980s. Cyprus became a net donor to the UN during the 1990s and UNDP closed its office in 1997. In the 1990s, international support turned to reconciliation efforts. As a result the UN's bi-communal activities, led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), were taken over by UNDP in 1998.

From 1998 to 2005, USAID provided US\$67million for the execution of the Bi-communal Development Programme (BDP). BDP aimed to build peace by encouraging the GC and TC communities to prepare and implement projects in areas of common concern that would together benefit the island as a whole, with a view to building peace and cooperation across the two communities. What began as separate projects on common issues gradually progressed to projects that were mirrored across the communities, with a view to eventually having the same project implemented jointly.

In 2005, ACT was launched with a focus on supporting reconciliation processes. The purpose of ACT was to create opportunities for GC and TC communities to work together on concrete projects that would benefit all Cypriots, while at the same time promoting inter-communal tolerance and mutual understanding. ACT has subsequently demonstrated two phases: ACT I (2005-2008) and ACT II (2009-2011). The distinction between the two phases will be discussed further on; but, in brief, the latter phase is attempting to promote more direct interaction between the two civil society communities while the former was targeted on establishing initial contact with and dialogue between the two communities.

The UN presence in Cyprus is peculiar. A peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) is present despite the absence for decades of hostilities. UNDP is present despite Cyprus being rated #30 on UNDP's Human Development Index (2008). The structure on the ground reflects this unique situation, with a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) leading a diverse effort that polices and administers the buffer zone between the TCC and the GCC (the UN Protected Area, UNPA, consists of approximately 3% of Cyprus territory), provides supplies to remaining

enclaves, supports the negotiation process and assists, through UNDP, with programmes in the areas of reconciliation (ACT, with mainly USAID funding) and infrastructural development (Partnership for the Future, PFF, which operates mainly in the TCC with EU funding). Support is also channeled through UNDP to de-mining efforts and the Committee on Missing Persons.

The net effect is that an irregular UNDP structure exists, where traditional Country Office structures and support are absent. The two UNDP programmes operate semi-independently with some integration into the local UN structures (e.g. attending weekly coordination meetings) and oversight and support coming from UNDP in New York and the Regional Support Centre in Bratislava.

In addition to UN peace and development activities, other international development partners (IDPs) are supporting a range of complementary programmes and projects. The EU is fast tracking a €259m programme to, among other things, strengthen civil society and prepare the Turkish Cypriot Community (TCC) for integration into the EU. USAID is supporting reunification of the island with a programme portfolio that puts specific emphasis on mitigating disparities in areas such as economic development, capacity development, the environment, in addition to ACT itself. Taken together, these three major IDPs are focused on setting the stage for eventual reconciliation and in particular to raising the capacities and capabilities of the TCC to smoothen the anticipated integration.

Before turning to a discussion and evaluation of the transition between ACT I and ACT II, it is important to note some of the almost unique elements of the ACT program and the environment in which it operates in Cyprus:

- ACT is not a development programme per se, as Cyprus has long passed the need for traditional development assistance, but instead is justified on the basis of its contribution to the reconciliation process. Other donor assistance (EU, USAID, and UN) is targeted on other facets of the reconciliation process, including foci on the economy, the environment and missing persons. ACT, however, is the only program devoted to inter-communal reconciliation activities that are driven by civil society.
- ACT's programme modalities operate through and are constrained by the bifurcated administrative structure on the island. Official representation in Cyprus is run through two Project Steering Committees (PSCs) chaired by the Red Cross in

Despite its growing prosperity and increasing sophistication, Cyprus' civil society is in relative infancy.

the GCC and the Humanitarian Relief Mission in the TCC. These committees in turn refer programme proposals to the relevant stakeholders for review. The result can be protracted discussions and occasional roadblocks in programme implementation; although it should be noted that generally the process is quicker and more accommodating now than it was several years ago.

- Despite its growing prosperity and increasing sophistication, Cyprus' civil society is in relative infancy. Religion, party affiliation, labor unions and even geographical location are strong determinations of opinion. Demographic change and new media outlets, among other changes, however, are starting to erode the old conservative order.

D. Evaluation Methodology

The Terms of Reference defined the general methodology to be used for the evaluation (see Annex 1). UNDP recruited the team leader, Lawrence Lachmansingh, and USAID seconded Charles Weden to form the evaluation team.² This evaluation used the lens of the programme objective *civil society strengthened to effectively support and contribute to the peace process*.

The evaluators were able to research a wide array of programme documentation made available before visiting Cyprus over a two week period (April 29 to May 11, 2009). The team was briefed initially by ACT leadership and staff and met USAID programme management. Subsequent to these initial briefings the team met with representatives of the leadership of both communities, Programme Steering Committee members, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General and other staff members of UNFICYP, the US Ambassador and officials of other foreign missions in Cyprus, representatives of civil society, academia, the media, and ACT partner organizations. The meeting schedule may be viewed at Annex 3.

On May 11 the team provided preliminary findings to ACT and USAID staff with a view to validating findings and to fast-tracking critical actions. This evaluation report was subsequently presented in draft form to ACT and their responses incorporated.

² Brief bios of team members may be viewed in Annex 2.

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3. FROM ACT I TO ACT II

A. The 2007 Evaluation

ACT was evaluated by a three-person team in May 2007 as a mid-term evaluation in the context of the 2005-2008 programme. That evaluation portrayed the political climate in which ACT operated, and as continues today, as complex, challenging and severely constrained by a central “recognition” issue - that neither side recognized the legitimacy of the other. Given this circumstance ACT projects were being implemented almost exclusively by CSOs.

The 2007 evaluation noted that civil society was weak, fragmented and vulnerable to political attack, and that the climate for civil society’s contribution to reconciliation had hit a low point due to the absence of an agreement in 2004. A number of factors were considered to have contributed to a national decline in trust at the time, including a GC Parliamentary Inquiry that effectively discouraged CSOs from collaborating with ACT. On the TC side, the evaluation found that public opinion had significantly hardened against GCs since their rejection of the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan.

Irrespective of this decline in the political atmosphere the evaluation emphasized that public opinion on both sides still saw some form of unification as the only viable and sustainable solution to the Cyprus Problem. No matter what shape unification would take it found that all respondents agreed that to reach and sustain it, trust and cooperation would still have to be built. Thus ACT was considered more relevant and important than ever.

From a programmatic perspective, the 2007 evaluation identified that ACT was addressing relevant and critical needs and that the programme’s operations were generally well run. At the same time, 30 recommendations were made – eight being considered as critical. These focused on resource allocations, impact, communications, operations, tailoring approaches, delivery rates, and learning. The 2007 evaluation summary recommendations may be viewed at Annex 4.

The evaluation urged ACT to move faster to make a difference. While some capacity building should continue, it stressed that more emphasis should be placed on getting more immediate “upstream” results that would be more likely to influence public opinion and/or policy formulation. The evaluation found that communications and environment were theme areas which had performed relatively well and which were more likely to deliver early results.

Conversely, it pointed to areas which lagged (cultural heritage and youth camps) which were relatively more risky and less likely to yield results that will make a strategic difference within a relatively short timeframe. It recommended that ACT should undertake additional analyses to substantiate possible changes in its allocation of staff and resources across and within themes for decision in the July 2007 Annual Review. With more staff and greater budgets, it recommended that ACT's communications action plan be more targeted and reach more people.

The evaluation found that there was scope for ACT to tailor its targeting and strategies to different contexts, opportunities and needs. It suggested that ACT should consider giving relatively higher priority in the TCC to building capacity in CSOs and linking them to regional and international NGO networks. In the GCC, it felt that ACT should consider placing relatively greater emphasis on strengthening civil society as a sector and addressing key media challenges.

The evaluation suggested that ACT tap into local wisdom more systematically by periodically organizing brainstorming and listening sessions of civil society and international community members to advise on key issues and strategy. Finally the evaluation recommended that for the Annual Review, and in between such reviews, ACT management, should review semi-annually what worked since the last review, what didn't, why and where strategic changes in direction, staffing and budget would be needed across themes, target groups and broad approaches, articulating this in a short updated strategic action plan with specific staff delivery targets and timelines.

B. Lessons Learned

As will be discussed in greater depth in the next section there is clear evidence that ACT not only took these recommendations seriously but went well beyond in terms of focus, scope and concentration. ACT II reflects a process where, as a general rule, strengths were retained and critical changes made. This has culminated in a reprogramming effort that separates ACT I (2005-2008) from ACT II (2008-2011).

The result has been a significant shift in emphasis: from some 120 disparate small projects to eight individual but interrelated theme areas (see figure 1); from many partners to a much smaller collection of interlocking civil society networks that could have the greatest impact; from a collection of similar but essentially parallel efforts in both communities to issue driven civil society networks working on common issues and participating together across the

community divide. The tightened definition of inter-communal collaboration to the point of programmatic jointness promises new challenges but also new and improved results, through a better defined set of outcomes, outputs and indicators.




Figure 1: ACT II Strategic Partnerships

In addition to addressing mid-term evaluation findings, ACT staff had revisited a number of early programme assumptions in arriving at ACT II, and found that:

- The aspirations of ACT I were too ambitious – the need now was to focus more and select more realistic targets.
- ACT’s impact would always be conditioned by the political environment which in many instances would be beyond the control of the programme.
- There was a need to redefine ACT’s role – to identify the programme interventions that could have the greatest impact before 2011.
- ACT needed to take more of a leading role in programme formulation - rather than passively solicit proposals it needed to work more directly with partners to foster focused inter-communal collaboration and impact.
- ACT needed to take calculated risks.

C. The Development of ACT II

In April of 2008, coinciding with political developments that would undergird a renewed process of negotiations around the Cyprus Problem, ACT initiated a process of review and planning with a view to transitioning ACT into a higher-impact programme. That process to strategically redesign the programme benefitted from the inputs of partners, academics and opinion leaders, and from the guidance of UN leaders and departments, including the SRSG, the UN Framework Team³, UNDP's Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, and USAID.

The re-design process established the goal of ACT II as **“Capacities of Cypriots to actively participate in a process of reconciliation strengthened.”** Three outcomes were identified to support the achievement of this goal, these being:

- Civil society strengthened to effectively support and contribute to the peace process;
- Opportunities for Cypriots to promote social and policy change on issues of common concern enhanced, and;
- Mechanisms to promote cooperation, common understanding and reconciliation fostered and demonstrated.

Recognising the need to greatly increase the focus of the programme, the review process eventually saw the identification of nine logical clusters within which the most relevant and impactful projects from ACT I could be focused and relevant new projects added. These consisted of:

1. ENGAGE - involving civil society directly in the peace process;
2. YOUTH ACTIVISM - providing youth with opportunities to encourage coexistence;
3. MULTI-PERSPECTIVITY and Intercultural Dialogue in Education – increasing local capacities to adopt multiple perspectives (balanced) approaches in education;
4. COMMON SPACES - increasing citizen participation in community development;

³ The Framework Team is a mechanism to promote collaboration between and provide support to UN agencies working to prevent conflict.

5. CULTURAL HERITAGE - encouraging people to people contact through cultural heritage activities;
6. COMMUNITY MEDIA - providing new approaches to establish a more diverse and pluralistic media landscape;
7. INTERDEPENDENCE - demonstrating the advantages of economic reunification;
8. CYPRUS 2015 – creating an enabling environment which allows the promotion of open and diverse public discussion on the solution of the Cyprus Problem, and;
9. DIVERSITY - advocating for social inclusion and combating racism in society.

In addition to the nine project areas identified above, ACT was requested by the leaderships to support the negotiations process through the provision of SUPPORT TO THE UN GOOD OFFICES.

UNDP pursued an analysis of its partners from ACT I with a view to identifying the best performers and collecting these, as a default approach, into networks that would eventually consider and jointly oversee the implementation of activities within project clusters. In a minority of cases, such as Cyprus 2015, networks were less conducive to the activities and so specific NGO's were engaged.

Through facilitated processes, these networks and groups were guided by ACT in workshops designed to assess the changed context and to design impactful responses to the new context, while building on the strengths of ACT I. These workshops laid an effective platform for consensus amongst stakeholders, validation of the new directions and prioritization of activities, as well as the identification of implementation modalities that would be used. Specifically, networks and groups were or are in the process of being proactively focused by ACT to develop proposals around the new project areas.

Finally, ACT recognized the usefulness of dedicating attention to aspects common across projects and also at the central level. To this end, resources have been assigned to address MONITORING AND EVALUATION, and COMMUNICATIONS.

Thus, there are twelve discrete areas of activities envisaged under ACT II – one-tenth of the activities pursued under ACT I. Of these twelve, two are cross-cutting and operational in nature: monitoring and evaluation, and communications. These activities are organized in such a way as to be administered directly by three Programme Analysts (four activities each), with support from three Programme Associates.

4. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Applied Principles and Models

The purpose of this section is to assess the approaches and models used by ACT, whether deliberately or accidentally, from the perspective of global learning and good practice. In so doing it is hoped that the relative strengths of ACT, and opportunities for its strengthening, will be more obvious.

The practice of evaluating peace programmes such as ACT is relatively underdeveloped and struggles to quantify that which some practitioners argue is fundamentally qualitative. To further complicate matters, the typical conflict prevention programme is concerned with violent conflict that has either recently ceased or is still ongoing, and in a context of widespread human suffering and poverty. Cyprus defies these norms by demonstrating a globally respectable level of human development, with notable reductions in the TCC, and a conflict that is frozen.

ACT II and its accompanying processes are consistent with at least three schools of thought on what constitutes good practice: the Paris Declaration Principles on Aid Effectiveness, the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC).

ACT II and its accompanying processes are consistent with at least three schools of thought on what constitutes good practice

The Paris Principles⁴

The **Paris Declaration** principles are arguably among the critical principles being adopted by developmentalists around the world today, with signatories including the UN Development Group (to which UNDP belongs), and the Governments of Cyprus and the United States. While much remains to be done to achieve the targets agreed, the recent High level Forum in Accra committed to several steps that would speed the process of increased aid effectiveness. Critically, the role of civil society in achieving increased effectiveness as a development partner

⁴ The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness contains twelve Indicators of Progress. The agreed targets can be accessed [*here*](#). The central principles of the Declaration are national ownership, alignment with national priorities and systems, donor harmonization, managing for results, and accountability.

in its own right has been recognized and the strengthening of capacity in that sector is increasingly being pursued. Civil society's ability to perform a developmental function also broadens the definition of national ownership within a democratic construct.

Building civil society capacity is the main plank within ACT and, taken together with the role of the two Programme Steering Committees, enhances *national ownership*. In particular, the views of civil society have informed and are informing the planning of ACT II to a considerable degree.

In the context of Cyprus' key developmental challenge – reconciliation – ACT is in line with *national priorities* as confirmed by the engagement of the Cypriot government in the negotiations currently underway. The use of national systems features within specific projects, where the extent of involvement depends on the activity being pursued.

Donor harmonization is being pursued in a context where the international development community is relatively small and where most assistance is geared towards a resolution of the Cyprus Problem, and particularly to building capacity (e.g. the economy and civil society) in anticipation of an eventual agreement. This small community shares information regularly and coordinates its efforts at a substantive level. The simplification and harmonization of procedures remains a challenge.

ACT II demonstrates considerable improvement over ACTI in the pursuit of *results for development*. While ongoing, as some projects are still being developed at this time, the indicator sets and baselines are markedly more measureable and consistent with the impact being pursued.

Finally, ACT II has committed to an elevated level of *accountability* that will be made real through enhanced contact with partners, including the two PSCs, and a more sophisticated communications strategy that will see, for example, greater pro-activity and reach in the divulgence of programme information.

Reflecting On Peace Practice⁵ (RPP)

“From 1999 through early 2003, RPP engaged over two hundred agencies and many individuals who work on conflict around the world in a collaborative effort to learn how to improve the effectiveness of peace practice. The agencies included international peace and conflict resolution NGOs as well as local organizations and groups working for peace in their countries. By analyzing these experiences through 26 case studies and consultations with over 1000 practitioners, RPP was able to clarify why some things work, and others do not. The lessons comprise a set of tools and concepts that are most useful for conceptualization and planning of peace interventions at all levels.”⁶

The specific tool relevant to ACT relates to the question of *whom* should be involved and the *level of change* that is desired in implementing a peacebuilding programme. The RPP theory is that changes at the personal and/or socio-political levels have differing degrees of relevance, depending on the specifics of the conflict. A programme can seek to pursue significant change by focusing on either larger numbers of persons or key people, or both, as illustrated in figure 2 below.




Figure 2: RPP Programme Analysis Tool

Wherever an organization's particular project is located on this matrix (in terms of work targets and levels), it needs to plan mechanisms for transferring project effects. Who else needs to be affected, at what level, in order to produce significant change?

RPP Resource Materials, p10

⁵ The Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP) is an experience-based learning process that involves agencies whose programmes attempt to prevent or mitigate violent conflict. Its purpose is to analyze experience at the individual program level to address the question: "How can international agencies engaged in peace practice make their work in peacebuilding more effective?" More details may be viewed at www.cdainc.com.

⁶ *Reflecting on Peace Practice: Resource Materials*, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2008.

Specific to ACT, some generalizations have been made to locate ACT I within the upper two quadrants, beginning most obviously within the upper left quadrant but moving, over time, towards the two adjoining quadrants. The three articulated focus areas of ACT II (see page 10) locate the programme in all four quadrants, with an increased presence in the lower two quadrants on the basis of investments in the upper quadrants. The movement and expansion of ACT within the matrix, together with the reinforcing effect of other programmes of support, strongly suggests that the likelihood of meaningful impact has increased.

OECD-DAC⁷

The Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) has assembled a working document intended to assist in evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. Drawing on donor commitments in the areas of evaluation and peacebuilding, including the Paris Declaration and other OECD guidelines, the DAC identified 8 key lessons (see Annex 5). These establish the importance of improving conflict analysis, strategic frameworks, programme design, and evaluation methodologies, and finding mechanisms for engagement that are not based on the provision of aid alone but upon the translation of analysis and planning into coherent and harmonised action.

In the case of ACT, and regarding the transition between ACT I and II, the DAC guidelines resonate with the processes employed. The Guidelines are particularly relevant for Cyprus, given that the conflict is frozen and that Cyprus is quite prosperous. The appeal of EU benefits may provide sufficient incentive for serious attention to resolving the Cyprus Problem, and so strengthen the strategic framework within which programmes like ACT seek to make an impact.

On ACT itself, the wealth of analysis, evaluations and data-based surveys over the life of ACT I suggests that the exhortation to utilize greater sophistication has been heeded. That ACT II has seen increases in focus and quality of measureable indicators will improve the means for evaluating the programme in the future.

⁷ *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, OECD-DAC, 2007. May be accessed at http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf

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B. Theory of Change

Based on the foregoing, and consistent with the project documentation reviewed, ACT has refined its Theory of Change to address the civil society outcome as follows:

The goal of the programme is to **build Cypriot capacity** to actively participate in a process of reconciliation. The strategic capacity needed for this goal to be achieved lies within **civil society**, who, under ACT II, will **learn by doing**. The content of that doing will lead and be supported by **good process**, which includes inter-communal collaboration, **capacity building**, **transparency**, **dialogue** and **ownership**.




Figure 3: ACT II Theory of Change

ACT Mid-Programme Outcome Evaluation

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C. Assessment of ACT

- i. Whereas ACT I succeeded in identifying CSOs and in some instances strengthening their ability to promote their individual policy objectives, ACT II focuses civil society on the settlement and reconciliation processes in a coordinated and interrelated fashion. The programme has moved considerably upstream, partly in response to the changed political context but mainly as a result of an increased focus on results. ACT is currently poised to be much more strategic and impactful than ever.
- ii. ACT has followed a model transition process between Phase I and II, as demonstrated by inclusiveness, transparency and the extent to which recommendations made in the 2007 evaluation have been incorporated. Impressively, the processes used and the eventual content and partnerships contained in ACT II reflect international good practices and are validated by credible models and principles, including focus and local ownership.
- iii. ACT is considered by partners as occupying a highly relevant and crucial niche, in the context of the Cyprus Problem and the search for its solution, as manifested by the renewed negotiation process.
- iv. The reputation of the programme for high quality work and respectful processes was highlighted by civil society and International Development Partners (IDPs). The quality and dedication of staff are the foundation from which best practice processes for project design and implementation have flowed.
- v. It must be noted that Cyprus has not experienced inter-communal violence for decades and is not considered significantly at risk of such violence. Further, ACT is far and away UNDP's most resourced peacebuilding programme globally, possessing significant levels of financial, human and time resources. These form important backdrops to the ACT experience and may limit the replication of lessons learned. However, especially given the absence of violence in Cyprus, they do suggest that UNDP's global peacebuilding effort is considerably under-resourced.

It is the considered view of the evaluators that the process of arriving at ACT II, and ACT II itself, reflect cutting edge practices that are worthy of further examination, analysis, articulation and sharing.

- vi. Notwithstanding the highly positive assessment of the programme by interlocutors, there is still the not insignificant challenge of operating in a conflicted society, with the accompanying social, cultural and official hurdles. Officials in both the TCC and the GCC demonstrated those challenges well during the evaluation meetings by highlighting grievances with each other and with the programme generally, and civil society in particular. The following recommendations highlight the level of effort that will be needed to create impact within key players (right quadrants, figure 2, pg. 18), such as those in authority, and to reduce the encroachment of suspicion, animosity, narrow agendas and manipulation into these important relationships since these will compromise the goal ACT seeks.
- vii. Finally, it is the considered view of the evaluators that the process of arriving at ACT II, and ACT II itself, reflect cutting edge practices that are worthy of further examination, analysis, articulation and sharing.

D. Recommendations

This mid-programme evaluation presents recommendations that stand out as opportunities for ACT, particularly in the immediate- to short-term and then in the medium-term. Most of them were presented to and discussed as preliminary findings with ACT and USAID personnel in Cyprus on May 11.

These recommendations are presented with considerable modesty, given the obvious ability of ACT staff to not only identify opportunities themselves but to also exercise mature judgment on the associated costs, benefits and risks. Nonetheless, opportunities undoubtedly exist and we urge their consideration as a means towards enhancing impact. We anticipate that the same wholesome approaches used in the development of ACT II will also permeate the implementation of recommendations, to good effect.

There is considerable uncertainty about how the negotiations will play themselves out and what critical needs might remain unmet at the time of the anticipated closure of ACT II in 2011. It is not possible to plausibly offer recommendations that reach so far into the future. However, there are a number of items ACT can consider pursuing over the next three years that address longer-term scenarios. These are presented as medium-term recommendations.

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

April-May, 2009.

SHORT TERM (<1 YEAR)

- i. **Update Communications:** In our meetings we were struck by the limited awareness regarding the important changes that had or were in the process of being made within ACT. As a first order of business, ACT staffers are urged to reach out to partners and other constituents of the programme to inform them of the changes that have occurred, particularly in terms of focus, inter-communal collaboration and the time horizon. An operational updating for partners will also be useful.
- ii. **Review Project Names:** The idea to boil project names down to short, snappy titles is a good one for many reasons, including “results marketing.” However, on a few occasions we noted that project names either did not entirely communicate the underlying thrust of the project (e.g. common spaces) or might potentially distract from the task at hand.
- iii. **Review Project RRFs:** While we were mostly impressed with the Results and Resources Frameworks for the projects, particularly the indicators, baselines and their measureability, we were not so convinced in a couple of cases, such as Cyprus 2015 (the outcome indicators are not necessarily symptomatic of the outcome, baselines not indicated) and Community Media (baselines not indicated). We recommend a thorough review of the RRF’s and adjustments that would emphasise both output and outcome indicators.⁸
- iv. **Establish an informal advisory group:** We met several ACT partners who are capable of contributing more than project implementation to the goal of the programme. These partners have a vision of a reconciled Cyprus, commitment, passion and a keen sense of how to get things done in Cyprus. We recommend that these “reconciliation champions” be brought together into an informal ACT advisory group that could advise on both broader strategic issues (e.g. new initiatives and political analysis) as well as tactical considerations (e.g. managing officialdom and operational problem solving).

⁸ These may already be occurring since, as in the case of Youth Activism, RRF strengthening had already occurred between our receiving the project document and our meeting the implementers of the project.

- v. **Establish a Partners Forum:** To increase synergies and impact, it is proposed that a mechanism be established where programme partners are routinely engaged. This mechanism should also permit the easy dissemination of information (e.g. a newsletter or an e-mail distribution list) and provide opportunities for collaborative working relations across projects (e.g. discussion groups, joint activities).
- vi. **Adjust Management and Project Architecture:** The preceding recommendations, if implemented, would be assisted by a graphical adjustment of the ACT management and project architecture. These could lead the process of implementing the Advisory Committee and the Partners Forum. The following two graphics are illustrative of what the adjusted architecture might look like.



- vii. **Establish a Civil Society Agenda on Reconciliation:** As it currently stands, ACT has increased its focus considerably by reducing the number of projects and concentrating partners into networks. At the same time, however, there is no broader or formal civil society agenda viz. the negotiations: the linkages between civil society groups are all through the ACT programme (as per figures 3 and 4 above), which represents a threat to sustainability. ACT might consider engaging the Advisory Committee, if formed, on the best way of going about the establishment of this agenda.

While some have complained that civil society has no explicit role in the negotiations, the authorities agree that civil society has a role to play in reconciliation. Enough is publicly known about the issues being grappled with in the talks (e.g. land ownership, economic integration), as well as the confidence-building measures already agreed, for civil society to develop an agenda without a formal invitation to do so.

An additional opportunity, if this recommendation is pursued, will be to engage those members of civil society not currently part of ACT, including mass-based organizations, women's groups and members of the diaspora.

The success of ACT II will be driven mainly by the leaders of partner organizations... As with vital assets anywhere, these leaders must be protected and preserved.

- viii. **Strengthen Leaders:** The success of ACT II will be driven mainly by the leaders of partner organisations, such as have been described earlier in recommendation iv. As with vital assets anywhere, these leaders must be protected and preserved, particularly so that they can withstand operational, social and political pressures.

ACT could usefully consider ways of engaging leaders with a view to developing and sustaining their capacities. The Advisory Committee would be an obvious double-benefit mechanism for both receiving from and giving to the leaders. Thought could also be given to dedicated peer sessions, perhaps on the side of Partner Forums or on an ad hoc basis, as well as formal leadership strengthening workshops – such as might be possible in collaboration with the EU leadership support activity through the Council of Europe.

- ix. **Support ACT Team:** A similar case can be made for ACT staff as for civil society leaders. The Team is a vital asset from whom steady outputs are required for the success of the programme. Mechanisms for dealing with the stresses arising from operational, social and political pressures, particularly for local staff, have been used in the past and should be maintained, even deepened, going forward. Social activities, empathetic management, professional development, and group retreats all require resources, particularly time, but the benefits are likely worth it.

Also, given the demonstrated expertise of ACT staff, consideration could be given to sharing staff and their experiences with other UNDP peace programmes through exchanges and temporary assignments, to mutual benefit.

MEDIUM TERM (1-3 YEARS)

- x. **Extract and Share Good Practices:** The cutting-edge nature of ACT II and its transition processes from ACT I will aid other peacebuilders around the world. The efforts to distill and capture the lessons from Cyprus should be deepened as soon as the initial flurry of ACT II activities are well underway and space for introspection is available.

The point was made, and it is taken, that the lesson-learning process ought to simultaneously contribute to the strengthening of practice in Cyprus. To this end, consideration could be given to using mechanisms such as the Partners Forum to review experiences and codify some of the learning, using techniques that are as much “celebratory” as they are “extractive.” Feeding knowledge products back to Cypriots will also strengthen future local practice in the same way, perhaps even moreso, as it would an overseas audience.

Another potentially rich vein of learning to mine relates to Cyprus’ categorization as a Small Island State.⁹ While Cyprus has graduated from the Small Island Developing State (SIDS) category, where 28% of developing countries are located, there may be lessons from a conflict perspective that Cyprus could share – or benefit from. The literature suggests that conflicts in small islands, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Grenada), tend not to escalate into full-blown violence but

⁹ Cyprus is a member of the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), a coalition of small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment. For more information see www.sidsnet.org/aosis/.

demonstrate volcanic features – simmering or lying latent for extended periods with only the occasional eruption (e.g. Guyana, Maldives).¹⁰ These countries are highly vulnerable to external shocks, particularly economic and environmental, with consequential increases in the levels of conflict.¹¹ At the same time, economic development tends to reduce the potency of social conflict (Trinidad and Tobago, Cyprus) and provide the space through which to address root causes – although the urgency of the task also diminishes as economies grow, unless that growth is noticeably uneven.

Further research and document reviews could pursue the features of leadership, the determinants of social change, and reducing group insecurities in small societies. This learning would contribute to the resolution of longer-term, more systemic challenges to peace in Cyprus and other Small Island States, and maybe even beyond.

- xi. **Reach Across the Aisle:** A fundamental question arising in peacebuilding programmes is what to do with those who are opposed to the objectives of the programme. To this end, the RPP tool (figure 2, pg. 18) is instructive: at a practical level *sufficient support* is required for positive changes to the status quo. Identifying the source of that support is an inexact science at best, however. What is more readily calculated is that all peaceful viewpoints have legitimacy in a democracy and, particularly if the negotiations result in reconciliation, Cyprus will need to strengthen its capacity to reconcile differences in opinion. Dialogue and engagement represent important tools with which to address such differences.

ACT II is already designed to promote dialogue and engagement but will be challenged in attracting detractors to the ACT purpose. For one, those who are uncomfortable with ACT in one way or another will probably resist being engaged. For another, there may be resistance from ACT partners themselves. Strategies for averting these challenges can be developed using programme processes, such as the Advisory Committee and the Partners Forum. They may include the targeting of key persons and constituents, the development of special communication strategies, the crafting of a guidance note on “engaging across the aisle”, and the inclusion of

¹⁰ *The Development Process in Small Island States*, edited by Douglas Lockhart, D. W. Drakakis-Smith, John Schembri, 1993.

¹¹ *Assessing Small Island Developing State Fragility*, David Carment, Stewart Prest, Yiagadeesen Samy, 2006.

others in the activities already underway (such as research dissemination and discussions, youth activities, and cultural heritage).

- xii. **Explore UNDP's Future Role:** Numerous constituents expressed concern at the thought of ACT ceasing operations in 2011, in the context of the reconciliation work that will remain regardless of the outcome of the current negotiations.

Scenario planning is already part of the UN's modus operandi. UNDP is included in that process to some extent but has the additional consideration of the peace and development functions. The arrival of a Peace and Development Advisor (PDA) will be a welcome addition to the UN team as a whole, and hopefully his/her arrival will be prompt, given the rapidly evolving negotiations process. This PDA could take the lead in assessing scenarios and propose for discussion with ACT and UNDP HQ the implications for UNDP's work and presence in Cyprus.

It is recommended that UNDP engage local and international partners to examine options regarding UNDP's future presence, role, and exit strategies in Cyprus. Such strategies could also benefit from the inputs of partners at some stage, particularly the ACT Advisory Committee and the international partners. Here, a focus on ensuring the continuation of critical peacebuilding work will be uppermost.

-END-

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Annex 1 – Evaluation Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE

International Consultant for Mid-Programme Evaluation

Outcome to be evaluated: “Civil society strengthened to effectively support and contribute to the peace process”

A. Background

On 1 October 2005 UNDP launched its peace building initiative in Cyprus, Action for Cooperation and Trust (ACT). The project has a 6 year duration (October 2005 – September 2011) and a total budget of US \$41.8 million, principally funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Initially the ACT programme had a 3-year life-span, and a mid-term evaluation was conducted in March 2007. The ACT programme was extended for a further 3 years, from October 2008. For ease of reference the period 2005-2008, is called ACT I and the period 2008-2011 is called ACT II. The overall outcome statement of ACT I was defined as **“A strengthened culture of cooperation and trust amongst all sectors of Cypriot society”**. The full results framework for ACT I is detailed below. Following this evaluation and a lengthy re-design process the overall outcome statement for ACT II was re-defined as: **“Capacities of Cypriots to actively participate in a process of reconciliation strengthened”**. The results framework for ACT II is also detailed below.

UNDP and USAID have decided that a Mid-Programme Evaluation is required to learn the lessons of the first 3 years of programme activities, in order to inform and feed into the implementation of ACT II. The overriding objective of the evaluation is to take stock of process and results at the transition point between the first and second phase of ACT in order to achieve maximum impact at the end of the full six-year cycle. The mid-term evaluation of ACT I in 2007 provided clearly outlined the major areas for improvement and articulated the causality between obstacles to progress, which were outside of ACT's control, and programmatic shortcomings. Almost two years later a number of these issues have been addressed by ACT or are no longer relevant to ACT's operating environment. Most notable a more conducive political environment has been created by the start of full-fledged peace talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Leaders and the ACT programme has been transformed into a more coherent programme focussed on building the Capacities of Cypriots to actively participate in a process of reconciliation. A more precise rationale for change has been articulated, which seeks to prepare Cypriot “transition stakeholders” in civil society for a settlement and post-settlement phase. Thus against this background the principle entry point for the 2009 Programme evaluation will be to assess lessons learned and ACT's future course through the lens of the programme objective (corporate UNDP outcome):

“Civil society strengthened to effectively support and contribute to the peace process”

The purpose of conducting the evaluation through this programmatic window will be to gain a substantive perspective of a major slice of the ACT programme, which when assessed against past results, current realities and future objectives will be able to provide a roadmap for the next 3 years of programme activities.

B. . Objectives and scope of the mid-programme evaluation

UNDP-ACT's mid-programme evaluation of 2009 has 3 main objectives:

Objective I

To assess lessons learned from the first phase of ACT (2005-2008) and provide relevant analysis on the difference ACT I made in the context of “**strengthening civil society to effectively support and contribute to the peace process**”

Objective II

To assess the direction and rationale for the second phase of ACT and ascertain if, given the current climate in Cyprus, it has the potential to make a real contribution to the larger macro objective of supporting a settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

Objective III

Based on the evaluation findings and internal evidence of the evaluation process, to provide a preliminary framework for UNDP-ACT's mode of operation in the event that a peace settlement is reached within the next 3 years.

In the context of the above objectives the purpose of this evaluation is to assess the achievements and “global” impact of ACT I, in order to capture the lessons of the first phase of the programme. The evaluation will consider the scope, relevance, efficiency, and sustainability of UNDP's support. Based on this assessment, the evaluation will review the scope and proposed direction of ACT II, and make recommendations on how UNDP could improve the prospects of achieving maximum impact in respect of strengthening capacities of Cypriots to actively participate in a process of reconciliation_during the period 2008-2011 through the potential adjustment of its programming, partnership arrangements, resource mobilization strategies, working methods or management structures.

The evaluation will assess the operational aspects of the ACT project and explore whether these are appropriate under the circumstances. It is critical that the evaluation makes both the substantive and operational linkage between the quality of the output level deliverables and the progress made towards achieving the outcome. i.e. to what extent did the outputs under ACT I facilitate the achievement of the ACT I outcome, and what can be learned to maximize the delivery of projects under ACT II.

In this vein the mid-term evaluation is based upon a set of very clear goals:

- Assess organizational and operational effectiveness of the project in terms of its contribution to the peace building process in Cyprus and in accordance to the project's own objectives
- Provide a platform for evidence-based decision-making
- Build knowledge, learning and ownership amongst all stakeholders

Principally these goals should be pursued through the prism of the following criteria

- **Relevance:** whether the activities in ACT I and ACT II were/are in line with local needs and priorities (as well as with donor policies);
- **Efficiency:** to what degree the outputs achieved under ACT I derive from efficient use of financial, human and material resources;

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- *Effectiveness:* the extent to which objectives of ACT I have been achieved;
- *Impact:* an assessment of the positive and negative effects of ACT-supported projects to date;
- *Sustainability:* assessing whether the right kind of approach was taken to provide the highest chance of long-term impact and durability of interventions.

In addressing the above objectives the following questions will, at a minimum, need to be addressed:

- Was the stated outcome under ACT I, indicator and targets appropriate for the situation in Cyprus and UNDP's programme of assistance in this field?
- To what extent were the recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation (2007) incorporated into the second half of the ACT I programme, and with what affect?
- To what extent was the overall outcome under ACT I achieved?
- What were the main factors (positive and negative) within and beyond UNDP's interventions that affected the achievement of the outcome? How did these factors limit or facilitate progress towards the ACT I outcome?
- Was UNDP's proposed contributions to the achievement of the outcome appropriate, sufficient, effective and sustainable?
- What can be learned from the experience of ACT I for achieving the outcome of ACT II with the indicated inputs and within the indicated timeframe?
- Assess the appropriateness of the transition from ACT I to ACT II and if the course direction set for 2008-2011 is adequately aligned with the country-specific and programme specific needs.
- Does the design of the Results Framework for ACT II (i.e. outcome statement, indicators, areas of focus, targets and milestones) allow for appropriate monitoring of results and provide the basis for efficient programme management?
- How can UNDP corporate priorities such as gender mainstreaming or MDGs be incorporated into ACT's monitoring work.
- To what extent do the selected initiatives, under ACT II, provide the maximum opportunity for the programme to achieve its goals and substantively support the process for achieving a settlement to the Cyprus Problem?
- Highlight the potential obstacles and risks to the achievement of the ACT II outcome and the key objectives under each initiative, and indicate a frame for a mitigation strategy to obviate the impact of such obstructions.
- Assess the relationship between the ACT programme and the wider UN support to resolving the Cyprus Problem, and indicate how this relationship could be improved to maximize the UN's and international community's overall support.
- Assess the need for ACT to change direction and realign priorities (including new project formulation) in the event of a peace settlement.
- Indicate what type of additional human and financial resources (if any) would be required to implement such changes and the degree to which ACT's current organizational structure would need modifying.
- In view of the above points, what type of contingency planning does ACT need to undertake to prepare itself for a change in operational and programmatic posture in the event of a final peace settlement?

Resources, partnerships, and management analysis

- Is UNDP's partnership strategy in this field appropriate and likely to be effective in achieving the outputs and ultimately the outcome?
- Are the resources available adequate for achieving these objectives?
- Are UNDP's management structures and working methods appropriate and likely to be effective in achieving the objectives?
- Overall, assess the scope, relevance, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP's partnership and management arrangements in achieving its objectives.

Recommendations

- Based on the above analysis, how should UNDP adjust its programming, partnership arrangements, resource mobilization strategies, working methods and/or management structures to ensure that the objectives are fully achieved by the end of the programme period (30 September 2011).

The results of the evaluation will be used in the following manner:

A. To learn lessons from 3 years of programming to ensure the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and contribution of project activities towards the outcome of Phase II

To confirm whether the results framework is appropriate to the objectives of the ACT project, and to provide recommendations on how to improve the quality of programme delivery at the output level towards the greatest possible impact at the outcome level.

B. To advise on priority setting for the next 3 years

The results must be used to set priorities for future programming and provide recommendations for possible future projects which can help accelerate progress towards best impact.

C. To help generate open dialogue between ACT, the "authorities" and the communities on building co-operation and trust on the island.

The results should be shared with the respective PSCs and used as an entry point to engage them on the peace building process on the island. This would also be utilised as a tool for strategising on how the ACT programme can support priorities set out by the two communities in the process of harmonization with EU norms and practices.

C. Methodology

The evaluation will follow three distinct phases: preparation (review of Terms of Reference with UNDP, preliminary desk review and theme-specific desk research); conduct of the evaluation by the evaluation team (anticipated two-week mission) and follow-up (dissemination of evaluation results, corporate discussions, Programme Management response, stakeholder consultation and learning activities).

Preparation

This process should begin by informing the two PSCs about ACT's intention to run an evaluation process. Evaluators will conduct a comprehensive desk review of relevant documents originating from the ACT project. UNDP will establish a web-based repository which will be accessible only by the evaluation team. During this period the ACT team will design a meetings schedule for the evaluation team in preparation for the on-island mission and also inform all relevant stakeholders of the evaluation.

Conduct of the evaluation by the evaluation team

The evaluation team will visit Cyprus for a two week period. Prior to the on-island mission the team will receive a briefing on the situation from senior UNDP officials and advisors who have been connected to the ACT project and previously the Bi-Communal Development Programme. ACT will designate a focal point who will manage all aspects of the evaluation process on-island, providing logistical and administrative support. The evaluation team will meet with representatives of the leadership of the two communities, Programme Steering Committee members, the UN Special Envoy for Cyprus, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and other officials of the UN Good Offices Mission and the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the US Ambassador and officials of other foreign missions in Cyprus, officials of USAID, representatives of civil society, academia and the media and of partner organisations. For purposes of political sensitivity, ACT Management will exercise a degree of discretion over this schedule of meetings.

Follow-up and Learning

The results of the evaluation are expected to provide ACT with the lessons learned from the first phase of the project (2005-2008) and guidance and recommendations for the implementation of Phase II (2008-2011). This guidance will need to be focussed on making progress towards the intended outcome. A "summary version" of the evaluation report will be shared with the two Programme Steering Committees. In addition the key findings of the report will be discussed in forums which will convene civil society stakeholders. The full report will be shared with the donor, RBEC and BCPR, with further consultations with UNDP as required. The mid-programme evaluation report results will be used substantively to inform and guide the 4th Annual Review meeting in July 2009 between UNDP and USAID.

D. PRODUCTS EXPECTED FROM THE EVALUATION

1. An inception Report

- Based on the desk review a 4-5 page report capturing the essence of the consultant's approach to the assignment, outlining initial assumptions and anticipated evaluation direction)

2. The key product expected from this evaluation is a comprehensive analytical report that includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the following components:

- Executive summary
- Introduction
- Description of the evaluation methodology

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- Analysis of the situation with regard to outcome, outputs, resources, partnerships, management and working methods and/or implementation strategy
- Assessment and analysis of the efficacy of operational procedures
- Key findings
- Conclusions and recommendations for the future program implementation
- Annexes including
 - Itinerary
 - List of persons interviewed
 - Summary of field visits
 - List of documents reviewed
 - Questionnaire (if any) used and summary of results
 - Any other relevant material that supports evaluation findings and recommendations

3. A Summary Report

- An enhanced version of the Executive Summary which will provide key messages regarding the findings of the evaluation that is appropriate for public consumption and access.

E. Reporting

At the end of the mission period, the draft Evaluation Report will be shared with UNDP ACT and USAID. A preliminary outline of main findings should be shared with UNDP senior management at the start of the second week of the field mission. The final Evaluation Report and any other associated documents should be submitted to the Programme Manager within two weeks after the completion of the evaluation mission.

F. Profile of Evaluation Team Leader

The evaluation team will consist of two international consultants, one of which will be selected by UNDP and the other by USAID.

The UNDP-selected consultant will have overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of the evaluation report to UNDP.

Specifically, he/she will perform the following tasks:

- Lead and manage the evaluation mission;
- Design the detailed evaluation scope and methodology and approach;
- Ensure efficient division of tasks between the mission members;
- Conduct the mid-programme evaluation in accordance with the proposed objective and scope of the evaluation;
- Draft and communicate the evaluation report;
- Finalize the evaluation report and summary report in English and submit it to UNDP.

Skills and qualifications:

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- An advanced degree in law, political science, human rights or other relevant fields;
- At least 15 years experience of working in peacebuilding, including 7-10 years minimum practical experience of conducting and leading evaluations of peacebuilding and reconciliation projects and programmes
- Extensive knowledge of result-based management evaluation, UNDP policies, procedures, as well as participatory monitoring and evaluation methodologies and approaches ;
- Demonstrable experience of working within politically sensitive environments, exhibiting a high level of diplomatic discretion when dealing with national authorities
- Experience in applying SMART Indicators and reconstructing or validating baseline scenarios;
- Knowledge of political, economic and social developments trends in Cyprus an asset
- Extensive experience in working with donors;
- Demonstrable analytical skills and strong drafting skills
- Excellent interviewing, public speaking at high levels;
- Teamwork capacity to work with the target group representatives
- Fluency in spoken and written English

G. Evaluation schedule

Activity	Timeframe	Place	Responsible Party	Payment schedule
Desk review	20-22 April 2009 (3 Days)	Home-based On-line (documents will be made available online from 16 April 2009)	All team members	N/A
Evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan – Production and communication to UNDP of Inception Report	23-24 April 2009 (2 days)	Home-based, with remote consultation with UNDP	UNDP ACT Evaluation Focal Point (EFP) and International Consultant (UNDP)	N/A
On-island Mission Field visits, interviews, consultations	26 April – 10 May (inclusive) (15 Days)	Cyprus (visits in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities)	All team members and EFP	Reimburse Air Ticket and DSA
Presentation of preliminary findings and Draft Recommendations to senior management of UNDP and USAID	8 May	Cyprus, Nicosia	All Team members	40% of fee
Finalization of First draft of full evaluation report and draft Summary Report	By 18 May (5 Days allocated)	Home-based and if required remote consultation	International Consultant (UNDP)	N/A
Finalization of second draft of Full Report and Summary Report, following feedback from UNDP	No later than 1 June (2 days allocated)	Home-based and if required remote consultation	International Consultant (UNDP)	60% of fee

UNDP-selected consultant – total 27 days

USAID-selected consultant – 18 days

H. Terms and Conditions

UNDP Action for Cooperation and Trust agrees to provide the following logistics to the consultant for the duration of the assignment in Cyprus:

- A vehicle and driver to take the consultant to appointments and to provide transport to and from Larnaca Airport.
- Office space and Internet connectivity
- Printer and stationery
- Part-time administrative assistance of one local staff member

APPLICATIONS:

- Interested parties should provide their CV and covering letter. Please note that candidates short listed for interview will be required to submit a financial quotation consisting of a daily fee rate and the estimated costs of air economy travel to Larnaca, Cyprus. The daily fee must take into consideration any expenses of the consultant for the duration of the TORs, excluding travel and DSA for the mission to Cyprus.

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Annex 2 – Brief Bios of Evaluation Team Members

Lawrence Lachmansingh (lawrencelachmansingh@gmail.com) is a Development Consultant in the areas of governance and conflict prevention, with particular expertise in conflict management, elections and civil society. Between 2003 and 2006 he managed UNDP's conflict management programme in Guyana. He has worked with CIDA, NDI, The Carter Center and UNDP over the past 14 years in 30 conflicted countries that include Cambodia, Guyana, Indonesia, Lebanon, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Mr. Lachmansingh is a peace and democracy activist in his native Guyana. He has a MBA degree from Dalhousie University (Canada) and a B.A. in Theology from the University of the West Indies (Jamaica).

Charles Weden (fweden2002@yahoo.com) is a Senior Field Advisor with USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). For the past 7 years he has advised on OTI's conflict programs in Iraq, Haiti, Sudan, West Bank/Gaza, Lebanon, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Prior to this Mr. Weden had a 30 plus career with USAID as a Foreign Service Officer serving in posts in South East and North East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. Among other assignments Mr. Weden was USAID Mission Director in Indonesia, Yemen and Tunisia and Deputy Director In Egypt. He also served in Washington as the principal officer for the then Near East Bureau and Asia in USAID's Asia Near East Bureau. Mr. Weden was a member of the three person team that evaluated the ACT program in 2007.

ACT Mid-Programme Outcome Evaluation

Civil society strengthened to effectively support and contribute to the peace process.

April-May, 2009.

Annex 3 – Meeting Schedule

Mid-Term Evaluation for UNDP - ACT

AGENDA & SCHEDULE

27 April – 11 MAY 2009

last updated: 11/05/09

***To be confirmed**

Wednesday, 29 April 2009 – Strategic Overview & Initiative meetings			
Time	Event/Meeting	Location	Address/Comments
8:30	PICK –UP FROM THE HOTEL	Holiday Inn, Nicosia	
09:00 – 10:00	JACO CILLIERS, PROGRAMME MANAGER, UNDP-ACT	UNPA Jaco's Office	UNDP-ACT Offices, UNPA, Nicosia
10:00 – 11:30	Kim Foukaris, Senior Programme Adviser, USAID	UNPA Jaco's Office	UNDP-ACT Offices, UNPA, Nicosia
12:30 – 13:00	LUNCH		
14:00 – 15:00	INITIATIVE PRESENTATION –ENGAGE, HISTORY & YOUTH, STAVROULA GEORGIADOU, PROGRAMME ANALYST	UNPA 'C' Conference Room	UNDP-ACT Offices, UNPA, Nicosia
15:15 – 16:30	INITIATIVE PRESENTATION, INTERDEPENDENCE, NICOLAS JARRAUD, PROGRAMME ANALYST	UNPA 'C' Conference Room	UNDP-ACT Offices, UNPA, Nicosia
17:15 -18:00	Board Member and Members: Mr. Selcan Akyel The Cyprus Turkish Civil Engineers Chamber KTMMOB-IMO	The Cyprus Turkish Civil Engineers Chamber KTMMOB- IMO, Nicosia (north)	Ask Pembe or Pelin for directions
Thursday, 30 April – more Initiative meetings if needed / Consultations			

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8:30	PICK –UP FROM THE HOTEL	Holiday Inn, Nicosia	
9:30-10:30	MS. LEDA KOURSOMBA, VICE PRESIDENT, CYPRUS RED CROSS & MR. NINOS SAVVIDES, DIRECTOR, PLANNING BUREAU	Cyprus Red Cross office	
10:45 – 11:30	INITIATIVE PRESENTATION, INTERPEACE – CULTURAL HERITAGE- CYPRUS COMMUNITY MEDIA CENTRE, PEMBE MENTESH, PROGRAMME ANALYST	UNPA 'C' Conference Room	UNDP-ACT Offices, UNPA, Nicosia
LUNCH			
13:00- 14:00	MEETING WITH MR. JOSE DIAZ, UNFICYP SPOKESPERSON	UNFICYP Spokesperson's office	Postponed till later
15:00 – 16:00	Meeting with US Ambassador, H.E. Mr. Frank C. Urbancic, Jr , Mr. Jonathan Cohen, DCM & USAID Representative, Mr. Alan Davis	US Embassy	Allow at least 15min to be there before for the security check.
Friday, 1 May '09 – Consultations GCC –**PUBLIC HOLIDAY**			
11:00	Mr. Bambos Pericleous, Kontea	Limassol	At Mr. Pericleous' home Tel: 99674444
Monday, 4 May '09 – Consultations GCC DAY			
8:30	PICK –UP FROM THE HOTEL	Holiday Inn, Nicosia	
9:00 – 10:00	Dr. Pavlos Flourentzos, Director and Ms. Marina Solomidou-Ieronymidou, Department of Antiquities	Department of Antiquities, Nicosia	
10:30 -11:30	Mr. Sebout Tabidian, Father Momic & Mr. John Guevherian Armenian Community (ACM Project)	Armenian Archbishopric Palace	
14:00 – 15:00	PROF. MARIA HADJIPAVLOU, UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS	At her home	Call her for directions

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	(SOCIAL & POLITICAL SCIENTISTS)		99305283
15:15- 16:15	MR. ARNE, PRIO AND SOME OF THE TEAM	PRIO Offices, Nicosia	
Tuesday, 5 May '09 – Consultations TCC DAY			
8:00	PICK –UP FROM THE HOTEL	Holiday Inn, Nicosia	
8:30	UNDP- ACT STAFF MEETING	UNDP -ACT, UNPA	
9:30 -10:30	Meeting with Mr. Ahmed Erdengiz (Director) and Ms. Servet Dorak -TCC Programme Steering Committee-	TCC Foreign Affairs Building, Nicosia (north)	
10:45 – 11:45	MR. CHRISTOPHE GIROD, THIRD MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE OF MISSING PERSONS Ms. Jennifer Wright, Assistant to the Third Member	Ledra Palace	
12:00 – 13:00	Meeting with Mr. Kutlay Erk	Mr. Erk's office, TCC 'Presidents' office' Nicosia (north)	<i>Ask Pembe or Pelin for directions</i>
13:30 – 15:00	BARBARA ROSSMILLER, SAVE - CHIEF OF PARTY, MARK MCCORD, EDGE - CHIEF OF PARTY & PATRICK COUGHLIN, CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (CDP) - CHIEF OF PARTY	SAVE Office, Nicosia (north)	
16:00 – 17:00	MEETING WITH MR. SEFIK ISIK	Sarray Hotel, on the roof Nicosia, (north)	
17:30	MEETING WITH MR. EROL KAYMAK FROM THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN UNIVERSITY	Ginka Restaurant, at the Square, Famagusta	0533 863 8742 <i>just in case</i>
Wednesday, 6 May '09 – Consultations TCC/GCC DAY			
9:00 -9:45	Meeting with Mr. Leonidas Paschalides and Mr. Kemal Baykalli – Interdependence Project	Holiday Inn, Nicosia	

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10:00-11:00	Meeting with Dr. Beyli, HRM	HRM, Nicosia (north)	
11:15 -12:00	Meeting with Ms. Tiziana Zennaro, UNDP-PFF	PFF Office, Nicosia (north)	<i>It is ok if it overlaps with the next meeting at UNDP ACT it is voluntarily to be there</i>
12:00 – 14:30	Communications Workshop with new consultants	C Conference Room, UNDP- ACT	<i>Media Consultants, Public Information Consultants & UNDP ACT staff</i>
15:00-16:00	Dinos Logides & Ulvan Pollili MARKO GAZIVODA -Youth Activism -	Flo Café, Ledra Street	<i>Evaluators need a UNDP/USAID sign so the partners can recognize them</i>
16:30- 17:30	Chara Makriyianni & Fezile Isik -Association for Historical Dialogue and Research -	Flo Café, Ledra Street	<i>Evaluators need a UNDP/USAID sign so the partners can recognize them</i>
Thursday, 7 May '09 – Consultations			
7:30	PICK –UP FROM THE HOTEL	Holiday Inn, Nicosia	
8:00 -8:45	MEETING WITH KIM FOUKARIS AND ALAN DAVIS (Jaco Cilliers & Christopher Louise)	Coffee Beanery, Engomi, Nicosia	<i>Mid-evaluation readout - brief and informal</i>
09:00 – 10:00	BULENT KANOL, MICHALIS AVRAAM & NADIA KARAYIANNI -Engage-	'C' Conference Room UNDP-ACT, UNPA	<i>*Need to be sponsored*</i>
11:00 – 12:00	Meeting with Mr. Taye-Brook Zerihoun, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Chief of Mission	UNFICYP HQ UNPA	
12:30 -13:30	MEETING WITH MS. KIKI SHIOTANI, CIVIL AFFAIRS	UNFICYP, UNPA	
13:45 -14:30	MEETING WITH MR. MICHAEL RAINE, PROGRAMME MANAGER, MINE ACTION CENTRE,	Mine Action Centre, UNPA	99 334681
15:00 -16:00	Meeting with Mr. Spyros Christou, -Interpeace, Cyprus 2015 -	University of Nicosia (Intercollege), Nicosia	<i>Meet at the reception and then go to the student café 99037243</i>
16:30 – 17:30	Mr. George Christofides Director of the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ms. Melina Savva	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia	

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Friday, 8 May '09 – Consultations			
8:30	PICK –UP FROM THE HOTEL	Holiday Inn, Nicosia	
9:00-10:00	Meeting with Swedish Ambassador, H.E. Mr. Ingemar LINDAHL	EMBASSY OF SWEDEN 9, Makarios Ave. Severis Building, 2nd Floor Nicosia	
11:00 –12:00	Alain Bothorel, Head of Programme Team, EU Programme Support Office in Cyprus, Virginia Cezilly, Project officer for Civil Society	EU Programme Support Office, Nicosia (north)	
13:00	MEETING WITH MR. JOSE DIAZ, UNFICYP SPOKESPERSON	UNFICYP Spokesperson's office	
15:00-16:00			
16:30 -17:30	Meeting with Ilke Dagli Doros Michael & MIKE HADJIMICHAEL, -COMMUNITY MEDIA CENTRE-	UNDP ACT offices, C' Conference Room	
Monday, 11 May '09 –			
8:30	PICK –UP FROM THE HOTEL	Holiday Inn, Nicosia	
11:00	MEETING WITH MR. YASSER SABRA, GOOD OFFICES - COORDINATOR	Good Offices, UNPA	
LUNCH	WITH UNDP-ACT STAFF AT LOCAL LUNCH VENUE	4307 Restaurant	
13:00 -15:00	EVALUATORS PRESENTATION	UNDP ACT offices, C' Conference Room	
15:00	DEBRIEFING WITH USAID/ UNDP ACT AND OFFICE STAFF	UNDP ACT offices, C' Conference Room	

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17:00	TELECONFERENCE WITH MR. PARVIZ FARTASH, UNDP HQ NEW YORK, RBEC & BCPR	UNDP ACT offices, C' Conference Room	
Tuesday, 12 May '09 - END OF EVALUATION			

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ANNEX 4 – 2007 EVALUATION: SUMMARY KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1	More emphasis on faster & upstream results
2	ACT to analyze potential movements of staff & budget across & within thematic areas
3	Communications action plan; scale up, broaden & expedite to target segmented groups of both more people & more influential people
4	Differentiate strategy: in TCC, prioritize CSO capacity building & links to regional & international NGOs. In GCC, emphasize human rights, sector strengthening & address media challenges
5	Establish 2 operational service centres, outside the buffer zone, for easier and quicker access by CSOs in the GCC and TCC respectively
6	Action plan to dramatically increase delivery in the next few weeks
7	Periodic partner brainstorming to advise on key issues and strategy
8	Every 6 months, review what worked since the last review, what didn't, why & where strategic changes in direction, staffing & budget & update rolling strategic action plan with specific staff delivery targets & timelines

Annex 5 – Evaluating Conflict Prevention & Peacebuilding Activities: Summary OECD-DAC Lessons

Emerging lessons from the analytical work underpinning this guidance

The joint process of developing this guidance has begun to reveal some important lessons for donor agencies and others working in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field. The following list of emerging lessons will be revised and updated once this draft has been field tested.

- 1) Donors should promote the systematic use of evaluation for all conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, and require implementing partners, such as NGOs, to conduct evaluations. Evaluation can support learning and accountability as professionals in this area of development co-operation strive to improve practice and results. Such learning is key to becoming more effective at building peace.
- 2) A clear need for a better strategic policy framework for conflict prevention and peacebuilding work has been demonstrated. There is a need to evaluate at the strategic level and to look at the interconnections between strategies, policies, programmes and projects. Policies and operations in this sensitive field need to be more effectively linked – a goal which could be achieved in part by working with practitioners and policy makers to update the existing *DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (including the 1998 *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*), in which donors recognised that work on these issues is a central part of development, extending beyond humanitarian assistance alone.
- 3) Evaluations should be facilitated through better programme design, even in the planning stages when, for instance, objectives should be clearly articulated to facilitate future assessment of results. There is a general need for further development in terms of planning, funding, management and implementation of activities that try to prevent conflict or build peace. In this field in general, there is a need to build tailored tools for learning and accountability to contribute to the professionalization of interventions, including the identification of best practices.
- 4) Coherent and co-ordinated intervention and policy strategies are needed to make progress towards peace. Donors cannot rely solely on aid and must look at other policy instruments and their impacts on conflict and the chances for peace. Strategic engagement at various levels and across governments is essential.
- 5) Concepts and definitions of peacebuilding and conflict prevention require clarification. Evaluators should work with staff, policy makers, managers and stakeholders to determine and assess the concepts of peace their activity is operating on.
- 6) The results of conflict analysis need to be translated into action, used to influence the programming and evaluation processes and linked to other forms of analysis, such as governance assessments, power and drivers of change analysis, as well as early warning indicators. (Note: As field applications are conducted and as learning and practices evolve, this list may be refined.)
- 7) The use of mixed-method approaches to evaluations is recommended due the complexity and multi-faceted nature of interventions in this field.
- 8) Joint evaluations allow for more harmonised approaches that demonstrate how efforts of different donors add up. Involving country partners is also important for understanding how change occurs and is a key element of supporting the Paris Declaration.