Country Led Evaluation of Delivering as One in Rwanda

Final Report

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Acknowledgments

The Evaluation Team wishes to extend thanks to members of the Evaluation Management Group (EMG) for providing independent counsel and review of all elements of this country-led evaluation on a volunteer basis. Under the leadership of the Chair Professor Jean de la Croix Nkurayija and Vice-Chair Diane Karusisi, the feedback of the EMG was at all times pertinent and valuable.

The team also wishes to recognize the staff and management teams of MINECOFIN and the United Nations in Rwanda. The time frame for this assignment was very ambitious due to the need to provide interim findings at the time of the June 2010 One UN Conference in Hanoi in June; within this context, the cooperation and leadership of the government of Rwanda, via MINECOFIN, as well as the cooperation of the UN family was essential and much appreciated. Many government officials and UN staff gave of their valuable time to discuss and provide salient information which contributed to this evaluation. In addition, Phionah Ingabire provided outstanding administrative assistance throughout the evaluation process.

The Evaluation Team would equally like to thank past and present members of the Delivering as One (DaO) Steering Committee for useful contributions at the inception stage and again during the data collection phase of the evaluation.

We would finally like to thank all the development partners and other stakeholders in Rwanda for their participation and kind collaboration during meeting and interviews, field visits and group discussions.
**Executive Summary**

**Background and Scope**

Universalia Management Group was contracted by the Government of Rwanda (GoR) to carry out the independent Country-Led Evaluation (CLE) of the Delivering as One (DaO) Programme in Rwanda. In 2007, Rwanda became one of eight One UN pilot countries. The objective of the reform, as defined in the Delivering as One concept paper, is to improve the impact, coherence, efficiency and positioning of the UN system in Rwanda to enable it to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Vision 2020 objectives.

Rwanda has made impressive efforts in achieving several MDGs. Notable progress has been made in education, gender equality, HIV/AIDS, malaria, water, sanitation and the promotion of environmental sustainability. This progress has been achieved in spite of an extremely challenging political climate that has existed since the 1994 genocide. It has been achieved as a result of political commitment at the highest levels, and the support of international and national development partners for the design and execution of national programs. The government of Rwanda (GoR) plans to effect a transition from growth based on recovery/reconstruction to more sustainable economic growth, and become a middle-income country by 2020.

DaO is implemented under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which is aligned with the government’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) and Vision 2020. The UN system in Rwanda is comprised of 10 UN resident agencies (UNDP, UNICEF WFP, UNFPA, FAO, UNHCR, WHO, UNAIDS, UNECA, UNIFEM), four agencies with in-country representation through UNDP (UNV, UNIDO, UN Habitat and UNCDF) and eight non-resident agencies (IFAD, ILO, UNEP, UNESCO, UNCTAD, ITC, OHCHR, ITU). In addition, the UN Country Team (UNCT) includes two Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and IMF), as well as two non-development agencies (MONUC and ICTR), which are not part of the “One UN” Pilot.

The intention of DaO is to enable the UN system to provide a more effective and coherent response to the needs of the GoR alongside other development partners. The purpose of this country-led evaluation is to inform decision makers on how the role and contribution of the UN system can be enhanced, to support national policies and strategies for the achievement of national development results. The evaluation focused on the effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and sustainability of DaO in Rwanda under the lens of the 5 “ones”: One UN Programme, One Budgetary Framework, One Leader, One Office and One Voice. In this context, the evaluation was undertaken with a view of identifying the key lessons learned and making recommendations for the improvement of the model.

**Limitations**

As with any early stage formative evaluation of an organizational pilot, a number of considerations affected the ability of the evaluation team to carry out the assignment.

The timing of the CLE, which took place prior to the UNDAF mid-term review, had important implications for one of the essential questions of this evaluation, namely: to what extent did DaO contribute to the achievement of results in Rwanda? A mid-term review might have provided a more complete review of programme results at the output or outcome level upon which this DaO evaluation could rely. Instead, the evaluation triangulated the achievement of results as documented in the 2008 and 2009 Annual Reports with interviews of government officials in the key sectors of DaO intervention. Key informant interviews provided useful data on how the UN had improved the processes and operations in comparison to the previous arrangement, thus pointing to greater potential for program effectiveness and efficiency.
Key interviews also provided some clarification in light of the absence of solid benchmarks on which to assess the *ex ante* and the *ex post* conditions of DaO could be assessed. The interviews also proved to be invaluable tools for capturing the *counterfactual* of DaO. Through the sharing of experiences that occurred prior to One UN, it was possible to isolate the effect of the contribution of DaO towards greater development results.

**Evaluation Methodology**

The Country-Led Evaluation began in April 2010. Data collection focused on key document reviews, including the UNDAF, Consolidated Annual Plans and Annual Reports for 2008 and 2009, and interviews with internal and external stakeholders (country representatives, UN staff, ministries, development partners, civil society organizations). An online survey for key UN staff working in programming and operations in Rwanda had a response rate over 60%, and allowed for triangulation of some key findings. Finally, field site missions in Kigali and in seven districts of Rwanda provided evidence of early programmatic results achieved by the GoR and the UN through the DaO pilot.

**Evaluation Findings**

*One Programme*

In two years of programming, the UN made notable contributions to channel national and decentralized capabilities towards key priorities, as outlined in the EDPRS and Vision 2020. UN agencies, through DaO Theme Groups and Task Forces, have been working closely with government and development partners under a One UN programme to deliver trainings and develop capacity, implement programs and processes, support policies and strategies and advocate towards the achievement of the MDGs and in favour of human rights and of the most vulnerable in the country.

Joint interventions, where several UN agencies collaborate for the achievement of greater results, are the testing ground for attaining increased effectiveness by working together. Development results have been occurring in a more coherent manner, with greater complementarity between the UN agencies, based on comparative advantages. DaO has had an overall beneficial effect on programme efficiency as a result of joint planning, which has reduced duplication and improved complementarity in programming. Joint planning, where UN agencies work within the same theme group to develop one consolidated annual plan, has also opened the door for an efficient engagement by the UN task forces. This has led to the deepening of the UN’s commitment towards human rights, gender, and common communication messages. In addition, signs of increased cooperation between agencies have been noted through DaO coordination mechanisms, such as theme groups and task forces.

The evaluation assessed the extent to which the DaO responds to the identified needs of the GoR. The assessment is positive in respect of the action taken by the UN to align to the EDPRS and Vision 2020 and to use these as a springboard for its own planning purposes. The positioning of UN agencies within the programming environment of Rwanda is showing evidence of greater focus on Paris Declaration priority areas. This is evidenced by key upstream support where requested by government, through participation in sector-wide approaches (SWAps) and national policies, while continuing the response to downstream capacity gaps, including during the process of decentralization and to respond to key normative obligations of the UN towards the rights of the people in Rwanda. However, there is still more that needs to be done to fully align with the Rwanda Aid Policy, including clearer financial transparency and aid predictability and lower transaction costs.

The GoR’s commitment towards sustainability is demonstrated by its emphasis on capacity development and knowledge transfer at national and decentralized levels. Within the One Programme, exit strategies for programmes have not yet been fully integrated into planning processes, although the Programme Planning and Oversight Committee (PPOC) has noted and begun to address this oversight in its review of One-UN funded programmes. Regarding the internal sustainability of DaO, it seems that a common
culture has largely been established and entrenched within the UN family, evidenced by stronger collaboration amongst both resident and non-resident agencies.

At this formative stage, only two year into implementation, there are still mixed views on whether the UN efforts have fully met the expectations of the Government with respect to donor harmonization. DaO effectiveness could also benefit from a number of additional improvements such as the development of performance indicators to track DaO progress, a greater attention to financial reporting, and a stronger emphasis on harmonizing monitoring, reporting and evaluation of programme results.

One Budget

Outside of the One Programme, the centerpiece for DaO’s donor engagement has been the One-UN Fund. Currently, a number of donors, including the Netherlands, SIDA, Spain, and DFID contribute to the One-Fund. At the planning stage, the PPOC oversees One-Fund allocations across the thematic groups. One-Fund allocation has also been designed to respond to EDPRS priorities and, in 2010, 80% of funds would be used to promote joint interventions between two or more UN agencies, thereby furthering the spirit of DaO. In summary, the One-Fund in Rwanda has evolved since 2008 to be more responsive to the development priorities of the country, while working to ensure faster utilisation of funds.

At the implementation phase, slow allocations and fund transactions from the One-Fund to the respective implementing agencies have hampered overall programme delivery by government and development partners.

One Office

It is likely that a One-UN house in Rwanda will only be fully operational in the next DaO programme cycle. However, a number of shared services and common support units are in place. At the time of the evaluation, the calculation of cost savings resulting from the shared support services of the UN was not completed. The Operations Management Team (OMT) has therefore started identifying a number of areas where an increase in operational efficiencies and cost-cutting can be beneficial across agencies. Since 2010, collection of data on these areas has slowly begun, including: sharing of cleaning and security services, telephone (landline and mobile) and internet services, shared travel agency and the development of common suppliers across agencies.

One Leader

An important factor that has helped increase DaO effectiveness and efficiency is the strong level of commitment towards the UN “delivering as one” in Rwanda. Under the leadership of the GoR and the Resident Coordinator (RC), this “buy-in” has occurred at all levels of government as well as amongst UN staff and development partners. The RC, as co-chair of the Development Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) has been instrumental in promoting the interests of all the UN agencies through regular dialogue throughout the year with development partners on such key issues as donor harmonisation and the “Division of Labor.”

One Voice

The Communications Group has succeeded in carving out a clear niche within the DaO framework, both in terms of communicating for development results and for communicating about DaO across the UN and amongst development partners in Rwanda. The Communications Group is the clearest example of economies of scale – where the UN agencies can achieve much more collectively, in terms of messaging, advocacy, media penetration and training and capacity development, than what could be achieved by each agency individually.
Summary

The following dashboard summarizes the results of scoring based upon a number of performance criteria. The scoring provided was from 1-4, with 1 = Poor, 2 = Moderate, 3 = Good, and 4 = Excellent. The detailed performance measures for this Dashboard can be found in Volume II, Appendix VII.

Exhibit 1.1 Four Point Assessment of the Pillars of DaO

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
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<td>Good</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Good</td>
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<td>Good</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Good</td>
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<td>One Leader</td>
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<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
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<tr>
<td>One Office</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Good</td>
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<tr>
<td>One Voice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Recommendations

The UN agencies, both in Rwanda and at Headquarters, and the Government of Rwanda should continue to encourage an environment for piloting and innovation in programming and operations. Alongside innovation and piloting comes the necessity to foster the learning that is often implicit in strategic intent of joint interventions. Synergistic mechanisms for improved monitoring and independent assessments of pilots should be developed; these may include engaging the University and research community and favouring more partnerships with civil society, the private sector and other DPs.

A reinvigorated UNCT and RC should work to strengthen and systematize a DaO Performance Measurement Framework. This area of strengthening is linked to the work of the RC and UNCT in managing and leading change within the DaO environment. First of all, RC and the UNCT may wish to internalize a number of performance criteria outlined within DPAF, and so more directly link its own performance with the indicators selected by the GoR. This would further align DaO performance with other DPs and more broadly link to the Paris Declaration objectives. Secondly, an up-to-date performance assessment framework with Key Performance indicators should be a greater focus within the RCO and in UNCT meetings.

One Programme

The UNCT in Rwanda should engage in a process during the MTR about how to clarify what appear to be some ambiguities and difficulties with regard to longer-term monitoring and evaluation of the UNDAF. While there is coherence between UNDAF outcomes and the outcomes defined in the EDPRS as well as the baselines used, unlike the EDPRS, the UNDAF matrices do not contain targets for 2012. The mid-term review period in 2010 may be the opportune moment to plan for a review of 2012 targets of the effects of the activities and outputs produced under the DaO framework. Related with this area of strengthening is the need for government and DaO to test in a formative way whether activities are spread too thinly across thematic sectors and result areas to demonstrate clear results and causality.

The Monitoring and Evaluation calendar contained in the UNDAF Annex 3 should be reviewed and updated to reflect the key studies, surveys and evaluations being carried out by the One UN family. This should be shared widely.

It would benefit the UNCT, the Government of Rwanda and Development Partners to be more actively engaged in the measuring and testing of outcomes of pilots and joint interventions. Pilots must undergo rigorous monitoring and solid evaluation in order to demonstrate effectiveness and potential for
scalability. Therefore, the UN and government should collaborate to make a more clear distinction of the pilot interventions and joint interventions within the UNDAF that have been reviewed and hold early potential for scaling up, and of others reviewed that are seen as unsuccessful and why.

The UN in Rwanda should develop a more formalized means of coordination across the network of multi-lateral actors, CSOs and the private sector with the view to the eventual promulgation of more common and harmonized approaches. As SWAp and budget support grows in importance as a key issue for development cooperation, it would appear sensible that the UN develop a more strategic understanding with the multilaterals, thus promoting a greater degree of harmonization between DaO and the Bretton Woods organizations. The importance of harmonization, not only in relation to the adherence to the Paris Declaration but in a more practical sense on the ground, is likely to increase synergies and strengthen the possibility for long-term partnerships. In a similar vein, partnerships with CSOs and the private sector should be shared across agencies.

The RC and UNCT should work with government and other DPs to establish modalities for capacity building and exit strategies for Rwanda There are few discussions of an exit strategy within the current DaO programming environment, yet it is a vital part of the aid landscape. The UN Team should develop better mechanisms to review capacity building in Rwanda, develop standardized costs, and evaluate in which circumstances an exit strategy is most appropriate, keeping in mind the normative role of the UN as well as the rights-based programming of UN agencies.

In its next programming framework, the UN Team in Rwanda should define sustainability strategies. These should include exit strategies, identification of risks and mitigation strategies to achieve sustainable results, and more sustainable approaches to capacity development.

The UN in Rwanda has a multi-faceted role in the Rwanda and will be challenged in the through the Division of Labor to clarify its niche – i.e., the role(s) in which it has greatest comparative advantage. Given the wide and diverse role of the individual agencies within the UN family, reducing roles and sectors is not always possible. However, DaO should be viewed is an opportunity: DaO acts as an internal division of labor, whereby via Theme Groups, individual agencies take the lead on some engagements with government, while others support the lead agency.

### One Budgetary Framework

The RCO and UNCT need to develop a common framework across result areas for quarterly financial reporting and better sharing of results with DPs and government. ROs and Agency Headquarters have an important role to play in harmonizing systems to facilitate common financial reporting.

Challenges for DaO are the quantity and quality of reporting on results as well as on financial disbursements. This recommendation is predicated on the GoR’s need for greater transparency on the progress of programme and activity results and financial disbursements throughout the year.

Moving in line with the Rwanda Aid Policy, which fundamentally is aligned with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, is part and parcel of the strategic intent of DaO. And the challenge for individual agencies as well as the entire UN is significant due to their different mandates, various types of budgeting, technical support or in-kind support mechanisms, and the scope for additional vertical funds that can be raised throughout the year, further confounding predictability and transparency. These are the challenges that require a re-think, both on the part of the GoR as well as UN agencies and the ROs and HQs.

The UNCT needs to take a leadership role in promoting financial transparency and accountability through the DPAF and CPAF. At present and given the emerging financial reporting systems being in Rwanda, the UN has been present in promoting aid effectiveness through engagements with MINECOFIN. There is therefore a need for DaO to take a more aggressive role in promoting the aid effectiveness agenda, including reporting of project disbursements and in support of the DPAF or similar reporting structures.
One Leader

UNDG and individual UN agencies must continue to empower and embolden the RC as well as Heads of Agencies in Rwanda with improved services, greater functionality and faster response times for pilot UN countries.

As with any pilot, the One UN pilot experience has provided lessons learned for future adjustment. It is clear that in the case of the One UN pilot countries, organizational change requires strong leadership and commitment on the part of the resident government as well as on the part of the RC and the Heads of Agencies. Organizational change, as shown through the One UN pilot, also requires necessary support mechanisms, incentives and checks and balances. IT systems, recruitment policies, transport procedures and agency reporting structures are well cited examples where further harmonization can have significant benefits.

One Office

Joint monitoring missions (between UN agencies in Rwanda, at regional level and at HQ level, and with government) should be favoured at all times in Rwanda. At the RO and HQ level, joint missions to Rwanda should become the norm, with measurable targets and experience sharing, so that the learning value of such missions can be captured and shared through UNDG.

The UNCT and the Steering Committee may wish to place a greater focus on reducing transaction costs, even in the current One Office environment in Rwanda. DaO has focused a great deal on the processes and systems around joint programming in Rwanda, including a number of innovative systems and processes for which the UN team is rightfully proud. A heightened focus on transaction cost reduction would greatly solidify the position of DaO from the point of view of efficiency and the perception of the UN as a multilateral organization at the forefront of change management towards greater streamlining.

It is strongly suggested that UNCT, via the Operations Management Team, fully develop and implement a plan on how it will reduce transaction costs in the coming two years to 2012. In that effort, it may be useful to have a short assessment of achievements on cost savings since 2008. It would also be useful to have a prioritization of where efficiency gains can most easily be made in the One UN office environment of Rwanda. This is already underway in 2010 by the OMT.

Overall Recommendations

Recommendation 1:The UN agencies, both in Rwanda and at Headquarters, and the Government of Rwanda should continue to encourage an environment for piloting and innovation in programming and operations

Recommendation 2:A reinvigorated UNCT and RC should work to strengthen and systematize a DaO Performance Measurement Framework.

One Programme

Recommendation 3:The UNCT in Rwanda should engage in a process during the MTR about how to clarify what appear to be some ambiguities and difficulties with regard to longer-term monitoring and evaluation of the UNDAF.

Recommendation 4:It would benefit the UNCT, the Government of Rwanda and Development Partners to be more actively engaged in the measuring and testing of outcomes of pilots and joint interventions.
Recommendation 5: The UN in Rwanda should develop a more formalized means of coordination across the network of multi-lateral actors, CSOs and the private sector with the view to the eventual promulgation of more common and harmonized approaches.

Recommendation 6: The RC and UNCT should work with government and other DPs to establish modalities for capacity building and exit strategies for Rwanda.

Recommendation 7: The UN in Rwanda has a multi-faceted role in the Rwanda and will be challenged in the through the Division of Labor to clarify its niche – i.e., the role(s) in which it has greatest comparative advantage.

One Budgetary Framework

Recommendation 8: The RCO and UNCT need to develop a common framework across result areas for quarterly reporting and better sharing of results with DPs and government. ROs and Agency Headquarters have an important role to play in harmonizing systems to facilitate common financial reporting.

Recommendation 9: The UNCT needs to take a leadership role in promoting financial transparency and accountability through the DPAF and CPAF.

One Leader

Recommendation 10: UNDG and individual UN agencies must continue to empower and embolden the RC as well as Heads of Agencies in Rwanda with improved services, greater functionality and faster response times for pilot UN countries.

One Office

Recommendation 11: Joint monitoring missions (between UN agencies in Rwanda, at regional level and at HQ level, and with government) should be favoured at all times in Rwanda.

Recommendation 12: The UNCT and the Steering Committee may wish to place a greater focus on reducing transaction costs, even in the current One Office environment in Rwanda.

Recommendation 13: It is strongly suggested that UNCT, via the Operations Management Team, fully develop and implement a plan on how it will reduce transaction costs in the coming two years to 2012.
# Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Annual Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<td>CLE</td>
<td>Country Led Evaluation</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Common Coordinating Mechanisms</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>COD</td>
<td>Common Operational Document</td>
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<td>Common Performance Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>DaO</td>
<td>Delivering as One</td>
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<td>Long term Agreement</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
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# Acronyms

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<td>Sector Wide Approach</td>
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<td>TCPR</td>
<td>Triennial Comprehensive Programme Review</td>
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<td>Theme group</td>
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### Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for the refugees</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
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1. Introduction

Universalia is pleased to submit this Final Report for the Country-Led Evaluation of the Delivering as One (DaO) Programme in Rwanda. The report is divided into two volumes: Volume I provides the narrative of the key findings and recommendations emerging from the data collection that took place from April 19th to June 30th, 2010. The bulk of this data collection took place in Rwanda, with additional phone interviews carried out from Universalia’s offices in Montreal. Volume II is a set of appendices and annexes to the main report; it contains the Terms of Reference (ToR) for this assignment, detailed United Nations (UN) staff survey results and a list of people met as well as documents consulted.

The UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) outlined a three-stage process¹ for evaluating the DaO pilots as follows:

1. Assessment of the “evaluability” of DaO, to provide the basis for the second and third stages. This was conducted by the UN Development Group (UNDG) and completed in March 2008;
2. A country-led evaluation (CLE) of the DaO;
3. An independent evaluation of the results and impacts of the pilots.

The current country-led evaluation is the second stage of the evaluation process and it intends to inform decision makers on how to enhance the role and contribution of the UN system in support of national policies and strategies to achieve national development results, specifically in Rwanda towards the achievement of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) targets and Vision 2020 goals. Within this context, the evaluation also assessed the progress made against the strategic intent of the DaO and identified areas for improvements and remaining challenges. The evaluation provides evidence on the relevance², effectiveness³, efficiency⁴ and sustainability⁵ of the DaO in Rwanda.

---

¹ See full Terms of Reference in Volume II.
² Relevance: ‘The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies. The question of relevance becomes a question as to whether the objectives and design of DaO are appropriate given circumstances in Rwanda.” Source: OECD Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management
³ Effectiveness: ‘The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. Also used as an aggregate measure of (or judgment about) the merit or worth of an activity, i.e. the extent to which an intervention has attained, or is expected to attain, its major relevant objectives efficiently in a sustainable fashion and with a positive institutional development impact.” Source: OECD Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management
⁴ Efficiency: ‘A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.” Source: OECD Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management
⁵ There are two dimensions worthy of consideration under the heading of sustainability: the first is the sustainability of the results of DaO in Rwanda. This assesses the ways in which long-term capacity is being developed within the country, both of government and of the multitude of other actors within the country – civil society, private sector, communities, families and so on. Within a human rights approach, these would be considered duty bearers – and by including them in the processes of development as well as focusing on them in activities, DaO can achieve sustainable results. The second dimension of the term relates to the ability of the UN organization itself to entrench the systems and processes of DaO, thus making One UN sustainable in the long run. At the country level, this necessitates diverse funding sources and a continued source of funds for the One Fund. It also implies that the UN continues to be relevant within the country, given the changing nature of the development landscape.
The specific objectives of the country-led evaluation are to:

- Assess overall progress in alignment of the DaO to Rwanda’s development agenda, specifically the EDPRS and the Vision 2020, as well as cross-cutting issues including gender equality and human rights;
- Determine progress made against achieving the strategic intent of DaO, and assess to what extent the UN work under the DaO is perceived as relevant, coherent and effective;
- Assess overall implementation of the “One Programme”, “One Budgetary Framework”, “One Leader”, “One Office”, “One Voice” and document best practices as well as challenges;
- Assess the effectiveness of other DaO managing bodies (Steering Committee, Theme groups, United Nations Country Team (UNCT), etc.) and identify key lessons learnt and recommendations;
- Assess harmonization and alignment of the One UN programme with the Paris Declaration principles, which forms the basis of national aid coordination and management and aims at improving the overall effectiveness of development cooperation in Rwanda;
- Assess DaO partnerships with other key stakeholders including civil society organizations and the private sector; and
- Assess the predictability and effectiveness of financial resources mobilized through the One UN budget framework and their alignment to GoR (GoR) systems.

Its scope covers the period 2006-2009, focusing on implementation of the Common Operational Document (COD) from January 2008 to December 2009 as compared to UN programmes implementation from 2006 to 2007.

Volume I of the Final Report is organized as follow:

- Section 1 & 2 – Introduction: presents objectives of the evaluation as well as the content of the Final Report and Background on Rwanda and DaO;
- Section 3 – Evaluation Methodology: provides an updated methodology and evaluation matrix for the assignment, including indicators and data collection and data analysis methods to be used;
- Section 4 – Key Findings and Message: presents key findings from data collected through interviews and documents review;
- Section 5 – Outlines Recommendations for DaO in Rwanda;

Volume II of the Final Report contains the following:

- A complete set of survey results from the UN Country Team survey on DaO;
- The Evaluation Matrix used for the assignment and the agreed upon Terms of Reference;
- A list of people met and projects reviewed;
- The list of UN Contributions to Sector Working Groups and Upstream Policy Activities.
2. Methodology for Data Collection

Given the mix of stakeholders for the evaluation, our approach provided a mixture of qualitative and survey data collection, with attention both to forward-looking, improvement-oriented questions and to assessment of results. UNEG standards were followed throughout the process. The key data sources for this evaluation are listed below: The evaluation was based on an Evaluation Matrix, approved by the Evaluation Management Committee, which outlined the evaluation questions and included data collection methodologies, data sources, and key respondents. The data collected was primarily qualitative and was triangulated to validate data from more than one source. The methodology for data collection consisted of document review, interviews, and survey and site visits.

- The document review consisted primarily of a review of: a) background documentation, b) presentations, correspondence and meetings, c) donor-specific documents, and d) external reports and assessments. A list of the documents reviewed can be found in Volume II.

- Semi-structured interviews and small group meetings: Interviews with internal and external stakeholders were carried out with head of agencies, UN staff, Ministries, Development Partners (DPs), and Civil Society Organizations (CSO) using open-ended, semi-structured interview protocols. Focus Groups were conducted with theme groups, task forces, Operations Management Team (OMT), Programme Planning and Oversight Committee (PPOC), and GoR staff.

- Survey: An electronic survey of UN staff was conducted, with 118 out of 185 relevant staff members responding, focused on those who work in management, programming and operations, submitting the survey for a response rate of 63.8%. The survey helped elucidate some of the benefits as well as challenges of the One UN system, encompassing the key evaluation questions contained in the Evaluation Matrix. The survey also included the effectiveness and utility of processes and systems in place internally, as well as perceptions of internal coordination thanks to DaO.

- Site Visits: A number of activities were visited in different parts of the country both outside of and within Kigali in order to see the UN DaO in action in Rwanda. A total of seven districts were covered, including Muhanga, Bugesera, Bicumbi, Musanze, Kicukiro, Nyarugenge and Gasabo.

2.1 The Timeline of this Report

Work for this evaluation commenced in late April 2010. The inception report was submitted on May 4th, 2010. This report was presented to the EMG on May 13, 2010, for comments and suggestions. Due to time constraints, the data collection component was carried out immediately following the inception phase of the assignment. The inception report was also submitted to the UNEG for review and comments, and shared with the EMG for perspectives on useful ways forward.

The interim report was submitted on June 7 with an overview of findings roughly six weeks into the startup of the evaluation process. It was developed in order to promote a timely discussion between the Evaluation Team, the EMG and the GoR prior to their scheduled June 14-16, 2010, meeting in Hanoi. The interim report was presented to the EMG on June 8, 2010.

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6 UNEG, Standards for Evaluation in the UN system, April 2005
The completed timeline is presented below:

**Exhibit 2.1 CLE Evaluation Rwanda - Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Inception Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submission of Inception Report</td>
<td>May 4, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of Inception Report and Stakeholder Workshop</td>
<td>May 13, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of Interim Report to EMG</td>
<td>June 7, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of Interim Report to EMG and GoR</td>
<td>June 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt of comments re: Interim Report</td>
<td>June 8-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanoi Meeting</td>
<td>June 14-18, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of Draft Final Report (full narrative)</td>
<td>July 5th, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of Final Report</td>
<td>October, 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.2 Limitations

As with any early stage formative evaluation of an organizational pilot, a number of considerations affected the ability of the evaluation team to carry out the assignment.

The timing of the CLE, which led to the evaluation taking place prior to the UNDAF mid-term review, had important implications for one of the essential questions of this evaluation: to what extent did DaO contribute to the achievement of results in Rwanda. Without the mid-term review completed, there lacked a more complete review of programme results at the output or outcome level upon which this DaO evaluation could rely.

Linked to the above, but also to the formative nature of such an evaluation, it is difficult to review outcomes, or in other words, the effects of the activities and outputs carried out with government and other partners, at such an early stage of a new programming environment. Only two full years have passed since the first programming year for DaO. In many cases outputs have been relatively recently completed and are only beginning to bear the fruit of wider development effects. In Universalia’s review of similar organizational pilots, initiatives or trust funds, the first years of new programming environments are often fraught with slow implementation and higher transaction costs than would otherwise be expected in the medium to long term. This leads to further delays in producing demonstrable results beyond deliverables or, in other words, results beyond the output level.

To resolve both of these issues, the evaluation triangulated the achievement of results as documented in the 2008 and 2009 Annual Reports with interviews of government officials in the key sectors of DaO intervention. Additionally, the key informant interviews provided useful data in terms of how the UN had improved processes and operations compared to the previous arrangement, thus pointing to greater potential for programmatic effectiveness and efficiency. Key informant interviews provide clarification and give context despite limitations created by the absence of solid benchmarks on which to assess the *ex ante* and the *ex post* conditions of DaO, as well as capturing the counterfactual in order to isolate the contribution of DaO towards greater development results. The CLE of the eight UN pilots compared to other existing UN models will provide further data for analysis in this regard.

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7 Contribution Analysis is a contemporary evaluation methodology first developed by Dr. John Mayne, formerly of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. It recognises that in most instances the developmental impacts of long term commitments are influenced by a number of interventions. Contribution Analysis allows for the development...
The CLE ToRs proposed a scoring of DaO’s contribution to UNDAF by the six UNDAF result areas, encompassing the progress made by each result area since the implementation of DaO. At this early stage of evaluation, little data was available to clearly distinguish one result area clearly from another, in terms of uptake of DaO principles and concomitant contribution towards greater achievement of results. Due to these constraints, a comparative assessment between TG was not made, but rather lessons and constraints for each TG are presented throughout the evaluation.

An electronic survey was carried out with UN staff, however, it was not viewed as feasible for government partners within the short timeframe of this evaluation, due to high turnover in government, and limited availability for such a survey due to the decentralization process. An early focus group meeting with technical government officials as well as targeted key informant interviews with senior government officials assured a sufficient government representation throughout the evaluation.
3. Background

3.1 Rwanda Background

Rwanda has made impressive efforts at achieving several Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); this progress has been due to political commitment at the highest level, and international support for well designed and executed national scale programs. Progress can be noted in education; gender equality; combating HIV/AIDS and malaria; sanitation; and promoting environmental sustainability. According to recent reports, MDGs related to education, gender equality, HIV and malaria and water and sanitation may be achieved by 2015. The MDG Report for Rwanda due out in 2010 will further confirm progress in these key development areas. It is important to note that these achievements have come despite the challenging post-genocide political environment with which Rwanda has been confronted.

High poverty and malnutrition as well as insufficient progress on child and maternal mortality measured just past the midway point to 2015 place MDGs 1, 4 and 5 at greater risk of not being achieved. Rwanda is Africa’s most densely populated country; with up to 467 people per square kilometre and a population of 10 million. While the poverty rate has dropped remarkably, from 70 per cent in 1994 to 57 per cent in 2006, a large proportion of this agrarian-based society still lives in dire conditions. Child and maternal mortality rates have fallen, but not fast enough. Ensuring access to safe drinking water is another challenge, due to poor infrastructure and an increase in demand.

The government has launched a major effort to scale up MDG interventions through the Vision 2020 Umurenge Program. This ‘Vision 2020’ incorporates six pillars: ensuring good governance; creating a knowledge-based society through human resource development; enabling a private sector-led economy; enhancing infrastructure; modernizing the agricultural sector; and achieving regional and international economic integration. Rwanda needs to continue to strengthen its capacity to deliver the necessary services and attract financing for scaling up. The government has put the Millennium Development Goals at the centre of its policy framework. The government plans to transition from growth based on recovery/reconstruction to more sustainable economic growth, and to become a middle-income country by 2020.

Reducing aid dependence is a key objective of Vision 2020. As part of implementation efforts, the government developed a five-year Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) with clear development priorities, called the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 2008-2012). The UN provided technical support to the development of the EDPRS, and also considered the assessment phase of the EDPRS to be aligned with the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA), thus incorporating the government led process as part of its own.

3.2 One UN

In the outcome document adopted at the 2005 World Summit in New York, global leaders called for stronger system-wide coherence across the various development-related agencies, funds and programmes of the UN.

In addition to supporting ongoing reforms aimed at building a more effective and coherent UN country presence, the document invited the Secretary-General to “…strengthen the management and coordination of the UN operational activities”. The UN was also asked to maximize its contribution to achieving internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs. The need for proposals for “more tightly managed entities” in the field of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment was also stressed.

*At the time of this evaluation, the 2010 MDG Report for Rwanda was under final review and not available.*
Consequently, the Secretary-General established a High-level Panel to explore how the UN system could work more coherently and effectively across the world in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment. The High-level Panel produced a report\(^9\) that outlined a set of recommendations based on five strategic directions:

1) Ensure coherence and consolidation of UN activities, in line with the principles of country ownership, at all levels (country, regional, headquarters);

2) Establish appropriate governance, managerial and funding mechanisms to empower and support consolidation, and link the performance and results of UN organizations to their funding;

3) Overhaul business practices of the UN system to ensure a focus on outcomes, responsiveness to needs and the delivery of results as measured in advancing the MDGs;

4) Ensure significant further opportunities for consolidation and effective delivery of “One UN” through an in-depth review; and,

5) Undertake urgent but well-planned implementation for permanent and effective change.

It was also recommended that the UN should deliver as one by establishing, by 2007, a number of One Country Programmes as pilots, the number of which, subject to continuous assessment, demonstrated effectiveness and proven results, would be expanded over time. By February 2007, eight countries\(^10\) had volunteered to participate in the One UN pilot, with the broad objective to improve the UN’s impact, coherence and efficiency, as well as to generate lessons for the future.

At the request of its government, at the beginning of 2007, Rwanda became one of the eight pilot countries for Delivering as One UN. 2007 was a year of preparation of the five pillars central to the reform: One UN Programme, One Budgetary Framework, One Leader, One Office and One Voice. 2008 was the first year the DaO was implemented in Rwanda.


\(^10\) The others are Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uruguay and Vietnam.
4. One Programme

The GoR and the United Nations System\textsuperscript{11} entered into a programming agreement and partnership by way of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which sets out the sectors of intervention as well as the planned results for the life of the programme. Through this partnership, the government and the UN seek to respond to the development vision, goals and aspirations of the people of Rwanda, as expressed in the two key planning documents: Vision 2020 and the EDPRS 2008-2012. This five-year partnership between the UN and the GoR, as expressed in these documents, began on January 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2008, and will end on December 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2012. This places the UNDAF programme cycle within the same programmatic cycle as the EDPRS.

The main government partner to the UN is the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), which provides overall coordination between the UN and the government ministries and agencies. Government ministries are key partners in the activities planned in the UNDAF, as are a number of the decentralized government entities, government’s arms-length agencies, relevant NGOs, and civil society partners. The UN-GoR partnerships further extends to bilateral and multi-lateral donors who – like the UN – are organized around the EDPRS and Vision 2020 to ensure harmonization and alignment of development efforts.

The Common Operational Document (COD) operationalizes the UNDAF using its situation analysis, strategies, outcomes and outputs. The COD is the agreement of the key activities to be undertaken during the five year period to fulfil the UNDAF results in addition to the operational modalities, including financial, technical or material support, and governing the relationship between the Government and the UN.

The operationalization of the UNDAF is organized around these six results areas:

1. Governance
2. a HIV
2. b Health
3. Education
4. Environment
5. Social policy, economic growth

Programme coordination within the UN agencies is carried out through the implementation of a number of central coordination mechanisms, including Theme Groups (TG) and Task Forces, as shown in Exhibit 4.1. These mechanisms ensure coordination of the UNDAF programmes, and have become central to the application for and allocation of the One UN Fund. Each results area has a Theme Group comprising of the relevant UN agencies with activities for that theme. Each Theme Group is responsible for overseeing the results of the relevant UNDAF outcomes. This responsibility includes: (i) policy dialogue with government; (ii) advising the UNCT on the allocation of the One Fund within the particular Theme; (iii) monitoring and overseeing both programme and financial delivery; and (iv) programme results. For each outcome area there is a Responsible Agency, which is responsible for coordinating the preparation of

\textsuperscript{11} The UN system in Rwanda comprises 10 resident agencies (UNDP, UNICEF WFP, UNFPA, FAO, UNHCR, WHO, UNAIDS, UNECA, UNIFEM), four agencies with in-country representation through UNDP (UNV, UNIDO, UN Habitat and UNCDF) and eight non-resident agencies (IFAD, ILO, UNEP, UNESCO, UNCTAD, ITC. OHCHR, ITU). IFAD, ILO and OHCHR are non-resident agencies with in-country representation. In addition, the UN Country Team (UNCT) is comprised of two Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and IMF), as well as two non-development agencies (MONUC and ICTR), which are not part of the “One UN” Pilot.
work plans by participating UN agencies, and for consolidating reports on progress. Each Theme Group has an Annual Plan, which will be a consolidation of agency work plans in relation to that theme. This will be used for One Fund allocation within the theme and monitoring of progress. Each Agency also maintains its Annual Work Plan with its National Implementing Partner, as existed prior to 2008.

Oversight of the entire DaO programme is assured through a Steering Committee, chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. The Steering Committee provides strategic direction on the priorities (results areas, themes and priorities within it). The Steering Committee includes 4 UN Agencies (representing the UNCT) and 3 donors (representing all donors).

A salient feature of the UN theme groups is the extension of coordination mechanisms beyond purely operational and programmatic features to include policy guidance. Therefore, each UNDAF Theme Group recruited one or two international policy advisors, with the rationale to strengthen the UN in Rwanda in order to produce a solid analytical assessment of the strategic challenges in each sector in order to produce a programme truly geared towards the attainment of strategic development objectives. The policy advisors are responsible for providing analytical support for decisions taken by the UNCT and to coordinate the participation of UN technicians in policy discussions to ensure that the UN speaks with one voice on key policy issues.

### Exhibit 4.1 UN DaO Coordination Mechanisms

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<th>Entity</th>
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<td>RC</td>
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### 4.1 Effectiveness

Has the DaO process led to improved effectiveness of UN programming and support to the GoR?

Typically, the effectiveness of a program is examined in the context of its objectives. Key to this analysis is the assessment of the nature and impact of the contribution that the UN has made in Rwanda, and the analysis of the areas where its contributions may have greater effects than previously achieved. The achievement of GoR-UN development results as outlined in the UNDAF is, therefore, the first level of programmatic effectiveness for DaO. Therefore, the analysis focuses as much as possible on the evidence of DaO making a contribution to the stated results, relying on what was shared in interviews, surveys, documentation, and during field visits.

A second level of effectiveness covers process, notably the systems and operational practices put into place through DaO which will facilitate the achievement of development results in the future. In the early stages of a new arrangement such as DaO in Rwanda, it is these processes which are more readily visible and measureable.

**Finding 1:** Over the past two years, UN DaO’s focus on results by Theme Group has made some notable contributions to enhance programme effectiveness towards development results in Rwanda.

Multi-agency collaboration in planning and implementing has led to a number of development results that encompass the expertise and inputs of several agencies, thus expanding the potential benefit to Rwandans.

The centerpiece of DaO programming in Rwanda has been a number of joint interventions that have received funds from the One UN fund and are intended to show greater effectiveness by focusing geographically or among a specific population. Joint interventions are generally those where two or more agencies work collectively towards a similar outcome within a similar geographic region or focus area.

They are also characterized by a common Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) framework and more detailed monitoring from several agencies. In this way, they act as “pilots” or showcases to see if greater results can be achieved by the synergies of the respective agencies working with government. Those with greatest impact can then be used as showpieces for additional support.
The survey results respondents cited “Joint Programming” as one of the “greatest successes or innovations of the DaO thus far”. The use of “Joint Interventions” to closely monitor and eventually showcase some of the early developmental results of the One-UN is fundamentally important for DaO to succeed, as it will show that DaO can leverage the comparative advantages and expertise of agencies to show that the pilot is working for greater development results.

One joint intervention that was visited by the evaluators during the assessment period was a primary school intervention by three UN agencies in Bugesera District. In this district, the Ministry of Education teamed up with the UN to provide schools that were child friendly and also provided school gardens and nutrition programmes, both for the students in terms of school feeding, but also for the parents in terms of training on nutrition. In our review of this primary school intervention in Bugesera, our interviews at the school and in the community confirmed that the intervention had real benefits for the local community as well as for the students themselves; early outcomes in favour of higher student attendance are positive as are the nutritional benefits to the families.

Another joint intervention focuses on gender-based violence (GBV). The GoR addresses GBV as a security issue under the mandate of the police. A GBV desk was created at National Police headquarters in Kigali, with support from several UN agencies. Indications from our discussions with stakeholders suggest that GBV is being treated with greater care than was previously the case, pointing to some institutional and behavioural changes. Exhibit 4.2 shows additional joint interventions that have been developed in 2010. These joint interventions cover both upstream and downstream interventions.

At this early stage, it appears that development results are greater than those prior to DaO due to a collective focus on results (outputs and outcomes) at the planning stage. This view was shared by government officials familiar with the CAPs. In addition, survey results point to a similar conclusion: 87% and 80% of respondents agreed that UNDAF theme groups are useful in enabling joint planning and implementation respectively. The survey also suggests that 80% of UN staff feel that under DaO “my own agency is a stronger partner to the Rwandan Government”.

### Exhibit 4.2 2010 Joint Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result Area</th>
<th>Joint Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>DevInfo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to Justice for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agaseke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E Support to MINECOFIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/Aids</td>
<td>Diversification of condom distribution (techniques: CCP Dispensing Machines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Towards an HIV Free Generation: The National PMTCT Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Population and Nutrition</td>
<td>Malnutrition: Ensuring continued support to tackle acute malnutrition in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutual Health: Support mutual health insurance reforms for a more equitable and sustainable system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maternal Health: Saving mothers and newborn lives in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Quality of Basic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School Health Package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teacher Training and Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring Learning Achievements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Albertine Rift Centre of Excellence for biodiversity and natural resources management in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda Resource Efficient and Cleaner Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mainstreaming Regional Integration processes for optimal results in environment protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Finding 2:** Theme groups and task forces have enhanced cooperation among individual agencies to improve both operational and development effectiveness and coordination on policy and technical issues.

The planning activities inherent in the role of TGs have led to greater harmonization within the United Nations agencies. There is widespread agreement on improved coordination and a greater focus on results across the five result areas outlined through the UNDAF, which are expected to lead to greater development results over time.

As theme groups are led by policy advisors, influence of TGs has extended beyond planning and implementing activities to providing know-how and technical inputs for the entire organization in their area of expertise. For example, the Environment Theme Group has offered a number of expert services in environmental issues to all UN staff, as well as to government.

Thus, the policy and technical reach of programme staff within the theme groups is enhanced. Another coordination mechanism, the establishment of task forces, has similarly strengthened the inclusion of cross-cutting issues within development results in the key areas of gender, M&E, and human rights and communication through the UN Communications Group (UNCG), and has added policy and technical value to a number of initiatives:

**UNDAF Theme groups are central to the planning, monitoring and evaluation of the CAPs. The UNDAF Theme groups, co-chaired by two agencies, have increasingly taken up their role during the implementation of the first year. However there is still a considerable difference in the quality between the UNDAF Theme groups and the level to which they have taken up their role as principal instruments through which the UN provides policy and advisory services to the Government. Cross-fertilization between the different UNDAF Theme groups was therefore encouraged and best practices from One UNDAF Theme group will be used in other UNDAF Theme groups. (2008 One UN Report)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross Cutting areas</th>
<th>Examples of Contributions to Better Development results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender Task Force</td>
<td>Carried out a participatory gender audit (PGA) with the aim to promote organizational learning and implementation of gender mainstreaming in policies and programmes and to assess progress made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provided advice and gender review of HIV/AIDS National Plan of Action at the request of UNAIDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E task force</td>
<td>Reviews all the CAPS before they are finalized to see that results are SMART and point to clear development results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data collection for end-of-year reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E training throughout the UN and extending to government partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Task force</td>
<td>Reviews all the CAPS before they are finalized to mainstream HRAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trains in Human Rights for the judiciary, Parliament, youth and CSOs and UN staff under the DaO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supports training of 100 CSOs and national partners on HIV and human rights and partnership with the East Africa Law society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cross Cutting areas | Examples of Contributions to Better Development results
---|---
Communication Group | Trains government, the media and civil society in areas such as Communications for Development, media relations and web publishing; Identified 12 flagship projects for advocacy kit with snapshots along the UNDAF themes developed. Carry out joint media relations in order to leverage media coverage for the UN as a system Trained 25 editors in international editorial practices, elections coverage, professional ethics and media law. 10 radio presenters were trained in human rights and peace-building reporting.

Has DAO led to improved effectiveness of UN systems and processes to be a better partner to the GoR?

**Finding 3:** At this early stage, there is a mixed view whether the efforts of coordination and harmonization seen internally by the UN have met the expectations of government, DPs and CSOs in terms of development results.

Despite numerous achievements in the operational effectiveness of DaO in terms of the structures and systems put into place by the UN in Rwanda, reviews on programme effectiveness of DaO at this stage are mixed.

Thus, while DaO initiatives and innovations have begun transforming the operational effectiveness of UN programming with government and other partners, these operational and process achievements have not yet clearly borne fruit in terms of development results. This finding points to both the early formative nature of this evaluation, as well as the time required for full breadth of the DaO collaboration to take shape in Rwanda. Sentiments shared by various DPs and government officials throughout the evaluation assignment questioned whether improvements in internal effectiveness inside the UN were leading to better results on the ground. For example, a number of challenges have been noted:

- **Inclusive programming leading to too many activities:** The number of activities contained within the CAPs suggests an overly inclusive programming environment; in 2008 and 2009 there were over 1000 activities contained in the CAPs. While the inclusive nature of the programming is laudable, several DPs suggest that a streamlining, rationalization and prioritization is needed to provide greater focus and enhance development results.

- **Lack of familiarity with One UN:** In one case, the government partner interviewed during a sector cluster meeting did not know which of the UN agency partners was holding the TG leadership at the meeting. In another case, government officials interviewed continued to credit individual UN agencies with contributions towards development results in Rwanda rather than DaO. Also, during several visits of joint UN interventions, the beneficiaries were often not aware of the “joint” nature of the UN intervention.

...despite the recognition by all UN agencies of the need for a more coordinated and results-oriented approach, many agencies have continued to focus on small projects. This is particularly problematic with small, underfunded and technical agencies. The two main safeguards put in place to minimize this problem have been: (a) The peer review mechanisms whereby agencies could discuss and challenge the relevance of proposed activities within the UNDAF Theme groups and (b) the Mid Year Review (including the allocation in 2 tranches) and the use of the 2008 financial implementation as a barometer for 2009 resource allocation. (2008 Annual Report)
Burden of joint planning: While the positive aspects of joint planning and participation in TGs and TFs have been noted above, it must also be pointed out that the DaO coordination mechanisms are time consuming, particularly for small agencies with limited staff resources. In some cases, the planning process took up to six months, significantly delaying programme implementation.

The finding underscores a key point: while DaO is extremely popular to those who have learned about it, and has the full support and backing of the GoR as well as DPs, the expectations on DaO are that the results of this reform will quickly be evident. The reality tells a different story: that the early organizational and structural processes that are laying the groundwork for DaO are only just underway.

Finding 4: While there is an improvement in overall programme coordination thanks to DaO, a stronger emphasis on harmonizing monitoring, reporting and evaluation of programme results has not fully taken root through the assessment period, leading to a missed opportunity to more fully align with government and capture the benefits of coordination under DaO.

This issue is of considerable importance because measuring the “degree of success” of the DaO may, in large part, come both during and after the completion of the common activities outlined within the CAP, when beneficiaries have taken the knowledge and capacity acquired and integrated it or “used it”. A number of elements encompassing monitoring, evaluation and reporting were identified and reviewed during the evaluation data collection period. The early “scaling up” costs of harmonizing these elements, including setting up systems, processes and resource windows, remain considerable.

Monitoring: Use of the monitoring frameworks in the UNDAF to measure progress and make needed adjustments during the year appears to be limited, and the sharing of monitoring information with government partners on progress of activities and outputs is insufficient in some cases. While participation of the UN in joint reviews has been laudable, DPs and counterparts have sought greater transparency on progress of programme implementation. Joint missions between agencies and with government partners have not achieved the targets set out in the DPAF results for 2009, although the M&E task force and the RC have prioritized this for 2010. While joint field visits show good potential for learning between agencies, the UN staff survey results suggest that most staff have not participated in joint missions in the last year in which they worked. Fully 66% of staff who responded to the survey had not participated in a joint DaO mission in the past year: a similar percentage (63%) had not participated in a joint UN-government mission in the past year.

The programme commenced in 2007, however the monitoring and evaluation framework for the programme was not finalised until the end of 2008. This meant that quantitative performance data on key indicators was only collected in 2009. Renewed efforts are required to ensure that data is collected so that performance can be measured. (2009 Draft End of Year Report)

The UN does supports a number of additional government instruments for monitoring development progress, including the MDG reports, nutritional surveys, and the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). The UN has also championed Dev-Info systems in the country, in order to enhance data dissemination and use, and has also supported the monitoring of the EDPRS.

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12 This was confirmed by the 2009 DFID Annual Review Report.
**Evaluation:** Use of the UNDAF M&E calendar has been limited in the assessment period, with little reporting on evaluative activities since 2008. In some cases this is to be expected, given the relative infancy of the DaO structure and the fact that the mid-term review process has not yet begun. Moreover, evaluations carried out in the first two years of DaO implementation are unlikely to significantly capture the effects of programme outputs since the onset of DaO. The UN appears to share its Evaluation plan with other DPs so as to maximize potential for harmonized evaluation efforts; DPAF 2009 results indicate that 93% of the analytic work carried out by the UN is coordinated.

**Reporting:** Good progress has been made on end-of-year reporting by agencies, thanks to support of the M&E task force within the UN structure, and the RCO. Both the RCO and PPOC are increasingly playing a key role in creating a useful framework for reporting as presented in Finding 9. However, reporting delays in 2008 and 2009 were lengthy. At the time of the CLE evaluation, the 2009 Annual Report was not yet finalized. Moreover, some government partners reported that they had to submit different reports for different UN agencies throughout the year. One senior government official specifically asked two UN agencies to harmonize their reporting requests. Separate reporting requirements may be due in part to specific donor reporting requirements or requirements from HQ. This is discussed further in Finding 17 on HQ and Regional Office progress on One UN.

### 4.2 Relevance

**To what extent does DaO respond to national priorities of EDPRS and Vision 2020?**

The relevance of the “One Programme” covers the extent to which the DaO programme, via the UNDAF and the COD, responds to the identified needs of government. In other words, is DaO more relevant to the needs of GoR than previous UN structures and processes?

**Finding 5:** DaO is relevant to Rwanda’s priorities and its strategic intent responds at the appropriate levels to Rwanda’s needs.

The majority of partners agree that UNDAF is coherent with priorities as defined in EDPRS and Vision 2020. Development of the COD and UNDAF in 2007 was participatory, with a strong engagement from government counterparts and other DPs. Moreover, the UN used the EDPRS as a springboard for its own planning purposes, rather than carrying out its own separate analysis. This was viewed positively by government partners. The coherence of the DaO result areas with the EDPRS is underlined in Exhibit 4.4.

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**Pillars of the GoR’s EDPRS 2008-2012**

1. Good governance and a capable state
2. Human resource development and knowledge-based economy
3. A private sector-led economy
4. Infrastructure development
5. Productive and Market Oriented Agriculture
6. Regional and International Economic integration

**Cross Cutting Areas:**

- Social Inclusion
- Gender equality
- Youth
- HIV/AIDS
- Protection of environment and sustainable natural resource Management
- Science and technology, including ICT
### Exhibit 4.4 Coherence of DaO with EDPRS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Sector National Policy</th>
<th>Sector UNDAF Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Equitable, efficient, and effective services delivered to all citizens in an environment of participation, accountability and empowerment</td>
<td>Good governance enhanced and sustained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Population, HIV and Nutrition</td>
<td>Reduce incidence and impact of communicable and child diseases, by improved advocacy, promotion, prevention, care, treatment, support</td>
<td>The maternal morbidity and mortality, the incidence and impact of HIV and AIDS and other major epidemics, the rate of growth of the population are reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Access to quality, equitable and effective education to all Rwandans</td>
<td>All children in Rwanda acquire a quality basic education and skills for a knowledge-based economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Optimal use and sustainable management of environment and natural resources, access to safe water and sanitation for all</td>
<td>Management of environment, natural resources and land is improved in a sustainable way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable Growth and Social Protection</td>
<td>Sustainable progress is made to ensuring that social protection is accessible to all, with a emphasis on the existing poor and vulnerable: to incorporate the Economic growth objective/priority as stated in the EDPRS</td>
<td>Rwandan population benefits from economic growth and is less vulnerable to social and economic shocks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDAF 2008-2012

The UN also works and participates in the development of key sector strategies with technical assistance – therefore, ensuring continued coherence with the EDPRS and vision 2020. In some cases, the UN was a key contributor to sector plans. This is outlined in more detail in Finding 11 below.

Relevance also encompasses the extent to which the vision of DaO, the sense of direction and the sense of discovery align with the country needs. This might be referred to as the strategic intent of DaO, and it is super-ordinate to the outcomes of the UNDAF programming. The vision for One UN in Rwanda encompasses the EDPRS, but also encompasses the kind of role that befits the needs for the country and the role of the UN: that of neutral and impartial broker with a normative role in favour of human rights and gender as well as a facilitator and coordinator of development dialogue.

Survey results confirm the relevance of DaO with the priorities of government. The statement “The DaO priorities are well aligned with the government priorities” scored 4.33 on a scale of 1 to 5; over 90% of respondents either “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the statement.

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**Vision for One UN in Rwanda**

The UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, together with the seven core conventions, provide overall guidance to the UN system in Rwanda. The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs define its strategic operational objectives in the area of development, and constitutes the basis for holding the UN system accountable for delivering results. Vision 2020 and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) delineate the entry points for the UN system’s programmatic engagement with the GoR in the area of development assistance.

(Source: Concept Paper- One UN: Delivering and One in Rwanda)
Finding 6: There are the beginnings of a more coherent and strategic relationship between government and the UN, due in part to DaO. More work, however, needs to be done to fully align with the Rwanda Aid Policy.

The 2006 Rwanda Aid Policy forms the basis of the government’s relationship with Development Partners and is closely aligned with the Paris Declaration\(^\text{13}\). The Policy seeks to address a number of key problems in aid effectiveness which “…limit the efficiency and effectiveness with which assistance is delivered and weaken the government’s case for the scaling-up of assistance in the short- to medium-term.”\(^\text{14}\)

Much of the impetus for DaO stems from the Paris Declaration and similar initiatives to adhere to harmonized and simplified development interventions. Exhibit 4.5 presents the key problems identified by government in its Aid Policy, the extent to which DaO is contributing to solve these problems and remaining challenges that DaO will need to overcome.

\(^\text{13}\) The Paris Declaration favours government ownership, donor alignment, harmonization of procedures, a focus on results and mutual accountability.

\(^\text{14}\) Rwanda Aid Policy, page 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Examples of DaO Contribution</th>
<th>DaO Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacities</td>
<td>DaO favours capacity building at all levels of government and of civil society, including policy development, technical assistance and strategic support. DaO has focused attention on the decentralization process taking place in Rwanda, with increased attention on decentralized structures and supporting capacities at these levels. DaO has focused capacity on the management structures around MINECOFIN so that they are better able to manage aid flows.</td>
<td>Greater clarity on defining what is and what is not capacity building in the Rwandan context. DaO needs to test which mechanisms for capacity building work best, and define exit and handover criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability of Aid</td>
<td>The UNDAF and COD include core, vertical and One UN funds. DPs have provided long-term secured funding of the One UN fund to help to ensure some predictability of aid.</td>
<td>DaO has not demonstrated additional clarity with regards to predictable funding for government. Vertical funds raised throughout the year are not guaranteed, so planned activities which do not receive vertical funding are not carried out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction Costs</td>
<td>DaO has worked to reduce duplication in terms of meetings and transaction costs.</td>
<td>DaO has not yet demonstrated sufficient reduction in transaction costs although some reduction in duplication is occurring at the planning stage. In some cases, early DaO processes have heightened transaction costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on Aid flows</td>
<td>DaO is supporting MINECOFIN to develop better systems on aid information for the development budgeting of the country.</td>
<td>Despite working under a One UN scenario, DaO itself is often not able to clearly provide updates to ministries on the level of financial assistance it has provided, and the level of disbursements at a given point in time. Agency systems are not well harmonized at HQ level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment with GoR's priorities</td>
<td>UN is viewed at neutral and objective, with no political interests or conditions on aid. 80% of funds geared towards EDPRS priority areas, as defined in the UNDAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume of Assistance</td>
<td>UN has some examples of its ability to use technical assistance to leverage funds for government, including Fast Track Initiative applications ($35 million) and Global Fund applications ($389 million between 2009 - 2012).</td>
<td>Relative to large DPs, UN is playing a smaller overall role in the volume of assistance in Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 The OECD DAC has defined “capacity” as the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully and “capacity development” is understood as the process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time. While there is general consensus on this definition, within any given country context there are different levels of capacity – national, sub-national, local – and different stages of development in different sectors that finally determine the CD response.
4.3 Efficiency

Efficiency generally refers to the resources needed to produce outputs. In assessing efficiency, it is seen as more difficult to assess outputs than inputs, especially in service organizations, such as the government or the UN, where outputs tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative. When outputs are quantitative, standardization of outputs in order to achieve per unit costs is rare. Thus in essence, capturing a comparison of outputs accomplished to the cost incurred is difficult. Under Dao, as has been mentioned, there is the distinct possibility that overall resources to complete an activity have actually increased, given the number of UN agencies involved in a joint intervention, for example. However, at the output level, the result may have also risen, but at a much greater magnitude, to reflect the collective expertise and comparative advantage of the DaO approach.

Finding 7: The Joint planning environment favoured by DaO has had an overall beneficial effect on programme efficiency, largely due to the reduction in duplication.

Overall, the One UN environment in Rwanda is characterized by planning by theme group (TG) rather than by agency. Annual planning usually takes place during the first quarter of the year and the list of activities to be implemented is summarized in the Consolidated Action Plan (CAP). All agencies participate in this process, including non-resident agencies, either in person or virtually. Importantly, one characteristic of the joint planning has been a reduction in duplication, notably where UN agencies were funding similar activities with the same counterparts, or where participating as individual agencies in strategic meetings. In many instances, government partners perceived joint planning, and the concomitant reduction in duplication, as the most fundamental and positive shift when compared to the pre-DaO environment in Rwanda. This view is shared by the UN staff: 73% agree that the duplication of effort among UN agencies has been reduced.

The survey findings also reveal that a majority of staff strongly agree that the TG’s are useful for planning purposes. At the same time, the survey shows that when considered alongside implementation, M&E and reporting, most staff perceives the planning phase of the programme cycle as being too lengthy: staff estimate that roughly 32% of their time in the programme cycle is spent on planning; they estimate that this figure should be closer to 21%. On the other hand, they perceive time spent on implementation as being too short to what is needed by roughly the same margin.

Over the course of only two years, the CAP and the theme groups have become a reference point for some UN partners, civil society and government. Senior officials within Ministries know who to contact as the UN sector lead, greatly facilitating communication and saving time. For example, the Ministry of Health has seen improved coordination of activities by each UN agency working in health, particularly where specialties cross, such as provision of health services, reproductive services, services for mothers and children and policy support.

This evaluation’s review of the CAP confirms the utility and functionality of viewing programmes defined by result area, with the contribution of each agency being outlined within the document.
Finding 8: Joint Interventions are laying the groundwork for testing the overall cost-benefit efficiency of DaO

Joint interventions are providing the means by which DaO in Rwanda can measure efficiency of harmonized and joint activities. In order to demonstrate the “proof of concept” ideas and innovations of DaO, joint interventions, involving two or more UN agencies and carried out in line with government priorities, are closely monitored and tracked by PPOC and the TGs. For a number of downstream interventions, the hypothesis is that while joint interventions may involve slightly greater transaction costs in terms of a greater degree of coordination between UN agencies to implement a wider range of interventions, they can lead to significantly greater results for Rwanda than if the same interventions were carried out by individual agencies. This is also an area in which the UN in Rwanda is actively working to develop and demonstrate cost efficiency and unit costs in a range of interventions.

It should be noted that cost efficiency is less evident at the upstream policy development level. However, efficiencies through donor harmonization and comparative advantages are at work when UN agencies collaborate to support SWAp and national policies at the upstream level.

Finding 9: While still in its infancy, DaO’s PPOC appears to be an innovative and effective mechanism to guide One UN programming decisions.

The Programme Planning Oversight Committee (PPOC) was instituted in 2009 to provide leadership and oversight to the programming activities of DaO under the UNCT. PPOC is composed of the Deputy Representatives (or those in charge of programme functions in the agency), the Senior Policy Advisor of the RCO, and the Policy Advisors of the TGs.

As part of its mandate, PPOC supports the RC and the UNCT on decisions for the use of the One UN fund. To that end, PPOC has established a number of criteria for use of the One UN fund; in 2010, 22 proposals were submitted for review. Each proposal is reviewed and scored and the One UN fund is allocated according to the amount available to each TG. The development of joint interventions encourages a better understanding of the synergies and comparative advantages between agencies, and helps to infuse common work practices, including a common understanding of human rights and gender equality.

Within the CAP planning process, new Sub-groups were created for the CAP in 2010, based on the three main activity lines for programming: Planning, oversight and quality control; Policy Dialogue and; Capacity building. These added activity lines provide for a more detailed analysis of programming realities in Rwanda. PPOC is thus providing important strategic leadership in programming for results.

Finding 10: The piloting of the Programme Monitor Zoho software is the type of innovative practice that has the potential to greatly advance UN programming and reporting.

In improving efficient systems and processes for complex management structures, such as those within the UN or in Government, innovation is paramount.
One of the challenges of effective performance of DaO has been the lack of harmonization in the programme and financial management software between agencies. Individual agencies use their own programme management software systems. Bringing diverse IT systems of individual agencies together has been a noted constraint to DaO in several fora, including the recent Executive Board mission to Rwanda. The RCO has therefore led the development of a “Programme Monitor” using web-based software called Zoho that integrates planned activities and allows for monitoring and better reporting.

The Programme Monitor stands out as state-of-the-art, as a results-driven Management Information System, in comparison to others used by single agencies. However, it should be noted that as it is not directly compatible with the current programme management software systems of any individual agencies, it necessitates a duplication of the data entry for programme budgets and results.

As a web-based system, however, Programme Monitor is comprehensive and enables a wide range of data entry and manipulation techniques. Testing of the system is underway in 2010; CAP activities can be entered into the system and monitored across agencies. All agencies have been trained and have full access to the Programme Monitor data. It allows for UN-wide results to be sorted in various ways, thus improving analysis and transparency and will speed up donor data requests and reporting. It can also provide the basis for comparisons and scoring between agencies and TGs, thus improving the learning and feedback environment within DaO. The RCO, including the Senior Policy Officer and other members of PPOC as well as the M&E officer will be able to further maximize the use of this data centered planning and performance tool.

Improved monitoring and reporting systems through the Programme Monitor can potentially enhance government and UN feedback mechanisms, such as those that have been established by UNDG and the eight pilot countries, as well as those internal to Rwanda. This may help to drive improved performance of development interventions and subsequently lead to greater programme effectiveness.

4.4 Sustainability

Finding 11: The GoR is leading the way to ensure sustainability by placing an emphasis on capacity building, in line with the Government’s Aid Policy and the recognized priorities of the UN.

According to the OECD DAC, sustainability refers to the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed; the probability of continued long-term benefits; and/or the resilience to risk of the net benefit over time. In our understanding, this implies at least two key dimensions of sustainability: the continuation as well as the dynamic adaptation of what has been achieved during the lifetime of a project or program. The sustainability of results only reveals itself in the long term (and more evident in an ex-post evaluation than can be seen in this type of summative review). In the shorter term, what can be assessed is the relative likelihood of results/achievements being sustainable, based on the observable factors that enhance or hinder sustainability. In considering sustainability of results/achievements, it can be helpful to analyze the data at different investment levels, as findings can vary from one level to another (i.e., from targeted individuals to organizations and institutions). There has been a notable contribution of DaO on upstream activities, in supporting Ministries in the development of policies and strategies, and backstopping civil society with the skills and knowledge to carry out their duties effectively. The contribution of all five result areas in upstream development of policies and strategies has been cited in Finding 5 and are listed in Appendix V in Volume II.
The GoR has also led a process of decentralization of services, in order to provide better services closer to its citizens. Again, in this instance, the priorities agreed upon by the GoR and the UN has favoured capacity support to decentralization, particularly where capacity is weak. For example, DaO has supported local budgeting and local administration through support of progressive localization of central budgets and the institutionalization of performance contracts in all districts. This focus on capacity development does not prove that the DaO interventions are sustainable, but rather, that they are the early means by which future sustainability may occur.

In areas where downstream support is still required or where capacity of government to respond is constrained, UN continues to play a critical, normative role. While not sustainable per se, here too, some elements of capacity development are taking place. In concrete terms, the DPAF engagement has reported that the UN has committed to further reduction in Programme Implementation Units (PIUs), from the 2007 baseline of 16 down to 5 by 2010. This creates scope for further transfer of management capacity from the UN to government.

Finding 12: Clear indications of exit strategies are only now starting to emerge in the DaO programming environment.

Sustainability implies a handover of capacity, as well as strong measurement instruments to monitor progress in the country. This is of particular importance in a country where sustainability has been enshrined in its Aid Policy. What’s more, the positive environment for piloting and innovation in Rwanda, recognized at both the government and UN levels, gains its legitimacy in the ability to build on and scale up pilots that have been shown to be effective.

Because most of the UN interventions in Rwanda are ongoing, and cover support over several years of implementation, it is hard to fully assess the sustainability of DaO initiatives. Capacity building, mainstreaming and national ownership are at the heart of the UN partnership in Rwanda, both with government, civil society, and to some extent, the private sector. However, from the desk review and on-site visits, it appears that most interventions do not have an explicit strategy for sustainability. Rather, anecdotal evidence from project documentation points to sustainable outcomes. Some of the indicators include:

- Many interventions focus on building individual capacities and training;
- All six result areas work on supporting institutional capacities in Rwanda, thus improving the ability of national actors to manage future interventions;

“Through the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review of operational activities for development (TCPR), the Paris Declaration on Harmonization and Alignment... Member States have called for the UN system to enhance its efforts particularly at country level to support national capacity development. They expect a major gearing up in the support and success of those efforts in order to meet the internationally agreed goals, including the MDGs. Looking ahead, the UN system’s purely financial contribution to development will be significant but small. Member States clearly view capacity development as a comparative advantage of the UN development system. If the UN at country level is to deliver on these expectations, a major shift is required in the way the UN does business, whether it is in countries that are adjusting to new aid modalities, countries that are facing or recovering from conflict, or countries that face particular challenges (such as HIV/AIDS) in achieving their development goals and targets. UNCTs will have to make capacity development the core of their work, and develop new ways of assessing and achieving capacity development results as a team, in different contexts, clearly making more of a sustained difference than has been the case in the past.”

UNDG Report on One UN pilots

Building the capacities of the government has started long ago. The DaO needs to bring in something new, a new approach to building the capacity of the government, while building its own capacity to deliver. Survey Respondent
Many interventions concretely ensure that national government or local actors allocate their own resources or time in the intervention;

Projects seem to integrate a gender component, which is often viewed as an essential factor in sustainability;

The Ex-Com Joint Executive Board delegation noted the importance of an exit strategy for the United Nations as part of its capacity building efforts and gathered some interesting lessons in Rwanda. The delegation suggested that an exit strategy should be incorporated early on to ensure capacity requirements are met at the final stage. The delegation therefore recommends that exit strategies be taken into account during Executive Board discussions of capacity building strategies.

The creation of PPOC and the enhanced assessment process for joint interventions using One UN funds is likely to improve the explicit consideration of the sustainability, or future viability of UN interventions. Joint proposals submitted to PPOC are now checked for sustainability during the process of Reviewing and Scoring Joint Proposals.

Sustainability, An example: One project, a UNIDO mini-hydroelectric plant that has expanded to a joint intervention with other UN agencies, started with one site. It has also mapped out 40 other potential sites in Rwanda. The engagement of the GoR throughout the intervention has ensured government ownership of the idea – GoR is planning to construct 10 additional mini hydroelectric plants to provide electricity to distant rural communities.

Exhibit 4.6 Dashboard Scoring on “One Programme”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One UN Pillar</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Programme</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. **One Budgetary Framework**

Next to the “One Programme”, the One budgetary framework is the cornerstone of the One UN pilots. The One Budgetary Framework is based on a total estimated amount of resources (core, vertical and One Fund) needed to implement the UN Common Operational Document (COD) for Rwanda. Currently, this is estimated at $487.6 million, of which $155.46 million or 32% is to be mobilized through the One Fund. The One UN Fund for Rwanda is a common fund mechanism to allocate resources that have been mobilized in a simplified, coherent manner that is consistent with the overall purpose of the One UN Initiative. As a vehicle for new resources pooled by donors to support the unfunded portions of the COD, the One Fund is allocated according to the breakdown shown in Exhibit 5.1.

**Exhibit 5.1 Breakdown on the allocation of the One UN fund by Result Area.**

![Pie chart showing the allocation of the One UN fund by Result Area.]

The objective of the One UN Fund is to support the coherent resource mobilization, allocation and disbursement of donor resources to the UNDAF under the direction of the Resident Coordinator as leader of the UN Country Team. The allocation of One UN fund to the thematic areas has specifically been designed to create the right incentive for staff from both resident and non-resident agencies to work with one another in a collaborative manner. Therefore, the allocation mechanism rewards delivering as one, with 80% of One UN Funds allocated to programmes engaging more than one UN agencies in 2009. The PPOC thus plays a crucial role in ensuring strategic program coherence, and helps address some of the challenges in allocation and implementation of One UN Funds. One UN Fund for Rwanda is administered in accordance with the Joint Programming Guidelines relating to the Administrative Agent function with recovery of 1% fee. Implementing UN Agencies can recover costs at 7%.

In 2009, funds received from donors for the One Fund were in the order of $41 million versus a total planned target of $155 million. Exhibit 5.2 shows that, at roughly the mid-point of the UNDAF, One Fund collection is at roughly 27% of the planned target for the programme period.
**Exhibit 5.2 One UN Funds raised versus target for 2008-2012**

![One UN Fund](chart)

**5.1 Effectiveness**

Finding 13: Allocation of the One UN fund has evolved since inception of DaO, however, delays in financial transactions continue to slow implementation for some One-UN fund activities

One of the challenges of the one-budgetary framework is transfer and utilisation of funds. Implementation of activities under result areas is done using parallel funding (each agency operates with its own budget for its activities under a common output or outcome) using core funding, vertical funds or One UN funds received for activities. The One UN fund system of allocation encourages agencies to coordinate in order to develop joint interventions; In 2010, the characteristics of joint interventions towards a given outcome have been more clearly developed to enhance the achievement of outcomes within a certain district or for given strategic partners. The CAPs have been developed with major focus placed on Joint Interventions – of the funds available in the One fund, 80% of the funds are available for allocation for interventions already in the CAP. The remaining 20% is retained and allocated to emerging priorities during the year. Of the amount available for interventions in the CAP, 80% is for joint interventions and the remaining 20% for individual agency interventions that contribute significantly to the output as recommended by the Theme group. The One UN fund also has mechanisms to ensure timely disbursement by creating incentives for disbursement of all funds within the year. Holders of One UN funds are penalized if funds remain unused at the end of year. At the same time, first disbursement of 75% of total allocation to an intervention provides an additional level of protection against delayed use of funds by TGs. In 2010, there were 38 joint interventions identified.

Despite an adaptive and responsive mechanism to allocate and distribute funds for development results, in many cases, delays have occurred for processing and allocating funds, both with partners and between the Administrative Agent and other UN agencies. One UN fund allocation took three months to bypass the administrative procedures between agencies before funds were deposited and ready for use in Rwanda. In this case, another agency provided short-term financial support to fill the gap and ensure that development results could be achieved.
5.2 Relevance

Finding 14: Clear and transparent UN Financial reporting remains a challenge under DaO

Closely linked to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, financial reporting is one of the key challenges identified by government partners and DPs regarding DaO and cooperation with the United Nations. The UN continues to be burdened by different reporting definitions, terminologies, budgeting frameworks, and IT systems that affect its delivery and reporting on financial matters. So even while the UN has undertaken and financed activities linked to the support of improved aid effectiveness initiatives within MINECOFIN under the governance result area, its own processes and submissions on available funding, disbursement rates and Official Development Aid (ODA) funds recorded in the national budgets are deficient. The UN itself is not perceived as a leader in the provision and clarity of financial reporting information at the individual Ministry level or within the MINECOFIN reporting mechanisms. Some senior staff within government ministries expressed deep frustration at not knowing the level of programme implementation, or fund disbursement at a given point in time. They also expressed dismay at the frequent changes to programmes depending on the availability of vertical funds.

While it is not clear how the current situation on reporting compares with that before DaO, the UN’s joint participation in the DPAF process only reinforces the weakness of the UN in financial reporting.

5.3 Efficiency

Finding 15: It does not appear that multi-year allocations of the One Fund are permitted, hampering efficient programme planning

It is unclear whether or not multi-year joint intervention proposals can be made against One UN funds. Since there is some stability and predictability in donor funding of the One UN fund, some agencies have suggested that this would be a welcomed option for TGs whose implementing partners require greater predictability in funding.

5.4 Sustainability

Finding 16: Programme Funding under the One UN fund does not meet the demand for funds planned in the UNDAF

The remaining human development and poverty reduction needs for Rwanda to meet the MDGs are significant. Donors have supported the DaO One UN fund with multi-year funding envelopes, with no earmarking of funds, thus providing the UN with an important capacity to meet the changing and evolving needs of the country through joint interventions. Total funds committed for the One UN fund is roughly $53 million, received from donors as outlined below in Exhibit 5.3, of which $41 million is deposited. This represents roughly 27% of the $155 million to be mobilized by the One UN fund for Rwanda for the period 2008-2012.
Exhibit 5.3 Donor Commitment/Deposit of One UN fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Commitment (USD)</th>
<th>Deposit (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3,661,542</td>
<td>3,661,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4,173,060</td>
<td>2,467,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-DFID</td>
<td>14,910,537</td>
<td>10,499,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded DaO Funding window*</td>
<td>17,219,000</td>
<td>17,219,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>6,777,108</td>
<td>1,452,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,741,247</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,300,172</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Expanded Delivering as One Funding Window for the Achievement of the MDGs is a global facility set up to support eligible Delivering as One countries, with current contributions from The Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom.


Demand for joint interventions funded by One UN funding is likely to exceed supply in the future. This will put greater pressure on the systems of sustainability mentioned above, as well as UNCT and PPOC assessments on intervention selection and competition for funds amongst agencies.

Exhibit 5.4 Dashboard Scoring on One Budgetary Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One-UN Pillar</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Budget</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. One Leader

The UNCT in Rwanda has already made significant progress in the implementation of the ‘One Leader’ concept. The UN Resident Coordinator is recognized by all Heads of Agencies as the team leader. For all UN related issues, activities or events or even Agency-specific activities which have broader UN relevance, the UN speaks with one voice through the RC or through a Head of Agency, on behalf of the whole team. The RC has a written code of conduct, a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, including UNDAF development, mobilization of funds, Monitoring and Evaluation, and assessment of the agency representatives. A Steering committee provides oversight to the One UN, in order to guide the RC.

Internally, the One UN team spirit among staff has increased since the onset of DaO, due to better internal communication through town hall meeting and more frequent collaboration across agencies.

6.1 Effectiveness

Finding 17: Some legitimate concerns exist about the progress of One UN at Regional Office (RO) and Headquarters, weakening development impacts and creating duplication.

This finding encompasses the views of government officials as well as UN resident and non-resident staff. A number of concerns have been cited with regards to regional offices and HQ support for DaO. These factors directly affect the ability of the RC to effectively lead DaO:

- **Common systems**: differences in information technology systems greatly impede harmonization, transparency and accountability. These constraints undoubtedly have a role to play in the UN’s weak financial reporting under the GoR’s reporting system, as outlined in Finding 13.

- **Reporting**: some agencies are still required to do individual reporting. This leads to a tentative conclusion that in some instances reporting requirements may result in overlap and duplication and in theory run against the drive for harmonisation and the reduction of internal DaO transaction costs. Several Ministries in the GoR have noted that certain UN partners continue to meet for specific reporting requirements. While there have been some noted improvements towards accepting joint reporting at HQ level, this remains a concern shared across several UN agencies.

- **Financial administration**: while indirect cost withholding has been addressed between agencies, there remain vastly different systems between agencies for the processing and passing of funds from donor to HQ to country level. This deficiency has been exacerbated due to the joint nature of activities within the One UN, where each agency is responsible for certain deliverables under a common output and outcome using parallel funding mechanisms. Delays for processing One UN fund allocations have been cited at up to three months by agencies, whereby other agencies have had to provide short-term financial support to fill the gap.

- **Decision making**: agencies continue to be burdened by protracted decision-making processes at Headquarters. In a number of instances, Heads of Agencies reported that delays were encountered at HQ on relatively trivial procedural issues – all the while the government partners were left waiting for the UN response. In these instances, UN becomes a less reliable partner to government, and an opportunity to solidify its leadership on aid effectiveness is missed.

- **Staffing**: delays in staffing are not solely a concern for One UN pilots, but rather they exist across the board in the UN system. While not seeking to be viewed as worthy of favourable treatment
compared to other countries, UN agencies nevertheless cite delayed staffing and hiring procedures at HQ as being a detriment to DaO, particularly given the additional requirements in the build-up of the DaO system within the RCO. Non-resident agencies in particular have difficulty meeting the demands that participation in planning meetings have for the DaO. Additionally, as outlined during the Joint Executive Boards meeting in April, 2010, a lack of harmony between UN agencies’ human resource policies “…result in grades of posts that do not always correlate with the responsibilities, resources and risks associated with those posts.”

Exhibit 6.1 below provides some further food for thought with regards to support from agency HQ. Just over half of respondents agree that HQ provides enough flexibility to manage DaO effectively, leaving an important minority either disagreeing, or ambivalent.

**Exhibit 6.1 Survey Response on Effectiveness at Headquarters.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree, 19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree, 38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither disagree nor agree, 21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree, 9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree, 8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Finding 18:** However, the GoR and the UNCT have begun to see better coordination at HQ level, particularly in terms of joint HQ missions.

The HQ of individual agencies as well as UNDG and DOCO have strengthened or are strengthening processes in favour of One UN. For example, One UN has been a focus on a number of meetings and conferences since its inception in 2008. This has allowed for knowledge and experience sharing on coordination and M&E. A satisfactory engagement from HQ and RO in training and support for Rwanda was noted in 2007 and 2008, though less for more recent years. Also, Headquarters have agreed to a common internal “transaction cost” of 7% for all funds that pass through HQ.
Regional Office and Headquarters missions have begun to favour joint missions, where technical support staff from several agencies visit Rwanda jointly, thus greatly contributing to the One UN philosophy. The Joint Executive Boards of UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA is one such highlight of a more coordinated approach from respective HQs, something which was greatly appreciated by the GoR, DPs and UN agencies alike.

Finally, some harmonization of reporting requirements have been noted by some UN agencies, which no longer require both the DaO Annual Report as well as their own agency Annual Report.

6.2 Relevance

Finding 19: DaO has benefitted from a strong level of commitment of all levels of government as well as the UNCT and most Development Partners.

One element of any pilot programme such as DaO is its facilitation of the learning and knowledge building that helps position it for future expansion and adjustment under the leadership of the RC. It is therefore important to understand the motivating factors of an effective DaO partnership with government in Rwanda.

The Government of Rwanda:

The leadership of the GoR within the process of the pilot One UN has been strong since the outset. The interest of the GoR in backing a One UN pilot was founded on its unwavering support of the aid effectiveness agenda and its principles, espoused during the 2005 Paris Declaration, as well as the 2009 Accra Agenda for Action. At the present time, the GoR has the view that there is no turning back on Delivering as One.

There are many ways in which the GoR has shown its steady commitment to the principles of DaO. During recent high level UN missions to Rwanda, for example, the Government has been committed to holding joint UN meetings with government officials, including the President, whenever possible and has shown its preference for joint high level missions. Another area where the government has shown strong commitment has been the speedy identification of land in Kigali for a One UN House which will become the common premises for all the UN agencies. These factors have implications for effective and efficient advocacy, and efficient attainment of development objectives in Rwanda.

Most importantly, the GoR has shown its commitment through its willingness to be a leader and take ownership of the DaO pilot, as well as other innovations linked to DaO. Government ownership is very much in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, whereby a government assumes responsibility for ownership of its development agenda. While there are other organizational attributes which favour the GoR as a good pilot One-UN country, its openness for piloting and moving quickly to achieve results is very much in line with the strategic intent of One UN.

UN Agencies

UN agencies have also shown a strong level of commitment. Senior staff within the UNCT is committed at the Country Representative level to work towards DaO objectives according to the four “Ones”. Both larger agencies, including the UNDG Executive Committee (ExCom) agencies, and specialized and non-resident agencies (NRA), have committed resources towards the common planning processes that include theme groups and task forces, because of their collective commitment towards results and the expectation that they will be able to realize a real value-added of this coordination in the outcomes and impacts of the UNDAF programming. In particular, within agencies where human resources are relatively scarce, there has been a notable engagement towards DaO in recognition of the potential results and greater economies of scale that can be achieved by working together. Our analysis has shown that specialized agencies have an added incentive; they tend to receive a greater share of the One UN fund when measured as a
percentage of their total funding envelope. A final benefit is that, as smaller specialized agencies, their voice in a collective One UN can reach a larger audience than would be the case under the previous structure. This expectation has even brought agencies with a regional mandate, such as UNIFEM and UNECA on board with DaO, despite numerous administrative barriers.

Heads of Agencies do not feel that DaO has been a headquarters (HQ) directive. They see DaO as an initiative which is firmly led at the country level and championed by the GoR. Nevertheless, they did express a number of concerns about DaO, including:

- The extent to which their own HQ will continue to support DaO.
- The ability to independently raise funds for agency-specific programming
- Losing sight of agency-specific mandates in a One UN environment

UN agencies also participated in a Dalberg survey and consultancy related to determining Capacity Assessment for Rwanda, whereby the UN staff were evaluated with respect to the capacity development needs of the country. This exercise highlighted some staffing gaps and further clarified how the capacity mix and comparative advantages of the UN agencies might coincide.

**Development Partners:**

Strong leadership has also been shown by DPs, including the DPs that have invested unearmarked funds in the One UN fund (the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK), as well as others who have participated as members in the DaO Steering Committee. In line with Paris Declaration commitments, DPs have been engaged in the DaO process, through participation in Steering Committee meetings, reviews and assessments since 2008. On some occasions, DPs have organized meetings across pilot countries to compare and share experiences on the role as a donor to the One UN fund. The investment in DaO is further elucidated by the long term financial commitments made by DPs, which span to the end of the current UNDAF. DPs have also been engaged with the One UN on structural elements of the pilot in order to improve effectiveness.

Multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, IMF and African Development Bank, appear to be less engaged in regard to DaO in recent years, despite the important cross-sectoral and strategic role that these institutions play in Rwanda. However, during the development of the EDPRS, each of these agencies was closely engaged with the UN and other DPs in a collective and coordinated way. Moreover, where the multilaterals work on SWAps together with UN agencies, collaboration is fruitful.

**How efficient and / or effective has the division of labour been between the RC and individual UN agencies?**

**6.3 Efficiency**

Finding 20: The effective functioning of the RCO and the sharing of duties amongst UN agencies has provided some measurable efficiency gains for the UN.

Sharing of leadership among UN agencies on theme group and task forces has reduced the need for separate structures to exist within each agency, particularly the smaller specialized agencies. For example, UN agencies that did not have a full time M&E officer in the past can leverage the knowledge and experience-sharing of the other UN M&E task force members, thereby responding more effectively and efficiently to M&E priorities. Similarly, the Gender Task Force has permitted a mainstreaming of gender issues across agencies and in turn across various sector priorities of the government. This

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16 Data taken from 2008 Annual Report only: no trend data available at the time of this CLE.
leveraging far exceeds what a single agency might achieve without this task force. The strong participation of the theme groups and task forces in the UN in Rwanda provides a foundation for greater understanding and coordination amongst UN agencies, thus allowing Heads of Agencies to focus discussions on issues of a more strategic nature.

Since some agencies do not have a dedicated communications officer, the efficiencies gained by sharing communication activities and a common website has provided greater outreach than would otherwise be the case. This will be presented in further detail under Section 9 below.

One of the characteristics of effective coordination is the capacity for staff of the various agencies to have a better understanding of each other, thanks to common knowledge, systems and culture. This coordination creates more time for strategic discussions and partnerships, particularly at the Heads of Agency level, rather than operational details, which are sufficiently covered in theme groups. The leadership of the RC has also facilitated the role of the Heads of Agencies, to the extent that the RC represents the entire United Nations at official functions.

**Finding 21: To date, the RC and UNCT have yet to sufficiently systematize a performance review of the One UN pillars, which has hindered a prioritization and sharing of key results to be achieved within DaO.**

The governance systems of DaO encompass a number of formal mechanisms for reviewing progress of DaO in Rwanda. These include review and reporting mechanisms of UNDG and the Regional Directors Team (RDT), the One UN Steering Committee and the UNCT itself. The One UN steering committee includes UN Resident Coordinator as well as representation from the government, the UN, and Development Partners. It is chaired by the Minister of MINECOFIN and provides guidance and supervision to the One UN process. In our review of these mechanisms, we have uncovered inconsistent reviews and records of DaO’s performance.

**Key Performance Indicators**

The RC and the UNCT have not yet formalized a set of key performance indicators that track progress on the five pillars of the One UN. This has led to a number of key challenges for the RCO – in a fast moving development context with highly motivated government counterparts and development partners, the RC has been unable to clearly elucidate the achievement of targets when communicating priorities of DaO in Rwanda. For example, the agreed actions of the UN in the 2010 Development Partners Retreat, including increasing joint missions and interventions within the UN system and reducing the number of Programme Implementation Units (PIUs) have not been defined within a monitorable tool within the UN DaO or UNCT structure. While targets are defined within the government-led Development Partners Assistance Framework (DPAF), they should also be shared within the UN so the targets may be internalized by agencies and staff. Of a similar nature, minutes of UNCT meetings have not systematically covered key performance criteria throughout the year, thus depriving members of the UNCT from an important review and feedback mechanism.

It should be noted that the 2008 End of Year Report did indeed contain a UNCT Work Programme for 2009 containing many of the elements of a good performance assessment framework, including results that spanned across the One UN pillars. One challenge in this regard has been the lack of an M&E officer within the RCO, as well as the fact that the RCO team is still in its relative infancy as a team. From our data collection, it appears that this UNCT Work Programme was not closely followed during 2009; no updates on what might be considered key performance indicators for DaO have been received by the evaluation team. However, in 2010, a renewed effort is underway with RCO to develop performance indicators to monitor overall progress on DaO.
One UN Steering Committee

The One UN Steering Committee is a second area of coordination that helps to guide the One UN process in Rwanda and provide transparent oversight and feedback, this time with the vital contribution of government and key DPs. Meetings are convened by the Office of the Resident Coordinator with the guidance of the Chair of the Steering Committee. However, the regularity with which meetings have been held has been uneven\(^17\). Discussions with members also suggest that the expertise of the participants is underused; members had recently proposed a logical framework to set out key indicators at the output and outcome level for Delivering as One, very much in line with key performance indicators, as suggested above. The UN reaction to this logical framework was perceived as slow, and it is not yet clear to the evaluation team how this was taken up by the RC or UNCT.

6.4 Sustainability

How does DaO assure sustainability with government?

Finding 22: The range of DaO initiatives are demonstrative of the ability of the UN’s leadership in Rwanda to harmonize as well as adjust and adapt to changing internal and external needs

The RC and the UNCT have developed a cohesive and functional organizational structure under which DaO has been able to demonstrate effectiveness throughout the assessment period. The RC is seen to be fully on board with the One UN approach. He considers himself the RC first, and the UNDP Resident Representative second in most instances; in a similar vein, most UN country representatives feel a first loyalty to the UN, and second to their agency.

Our assessment showed evidence of strong coordination\(^18\) mechanisms in place in Rwanda, which underscore the effective leadership of the UN in Rwanda. Mutual adjustment, for example, is one of six coordination mechanisms under a framework proposed by Mintzberg. It suggests that effective coordination of work is made possible by a process of informal communication between people conducting interdependent work. Our group discussions with UN staff members suggest that informal communication between staff has been greatly enhanced through participation and work in TGs and task forces. This was confirmed in the UN staff survey, where the occurrence of informal communication was perceived most strongly amongst coordination mechanisms. Informal communication is also important amongst agency representatives; our assessment revealed that agency representatives have between 4 and 5 other agency representatives on average, with whom they speak to informally on regular occasions.

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\(^17\) One UN steering committee meetings are supposed to be held every two months, however, meeting records reviewed suggest that meetings have occurred only a few times per year in 2008 and 2009.

\(^18\) See Mintzberg’s 6 elements of Coordination which include: Mutual adjustment, Direct supervision, Standardisation of work processes, Standardization of output, Standardization of skills and knowledge, and Standardisation of norms.
Exhibit 6.2 Mintzberg’s Six Coordination Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Coordination</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Examples within DaO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Adjustment</td>
<td>Coordination of work is made possible by a process of informal communication between people conducting interdependent work.</td>
<td>Heads of Agencies are in regular contact with an average of between 4 and 5 other Heads of Agencies outside of regularly held meetings. RC produces a newflashing straight from his desk to all staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Supervision</td>
<td>Coordination is achieved by one individual taking responsibility for the work of others</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator is the leader and the coordinator of the ‘One Programme’; UN Resident Coordinator will coordinate UNDAF development and supervise the implementation of ‘One Programme’. The agency representative will take responsibility for specific outcomes of the UNDAF results matrix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization of Work Processes</td>
<td>Coordination is made possible by specifying the work content in rules or routines to be followed.</td>
<td>Common Operational Document in line with EDPRS Code of Conduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization of Output</td>
<td>Coordination is obtained by the communication and clarification of expected results</td>
<td>Consolidated Annual Plans aligned with EDPRS One UN Annual Report format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization of Skills and knowledge</td>
<td>Coordination is reached through specified and standardized training and education. People are trained to know what to expect of each other and coordinate in almost automatic fashion.</td>
<td>UN and government partners trained extensively on Human Rights based approach to programming, Results based Management and Gender Mainstreaming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization of Norms</td>
<td>Norms are standardized; Socialization is used to establish common values and beliefs in order for people to work towards common expectations</td>
<td>Human Rights (EDPRS and UNDAF) Reaching out to most vulnerable populations (Vision 2020 and UNDAF) Gender mainstreaming (EDPRS and UNDAF) Results based Management (EDPRS and UNDAF).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The RC/UNDP firewall has not been seen as an issue of great concern among the Country Representatives. Moreover, the RC has worked to strongly engage UNDP to spearhead elements of the One UN reform, by leading in several areas, including financial administration, leadership in thematic areas, and leadership in the OMT in 2010.

The RC’s span of responsibility and accountability extends to the wider UN family, as evidenced by the RC’s participation in a number of agency-specific events and an engagement to communicate with the UN several times a year. In response to key requests from government, the RC frequently relies on Heads of Agencies or UN staff for support. For example, during the recent financial crisis he engaged economists and expertise from several UN agencies to work under a One UN banner to comment on implications of the financial crisis for Rwanda. This is carried out with the approval of the respective UN Country Representatives.

The RC co-chairs regular meetings throughout the year of the Development Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) with MINECOFIN, a reflection of the important role that the UN has within the wider DP community. One of the RC’s roles is to engage in mobilizing funds for the One UN fund. This was cited as one of the UN priorities at the DPCG 2010 retreat. It remains to be seen, however, what the net effect
of DaO will have on overall funding levels for Rwanda, a prospect made more difficult to measure, given the dynamic aid environment and exogenous variables that influence donor funding decisions.

How does DaO assure internal sustainability?

Finding 23: The DaO systems in place promote internal sustainability and reduce the risk that leadership changes will impact the DaO approach

A common culture has largely been established and entrenched within the DaO family, with a degree of organizational coordination that, despite its recent development, appears sustainable. Evidence in the innovations and cooperation amongst agencies, including agency heads but also UN staff members at all levels demonstrates a sustained commitment to DaO.

A number of factors can be attributed to this internal sustainability:

- Leadership of the GoR in the process is vital. As mentioned previously, DaO does not appear to be a HQ-driven policy; rather it is firmly in line with the GoR’s Aid Policy.
- Buy-in to DaO by UN staff is strong. The RCO and heads of Agencies are supportive of the process, despite the challenges that change from the old way of doing business will bring.
- Theme group participation and task forces underline the joint work environment that has emerged in the UN. It should be noted that attendance in task force meetings far exceeds that which existed prior to DaO.
- Continuous learning is favoured. The UN has prioritized training of its staff members, as well as government partners, in key tools and practices, including Monitoring and Evaluation, Gender Mainstreaming, and the Human Right based approach to Programming. This focus on learning brings staff to a common understanding of their roles as UN staff and allows them to “speak the same language” within their areas of specialization. Moreover, this training is increasingly being carried out with government and civil society partners.
- As outlined in Finding 23, joint recruitment is a policy that has been favoured by DaO. This will be formalized by a joint recruitment framework memorandum of understanding between agencies. This has a significant impact on the team aspect of the UN.

Exhibit 6.3 Dashboard Scoring on One Leader

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One-UN Pillar</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Leader</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. One Office

The ‘One Office’ pillar aims to ensure that the One UN programme maximizes synergies between agencies and minimizes overheads, thereby assuring an implementation in the most efficient way possible. The UN in Rwanda has been working with the GoR since 2007 to establish a common “UN House” for all agencies by 2012, thus expanding the scope for efficiency gains. Prompted by high expectations from the President of Rwanda about the One UN House plan, a security survey was signed and a Land Agreement was signed in April 2009 between the UNDP (as Administrative Agent for all the other UN Agencies) and the Government. Subsequently, a number of additional steps have been taken including:

- A One UN House taskforce established in October 2009;
- A preliminary study on One UN house carried out by a senior consultant in January 2010,
- A Public Private Partnership framework for the One UN house requested by MINECOFIN
- Meetings between the RC and key stakeholders to identify the best way on funding modalities
- UN house task force fully operational in April 2010 and roadmap developed

7.1 Effectiveness

Finding 24: Agency-specific policies sometimes hinder the functioning of One Office

DPAF identifies indicators that can be linked to shared premises and shared services. One of those highlighted is the percentage of total UN missions that are carried out jointly. The OECD definition of this indicator includes joint missions carried out with partner authorities and where necessary, other donors. In 2009, this figure was 23%, below the target of 53% that was set by DPAF and the UN. Agency-specific transport procedures sometimes hinder a more efficient sharing of vehicles amongst staff members from different agencies, particularly on missions outside the capital. For insurance reasons, staff members from one UN agencies may not be permitted to use the vehicle of another agency.

Meanwhile, as mentioned previously, joint missions between UN agency HQs and Regional offices have shown some progress. In terms of arranging joint missions, highlighted by the Joint Executive Boards meeting held in April 2010. In many instances, it is the GoR that is insisting on Joint meetings and missions, underlying the leadership of the GoR in this area.

7.2 Relevance

Common services and shared premises are relevant to the reduction in transaction costs that are a fundamental part of the Rwanda Aid Policy.

To what extent has DaO been successful in reducing management demands and associated transaction costs?

7.3 Efficiency

For the purposes of common premises, we looked to transaction costs, in terms of financial costs and costs in time and effort but also in terms of systems for communication, coordination, transport, common services, etc., in order to review the efficiency of DaO, with a view to seeking out useful practices and procedures that have shown measurable cost savings.
As outlined in previous sections of this evaluation, a reduction of transaction costs is enshrined in the GoR’s Aid Policy. Moreover, it is a key barometer of the success of the UN Delivering as One pilots; the extent to which cost-savings and efficiencies can be gained by closer collaboration. The GoR has demonstrated its leadership on this issue, through its engagement with the UN Common Premises process.

At a macro level, and one which is relevant to the UN in Rwanda, as elsewhere, the recent financial crisis has heightened the importance of demonstrating that agencies can become more streamlined. Other DPs, including those who contribute to the One UN fund in Rwanda, have not escaped belt tightening measures.

Finding 25: The lack of evidence of substantial cost efficiencies or of a specific plan for reducing transaction costs due to shared services thus far constitutes a risk to the overall success of DaO in Rwanda.

In 2007, the OMT held a meeting to identify a number of quick-wins that could show short-term benefits on efficiency. The meeting also sought to identify best practices and propose cross-agency solutions and identify opportunities for joint logistical/operational support to government to implement national policies. Short-run cost savings identified included: administrative savings such as fuel maintenance, general services, and contracts; HR including recruitment panels, training plans, job titles; and procurement. In the longer run—protocols; HR including contracts used, performance evaluation, payroll, transport, warehousing, financial rules, and ICT including VSAT, ISP, e-mail, telephone, networking printing, were targeted for harmonization.

Despite some renewed efforts made by the OMT and UNCT in 2008 and 2010, there is an absence of clear targets or measurements on transaction cost reductions since 2008. The DaO initiative therefore risks missing out on the “efficiency” element of the reform, an essential element of the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR), which states that the UN should

“...take concrete steps in the following areas: rationalization of country presence through common premises and co-location of members of United Nations country teams; implementation of the joint office model; common shared support services, including security, information technology, telecommunications, travel, banking and administrative and financial procedures, including for procurement...”

The efficiency element of the reform has important positive knock-on effects for DaO in terms of satisfaction of government and DPs, and overall sustainability of DaO. However, an analysis of cost-savings gained by the harmonization of some administrative services thus far has not been carried out by the RC and UNCT.

In terms of other areas for harmonization and improvement in efficiencies, a common joint mission plan has not yet been established by the RCO. What’s more, joint missions by UN agencies and with government appear to be limited compared to overall number of missions;

It should be noted that the DFID logical framework for measuring success of the One UN in Rwanda has identified a number of targets for the DaO, including an efficiency target of $1 million in administrative cost efficiency savings by 2012.

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19 In the 2008 Annual Report Annex, a UNCT Workplan further established recommendations for the 5 “Ones”, including “One Office”. Listed here were a number of recommendations on a roadmap and a budget for common premises, and getting support from donors for common premises.

20 DFID Rwanda: Support to the One UN programme 2008-2012, Logical Framework.
Finding 26: The identification of priority areas for operations harmonization and reduction in transaction costs will serve as overall targets for future gains in efficiency.

The OMT has identified in 2010 a number of areas where an increase in operational efficiencies can be gained across agencies. These include travel, cleaning services, IT Equipment and Maintenance, stationary, Communication, Printing and Interpretation and Freight Forwarding Services. In 2010, data is being collected by each agency to develop a cost-savings plan based on priority areas where the greatest efficiencies can be won. The objective is to have common long-term agreements and a Vendor Database established at in 2010. An Information and Communication Technology Roadmap (2009-2012) has been produced by the OMT and signed by UN authorities in 2010. This Roadmap outlines progress that can be made on ICT both before and after the One UN house. The options proposed therein are subject to detailed cost-benefit analysis, scheduling and budget.

7.4 Sustainability

The One-House objective is to have UN common premises built and occupied by end of June 2012; the UNCT has worked with the GoR to identify land for the future One UN office. However, to be completed, the One-House project needs funding for a geological survey of allocated site, building design and architectural drawings, cost estimates, cost-benefit analysis, as well as request for EOI from developers. The 2009 UNCT workplan sets out a number of recommended activities to advance the One-House, including the creation of a roadmap and budget for common premises and getting support from HQ and donors for common premises.

Systems for shared services and cooperation are important measures of sustainability as well. One important achievement since DoA has been the engagement of various UN staff members, who have participated as panellists in recruitment processes for posts outside their home agency. This appears to be consistently applied across UN agencies, thus greatly adding to the cooperative spirit and team atmosphere of the UN in Rwanda. It reflects another element of standardization of norms, common values and beliefs across agencies towards common expectations, a key culture based element of coordination efficiency.

Exhibit 7.1 Dashboard Scoring on One Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One-UN Pillar</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Office</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


22 OMT Presentation to the UNCT retreat, 29 October 2009.
8. One Voice

DaO in Rwanda is supported by a common communications strategy. The UN Communications Group (UNCG) has its own budget, and makes the strategic communications decisions for the entire UN family in Rwanda. The strategy covers internal and external audiences and covers such priorities as media relations, visual identity, publications, events, and common tools, including the website, surveys, and trainings. The UN Intranet, a regularly updated internet website and monthly newsletters are concrete examples of spreading the key messages of One UN in Rwanda. As shown in Exhibit 8.1 below, the UN Survey respondents have a range of sources of One UN information at their disposal in Rwanda. Moreover, they are largely satisfied with the level of communication on DaO that is made available to them.

Exhibit 8.1 Internal Communications on DaO

Source of information about DaO:
- UN Rwanda website, 13%
- UN Rwanda newsletter, 28%
- My agency (documents, colleagues), 35%
- Resident Coordinator’s Office (e-mails, meetings), 24%

Amount of information received on DaO:
- About right, 73%
- Too little, 24%
- Too much, 2%
- Not applicable/Do not know, 1%

Source: Survey Respondents
8.1 Effectiveness

Finding 27: In communications, the UN Communication Group can point to a number of key achievements, both in terms of internal and external communications about DaO, but also in terms of its role in advocacy.

The existence of the UN Communication group (UNCG) is itself evidence of a coordinated approach to the subject under the umbrella of One UN. The team is led by the RCO Communications Advisor, and comprises 10 staff members from UN agencies, roughly half of whom are full-time communications staff for their agencies.

An important achievement of the UNCG, through DaO has been a shift away from agency based advocacy in favour of issue-based advocacy, where key messages and key UN days (International Women’s Day, World Poverty Day, UN day, World AIDS Day, and 16 days of Activism) are celebrated collectively. This has led to less individual agency “flag waving” and instead has kept the focus of attention on the key advocacy messages. What’s more, UN week provides a platform for joint advocacy on key issues of interest in Rwanda.

Like other task force members, UNCG members also act as focal points within the TG meetings, thus staying abreast of key needs from the sectoral areas in terms of media coverage, field visits, and collecting content for stories or coordinating media interventions.

Since the start of DaO, the UN has benefitted from the outstanding role that the UNCG has played through the development and use of surveys of UN and government partners, in coordination with the UNCT and RCO. These surveys were done in 2008 and again in 2009, and not only captured the internal and external effectiveness of the communications work being carried out by the UN, but also provided important data points and baselines for the perception of DaO internally and externally. For example:

- Overall awareness of the DaO concept in 2008 by the general public was only 14% in 2008
- Amongst stakeholders of the UN, the overall awareness of the concept was 60% in 2008
- Radio and TV are key sources of UN news and information. However, Schools and university, websites and press are much more important for stakeholders
- Key messages recalled about delivering as one UN relate to improving efficiency and the service to society.
- The delivering as one UN idea is overall favourably rated.

This data provides key baseline information on DaO for Rwanda, and sets the stage for future comparative analysis of stakeholders and the general public.

8.2 Relevance

Common services and shared premises are relevant to the reduction in transaction costs that are a fundamental part of the Rwanda Aid Policy.

8.3 Efficiency

Members of the communications group and other UN staff point out that as a team, the UN Communications Group can achieve a greater impact for a given mix of resources than would otherwise be the case. It is one of the best examples of efficient use of scarce resources within the DaO pilot in Rwanda.
8.4 Sustainability

The Communications Group supports improved internal sustainability of the One UN programme in Rwanda through internal communications and knowledge sharing. Moreover, through a common external communications strategy, the “One Voice” helps to build a brand image of the UN in Rwanda as a common entity.

Exhibit 8.2 Dashboard Scoring on One Voice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One-UN Pillar</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Voice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Conclusions and Recommendations

9.1 Conclusions

From the above findings, it is evident that in its short lifespan, DaO in Rwanda has played a marked role in strengthening the operational effectiveness of One UN programming based on the strength of the organizational coordination of the UN team in Rwanda. At an early stage, operational effectiveness and efficiencies in terms of reduction in duplication should lead to greater development effectiveness, though it is too early to say with certainty whether the results, both upstream and downstream, are greater than the pre-2008 agreements.

What Difference has the DaO Made?

The natural first question about the DaO is whether it has made any difference and by implication, whether the positive contributions were worth the costs. As the decision has been taken to develop a follow-on evaluation of all eight pilot countries, the evaluation has framed the answer not as a summative conclusion, but as a starting point for a more detailed examination of options and improvements.

The UN DaO in Rwanda today can be characterised as a positive and innovative structure that has provided a stage on which the UN agencies, both resident and non-resident, can collectively and strategically relate to improved harmonisation, strengthen their ability to contribute to goal attainment, promote their collective and individual influence, and ultimately strengthen the UN's overall performance.

In this light, three general conclusions or observations can be made. They reflect a synthesis of all the above findings:

- Notwithstanding some limitations noted in the evaluation, DaO has contributed to strengthening the UN’s overall operational performance and has positioned the UN to be a more relevant and effective development partner in Rwanda.

- By focusing on internal structures and organizational coordination, the UN in Rwanda has set the stage for greatly enhancing programme effectiveness through piloting, innovation, and strategic interventions meeting needs at the right levels.

- The current DaO is a work in progress; greater attention on defining indicators of and measuring UN organizational performance and cost efficiencies and consideration on exit strategies will increase the DaO scope for effectiveness, sustainability and relevance in a crowded and complex donor landscape.

9.2 Strengths and Challenges of DaO in Rwanda

These three general conclusions lead to the synthesis of strengths and challenges that can inform the continued development of DaO, leading to the mid-term review and any adjustments that may emerge from that review.
### Exhibit 9.1 Strengths and Challenges of the 5 “Ones”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Challenge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Programme</td>
<td>DaO provided UN agencies with a mechanism to promote greater harmonisation of programming with other agencies, through TGs and TFs. Joint planning has reduced duplication and therefore assisted programme efficiency. Joint interventions permit testing development results and their cost effectiveness prior to scaling up.</td>
<td>There are inherent initial transaction costs in implementing a new framework like the DaO that cannot be avoided, both for the UN agencies and government partners. These costs lie in the processes required for initial planning, negotiations, and reporting. Conceptually, the added costs are offset to some degree by the added value of a collective relationship. This must be captured, in part, as part of the mid-term review or as a separate evaluation. There is a need to conceptualise the thinking about capacity building exercises and the exit strategy for a selected number of activities. RO and HQ participation in this would be welcome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Budget</td>
<td>UNCT approved incentives for joint programming. PPOC has appropriate mechanisms and incentives for joint programming and rapid implementation under the One Fund.</td>
<td>Long term effect of One Fund on overall funding for Rwanda must be closely monitored. Transparency remains a challenge for One UN in Rwanda. Agencies need to develop realistic planning on budgets, given available resources to carry out activities. Per unit standardization of costing for some outputs would be useful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Leader</td>
<td>The RC and UNCT have collectively played a notable challenge function in relation to improved management practices and willingness to pilot and make adjustments. The GoR and Development Partners have taken the lead and supported in implementing DaO.</td>
<td>Measuring the performance of the DaO organizational success. Performance review of the value added of DaO organizational efficiency with respect to programmed results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Office</td>
<td>Leadership at the country level to harmonize administration and other elements of the relationship.</td>
<td>Individual agency RO and HQ slow harmonization in administrative areas. Lack of evidence on cost efficiencies due to One Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Voice</td>
<td>Shared results of the Communication Group have wider impact than would otherwise be the case.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9.3 The DaO Dashboard

The DaO dashboard was developed in order to following dashboard summarizes the results of scoring based upon a number of performance criteria. The scoring provided was from 1-4, with 1 = Poor, 2 = Moderate, 3= Good, and 4= Excellent. The detailed performance measures for this Dashboard can be found in Volume II, Appendix VII.
Exhibit 9.2 Four Point Assessment of the Pillars of DaO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Programme</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Budget</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Leader</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Office</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Voice</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
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</table>

9.4 Readiness for One-UN

Readiness for One UN implies an organizational readiness of both government and the UN, which is readily visible in Rwanda. Our assessment of the Rwanda context has led us to propose an initial framework on government and UN country office readiness to prepare for One UN delivery, in order to capture some of the logic of what is needed for a successful pilot. It measures Government organizational readiness along the x-axis, and UN organizational readiness along the y-axis, with the top right quadrant representing both strong UN and government organizational readiness. According to the top right quadrant, for One UN to be successful, the UN country office has to: experience strong coordination, have a history of conducting joint interventions and joint training, share common work practices, harmonize operations in order to have low transaction costs as well have an openness to pilot and innovate. The government organization must have: strong national systems and good governance and stability, it has to make the best use of its systems in order to have low transaction costs and have the ability to innovate. In addition, there must be a mature CSO community in the country as well as a stable environment. DPs are implicit within this framework: the government’s use of national systems, such as SWAps and budget support, imply a strong governance environment alongside DPs use of harmonized systems.

One key commonality for both the government and the UN in a successful partnership is the need for the right incentives, in view of the transaction costs for collaboration. Two levels of transaction costs might be considered – those within the organization itself, as well as those that might exist between the UN and the government. If either of these is viewed as being too high for collaboration, the organization(s) will not be ready for DaO. A second commonality is the importance of creating an environment for innovation and piloting on both sides. This implies that both the UN and the government are experienced organizations in innovation and have the organizational capacity and coordination capacity to undertake pilots and innovative programmes or activities.
Exhibit 9.3 Initial Framework for a successful One UN pilot country

Preparing for One-UN Delivery

UN Country Office
- Strong Coordination between UN Heads
- History of joint programmes between agencies
- Joint training between agencies and with government
- Common work practices
- Operations harmonized
- Ability to pilot and innovate
- Available Human Resources

Government
- Weak governance systems
- Complex emergency situations (conflict or post-conflict)
- National priorities not well defined
- Many donors and funding mechanisms
- Weak CSD community
- High transaction costs
- Inability to pilot or innovate

UN Country Office
- Weak Coordination between UN Heads
- Few joint programmes between agencies
- No joint training
- Few common work practices
- Staffing shortages

Government
- Weak governance systems
- Complex emergency situations (conflict or post-conflict)
- National priorities not well defined
- Many donors and funding mechanisms
- Weak CSD community
- High transaction costs
- Inability to pilot or innovate

UN Country Office
- Strong Coordination between UN Heads
- History of joint programmes between agencies
- Joint training between agencies and with government
- Common work practices
- Operations harmonized
- Ability to pilot and innovate
- Available Human Resources

Government
- Strong national systems with well developed linkages and connections with local or regional government
- Good governance
- Stable environment
- Donor use of national systems mechanisms: budget support, SVA, Baskets, etc.
- Competition for Development Partner funding
- Existence and maturity of the CSD community
- Ability to pilot and innovate

UN Country Office
- Weak Coordination between UN Heads
- Few joint programmes between agencies
- No joint training
- Few common work practices
- Staffing shortages

Government
- Weak governance systems
- Complex emergency situations (conflict or post-conflict)
- National priorities not well defined
- Many donors and funding mechanisms
- Weak CSD community
- High transaction costs
- Inability to pilot or innovate

High

Low

Government Organizational Readiness
The top right quadrant, as shown in Exhibit 9.3 is that which is best represented by DaO in Rwanda. In reviewing the entire matrix, the three other quadrants do not have the right mix of readiness for a successful One UN partnership. In the case of the upper left quadrant, weak government readiness would minimize the impact DaO might achieve. This would be the case, for example, where transaction costs of coordination between the UN and government are judged to be extremely high, which may be due to weak governance structures. The lower right column is also unsustainable; in this case UN agencies do not work easily together, as suggested in the matrix by little or no past experience in joint programming or partnerships. Therefore, the transaction costs of coming together would be judged as being excessively high. In the lower left quadrant, neither government nor UN is ready for One UN action – this may be the case in certain states under emergency situations, whereby complex planning procedures between agencies and with government would not be appropriate.

9.5 Recommendations

The recommendations that follow are designed not so much to retrospectively correct any of the shortcomings which this evaluation may have uncovered. Rather, they have been developed in the spirit of organizational learning to look forward to complement and support DaO as it moves to expand from, in essence, a pilot project with several adjustments made over time, to a more formidable presence that will serve to meet the expectations of the GoR and remain a model pilot for future One UN countries. From there, the real benefits of One UN should be seen in more practical terms – that is, in terms of the effectiveness of results on the ground, on the learning and knowledge that is developed through capacity building activities at all levels, and on the economies of scale that can be achieved, leading to greater results at lower per-unit cost.

In this light, it needs to be emphasized that many of the recommendations which follow are largely formative and procedural in nature. They concentrate on suggesting ways to build a stronger platform. The strategic thinking and strategic intent that underpins DaO is sound and the overall avenues of operation are generally effective given the current scope.

The recommendations that follow are set out using the 5 One-UN Pillars; however, they concentrate on four primary areas that correspond to this evaluation’s topology of effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and sustainability.

- Effectiveness – strengthening planning and monitoring systems so as to improve immediacy and promote joint interventions and pilots.
- Relevance – the strengthening of coordination with Rwanda’s Aid Policy as well as stronger linkages with some key multilateral actors.
- Efficiency – demonstrating real savings in transaction costs (human and financial) over time to validate the One Office harmonization, and demonstrate greater per unit results in interventions in Rwanda.
- Sustainability – continued focus on key interventions that make a difference and that can be handed over within a clear time frame and with a clear exit strategy.

Our findings with respect to the effectiveness of current DaO planning, reporting and managerial systems highlight the degree to which it is, in effect, at an early formative stage for evaluation. Key DaO coordinating mechanisms have been largely established and are setting the stage of improved operational effectiveness in terms of planning effectiveness, engagement of staff, and taking advantage of comparative advantages of all agencies. It should be noted that while the mid-term review of the UNDAF is not yet underway, some of these activities are likely to be highlighted during the mid-term review process in 2010.
Our principle focus in making recommendations with respect to efficiency is directed toward one of the original intentions of DaO; that is to say, “…in improving efficiency of the UN system and reducing overhead and administrative costs”\textsuperscript{23}. These recommendations differ from those made in relation to Effectiveness presented above, in that those above focused largely on management for development results, where the ones presented below are mostly related to process, resources and operations of the “One Office”.

We recognize that the DaO operations system in Rwanda lacks the proximity that exists in a One UN House scenario. This has implications on several fronts – systems and operations that have to be diffused across several locales, staff do not benefit from close proximity and government lacks a physical one-stop shop for its UN engagements. The effort at achieving cost efficiencies in the One-office context of Rwanda, where a One UN House is not yet operational, is a challenge. However, it is necessary that the UN and the GoR demonstrate that savings can be realized even prior to the One UN house completion. Moreover, it sets a baseline for operational savings that can be achieved in the future One-House.

Our findings with respect to relevance pointed to the degree to which the first UNDAF programming has been well-received, seen as being closely aligned with the EDPRS. However, as the DaO confronts its mid-term review, it faces the challenge of too many activities; a do everything approach. At the same time, projects are not the most favoured modality for the GoR, thus putting greater pressure on DaO to reaffirm the value of its approach, while engaging closely in discussions with government and other DPs on budget support and SWApS, as the trusted honest broker. Therefore, a first consideration with respect to strengthening the relevance of DaO for the future lies in the promotion of more active means of coordination and alignment.

Overall, in addition we feel it appropriate to lay out two primary and overarching recommendations.

**Recommendation 1:** The UN agencies, both in Rwanda and at Headquarters, and the Government of Rwanda should continue to encourage an environment for piloting and innovation in programming and operations

Both the UN organizational readiness and government organizational readiness have fostered an environment where innovation can be championed, and adjustments can be made to reflect improvements following practice. This “readiness” factor is discussed further in the conclusions above. This recommendation covers all of the One UN pilots and pillars insofar as pilots and innovations take place in a collaborative space where mutual learning can take place.

Since the development of the COD in 2007, the DaO experience has shown that the Rwanda UN Country Team, UN Regional offices and Headquarters alike have benefitted from the freedom for greater “piloting” in the true sense of the word. Each needs to recommit itself to seeking out the most efficient ways of doing business which can have the greatest impact on results. This means allowing for new innovative software on programme data and budgets, innovative methods for carrying out pilots, or testing out the use of pooled funding mechanisms rather than a strict adherence to parallel funding.

As noted below on recommendations linked to sustainability, an underlying assumption of pilots is the need for a time-bound decision on success or failure of a process or intervention. To help to achieve this in the Rwandan DaO context, the current PPOC review of joint interventions requires a clear indication of expected development results as well as an exit strategy.

With innovation and piloting comes the necessity to foster the learning that is often implicit in strategic intent of joint interventions. The dynamic environment fostered by the organizational readiness of the GoR creates opportunities to examine the real value-added of combining the comparative advantages of the UN agencies alongside government. The last two years has seen DaO prioritize training of UN staff

\textsuperscript{23} Delivering as One Concept Paper, page 15.
and government on results based management combined with human rights based approach to programming. This groundwork on M&E, gender and HRBAP, as well as the M&E task force’s activities can be the foundation upon which issue-specific evaluations and assessments of such pilots and innovations can be undertaken. Synergistic mechanisms for improved monitoring and independent assessments of pilots should be developed; these may include engaging the University and research community and favouring more partnerships with civil society, the private sector and other DPs.

**Recommendation 2:** A reinvigorated UNCT and RC should work to strengthen and systematize a DaO Performance Measurement Framework.

This area of strengthening is linked to the work of the RC and UNCT in managing and leading change within the DaO environment. It must be noted that staffing vacancies within the RCO (M&E officer, Senior Policy Officer) for the early months of DaO limited the ability of RCO and UNCT to systematize key performance indicators which could demonstrate progress of on the One UN pillars, including accompanying structures and processes. A number of elements might be considered to strengthen this process:

First of all, RC and the UNCT may wish to internalize a number of performance criteria outlined within DPAF, and so more directly link its own performance with the indicators selected by the GoR. This would further align DaO performance with other DPs and more broadly link to the Paris Declaration objectives.

Secondly, an up-to-date performance assessment framework with Key Performance indicators should be a greater focus within the RCO and in UNCT meetings. In addition to the linkage with DPAF, the Framework should include performance indicators across the pillars of the One UN and cover such issues as:

- Quarterly disbursement of Core, vertical and One UN funds as a percentage of total funds planned by Theme Group (see Finding 13);
- Percent of HQ and RO missions that are carried out jointly (see Finding 18);
- Percent of UN field missions and M&E activities that are carried out jointly between agencies and jointly with government (see Finding 4 and Finding 24);
- Annual One UN building and transaction cost reductions (see Finding 25 and next area of strengthening).
- Engagement of Task forces within Theme Groups and government structures

As this evaluation was being carried out, a number of these indicators, as well as others, were being developed by the Coordination Officer in the RCO.

Finally, in a rapidly evolving organizational context where new structures and systems are being developed quickly, the supporting documentation and terminology needs to be fully captured and explained, both internally and, equally importantly, with external partners. As performance criteria are defined, it may be useful for the DaO to provide further clarity on terms such as “joint interventions” and “joint missions”. It may also be useful for RCO to develop an updated common Glossary of terms, in order to solidify a common understanding of the terms used by DaO.

Key performance indicators for DaO should be reviewed at regular UNCT meetings and Steering Committee meetings, with a focus on achievements and corrective measures to be taken. A schedule of key meetings, including UNCT meetings, should be planned sufficiently in advance such that non-resident agencies may participate. Otherwise, non-resident agencies should be offered other methods of staying connected with UNCT meetings, such as through conference calls.
The relative youth of the DaO and the rapid pace of its evolution as well as the pace of the GoR’s advancement are the driving factors behind most of the lines for strengthening that are presented next.

9.6 One Programme

Recommendation 3: The UNCT in Rwanda should engage in a process during the MTR about how to clarify what appear to be some ambiguities and difficulties with regard to longer-term monitoring and evaluation of the UNDAF.

While the Monitoring and Evaluation acumen and knowledge of result-based management (RBM) by staff is robust within the UN, this evaluation uncovered ambiguities and potential for improvement in the monitoring systems of the UNDAF. While there is coherence between these outcomes and the outcomes defined in the EDPRS as well as the baselines used, unlike the EDPRS, the UNDAF matrices do not contain targets for 2012. The mid-term review period in 2010 may be the opportune moment to plan for a review of 2012 targets of the effects of the activities and outputs produced under the DaO framework. As much as possible, targets should be harmonized between EDPRS and the UNDAF.

Related with this area of strengthening is the need for government and DaO to test in a formative way whether activities are spread too thinly across thematic sectors and result areas to demonstrate clear results and causality. Over 1000 activities were planned in the 2008 and 2009 CAPs; in 2010, this number remained at over 900. The MTR must question the fragmentation of activities being carried out under the DaO framework.

The Monitoring and Evaluation calendar contained in the UNDAF Annex 3 should be reviewed and updated to reflect the key studies, surveys and evaluations being carried out by the One UN family. This should be shared widely with government and DPs, with clear indications where cooperation between DPs on analytic work is being carried out. It may be useful to post this information within the One UN website, as well as links to GoR websites for all completed studies, surveys and evaluations completed collaboratively. This recommendation is linked to Findings 1-4.

Recommendation 4: It would benefit the UNCT, the Government of Rwanda and Development Partners to be more actively engaged in the measuring and testing of outcomes of pilots and joint interventions.

Also linked to Finding 1-4 as well as Finding 8, in the spirit of piloting and rapid advancement in programming in Rwanda under the leadership of the government, there needs to be a recognition that some ideas will inevitably fail, while others will succeed. Pilots must undergo rigorous monitoring and solid evaluation in order to demonstrate effectiveness and potential for scalability. This spirit of learning is even more important is a pilot country that is potentially a model for future One UN countries. Therefore, the UN and government should collaborate to make a more clear distinction of the pilot interventions and joint interventions within the UNDAF that have been reviewed and hold early potential for scaling up, and of others reviewed that are seen as unsuccessful and why. For those worthy of scaling up, better information can be provided for potential donors on future areas for funding. This information may include the factors for success, the unit-costs for which the development results can be achieved, and the engagement required. For those unsuccessful, lessons can be learned and shared across DPs, and adjustments and corrections made.

- Measuring the effect of interventions should help determine whether or not more focus should be placed on certain types of interventions compared to others, and allow time for needed adjustment in a formative setting. This discussion can only take place in an environment where all development partners are fully aware of the One UN interventions.
- M&E task force may have a role to play in harmonizing terms of references and reviewing formative evaluation activities.
Recommendation 5: The UN in Rwanda should develop a more formalized means of coordination across the network of multi-lateral actors, CSOs and the private sector with the view to the eventual promulgation of more common and harmonized approaches.

This recommendation speaks to a core reality in contemporary development cooperation: namely, the centrality of the collective work of multi-lateral institutions. The UN through its leadership with the DPCG has addressed the question of coordination on the broader scale to some degree. As Finding 19 notes, however, it appears to be absent is a similar degree of coordination with sister multilateral institutions, in particular the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the IMF. While the World Bank and IMF members of the larger UN family, they do not appear to be active participants in various UN meetings or discussions.

Moreover, while much positive energy exists between individual UN agencies and these institutions through bilateral engagement or through technical working group meetings, this has not been shared with the UN as a whole, so as to maximize understanding and potential for greater collaboration.

As SWAps and budget support grows in importance (Finding 5) as a key issue for development cooperation, it would appear sensible that the UN develop a more strategic understanding with the multilaterals, thus promoting a greater degree of harmonization between DaO and the Bretton Woods organizations. This may be within the role of the Senior Policy Officer within the RCO. The importance of harmonization, not only in relation to the adherence to the Paris Declaration but in a more practical sense on the ground, is likely to increase synergies and strengthen the possibility for long-term partnerships.

In a similar vein, partnerships with CSOs and the private sector, as was mentioned in the Executive Directors Joint Mission Report, sometimes remain at the agency-level, thus depriving other agencies from knowledge of these essential partners. HACT has already gone some way to improving information and sharing on key partners to the UN. The RCO should be kept closely engaged in the sharing of these partnerships across agencies. This could take the form of a DaO private sector engagement strategy or a common CSO engagement strategy.

Recommendation 6: The RC and UNCT should work with government and other DPs to establish modalities for capacity building and exit strategies for Rwanda

There are few discussions of an exit strategy within the current DaO programming environment (see Finding 9, 11 and 12), yet it is a vital part of the aid landscape. This was equally highlighted by the Joint Executive Board’s recent mission to Rwanda as well as the Dalberg Report on Capacity Assessment for Rwanda (Finding 19). At a country level, the most recent PPOC reviewer’s handbook for joint assessments requires a demonstration of sustainability, through, for example, the creation of partnerships and handover to government partners. The UN Team should develop better mechanisms to review capacity building in Rwanda, develop standardized costs, and evaluate in which circumstances an exit strategy is most appropriate, keeping in mind the normative role of the UN as well as the rights-based programming of UN agencies.

In its next programming framework, the UN Team in Rwanda should define sustainability strategies. These should include exit strategies, identification of risks and mitigation strategies to achieve sustainable results, and more sustainable approaches to capacity development. The evaluation found insufficient attention to sustainability within program documents and reports. Sustainability should be considered in the design of new programs and monitored throughout the life of the program. This will require the UN to be considerably more proactive in identifying potential sustainability issues and developing sustainability and exit strategies during the planning stage, increasing attention to sustainability of results throughout implementation and requests for One-UN funds through PPOC. The UN should clarify (in conjunction with GoR), develop and foster a common understanding, approach, and strategy to capacity development that fosters sustainable institutional development. The UN’s capacity building efforts have accounted for
a significant portion of its investments over the two years, but much of this has been aimed at individuals. Future capacity building support should consider how capacity building initiatives will benefit institutions, where longer term benefits can be realized.

**Recommendation 7:** The UN in Rwanda has a multi-faceted role in the Rwanda and will be challenged in the through the Division of Labor to clarify its niche – i.e., the role(s) in which it has greatest comparative advantage.

One of the challenges faced by many organizations is to define and nurture their comparative advantage or niche. Global competition has become the norm in most sectors, countries, and across all types of organizations and institutions including those involved in international development. Recent financial events have heightened the stakes. In this context, organizations are being increasingly challenged to be contextually relevant and to identify and focus on their strengths and added value. This also implies that they need to decide how and when to withdraw from activities where their relevance and/or added value have declined over time. As an organization, UN has a unique role to play with the GoR in terms of its normative role and obligations under international conventions. Given the wide and diverse role of the individual agencies within the UN family, reducing roles and sectors is not always possible. However, DaO is an opportunity: DaO acts as an internal division of labor, whereby via Theme Groups, individual agencies take the lead on some engagements with government, while others support the lead agency. There is therefore a role for the RC, Heads of Agencies, UN staff and the Communications Group to confirm a clear position on the Division of labor issue.

At the same time, however, the normative role of the UN must be maintained at both the upstream and downstream levels, allowing for UN agencies to benefit from a flexible approach to the division of labor, while ensuring that where possible, a lead agency can be identified for all key sectors, with other agencies providing backup and regular TG support.

**9.7 One Budgetary Framework**

**Recommendation 8:** The RCO and UNCT need to develop a common framework across result areas for quarterly reporting and better sharing of results with DPs and government. ROs and Agency Headquarters have an important role to play in harmonizing systems to facilitate common financial reporting.

Challenges for DaO are the quantity and quality of reporting on results as well as on financial disbursements (see Finding 14). This recommendation is predicated on the GoR’s need for greater transparency on the progress of programme and activity results and financial disbursements throughout the year. This recommendation would address this potential accountability gap through a process of standardization.

Moving in line with the Rwanda Aid Policy (Finding 6), which fundamentally is aligned with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, is part and parcel of the strategic intent of DaO. And the challenge for individual agencies as well as the entire UN is significant due to their different mandates, various types of budgeting, technical support or in-kind support mechanisms, and the scope for additional vertical funds that can be raised throughout the year, further confounding predictability and transparency. These are the challenges that require a re-think, both on the part of the GoR as well as UN agencies and the ROs and HQs.

Common programme planning by result area, through the UNDAF, COD and CAPs, goes part of the way in improving harmonization, and sets the expectation for the next level of standardization; that is, in reporting on results and on disbursements and available funds, so as to allow the GoR the ability to manage its funds as needed with the UN and other DPs. More transparency is also required with regard to what constitutes an appropriate level of overhead, as well in the costs of PIUs in use by the UN.
It appears that some of this work may currently be underway under the leadership of the PPOC and in the context of the web-based Programme Monitor tool. Lessons on this tool should be shared within the GoR and the wider UN community, to the extent that it solves some of the challenges mentioned above. It may be appropriate to further link this tool to the harmonizing of mission reports of progress on activities and outputs. This may be linked with HACT reporting mechanisms, as well as joint monitoring missions as shown below.

**Recommendation 9:** The UNCT needs to take a leadership role in promoting financial transparency and accountability through the DPAF and CPAF.

At present and given the emerging financial reporting systems being in Rwanda, the UN has been present in promoting aid effectiveness through engagements with MINECOFIN. Nevertheless, DaO has brought little or no appreciable gains in transparent reporting systems of financial disbursements or the status of completion of activities, according to numerous partners. There is therefore a need for DaO to take a more aggressive role in promoting the aid effectiveness agenda, including reporting of project disbursements and in support of the DPAF or similar reporting structures. The legitimacy of the One UN exercise rests on cogent arguments that One UN can achieve greater results in a timely manner using programmes with concomitant increases in the speed of disbursements and reduction in overhead costs. As mentioned in Finding 14, some efforts to this effect are underway.

### 9.8 One Leader

**Recommendation 10:** UNDG and individual UN agencies must continue to empower and embolden the RC as well as Heads of Agencies in Rwanda with improved services, greater functionality and faster response times for pilot UN countries.

As with any pilot, the One UN pilot experience has provided lessons learned for future adjustment. It is clear that in the case of the One UN pilot countries, organizational change requires strong leadership and commitment on the part of the resident government as well as on the part of the RC and the Heads of Agencies. Organizational change, as shown through the One UN pilot, also requires necessary support mechanisms, incentives and checks and balances. While One UN priorities to support the eight pilot countries included capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and cross-agency integrated support, these were not sufficiently reinforced at the operational and procedural levels in agency headquarters to facilitate the adjustment amongst the pilot agencies. IT systems, recruitment policies, transport procedures and agency reporting structures are well cited examples where further harmonization can have significant benefits, in line with Findings 10, 13, 17, 18 and 24.

- Underlying these elements is a need for a more clear communication between UNDG, agencies and DaO pilots on the progress of the One UN pilots
- UN agencies must clearly work to reduce the duplicative reporting burden on One UN pilot countries
- UN agencies must collaborate with a view towards harmonizing HR systems, IT systems and financial processes between agencies
  - Greater and more responsive troubleshooting capacity from UNDG would permit faster decision making by RCs

### 9.9 One Office

**Recommendation 11:** Joint monitoring missions (between UN agencies in Rwanda, at regional level and at HQ level, and with government) should be favoured at all times in Rwanda.
DPAF, which represents the government monitoring framework for DP’s engagement with aid effectiveness, has allotted an indicator towards the number of joint monitoring missions carried out. At the same time, the spirit of the One UN reform points to a greater number of joint field missions between UN agencies, including those from HQ and RO to Rwanda.

The RC and the UNCT, through the M&E task force, should look at ways to achieve the DPAF targets in joint missions. A common DaO mission plan would go further by providing clear information to government and partners of upcoming missions to districts for monitoring purposes.

At the RO and HQ level, joint missions to Rwanda should become the norm, with measurable targets and experience sharing, so that the learning value of such missions can be captured and shared through UNDG. It is by such initiatives, which are not dependent upon systems or processes but by schedules, that One UN entrenches itself as an effective modality of operation.

**Recommendation 12:** The UNCT and the Steering Committee may wish to place a greater focus on reducing transaction costs, even in the current One Office environment in Rwanda.

DaO has focused a great deal on the processes and systems around joint programming in Rwanda, including a number of innovative systems and processes for which the UN team is rightfully proud. This focus has come at a price, namely less prioritization on reducing (and measuring) transaction costs and efficiencies as elucidated in Finding 25 of this evaluation. A heightened focus on transaction cost reduction would greatly solidify the position of DaO from the point of view of efficiency and the perception of the UN as a multilateral organization at the forefront of change management towards greater streamlining. More importantly, a greater focus on reducing transaction costs would be in line with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda on Aid, as well as the GoR’s Aid Policy. It would furthermore be a clear indication to both Government and DPs that One UN is taking seriously the goal of being an efficient agency and partner.

**Recommendation 13:** It is strongly suggested that UNCT, via the Operations Management Team, fully develop and implement a plan on how it will reduce transaction costs in the coming two years to 2012.

In April 2007, an OMT meeting was held to plan operations savings that might be prioritized in the DaO environment. However, on close inspection, while some early cost efficiencies had been realized in terms of a common dispensary and common security even prior to the start of DaO, the real savings have not been adequately calculated so as to lay out a clear rationale for the One office under DaO. In line with this plan, and an updated list of priorities for 2010, a number of elements might be considered.

It may be useful to have a short assessment of achievements on cost savings since 2008. It would also be useful to have a prioritization of where efficiency gains can most easily be made in the One UN office environment of Rwanda. This is already underway in 2010 by the OMT as noted in Finding 26. A monitoring system should be established to closely track the cost savings of DaO efficiencies, with clear targets and indicators of performance that should be part of the performance assessment framework mentioned above.
A list of efficiency savings priorities where UN agency RO or HQ engagement is required may also be developed and shared with respective HQ, taking into account needs of resident as well as non-resident agencies. This would respond in part to Finding 14 related to the common challenges with UN agency HQ.

9.10 List of Findings

Finding 1: Over the past two years, UN DaO’s focus on results by Theme Group has made some notable contributions to enhance programme effectiveness towards development results in Rwanda.

Finding 2: Theme groups and task forces have enhanced cooperation among individual agencies to improve both operational and development effectiveness and coordination on policy and technical issues.

Finding 3: At this early stage, there is a mixed view whether the efforts of coordination and harmonization seen internally by the UN have met the expectations of government, DPs and CSOs in terms of development results.

Finding 4: While there is an improvement in overall programme coordination thanks to DaO, a stronger emphasis on harmonizing monitoring, reporting and evaluation of programme results has not fully taken root through the assessment period, leading to a missed opportunity to more fully align with government and capture the benefits of coordination under DaO.

Finding 5: DaO is relevant to Rwanda’s priorities and its strategic intent responds at the appropriate levels to Rwanda’s needs.

Finding 6: There are the beginnings of a more coherent and strategic relationship between government and the UN, due in part to DaO. More work, however, needs to be done to fully align with the Rwanda Aid Policy.

Finding 7: The Joint planning environment favoured by DaO has had an overall beneficial effect on programme efficiency, largely due to the reduction in duplication.

Finding 8: Joint Interventions are laying the groundwork for testing the overall cost-benefit efficiency of DaO.

Finding 9: While still in its infancy, DaO’s PPOC appears to be an innovative and effective mechanism to guide One UN programming decisions.

Finding 10: The piloting of the Programme Monitor Zoho software is the type of innovative practice that has the potential to greatly advance UN programming and reporting.

Finding 11: The GoR is leading the way to ensure sustainability by placing an emphasis on capacity building, in line with the Government’s Aid Policy and the recognized priorities of the UN.

Finding 12: Clear indications of exit strategies are only now starting to emerge in the DaO programming environment.

Finding 13: Allocation of the One UN fund has evolved since inception of DaO, however, delays in financial transactions continue to slow implementation for some One-UN fund activities.
Finding 14: Clear and transparent UN Financial reporting remains a challenge under DaO

Finding 15: It does not appear that multi-year allocations of the One Fund are permitted, hampering efficient programme planning

Finding 16: Programme Funding under the One UN fund does not meet the demand for funds planned in the UNDAF

Finding 17: Some legitimate concerns exist about the progress of One UN at Regional Office (RO) and Headquarters, weakening development impacts and creating duplication.

Finding 18: However, the GoR and the UNCT have begun to see better coordination at HQ level, particularly in terms of joint HQ missions.

Finding 19: DaO has benefitted from a strong level of commitment of all levels of government as well as the UNCT and most Development Partners.

Finding 20: The effective functioning of the RCO and the sharing of duties amongst UN agencies has provided some measurable efficiency gains for the UN.

Finding 21: To date, the RC and UNCT have yet to sufficiently systematize performance review of the One UN pillars, which has hindered a prioritization and sharing of key results to be achieved within DaO.

Finding 22: The range of DaO initiatives are demonstrative of the ability of the UN’s leadership in Rwanda to harmonize as well as adjust and adapt to changing internal and external needs.

Finding 23: The DaO systems in place promote internal sustainability and reduce the risk that leadership changes will impact the DaO approach.

Finding 24: Agency-specific policies sometimes hinder the functioning of One Office.

Finding 25: The lack of evidence of substantial cost efficiencies or of a specific plan for reducing transaction costs due to shared services thus far constitutes a risk to the overall success of DaO in Rwanda.

Finding 26: The identification of priority areas for operations harmonization and reduction in transaction costs will serve as overall targets for future gains in efficiency.

Finding 27: In communications, the UN Communication Group can point to a number of key achievements, both in terms of internal and external communications about DaO, but also in terms of its role in advocacy.