

**MID TERM EVALUATION REPORT SUSTAINABLE INTEGRATION AND RECOVERY IN NORTH OSSETIA-ALANIA**

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**Vladikavkaz February 2011**

# List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **BAC** | **Business Advisory Centre** |
| **CAP** | **Common Appeal Process** |
| **CF NOA** | **Children’s Fund of North Ossetia Alania** |
| **DRC** | **Danish Refugee Council** |
| **FAO** | **Food & Agricultural Organisation** |
| **HDI** | **Human Development Index** |
| **HDR** | **Human Development Report** |
| **DP** | **Displaced Person** |
| **ILO** | **International Labour Organisation** |
| **MDG** | **Millennium Development Goal** |
| **MTE** | **Midterm Evaluation** |
| **MFI** | **Micro Finance Institution** |
| **MoU** | **Memorandum of Understanding** |
| **NO-A** | **The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania** |
| **NGO** | **Non Government Organisation** |
| **QIP** | **Quick Impact Project** |
| **RUB** | **Roubles** |
| **SIYB** | **Start and Improve Your Business Programme** |
| **STG** | **Sovremennie Tehnologii Grupp Ltd** |
| **ToR** | **Terms of Reference** |
| **ToT** | **Training of trainers** |
| **UNHSTF** | **United Nations Human Security Trust Fund** |
| **UN** | **United Nations** |
| **UNDP** | **United Nations Development Programme** |
| **UNDSS** | **United Nations Department of Safety and Security** |
| **UNHCR** | **United Nation High Commission for Refugees** |

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# 1. Executive Summary

The project has to date been implemented successfully and there is a good chance that implementation can be successfully completed within the timeframe. That being said objectives 1.1, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.2 pose specific challenges if they are to be completed within the allotted timeframe.

The main findings of the evaluation report are as follows

1. The design and development of the project was a slow and cumbersome process. This has resulted in a documentation that is overly ambitious, nine objectives and 29 outputs, lacks causal logic and is unrealistic in the targets set, given the resources available.

2. However the content of the proposal, in terms of problems addressed and activities proposed, was at the time of design and at the current time remain relevant. The one benchmark that has changed is the attitude of the Russian Government towards the UN presence in NO-A. The net result being that all UN agencies will be withdrawing from NO-A by the end of 2011. This has impacted on the level of engagement and supported received from the government authorities and created challenges for the UN implementing agencies, in particular UNHCR and UNDP

3. From an effectiveness perspective the majority of activities have been implemented but there remains significant work to be completed under objectives 1.1, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.3. Furthermore in certain cases there is not always a causal logic between the outputs and the objectives. Coordination between the UN agencies has been good but this has not translated into a truly integrated approach.

4. Based on the figures from 2009 the efficiency would be ranked as good with at least 50% of inputs directly reaching the final beneficiaries. An approach of employing minimum numbers of staff and outsourcing where possible has been employed by all UN agencies. ILO’s staff and personnel costs seem high given that they do not have a permanent presence in Vladikavkaz.

5. In terms of sustainability based on an assessment made at the current point in time the prediction is that for Goal One the sustainability will be minimal apart from what has been achieved with the Childrens Theatre. That situation could change by the end of the project and much will depend on the level of success achieved in the production of strategies at district level. Goal Two will provide excellent results with there being a good chance that all the outputs are sustainable as will Goal Three. However the departure of UNHCR will leave a void that is unlikely to be filled. The project is to be congratulated on the general practice employed of working to strengthen existing institutions. It is recommended that some of the work here particularly that with the Public Employment Committee and the Extension Services under objectives 2.2 and 2.4 respectively be held up as examples of best practice.

6. An assessment on impact would be identical to that for sustainability. The one caveat here being that impact achieved under goal three will be greatly reduced if the houses constructed are not connected to utilities before the end of the project.

The recommendations concentrate on actions that the UN agencies should take within the remaining eight month period. The focus is on updating the results framework which should include introducing impact indicators and improving the quality of the reporting that is submitted to the Human Security Trust Fund as well as ensuring all activities are implemented within the timeframe. In regard to the latter the most significant challenges relate to Goal One and Goal Three.

The lessons learned highlight the need for better design and preparation as well as sound understanding of joint programme methodologies. Furthermore attention is drawn to best practices employed by the programme in particular that of strengthening existing institutions

# 2. Introduction: background and context of the programme

The Republic Of North Ossetia – Alania (NOA) is a republics of the Russian Federation and is situated in the south of the country in the North Caucases. This is an ethnically diverse region situated on the modern day border of the Russian Federation and Georgia

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 a conflict broke out in 1992 between Georgia and its breakaway republic South Ossetia. This sparked the displacement of 110,000 ethnic Ossetians from Georgia into North Ossetia. The majority of those Ossetians have now settled permanently in NO-A and been granted Russian Citizenship but a significant number of this group still hold forced migrant status[[1]](#footnote-2) and are in need of assistance if they are too fully integrate. During the short conflict between Russia and Georgia in the Summer of 2008 there was again a displacement of Ossetians from South Ossetia into NO-A although on this occasion it was mainly women and children who were displaced and the vast majority returned as soon as the fighting had subsided.

In 1992 the Republic of North Ossetia had a brief conflict with its western neighbour Ingushetia which claimed, and still does, the territory of Prigorodny District on the western bank of the river Terek. Large numbers of Ingush were displaced. Subsequently significant numbers of Ingush have returned although there are no up to date figures available on the exact numbers.

Despite a relatively turbulent history there have been no open outbreaks of hostilities in recent years in NO-A. However tensions remain, specifically between the Ossetian and Ingush communities although this is a topic that is rarely discussed openly. The situation is not helped by the fact that the majority of collective centres housing Ossetian forced migrants are situated in Prigorodny District which is also where the majority of Ingush are located.

The main security risk in NO-A is from “spillover” from other the republics that can and do take the form of suicide bombers who are invariably of Ingush origin. There are frequent radio broadcasts warning the population to beware of suicide bombers. However for all these potential risks Vladikavkaz and the region in general, with the exception of a few notable locations, remain relatively calm and peaceful.

NO-A is in Human Development terms is ranked 42 out of a total of 80 regions[[2]](#footnote-3). Unemployment levels remain above the national average and government statistics for the region reflect rates of between 5.6 and 3.5 % between 2005 and 2010 respectively. However in 2008 according to the ILO methodology the unemployment rate was 10.1 % for the region, the government rate for 2008 ranged from 4.2 – 5%[[3]](#footnote-4). Apart from production and some simple agro processing there are few industries present. In the rural districts, outside of the regional capital Vladikavkaz, the majority of households are reliant upon small agricultural plots, between 500 and 1000 square metres, plus a few livestock in order to maintain a livelihood.

The region itself has autonomous status and its own parliament and is made up of eight separate districts. Not surprisingly being a relatively poor region the Republic Government is heavily reliant upon transfers from the centre for its revenue, see table below. However in the course of the last seven years these transfers have on a proportional basis decreased significantly. In 2004 they made up 74% of total revenues however by 2010 this was reduced to 56%.

**Table One The Total Revenues for the Republic of NO-A and the Percentage of those Revenues Provided by Transfers from the Centre**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Total Revenues in Roubles | Total Amount Transferred from Centre in Roubles | % of revenues contributed by centre |
| **2004** | 7,075,553 | 5,260,652 | 74.345 |
| **2005** | 7,539,576 | 5,404,024 | 71.68 |
| **2006** | 9,263,731 | 6,229,454 | 67.24 |
| **2006** | 9,263,731 | 6,229,454 | 67.25 |
| **2007** | 11,107,377 | 7,154,654 | 64.41 |
| **2008** | 17,932,040 | 8,173,815 | 45.58 |
| **2009** | 12,222,871.90 | 6,356,457.40 | 52.00 |
| **2010** | 12,758,410.30 | 7,091,032.80 | 55.58 |
| **2011** | 13,468,444.40 | 7,467,830.40 | 55.45 |

Source Data provided by ILO Moscow Office

The UN has been active in the North Caucases since the mid 1990’s with initially UNHCR taking up its protection and shelter mandate in 1995. Subsequently other UN agencies followed with the focus initially being emergency interventions targeted at the displaced and other victims of the various conflicts that have impacted upon the wider region. The general trend was for programmes to focus upon the other republics in the region such as Chechyna and Ingushetia as this where the greater need was and use NO-A as a base. However at the same time UN agencies were implementing projects in NO-A as well. From as early as 2004 the UN realized there was a need to transition the programming to a more recovery/development approach and this is reflected in the various Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAP) that were launched for the region between 2004 and 2007. It was in this context that the Sustainable Integration and Recovery in NO-A project was first conceived. The initial vision being that a joint programme would better facilitate a recovery/development approach while also assisting in raising more funds that would complement the wide range of initiatives that were being implemented throughout the North Caucases at that time. The United Nations Human Security Trust Fund (UNHSTF) was at that time a relatively new institution and the UN agencies immediately identified the potential of a relevant source of funding for piloting this new approach. The intention at this conception phase was that this would be a pilot intervention that would if successful lead to further programming[[4]](#footnote-5).

At the time of the conception of the project the Russian government was supportive of the UN presence, which was significant, in NO-A and the wider North Caucases Region. However that position has changed dramatically in the course of the last five years. The current stance of the Russian Federation is that as a G8 member it should not be receiving external aid from other states. While the UN will retain a presence in the country all UN agencies will be withdrawing from NO-A by the end of 2011. This pending withdrawal has clearly impacted on the willingness of the NO-A authorities to engage with the project at the local level and is a theme that comes up throughout this document.

# 3. Description of the programme

The Sustainable Integration and Recovery in North Ossetia-Alania Project is a Joint UN intervention implemented by FAO, ILO, UNDP and UNHCR. UNDP is the lead implementing agency. The funding is provided by the United Nations Human Security Trust Fund (UNHSTF) and the project has a total budget of 3,609,826.52 million USD. The time frame is November 1 2008 – October 31 2011. A list of the government partners is provided below, these are all ministries at the Republic level.

**Government partners** Ministry of Investments and Foreign Economic Relations,

Ministry of Economy

Ministry of Agriculture

Ministry of Culture

Ministry of Nations

Employment Committee

Committee of SME Support and Investment Projects

Non – UN Executing Partners Danish Refugee Council (DRC)

Childrens Fund of North Ossetia (CF NOA)

Business Center Development Ltd

**The overall project aim** is to support integration of displaced people and improvement of life level in the region through enhancement of local employment opportunities, development of sustainable livelihoods, enhancement capacity of local authorities and NGOs involved in economic and social recovery. Special attention is given to the most vulnerable groups, i.e. women, single headed female households, elderly and invalids.

**Specific Goal #1**

To enhance capacity to strengthen recovery and social cohesion of the local NGOs and authorities involved in economic and social recovery and integration: Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Agriculture and the Employment Services

***Objective #1.1***

Increased capacity to design and implement coordinated longer-term strategies for socio-economic recovery

***Objective # 1.2***

Increase in activities planned, implemented and financed at the local (district and/or municipal) level

***Objective # 1.3***

Increased mainstreaming of social cohesion and peace-building as a cross-sectoral thematic within NGO activities, hereunder activities of employers organizations and trade unions

**Specific Goal #2**

To increase opportunities to build sustainable livelihoods through enhanced employment opportunities

***Objective #2.1***

Increased access to micro-credit, approx. 600 people per year with the average loan size of US$ 5000

***Objective #2.2***

Increased access to business advisory services approx. 1.000 entrepreneurs trained and/or consulted per year

***Objective #2.3***

Increased access to a favorable growth environment for small entrepreneurs at the Business Incubator contributes to the creation of new jobs, at least 10 tenants per year

***Objective #2.4***

Increased attractiveness of rural employment opportunities as awareness is built by the Agriculture Extension Service Centre network

**Specific Goal #3**

Enhance integration opportunities for the displaced persons and increase their overall resilience

***Objective #3.1***

Enable the most vulnerable displaced families to construct more permanent shelter (min. 30 houses annually)

***Objective #3.2***

Enhance community resilience through provision of Quick Impact Projects (min. 10 QIPs annually)

For a comprehensive table providing information on the goals, outputs and activities as well as the progress to date the reader should refer to section 7.3 Effectiveness.

# 4. Purpose of the Evaluation

The major objective of this midterm evaluation is to research and present findings with regards to the project implementation to date. This will include a review of the design and preparation process associated with the project document. Furthermore operational aspects, such as project management and implementation of activities and also the extent to which the objectives are being fulfilled will be assessed.

The purpose of this evaluation first and foremost is to assist the UN agencies in their further implementation of the project. It is as such an internal document whose target audience is the four implementing UN agencies. The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the assignment are available in annex one.

# 5. Key questions and scope of the evaluation with information on limitations

The scope of the assignment is a Midterm Evaluation (MTE) of the Sustainable Integration and Recovery in North Ossetia-Alania Project. The project began implementation in November 2008 and its Operational Implementation Phase ends on 31 October 2011. The MTE took place in February 2011 during the 28th month of project implementation.

The UNDP evaluation methodology employed in this MTE employs each of the five established evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). The list of documents reviewed and individuals interviewed are provided in Annexes Two and Three respectively. The documents reviewed included the files on the project from design, to contracting and implementation; project reports; minutes of coordination meetings and other relevant reports and background data.

The evaluation was limited by the time available, only seven (five working) days in NO-A, and the complexity and multi dimensional nature of the project, four UN agencies engaged in three distinct sectors. The time available did limit the scope of the mission.

The report focuses on a review of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency criteria. Furthermore a separate section is devoted to the project design and preparation process. While the other evaluation criteria, sustainability and Impact, are addressed they do not receive the same level of attention. Finally significant emphasis was placed on the conclusion and recommendations with a view to informing the remaining implementation of activities.

# 6. Approach and Methodology

The evaluation was undertaken by an independent international evaluation consultant, supported by members of the UNDP NO-A team. The time-frame for the evaluation was approximately four weeks, from 31 January until 26 February, approximately divided as follows:

*Week 1: - desk review of documentation and data*

*- preparation of final evaluation plan and methodology*

*Week 2: - field work in NO-A including;*

*- interviews with all UN agencies engaged in the project*

*- visits to project sites etc.*

*- interviews with participants and beneficiaries*

*Week 3&4: - preparation of full evaluation report*

# 7. Findings

## 7.1 Project Preparation and Design

A wide body of evidence from evaluations confirms the strong positive correlation between the quality of design and the success of implementation, as well as the quality of design and impact of the intervention. The quality of the design and the preparation process will be assessed by answering the following questions

1. Was the design process efficient and effective

2. Does the proposal provide a realistic and logical plan as to how the expected project outputs will be achieved and a causal relationship between the outputs, objectives, goals and overall aim.

1. The project preparation was a long and cumbersome process that after being initiated in Spring of 2005 was only closed out over three years later in the summer of 2008. UNDP and UNHCR took the lead in developing the proposal with FAO and ILO both having a minimal input. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to review in detail the design process however the impression gleaned is of a process that dragged on over a number of years with several different individuals having significant input at different points of time but with no one person or group ever taking overall responsibility[[5]](#footnote-6). The resultant project document is broad and all encompassing and the consultant would argue not realistic given the budget available.

2. The delay of three years from the time of initial conception resulted in the budget being outdated from the outset and as a consequence putting the implementing team under undue duress.

For example costs that at the outset were estimated in Rouble, the most significant being building materials under Goal Three, increased significantly between 2005 and the end of 2008 because of the impact of inflation (see table above). In short 100,000 roubles in 2005 was in effect worth 63,392 roubles in 2009. The crucial point is there was no exercise to revisit the budget once the project had been approved.

3. The Results Framework is overly ambitious and the target of achieving nine objectives and 29 outputs given the budget and scale of what is expected is not realistic. Furthermore certain parts of the framework lack logic (see comments in section 7.3 Effectiveness). Finally the wording of the objectives in certain cases set unrealistic targets. Examples of the this being objective 2.1 “ *Increased access to micro-credit, approx. 600 people per year with the average loan size of US$ 5000”*. A simple calculation would illustrate that such a target would require 9 million USD of funding which is almost three times the total project budget. In a similar vein Objective 2.2 ***“****Increased access to business advisory services approx. 1.000 entrepreneurs trained and/or consulted per year”* in order to be achieved would require 3000 entrepreneurs to have been trained during the course of the project. This is not realistic given the budget available.

4. The indicators in general are simply a record of an activity having taken place and there are few if any that demonstrate impact. While a record of events is important this information alone will not be enough in order to demonstrate impact. It is not too late to address this and the consultant would recommend that impact indicators are established and data collected before the end of the project. Refer to recommendation Three.

5. The overall aim is literally the three objectives stuck together and offers no vision of a greater more fundamental cause that the project is contributing towards. Furthermore there are no indicators at this level and as such the overall aim serves little function.

6. The manner in which the proposal addresses “peace building” lacks clarity. The situation in NO-A is complex and there is potential for conflict between a number of groups most notably Ossetians and Ingush. However there is also a large Russian population and many other minorities including Ukrainians, Armenians and several other groups. The consultant would argue that “peace building” would have been better addressed at the overall aim level with all objectives contributing towards it rather than via one output. Indeed the impression is, although this cannot be proven, that this is infact what has happened with the programme in a range of different settings bringing people together around issues such as micro finance, agricultural extension and theatre and culture to name but a few. To prove an impact here the programme would need to collect ethnicity data on those participating in these different events.

## 7.2 Relevance

Relevance is a “real time” assessment of a project’s relevance at any point during the life-cycle of the project to test and assess whether the intervention logic remained true in the context of possible changes on the demand side and if not, to assess the response made. The key question that will be answered in this section is

Whether the project’s target benchmarks remained valid and achievable or whether there was a case for revision to take account of change in demand or the speed of delivery of services.

Suprisingly given what has been said in the previous section the overall goal, specific goals and objectives of the programme document remain relevant. Despite the fact NO-A has significantly risen in the HDI rankings since the project was first conceived[[6]](#footnote-7), this can mainly be attributed to improvements in health and education indicators. Indeed the 2010 HDR refers to the significant improvement on several indicators in the North Caucases as a whole and attributes this to large inflows of finance from the Centre. However this does not concur with the data presented in table one that indicate the proportion of funding to NO-A contributed by the Centre has fallen by as much as 20% between 2004 and 2010. In addition the temporary influx of Ossetian refugees during the Russian Georgian conflict of 2008 did put further strain on the resources of the region albeit for a relatively short period of time. The conclusion based on discussion with stakeholders and review of documentation is that despite an improvement in the situation the problems of weak governance, poorly developed civil society, unemployment and a large displaced population remain a priority for this region.

The design therefore remains relevant. However what has changed in the benchmark is the stance of the central government as highlighted in section two. This has impacted on all aspects of the programme and the comment here is that it would be wise to reassess what can be achieved especially in those objectives that rely upon a significant government input i.e 1.1 and 1.2. Refer to recommendation four goal one.

## 7.3 Effectiveness

Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which the initiatives intended results (outputs or outcomes) have been achieved or the extent to which progress towards outputs or outcomes has been achieved. This section will answer the following questions

1. To what level have the outputs been achieved or are likely to be achieved during the course of the implementation period

2. Is there a causal link between the output and the objective

**Table Two Objectives, Outputs and Activities Framework**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Objectives** | **Outputs** | **Activities** | **Progress** |
| Objective 1.1 Increased capacity to design and implement coordinated long term strategies for socio economic development | 1.1.1 Organisation of study tour | Review longer term strategies successfully designed and implemented in Russia and the CIS | Review completed main finding that socio economic plans exist in many districts but are top down, have lacked real participation in the course of their development and are largely ignored and obsolete.  Study tour planned for summer 2011 to Tambov City in Tambov Oblast |
| 1.1.2 Organization of a workshop | - Analyze longer-term strategies used in Russia and the CIS to strengthen recovery and social cohesion  - Review lessons learnt of the study tour  - Make projections for the republic based on the lessons learned | - Based on analysis Tambov selected as location for the study tour. Case study visits planned for this year  -Review of lessons learnt from study tour not completed as can only happen once study tor takes place  - The business travel for participation in Federal exhibition “Agrorus 2010” was organized for one representative of Pravoberezhny district administration of North Ossetia-Alania and Director of Agro Tourism Centre, on 21-26 August 2010. The event was held inSt. Petersburg  UNDP Consultant and Project Manager, Heads of pilot districts of North Ossetia- Alania with colleagues and officials from the rural communities participated in the International Conference “Sustainable development of mountain areas of the North Ossetia-Alania”.  - Based on the results of the workshop it was recommended to develop strategies in 2 or 3 pilot districts and learn from the successes of other regions. |
| 1.1.3 Increase in number of joint and/co –funded activities | - Recruitment of consultant to provide an assessment of the current mechanisms of joint planning and co funding and to make recommendations  - Operational support to the government unit on monitoring and evaluation of the humanitarian and development activities  - Recruitment of a consultant to provide an analysis of the project results and impact  - Organisation of a workshop to review the project and the analysis provided by the consultant  - Ensuring employers organisations and trade unions participation in the joint and co funded activities | - Consultant recruited and this activity implemented in conjunction with output 1.2  - based on republic Ministry recommendation support provided in establishment of website [www.osetia-invest.ru](http://www.osetia-invest.ru)  - Attendance at seminar “New Approaches in Strategic Planning for the Territorial Development” September 2009 |
| **Analysis** | **There is a weakness in the design in that the outputs and activities do not relate directly to the objective. There is no mention in the outputs of supporting district/regional governments to draft strategic planning which is a prerequisite if planning capacity is to be improved. Fortunately the project has taken a pragmatic approach and is supporting three pilot districts in doing just this. A consultant has been engaged who is taking the lead on this issue. To date three districts have formed working groups and started the process of drafting strategic plans. However these are activities that strictly speaking according to the results frame are recorded under output 1.2.3.**  **This has been a difficult objective to achieve progress on as it relys upon the district government officials being ready and willing to actually participate/lead the process and write the document. Progress to date has been slow and this has not been helped by the delay of the study tour which one would hope would help clarify some points and instill a sense of enthusiasm amongst the officials involved.**  **That being said both the consultant and UNDP project manager are confident that the draft strategies will be produced by the end of the project given directive issued from the centre that that all regional governments are responsible for developing “ Sustainable Rural Development Plans” the basis of which will be district level plans. If these drafts can be produced this would be a good indicator of success. However in order to achieve this target considerable effort will be required during the remaining eight months implementation period and the process will have to proceed far more quickly than it has to date.** | | |
| Objective 1.2  Increase in activities planned, implemented and financed at the local (district and/or municipal) level | 1.2.1 Assessment on existing practices in district planning and budgeting. | - Recruitment of consultant  - Build knowledge on best parctices on decentralized district and participative planning | - One consultant is recruited for assessment and assessment completed. General conclusion that planning is done in a top down and outdated non participatory manner.  - Four high level offficials participated in the IX All-Russia Conference “Strategy planning in Regions and Cities of Russia” in St. Petersburg and in the Round table “Socio-economic development of North Caucasus”  - One high official participated in “Municipal Russia 2010” and took active part in the work of the Round Table “Rural Development” in Moscow. |
| 1.2.2 Workshop for district heads on transparent planning and budgeting | - Access and influence decision-makers at central level, a factor decisive for decentralization  - Introduce innovations in integrated planning | - Five day training provided on financial management to district level administrators 32 participants  - Second workshop held with support of international expert from France December 2010 30 participants “Sustainable Development of the rural territories: theory, methods of analysis and rural life examples”  - Participatory approaches introduced via workshops held with district level officials |
| 1.2.3 Conduction of community meetings using the Participatory Approach | - Setting up operational support to community initiative groups to monitor the application of mechanisms developed | - Strategy development working groups trained and established in 3 pilot districts Pravoberezhny Prirogrodny, and Ardonsky. In Prirogrodny District the main thematic working groups have been agreed upon as the following Agriculture  Industry  Youth  Tourism  Thematic working groups to be established in other two pilot districts  - Training implemented on different issues via 12 seminars used as a means of introducing participatory approaches  - Roundtable in September 2010 on the design of programmes on sustainable rural development, the current situation, and the role of Extension Cervices in this process |
| **Analysis** | **Again there is an issue with causality, put simply the achievement of the outputs in no way ensures that the objective will be achieved. Indeed all of the outputs under this objective are in fact activities. That being said a consultant has been engaged to lead this objective and the outputs have or will have been achieved by the end of the project. However there is no evidence to lead one to believe that this will lead to the objective being achieved.**  **Even if the outputs had led to significant changes it would be impossible to prove it given that no baseline was collected. The real problem here is in the wording of the outputs and objective and an absence of a causal link. The impression of the consultant is that the designer intended to design an objective that lead to more efficient district level planning and budgeting in essence following on from the strategies developed by objective 1.1 however a far more rigorous design was required. Furthermore even if the design had been perfect achieving such a result in the context of NO-A is an extremely ambitious target.**  **From an implementation perspective the team have achieved as much as they can and are now focusing on developing the strategies in pilot districts.** | | |
| 1.3. Local NGOs have improved capacities and resources for supporting communities to strengthen co-existence | Output 1.3.1:- Local NGOs have improved capacities and resources for supporting communities to strengthen co-existence | - Support cultural exchange projects – music and art  - Support local efforts of children playing theatre  - Support organization of art exhibition of local painters  - Summer language camp for youth | - Cultural exchange project implemented North Ossetia-Alania and Moscow Oblast. As a result of the Festival, the cultural and economic relations were established between Ardon district, North Ossetia-Alania and Sergiev Possad district, Moscow Oblast  - Childrens puppet theatre supported to provide classes to children on making puppets  - Puppet theatre also supported in purchase of lighting and sound equipment and the production of promotional material as part of its 75 years of existence celebration  - Symposium event held from 20 August – 20 September 2010. Event held involving both local and international artists  - Two date two summer camps held 2009 two trips each with 15 children. 2010 one trip with 30 students  - Agreement with the Ministry of culture signed |
| Output 1.3.2 :- Increased capacity to mainstream conflict prevention in recovery work | - Recruitment of a confidence building expert  - Organization of a one week training and workshop | - Two confidence building experts recruited and made assessment of local NGOs in peace building. Recommendations to mainstream work and build synergies amongst NGOs.  - Five day interactive training and one day workshop were held with NGOs from the region with the aim to improve peace building approaches. l  - Part time Peace Building Coordinator employed on a permanent basis |
| Output 1.3.3 :- Employer organisations and trade unions develop policies to use their potential to secure better integration of the target group in the local labour market. |  | Nothing implemented to date. |
| **Analysis** | **The majority of activities have been implemented under outputs 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 and furthermore there is logical causal link between these outputs and the objective. However the assumption is that NGOs capacities will be improved through implementing the activities identified in the proposal and thus local NGOs themselves would be the implementing agents for these activities. In the first year of the project following a forum organised with local NGOs one was selected and implemented the first summer camp. However subsequently due to financial reasons UNDP have implemented these activities directly themselves. This changes the light in which the this output is perceived and while such an approach has clearly resulted in more inputs reaching the final beneficiaries, the question is whether such a policy has negated the original objective. There are still examples of NGOs having benefited and increased their capacity as a result of the activities however these are not as explicit as they would have been had the process been implemented as originally planned. The team working on this objective should strive to record and document examples of how NGO capacities have improved as direct results of the project intervention before the end of the project.**  **Output 1.3.3 the consultant would argue does not fit under this objective and the team actually have far more opportunity to address it as part of objective 2.3. There are no activities specified under this output or budget available.** | | |
| 2.1 Increased access to micro-credit, approx. 600 people per year with the average loan size of US$ 5000 | 2.1.1 Consultancy to support establishment of (1-2) MFI(s) | - Finalization of all legal documents and working guidelines | - UNDP implemented assessment of all MFIs in the region and decided to support the strongest Zhitnitsa. UNDP also supported the establishment of a new MFI Express Credit. Both Zhitnitsa and Express Credit are Credit Cooperatives.  - Agreements reached and signed with two MFIs  - A legal consultant was recruited and both MFIs supported in ensuring their legal documents are in correct order.  - A consultant for the practical issues was recruited and both MFIs supported to put in order their book-keeping, budgets management etc. |
| 2.1.2 Provision of training and capacity building | Training on  - Delinquency management and sustainable interest rates  - Financial analysis  - HR management  - Impact assessment and market research  - Loan portfolio management  - Operational risk management  - Training loan officers | - All these topics and more were covered in trainings provided by the Rural Credit Cooperation Development Fund  - Furthermore individual consultancies were provided to the heads of both cooperatives by ACDI VOCA. |
| 2.1.3 Lending capital granted | - Awarding of performance based contracts | - Express credit signed a contract for RUB 2,200,000 loan capital that was twice amended first time with RUB 1,736,000 and the second time with RUB 1,154,400. Therefore a total of 5,090,400 provided as loan capital  Issued 88 loans  8 to DPs (1.25%)  20 to farmers (3%)  60 to entrepreneurs (5%)  Interest rates per month indicated in brackets  Zhitnisa signed contract with UNDP for 500,000 Roubles as loan capital  9 loans issued  To date Express Credit have proven to be far more proactive and thus the majority of the support provided by the project has focused on them. |
| 2.1.4 Administrative and operational support to the MCI | - Manager (x2)  - Loan Officer (x8)  - Accountant (x2)  - Admin support (x2)  - Cashier/register (x2)  - Driver (x2) | As part of the agreement signed both organisations receive 920,000 Roubles to support their administrative staff and running costs. The organizations and their staff performance monitored on a regular basis by UNDP and the MFI consultants  Two Micro Finance managers were engaged up until the end of 2010. They both worked with both institutions |
| **Analysis** | **The outputs have been implemented as planned with the one change being one existing MFI was supported and another was established. Furthermore there is a clear causal link between the outputs and the objective. The only issue of concern is the level of borrowing that was anticipated in the objective that is 600 loans per year which over the projects life time would be 1800. This issue has already been discussed in the section on project design. A more appropriate target would be between 200 and 300 loans targeting a range of beneficiaries including IDPs, agricultural producers and entrepreneurs.** | | |
| 2.2 Increased access to business advisory services approx. 1.000 entrepreneurs trained and/or consulted per year | 2.2.1 Support to the establishment of an oragnization that will become a Business Advisory Centre | - Selection of an organisation that will become a Business Advisory Centre | - Capacity assessment implemented and UNDP signed an agreement with STG to establish Marketing Centre |
| 2.2.2 Training of business Counselors and provision of relevant supporting materials, conduction of studies and drafting tools | - Organisation of training of potential business counsellors  - Employment of most promising graduates as business counsellors at the BAC  - Capacity building study tours, workshops to selected counsellors  - Organizing training of of potential SIYB trainers, training of existing and potential entreprenuers, rapid market assessments, SIYB materials adaption and production | - Three staff employed by Marketing Centre  - All three staff received a series of 7 trainings on different issues associated with business and business start ups. Plus an international consultant hired to provide mentoring support to the director and team as a whole.  - Marketing Centre provided 285 trainings on different business issues to a core group of clients approximately 20% of whom were women  - Marketing Centre implemented several piece of research/surveys and various promotional events  Business Development Centre Ltd (ILO contracted implementing partner)  - Two staff received Master Trainer status in SIYB[[7]](#footnote-8)  - 18 level 2 SIYB trainers received certificate  - Public employment service trained eight of its staff to SIYB level 1  - 460 individuals receive Training of trainers (ToT) of potential entreprenuers  - 690 individuals received training on starting up their own business The figures reported are inaccurate and should be amended for the final report (Refer to Recommendation 4 Goal Two)  - Over 2000 copies of copies of ILO training tools printed. Six levels of an ILO guide on business start ups printed |
|  | 2.2.3 Provision of administrative and operational support to Business Advisory Center | - Administrative support office equipment and utilities  - Recruitment of an International consultant/Business Advisor  - BAC Manager/Business Counsellor  - Business counsellors (3)  - Admin Assistant/Interpreter  - Short term consultants  - Outreach activities | - As part of the agreement UNDP supported the running costs of the newly developed Marketing Centre  - An international consultant employed as a business advisor and two support missions implemented to the Marketing Centre during the autumn of 2010  - The cost of various posts, operational costs and outreach activities in Marketing Centre covered under the terms of the agreement through a transfer of 2,982,400 Roubles. |
| 2.2.4 Organization of job fairs and study tours | - Study tours to visit innovative SMEs in Russia and or CIS  - In order to boost employment, job fairs will be oragnized in each district to spread awareness among the local population about entreprenuership as a means of self employment | 2 representatives of Republic’s Committee for Employment participated in the international conference on youth employment promotion in Saint-Petersburg on November 15-16 2010.  The seminar “Sources of microfinance as an opportunity to implement business ideas” was organized by the Business Center on 29 April 2010 for interested entrepreneurs and staff of the Marketing Center  The workshop on establishment of Club for Youth entrepreneurs of North Ossetia took place on 5 October 2010.  Workshops on decision making and Workshop on access to microfinance for youth organized for the club members in 2010.  Job fairs in the districts planned for 2011 |
| **Analysis** | **The majority of outputs have been implemented as planned and there is still significant training that will be provided over the remaining project lifespan. A very positive additional output has been the acceptance by the public employment committee of the ILO SIYB methodology and the engagement of eight of its staff in SIYB level 1 training. The only output that has not been fully addressed is 2.2.4 with there being no job fairs held in the districts to date. A causal link can be identified between the outputs and the objective. The one point of contention is again on the quantitative targets given in the objective. That is 1000 entrepreneurs trained per year over the projects life time would mean a total of 3000. Given the resources available this well beyond what is achievable. A more realistic target would be between 800 and a 1000.**  **UNDP and ILO have worked through different implementing partners with regards the Business Advisory Centre and this reflects a lack of collaboration between the two organizations during the earlier stages of the project. However there is no evidence to illustrate that this has been a less effective approach than had both agencies worked through one partner. It could even be argued that working through two separate partners has been more effective in terms of numbers of final beneficiaries reached and long term impact of the project.** | | |
| 2.3 Increased access to a favorable growth environment for small entrepreneurs at the Business Incubator contributes to the creation of new jobs, at least 10 tenants per year | - 2.3.1 Promotion of small and micro enterprise as livelihoods strategy through creation of a favorable growth environment in a Business Incubator | - Provision of an integrated package of services: premises, training, networking, introduction of ICT in business processes etc | - Agreement signed with Business Incubator |
| 2.3.2 Enhanced national ownership in sustaining livelihoods and enhancing employment opportunities | - Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Industry will provide in kind contribution  - Free of charge premises of the incubator  - Government focal person (2 hours per week)  - Furniture and equipment  - Logistical support  - Communication costs | - Business Centre which actually also acts as a business incubator constructed and operational since autumn 2010 |
| 2.3.3 Provision of technical and operational support to Business Incubator | - Recruitment of a consultant  - Support to the establishment of an internal policy for the incubator tenants selection and graduation criteria  - Operational support  - National personnel costs  - Trainings and workshops  - Outreach activities | - Currently in the process of recruiting a consultant  - Operational support will be provided by the funds that become available as part of the agreement between UNDP and the Business Centre  - Four officials from NO-A participated in the study tour to visit the Business Incubator Naberezhnye Chelny, Republic of Tatarstan, on 24-28 October 2010  - 16 November. Round table “Problems and further development of youth entrepreneurship in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania”  - 17-18 November. Exhibition “Business-start” was organized by UNDP together with the Ministry of Economic Development and hosted 25 young entrepreneurs  - 19 November 2010. Round table was held for young entrepreneurs who participated in the exhibition “Business-start”, members of the business club “Business Times”, created jointly by UNDP and Republican Marketing Centre. The event gathered around 20 participants. |
| **Analysis** | **Progress has been severely hampered due to the lack of progress on constructing an incubator centre by the Republican government as was forseen in the original project document and a necessary precondition for activities under this objective to proceed. Nonetheless the UNDP team have had sufficient initiative and drive to identify an alternative partner and engage with them. This partner is the Republican Business Center which was newly constructed and opened in the autumn of 2010. Most importantly this complex acts as an incubator providing premises to up to 25 businesses as well as a range of other services the majority of which are still being developed. UNDP have already signed an agreement with the agency and are in the process of recruiting a consultant who will support its work. Furthermore staff from the Center have been engaged in various study tours as illustrated in the progress update.**  **By the end of the project the objective will in all likelihood be partly achieved mainly due to the delayed timeframe in starting these activities. Furthermore there will be a difficulty in illustrating causality between the UNDP input and the number of businesses taking up residence in the incubator. This is because the site was established and tenants found with no influence or input by UNDP**  **The wording of the objective and outputs is sound and a causal link can be established.** | | |
| 2.4 Increased attractiveness of rural employment opportunities as awareness is built by the Agriculture Extension Service Centre network | 2.4.1 Support to the set-up and establishment of 4 inter-District Agriculture Extension Services provided | - Selection and establishment of 4 inter District agriculture extension services  - Technical and operational support  - Provision of trainings and study tours in agri business, trade and marketing | - Four District Agriculture Extension Services supported two of which cover 2 dstricts. Therefore total number of districts covered by this intervention is six. The Republic government supported the extension services in the remaining two districts.  - Agreements signed with NO-A Ministry of Agriculture  - Agreement signed with Republican State Unitary Infocenter (the state extension service) on the establishment of the extension centres.  - Operational support provided in the supply of basic office material and a vehicle to all four extension offices  - 11 staff employed as district extension agents 3 of whom were women  - 14 different seminars and training events held between May 2009 and end of 2010. Total participants approx 400 with 35% representation of women  - One study tour implemented to Galilee Israel involving five high level officials  - North Caucasus Okrug Forum was organized for the Extension Centers with participation of the Federal level representatives |
| 2.4.2 Technical support provided on rural cooperatives | - Recruitment of an expert consultant on rural cooperatives, help support the development of rural cooperatives | - Three consultants from ACDI VOCA engaged to train and develop the capacity of the cooperatives  - Two cooperatives established and trained on “Legislative and institutional bases and internal procedures of the Agricultural Consumer Cooperatives[[8]](#footnote-9) in the Russian Federation”  - Both accountants from the cooperatives received training on the management of revolving funds |
| 2.4.3 The rural population is able to benefit from the new opportunities offered by micro-credit schemes and other business support mechanisms | - Collection and dissemination of market information e.g up-coming opportunities to access micro credit , training information on best practices, expertise etc for different target groups in the rural area | - A Letter of Agreement was signed between FAO HQ and the Agriculture Extension Center (Republican State Unitary Entity "Infocenter") in support of activities related to raising awareness on HORTIVAR[[9]](#footnote-10) among the concerned agricultural specialists in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. The Agricultural Extension Center established the Hortivar Café in its main office in Vladikavkaz where any person interested in data on the performances of horticulture cultivars can come and receive the support of the specialist  - Booklets on legal basis, tax regulation system and existing opportunities for small and medium businesses to access governmental support and subsidies in rural area are developed and published by FAO and disseminated through the district extension offices.  - Simple extension material on issues such as poultry and greenhouses developed and printed. Then provided to Extension Agents for distribution.  - FAO supported publication of a brochure with the title “Priorities in the development of the Ministry of Agriculture of the RNO-Alania”.  - Monthly bulletins of the Republican State Unitary Entity "Infocenter" developed by the extension specialists during the year were printed by FAO.  - A Guideline “Resource –saving technologies in crop production” was published and disseminated among farmers and extension centers |
| 2.4.4 Successful revolving livestock project expanded | - Revolving livestock project in Pravoberezhny district  - Revolving livestock project in Irafsky district. | One cooperative consisting of five famers received 9 Hereford in calf heifers  - One cooperative consisting of 10 farmers received 9 Aberdeen Angus in calf heifers  - One study tour to France was organized  - A booklet on meat cattle breeding developed for the farmers  - One field day organized for promotion of meat cattle in the Republic  - The heads of the meat cattle cooperatives were invited by ACDI/VOCA to participate as trainers for the farmers and Extension Centers from neighboring republics |
| 2.4.5 Job fairs organized in each district | - In order to boost employment, job fairs will be organized in each district to spread awareness among the local population on farming as a means of self employment | Decision taken not to organize job fairs due to the limited job opportunities available. Instead clients of the extension service provided with direct support and advice on income generating small scale agricultural business models for rural areas. Different models of small-scale animal and poultry breeding (sheep, cattle, goat, rabbit, goose, duck, turkey and chicken) and greenhouses as a means for self-employment in the villages were carefully designed by economists and agronomists. The leaflets with the information on all financial aspects and production basis were printed for each model and disseminated through the district Extension Services to the rural population.  Also FAO works with the Info center to provide technical support to the farmers for establishment and improvement of the agricultural businesses and provide one time minimal support to the farmers who apply for a microcredit |
| **Analysis** | **The outputs have been implemented as planned with the exception of 2.4.5. Here given the economic climate and the lack of employment opportunities in the Districts a decision was taken to focus on improving resources connected with income generation/entrepreneurial activities such as greenhouses, chicken, livestock projects etc. In the consultants view the logic and reasoning behind this decision is sound. The performance against the other outputs is extremely impressive given the wide range of activities implemented with the limited resources available. A clear causal link can be made between the outputs and the objective although strictly speaking it would have been better if the objective referred to ‘increased rural income generating and employment activities” rather than just employment.**  **This is one of the few examples where the project demonstrates an integrated approach with the farmers who are applying for micro credit being supported by the extension services.** | | |
| 3.1 Enable the most vulnerable displaced families to construct more permanent shelter (min. 30 houses annually) | 3.1.1 Shelter project beneficiaries selected | - Consolidate UNHCR database on the displaced persons and short list applicants  - Screen all applicants  - Sign all contracts with the each beneficiary following the selection and and outline the terms and conditions of the assistance | - UNHCR database consolidated with input from government, DRC and Childrens Fund  - Process established whereby all applicants screened by a selection committee and then visited in person before final decision made  - To date contracts signed with a total 36 final beneficiary families |
| 3.1.2 Construction material provided to approx. 30 displaced families annually incl. labor assistance for the vulnerable families | * Provide material in installments, with each subsequent installment contingent on demonstrated progress in construction. Provide support in labour to vulnerable families * Carry out regular monitoring visits to the beneficiaries | - Materials distributed in installments to final beneficiaries with an average value of 320,000 Roubles per beneficiary. In addition all beneficiaries were provided with 40,000 Roubles in order to pay the cost of skilled labour  - Regular monitoring missions implemented by UNHCR local staff on average twice a week. Furthermore up until the end of 2010 monthly monitoring missions made by the UNHCR International Shelter Expert. |
| 3.1.3 Shelter project evaluated after Year 1 | - Evaluate the project after year 1 and recommend implementation modalities for years 2 & 3 based on progress and performance | Progress of project evaluated on a regular basis as part of the monthly monitoring visits implemented by the International Shelter Expert. The findings recorded in internal reporting documents. |
| **Analysis** | **All of the outputs are in the process of being implemented and the causal relationship between the outputs and objective is clear. However the reality is that two specific points of the objective will not be achieved that is 90 houses constructed in the course of the project period and assistance being provided to the most vulnerable. These two points will now be addressed. In all likelihood a total of 45 houses will be constructed half the original target. The reason for this can be attributed to the increases in costs of building materials over the three years during which the project was under development. This is reflected in the inflationary figures that are presented in Figure One. Secondly those who have been supported by this objective are not the most vulnerable. Again this is no fault of the implementation process but simply a reflection of the reality on the ground. In order to build a house the final beneficiary must own some land on which it can be built and the most vulnerable in general do not own land. Secondly the most vulnerable are excluded as this was a “self help” initiative with final beneficiaries expected to provide the vast majority of the labour themselves. The most vulnerable simply cannot do this.**  **The one concern that exists here is that UNHCR will be closing their office in Vladikavkaz as of 30 June 2011 leaving in effect four months for the remaining implementation. This presents significant challenges if the outputs are to be completed as per the project document and the implications and possible solutions are discussed further under recommendation 4 Goal three.** | | |
| 3.2 Enhance community resilience through provision of Quick Impact Projects (min. 10 QIPs annually) | 3.2.1 Minimum of 10 QIPs designed and implemented annually | - Support communities of displaced persons to deliver initiatives for QIPs and work with them to design the most suitable projects  - Implement QIPs together with the beneficiaries, other community members and representatives of local authorities (where applicable) | - 42 applicants in 2009, and 10 applicants in 2010  - To date 14 QIPs from 2009 implemented and 9 from 2010. Total = 23  Total costs = (in 2009: RUB. 1,277,473. in 2010: RUB. 1,453,128; The overall TOTAL: RUB. 2, 730, 601)  Total Beneficiaries = (In 2009: direct beneficiaries - 478 persons; indirect beneficiaries - 2,431 persons. In 2010, direct beneficiaries – 2,072; indirect beneficiaries – 3,525.  TOTAL direct benef. – 2,550;  TOTAL indirect benef. – 5, 956  Overall TOTAL: 8,506 beneficiaries). |
| 3.2.2 QIP Projects evaluated | . Evaluate the project at the end of year 1 . Develop and publicize QIPs lessons learnt and best practices report at the end of 1. | Evaluation is held regularly on a monthly basis by the implementing partner. The first overall evaluation by UNHCR international staff is scheduled for the last week of February 2011  QIPs publicized via internal reports and local media |
| **Analysis** | **Outputs have or will be achieved by the end of the project. In addition there is a strong causal linkage between the outputs and the objective particularly where communal infrastructure projects have been implemented. All projects required beneficiary participation and there was rigorous application and selection procedure. Indeed the whole process was based upon a standard UNHCR procedure. Furthermore the decision to in some cases cluster these interventions where there were high numbers of DPs living has facilitated this relatively efficient process with regards to the communal infrastructure projects. It is reasonable to assume that by the end of the project the target 30 QIPs will have been implemented.**  **The point raised under Objective 3.1 concerning the closure of the UNHCR office also applies here see recommendation 4 Goal Three.**  **The other point to be raised here is that it would have been more effective to focus the QIP grants on communal infrastructure and direct those with ideas for business grants to the activities implemented as part of Goal Two. There are examples of this having taken place in a few cases and the fact that this did not happen more is likely due to a number of reasons not least the different time frames and implementation schedules that the respective UN agencies are working to. Ideally this is an issue that will be examined more closely as part of the final evaluation and by then there may well more examples.** | | |

## 7.4 Efficiency

Efficiency measures how economically resources or inputs (such as funds expertise and time) are converted to outputs. Efficiency is important in ensuring that resources have been used appropriately and in highlighting more effective use of resources.

The specific questions that will be addressed in this section of the evaluation are

1. To examine the relationship between the inputs and the outputs

2. To examine the project management system

**The Relationship Between Inputs and Outputs**

As of the end of 2010 the project had spent a total of 2,223,440.79 of its total budget of USD 3,609, 826 which is a delivery of 62%. The portion of the budget per UN agency is provided in Table Three. There is a clear differentiation between the four UN agencies that are implementing the project with there being two larger partners UNDP and UNHCR whom between them control approximately 84% of the budget and ILO and FAO who control the remaining 16%

The pie charts presented in Figures 2 – 5 illustrate how the different UN agencies expenditures were allocated for 2009 on a percentage basis[[10]](#footnote-11). Given that the project is still under implementation and the final financial figures are not available yet this provides a snapshot by which the performance of the different agencies can be compared and efficiency criteria evaluated. This data provides an approximate means by which to assess efficiency and the following assumptions are made here

1. That operating costs, project support costs and staff and personnel costs are all looked upon as inputs

2. The contractual services and acquisitions are looked upon as outputs either services, or materials that impact directly upon final beneficiaries

3. With the Other and Travel lines here there is no clear cut definition but certainly with certain agencies such as FAO and UNDP the majority of the travel is associated with costs associated with final beneficiaries and thus can be looked upon as an output.

The main findings when analyzing this data are as follows

1. The smaller agencies spend a significantly higher percentage of their budget on staff and personnel. This would be expected given the economies of scale that come with managing a larger budget. However what is noticeable is that ILO the only agency that does not have a staff member based in Vladikavkaz in 2009 had the highest percentage of costs, 35%, going towards staff and personnel expenses.

2. In terms of programme support costs both of the larger agencies again prove more efficient with the rate being 7% in comparison to the 10% charged by FAO and ILO.

3. In terms of operating expenses the only other factors that stand out are the relatively high level of operating costs of UNHCR, 18%, in comparison with the next highest being UNDP 4%. In addition FAO appears to have relatively high Travel expenses, 19%, in comparison with the next highest which is UNDP with 6%. However this is in all likelihood explained by costs associated with the study tour organized to Israel.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Figure 2 An Overview of UNDP expenditures for 2009** | **Figure 3 An overview of UNHCR expenditures for 2009** |
|  |  |

Note For UNDP the programme support costs are in fact 7% and the fact they are expressed as 6% is due to a simple rounding up error.

4. In terms of actual funds spent directly on final beneficiaries if it is assumed that the contractual services and acquisitions line cover this expenditure then the percentages are 53% UNHCR, 45% UNDP, 39% ILO and 32 % FAO. In all likelihood given that UNDP, ILO and FAO all have between 12 and 15% under the “Others” title a proportion of this has also gone directly towards final beneficiaries. Furthermore it is likely with UNDP and FAO at least that a significant proportion of the travel costs have gone towards costs associated with study tours and attendance at workshops etc and therefore been spent directly on final beneficiaries. One could therefore safely assume that with three of the agencies at least 50% of the funds are directly impacting on final beneficiaries. The only exception may be ILO and the final % here will be dependent on the proportion of the “other category” that was spent on final beneficiaries.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Figure 4 An overview of FAO Expenditures for 2009** | **Figure 5 An overview of ILO expenditures for 2009** |
|  |  |

Note for both ILO and FAO programme support costs are in fact 10% and are represented in the both graphs as 9% is because of simple rounding up error.

To sum up given the difficult operating environment and taking into account the various obstacles the programme has had to overcome the consultant would argue that an approximate result of 50% of the funds directly reaching final beneficiaries is a positive finding. It should be noted this finding is based on the data from one year of implementation and results over the whole implementation period may differ.

**Programme Management**

Table Three provides an overview from a management perspective and what is most revealing here is given their budget and staffing numbers the number of outputs that UNDP are responsible for. Obviously not all the outputs require the same staff input however each does require at the very least a minimum amount of oversight. Given that UNDP are also the lead agency and responsible for compiling the reports the ratio of staff per output is impressive.

**Table Three Budget, Staff and Number of Outputs Per Agency**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Agency** | **Number of Staff** | **Implementing Agencies/Consultants** | **Number of Outputs** | **Total Budget Responsible for** |
| UNDP | 4.5 (one staff member the Coordinator/Confidence Building is part time) | 1 Governance Consultant  2 MFI Consultants  2 MFI Manager  1 International Consultant for the Marketing Centre  1 NGO  2 Peace Building Consultants | 19 | 1,883,999.63 |
| UNHCR | 2.5 (the half represents the protection officer who is engaged part time on the project. In addition UNHCR international Shelter Coordinator had an input up until the end of 2010 and the UNHCR International Office Manager also has an input | Two Danish Refugee Council and Childrens Fund | 5 | 1, 136,388.23 |
| ILO | No staff on site. Monitoring visits from Moscow approximately four times per year | One Business Development Centre Ltd | 3 | 326,732.67 |
| FAO | 1 (Ad hoc support provided by international consultants as and when they are on missions) | Consultants on Cooperatives | 3 | 262,705.95 |

Note One output 2.4.1 is implemented jointly by both UNDP and FAO

Other findings with regards the management are as follows

1. All the agencies have employed a policy of keeping the number of full time staff to a minimum and working through implementing agencies such is the case with UNHCR and ILO or making use of independent consultants which has been predominantly the mode of operation employed by UNDP and FAO. In both cases this is simply a means of outsourcing the administrative cost. Given the operating environment and the availability of good and experienced firms and consultants the consultant would concur that this was a sound approach.

2. In several cases most notably with UNHCR and FAO the project has benefited from the inputs of other consultants who have actually been charged against other interventions.

3. All agencies were operational soon after the final agreement was signed with the exception of UNHCR who did not become operational until September 2009. This was due to a prolonged delay in signing an agreement with the Government counterpart. In addition UNHCR lost three months of implementation time between June and September 2010 when there was a change in their government counterpart. Furthermore during the course of implementation activities UNHCR was adversely impacted when their implementing partner Childrens Fund was suspended from operating and put under investigation by the local authorities. Childrens Fund was eventually given the approval to continue with their activities but not before considerable time had been lost. The net result being a considerable loss of implementation time and an increase in the management and oversight required.

4. UNDP also report a large amount of staff time being required to negotiate with and explain the programme to the government counterparts due to the fact that their counterpart changed or was replaced on a number of occasions. However in the case of UNDP although this was a laborious and difficult task it did not result in the same loss of implementation time that UNHCR have experienced.

5. From a theoretical perspective and focusing purely on the project it does appear there could have been savings in terms of operating costs had the three agencies that are based in Vladikavkaz been based in one office. However given the fact that all three agencies prior to this intervention were already active and in addition to this project have implemented other interventions in effect means that such an arrangement was simply not practical.

## 7.5 Sustainability

Sustainability measures the extent to which benefits of initiatives continue after external development assistance has come to an end. The basis upon which the criteria will be assessed is by answering the following questions

1. Are the outputs implemented and objectives achieved under the three project goals sustainable once the intervention ceases

2. Are the project goals replicable

**Specific Goal One:- Enhance capacity to strengthen recovery and social cohesion of the local NGOs and authorities involved in economic and social recovery and integration: Ministry of Economic, Ministry of industry, Ministry of Agriculture and the Employment Services.**

There are two distinct partners that this goals is addressing one is the NGO sector under Objective 1.3 and the other is the republic and district government structures under Objectives 1.1 and 1.2. The latter shall be addressed first. Given the relatively slow progress to date under these objectives it is hard to confirm if the anticipated results will be achieved let alone sustained. Furthermore given the bureaucratic nature of government structures at this point it appears unlikely that the outputs achieved will be sustained without external assistance. That being said if the three pilot strategies that are currently under development are completed and put before their respective district government structures the element of sustainability here will be increased.

The one exception, in terms of government structures, is the Childrens Theatre that has been supported under the activities of objective 1.3, implemented by UNDP. This is an institution that definitely plays an important peace building role within the republic as well as the wider region. What is more as a direct result of the project, the management was changed leading to far more dynamic leadership and working practices being introduced. This institution based on its leadership, funding from Republic government and demand for its services will continue in a sustainable manner. Furthermore the approach adopted here could easily be replicated.

In terms of the NGOs despite the fact the project has not worked through the NGOs as initially anticipated there have been some successes here. The most notable of which is an “Agro Tourism” NGO that engaged with the cultural exchange to Moscow and as result managed to secure 100 bookings for Agro Tourism home stays in 2010. Whether this success can be attributed directly to the project is debatable however what is without doubt is that project activities contributed towards it. Furthermore based upon its committed leadership there is little doubt that this NGO will continue to function and play a positive role in the socio economic development of the region. However apart from this example there is no other evidence that as a result of the project NGOs have been strengthened and will continue to operate in a sustainable fashion. The sustainability and impact aspects of this goal have been negated by UNDPs decision to implement activities directly.

To sum up, based upon the data presented and meetings held, apart from with the Childrens Theatre and the Agro Tourism NGO at the current point in time there is little or no evidence to indicate that the outputs achieved will be sustainable. That does not mean to say they will not be and the staff should investigate this issue further and if evidence does exist present it coupled with a persuasive argument in the final report.

**Specific Goal Two:- To increase opportunities to build sustainable livelihoods through enhanced employment opportunities**

The project has worked with host of existing institutions under this goal and in some cases, two cooperatives and one MFI, assisted in the establishment of new ones. The existing institutions that the projected engaged with are either strong private sector consultancies such as STG and Business Centre Development Ltd or Government organs such as the state extension service or the Government Business Centre which acts as a an incubator. This policy of partnering with strong institutions that in effect have already ensured their own future and assisting them to develop further has proved particularly successful. In the consultants opinion the one relationship that really stands out here as an example of best practice is that which has been forged with the Republic Extension services. As a direct consequence of the project this institution has significantly widened its services increasing the access of poor small holder farmers to extension support and advice. Following an initial input from the project of cars, computers and payment of salaries, coupled with a substantive training input district extension services have been established. The key point is an MoU was signed with both the state extension services and the Ministry of Agriculture and that these district extension units established will now come under the republic government umbrella ensuring their long term future.

Coming back to this point of partnering with existing institutions it is refreshing to see the approach that has been adopted here as all too often projects have a tendency to establish new institutions. This is far easier during the implementation phase but rarely leads to sustainability aspects being achieved in the longer term. For example both the UNDP and ILO Business Services partners STG “marketing Centre” and Business Development Centre Ltd respectively have a vested interest to continue to supply the level and intensity of the training services that were delivered during the course of the project. The relationship that the project has with these two entities is actually very different. Business Development Centre Ltd is paid as a subcontractor to deliver training hence once the project finishes there is no obligation to continue. The relationship with STG is they were supported to establish “Marketing Centre” that provides a specific service, in this case targeting young people, and there is a moral and contractual obligation that this service will be continued. However more importantly for both entities the important point from a sustainability assessment is that they have been strengthened in delivering their existing core business. In addition the fact that the state employment committee has adopted the ILO methodology and begun training it’s staff is another positive result in terms of sustainability.

Where new institutions have been developed there has been a demand, a significant training input has been made available and in all institutions the consultant met there is strong and sound leadership. Based on these fundamental points having been achieved there is a good likelihood that these institutions will survive and flourish in the longer term.

To sum up based on the evidence presented and meetings held there is a strong probability that the outputs achieved under this goal will be sustained in the longer term. Furthermore the practice of strengthening existing institutions should be held up as an example of best practice and other projects should be actively encouraged to adopt a similar approach.

**Specific Goal Three:- Enhance integration opportunities for the displaced persons and increase their overall resilience**

This is far simpler to evaluate than the previous two goals given that the displaced are provided with a comprehensive solution to their housing problem. Their issues with shelter are therefore solved. The only concern here is unless the utilities are connected, in particular gas, the property will never be fully utilized. This point is discussed in more detail in the next section.

With regard to the QIPs there were two distinct interventions income generating grants and communal infrastructure each will be examined separately. In terms of the income generating grants the fact that it was grant with no repayments is in itself a huge advantage when it comes to securing long term sustainability. Furthermore one would expect the rigorous selection and vetting of applicants would lead to selection of strong individuals. Of the three enterprises visited by the consultant this certainly seemed to be the case. Based on the short visits and discussions with project staff the consultant would assess that there is a strong possibility that these grant beneficiaries will be sustainable. However the UNHCR team should carry out more research on this issue before the end of the project and keep records of their progress.

With the communal infrastructure projects the fact that they are providing essential services whether it be water, electricity or health that directly benefit community members is a powerful reason for ensuring sustainability. However in many similar instances this has not been the case and the fundamental issue here is establishing a simple mechanism of identifying a responsible body/institution for managing the resource and ensuring the service is maintained. Here such mechanisms have been put in place. In certain locations the community provide this function themselves and in others it comes under a local utility company. However it exists in all locations where communal infrastructure QIPs have been implemented and thus at this point the assumption would be that the results achieved will be sustainable

On a macro level when one looks for the entity that will take the lead in addressing integration of the displaced the answer is not clear. The government while claiming this role and actually insisting that UNHCR depart does not back up the rhetoric with concrete action. For example while in theory substantial grants are available to forced migrants to support them in constructing new shelter accommodation in practice only 12 such grants have been awarded since 2006. The local implementing partner “Childrens Fund” will in all likelihood maintain an advocacy role but is unlikely to access the level of funding necessary to address the longer term integration issues that exist. DRC the other implementing partner is an international NGO and will therefore in all likelihood withdraw from the region once the international funding finishes.

The approach adopted by UNHCR under this goal is relatively standard and appropriate for replication in other interventions. In all likelihood it was itself copied from other interventions and indeed the QIP methodology is a standard UNHCR methodology.

To sum up the direct results of the project will be sustainable however at the macro level there remain serious question marks about the future support to the displaced with it being highly unlikely that any local institution government of non government will fill the void left by UNHCR.

## 7.6 Impact

Impact can only be assessed after the end of the project. However, it is increasingly common in interim and final evaluations to anticipate or forecast impact. This section will do just that by answering the following questions

1. The likelihood of the overall project aim and specific projects goals being achieved.

2. Degree of change and value added bought about by the project

Impact measures the effect of the project in meeting the overall project aim. By definition, the latter is beyond the scope of a particular project but a positive impact results if the project goals are achieved, thus contributing to the realisation of the wider project aim. Given the fact that there are no impact indicators the consultant is making a judgement based predominantly on a review of the project documentation and discussions with project staff and stakeholders.

**Enhance capacity to strengthen recovery and social cohesion of the local NGOs and authorities involved in economic and social recovery and integration: Ministry of Economic, Ministry of industry, Ministry of Agriculture and the Employment Services.**

At this point in time there is little evidence of any real change that has come about due to the intervention with regard this goal. Attending meetings, study tours and organizing of working groups does not translate as real change. Producing a draft strategy at district level and putting it to the district parliament/elected body for endorsement would be the type of action that indicates short term impact. Similarly there is no indication that there has been an increase in activities at the district that can be directly attributed to the intervention. The real problem here is the lack of a baseline. The project indicators framework simply states nil but it is impossible to demonstrate “increase” if you do not know what level you are increasing from. On the issue of NGO capacity while there is a sense of short term impact this is based on ad hoc discussion and more concrete data and evidence should be forthcoming.

The fact that impact cannot be demonstrated at this point in time does not mean to say this will be the case at the end of the project. Refer recommendation 4 Goal One Objective 1.3.

The one exception to the above is results that have been achieved with the puppet theatre where a significant impact has been achieved. However in the overall scale this makes little difference at the Goal Level.

**Specific Goal Two:- To increase opportunities to build sustainable livelihoods through enhanced employment opportunities**

There is existing evidence that change has occurred as a direct result of the project intervention. This is demonstrated by issues such as the figures on MFI lending, the increased coverage of the republic extension services, the formation of two Agriculture cooperatives and the increased capacity of the project partner STG to provide targeted consultancy services. The latter is complemented by the large numbers of entrepreneurs who have accessed training and support via Business Development Center Ltd the ILO contracted implementer. What is significant here is not the large numbers that were trained but the fact that 73 individuals as a result of this training went on to establish their own businesses. Finally the adoption of the ILO SIYB methodology by the public employment committee although unplanned is positive and can be recorded as a change that is directly attributable to the activities of the project.

However the project does need to document these impacts that are highlighted above and provide more evidence of the causal link to project activities refer recommendation 4 Goal Two. Furthermore by the end of the project there is every chance that impact would also be able to be demonstrated under objective 2.3 Increased access to a favorable growth environment for small entrepreneurs at the Business Incubator contributes to the creation of new jobs, at least 10 tenants per year.

To conclude there is existing evidence that short term impact has been achieved. Provided data is collected the consultant would be optimistic that there will be further evidence by the end of the project illustrating a very good impact achieved under this goal.

**Specific Goal Three:- Enhance integration opportunities for the displaced persons and increase their overall resilience**

The immediate impact of this goal is very high in that final beneficiaries will have had their shelter issues resolved by the end of the project. Furthermore the QIPs will have contributed towards the integration opportunities of IDP communities through providing income generating opportunities or access to better services. While the information on shelter beneficiaries is well document the consultant would argue more evidence of impact could be collected on the QIP projects, for more detail see recommendations

The impact of the shelter part of this goal will be greatly reduced if the issue of utility connections is not resolved before the end of the project. The reason being it is highly unlikely the beneficiaries will resolve this themselves and without utilities, in particular gas for heating, the accommodation will never be fully utilized during the winter months.

**Overall Aim**

In reality the overall aim is simply a conglomeration of the three specific goals and as such goes no further in articulating the specific changes and development outcomes that are being sought. Generally an overall goal or aim will articulate a change that a project contributes to but cannot attain without certain other factors taking place. Given the wording of the overall aim and the lack of any indicators at this level no judgement on impact can be provided beyond the Goal level.

# 8. Conclusions

1. The project design although relevant in the general themes and topics addressed was outdated and not appropriate, in particular given the number of outputs and the budget available, by the time implementation began. The fact that it has not subsequently been reviewed has left the implementing agencies with in certain cases unrealistic targets.

2. From a real time perspective the only relevance factor that has changed significantly has been the attitude of the Russian government towards the UN. The ramifications of this for the team have been significant and resulted in very real challenges in engaging government counterparts. The fact that the project has progressed as far as it has is a credit to the implementing agencies on the ground however significant challenges still exist if all activities are to be completed within the planned timeframe.

3. The project has been implemented effectively and it is likely that the majority if not all the outputs will be delivered within the timeframe. However this will not necessarily result in the objectives being achieved. This a design fault and is either due to there being a lack of causal logic between the activities, outputs and objectives or because quantative targets given in the objective are unrealistic given the resources available.

4. Despite the fact coordination between the UN agencies involved was good this did not translate into a real integrated approach. An opportunity was missed here from an effectiveness perspective.

5. In general however the project has provided good value for money with 29 outputs being delivered with a relatively small number of staff and approximately 50% of inputs directly reaching final beneficiaries.

6. From a sustainability perspective although too early to make a final assessment the indications are that the methodology employed across all goals of working with partners and through local implementing agents will lead to a lasting and long term effect of the results achieved. Particular successes that the consultant would highlight here are

- the fact that the employment committee have accepted the ILO SIYB methodology and begun the process of training a cadre of staff in this methodology. This is an excellent example of what is widely perceived as international best practice being embedded at the local level

- the collaboration with the republic extension services and the development of more services at local level. Here an existing institution has been strengthened to provide better services to key target group that is small holder farmers.

The one disappointment here is goal one where even if the outputs are achieved it is highly unlikely they will be sustained in the longer term. This relates on the whole to overly ambitious objectives and a very difficult partner, that is the district and republican governments. In relation to the objective that targets NGOs and civil society here the decision by UNDP to deliver activities directly rather than work through an NGO has to a large degree negated the sustainability factor.

7. While too early to make a thorough assessment of impact the indications are that this evaluation measure will vary enormously between the different goals. Goal one is weak, goal two is strong and a final result with regards to goal three will be strongly correlated with whether the accommodation constructed is attached to utilities or not before the end of the project.

8. The management and leadership on all aspects of the project have been professional and effective. That being said there is no joint oversight body involving all UN agencies plus key stakeholders. The reasons given for not creating such a body are valid however its absence have left a void in terms of management oversight and support for the heads of the UN agencies working in Vladikavkaz.

9. It is not within the remit of this evaluation to implement a gender analysis however it does appear that men and women have both participated actively in the project and been direct beneficiaries of the activities. Furthermore in many cases there is data to prove this.

10. From a peace and reconciliation perspective the consultant is under the impression that the project simply by bringing people together around non contentious themes is doing a huge amount of good work. This applies across all the project goals and the reporting would benefit from a more concerted effort to record what is an important result.

# 9. Recommendations

1. It is important that the Human Security Trust Fund is made aware that certain stated in the objectives will not be met e.g objectives 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1. The main reason why they will not be achieved is either because they were unrealistic in the first place or because of the dramatic decrease in the real value of the budget. A specific report could be drafted for this purpose or simply forwarding the evaluation report with a cover letter would be sufficient and perhaps a more appropriate means of addressing this issue.

2. All UN agencies engaged in the project, should make more effort to collect and record data against the indicators as listed in the project document. This data should then be reflected in a simple and easy to read format in the project reports.

3. The existing indicators are weak in terms of assessing the impact and sustainability of the project and an opportunity to demonstrate potentially very strong results is being missed. The recommendation is for each objective to develop and collect data on at least one impact indicator. Furthermore a conscious effort should be made to record all instances where the project brings people together around non contentious issues and in effect provides a valuable “reconciliation” and “peace building” function. The crucial data that would illustrate this is the numbers of different ethnicities participating in different events.

4. With regards the remaining implementation period the recommendations are presented for each of the project goals. It is Goals One and Three that will require the most attention and should be given priority.

**Goal One**

- Objective 1.1 to complete draft strategies in the three pilot districts. Ideally the planned study tour would take place earlier in the Spring rather than in August as planned and provide an incentive that really kick starts the process. The consultant working on this output will require more support in chasing up and guiding the partners at district level and his input alone will not be sufficient.

- Objective 1.2 Document any changes in budgeting and planning at district and republic level that can be attributed to the project intervention. The causal link will need to be clearly demonstrated.

- Objective 1.3

Output 1.3.1 – Demonstrate what impact that the activities implemented to date have had on NGOs from the region and their ability to influence and impact upon social and economic recovery. This is far easier said than done but based on discussions with staff the consultant does believe this has happened to a certain degree but that the information has not as yet found its way in to the reports produced. In the final report a sound and well reasoned argument on why UNDP chose to implement activities directly under this output rather than through NGOs as implied in the project document should be put forward. Financial data and a simple cost benefit analysis should be presented in support of this argument.

Output 1.3.2 under this output the staff should seek to collect data and demonstrate on how project activities have bought people of different ethnicities together. The data collected here should not just be limited to this objective or goal but should cover the project as a whole see previous recommendation

Output 1.3.3 this should be addressed via the consultant who is engaged to worked with the business incubator under objective 2.3. All that is required is production and acceptance by the incubator of some strategies that favour the more vulnerable in accessing working opportunities. Given that the incubator already plans to develop a computer training facility that will provide improved access to those with physical disabilities and the elderly this target should be achievable.

**Goal Two**

The vast bulk of activities have been implemented under this goal however there are still remaining actions required the most notable of which are

- Implement all the activities under objective 2.3. This process has already begun but special emphasis will be required given the delayed start.

- ILO should correct the reporting data associated with output 2.2.2 and in future only those trained with resources made available by the Trust Fund should be listed here. Furthermore further enquiry should be conducted on the quality of the training and its impact. Simple actions that could be implemented here are having each trainee fill in a feedback questionnaire and tracking how many of the trainees actually succeed in starting up a business. In response to a request by the consultant the implementer have already provided data here and 73 businesses have been established. A simple survey of their level of performance and turnover would be recommended.

- Following on from the last point and in line with an issue already raised in the conclusion in general more evidence that demonstrates impact is required.

**Goal Three**

Given that UNHCR will be withdrawing their presence in Vladikavkaz as of 30th June 2011 this leaves four months during which an active presence will remain on the ground. This is will not be enough time to implement the remaining activities. The following are the key recommendations

- Identify exactly what mechanism will be employed to complete implementation as of 1 July 2011. There are various different alternatives that could be employed here and ideally at least two staff would remain operational in Vladikavkaz. However if this is not possible the only real alternative would be to work through the implementing partners with monitoring visits from Moscow.

- That being said it should be a case of full steam ahead in the course of the next four months in order to achieve as much as possible before the office closes down. Given that there will presumably be some savings gained through this early closure it may even be worth considering taking on an extra engineer to speed up the implementation process during the course of the next four months.

- Finally and perhaps most importantly every effort must be made to ensure that the issue of utility connections is resolved before the end of the project. Failure to achieve this will in a likelihood result in a situation where in the majority of cases the utilities are never connected thus greatly reducing the impact of this objective

5. For the project to do itself justice and receive the acclaim that it deserves the team as a whole must commit more time and effort to reporting. The reports that have been presented to data are confusing, repetitive and actually lack crucial information. A real effort will be required here to collect good data and then ensure it is presented in a concise and readable fashion.

6. One document that all UN agencies are working from should be agreed upon and held by each agency. This is in effect a formality but it is an important one.

# 10. Lessons Learned

The more significant lessons learned from this project are as follows

1. There are significant misconceptions and knowledge gaps concerning the operational methodologies of joint UN programming and any UN agency engaging in a joint programme should from the outset ensure it has an understanding of these issues. Failure to do so results in time lost on complex negotiations at the outset and can impact upon the quality of the programming and the developmental results achieved.

2. When the design and development of a project takes a significant period of time, as was the case here , prior to the project starting the budget should be reviewedto verify that it is still appropriate. In this case such an exercise would have highlighted serious shortcomings and perhaps presented the opportunity to make changes or at least open a dialogue with the donor.

3. Those who are leading the design process must be responsible and realistic in the targets that they set. While there is an obvious desire to write a strong document that will win funding this must be tempered with a sense of reality. Ideally those implementing the project would have taken the lead in the design process or at least been given an opportunity to review and amend the final draft.

4. When drawing up budgets for shelter projects the cost of connection to all necessary utilities should be included in the budget or an alternative mechanism be put in place.

5. On projects such as this covering a wide range of objectives and outputs and involving a number of UN agencies good coordination amongst the agencies alone will not necessarily result in an integrated approach between the different programmatic goals and amongst the agencies. Actually the mechanisms that govern joint programmes and the fact that each agency is accountable for its specific input make this harder to achieve than in interventions implemented by one UN agency. Joint programmes do not necessarily translate into UN agencies working together in an integrated manner

6. The most effective and sustainable developmental results are achieved when existing institutions are strengthened and this project provides good examples of this approach. The most notable being the partnerships with the extension services and the public employment committee.

# 11. Annexes

# Annex One Terms of Reference

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Ref.No | PME |
| Title | **Project Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist** |
| Agency | UNDP |
| Project | Sustainable Integration and Recovery in North Ossetia-Alania |
| Location | Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia-Alania |
| Duration | November - December 2010 |
| Date of Expire | 2010-11-17 |
| Description | UNDP implements the project “Sustainable Integration and Recovery in North Ossetia-Alania” to support integration and improvement of life level in the region through enhancement of local employment opportunities, development of sustainable livelihoods, enhancement capacity of local authorities and NGOs involved in economic and social recovery integration and recovery in North Ossetia-Alania. The project is being financed with UNTFHS funds, has started in 2009 and will be completed in 2011. This mid-term evaluation is conducted in accordance with UNDP rules and regulations and donor’s requirements. The successful candidate for the position will provide project mid-term evaluation, prepare the evaluation report and have it agreed with UNDP. |
| Terms of Reference | Objectives and Results:  The major objective of mid-term evaluation is to reveal and present project’s findings and weaknesses, discuss issues and ways of their addressing. A mid-term review will assess operational aspects, such as project management and implementation of activities and also the extent to which objectives are being fulfilled.   Responsibilities and tasks:  • Before starting, get thoroughly familiar with the project (objectives, outputs, budget, time schedule, problems, etc); • Consult with the Project Manager on the review mission plan, involvement of the project staff, partners and primary stakeholders, timeframe for fieldwork and reporting. Agree with project management on the methodologies of the review; • Per project activity, assess physical and financial progress, efficiency and adequacy and sustainability; • Assess the efficiency of project organization and management, the qualifications of consultants, reporting, effectiveness of the monitoring and evaluation system; • Assess the quality of cooperation with governmental institutions and effectiveness of coordination mechanisms, and contribution to timely decision making and problem solving; • Analyze what factors and constraints have influenced project implementation, including technical, managerial, organizational, institutional and socio-economic policy issues, in addition to other external factors unforeseen during design; • Assess the prospects of the local primary and secondary stakeholders/beneficiaries and institutions for sustaining impacts after completion of the project, taking into account old and new assumptions and risks; • Produce a clear set of lessons learned that can benefit the project in its remaining lifespan. |
| Background | Competencies:  • A solid understanding of local socio-economic development;  • Previous experience in the region is an asset; • Knowledge of the Russian language would be an advantage  Required Skills and Experience:   - University Degree in Economics; - At least 5 years experience in project monitoring and evaluation and experience in rapidly assessing information and developing recommendations.  The application should contain:  - A cover letter stating his/her interest in the assignment and qualifications for the position; - At least one recommendation letter from beneficiary of the earlier conducted project evaluation  - A current detailed CV including date of birth, citizenship, educational qualifications, a summary of professional skills and expertise, a summary of relevant work experience, publications written, and languages spoken, or completed United Nations Personal History form available on the web site. |
| Contacts | All applications should be sent to hr.ru@undp.org with cc.: alla.oleinik@undp.org by November 17, 2010 quoting the code "PME". Applicants will be contacted only if they are under serious consideration. |

# Annex Two List of Documents Reviewed

First Consolidated Progress Report for the period of November 2008 through October 2009

The Consolidated Progress Report for the period of November 2009 through December 2010

Project Document SUSTAINABLE INTEGRATION AND RECOVERY IN NORTH OSSETIA-ALANIA (UNDP Version)

Project Document SUSTAINABLE INTEGRATION AND RECOVERY IN NORTH OSSETIA-ALANIA (UNHCR Version)

FAO 2009 Consolidated Financial Report

ILO 2009 Consolidated Financial Report

UNDP 2009 Consolidated Financial Report

UNHCR 2009 Consolidated Financial Report

Data on Russian Federation Inflation Figures 2000 – 2009

Data on NO-A unemployment Statistics

Agreement on Cooperation between UNDP and the Centre for Entreprenuership Development

Agreement on Cooperation between UNDP and Rural Credit Consumers Cooperative Zhitnitsa

Agreement on Cooperation between UNDP and Credit Consumers Cooperative Express Credit

Agreement on Cooperation between UNDP and Sovremennie Tehnologil Grupp (STG)

Agreement on Cooperation between UNDP and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of NO-A

Agreement on Cooperation between UNDP and the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of NO-A

Agreement on Cooperation between UNDP and the Ministry of Investments and Foreign Activity of the Republic of NO-A

Agreement on Cooperation between UNDP and the Republican State Unitary Enterprise Infocenter

Reporting Notes on Output 1.3.1

Reporting Notes on Output 2.4.1

Reporting Notes on Output 2.4.2

ILO briefing notes

Meeting minutes of UN Agency coordination meetings held in 2010

Final Report of Ulugbek Dedabaev the Business Advisory Centre International Consultant

Explanatory note on the Results of Social Economic Development in the Republic of NO-A for the First Quarter of 2004

Final Report on Implementation of UNDP Programme “Sustainable Reintegration and Recovery in the North Caucases”

UNHCR data on the QIP projects

UNHCR data on the shelter beneficiaries

UNHCR data on the costs of construction materials

UNHCR QIP Project selection criteria and application forms

UNHCR QIP Guide

UNHCR Project Fact Sheets

National Human Development Report in the Russian Federation 2010

2006 Consolidated Appeal for the North Caucases

# Annex Three Mission Time Table and List of People who the Consultant had Meetings With

**Saturday, 05.02.2011**

Security briefing, UNDSS

**Sunday, 06.02.2011**

Briefing by UNDP Team, Project Associate, Project Assistant, UNDP Coordinator/Confidence Building

**Monday, 07.02.2011**

Meeting with FAO Project Assistant 10:00 – 10:30

Meeting with Beslan Extension Center 10:45 – 12:00

Visit Youth station for handicrafts and meet Director 12:15 – 12:40

Visit Puppet theatre “Shabi”meet Director 15:00 – 15:45

Meeting with UNDP Consultant Objectives 1.1 and 1.2 16:30 – 18:00

**Tuesday, 08.02.2011**

Departure to Ardon 10:00

Meeting Ardon Extension Center Ardonsky & Alagirsky Districts 10.45 – 11.15 Meeting with the STG Director 14:15 – 15:00

Meeting with the Government Business Incubator Director 15:15 – 16:00

**Wednesday, 09.02.2011**

Meeting with ILO implementing partner “Buisness Development Center LTD” Director 10:00 – 12:00

Meeting with Cooperative “Razvitie” Director Zamankul 14:00 – 14:30

Meeting with to Cooperative “Pchelka” Director 15:00 – 15:30

Meeting with UNDP Project Associate and UNDP Coordinator/Confidence Building 16.00 – 17.30

**Thursday, 10.02.2011 – UNHCR (Accompanied by Shelter Clerk and Protection Assistant)**

Briefing by UNHCR Shelter Clerk & Protection Assistant

Vladikavkaz, a refugee settlement in the Gardeners Association "Nauka" - a 2009 QIP (electricity and water supply)

Khataldon, occupied houses.

Mairamadag, occupied house

Komsomolskoye, Kirovsky District - 2009 QIPs (sewing workshop, car repair shop, hairdresser's)

Beslan 2010 QIP (playground in the kindergarten)

**Friday, 11.02.2011**

Meeting with UNDP Micro Finance Consultant 10:00 – 11:00

Meeting with credit cooperative “Express-credit” 11:00 – 13:00

Meeting with credit cooperative “Zhitnitsa” 14:00 – 15:30

Meeting with UNHCR Head of Office, UNHCR Shelter Clerk and UNHCR Protection Officer, 17.00 – 18.30

**Saturday, 12.02.2011**

Meeting with UNDP Project Manager 11:00 – 13.00

Departure to airport 13:00

UNDP Business Center Consultant Communication By Email

ILO Moscow Communication by email & telephone discussion

UNHCR Moscow Telephone discussion

1. Forced Migrant status in accordance with Russian Federal Law protects refugees who became naturalized but remain in dire need of assistance shelter employment etc [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Source UNDP Human Development Report on Russia 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. These statistics have been provided by the ILO Moscow Office [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. This paragraph is based on discussions with Oliver Mouquet UNHCR Moscow who was at the time based in Geneva and played a role in the original design process right through until the project being launched. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. The contents of this paragraph are based on discussions with Natalia Andreeva UNDP and Olivier Mouquet UNHCR. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. According to the 2002 HDR NO-A was ranked near of the bottom of 80 constituent units on a HDI however in the 2010 HDR it was ranked 42 out the 80 constituent units. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. The Start and Improve your own Business is a system of interrelated practical management –skills training packages for existing and aspiring small scale enterprise owners and managers. This is globally recognized as an ILO trademark and has been introduced in over 80 countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Agricultural Consumer Cooperatives (Сельскохозяйственный потребительский кооператив) in Russian Federation unite the different types of farming (producing) entities. These Cooperatives are noncommercial legal entities. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. HORTIVAR is FAO´s database on performances of horticulture cultivars in relation to agro-ecological conditions, cultivation practices, the occurrence of pests and diseases and timing of the production. (http://www.fao.org/hortivar/index.jsp) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. The data presented is taken from the financial reports for 2009 provided by each of the UN implementing agencies [↑](#footnote-ref-11)