External Evaluation Report
For
Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy: NGOs Small Grants Programme
And
Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue
By Frances Barns
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Capacity Development Mentor</td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>D&amp;M</td>
<td>Dialogue and Mediation</td>
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<td>DNAS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>F-FDTL</td>
<td>Timor-Leste Defence Force</td>
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<td>HHK</td>
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<td>Hamutuk Hari’i Uma</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non-Government Organisations</td>
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<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>Jesuit Refugee Service</td>
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<td>Ministry for Social Solidarity</td>
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<td>National Non-Government Organisations</td>
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<td>National Recovery Strategy (Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru)</td>
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<td>Provedor for Justice and Human Rights</td>
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<td>SCJP-LP</td>
<td>Sub-Commission for Justice and Peace – Liquiça Parish</td>
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<td>SGP</td>
<td>Small Grants Project</td>
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<td>SoSSAND</td>
<td>Secretary of State for Social Assistance &amp; Natural Disasters</td>
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<td>TORs</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Executive Summary

This report is an evaluation of two projects designed to support the implementation of the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) and the work of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. The two projects are:

- Support for the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy (known as the HHK NGOs Small Grants Project); and
- Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue (known as the Dialogue Project)

This report covers the period from the beginning of the implementation of the two projects in June 2008 until August 2009.

In April-May 2006 a political crisis triggered by the dismissal of close to 40 percent of the defence force led to open and widespread conflict in Timor-Leste. Approximately 145,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were identified as being displaced during the 2006 crisis, including 70,000 in Dili.

To facilitate the safe and successful resettlement of IDPs to the community the Government adopted in 2007 Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru, a National Recovery Strategy. The National Recovery Strategy (NRS) is comprised of five pillars (housing, stability, socio-economic development, trust-building and social protection) and focuses on the needs of the displaced population and the communities into which they are to be reintegrating. Peace-building elements were encapsulated in the Trust-Building Pillar, Haumutuk Hari’i Konfiansa (HHK) as well as in aspects of the other four pillars.

To support the NRS, the UNDP designed the two above-mentioned projects. The specific objectives of the Projects were to support the implementation of the NRS, including, but not limited to, managing the “displacement challenge”. The Dialogue Project aimed to assist with managing conflicts (associated with returns/relocations of IDPs), improve the perception of State officials, and strengthen the role of local authorities in conflict resolution and nationwide Timorese identity based on cultural and historical traditions.

The Small Grants Project aimed to contribute to operationalising the HHK pillar of the NRS and improving coordination between partners. This was done by putting out a call for proposals to National and International NGOs for projects focused on the key actions of the trust-building or HHK Pillar.

This report is the outcome of a mid-term evaluation of the two projects. The objective of the Evaluation has been to assess at mid-term the results, achievements and constraints of the two projects and to provide recommendations on optimising

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Estimates vary between 140,000 and 170,000 persons displaced. 154,000 IDPs is used in the RDTL Background report for the 2010 Timor Leste Development Partners Meeting.
implementation including future projects direction and UNDP Programming in this area.

The Evaluation found that the objectives of the Projects were relevant and appropriate. The objectives are relevant to both the operational UNDP mandate, which is that of working in special development situations, and the relevant national policy framework, which is the National Recovery Strategy.

There was also a practical need for these Projects, particularly in regard to project activities targeted at supporting the resettlement of IDPs. This included the Dialogue Project and activities under the Small Grants Project focused on implementing the Key Actions of the HHK Pillar specifically focused on resettlement. In early 2008, prior to the commencement of the Projects, camp closures were being pushed very quickly and many problems were emerging related to inter alia, conflict over returns, property ownership disputes and lack of clear information among the community about their entitlements. There was a need for support to assist with the management of conflict issues, to provide access to information for the communities and monitoring of returns to identify problems and issues. The Dialogue Project focused on managing conflict through enhancing MSS’ dialogue and mediation services.

The Key Actions of the HHK linked to resettlement focused on all three issues. There was also a good rationale for support to peace-building in communities as identified in the NRS. Among the range of underlying causes of the Crisis such as poverty and unemployment, poor infrastructure, security concerns and access to justice, there was a need to strengthen relationships and build a culture of peace in a fractious society with many social and political cleavages. While the rationale for general peace-building support was strong, it is moving into early recovery rather than crisis response and therefore at the outset it can be predicted that the relationship between the interventions and the impact will be more complex.

From the donor perspective, there was a strong rationale for channelling funding for NGOs implementing projects aimed at both assisting resettlements and peace-building in the broader community. By linking the selection criteria for funding to the HHK Pillar and establishing a Project Management Board with Government representation the Small Grants Project helped to ensure that NGO projects working in the sector were operating within the parameters of Government policy. This approach also helped to improve coordination, such as in relation to promoting a more even geographic coverage, and reduce overlap.

It seems clear that the Dialogue Project positively affected the process of camp closures and resettlement of IDPs. The resettlement process can be said to have been successful, with all camps closed by August 2009 (with the exception of IDPs

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2 UNDP has been given a clear mandate by the United Nations General Assembly to operate in “special development situations”, where disasters and violent conflicts have undermined the human, social, physical and institutional capital that underpin development. In addition, the Executive Board of UNDP and UNFPA acknowledged in 2001 that the increased incidence and risk of violent conflict and natural disaster in programme countries indicates that the demand for UNDP’s services in crisis and post-crisis environments is also increasing.

3 The HHK Pillar included some key actions that were focused specifically on IDP resettlement issues (i) supporting MSS to carry out dialogue, (ii) supporting information distribution regarding the HHK and (v) monitoring of returns. Other pillars, however, were focused on peace-building in the general community including (ii) encouraging positive contributions from youth and martial arts gang members, (iv) supporting internal tourism and (vi) dissemination of educational materials highlighting a common and shared history and culture.
remaining in transitional shelters holding close to 500 families which are in the process of being closed at the time of writing). It was very complex as disputes and problems continued to emerge throughout the process. For example, some households interviewed during the evaluation reported ongoing conflict with their neighbours. In one case, one family had occupied a property owned by their neighbours who were IDPs after the IDPs had returned in an attempt to extract payment from the neighbouring IDP family. Numerous iterations of dialogue and mediation had to be made in certain conflict-prone communities. In general, the big picture is one of success, given the large number of IDPs that moved out of the camps back into the community during 2008-2009.

The Dialogue Teams were not the only party responsible for the successful resettlement of IDPs; it was very much a coordinated effort involving many stakeholders. However, it appears that the success of the process can be directly attributed in part to the UNDP Dialogue Project. This project added to the resources available to MSS for dialogue. Between July and October 2008, 41 staff were recruited on Government contracts with MSS including 34 staff who were subsequently trained and tasked to facilitate dialogue and mediation in communities. To promote a high level of capacity among staff contracted within the framework of the Project, substantial time and effort was put into the recruitment process as well as training of the staff. UNDP also provided support for a more structured and focused approach to planning and implementing dialogues.

Evidence for the central role that the MSS Dialogue Teams played in facilitating the resettlement of IDPs can be seen in the large number of dialogues and meetings that were held. As of 30 September 2009, 42 community-level dialogue meetings were held in addition to 83 pre-dialogue meetings and 694 mediations.

In regard to mediation, the UNDP Progress Reports shows that not all cases were resolved to the satisfaction of all parties involved. While 94 % of cases were resolved to the satisfaction of both parties in the first reporting period (June – December 2008). In the second reporting period (January – September 2009) 30 % of cases have been resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. The remaining cases are still ongoing.

The Project also extended the capacity of MSS to provide dialogue services outside Dili by helping to set up Dialogue Teams in Ermera and Baucau. Such services were required in these Eastern districts where the bulk of rural displacements had occurred following the 2006 crisis and some people had also fled their homes following the 2007 Presidential and parliamentary elections.

The Project achieved its other specific objectives, including improving the participation of State Officials by inviting national leaders/civil servants to attend dialogue sessions which demonstrated their concern for the community and the challenges they face. On the negative side, the sessions sometimes resulted in the leaders making promises about services to be provided which may have encouraged a tendency towards haphazard and politicised service delivery planning.

The Project also helped to strengthen the role of local authorities in conflict resolution. Locating the dialogue staff in the sub-districts facilitated better communication with local leaders. The project took steps to involve local authorities
in every stage of the process. Training for community leaders was conducted. The Dialogue Teams received Training-for-Trainers (ToT) with a view to conducting conflict resolution training for community leaders.

The Project helped to develop a national identity based on cultural and historical traditions by drawing on local cultural practices around conflict resolution and linking them in a broader process.

The activities supported through the Small Grants Project which were closely related to the resettlement of IDPs were essential aspects of a coordinated response involving the Government and many agencies. CARE, CRS and Austcare carried out a range of activities supporting the resettlement of IDPs.

The funding of agencies heavily involved in a coordinated response is positive for a number of reasons. Due to their experience these agencies have a clear sense of the practical needs. As participants in the HHK coordination forum, they have a good understanding of and commitment to the Government’s policy objectives. Funding such agencies also takes advantage of economies of scale. The risk is that there is overlap. This does not appear to have occurred.

With an approach whereby different implementing agencies negotiated to divide up the focus of their programmes into specific geographic regions, these agencies effectively became extensions of Government programmes. They provided services that complimented and facilitated the Government’s activities under the NRS.

The working relationship between NGOs supported by UNDP and the Government was important in Dili. However, this relationship was particularly important in the Districts, notably the eastern districts where the large majority of the displacements had taken place. Given the very limited Government resources in the districts, support from NGOs has been critical. Regular HHK Working Group meetings also helped to strengthen the coordination in Dili and in Baucau. It should be noted that the Dialogue Teams in Ermera did not benefit from close support from an NGO.

Monitoring of the resettlement of IDPs and their host communities is critical to provide information on the level of conflict and social cohesion in communities where IDPs have been reintegrated/or relocated as well as other issues facing returnees and home communities such as access to services and treatment by Government.

Under the UNDP Small Grants Project returns/relocations monitoring was supported through funding of a project implemented by the Office of the Provedor (PDHJ) in cooperation with IOM and a project implemented by CARE. The returns/relocations monitoring carried out by IOM and the PDHJ was effective with some challenges and limitations.

Three NGO programmes supported through the Small Grants Project aimed at shifting the orientation of young people away from conflict towards a more peaceful orientation and improving the life skills and employment prospects of youth by assisting them to prepare proposals for and implement project activities of their choice such as livelihood or self improvement projects to make participants more employable. Support for encouraging positive contributions from youth is one of the
key actions of the HHK pillar. The projects appear to have assisted young people in developing a more pro-peace outlook and new conflict resolution skills. However, unlike those activities directly linked to the resettlement of IDPs, with activities supporting youth there is not an obvious or formal feedback mechanism regarding the impact of the Projects. If resettlement were not working then it would have become clear very quickly, however widespread violence and antisocial activity by young people involved in martial arts groups had already largely decreased by the start of 2008. Therefore, more work is required to investigate the impact of projects aimed at strengthening peace in the community more broadly rather than only among IDP communities. This could be a task of the Peace-Building Unit if it is to be established in the Ministry of Social Solidarity.

Furthermore, to ensure sufficient impact and sustainability of benefits, a certain level of coverage needs to be achieved and activities supporting youth need to be integrated into a comprehensive strategy to improve opportunities for youth. Such a strategy has not really been operationalised, but it is not appropriate that it be developed by the Ministry of Social Solidarity, as responsibility for youth matters is the role of another institution. Special effort needs to be made to target at-risk young people and those involved in violence.

Training in conflict resolution/peace-building for community leaders and other community members was implemented by Ba Futuru, CRS, Austcare, Renetil and SCJP-LP (the latter for youth). This training is critical, particularly for community leaders as they have a traditional role in facilitating conflict resolution. However, methodologies applied should be based on strengthening existing approaches to resolving conflict within communities because this has been shown to be more effective (Ledarach 1996, Bearman 2004) that approaches that import methodologies. While the evaluation did not fully assess the NGO training methodologies, anecdotal reports suggest that in some cases the approaches were somewhat “top-down”.

For their size and scope, the two projects have made a significant contribution to prospects for peace and stability in the long-term. However, there are many issues which remain triggers for conflict. These include inter alia: high unemployment, especially among youth, patchy access to public utilities (water, sanitation and electricity), ongoing problems with resettlement and land and property ownership, potential future dislocations due to planned development projects, ongoing social cleavages within the community, continuing rivalries among the political elite, increased poverty due to climatic changes and environmental damage, and lack of access to justice.

Unfortunately, the remaining Pillars of the NRS that focused on bringing about improvements relating to the underlying causes of conflict have not been operationalised to the same extent as HHK and Hamutuk Hari’i Uma (HHU) which focused on providing assistance for rebuilding houses. There is a temptation for MSS and Peace-building focused NGO projects to compensate for this situation by incorporating activities from the other pillars under the HHF. This is not advisable as it is unlikely to have the scale of coverage necessary.

The project has performed reasonably well on gender issues in terms of the HR recruitment strategy, in that about 30 percent of the Dialogue Team’s members are
women. Interviews with the Capacity Development Mentor (CDM) and the Project Manager reveal that women have performed as effectively as men as facilitators of dialogue and mediation. Not surprisingly, given the highly patriarchal nature of Timor-Leste’s cultures, it has been a challenge to harness the full participation of women in dialogue, particularly in larger community meetings.

The approach to project management was one of the key strengths of the Dialogue Project. This included the innovative approach whereby UNDP supported the recruitment, training and management of staff on Government contracts. This enabled UNDP to inform programme direction but also ensured that the activities were fully integrated into the work of the Ministry. The duplicate reporting structure may have led to some confusion over lines of authority at the beginning of the project but this has been overcome by regular interaction with MSS. Application of this innovative management approach should be considered more widely.

Because the implementation of HHK was located within one directorate of MSS, the Project “entry point” was one directorate, rather than the Ministry as a whole. This limits the likelihood of the systems and approaches being emulated by the Ministry in the future. This approach of the UNDP projects is indicative of a general trend within MSS whereby there has been much more assistance on a directorate/sectoral basis rather than on a whole-of-ministry basis. There is a need for more assistance to strengthen whole-of-ministry systems, for example in relation to annual planning, budget planning, financial management, HR policy and information and logistics management.

The approach adopted on the Dialogue Project for institutional development and project management should be considered more widely for other development programmes.

Another positive development was the recruitment of a national project manager with strong leadership skills who was able to provide technical direction on the Project as well as project management and administrative oversight. The Project Manager went through a period of direct mentoring by an International Project Manager as well as undergoing training in conflict prevention and mediation overseas. However, the project management could have been strengthened by the inclusion of the Project Assistant position earlier.

The Dialogue staff were subject to extensive training including training in conflict transformation theories and practical approaches at well regarded international institutions (for a more full discussion of the training received see the full body of the report). A Capacity Development Mentor was recruited ten months into the Project.

Project Management on the Small Grants Project was effective. The Project Manager provided attentive monitoring and financial oversight. The job of the Project Manager in monitoring could have been made easier by the collection by NGOs of better baseline data consisting of qualitative and quantitative data.

Coordination was another strength on both of the Projects. The main mechanism for coordination for MSS and stakeholders was the HHK Working Group that was supported by both projects. This group met fortnightly in Dili and Baucau. The group
was well attended and provided an effective forum for exchanging information and identifying needs to be followed up on. There was room for more Government ownership.

Looking forward there is a need for the Government to define its policy priorities around peace and stability as in regard to the NRS, the political pressure to solve “the displacement challenge” has receded as the issue has been resolved. There remain issues that are likely to trigger conflict in the short term. These include unresolved disputes relating to resettlement and new dislocations relating to potential conflicts resulting from the implementation of the Land Law and measuring of the Cadastral System. Given UNDP’s strong relationship with MSS, UNDP should continue support the Government in moving forward in policy development for peace-building.

At the current time there is a plan to absorb some of the Dialogue Team members into a new department in MSS, to be known as the Department of Peace-Building and Social Cohesion (DPBSC), to be housed under the National Directorate for Social Assistance. MSS has requested UNDP support for establishing this department as an exit strategy for the Dialogue and Small Grants Projects in the medium-term.

**Recommendations**

**Small Grants Project**

1. More work is required to investigate the impact of projects working with youth and martial arts gang members as securing their interest in workshops etc may be more difficult than obtaining that of young people who already have a more positive outlook. Activities which attract the interest of more anti-social youth appear to be activities which bring some economic benefit and NGOs are thus tending to move in this direction. In fact this is the case for activities involving community members of all ages. But what is the likelihood of these projects being able to assist economically in the longer-term? UNDP should support NGOs to link up or emulate other initiatives in sectors such as agriculture and private sector development that have been shown to be effective.\(^4\) (This comment is not directed towards peace-building projects but towards UNDP more generally). UNDP should also undertake high-level advocacy to support the Government to address structural issues and take care that ineffective strategies aren’t inadvertently being supported. In addition to a commitment to participation, when implementing projects with an economic impact, the latter should be considered in the Project design.

2. If there is an extension of the Small Grants Project it would be useful to focus on collecting strong baseline data in order to enhance the ability to measure impact through the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. There should also be more focus on assessing coverage, for example, which communities and

\(^4\) Some initiatives are not effective. According to an adviser at ILO, 80 percent of vocational courses in Dili provide English and Computer training but only a fraction of the jobs are in this area. However, if you ask many people what type of support they would like they say English and Computer training which is presumably why these are the courses provided.
which groups within the communities have received and are in need of assistance.

3. Looking forward there are at least two priority challenges for promoting greater participation of women on the Project including (i) harnessing the special role of women as peace-builders and (ii) making a special effort to include women’s views and needs in conflict resolution and peace-building activities. (This also applies to the Dialogue Project).

Dialogue Project

4. There is a need for more assistance to strengthen whole-of-ministry systems at MSS, for example in relation to annual planning, budget planning, financial management, HR policy and information management and logistics management.

5. Training for dialogue staff in the future should continue to be based on an ongoing analysis of training needs to ensure that staff continue to have the opportunity to develop their skills and that courses provided are not repetitive or overlapping. Dialogue staff should receive certificates for training received. Consideration should be given to the possibility of providing a select number of staff the opportunities for studying for higher qualifications relating to conflict transformation and peace-building.

6. The reasons for the need for dialogue, mediation, capacity building of communities in conflict resolution and community strengthening activities are still relevant as they were at the commencement of the Projects. It is therefore worthwhile continuing support in these areas. Given UNDP’s strong relationship with MSS, it would be useful for UNDP to continue supporting the Government in moving forward in policy and programme development for peace-building and social cohesion.

Future Programming

7. Care should be taken to ensure that any support to NDSA to develop peace-building programmes stays within the context of its mandate: social protection of vulnerable groups and prevention of and response to emergencies. This implies that the focus of peace-building programmes should be on reducing vulnerability to conflict and in doing so there should be an emphasis on promoting the inclusion of vulnerable members of the community.

8. In the future, effective coordination by MSS with stakeholders in the peace-building sector will be essential. MSS should seek to accommodate the views and roles of other key stakeholders in peace-building activities such as the Secretary of State for Security. It would be useful to establish a mechanism similar to the HHK Working Group. MSS could take a lead role in such a forum.

9. Some of the key priorities for a new department for peace-building may be as follows:
• Oversight and coordination of monitoring of resettlements and other potential issues of conflict.

• Mediation and dialogue on specific issues such as in relation to conflicts that might emerge in relation to the implementation of the Land Law.

• Conflict resolution training for community leaders through oversight of the coverage and quality of training, forward planning and delivering the training in coordination with the Ministry for State Administration and Territorial Management.

• Community strengthening activities such as sports, arts and music events and small scale infrastructure development such as building of community halls and sports fields. To achieve peace and social cohesion it is essential that, as well as focusing on reducing negative influences through conflict mitigation, there is a focus on increasing the positive influences by creating opportunities for positive interactions among community members.
Introduction

In April-May 2006 a political crisis triggered by the dismissal of close to 40 percent of the defence force led to open and widespread conflict in Timor-Leste. Fighting between the army and police resulted in many casualties. As simmering tensions linked to a range of long and short-term issues rose to the surface, houses and other buildings were looted and burned (including an estimated 5000 properties in Dili alone). Their properties destroyed and facing threats, many people fled their homes and sheltered in the grounds of state and church buildings while others took refuge in the homes of relatives. Approximately 145,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were identified as being displaced during the 2006 crisis, including 70,000 in Dili.5

The crisis receded and normalcy returned. During 2007 Parliamentary and Presidential elections were held without significant irregularities reported (although further conflict between politically aligned groups triggered significant displacement in Ermera in the wake of the Presidential elections and again in Viqueque after the parliamentary elections). However, due to fear of being attacked on return and their homes destroyed or taken over by other community members, many of the IDPs stayed on in the makeshift camps that sprang up in the locations to which they fled during the crisis. There was also a period of widespread instability and heightened security concerns following the 2008 shooting of the President and attacks against Prime Minister.

Reintegrating displaced community members became one of three areas of national priority delineated by the IV Constitutional Government, sworn in on 8 August 2007 (the other two related to issues affecting national security, the case of the ‘petitioners’ group previously discharged from the Army and that of Alfreido Reinaldo and his rebel group). To facilitate the safe and successful resettlement of IDPs to the community, the Government prepared and adopted in 2007 Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru, a National Recovery Strategy (NRS). In endorsing this strategy, the Government, donors and international agencies acknowledged that there were interlinked social, political and economic factors associated with displacement that would need to be dealt with to facilitate successful resettlement and reintegration of the displaced community members. Accordingly, the National Recovery Strategy is comprised of five pillars (housing, stability, socio-economic development, trust-building and social protection) and focuses on the needs of displaced populations and the communities into which they were to be reintegrating.

A number of aspects of the NRS related to “peace-building” in the community. These included repairing relationships severed during the 2006 Crisis, strengthening community fabric and promoting peaceful ways of behaving and supporting the resolution of disputes relating to property ownership that had ensued following the Crisis. Peace-building elements were encapsulated in the Trust-Building Pillar of HHK (Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa) as well as in aspects of the other four pillars to varying degrees.

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5 Estimates vary between 140,000 and 170,000 persons displaced. 154,000 IDPs is used in the RDTL Background report for the 2010 Timor Leste Development Partners Meeting.
To support these aspects of the NRS, the UNDP designed the two projects:

- Support for the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy (known as the HHK NGOs Small Grants Project); and
- Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue (know as the Dialogue Project)

This report is the outcome of an external evaluation of the two projects covering the period June 2008 until August 2009. The Projects were evaluated together as they both support the Ministry of Social Solidarity in its implementation of the NRS. The objective of the Evaluation has been to assess the results, achievements and constraints of the two projects and to provide recommendations on optimising implementation including future government support and UNDP Programming in this area.

**Methodology**

The Methodology of the Evaluation utilized a qualitative approach based on interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders. The approach can be described as semi-structured in that a set of open-ended questions were asked but there was also scope for participants to discuss other topics of relevance to them. Interviews were held with a range of stakeholders including Government representatives, relevant UNDP staff, Dialogue Team members, NGO project representatives, relevant community members including returned IDPs and beneficiaries of projects supported by the Small Grants Project as well as experts and observers of peace and conflict issues in Timor-Leste. See Annex 3 for a list of interviews held.
### Summary of Questions to be Addressed in the Evaluation

Based on the TOR, the list of questions to be addressed in line with the topics that are normally addressed in an evaluation are as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<tr>
<td>Were the objectives of the Project appropriate and relevant?</td>
<td>Were the objectives of the Projects relevant and appropriate to (i) the UNDP Mandate for operating in “special development situations” and (ii) the National Recovery Strategy (iii) the National Priorities</td>
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<td>Did the Projects achieve their objectives?</td>
<td>Did the Projects contribute to solving “the displacement challenge”?</td>
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<td>What was the UNDP contribution to an inter-sectoral approach to recovery from the Crisis (as outlined in the HHK pillar of the NRS)?</td>
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<td>Did the Projects contribute positively to prospects for peace and stability in the medium to long-term?</td>
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<td>Did the Projects effectively promote the full participation of men and women in conflict resolution and peace-building?</td>
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<td>Did the small grants project contribute to operationalising the HHK pillar of the HHF and improving coordination between partners?</td>
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<td>Did the Dialogue Project assist with managing conflicts (associated with returns/relocations of IDPs), improving the perception of State officials, strengthening the role of local authorities in conflict resolution and developing a nationwide Timorese identity based on cultural and historical traditions?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Were the objectives of the Projects achieved in an effective manner?</td>
<td>How effective and sustainable was the approach to capacity building and partnership with MSS and NGO agencies?</td>
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<td>How effective and efficient were the coordination and communication systems established through the Projects?</td>
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<td>What factors impacted on whether the Projects achieved their expected results</td>
<td>What factors beyond UNDP’s control influence the Project environment and results?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Where to from here?</td>
<td>What are the issues, modalities and partnerships that should be the focus of UNDP in the peace-building sector?</td>
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EVALUATION OF THE PROJECTS

Relevance and Appropriateness of Objectives

“To what extent were the Projects relevant, appropriate and strategic to the UNDP Mandate for operating in “(i) special development situations” (ii) the National Recovery Strategy.

Addressing the question of the relevance of the Projects to the UNDP mandate and the NRS is fairly straightforward. Clearly the objectives are relevant to both the UNDP mandate of working in special development situations and the National Recovery Strategy given that they are focused on dealing with a displacement crisis which can easily be defined as a special development situation and supporting the NRS itself.

While the question of the relevance of the Projects to the UNDP mandate is logically obvious, the question of whether the Projects were appropriate and strategic also depends on whether there was a practical need for them in the operating context and whether UNDP was an appropriate agency to address these needs. These points will be addressed in the following paragraphs.

Problems with camp closures

The Projects were designed during 2007 prior to camp closures. They were timely as there were difficulties associated with camp closures and IDP resettlement in late 2007/early 2008 for which assistance was needed. Having been closely involved with MSS for the duration of the response to the Crisis, UNDP was well placed to support the Government to respond.6

Commencing in 2008, camp closures were a matter of high national priority for the Government. They were being driven by a very tight timeframe which was set by the process of identifying, verifying and distributing the various assistance packages for IDPs. Keen to receive the packages, IDPs would often state that it was safe for them to return when in fact their house was still occupied. In some cases, this was complicated by properties having being bought and sold after the departure of the IDPs. Often the communities into which the IDPs were re-integrating, including the local authorities, were not informed about the camp closures until they were imminent.

A number of other problems were emerging in the context of camp closures including:

6 UNDP has had several projects in this area working with MSS as well as its previous incarnation including among others, Work for Peace/ Serbisu Ba Dame; Women-in Self Employment (WISE); Work for Crisis Prevention/ Servi Nasaun; Support to IDPs reintegration; Communication Outreach for IDPs; Urgent Damage Assessment, and Support to Registration and Verification of IDPs.
• Confusion over who was entitled to what assistance packages;
• Access to correct information;
• Jealousy and resentment by non-IDPs of IDPs receiving assistance packages;
• Ongoing martial arts activity and violence. For instance, vehicles belonging to MSS or NGOs and IDPs’ houses were being stoned;
• Lack of access to water and electricity in the houses to which IDPs returned. For example, in some of the houses to which IDPs were returning, water pipes had been removed during their absence.

The NRS provided a mandate for a range of Trust-Building activities to address IDP reintegration and social recovery. The providers of these services included MSS, the Office of the Provedor (PDHJ) and the Land and Property Office (DNTP) and other line ministries. At the time of the development of the NRS, it was widely recognised that these key bodies and other actors in related fields were under-resourced to adequately address the activities at hand. In the early period of the current administration, MSS had only two dialogue staff. Furthermore, approaches to dialogue that had been employed to date had been less than effective. There was a need for assistance to develop a more systematic, resourced approach to dialogue that was able to support communities until issues were resolved.

Need to address underlying vulnerabilities

In addition to the immediate problems associated with camp closures, there was also a need to build up conditions in the society that would enable peace and stability to be maintained. While the social unrest associated with the 2006 Crisis had receded by mid-2007, if the underlying issues causing the crisis were not dealt with, it was not unlikely that conflict might flare up again given the appropriate triggers. It was for this reason that the NRS took a more holistic approach to dealing with the “displacement problem” that was focused on more than just camp closures. As is stated in the Preamble of the NRS:

“The effects of the Crisis that began in April/May 2006 have had impact on the lives of all East Timorese. The process of recovery will therefore necessarily be a complex and delicate one. The process will require a concerted effort by the Government, communities, civil society and the international community to address both the immediate impact of the Crisis and the pre-existing community-level vulnerabilities. As, such the closure of the IDP camps cannot be the only focus of attempts to address recovery. The strategies included within The National Recovery Strategy” offer a framework by which the Government can harmonise its efforts to address the many and varied impacts of the Crisis on the society as a whole.”

With its five pillars, the NRS as a whole was targeted at addressing the immediate causes and underlying conditions associated with conflict and social unrest. However, the HHK pillar was specifically focused on strengthening trust within the community. Among the range of underlying causes of the crisis such as poverty and unemployment, infrastructure, security services and access to justice that needed to be addressed, there was a need to strengthen relationships and build a peaceful culture in a fractious society with many social cleavages. Key Actions of the HHK Pillar included both trust-building activities associated with the resettlement of IDPs
(dialogue, information campaign and monitoring) as well as activities that contributed more broadly to “strengthening of trust throughout the community and, crucially, between the citizens and their Government” (encouraging positive contributions from youth and martial arts gang members, supporting internal tourism and dissemination of educational materials highlighting a common and shared history and culture.) The two UNDP projects were specifically designed to support the HHK pillar.

Assessment of the justification for the Projects

In the context of the above issues there was strong justification of the practical need for both projects.

The Dialogue Project was needed to address problems associated with camp closures by developing the Government’s capacity in dialogue and mediation. This included a need to:

• **Allocate greater resources:** dialogue and mediation activities were under-resourced in terms of staff and operational support. Of the $15 million allocated to the NRS only $15,000 had been allocated to HHK, the trust-building pillar.

• **Increase and improve the human and other resources available for dialogue and mediation Services.** Only two staff were available for this purpose at MSS.

• **Systematise the approach to dialogue and improve the methodology:** Dialogue/mediation sessions were often “one-off” sessions with a less than optimum sense of focus and not always leading to a resolution. To improve outcomes, dialogue and mediation processes needed to be structured and facilitation skills of relevant staff needed to be improved.

• **Provide local authorities with a leadership role in dialogue and mediation and strengthen their ability to do this:** During camp closures, Chefes de Suocos, Chefes de Aldeias and Suco Councils were not sufficiently informed or involved in negotiating returns processes. This needed to change. Dialogue and mediation processes that fit into local mechanisms of decision-making, authority and skills of local community leaders needed to be strengthened.

• **Provide a space for interface between national leaders and communities:** Both IDPs and return communities were often focused on grievances and hoped for opportunities to discuss these with national leaders.

• **Support systematic monitoring of returns/relocations:** Information feeding back to the Government and partners on how reintegration was going was sketchy and anecdotal. There was a need to collect more systematic information, particularly regarding the safety of vulnerable communities but also on the level of conflict and other emerging issues.

• **Support the provision of clear and consistent information on government policies:** Understanding was often confused among community members regarding entitlements to assistance packages and other government policies and services (e.g. how to get water supply connected).

• **Develop the concept of a Timorese national culture** including strengthening and consolidation of existing cultural mechanisms for conflict resolution.

These problems, which the Dialogue Project sought to address, were immediate. They were impairing the resettlement process and in some cases putting community
members in danger. The objectives of the Dialogue Project were well designed to both address these issues and were also well framed in the spirit of the NRS to improve the relationship of the community and the Government more broadly and promote sustainable structures for peace.

The Small Grants Project aimed to address issues relating to the resettlement process and to address underlying causes of instability and promote peace-building in the general community by supporting NGO programmes focused on implementing the key actions of the Trust-Building Pillar (HHK) of the NRS. As stated above the HHK included key actions that related to both IDP resettlement issues and broader peace-building. By funding NGOs implementing activities focused on the HHK, UNDP aimed to improve coordination and links to the Government’s policy platform (the NRS) as well as to complement its support to MSS by supporting civil society initiatives at the community level. NGOs working with IDPs had been playing a key operational role as part of a coordinated inter-agency response and had established relationships with communities and a practical sense of immediate and emerging priorities. As stated above, the specific priorities relating to IDP resettlement in the HHK included support for dialogue, returns monitoring (led by PDHJ) and the communication of government policy. All of these were clear and immediate needs in the context of camp closures as described above.

This is an effective approach to programme design, particularly in regard to activities linked directly to resettlement. The fact that the designs of the two projects support both the Government and NGOs to facilitate dialogue raises the question of whether there could be overlap. However, this did not appear to be a problem as the NGOs had specific roles in relation to dialogue vis-à-vis MSS which related to supporting linkages with the community to facilitate participation in the Government-led dialogue.

The approach was also effective in regard to support for programmes working in peace-building in the community more generally. The need to develop a more peace-orientated culture among young people was clear. However, there was not the same consensus on the scope of the needs, i.e. what level and distribution of programming would be required to have impact as there was with the Projects focused on resettlement. This is not so much a criticism as a function of some of the NGO Projects (i.e. those ones not directly relating to resettlement) moving out of crisis response into early recovery. For example, dialogue in Becora sub-district was directly linked to camp closures and resettlement, evidenced in the fact that it was only after seven pre-dialogue meetings and two dialogue meetings that home communities agreed that IDPs could return. The “feedback” on the effectiveness of the interventions was immediate and obvious. In regard to projects working to support a more peaceful orientation among youth through training in peace-building and life skills there was not the same immediate feedback because the spate of violent activity which had followed the crisis had already calmed down by the time most of these projects commenced. It is not easy to objectively determine at this stage whether peace-building projects such as those supported under the Small Grants Project have had the desired long-term impact. However there are mechanisms that can be used to determine success in the short to medium term.
Furthermore, the HHK was quite specific about what types of initiatives were to be implemented to support general peace-building (not specifically IDP related): support for youth and martial arts group members, support for developing Timorese cultural identity and internal tourism. But it is not extensively elaborated how and why those specific initiatives would lead to the objectives of the HHK. While it is appropriate for UNDP to support government policy, these design issues with the policy itself could affect the outcomes of the UNDP activity.

**Did the Projects achieve their Objectives?**

In terms of addressing the questions linked to the subject of whether the objectives of the Project were achieved this section of the Report looks first at the impact of the Dialogue Project on “displacement challenge”, followed by a discussion of whether the Dialogue Project achieved its specific objectives. It then looks at the impact of the Small Grants Project on the displacement challenge and whether it achieved its specific objectives.

**Achievements of the Dialogue Project**

**Did the Dialogue Project contribute to solving “the displacement challenge”?**

It seems clear that the Dialogue Project (USD 937, 5407) positively affected the process of camp closures and resettlement of IDPs. The resettlement process can be said to have been successful, with all camps closed by August 2009 (with the exception of IDPs remaining in transitional shelters holding close to 500 families which are in the process of being closed at the time of writing). It was complex as disputes and problems continued to emerge throughout the process. For instance in Camea Sub-District of Dili, particularly in sucos Fatuk Francisco and Burbulau, despite numerous dialogue sessions, conflict between residents and newly resettled IDPs continued until well into mid-2009. Some disputes over properties and social jealousies continue into the present. This is why various iterations of dialogue and mediation had to be undertaken in some locations. In general, the big picture is one of success, given the large number of IDPs, supported by the project that moved out of the camps back into the community during 2008-9.

The Dialogue Teams were not the only party responsible for the successful resettlement of most IDPs; it was very much a coordinated effort involving many stakeholders, led by MSS and including other Government bodies such as PNTL, F-FDTL, DNTP and DNAS (the Directorate for Water and Sanitation Services) as well as many NGOs such as CARE, CRS, Belun, Austcare and JRS as well as the UN/or UN Affiliated agencies such as IOM, UNPOL and UNMIT. However, it appears that the success of the process can be directly attributed in part to the Dialogue Project. This project enabled MSS to take the leadership role in dialogue and mediation that had been lacking and was very much needed to facilitate camp closures. This was done by increasing the resources available to and improving the skills, methodology, planning and organisational capacity of the MSS Dialogue services.

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7 AusAid: USD $498,548, NZAid USD$220,000, UN Peace Building Fund USD$218,992
The UNDP Dialogue Project added to the resources available to MSS for dialogue. Between July and October 2008, 41 staff were recruited on Government contracts with MSS including 26 dialogue staff in Dili (recruited in July/August 2008), eight dialogue staff in Baucau (4) and Ermera (4) (a total of 34 dialogue staff), one senior coordinator (seconded from MSS), three support staff and 3 drivers. The Dili based dialogue staff were organised into sub-district teams based in the sub-districts with large numbers of returning IDPs including Cristo Rei, Dom Aleixo, Vera Cruz, Nain Feto and Metinaro. Their offices were located in the sub-districts.

To promote a high level of capacity among staff contracted for the Project, substantial time and effort was put into the recruitment process as well as training the staff (see more about this under the section, Were the Projects Achieved in an Effective Manner?).

Throughout the Project, UNDP also provided support for a more structured and focused approach to planning and implementing dialogue. Guidelines were produced by the joint UNDP/MSS management team indicating how dialogue and meeting sessions were to be structured and managed.

The approach to dialogue changed over time as the needs for and understanding of dialogue evolved over the Project duration but basically the steps for dialogue, which was coordinated around camps closures, involved:

- Liaising with Government/community leaders, Site Liaison Support (SLS) officers and Partners to identify the needs for dialogue and mediation sessions.
- Socialising the approach with District Administrators (Dili, Baucau and Ermera), Sub-District Administrators and Suco and Aldeia leaders to harness their support.
- Publicising the events through word of mouth, brochures and publicity materials as well as TV and Radio.
- Holding pre-dialogue sessions with key IDP/community figures to build consensus.
- Facilitating large dialogue events involving 500 – 1000 people, often attended by national leaders and ending with a symbolic action signifying the resolution of disputes and repair of social relations such as signing of a peace agreement and/or the traditional nahe biti bo’ot ceremony.
- Facilitating inter and intra-family mediation sessions.
- Documenting processes for further institutional reference.

This basic approach, introduced through the UNDP Project, was much more structured and planned than that which had been implemented prior to the start of the Project. UNDP’s ability to inform the planning and implementation of a Government programme was supported by a joint management structure headed by both an MSS Director and a UNDP Project Manager.

Evidence for the central role that the MSS Dialogue Teams played in facilitating the resettlement of IDPs can be seen in the large number of dialogue and meetings that were held before returns were carried out. Over the course of the Project, 42 community-level dialogue meetings were held and 83 pre-dialogue meetings as
shown in Chart 1 and 2 below, 694 mediations have been carried out so far.\(^8\) Dialogue and pre-dialogue meetings were the forum where IDPs negotiated with the home community to allow their return. This often took a number of pre-dialogue and dialogue sessions. Without the structured approach introduced by the Project it would have been difficult to negotiate the returns. The number of events held met the targets included in the Project Document.

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Changes over the duration of the Project

Approaches changed over the duration of the Project as the understanding of what dialogue meant in the community evolved, as well as changes in the operational

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9 Data taken from Dialogue Project Progress reports January-December 2008 and draft progress report January-September 2009
context. Beginning with emergency mediation in the camps, the Project moved on to conduct the large dialogue sessions and mediation associated with camp closures. At the current time, the focus is on normalising the resettlements.

At present, the Dialogue Teams still have a role in monitoring returned IDPs and local community members to ensure that any ongoing issues are resolved. There is a need to ensure that community members are aware of this role of the Dialogue Teams and see them as a resource to assist with managing issues of conflict. There should be close oversight of the role of the Dialogue Team members in managing resettlements to ascertain what is actually occurring and what adjustments might need to be made. Previous identification of a focal-point from the National Directorate of Land and Property (NDLP) to act as a resource for thematic ‘mediation clinics’ for staff engaged in land and property related mediation was a useful undertaking as reported by staff involved in the Dialogue Project. Ongoing discussions to establish a forum for coordination between the NDLP, MSS/UNDP Dialogue Teams and a range of other actors engaged in land and property related dispute-resolution could represent a useful contribution to harmonising efforts and sharing of tools between the key actors engaged in what remains a critical legacy issue of the 2006/7 Crisis.

**Specific Objectives of the Dialogue Project**

The Dialogue Project also performed well in terms of its specific objectives in assisting with managing conflicts (associated with returns/relocations of IDPs), improving the perception of State officials, strengthening the role of local authorities in conflict resolution and developing a nationwide Timorese identity based on cultural and historical traditions with some limitations and challenges.

**The Project helped to manage conflicts.** As explained above, MSS facilitated dialogue played a central leadership role in managing conflicts to support camp closures and the resettlement of IDPs. The UNDP Project improved the quality and quantity of the dialogue that was carried out by MSS.

In addition to supporting dialogue processes, capacity building in mediation also assisted with resolving conflict. One characteristic of the mediation sessions was that they involved no reference to any external legal framework or regulations but rather negotiations continued until an agreement was reached. This was both a strength and weakness as it allowed flexibility but meant that the Dialogue staff had no power to implement any particular approach but rather discussions had to continue until an agreement was reached.

The UNDP Progress Reports shows that not all cases were resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. Over the July – December 2008 reporting period, about 60% (245) of the cases required some form of formal accord to be developed between the parties, and, of these 94% (231) were resolved to the agreement of both parties. Over the January – September 2009 reporting period 302 mediations were carried out with support of the MSS/UNDP teams. About 80% of these cases required a formal

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accord but only 92 cases have been resolved to the agreement of both parties. The remaining cases are still ongoing.

The Project also extended the capacity of MSS to provide dialogue services outside Dili. By helping to set up Dialogue Teams in Ermera and Baucau, the UNDP Project assisted in managing conflicts related to the 37,000 displaced people in the Eastern Districts. This was supported extensively by NGOs, particularly CRS in Baucau and Austcare in Viqueque.

It was, technically speaking, out of the scope of the Project to deal extensively with conflict preceding 2006. However, in some areas, it ended up being necessary to incorporate such discussions into dialogue sessions to reach any kind of resolution. This was an additional challenge for the Project that was effectively handled by allowing the groups to work through the issues.

**The Project assisted in improving the perception of State Officials.** By inviting national leaders to attend dialogue sessions it created a space for engagement between them and community members and an opportunity for community members to air their grievances. Aside from anything that was said during the meetings, the presence of the leaders demonstrated their concern for the communities and the challenges faced by them. The officials were also able to use their influence to achieve positive outcomes.

On the negative side, however, on some occasions state officials did not attend when they were anticipated which led to disappointment and probably had a negative effect on perceptions. Also, the sessions often resulted in the leaders making promises about services to be provided. Given that Timor-Leste is not yet fully developed in its capacity for systematised planning, this practice of making decisions about priorities based on ideas which emerge spontaneously during meetings with the community rather than through a policy development process perhaps encourages a tendency towards haphazard and politicised service delivery planning.

**The project also helped to strengthen the role of local authorities in conflict resolution.** Locating the dialogue staff in the sub-districts facilitated better communication with local leaders. The project took steps to involve local authorities in every stage of the process. Through the pre-dialogue process, in each community a team was established for managing the process together with MSS which recognised and built up the local leaders. They also featured as facilitators and public leaders at large dialogue meetings and in the resolution ceremonies. This, in turn, encouraged them to actively continue with this role post-return. Moreover, implicit in the dialogue process are concepts about getting to the roots of conflict, resolving conflict peacefully and to encouraging a “win-win solution” which would have been likely to be adopted by the community authorities although this evaluation did not collect specific information on this. It would be useful to do so.

Training for community leaders was included in the project design. However, initially this training was postponed because of fear of overlap with the training for community leaders that was being extensively provided by other organisations, including those funded under the Small Grants Project. However, by closely coordinating with other organisations involved to avoid overlaps, training for
community leaders was implemented by CARE and CRS with funding from the Dialogue Project. Moreover, towards the end of the Project, the Dialogue Teams received Training-of-Trainers (ToT) with a view to conducting conflict resolution training for community leaders. Looking forward, however there is a need to map the training of community leaders in terms of geography and content and methodology with a view to understanding where the gaps are and deciding how they should be filled.

The project helped to strengthen nationwide Timorese identity based on cultural and historical traditions by drawing on local cultural practices around conflict resolution and linking them in a broader process. This occurred through the use in dialogue meetings of traditional ceremonies and concepts such as *nahe bitti boot, tara bandu* and *juramentu*\(^\text{12}\) as well as the allocation of a pastoral/facilitator role to traditional spiritual leaders. Some of the NGOs supported through the HHK Scheme worked specifically on promoting the concept of “one-timor” through cultural activities, which are discussed later in this paper.

**Achievements of the Small Grants Project**

The Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy Project (USD 940,991) is a small grants fund which invited proposals from international and local NGOs to implement projects with objectives in line with the HHK Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy. By funding NGOs in this way, UNDP aimed to improve coordination and links to government of activities occurring in the area of peace building under the policy framework of the HHF to complement the work of the dialogue teams and MSS led initiatives at the community level.

A call for proposals for projects of up to USD 150,000 was put out with selection criteria including, “that the Projects identify how they contribute to the objective of the HHK” and noting that the HHK identifies the areas of:

1. Strengthening the Government’s capacity to engage in dialogue;
2. Engaging with youth and martial arts groups to encourage positive contributions;
3. Information dissemination about the NRS and its implementation;
4. Promotion of internal tourism to support exchange of ideas and understanding (including go-and-see visits between communities and between IDPs and their former communities);
5. Post return/relocation monitoring of IDPs and their host communities; and
6. Dissemination of educational materials highlighting a common and shared history and culture.

A total of ten projects were approved including four projects run by international non-government organisations (INGOs), one run by an international agency (IOM) and five projects run by national non-government organisations (NNGOs). Projects were approved in districts including Dili, Baucau, Viqueque, Ermera, Liquiça, Bobonaro, Los Palos and Covalima. Initially seven projects were approved, Remaining funds

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\(^{12}\) A range of processes exist within Timor-Leste that are regularly used to resolve conflict at the community level: *nahe bitti bo’ot* represents a conflict resolution mechanism, *tara bandu* is a customary means by which rules and norms are established for social control and *juramentu* constitutes an oath-binding ceremony. All invoke linkages to the spirit world through rites and rituals employed by the community of *lia-nain* (elders).
were later used for additional projects to add more regional balance and also include more NNGOs. The Projects were for a one-year duration, commencing in mid-2008, but several Projects received no-cost extensions until the end of December 2009.

Chart 3 below summarises the focus activities of the approved projects. These included activities included in the selection criteria as well as other secondary activities. See Annex 3 for a Map of Types of Activity provided by Location under the Small Grants Project.

**Chart 3: Focus of Projects Funded by the UNDP Support for HHK Project**

**Activities included in the HHK Pillar**

1. Strengthening MSS capacity to engage in dialogue (this includes pre-return visits, dialogue and post-return trust-building)
   - CRS (Baucau)
   - Austcare (Viqueque)
   - CARE (BairoPite)

2. Engaging with Youth and Martial Arts Groups to encourage positive contributions
   - (i) **Peace-building training for youth**
     - SCJP – LP (Liquica)
     - Caritas (Dili)
     - BaFutura (Dili, Baucau, Los Palos)
   - (ii) **Skills building/livelihood activities for youth**
     - SCJP – LP (Liquica)
     - SCJP – LP (Liquica)
     - RCDS (Bobonaro)
   - (iii) **Cultural/Sporting activities for youth**
     - CARE (BairoPite)
     - CRS (Baucau)
     - Austcare (Viqueque)
     - Caritas (Dili)
     - Austcare (Viqueque)
     - SCJP – LP (Liquica)
     - RCDS (Bobonaro)

3. Information dissemination about the NRS and its implementation
   - CARE (BairoPite)
   - CRS (Baucau)
   - Austcare (Viqueque)
   - Caritas (Dili)
   - Austcare (Viqueque)
   - SCJP – LP (Liquica)
   - RCDS (Bobonaro)

4. Internal Tourism (suco and youth exchange visits)
   - IOM/PDHJ (all districts with IDP returns)
   - Austcare (Viqueque)
   - CRS (Baucau)
   - CARE (BairoPite)

5. Post return/relocation monitoring of IDPs and their host communities
   - Dissemination of education materials highlighting a common and shared history and culture
     - East-Timor Community Reflection Network (ETCRN)

**Activities not included in the HHK Pillar**

(Secondary components of selected Projects)

- Peace-building training for community leaders and others
  - BaFuturu (also women and children)
  - CRS (Baucau)
  - Austcare (Viqueque)
  - Renetil (Ermera, Maliana, Baucau)

- Community infrastructure development
  - CRS (Baucau)
  - Austcare (Viqueque&Lautem)
Activities included in the HHK Pillar

Renetil (Covalima, Ermera, Bobonaro)
Administration and finance training for suco Renetil councils

Did the Small Grants contribute to solving “the displacement challenge”?

The activities supported through the scheme which were closely related to the resettlement of IDPs were essential aspects of a coordinated set of support activities for resettlement involving the Government and many other agencies.

CARE (USD $56,231), CRS (USD $149,860) and Austcare (USD $149,915), submitted successful proposals which focused on a range of activities supporting the resettlement of IDPs. As the above table shows, the projects of these agencies had links to the three sections of the HHK cited above on page 26 in Sections 1, 3 and 5. Prior to the commencement of the Small Grants Project, these agencies had been supporting IDPs for some time first in the context of camp management and then resettlement. The way that camp management had been organised was for particular agencies to take responsibility for particular camps. As the IDPs returned into the communities, these agencies then supported resettlement into those areas where IDPs from the camps they had been managing were returning. For example, CRS worked in Comoro, CARE in Bairo Pite and Austcare in Ai-Mutin, Becora and Delta. These agencies also all received funding for programmes supporting IDPs from other sources including USAID, Irish Aid and Refugee International Japan.

With the approach whereby different agencies negotiated to divide up the focus of their programmes into specific geographic regions, these agencies effectively became extensions of Government programmes. They provided services that complemented and facilitated the Government’s activities under NRS. While the Government was closing the camps, distributing the assistance packages and holding dialogue sessions these agencies with support from the UNDP Small Grants Project and other sources:

• Assisted with camps closures,
• Monitored resettlements in regard to conflict levels and other challenges and informed the Government of emerging needs,
• Supported MSS-led dialogue processes through logistical and other assistance, and
• Acted as a communication bridge with the community regarding Government policy (HHK) and other important information.

The funding of agencies heavily involved in a coordinated response is positive for a number of reasons. With their experience, these agencies are well positioned to have a clear sense of the practical needs relating to resettlement. As participants in the HHK coordination forum, they have a good understanding of and commitment to the Government’s policy objectives. This funding approach also takes advantage of economies of scale and the agencies longer-term commitment.
The risk is that there might be overlap. This does not appear to have occurred as the agencies used funds from different donors to implement programmes in different geographical areas with the exception of CARE who used both USAID and UNDP funding to implement programmes in Bairo Pite.

Expenditure rates tended to be slow which could have been an indication of overfunding. It seems that this was not the case but rather delays in implementing programme activities appeared to be due to difficulties in securing the participation of beneficiaries. There are likely to be many reasons for this but one that was mentioned was the run-up to local elections that were held in October 2009.

Implementation by agencies working on resettlement who were funded through the Small Grants Project was not perfect. There were sometimes problems with coordination between the NGOs and MSS, for example, on day-to-day issues particularly in Dili such as ensuring joint attendance on events and sharing transport. However, overall the agencies demonstrated flexibility and a strong commitment to working together with the Government and other agencies to assist with the return of IDPs into the community.

**The Role of NGOs in Resettlement in the Districts**

The working relationship between NGOs and the Government was important in Dili. However, this relationship was particularly important in the Districts, notably the eastern districts where the large majority of the displacements had taken place. As a result of the Crisis, 37,000 people were displaced in the Eastern districts including Lautem, Viqueque, Baucau and Ermera. As stated above, the dialogue project funded staff in the districts, including four staff in Baucau and four staff in Ermera. The responsibilities of the Baucau based staff extended to managing conflicts in the districts of Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem. The responsibilities of the Ermera team included Ermera, Bobonaro, Liquica and Covalima.

Under the small grants scheme, funding for IDP resettlement work was extended to Austcare, who focused on Viqueque (including Viqueque, Uatucarabu, Viqueque Villa, Ossu and Lacluta Sub-districts) and Lautem (including all five sub-districts Luro, Muro, Tutuala and Los Palos) and CRS who focused on Baucau (including sub-districts Vemasse, Venilale and Baguia). The programme approach of these two agencies was similar and included:

- Logistical and other support for MSS led dialogue processes,
- Training for local MSS staff in conflict resolution,
- Communication to the community regarding the NRS and other important information,
- Monitoring of returns and resettlement,
- Supporting the dialogue teams and other stakeholders such as the District Administrator, PNTL and other NGOs in dialogue and conflict resolution,
- Training in conflict resolution for community leaders, IDPs and other community members, and
- Encouraging positive interaction between community members and addressing practical needs by supporting construction of small-scale community infrastructure.
Given the very limited government resources in the districts, support from NGOs has been critical. Activities supporting MSS work in IDP resettlement in the districts such as support for dialogue, capacity building for MSS, communication and monitoring and linking with other stakeholders were essential functions of the NRS and thus it was highly appropriate, effective and useful to provide funding for these complementary activities.

There were challenges in particular to working on IDP resettlement in the Districts. In this context, the social issues addressed through a peace-building project quickly become intermingled with economic and access-to-service issues. It is a challenge for peace-building projects in terms of how to respond to requests for dealing with issues which are outside their mandate. It should not be the responsibility of the NGO alone to deal with such issues but rather these issues should be discussed and an approach decided on with MSS advising on policy direction.

The context in the districts in terms of nature of the conflict, the challenges faced and the dynamics of communities is different compared to in Dili. In the districts, there are fewer layers of causes to the conflicts but in some cases the causes stretch back a long way into history. For example, in Uatulari Suco, Viqueque Villa Sub-district, Viqueque the conflict was split between two different ethnic groups and revolved around the differing political allegiances of the two groups in the context of Portuguese and Indonesian colonisation, the roots of which dated back to 1959. Community bonds are more cohesive and local community leaders and adat (traditional) leaders have more influence over the community. Furthermore, in the districts the standard of living is lower. Communities are confronted by lack of job opportunities and infrastructure and difficulties in accessing resources. One of the challenges faced by CRS working in Baucau, was a lack of enthusiasm by IDPs to return to their previous communities because of the unappealing prospect of living there.

The programming implications of this are that it makes sense to provide support for a range of integrated inter-sectoral activities for communities where resettlement is occurring. This approach was taken by Austcare and CRS who, in addition to supporting MSS and providing training for community leaders and others in conflict resolution, also provided support for small community infrastructure projects. For benefits to be sustainable, however, there needs to be continued support into the future. Given their greater level of authority in the districts, training for community leaders is particularly important in this context.

It should be noted that the Dialogue Teams in Ermera did not benefit from close support from an NGO. There was one NGO, Renetil, who was working on dialogue, village capacity development and community infrastructure development in Ermera (as well as in Bobonaro and Covalima) however their operating style was more independent of Government. Renetil also worked in sectors further removed from peace-building (village administration/finance capacity building and infrastructure development) as part of their project funded by the Small Grants Project. While a more integrated approach is appropriate in the districts, without a close working relationship with Government, the sustainability of benefits has to be questioned.

Post return/relocation monitoring of IDPs and their host communities
Monitoring of the resettlement of IDPs and their host communities is important to provide information on levels of conflict and social cohesion as well as other issues such as access to services and treatment by Government. Under the Small Grants Project, returns/relocations monitoring was supported through funding of a project implemented by the Office of the Provedor (PDHJ) in cooperation with IOM and a project implemented by CARE International. PDHJ also worked together with JRS, the UNMIT Transitional Justice and Human Rights Unit (UNHRTJS), and Belun. Monitoring was done in Dili, Ermera, Baucau and Viqueque. Together, all the above organisations formed return monitoring teams.

Return monitoring teams led by the PDHJ interviewed returnees and host communities regarding issues of security, acceptance, treatment by Government including MSS and police as well as access to water, education and electricity. The PDHJ also produced a monthly bulletin providing information on the state of affairs among IDPs. When issues of conflict were identified they were referred to the Dialogue Teams.

Collaboration between agencies including PDHJ, IOM, JRS, UNHRTJS and CARE in undertaking returns monitoring was taking place prior to the commencement of the Small Grants Project. Different funding sources have supported the implementation of returns monitoring. The collaboration between the various agencies working on different projects with different funding sources is an example of the good coordination that has existed between agencies. After some months CARE began doing their own independent monitoring due to concerns regarding methodology and the slow speed of turnover of the IOM/PDHJ Reports. Focusing on continuing and improving the joint report would have likely improved the impact of the Report.

Capacity building for the PDHJ to undertake monitoring of conditions in the community and treatment of community members by the Government is very important due to the fact that the PDHJ is the officially mandated independent institution responsible for monitoring the compliance by public bodies with the law and investigating citizens’ complaints against those public bodies. Furthermore, the PDHJ is the mandated head agency for the fifth action of the HHK pillar, Post return/relocation monitoring of IDPs and their host communities and therefore it is appropriate that they take the lead in this area. Funding and staff allocations from the Government have been minimal, therefore, collaboration with and support from development partners has been essential. Questions were raised about the fact that IOM was funded through the UNDP HHK Small Grants Project when it is not an NGO but a UN affiliated agency. However, while direct funding to a Government agency through the scheme was not possible, there were no such regulations regarding UN affiliated agencies. This was seen as the best option to enable support to the PDHJ.

The returns/relocations monitoring carried out by IOM and the PDHJ was effective. One criticism expressed by respondents to the evaluation is that the usefulness of the reports was reduced by slow turnover and small sample size. Another issue has been that in the districts outside Dili it has been difficult to make contact with returnees. These are areas for improvement in the future. It is important, however, to keep in mind the difficult operating environment and not be too critical so as to dampen the
enthusiasm of nascent institutions. Towards the end of the Project, momentum by the PDHJ has dropped off somewhat although IOM monitoring is ongoing.

**Did the small grants project contribute to operationalising the HHK pillar of the HHF and improving coordination between partners?**

This question has been partly answered in the question above on the displacement challenge. That is, this report has already discussed the ways in which the HHK pillar was operationalised and coordination was enhanced by funding of NGOs active in the area of resettlement.

The following section of the report looks at those activities supported through the scheme focused on peace-building in the general community and the extent to which these activities operationalised the HHK Pillar and how effective they were.

**Support for Positive Contributions by Youth & Martial Arts Gang Members**

Three organisations focused on supporting young people through the small grants scheme:

- Caritas Australia, support for youth in 17 sucos in Dili ($108,668)
- Sub-Commission for Justice and Peace, Dili Diocese, Liquica Parish 5 sucos in Liquica ($30,700)
- Rural Community Development Society, 6 sucos in Maliana District ($11,000)

These organisations implemented similar programmes aimed at shifting the orientation of young people away from conflict towards a more peaceful orientation as well as improving the life skills of youth. The two national organisations, SCJP-LP and RCDS had previously implemented similar programmes funded by Caritas.

The programmes above have provided support for a large number of young people in a range of activities including:

- conflict resolution training
- inter-community exchanges and visits among youth
- sporting and cultural events
- skills development including preparation of proposals for small livelihood activities

Support for encouraging positive contributions from youth is one of the key actions of the HHK pillar. The rationale stems from the involvement of youth in social unrest and the recommendations from reports produced around the time of the crisis that there was a need to create opportunities for young people to learn positive behaviour patterns and express their creativity. For example, the establishment of youth centres was recommended in the Stanbury Report (2006).

The projects appeared to have assisted young people in developing a more pro-peace outlook and new skills. In the Caritas project, for example, considerable time and effort has gone into supporting young people to develop proposals for small-scale
activities to be undertaken in their Suco. The approach of the Project was to contract Project Officers from the Suco. This was a challenging way to manage the Project. Much time and effort needed to be put into capacity building of the Project Officers for this role. Also, the approach tended to entice attempts from Suco leaders to become brokers in the recruitment, which had complications. However, the approach was well worth the effort to build up the skills and knowledge of young community members so that they would be able to apply in the future in seeking other opportunities.

Projects such as the Caritas Project (all three projects working with young people were very similarly structured) appeared to be positively supporting young people. Furthermore, there is a definite rationale for capacity building for youth as it tends to be young people that get involved in violence. However, unlike those activities directly linked to the resettlement of IDPs, in regard to activities supporting youth there is not an obvious feedback mechanism which demonstrates whether the Project is having an impact. If resettlement is not working then it becomes clear very quickly, widespread violent and antisocial activity by young people involved in martial arts groups had already largely calmed down by the start of 2008. Therefore more work is required to investigate the impact of projects such as these. It may be possible to look at their impact on the level of sporadic violence (which is still ongoing throughout the country). This is important to gauge the likelihood of youth becoming involved in violence again if triggered by another political crisis.

Furthermore, to ensure sufficient impact and sustainability of benefits, a certain level of coverage needs to be achieved and activities supporting youth need to be integrated into a comprehensive strategy to improve opportunities for youth. Such an approach should be led by Government, but not by MSS. In the HHK, the second Key Action, focus on youth, is intended to be led by the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport.

The need for this comprehensive approach can be seen in the interactions between NGOs and young people on the Small Grants Project. NGOs stated during the evaluation that once the atmosphere of violence following the crisis had decreased, it was difficult to attract the interest of young people in activities focused specifically on peace and conflict resolution. There needed to be some aspect which benefited them personally such as support for livelihood activities. As a result NGOs working on peace-building tended to move into activities focused on livelihood development. However, due to the poor state of markets for local products as well as market linkages, obtaining a sufficient level of benefit for youth is extremely difficult. Livelihood projects would be better implemented in the context of a strategy to create markets and market linkages. This is a broader problem with the state of economic development in Timor-Leste and not something, which could have been addressed within the scope of the Projects.

The need for a comprehensive multi-sector strategy for longer-term peace-building was acknowledged in the National Recovery Strategy and it was for this reason that a number of pillars were included. The Hamutuk Hari’i Social Ekonomia Pillar, to be led by the Ministry of Economy and Development, was included based on the recognition that some of the roots of conflict were related to economic issues. This pillar would have been the ideal basis for coordinated analysis and holistic strategy development on employment and livelihoods for youth. Unfortunately,
operationalisation in this pillar has lagged behind as the Ministry of Economic Development was reluctant to prioritise IDPs or their return and favoured nationwide economic development that was more broadly targeted.

Another issue which bears on the effectiveness of capacity building for youth is the issue of targeting. The minority of young people who become involved in violence are not necessarily going to be the ones who put their hands up to attend NGO training courses and programmes. A special effort needs to be taken to secure the involvement of hardcore martial arts gang members. Here again the issue of cross over between social and economic issues comes up. To garner the interest of these young people there needs to be something in it for them.

**Dissemination of education materials highlighting a common and shared history and culture**

One NGO, the East-Timor Community Reflection Network (ETCRN), focused on operationalising this sixth key action of the Trust-Building Pillar. The ETCRN sought to do this by publicising the key findings and messages of the Report from the CAVR, *Chega!* The ETCRN staff have addressed the challenging subject of discussing the events of 2006 through reflecting on the recommendations and findings of the *Chega!* report. ETCRN held seminars providing viewings of the documentary and communicating key findings of the Report. The focus was not on incriminating individuals but rather encouraging people to reflect on the past to help them understand the future. Nevertheless being exposed to the findings of the Report is deeply upsetting to some people. This needed to be handled sensitively. There is definitely scope for the Report to be publicized more widely. The ETCRN team only visited some of the districts and only to sub-district level so there are still many people who are not familiar with the Report.

**Conflict resolution training**

Training in conflict resolution/peace-building for community leaders and other community members was implemented by Ba Futuru, CRS, Austcare, Renetil and SCJP-LP (the latter for youth) as part of their projects. This training is critical, particularly for community leaders as they have a traditional role in adjudicating conflict resolution. Enhancing their skills so that community leaders are more effective, confident, respected and pro-peace is critical if long-term peace is to be maintained. Evidence shows that the level of conflict is less in areas where there are strong community leaders\(^\text{13}\). In general it is positive that this training has been carried out with community leaders. However, some of this training has been provided in one-off week-long sessions. Evidence shows that training is probably more effective when it is integrated into a programme of capacity building. This does not mean that stand-alone training programmes are all ineffective, but they should be provided in the context of a longer-term programme. Furthermore, it is important that appropriate methodologies are adopted. The approach should not be one of imparting a body of knowledge so much as building on community leaders existing skills and knowledge through participatory learning methodologies.

\(^{13}\) Cook-tonkin, Louise, 2007, Peace Building Report
As already explained in this report, training for community leaders was planned in the Dialogue Project as well. Some training of community leaders was “outsourced” to NGOs. This was a reasonable decision. However, to maximise impact responsibility for overseeing training of community leaders in conflict resolution should be taken on by MSS in the future. This does not imply that MSS must necessarily deliver the training but rather it should take on a supervisory role, monitoring the quality, methodology and distribution and identifying gaps and needs.

In this regard it would be useful if a mapping exercise of the geographic distribution of community training was carried out, the individuals trained (there has recently been a local level election held and the individuals may have changed), the subjects covered and the methodologies employed. This could provide a basis for a needs analysis and future programming in this area.

Small Community Infrastructure Development

Three of the Projects provided support for small infrastructure development as part of their projects including CRS, Austcare and Renetil who were rehabilitating community halls, rubbish facilities, bridges and water supply facilities. Plans for infrastructure development emerged on these peace-building projects as community meetings over peace-building issues led to communities expressing interest to do something tangible for the community. Also, as stated above, it is easier to garner the interest of communities in something with practical application rather than a pure focus on social issues. This approach is reasonable although it would be better if infrastructure projects were implemented as part of a comprehensive strategy led by Government. When implementing such projects, care should be taken to ensure that the constructions are of sufficient technical quality, are sustainable with appropriate management arrangements and are not overlapping with other programmes. These caveats are particularly important as infrastructure development may not normally fall within the expertise of peace-building project managers.

Did the Projects contribute to peace and stability in the longer-term as well as the UNDP CPAP?

The Dialogue Project and many of the activities funded under the Small Grants project were crisis response interventions, designed to deal with the immediate issue of IDP resettlement and the occurrence of conflict within the community. However, it is likely that many of the benefits of the Projects will have an impact in the long-term mostly in the area of conflict management at the community level. The fact that the Projects focused on improving traditional conflict resolution practices, linked to support from Government, bodes well for sustainability as people have learned through the Project to adapt what they already do, rather than taken on an entirely new approach. The traditional conflict resolution practices that have been the focus of the Projects include the practice of resolving conflict through negotiation between parties, facilitation of conflict resolution by local authorities and the use of traditional cultural concepts such nahe biti boot and tara bandu to seal and confirm particular resolutions. The project has sought to give community leaders more confidence in their roles and to apply new concepts to apply to their conflict resolution that are more focused on achieving a “win-win” solution and getting to the roots of conflict. The
presence and leadership of Government staff in undertaking these practices provides the legitimacy and leadership that is required to consolidate them.

Furthermore the capacity of MSS has been enhanced by the development of a cadre of 34 staff with abilities in facilitating dialogue and mediation as well as training skills. The Government will take on seven of these staff as part of the planned Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion. They would have taken more had their requested budget been approved.

**There is, however, a need to take stock by undertaking a mapping exercise of (i) what training/capacity building has been received by whom (as described above); and (ii) community perceptions of conflict and how it is and should be resolved.** This should form the basis for future planning because it is clear that if benefits are to be sustainable work is not finished in this area. There is a need to consolidate and expand the capacity building in conflict resolution at the local level.

Given their size and scope, the Projects are likely to contribute significantly to prospects for peace and stability in the long-term. However, there are many issues beyond their scope, which are likely to be underlying factors contributing to potential for conflict, which have not yet been dealt with.

- **High unemployment remains.** A strong indicator for ‘holding the peace’ in post-conflict environments is economic recovery. However, while Timor-Leste has been said to have been experiencing high economic growth recently in the non-oil economy (12.8 percent in 2008) this has been generated primarily through the public sector. The sectors that could provide a basis for employment among the population (e.g. manufacturing, agriculture and SME sector) are still very weak. This can be seen in the fact that a large proportion of consumable products are imported, which is demonstrated by Timor’s balance of trade figures from 2008; imports were valued at $258 million compared to $13 million for export. The lack of a viable economy providing job opportunities means that there will continue to be large numbers of unemployed youth with the potential to be drawn into violent conflict.

- **Limited access to public utilities (water, sanitation and electricity), infrastructure and other resources** among the population. The grants were provided to IDPs to rebuild houses without a systematic plan for service provision to the properties (electricity, water supply and sanitation). The return of large numbers of people into communities dramatically changed the dynamics around demand for resources/services, which could lead to conflict if not managed carefully. In the districts service delivery is much thinner than in Dili.

- **Vulnerability to climatic changes**, which may affect agricultural cycles and lead to increased food insecurity and consequent conflict over resources.

- **Dislocations are likely to continue to occur** into the future due to land being called upon for planned development projects. Changes in land ownership

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15 IMF, Selected Social and Economic Indicators, distributed to the Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting (TLDPM) quoted in Lao Hamutuk’s Statement to on the 2010 Budget to Parliamentary Committee C
caused by the finalisation of the Land Law and the cadastral system may also cause conflict.

- **Cleavages within the community** related to ethnic identity and roles in past conflicts, conflicts and overlapping mandates within the security sector, gang membership and other issues still exist as do fierce political rivalries among the country’s leadership. There is still the possibility in the future for the community to be polarised in connection with political issues leading to instability once again.

- **The justice system is still under development** and is yet to become a fully independent and efficient third pillar. The way that some highly political cases have been dealt with has led to a perception of impunity which on the one hand fuels resentment and on the other encourages a perception that criminal and violent actions can be taken without consequences.

- **There are still problems with resettlement** relating to social jealousies, houses built in inappropriate locations and disagreements over property ownership.

**What was the UNDP contribution to an inter-sectoral approach to recovery from the Crisis (as outlined in the NRS)?**

It was in recognition of the wide-ranging causes of conflict that the National Recovery Strategy was designed to be a broad-based multi-sectoral approach to national recovery that would provide a strong basis for peace. Unfortunately, the Pillars of the NRS focused on bringing about improvements relating to the underlying causes of conflict have not been operationalised to the same extent as HHK and HHU, which were those Pillars most practically linked to facilitating the resettlement of IDPs.

**Did the Projects effectively promote the full participation of women and men in conflict resolution and peace-building?**

The dialogue project has performed reasonably well on gender issues, given the cultural context. In terms of the HR procurement strategy, about 30 percent of the Dialogue Teams are women. Interviews with the Capacity Development Mentor and the Project Manager reveal that women have performed as effectively as men as facilitators of dialogue and mediation.

It has been a challenge to harness the full participation of women in dialogue meetings. Particularly in rural areas and more traditional contexts, women tend not to speak or often even be present at large public meetings. Women tended to participate more actively in mediation meetings aimed at resolving conflicts within or between individual households.

**Looking forward there are at least two priority challenges for promoting greater participation of women on the Project:**

- **Harnessing the special role of women as peace-builders.** Experience with the CAVR and the Dialogue Project reveals that some women can be highly effective facilitators of dialogue and mediation due to their sensitivity and flexible approach. Recognising this, more effort should be placed into raising
the proportion and increasing the skills and confidence of female dialogue staff.

- **Making a special effort to include women’s views and needs in conflict resolution and peace-building activities.** Given that women are less likely to participate, their needs and views may not be captured in conflict resolution methodologies unless there is a special effort to do so. Aside from women’s inalienable right to have their views heard, moving ahead without incorporating the views of all community members often has negative consequences later on. Consideration should be given to having separate women only discussions or ensuring women have the chance to speak in a less threatening environment such as in smaller pre-dialogue forums prior to the large meetings. When facilitating a more active role for women, however, consideration must be given to the consequences for women of speaking out in terms of the danger it might put them in.

### Were the Objectives of the Project Achieved in an Effective Manner?

The Terms of Reference for this assignment cover the topic of the approach to project implementation in terms of questions regarding the effectiveness of the approach to project management, the approach to capacity building and the approach to coordination and communication.

#### Approach to Project Management and Capacity Building on the Dialogue Project

**Project Management**

The approach to project management was one of the key strengths of the Dialogue Project. This included the innovative approach of joint management between UNDP and MSS. This enabled UNDP to inform programme direction and promote national ownership, while supporting the HR capacity and financial reporting capacity but also ensured that the activities were fully integrated into the work of the Ministry. The strong leadership of the DNAS Director was also a definite bonus to developing a good partnership with the Ministry. The dual management approach is not necessarily something that should continue over a long period of time, but rather in the start up of a new programming direction.

Application of this innovative management approach should be considered more widely as a way to get moving on new programme directions, particularly in post-conflict development settings at a fairly low stage of capacity development, such as Timor Leste.

In addition, the recruitment of a national project manager and fostering his strong leadership skills was able to provide technical direction and cultural savvy to implementation. Administrative oversight lagged behind. UNDP provided some administrative support directly due to the Project Managers high workload. The project also provided the Project Manager with opportunities to extend his knowledge in the area of peace-building and conflict transformation including opportunities to participate in courses on conflict transformation at reputable international institutions.
in Sweden and Japan. The fact that there was a team leader who had a background in peace-building in Timor, had been extensively involved in the programme design and had a very good understanding of the Project objectives also helped to steer the project in the right direction.

There were some weaknesses in project management on the administrative side including delays in obtaining approvals for proposals to implement certain activities. Some of these were likely a consequence of the need in some cases for approvals from both the UNDP and the MSS side. Others were a consequence of the Project Manager having the dual role of managing technical and administrative aspects of the Project. The promotion of one of the dialogue staff into the position of project assistant has been a very positive step in regard to improving administrative efficiency on the Project and could have been done earlier. These matters can impact on project progress. For example, the Baucau Dialogue Team, during consultations as part of this evaluation, mentioned that they had been waiting for some weeks for a proposal to be approved for Dialogue sessions in Uatulari and that the delay was causing some momentum to be lost in the community.

**Capacity Building**

The Dialogue project performed well in terms of supporting the Government of Timor-Leste in Institutional Strengthening.

As a new Government, the GoTL is still in the process of developing effective planning and management practices. This often resulted in problems in implementing approved policies due to difficulties in planning and a lack of resourcing for operational requirements, clarity about roles and responsibilities and appropriate skills and knowledge of staff in positions of responsibility.

The UNDP Dialogue project utilised an innovative approach to institutional strengthening. Rather than simply providing advisory support or training to explain how the programme in question could be run effectively, UNDP chose to demonstrate an approach to programme implementation. This was done by supporting the recruitment and training of staff on Government contracts and undertaking joint supervision of these staff with the Government. Such an approach should have greater scope to influence the Government’s way of doing things than that which consists of supporting programmes entirely run by Government with advisers and training courses for staff. It allowed UNDP to model to the Government an approach to programme implementation including recruitment, training and management of staff and planning and implementation of activities.

This can be seen, for example, in the approach to recruitment of the staff. The staff were recruited into MSS onto standard government pay-scale but the recruitment was facilitated by UNDP and involved a thorough multi-staged process involving CV submission, testing and interviews with standard questions and responses marked in a matrix according to an agreed scale. UNDP and MSS representatives sat on the interview panel. The result of this process, which in Dili for example, resulted in the selection of 25 staff from an applicant pool of over 400. This process can be said to be more impartial, standardised and thorough compared to other similar recruitment
processes. The thoroughness of the process was noted by MSS staff and the capacities of staff on the Dialogue Teams were noted by respondents to the Ministry.

This approach was not without its challenges, however. Joint management by MSS and UNDP meant that processing of payments such as salaries were delayed as MSS staff had difficulties with financial reporting and providing supporting documents. Training of MSS Finance Staff by UNDP Finance staff assisted in ironing out some of the issues. Such training could have been usefully implemented from the project outset.

Another issue related to the “modelling” approach described above is that because the Project “entry point” was one directorate, rather than the Ministry as a whole, there might be limited scope for the approach to be emulated by the Government in the future. Within MSS there has been much more assistance on a programme basis than on a whole-of-ministry basis. There is a need for more assistance to strengthen whole-of-ministry systems, for example in relation to annual planning, budget planning, financial management, HR policy and information management and logistics management.

The Dialogue staff were subject to extensive training. An initial induction course was provided on mediation, dialogue and facilitation. Not all dialogue staff received this training because they had not all been recruited at this stage. Subsequent to this, a total of 22 training courses have been provided in topics including conflict transformation, conflict analysis, mediation skills, dialogue skills, facilitation skills, listening skills, the use of the arts in peace-building, English training, proposal and report writing, meetings management and organisational management. Training was provided by a total of 11 providers including MSS, UNDP Project Management staff and UNDP Dialogue project capacity development mentor, the National Directorate for Land and Property (Ministry of Justice), Ba Futuru, CPI Partners (funded by World Bank), JICA, Minandanao Peace-building Institute, the East Timor Community Reflection Network, Consensus Group, the East Timor Development Association (ETDA) and the Centre for Peace Development at Duta Wacana Kristian University, Yogyakarta.

A Capacity Development Mentor (CDM) was recruited some months into the Project. This was a good decision as it facilitated a focused approach to capacity building of the Dialogue staff based on training needs analysis and enabled oversight of methodologies. It might have been beneficial if the position had been recruited at the start of the Project. Due to the high level of interest in the dialogue staff among donors and agencies it is likely that some of the training was rather supply driven as organisations elected to deliver their pre-developed training packages to the team. The Capacity Development Mentor facilitated a more selective approach to training. This approach is encouraged in future initiatives to continue basing training on an ongoing analysis of needs and priorities to ensure that staff continue to have the opportunity to develop their skills and that courses provided are not repetitive or overlapping.

Dialogue staff also expressed a desire to achieve higher levels of qualification through their training. This should be followed up on through the provision of certificates for
training received. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of providing a select number of staff the opportunities for studying for higher qualifications

**Approach to Project Management and Capacity Building on the Small Grants Project**

Project Management on the Small Grants Project was effective, particularly following the recruitment of a dedicated project manager. At the beginning of the project it was managed by the Social Reintegration Team Leader. The Project Manager monitored project implementation and provided overall financial oversight. The job of the Project Manager in monitoring could have been made easier by the collection of better baseline data by NGOs consisting of qualitative and quantitative data. It is quite difficult to measure the impact of activities such as training for youth and some focus groups at the start of the Project might have been a useful way to identify whether progress had been made. Such steps are rarely taken but it would be useful if they were.

Project management by the NGOs themselves was reasonably effective but impaired by a couple of factors:

- **Difficulty of securing the timely participation of beneficiaries in project events.** A number of the NGOs experienced this difficulty particularly in the districts where peoples’ ability to travel to events is impaired by distance, lack of transport and lack of access during the wet season.
- **Changes in the cost of inputs such as food and beverages for training sessions and vehicle hire.** However, it would also be useful for UNDP to have an independent understanding of the realistic costs for certain items in each district. Collecting and maintaining such information should not be difficult, perhaps a database could be prepared in collaboration with other partners.

**Coordination, Partnership and Communication Systems on the Projects**

Coordination was another strength on both of the Projects. The main mechanism for coordination for MSS and stakeholders was the HHK Working Group. This group met fortnightly both in Dili and Baucau. The group was well attended by a range of stakeholders including NGOs, UN Agencies, UNPOL and ISF. The group provided an effective forum for exchanging information and identifying needs to be followed up on. As with most of these groups, there was definitely room for more Government ownership in the sense that key government staff did not always attend the meetings due to other commitments. This is very much the norm for such groups in Timor due to the high workload of staff in management positions and tendency not to delegate or build up management capacity of more junior staff. The fact that the group was dominated by outside agencies was not ideal but given the large number of partners operating in the sector the coordination opportunity provided by this forum was critical. Of all the working groups established to support the NRS the HHK Working Group was the only one that continued to function beyond the immediate period following the launching of the Strategy. UNDP provided secretariat services to the HHK Working Group so UNDP had a direct role in ensuring the regularity of the group, which was a significant factor in its usefulness. Good quality minutes of the
meetings were kept reliably which provide an excellent source of information on the operationalisation of the HHK.

The fact that coordination mechanisms around the other Pillars of the Strategy were not functioning meant that there was often pressure to address issues that were outside the TORs of the Group. This was not a weakness of the group but rather a challenge that it faced due to factors beyond its control.

There was also a peace-building working group for more general peace-building initiatives. This group did not meet as regularly which is perhaps understandable given that such initiatives did not have the same urgency to coordinate as there was with camp closures. Furthermore, this group has not had as tight a focus as the HHK Group. It would seem at this stage as all organisations are moving beyond an exclusive focus on IDPs that it is sensible to combine the two groups.

*Communication*

The communication strategy for the Projects has been strong with the publication of many pamphlets, brochures, the production of a video and advertisements on radio and television about upcoming dialogues, as well as press releases facilitated by a dedicated UNDP/ MSS Communication and Outreach Officer located fulltime at MSS.

*Where to from here?*

**What are the issues, modalities and partnerships that should be the focus of the Sector?**

Looking forward there is a need for the Government to define its policy priorities around peace and stability. As in regard to NRS, the political pressure has focused on solving “the displacement challenge” and this largely been resolved. It is hoped that peace-building for long-term social stability and cohesion will remain a high priority and the approach to these goals will be to take a holistic approach to socio-economic development as the basis of a solid grounding for peace, as was envisaged in the NRS. There remain issues that are likely to trigger conflict. These include unresolved disputes relating to resettlement and new dislocations relating to potential conflicts resulting from the implementation of the Land Law and measuring of the Cadastral System. Furthermore there is a need to proactively promote the strengthening of the community fabric and conflict resolution mechanisms at the community level. *Given UNDP’s strong relationship with MSS and experience, it should continue to support the Government in moving forward in policy development for peace-building.*

At the current time there is a plan to absorb some of the Dialogue Team members into a new department in MSS, to be known as the Department of Peace-building and Social Cohesion (DPBSC), to be housed under the National Directorate for Social Assistance. For next year, however, the Government has limited resources through the state budget to operationalise this department. It is appropriate for UNDP to provide support to this new Department due to its current role supporting this area as well as its relevant international experience and networks.
So what might be the responsibilities of this department? Clearly not all responsibilities for peace-building can be taken on by MSS. MSS’ relative strengths in operationalising a response means that it often gets requests to respond to initiatives outside its official responsibilities. NDSA should take on a role in peace-building within the context of its mandate. This is important as there are other Government stakeholders with a current or developing role in peace-building. These include:

- The National Directorate for Community Conflict Prevention in the SOS for Security is currently developing a role in peace-building including a conflict monitoring system and a peace-building department.
- The PDHJ has a mandated role for mediation and conciliation in regard to disputes between citizens and the State.
- The National Directorate for Disaster Management (NDMD), MSS is responsible for coordinating prevention, mitigation, response and recovery in relation to all disasters including episodes of violent conflict/social unrest.

Effective coordination with these and other stakeholders will be essential. It would be useful to establish a mechanism similar to the HHK Working Group. MSS could take a lead role in such a forum.

From a policy perspective (articulated in the draft Social and Humanitarian Assistance Policy), NDSA involvement in peace building comes from a mandate to assist vulnerable members of the community and to prevent and respond to humanitarian emergencies, in other words from a mandate for social protection and emergency response. Vulnerable members of the community are difficult to define in Timor where the majority of the population are vulnerable to food insecurity, malnutrition and natural disasters, among other things. In this case the concept should be of a particularly high level of vulnerability to conflict. Peace-building in a more general sense which includes the delivery of services for improved social and economic development should be a cross cutting issue that is a whole-of-government responsibility and for which different departments and agencies have specific terms of reference.

Monitoring of resettlements and other potential issues of conflict could be considered a key priority for the DPBSC. This does not mean that DPBSC necessarily needs to do the monitoring but rather should take responsibility for ensuring that it is carried out effectively. The Department would need to coordinate on this with other stakeholders who are currently or potentially involved in monitoring conflict such as the NDCCP, PNTL and the NGO Belun who have developed a conflict early warning system.

DPBSC could also continue to play a role mediation and dialogue. However, again DPBSC should specifically identify which issues it will get involved in to avoid overlapping with the mandate of other agencies. In relation to the measuring of the cadastral system/implementation of the Land Law, discussions have been held between DNTP and MSS about Dialogue staff assisting with mediation and facilitation on this issue. This is due to the Dialogue staffs’ knowledge and experience of the issues having been involved in facilitating on Land and Property issues in
recent months. This seems appropriate; however, the DPBSC should take care not to overlap with DNTP mandate.

*Capacity Building for Community Leaders in Conflict Resolution* is a very important area and there have been some real achievements recently with support from the UNDP and other partners. **It would be appropriate for MSS to take leadership in this area by ensuring oversight of the coverage and quality of training, forward planning and delivering the training if necessary.** In regard to training for community leaders there will need to be strong coordination with the Ministry for State Administration and Territorial Organisation.

**Oversight and monitoring of the impact of programmes supporting youth.** Responsibilities in this area would need to be shared with Secretary of State for Youth and Sports. However, given the big role that young people have played in fuelling episodes of social unrest in the past, keeping an eye on where things are at with youth issues can be seen to be central to work in peace-building.

*Community strengthening could be a priority for DPBSC.* This means building ways of thinking, behaving and interacting within the community that promote peace. This can be done through organising activities such as sport and arts that promote togetherness, healthy competition and creativity, Peace Building through small scale community infrastructure development that promotes social cohesion and promotional materials for peace. The focus for MSS should be on communities that have been identified as particularly vulnerable to conflict. This approach raises an issue of fairness and of rewarding bad behaviour by providing only support to communities where there has been a breakdown in ethical behaviour. However, it is important to remember that MSS is responsible for social protection and humanitarian/emergency response not social and infrastructure development in general. Issues of balance should be addressed across the whole of Government and not just be the responsibility of MSS.

**In supporting the new department, the international community should ensure that it continues to encourage the Government to provide adequate funding for its policy priorities through the national budget.** This should occur through a phased approach, whereby support is gradually reduced for the unit over a two to three year period.

While a “department” is a very small unit within the Government structure (sitting under the level of Directorate) it is considered to be worthwhile focusing support for the DPBSC given the high importance of peace-building as an issue and its centrality to the UNDP mandate for assistance. Hopefully, through collaboration in the establishment of the new Department, UNDP can continue the strong partnership it has developed with the Ministry of Social Solidarity in the area of peace-building and trust-building through the Dialogue Project and the Small Grants Project.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

To support the National Recovery Strategy, the UNDP designed the two projects over 2008-2009: These included:
• Support for the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy (known as the HHK NGOs Small Grants Project); and
• Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue (known as the Dialogue Project)

These projects were aimed at assisting with the resettlement of IDPs and operationalising the Trust Pillar (Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa). Both projects were effective, particularly in regard to support for the reintegration of IDPs. The Dialogue Project assisted with the management of conflict through a project jointly managed with MSS, whereby a team of 34 dialogue staff were recruited onto Government contracts and trained in facilitating dialogue and mediation. Over the course of the Project so far, these staff facilitated over 120 pre-dialogue and dialogue sessions and almost 700 mediation sessions in Dili, Baucau, Viqueque and Ermera. The Dialogue Project performed well on its objectives of helping to manage conflicts, improve the perception of state officials, raise the involvement of local authorities in resettlement and promote the Timorese culture through recognizing and mainstreaming cultural conflict prevention mechanisms.

The Small Grants Project is supporting projects aimed at implementing projects in line with the key actions identified under the Trust-Building Pillar (HHK) of the NRS. The Small Grants Project succeeded in its objective of operationalising the HHK. The projects related specifically to supporting resettlement of IDPs were focused on key activities and filling gaps that were needed to assist with resettlement. This included accompaniment of MSS dialogue processes, providing a range of support for communities with re-integration of IDPs, community stabilisation activities monitoring or returns/resettlements and providing information about the HHF.

The Small Grants Project also supported activities focused on peace-building in the general community, including support for young people, conflict resolution training for community leaders and distribution of information regarding the report from the CAVR, Chega! These activities were also positive contributions but their long-term impact is less clear. The impact of the UNDP Projects on peace-building in the longer-term was marred by the fact that other pillars of the strategy focused on dealing with broader underlying causes of conflict were not implemented. Furthermore, peace-building activities tend to quickly dovetail into other sectors (infrastructure and livelihood development) as communities wish to focus on their practical needs. However, without the other Ministries taking the lead in the areas allocated to them under the NRS, there is limited scope for such activities to be integrated into a comprehensive strategy which is required if they are to have a significant impact. They will, nonetheless, continue to ease pressure in vulnerable communities within this limited scope.

While the Dialogue Project and the Small Grants Project have been successful, more work is required in the area of peace-building. There are still many issues likely to cause conflict into the future resulting in an ongoing need for dialogue and mediation services as well as pro-active activities to strengthen the community fabric. The Government plans to set up a Department of Peace-building and Social Cohesion within the Ministry of Social Solidarity. It is recommended that UNDP provide support for such a department, in order to assist with provision of the above services.
It will be important, however, that with such support from UNDP comes a commitment from the Government in the medium-term to allocate resources to its policy priority in the area of peace-building. MSS should also be encouraged not to step outside its mandate, but to focus its work on social issues and social relationship strengthening although this is sometimes difficult, given that operationalisation in other sectors as is required is sometimes lacking.
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Annex 1: Key Pillars of the National Recovery Strategy

I. **Hamutuk Hari’i Uma** which included the provision of in-kind or financial assistance to rebuild homes with a focus on restoring occupants to their former places of occupancy prior to 2006. This was a simple approach of providing a range of assistance packages depending on categories of damage/need and did not try to address property ownership issues or compensate for losses incurred during the 2006 Crisis.

II. **Hamutuk Hari’i Protesaun** which included support for vulnerable members of the community, meet food security needs of the food insecure,

III. **Hamutuk Hari’i Estabilidade** which aimed to create an environment of stability by dealing with multi-tiered security issues including publicising progress being made in regard to high profile security issues (e.g., M. Alfredo and the Petitioners), increase the police presence in camps and communities, support for conflict resolution mechanisms including formalisation of suco council dispute resolution mandate,

IV. **Hamutuk Hari’i Ekonomia Sosial** which aimed to create livelihood opportunities with short, medium and long-term benefits with a focus on activities that will contribute to reintegration of displaced persons. This included proposals for labour intensive employment generation schemes in the infrastructure, agriculture and environmental protection sectors and increasing the availability of microfinance

V. **Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa** which aimed at strengthening trust between the people and the government and throughout the society and building social cohesion through dialogue, support for increasing the productive contribution of youth and martial arts groups, internal tourism, monitoring of returns and supporting awareness of a shared and common history.
Annex 2: List of Key Interviews Held

Mark Green,
County Director, Caritas Australia, Timor Leste

Florentino Sarmento,
Program Manager, Catholic Relief Services, Timor Leste

Richard Bowd,
Program Manager, CARE international, Timor Leste

Robert Hull,
Representative, Irish Aid, Timor Leste

Sarah Wong,
Manager New Zealand Aid, Timor Leste

Simon Poppelwell,
Project Manager, HHK, UNDP, Timor Leste

Alissar Chaker,
ARR, Head CPR UNIT, UNDP, Timor Leste

Ben Larke,
Social Reintegration Advisor, UNDP, Timor Leste

Olga Da Costa,
Project Manager Austcare/Action Aid, Timor Leste

Lin Cao,
Head of Monitoring and Evaluation, UNDP Timor Leste

Ayako Higuchi,
Programme Analyst, UNDP CPR Unit, Timor Leste

Jose Belo,
Project Manager Dialogue Project, UNDP, Timor Leste

Richard Markowski,
Head of Programmes, Catholic Relief Services, Timor Leste

Louise Cook Tonkin,
Capacity Development Mentor, Dialogue Project, UNDP

Nick Beresford,
Deputy Country Director Operations, UNDP, Timor Leste
Matt Everit,  
Camp Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council, Timor Leste

Gonzalo Recalde,  
Representative, International Organisation for Migration ,Timor Leste

Rebecca Engel,  
Senior Advisor, Belun

Luiz Veira,  
Chief of Mission, International Organisation for Migration, Timor Leste

Youth Representatives  
Tibar Suco, Liquica

Youth Representatives  
Ulmera Suco, Liquica

Henrique Da Costa,  
District Commander PNTL Baucau

Jacinto Rigoberto Gomes,  
Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Ministry of Social Solidarity

Representatives,  
UNPOL, Ermera District

Augusto Soares  
Representative, NZAID

Jose Caetano  
ETCRN, Ita Nia Ria

Fiona Howell,  
Advisor to the Director for Social Assistance, MSS

Lucy Kaval  
Advisor, Ba Futuru

Maria Domingos Fernandes Alves  
Minister of Social Solidarity

Representatives,  
Returns and Community Stabilisation Project CRS, Baucau

Working Group Members,  
HHK Working Group
Dialogue team Staff,
Dialogue Project, UNDP Timor Leste

Rui Da Costa,
Project Manager, Renetil Timor Leste

Representatives,
Sub-Commission Justice and Peace Liquica District

Osorio Jose da Conceicao,
Representative, Office of the Provodor

Louisa Medhurst,
Protection and Social Assistance, Norwegian Refugee Council, Timor Leste

Lyn Wan,
Head of Austcare/Action Aid, Timor Leste

Fernando Encarnação
Advisor, International Labour Organisation

Representatives,
Camea Suco, Becora, Dili

Representatives,
Caicoli Suco, Vera Cruz, Dili

Sophia Cason,
Communication Specialist, Ministry of Social Solidarity

Sossi Tatikyan,
Programme Officer, CPR Unit, UNDP Timor Leste

Barney Chittick,
Representative, International Organisation for Migration Timor Leste

Ibere Lopes,
Advisor, National Directorate of Land and Property, Timor Leste
Annex 3: Map of Activities implemented under the Support for the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy Project by Location

Timor-Leste
NGO Small Grants Fund supported under the 'Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy' Project 2009

$750,977
Total Funding Committed (USD)