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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Português</th>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>non-resident Agency</td>
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<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results Based Management</td>
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Executive Summary

1. **Background and Methodology:** In broad terms, the UN in Mozambique has an annual budget of USD 150,000,000, employs 600 staffers, consists of 24 legally separate UN agencies. The Delivering as One (DaO) initiative has been operational in Mozambique since 2007. DaO’s goal is to improve program delivery and results, through a more coherent, better-coordinated, funded and managed UN. On February 10th, 2010 the Government of Mozambique and the United Nations, competitively selected Consultores HODI to organize a country-led Evaluation to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the DaO initiative. The process to select a methodology included: framing 17 lines of enquiry and 56 supportive evaluation questions, assessing knowledge gaps, the complexity of the assignment and resulted in the selection of the qualitative approach based on the interpretative paradigm. Methodological challenges included the absence of a baseline indicators and a set of pre-DaO launch assumptions. A total of 130 interfaces that included focus group sessions, SWOT analysis, interviews, consultation sessions, and desk research on 90 documents was completed over a three months period.

2. **Findings & Conclusions:** DaO was launched 3-4 years after the aid environment changed and has to catch up. Notwithstanding, UNCT has effectively established the foundation for the DaO approach in less than 3 years. DaO builds on UNDAF and responds to the challenges in the external aid environment, is a relevant solution, effectively contributes to increased coherence and is repositioning the UN. With the aid of a robust institutional and management framework, UNCT has successfully introduced a substantive horizontal national dimension to UN’s existing vertical chain of command i.e. from the various UN HQs to their respective country offices and is eroding the entrenched “silo” culture in the process. NRA’s are included and bring the full power of the UN together.

3. The GoM interest and commitment to take ownership of the country program has increased post DaO. The GoM interfaces with One Leader and One Program, the UN agencies are working together and programming together, reducing duplication, overlap and competition for funding and contributing to increased levels of coherence. The One Fund has empowered horizontal collaboration and has provided substance to DaO and improved program alignment. Alignment with national development goals has increased through the JPs and joint programming. The humanitarian operations have improved significantly, the configuration, preparedness, coordination with the GoM for response inspires a new level of coherence and confidence. The JPs introduce new synergy and demonstrate the UN can effectively address the complex challenges of multi-sectoral development. However, judgement on the JPs is being withheld because the impact level results are not measurable.

4. The new aid environment increases the challenges for the GoM and Donors. Both are interested in the effectiveness and efficiency of GoM service delivery and recognize a strategic capacity gap in this area. Significant resources are being channelled through the line ministries by the SWAPs and Pooled funds. The UN has a track record and is uniquely placed to contribute to increased service delivery capacity for the GoM. However the UN has not comprehensively occupied this strategic space.
5. The UN in Mozambique has initiated the process of testing and obtaining improved economies of scale, bargaining power, transaction efficiencies and costs savings through harmonization and common services. Harmonization is eliminating the barriers to the UN delivering as one. Comprehensive coverage and mainstreaming of DaO tested processes i.e. common services & harmonization are required. A One Office premises will help the UN to obtain the full benefits of harmonization of business processes, common services and reduce risks of future disruption.

6. In summary, the progress achieved is significant. Notwithstanding the success and progress, there are restraining forces that limit DaO and increase its challenges. Managing these challenges will be critical for DaO to accomplish its full potential. The UN’s challenges are fragmentation, duplication, lack of focus, competition between the agencies for funding, inefficiency, inadequate coherence, inefficient operation inter alia the other UN documented challenges. As currently configured, DaO is an insufficient solution and is contending with significant restraining forces. The next paragraph summarizes the context and cause for the restraining forces.

7. **Problem Causality:** The anthology of each organization, the millions of dollars invested in vertical systems and processes have concretized “silos” over decades and set the framework for duplication. The Institutional separation i.e. 24 agencies reporting on a vertical axis, maintaining separate systems, assets, staffing, infrastructure and business processes, require duplicating functions and responsibilities 24 times on a vertical axis. DaO reduces some of the effects of this duplication. There are horizontal coordination and reporting requirements between the UN Agencies and the RCO. Through the rationalization of responsibilities between HQs and Mozambique, the structural challenges could be reduced. Meanwhile the UN has the following challenges and limitations to address:

   - **Operational Issues:** Coverage of Harmonization and Common Services: There are two dimensions to this challenge, the first is achieving 100% or system wide coverage of all common services and harmonization initiatives that have been initiated and tested (LTA, HACT, EFTs, ICT platform-virtual office, knowledge management infrastructure, common procurement, orientation, audit, etc). The second dimension is to expand the coverage of harmonization and common services to cover new services and processes.

   - **Programmatic Issues:** Project spread. Simplistically, project spread means too many projects, outputs, implementation responsibilities, contributing to inadequate strategic focus and fragmentation and leading to an a non responsive balance in the portfolio. Rebalancing will contribute to higher levels of coherence, strategic repositioning and leveraging of the UN absolute advantages. Rebalancing will enable the UN to improve the service delivery of the line ministries and will address an identified need of the GoM and the Bi- lateral agencies.

   - **Structural Duplication Issue:** There are two dimensions to structural issues, the first is a limitation because it restricts DaO’s scope and area of impact. Why? because the vertical axis (HQs) has its requirements which the respective agencies have an obligation to maintain and service. The second is by not
rationalizing the responsibilities between the various HQs and Mozambique it increases the work load because DaO introduces a horizontal dimension to duplication while maintaining the work load on the vertical axis. The structural duplication creates a work load challenge and a space limitation for DaO.

8. **Managing the Solutions** There is a symbiotic complex relationship between the three issues (above). The effectiveness and scope for addressing the operational issues (i) and project spread (ii) is limited by structural duplication (iii). If the structural issues are addressed i.e. the structural duplication is diminished, then additional space will be created to resolve the operational duplication and to a lesser extent the project spread. Why? Because then there would be space for strategic consolidation and a significant range of services and business processes could be transitioned to common services and/or harmonized business process. The challenges: operational and project spread can be addressed by the UNCT in Mozambique with support from UN HQs, however structural issues will require significant and synchronized leadership from the UN HQs. Consequently the level of effectiveness of DaO and its sustainability is dependent to a material extent on the effectiveness of the UN HQs constructing solutions to the challenges created by the structural duplication issue.

9. The findings confirm the economic advantages of DaO and improvements in development and humanitarian operations as well as Gender, HIV and AIDS and Human Rights. This justifies the continuation of DaO, even without addressing the structural issues. However, the full potential of DaO will remain unrealized if the duplication issue is not addressed.

10. **Recommendations:** The stakeholders have a collective responsibility in creating conditions for DaO to contribute to fundamental change and reposition the UN which achieving system wide coherence.

11. **UNHQs:** Based on DaO´s accomplishments, its limitations and challenges, UNHQs should fast-track the strategic consolidation by decentralizing roles and responsibilities between the respective UN HQs and their country offices and further rationalization between UN Agencies, the RC and CD UNDP. This is a means to address the duplication issue without entering into the formidable area of mandate reviews. The financial allocation model should be revised to ensure that the One Fund is strengthened in line with the multiple pronouncements on national ownership and alignment.

12. **Bi-lateral Agencies:** Strategically invest in repositioning the UN, by directing their financing towards; i) the One Fund, ii) to bridge the performance deficit with the SWAPs and iii) to improve the service delivery capacity of the Ministries. The bi-lateral agencies will reap two sets of benefits, first, the SWAP´s will be more effective and the second is the GoM service delivery will improve. The assumption is that UN will have the human resource capacity to service this space.

13. **GoM:** The GoM should take advantage of the full range of benefits of the UN system by defining its strategy, objectives, priorities and precise expectations of the UN. The PARPA document could be the framework plan from which to these priorities are extracted.

14. **UNCT:** i) The smaller agencies should be strategically consolidated in country, ii) the institutional and management framework should be strengthened to include
Donors in the SC, the powers of the RC should be increased to effectively intervene and overrule in areas that effect the wider UN’s absolute advantage, iii) a programmatic policy stance should define and manage the objectives of rebalancing the portfolio, including the types and levels of engagement and reduce project spread in the process, iv) continue change management until DaO takes effective roots and the coverage of common services and business process harmonization is comprehensive, v) move forward with the One Office, vi) if HQs rationalizes and decentralizes consider one framework arrangement for national staff. vii) implementation of knowledge management and improvement of common monitoring and RBM.

15. **Concluding Observations:** The challenges and limitation in the pre DaO environment have been validated, the UN’s relevance and absolute advantage was diminishing and reform was required. DaO is demand driven solution. UNCT has efficiently and effectively planned and executed the numerous institutional arrangements required to launch DaO. By introducing an effective horizontal dimension to the vertical control axis, the UN’s silos started to erode and new levels of synergy emerged. Program alignment improved and the UN’s capacity to address multi-sectoral development programs was tested. The fragmented organization gradually improved its coherence and the level of sustainability. If the challenges are addressed effectively, DaO will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations and contribute to the relevance and sustainability of the UN in Mozambique. Momentum must be maintained and new space for DaO will be required.

**Acknowledgements**

The UN is a vast and all encompassing organization. The people involved in it do so for various reasons, but without exception because they care about whatever their organization is mandated for. Be it children, the environment, women, the poor, justice, etc. Reforming such an organization from the roots up, touches on the core of the organization and the professionals involved. Evaluating such a reform is therefore a delicate undertaking and impossible to execute without disagreements, disbelieve and disliking as well as pleasant surprise, praise and learning. An external evaluation is like a scorecard carried out by scorers who are not part of the game, who are behind in knowledge, use different lingo, different angles, different interests but try to apply the same scores. Consultores HODI would not have been able to carry out the task without the co-ordination and management of the Government officials from MINEC and UN in the Evaluation secretariat, without the input and availability of the various stakeholders contacted and without the help of: Antonio Chambal, Khovete Panguene, Sharon Elliot, Paula Valentine and our Strategic Advisor and Task Leader Mike Mispelaar. Although we started as reserve players, we have come to care as much about the goals as the captain.

1 June 2010
Jeannette Keyzer
Consultores HODI, Maputo
Chapter 1 - Introduction

Preamble
This is a Draft Evaluation Report (ER) for the Country Level Evaluation of the Delivering as One (DaO) initiative. This report is being submitted to the Evaluation Management Group on June 1st, 2010. Unless and until formally approved and released by the United Nations and the Government of Mozambique this report will be deemed to be an unofficial draft.

Background

1. The DaO initiative has been operational since 2007 in eight countries¹, including Mozambique. The High-level Committee on Programs (HLCP)—on 20-21 March 2007, and the Chief Executives Board (CEB)—on 20 April 2007—called upon the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) to organize an evaluation of the pilots. On February 10th, 2010 a country-led evaluation for DaO in Mozambique was commissioned by the Government of Mozambique and the United Nations.

2. The UNEG decided on a three-phase evaluation process: i) an assessment of the evaluability of DaO at country and UN systemic levels; ii) an independent process evaluation of the pilot experience; and iii) a synthesizing independent evaluation of the results and impacts of the eight pilot experiences up to September 2011. The findings of the current evaluation will inform the third phase of the evaluation process and complete the evaluation cycle for the DaO pilots.

3. The evaluation of the Delivering as One initiative at country level is intended for stakeholders which include: government, civil society, the UN System, the private sector, implementation partners, academic institutions, bi-lateral agencies and all UN DaO pilot countries. From a policy and management perspective, this evaluation will be of significant value to the UN System, its governance structures, the GoM and bi-lateral policy makers.

Scope of the Evaluation

4. The evaluation covers the period from the inception of DaO in mid-2006, up to December 2009. Being a country-level evaluation, the focus is on UN operations in Mozambique. The evaluation process is applied to DaO’s five pillars and includes the 24 UN entities, including 16 resident and 8 non-resident agencies (refer to textbox 1) and a non-random sample from the approximately 500 UN staff members². These UN agencies, the counterpart GoM coordinating ministries and line ministries, as well as the principal NGO

TEXTBOX 1 – THE UN IN MOZAMBIQUE

The UN System in Mozambique is composed of 16 in-country agencies: namely FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WFP, WHO, UNAIDS secretariat, IFAD, ILO, UNV, UNIDO and UN-HABITAT. 8 UN Agencies, covering Mozambique from other countries, these are ITC, OCHA, UNDES, UNEP, OHCHR, UNDCP, UNCDF, UNCTAD and 10 joint programmes and 3 MDG-F financed programmes are currently being implemented

¹ Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam. In addition several other countries, known as “self-starters” are subsequently moving forward with the reform agenda and DaO.
² ToR for “Delivering as One Country level evaluation”, p. 20
implementation partners, are all included in the scope of this evaluation.

5. Four evaluation criteria—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (REES)—have been applied to the five pillars (please refer to textbox 5) of One Leader, One Program, One Fund, One Office and Communicating as One, to establish the level of progress towards alignment with the national development goals, as well as the level of coherence and programmatic relevance of Delivering as One. Being process-oriented, utilization-focused and formative (refer to textbox 3), the evaluation has researched and formulated a clear set of findings, lessons learned and recommendations on DaO in Mozambique. The extent to which DaO is helped or hindered by conditions and forces beyond the control of the UNCT has also been examined in the best interests of understanding causality.

Purpose of the Evaluation

6. The purpose of this evaluation is to provide the GoM and the UN with critical knowledge on the extent to which DaO in Mozambique is on track to achieve its objectives i.e.: i) assess to what extent DaO in Mozambique is on track to achieve its targets against its strategic intent; ii) assess how the DaO initiative is contributing to national development goals; iii) identify challenges and lessons learnt from the implementation of DaO; iv) make specific recommendations on actions that should be undertaken by the different stakeholders (UN, Government and donors) in Mozambique. The Evaluation Report (ER) explores, describes and analyzes the status of the DaO initiative in relation to its strategic intent and covers the scope discussed above. In addition, the report provides insights into and an analysis of the extent to which the architecture of DaO as a solution has been able to address the core causal elements of the problematic. The report takes into account both progress, as well as the actions and time period required to anchor DaO as a sustainable operating practice. This evaluation will be a critical knowledge instrument to manage scientific change.

**TEXTBOX 2- DELIVERING AS ONE**

The overall goal of Delivering as One in Mozambique is to improve program delivery and results, through a more coherent and better-coordinated, -funded and -managed UN. Delivering as One is a concrete and focused initiative to address fragmentation, ineffective governance and operations, duplication and lack of coherence in the UN’s development and humanitarian operations. DaO envisages changing the way the UN operates at country level, while anticipating the ‘bottom-up’ stimulus DaO will have on reform at regional, HQ and system-wide levels. DaO’s vision is to enable the UN to deliver value which is greater than that of the sum of its parts.

**TEXTBOX 3- EXPLANATION OF TERMS**

* Process-oriented: adjusted towards the DaO process, in contrast to being result-oriented
* Utilization-focused: attention directed at use of the evaluation report, practical
* Formative: process of ongoing feedback on performance, in contrast to summative, which is an evaluation after the fact.
* Coherence: Logical, orderly and consistent relation of parts.
* Triangulation: determining the position of an opinion or document by consulting other opinions and document on the same issue.

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3 ToR for “Delivering as One Country level evaluation”, p. 26
Chapter 2 – Evaluation methodology

7. The selection of the methodology for the evaluation is guided by the ToR (Annex 13) and informed by a comprehensive literature review. Two separate meetings with a Focus Group and a Reference Group designed to; i) test the Lines of Enquiry and the supportive evaluation questions, ii) confirm the knowledge gap and iii) assess the evaluation’s challenges and limitations, enabled the team to consolidated the selection process. Refer to table 1, Lines of Enquiry and Annex 11 the supportive evaluation questions.

8. The evaluation has been guided by the UN standards and norms for evaluations, and takes into account the following principles: country ownership and oversight; the primacy of the Mozambique context; being results-oriented; transparency, credibility and comparability. (The evaluation report offers comparability with other pilot countries of the DaO initiative in terms of results achieved). This country level formative evaluation for Mozambique builds on the evaluability study

### Table 1 - Lines of Enquiry for DaO Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Line of Enquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE Leader</td>
<td>1. Program Effectiveness, Coherence and Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Efficiency and Effectiveness of DaO Institutional and management framework in contributing to program delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. DaO’s contribution to repositioning the UN in Mozambique relative to the changed environment for development assistance and changed status of donor and GoM support for DaO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE UN program</td>
<td>4. National ownership and leadership of the UN's programs in Mozambique; integration, engagement and contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Contribution by the UN's Program Management Operations to program performance, integration and harmonization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Responsiveness to National Goals and Priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Cost effectiveness of the Program and the Efficiency of UN operations - Stock taking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE Fund</td>
<td>8. Resource mobilization, effectiveness and efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. ONE Budget vis-à-vis accountability and strategic focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE Office</td>
<td>10. Cost Effectiveness of Common Services, accountability and service level (client satisfaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE Voice</td>
<td>11. Internal perceptions (UN staff and agencies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. External perceptions (on the part of the GoM and other partners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overarching themes</td>
<td>13. Change (vertical and horizontal),, Change Management change in institutional effectiveness at UN &amp; GoM level, and attitudinal change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Lessons learned and their institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Opportunities missed, unintended consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. Cost effectiveness and benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Causal factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Limitations and Challenges

9. Four limitations were identified during the Inception phase and have remained relevant throughout the evaluation process:

- This evaluation is occurring roughly 3 years after the effective launch date of DaO in Mozambique and as such it is premature to evaluate results in terms of the program’s goals (Outlined in the Inception Report March 2010).

- This Evaluation Report reconfirms that there are “methodological challenges relating to baselines and counterfactuals”\(^5\) To compensate for the lack of a solid baseline the team increased the number of support questions and focused the direction of the inquiry on precisely “what were the conditions pre-DaO, what changed when, how much changed and what were the effects of the changes?”.

- The lack of an explicit set of assumptions and a risk assessment on the DaO initiative became apparent after a literature review for the period 2004 to 2007. This information could have shed additional light on the circumstances and context prior to launch, as well as test the validity and relevance of the intervention logic.

- A modified undated logframe with “soft” indicators for the core success factors for DaO was received from the UN in Mozambique\(^6\) (attached as Annex 3). It is inappropriate to set the judgement criteria based on a set of soft indicators alone (refer to textbox 4 for an explanation on Soft indicators). We have therefore intensively researched other primary and secondary data sources, including macro policy documents as well as operational plans, to obtain an improved balance (Please refer to the list of documents reviewed – Bibliography).

10. Notwithstanding the methodological challenges and the limitations, the team has been able to establish a point of departure pre-DaO and determine the extent to which DaO is on track to achieve its objectives. Comments and observations received from the GoM, UNCT and UNEG have been contradictory at times and it has been a challenge to incorporate the diverse comments in the second draft of this report.

Selection of Methodology based on the Interpretive Paradigm

11. The methodology for this evaluation has been selected based on an analysis of: i) the ToRs for the evaluation; ii) a literature review on the subject; iii) the key lines of enquiry and supportive questions; iv) a review of the questionnaires for the planned (quantitative)

\(^5\) Evaluability Study (2008)
\(^6\) Document developed in mid- or late 2007: One UN initiative in Mozambique – Success Factors Monitoring and Evaluation table.
survey of stakeholders and the expected outputs of this survey; v) the complexity of the subject; vi) an estimation of the challenges in researching and obtaining answers to the questions; vii) the challenges and limitations identified in paragraph 9; viii) the diversity of interests, knowledge and levels of engagement in DaO\(^7\) on the part of the stakeholders. The factors cited above increase the complexity of the data extraction, establishment of criteria for making judgements and analysis of the data sets. The evaluation team selected the methodology based on the interpretive paradigm\(^8\) and applied a qualitative approach to this evaluation. However, data and information emerging from the quantitative survey of stakeholders (February and March 2010) have also been used in the evaluation to strengthen its findings\(^9\).

**Information Extraction**

12. In support of the methodology, a triangulated information extraction process has been applied and multiple primary and secondary data sources have been used. Annex 11 catalogues the total number of information extraction engagements planned as compared to the actual number carried out. The level of coverage is considered adequate for the evaluation. The planned case studies on Joint Programmes could not be finalized due to lack of data on program results, the available progress reports usually contained a listing of the activities which were hard to translate back to intended program results. Without a clear picture of the results, an analysis of effectiveness and efficiency of the selected JPs would be a fruitless exercise. However, the knowledge and understanding gained from the research for the case studies has been put to use in various places in the report. The list of individuals contacted for the evaluation is presented in Annex1. On average five to seven key lines of enquiry and 20-25 supportive questions were examined during each interview. This has produced roughly 1300 to 1400 data sets from 60 primary data points.

**Information Processing**

13. Processing the data obtained has proven to be both labour-intensive and challenging, requiring a high degree of analysis and filtration. The diversity of the stakeholders and interviewees and the difference in their levels of knowledge, engagement and interest, further complicated the recording and analysis of the responses. To the extent feasible, triangulated data sets have been generated from multiple data points and sources. The 1300 to 1400 datasets were processed with the aid of a system that involved the use of the data processing and interpretation matrix in Annex 2.

14. The SWOT analyses and focus groups have proven to be extremely useful in filtering, classifying and penetrating the complex issues involved, as have the counterfactuals. The three sets of tools contributed to an improved understanding on

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\(^7\) This approach is inspired by Michael Scriven – Evaluation Checklists and Methodology 1996. Formative Evaluations 1998

\(^8\) Neuman. L, W, Social Research Methods, University of Wisconsin. 2006, p. 80 - 104

\(^9\) An Independent Quantitative Stakeholder Survey was completed in March 2010 and was made available to the Evaluation Team.
causality and also enabled the evaluators to determine the levels of relevance of the findings and their causality.

15. Despite the inherent limitations (please refer to text on page 14) the evaluators employed the available indicators (Annex 3) to set the judgement criteria and identify patterns in the data sets. These patterns were then processed and filtered to enable grading and classification.

16. During the course of the interviews and focus groups (primary data sources) some contentious assertions arose, many of which were also supported by secondary data sources. To test the validity of these assertions, the evaluation team decided to create a counter hypothesis construct and seek triangulated evidence to refute or validate each component of the hypothesis. This approach has proved to be immensely useful as it contributed to eliminating ambiguity in the findings and also made explicit some lingering doubts. Please refer to Annex 11.

Validation and Reliability

17. The following tests were applied during the data collection and processing stages\(^{10}\): i) adequacy of triangulation; ii) member checks -iii) peer examination - applied to 85% of the findings and recommendations; iv) principles of collaborative research that were adhered to by sharing information during the Interview, Focus Group and SWOT processes; and v) identification of evaluator bias and checking for same within the team to minimize its impact on the findings. It is the estimation of the evaluation team that the checks and quality control processes applied to date have improved the reliability and validity of the findings and recommendations. Please also refer to the section on limitations and challenges (page 14.)

Role of the Government of Mozambique in the DaO Evaluation

18. Being a country-led evaluation, the GoM has a significant role in: planning the evaluation, organizing and chairing the meetings of the EMG (Evaluation Management Group) and in the selection process of the independent evaluators. Seven ministries were represented at the meetings for the focus group, reference group and EMG. The purpose of these meetings was to consider the lines of enquiry and supportive questions, approve the Inception Report (IR), review the preliminary findings, conclusions and lessons learned. A total of nine major meetings (excluding the interviews) have been organized by the GoM to coordinate the Evaluation processes.

19. As testimony to the interest and commitment on the part of the GoM, the IR was approved at a meeting that was chaired by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and with the participation of four other Vice-Ministers.

\(^{10}\) Merriam. S, Qualitative Research a Guide to Design and Implementation 2004 Jossey Bass Education Series

* Relevance: having a bearing or connection with the issue
* Effectiveness: capacity to produce effects
* Efficiency: ratio of output to the input of an activity
* Sustainability: capable of being continued
* Counterfactuals: What if it had not happened
* Paradigm Shift: one conceptual worldview or system is replaced by another (Kuhn, 1962)
outputs of the evaluation process—i.e. the Lines of Enquiry, Evaluation Questions, Inception Report, Preliminary Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations and finally Draft 1 of the Evaluation Report—have been reviewed and approved by the GoM at a structured Consultative Committee meeting. In summary, the GoM is engaged in directing and coordinating the evaluation process. The final meeting is pending to review Draft 2 of the Evaluation Report.

**Structure of the Evaluation Report**

20. The following chapter provides comprehensive information on the external and internal environment and rationale for DaO. It does not constitute a finding as such, but will considerably augment the reader’s knowledge regarding DaO in Mozambique, the structure of its implementation, the steps involved, its organization and achievements. This will help the readers gain perspective on the findings and improve understanding of the remaining chapters.

21. The findings presented in chapters 4-9 are organized by theme: Macro, One Leader, One Program, One Fund, One Office and One Voice. Each chapter (or theme) has a standard structure, consisting of the following: i) a summary introduction to the key lines of enquiry, issues and questions being reviewed; ii) the findings that are relevant for each theme; and iii) a summary of the findings and analysis of DaO’s Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability (REES) based on the findings for each chapter. Next, chapter 10 presents the conclusions of the findings and establishes the foundation for an improved understanding of the recommendations, presented in chapter 11. Lessons learned and concluding remarks are combined in chapter 12.

22. To reduce the bulk of this report, the majority of the tools used in the evaluation are presented in annexes:

- The **evaluation process framework**, which outlines the ‘backbone’ of this evaluation, is presented in Annex 4.
- The **intervention logic** illustrates the framework for the analysis and identifies the causal factors that contributed to success or otherwise within each of the five pillars. It is in Annex 5.
- The **data extraction tools** and work plan for the evaluation are in annex 6
- The data processing and interpretation matrix is in Annex 2
- The **list of individuals** contacted and interviewed is in Annex 1
- The **list of all reference documents** reviewed is found at the end of this report.
Mozambique’s Challenges and Opportunities

23. Eighteen years ago Mozambique was a divided country in the midst of a debilitating war. The economy had been contracting for years, communications were limited and the lack of security was a constant concern—yet Mozambique sustained itself within an unhelpful and hostile environment for over 15 years. In 1990, after nearly a decade and a half of pursuing a centrally-planned command economy, Mozambique introduced a new Constitution and set out the framework for democratic transition and an open economy. Post-1990, Mozambique successfully completed legislative, institutional and policy reforms and realigned its governance mechanisms with the requirements of a free-market democracy.

24. An objective review of recent history reveals that Mozambique has navigated the turbulence and has effectively set the course for the future, based on a comprehensive understanding of its needs. Over the previous eight years, Mozambique’s GDP growth rate has averaged an impressive 8.1%. Yet despite this, over 50% of its population lives below the poverty line\(^\text{11}\). Mozambique indeed faces both huge challenges as well as significant opportunities. It is critical that all resources—including international development assistance—be invested and managed diligently to maximize the country’s true potential\(^\text{12}\).

The Rationale for Reform within the UN System

25. The history of reform for UN is well-documented (since its inception in 1945). There is a wealth of material detailing resolutions, proposals, discussion and debate. A complete examination of the history and rationale for reform is beyond the scope of this evaluation. A brief introduction to contemporary reform of direct relevance to the scope of the evaluation i.e. DaO is presented here.

26. The United Nations system recognized the emerging changes within the development arena. These positive changes and challenges included democratization and elections, HIV and AIDS (late 1980s), the end of the Cold War (1991), increasing natural disasters, destabilization and expanding environmental challenges. Simultaneously, the need emerged for systemic introspection and reform of the UN’s delivery system, due to globalization

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\(^{11}\) Economic Intelligence Unit 2007 Country Profile

\(^{12}\) Also refer to: UN System Aid Effectiveness in Mozambique: A Delivering as One pilot country experience (Nov. 2009) p.13
and the new developments in development assistance, including: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (1997 & 2005), introduction of General Budget Support mechanisms (GBS) and SWAps (late 1990s), the Rome Accord on Harmonization (2003), the Accra Accord for Action (2008) and the emphasis on good governance. Encouraged by General Assembly (GA) resolutions, the UN system decided to question its existing status and adapt to the changing realities by attempting to enhance its relevance, coherence and effectiveness. DaO was developed as a mechanism to respond to these external and internal developments. The table below lists events and processes that have created the enabling and authorizing environment for reform within the UN and the implementation of DaO (Table 2).

**Table 2: DaO Chronology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Event or process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>A/RES/63/311</td>
<td>“System-Wide Coherence” Resolution calls for country-led evaluation of “Delivering as One”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intergovernmental Meeting of the “Program Country Pilots” on “Delivering as One” in Kigali (Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
<td>Accra Declaration calling for accelerated implementation of the principles of improved aid effectiveness in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maputo Seminar of DaO pilot countries, to exchange experiences and lessons learned with Delivering as One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>A/RES/62/208</td>
<td>TCPR calls for greater coherence and coordination within the UN system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Secretary-General BanKi-Moon takes office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>A/RES/61/836</td>
<td>Secretary-General launches Delivering as One. The governments of eight countries volunteered and were designated to become “Delivering as One” pilots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>November</td>
<td></td>
<td>By letter of the Prime Minister, the GoM volunteers as a DaO pilot country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>A/RES/61/583</td>
<td>High-level Panel on System-Wide Coherence submits its report entitled “Delivering as One”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
<td>High-level Panel on System-Wide Coherence established; co-chaired by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan, Mozambique and Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ex-Com Principals Retreat, in which the Secretary-General supports the recommendations, in particular those related to country level DaO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>GA/RES/A/59/250</td>
<td>TCPR recommendations delivered, aimed at better coherence and coordination between UN offices at the country-level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>A/RES/57/387</td>
<td>Secretary-General’s second major package of reform: “An agenda for further change”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td>Millennium Summit is held: 191 nations in total adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>A/RES/52/12</td>
<td>General Assembly endorses the Reform Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary-General-designate Kofi Annan outlines goals for his term</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Background to the DaO initiative

27. The recommendations of the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR 2004), the Executive Committee Principals Retreat (July 2005) and the comments of the Secretary-General on the Recommendations of High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence (HLP A/61/836), established the policy environment and base for the pilot DaO initiative, namely: UN ‘Delivering as One’ at country level. The GoM volunteered to be a Delivering as One UN pilot country, and was officially designated as such in January 2007.

Goal and Objectives of DaO

28. The Goal of DaO in Mozambique is to improve program delivery, results and impact through a UN which is more coherent and better-coordinated, -funded and -managed. DaO envisages creating new synergy between the UN and government, and contributing to the GoM’s strategy to reduce poverty effectively and coherently (see textbox 6). Furthermore, by eliminating duplication and competition between the UN agencies, the UN will be structurally and organizationally in an improved position to more effectively achieve its goal and mandate.

The Intervention Logic for DaO

29. UN General Assembly Resolution 59/250 (2004) provided an authorizing environment for joint UN offices. Subsequently, in November 2006, the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence provided the impetus for “Delivering as One”. It formulated comprehensive recommendations, including the One UN pilot initiatives at country level, with One Leader, One Program, “One Budget”, and where appropriate, “One Office”. For Mozambique, One Voice was also added. The TCPR, contained in GA resolution 62/208, provided guidance to make the UN system more coherent, effective, and relevant at the country level.13

30. The central objective of DaO, as described in the HLCP report on Delivering as One, is that “the changes would secure and strengthen the UN’s role at the heart of the multilateral system”14. This document further identifies five strategic directions for reform: i) coherence and consolidation of UN activities, under the principle of country ownership; ii) establishment of appropriate governance, management and funding mechanisms to empower and support consolidation; iii) overhaul the business processes of the UN system; iv) ensure significant opportunities for consolidation; and v) urgent implementation of the agenda for reform and of DaO.

31. In the Mozambican context, the logic for the DaO initiative is reinforced by a changing development assistance environment, as well as by an improving capacity on the part of government to coordinate and manage complex programs. Consequently the UN recognized the need to reposition itself within this new environment, and DaO is an integral part of this repositioning process.

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13 UNDG, United to deliver effective support for countries. Promoting UN coherence, effectiveness and relevance: an overview of progress since 1997
14 UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence, “Delivering as One” (A/61/583) Nov. 2006; cited as: HLPC report Delivering as One (2006) p. 10
32. The intervention logic for DaO aims to address core problems with the UN’s
development and humanitarian operations in Mozambique, namely fragmentation,
duplication, lack of coherence, operational ineffectiveness across the system, outdated
business practices, mission creep and competition for funding between the agencies. The
2006 HLPC Report titled “Delivering as One” further indicates that “taken as a whole our
recommendations could result in steep change in the way the UN operates at HQ level,
within each region and each country” and highlights the importance of the urgent
implementation of DaO. In other words, there are multiple and ambitious expectations
for DaO. Please refer to an illustration of the intervention logic for DaO in Annex 5.

**Dao Stock-Taking Report – 2007 to 2009**

33. In this section DaO’s achievements will be reviewed—from its launch up to the
end of 2009. This section does not constitute a finding as such, the findings will draw
their information and analysis on the facts presented in this section. The
accomplishments described below have been conceptualized, planned, implemented and
refined over a 36-month period.

34. UNCT created an institutional and management framework to direct and
manage the establishment and operations of DaO in Mozambique. The structure was
designed to achieve multiple objectives, such as inclusiveness, GoM participation and
ownership, coordination, collaboration, information exchange and - most importantly - to
create the mechanisms to enable the 24 UN organizations to function together
effectively and Deliver as One. See Annex 7 for a depiction of the management
framework

35. Based on the Evaluation Team’s observations and analysis UNCT followed a
three-step process to establish DaO. These are:

- The first 6-10 months were applied in planning, preparation, organization,
  conceptual modeling, laying the foundation to work together as a team, defining
  roles, responsibilities and parameters, determining objectives, and in general,
  increasing clarity to facilitate launch.

- The second step, between months 10 and 30, focused on the development and
  ratification of the concrete institutional arrangements, like the MoU,
  agreements, ToRs, management structures, working groups, thematic groups
  and program management structures, plus development of the JP and the
  institutional arrangements to operationalize the One Fund and budgetary
  framework. During this step, ideas, concepts and objectives were transformed
  into plans, agreements, frameworks and structures. Operationalization of DaO
  also occurred during this step.

- We are now six months in to the third step, which is focused on refinements,
  assessing successes and challenges, expansion of change management
  initiatives, consolidation and determining where DaO should go next.

36. By the end of 2009 DaO has achieved and addressed the following:
### TABLE 3 – REVIEW OF ACTIONS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Institutional Level** | The five Ones are established and functional.  
The accountability framework creates the basis for the institutionalization of DaO and empowerment of the RC, and is implemented.  
GoM keenly interested in UN reform and DaO, and recognizes the importance of exercising ownership of the country-level operations.  
GoM is substantively represented on the SC and in programmatic structures.  
GoM recognizes the changes, demonstrates interests and commitment. |
| **One Leader**    | RC is effectively representing UN operations in the country, and both RC and RCO are empowered, the firewall is effectively in place and UNCT is fully engaged with the institutional and management framework.  
The 24 “UNs” are working together and new forms of collaboration have emerged,(JPs, common services, HACT, LTAs, ICT platform, harmonization etc.). A structured horizontal dimension to inter-agency collaboration has been introduced.  
Institutional arrangements to operate the five Ones are in place, including all foundational documents, ToRs, agreements, plans, MoUs, LoUs, etc.  
An Institutional framework and management structures have been established for UNCT to manage the operations of DaO.  
Change management strategies and plans have been developed and are being executed.  
The management systems to bring the 24 organizations together within a coherent framework are functional. |
| **One Program**   | The program management structures are established and functional.  
GoM line ministries are engaged in the pillars.  
The 10 JPs are a reality and operational. They have introduced a new dynamic and synergy into interagency collaboration.  
Programmatic duplication is identified early in the planning cycles for JPs and addressed.  
A fourth Pillar was responsively added to UNDAF.  
New approaches aimed at responsiveness to multi-sectoral development are emerging that harness the combined strength of the UN system, with a case in point being the nutrition program demonstrating increased responsiveness to GoM, e.g. strategies to manage rising food prices.  
Joint monitoring and reviews are being tested. Common standards and systems are partially implemented for monitoring of program quality.  
The UN’s planning cycles have been aligned with those of the GoM.  
NRA inclusion secured.  
Contribution to the National Policy on Gender, HIV and AIDS, as well the mainstreaming of gender in program areas.  
A culture of working together in all phases of the program cycle is emerging. |
| **One Fund**      | A framework for mobilization, allocation and disbursement of resources was set up within the first 12 months.  
Basic systems are in place to manage the fund.  
Within 18 months of launch, the One Fund had received 28 million USD. |
| **One Office**    | Common services, common audits, harmonization of business processes, LTAs, EFT and a common IT platform have been tested, with the benefits becoming more measurable.  
Cost-saving measures such as elimination of the UN clinic have been introduced, joint security, joint travel agency. |
| **One Voice**     | A communications strategy has been developed and executed.  
A stakeholder survey (March 2010) demonstrates that the UN has a positive image amongst the stakeholders. |
A preliminary balance has been achieved between issue-based communication and agency profile. Increased sensitivity to projecting the UN brand. One Voice being heard on key advocacy issues (e.g. child trafficking, human rights) and programmatic issues (e.g. chronic malnutrition, disaster risk reduction, social protection).

**Analysis of Achievements:**

37. The accomplishments presented above raise five questions: i) is DaO on track to achieve its strategic intent? ii) in what way does DaO contribute to the NDGs, and to what extent? iii) are the achievements relevant, effective and efficient, and will they contribute comprehensively to the sustainability of DaO? iv) are the achievements adequate to sustain DaO? and v) is the pace of change responsive to the requirements in the external environment? These questions will be addressed in the chapters ahead on findings.

38. The purpose of the following Tables 4 and 5 is to illustrate per capita output for organizations that are engaged in development however have different business models and approaches. The tables are self-explanatory and indicate where the UN and some of its agencies are situated on a per capita output spectrum. Judgements based on high or low values are inappropriate.

**Table 4 Estimated Output per Staff FTE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>UN (Mozambique)</th>
<th>USAID (Mozambique)</th>
<th>World Bank (global)</th>
<th>CARE (Sub-Saharan African region)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total FTE</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>&gt; 10,000</td>
<td>3,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Value of Portfolio (USD)</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>186,000,000</td>
<td>58,800,000,000</td>
<td>307,785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output per staff FTE (USD)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>1,240,000</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>81,988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5 - Output per Staff FTE – UN Agencies in Mozambique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>UNICEF</th>
<th>UNCDF</th>
<th>UNFPA</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>IOM</th>
<th>WFP</th>
<th>UN-HABITAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total FTE</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Value of Portfolio (USD)</td>
<td>61,982,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>17,018,596</td>
<td>29,600,000</td>
<td>1,156,560</td>
<td>35,879,777</td>
<td>3,874,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output per staff FTE (USD)</td>
<td>563,473</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>486,246</td>
<td>493,333</td>
<td>192,760</td>
<td>186,874</td>
<td>387,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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16 World bank output was 58.8 billion in 2009, managed with over 10,000 staff, see World Bank Annual report 2009 http://go.worldbank.org/AA92CEU590

17 Care USA 990 Form 2009, US tax declaration form on http://www.care.org/about/990.asp

Random selection of UN agencies, based on response by agency
Chapter 4 – Macro level

Lines of Enquiry and Issues examined

39. Important macro issues are examined in this chapter, extending beyond the five DaO themes. UN reform was necessary at an international level\(^{18}\). Was there sufficient evidence to reconfigure the delivery end of the UN’s development and humanitarian operations in Mozambique? Is DaO a valid and relevant approach? Is it a sufficiently responsive solution to the challenges present in the UN’s external and internal environment? Does DaO establish a base for the UN to adequately improve program effectiveness and organizational coherence in Mozambique? And finally, is there evidence to establish that DaO is repositioning the UN effectively? These critical questions will be explored at a macro level, to determine the level of DaO’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

FINDING I. Delivering as One is a valid and relevant solution that responds to the changes in the external and internal environment for the UN’s operation in Mozambique. The external environment for the UN changed about three to four years before the launch of DaO.

Mozambique’s History and Functional Relationship with the UN

40. Mozambique’s recent history can be divided into the following phases: Post-independence (1975-1978); the Cold War (the period of destabilisation and emergencies) (1978-1992); the consolidation of peace, democratisation and policy reform (1993-2005), through to the period of accelerated growth and development (2005 - ). For each phase, the GoM developed a functional relationship with the UN and pursued different objectives. The changing aid environment in Mozambique (see paragraph 42) created a shift in the GoM’s challenges and opportunities and triggered introspection by it on the UN’s role in Mozambique.

The International Assistance Environment in Mozambique

41. Mozambique has the strongest donor presence in Africa, with ODA accounting for 56 percent of the national budget\(^{19}\). Notwithstanding strong economic growth (averaging 8.1 % over the past decade), Mozambique remains in 172 place out of 179 on the Human Development Index (see Table 6) The ODA flows to Mozambique increased in gross value by roughly 5-6% annually over the seven years\(^{20}\) preceding DaO, with the delivery channels shifting from direct bi-lateral and project funding to IFI credits, GBS and SWAPs\(^{21}\).

42. The GoM recognized the changed aid landscape and simultaneously became conscious of the fragmentation and non-strategic elements of the UN’s operations in Mozambique. This contributed to the GoM requesting the UN to present a more coherent

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\(^{18}\) HLPC report Delivering as One (2006)

\(^{19}\) ODAMOZ on www.odamoz.org.mz

\(^{20}\) According to OECD Statistics and Mozambique Donor Atlas 2008, 23% increase between 2005 – 2008: USD 1,3 billion to USD 1,9 billion

\(^{21}\) RC Mozambique, UN System Aid effectiveness in Mozambique: A Delivering as One pilot country experience (November 2009), p. 24
framework, to enable the government to engage with One UN at national level. This is the genesis of the former Prime Minister’s letter to the UN Secretary-General, volunteering Mozambique as a pilot country for DaO implementation (See table 2).

**Policies, Capacities and GoM Expectations**

43. As Mozambique stabilized and the constitutional, legal and policy reforms took effect, the GoM’s expectations of UN assistance evolved. The GoM, the UN and the bilateral agencies all recognized the significant development challenges and opportunities and the need for concerted action to manage resources in order to attain the national development goals (refer to textbox 6). Thus, harnessing the UN’s undisputed advantages to support the GoM’s revised requirements and creating conditions for the repositioning of the UN became a priority for the UN, an agenda item for the GoM and a matter of interest for the development partners. In this context, DaO assumes greater importance—as a concept and instrument of change for increased effectiveness, relevance and coherence—in the effort to accelerate equitable and symmetrical development in Mozambique. “Without change (in the UN), there is little hope - DaO has introduced some hope” – UN employee.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mozambique Development Indicators 22, 2008</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
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</table>

**Time is of the Essence**

44. Donors initiated negotiating SWAPS with the Government in 2000, The Ministry of Education signed its first SWAP MOU in September 2002. Secondly, the GoM and the development partners signed a Program Aid Partnership (PAP) during 2004 to provide Direct Budget Support (DBS) to Mozambique. The aid environment changed in Mozambique between 2002 and 2004, but the UN’s reaction was slow to the external and internal changes. Consequently the UN is roughly 3-4 years behind the change.
curve and has to fast track\textsuperscript{25} the reform process in order to catch up with the new reality. According to the HLCP Report “Delivering as One” (2006), “implementation should move forward with urgency”. DaO has effectively started (in 2007) the process of repositioning the UN and will require acceleration in order to consolidate the initial changes in Mozambique. A Quote from an academic in Maputo makes the point in seven words: “the UN has run out of time”.

**The Demand for DaO**

45. Each stakeholder—the GoM, the bilateral agencies and the UN—motivated by its respective interests, acknowledged a common opportunity and pushed forward the agenda for change and consequently the introduction of DaO in Mozambique. The expectations of the key stakeholders are that DaO will: reduce duplication and fragmentation; improve effectiveness, relevance and alignment with national development priorities; and achieve coherence. In other words, they validate the need for DaO and its relevance within the Mozambican context.

**Recommendations: 1,7**

**FINDING II.** DaO strengthens the UN’s absolute advantage and improves coherence. If the challenges and limitations of duplication and project spread are addressed (FINDING III below), then DaO will have the potential to be a cause of fundamental change for the UN.

**Pre-DaO**

46. There is a continuing perceptible level of confidence within the Government, bilateral agencies and Mozambican civil society, that the UN is a stable, issue-focused organization that will not be influenced by passing international relations issues or by the changing dynamics of geo-political equations. The UN has an undisputed natural absolute advantage (see textbox 7). Within its humanitarian function, the UN has for the past four decades played a vital and natural role in assisting the GoM to coordinate emergency operations.

47. The UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework) encouraged increased levels of interagency collaboration by presenting a ‘shopping list’ or ‘menu’ of programs to the government and donors, within a common framework. However the UNDAF had its structural limitations and did not address the challenges and problems faced by the UN system in Mozambique. Counterfactual analysis indicates, UNDAF alone would not have increased either the relevance or coherence of the UN in Mozambique.

48. Stakeholders were tiring of assertions of impending reform\textsuperscript{26} but with minimal execution and limited concrete action\textsuperscript{27}. The opinions of the stakeholders, including the

\textsuperscript{25} Fast Tracking: To do more things in the same time in order to finish a job earlier than normal or planned. It is the process of reducing the number of sequential relationships and replacing them with parallel relationship - Source Harvard Business Review May 2008

\textsuperscript{26} Verified and asserted in focus group with Country Representatives

\textsuperscript{27} HLPC report Delivering as One (2006) par. 10 ; Joint Inspection Unit, Some measures to improve overall performance of the United Nations system at the country level. Part I a short history of United Nations Reform in development p. 7
GoM and the bi-lateral agencies were unstated but clear: UNDAF did not include the substantive change elements needed to address concerns such as fragmentation, inadequate relevance and effectiveness. With the end date for the attainment of the MDGs fast approaching, development efforts had to be accelerated. The need was apparent for a more coherent UN operation at country level.

**Post-DaO**

49. DaO introduced solutions to fill the gaps in the UNDAF modality, and had a direct initial positive impact on improved leveraging of the UN’s absolute advantage. In substantive terms, the UN agencies in Mozambique successfully introduced a structured horizontal dimension to their ad hoc collaboration and in the process strengthened the concept of multi-sector development. This was accomplished by weakening the established “silo” culture (see textbox 8) and introducing new channels and outlets for cooperation and is evidenced by the Joint Programs, common services, Long Term Agreements (LTAs), joint representation, One Fund, One Leader, harmonization of business processes, a common ICT platform and the institutional framework for DaO. These actions and initiatives have raised coordination, collaboration and communications within the UN system to a higher level of effectiveness. “Interagency collaboration has become more natural”, stated a UN Employee.

50. Purely from an image perspective, One UN—although not perfectly fused—was significantly easier to comprehend than 24 UNs. One UN also provided the reform process with the required opportunity for its re-branding in Mozambique. The favourable ratings and image of the UN which were captured in the stakeholder survey in March 2010 are due in part to DaO.

“Especially in a complex environment like Mozambique, immense value is added by collaborating and representing each other”. This quote by a UN employee makes an important point.

**Textbox 7 – Absolute Advantage**

In the ToRs for this evaluation, as well as in other UN documents, the term “Comparative Advantage” is used to describe the UN’s strengths in Policy and Advocacy, Normative and Technical Support, Capacity Development and Civil Society Partnerships. To avoid misapplying definitions or changing the UN’s preference in use of this term, the evaluators are applying the term “Absolute Advantage” to describe the following UN strengths and natural characteristics: Universality, Global Ownership, Being an Honest Broker, Neutrality, Specialized externally-Focused Technical Assistance and commitment to Pursuit of Universal Human Rights. This term was accepted in the SWOT analysis meeting with the CRs, and is based on the principle of absolute advantage as being: “the ability of a party (an individual, or firm, or country) to produce more of a good or service than competitors, using the same amount of resources, because of its natural factors.”

The UN’s absolute (natural) advantages are reinforced by the fact that it would be nearly impossible to replace.

51. The dynamics of information sharing has improved significantly. Trust is improving, competitiveness between the agencies is diminishing (although still visible), and relationships are becoming more productive. The level of structural coordination has improved many times over. DaO has made the first small but significant step toward

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28 UN and Government of Mozambique, Relatório sobre os objectivos de desenvolvimento do Milénio (September 2008). At the current pace, out of the 21 objectives, Mozambique is likely to only achieve 4 by 2015

29 Source: Marrewijk. C, World Economy Absolute Advantage, Princeton University 2004
bringing together the full power and benefits of this global and specialized institution and improving coherence. The multiple sectors of UN specialization are becoming available in one package, a package which is more manageable and acceptable to Mozambique under One Leader.

52. There is concrete evidence that DaO has most of the critical components to introduce a paradigm shift (Refer to textbox 5 for explanation of terms), i.e. the emerging breaking-down of divisions between silos and the discovery of new synergies through increased horizontal collaboration (see Findings 1, 4, 9 and 10). The changes embodied in One Leader, One Program, One Fund, One Office and One Voice are fundamental ones that have the potential to address many of the shortcomings of the UN’s operations. The economic benefits accruing from the post-DaO synergies are documented in finding 6 below. An opinion from a UN employee places DaO in perspective: “DaO is the way to go in the new aid environment: agencies complement each other.”

53. Program alignment with national development goals is improving through the Joint Programs, as evidenced in finding 7. New space and opportunities are being created for the NRAs, as outlined in finding 10 below. The GoM is more engaged and confident that DaO has the essential elements to enable it to increase the level of its effective ownership over the program. The central Coordinating Ministries are directly engaged, and have an improved sense of responsibility for the programs being executed jointly by the UN and the Line Ministries.

54. The paradigm has almost shifted. DaO changes the way the UN operates in Mozambique, and in doing so sets the framework for addressing its shortcomings and challenges. Nevertheless, DaO faces structural constraints that prevent it from reaching its full potential, finding 3. These are: the requirement for both vertical and horizontal accountability, the financial allocation model, and the structural separation at country level that rationalizes redundancy and duplication. If these structural issues are adequately addressed, the paradigm will shift and contribute to the strategic repositioning of the UN in Mozambique.

**TEXTBOX 8 – SILOS**

The term "silo" is borrowed from business management theory. It refers to organizations characterized by units that are inward-looking and mainly focused on protecting their own interests and turf. In a "silod" organization there is a lack of communication and common goals. Departments compete with each other without consideration for the effects of their actions on other departments. Obviously this is not the spirit sought in DaO.

**FINDING III.** DaO faces two restraining forces: duplication and project spread. These forces have the capacity to marginalize and prevent the initiative from contributing to the strategic repositioning of the UN in Mozambique.


Business Week, Febr. 5th 2010, “Smashing Silos, Five steps to encourage collaboration and do away with insular business units acting at cross-purposes”
Pre-DaO

55. The HLPC report *Delivering as One* (2006) stated that “cooperation between organizations (read UN agencies) has been hindered by competition for funding, mission creep and by outdated business practices”. The same report adds that “despite its unique legitimacy, (...) the UN’s status as a central actor in the multilateral system is undermined by lack of focus on results, thereby failing, more than anyone else, the poorest and most vulnerable. Inefficient and ineffective governance and unpredictable funding have contributed to policy incoherence, duplication and operational ineffectiveness across the system.”

56. Our findings corroborate this view of the erosion of the UN’s absolute advantage in Mozambique and informs our understanding of the pre-DaO baseline. The evaluation has attempted to understand Why? Based on DaO’s track record is there evidence it is addressing the challenges described above? What are the causes of these conditions that are described above, and does DaO address the challenges and limitations adequately?

Post-DaO

57. DaO introduces new possibilities and attempts to address the problematic elements identified above. Head of UN agencies were near unanimous in stating that competition for funding had reduced significantly and program coherence has improved. Finding 5 and 6 demonstrate significant efficiency gains, improved bargaining power, transaction efficiencies, cost savings and economic benefits of DaO. However DaO is failing to comprehensively achieve its full potential, because it is restrained by two active factors, these are:

a) Duality, duplication and redundancy and

b) Project spread, inadequate focus and fragmentation

58. DaO is effective in reducing some of the effects of duplication by introducing common services, harmonizing and streamlining business processes. DaO is addressing the symptoms of duplication without addressing the cause of duplication and is consequently running out of space. DaO is at risks of being limited to focussing on the “low hanging fruit” without addressing the structural issues that endorse duplication, duality and redundancy. Mozambique’s Change Management Plan is silent on addressing the core structural causes of duplication.

59. What is duplication and why does it emerge? In simple terms, duplication involves 24 UN agencies with program interests in Mozambique performing a range of functions daily using their individual and customized systems, processes and fulfilling their respective obligations to 24 different HQs. During interviews it was learned that each agency has different approval processes and limits for procurement, travel and programs etc. To review an example, the smaller agencies have portfolios below USD 2 – USD 2.5 million annually and expend a disproportionate ratio on establishment and

31 ibid

32 HLPC report Delivering as One (2006): a third of UN programmes have more than 10 UN agencies and in just under a third, less then 2 mln USD is spent by each agency p. 2
administrative costs. DaO’s capacity to intervene to consolidate the administrative, financial and program support services under a common services operation is limited by the individual agency policies and standards and this perpetuates duplication.

60. DaO introduces horizontal coordination (which is purposeful and relevant) without eliminating the vertical controls and this increases duplication too. Project spread includes an excessive number of projects; small projects with annual budgets of less than USD 1 - 2 million; and a disproportionate number of projects operating at an implementation level, rather than at a policy, strategic or coordination level increases the workload significantly and distract the UN. As analyzed in the table below there are economic reasons for the project spread that cannot be ignored either. The project spread added to horizontal and vertical duplication, result in a significant drain on UN resources. DaO has limitations, imperfections and design shortcomings that create space for the continued existence of the two constraining factors cited above. Please refer to Table 7 for a more complete examination of causes and effects of the restraining forces.

**Table 7 Duality, Duplication and Redundancy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duality, Duplication, Redundancy &amp; Project Spread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandate overlap</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-Cutting issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horizontal and vertical reporting and silo culture</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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33 Implications of UN’s Mandate Review- Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars April 2006

Delivering as One Country-led Evaluation -2010
example, the HR management issue for which there is evidence, of different systems for national staff, hiring, contracts, benefits etc.

Project and program overlap/duplication

The evaluation has observed situations in which two or three UN agencies are implementing projects within the same ministry. Mandate overlap creates the space for duplication, increases competition and also impacts on the transaction costs for government counter-parts. To underscore the point: the situation has improved post-DaO, but the improvements are insufficient.

Overlap and duplication in reporting requirements. UN agencies are required to produce reports to several constituencies (HQ, RO, donors) at various points in time.  

Regional Offices

It is beyond the mandate of this evaluation to review the role of the Regional Offices. Nevertheless, during the investigation into the vertical reporting requirements of the various UN agencies, it became apparent that there is an overlap of responsibilities and accountabilities, between the Mozambique Office, the Regional Offices and the HQs.

Project Spread & Small projects

The UN is engaged in 31 types of programmatic intervention in Mozambique. Not all of these 31 types are equally strategic. UNDAF 2010 - 11 has about 110 outputs. These are elegantly grouped under the four UNDAF pillars. From a management and operations perspective, UN responsibility does not stop at the pillar level nor at that of the 31 programmatic interventions, but extends down to that of programs and projects.

There is another dimension to project spread: small projects exist across most of the UN agencies in Mozambique. These require nearly the same level of effort as large projects, have a distracting effect on the individual agency and do not necessarily contribute to coherence.

It is acknowledged that small projects contribute to revenues and payment of overheads, and to this extent these projects are short- and medium-term economic solutions.

The higher the number of projects the greater the workload and effort for project management, and the concomitant requirements in direction and oversight. This spread increases the complexity of the operations and the challenges to achieving integration, strategic engagement and coherence.

61. Duplication and redundancy are critical barriers to transformation and empowerment of the horizontal axis in Mozambique. DaO has helped to illustrate the extent to which duality, duplication and redundancy are pervasive within the UN system in Mozambique. Project spread, fragmentation and lack of focus can be addressed in Mozambique as well as the effects of duplication can be reduced through common services and business process harmonization. However, the UN reform agenda will not meet expectations if these constraining forces are not checked conclusively. DaO will remain constrained and may not be able to reposition the UN if the UN HQs do not create an enabling environment for strategic consolidation at country level and substantive decentralization of roles and responsibilities.

See recommendations: 1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10

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34 Grinsted, Mapping Exercise and Analysis of Agency Annual Report Requirements (June 2009)
35 Dahlberg, UN Delivering as One: Capacity assessment for Mozambique, (July 2008)
Summary of Findings and REES Analysis-Macro

62. This chapter has examined the macro issues related to the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of DaO in Mozambique. Efficiency does not play a role for the analysis of the Macro theme.

63. The main findings in this chapter are as follows. Firstly, the external environment for the UN operations at country level had changed significantly, internal UN introspection processes had been set in motion and the GoM had recognized its own revised requirements and volunteered to be a pilot country for DaO. DaO was launched roughly 3-4 years after the Pool Funds, SWAPs and GBS were introduced in Mozambique, and is thus required to catch up with the new realities. Secondly, DaO is relevant, necessary and demand-driven. It improves organizational coherence and strengthens the UN’s natural absolute advantage. Third and lastly, DaO’s significant potential is diminished on the one hand and threatened on the other, by duplication, redundancy, project spread, fragmentation and inadequate focus.

64. Relevance: Pre-DaO, the UN’s relevance was diminishing and reform was required. Counterfactual analysis reveals that DaO is a relevant initiative and responds to the challenges and demand prevailing in Mozambique. If DaO had not been introduced, the UN’s value and usefulness would have diminished. Why? The new aid environment reduced the opportunity for 24 separate UN entities in Mozambique to compete for financing and program space and required a more coherent institutional and organizational approach. The GoM and bilateral agencies prefer to coordinate with One UN rather than twenty-four separate UN agencies. DaO responds in conceptual and practical terms to this requirement.

65. Effectiveness: DaO introduces new levels of horizontal synergy and creates new opportunities to bring together the full benefits and power of the UN. DaO is perceived by the stakeholders to be more relevant and responsive in the revised environment. Although demand-driven, DaO is constrained by duplication, redundancy, project spread and inadequate focus. These elements diminish DaO’s benefits and potential.

66. Sustainability: DaO despite being a relevant solution and enhancing coherence is being restrained. Many of the challenges faced by the UN are caused by institutional separation that contributes to duplication and project spread. In its present form and based on the track record to date, DaO constitutes a partial solution to these problems. If these constraining forces of duplication and redundancy are comprehensively addressed, then the UN’s effectiveness and efficiency will improve further and will contribute to improved sustainability.
Chapter 5 – One Leader

67. Four issues are examined in this chapter. Firstly, the effectiveness and efficiency of the institutional and management framework are analyzed, including the extent to which this framework has contributed to the establishment of DaO in Mozambique. Secondly, how has UNCT performed when measured against its own benchmarks as set forth in the core success factors identified. Thirdly, does DaO make the UN more efficient, and are there cost savings and economic benefits? Fourthly, an overview is presented of what has changed following the introduction of DaO, and the impact of change management on the UN’s level of effectiveness in Mozambique.

68. The findings will provide an insight into the contribution of One Leader to the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of DaO.

FINDING IV. The Institutional and Management Framework have been effective in establishing the foundations for DaO. However, additional reform is required to achieve the full benefits of DaO.

Pre-DaO

69. Prior to DaO, each UN Agency operated through a vertical chain of command; to a large extent this continues to be the case. The level of horizontal coordination and collaboration at country level was generally ad hoc and tactical rather than strategic. The RC was viewed as a voluntary coordinator, as there were no instruments to establish an accountability framework between the RC and the heads of the UN Agencies.

Post DaO

70. Three years is a short time for reform in a vast and complex organization like the UN. The significant levels of planning, organization, execution and coordination that have been undertaken, are evidenced by the achievements listed in Table 3 – Review of Actions and Accomplishments.

71. When evaluated exclusively against the indicators set forth as the Core Success Factors (Annex 3), the institutional Framework (Annex 7) has achieved a high degree of success. These successes are largely attributable to the commitment of the leadership, the support of the officers, and the enthusiasm of the UNCT. However the core success factors embody two specific limitations. Firstly the indicators are “soft” (Refer to textbox 4), and secondly there are no explicit assumptions provided. In these circumstances, some of the judgement criteria focus on soft deliverables. If we substitute the judgement criteria and focus on the implied higher-level indicators, DaO’s success rate decreases from high to medium-high. The higher-level indicators involve contributing to improved coherence and program effectiveness by reducing duplication, fragmentation and redundancy, and by increasing the level of financial effectiveness, measured savings and program alignment, amongst other indicators.

36 Focus Group & SWOT Analysis
37 annual portfolio is roughly USD 20 billion; over 7000 mandates and 38 separate agencies
38 Derived from HLPC report Delivering as One (2006)
While the structure for DaO is unanimously labelled as ‘heavy’ on the side of burdensome by UN staff\textsuperscript{39}, the resulting robustness has been fundamental in stabilizing DaO. The communication, coordination and collaboration requirements are vast, and it should be recorded that both the RCO and the UNCT have coped well under challenging circumstances. UN staff generally recognize that the increased workload is the price for improved coordination, collaboration and coherence.

The ‘firewall’\textsuperscript{40} has functioned effectively in Mozambique and has responded to its purpose, i.e. to ensure that the One Leader coordinates the entire system and eliminates perceptions of (and actual) conflict of interest; in other words, the system belongs to all, but can be managed by one entity\textsuperscript{41}. The dissolving of UN sector groups in favour of the partners’ sectoral working groups was a step in the right direction towards harmonization\textsuperscript{42}. This has contributed to an improved positioning of the UN within the new environment and has reduced one layer of insular coordination. Please refer to Annex 8 for a coordination map of donor groups and UN agency participation, developed by the RCO and demonstrates the coherent approach to coordination and participation by the UN in the revised environment. UN staff confirmed that coordinated approach would not have occurred four or five years ago.

Breaking down the barriers of the past, eroding the entrenched silo culture and changing solidified systems constitute a very significant achievement. To a large extent, the credit for the successes in this area belongs to the UNCT and the institutional framework that supports the policy framework for DaO. The GoM’s enthusiasm is supportive but its engagement needs to become more substantive. This issue will be explored under One Program.

It is a challenge to ensure coordination and collaboration between the 24 agencies and 14 government ministries, with 70 interface points, as well as 95 (non-governmental) implementation partners\textsuperscript{43}. Nevertheless the effectiveness of coordination and collaboration is improving, the UN is being more coherent and strategic is sharing information with each other and ensuring coverage based on a practical division of specialization. A comment from a donor indicated that in the past, it was not uncommon to have three or four UN agencies at the same meeting. The institutional framework, UNCT, PMT and the pillars contributes to the new levels of specialization and division of labour rationalization, coordination and effectiveness.

Enabling horizontal coordination while simultaneously managing each agency’s vertical expectations and customized requirements remains a challenge for UNCT. Post-

\textsuperscript{39} Evidence from staff survey – December 2009
\textsuperscript{40} The UN mechanism to ensure separation between the UNDP and the RC.
\textsuperscript{41} Interviews with Senior UN Officials confirmed that the firewall and the accountability framework was effectively implemented as per the Management and Accountability System of the UN Development and Resident Coordinator System including the “functional firewall” for the RC System(UNDG, August 2008) p. 2
\textsuperscript{42} Concept Note: Role of the UN in a Direct Budget Support Environment Mozambique 2007
\textsuperscript{43} Ernst & Young, Stakeholders Survey (draft report) Delivering as One,- (March 2010). –The evaluation has discovered that the number of interface points are understated and the UN’s range of coordination extends significantly beyond the numbers presented above.
DaO the workload has increased on the horizontal axis and remained stable on a vertical axis. The result is that the level of effort has increased post DaO.

77. The UNCT has applied these ‘heavy’ structures fairly effectively to create conditions for change within a complex environment. The structure has been inclusive, with two exceptions: Firstly, there was no bi-lateral representation on the Steering Committee\textsuperscript{44}, which led to apprehension and lack of full understanding and support. Secondly, no coordination mechanism at the technical level between the Line Ministries and the UN was included in the institutional framework. The Line Ministries considered this to be a gap that left them without a common forum to address program concerns that were specific to the UN. The Evaluation team makes suggestions for addressing these issues.

78. In conclusion, the institutional framework, the RCO, the coordinating committees and the management team have collaborated relatively effectively and have introduced and established the foundation for DaO. As suggested earlier, by doing so the paradigm has almost been shifted. To achieve the strategic intent of comprehensive repositioning, effective and coherent program delivery, the paradigm must actually shift. Policy space and structural support for the next phase of reforms will need to be provided by the dispersed UN HQs, in a synchronized and symmetrical manner.

\textbf{See recommendations: 5, 6, 11, 12}

\textbf{FINDING V.} The investment in the specialized change management strategy and execution of this strategy, have led to significant results in an environment where there are barriers to change. However there are still a number of hurdles to overcome.

\textbf{Pre DaO:} Not relevant pre-DaO.

\textbf{Post DaO:}

79. As stated earlier, the agency’s “silos” have been established over decades and contribute to the complexity of change management. Nevertheless several fundamental changes have in fact been introduced, for which the credit rests with the change management plan, the commitment of the UNCT and managers responsible for the plans execution. The change management requirement was correctly identified and provisioned for by the UN in Mozambique.

80. The change management plan was introduced in mid-2008, roughly eighteen months following the launch of DaO. It was designed to encompass the following areas: building a common infrastructure and services; establishing common office premises; harmonizing business practices, procurement, finance and HACT (Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer) and increasing capacity; and staff inclusion and training\textsuperscript{45}. Based on our analysis of the change management plan, progress made is roughly 80% as against

\textsuperscript{44} Terms of Reference of delivering as one UN steering committee (Jan. 2009)

\textsuperscript{45} Change Management Plan. A Strategy towards Delivering as One for the UN in Mozambique (December 2008) and interviews
the plan’s targets, with one exception: common premises. (See FINDING XII.) The institutional framework set up to oversee change management is well thought-out and has been followed reasonably well.

81. The Change Manager is based in the RCO, but is mobile and is engaged with the other agencies. Through a focal contact, the change manager interfaces with three other UN-wide committees in Mozambique. This approach leaves a gap in the outreach methodology. An approach that connects the change manager to an embedded change agent in each UN agency would accelerate the change process, ensure institutional continuity and contribute to sustainability.

82. The evaluation applied basic parameters set forth in the Change Management Plan to assess the effectiveness of the change management. It found four areas where change has been successfully introduced and is having a positive impact.

- Combined bargaining power: Creating mechanisms and processes to combine the management of procurement of administrative services and goods has increased the bargaining power of the UN (the buyer). The benefits of this have been discussed in FINDING VI. Our estimate indicates that this saved the UN roughly 200,000 to 300,000 USD over two years (refer to textbox 9) The potential to expand on this model is significant.

- Transaction cost savings: By redirecting and consolidating the responsibility for a particular function to a single entity, transaction costs are reduced. There is an assumption that reduced transaction costs are manifested in financial savings. This assumption is not valid in all cases. Transaction cost savings have the potential to be converted into financial savings, only if these contribute to a decline in staff numbers. Consolidation through common services can increase

**TEXTBOX 9 - QUANTIFYING POSSIBLE SAVINGS**

| Possible savings by common ICT platform:          |                              |
| Internet                                          | 147,051 USD (per annum)     |
| Upgrade ICT equipment                             | 156,734.55 USD              |

| Possible savings by common procurement:          |                              |
| Savings in common Security services contract    | approx. 80,000 USD (per annum) |
| Introduction of LTAs, savings from economies of scales and purchasing power | unknown |
| LTA’s savings from rationalization of procurement process | 58,000 USD (per annum) |

Whether possible savings are translated into actual savings depends on various factors. E.g. in the case of common internet access, it is noted that some agencies although using the common internet access, were unable to terminate their individual arrangements, due to contractual restrictions.

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46 RCO change management, 2009 Change Management Project Report (Jan. 2010), minutes, cross references to change management activities,

47 TORs of the Change Management Group 2008 and interviews

48 UN agencies negotiating a common contract with the security company that resulted in a 18% price increase rather than the 55% price increase suggested by the company initially.- Combined security costs 2008: 219,000 USD (OMT Write up 2008)
savings in transaction costs, one example being the combined security contract for UN premises.

- Transaction efficiencies include the continuation of functions with the respective agencies, and reducing the level of effort required to accomplish the task by re-engineering the business processes. EFT is an example of transaction efficiency gains.

- Harmonization of business processes. As observed earlier, the UN is vertically integrated. The agencies have developed their customized vertically integrated systems and business processes. Diversity in business processes is a significant barrier to increased use of common services. The more common services, the greater the potential to reduce costs and increase transaction cost savings and efficiencies. Significant effort has been invested in the analysis and identification of areas for harmonization by the UN. HACT is an example of successful harmonization, and its application should be increased. Significant foundational work has been completed to move forward with a harmonization agenda. Harmonization will reduce the barriers to Delivering as One and will be the foundation for more profound changes at the country level. The value of this area of change management should not be underestimated.

83. The analysis of the information above reveals two elements. The first is, there is no evidence to suggest that reduction in transaction costs, increases in common services and transaction efficiencies and the harmonization of business processes over the past 3 years have contributed to a direct realized reduction in personnel costs. This could only happen if personnel were reduced as a direct result of efficiency gains and the evaluation has not obtained evidence of this dynamic. The second issue relates to the Change Management Plan, which is silent on addressing the issue of structural duplication and redundancies. The HLPC report on Delivering as One (2006) did contemplate streamlining and consolidation.

84. In program terms, the impact of change management has begun to spill over into the JPs, with the level of practical collaboration and coordination having increased significantly (see finding 9,10,11). The institutional structure and effectiveness of UN have improved over the past two years, with the potential to improve further. As stated earlier, the silos are eroding and in the process useful channels and outlets have emerged. This would not have happened without the commitment of the UNCT to change. Change management will require additional space and territory in order to introduce change at a more structural level.

See recommendations: 10, 11

| FINDING VI. The economic benefits significantly exceed the measurable financial savings |
**Perspective**

85. The HLPC report Delivering as One (2006) indicates that in one-third of country programs there is participation by more than ten agencies, and in almost one-third, each agency spends less than 2 million USD.\(^{49}\)

86. The financial cost savings do not represent the full spectrum of economic benefits accruing from DaO. The judgement criteria selected for this line of enquiry was deemed to be restrictive, ignoring several economic benefits of DaO. Furthermore, DaO not only aims at cost reduction for the UN, but also cost reduction for its partners. The following attempts to place these wider benefits in perspective.

**Pre DaO**

87. To establish a base, the changes implemented post-DaO were adjusted or reversed to determine a “shadow” baseline. The case study on transaction costs could not be completed because of the lack of available data. The Evaluability Study stated that the reduction of overhead and transaction costs that was sought through the DaO initiative, probably refers to direct and variable indirect costs.\(^{50}\) This is not stated in explicit terms and thus our review will cover the savings in broader terms.

88. To simplify the definition of terms: Any reduction in costs attributable to a change in bargaining power, behaviour or business process design is broadly speaking a cost saving. “Transaction efficiency” means a decline in the units of effort or cost required to complete a particular transaction for the same level of output. Normally in Government cutback targets tend to be set at a minimum of 4 to 5% of total salary plus overhead budget. containing costs below this level constitutes a normal financial control. Based on these parameters an acceptable target for the UN system in Mozambique, should aim at a minimum cost reduction of 1.5 million USD per annum (refer to table 8).

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\(^{49}\) HLPC report Delivering as One (2006) p. 2

\(^{50}\) UNEG Evaluation of the Pilot Initiative for Delivering as One - Evaluability of UN Reform Process in Mozambique (Dec. 2008)
Post DaO

89. There is inadequate documentation on comparative costs and tracking mechanisms to accurately monitor and measure post-DaO cost savings on an itemized basis. Nevertheless, a rapid estimate indicates that the net financial savings emerging from common services is in the range of 200,000 to 300,000 USD over two years. In comparison to the parameters above this is a very modest accomplishment for an annual portfolio of 150 million USD. This does not include the offsets that should be applied for the increase in costs in some areas, like the marginal costs of coordination, change management and the depreciation on capital, such as the ICT infrastructure.

90. Operating individually required the agencies to negotiate separate contracts for services such as ICT, banking services, security, travel and insurance, and to design their own management and control systems for such services. This pre-DaO approach did not capitalize on the bargaining power of the combined UN. There are concrete and verifiable examples, i.e. the contracting of security services. By combining the bargaining power of the UN, and consolidating the contracting process for security services, cost escalation was capped at 18% instead of 55%. The net financial savings are obvious. There are several similar examples, in travel, communications, procurement, LTA, EFT, ICT, common audit framework agreement, etc.

91. The financial savings are a small part of the equation. Transaction cost savings for government and other partners are equally relevant. Although there is room for improvement, in general the GoM noted that it was saving significant blocks of time and capacity by managing their relationship with a consolidated One UN. There are other economic advantages and transaction cost savings that are more difficult to measure, but this should not be a reason to ignore these.

Economic Benefits of DaO:

92. There is irrefutable evidence that the economic benefits of common services are greater than the financial saving realized, and the respective potential is significantly greater (paragraph 82). If ‘opportunity costs’ were factored into the equation, the benefits would increase further. As an example, eleven UN agencies negotiated separate contracts each year with security companies. By consolidating the management of contracting a security company, three benefits emerge, firstly improved bargaining power and lower prices, secondly lower transaction costs (one entity consolidates and manages the workload for 11 agencies), and thirdly because with one entity focusing on one task with a common supplier, transaction efficiency increases significantly. Based on the UN's past experience, the savings in time expended for this function alone is roughly 70%.

93. In other words, the economic evidence is compelling and should allay any opposition to the front-end-loaded investment required in terms of time to set up common services.

94. Virtually every operational and management process in each of the agencies is customized to their individual requirements
95. Insufficient business process harmonization makes it difficult to apply common services and standards. This in turn restrains the progressive movement towards common services and strategic consolidation, consequently reducing the potential economic benefits. The potential for harmonizing business processes is significant.

96. Documentary evidence to suggest that Electronic Financial Transfers (EFT) contributes to significant transaction savings\(^{51}\), however only 4% of all transactions by the UN in Mozambique are currently EFT. This implies that the potential savings can be substantially greater than those obtained to date. The same logic can be applied to contracting telephone services, medical benefits, vehicle repairs, insurance, courier services, travel, customs clearance, freight forwarding, staff orientation, legal advice, IT services, training, office supplies, cleaning services, etc. The UN Procurement Working Group is making progress in negotiating these common services and accelerated comprehensive coverage will improve effectiveness.

97. When fully implemented, common services will have a more significant economic impact on the smaller agencies with portfolios below 2.5 million USD per annum. Common services, harmonization and streamlining are all important initiatives, and based on the track record and experience in Mozambique, they will reduce costs. However, in projecting forward, there are limits to the cost savings that will be achieved because of the limitations imposed by the structural duplication that reduces the space for DaO to operate. Notwithstanding, important lessons have been learned in terms of setting up common services and business process harmonization.

98. In conclusion, DaO has been successful in scratching the surface of the

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\(^{51}\) Change Management, DaO BPR Payments UNCT Presentation (2010)
following economic benefits: increased bargaining power, reduced transaction costs, improved transaction efficiencies for One UN; and reduced transaction costs for the government and donors. The challenge is to increase the coverage of common services and harmonization to as close as feasible to 100%.

See recommendations: 7, 8

Summary of Findings and Analysis of REES:

99. This chapter confirms that over 36 months the institutional framework and management team have effectively established the foundation for DaO in Mozambique (refer to Table 3). Substantive changes have also been effected, contributing to improved bargaining power, cost and transaction efficiency gains and to consequent economic benefits for the UN system. The management structures are contributing to increased levels of organizational coherence. Two constraining forces—duplication and project spread—hold DaO back from achieving its full potential.

100. **Relevance:** The institutional arrangements embodied in One Leader, the UNCT and the RCO, constitute the glue that holds the UN together, laying the foundation to plan and deliver in practice “as one”. DaO would be ineffective without One Leader. UNDAF provided a useful framework for interagency collaboration. DaO increases the benefits of working together and collaborating further, by contributing to improved organizational and program coherence.

101. **Efficiency:** The introduction of HACT, a common IT platform, LTA, Common Services and Harmonization is contributing to improvements in efficiencies. DaO has made a useful beginning. It has proven that common services and harmonization are feasible and that there is further scope for expansion, based on the experience gained. There is evidence that the management structures are onerous and require a significant level of effort, notwithstanding UNCT and the wider team having coped effectively with the workload.

102. **Effectiveness:** The UN’s bargaining power becomes formidable when combined, as evidenced in the Findings. Change management has increased DaO’s effectiveness. One Leader has been effective in establishing the foundation for DaO in just thirty-six months.

103. **Sustainability:** The contribution to sustainability by One Leader and the UNCT is significant. This is evidenced by the twenty-four UN agencies working together, eroding the entrenched silo culture in Mozambique and contributing to improved levels of coherence. Nevertheless, duplication, project spread and redundancy are potent constraining forces. Unless the fundamental causes are addressed, these factors will remain active and not only hinder the sustainability of DaO as an approach, but will hold back the wider UN organization from achieving its full potential.
Chapter 6 – One Program

104. Four issues are examined in this chapter. Firstly, does One Program contribute to an increased level of government interest and effective ownership in the program? Secondly, does DaO improve alignment with National Development Goals, priorities and planning? Thirdly, what is the usefulness of the joint programs in contributing to effective program delivery, efficiency and coherence? Fourthly and lastly, does DaO contribute to improved program results and humanitarian response? The answers to these questions will provide an assessment of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of One Program.

FINDING VII. Program alignment with national development goals has improved considerably;

Pre-DaO

105. Following initiation of UNDAF in the late 1990s in Mozambique, the Line and Coordinating Ministries became more engaged with the development framework. This undoubtedly represented a departure from the past, with the UNDAF consolidating the various programs and interventions. This framework improved the governments understanding of the content and objectives of the programs, but planning was mostly led by the UN with some GoM input. Consequence of this was inadequate alignment of the UN programs with the GoMs development goals and ownership.

Post-DaO

106. Program alignment has improved significantly. The Joint Programs are aligned with national priorities and represent roughly 25% of the UN’s portfolio in Mozambique. During 2008 the UNCT decided to fully align the planning cycle with the GoM’s. There is a significant and perceptible shift in GoM stance, with the Coordinating Ministries being better engaged and the level of contact between the Line and Coordinating Ministries having been upgraded. The Government’s interest in DaO has been traced and documented in the chronology of events (See Table 2) and in the explanation on the background to DaO.

107. According to the Mozambique Donor Atlas for 2008, roughly 30% of UN’s expenditure is captured in GoM financial reporting and is deemed on-budget. The GoM expects that the on-budget contribution should double over three to five years. During focus group meetings and interviews, the GoM expressed concern about direct transfers of funds to government agencies and provinces without the knowledge of the Coordinating Ministries nor the use of the government’s funds transfer mechanism.

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52 Noteworthy is the introduction of a fourth pillar on Economic development to answer to government priorities pronounced in PARPA II and UN’s contribution to development of PARPA II.; also: RC Mozambique, UN System Aid effectiveness in Mozambique: A Delivering as One pilot country experience (November 2009), p. 31

53 RC Mozambique, UN System Aid effectiveness in Mozambique: A Delivering as One pilot country experience (November 2009), p. 24


55 Interview with Ministry of Planning
evaluation has noted this observation. Nevertheless, based on current trends with the JPs and the envisaged expansion of One Fund, the on-budget share will increase and better reflect GoM expectations.

108. It is recognised however that One Program started as the UNDAF was being finalised. The inclusion of a fourth pillar and extension of UNDAF in line with the PARPA II extension demonstrate how alignment has improved56.

109. Interestingly, the UN’s shift to greater coherence and alignment has in turn increased pressure on the government and the donors themselves towards greater coherence, alignment and focus on the same set of priorities. Of note in this respect is the improved coordination and cooperation between the INGC and the other ministries during disaster response.

110. Experience with the JPs has resulted in a better informed UN and a realistic road map to move forward with JPs. The JPs shine a light on potential programming overlap and duplication, making corrections easier. DaO is a step forward, in government ownership and alignment with GoM priorities as well as in eventual program coherence.

See recommendations: 3, 4, 6, 9

FINDING VIII. The level of GoM ownership has increased, although capacity constraints limit the government in transforming its ownership intentions into a pragmatic mechanism to define and guide pursuit of its own priority interests. The UN’s responsiveness to the NDGs and GoM’s requirements is improving.

Pre-DaO

111. Prior to DaO, the government engaged with each UN agency on an individual basis. This modus operandi was consistent with the GoM’s respective agreements with each of the agencies. Generally the GoM was consulted on program directions at Line Ministry level. The GoM approved individual program interventions annually. A GoM official stated that “it was difficult; on some days there were three different UN agencies requesting meetings on a similar subject.”

112. The government commitment and intention to take full ownership of the UN programs was and is sincere. However capacity constraints have prevented realistic and effective ownership. Mechanisms to develop ownership were divided between the Line and Coordinating ministries, which fragmented the institutional framework.

113. There is documented evidence to support the notion that the government seeks and supports a strong UN that is fully aligned with national development goals57. The government is articulate in defining its broad interest vis-à-vis the UN, but was less clear on a strategic framework. SWAPs, Pool Funds and Direct Budget Support have changed the government’s requirements and its expectations of the UN’s development

56 Also see UNCT Mozambique, Delivering as One Position paper (June 2009)
57 Reference to Prime Minister letter in: Evaluability study (2008)
programs. Overall, GoM seeks a relationship with a UN that responds to the changed environment, challenges and priorities in Mozambique\textsuperscript{58}.

**Post-DaO**

114. The GoM considers the DaO institutional framework to be an effective departure from the past, designed to increase its ability to take effective ownership\textsuperscript{59}. Our observations are that the government is more engaged and involved at the level of the Coordinating Ministries, and the capacity to concretely engage has improved. Programmatically the Line Ministries engage at the level of the pillars (see annex 7). From the GoM’s perspective the substance of this engagement has improved.

115. However, evidence suggests that, due to a lack of appropriate monitoring systems and management tools, the government is unable to engage in a result-oriented manner. Capacity limitations and conflicts over priorities contribute to documents not being processed on time by the government\textsuperscript{60}. The delays in signing the JPs—some by over 12 months—illustrate the GoM’s limitations.

116. DaO has improved access between government and the UN at all levels—the doors are open. However, the GoM’s engagement with the UN is not adequately substantive and consistent, and as such “ease of access” does not translate into “strategic engagement”.

117. The GoM is open about its requirement to strengthen the following: policy formulation, policy performance analysis and accountability, management systems upgrade, coordination capacity, inter-ministerial coordination and effectiveness, and structured service delivery capacity. Many of these systemic gaps and weaknesses can be strengthened by the UN’s specialized agencies. The UN’s advantage in normative and technical assistance\textsuperscript{61}, when engaged appropriately, will have a significant impact on aid effectiveness, coordination and service delivery, as well as in improving the performance of the SWAPs and Pool Funds and in assisting the GoM in achieving the benchmarks for additional Direct Budget Support.

118. The government recognizes that in some areas the UN is currently strengthening the capacity of the government to coordinate at strategically important levels, for example in the area of HIV/AIDS and Gender.

119. The GoM expects the UN to have a revised and strategically focused role\textsuperscript{62}. The GoM views the UN’s project spread—especially its involvement in small-scale project

\textsuperscript{58} Finding 10 Maputo seminar 2008. Also corroborated in interviews with Government Officials


\textsuperscript{60} Focus Group meeting with the GoM

\textsuperscript{61} Extensão do quadro das nações unidas para assistência ao desenvolvimento para 2010-11, p9-10

\textsuperscript{62} Finding 11 Maputo seminar 2008
implementation—as a distraction that takes it away from focusing on large-scale project management and strategic support at a higher policy and coordination level. The GoM requires technical assistance to improve the; i) utilization of resources, ii) GoM service delivery capacity iii) accountability and reporting systems. In fact service will directly impact and address the gaps with the existing SWAPs and Pooled Funds. The technical capacity of the UN to realign with these higher-end or upstream policy and coordination engagements is currently inadequate\(^{63}\) and will need to be upgraded to be responsive to GoM and bi-lateral concerns and priorities.

120. There are three emerging important sets of evidence. The first is that DaO has contributed to increased GoM ownership (paragraph 114) the second is that alignment with NDGs has improved (paragraphs 106, 108, 110,125,126 & 127) and finally the GoM is more aware of where its capacity gaps (paragraph 117 & 119), limitations and challenges are located but have not been able to bring this awareness together in a coherent paper that precisely defines the GoM´s relationship with the UN.

121. There appear to be contradictions between GoM expectations, the current UN portfolio of programs and the UN’s capacity. As the UN’s track record suggests, it has initiated innovative projects (textbox 12), been engaged at a high policy level (textbox 13) and managed large and complex programs that have been effectively scaled up in Mozambique, this facts are recognized by the GoM. The contradictions between GoM´s revised expectations, Donor priorities, and UN´s proven track record dissipate upon deeper analysis and the core of the finding is that the UN needs a better balance in its engagement: the UN has the composite experience to be responsive to the new requirements; between innovative and large scale programs and integrated technical assistance that increase the GoM’s policy, analysis, management aimed at improving service delivery capacity.

\[\text{See recommendations: 3, 4, 9, 11}\]

\[\text{TEXTBOX 13 - UN ´S POLICY AND STRATEGY ENGAGEMENTS – POST DAO}\]

Based on primary and secondary data, post DaO the UN has been engaged in technical assistance for; i) the formulation of legislation ii) policy papers ii) strategy papers iii) implementation plans and iv) white papers in over 20 specialized areas in Mozambique. This is a significant contribution to upstream policy and analytical engagements. Despite, these assignments there is a perception within the GoM, the bilateral agencies and civil society that UN is not adequately engaged in the upstream programmatic policy area. The answer follows

\[\text{FINDING IX. DaO introduces a new dynamic and synergy in the delivery of humanitarian and development operations. Efficiencies are improving and \(\text{preliminary indications are positive.}\)}\]

\[\text{Pre-DaO}\]

122. There is a lack of relevant available data sets to form a pre-DaO picture of joint programs. The available benchmarks relate to non-JPs.

123. A broad baseline for the pre-DaO environment on humanitarian operations is established by the UN’s 2005 Humanitarian Response Review that identified problems such as erratic coordination, insufficient accountability and inconsistent donor policies.

\[\text{63 Dahlberg, UN Delivering as One: Capacity assessment for Mozambique, (July 2008) ...}\]
During humanitarian emergencies in Mozambique pre-DaO the UN organized joint assessments and appeals and took on a coordination role. Following the receipt of funds each agency established its relationship with the government Line Ministry concerned, and pursued its program based on its own agreements.

**Post-DaO**

124. The JPs have been in operation for less than twenty-four months. Most JPs have had a positive disbursement rate and are deemed to be fully aligned from a design perspective with national development goals. The evaluation is withholding judgement on the level of impact at this stage due to a lack of measurable results (see Annex 9 for a snapshot of the planned JPs in 2008).

125. The JP for HIV & AIDS - *Strengthening the HIV/AIDS response in Mozambique* - has significant scale-up potential. This JP has had the benefit of UNTAM, which is deemed to be a useful and energetic coordination mechanism. Needless to say, HIV & AIDS is a sub-sector with a degree of cohesion and definition of its borders that reduces implementation challenges.

126. The GoM considers the JPs to be convenient arrangements, however they recognize that it is premature to determine if the JPs constitute a successful model. In the interest of caution, policy-makers should be careful and not assume that success in one JP is transferable to other JPs. Each JP has a very different context, design and approach, and therefore comparability is limited.

127. An example of high level of integration is the *Building Commodity Value Chains and Market Linkages for Farmer’s Associations* JP, where WFP and FAO program managers share the same office.

128. Several assertions were received from primary and secondary data sources that indicated that “JPs were not a serious attempt at coherent programming”, but rather “a collection of existing agency projects under a single title”, that “working together is not always easy and requires high levels of coordination” and that “it is getting better”. The evaluation draws three conclusions from this landscape. First, the JPs are relatively new and represent a break from the past, this presents obvious difficulties and challenges. Second, it is too early to determine if program delivery is more efficient and coherent, or to measure the level of impact. Third, the level of effort required to set up these operations is significant, but experience shows that the level of effort declines as the operation stabilizes.

**Assumptions and Interrogation**

129. The evaluation team started examined the premises for the JPs. The primary data indicate that the JPs are underpinned by the following set of assumptions: (i) multi-sectoral development is served by joint programs; (ii) no single agency can respond to all of the requirements of the target community; by combining the strengths and specialization of the UN agencies, program delivery will be more responsive; (iii) combined and focused delivery will increase transaction efficiencies. The evaluation has

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64 Godwin, Analysis of the HIV and AIDS Pillar of the UNDAF in Mozambique 2007-2009 Organization and Results (March 2010)
validated assumptions (i) and (ii), but has not obtained sufficient data sets on transaction costs to determine if indeed assumption (iii) is valid.

130. At this stage the evaluation cannot validate results in terms of program impact. Assuming that the program impact is neutral—i.e. no changes in program indicators—there is a case for the UN to continue to pursue JPs based on the preliminary evidence available, on the sole grounds that JPs are increasing program coherence. There is preliminary evidence to indicate that JPs improve the effectiveness of the UN as a whole and constitute an improvement over the previous modus operandi of individual UN agencies. The JPs are a successful attempt to overcome the “silo” culture and increase collaboration.

131. Two emergency situations have been managed post-DaO, in 2007 and 2008. The visible difference is the level of structured coordination and organization that has been introduced into an emergency response. The introduction of the cluster approach has defined roles and responsibilities more clearly, and this has contributed to improved results and coordination between the stakeholders and the GoM.

132. The Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Response to the February 2007 Floods and Cyclone in Mozambique\(^65\), while outlining many criticisms and recommendations, concludes that the relief response in 2007 was a success. The reasons for this success included effective preparedness and coordination by the government and the impact of humanitarian reforms such as the cluster approach and CERF (Central Emergency Resource Fund). The report also notes that victims who had experienced both the 2001 and 2007 responses, noted that coordination among the international humanitarian community was far better in the 2007 response. The investigation carried out by this evaluation tends to support the finding above. There is evidence that the increased collaboration and coordination post-DaO has enhanced emergency response capacity and reduced response time\(^66\).

133. The introduction of Delivering as One, the Cluster Approach and CERF within the same timeframe and as part of the wider UN reform agenda, ensures that the initiatives are intrinsically linked\(^67\). The GoM is more comfortable with the new cluster approach, because it reduces inter-agency competition and enables the government to communicate with One Leader instead of multiple entities, and ensures that all energies are focused on achieving a common set of objectives. The entities responsible for humanitarian response (MAE and its execution agency INGC) were unanimous in their opinion that DaO inspires a higher level of confidence in the UN’s ability to assist with a response (when compared to the past). NGOs engaged with humanitarian operations, generally agree that the UN’s capacity to coordinate in an emergency situation has improved since 2007. The government recognizes that the approach to emergency situations after 2007 has reduced transaction costs and improved coordination and reporting.

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\(^65\) Cosgrove, etc., Inter-agency real-time evaluation of the response to the February 2007 floods and cyclone in Mozambique, (May. 2007)

\(^66\) The UN emergency plan developed with GoM and annually updated

\(^67\) Evaluation of the integration of the cross-cutting issues of HIV and Gender in the 2008 floods in Mozambique
To conclude, the JPs, cluster approach and CERF funding have introduced new synergies and dynamics in inter-agency collaboration contributing to improvements in the effectiveness program delivery.

See recommendation: 4

FINDING X. DaO has provided a platform for NRA integration into the development framework in Mozambique. The benefits of increased accessibility, visibility and knowledge-sharing are reciprocal.

Pre DaO

The NRAs had no seat at the table and could not participate or join programs as part of the Country Team. Their access to Line Ministries was dependent on their ability to indirectly engage the respective ministries. This limited the access the NRAs had to critical networks and opportunities. The active silo culture did not help either, and consequently simple logistical issues prevented access, engagement and resolution. The full benefits of the composite UN system failed to be available to the Government of Mozambique, and indeed to the UN itself.

Post-DaO

The NRAs represent 8 of the 24 UN agencies active in Mozambique. DaO has been a “game-changer” for the NRAs. These agencies are strategically included in the country program and gave them access to networks and information by being integrated within the pillars, NRAs are represented in dealings with government by other agencies with a presence. The inclusion of the NRAs within the programming framework creates improved conditions for alignment with NDGs, and ensures greater coherence in program delivery.

As a direct result of DaO, the NRAs are significantly more engaged and involved in the country program, and have three sets of advantages: (i) improved knowledge and information; (ii) improved access and support; and (iii) improved leverage and visibility. Despite initial tensions, One Fund further improves the NRAs’ access to resources. From the GoM perspective these agencies—which were external, forgotten or not easily accessible to the government—have indeed become more accessible to the government.68 These three critical elements are contributing to improved effectiveness and access of the NRAs under DaO.

There is an element of risk in the relationship between the NRAs and DaO. The NRAs and smaller UN agencies face economic challenges, with their financial ratios (i.e. the percentage of funds expended on administrative and establishment-related costs) being well above the comfort zone. Under normal conditions these organizations would be forced to radically cut back on their expenditures and restructure their operations. However One Fund may become a mechanism to perpetuate deployments that are uneconomic. There is adequate evidence to flag the issue as a risk, but

inadequate evidence at this stage to state that the risk has been fully present or absent. Further analysis will be required in order to take a clear position on this issue.

139. However the additional workload borne by the NRAs should not be ignored. The NRAs active in Mozambique are specialised and have fewer staff at national or regional levels. The extra demands of inter-agency coordination and planning meetings have been significant.

140. In summary: this is a necessary cost of DaO, the impact of which—if lessons are learned—should diminish following the roll-out period. DaO is effective in bringing the full benefits of the composite UN to the country, reduces the constraints for NRAs and improves access, knowledge and networks.

See recommendation: 4, 5

Summary of Findings and Analysis Of REES:

141. This chapter establishes that the GoM is enthusiastic and committed to increasing its ownership over the consolidated program, and the latter is substantially aligned with the NDGs. DaO has set up structures that facilitate the engagement of the GoM. However capacity constraints reduce its effectiveness in coherently steering the program towards specific levels of engagement. The UN’s capacity to address multi-sectoral development challenges is enhanced by the Joint Programs and joint programming. Following the launch of DaO, the capacity of the UN to assist the GoM in coordinating and responding to humanitarian crises has increased significantly.

Relevance: One Program provides the basis for Joint Programs. Furthermore, One Program has contributed to the UN addressing multi-sectoral development challenges in a comprehensive and unified manner, for example in the Nutrition Program. This program is demand-driven, with the government identifying the requirement and the UN responding in a coordinated manner. The UN agencies collaborated with each other, and work within the GoM to implement the Program. This is a demonstration of the relevance and effectiveness of One Program.

Efficiency: Under One Program there is a strategic division of labour within the UN system that increases efficiencies, reduces the effort required and improves the quality of supervision of the programs. Joint monitoring has been organized for several programs, thus contributing to increased efficiency. The structured sharing of knowledge and information through the pillars and program management structures has increased synergy and efficiencies. This is in contrast with the past, when each UN organization would have had to obtain the required information individually. The level of effort required to organize the JPs is significant, but staff confirm that the benefit is increased coherence.

Effectiveness: The program management structure for One Program has increased the level of synergy, strategic planning and collaborative information exchange, thus contributing to increased effectiveness in programming. The GoM’s identification of a problem in the area of nutrition, and the UN’s concrete response with a multi-sectorally

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69 Derived from Focus group meeting & Interview with Program Managers on- Review of the UNTAM reports
designed program response, are testimony to the increased level of effectiveness of One Program. Effectiveness is increased because programmatic duplication was identified and addressed during the planning stage for the Joint Programs. The quality assurance systems introduced for the JPs are improving the monitoring of quality control with program delivery.

**Sustainability:** Preliminary evidence indicates that One Program is relevant and has contributed to increased efficiencies and effectiveness. The sustainability of One Program is contingent on the level of impact on project beneficiaries. While preliminary indications are encouraging and positive, the effectiveness of Joint Programs in terms of their impact cannot be measured at this stage. The second element of sustainability is the extent to which the UN can use its experience and track record to rebalance its portfolio to better address the gaps and priorities identified above.
142. In this chapter the effectiveness and accountability of One Fund is reviewed. In terms of former, does it strengthen or weaken the following: (a) strategic focus, coherence, UN agency integration and effectiveness of program operations, (b) resource mobilization (c) competition for financing, and (d) transaction efficiencies. The answers to the issues above will provide an assessment of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of One Fund to DaO’s strategic intent.

**FINDING XI.** The One Fund is more conducive to increased horizontal collaboration than a vertical allocation model (HQ to Mozambique).

**Pre DaO:** There is no observation or opinion.

**Post DaO:**

143. The UN in Mozambique receives funds at the country level through six main channels:

- Fund transfers from agency’s respective HQs to the country for its programs and overhead; includes core funds;
- Special HQ financing window(s) that are created and accessed by multiple agencies;
- Special international funds initiated by the UN or government, e.g. the Spanish MDG-F Fund;
- Locally-raised funds mobilised by the individual agencies in Mozambique from bi-lateral agencies;
- Transfers to Mozambique from HQ and bi-laterals to the One Fund;
- Private donor money raised by the individual agencies at HQ level, with and without earmarks and restrictions.

144. Channel (a) is used for the majority of the funds transfers. One of the objectives of the UN reforms is increased responsiveness and engaged ownership at the country level. However the fund flow system is not synchronised with this intent. It is set up in such a manner that the HQs retain centralized vertical control. The entire system is engineered to reflect a centralized organization with central controls at all levels. It is observed that some agencies, like WFP, are comparatively more decentralized than others like WHO. The question is: does this level of decentralization respond to the requirements of country ownership, alignment, multi-sector development and coherence at the country level?

**TEXTBOX 14 – CORE FUNDING**

Core Funding: The evaluation accepts that Core Funding is the bedrock of the UN’s neutrality, role as an honest broker and is one of the elements that contribute to the UN being an issue-focused organization. To this extent, the principle of Core Funding is relevant and untouchable. However DaO’s commitment to country-level ownership remains meaningless without a resourced One Fund.
145. The evaluation accepts that One Fund represents a break with the past. However it will need to grow and mature much more in order to change the dynamics and create the conditions for country-level ownership and coherence (Refer to textbox 15). Documentation on the vision of reform of the financial architecture is conspicuous by its absence. Articulation of a policy framework to add substance to financial empowerment at the country level will increase the level of consistency between stated intent and concrete action.

146. One Fund accounts for about 15% of the UN’s total annual portfolio for Mozambique. Please see Textbox 15 below for additional information on the One Fund. The institutional framework and understandings for management of the One Fund have been developed and institutionalized. Systems and protocols are in place to manage the fund i.e. UNDP as administrative agency, ToRs for the One Fund and One Fund MoU.

147. The One Fund has empowered UNCT and enabled a more responsive approach and created conditions for improved alignment with national priorities and goals. One Fund enables the UNCT to work together and creates a concrete base for the review and management of program issues along a horizontal axis. This approach shifts responsibility and accountability for mobilizing and managing resources to the country team as a whole. Furthermore, this has contributed to the UNCT introducing agreements on quality and standards for accountability at country level. The benefits of these systems and processes are significant in terms of improved accountability. One Fund has placed collective financial responsibility squarely on the UNCT. This reinforces horizontal accountability between the wider team country programs and increases coherence.

148. The bi-lateral agencies are part of the governance structures of the UN agencies and are engaged in the full spectrum of delivery channels: direct budget support, bi-lateral programs with government, support to civil society organizations, the UN, SWAPs and Pooled Funds. The bilateral are interested in increased capacity of the GoM to manage these delivery channels and the UN can contribute to enhance the GoM’s capacity and service delivery.

149. The bi-lateral agencies are in a unique position to contribute to further repositioning of the UN by directing their financing towards this end paragraph 148. Both the bi-lateral agencies and the GoM would reap the direct benefits of such UN engagements.

**Textbox 15 - One Fund and the One Budgetary Framework**

Slow start-up of the One Fund: Contributions to the One Fund were received 12 months after inception of DaO. In 2008, 3 donors contributed a total of USD 19 million; in 2009 contributions received amounted to USD 15.1 million from 6 donors. In total 7 donors contributed over 2 years to the One Fund. Funds were disbursed in 2008 to 16 agencies and in 2009 to 19 agencies. The delay in obtaining funds had an impact on the approval of JPs by GoM and on programme execution.

One Fund raised approximately USD 1.2 million for change management in 2008.

Theoretically it is a coherence enhancing tool; it creates an excellent base for the JPs and coordination. One Fund empowers the horizontal axis by allocating funds to the country level and enabling the UNCT and RC to make programmatic decisions. It follows that because of this new funding mechanism there is an improved opportunity for national ownership and alignment.

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70 Trust fund contribution figures as of March 24, 2010 and One Fund status report
Summary and Analysis Of REES:

150. This chapter confirms that One Fund is an enabler of horizontal collaboration and brings the UN closer together in Mozambique. One Fund increases national ownership, as the resources are allocated at country level and are linked with national priorities. The financing of the Nutrition Program, the Value Chain and the HIV Program provides examples of One Fund being responsive to national priorities, fostering inter-agency collaboration and enabling multi-sectoral development initiatives. The fund had a slow start, but has picked up momentum and attracted over 35 million USD over three years. Based on the minutes of meetings, One Fund reports and interviews, there is evidence that the funds were disbursed effectively and efficiently by UNCT.

On the other hand, there is a disconnect between the commitment to increasing national ownership and the UN’s financial architecture (excluding One Fund) for their respective country offices.

Relevance: One Fund is critical for the success of DaO. It enables horizontal collaboration and empowers the UNCT to be responsive to national priorities. DaO would be less relevant without One Fund.

Efficiency: Documents and interviews indicated that the last disbursement (March 2010) from One Fund was managed exceptionally well. The allocation systems functioned efficiently, the reviews were comprehensive and the disbursement decisions were sound, demonstrating efficient co-operation between the UN agencies in Mozambique.

Effectiveness: One Fund is a new responsibility for UNCT. One Fund improves accountability at the country level and renders UN more effective and responsive in Mozambique.

Sustainability: What will happen if the fund increases significantly? Based on past history with some adjustments to processes and systems, the Administrative Agency will be able to continue to manage the One Fund effectively. The growth in resource mobilization for the One Fund in previous years demonstrates a initial interest of bi-laterals in the One Fund, improved sustainability can be achieved when DaO is successful in anchoring UN reform. Additionally, bi-laterals raised the need for improved reporting and accountability during focus groups.

See recommendations: 2, 3, 8
Chapter 8 – One Office

151. The issues examined in this chapter are progress in establishing “One Office”, the extent to which it helps or hinders in the establishment and effectiveness of DaO, and the extent to which “One Office” is a pre-requisite for creating the conditions for common services, harmonization, improved efficiencies and effectiveness.

**FINDING XII.** The economic advantages of “One Office” are compelling, yet the lack of concrete solutions in achieving “One Office” is creating barriers to strategic consolidation and stalling the benefits of common services and harmonization.

**Pre-DaO:**

152. The majority of the office space utilised by the UN in Mozambique is rented commercially or at under commercial rates from the government. The total rental bill per annum in 2006 was estimated at 400,000 USD. Ninety percent of the UN’s premises are conveniently located within a 3.5 kilometre radius of a notional center point. Traffic and distances are not problematic. The UN has invested in upgrading the majority of its premises and there is obviously the convenience associated with maintaining the status quo.

**Post-DaO:**

153. A One Office options paper for was developed for DaO by UNCT in 2007. This paper is good start and there have been several follow-up meetings at UNCT and OMT level to review the acquisition options. It is our assessment that the progress toward implementing a concrete plan has lost momentum. There are concrete reasons (as presented below) to move forward decisively.

154. The UN currently occupies 5,600 square meters of office space in Maputo, with a net rent per annum per square meter of roughly 72 USD, or 6 USD per month per square meter. This would be economically attractive if stability were assured. The evaluation has not confirmed evidence, either documentary or in interviews, that might assure medium-term stability. Therefore the evaluation contests any and all assumptions of stability.

155. Several UN staff members have pointed towards the notion of a “virtual office” as a substitute for One Office. However the evaluation has not found supporting evidence to confirm the effectiveness of the substitution, firstly because the virtual office concept is only embryonic in Mozambique. A common ICT platform has been installed recently (February 2010) and a document and knowledge management infrastructure is being contemplated for implementation. The UN has a very long way to go before it has an effective virtual office comparable to those in the private sector. It should be noted here that a virtual office system with multiple functionality may improve efficiencies, but it is unlikely to cut back on costs, or contribute to right-sizing, until its pre-conditions are implemented, like strategic consolidation in order to end structural duplication.

71 Minutes of meetings and Interviews with the RCO Staff.
156. The evaluation interrogates the stability of the existing leases. The stability of the leases could change, including the arrangements with the government. If there is a drift towards real market rents the UN will be vulnerable, as the rise will be severe and disruptive. The evaluation argues that the higher the differential between real market rents and the rents being paid by the UN, the higher the probability of risk and disruption. Not all UN staff assess the risks as presented above, although no evidence has been presented to support their the low risk scenario.

157. The spin-off benefits of acquiring common premises will be significant. For example, the barriers to harmonization and common services will be minimized. The UN will be able to rationalize its staffing, assets (both national and expatriate) and resources, in a more effective and economic manner.

158. The risks of delays in establishing a common premises are high in this environment. In conclusion, the plan to acquire common premises should remain on the priority list and be vigorously pursued.

See recommendation: 5

Summary of Findings and Analysis Of REES:

**Relevance:** The notion of “One Office” is sound from the operational and economic perspectives. However, progress towards unitary office premises has been slow.

**Efficiency:** The changes introduced under DaO have had a positive impact on efficiencies. There is potential to expand the coverage of common services, LTAs, EFTs and harmonization, and counterfactually, if the UN were to have unitary premises, there would be great potential to achieve higher efficiencies and greater savings.

**Effectiveness:** The initial experience with common services (including IT services), harmonization of business processes, LTA and EFTs etc. has demonstrated that they contribute to efficiencies and effectiveness. One office will contribute to an expansion in harmonization and common services.

**Sustainability:** The economic arguments presented for common premises are understated and are based on unstable assumptions. The findings explain our analysis and reasoning as to why the figures in the plan for common premise require review. “One Office” has only scratched the surface in enhancing efficiency and significant potential remains.
Chapter 9 – Communicating as One

159. The issues examined in this chapter are the effectiveness of the One Voice communications strategy and its role in the implementation on DaO, the level of information on DaO in the internal and external environment and the extent to which One Voice supports the implementation of DaO and strengthens One UN’s image in Mozambique. The enquiry will provide insights into the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of One Voice as it relates to DaO.

FINDING XIII. The Communications Strategy has contributed to the establishment of DaO. The strategy has some gaps and was initially sub-optimally implemented. The strategy and its execution have not been well synchronized with the requirements of DaO.

Pre-DaO

160. The UN has worked together effectively in the past on joint appeals, common messaging and joint programs. A quick review of the majority of UN websites establishes the comprehensiveness of the UN’s communications strategy and capacity. If there is an issue, it appears to be that of packaging the message for different target groups. Nevertheless, from a general baseline perspective the UN has significant experience and capacity in the area and historically has managed communications effectively.

Post-DaO

161. Communicating as One is more than an exercise in rebranding the UN. It has assisted in establishing DaO internally and getting the message out on UN Reform in Mozambique. Measured against the targeted activities set forth in the communications strategy and plan, One Voice has performed above average. The March 2010 stakeholder survey indicates that 65% of stakeholders were aware of DaO. When examining the data by sector, 100% of private sector respondents were aware of DaO, but only 48% of GoM stakeholders and 89% of donor respondents were. Additional focussing, targeting and messaging to key constituencies will be required.

162. The communications strategy (2007) was inadequate. It was too general and not adequately focused on the specific challenges of DaO. In our opinion, the strategy is diluted and departs from what the central focus should be, namely the comprehensive establishment of DaO, the rebranding of UN operations in Mozambique, and the fostering and facilitating of change internally, while reinforcing the overall objective of DaO and the UN in Mozambique (National Development Goals and MDGs). The communications strategy for DaO argues against DaO being the focus of the messaging, although in itself an understandable choice of strategic direction, different target groups (GoM, bi-laterals) require different information and the lack of knowledge about DaO and its achievements, may be caused by this choice of strategic direction.

163. At the execution level there appears to be three sets of problems. Firstly, the coordination of external messaging was inadequate. Secondly, the independent projections by the agencies continued to run in parallel and DaO did not achieve adequate visibility—at least during the six months previous to and six months following launch. Thirdly, the information being shared during the early stages with the
government and the bi-lateral agencies was less than effective\textsuperscript{72}. In the initial stages the external stakeholders remained unclear about the substance of DaO and did not understand its benefits. Midway into the process there were perception swings that appeared to be disconnected with reality (explained below). The stakeholder survey confirms our observations, and states that the level of awareness of DaO within the NGO sector was 69%.

164. Change management and communications have worked in tandem. However the messaging was not structured to coincide with the implementation of new initiatives, trials or tests under DaO. Information on some significant elements—such as HACT, harmonization of business processes, LTAs, Common Services, etc.—appeared to only barely trickle down. Internally, One Voice has had a slow start. It has been less than effective and did not comprehensively prepare the UN for change internally, especially at the middle management and operational levels. However it did catch up in Year 2. A new communication plan for 2010-2011 was prepared, but this was received too late by the evaluation team for meaningful analysis.

165. The perceptions of staff, as evidenced by the Dalhberg report and the stakeholder survey, are indicative of the degree of cynicism and caution. The evaluation attempted to unpack this scepticism further and discovered the following: Qualitatively speaking, at the higher levels of the UNCT there is optimism and interest, while at middle-management level there is cautious optimism and understanding, and at implementation level there is some cynicism and uncertainty about the value and future of DaO.

166. The GoM, especially MINEC and MPD, were reasonably well-informed before the launch and were aware of DaO’s content. The Line Ministries did not have the same level of information, although they were engaged with the UN at a programming level. The Coordinating Ministries understood that DaO would create significant savings and that these would be reinvested in the country. Apparently this information travelled into the higher levels of government before it was contained effectively by UNCT.

167. In conclusion, the communications strategy and its execution were less than effective, and the results of the stakeholder survey demonstrate a gap in knowledge and information. Nevertheless, the evaluation is cognizant of the fact that DaO is a relatively new initiative, and as such there was a significant learning curve.

**Summary of Findings and Analysis Of REES:**

168. The balance is not perfect between individual agency identity and a One UN brand. Externally, the perceptions and image of the UN are generally positive, although knowledge of DaO continues to lag in some segments—those of civil society and government.

**Relevance:** Although not explicitly stated in the literature, DaO is about rebranding the UN at country level. One Voice has been relevant during the initial phase of DaO.

\textsuperscript{72} It is of note that initially all communication was only available in English, inappropriate for the government.
**Efficiency:** One Voice had a slow start, and the 2008 communications strategy wasn’t adequately aggressive. Based on a predetermined schedule, One Voice efficiently produced standard information and newsletters for a broad audience with varying levels of interest in DaO.

**Effectiveness:** The stakeholder survey indicates that not all segments were aware of DaO. This implies that either the targeting and/or content and/or delivering of the messaging fell short of requirements. Our analysis indicates that all three factors contributed to an asymmetrical level of knowledge within the wider stakeholder community.

**Sustainability:** Establishing a One UN brand without diminishing the identities of twenty-one UN agencies requires establishing a delicate balance. To a significant extent, the UN team is sensitized and effective in introducing and maintaining this balance in their respective agencies., this will contribute to the sustainability of DaO.
Chapter 10 - Conclusions

Progress and Achievements

169. DaO is a relevant solution and has the potential to effectively contribute to the UN’s reform agenda for system wide coherence in Mozambique. UNCT over a short period of 36 months have effectively established the foundation for DaO. DaO was launched roughly 3-4 years after the changes occurred in the aid environment and the GoM’s requirements. Consequently fast tracking to catch up with the delayed launch will increase the relevance of the UN’s operation in Mozambique.

170. DaO has contributed to coherence in the UN relationship with the GoM and even more fundamentally, has enhanced the GOM’s interest and commitment in ownership (UN) of the program. The GoM’s deployment of capacity to translate interest into action (ownership) is inadequate. Building on UNDAF and joint programming, under DaO program alignment with national development goals has improved significantly. The responsiveness and capacity of the UN to address GoM’s multi-sectoral development requirements has increased substantively. The GoM interfaces with One Leader and One Program, the UN agencies are working together and programming together, reducing duplication, overlap and competition for funding and contributing to increased levels of coherence in Mozambique.

171. DaO has successfully introduced a substantive horizontal dimension to UN’s existing vertical chain of command i.e. from the various UN HQs to their respective country offices. The historical separation and an entrenched silo culture is being eroded to enable the UN to respond more effectively to national priorities.

172. Under DaO the UN has initiated the process of obtaining improved economies of scale, bargaining power, transaction efficiencies and costs savings through harmonization and common services. Harmonization is eliminating the barriers to the UN delivering as one. Comprehensive coverage and mainstreaming of DaO tested processes i.e. common services & harmonization will require targeting and time bound implementation. A One Office premises will help the UN to obtain the full benefits of harmonization and common services.

The Limitations and Challenges

173. The anthology of 24 UN agencies in Mozambique, the millions of dollars invested on vertical systems and processes have concretized “silos” over decades and set the framework for duplication. DaO reduces some of the effects of this duplication. There are horizontal coordination and reporting requirements between the UN Agencies and the RCO. Through rationalization of responsibilities between HQs and Mozambique, the structural challenges could be reduced. Meanwhile the UN has the following challenges and limitations to address:

- **Operational Issues**: Coverage of Harmonization and Common Services: There are two dimensions to this challenge, the first is achieving 100% or system wide coverage of all common services and harmonization initiatives that have been initiated and tested. (LTA, HACT, EFTs, ICT platform-virtual office, knowledge management infrastructure, common procurement, orientation,
audit, etc). The second dimension is to expand the coverage of harmonization and common services to cover new services and processes.

- **Programmatic Issues:** Project spread. Simplistically, project spread means too many projects, outputs, implementation responsibilities, contributing to inadequate strategic focus and fragmentation and leading to an a non responsive balance in the portfolio. Rebalancing will contribute to higher levels of coherence, strategic repositioning and leveraging of the UN absolute advantages. Rebalancing will enable to UN to contribute to improving the service delivery of the line ministries and will address an identified need of the GoM and the Bilateral.

- **Structural Duplication Issue:** There are two dimensions to structural issues, the first is a limitation because it restricts DaO’s scope and area of impact. Why? because the vertical axis has its requirements and the respective agencies have to maintain and service. The second is by not rationalizing the responsibilities between HQs and the field it increases the work load because DaO introduces a horizontal dimension to duplication while maintaining the work load on the vertical axis. The structural duplication creates a work load challenge and a space limitation for DaO.

174. Managing the Solutions There is a symbiotic complex relationship between the three issues above. The effectiveness and scope for addressing the operational issues (i) and project spread (ii) is limited by structural duplication (iii). If the structural issues are addressed i.e. the structural duplication is diminished, then additional space will be created to resolve the operational duplication and to a lesser extent the project spread. Why? Because then there would be space for strategic consolidation and a significant range of services and business processes could be transitioned to common services and/or harmonized business process. The challenges: operational and project spread can be addressed in Mozambique with support from UN HQs, however structural issues will require significant and synchronized UN HQs leadership. Consequently the level of effectiveness of DaO and its sustainability is dependent to a material extent on the effectiveness of the UN HQs constructing solutions to the challenges created by the structural duplication issue.

**Moving Forward**

175. The findings confirm the economic advantages of DaO and improvements in development and humanitarian operations as well as Gender, HIV and AIDS and Human Rights. This justifies the continuation of DaO, even without addressing the issue of structural issues. However, the full potential of DaO will remain unrealized if the duplication issue is not addressed. Finally the next chapter will recommend concrete action and solutions that will address all three issues inter alia the other course corrections that should increase the relevance and sustainability of DaO. (Please note: The Evaluation team have not been able to process the data sets on DaO’s contribution to the environmental programs and will be presented later as an annex to this report).
Chapter 11 - Recommendations

176. Over a three year timeframe the DaO approach is established in Mozambique and the UN is working effectively together. The findings and conclusions when reviewed holistically reveal a pattern of opportunities and challenges. The recommendations aim to capitalize on the opportunities and minimize the challenges. The recommendations take cognizance of resolutions and policy documents on DaO. If guidance and recommendations contained in these documents are echoed in the recommendations below, it is because continued action and results are required to consolidate the process of reform.

177. There are concrete justification to invest in DaO. DaO is repositioning the UN by establishing structured collaboration on a horizontal axis between the agencies, facilitating national ownership and program alignment, and improving on the pre DaO levels of efficiency, effectiveness and coherence. The overall thrust of the recommendations are to create conditions for DaO to continue to move the UN along the reform continuum until the changes are anchored and strategic intent achieved.

178. The responsibility for action does not rest with the UNCT alone. The UN HQs, the GoM, and the bilateral agencies have a significant role and responsibility in moving the DaO approach forward. The recommendations in this chapter are grouped into four sections, according to the addressed stakeholder. Furthermore for each recommendation the urgency, importance and impact is indicated. The connections to the findings, lines of enquiry, and the evaluation’s assessment of complexity and the availability of capacity to execute the recommendation are also presented. These additional indicators for each recommendation will help the stakeholders to prioritize future implementation of the recommendations.
**RECOMMENDATION n° 1**

Move forward decisively with DaO by strategically consolidating operations in Mozambique. Time is of the essence.

Consistent with the goal of the mandating UN resolutions and policy statements for DaO, the UN HQs should provide additional policy space for:

1. Synchronize decentralized functions from HQs to the field and thereafter strategic consolidation at the country level.
2. Rationalization of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities between the HQs and the Field Offices.
3. Subject to ii) revise & rationalize the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities between the RC, HOA, CD UNDP.
4. Empower the RC & UNCT to reengineer and reorganize the country level operations.
5. Vertical transfer of functions to the Country Offices from HQs, and
6. Synchronized horizontal transfer of functions to common units and working groups in Mozambique.

Strategic consolidation is a process that will create conditions for rationalization and right-sizing, as well as diminish duplication and redundancy.

**RESPONS to FINDINGS**

\[2, 3, 6\]

**COMPLEX DEPENDENCY**

\[\text{NO} \, \checkmark \, \text{YES}\]

**RESPONs to Line of Enquiry**

\[1, 3, 13, 16\]

**CAPACITY AVAILABLE**

\[\text{NO} \, \checkmark \, \text{YES}\]

**ACTION by**

\[\text{UN HQs}\]

**DURATION**

\[24 \text{ months}\]

**Additional Explanation:** Changing mandates is a long process in intergovernmental agencies and is unlikely to occur in the near term. The evaluation argues that continuing to operate with the limitations is equally constraining. A decisive solution like Strategic Consolidation will be required to pilot test the next level for reforms. This type of rationalization will provide DaO the tools with teeth it requires to respond comprehensively, instead of partially, to the challenges faced by the UN in Mozambique. The figure below is for indicative purposes and demonstrates an option for symmetrical and synchronized transfer of responsibilities from HQs to the Mozambique, consolidation of the functions at the country level to maximize the benefits of DaO and eliminate duplication and redundancy. The functions on the left side are vertically transferred to the respective country offices, while the HQs retain the functions on the right side of the graphic, thereafter the functions are transferred horizontally and consolidated at country level.
RECOMMENDATION no 2

The UN HQs should review, revise and restructure their financial allocation models to the country to enable the system to be consistent with the new direction, i.e. Country ownership. Delivering as One requires further empowerment of the UN Country Team.

i) Increase the use of the One Fund as a mechanism to finance country level operations and establish a new balance with core-funding.

ii) Synchronized reduction in direct financial support to the respective country offices and increased contributions to the One Fund.

iii) Downshift financial responsibilities to the country level and create more space for national accountability and ownership.

RESPONS TO FINDINGS: 2, 3 and 11

RESPONS TO LINE OF ENQUIRY: 1, 7, 8, 13

ACTION BY: UN HQs

DURATION: 18 months

COMPLEX DEPENDENCY: NO YES

CAPACITY AVAILABLE: NO YES

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RECOMMENDATION no 3

Bi-lateral agencies should assist by investing strategically in repositioning the UN. This requires two types of action:

i) There is a general performance deficit within the SWAPs, Pool funds, and Direct Budget Support operations. By investing in the UN to fill this gap policy formulation, analysis, coordination and service delivery of the ministries will be strengthened.

ii) Re-programming an increasing percentage of financial allocations directly to the country level to the One Fund. This will shift the centre of gravity to the field, enable decentralization, strategic consolidation, horizontal coordination and coherence in Mozambique.

There are two assumptions: The UN will increase its HR capacity to provide the level and type of TA required, and the major bilateral agencies are synchronous in their approach to ensure minimum disruption of financing during the transition period to the country level- One Fund.

RESPONS TO FINDINGS: 2, 3, 7, 8 and 11

RESPONS TO LINE OF ENQUIRY: 1, 5, 6 and 8

ACTION BY: Bi-lateral agencies

DURATION: 24 - 36 months

COMPLEX DEPENDENCY: NO YES

CAPACITY AVAILABLE: NO YES
### RECOMMENDATION n° 4
The GoM should take advantage of the full range of benefits of the UN system in Mozambique by defining on paper the objectives, priorities and precise expectations it intends to pursue with the UN. The new PARPA document could be the framework plan from which these priorities are extracted. This approach will increase the level of coherence and coordination within government and will set benchmarks to monitor and evaluate performance of the UN and the GoM.

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<th>RESPONDS to FINDINGS</th>
<th>7, 8, 9, 10</th>
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<td>GoM</td>
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<td>DURATION</td>
<td>6 months</td>
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### RECOMMENDATION n° 5
Strategic Consolidation - Smaller Agencies: A policy should be formulated by the UNCT to consolidate individual UN agency operations that are below a certain threshold value. Additional analysis will be required prior to setting firm judgement criteria. Most of the smaller agencies expend a disproportionate amount of total revenue on administrative and establishment costs and strategic consolidation will re-balance the financial ratios.

Consistent with the HLPC recommendations, DaO creates the opportunity for strategic consolidation and UNCT should test this space; UN HQs should support the consolidation policy as defined at the country level.

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<th>RESPONDS to FINDINGS</th>
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<td>DURATION</td>
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### RECOMMENDATION n° 6
Institutional Framework- Three specific changes are required i) the bilateral(s) should be represented on the Steering Committee ii) a technical working group of the major Line Ministries and the UN’s PMT should be convened for a short program direction and strategy review meeting twice a year iii) the strengthening of RCO and additional executive powers for the RC to effectively intervene and overrule in areas that effect the wider UN’s absolute advantage.

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<td>DURATION</td>
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**RECOMMENDATION n° 7**

Change management should be continued until DaO takes effective root: i) each agency should appoint a Change agent who will be the interlocutor with the Change Manager. ii) the Change agents and manager should form a change network to facilitate the agenda for change iii) change management will be required to facilitate the complex work of structural reengineering during the next phase.

Change management should target the following operational priorities:

1) Achieve comprehensive coverage on all common services & harmonization initiatives: Several common services and harmonization initiatives have been tested, these should now be set on a path for comprehensive coverage and full implementation.

**Recommended Process:**

Complete a rapid risk assessment for full scale implementation of each item of common services and business process (bp) harmonization, if the risks are not high, finalize the implementation plan, if the risks are high reassess and de-prioritized.

A lead agency and person should be nominated to manage each item

2) Identify all potential new targets for bp harmonization and common services and commence implementation each. Elaborate a comprehensive list of items for UNCT approval.

**Recommended Process:**

i) A brief assessment of risks and opportunities for each item,

ii) An implementation schedule – for each item on the positive list

iii) A lead agency and person should be nominated to manage each priority

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<td>CAPACITY AVAILABLE</td>
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<td>DURATION</td>
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**RECOMMENDATION n° 8**

The UN should be aggressive in finding a solution to the challenges that are slowing the decision making processes to acquire common premises in Maputo. The One Office premises will facilitate strategic consolidation and should be prioritized for execution. Retaining UN ownership of the premises should be the long term goal of this acquisition.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>RESPONDS to FINDINGS</th>
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<tr>
<td>DURATION</td>
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RECOMMENDATION n° 9

The UNCT should formulate a programmatic policy position on project spread, overlap and the levels of engagement - ensuring strategic engagement, balance, eliminating overlap and working towards a strategic niche for the UN.

i) Identification of all areas of programmatic duplication and overlap, agreement on principles to eliminate overlap and duplication

ii) Formulation of a policy position on managing project spread, overlap, obtaining balance in the levels of engagement, and achieving programmatic consolidation

iii) Based on ii) above, identify sequencing, priorities and timeframe for execution

iv) Include, seek and support endorsement from GoM and Bilateral agencies

v) Demonstrate the benefits for the GoM and Bilateral agencies

RESPONSES to FINDINGS
3, 7 and 8

RESPONSES to Line of Enquiry
1, 5 and 6

ACTION by UNCT

DURATION 6 - 12 months

COMPLEX DEPENDENCY
NO

CAPACITY AVAILABLE
YES

RECOMMENDATION n° 10

A process should be implemented for the consolidation of UN national staff in Mozambique:  i) Amend existing contracts & employment terms and conditions to create a common pool- to facilitate transferability between agencies, ii) standardize the benefits and terms of employment, iii) consolidate Staff under one contracting arrangement, one framework and one system, subject to a legal assessment, iv) create common internal vacancy system and grant preference to internal candidates from other agencies, v) create common training facilities to create a basis of common knowledge and capacities for UN staff, e.g. language courses, ICT skills, communication skills, project management skills according to a common standard, etc.

Please note: This recommendation should only be acted upon, if UNHQs implements recommendation one on strategic consolidation. If not, this recommendation will not be worth the effort required and should be eliminated.

RESPONSES to FINDINGS
3 and 5

RESPONSES to Line of Enquiry
7, 10 and 16

ACTION by UNCT

DURATION 6 months

COMPLEX DEPENDENCY
NO

CAPACITY AVAILABLE
YES
**RECOMMENDATION n° 11**

Simplified common monitoring, reporting & evaluations tools for all agencies, including the government counterparts and implementing partners should be introduced and executed. Common training, simplified guides and forms, and an RBM base should be uniformly applied to achieve this objective (Consistent with the Rome Accord on Harmonization and HLPC recommendations). The knowledge management infrastructure should be extended an link all UN agencies in Mozambique. The stakeholders, GoM and other UN partners, should have appropriate access to the knowledge infrastructure and information. Monitoring and Evaluation requirements of each programme should be rigorously maintained.

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<td>YES</td>
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<td>DURATION</td>
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**RECOMMENDATION n° 12**

The duration of meetings should be reduced through improved agenda filtering and setting, pre and post meeting follow-up, separating tactical and strategic issues and synthesizing documents. Similarly, advance clearing of difficult or bilateral issues, sharing short information blurbs on complex issues, will save time and ensure meetings stay focussed on the major issue, reducing time required to reach agreements.

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Chapter 12 - Lessons Learned

179. DaO was launched three years ago and multiple lessons have been learned during this period. Dao is a departure from the past, there are no institutional roadmaps, and heuristic approaches are appropriate in such circumstances. With the intention of capitalizing on the benefits of hindsight, the evaluation has sought information from the stakeholders on i) what action or policy would you have applied differently ii) what opportunities have been missed and iii) are there any regrets for action taken or action ignored? Additionally the intervention logic (Annex 5) has enabled the evaluators to situate the cause of problems and as well to comprehend what set of alternatives and counterfactuals, could have produced a different set of outcomes. This process of analysis has largely provided the input for the section on recommendations, in addition there are precise lessons that have emerged in the process and these are summarized below for future use.

Introduce a Sense of Urgency:

180. DaO is roughly 3-4 years behind the change curve. DaO has multiple complex dependencies, and this situation lends itself to a slow decision making process. Waiting for the normal approval processes is cumbersome and inconsistent with the situational requirements. The lesson learned; at launch introduce a sense of urgency and immediacy in dealing with the dispersed HQs, consistent with the TCPR Operational Document. The pressure should be spread across the dispersed HQs and agencies to respond over a compressed time frame. Fast tracking is essential and should be institutionalized for DaO at the onset.

Low hanging Fruit v/s Fundamental Change:

181. It is a matter of fact that there is plenty of low hanging fruit to harvest post DaO launch. Notwithstanding, the purpose of DaO is not low hanging fruit, it is to reach all those difficult and complex parts that will contribute to ending duplication, redundancy, ineffective programme delivery and addressing the fundamentals. The lesson learned is do not allow the low hanging fruit to distract from the fundamental purpose of DaO, target the complex and difficult structural issues simultaneously.

Introduce Change Management at the Onset:

182. The complexity of the individual context from a change management perspective should not be underestimated. There will be situational learning curve for even an experienced change management professional. In Mozambique, the change manager was introduced in mid 2008 almost 18 months post launch. Progress has been positive post introduction of the position. The lesson learned, introduce the change manager at the onset. Embed change management within each agency by creating a change network.

Include the Key Stakeholders Substantively

183. The environment for DaO is difficult and complex. DaO has inherent multiple and complex dependencies and the UNCT will require all the support it could obtain and harness. The GoM was interested, committed and had a framework to engage, but lacked a strategy. The bilateral agencies had interest but lacked a mechanism and a substantive agenda to engage with the DaO process. The lesson
learned, comprehensively engage the key stakeholders include them substantively in the process and its issues shortly after inception. The complex dependencies are significant and the UN’s silos have exceptional survival capacity and restrain DaO. UNCT requires support to manage the various dimensions of this massive responsibility and address the complex dependencies. Every ounce of support from the key stakeholders is essential and critical for the success of DaO.

Test the Space

184. The evaluation team reserve the right to be wrong on this issue, however, based on a review of the authorizing literature for DaO, the team estimates that there was (and is) perhaps more space available to heuristically test structural reconfigurations under DaO. UNCT took a more careful approach, pursued the low hanging fruit and adhered to its approved planning documents. The lesson learned is; test the space beyond the low hanging fruit, and push into realm of the difficult areas like restructuring and strategic consolidation, and even if the initiative fails, or is rejected by HQs, it is a positive development because it will generate knowledge on testing the limits of space under DaO and will contribute to the knowledge base for future policy adjustments.

Formulate and Apply Negative Lists

185. With 60 years of culture and history invested in every process there will be resistance to change. The UNCT applied a careful approach identified what it wished to do (positive list) the targets for common services, harmonisation, streamlining, business process revisions and then proceed to implement; the steps include: i) analysis the problem, ii) assess its impact, iii) consider revision objectives, iv) design option, v) select option, vi) introduce option, vii) test, viii) then replicate. Thereafter start with the next item on the list. Perfectly logical, linear, sequential and careful. The lesson learned, test a negative list, identify only those elements that will not be reformed, assume any item not on the list will be revised and reformed. The negative list, reduces the time required for specific approvals, introduce a simultaneous approach, wherein several process are reformed simultaneously.

Conclusions

186. DaO has illuminated the opportunities and limitations of the reforms. The results are clear and unequivocal. In less than three years DaO has indeed created new space and opportunity for the repositioning of the UN and improving program effectiveness, relevance and coherence. Moving forward with the reform process is the only viable option. The consequences of not creating adequate conditions for DaO to achieve its full potential are serious. DaO will be pulled back by the force of history, culture, orthodoxy and gravity.

187. DaO has most of the essential elements to strategically reposition the UN and achieve its strategic intent, but it should extend beyond the present limitations and compress the time frame for implementation.
188. The UNCT have accomplished the first phase of establishing DaO reasonably well measured against the core success factor and the list of achievements (chapter 3). Moving forward, the responsibility for creating conditions for DaO to succeed belongs to the combined UN’s HQs and its management structures. DaO has significant potential, but is an insufficient solution with correctable imperfections and the responsibility to formulate supportive policies for this reengineering rests with the combined HQs of the UN. Vertically integrated reforms, horizontal reconfiguration, restructuring and strategic consolidation of functions at the country level will address the limitations. Additional policy space is required move down this path. There is significant potential for rationalization and right sizing of the UN operations, provided the core causality of duplication, duality, redundancy and project spread is addressed.

189. An important and equally relevant responsibility also belongs to the major bilateral agencies. This group of stakeholders have a strategic opportunity in terms of their collective relations with the UN. They have made a valuable investment in the UN and need to continue to engage and assist the UN through this difficult period and process of repositioning and reform. Applying their financing strategically towards strengthening the One Fund will increase coherence at the country level and ensure the UN focuses on niche areas.

190. The government of Mozambique has a responsibility. It cannot on the one hand, through its line ministries (health, agriculture, education, water, social action, youth, culture, etc.) encourage the UN to pursue diverse projects and on the other hand, through central coordinating ministries express concern about inadequate UN focus and the consequent diminished attention of the UN to key strategic areas, policy, analysis, coordination and improving GoM service delivery. The GoM also has a responsibility to prioritise and define precisely what balance it requires and expects from the UN during this phase of Mozambique’s development.

191. The limitations imposed by the mandates and anthology can be eroded and should be eroded without diminishing the specialization and focus of the individual Agencies at the country level. In fact some of recommendation will indeed enable the individual Agencies to strengthen their focus and specialization.

192. There are experiences in the private and public sector, that have taught us, that minor course corrections, work for the short term. DaO is not a minor course corrections, however the limitations and restraining factors reduce the space for it to accomplish its full potential and will frustrate the process of reforms. This type of reform requires comprehensiveness and compromise, and will ensure that the wider organization remains relevant in a changing landscape and will create new opportunity to strengthen its absolute and comparative advantages.

Maputo, 2 June 2010
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General document

- Accra Agenda for Action
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## Evaluation Schedule – People Contacted

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Organization + Position</th>
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<td>03, 2010</td>
<td>WFP Representative WHO Representative</td>
<td>Lola Castro El Hadi Benzerroug</td>
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<td>04, 2010</td>
<td>RCO UNCG Chair UNRCO Change Manager</td>
<td>Luis Zaqueu Christian Schornich</td>
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<tr>
<td>05, 2010</td>
<td>WFP Program Manager - JP Value Chain &amp; Commodity</td>
<td>Billy Mwinga</td>
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<tr>
<td>09, 2010</td>
<td>UNAIDS Country Coordinator UNIDO Head of Operations</td>
<td>Mauricio Cysne Jaime Comiche</td>
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<td>10, 2010</td>
<td>FAO Representative Save the Children Country Director</td>
<td>Maria Zimmerman John Larsen Grabowski</td>
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<td>UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative</td>
<td>Ndolamb Ngokwe</td>
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<td>15, 2010</td>
<td>FAO Operations Unit Coordinator</td>
<td>Sandra Gomes</td>
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<td>RCO (2), WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNDP, WFP</td>
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<td>22, 2010</td>
<td>UNDP Head of Finance</td>
<td>Bernardo Jorge</td>
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<tr>
<td>23, 2010</td>
<td>UNDP Operations Management Team Chair UNDP Country Director</td>
<td>Christina Masaka Jocelyn Mason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24, 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINEC), National Director for International Organizations and Conferences</td>
<td>Albertina MacDonalds Milagre Macaringue Fernando Julião</td>
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<td>25, 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINEC), National Director for International Organizations and Conferences</td>
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<td>26, 2010</td>
<td>WFP ICT Manager UNICEF Deputy Representative</td>
<td>Karen Basemian Roberto de Bernardi</td>
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<td>29, 2010</td>
<td>RCO Aid Coordination Officer RCO Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Specialist UNRCO Change Manager</td>
<td>Ramesh de Silva Ainhoa Jaureguiebeka Christian Schornich Abilio Gune Cristina Matusse</td>
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<td>30, 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD), Deputy National Director of Planning MPD, National Directorate of Planning</td>
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<td>31, 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Industry and Commerce, National Director for Promotion of National Products INGC Director General</td>
<td>Jaime Nicols João Ribeiro</td>
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## Annex 1

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday, April 01, 2010</td>
<td>IOM Country Representative</td>
<td>Stuart Simpson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday, April 02, 2010</td>
<td>Comissão National para a UNESCO CNCS Deputy Executive Secretary RCO Senior Coordinator UNFPA Country Representative Ministry of Public Administration, Deputy National Director for Municipal Development UNESCO Country Representative Embassy of the Netherlands, Ambassador</td>
<td>Januário Muthaquia Diogo Milagre Sergio Muchanga Patricia Guzman Juvenal Mendieta Claudia Harvey Frans Bijvoet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday, April 05, 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology, Coordinator, Millennium Villages Program Ministry of Environment, Director of the Institute for Territorial Planning INE, Head of Cabinet &amp; Head of Department of International Relations and Cooperation INE, Department of International Relations and Cooperation UNICEF Chair Procurement and Administration Working Group</td>
<td>Vitória Jesus Langa Arlindo Dgedge Alda Rocha Renato Cassamo Sonia Freitas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday, April 08, 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, Deputy National Director for Planning and Cooperation Ministry of Health, Technical Staff for Cooperation UNICEF Project Manager UNICEF Head of Child Protection Unit</td>
<td>Célia Gonçalves Dra Judite Ruben Cossa Theresa Kilabane</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday, April 09, 2010</td>
<td>UNDP Project Manager UNDP Project Manager UNDP Project Manager Ministry of Agriculture, SETSAN, Head of Permanent Information Unit</td>
<td>Gabriel Dava Jose Macamo Luis Mucacho Francisca Cabral</td>
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<td>Thursday, April 15, 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Women and Social Action, National Director for Cooperation</td>
<td>Sansão Buque</td>
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<td>Friday, April 16, 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Hilten Jantilal</td>
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<td>Monday, April 19, 2010</td>
<td>UNICEF Country Representative Focus Group Bi-laterals</td>
<td>Leila Pakkala Irish, Swedish, Norwegian, Canadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday, April 28, 2010</td>
<td>RCO Humanitarian Affairs Assistant</td>
<td>Angelina Tivane</td>
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Data processing Matrix
### Evaluators assessment of Core Success Factors

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<td><strong>One Leader</strong></td>
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| 1. Functional partnerships in place with Government, donors and civil society - to support the process financially, technically and politically.  
  1.1. Joint Steering Committee and related consultative fora established according to agreed criteria  
  1.2. Number of Joint Steering Committee meetings carried out  
  1.3. Percentage of partner government institutions, donors and civil society organisation who rate as successful the UN effort to build a broad and effective partnership | The ToRs for the Joint steering committee have been developed and approved in January 2009. Joint steering Committee convenes twice in 2009. Bilaterals are not part of the Steering Committee. They are part of the Tripartite Consultative forum, which convened twice in the period under investigation.  
  The stakeholder survey did not contain any question asking about the successfulness of building partnerships |                     |
| 2. Broad ownership and staff involvement in the Delivering as One initiative, which allows UN staff to inform and drive the reform process.  
  2.1. Percentage of staff at different levels who respond correctly to at least 80% of a set of questions about UN coherence  
  2.2. Percentage of non senior staff at different levels who rates as “adequate” the opportunities provided to them to participate and inform the UN reform process  
  2.3. Number of Town Hall meetings per year on UN reform process | Majority of UN staff is aware of DaO process and acknowledges the need for it. However, the staff survey did not contain questions on coherence of the UN, also no questions related to staff input were part of this survey.  
  It can be assessed as favourable that 89% of the participants in the Staff Survey support DaO and 73% believe DaO is contributing to increased impact of the UN in Mozambique.  
  Also no level of staff inclusion was not rated in the Staff survey, however a staff association (mUNSA) was set up to have a formal framework for staff inclusion in UN reform.  
  Town Hall meetings have been held on a quarterly basis since 2007, evaluators estimate based on different sources of verbal information that in total |                     |

---

73 Stock taking report 2007 and Stock taking report 2008
### Core Success Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Success Factor</th>
<th>Evaluators Assessment</th>
<th>Percentage achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Positive attitudinal change towards DAO agenda</td>
<td>Induction training of new staff members carried out</td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. System in place for introductory briefings on the UN Reform process for newly appointed member of UNCT, OMT and PMT</td>
<td></td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ability of the RC to clearly separate his/her functions as Resident Coordinator from those of UNDP Resident Representative (including the firewall).</td>
<td>ToRs for RC have been developed and endorsed by UNCT. Country Director for UNDP nominated and made responsible for day-to-day management of UNDP, thereby institutionalizing the functional firewall between RC and UNDP responsibility. Core Management Principles (Code of Conduct) were adopted by UNCT in July 2007</td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Existence on an institutional firewall between UNRC and UNDP through clear delegation of authority to UNDP CD</td>
<td></td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. Increased accountability for the RC and members of UNCT.</td>
<td></td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. Code of Conduct and key management principles in place and operational for all members of the UNCT</td>
<td></td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Set-up/Strength the UNCT/RC accountability framework</td>
<td>Not assessed by evaluator - Assessed by 180 degree appraisal report, which is not to public information.</td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### One Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One Program</th>
<th>Evaluators Assessment</th>
<th>Percentage achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. One UN Program activities contribute coherently to support the achievement of country development objectives: 1.1. Extent to which the One UN program intervention is in line with and contribute to the strategic national development issues defined in the PARPA 2007-09.</td>
<td>To be assessed by external impact evaluation (2010/2011). From the stakeholders survey it can be learned that the perception is favourable to this respect: over 60% thinks UNDAFs content is aligned with PARPA and just over half of the GoM respondents have the expectation that DaO will contribute to improved UN alignment.</td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. One Program results are measured positively against the UNDAF 2.1. Percentage of JP outputs fully achieved by 2009. 2.2. Percentage of JP outputs partially achieved by 2009. 2.3. Percentage of JP outputs achieved jointly</td>
<td>To be assessed by external impact evaluation (2010/2011)</td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Staff capacity matched with agencies mandate, program and involvement in the Delivery as One process (to ensure a reasonable balance between respect for mandates of</td>
<td>Staff capacity assessment carried out (Dahlberg report) No reporting found on implementation of this assessment in relation to staff capacity is</td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Percentage achieved" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Core Success Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluators Assessment</th>
<th>Percentage achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>organizations, and capacity to coordinate and implement). 3.1. Percentage recommendations from the capacity assessment implemented.</td>
<td>found. However some evidence exists of increased focus on 4 UN approaches (UNCT position paper, sept 2009), which was one of the recommendations of the Dahlberg study</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. Harmonisation and alignment of processes and mechanisms supporting a results-based approach

- 4.1. Joint UN planning and review process established from mid-2007 onwards.
- 4.2. Joint UN Annual Review (starting in 2007) results in a more efficient and effective process for the Government and the UN.
- 4.3. Strengthen RBM and funding of JPs
- 4.4. UN financial contributions reflected in the State Budget and in Government Reports

11 Joint programs signed by end of 2008

4.1 Joint UN Annual Review: UNDAF Progress Report March 2010, Stocktaking report 2007 and Stocktaking report 2008. Notwithstanding this common reporting, some agencies still have parallel reporting duties towards donors or HQ. Joint reviewing also taking place with stakeholders (missions with Media, GoM, etc.)

4.3 RBM strengthened, outcomes and outputs but not reflected in reporting. Activities, outcomes and outputs not sufficiently linked in progress reports.

### One Budgetary framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluators Assessment</th>
<th>Percentage achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding has been leveraged to meet the priority focus areas of the UNDAF. 1.1. Joint resource Mobilisation Strategy in place 1.2. Percentage of UNDAF that is funded 1.3. Percentage of UNDAF funds executed 1.4. Amount of financial resources leveraged from other multi-lateral and bilateral development partners</td>
<td>Priority focus areas not defined. Allocation of funds according to implementation by each agency 1.1. Joint resource Mobilisation Strategy in place, no reports found on activities undertaken for joint resource mobilisation 1.2 33% of UNDAF funded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Funding has been leveraged to meet the priority focus areas of the One Program.

2.1. Joint Resource Mobilization Strategy is being used for the UNDAF/One Program, clarifying roles and responsibilities, processes and also maximizes comparative advantages and efficiencies (including avoiding competing for common pool of resources)

2.2. Percentage of One Program that is funded.

2.3. Clear criteria for budgetary allocation within the One Program in place and being used, providing the basis both

2.1. Joint Resource Mobilization strategy is in place, but not clear how competition for funds is being avoided. Verbal evidence of different target groups for individual and joint resource mobilization.

2.2. 2008: 100% of One Program funded

2.3 Allocation Criteria for One Fund are in place and agreed on.

2.4 Yes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Success Factor</th>
<th>Evaluators Assessment</th>
<th>Percentage achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>for initial allocation of resources as well as monitoring of performance and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subsequent allocations to participating agencies.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4. Standard MOU in place and operational to facilitate partnerships and transfer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>of funds between AA and UN agencies as part of the One Program.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A system is in place to ensure agency accountability to realize financial</td>
<td>All funds in Budgetary framework were disbursed, 33% of UNDAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitments in the one Budgetary Framework and One Program.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Percentage of financial allocations (core and non-core) shown as “available”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the Budgetary Framework, disbursed in the course of the cycle (2007-2009) by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agency.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2. Percentage of funds shown as “pledged” in the Budgetary Framework,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disbursed in the course of the cycle (2007-2009) by agency.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Common Services**

1. Specific actions have moved forward for harmonization of IT, financial, HR and   | Various common services in place, such as common ICT platform, common procurement for   |
procurement rules and regulations (taking best models available and as per the       | operations, (HACT, Admin and Procurement, Communication, ICT, Common Premises and Human   |
Operational results outlined in the One Plan).                                       | Resources)                                                                             |
1.1. Number of functional inter-agency working groups for common services set-up.   | 1.2. No                                                                                |
1.2. One standard working process in place (HR)                                     | 1.3. No                                                                                |
1.3. Central management of vacancies in place.                                       | 1.4. Yes, since 1 febr. 2010                                                         |
1.4. Virtual network established                                                    | 1.5. Yes, since 1 febr. 2010                                                         |
1.5. VSAT as main and one back-up ISP connectivity link available for all agencies   | 1.6. No joint financial monitoring system                                             |
1.6. Joint financial monitoring system established                                    | 1.7. Rudimentary supply planning process exists for negotiation of common contracts   |
1.7. Supply planning process                                                         | (LTA’s)                                                                                |
1.8. Supplier database in place                                                      | 1.8 Yes, content and technique is in place. Dependent on Common ICT platform to make  |
|                                                                                        | available to all agencies                                                              |
### Core Success Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Success Factor</th>
<th>Evaluators Assessment</th>
<th>Percentage achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2. Common initiatives in place for staff development, participation and wellbeing.  
  2.1. A common Staff Federation established and functioning.  
  2.2. A common We Care program is in place and functioning, covering staff from all UN agencies | 2.1. Yes, mUNSA (Mozambique UN staff Association)  
2.2. Yes | ![Bar Graph](image) |

### Communicating as One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communicating as One</th>
<th>Evaluators Assessment</th>
<th>Percentage achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Unique voices by mandate maintained, and one voice on issues relating to the UN as a whole.  
High-level representation is coordinated by the UNCT to ensure that the UN speaks with one voice through the RC or through a Head of Agency, on behalf of the UN.  
Balance maintained between visibility of organizations (by mandate) vis-à-vis the visibility of the issues (one UN voice).  
  1.1. A clear and focused communication strategy is being implemented with all agencies participating and contributing to its implementation  
1.2. A minimum set of tools in place and effectively promoting communicating with one voice, such as joint press clippings analysis, joint press releases, joint press conferences, joint media visits, joint events, joint language guidelines | Communication strategy is formulated.  
Communication Workgroup was established with participation of several UN agencies. Assessing from the One UN newsletter (Juntos), the One UN communication is very inward looking, reporting on the UN reform, missions visiting the country, conferences, progress of Joint Programs. It also seems to have had trouble finding the space allowed by agencies of what to inform on.  
The communication strategy did not have a definition of target groups and one of the communication forms used: an electronic newsletter distributed 12 times per year, may not be suitable to all stakeholders.  
Assessing from the UN Newsletters, joint media visits and press conferences have been organized | ![Bar Graph](image) |
| 2. Internal Audience: UN staff are fully conversant with the MDGs and have a clear sense of the UN's overall role in supporting their achievement in Mozambique and are able to convey it to their personal and professional networks.  
2.1. Percentage of Staff who are knowledgeable about the MDGs and how the UN is working to achieve them  
2.2. UN staff understand the reform process in Mozambique and know where to go for information  
2.3. Percentage of Staff who know about the DaO initiative and where to go for information  
2.4. UN staff feels part of a larger UN family with a common | From staff survey:  
2.1. No questions were asked about MDGs  
2.2. 76% says to understand the Goals of DaO, however 50% also says they do not get enough information on DaO.  
2.3. No information available  
2.4. In the staff survey 94% indicated to be proud to work for the United Nations and almost the same percentage (92%) felt to be contributing positively to the organization. | ![Bar Graph](image) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Success Factor</th>
<th>Evaluators Assessment</th>
<th>Percentage achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>purpose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Development Partners</td>
<td>UN is perceived as a transparent organization that is coherent, well-coordinated, funded and managed.</td>
<td>From the stakeholders survey, this answer cannot be distilled because no questions to this effect were asked. However, in general the UN’s reputation was perceived as high (90%). 3.1 increase of number of funding partners 2008 – 2009: 100% from 3 to 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Percentage of increase in the number of funding partners and funds allocated to the One Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. General public, civil society and media</td>
<td>MDGs are fully integrated in PARPA and issue of fight against poverty is day to day part of social discourse. Regular showcases of Private Sector interest in MDGs by donations and advocacy activities. Media regularly address issue of fight against poverty and importance of MDGs. Quantitative evidence harder to come by.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Increased awareness of development priorities and the UN role in helping Mozambique achieve the MDGs. Extent to which the MDGs are fully integrated into government policies and programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Extent to which the MDGs are integrated into civil society and private sector development activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Percentage of the general public aware of the MDGs and the challenges and progress in achieving them.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. National Media capacitated to report on MDGs and development priorities in Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5. # of articles on MDGs in the Mozambican media in 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4

Evaluation Process Map
Annex 4

Intervention Logic
Evaluation Tools applied
System: Processing Data into Information

193. Data collection and analysis was guided by the objectives of the evaluation. The methodology is anchored to the focus areas for the evaluation, and was designed to respond to the 17 selected Lines of Enquiry. The importance of this evaluation, its utilization focus and process emphasis required penetration into complex cause and effect relationships creating the need for a sophisticated processing system. The collected data was processed and transformed, filtered, weighted, validated, classified, and finally synthesized into findings that respond to the lines of enquiry. A cause and effect analysis provided a framework to place the causal factors into perspective and formulate the recommendations. Finally, analysis, judgment and final synthesis was the basis for the formulation of the evaluation report.

194. A set of evaluation tools was selected for information extraction and validation to respond to the enquiry and questions. The tools are listed below. In most cases more than one extraction or validation tool was applied to obtain the required information. The methodology includes processing data into information by filtration, applying weights, synthesis, validation, establishing causality, triangulation and classification.

Data Extraction and Analysis Tools

Reference Group Consultation

195. This tool was used for validation of information, or to seek guidance on complex evaluation issues. The reference groups consisted of between 5 and 9 persons. No attribution was to be used in the evaluation report, hence

Interviews

196. The majority of the enquiries consisted of structured and semi-structured interviews. The choice of semi-structured interviews was largely to provide senior officials with an opportunity to explore the topic and provide opinions that could have a wider scope and a deeper level of analysis including meta analysis. Each enquiry was pursued with few support questions. The interviewers received refresher training in interview techniques to ensure parity and objectivity. The retraining has enabled them to obtain information and seek evidence to support the views or hypothesis presented by the interviewee in a time-efficient and verifiable manner. A selection based on the level of the person in the organization, their exposure and engagement with the line of enquiry was interviewed. Resulting in about 60 interviews.

Focus Group

197. Specific lines of enquiry were pursued in four focus group sessions. For each Line of Enquiry a different set of stakeholders were selected. The team has chosen Line of Enquiry 3, for three focus groups sessions. The first focus group was for governmental stakeholders and was directed towards Line of Enquiry 4. The criteria for selection of participants and organizations, was based on a rapid assessment of who can contribute the
most to the specific line of enquiry being pursued as well as to ensure balance and maximize participation.

**SWOT Analysis**

198. The SWOT analysis method (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) was applied as an evaluation tool to analyse a complex situation requiring profound analysis with high level, the SWOT analysis proofed a useful and effective data extraction tool.

**Case Study**

199. The Case Study method was applied to three situations: 2 Joint Programs were compared to each other and to other non-DaO joint programs and 1 case study on the effectiveness of Humanitarian Assistance post-DaO A case study in an evaluation is never meant to be generalized or to represent a general situation. In this case the Humanitarian Assistance was chosen as a subject of a case study to illustrate cooperation between UN agencies and the improved (or not) impact of it on relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. Also the case studies on Joint Programs were not intended as indicative of all Joint Programs. Nevertheless, they are indicative and validate or refute other emerging findings. A simple criterion grid was applied to make the comparisons.

**Counterfactuals**

200. Counterfactuals were a critical part of the tools and methods. The hypotheses of how the situation would have differed if DaO had not been or was not implemented provided critical insights into the understanding of the officials associated with the implementation of DaO. The approach accommodated both upward and downward counterfactuals. A secondary counterfactual was included in the SWOT analysis session (refer to Findings part IV)

**Surveys**

201. The evaluation applied the findings and results of two stakeholder surveys, namely the staff survey carried out in December 2009 and a stakeholder survey implemented in February – March 2010. The survey outputs were used to validate or refute emerging hypotheses and the methodology considers the results of these two surveys as essential to provide a comprehensive analysis of DaO.

**Multi Criteria Analysis**

202. Tool was not used

**Quality Control and Validation**

203. Our methodology mandated that each line of enquiry and the related questions were exposed to more than one extraction tool to ensure quality control and validation. In addition, all data obtained through this extraction process was re-validated, verified and weighted before being further analyzed and synthesized. Consistent and repeated data integrity checks were applied to identify any errors that could distort the findings. Each enquiry and question was addressed by a tool most suited for the nature of the enquiry.

**The Evaluation Work plan**
### Evaluation engagement schedule – Planned and Realized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation tool</th>
<th>Sessions</th>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>GoM</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Bi-laterals</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>IFI</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enquiry – planned</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enquiry - realized</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Focus Groups - planned</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Desk Review - realized</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi criteria – planned</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi criteria- realized</td>
<td>Not applied in this evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterfactuals- realized</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfactuals- planned</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Survey -planned</td>
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<tr>
<td>Survey - realized</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Institutional Framework for DaO in Mozambique
## Donor Working groups and UN participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working groups</th>
<th>Participating UN agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Devel. Partners Group (DPG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>code of conduct</td>
<td>UNRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGs and division of labour</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G19 – General Budget Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMs (heads of mission)</td>
<td>UNRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOCs (heads of cooperation)</td>
<td>UNRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economists working group</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1) Poverty and macro-economic manag</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAMS Poverty anal./mon. syst.</td>
<td>UNICEF, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>budget analysis group (BAG)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tax reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>procurement reform</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>audit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SISTAFE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2) Governance.</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance platform</td>
<td>UNDP, ILO, UNFPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector reform</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>UNDP, UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>municipal development</td>
<td>UNHABITAT, UNICEF, UNFPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>UNDP, UNICEF</td>
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<td><strong>3) Economic development</strong></td>
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<td>Financial sector</td>
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<td>microfinance (IPRM)</td>
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<td>trade</td>
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<td>Agriculture (Proagri)</td>
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<td>financial/planning</td>
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<td>extension</td>
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<td>Road sector</td>
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<td>Energy</td>
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<td>Fisheries</td>
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<td><strong>4) Human capital</strong></td>
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<td>Health swap group</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>drugs (GTM)</td>
<td>WHO, UNFPA</td>
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<td>health system</td>
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<td>endemic diseases</td>
<td>WHO, UNICEF, FAO</td>
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<td>DSRH new-born child health and nutr.</td>
<td>WHO, UNICEF, FAO, WFP</td>
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<td>human resources</td>
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<td>monitoring/evaluation</td>
<td>WHO, UNICEF, FAO, WFP</td>
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<td>investments / planification</td>
<td>WHO</td>
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<td>finances and audit</td>
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<td>gender</td>
<td>WHO</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/TB (partners only)</td>
<td>UNICEF, WHO</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>basic education</td>
<td>UNICEF, UNESCO</td>
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<td>secondary education</td>
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<td>technical and vocational training</td>
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<td>adult and non formal education</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
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<td>teacher training</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>cross cutting issues</td>
<td>UNICEF, FAO, UNFPA, WFP</td>
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74 Developed by RCO, undated
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<th>Annex 8</th>
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<td><strong>5) Cross cutting issues</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
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<td><strong>HIV/AIDS (partners forum)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Food security</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Disaster risk management</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Demining</strong></td>
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Joint programs UN agencies Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of JP</th>
<th>Pilar and Outputs</th>
<th>Date signed off</th>
<th>Program duration</th>
<th>Budget Status (US$)</th>
<th>UN Agencies involved</th>
<th>UN Pledged (US$)</th>
<th>Ministries involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality</td>
<td>Pillar: Governance UNDAF Output: 1.4.2; 1.5.4; 1.7.2</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>May 2007 to Dec 2009</td>
<td>Total: <strong>12,345,000</strong></td>
<td>UNDP: 2,000,000</td>
<td>UNFPA (C): 1,000,000</td>
<td>MINEC</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Signed off by RC</td>
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<td>Available in 2007: 2,745,000</td>
<td>UNIDO: 3,000,000</td>
<td>ILO: 1,200,000</td>
<td>Gvt Implementation: MMAS (Min Women and Social Action)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Unfunded: <strong>9,600,000</strong></td>
<td>FAO: 1,000,000</td>
<td>UNIFEM: 1,300,000</td>
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<td>Total Approved: <strong>1,574,355</strong></td>
<td>UNICEF: 770,000</td>
<td>UNESCO: 1,200,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNDP: 570,000</td>
<td>WHO: 375,000</td>
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<td>MISAU: 6,117,100</td>
<td>CM + E: 500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Strengthening the HIV and AIDS Response in</td>
<td>Pillar: HIV/AIDS UNDAF Outputs: 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.5, 3.5.4, 3.5.5</td>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>March 2008 to Jan. 2010</td>
<td>Total: <strong>9,087,100</strong></td>
<td>UNICEF: 2,400,000</td>
<td>WFP: 6,117,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed off by RC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Confirmed: <strong>2,305,000</strong></td>
<td>UNAIDS (C): 5,000,000</td>
<td>UNDP: 570,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unfunded: <strong>5,397,100</strong></td>
<td>ILO: 400,000</td>
<td>UNICEF: 2,400,000</td>
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<td>Total approved: <strong>1,578,688</strong></td>
<td>UNICEF: 2,400,000</td>
<td>UNFPA: 570,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Building Capacity of Civil Society</td>
<td>Pillar: Governance UNDAF Output: 1.6.2</td>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Total estimated: <strong>13,000,000</strong></td>
<td>UNICEF: 5,000,000</td>
<td>ILO: 400,000</td>
<td>MINEC Ministry of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizations, including Communication for</td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed off by RC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unfunded: <strong>4,430,000</strong></td>
<td>UNFPA: 1,000,000</td>
<td>UNIFEM: 250,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total Approved: <strong>1,231,043</strong></td>
<td>UNESCO: 120,000</td>
<td>UNDP: 500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Ensure the Most Vulnerable Populations have</td>
<td>Pillar: Human Capital UNDAF Outputs: 2.5.1; 2.5.2</td>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>October 2007 to</td>
<td>Total estimated: <strong>10,316,000</strong></td>
<td>WFP: 4,382,000</td>
<td>ILO: 666,000</td>
<td>MINEC Min of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to a Social</td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed off by RC</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Unfunded: <strong>4,268,000</strong></td>
<td>UNICEF: 1,000,000</td>
<td>UNICEF: 1,000,000</td>
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<td>Total approved:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of JP</td>
<td>Pilar and Outputs</td>
<td>Date signed off</td>
<td>Program duration</td>
<td>Budget Status (US$)</td>
<td>UN Agencies involved</td>
<td>UN Pledged (US$)</td>
<td>Ministries involved</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety Net</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1,750,582</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Response</td>
<td>Pillar: Human Capital UNDAF Outputs: 2.1.4, 2.2.7, 2.3.4, 2.4.4</td>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>Nov. 2007 to Jan. 2010</td>
<td>Estimated budget: 10,000,000 Unfunded budget: 7,260,000 Total Approved: 2,384,042</td>
<td>UNICEF 1,500,000 UNDP (C) 1,800,000 UNFPA 170,000 FAO 1,500,000 WHO 880,000 WFP 1,450,000 IOM 980,000</td>
<td>Ministry of State Administration</td>
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<td>6 Promotion of Youth Employment</td>
<td>Pillar: Economic Development UNDAF Output: 4.3.1</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Estimated UNIDO: 524,529 Total Approved: 2,441,345</td>
<td>UNDP (C) ILO UNESCO UNIDO UNCDF (C) FAO UNHCR</td>
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<td>7 Building Commodity Value Chains and Market Linkages for Farmer’s Associations</td>
<td>Pillar: Economic Development UNDAF Output: 4.3.2</td>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td>Jan. 2008 to Dec 2009</td>
<td>Total estimated: 1,350,000 Unfunded: 950,000 Total Approved: 427,676</td>
<td>FAO 450,000 IFAD 400,000 WFP (C) 500,000</td>
<td>MINEC Min of Industry and Commerce Min of Agriculture Min of Planning and Dev.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Support to Decentralization and Integrated Local Development</td>
<td>Pillar: Governance UNDAF Output: 1.1.1.</td>
<td>May 2008</td>
<td>Nov. 2007 to Jan. 2010</td>
<td>Total Estimated: 13,146,500 Total Unfunded: 6,670,000 Total Approved: 1,624,847</td>
<td>UNICEF 600,000 UNDP (C) 2,000,000 ILO 300,000 UN-HABITAT 1,276,500 UNFPA 900,000 UNCDF 3,200,000 WHO 2,000,000 UNESCO 1,200,000 FAO 820,000 UNHCR 350,000 UNIFEM 500,000</td>
<td>MINEC Min of Planning and Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of JP</td>
<td>Pilar and Outputs</td>
<td>Date signed off</td>
<td>Program duration</td>
<td>Budget Status (US$)</td>
<td>UN Agencies involved</td>
<td>UN Pledged (US$)</td>
<td>Ministries involved</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Enhance the Quality and Accessibility of Sexual and Reproductive Health services, Neonatal, Child Health Services and Nutrition</td>
<td>Pillar: Human Capital UNDAF Output: 2.2.1, 2.2.2</td>
<td>August 2009 Signed off by: UNICEF, FAO, WHO, WFP</td>
<td>Oct. 2009 to Jan. 2012</td>
<td>Total estimated: 5,500,000 Total funded: 5,500,000</td>
<td>FAO 1,590,662 WFP 1,978,430 UNICEF 1,805,090 WHO 125,818 UNFPA (C)</td>
<td>MISAU Min of Agriculture</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Building Capacities for Effective Trade Policy Formulation and Management</td>
<td>Pillar: Economic Development UNDAF Output: 4.3.5</td>
<td>November 2007 Signed off by RC</td>
<td>Jan 2008 to Jan 2010</td>
<td>Estimated Budget: 5,725,000 Unfunded: 5,160,000</td>
<td>UNDP (C) 1,500,000 UNIDO 1,615,000 FAO 760,000 UNCTAD 350,000 ITC (C) 1,500,000</td>
<td>MINEC Min of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>MDG - F</td>
<td>Environment Mainstreaming and Adaptation to Climate Change</td>
<td>Pillar: Economic Development UNDAF Output: 4.2.6</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>Jan 2008 to Dec 2010</td>
<td>Estimated Budget: 7,000,000</td>
<td>FAO (C) MDGF</td>
<td>MINEC Min Coordination of Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nr.</td>
<td>Questions --&gt;</td>
<td>On the Effects of DaO on Processes and Results</td>
<td>Theme</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>To what extent is program delivery more effective or less effective? What has caused the program delivery to be more or less effective?</td>
<td>1. ONE Leader (Coherence, Relevance, effectiveness and Improved Delivery) - Program Coherence, Performance</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Has joint programming ie: UNDAF increased effectiveness and coherence of program delivery? Has DaO further contributed and improved program delivery and coherence? What percentage of your agency's programs are being implemented outside the Joint Programs?</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>What are the perceptions of the GoM, civil society and other stakeholder on the pace of integration of DaO and is it considered a solution for program effectiveness and coherence?</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Has DaO institutional and management framework contributed to improved program delivery? Is the ONE Steering Committee effective in improving program delivery? Have the RC, RCO and the CMT been effective in driving the DaO initiative? To what extent has the UN RC as One Leader been able to exercise enhanced authority, responsibility, and accountability?</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Is the institutional and management framework for DaO effective and efficient? Is it cost and time efficient? Does it contribute to coherence and integration? Is the firewall between UN RC and UNDP working? Which actions would be required from UN HQ to further enhance the authority and accountability of the One Leader?</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Has the Tripartite National Consultative Group effectively engaged and contributed to the DaO process?</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Are the program Management Structures (pillars, convening agencies and participating agencies) effective to enable harmonized and aligned programming?</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Has DaO and UNDAF brought the UN organizations closer together or has it increased the distance?</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Is the ONE Steering Committee for DaO an effective or ineffective mechanism that creates space and opportunity for national ownership and leadership? What is the SC's role in UNDAF?</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Is the UN adequately and effectively repositioned within the changed aid environment since the implementation of DaO?</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Have UN agencies been able to formulate common positions towards the wide Aid Environment through Dao</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Have DaO efforts enhanced Aid Coordination at country level? Or have they duplicated it?</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>What is the level of political and institutional support from GOM for the reform process and DaO?</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Has the ONE Fund increased or decreased ownership and empowerment of the GoM?</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Is the engagement of the government structural and substantive or superficial and perfunctory?</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Are the governance mechanisms enabling national ownership and effective interagency cooperation?</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Has the RBM and newly established M&amp;E systems been effective, have they strengthened or weakened the effective delivery of outputs?</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Have the Joint Programs effectively increased collaboration? How and why? Have the Joint Programs added value? How, where and what value has been added? Can this added value be quantified and qualified? Has there been any progress in mainstreaming the UN conventions and resolutions in the joint programming, including human rights, gender, HIV and AIDS etc, and if so, to what extent?</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Has the GoM allocated adequate resources and capacities to assume ownership and guide DaO at an institutional level?</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Have UNDAF and DaO contributed to increased alignment with national planning cycle and national priorities? What has been the effect of increased alignment with national priorities on program delivery?</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Has DaO increased or decreased harmonization and alignment with national development goals?</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Has joint program delivery increased or decreased cost effectiveness and cost efficiency? Has measurable increase/decrease been registered?</td>
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Annex 10
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<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Questions --&gt; On the Effects of DaO on Processes and Results</th>
<th>Theme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>To what extent has DaO increased or decreased redundancies in program delivery?</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>ONE fund: Are there clear and defined criteria for budgetary allocation within the ONE UN program? Are the criteria being adhered to 1) for initial allocation 2) for continuous monitoring of performance 3) for participating agencies?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>What are the donor perceptions of the ONE budget framework and have their perceptions had an impact on the level of their support for the UN ONE fund initiative? To what extent have donors provided un-earmarked and multi-year resources to the One Plan Fund in a timely manner?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Has the ONE fund mechanism facilitated strategic focus and improved effectiveness? Has ONE fund improved transaction costs? To what extent have the Cost Norms been harmonized among UN Agencies and with GoM, and donors and has this led to efficiency gains?</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>What is the level of financial and political support from Donors for the Reform Process and DaO?</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>What percentage of the ONE initiative has been funded? What is the trend in bilateral financing for the ONE Fund? Is it increasing or decreasing? How has ONE impacted on the timeline between resource mobilisation, allocation and utilisation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Is the joint resource mobilisation strategy in place and operational? And to what extent are the roles, responsibilities and processes of the strategy clarified? What are the results?</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Has the ONE fund increased or decreased competition for funds by UN agencies? How has this been achieved and how is it being measured? What is the opinion of the bilateral on the ONE fund? Do they consider that the ONE Fund will increase program effectiveness and will it reduce transaction costs for the donors? Is the One Budget proposal the most suitable way to enhance the financial administration of DaO? To what extent has the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) been implemented?</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>What are the common services that are being implemented under DaO? What is the level of client satisfaction with these services?</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>What is the cost effectiveness of these common services? Are these verifiable? To what extent did common support services and shared business units increase the effectiveness and efficiency of DaO in terms of achieving program objectives? What are the main constraints (including in terms of resources)? Are the common support services and shared business units the most suitable way to enhance the administration of DaO?</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>How effective has the functional clustering mechanism been in promoting working together and increasing organizational efficiency?</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>What specific strategies and actions have been carried out to achieve harmonization of financial regulations and operations? Has a common auditing system for the ONE UN program been established and how does this harmonize with the system utilized before ONE?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Is DaO perceived to be an effective solution by UN Staff?</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>To what extent can UN staff convey / communicate the UN's role in supporting achievement through ONE?</td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>To what extent do staff consider they receive the information they need on UN reform and the UN's work under UNDAF?</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>To what extent has the communication strategy been implemented with individual agencies participating and contributing to implementation?</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>To what extent has the balance been maintained between visibility of ONE and the individual agencies?</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>To what extent has the general public awareness of the UN's work and achievements under the UNDAF and ONE UN program increased?</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>To what extent is the UN's development work under UNDAF and DaO in Mozambique externally promoted?</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>To what extent can partners (NRAs) and GoM communicate/convey the UN's role in supporting NDGs and MDGs and their own institutional achievements?</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>To what extent do you perceive that GoM and partners fully understand the UN's role and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nr.</td>
<td>Questions --&gt; On the Effects of DaO on Processes and Results</td>
<td>Theme</td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Have the stakeholder perceptions on the UN changed since the introduction of DaO?</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Has the change management plan been effective? Has it successfully changed staff attitudes towards the goals of DaO? To what extent has participation been promoted in change management through continuous consultations with development partners and UN staff?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>To what extent has the concept of working together as a team, with openness and trust been internalized and operationalized?</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>To what extent has external communication of UNCT supported the change management process within the GoM?</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>To what extent has the capacity of the OMT and operations staff supported the change of business processes and their harmonization?</td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>How was the process of lessons learned documented and institutionalized? What specific actions have been carried out to integrate learning from good practices and hindering behaviours?</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>To what extent have the findings and recommendations of the evaluability study been accepted and implemented?</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>To what extent has the pilot gone from short term quick wins to long term results?</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>What specific opportunities have been missed? What are the unintended consequences? What is the impact of the opportunities missed and the impact of the unintended consequences?</td>
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<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Establish the degree of cost effectiveness of DaO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Identification of causal factors that have contributed to successes and setbacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>What were the national political drivers for the country to become a DaO pilot?</td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>What was the UNCT environment and experience of joint work at the time of launching the process?</td>
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</table>
Counter-Hypothesis

During the course of the interviews, several contentious assertions were presented by the interviewees. The team received these at face value, and decided to verify or refute these assertions through the application of a counter hypothesis construct. This approach enabled a comprehensive and holistic analysis of the interviewees assertions.

### Counter Hypothesis Construct:
DaO is a re-branding exercise for initiatives that had failed in the past, collaboration is being marketed as a solution and impact when in reality it is a process, GoM ownership is cosmetic, DaO does nothing to reposition the UN in the revised aid environment, and finally, the UN is slow and fundamental changes like DaO will take decades.

### Components of the Construct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of the Construct</th>
<th>Analysis of the components</th>
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</table>
| 1. DaO is simply an attempt to re-brand, re-formulate and market old ideas and mechanisms of superficial collaboration which would have been consolidated as standard practice through natural and practical reasons independent of DaO. | Refuted
Joint working (programming, programs, assessments and appeals) have been significant aspects of UN reform over the previous 20 years. While DaO builds on the learning and recommendations of previous collaboration it is a departure from ad hoc, opportunistic and program based initiatives towards more structured, strategic, results driven collaboration at both horizontally and vertically integrated levels.

Branding is a necessary element of change management. The consequent evidence that the UN did not promote DaO adequately or timely, internally or externally (see findings **) suggests 're-branding' was not conceived as a façade. |
| 2. DaO presents and markets collaboration and working together as an impact of reform and not as a process of reform. This malapropism presents the implicit yet erroneous assumption that collaboration will solve the recognised and/or perceived problems of inadequate coherence, inefficiency, ineffectiveness and waning relevance. Collaboration and working together, as presented by DaO as an initiative, has not produced improved impacts. | Partially Refuted
Working together has been the first step and this has initiated the process of eroding the silos. Evidence suggests that DaO is beginning to make some headway in addressing fragmentation, inter agency competition, silo-culture, inadequate NDG alignment and coherence issues that necessitated UN reform. Notwithstanding, the positive developments, DaO’s ability to comprehensively address duplication and redundancy is dependent on the UN HQs providing more space for i) accelerated erosion of the silos, ii) strategic consolidation and iii) additional decentralization to the country level.

If DaO fails to address the restraining factors outlined in finding ** then this partial substantiation will remain valid. |
| 3. With UN financial assistance to Mozambique at almost 6 % of total aid support it is unlikely that the government will have the time or proclivity to engage and | Refuted
The chronology of DaO evidences that the initiative is demand-driven. The GoM has consistently advocated the necessity of one common framework for its engagement with the UN. Evidence presented in the findings indicates the interest and commitment of |

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**Source:** OECD, Country statistical profiles 2010: [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/7/1882362.gif](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/7/1882362.gif)

Latest statistics available: 2008 Total NET ODA: **1,994 mln USD**

Source: UNDAF progress report 2009: **117.06 mln USD**

Percentage UN contribution as part of total ODA to Mozambique: **5.87%**

(OECD does not provide information on 2009 ODA, hence it was assumed that no increase of ODA occurred for 2009. Should this be an erroneous assumption and the trend of 2006 -2008 of approx. 10% increase per year extrapolated to 2009, than the UN contribution should be adjusted downward. Reliable and recent information is extremely difficult to come by. The used sources and years seemed most reliable available)
interact at all the levels required under DaO. The prerequisite of Government ownership of the initiative will therefore lack impetus and be largely cosmetic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partially Refuted</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. DaO does not reposition the UN relative to the new aid architecture, nor to Mozambique's revised development goals because it follows the path of least resistance and as such results (outputs and outcomes), are and will be minimal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Years is inadequate for a programmatic impact evaluation of Dao. Circumstantial evidence and the core success factor indicators suggests that the level and effectiveness of coordination is more integrated with national development priorities and that program delivery is moving towards greater coherence and impact. There is inadequate documentary proof to demonstrate that DaO has a viable plan to address structural and design challenges nor structural duplication and redundancy. There is evidence of an attitude of 'default to business as usual' particularly at programmatic level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nearly Refuted</th>
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<tr>
<td>5. The UN is a vast, slow and an unwieldy apparatus which will take decades to effect substantive structural change. Within this assumption, current agency collaboration is little more than acquiescence to divert external pressure to reform which in itself, 'self fulfils the prophecy' that reform within the UN is fruitless.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Following comprehensive analysis components 1 & 3 are refuted without reservations, 5 is refuted with a minor reservation. Critically however, components 2 & 4 contained fragments of compelling substance:
Terms of Reference for the Country-Level Evaluation of the Delivering as One United Nations in Mozambique

1. Global Context

The Delivering as One (DaO) approach was recommended by the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment on 9 November 2006. The Panel, which was co-chaired by the Prime Minister of Mozambique, H.E. Luisa Dias Diogo, was mandated by the Secretary-General as part of the follow-up to the 2005 World Summit. The Panel recommended to the Secretary-General that the UN system should establish UN Country Teams with what they called the four Ones—One Leader, One Programme, One Budgetary Framework, and, where appropriate, One Office—in order to bring about real progress towards the MDGs and other Internationally Agreed Development Goals. UNCTs should also have an integrated capacity to provide a coherent approach to cross-cutting issues, including sustainable development, gender equality and human rights.

On 22 November 2006, the Secretary-General decided to move forward with some of the recommendations, focusing on the call to establish pilot country initiatives where the One UN approach would be tested. On 3 April 2007, the new Secretary-General presented the report of the High-level Panel to the General Assembly. In his comments, he noted that the exercise would test the principles advocated by the Panel in different countries. The governments of Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Vietnam volunteered to pilot the Delivering as One approach. The Secretary-General tasked the UNDG to move forward and support the eight pilot countries. Member States agreed that these concepts should be tested in the pilot countries on a voluntary basis and that the evaluation of lessons learned from these experiences would inform future intergovernmental consultations.

The Delivering as One United Nations (DaO) approach has been implemented in eight programme countries since 2007. The evaluability assessments conducted in 2007 and 2008 suggested that country-level evaluations be conducted to assess the progress made against the strategic intent of DaO, record achievements, identify areas for improvement and remaining challenges and most importantly, distil lessons that could inform decision-making processes at the national and intergovernmental levels.

The DaO initiative is intended to make the role and contribution of the UN system at the country level more relevant, effective and efficient. This evaluation is intended to assess how, and the extent to which, the intended and unintended results were achieved in Mozambique.

The United Nations General Assembly emphasized the need for an independent evaluation of lessons learned from DaO efforts, for consideration by Member States, without prejudice to a future intergovernmental decision. This country-level evaluation should be considered a building block for the independent evaluation which will be commissioned by the UN General Assembly. The independent
evaluation would be able to integrate the evaluative evidence from the country-level evaluation, assess systemic efforts of the UN and provide recommendations for decision-making at intergovernmental level.

This Terms of Reference (ToR) is based on the framework ToR developed by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) at the request of the member states participating in the Delivering as One pilot initiative to support the conduct of country-level evaluations in line with the resolutions of the General Assembly (GA) contained in the 2007 Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) of operational activities for development of the United Nations system.

The TCPR, contained in General Assembly Resolutions 59/250 (2004) and 62/208 (2007), provides guidance to make the role and contribution of the UN system more coherent, effective and relevant at the country level. In the resolutions, the GA emphasizes that the planning and programming frameworks of the UN system, including the UNDAF, need to be fully aligned with national development planning cycles whenever possible and that they should use and strengthen national capacities and mechanisms. The ownership, leadership and full participation of national authorities in preparing and developing these planning and programming documents are vital to guaranteeing that they respond to the national development plans and strategies.

The resolutions emphasize that programme countries should have access to and benefit from the full range of mandates and resources of the UN development system. National governments should determine which resident and non-resident UN organizations could best respond to the specific needs and priorities of the individual country, including, in the case of non-resident agencies, through hosting arrangements with resident organizations and the use of advanced information and communication technology, including knowledge management.

2. Background on Delivering as One UN in Mozambique

The overall goal of the Delivering as One UN Initiative in Mozambique is to improve programme delivery and results through a more coherent, better coordinated, funded and managed UN.

Under the overall leadership of the Government of Mozambique and the Resident Coordinator, the UN system in Mozambique aims at delivering tangible development results as one team through the implementation of one country-owned and relevant UN programme that is consolidated as the UN Development Assistance Framework for 2007-2009, with a two year extension approved for the period 2010-2011. This overall programme framework is based on the principles of joint programming and includes all UN system entities, members of the UN Country team as well as non-resident agencies. It is implemented within the context of one budgetary framework and overall joint resource mobilization strategy, in close cooperation with other international development partners and national partners, including civil society organizations.

The UN in Mozambique has been moving towards better coordination and increased alignment. This process has incrementally moved forward with efforts to effectively reposition the UN in the changing aid environment of Mozambique.

The UN System in Mozambique comprises of eight agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO) and a UNAIDS Secretariat, with physical in-country presence, and with 11 other agencies (IFAD, ILO, OCHA, UNDESA, UNIDO, UNIFEM, UN-HABITAT, UNHCHR, UNODCP, UNCDF, UNV) covering Mozambique from other countries, regional offices or Headquarters.
2.1 Re-positioning of the UN

In order to respond more effectively to the challenges of meeting the MDGs, the UN in Mozambique has in recent years been moving towards improved coordination and increased alignment with national priorities. The implementation of UN reforms and the rapidly evolving development assistance environment in Mozambique, characterized by a move towards more flexible aid modalities such as sector Common Funds and General Budget Support (GBS), due to the increased capacity of the Government for the management of the development aid, have provided the UN family with an opportunity to accelerate reform activities at country level. This process has enabled the UN Country Team to work more closely together, acting as one family and speaking with one voice.

The UN system in Mozambique has viewed the evolving aid environment as an opportunity to initiate reflection at the country level on the future role of the UN in the new General Budget Support (GBS) environment, and to expedite the implementation of the UN Reform, joint programming modalities and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. It is therefore very important to place the One UN Initiative in the framework of the ongoing efforts and initiatives in Mozambique. The rapidly evolving development assistance environment in Mozambique, with an increased focus on GBS and sector wide funding, has provided the UN family with an opportunity to accelerate UN Reform activities at country level.

The UN works closely with the Government in the new environment, based on its neutrality, impartiality, regulatory/normative role, technical expertise, more general expertise in capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, provision of services, enhancing the voice of the civil society, sudden onset emergency and ability to create and nourish partnerships. There are also increased preparedness and response to efforts by the UN to play a pro-active role in upstream policy dialogue under the Joint Review process of the PARPA, which is implemented through the Plano Quinquenal, and through the Development Partners Group (DPG) co-chaired by the UNRC and the WB Country Director. The UNCT has moved forward in engaging more proactively in the SWAp and the Programme Aid Partnership (PAP) Working Groups, taking on various convening roles.

A number of areas of comparative advantage of the UN system in Mozambique have been identified:

- **Advocacy** for UN core values, including human rights, gender equality, human security and the Millennium Development Goals;

- **Normative and technical advisory support**, setting standards and ensuring quality control, in addition to providing technical advice according to the agencies’ respective mandates;

- **Strengthening of national capacity** at both central and decentralized levels, particularly strengthening Government capacity to deliver the additional resources channeled to the State Budget;

- **Support to national scale-up** of evidence-based programmes;

- **Implementation services**. The UN can be sub-contracted to implement services on behalf of the Government, as seen in other regions, such as Latin America;

- **Support to preparedness and national humanitarian response** in sudden onset emergencies; and

- **Bringing the voice of civil society to the table**. The UN can play a strategic role in ensuring
that the voice of civil society is heard. In so doing, it would also ensure that provinces, districts and
communities are given similar opportunities and access to make their voices heard and to
influence central government policy.

- **Building partnerships between all stakeholders.** Given its impartiality, the UN is an ideal
mediator and facilitator to foster partnerships.

### 2.2 The “Five Ones” of the Delivering as One UN in Mozambique

The “Five Ones” in Mozambique are the following:

- **One Programme:** focusing on a sub-set of selected, strategic UNDAF outputs highlighting
joint programmes. The 2007 – 2009 UNDAF, both in substance and cycle, is fully in line
with the national development framework. In order to be fully in line with the next national
development plan in Mozambique, and based on guidance from the Government, the UNDAF
2007-2009 was extended by two years (2010-2011) as indicated earlier in this document. The
overall strategies and approaches of the UNDAF 2007-2009 will remain consistent in the
extension period. The next UN plan will then be developed based on the next National
Development Plan, which is expected to be finalized by the second quarter of 2010. All
UNDAF outcomes/outputs involve at least two, preferably three or more UN agencies – s
ingle UN Agency activities are not included. Strategic inclusiveness in the One Programme
focuses on the contribution of all UN agencies, specialised and non-specialised, resident and
non-resident in areas of UN comparative advantage to achieve greater impact in the context
of Mozambique development priorities and of the new aid environment;

- **One Leader:** an empowered and accountable Resident Coordinator, with the competencies
and authority to guide the development and management of the UN in Mozambique and
speak with one voice on behalf of the UN and supporting Agency representatives leading
agency specific representation in-country, while exploring opportunities for clustering of
representation where more effective and efficient. This is the “Cabinet Model”, with the RC
acting as the “Prime Minister” and the UN Country Team members acting as the “ministers”;

- **One Budgetary Framework and One Fund:** consolidating all contributions to support a
coherent and joint resource mobilisation, allocation and disbursement of donor resources to
the UNDAF and the Delivering as One UN Operational Plan;

- **One Management System:** a results-based management system, with integrated support
services, under which all agencies share joint premises and common services, wherever cost–
efficient, with an aim to ensure efficient and effective delivery of operations support for
programmatic activities of all agencies in the country. This arrangement ensures that
cooperative arrangements are in place to build on synergies and maximise the use of available
capacities and infrastructure; and

- **One Communication Strategy:** a common approach to communication and advocacy, in
which there is a rational use of communication assets to raise and advance issues related to
the mandate of the UN. The strategy would lead to greater coherence and effectiveness in the
UN’s approach to advocacy, resulting in measurable results.

### 4. Purpose and Use of the Country-Led Evaluation

It is anticipated that the evaluation of the Delivering as One initiative will be carried out in two
phases:
(a) a country-led evaluation, which will need to be carried out by the Governments of each DaO pilot country in conjunction with the UNCT and other key stakeholders by mid-2010; and (b) an independent global evaluation, which will commence in July 2010 and will be completed by mid-2011, in time for presentation at the 66th Session of the General Assembly in September 2011.

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess to what extent the DaO in Mozambique is on track to achieve its targets against its strategic intent.
- Assess how the DaO initiative is contributing to national development goals
- Identify challenges and lessons learnt from the implementation of the DaO in Mozambique
- Make specific recommendations on actions that should be undertaken by the different stakeholders (UN, Government and donors) in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the DaO in Mozambique

The Mozambique country-led evaluation is based on a number of key principles:

- **Country ownership and oversight:** the evaluation will be overseen by the Government of Mozambique with a view to ensuring that the results and recommendations are aligned with the national development agenda and can be fully incorporated into key processes and plans;

- **Primacy of national context:** the evaluation process and methodology will be developed with full recognition of the national context and working modalities of Government and development partners – there will be no attempt to create parallel processes or structures;

- **Focus on evaluation of results:** the evaluation will focus on reviewing the contributions of the UN Delivering as One to the overall national development agenda and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in Mozambique;

- **Transparency and credibility:** the evaluation will be carried out in an open and transparent manner, with high level, independent professional expertise contracted to support the process, outcome document and core set of recommendations in conformity with international evaluation standard; and

- **Comparability:** while flexible and based on the national context, the evaluation process will also ensure comparability of methodology and results with similar country-led evaluations being carried out in other DaO pilot countries.

The country-level evaluation, including the recommendations, will be used by the stakeholders as an input to the discussion on how to enhance the role and contribution of the United Nations development system in support of national policies and strategies for the achievement of national development results. The evaluation will assess the progress made against the strategic intent of DaO in the country, record achievements, identify areas for improvement and remaining challenges and distil lessons to inform decision-making processes in the country.

The evaluation will also ascertain the level of effectiveness of the DaO initiative in bringing to the country’s benefit the whole potential of the UN development system. The evaluation will be used by the UN and stakeholders to enhance its approach and processes to reach the related national development goals as outlined in the National Development Plan (PARPA II and the next National Development Plan) and also the internationally agreed development goals. It is also intended that this
evaluation will be an opportunity to learn from the other pilot experiences and also will be an opportunity for South-South cooperation.

4. Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation will focus on the UN’s response to addressing the identified key development priorities in the country. When assessing that response, the evaluation will analyze the implementation of the Delivering as One approach expressed in the above mentioned five Ones, namely – One Programme, One Leader, One Budgetary Framework and One Fund, One Management System and One Communication Strategy – in order to assess its contribution towards the achievement of national development goals.

More specifically:

- **One leader** and the extent to which the position of Resident Coordinator enabled a more coherent UN approach to address national development challenges;

- **One programme** and the feasibility and progress made in establishing joint programming and joint programmes which led to enhanced results that were greater than the sum of the individual UN agency specific programmes;

- **One budgetary framework** and establishment of a resource mobilization framework and One Fund, including the extent to which the administrative systems in place were able to achieve one financial management system;

- **One management system** and the extent to which common support services and shared business units increased efficiency; and

- **One communication strategy** and the extent to which it supported a more effective role and contribution of the UN system in the country.

The evaluation will assess the operational initiatives initiated and conducted within the DaO process since its inception. This should entail, all programme activities falling under the One Programme and also the extent of joint programming related to the implementation of the UNDAF more generally. The timeframe under evaluation should cover initiatives implemented since the initiation of the DaO in mid-2006. The emphasis of the evaluation is on the contribution of DaO to development results, however, humanitarian assistance will also be noted as area which has also been reformed based on the IASC reform agenda.

5. Evaluation Framework

This formative evaluation will assess the relevance (the responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the countries), effectiveness (the implementation of better processes and production of development outputs, and when possible the assessment of development outcomes and impacts), efficiency (the reduction of transaction costs for the countries), and finally, the sustainability of the DaO initiatives (the probability of long term benefits of continuing the approach over time).

A utilization-focused evaluation methodology will be used to guide the identification of the specific evaluation issues and questions, and also the related tools, to make the evaluation a meaningful exercise for national stakeholders: the detailed list of issues and questions will be prepared during the inception phase.
An evaluation matrix is presented as annex. The matrix will be further nurtured as part of the inception phase and will guide the formulation of the specific questions.

In addition to the specific evaluation questions contained in the matrix, the following questions could be canvassed to identify the contextual elements related to the DaO process which would also enable some analysis between the various pilot counties:

- What were the national political drivers for the country to become a DaO pilot?
- What was the UNCT environment and experience of joint work at the time of launching the process?
- To what extent have the findings and recommendations from the evaluability assessment been accepted and implemented?
- What is the progress made towards mainstreaming the RBM approach in the joint programming and joint programmes?
- Is there an M&E system that supports effectively the planning, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the One Operational Plan and the One Programme in particular?
- Have there been missed opportunities for the DaO process so far and if so, which?

7. Institutional Arrangements for the Evaluation

6.1. Evaluation Management Group

The overall guidance for the evaluation will be provided by an Evaluation Management Group (EMG) which will consist of the Government of Mozambique, a representative of the UN, a representative of the civil society, One UN Fund donors, a representative of the private sector and two representatives of Academia. It will be chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. The members of the EMG will commission the evaluation. The EMG will oversee the conduct of the evaluation and will meet at key points during the evaluation process. This involves participating in the design of the evaluation, managing the evaluation process, including the identification and selection of the evaluation team and assuring the evaluation process and the final product complies with the highest standards in evaluation. It will include the following activities: revising and approving this Terms of Reference (ToR), coordinating and managing the evaluation process, developing the ToR for the evaluation team members and identifying an evaluation team. The EMG would be supported by a joint Secretariat (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office).

To ensure the compliance of the country-led evaluation with international quality standards, the EMG will be supported by an external advisory panel. The panel will enhance the quality of the country-led evaluation by reviewing all deliverables, including terms of reference, inception reports, draft and final evaluation reports.

6.2 Reference Group

The EMG will identify a larger reference group. The reference group will be a consultative body and will serve as a sounding board for the EMG decisions on the evaluation, and will also be a technical resource to ensure independence and quality in the evaluation process. The EMG will keep the reference group informed throughout the evaluation process. Key information and products regarding
the conduct of the evaluation such as terms of reference, inception report and final report should be shared with the reference group for their comments and feedback. The reference group can consist of stakeholders and interested parties such as civil society organizations, private sector, media and academia, the international partners working in the country and donors.

6.3 Secretariat

The Secretariat will be supporting EMG in the implementation of the evaluation. The Evaluation Secretariat will be co-chaired by the designated focal points from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office with the administrative support of their respective offices. The responsibilities of the Secretariat are to:

- Support the implementation of the evaluation as defined by the EMG
- Act as liaison between the EMG, the Reference Group and the evaluation team
- Manage the evaluation budget under the guidance of the EMG
- Support the selection process of the evaluation team
- Facilitate the work of the evaluation team by ensuring that all relevant information and contacts are available
- Coordinate stakeholder workshops in consultation with the evaluation team and other evaluation-related meetings, with responsibility for: drafting the agendas, indentifying materials for consultation and distribution and coordinating with participants
- Ensure the editing, publication and distribution of the evaluation report
- Perform any other technical and administrative duty as required

6.5 Evaluation Team

The evaluation team will be led by an internationally recognized evaluator (individual or institution), and will include at least a technical expert in the area of development and at least one in the area of management. The team should be able to read and communicate in Portuguese and be familiar with the context of Mozambique, or a similar development context.

The team leader should have following qualifications:

- Master’s degree in international development, public administration, social science, evaluation or related field
- A minimum of 10 years of professional experience specifically in the field of evaluation of international development activities
- A track record of conducting various types of evaluations, including process, outcome and impact evaluations preferably in Mozambique or at least in the Southern African Region
- Knowledge and experience of the UN System and UN reform process
• Understanding of the development context of Mozambique or of other DaO countries would be an advantage

• Excellent report writing skills

Other team members should have following qualifications:

• Master’s degree in international development, public administration, social science, evaluation or related field

• A minimum of 7 years of professional experience in the field of international development

• Knowledge and experience of the UN System and UN reform process

• Excellent report writing skills

8. Methodology

7.1. Evaluation Methods

During the Inception phase, the team members will formulate in detail the methodology for the evaluation. The evaluation will be informed by the key methodological principles below:

• The evaluation is formative and forward looking and will focus on the process aspects of the DaO initiative;

• The evaluations will adopt a highly consultative, iterative and transparent approach with stakeholders, consistent with the utilization-focused approach to evaluation;

• Triangulation of information and data across groups of stakeholders and individuals will be the key method to validate evidence, throughout the whole evaluation process; and

• The evaluations will strictly adhere to the UN Evaluation Group Norms & Standards.

The evaluations will use a wide range of methods and tools, fine-tuned to the national context and to the evaluation questions and in consultation with the EMG and Reference Group. They will preferably include some or all of the following, among others:

• Evaluation matrix relating evaluation issues and questions to evaluation criteria, indicators, sources of information and methods of data collection (inception phase);

• Mapping exercise of the main focus areas of the DaO work (inception phase);

• Desk review of reference documents (inception and data collection phase);

• Individual and group interviews with the members of the reference group including (but not limited to) representatives from Government, Donors, UN Agencies, UN Resident Coordinator’s Office, UN M&E Reference Group, Programme Management Team, Operations Management Team, Communication Group, One Fund Administrative Agent, and other key stakeholders (both during inception and data collection phase);

• Checklists or semi-structured interview protocols for each type of interview;
• Establishment of historical causality: a time-line and narrative about the milestone events in the DaO process within the country (inception and data collection phase);

• Field observation and interviews with stakeholders at various levels (data collection phase);

• Thematic studies on specific areas of focus of the DaO process, as relevant and appropriate (data collection phase); and

• Debriefing session with the reference group and also the EMG.

9. Expected Deliverables

The evaluation team is expected to produce the following deliverables (all in Portuguese and English):

• an inception report outlining the evaluation team’s understanding of the issues under evaluation including an evaluation framework and a detailed work plan;

• a presentation with preliminary findings to be shared in a meeting of stakeholders and, following revisions, with the EMG and Reference Group;

• a first draft report for circulation among reference group and EMG for quality assurance and identification of factual corrections from stakeholders;

• a final evaluation report and presentation.

The basic table of content for the final evaluation reports should include minimally i) an executive summary, ii) introduction and rationale, iii) evaluation methodology, iv) country context, v) findings, vi) conclusions, lessons and recommendations, and vii) annexes.

9. Phases and Timeframe

The indicative time schedule is reflected below. The evaluation should take approximately six months, beginning in November 2009 and be completed by mid May 2010. It will entail:

• Establishing the EMG and Reference Group: The institutional arrangements to conduct the evaluation should be in place before starting the evaluation process. This phase may take approximately two weeks (November).

• Finalize the ToR: The Terms of Reference should be reviewed by the Reference Group and comments provided. The EMG will revise and approve the ToR (by early December).

• Select independent evaluation team: The selection of the evaluation team is a critical success factor in the evaluation process. The consultants need to have a proven track record of objective and impartial assessment with the capacity to provide constructive feedback to both, the national government and the UN. A short list should be circulated among members of the EMG and these should be rated and ranked according to mutually agreed criteria. This phase could take five to six weeks (completed by mid-January).

• Initiation of the evaluation and Inception Report: The first deliverable of the evaluation team is
an inception report. The inception report outlines the evaluation team’s understanding of the issues to be addressed in the evaluation, the information available and the methods for data collection. It spells out the evaluation framework and a detailed work plan. This could take approximately three to four weeks after the evaluation team is hired and starts work (completed by mid-February).

- **Data collection:** The evaluation team will collect data through various means, including desk review, semi-structured interviews, focus group, surveys or field visits. This phase usually takes four weeks (completed by mid-March).

- **Stakeholder meeting on preliminary findings:** After the data collection is finalized, a stakeholder meeting should be organized to present and validate preliminary findings. Participants of the stakeholder meeting should include but not be limited to the people interviewed and all relevant stakeholders in the country including all members of the reference group. This systematization could be done in a couple of weeks (completed by end March).

- **Draft report:** After the stakeholder meeting the evaluation team should present a first draft report to the EMG. This will take two weeks (completed by mid-April).

- **Review of draft report:** The EMG sends the report to the Reference Group and other stakeholders for factual corrections and comments to the evaluators (by end April).

- **Final report:** The evaluation team will update and finalise the report after receiving comments of the EMG and Reference Group (by mid-May).

- **Approval of report:** EMG will review the report for approval (by end May).

- **Publication of report:** After the report is received from the evaluation team, the EMG will send the report to print and make it available on public websites (June).
## Annex 12

### ANNEX I Work Plan

**Mozambique Country Level Evaluation of the Delivering as One Initiative (2009-2010)**

**Updated 10 December 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Activities</th>
<th>Year 2009</th>
<th>Year 2010</th>
<th>Responsible Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reception of Bidding Proposals</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>by 12 Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Opening of bidding proposals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortlisting of Proposals</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of evaluation team (Second EMG Meeting)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>EMG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiation of the evaluation and <strong>Inception Report</strong> is due</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic comments by EMG and RG on inception report</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>EMG and Reference Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder meeting on preliminary findings</td>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Draft report</strong> due</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Review of draft report</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reference Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of draft report (Third EMG Meeting)</td>
<td></td>
<td>EMG</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Final report</strong> due</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approval of report (Fourth EMG meeting)</td>
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<td>EMG</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Official</td>
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<td>Evaluation team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presentation of report</td>
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<td>Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Editing and printing of the report</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex II – Composition of Evaluation Management Group

**Government**
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
- Ministry of Development and planning
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of State Administration
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Public Function
- Ministry of Health

**United Nations**
One representative, member of DaO Steering Committee

**Academia**
- One representative of University Eduardo Mondlane
- High Institute of International Relations

**Civil Society**
One representative of G20

**Private Sector**
One representative of the private sector

**Donors**
One UN Fund Donors: Spain, United Kingdom, Norway
Annex III – Composition of Reference Group
Coordinated by MINEC (DOIC)

**Government**
Ministry of Education and Culture
Ministry of coordination of environmental action Ministry of Woman and social action
Intituto Nacional de Estatística (National Institute of Statistics)
Conselho Nacional de Combate ao Sida (National Council against AIDS)
Technical Group of Delivering as One Steering Committee
Instituto Nacional de normalização e qualidade (National Institute of normalization and quality) Instituto de pequenas e meias empresas (Institute of medium and small enterprises)

**United Nations:** All UN agencies not members of the EMG

**Academia**
University Eduardo Mondlane: Faculty of Economy, Faculty of Architecture, Center of policies analysis Politecnic University
ISTEM
ISRI: Centre for International Strategic Studies

**Civil society**
AMODEFA
IKURU
Conselho cristão de Moçambique
MONASO
RENSIDA
PSI
Grupo Moçambicano da divida
SNV
Wateraid
OIKOS
Cruz Vermelha Moçambicana
Forum Mulher
CUAMM
FDC
Save the Children
ANSA
CFJJ
Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique
WWF
Handicap International

**Donors:** G19, USAID, Japan

**Private Sector:** Confederação das associações económicas (Confederation of economic associations)
## Annex VI: Evaluation questions matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One Programme</th>
<th>One Leader</th>
<th>One Budgetary Framework</th>
<th>One Office</th>
<th>One Voice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td>To what extent did the new Programme respond to national priorities?</td>
<td>Is the leadership of the UN RC the most suitable way to represent the depth and breadth of the UN system?</td>
<td>Is the One Budget proposal the most suitable way to enhance the financial administration of DAO?</td>
<td>Are the common support services and shared business units the most suitable way to enhance the administration of DAO?</td>
<td>Is one communication strategy the most suitable way to explain the UN activities and the DAO approach?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>Has the DAO process led to improved effectiveness and impact of operational initiatives for development?</td>
<td>Has the UN RC leadership perceived as more effective than previous arrangements?</td>
<td>To what extent has the one budget resulted in a more effective allocation and use of funds to the one programme components?</td>
<td>To what extent did common support services and shared business units increased the effectiveness of DAO in terms of achieving programme objectives?</td>
<td>To what extent did one communication strategy support a more effective role and contribution of the UN system in the country?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has there been any progress in mainstreaming the UN conventions and resolutions in the joint programming, including human rights, gender, HIV/AIDS, etc, and if so, to what extent?</td>
<td>To what extent has the UN RC, as One Leader, been able to exercise enhanced authority, responsibility and accountability?</td>
<td>Has the configuration of the One Budget/One Fund progressed and how?</td>
<td>To what extent have donors provided un-earmarked and multi-year resources to the One Plan Fund in a timely manner?</td>
<td>Is the UN speaking with One Voice in a coherent way and is that one voice manifest in the one programme&quot;??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent has the one programme generated positive synergies and value-added beyond the individual interventions to increase effectiveness?</td>
<td>Is the firewall between UN RC and UNDP working?</td>
<td>To what extent have donors provided un-earmarked and multi-year resources to the One Plan Fund in a timely manner?</td>
<td>To what extent did one communication strategy support a more effective role and contribution of the UN system in the country?</td>
<td>Is the UN speaking with One Voice in a coherent way and is that one voice manifest in the one programme&quot;??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the DAO process led to improved relationships between the national government and the UN agencies?</td>
<td>Which actions would be required from UN HQ to further enhance the authority and accountability of the One Leader?</td>
<td>To what extent have donors provided un-earmarked and multi-year resources to the One Plan Fund in a timely manner?</td>
<td>To what extent did one communication strategy support a more effective role and contribution of the UN system in the country?</td>
<td>Is the UN speaking with One Voice in a coherent way and is that one voice manifest in the one programme&quot;??</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Has the DAO process progressed in the level of inclusiveness among UN agencies, on one hand, and national institutions, on the other hand?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Has the DAO process led to improved efficiency and impact of operational initiatives for development? To what extent has the one programme generated positive synergies and value-added beyond the individual interventions to increase efficiency? Has the DAO process led to reduced transaction costs for the national government and the UN?</td>
<td>To what extent has the one programme been integrated into government systems to ensure ownership and sustainability of capacities developed/strengthened or results achieved?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent has the one leader taken leadership and ensured efficiency gains from the harmonization of the programme, budget, office and voice? To what extent has the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) been implemented? To what extent have the Cost Norms been harmonized among UN Agencies and with Government and donors and has this led to efficiency gains?</td>
<td>To what extent has the UN RC ultimate authority on the allocation of resources from the OPF?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent did common support services and shared business units increased the efficiency of DAO? Has there been any progress in the definition and calculation of transaction costs of the collaboration through DAO for both the Government and the UN?</td>
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**Annex 12**