Independent Final Evaluation - Phase 1

Draft Report
Field visits July - August 2010

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Request for Services 2010/236936 version 1

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INDEPENDENT FINAL EVALUATION
Phase 1
Field Visit July - August 2010
DRAFT V1

Evaluators:
Lene Poulsen, Team Leader
Abdelmajid Khojali
Frederik Prins
Rolf Grafe
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**DISCLAIMER**

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The designation employed and the presentation of material in the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the EC concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

**APPRECIATION**

The Evaluation Team would like to present our sincere thanks to the many, many people who have dedicated their valuable time to us and offered their precious opinion, expertise, and experience for this Evaluation. We appreciate the positive and productive discussions we have had throughout the exercise with a wide range of resource persons with a common keen interest in ensuring peaceful sustainable development for the Sudanese people. A list of the resource persons for the Evaluation is presented in Annex I. We are grateful to each and everyone.

We benefited from continuous support from the Ministry of International Cooperation, the EC Delegation, and UNDP in Khartoum and Juba and we are grateful for their flexibility, pragmatism, and constant availability. The individual projects provided invaluable support in organizing our visits in spite of tight schedules and delayed flights requiring numerous modifications to the programs. We recognize that the Evaluation was another add-on to already heavily charged working programs and we are impressed by the hospitality and support we counted on everywhere notwithstanding that the projects had closed officially.

Finally, we would like to thank the ECD for giving us this unique opportunity to take a strategic and global look at an innovative approach to collaboration and linking relief, rehabilitation, and development to support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Thanks!
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABEAS</td>
<td>Annual Budget Estimate and Activity Schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Action Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>Annual Progress Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRIDGE</td>
<td>Building Responsibility in the Delivery of Government Services Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate General for the European Commission Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECD</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESPA</td>
<td>Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSTP</td>
<td>Food Security Thematic Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Income Generation Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAP</td>
<td>Knowledge, Attitude, Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Logical Framework Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGRP</td>
<td>Local Government Recovery Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRDF</td>
<td>National Reconstruction and Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Project Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHAST</td>
<td>Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Policy and Review Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPR</td>
<td>Quarterly Progress Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery And Rehabilitation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRDF</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STABEX</td>
<td>Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d’Exportation - Compensatory finance scheme to stabilise export earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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</table>
The Executive Summary will be prepared once the first round of comments on the Draft Report.
1. INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

1.1 BACKGROUND

1. To further peace dividend for the most vulnerable communities in Sudan and impede further conflicts the European Commission (EC) launched a four year initiative in 2005 in collaboration with the Government of National Unity (GONU) and Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). The initiative, the Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), has been administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and implemented through NGO consortia in 10 States throughout the Sudan. The total budget of the RRP is 57 million Euro.1 More than 90% of the overall RRP budget is funded with Stabex2 funds accumulated from 1990 to 1999 in Sudan. The overall objective of Stabex is agricultural based economic development and export commodity competitiveness and diversification.

2. RRP was launched in January 2005 for an implementation period of originally 60 months, but later amended to 72 months, including preparation and closure. A final independent evaluation was commissioned in 2010 by the EC Delegation (ECD) in Khartoum to ensure accountability of the funding and draw lessons learned of the RRP experience.

1.2 EVALUATION OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

3. The objective of the Evaluation, defined in the Terms of Reference (TOR; presented in annex 1), is to assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the ten RRP Projects to produce conclusions and recommendations regarding:

- whether outcomes and impact of the RRP have been achieved as expected, with an emphasis on the sustainability of identified achievements,
- why certain results and certain impacts have or have not been achieved, and
- the relevance of the RRP approach as a valid mechanism of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development (LRRD) taking into account the special historical context in Sudan as well as the socio-economic context of each project and special factors that have been determining for the efficiency and effectiveness of the RRP.

4. The historical context is particularly linked to the timing of the RRP being launched in the wake of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

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1 €49,750,000 from the EC/GONU and €4,575,000 from UNDP with an additional €1,169,352 originated from the interest earned for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. Moreover, in November 2008 around €1,700,000 was provided by the Government of Norway for the last phase and earmarked for the Abyei RRP project (RRP02).

2 Stabex is the acronym for a European Commission compensatory finance scheme to compensate African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries for fluctuations in export prices of agricultural products. It was introduced in 1975 and was abolished in 2000.
between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement ending more than 20 years of civil war.

5. While the CPA has put an end to the war between the North and the South, internal and more localized conflicts have continued and resulted in temporary suspension of RRP project activities in various States. This combined with administrative challenges led to delays in the implementation of several of the projects and extensions were granted to most projects partly funded from the contingency budget line to allow implementation of planned activities. Moreover, one of the projects, RRP02, was extended with supplementary funding from the Government of Norway in November 2008. The 10 projects therefore come to a close at different times and the final Evaluation will take place in two phases:

6. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Sudan</td>
<td>Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP03 in Nile State</td>
<td>RRP06 in Upper Nile State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP04 in Red Sea State</td>
<td>RRP07 in Central Equatoria State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP08 in Eastern Equatoria State</td>
<td>RRP05 in Southern Kordofan</td>
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<td>RRP09 in Warrap State</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRP10 in Northern Bahr el Ghazal</td>
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</table>

7. The division of the national RRP into three major groups: Northern, Southern, and the Three Areas corresponds to the proposal of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). The JAM was organized by the UN and the World Bank in cooperation with the Government of Sudan, the SPLM, other UN agencies, and donors in 2004 – 05 assess Sudan’s rehabilitation needs following the CPA. The major output of the JAM was the framework for reconstruction and transition through 2010³, which disaggregates programs for the Northern Sudan, Southern Sudan, and the Three Areas⁴ taking into account the very different development contexts.

8. This Evaluation Report covers Phase I of the final RRP Evaluation and hence seven projects in seven States in Northern and Southern Sudan. A map with indications of the location of the seven projects can be found in Annex 3.

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³ Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication
⁴ The ‘Three Areas’ refer to the states of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile located in the transitional area between Northern and Southern Sudan. The Three Areas are culturally and politically part of the South but the CPA sets out special protocols for the areas, including separate administrations until a referendum is held in which they will have the option of joining the South or remain under Northern administration. The areas are also referred to as the ‘Protocol areas’. 

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1.3 Evaluation Methodology

9. The final Evaluation is a summative exercise looking at both ‘how things have been done’ and ‘what have been done and achieved’ in line with the evaluation guidelines from the EuropeAid Cooperation Office.

10. To achieve the objective of the Evaluation and ensure consistency among the evaluation of the 10 RRP projects and hence also between phase I and II an Evaluation Matrix was prepared. The Evaluation Matrix focuses on the following key questions:

- Is the RRP concept relevant for the Peace process and for achieving the overall objective of agricultural based economic development and export commodity competitiveness and diversification?
- Is the RRP efficient and have the RRP Program and projects’ management and coordination arrangements been appropriate, responsive, flexible, and timely to achieve the objectives of the RRP?
- Is the RRP effective and have the intended outputs and outcomes been achieved?
- Has the RRP had impact on the recovery in Sudan’s post-conflict context, supported the CPA, and supported peaceful coexistence?
- Are the program and project activities appropriately coordinated, harmonized, and aligned with other humanitarian and development activities, including government and state programs, and private and CBO initiatives to ensure sustainability?

11. The Evaluation Matrix with sub-questions, indicators, and primary sources of information is presented in Annex 4 together with key overall findings. The Evaluation Matrix was used to guide the discussions with different resource persons as well as a framework for the analysis of background documents.

12. The Evaluation was informed by:

- Review of RRP documents: program and project documents: project baselines, quarterly and annual reports, Annual Budget Estimate and Activity Schedules (ABEASs), the 2007 Mid Term Review (MTR), reports from lessons-learned workshops, and final internal evaluations for six of seven Projects,
- Review of RRP relevant documents, including needs assessments and baselines: the CPA, the JAM and other needs assessments and baselines, such as the Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessments (ANLAs), the 2007 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessments (CFSVAs), the 2005 Survey of Civil Personal in Southern Sudan, and the 2006 Sudan Household Health Sur-

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6 The final evaluation of RRP10 had still not taken place at the time the Final RRP Evaluation.
vey (SHHS), the EC Country Strategy Paper 2005-2007, and DG ECHO funding decisions 2006 - 2010,

- Review of documents for initiatives relevant and/or similar to RRP, including: EC funded recovery and rehabilitation programs such as the Eastern Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (ERRP), the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP), the Livestock Epidemiology-Surveillance Project (LESP), the UNDP implemented Local Government Recovery Programme (LGRP), the World Bank funded Community Development Fund (CDF), and the USAID funded BRIDGE aiming at delivery of government services,

- Field visits to seven RRP Projects: RRP03, 04, 06, 07, 08, 09, and 10. The Project visits included interviews and focus group discussions with Consortium Members, Local Government Authorities (LGAs), and communities in selected Project locations identified for their representativeness in terms of coverage of the Projects' focus areas: basic social services, capacity development of LGAs, and Income Generation Activities (IGA). Moreover, the Project visits included what can best be described as 'general observations': visual impressions from the Project sites,

- Individual interviews with key stakeholders in the implementation of the RRP: Ministry of International Cooperation in Khartoum, Aid Coordination Unit in GOSS, EC in Khartoum and Juba, including DG ECHO, UNDP in Khartoum and Juba, Consortia members from ten RRP projects through meetings in Khartoum and Juba, and

- Individual interviews with other relevant support institutions and initiatives: EC funded projects on agriculture and education, World Health Organization (WHO), Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and USAID and World Bank funded initiatives on capacity development of local authorities.

13. The fact finding for the Final Evaluation phase I took place from July 22 to August 25 including three days of preparation for each member of the Evaluation Team. A program of the itinerary for the fact finding in Sudan is presented in Annex 5.

14. The key outputs of Phase I of the Final Evaluation consists of:

- Seven individual Project Evaluations giving special emphasis to the specific dynamic contexts in the state and locations, and

- The Overall Evaluation based on the findings of the individual Project Evaluations but with special attention to the program approach in overall context in Sudan following the CPA and presenting conclusions and recommendations for key stakeholders in the RRP process. Special emphasis is given to the LRRD and Consortium approach.

1.4 EVALUATION TEAM

15. The Evaluation was carried out by a consortium led by Agrer Etudes et Conseils. The consortium recruited four independent senior consultants for the Evaluation: Lene Poulsen, Abdelmajid Khojali, Frederik Prins, and Rolf Grafe. The Team has extensive ex-
perience in conducting program evaluations of development and humanitarian activities as well as the grey area between the two, the so-called LRRD, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development. Moreover, the Team has a thorough knowledge of key aspects of the RRP: livelihoods, governance, conflict management, community mobilization, fragile counties, food security, agriculture, water, and health from Sudan and other parts of the world.

16. Ms. Poulsen and Mr. Khojali have never been involved in any activity directly linked to the RRP and the 10 individual Projects. Mr. Grafe carried out conflict management training within RRP08 and RRP07 and Mr. Prins worked for a short period in 2008 with VSF-Belgium as interim country manager working closely with the VSF family for harmonization of activities. The team leader takes the overall responsibility to ensure that no biased evaluation will be made based on special interests and former involvement of team members.

1.5 EVALUABILITY ASSESSMENT AND MAJOR CHALLENGES

17. While the RRP constitutes a substantial contribution to recovery and rehabilitation in Sudan, this aid is still only a fraction of the overall economic contributions and support towards the vulnerable communities. Considering the limited scope of the Evaluation exercise the Evaluation can only make general assessments of the direct impact of RRP’s support to the vulnerable population affected by conflicts and drought. The Evaluation should therefore not be seen as a proper impact assessment.

18. Likewise, this Evaluation was faced with a typical dilemma of development project and program evaluations, namely assessment of what would have happened without the Projects. However, there are some neighboring communities to the ones covered by the operations and the Evaluation relied on information from institutional stakeholders to inform on their general perception about the difference between the development in the communities covered by the RRP and other communities.

19. The high staff turnover within many of the implementing partner agencies have a direct impact on the level of information the Evaluation could obtain about the history and experience of the RRP activities, including coordination and interaction with other RRP stakeholders such as UNDP, the EC, and the PRC.

20. Moreover, as a Final Evaluation, the exercise took place when some of the Projects had already closed RRP activities. This is how it should be but it also creates some logistical challenges in terms of organizing meetings with local stakeholders and even meeting with all the consortia members as many will be occupied with new assignments. Still, the Evaluation is very grateful for the enormous efforts made by consortia members to accommodate the team and facilitate all aspects of logistical arrangements.

21. The high staff turnover also resulted in difficulties in obtaining baselines for the individual Projects and some of the baselines were only obtained after the Project visits. The scope of many of the baselines, though, did not provide proper baseline information either. Most were done well into the Project activities and most did not follow the indicators of the logical frameworks for the Projects and did not provide information, for
instance, on level of poverty or food security or use of basic social services, despite the fact that those were key objectives of the projects. Actually, many of the baselines are presented as general needs assessments. The Evaluation therefore had to evaluate against what seemed to have been the conditions at the outset of the Projects.

22. Logistical arrangements in project areas where there are enormous distances to cover between the different project operations, posed a special constraint for the Evaluation and choice of sites to visit was influenced by the logistical possibilities. The logistical arrangements were further challenged by the timing of the Evaluation during rainy season in the South and the summer season in the North causing problems in crossing the Nile river.

23. Language was a challenge for the discussions with communities and many LGAs. While the Evaluation Team speaks Arabic and English there are more than 200 languages in the Sudan and the team had to rely on translation for some discussions. The translation was mostly facilitated by Project staff and even had to go through some steps of local language translation before getting to English or Arabic.

24. Development and humanitarian cooperation is awash with jargons and concepts with different meanings and definitions to different people. While the Evaluation recognizes that often there are no single correct definition, we also acknowledge that cross-cultural discussions will often mean different understandings of the same concept. To diminish the possibilities of misunderstanding, a list of major concepts and terms used in the Evaluation is presented in Annex 6.6 with the definition applied by the Evaluation.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 CONTEXT

25. After more than two decades of civil war between the North and South a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan. The agreement outlines measures for power sharing, wealth sharing, conflict resolution, and sets a timetable for a referendum on self-determination in Southern Sudan and the status of the region of Abyei. The votes are slated for January 9. For the interim period, the CPA granted the South autonomy for six years.

26. The civil war combined with a series of droughts and other natural calamities resulted in more than two million fatalities, four million Internally Displaced People (IDPs), and half a million Sudanese refugees in other countries. The protracted crises devastated the infrastructure and social services particularly in the South. During the civil war most basic services were delivered by NGOs while government was generally absent. It is estimated that government expenditures on basic social services were around 1.5% of total GDP at the end of the war. While Sudan is one of the largest recipients of humanitarian aid in Africa mostly channeled outside the government, very little development assistance was offered at the time of the peace negotiations. In anticipation of a large increase in aid flows following the CPA, donors insisted on the need
for aid coordination at all levels putting special emphasis on sharing knowledge and building common approaches. This spirit of coordination and harmonization of development assistance was reflected in the RRP’s general vision.

27. The civil war also resulted in inadequate and often non-functional statistical systems at state and local levels and reliable baseline information was very limited at the time of the peace agreement. The population of Sudan is generally agreed to be 39 million with 10 million living in Southern Sudan. The 2008 population census was the first to take place in 15 years but the results were highly contested by the South. Moreover, the population is highly mobile after the CPA and with a high degree of spontaneous returns that are difficult to quantify. It is important to notice the lack of proper census data for Sudan and hence the lack of proper sampling background for surveys, further limiting the level of confidence of various baseline surveys. Most RRP projects were based on data from the 1993 census.

28. The donor community recognized the need to accompany the CPA and committed to provide substantive support to development in war affected and least developed areas with the aim of bringing these areas to the national average standards and level of development.

29. In preparation of the overall rehabilitation and recovery following the CPA a Core Coordination Group (CCG) was established with representatives from the government and the SPLM, the UN System, the World Bank, and the IGAD Partners Forum for Peace\(^7\) to develop a common framework. The CCG launched a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in 2004 to assess Sudan’s rehabilitation needs. In March 2005 and after 15 months of work\(^8\), the JAM presented a framework for reconstruction and transition through 2010\(^9\) addressing underlying structural causes of conflicts and underdevelopment in the country. The framework was presented to the donors’ conference organized after the signing of the CPA in 2005 and US$ 4.5 billion were pledged. While the JAM constitutes a unique framework for reconstruction, some criticisms have been raised by civil society regarding the lack of sufficient participatory assessments at local and state government levels. As a result diversified needs and expectations of rural and urban communities were not properly identified. Still, the JAM represents the most robust baseline available for the Sudan in 2004 at the time of the development of the RRP.

Table 1 Some key baseline information from the JAM - Areas of RRP interventions highlighted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States with poverty levels(^a) above 60%</th>
<th>Northern Sudan</th>
<th>Southern Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea, Southern Kordofan, Western Darfur</td>
<td>Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, Upper Nile, Jonglei</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| States with poverty levels 40 – 60% | Northern Darfur, Southern | Eastern Equatoria |

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\(^7\) IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) consists of donor countries, the EC, UNDP, IOM, and the World Bank.

\(^8\) Originally planned for 11 weeks.

\(^9\) Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Darfur</th>
<th>Western Equatoria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>States with poverty levels 13 – 40%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>States Human Development Index below 0.40</strong></td>
<td><strong>Blue Nile, Western Kordofan, Red Sea, Northern Kordofan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>States with Human Development Index 0.40 to 0.45</strong></td>
<td><strong>South Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Western Darfur, Kassala, Al Gadarif, Sinner</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>States with Human Development Index 0.45 to 0.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>Northern Darfur, Western Nile, Northern</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Poverty rate defined as the proportion below 40 percent of an economic status index based on asset ownership. Year: 2000 (North); 1999 (South). Source: World Bank staff calculations based on MICS and DHS surveys. Data is not available for all states.*

30. For the North, the framework stresses the need for community-driven recovery and equitable distribution of wealth to enable state and local governments to fulfill the responsibilities to deliver basic services, particularly health care, education, and water and sanitation. Moreover, investments should be made to increase agricultural and livestock productivity along with private sector development. For the South, the framework emphasizes the virtually non-existing infrastructure as well as the lack of institutional capacity to deliver basic social services. The return of IDPs and refugees should be included in new plans. The framework highlights the need to promote agricultural production and productivity as part of the rural development. The framework, furthermore, highlights the need to address women’s conditions and eliminate discrimination in economic and public spheres and ultimately ensure gender equality. Reconstruction and recovery programs should address environmental degradation and desertification. Moreover, HIV / AIDS and conflict prevention should be mainstreamed in design of programs at all levels. The framework estimated that the costs linked to the need reconstruction and recovery would be US$ 7.9 billion for the period July 2005 to December 2007 and with a focus on the poorest and most marginalized areas. It is important to notice this astounding amount when assessing the impact of the RRP with an overall budget of around US$ 70 million.

31. Food Security assessments have taken place regularly in the Sudan including annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAMs)\(^{10}\) organized jointly by FAO and WFP and with participation of Government representatives. The EC participates regularly in these assessments and typically provides funding for the exercises too. Other regular participants include NGOs funded by the RRP such as CARE, IRC, Concern, Tearfund, and CRS. Over the years, the CFSAMs have highlighted the poor nutritional status and the lack of access as major components of household food insecurity. While there is an overall cereal deficit in the South, some counties normally have a surplus production, including some of the counties where the RRP is intervening such as Renk in Upper Nile and Juba County in Central Equatoria.

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32. Nutritional status is often considered to be one of the best outcome indicators for overall livelihood security since it captures multiple dimensions such as access to food, healthcare, sanitation and education. The following figure 1 shows the levels of chronic and acute malnutrition at the State level in Sudan in 2006. The figures are from the Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS)\(^\text{11}\) based on 25,000 households surveyed in April / May 2006. The SHHS was the first national survey covering all social sectors since the CPA and was carried jointly by GONU and GOSS.

33. The survey shows very troubling malnutrition levels throughout the Sudan with levels that exceed the internationally threshold level of emergency interventions for acute malnutrition levels (weight for height) above 15%. Moreover, the survey confirms that the extremely high chronic and acute malnutrition levels are caused by a complex of poverty, lack of development, and insecurity.

**Figure 1** Global and Acute Malnutrition among children under five (%) - Source: Sudan Household Health Survey, 2006

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34. WFP carried out household food security baselines (CFSVA) for Northern\textsuperscript{12} and Southern\textsuperscript{13} Sudan in 2006. According to the CFSVAs conflict is generally referred to as the major cause of the persistent food insecurity in Sudan. In areas where conflict are less of an issue such as the Northern States, food insecurity is particularly linked to asset poverty and 30% of households in the poorest quintile were food insecure while only 5% in the richest quintile were. A regression analysis showed that critical factors linked to food insecurity are female headed households, households with high dependency ratios, displaced households, and households experiencing shocks, particularly price shocks. Current IDP and refugee households are also more likely to be food insecure. Worst off are former IDPs who have recently resettled with 30% of households being food insecure.

35. Agriculture accounts for 35% of GDP in Sudan and more than 65% of employment. The Government’s investment in the agricultural sector constitutes around 8% of the national budget which is close to the commitment made by African Heads of State in 2009. The efficiency of the investment in terms of addressing food security for the poor is questioned though. The main constraints for agricultural development include water scarcity, land degradation, frequent droughts and inundations, high pest infestation, poor access to rural areas, and land use conflicts. Moreover, the quality of seeds is poor in many areas and prices are unstable. In the South markets are still underdeveloped and paralyzed by poor infrastructure and conditions are not yet conducive for increased agricultural production for income generation. Land ownership is still a major issue in Sudan after the CPA. Traditionally, land belonged to the Government but was managed by communities and local leaders. The CPA defines that the land belongs to the people without further defining what that means or should be in the future thus creating a lot of uncertainty for investment in agricultural development.

36. Administratively, Sudan is a federal country with 25 states that are semi-autonomous with their own executive, legislature, and judiciary. Southern Sudan comprises 10 states that are subdivided into counties, payams, and bomas. Those administrative divisions are parallel to localities, administrative units, and village councils in Northern Sudan. The state level plays a dominant role in delivery of basic services and development planning. The States have the overall responsibility for approving and implementing development projects identified by LGAs, i.e. counties / localities. The States are, furthermore, responsible for staff working at LGAs, including hiring and firing as well as payment of salaries. The LGAs are responsible for planning, supervision, and financial management. The CPA created the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan which started with very few qualified professionals and very limited experience in governance. Moreover, the new opportunities created by the establishment of the GOSS, attracted a number of leaders of civil society organizations throughout the Southern Sudan and allegedly resulted in a lack of well-functioning not-state actors, particularly at local level.

\textsuperscript{12} WFP (2007) “Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis - Sudan: ROS” World Food Programme, Rome
\textsuperscript{13} WFP (2007) “Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis - Sudan: Southern Sudan” World Food Programme, Rome
Poor levels of health, water, and sanitation, and education that have been identified as critical underlying factors of the alarmingly high malnutrition levels is a result of extremely weak basic social services, particularly in the rural areas. According to a 2008 study of health care delivery in Southern Sudan is done by NGOs funded by international donors and less than 30% of the population has minimal access to primary health care. At the same time, the demand for public basic services is often weak; e.g., poor people may not be able to travel to the health and education infrastructures, local conflicts might prevent certain groups from using the services if those are controlled by conflicting groups, and traditional lifestyles and cultural norms dictate that some groups will use traditional healers rather than modern medicine or decline to send their girls to school.

37. As part of the preparation of the new Government of Southern Sudan, a survey of the public service workforce was carried out at the end of 2005. The report highlights the uneven distribution of civil servants across states, counties, and functional areas and the short supply of specialized staff for health services, education, agriculture, and rural development. Agriculture and technical engineering had the lowest number of staff. The education levels were not very high and many staff lacked sufficient bilingual capacity. However, the report also showed that the staff is relatively young and development of their skills is therefore viable. While around 19% of the civil servants are women, there is a critical lower level of female staff in managerial and decision-making positions. Based on the results, the survey report recommends upgrading skills training, affirmative action to improve gender equality, as well as public management reforms.

38. With oil constituting 85% of total export revenue in Sudan, there is a strong dependency on oil revenue for GOSS and GONU to finance public expenditures, and the last years decrease of the oil price has put further pressure on particularly GOSS as oil constitutes 98% of its revenues.

39. While there was high optimism in the wake of the signing of the CPA, the continuing political uncertainty and disagreements over Abyei and the demarcation of borders underline the continuous fragility of the agreement. Groups opposed to the disarmament have created instability in areas of Upper Nile, Eastern and Central Equatoria, and Jonglei, disrupting the return process. In addition, land use conflicts continue to disrupt the livelihood security of people in several states in the South. The perception of a ‘post-conflict’ situation in the South ready for development is therefore very questionable. Moreover, Sudan is disaster prone and natural hazards such as drought, inundations, and epidemics are frequent and have caused severe disruptions in the fragile recovery and development process launched after the CPA.

40. The continued insecurity and the lower than expected rate of rehabilitation of basic social services and livelihood opportunities have somewhat limited the return of IDPs and refugees to Southern Sudan. Still, it is estimated that around 2 million displaced

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14 BASICS (2008) “The Health Sector Relief to Development Transition Gap Analysis: Southern Sudan” Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival (BASICS) for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Arlington quoting the UN
16 During the first 6 months of 2010 there were 147 registered new conflicts in Southern Sudan.
have returned. But the continuous insecurity combined with inundations and droughts have resulted in around 390,000 displaced people since 2005.

41. The international sanctions against Sudan imposed by the international community in 1997 has had a decisive impact on development cooperation and general development of productive sectors in Sudan. So while overall international assistance has steadily increased development aid has been very limited. It should be mentioned, though, that important investment in agricultural development has been made by non-OECD countries particularly in Northern Sudan.

42. Following the signature of the CPA in 2005, the EC resumed development cooperation with Sudan and committed initially € 400 million in long-term development assistance under the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Community budget for recovery, rehabilitation and development activities in the Northern and Southern Sudan. The GONU has chosen not to ratify the revised Cotonou Agreement thereby blocking the implementation of development cooperation under the 10th EDF. This means that the Commission will not be able to disburse the € 300 million pledged for the period 2008-2013.

2.2 RRP Objectives, Strategy, and Structure

43. The RRP is funded through Stabex\textsuperscript{17} funds accumulated from 1990 to 1999 in Sudan. The overall objective of Stabex is agricultural based economic development and export commodity competitiveness and diversification. In order to quick-start the productive sector after the CPA the Government of Sudan agreed with the EC that € 50 million of the total accumulation of € 200 million would be used for the ‘Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme’ (RRP).

44. The overall objective of the RRP is defined as “reduce the prevalence and severity of poverty and increase food security amongst conflict affected rural households across Sudan by achieving tangible improvements at the community and local authority level. This will take into account the extent and immediacy of IDP return”. The development objective is part of the EC’s overall development assistance to Sudan defined to consolidated peace with sustainable and equitable development. The development assistance consists of different complementary programs, including the RRP and the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP) aiming at rural development. However, the complementary programs have had different periods of implementation. The SPCRP, for instance was designed in 2004 like the RRP but only launched in 2008, thus limiting coordination and full use of complementarities.

45. To reach its overall objective, the RRP focuses on the following activities:
   - capacity development of local government authorities (LGAs) to facilitate their resumption of their core competencies and responsibilities in providing basic social services and local governance,

\textsuperscript{17} Stabex is the acronym for a European Commission compensatory finance scheme to compensate African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries for fluctuations in export prices of agricultural products. It was introduced in 1975 and was abolished in 2000.
• development of physical infrastructure required for basic social services, and
• development of sustainable livelihoods among the vulnerable households through income generation activities including agriculture, fisheries, and livestock.

46. The key principles of the RRP strategy include:
• Implementation through flexible, pragmatic, and result-oriented approaches with active community involvement and emphasis on self-reliance and community ownership,
• Involve Local Government Authorities (LGAs)\(^{18}\) actively in all phases of the operations - planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation - to promote sustainability of the program,
• Linking relief, rehabilitation and development activities (LRRD),
• Ensure coordination with other donors’ interventions, and
• Ensuring high proportion of program expenditure goes directly to target communities.

47. It is expected that the RRP will facilitate the release of different EU funding mechanisms, including the EDF, Stabex, and various budget lines.

48. The daily management of the RRP implementation, is ensured by UNDP through a special Action Management Unit (AMU) based in Khartoum and with a sub-office at UNDP-Juba. The functions of AMU include financial administration, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting.

49. The overall supervision of the RRP is ensured by a Policy and Review Committee (PRC) integrating representatives from GONU and GOSS, the EC Delegation, and UNDP.

50. In preparation of the RRP, the EC organized a general presentation of the program concept for INGOs in Nairobi in 2003. The presentation highlighted that the RRP would be implemented through a series of integrated rural development projects in both Northern and Southern Sudan. It was also made clear during the presentation that the RRP projects should be implemented by NGO consortia with solid experience in integrated rural development. The projects would be implemented at county or locality levels in ten different states.

51. A call for proposal was issued in 2005 accompanied by a set of Technical Guidelines explaining the RRP and the eligibility criteria and application procedures. It was particularly highlighted that NGOs and other non-state actors are considered to have a comparative advantage over other implementing partners in the executing of community-based support based on their local knowledge and experience. It was not specified who other implementing partners might be, though. According to the Technical Guidelines the RRP would “provide the foundations for increased productivity from the ‘grass roots’”. There is no further explanation regarding sector specific productivity. The

\(^{18}\) The LGAs correspond to the county administration in the South and locality administration in the North.
Technical Guidelines outline the type of activities eligible for RRP funding as described in the original funding agreement between the EC, GONU / GOSS, and UNDP:

- Rehabilitation and development of social and civic infrastructure,
- Rehabilitation and development of physical infrastructure related to production, water, sanitation, education, and health,
- Rehabilitation of productive capacities,
- Income generation,
- Micro-financing with cost recovery, elements,
- Access to services and markets,
- Sustainable natural resource utilization and management,
- Human resource skills development,
- Technical and vocational training, and
- De-mining.

A total of 10 projects were approved for RRP funding:

Table 2 RRP Projects and Consortia

<p>| RRP01 | Islamic Relief | &gt; Mines Advisory Group &gt; Save the Children Sweden &gt; Spanish Red Cross | &gt; Blue Nile Network for Development Organizations &gt; Child Rights Institute &gt; JASMAR - Sudan Association for Combating Landmines &gt; Sudanese Red Crescent Society | Blue Nile |
| RRP02 | Mercy Corps, later replaced by MC Scotland, Save the Children US | &gt; GOAL Ireland, Save the Children US | &gt; Abyei Community Action for Development | Abyei SAA |
| RRP03 | International Rescue Committee, later replaced by partner SOS Sahel | &gt; Agency for Cooperation in Research and Development &gt; SOS Sahel | &gt; Port Sudan Association for Small Enterprise Development &gt; Sudanese Environmental Conservation Society RSS, &gt; Doa’a women CBO - later expelled | Red Sea |
| RRP04 | Roots Organization for Development | &gt; Global Health Foundation &gt; Nawafil El Khairat Organization | &gt; African Charitable Society for Mother and Child Care | River Nile |
| RRP05 | Save the Children - US, later replaced by SC Sweden | &gt; Danish Church Aid | &gt; Diocese of El Obeid &gt; Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation Development | Southern Kordofan |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead NGO</th>
<th>Partner NGOs</th>
<th>Associates</th>
<th>State - Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RRP06</td>
<td>Fellowship for African Relief, later replaced by Mercy Corps-Scotland</td>
<td>&gt; Tearfund, &gt; International Aid Service - pulled out later &gt; Strømme &gt; Fellowship for African Relief</td>
<td>&gt; Sudan Development and Relief Agency, later handed over to Episcopal Church of Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP07</td>
<td>Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation</td>
<td>&gt; Action Africa Help International &gt; ZOA Refugee Care</td>
<td>&gt; Sudan Health Association &gt; New Sudan Council of Churches &gt; Sustainable Community Outreach Programme for Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP08</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Service</td>
<td>&gt; MERLIN &gt; Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale</td>
<td>&gt; Catholic Diocese of Torit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP09</td>
<td>VSF-G (Veterinarians Without Borders - Germany)</td>
<td>&gt; World Vision International &gt; Impact on Health, Cooperazione e Sviluppo Onlus</td>
<td>&gt; Sudan Education and Development Agency &gt; Sudan Production Aid, Indigenous Forest Resources Awareness in the Improvement of Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP10</td>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
<td>&gt; Concern</td>
<td>&gt; Hope Agency for Relief and Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. The members of the 10 Consortia originally included 51 NGOs\(^{19}\); 23 Sudanese NGOs and 28 International NGOs (INGOs). During the RRP implementation there have been some modifications to the composition of the RRP consortia. Three lead agencies have been replaced by other INGOs while one national NGO was expelled and some partners decided to pull out.

54. Originally, the 10 Consortia worked in 13 localities / counties. During the implementation an administrative reorganization took place in both Northern and Southern Sudan, which led, inter alia, to a sub-division of the localities and countries and the RRP ended up working with 20 LGAs. This process obviously had severe programming impact for RRP projects, especially since many of the new localities and counties did not have qualified staff at all. The projects are organized with Project Coordination Committees consisting of heads of the consortia members who typically will meet monthly in Khartoum or Juba. At the local levels, project technical committees with participation of consortia members and representatives from LGAs and communities meet typically at county / locality or in some cases at state level. Moreover, the individual projects are often working through Payam / Administrative unit committees as well as Village Development Committees (VDCs).

\(^{19}\) Including two organizations from the Red Cross Movement: one national society and one international. The Evaluation recognizes that officially members of the Red Cross family are not classified as NGOs but the Evaluation uses the concept here as Red Cross partners function similarly to the INGOs involved in the RRP.
In March 2009, GONU expelled 13 INGOs and revoked the licenses of three national NGOs with direct consequences for many aid projects in Northern Sudan considering that the expelled organizations accounted for 40% of all aid workers there. Among the 13 INGOs were IRC, Save the Children UK and US, and Mercy Corps who were partners or lead agencies in RRP projects. The expulsion had severe impact on the project implementation for RRP02, 03, 05, and 06 with temporary suspension of activities and indefinite confiscation of project material, particularly in RRP03. With support from the PRC and AMU the consortia were reconstituted and expelled lead agencies were being replaced by other related INGOs[^20]. In the case of RRP04, which is one of the seven projects that are part of this Evaluation, another consortium member agreed to assume the responsibilities as lead agency.

### 3. Findings

#### 3.1 Relevance

#### 3.1.1 Support to the CPA

56. The CPA created the autonomous GOSS, which started with few qualified professionals and very limited experience in good governance, including participation, decentralization, and equality. RRP’s support to LGAs in the South is therefore in line with the required actions for follow-up to the CPA. Moreover, the CPA establishes that the Multi Donor Trust Funds shall prioritize capacity building and institutional strengthening and quick-impact programs identified by the Parties. The RRP strategy as a quick-impact program with institutional development is therefore also in line with the CPA. In terms of the CPA’s call for greater geographical equality and prioritization of public spending to war-affected areas, several of the 10 States where the RRP is operating are not among the poorest or the states with the lowest human development index according to the 2005 JAM or the 2006 Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS). Particularly, the River Nile State is relatively well off and considered food secure (CFSVA 2006) although still with relatively high acute and chronic malnutrition rates. However, within the 10 states all RRP intervention areas are marginalized and the communities are underserved although they do not necessarily qualify as the poorest or most marginalized. It should also be noted that the RRP project documents do not present any clear list of criteria with indicators for why some locations were chosen and others not.

57. The CPA promotes the concept of ‘One Country - Two Systems’ which to a certain degree is not reflected in the RRP approach. Rather the RRP seeks to address one program for the three different systems: North, South, and the Three Areas with little differences in the activity categories implemented in projects in the South and North. Other national programs developed in support of the CPA have chosen to make a

[^20]: In most cases related INGOs replaced the initial INGOs though a so-called ‘re-hatting’ exercise. E.g. Save the Children US was replaced by Save the Children Sweden, and Mercy Corps was replaced by Mercy Corps Scotland.
clearer distinction between different sub-programs for the different areas. The Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP)\textsuperscript{21} has different focus areas and timelines for the capacity development of the Ministry of Agriculture in the North and the South. Likewise, the USAID funded BRIDGE operates different sub-programs for the Three Areas and the South aiming at local level capacity building for health and education. Finally, it should be noted that for the RRP projects in the North, RRP03 is not only consistent with the CPA but also with the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), which was signed in October 2006\textsuperscript{22}. The Evaluation finds that greater flexibility within each project is possible with a ‘one country – two approaches’ program.

58. As highlighted in the JAM, major root causes of the decade-long conflicts in Sudan include a biased development in favor of Khartoum and with marginalization of rural areas. As a result, the many rural areas are characterized by lack of access to basic services, food insecurity, and lack of investment in productive capital. The RRP concept and focus is therefore also in harmony with the JAM. Furthermore, according to the JAM agricultural output growth has favored those with capital and land while the landless have been further marginalized. The Evaluation finds that the RRP projects pay little attention to the different needs of different land tenure groups.

### 3.1.2 Alignment with Stabex Objectives

59. RRP’s focus on providing the most vulnerable and the poor and food insecure with livelihood support that include diversified agricultural production is in line with the CPA and should, in principle, also respond to Stabex’ overall objective in terms of promoting agricultural based economic development. Still, the individual project documents pay limited attention to agricultural production and food security and poverty are addressed implicitly rather than explicitly. Individual projects in the North pay limited explicit attention to drought affected communities and drought risk management is not addressed. RRP04, for instance, focuses more on populations along the Nile who generally are better off with greater resilience towards droughts as highlighted in the JAM. In the South, project locations are all areas that were heavily impacted by the war with eroded basic social services and often total lack of LGA capacity. Poverty and food insecurity are rampant in all project areas.

60. Overall, the project documents give limited attention to agricultural production as such and rather than looking at the overall food production needs and potential the projects are supporting individual and sporadic activities without sufficient attention to the general context such as market structures, extension services, or financing services.

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\textsuperscript{21} The Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP), financed by the EC, is a 4-year program for recovery of human and physical productive capacities in some of the most vulnerable and war and drought affected areas in Northern and Southern Sudan. SPCRPs’s activities focus on the agricultural sector. SPCR was originally seen as complementary to RRP. However, while the program was developed in 2004 the launch got delayed until 2008.

\textsuperscript{22} Eastern Sudan is among the most marginalized states in Sudan with few development actors. The marginalization led to a low-intensity conflict in 1997 between the various rebel groups and the Government. In October 2006 the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) was signed by the Eastern United Front and the Government of Sudan for the three States of Kassala, Red Sea, and Gedarif. The ESPA includes a framework for rehabilitation and development of this marginalized region, focusing on capacity building, strengthening of infrastructure, poverty eradication and a return of refugees and IDPs.
Likewise, the project activities are not defined in the context of other more general support to the agricultural sector or the overall policies for agricultural development in the states. There are some exceptions though. The project document of RRP03, for instance, provides a general analysis of the food production constraints in the project areas and identify specific project activities to address issues such as poor irrigation. Other critical identified constraints such as lack of market access and information have not been addressed, though. RRP07 and RRP10 both build on the partners' previous investments in agricultural development in the project areas. This is positive although the projects do not provide a critical jump-start but rather continuation of initiated activities. In terms of quick-start of rural development, the projects' support to basic social services with rehabilitation infrastructure of basic social services as human resource development of LGAs is relevant.

61. While the project documents outline major target groups as IDPs, returnees, and so-called 'stayees' there is no clear analysis of the many and often competing recovery strategies of returning IDPs and refugees, the poor, the landless, private investors, farmers, nomads, and other groups claiming a livelihood in the rural areas where the RRP is intervening. With the competing land use interests local conflicts continue to emerge and there is a general perception, particularly in the South, that local conflicts have increased over the last years. That there will be likely impact on food security and poverty is generally recognized. However, little has been done to clearly identify the links and ensure explicit conflict sensitivity in all project activities to increase the relevance of the activities.

62. A clear distinction between the different stakeholder groups is similarly important for some of the other focus areas of the projects. E.g. returnees have often spend considerable time in camps or sites and will typically have a better nutritional status than the 'stayees'. Likewise, hygiene, treatment of drinking water, and use of latrines will often be higher among returnees than among other groups. Still, the project documents do not offer differentiated approaches and focus areas for different groups and relevance assessments become very general.

3.1.3 Basic Conditions at the Launch of the Projects

63. The basic conditions at the onset of the RRP differed considerably between the North and the South. In terms of stability and basic communication infrastructure the required conditions for development interventions were available in the North although the road network to many of the RRP project areas remains very poor.

64. In the South, stability is still in the making and the description of the situation as 'post-conflict' seems an illusion. Local low-intensity conflicts continue to create real security risks and RRP project staff were evacuated for security reasons on several occasions. The lack of stability does also have a direct impact on the possible functioning of basic service infrastructure where population will avoid using the services for fear of attacks or being linked to certain fractions in the complicated power structure.

23 'Stayees' refer to the people who did not leave due to conflict and droughts.
65. The road network in the South remains very fragile and many project areas are cut off during part of the rainy season. There is only 50 km of tarmac rods and while important investments have been made to rebuild roads, the maintenance is often lacking and roads that were considered passable at the time of the design of the projects were already in disrepair a few years later. Moreover, landmines are still widespread in States where the RRP is intervening.

66. Capacity development of LGAs is a critical component of the RRP strategy. However, LGAs were not existing in several states in the South at the onset of the RRP and where they were existing they were very fragile with vacancies in many critical positions. An additional although unforeseeable problem regarding the LGAs was added after the RRP onset in both the North and the South as a result of an administrative reorganization when many of the counties and localities where RRP is intervening were subdivided. This led to new localities with no immediate counterpart for the RRP projects. It should also be noted that there were areas in the South where LGAs were more functional than the ones in the chosen project areas. However, those localities were considered to be already covered relatively well by other interventions. Critical for the existence of sufficient development conditions for the RRP is the assumption that a nascent government in the South starting from scratch would be able to take on important management and human resource responsibilities in terms of LGAs. In hindsight everybody seems to realize that this assumption was either overly optimistic or totally unrealistic. While the Evaluation has some sympathy for understanding the special environment immediately after the signing of the CPA when all partners wanted to be supportive of the new structures, the Evaluation also find that experienced partners should have warned against such clearly idealistic assumptions. In the end the relevance of the project is jeopardized by the lack of appropriate development conditions at the start of the RRP.

3.1.4 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development

67. EC’s policy regarding LRRD is laid down in two major communications from 1996 and 2001 calling for relief to be implemented alongside or followed by rehabilitation and reconstruction to ensure a smooth transition to long-term development processes. The 1996 communication states that from an EC point of view special attention should be given to food security and health when applying LRRD approaches. Moreover, coordination is critical. The 2001 communication is based on a general evaluation in 1999 of EC’s LRRD activities and the recognition of a need to streamline EC’s cooperation activities and strengthen the links between humanitarian and development activities. According to the 2001 communication the LRRD rationale outlined in

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24 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development COM (95)/423
26 Actually, the LRRD concept was developed in the 1980s in response to the food crises in Sub-Saharan Africa when it became clear that the food crisis were not a temporary disruption to the normal development process but rather a symptom of bad governance. See for instance Goyder, Hugh (2006) “Linking Relief, Recovery, and Development (LRRD) – Policy Study” Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London
1996 remained valid but development programmes should increasingly integrate disaster preparedness and coping strategies.

68. As mentioned the EC LRRD policy suggests that the implementation of an LRRD approach can follow either a continuous or a contiguous approach. A continuous approach where relief and rehabilitation will be followed by development might be valid for stable development countries that are not prone to frequent disasters. On the other hand, the Evaluation finds that a contiguous LRRD approach is particularly valid for fragile countries such as the Sudan, where a high level of vulnerability to natural hazards and low-intensity conflicts are likely to continue in the foreseeable future. In this way, it is important to ensure that risk reduction activities, including disaster preparedness and risk monitoring will be mainstreamed into the development agenda to ensure that there will be an ever-ready capacity to respond to surges in humanitarian indicators.

69. While LRRD is defined as a key principle of the RRP, there is no clear evidence of how the program designers perceived the application of LRRD. Many of the project documents do not refer specifically to how the LRRD will be applied. Others, such as RRP04 and RRP06 state that LRRD will be applied to move from a relief mode to a self-reliance mode in the communities, which in itself seems to indicate application of the LRRD in a continuum manner. Overall, though, it seems that the RRP has generally served as a gap-filler in the gray area where humanitarian funding cannot intervene as the problems are structural and where there is no development funding. Offering a four year funding, moreover allows a certain degree of consolidation but the continued absence of development funding raises question about whether or not this gap-filler approach can be considered as a useful and relevant LRRD mechanism.

70. In the annual global plans of DG ECHO’s interventions in Sudan from 2005 to 2010, it is stated that LRRD will be encouraged whenever possible. Similar to the RRP there is little indication about how the modalities for an LRRD approach should be applied and the plans have given increased focus to reinforcing livelihoods and strengthening community and household resilience to hazards. But the plans question the possibilities for ‘handing-over’ to rehabilitation and development considering the continuous ‘no-peace, no-war’ situation and thus implying that a possible LRRD approach would follow a continuum model.

71. In spite of DG ECHO’s strategy to apply LRRD, the Evaluation did not see evidence of coherent planning and coordination between RRP and DG ECHO which could have increased the relevance of the LRRD approach. Actually, after DG ECHO’s more active participation in the initial design of the RRP the interactions seem to have been limited to general information sharing.

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27 EC’s Office for Humanitarian Assistance.
3.2 Efficiency

3.2.1 Concrete Outputs

Overall, the RRP has generated an impressive number of concrete outputs as can be seen in the following cumulative numbers from AMU’s quarterly reports:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People trained in public administration</td>
<td>2,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village development committees established/reorganized</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People receiving training in peace-building/human rights/gender issues</td>
<td>2,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training events in peace-building / human rights / gender conducted</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth associations established</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers / pastoralists trained</td>
<td>2,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer / livestock associations trained and provided inputs / tools</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households provided with agricultural inputs / tools for food production</td>
<td>32,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock vaccinated / treated</td>
<td>217,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women received handcrafts, agricultural, or skills/business training</td>
<td>1,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water systems refurbished or built</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water management committees formed / trained</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation equipment facilities distributed or refurbished (e.g. latrines)</td>
<td>3,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health administrators / outreach workers trained</td>
<td>1,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health awareness/outreach workshops held</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health workers trained (nurses, midwives, traditional health workers)</td>
<td>1,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School classrooms rehabilitated or built</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers trained</td>
<td>1,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School parent teacher associations formed / trained</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults receiving literacy training</td>
<td>6,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People trained in mine risk</td>
<td>52,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine risk training events</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Evaluation finds that for physical outputs, particularly for basic services, the projects have been timely and cost effective. However, the high level of specific project activities has apparently led to partners being more focused on implementing as planned originally rather than adapting to the local dynamic reality which would require continuous and participatory monitoring of different stakeholders’ needs and the impacts of the external environment.

The projects have efficiently applied AMU / RRP’s formats which are informative for both the projects and the PRC. However, many projects complain that the quarterly and annual reports are bulky and time consuming exercises asking for the same information for different tables but in different formats. According to the lead agencies they spend on average 3 full working days for filling in the quarterly reports. Moreover, the Evaluation finds that the report formats do not lend themselves enough to partici-
patory monitoring and user satisfaction, which are critical elements for overall efficiency.

3.2.2 Project Locations

75. The implementation in many remote locations in areas with extremely weak road networks is an inefficient mode of operation and costly both. The Evaluation finds that many project staff often spend half their time in vehicles. The Evaluation recognizes that there could have been certain political pressure to ensure that the RRP covers as many counties and localities as possible.

3.2.3 Risk Management

76. Project Risk management matrixes presented in project documents and ABEASs are not project specific but copies of the general risk management matrix presented in the JAM. Moreover, project specific risk management plans are not presented in the project document and ABEASs. This is in spite the Technical Guidelines’ requirement of risk management plans that should take into account the specific and dynamic environment.

77. At program level, UNDP prepared a specific risk management matrix in 2006 identifying five major risks: travel restrictions, decision-making structures within partner organizations, staff turnover and loss of institutional memory, low state, county, and locality capacity, and natural disasters. Some of the components of the accompanying risk management strategy have been applied with limited impact while others have not been fully applied, e.g. early warning systems at local levels. The Evaluation considers that efficient management in a very dynamic context should monitor and analyze potential impacts of risks continuously in order to have an updated and efficient risk management strategy. This has not received sufficient attention at program and project levels.

3.2.4 RRP Mid-Term Review and the Follow-Up

78. The Mid-Term Review (MTR) was carried out in February – March 2008 with special focus on the relevance and effectiveness of the Action Management Unit. Moreover, the MTR included assessments of the individual projects addressing relevance, efficiency and effectiveness, and sustainability.

79. The MTR concluded that the RRP concept is relevant but that the program is ambitious considering the very challenging environment for implementation. The Review highlights the impressive number of outputs but also finds that the final impact will be less impressive considering the huge area of coverage of RRP activities and relatively limited impact there will be even at state level. The Review appreciated the efforts to develop community based organizations which according to the Review should allow for sustainability. But the Review also stressed that not enough attention had been given to livelihoods. It was found that four projects have been rather successful and the MTR therefore also call for greater learning among the consortia. At the level of the
consortia, the Review noticed that most of the implementing partners continue to operate in a relief mode. A number of the challenges could have been solved, according to the Review, with more efficient management direction and the Review is particularly critical vis-à-vis UNDP’s management role. Moreover, the effectiveness of the AMU was seen as suffering from the lack of senior staff and experienced management.

80. The final Evaluation finds that many of the findings and conclusions of the MTR were still valid at the end of the RRP, including the lack of proper indicators, lack of a mutual learning environment among the consortia, and the lack of focus.

81. However, the Evaluation also finds that UNDP has reviewed its role in the RRP and followed-up with several measures that have improved the effectiveness of the AMU. The Evaluation finds, that senior management in UNDP is committed to the RRP and that the AMU integrates the necessary technical and management skills required to administer the RRP. But the Evaluation also finds that the meaning of UNDP’s role to administer and manage the RRP is perceived in different ways by different stakeholders. Many expressed that UNDP should provide technical support to the implementation of the RRP which is different than the requirements outlined in the agreement between UNDP, the Government of the Sudan, and the EC. In fact, the agreement specifies the fundamental requirements for good management, namely close consultation between the EC, the Government, and UNDP, participation of LGAs, close liaison with the implementing consortia, and transparency. The Evaluation finds that considering the context, UNDP has adequately implemented these requirements: the AMU provides adequate secretarial support for the PRC, the unit is in continuous communication with all the consortia, LGAs are actively participating in the projects, and AMU maintain an excellent documentation of project and program activities allowing transparency. Still, the misperception about UNDP’s role seems to suggest a communication problem. It should also be noted that the Evaluation was surprised to learn that experienced INGOs had expected more technical support from UNDP.

3.2.5 RRP Management Structure

3.2.5.1 Policy and Review Committee

82. The Evaluation finds that what is alluded to in the MTR as lack of management directions is more a challenge of the role of the PRC than that of the AMU. Throughout the RRP implementation, the PRC has drawn the attention on a number of issues that should be strengthened in the projects, including environmental considerations, communication with stakeholders at local level, participation of communities and LGAs in project design and implementation, involvement of different stakeholders in the lessons-learned process, and institutional assessments of LGAs to design a proper handover strategy. While these issues have been brought to the attention of the projects, there is no clear rules or structures in the Program about what should happen if follow-up to management directions are not taken place.

83. The PRC has also raised a number of challenges faced by the individual projects, e.g. constraints for RRP03 to obtain visa and travel permits and confiscation of IRC as-

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28 Contribution Specific Agreement signed in October 2005 but effective from January 2005.
sets that belonged to the project and GOSS’ lack of payment of education and health staff for projects in the South. PRC members have taken a number of initiatives to facilitate solutions to these challenges such as visits to the project areas and discussions with state and local authorities. However, the impact has been limited and the Evaluation questions the legal authority granted to the PRC, particularly vis-à-vis state authorities. The lack of specific formal agreements with individual states regarding roles and responsibilities of the different actors in the RRP might be a contributing factor to the often limited efficiency of the PRC to address implementation challenges at the project level.

84. The recently adopted system of organizing PRC meetings in the states of the RRP projects has improved the relationship with the local stakeholders and seems to have an impact in terms of greater state commitment. This leads to a question about the composition of the PRC and whether involvement of state representatives would have improved project and program efficiency. This is particularly the case in the South where all stakeholders are concerned about limited capacity and maybe even commitment to fulfill their role in terms of paying civil servants and ensure continuity of the basic service infrastructures after the end of the RRP projects. In this regard, it should be noted that the ministries of finance at the state levels had not been sufficiently informed and in a timely manner about the obligations for managing the delivery of basic social services. It has also been noted that the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) is the government focal point for NGOs. Hence, it might have facilitated the PRC’s role if HAC had been a member.

85. Overall, the Evaluation finds that the role of the PRC has been limited to the ‘R’, i.e. review and monitoring while insufficient time has been allocate to the ‘P’, i.e. the policy or strategic function and there is little evidence of strategic reflection about the overall principles of the RRP such as the future of LRRD or RRP’s contribution to state and government policies. This could be a simple matter of the management of the agenda of the PRC meetings where at least 50% of the time, for instance, should be used for policy and strategic thinking.

3.2.5.2 Action Management Unit

86. As mentioned above the effectiveness of the AMU was questioned by the MTR. The Evaluation finds that the response from the UNDP senior management was positive and that the current AMU staff includes the required skills allowing AMU fulfill the management responsibilities assigned to it in the contribution agreement, including monitoring, reporting, and administration of financial resources.

87. UNDP plays a unique role in the recovery and development processes in Sudan as part of its large country operation with implementation of a great number of RRP related programs. Moreover, UNDP plays a critical role in the UN Country Team with close ties to other UN agencies and programs. However, the Evaluation finds that AMU is not adequately integrated and harmonized with other UNDP activities and that the large potential for harmonization with other UNDP programs is not underutilized. This would include harmonization with the Local Government Recovery Programme (LGRP) which aims to strengthen GOSS, establish local government structures, and build confi-

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29 The UNDP Sudan office manage the largest UNDP country operation in the world after Afghanistan.
dence in local governance and the UN Volunteer program through which UNDP is funding 150 UN Volunteers to work within state administrations in the South in order to develop capacity. Similarly, there seems to be no links between the RRP and the UN Country Team, which could have facilitated connectivity and sustainability.

88. The LGRP works towards a decentralized governance at the state and local levels. The LGRP provides training of staff of the 78 counties in the 10 states in Southern Sudan. The three-year initiative is implemented by UNDP and the Government of Southern Sudan and funded by DFID, France, and the Netherlands. The project supports development of county development plans, including strengthening of local councils and planning and budgeting systems based on transparency and participatory approaches. The PRC recommended in January 2008, that UNDP should facilitate greater collaboration between RRP and LGRP and other development initiatives. However, during the project visits the Evaluation did not see any evidence that this had happened explicitly. On the other hand, some projects present a number of impacts in their final reports that could be the direct result of LGRP support; e.g. a county plan developed in RRP09.

89. Similarly, lessons learned from other UN programs could have been used to improve RRP implementation. E.g. lessons learned from the UN and Partners Work Plan in 2006 showed the need to strengthen state level planning in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of LGA support. During the Evaluation, many resource persons expressed their concern with the limited attention given by the RRP to the state level, particularly in the South.

90. Particularly in Southern Sudan there is a number of other programs and initiatives supporting areas covered by the RRP, typically through INGO implementation. The Basic Services Fund (BSF) for instance, which was launched by DFID in 2006 to strengthen primary education and health and water and sanitation services. The program focuses on building and rehabilitating physical infrastructure and strengthening of local structures, including community committees for water management, health, and education. With funds from DFID, the Netherlands, Norway, and Canada BSF has been extended until August 2010. Many of the projects supported by BSF is implemented by the same INGOs participating in the RRP and often in the same counties. E.g. Tearfund in collaboration with Medair is implementing a primary health care and capacity building project in Upper Nile State, including in Melut county where RRP06 is intervening with Tearfund as a partner. Another example is RRP08 partners AVSI and Merlin who are also working together is a BSF funded project in Lafon and Ikwotos counties. With the clear complementarity and maybe even overlap of activities it is worth noting that there is no reference to the RRP in the BSF project documents, including quarterly progress reports like there are no references to BSF in the RRP documents.

91. The Evaluation concurs with the PRC’s recommendations that more emphasis should have been given to strengthen collaboration with other programs and initiatives and that AMU should have played a lead role in ensuring greater complementarity and cooperation.

92. In terms of communication, the AMU has applied various electronic communication tools, including a website and an electronic newsletter. The website with chat room possibilities was only launched in 2008 and while several consortia members ap-
preciate the website it has not served to promote communication and exchange of experience among the RRP stakeholders. LGAs seemed to be unaware of the website and many consortia members acknowledged that they had not visited the website very often. The concept of a chat-room is appealing to most stakeholders but general experience shows the need for a facilitated chat at least in the initial phases.

93. Following the bureaucratic and multilayered structure of the RRP, AMU communicates only directly with lead agencies. In an ideal world this would be good enough as the lead agencies are supposed to inform their consortium partners. However, the Evaluation found several examples of communication problems at the level of the consortia; a problem that could have been eased by simply copying all consortia members on all communication.

3.2.6 CONSORTIUM MODEL

94. Cooperation through consortia refers to many different forms of collaboration among formally constituted organizations from loose coalitions or networks to strong formal and legal entities that may be formed on a project or cause basis. In the RRP context the consortium concept is similar to how consortium models are most commonly used in the humanitarian and development community, namely as a formal collaboration on a project basis. The consortium model applied in the RRP is defined in the original funding agreement between the EC, GONU / GOSS, and UNDP and which is included in the 2005 Technical Guidelines for the RRP. According to the Guidelines consortia should be made up of three different partner categories: the executing agency which is the lead agency for the consortium partners and associates. The associates should be Sudanese non-state actors that could benefit in terms of capacity building from participating in the project. The executing agency and partners can be Sudanese or INGOs or members of the Red Cross / Crescent movement. Moreover, the Technical Guidelines delineates the area of operations for the consortia to the state level\(^{30}\). However, the same organization can be partners simultaneously in RRP consortia in other states. While the Guidelines specifically states that the partners must participate in the design as well as implementation, the requirement for the associates is that they ‘must be involved in the Project’. Moreover, in the consortium structures the associates are placed either under the lead agency or under one or several partners.

95. The Guidelines’ definition of ‘associates’ clearly give the impression of what many resource persons for the Evaluation referred to as ‘second class’ consortia members, which obviously creates a lot of resentment. This impression was further reinforced by the fact that several ‘associates’ are in fact experienced and competent organizations similar to the partners. In several projects the ‘associates’ therefore seem to be the token local organization and only included because of the requirements in the Technical Guidelines. The Evaluation appreciates the original RRP concept of building local capacity through the consortia; particularly ensuring that ‘associates’ would develop their capacities to implement recovery and development activities in the project areas. However, among the seven projects evaluated only one consortia, RRP07, had developed and implemented coherent and individual capacity development plans for

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\(^{30}\) Or in the case of Abyei ‘Special Administrative Area’.
the ‘associates’ based on institutional capacity assessments. Three consultants were brought in to provide training for the ‘associates’ in the framework of ICCO’s general program for capacity assessment and development, CADEP. As a direct impact, one of the ‘associate’ credit the RRP involvement for increasing their capacity to implement directly a new development project in the area. For the other consortia, the Evaluation finds that the fact of having worked with the RRP projects, had generated some additional capacity for several of the ‘associates’ although not in a planned manner. In RRP03, for instance, one of the ‘associates’, PASED, did not have any experience in working in rural areas before participating in RRP activities. The participation in RRP has allowed PASED to refocus its future activities and include rural areas if funding options should arise. Another RRP04 ‘associate’, SECS RSS, benefited from having to apply UNDP’s financial management system. The specific training in that system brought lasting improvements to SECS RSS’ own management system. While those examples can be considered as positive capacity development of the ‘associates’ similar examples could most likely be identified among many of the consortia partners. However, the Evaluation finds that these the RRP objective of capacity development of local non-state actors is not sufficiently addressed through these cases and that the original idea has not been implemented except in RRP07.

96. In some consortia the ‘associates’ considered their role to be similar to being sub-contracted for specific and often short-term activities. This was, especially the case in RRP03 where ‘associates’ even left the consortia before the project was finished based on the completion of their ‘sub-contracted’ activities. Discussions with ‘associates’ during the Evaluation, furthermore, revealed that most ‘associates’ were under the impression that only INGOs could apply for funds as partners or lead agencies. This, furthermore, reflects the poor involvement of associates and partners in overall RRP issues.

97. The initial briefing about the RRP took place in Nairobi and was only attended by INGOs with representation in Kenya. This allowed many of those organizations to start planning and for many to take the lead in different consortia formations while Sudanese NGOs typically would only be informed about the RRP as associates to consortia with partners present in Nairobi. RRP04 in the River Nile State is the only one of the 10 consortia that have been led by a Sudanese NGO. The concerns about the short time for preparing the proposal was therefore also much more pronounced for RRP04 than for the other consortia.

98. The Guidelines outlines what skill sets the consortia members should have but there are no provisions in terms of how the different technical skills should be combined or how the consortia should work and function with the principal partners of the Projects, namely the communities and LGAs. While constituting a key element development of LGA management capacities is only referred to as “human resource skills development and technical and vocational training”. More recent programs such as the US funded BRIDGE puts much more explicit focus on capacity development of LGAs to plan and manage. Consequently, the NGOs implementing the RRP are also more prepared in terms of having the right capacities.

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31 Namely “relevant thematic experience in post conflict recovery, community based development, capacity building, integrated project implementation”.
99. The RRP project documents outline a total of 26 different areas of expertise that the consortia consider of importance for the RRP. Interestingly enough, none of the consortia refers to expertise in building LGA capacity or expertise to work in consortia. The experience in project management, coordination, and work in Sudan vary among the INGOs involved in the RRP. Many of the INGOs are large organizations; e.g. in 2008 the budget of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) who is leading RRP08 was bigger than Portugal and Greece’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), Safe the Children US who originally was a partner in RRP02 had a bigger budget than Austria’s ODA, and World Vision International, a partner in RRP06 had a budget that was almost at par with Denmark’s ODA.32

100. However, a special problem of the lead agencies seems to be the tendency to assign staff with no particular coordination and overall management experience for multi-partner projects during the last phase of the projects. Many partners are therefore expressing frustration over decreasing coordination efforts at a time when joint and consortium wide lessons learned would be important. It might even give a feeling of already moving on to new and more interesting activities instead of making sure that what is ongoing is being finished in the most optimal way. And it definitely put questions to the commitment for longer-term cooperation in the consortia beyond the RRP project.

101. Overall, the Consortia report that it takes at least 12 months to established functional working procedures within the consortium. This raises obviously questions about the validity of using a consortium model for a relatively short term intervention such as the RRP. The concept of the RRP was originally developed with the expectation that there would be a second phase under EDF10 with a stronger focus on development. In this context investment in strong consortia could be justified. Moreover, if investment in the consortia is seen as a general support to stronger NGO cooperation for future development in the Sudan the investment could be justified. However, the Evaluation did not perceive that the consortia and investment in the same were seen as a general investment in improved partner resources.

102. The Guidelines also calls for proven track records of work in Sudan for consortia members. All 51 NGOs in the original consortia had worked in Sudan several years prior to the RRP. Moreover, most of them were already established in the areas of intervention at the time of the launch of the RRP, which facilitated the startup. On the other hand, several of the Projects both in the North and in the South are to a large degree continuation of cooperation in the communities. E.g. RRP03 is supporting the rehabilitation of fishery projects that IRC had previously implemented. The critical new element brought by RRR is the capacity development of the LGAs.

3.2.6.1 Consortia models

103. The NGOs have chosen very different models ranging from a geographical distribution of the project area among the consortia members to a technical distribution where each member is responsible for one or of several focus areas such as income

generation activities or health. Among the RRP consortia there are, furthermore, different combinations of these two different models, which can be termed the geographical distribution and the technical complementarity models. While there seems to be a general perception about the ‘RRP consortium model’ the reality is that there are many different models each with strengths and weaknesses. So when findings in lessons-learned workshops within the Projects, for instance, state that the ‘consortium model’ has allowed community organizations to build capacity, the Evaluation wonder what model the workshop refers to. Particularly these findings come from a consortium that has applied a geographical distribution model.

104. There were different levels of organizational considerations going into the formation of the consortia. RRP07 probably invested most time and organizational resources in analyzing different potential structures and partners. This was a result of the initial briefing about the upcoming RRP that the EC organized in Nairobi in 2003. After the briefing 11 INGOs based in Nairobi came together to discuss possibilities for cooperation. ICCO\textsuperscript{33} agreed to fund monthly meetings and the development of a strategic plan for the ‘Sudan Consortium’. In line with RRP07’s explicit attention to the consortium model, the baseline for RRP07 includes baseline information regarding the functioning of the consortium members in the field. The baselines for the other six projects do not include any consortium related information. In most other cases the consortia were formed with limited attention to the organizational setup. Rather, many RRP partners felt that the time was short for the development of the project proposals and the consortia were defined in a mechanical way ensuring that the Technical Guidelines were respected. In principle, the lead agency is selected by the consortium but in practice alternatives were not identified. Rather, the lead agencies were the NGOs with funds and capacity to develop the proposals.

105. Some of the consortia such as RRP04 and RRP06 chose deliberately to have all members under one roof, which has had a direct impact on the efficiency of the project as a result of common use of project resources. Other consortia considered similar ‘one-roof’ models but found that the overall costs would have been higher. At the other end of the diversity is RRP08 where the consortium members were located in distant locations and one of the partners were even located in another town. This created obvious constraints for the common approach and decreased efficiency of the project.

3.2.6.2 Why should we use consortia?

106. There are many arguments for the increasing use of a consortium approach for humanitarian and development interventions; arguments that often seem to be more founded in logical conclusions than empirical evidence. Implementing NGOs typically highlight that working in consortia promotes use of complementary and coordinated approaches with improved knowledge management and outreach campaigns. However, there is also a more pragmatic reason where donors will require consortia as a prerequisite for funding. From the donors perspective there might be various reasons, including the general wish to strengthen harmonized and aligned development inter-

\textsuperscript{33} Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation, the Netherlands. ICCO would later become the lead agency of RRP07.
ventions. But for the donors there is also a very pragmatic reason, namely having to deal directly with much fewer agencies. In the case of RRP there were originally 10 lead agencies and 41 other partner/associate NGOs and it is obviously easier to administer and interact directly with 10 instead of 51 organizations. Moreover, many donors also see that the consortium model reduces the risk for interruptions in the implementation of development projects if for one reason or another an NGO is forced to withdraw from its commitments to a project. This was in fact the case in the RRP, when several RRP implementing agencies were expelled. Overall, the 2009 experience with showed the importance of consortia as a mechanism to overcome smoothly an unexpected and fast withdrawal of a partner. However, the experience also showed some shortcomings in consortia with very strong leaders and limited involvement of other partners and associates in the daily project management as well as in the overall RRP programmatic issues.

107. For other local partners, including communities and LGAs, advantages of consortia were often identified as the consistency in the approach and wider availability of complementary services offered. Interestingly enough, the Evaluation observed very limited specific views from community members and LGAs about the consortium mode of implementation, though. Rather, community members often referred to the consortia by referring to the lead agency.

108. There have been little formal thematic assessments of delivery of humanitarian and development cooperation through NGO consortia. However, the general experience from different parts of the world shows that the success rate of the consortia is closely linked to the management structures. It is particularly important that the members are carefully chosen for their values and approaches. Moreover, there should be a clear common understanding of the justification for working in consortium and clear agreement on each member’s roles and responsibilities.

109. Close collaboration and involvement of all consortia members in management activities as a critical element for maximizing the potential efficiency of consortia might also have solved management deficiencies observed in many of the projects as a result of the high staff turnover. It was noted for instance, that key project documentation such as baselines and thematic studies were not available or even known by consortia members that had not been directly involved in their preparation.

110. It should also be noted that in several places where the RRP is being implemented other development actors are active. E.g. in Torit where RRP08 is located there is a range of other INGOs including Caritas and Lutheran World Association. Similarly in Port Sudan there are many other actors, actors often working with the same communities as the RRP03, e.g. Oxfam and WFP. While there have been some attempts to involve other actors in key meetings and workshops the Evaluation found that the consortia have not actively pursued the cooperation with other partners to increase complementarity and efficiency.
3.3 Effectiveness

3.3.1 Basic Social Services

111. The Evaluation found that the projects have implemented an impressive amount of activities to strengthen the physical infrastructure for basic social services, including rehabilitation of schools, water infrastructure, and health clinics. Likewise, the projects have effectively trained staff under the auspices of the LGAs for direct delivery of basic social services such as teachers and primary health staff. Where the projects have been less effective is in developing management and administrative capacity of LGAs for the basic service delivery. This seems to be partly a design problem as limited attention was given to this issue in the project documents and the following monitoring.

112. Considering the high level of specific and direct output-oriented project activities, such a certain number of boreholes, goats distributed, or committees trained, projects seem to have been more focused on implementing as planned originally rather than adapting to the local dynamic reality with a view of producing outcomes and impact. The focus on output rather than outcomes and results might also be a reflection of the intention of the RRP to create quick and visible impacts.

113. Likewise, the projects have not given enough attention to the real accessibility of basic services for the poor; e.g. through mobile, temporary, and outreach services for health and education. This is again partly a design problem, partly lack of sufficient attention to the issue in baselines and monitoring, which again is a reflection of the limited participatory approach that the projects have applied. Furthermore, the Evaluation did not observe any monitoring efforts of the knowledge among the poor of the availability of basic social services and it is unclear if different groups, particularly marginalized groups, are aware of the improved services.

114. In the South, the Evaluation was particularly surprised to see the very limited use of health facilities rehabilitated or constructed by the RRP. In RRP08, for instance, health staff noted that the communities did not want to use the in-patient facilities for fear of being attacked. In other cases, there seem to be some local power structure problems that prevent people from using the health facilities. But maybe most importantly is the poor road conditions and the need for many communities to travel long distances on poor almost non-existent roads. Likewise, most projects did not show special attention to analysis of barriers for different social groups to use basic social services, e.g. cost barriers, gender barriers, or administrative barriers, such as requirements of identity cards. RRP09 is an exception and have prepared special studies to analyze economic barriers to the use of health services.

3.3.2 Livelihoods

115. The focus on livelihoods in a program that targets war and drought affected communities is critical to ensure that households are able to recover from the stresses and shocks and strengthen resilience and coping capacities. However, the Evaluation did not identify clearly stated objectives or goals for the livelihood activities supported in the projects in terms of resilience and coping capacities. Rather, the projects have
identified a number of mainly food production activities, particularly agriculture, livestock, and fishery. Within these activities, the RRP has provided immediate support to restore or increase productivity, both through distribution of input material such as goats, fishery nets, and ploughs, and introduction of improved technologies, e.g. small irrigation and early planting, weeding, and harvesting. Moreover, the projects have assisted in strengthening and rebuilding specific elements of the general support system for agriculture, livestock and fishery, e.g. warehouses, markets, slaughterhouses, and credits.

116. In addition, the most projects have included support to small income generation activities, e.g. vegetable production and skills training for blacksmiths, tailors, and carpenters as a general support to the household livelihoods. These activities are generally appreciate by the women who are involved.

117. Overall, there is an impressive number of activities in support of livelihoods in the projects and the Evaluation finds that these many activities have effectively provided immediate improvements in the household livelihoods.

118. Still, the Evaluation questions the apparent accidental menu of activities that have been supported, particularly since the activities are not defined in terms of their impact on households’ resilience and coping capacity. This is partly linked to the absence of a proper participatory approach in the design of the projects as well as the absence of a livelihood analysis as basis for identification of focus areas that should be supported. Many of the implementing NGOs have strong organizational experience in livelihood analysis; an experience that has not been applied sufficiently to the benefit of the RRP. RRP10 suggested originally organization of livelihood analysis training but there have been no direct impact of that on the activities.

3.3.3 Organizational Capacity Development

119. The projects have provided various forms of organizational capacity development. At the community level user communities have been established or where already existing strengthened for basic social services such as parent-teacher committees, water management committees, and health unit committees. Moreover,

120. Most of the projects have supported communities and LGAs in lobbying activities, which is generally appreciated although it is difficult to identify immediate results. Moreover, the Evaluation did not identify and specific activities to developing lobbying capacity as such.

121. When the LGAs have been functioning they have been involved in the design and monitoring of project activities which as not only served to increase overall effectiveness but also been useful for capacity development of the LGAs.

122. The projects have supported the establishment or strengthening of various community user groups, such as ‘parent-teacher’ associations, water management committees, and village health committees (VHCs). While many of these committees show a certain enthusiasm while the project staff is around post-project evaluations have shown a quick decline in community members participation and the effectiveness of many of these committees is questioned. In RRP09, for instance, post-evaluation of the
health activities showed only around 50% of the community members were aware of the VHCs. Moreover the number of VHC members quickly went from 99 to 44. Some of the VHC members who had dropped out were demoralized as a result of no payments being made for the work they have to do.

123. The provision of water infrastructure and development of water management committees shows a clear match between RRP activities and communities’ priorities. This is reflected in communities’ involvement and taking responsibility for the functioning of the water management.

3.4 IMPACT

3.4.1 IMMEDIATE AND LIKELY IMPACT

124. Overall, the RRP has produced immediate impacts in terms of improved access to education, health, and water and sanitation at the community levels in line with an early recovery and rehabilitation program. Compared to the general situation described in the baselines and in the project documents, more children now have access to proper school buildings instead of the schools under the trees and LGAs have proper operating facilities whereas many at the start of the projects also were located under the trees. Moreover, the projects have enhanced community organizations and facilitated the development of village development plans and county and locality development plans. In most projects the communities seem to consider project activities as addressing their needs.

125. However, meetings with communities seem to show that the projects have not focused enough on community ownership. E.g. communities wait for ‘someone’ to take initiative for improvement of social service delivery. Most likely, this attitude does also reflect the widespread ‘relief mode’ where international cooperation for many years has by and large consisted of humanitarian aid with handouts and building of physical infrastructure as a major component from the community perspective. RRP10, which is led by Save the Children UK, applied the organization’s impact assessment framework in the project in 2008. The framework, which is referred to as GIM, the Global Impact Monitoring, aims to identify the changes brought about by the projects at different levels and the key processes leading to such changes. A key result of the RRP10 GIM was that different stakeholder groups referred to the physical presence of infrastructure projects and not to any changes in their daily lives as such.

126. When assessing the overall impact of the individual projects, it is important to put some of the achievements into perspective. E.g. the projects operate at county / locality levels with a number of inhabitants and LGA staff that is higher than the community members and LGA staff that have been directly involved in the projects. RRP04, for instance, which was implemented in two localities: Abu Hamad and Berber indicates in its last quarterly report that a total of 225 LGA officers and community leaders have been trained in public administration. Moreover, the RRP03 has provided training to 225 teachers and 150 health workers in the two localities. This should be compared to the total staff in Abu Hamad locality alone, which is 2,600.
In several of the visited communities the Evaluation learned that neighboring communities had shown some interest in various of the activities supported by the RRP. There did not seem to be any systematic attempt, though, for exchange visits or ‘open house days’ to present the activities to other communities in order to increase the overall impact.

The seven projects evaluated have introduced various forms of income generation activities for women. RRP08, for instance, has provided sewing machines for tailoring, RRP07 has supported groups of women for production of vegetables for the local market, and RRP03 has provided food processing equipment to women in some of the communities. Generally, these activities and inputs were appreciated by the women but the Evaluation also noticed that in many projects it was particularly highlighted that the women use these common facilities mainly for socializing.

### 3.4.2 Trust and Coexistence

With the focus on multi-actor partnerships at all levels, the RRP has had a positive impact on trust building, not only between NGOs and authorities but the distance between communities and LGAS has also been reduced, particularly in the North as an outcome of the RRP. Moreover, with the consortium model authorities start to see NGO contribution in more substantial forms instead of individual small projects. According to the commissioner in one of the LGAs, they would consider using the services of the NGO in the future instead of relying on training of their staff in Khartoum.

The RRP’s greatest impact potential is symbolic value in terms of the peace process and particularly as a confidence building measure: initiated in the early stages of the peace process despite major practical obstacles and lack of what would normally be considered as basic requirements for the RRP development activities: existence of government structures at all levels, security, and a reliable and year-round communication infrastructure.

However, the Evaluation found that at the Project level limited attention is given to the symbolic value and most local stakeholders seem unaware of RRP’s overall value and principles. Even many partners and associates have limited knowledge about the overall RRP.

When meeting with local stakeholders in the South, the Evaluation observed a number of misconceptions about the situation in the North. Comments like “we in the South cannot cultivate as much as they can in the North where they have agricultural machines” witness about a lack of understanding of the livelihood conditions in the North.

Developing the capacity of local authorities, civil society actors, and government actors to engage with each other is in itself an important peace building undertaking even when there is no explicit focus on peace building as such. However, former studies on peace building processes have highlighted the importance of explicitly hig-
highlighting peace building. A study on the peace building coordination in Africa, for instance, highlights the lack of coherence between humanitarian and development cooperation programs and specific peace and security initiatives. Particularly, there is a strategic deficit that prevent effective consolidation of the peace building efforts.

3.4.3 Baselines and Indicators

134. RRP’s overall objective is defined in terms of poverty eradication and food security; both complex concepts that would need further analysis to identify underlying factors. Considering the focus on provision of basic social services a traditional basic needs definition for poverty could be justified where basic needs are would include two elements: minimum requirements for survival, i.e. shelter, food, water, clothing; and essential basic social services, i.e. water, sanitation, health, and education. However, the project documents refer to the Millennium Development Goals as an indicator framework for the poverty eradication and food security objective and several project documents and baselines refer to income poverty. Still, while logical frameworks in the project documents include poverty and food security, few projects have established baseline values. Some exceptions are the baseline in RRP04 that indicates that the income poverty level is US$ 0.5 and the RRP07 baseline indicating cash income of around US$ 0.16 and grain in-kind of around 68 kg. But monitoring reports, including the final reports of the projects do not offer any values of the same indicators that would have allowed impact assessments.

135. Likewise, the project documents and baselines do not offer any food security analysis and while proxy indicators for food security are suggested in some few projects, e.g. number of meals per day in RRP06, there is no analysis showing the relative role of food production, access, utilization, or stability for the overall food security within the communities. In RRP08, the baseline notes that the “populations looked wasted” but this statement was not accompanied by any further analysis. And again similar to poverty there has not been any monitoring of the food security within the project limiting the possibility to do an impact assessment.

136. Overall, most of the baselines for the seven projects were produced well into the project implementation and most of them took place between end 2006 and beginning 2007. One baseline was only prepared two years after the launch of the project implementation. While baselines and realistic indicators might seem to be critical for any development project, the Evaluation noticed that there was very little awareness about the baselines and the indicators among project implementing staff and some obviously had never seen the baselines, let alone used them for planning and monitoring purposes. It should also be noted that the baselines have generally been prepared by consultants, which might have limited the internalization of the results. This might be linked to the relief mode that is still prevalent among most project staff. In this way, outputs receive much more attention, number of boreholes, number of training sessions, etc. than results and outcomes presented in the project documents. Moreover, the

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Evaluation did not get the impression that communities and LGAs are aware of the overall poverty eradication and food security objective of RRP.

137. Although several of the baselines are based on household surveys, they have generally not been used for proper livelihood analysis. This is particularly surprising, considering that many of the consortia lead agencies are generally well-known for their expertise in livelihood analysis, including identification of critical underlying factors leading to food insecurity. Moreover, the project documents fell short of impact analysis of the projects, particularly with regard to potential impact on the environment, resilience and recovery capacity, and the socio-economic structures in the areas; e.g. what are the likely impact of the projects on households' capacity to prepare for future natural disasters or likely impact on peaceful coexistence among different socio-economic groups.

138. Many of the baselines have been generated through extensive consultations with communities and LGAs and do actually provide wealth of important information. Still, few of them use the logical frameworks and values have not been established for most of the indicators. One of the exceptions is the specific baseline for the health sector prepared by RRP09 in the beginning of 2007. The study established baseline information for most of the indicators directly linked to capacity, quality, and access to health services. However, the original indicator framework was modified in subsequent planning and monitoring documents and baseline information was not used. Impact assessments are therefore practically impossible. Moreover, in the cases where intended results are indicated in the project documents, these often seem overambitious and unrealistic; e.g. RRP04 suggests to reduce moderate and severely underweight children under five by 80%. There are no baseline information available, neither did the Evaluation find a proper food security analysis to identify causes for underweight. This would have allowed to establish relevant responses.

139. Several of the baselines include suggestions for project activities, which generally have not been accommodated through revisions of the project documents. In some of these projects the Evaluation observed a certain frustration with the projects and some of the consortia members. It is not clear though whether or not this is directly linked to the identification of project activities that have not been implemented.

3.4.4 Cross-Cutting Issues

140. While the Technical Guidelines call for assessment of expected impact on target populations, they do not explicitly call for likely impact on cross-cutting issues such as gender equality, environmental sustainability, and peaceful co-existence of populations in the project areas. Still, like most other development agencies, UNDP, EC, and the implementing INGOs have general requirements and policies regarding the need to address cross-cutting issues in project design and implementation. Most agencies

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35 Some of the baseline data seems to have been included into the overall accomplishment of the project.
36 The European Development Consensus identifies four cross-cutting issues of major importance for development: democracy and human rights, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and HIV / AIDS. Cross-cutting issues require action in multiple fields and should be integrated into all areas of development projects and programs.
have developed simple checklist to ensure that proper considerations have been given to cross-cutting issues. E.g. EC’s Environmental Handbook\(^{37}\) suggests checklists for the different project phases. However, the Evaluation did not find any evidence of use of such checklists and overall there have been limited, if any attention to environmental impact.

141. The Basic Services Fund (BSF), which was launched by DFID in 2006 to strengthen primary education and health and water and sanitation services in Southern Sudan through INGO implementation requires all projects have to prepare environmental screening notes as part of the design phase similar to what is called for under the financing instrument for EC Development Cooperation 2007 - 2013.\(^{38}\) In 2008, BSF prepared an overall environmental impact analysis\(^{39}\) that concludes that overall the potential negative environmental impacts from the funded projects will not be significant. Activities most likely to have a negative environmental impact are construction of physical infrastructure for the basic social services and although the potential impacts were not significant, it is noted that there have not been any attention to use environmental friendly materials. The Evaluation considers that this finding is valid for the RRP too.

142. Environmental assessments are even more important in a region where most conflicts are centered around the exploitation of natural resources, not only conflict resources such as timber and oil but also access to land and water that is defining the livelihoods of most the vast majority of the people in the rural Sudan. The scarcity of these basic natural resources have generated violence at local levels before and during project implementation - and will most likely continue in a foreseeable future. Still, potential conflict issues have only been addressed in a limited way in project design and implementation. RRP07 and 08 invested in ‘Do No Harm’ training focusing on conflict management for project staff at the launch. While, the training has not led to explicit institutionalized conflict-sensitive project planning and implementation the projects have implemented various specific activities to promote peaceful coexistence. RRP07, for instance, has trained 28 community members as peace facilitators and supported inter-church committees for peace. RRP08 intentionally rehabilitated a road to promote linkages among different ethnic groups and thereby peaceful coexistence and the project has provided training for community peace-building committees. The Evaluation considers that such specific activities are important but will need longer-term support and greater attention to participatory land-use planning to have an impact in an environment that is seeing an increasing level of cattle raids and conflicts among different groups typically over land-use.

143. In terms of impact on gender equality the Evaluation found that generally, the projects encourage women to participate in different community organizations; not from a purely gender equality perspective but more to promote the role of women with an underlying goal of having a 50:50 representation of men and women. A gender

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perspective would have focused on equal opportunities to participate as well as the organizational capacity to apply a gender sensitive approach, which is different from the 50:50 principle. The consortia members seek actively to recruit more female staff but many report of challenges in attracting women to work in remote areas.

3.4.5 **Unexpected Impacts**

144. During discussions with the health segment in RRP08, the Evaluation learned about the very high acute and chronic malnutrition rates among children under five in the project area as a result of a complex of multiple factors. It was noted that there is a widespread use of grains for beer production in the area with negative impacts on food availability and hence food security. RRP is encouraging beer production through microfinance support to women’s saving groups. Whether or not there is a negative impact could not be established by the Evaluation, though, primarily because of the lack of full integration of the different project funded activities. An integrated approach, for instance, would have allowed for better assessment of the relationship between the different elements and proper assessment of potential negative impacts.

145. Finally it should be noted that the Evaluation learned about several examples where the projects have generated additional impacts, particularly in the North. In RRP03, for instance, project support to water and a health facility motivated the community to take initiative to build a school with supplementary support from the government. Similarly, project construction of latrines for nomadic populations was replicated by the communities themselves through the building of more latrines.

3.5 **Connectivity and Sustainability**

3.5.1 **Sustainability**

146. The RRP process was seen as an innovative approach to the support to the CPA through the consortium model and with a focus on integrated rural development in both the North and the South. The RRP is generally well-known among development actors in the Sudan and is particularly appreciated for providing immediate results. Still, the expectations to the RRP have been high and not always based on sustainability assessments of the individual projects.

147. According to AMU’s progress reports, the minimum operating requirements for RRP to ensure sustainability and ownership are to 1/ work with state and local authorities and community representatives, 2/ developing communities’ capacity to claim their rights vis-à-vis authorities, 3/ strengthen markets and livelihoods by improving access to primary and secondary markets, and 4/ supporting state and community efforts to provide basic services by strengthening facilities such as water pumps.

148. Looking at those four elements, RRP projects have been most successful in rehabilitating and building physical infrastructure for basic social services and working with LGAs and community representatives in project implementation. Some projects, such as RRP03 have been successful in involving state officials while projects in the South
have not developed the same degree of institutional partnership for design and implementation of the RRP activities. While most projects have implemented some specific market activities, such as construction of market stalls, these activities have not been seen as an overall and cross-cutting component of project activities and many food production and income generation activities have not been identified based on coherent market analysis. Finally, the Evaluation found that advocacy capacity has not been addressed properly in the projects. At the level of the communities, the Evaluation found some examples of participation of a few representatives from the communities in general training in networking and advocacy for LGAs and others, e.g. in RRP03. However, the Evaluation did not see any evidence of assessments of communities’ advocacy capacity. At the level of LGAs, in addition to the few examples of network workshops the Evaluation saw several examples where the projects have supported LGAs in meetings with state officials to lobby for salaries, etc. Meanwhile, this is far from strengthening advocacy capacity in a sustainable manner.

3.5.2 Additional Funding

149. On the other hand, DFID decided after some reflections to support BRIDGE instead of supporting a new phase of the RRP. In fact, BRIDGE seems to have integrated some of the important lessons learned from the RRP, including the need for a more regionalized approach; in the case of BRIDGE a clear division in the approach and program management of the support to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. In terms of layers in the implementation; an issue that has often been criticized in the RRP, it is interesting to note that BRIDGE also includes a management level similar to that of UNDP/AMU. In the case of BRIDGE the management function is ensured by a consulting company and an INGO.

150. Many of the RRP implementing partners will continue support activities in the project areas through two to three years funding from the EC Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP). The support will be more focused than the RRP and will only focus on access and availability. It is expected that the FSTP will capitalize on some of the structures enhanced by the RRP projects, including the village development committees.

3.5.3 Exit Strategies

151. Exit strategies in the project documents are mainly described as the overall project strategy, namely capacity development of communities and LGAs. While capacity development of local stakeholders is without doubt a sound approach to promote sustainable sustainability, it still leaves the main point of an exit strategy unanswered about how the projects intend to withdraw their support.

152. Furthermore, there seems to be some confusions about what an exit strategy is and the Evaluation encountered several examples where exit strategies are seen as synonymous to sustainability strategies. The Evaluation concurs that realistic exit strategies are fundamental for sustainability. However, other factor influence sustainability too and should be addressed such as institutionalization of new approaches introduced
during the projects, e.g. behavioral changes. In this way, sustainability is more about the outcomes while exit strategies are concerned about outputs.

153. The exit strategies presented in the projects do not adequately describe how the projects intend to withdraw its support while ensuring that the achievements obtained during the project will not be jeopardized and that the development processes initiated will continue. Rather, the project documents describe the project strategy as such; e.g. participatory approaches will be applied to promote ownership and LGA capacities will be strengthened to allow them to continue after the projects finish.

154. Generally, exit strategies have only been discussed with local stakeholders when defining hand-over plans at the end of the projects, e.g. during the non-cost extension and what is referred to as “Exit Strategy Workshops” were typically only planned as part of the third ABEAS. In RRP09, for instance, a meeting in December 2009 with water and sanitation stakeholders discussed “main points for the exit strategy” such as identification of responsible units within LGA for water and sanitation, how the transfer should take place, and responsible for future watsan activities in the LGA. AMU has repeatedly highlighted the need to discuss exit strategies as part of their project monitoring visits after the MTR. While this seems to have had an impact on some of the hand-over agreements, it still came too late to be part of a proper sustainable exit strategy. During the Evaluation, for instance, some consortia explained that communities seem to be in denial about the close of the projects. This seems to reflect the lack of appropriate exit strategies should have included transparency about the project lifelines.

4. Conclusions

4.1 General Issues

155. The Evaluation recognizes that true impact from improved basic services and capacity building cannot be expected after three to four years of project implementation. However, general appreciations of likely impacts can be done in the same way that most development projects would normally require a social or environmental impact assessment at the design phase.

156. Overall, basic social services have had immediate positive impact on access to education, WASH, and health. Several LGAs are more functional as they now have improved physical infrastructure as a result of the projects. Similarly, the training of LGAs has had a certain positive impact in terms of planning. These impacts are often challenged though, by transfer of staff to other functions and areas and the use of the acquired knowledge might be positive for other locations.

157. The focus on peace dividend in the RRP and the general approach as defined in the program agreement is consistent with the CPA and EC’s policy in Sudan for the post CPA situation. However, the structure of the program, the lack of sufficient attention to the symbolic values of the RRP at all levels, and the general lack of effective communication has diluted the consistency with these values in actual implementation.
The long history of international cooperation focusing on humanitarian assistance in Sudan is reflected in the primary mode of operation being still relief oriented. This is further reinforced by the fact that local conflicts continue in many areas. Standard principles for development cooperation such as participatory approach, long term sustainability, and reinforcement of state authorities have not been sufficiently prioritized in the RRP design and implementation. The focus on quick impact is furthering this tendency. As a result, physical infrastructure and the respective services cannot be sustained in all cases. There might have been some improvements in terms of participation of community and LGA representatives in the meetings for the preparation of the last ABEAS. Still, the ABEAS’ remain by and large programming exercises.

The challenges of working in a ‘post-conflict – non-peace’ environment has not been taken sufficiently into account. Lessons learned from other countries and even from Sudan have not been taken into account either apparently making the project documents over-ambitious and not realistic. The findings are similar to many other project evaluation is Sudan and other fragile post-conflict countries showing the vulnerability of the physical infrastructure including the roadways during rainy season and the limited possibilities that local and state authorities will be able to assume full responsibility for basic social services.

The context of Sudan following the CPA called for strong support to implement peace dividend in both Northern and Southern Sudan. However, the contexts of Northern and Southern Sudan are fundamentally different when it comes to existing capacities for integrated rural development activities. The regionalized approach applied by programs such as BRIDGE and SPCRP have proven more effective.

The insufficient attention to a participatory approach during the design of the projects have led to limited involvement of communities in management of most project activities and hence limited post project impact. The importance of community involvement as a result of their perceived interest is clear in the water sector where the long history of community water management has shown the demand orientation.

4.2 **Design Challenges**

The Evaluation found that RRP’s major challenges are linked some inherent contradictions, including:

- It is a recovery and rehabilitation program with development objectives,
- It is an integrated program consisting mainly of sectoralized activities that are not harmonized and integrated,
- It is national one-approach program for a ‘two-system’ country,
- The operation assumes a post-conflict situation while there are many ongoing conflicts in the South
- The operation assumes that a government that is only in its making in the South will be able to assume full responsibilities for basic social services; re-
responsibilities that many well-established governments in non-fragile development countries are not even able to assume fully.

4.3 Focus Areas

163. While the overall objective in terms of poverty eradication and food security are highly relevant for Sudan, both poverty eradication and food security have suffered from the lack of appropriate analyses of underlying causes in order to define the most appropriate intervention areas.

164. The importance of conflict-sensitive planning and implementation is highlighted throughout the RRP. While improved livelihoods and improved coordinated planning in itself will decrease tensions among different groups, land-use conflicts is still a major concern and requires substantial special expertise and skills. Individual training in peace-building and -management are important elements as are creation of multi-stakeholder peace-committees at community and locality / county levels. However, it is important that such activities are not implemented as add-ons but as part of a project strategy that builds on integration of conflict management at all levels and in all activities. It is also important to recognize that conflict-sensitive planning calls for special expertise and experience in identifying the root causes of complex and diverse conflicts and hence an understanding of the wider social, economic and political processes. The expertise should be neutral respecting that there is no single ‘objective’ account of the conflicts and that conflicts are dynamic.

165. The RRP refers to the MDGs as a major indicator framework. The first MDG report in the Sudan was prepared in 2004 and the report identifies the main reasons for poverty to be conflict and natural hazards, particularly drought and a general reduction in the mean average rainfall. To address the general high vulnerability to drought and water scarcity, integrated water resource management would seem to be a logical solution. Still, the Evaluation noticed the absence of an integrated approach to the local development based on effective resource management, including water. E.g. while supply of drinking water from new and rehabilitated wells has been improved in most projects, little attention has been given to aspects such as rainwater harvesting or reuse of water for agricultural production.

4.4 LRRD

166. Key characteristics of the general context of the RRP in Sudan show an extremely vulnerable context for the RRP: an eroded public sector, a hostile environment with frequent floods, droughts, pests, and diseases, which will most likely be reinforced by the climate change, a volatile post-conflict situation, and a pervasive poverty with extremely limited livelihood options. This vulnerable context translates into high risks for all stakeholders in the program and it is of utmost importance to indentify the natural and interactions of hazards which threaten the poor. In a foreseeable future, there will therefore be need for constant emergency preparedness. An LRRD approach based on a contiguous model with integration of risk reduction activities into development
programs is therefore a sound approach. On the other hand, the LRRD approach based on a continuum model that seemed to be implicitly suggested in the RRP is not viable for a fragile country such as Sudan and it is particularly noted that there are no clear links between the RRP as a transitional program and development programs both in the North and in the South.

167. The investment in physical infrastructure for basic services offers in principle a bridge between humanitarian and development funding. However, in many locations in the South, the sustainability concerns regarding the physical infrastructure puts some doubts about the effectiveness and even relevance for this approach as it is assumed that the authorities will take over the responsibility for funding and maintaining delivery of basic social services activities.

168. The recent and rather long experience with humanitarian programs being almost the sole mode of international cooperation has created a relief mode of operation among most actors and an expectation among communities and LGAs of relief and handouts rather than development cooperation. To change this environment coordinate strategies among all development and humanitarian actors will be necessary to increase the awareness of the objectives of development cooperation in terms of sustainable self-reliance at country, state, LGA, and community levels. A proper LRRD approach with harmonized and aligned humanitarian and development activities would be very important in this regard. However, it requires an explicit strategy which has not been developed within the RRP.

4.5 **Consortium Model**

169. Discussions within consortia seem to point to the conclusion that the best consortium structure should consist of a complementary technical model. The lead agency should have the responsibility for management and administrative issues while sector specific operational aspects should be ensured by NGOs with proven comparative advantages in the specific field such as health or education. Moreover, the consortium should have sufficient capacity and commitment to step in and provide funding when delays in transfer of money from the overall funder or administrator might occur. Other consortium members should be kept informed on all management issues and management records should be available within all consortium members. The term ‘associates’ should be limited to non-state actors with a proven limited experience in implementing activities required by the program and proper needs assessments of associates should be prepared with as a joint exercise with the associate and the other consortium partners and a capacity development plan for the associates should be developed.

170. Communication strategies should be developed as part of the consortium agreement and special attention to be given to ensuring that all consortium members will all program relevant information. Coordination, alignment, and full harmonization of activities undertaken by the different consortia members should be ensured by appropriate joint management structures and procedures including as much as possible daily updated planning online.
171. The full commitment of the consortium members is important; in cases where the consortium members’ activities have been 100% concentrated on the RRP the consortium has shown better unity; such as was the case in RRP04.

4.6 SUSTAINABILITY

172. Exit strategies have not been designed at the onset of the projects but has rather taken the form of concrete hand-over plans developed at the end of the projects. While a realistic exit strategy is a fundamental component of a project’s sustainability strategy there are other elements of the project that are equally important.

4.7 COMMUNICATION

173. Throughout the RRP, there have been widespread discontent with UNDP. Some of the discontent in the first phase was justified as highlighted in the Mid Term Review. UNDP has responded actively to most of the criticism of the MTR; e.g. more senior and experienced staff have been recruited for the AMU. Still, the Evaluation found a widespread criticism regarding UNDP’s role in the RRP. Part of the criticism is clearly linked to a misinformation about UNDP’s role and responsibility which could have been rectified with a more active two-way communication with all stakeholders in the RRP. Moreover, there seems to be a perception that some of the costs of running the AMU could have been used directly for the consortia apparently with little understanding of the administrative accountability requirements for EC – GONU / GOSS funding. Moreover, there seems to be very little recognition that UNDP is co-funding the RRP at around 8% of the total costs and that the co-funding is used for financing the AMU. Still, it might be valid to question if 15% of the operation for administrative costs is reasonable.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1.1 GENERAL ISSUES

174. For early recovery and rehabilitation programs of a lifespan of three to four years it is important to define objectives in terms of restoring livelihoods rather than poverty eradication.

175. Projects documents should show comparable experience, i.e. relief and recovery projects in fragile countries. The experience should include description of what mid-term and final evaluations have shown in terms projects being realistic and not over-ambitious. If the projects are trying something innovative for which the implementing agencies feel there is no comparable experience this should be clearly spelled out.

176. To improve relevant monitoring more attention should be given to satisfaction assessments, including satisfaction of basic social services. It is recommended that standardized tools such as the Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ) be ap-
plied. The CWIQ was developed by the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, and ILO in order to facilitate countrywide household surveys for monitoring of overall development frameworks, including the MDGs. The household surveys include effectiveness of basic services as well as households own perception of vulnerability.

177. NGOs should consider lower their requirements for women to promote their participation - - e.g. recruit couples or recruit women in the villages – should organize special sessions with the payams and VDCs to discuss how to get more women involved.

5.2 **Regionalized Approach**

178. Future similar national initiatives should be designed with a greater attention to the different regional contexts.

5.3 **Focus Areas**

179. To strengthen LGA capacity development more attention should be given to management capacity of the LGAs and with alignment of support to State level authorities. Where available, cooperation should be established with UN Volunteers and IGAD civil servants who are working within the state authorities to provide capacity development. For similar projects it will be important to

180. To strengthen the effectiveness of integrated rural development programs aiming at improved food security and poverty eradication, it will be important include proper analysis of poverty and food security to identify underlying factors. It will therefore also be important to include proper food security expertise in the programs.

181. Greater attention to proper food security analysis would also allow programs such as the RRP to play a greater role in supporting the overall food security programming at state and national level. Analyses of the overall food security situation in Sudan shows that access is a critical factor for food insecurity in Southern Sudan where many households will need food assistance while there is a potential for greater food production. In such situations programs like RRP could play an important role in facilitating local purchase programs which could promote the weak marketing structure and encourage agricultural production in an environment where potential producers in the South are still hesitant to engage in cash crop production and where farmers in the North are still looking for improved marketing to jumpstart their production. Such an approach could therefore also have positive impacts on the perception of the peace process.

5.4 **Consortium Model**

182. Ideally NGO Consortia should build on additionality among NGOs based on comparative advantages and ensure mutual strengthening among NGOs in Sudan to improve performance in delivering development assistance to communities.

183. Moreover, for fragile countries such as Sudan that are prone to frequent natural disasters and local conflicts, it will be particularly important to ensure that the consortia will include both humanitarian and development capacities.
184. In the future, it will be important to explicitly describe the applied consortium model based on a sound organizational analysis comparing alternative models. Likewise, specific indicators for the effectiveness and efficiency of the consortia should be included and alternative consortium models should be experimented; e.g., including both state and non-state actors or involving both involving both state, county/locality, payam/administrative units, and community levels. Moreover, it will be important to ensure shared vision of the members.

185. While there have been some attempts to involve other actors in key meetings and workshops it would be important to upgrade this for future similar consortia and request the consortia to play a proactive coordination role. This should include establishing a more formal network with other development and humanitarian partners in the area to ensure that all consortium members are totally informed about the work of other actors and keep connected and ensure that other actors have full knowledge about the consortium work. This could lead to improved implementation of development and humanitarian actions and development of greater and more important consortia.

186. To increase transparency and promote full involvement of all consortia members in RRP programmatic issues, the web-site should be used increasing with posting of PRC minutes of meetings, specific studies undertaken within the different consortia.

5.5 **LRRD**

187. Interventions in fragile countries such as Sudan should apply a contiguous LRRD model and ensure that humanitarian and development actors work together at all levels and during all phases of the projects.

188. Risk analysis aims to identify the nature, characteristics, interaction and causes of hazards which threaten poor people's assets and livelihoods, identifies their impacts, and establishes who are the most vulnerable to these and why should be an integrated part of LRRD approaches.

5.6 **Sustainability**

189. Exit strategies should be developed at the design phase of projects and follow a participatory approach with active involvement of all relevant stakeholders such as representatives from different groups in the communities, LGAs, States, non-state actors. The exit strategies should be based on proper capacity analyses and clearly identify plans with timelines for the intentions for different types of activities:

- will they be phased-out, i.e. no follow-up is considered necessary. This could be the case for livelihood interventions such as a livestock restocking program where the project is responding to a temporary need after households have lost their product assets due to calamities,

- will they be phased-over, i.e. other institutions will be responsible for continuing the activities. This could be the case, for instance, for a new or rehabilitated health centre that will only be functioning after the project comes to
an end if another institution assume the responsibility such as LGAs, communities, or a non-state actor, or

- will they be phased-down, i.e. the project or the implementing agencies intend to continue supporting the activities after the current funding has come to an end but with less and less support. This could be the case, for instance, where a second phase will be funded.

190. Moreover, the exit strategies should include an exit plan identifying who should do what and when and with whom to implement the exit strategy as part of the overall project. It is particularly important to see the exit strategy as a path or a series of events from the launch of the project to the closure. The timelines should be based on realistic assessments of when it is most optimal to phase-out or -over. E.g. while it might be important to distribute food at a certain time of the project free delivery should be time-bound to avoid fostering a relief mode.

191. For activities that will be phased-over the exit strategies should clearly identify the future responsible institutions and how the phase-over, or hand-over, will take place for each type of activity and each institution that will assume responsibilities after the project comes to an end. Physical infrastructures such as a road or a building that are considered to be finished by the project still needs maintenance and should there be considered as activities that should be phased-over and not phased-out. For activities that will be phased-over or phased-down it is particularly important to do so in a phased manner where institutions that will assume responsibility after the project will do so increasingly toward the project end.

192. Exit strategies should be part of the whole project planning cycle. Following a participatory approach for the monitoring and review of the projects, the exit strategies should also be reviewed regularly and adapted if necessary. To use the RRP language the exit strategies should be part of the ABEAs and for the activities that will be phased-over the review will allow to show if adjustments are needed for the exit strategies to remain realistic.
6. ANNEXES

6.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE

SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE

For the Final Evaluation of the Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP)

1. BACKGROUND

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, the European Commission (EC) re-launched its development assistance with a €55.494 million Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), which includes UNDP co-financing of €4.575 million. The RRP is a six-year initiative (January 2005 -January 2011), managed by UNDP, on behalf of the Government of National Unity and Government of South Sudan.

The programme was first envisaged in early 2003, following the North-South ceasefire, in recognition of a real possibility of a final peace agreement. The programme design, its management arrangements and its implementation modalities, are peculiar to the circumstances of the time and the capacities, or lack of them, of the contractual parties, beneficiary communities and local administration.

The RRP is the largest and most comprehensive recovery programme in Sudan, benefiting up to 800,000 Sudanese. A total of 44 national and international NGOs are pooled together into consortia that work in 10 locations across the country. Programme activities focus on livelihoods, capacity building and basic services. These activities intend to provide food and income to the targeted households, improve local administrations’ capacities and respond to critical needs and priorities as defined by the communities themselves.

The RRP was expected to provide immediate “peace dividends” to war affected communities with the objective of reducing the prevalence and severity of poverty and increasing food security amongst conflict affected rural households across Sudan. This was to be achieved through tangible improvements at the community and local authority level; taking into account the extent and immediacy of needs associated to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugee return.

The RRP aims to achieve the following goals:

- To link relief, rehabilitation and development;
- to ensure that high proportion of total project expenditure is accrued directly to the target communities;
- to use a flexible and pragmatic process-oriented approach with the active involvement of beneficiary communities in all stages of the project cycle and emphasis on building self-reliance and beneficiary ownership;
- to ensure sustainability of action by supporting capacity building within local government
authorities (LGAs). They will be fully involved with programming to allow them the ability
to resume their core functions and responsibilities;
• to ensure coordination with other donors' interventions.

The programme commenced in January 2005 and is scheduled to run for a period of six years,
ending on 25th January 2011.
Annex 1 provides more details about the status of the ten RRP funded projects.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

2.1 Global objective

The objective of the present consultancy is to undertake a final evaluation of the RRP in two
phases (phases I and II), notably with regards to the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact
and sustainability of the ten Projects within the Programme as specified in Annex 1.

The consultancy will produce clear conclusions and recommendations that will assess:

a) whether outcomes and impact of the RRP have been achieved as expected, with an em-
phasis on the sustainability of identified achievements;

b) why certain results and certain impacts have or have not been achieved by the partner's
programme

In broader terms, the consultancy will also produce an independent assessment of the rele-
ance of the RRP approach as a valid LRRD\(^1\) mechanism, and make concrete recommendations
on the relevance and the feasibility of applying a similar approach in future EU programming for
Sudan, taking into account two important factors:

1. the specificity of the local context and the evolution of the geopolitical circumstances
   in Sudan; and

2. the observance of the strategy "Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Im-
   plementation Units for External Aid provided by the European Commission" and re-
   lated guidelines for making technical cooperation more effective\(^2\).

2.2 Specific objectives

The evaluation (phases I and II) should carry out a general assessment of the performance of
the RRP against the stated objectives. It should consider the relevance, effectiveness, efficien-
cy, impact and sustainability of each of the ten individual projects (managed by a different con-
sortium of NGOs), which constitute its core, as specified in Annex 1. In overall terms, the eval-
uation is expected to provide a good description of the socioeconomic context of each project
and the key factors which have influenced the final results identified, besides the provision of
useful documentation about lessons learned (examples of good practice & lessons learned)

More specifically the experts will be expected to:
1. Review the performance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as administrator of the Programme, including management, coordination, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, visibility, communication and dissemination of information.

2. Analyse the programme’s coherence with the EC Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme, and the country development and sector policies and strategies.

3. Carry out coherent and systematic desk reviews as well individual field missions to the ten RRP projects, evaluating their performance, analysing the extent to which recommendations made by the Mid-term-Review (MTR) carried out in February 2008 were applied and the degree of continuity in the different activities proposed in each of the projects after the end of the RRP support.

The consultancy will assess the activities carried out by the ten projects on the ground and gauge, for each, the:

- extent to which the RRP was consistent with and supportive of the policy and program framework within which the Programme was initially placed and also considering the recommendations by the MTR;
- results and key achievements of the project vis-à-vis its objectives;
- relevance/contribution of the RRP achievements to recovery in Sudan’s post conflict context;
- projects’ management and consortium coordination arrangements by UNDP, in particular the extent to which timely and appropriate decisions were made to support effective implementation and problem resolution;
- degree of coordination with other humanitarian and development projects in each project's location, analyzing the mechanisms established to enhance synergies and opportunities for handover of activities at the end of the RRP;
- quality of information management and reporting from each consortia, and the extent to which key stakeholders were kept adequately informed about progress in the RRP implementation;
- quality of operational work planning, budgeting and risk management from each consortia;
- levels of ownership and stakeholder participation in the management and implementation of each project, gauging the perspectives and opinions of communities, local civil society organisations and local government authorities on RRP performance;
- projects' performance in terms of effective integration of specific cross-cutting issues such as gender and environmental mainstreaming into the actions;
- prospects for sustainability of identified RRP benefits, analysing the continuity of activities/benefits still ongoing after the end of the RRP support, including the social acceptability, the degree of ownership and the financial viability of actions, the handover and maintenance of equipment/assets and the level of participation, technical and managerial capacities from the various local stakeholders still involved.

2.3 Methodology
The evaluation will be conducted in a participatory manner through a combination of methods including a review of the key project documentation and EC Country Strategy Paper/guidelines, interviews with different stakeholders/counterparts, beneficiary consultation and site visits to the ten projects as deemed necessary.

The evaluation team shall propose in the inception report the approach, design, methods and data collection strategies to be adopted for conducting the evaluation.

The team should triangulate and validate information, assess and describe data quality in a transparent manner (assess strengths, weaknesses, and sources of information). Data gaps if any should also be highlighted.

2.4 Proposed consultancy team members and work plan

The two phases of the consultancy will be carried out as follows:

**Phase I**: it will involve a team of four experts: one team leader, one consultant for the North (projects in Red Sea and River Nile states), and a team of two consultants for the South (projects in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrab, Upper Nile, Central and Eastern Equatoria states).

**Phase II**: it will involve a team of two experts: one team leader and one consultant for the North/Transitional Areas (projects in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and Abyei).

**Phase I** will involve an estimated total of 62 calendar days, including travel, as follows (calculated on the basis of the Team leader schedule, see table in page 7):

- 3 days for familiarisation with relevant documentation prior to commencement of field work in country;
- 6 days between Khartoum and Juba, where the experts should meet with all relevant stakeholders, including key staff from UNDP, representatives from Government of National Unity (GNU), Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC), and EU Delegation, and selected staff from implementing consortia (Sudanese and international NGOs), and donors, in particular the World Bank (Multi-donor Trust Fund –MDTF-), OFDA and DfID (BRIDGE);
- 20 days visiting selected projects in the North and in the South, including travel;
- 5 days between Khartoum and Juba for debriefings about preliminary findings to the concerned parties, namely UNDP, EU Delegation, MIC and GoSS;
- 14 days for finalising the final draft report (location(s) to be defined by the consultants);
- 7 days for the MIC/EU to transmit their comments to the report;
- 7 days for the consultancy to incorporate these comments, make any modifications deemed necessary and submit the final report.

**Phase II** will involve an estimated total of 40 calendar days, including travel, as follows (calculated on the basis of the Team leader schedule, see table in page 7):

- 3 days for familiarisation with relevant documentation prior to commencement of field work in country;
• 3 days in Khartoum where the experts should meet with all relevant stakeholders, including key UNDP, MIC and EU Delegation staff, appropriate GNU line ministries’ staff, staff from implementing consortia (Sudanese and international NGOs), and donors, in particular the World Bank (MDTF), OFDA and DfID (BRIDGE);
• 14 days visiting selected projects in the North and Transitional Areas, including travel;
• 3 days in Khartoum for debriefings about preliminary findings to the concerned parties, namely UNDP, EU Delegation, MIC and GoSS;
• 7 days for finalizing the final draft report (location(s) to be defined by the consultants);
• 5 days for the MIC/EU to transmit their comments to the report;
• 5 days for the consultancy to incorporate these comments, make any modifications deemed necessary and submit a final report.

2.5 Required Outputs

1. At the beginning of each phase, the team will provide an inception report for the evaluation phase. The inception report will contain detailed evaluation methodology, evaluation questions, proposed sources of data, and data collection tools

2. At the end of both phases and before leaving Sudan, the consultants will share the preliminary findings of the evaluation missions with the concerned members of the National Authorising Officer (GNU), GoSS, the EU Delegation and UNDP in Juba and in Khartoum. Briefing sessions for this purpose will be organised by the team leader of the evaluation team, with support from UNDP and the EU Delegation.

3. The main outputs of this consultancy will be the two comprehensive final reports (CFRs), one at the end of phase I and the other at the end of phase II. Information should be presented in a clear and concise manner, compiling and analyzing all relevant information, listing key conclusions and making relevant recommendations for the future, in line with the proposed terms described in sections 2.1 and 2.2. Considering that two CFRs will be required for different locations and at different points in time, the consultancy should ensure the necessary coherence in terms of structure and contents between both documents, for which a well defined methodology would need to be systematically applied throughout the entire evaluation process.

3. EXPERTS PROFILE

• Collectively, the team of consultants should have extensive experience in monitoring and evaluation of rural development projects, especially in a post-conflict, recovery environment, with demonstrated knowledge of the LRRD approach and aspects related to good governance.

• The team leader should have at least 15 years of relevant experience, with a Masters Degree or equivalent relevant to rural development, agriculture or economics. Senior expert

• The three other team members should have at least 10 years of relevant experience and a minimum of a first degree or equivalent relevant to rural development, agriculture or economics. At least two of them must have knowledge of the local language at the place
of assignment and be familiar with the national and state institutions and local governance structures. Senior experts.

All consultants should have:

- Comprehensive experience of Project Cycle Management with good experience in the use of the logical framework. Proven experience in the management and implementation of rehabilitation and development projects is a strong asset.
- Fluent command of the English language, both written and spoken.
- Excellent communication skills.
- Physically fit and able to undertake field visits in difficult environments and remote locations by plane, vehicle and foot.
- Familiarity with Sudan is an important asset.

4. LOCATION AND DURATION

4.1 Indicative Starting Dates

The start dates for the two phases of the consultancy are proposed as follows:

Phase I: starting 1st July 2010;

Phase II: starting 1st February 2011.

4.2 Duration and Location(s) of Assignment

The consultancy will be undertaken in two separate phases as indicated in the tables below (page 7).
5. REPORTING

Phase I:

- The team leader is responsible to produce the report in English.
- The preliminary findings of the evaluation are to be shared with the National Authorising Officer (NAO) of the MIC and GoSS, the EU-RRP Programme Coordinator and the UNDP/AMU Coordinator in both Juba and Khartoum, before the consultants leave Sudan, as explained above.
- The draft report will be due 14 days after the consultations in Juba and Khartoum.
- The Delegation will share it with the NAO/GoSS and AMU and have 7 calendar days to make comments.
- Within 7 days of receipt of the comments on the draft report, the Framework Company shall incorporate these comments and submit the final version of the comprehensive final report (CFR) in 5 (five) bound hard copies and one CD, to the office of the National Authorising Officer and the EU Delegation in Khartoum, Sudan.
- The Consultants and Framework Company shall not provide any copy of the draft or final report to any third party without the prior, written authorisation of the EU Delegation in Sudan.

Phase II:

- The team leader is responsible to produce the report in English.
- The preliminary findings of the evaluation are to be shared with the NAO/GoSS, the EU
RRP Programme Coordinator and the AMU Coordinator in Khartoum, before the consultants leave Sudan, as explained above.

- The draft report will be due 7 days after the consultations in Khartoum.
- The Delegation will share it with the NAO/GoSS and AMU and have 5 calendar days to make comments.
- Within 5 days of receipt of the comments on the draft report, the Framework Company shall incorporate these comments and submit the final version of the CFR, in 5 (five) bound hard copies and one CD, to the office of the National Authorising Officer and the EU Delegation in Khartoum, Sudan.
- The Consultants and Framework Company shall not provide any copy of the draft or final report to any third party without the prior, written authorisation of the EU Delegation in Sudan.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

6.1 Tax and VAT arrangements
In general the contract will be free from taxes and duties, except for goods and services purchased by the Consultant on the local market, on which taxes and duties have already been imposed.

6.2 Others
- It will be very positively appraised that the consultancy firm designates the same candidates in both phase I and phase II for the positions of team leader and consultant to the North and Transitional Areas, this in order to ensure a minimum of coherence and continuity to the evaluation work.
- The experts will carry out all elements of the assignment and provide all the resources necessary for the execution of the given tasks.
- The experts will be responsible for the provision of his/her accommodation and local transport.
- The experts should be equipped with their laptops and mobile phones.
- The working hours are fixed on the basis of the local laws and the requirements of the assignment. In general the experts are expected to work 5 days a week (except when visiting the field, when 7 days a week might be required) from 8:00 am to 4:00 pm, Sunday to Thursday.
- National Travel: the per diems should include intra-city travel (within Khartoum and Juba) so intra-city travel expenses are not eligible under reimbursable. Inter-city travels foreseen in the Terms of Reference (for site visits) are to be included under “local travel” costs.
- Office supplies and communications are to be covered in the fees and may not be recovered as reimbursable.
- The EU Delegation in Khartoum in coordination with the NAO/MIC will provide assistance in facilitating the visas for Sudan, travel and photographic permits; whenever required, the EU Delegation will support in terms of identifying accommodation, as well as information for the booking of internal flights for the consultants.

7. AVAILABLE DOCUMENTATION UPON REQUEST
- RRP Technical Guidelines for the Call for Proposals.
- Contracts with UNDP + Riders
- Annual reports, lessons learnt as well as monitoring and evaluation reports from AMU
- Mid-term evaluation as well as audit reports for each Project
- Access to RRP website
- EC / Sudan Country Strategy Paper
6.2 Resource Persons for the Evaluation

The following list includes names and institutions of the resource persons having informed the Evaluation through interviews. It should be noticed, though, that a critical mass of resource persons are not mentioned in the list, namely the many community members who spoke with the Evaluation during visits to the seven Projects. Unfortunately, the logistics for the Evaluation did not allow to get the details of these important informers.

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<tr>
<td><strong>Khartoum</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvaro Ortega</td>
<td>Rural Development and Food Security Section, EU Sudan</td>
<td>Program Coordinator</td>
<td>912 172 775 183 799 393</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Alvaro.ortega-aparicio@ec.europa.eu">Alvaro.ortega-aparicio@ec.europa.eu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eatizaz Mohamed El Hassan</td>
<td>Rural Development and Food Security Section, EU Sudan</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>912 881 166</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Eatizaz.mohamed@ec.europa.eu">Eatizaz.mohamed@ec.europa.eu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekki Mirghani Osman</td>
<td>EDF Unit, Ministry of International Cooperation</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>183 764 384 / 311 122 227</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Mekki.osman@yahoo.co.uk">Mekki.osman@yahoo.co.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd Elatii Jaber</td>
<td>EDF Unit, Ministry of International Cooperation</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>911 122 223 / 912 35 368</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Atti_osman@yahoo.com">Atti_osman@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solafa Sir El Khatim Gaily</td>
<td>EDF Unit, Ministry of International Cooperation</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>912 654 721</td>
<td><a href="mailto:solafagaily@yahoo.com">solafagaily@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auke Lootsma</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Deputy Country Director</td>
<td>183 773 727</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Auke.lootsma@undp.org">Auke.lootsma@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massimo Diana</td>
<td>UNDP – BCPR</td>
<td>Head of Unit</td>
<td>912532359</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Massimo.diana@undp.org">Massimo.diana@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alinazar Alinazarov</td>
<td>UNDP – RRP</td>
<td>Finance Officer</td>
<td>83783756 ex.:1913</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Alinazar.alinazarov@undp.org">Alinazar.alinazarov@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Cheema</td>
<td>UNDP – RRP</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>908 030 184</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Adnan.cheema@undp.org">Adnan.cheema@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hisachi Izumi</td>
<td>UNDP – BCPR</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>915 837 329</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Hisachi.izumi@undp.org">Hisachi.izumi@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paton</td>
<td>SPCRP – Northern Sudan, FAO</td>
<td>International Capacity Building Advisor</td>
<td>837 74 591</td>
<td><a href="mailto:John.Paton@fao.org">John.Paton@fao.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parvez Akhter</td>
<td>EMIS Development Project, UNICEF</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>919 697 609</td>
<td><a href="mailto:P.ahkter@hotmail.com">P.ahkter@hotmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulgadir Turkawi</td>
<td>Community Development Fund Project</td>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>183247195 918114077</td>
<td><a href="mailto:turkawii@hotmail.com">turkawii@hotmail.com</a> <a href="mailto:turkawi123@yahoo.com">turkawi123@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nilesh Buddha</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="mailto:buddhan@who.int">buddhan@who.int</a></td>
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<td>Nageeb Hammad</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>912 832 702</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ibrahimn@aud.emro.who.int">ibrahimn@aud.emro.who.int</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hege Magnus</td>
<td>Royal Norwegian Embassy</td>
<td>1st Secretary</td>
<td>912 531 991</td>
<td><a href="mailto:htm@mfa.no">htm@mfa.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelle Shirley</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Programme Officer – BRIDGE</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="mailto:mshirley@usaid.gov">mshirley@usaid.gov</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Massimiliano Pedretti</td>
<td>EC Juba Office</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>912104694</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Massimiliano.pedretti@ec.europa.eu">Massimiliano.pedretti@ec.europa.eu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Minari</td>
<td>Food Security and Rural Dev., EC Juba Office</td>
<td>Technical Advisor</td>
<td>92250400</td>
<td><a href="mailto:emmanuel.minari@gmail.com">emmanuel.minari@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morten R. Petersen</td>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Technical Assistant</td>
<td>912 172 968</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Mor-ten.petersen@echosudan-juba.org">Mor-ten.petersen@echosudan-juba.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Conway</td>
<td>UNDP, Southern Sudan</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Office</td>
<td>477 128 329</td>
<td><a href="mailto:George.conway@undp.org">George.conway@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusufa Gomez</td>
<td>UNDP Southern Sudan</td>
<td>Program Specialist</td>
<td>919768995</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Yusufa.gomez@undp.org">Yusufa.gomez@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Mabior</td>
<td>Aid Coordination, Ministry of Finance GOSS</td>
<td>Director, RRP focal point</td>
<td>122 249 178</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Dramani</td>
<td>UNDP – BRPCR Southern Sudan</td>
<td>Program Analyst</td>
<td>122 085 290</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Martin.dramani@undp.org">Martin.dramani@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra Laes Miguel</td>
<td>UNDP – BRPCR Southern Sudan</td>
<td>RRP consultant</td>
<td>902719207</td>
<td><a href="mailto:alezandralaes@gmail.com">alezandralaes@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganiyu Ipaye</td>
<td>UNDP – BRPCR Southern Sudan</td>
<td>Senior Program Specialist</td>
<td>126 203 984</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Ganiyu.ipaye@undp.org">Ganiyu.ipaye@undp.org</a></td>
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<td>Yusuf Ahmed</td>
<td>Islamic Relief Sudan</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>912 161 634</td>
<td><a href="mailto:yusuufahmed@yahoo.com">yusuufahmed@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsadique Elnour</td>
<td>Islamic Relief Sudan</td>
<td>Senior Programme Manager</td>
<td>915 152 060</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Sadique.elnour@islamic-relief.org.sd">Sadique.elnour@islamic-relief.org.sd</a></td>
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<td>James Akai</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>BRIDGE Coordinator</td>
<td>926 495 458</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jakai@rd.mercycorps.org">jakai@rd.mercycorps.org</a></td>
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<td>Ohaj Ahmed Emami</td>
<td>SOS Sahel</td>
<td>Country Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>154 925 434</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ojahemain@sahel.org.uk">ojahemain@sahel.org.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taha El-Taher Bedawi</td>
<td>SECS RSS</td>
<td>Director ICZM Office</td>
<td>912 935 782</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Taha.bedawi@iczm-rss.sd">Taha.bedawi@iczm-rss.sd</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah Ali Elawad</td>
<td>PASED</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="mailto:Acopsd@hotmail.com">Acopsd@hotmail.com</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>RRP 4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohieldin Omran</td>
<td>ROD</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>912 250 209</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mohiomran@yahoo.com">mohiomran@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
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<td>RRP 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hassam Oman</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>FS/ C Specialist</td>
<td>912 145 359</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hassa-no@ecaf.savethechildren.se">hassa-no@ecaf.savethechildren.se</a></td>
</tr>
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</table>
### RRP 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ken MacLean</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>917 506 746</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kmac-lean@sd.mercycorps.org">kmac-lean@sd.mercycorps.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyama Moses Remson</td>
<td>Stromme Foundation</td>
<td>Country Coordinator</td>
<td>926 659 197</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Mosesremson.anyama@stromme.org">Mosesremson.anyama@stromme.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Laku Natana</td>
<td>Stromme Foundation</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>911 156 492</td>
<td><a href="mailto:James.laku@stromme.org">James.laku@stromme.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### RRP 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Email</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inyani Kalisto</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>927 146 438</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kalistoinyany@yahoo.com">kalistoinyany@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Rotich</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Finance Officer</td>
<td>787602350</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Edwin.chenulyot@icco.nl">Edwin.chenulyot@icco.nl</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Biragane</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Country Program Manager</td>
<td>477 298 405 / 955 048 613</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Justin.biragane@icco.nl">Justin.biragane@icco.nl</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyop Teklay</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Monitoring / Food Security Specialist</td>
<td>955 189 525</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Eyob.ghilazghy@icco.nl">Eyob.ghilazghy@icco.nl</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kajob</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>955 655 899</td>
<td><a href="mailto:zoakatigiri@uuplus.com">zoakatigiri@uuplus.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Mulu</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>927 300 462</td>
<td><a href="mailto:patrickmulu@gmail.com">patrickmulu@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathew N’dote</td>
<td>AAH-I</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>477 134 546</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ndottle-provz@yahoo.co.uk">ndottle-provz@yahoo.co.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juma Solomo</td>
<td>AAH-I</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>953 069 248</td>
<td><a href="mailto:solomondu-mo@yahoo.com">solomondu-mo@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muro Mimiyule</td>
<td>AAH-I</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>477 138 092</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mmi-vule@actionafricahelp.org">mmi-vule@actionafricahelp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Githae</td>
<td>PG Associates</td>
<td>Audit Consultant</td>
<td>+254 20 3740233</td>
<td><a href="mailto:peter@pgithaeassociates.com">peter@pgithaeassociates.com</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### RRP 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leek Thon</td>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>RRP Coordinator</td>
<td>917 351 041</td>
<td><a href="mailto:thon@crssudan.org">thon@crssudan.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson Maina</td>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>926 792 964</td>
<td><a href="mailto:wmaina@crssudan.org">wmaina@crssudan.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melissa Mullan</td>
<td>MERLIN</td>
<td>Project Coordinator</td>
<td>955 029 006</td>
<td><a href="mailto:torit.pc@merlin-southsudan.org">torit.pc@merlin-southsudan.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>RRP9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinega Ong’ondi</td>
<td>VSF – Germany</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>+254 20 387 3676</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Otto</td>
<td>VSF – Germany</td>
<td>Country representative</td>
<td>928 775 445</td>
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<td>RRP 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maina Kibeta</td>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
<td>RRP Coordinator</td>
<td>922 407 122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abebaw Zeleke</td>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
<td>Director of Program Implementation</td>
<td>922 407 116</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Berhana Haile</td>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louise Mcgrath</td>
<td>Concern Worldwide</td>
<td>HQ Support</td>
<td>922 022 365</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Unguec</td>
<td>HARD</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>721 132 247</td>
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| Tinega Ong’ondi                                                      |                                                                 |                                                                 |                                                                 |
| Michael Otto                                                        |                                                                 |                                                                 |                                                                 |
|                                                                    |                                                                 |                                                                 |                                                                 |
| Maina Kibeta                                                        | Save the Children UK                                            | RRP Coordinator                                                 | 922 407 122                                                     |
| Abebaw Zeleke                                                       | Save the Children UK                                            | Director of Program Implementation                              | 922 407 116                                                     |
| Berhana Haile                                                        | Save the Children UK                                            | Project Manager                                                 |                                                                 |
| Louise Mcgrath                                                       | Concern Worldwide                                               | HQ Support                                                      | 922 022 365                                                     |
| Joseph Unguec                                                       | HARD                                                            | Executive Director                                              | 721 132 247                                                     |
6.3 **Map of Project Locations for Phase I of Final RRP Evaluation**

### Evaluation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Primary Sources of Information</th>
<th>Key Overall Findings</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
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</table>
|   | Is the RRP concept relevant for the Peace process and for achieving the overall objective of agricultural based economic development and export commodity competitiveness and diversification? | Reducing the gap between war affected / least developed areas and national average standards in Sudan | PDs, Interviews with Gvt, UNDP, EU, general observations                                       | • RRP focus on rural areas which are marginalized in both the North and the South,  
• Focus on food security and poverty eradication is in line with CPA to ensure equal development,  
• As complex concepts both food security and poverty eradication require integrated approaches,  
• The focus on basic social services is relevant to show peace dividend, although symbolism not reflected in implementation,  
• RRP livelihood component focuses on agricultural production with some attention to diversification. |
| 1 | Is the RRP consistent and supportive of the principles of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005? | Existence of LGAs                                                         | Interviews with projects                                                                      | • Too early for development interventions in the South: ‘post-conflict – non-peace’ and lack of stability, LGAs not functional, GOSS not well-established and not able to assume responsibility of LGAs, roadways break down, many communities impassable in rainy season,  
• North: ready for development although LGAs still not fully functioning. Roadways a challenge during summer season in many areas. |
| 2 | Were the conditions that would be necessary for a development action existing in the project areas, e.g. post-conflict or instability still an issue, functional LGAs, functional communication infrastructure, etc.? | Focus on agricultural production during the lifespan of the projects      | PDs and interviews with projects                                                              | • Increased attention to food production after the Mid Term Review - but overall relatively limited attention,  
• Distribution of production inputs have generated some improvements in food production among target groups but limited attention to integrated approach, incl. markets, finance, and extension. |
<p>| 3 | Has the program design been relevant for a quick start of agricultural and rural development in Sudan? |                                                                           |                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                   |
| 4 | Do implementing partners have appropriate local knowledge and experience? | Former operational experience in basic services and livelihood activities in the areas of the projects | Interviews with projects | • Implementing NGOs have organizational capacity for integrated development projects. However, staff assigned to Southern Sudan mainly experience in relief operations. No training of staff to improve development capacity, • Limited organizational and individual experience in capacity development of LGAs management skills in both North and South, • Underuse of local partners' capacities in both the North and South. |
| 5 | Is the integrated program approach relevant to reach the objective of the RRP? | Attention to all food security components Attention to root causes for poverty | Baseline information, interviews | • Integrated rural development approach relevant, but implementation has mainly taken form as sectoralized and non-integrated activities, • Lack of attention to critical issues for poverty eradication and food security, including nutrition and alternative IGAs. |
| 6 | Is the Consortium model relevant to the context at the level of localities? | Definition of the consortium model incl. roles and responsibilities for providing basic services, livelihood improvements, and capacity development | PDs and interviews with projects incl. LGAs and community members | • No one single consortium model in RRP, • In principle a technical complementarity model would be relevant for longer-term development projects, but model requires intensive coordination and planning, • The principle of involving local non-state actors to develop local capacity is highly relevant but ‘associates’ but except RRP07 ‘associates’ were not identified based on the their needs for capacity development, • It takes at least 12 months for a consortium to be fully operational and requires good capacity in working together. |
| 7 | Have communities and LGAs been involved in the design of the projects? | Role of LGAs in defining priorities role of communities in needs assessments prior to project design | PDs and interviews with projects incl. LGAs and community members | • Projects were mainly designed based on INGOs former experience and knowledge about the project areas, • Where LGAs existed they were consulted. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Baseline for all project areas prepared prior or during project design</th>
<th>PDs and interviews with projects incl. LGAs and community members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 8 | What preparatory activities were undertaken for the design of the project proposal? Were baselines established? Were other data sources used? | • Baselines only developed after launch of projects; some 2 years after launch. But many baselines are based on participatory needs assessments and consultation with communities and LGAs. Results often not applied,  
• Limited evidence of use of other data sources, incl. JAM needs assessments. |  
| 9 | What was the process to form the consortia - were alternative partners and associates contacted and did they participate in the process? | • Most consortia established under the lead of what would later become the lead agency, • Partners and associates normally INGOs that have had working relationships with the lead agency, • Other INGOs and NGOs participated in initial discussions but decided not to join the consortia, often because of lack of capacity to engage in another project. |  
| 10 | Are the available resources (technical, financial, and organizational) appropriate for the designed actions? | • The allocated resources are appropriate for the planned physical outputs but inadequate for human capacity development, particularly management training of LGAs. |  
| 11 | Were realistic exit – transit strategies designed at the start of the projects? | • PDs do not include strategies for how the projects intend to withdraw its support while ensuring that the achievements obtained during the project / program will not be jeopardized and that the development processes initiated will continue,  
• Exit strategies only discussed during the last phase of the projects. |  
| 12 | How is post-conflict situation in the respective areas of operation? | • Land use conflicts are frequent in the South and with increasing intensity during the lifetime of the RRP,  
• In the North, land use conflicts are contained. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do the approaches adequately consider conflict situations (pre-existing as well as emerging ones)?</th>
<th>Conflict sensitivity mainstreaming in project activities</th>
<th>PDs and interviews with projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 13 | • Conflict management referred to in PDs but not mainstreamed in all project activities,  
    • Specific conflict related activities included in the projects: community peace committees, and peace building workshops,  
    • RRP07 and 08 organized training in conflict sensitivity during first phase of projects but results not institutionalized. |

**EFFICIENCY**

*Have the RRP Program and project's management and coordination arrangements been appropriate, responsive, flexible, and timely to achieve the objectives of the RRP?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>How is the quality of operational work planning, budgeting, and risk management at project and program levels?</th>
<th>Risk management matrix for the at project and program levelImplementability, clarity, and flexibility of the work plans</th>
<th>PDs, ABEAs and interviews with consortium members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 | • Operational work planning and monitoring following RRP / AMU’s formats are informative and efficient,  
   • Implementation flexibility hampered by the focus on the huge number of concrete outputs. Some adaptation to new demands and external factors though.  
   • Risk management not context specific in projects and limited efforts to develop risk management strategies,  
   • At program level more realistic and context specific risk management strategy. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>What are the means of communication with key stakeholders?</th>
<th>Communication strategy within and among projects and program</th>
<th>PDs and interviews with projects and UNDP, EU, Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2 | • Program: AMU and PRC only in direct contact with lead agencies. Some bottlenecks when lead agencies do not inform consortium members,  
   • Program: website and newsletters as one way communication. Limited attention to users’ satisfaction,  
   • Project: No formal communication strategy. Most communication with communities and LGAs through meetings. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>How is information being distributed?</th>
<th>Role and responsibility of stakeholders in the communication strategies</th>
<th>PDs and interviews with projects and UNDP, EU, Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3 | • No evidence of targeted communication strategies,  
   • Consortium model has not led to common communication with communities but to a certain degree with LGAs. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4</th>
<th>Level and quality of communication and coordination among the consortia?</th>
<th>list of contacts among consortia</th>
<th>Interviews with consortia</th>
<th>• Communication among consortia is limited to lead agencies’ participation in RRP meetings, incl. ad-hoc participation in the PRC, • RRP website not used for inter-consortia communication, • Exchange visits, although appreciated, limited to visit to one other project.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>How is the consortium model working – what are the strengths and weaknesses?</td>
<td>Consortia SWOT</td>
<td>PDs and interviews with consortia, LGAs, get, EU, and UNDP</td>
<td>• Strengths: mutual reinforcement, rational use of resources, easier for communities, LGAs, government and UN / EC to communicate, • Weakness: Time consuming, need for equal commitment of all partners, lack of organizational identity, • Opportunities: If one partner has to leave others can take over, improved advocacy through one voice, • Threats: Organizational egos and competition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Is the division of roles among different partners supporting the implementation of the RRP efficiency: National Authorizing Officer, the ECD, the UNDP, regional and local offices. How is the communication functioning?</td>
<td>Frequency and means of communications among different stakeholders</td>
<td>Interviews with projects and UNDP, EU, Government</td>
<td>• All stakeholders fulfill their roles as planned, • The extended number of layers in program and within the projects is time consuming and not efficient as too many have to inform and agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Are the consortiums made up of partners with complementary capacities – are all capacities required appropriately covered?</td>
<td>Capacities and experience of partners and associates</td>
<td>Interviews with consortia</td>
<td>• Complementary capacity in technical fields such as construction of basic service infrastructure and delivery, • Very limited capacity in food security analysis, • Very limited capacity in capacity development of LGAs’ management skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Observations</td>
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</table>
| 8 | Is the PRC an efficient mechanism to promote project activities at local level? | Knowledge of individual project activities among PRC members discussion of specific activities at PRC meetings Minutes of meetings Interviews with PRC members | • The PRC has limited impact on the States,  
• The recent trend to organize PRC meetings in different states has increased the role of PRC,  
• Many project partners are unaware of the role and composition of the PRC. |
| 9 | Were assumptions regarding external factors relevant? Are there others that should have been considered? Have they happened? Have the projects/program implemented mitigation measures (e.g. have risk analysis matrices been developed)? | History of risks and external factors influencing the project implementation PDs and interviews with project | • The assumptions in the projects are ‘standard’ and not context specific and the assumptions have not been reviewed regularly although some projects have reviewed some of the assumptions during the last phase,  
• Projects very weak in risk management strategies. |
| 10 | What are the criteria for choosing the states, localities, and communities? | Criteria for choosing the states, localities, and communities? PDs and interviews with consortia, LGAs, get, EIU, and UNDP | • The states are all affected by poverty and food insecurity, although River Nile to a less degree. Most states would have benefitted from participation. The 10 states also respond to some political considerations for supporting all,  
• Counties/localities identified with states taking into account where the NGOs had former experience,  
• Communities identified with LGAs - often where NGOs already active. |
| 11 | What are the criteria for choosing partners, associates, and the groups/persons that will be contacted at the first communication with the communities? | Criteria for choosing partners, associates, and the groups/persons that will be contacted at the first communication with the communities? PDs and interviews with consortia, LGAs, get, EIU, and UNDP | • Partners and associates chosen mainly because of former knowledge of each other and/or common vision,  
• Consortia generally established because of requirement to work in consortium with limited attention to alternative organizational set-ups or partners. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>12</strong></th>
<th>Cost-effectiveness considerations of the operations?</th>
<th>Costs of alternative implementation modalities</th>
<th>PDs, ABEAs and interviews with consortium members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|  |  |  | • The spreading out of project activities in areas with extremely poor communication causes unnecessary height costs.  
• Some of the physical infrastructures seem to have paid little attention to sustainability and some were not even finished,  
• Overall, around 15% is spent for operating AMU and another 20 to 30% for operating costs within the consortia. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>13</strong></th>
<th>How are partners, associates, LGAs, and communities involved in the implementation?</th>
<th>Roles of project stakeholders in project activities</th>
<th>PDs and interviews with consortia, LGAs, get, EIU, and UNDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|  |  |  | • Overall partners and associates are involved in their specific technical capacities,  
• Apart from RRP07 limited attention to training of associates,  
• Most associates mainly integrated because of RRP requirement for an associate. |

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**EFFECTIVENESS**

**Have the intended outputs and outcomes been achieved?**

• The projects have focused more on outputs than outcomes reflecting the intention of the RRP to achieve quick impacts,  
• Physical infrastructure for basic services has been effectively put in place but without sufficient attention to ensure the provision of the respective services, particularly in the South,  
• The outputs have had limited impact on the intended outcomes in terms of poverty reduction and food security,  
• Some impact in terms of better functioning LGAs.  
• Cross-cutting issues such as gender, environment, and conflict sensitivity have not been properly addressed in the project design and implementation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>What are the means that have been applied to promote a participatory approach?</th>
<th>Description of means and procedures with specification of roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder group in different project phases</th>
<th>PDs, ABEAs, and interviews with consortium members, community representatives, and LGAs</th>
<th>Most of project design and implementation uses consultations with communities and LGAs. Very limited participatory approach with full involvement of all stakeholders in all phases; the short timeframe and the high activity schedule would have even have made it difficult. Limited involvement of communities in monitoring and evaluation. Project lessons learned workshops limited to few representatives from communities and LGAs plus consortia members. Regional lessons learned workshops did not include all partners and associates.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>How has ownership been promoted and what are the levels of ownership and stakeholder participation in the management and implementation at project and program levels?</td>
<td>Project definition of ownership Description of means to further participation and ownership</td>
<td>PDs, ABEAs, and interviews with consortium members, community representatives, and LGAs</td>
<td>When the LGAs have been functioning they have been involved in the design and monitoring of project activities. VDC representatives in the steering committees ensure some level of community ownership. In most projects the communities seem to consider the project activities as theirs and are active in water management committees, parent-teacher associations, and health center committees. Some tendency for communities still expecting that ‘someone’ will come in and lead new activities. Some reluctance of communities to pay for operating costs, e.g., fuel for water pumps, reflecting the relief mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>How has gender mainstreaming and the role of women been incorporated in the RRP implementation?</td>
<td>Participation and role of women in different project phases and activities Project definition of gender mainstreaming</td>
<td>PDs, ABEAs, and interviews with consortium members, community representatives, and LGAs with special attention to get both women and men's perspective</td>
<td>A proper gender mainstreaming approach has not been applied; no evidence of gender analyses, or capacity for gender mainstreaming. All projects include special activities for women but traditional women activities such as goat keeping, vegetable production, and saving groups, and also insists on having at least two women in the VDCs. Most partners and associates only have male staff members, except for secretaries and other support staff.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   | Have the RRP activities been adapted to the local dynamic context? | Description of area specific activities and project procedures  
Adaptation of project activities during the project | PDs, ABEASs and interviews with consortium members, community representatives, and LGAs  
- In the North, one example of shifting the focus from building new health centers to supporting existing centers with delivery facilities.  
- Overall, limited attention to a flexible implementation. The short timeframe of the projects and the high level of expected outputs seem to prevent a more flexible approach.  
- Examples of stakeholder need assessments that were not respected. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | What are the means that have been applied to promote a conflict sensitive approach? | Project definition of a conflict sensitive approach  
Description of potential conflicts in PDs and ABEASs | PDs, ABEASs and interviews with consortium members, community representatives, and LGAs  
- RRP07 and 08 organized conflict management training in the initial phase. Limited institutionalization.  
- Conflict sensitivity has not been mainstreamed but reduced to specific activities such as peace committees in the communities and peace building workshops. |
| 6 | Have there been qualitative output indicators? | Description of indicators applied in the projects | PDs, quarterly and annual reports and interview with consortia  
- The vast majority of indicators are quantitative with little attention to impact. |
| 7 | What efforts have been taken to ensure coordinated and aligned approaches by all partners, e.g. gender, conflict? | Consortium meetings on approaches | Interviews with consortia members  
- As cross cutting issues have not been properly addressed coordinated approaches have not been discussed either.  
- Response to environmental degradation and desertification as called for by the JAM have not been addressed at all. |
| 8 | Are introduced technologies appropriate for the local contexts? | Use of introduced technologies by communities | Quarterly and annual reports and interviews with consortia, LGAs, and community members | • Generally the technologies introduced are appropriate for the environment.  
• Some examples where specific equipment such as microscopes have been procured but not used because of lack of human resource skills.  
• Lack of proper market analyses reduce the effectiveness of some of the IGAs. |

**IMPACT**

Has the RRP contributed to the recovery in Sudan’s post-conflict context, supported the CPA, supported peaceful coexistence within communities, among communities and between North and South?

| 1 | Have social and environmental impact analyses be prepared? | Description of impact analyses | PDs, quarterly and annual reports and interview with consortia, LGAs and community members, general observations | • Within the specific communities of project interventions the RRP has proven the benefit of peace dividend,  
• The symbolic value of RRP, e.g. covering both conflict affected communities in the North and in the South, remains unknown to most local stakeholders, including many partners and associates,  
• Potential and existing local conflicts in post CPA Sudan have only been addressed marginally in the project design and implementation. |

| 2 | Has the RRP promoted the release of other EC funding mechanism such as the EDF and EC thematic programs? | Description of funding discussions at the project and program level and identification of potential funding | Interviews with EC, UNDP, Consortia, and other agencies/international community | • No impact analysis or considerations have taken place,• Some activities are questionable from an environmental point of view such as the goats and some water infrastructure seems to be constructed with very limited protection,• The impact of the projects on the local power structure remains unknown.  
• FSTP projects have been approved as continuation of RRP where applicable,  
• The SPCRP (FAO) was started late and the planned links, e.g. with extension services could not be realized,  
• The RRP experience has been used for BRIDGE funding. |
|   | Has the RRP promoted agricultural based economic and competitive development? | Role of agriculture, fishery, and livestock activities in project activities | Quarterly and annual reports and interviews with consortia, LGAs, and community members | • Several projects have successfully promoted vegetable production for local markets as well as fruit trees,  
• Goats have provided some income from milk but still in a very limited and unsustainable manner,  
• Support to fishery has had a direct impact but the maintenance of the fishing gear is questionable,  
• Market limitations still critical for developing cash crops. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Has the capacity of national NGO associates been reinforced / strengthened in terms of responding to the needs of local populations? | Capacity assessments - baselines and during project implementation Strategies for NGOs capacity reinforcement PDs, ABEAS, quarterly and annual reports, interviews with associates and partners | • Most associates have not been identified based on specific capacity needs in terms of responding to the needs of local populations but rather based on the RRP requirement for a local organization in the consortia and no specific capacity development plans have been development and implemented,  
• One exception is RRP7 where the partners specifically identified the associate based on their needs to be eligible for funding for community activities in the future,  
• Some few associates express that overall they have benefitted from the RRP experience for their future activities, e.g. financial management system and more experience in rural areas. |
| 4 | Has the RRP contributed to reconciliation between the North and South? | Description about discussion re. CPA during project implementation | Interviews with consortia, LGAs, communities, national authorities, general observations | • In the South most partners and associates are not aware about the RRP’s coverage and principles of addressing both the North and South as a contribution to the CPA,  
• In one project area, RRP7, there were still two separate administrations at the beginning of the project. The project ensured that the two administrations participated in the project during the transitional phase of merging the two administrations,  
• There is still a lot of wrong perceptions in the South regarding the conditions in the North and many community members are unaware of the level of poverty and food insecurity in the North. |
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>What are the impacts of the RRP on the peaceful co-existence between different groups at the local level?</th>
<th>Risk assessments</th>
<th>Interviews with consortia, LGAs, communities, national authorities, general observations</th>
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<td>6</td>
<td>• In the South: several examples of specific activities that have promoted peaceful coexistence such as the peace road in RRP08. • In the North: limited attention to peaceful coexistence. Limited attention has been given to IDPs and nomadic populations although planned for in the PDs.</td>
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<th>Has the RRP applied impact oriented strategies? E.g. follow-up of training?</th>
<th>Description of post-workshop / training strategies</th>
<th>Interviews with consortia, LGAs, and communities</th>
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<td>7</td>
<td>• The projects generally monitor basic service delivery staff to ensure that planned activities are undertaken and thus ensuring immediate application of skills. • Some refreshed trainings have been implemented for service providers, • Limited attention to building training capacity within the communities and LGAs, for instance for service providers. The limited timeframe of the projects would probably not have allowed this either.</td>
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<th>What are the expected positive and negative impacts?</th>
<th>Description of unexpected impacts</th>
<th>Risk analysis</th>
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<td>8</td>
<td>• In RRP4, some examples of positive unexpected impacts in terms of communities’ capacities to undertake other development initiatives, • The basic social services have had immediate positive impact on children’s education and health, • Several LGAs are more functional as they now have improved physical infrastructure as a result of the project, • Limited impact on poverty eradication and food security, although lack of baselines and monitoring prevents a proper impact assessment.</td>
<td>PDs quarterly and annual reports and interview with consortia, LGAs and community members, general observations</td>
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<td>Page</td>
<td>What means have been developed to mitigate potential negative impacts?</td>
<td>Description of risk analysis and mitigation strategy</td>
<td>PDs, quarterly and annual reports and interview with consortia, LGAs and community members, general observations</td>
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**SUSTAINABILITY**

Are the program and project activities appropriately coordinated, harmonized, and aligned with other humanitarian and development activities, including government and state programs, and private and CBO initiatives?

| 1 | Have stakeholder satisfaction assessments taken place; e.g. as part of lessons-learned workshops? How have the results been incorporated in the project and program implementation? | Stakeholder satisfaction assessments Adaptation of project design according to stakeholder satisfaction assessments | PDs, ABEASs, Interviews with consortia, LGAs, and communities | • Most of the projects are aligned with LGA and State plans and often form parts of those.  
• The program uses the MDG framework but little efforts have been used to apply the MDG indicators, e.g. for the baselines or monitoring,  
• RRP activities are not directly aligned with humanitarian activities,  
• DG ECHO participated in the initial negotiation of RRP but has not participated directly during the implementation,  
• The projects do not use relevant development platforms such as SIFSIA / Food Security Council. |
| 2 | What is the likelihood that the activities launched under the RRP will continue after the program ends? Have the activities been institutionalized? | Discussions about post project strategies as part of project implementation Exit/transit strategies | PDs, ABEASs, quarterly and annual reports, interviews with consortia, LGAs, and communities, Interviews with UNDP, EC, | • In the North: state authorities are expected to continue supporting and operating the health and education services strengthened by the project – in the South: it is doubtful and there are already many examples of discontinuation of basic social services after the closure of the projects,  
• For both North and South most of water |
3. Have capacity development been institutionalized?

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<tr>
<th>Have capacity development been institutionalized?</th>
<th>Adaptation of news skills developed during project</th>
<th>Interviews with consortia, LGAs, and communities</th>
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<tr>
<td>• For both North and South: IGAs related to food processing are often used for socialization rather than income generation and the sustainability as an IGA is questioned. • For both North and South: no evidence of strengthened advocacy and resource mobilization capacities of LGAs and communities, • Handover activities have generally been carried out as requested by the agreements with the EC - UNDP • Projects that will continue under the FSTP will most likely get another lifeline for training activities.</td>
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4. Have sustainable structures been established to ensure the maintenance of physical infrastructure established under the RRP, e.g. water committees, payment systems, health committees?

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<tr>
<th>Have sustainable structures been established to ensure the maintenance of physical infrastructure established under the RRP, e.g. water committees, payment systems, health committees?</th>
<th>Formal agreements on ownership and maintenance of physical infrastructure, incl. roles and responsibilities and payment structure</th>
<th>Quarterly and annual reports and interviews with consortia, LGAs, and community members</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>• Water committees have been established or supported in all projects and are likely to continue, particularly since it is not a new institution for the communities and there is a general recognition of their value, • Maintenance of buildings is already weak at the end of the project; no evidence of training in maintenance of buildings, • Health committees are relatively new structures and communities do not seem to value their role. In RRP09 their numbers had already halved at the end of the health sub-project.</td>
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5. What lobbying / advocacy efforts have been undertaken to assure the sustainability of results?

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<th>Advocacy strategies</th>
<th>Quarterly and annual reports and interviews with consortia, LGAs, and community members</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The consortia have taken initiative to discuss the continuation particularly of the health services both with the authorities and UNDP. • The issue has also been brought up in the PRC at various occasions, • On the other hand the projects have done very little to raise the advocacy capacity of LGAs, • Where LGAs have been able to successfully advocate for support to basic services this has been because of strong personalities.</td>
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To what extent have the project activities substituted local capacities on the ground?

Role of government funded staff in basic service provision during project and post project

Interviews with consortia, LGAs, communities, national authorities, general observations

- In the South: Long history of humanitarian assistance communities as well as government structures tend to expect that basic services will be provided by NGOs and other NSAs.
- So whether it is substitution or filling a gap is a matter of words.
- In the North, there is limited evidence of substitution but there are examples of establishing parallel structures which might lead to substitution in the longer term.

What are the mechanisms established to enhance synergies and opportunities for handover at the end of the RRP?

Written agreements on hand over of project assets

Quarterly and annual reports and interviews with consortia, LGAs, and community members

- The project agreements put out clear guidelines for the handover process.
- Most projects have organized workshops that have been appreciated by partners.
- Some projects where handover plans have not yet been approved by UNDP causing some anxiety and ‘UNDP bashing’ which might be totally unfounded but linked to poor communication.

6.5 Itinerary of Final Evaluation of RRP, Phase I

6.6 Definitions used in the Evaluation for Specific Concepts

In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, the Evaluation has applied following definitions for common concepts used in the Evaluation. The Evaluation recognizes that there are many other definitions that might be valid for other circumstances.

Accessibility

The extent to which different activities and products generated within RRP can be reached / obtained by different stakeholders; e.g. knowledge about the possibilities to participate, location of meetings, etc.

Activity

Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilized to produce specific outputs.
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Acute Malnutrition</strong></th>
<th>Weight for height below normal standards. Also referred to as wasting and generally only refers to children between 6 and 59 months of age.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Advocacy</strong></td>
<td>Any attempt to persuade another side to agree to one’s demands: e.g. communities’ demands to LGAs for providing basic social services or LGAs demand to States to pay salaries for basic social service providers.</td>
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<td><strong>Baseline</strong></td>
<td>The reference situation against which changes can be assessed such as changes and impact resulting from the RRP.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity Development / Building / Strengthening</strong></td>
<td>The process by which individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and countries develop, enhance and organize their systems, resources and knowledge, all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chronic Malnutrition</strong></td>
<td>Height for age below normal standards. Also referred to as stunting and generally only refers to children between 6 and 59 months of age.</td>
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<td><strong>Clusters</strong></td>
<td>Within the RRP, clusters refer to geographical clusters of a certain number of communities.</td>
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<td><strong>Coherence</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which policies of different actors are complementary or contradictory.</td>
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<td><strong>Communication</strong></td>
<td>The process of transmitting information in a way that it will be understood and thus communication goes beyond simple information dissemination. To ensure that the information will be understood any communication should be based on a good knowledge of the context of the target group, in terms of values, priorities, resources, capacities, etc. Communication becomes even more important, and takes on added dimensions when it involves inter-cultural or inter-organizational communication, which is the context for practically all RRP work.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflicts</strong></td>
<td>Incompatible interests between different groups, which can take the form of hostile attitudes or damaging actions. Interests are typically linked to access to resources, power control, identify, and status.</td>
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<td><strong>Conflict Management</strong></td>
<td>Identification and handling of conflicts in a sensible, fair, and efficient manner to prevent them from escalating out of control.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consortium</strong></td>
<td>Consortia is a general concept used for many different forms of collaboration from loose coalitions to strong formal and legal entities. Consortia may be formed on a project basis or on a cause basis. Within RRP the concept refers to a formal collaboration among national and international NGOs formed for the implementation of a specific RRP project and thus with a common goal through common structure and funding.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consultation</strong></td>
<td>A process that finds out what targeted stakeholders think about specific activities, projects, or approaches. Focus groups, questionnaires, and interviews are common consultation techniques.</td>
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<td><strong>Coordination</strong></td>
<td>The process of systematically analyzing a situation, developing relevant information, and informing appropriate command authority of viable alternatives for selection of the most effective combination of available resources to meet specific objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which the intervention’s outputs and outcomes were achieved. Measuring effectiveness means taking the perspectives of the target groups into account. Use of qualitative indicators is critical as they are closer to a number of the changes aimed for, including complex conditions such as food security and livelihood improvements. Moreover, qualitative indicators are closer to the vision of the target groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
<td>A measure of how economically resources / inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into outputs and results. Quantitative indicators are appropriate for most efficiency measures.</td>
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<td><strong>Evaluability</strong></td>
<td>Extent to which an activity or a program can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. Evaluability assessments refer to early reviews of basic parameters to ascertain whether the design of activities / projects / programs properly allows for later evaluations including verifiable outputs and outcomes and applied processes.</td>
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Exit Strategy  A plan describing how the project / program intends to withdraw its support while ensuring that the achievements obtained during the project / program will not be jeopardized and that the development processes initiated will continue. Ideally, an exit strategy should include scenarios to address most likely post-project / program situations.

Food Security  “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (World Food Summit, 1996). Food security consists of four key elements: access, availability, utilization, and stability.

Harmonization  The process through which two or more parties apply consistency in their procedures, rules, and regulations for specific activities.


Government of Southern Sudan  Government administering the 10 states of Southern Sudan.

Government of National Unity of the Republic of Sudan  The federal Government formed subsequent to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Impact  Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. These effects can be economic, socio-cultural, institutional, organizational, political, environmental, technical, or of other types. The Evaluation recognizes that many of the interventions have been launched recently and an objectively verifiable impact assessment can only be made some months or years from now. Still, observations and interviews with the different RRP stakeholders, including village committees, LGAs, and Project and Program staff allow an assessment of likely positive and negative impacts of the Projects and the Program.

Land use conflicts  Disputes and disagreements over access to, control over, and use of natural resources, such as water, forage, forest resources, and arable land.
Livelihood | Combination of the resources used and the activities undertaken in order to live. The resources might consist of individual skills and abilities (human capital), land, savings and equipment (natural, financial and physical capital, respectively) and formal support groups or informal networks that assist in the activities being undertaken.

Malnutrition | Nutritional deficiencies as a result of too few calories in the food intake and / or inadequate food uptake in the body typically because of diarrheal and respiratory diseases, malaria and epidemics such as meningitis.

Needs Assessment | Identification of required interventions to achieve the stated objectives of the program / project based on a comprehensive evaluation of the baseline situation.

Objective | Precise and concrete target of an intervention such as a specific activity, a project, a program, or a policy.

Outcome | The likely effects of different levels of RRP.

Output | The products and services resulting from the completion of activities typically as part of a project or program.

Ownership | The targeted stakeholders such as communities or local government authorities exercise effective leadership over the project and program activities. Ownership is closely linked to effective participation which should allow only to implement activities that have been identified as priorities by the targeted stakeholders.

Participation | Participation is about including targeted stakeholders in decision-making processes, including identifying needs and solutions and be actively involved in project and program design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Common participatory techniques include facilitated community meetings and workshops.

Peace Building | Short-, medium-, and long-term initiatives designed to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid a relapse into violent conflict and to consolidate sustainable peace. Peace building initiatives consist of a range of interrelated activities addressing both causes and consequences of conflicts, including social justice, sustainable peace, and equitable development.
Peace Dividend  The reallocation of public spending from military purposes to peacetime purposes, such as education, health and water and sanitation.

Poverty  There are many different definitions of poverty. In the RRP program and project documents there is no clear definition whether or not it is income poverty or other levels of poverty that are referred to. Considering the focus on provision of basic social services a traditional basic needs definition for poverty could be justified where basic needs are would include two elements: minimum requirements for survival (shelter, food, water, clothing) and essential basic social services (water, sanitation, health, and education). Some project baselines refer to ‘income poverty’. It is supposed that this would refer to computed income and not just monetary income.

Program  The RRP is a program consisting of 10 individual projects.

Project  The RRP consist of 10 projects

Relevance  The extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with stakeholders’ requirements.

Representativeness  The extent to which a certain sample shares characteristics of a larger group; e.g. a household might be representative for a larger group of households sharing the same livelihood system.

Stakeholders  Agencies, organizations, groups, or individuals who have a direct or indirect role and interest in the objectives and implementation of a program or project and its evaluation. In participatory evaluation, stakeholders assume an increased role in the evaluation process as question-makers, evaluation planners, data gatherers, and problem solvers.