

**Mission Report: Evaluation of UNDP Project: Tajikistan Rehabilitation, Reconstruction Programme (RRDP)**

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**SUMMARY FINDINGS: EVALUATION OF THE RECONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (RRDP) IN TAJIKISTAN**

**Overall Findings**

Findings Concerning the 1996-2000 Programme

- With significant start-up investments from UNDP, RRDP has built a substantial programme delivery capacity in the regions it operates. Between 1995 and 1998 UNDP support accounted for over 80% of the programme's resources and during this period made \$6.4 million available to the programme.
- Taking advantage of the generous support UNDP provided for the management costs of the programme and of the very substantial programme delivery base established via UNDP funded projects, third party donors have been attracted to RRDP. Of funds available for the programme in the period 1995-1998, 82% were made available by UNDP (\$6,385,906 of \$7,703,907.) From 1999 to mid-2000, of the funds made available for the programme (\$10,24,348), 23% (\$2,333,365) were made available by UNDP and 77% (\$7,960,983) were made available from other sources.
- Operating in three very different and difficult social, political and economic contexts, RRDP has made significant contributions to the social and economic recovery of each of these areas, as testified by local government officials and programme beneficiaries.
- Very strong working relationships have been established with local authorities. This assures that the programme operates in a framework that is consistent with local priorities. The establishment of District Development Advisory Councils and Tender Committees, while they still lack the wider citizen participation called for in the original project document, have been instrumental mechanisms in creating this positive programme climate.
- The programme did not establish formal links with the central government during this first phase of the programme.
- 582 *sub-projects* have been initiated, with 350 completed and 232 on-going totalling \$8.95 million, of which 29.5% has been for health, 13% for education, 11.8% for infrastructure, 11.5% for agriculture, 11.5% for water development, 4.6% for Gender in Development, 2% for shelter and 1.8% for institution and capacity building.
- The projects have been selected with significant input from local authorities. The selection of contractors has been done on a transparent and competitive basis, which is no mean feat in an environment where these kinds of decisions are not made on this basis. Where problems in project implementation are identified through monitoring steps have been taken to try to correct the problems, including closing projects.
- In the main, the projects, while implemented in various sectors have focussed on the rehabilitation of physical facilities. These choices reflected that the country was, indeed, in a post-civil war recovery phase. The physical infrastructure of the country had either been destroyed or deteriorated by neglect over the last decade. The choices also reflected the priorities of local authorities that basic facilities such as schools, hospitals, clinics, drinking water systems, agricultural canalization systems etc. were in serious need of rehabilitation.
- The rehabilitation of these facilities was needed to help communities re-establish themselves physically and psychologically. This last point was made to us repeatedly by people we interviewed in the regions.

- Through its subcontracting to local public and private firms for contracting (\$8.9 million) the programme has had a positive effect upon local economies and on job creation. Assuming that an average of 25 people are employed on each sub-project, 14,450 people have been employed through these projects to date. Additional jobs are supported through the procurement of supplies and materials for implementation of the sub-projects and, of course, some portion of the salaries of those employed are spent in the market supporting yet more employment.
- Through the reintegration programme short term employment opportunities have been provided to 1200 ex-combatants and this has had a positive effect upon encouraging their reintegration into the community and on the peacebuilding process. Some 485 ex-combatants have gained permanent employment to date.
- In all the areas, the programme seems to be contributing to the consolidation of peace. In conversations with local commanders in the Gharm area we were told that the temporary employment programmes were contributing to reintegration and that, for example, some ex-combatants did not get involved with destabilizing activities in the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border area because they had become more rooted in their communities. In Shaartuz,

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improvements in the physical environment, including things like improvements in the local park, have helped restore a sense of normalcy to the community.

- While we were unable to collect data where we can give an accurate range as to the numbers of people who have directly benefited from the programme, it is clear that the programme has high visibility in the project areas and that a significant number of project area residents are in some measure benefiting from the programme. This was substantiated by our visits to the field where we met with community leaders and residents.
- The programme has allocated less than 5% of the resources to gender-related projects. The activities of the women's centers that focussed on income generation activities were generally found to be effective. In addition many of the agriculture projects supported women working on private farms.
- Substantial attention has been provided to the issue of the sustainability of the facilities and other things supported by the programme. Self-financing approaches have been introduced to support sustained operations of schools, health centers, hospitals, water and irrigation systems etc. In addition, the programme has successfully encouraged government and kolkhozes to make land available to the staff of these facilities so that they can have a source of sustenance and income. This is particularly important because in most instances, the staff of these facilities are not being paid their salaries, except on an interim basis and, in any case, the salary is very low. This having been said, sustainability cannot really be assured without economic recovery and the government playing a positive role.
- The programme has achieved a critical mass in the various regions. As a result, RRDP has sufficient influence to be able to insist on the observance of certain procedures and principles. Also, practices encouraged by programme are sometimes extended to other settings. For example, the extension to other facilities of the practice of making land available for teachers, health workers.
- The programme delivery capacity at the area level, and the structures developed for priority setting and decision making, was a significant factor in the decision of the Asia Development Bank to invest \$20 million in Tajikistan and to use the RRDP's capacity and mechanisms in programme delivery.

## Future Directions

RRDP faces significant programmatic and management challenges in the future. In the main these challenges are a result of the programme's growth, success and influence.

- The future programme must build on the current, successful programme. A substantial volume of work is ongoing and new funds will be coming in to support current priorities. The first responsibility is to perform this work at a high quality level. Also, there is continuing need for further work in the current areas.
- The programme needs to make adjustments to the evolving social and economic situation of the country. Time and priority must be given to developing the future strategy for the programme. The programme cannot remain static but must evolve to new areas of opportunity. Balances across different sectors need to be sustained and enhanced and the interactions between various sectors, in supporting social and economic development, must be examined and used as a base for programming and resource mobilization.
- While the programme has established excellent working relationships with authorities at the local level the programme has not succeeded in establishing effective working relationships at the central level. It is essential that this be done but in a manner that reinforces rather than undermines the relationship of the programme to local decision making and decentralization. Recognizing the multidonor nature of RRDP at this time, consideration should be given to forming a tripartite steering committee at the national level involving appropriate government representatives, UNDP and representatives of donors with RRDP acting as secretariat.
- While maintaining capacities to rehabilitate social infrastructure there are increasing opportunities for the programme to focus on job creation and support for small and medium scale economic enterprises. The capacity of the programme to provide technical assistance regarding economic development and small enterprise development needs to be improved as do the capacity building and gender components of the programme.
- Temporary employment opportunities through the reintegration programme for ex-combatants should be opened to both ex-combatants and others in the community. In this way, ex-combatants will be integrated in a workforce with others in the community rather than maintaining their military brigades. In the development of the enterprises supported through the reintegration programme the ex-combatants should be provided training and other encouragements to move into positions of permanent employment including considerations of management and ownership of such enterprises.
- The programme does an excellent job of monitoring and reporting on project progress for donors. However, it needs to do a better job of measuring programme impacts and beneficiaries. This will be particularly important as the programme makes adjustments toward more development activities.
- The area planning and local capacity building dimensions of the programme need to be strengthened. This is an important component of many post-conflict programmes implemented by UNDP/UNOPS in other countries; this experience should be drawn on in the Tajikistan context. This is particularly important in relation to developing an exit strategy.
- The DDACs and Tender Committees while serving vital functions need to be strengthened. The Terms of Reference of these committees needs to be reviewed, rearticulated and shared with the membership of the committees. The Terms of Reference should include reference to what are the longer term purposes of

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establishing these committees. The membership of the committees needs to be expanded or revised to include representatives of civil society and strategies for citizen participation and input to the priority setting process should be encouraged.

- The cooperation/collaboration/partnership of the programme with other UN agencies and NGOs working in the country needs to be encouraged. The programme has laid a base for many improvements that the programme will not have the capacity to follow up on. This problem can be addressed by developing partnerships and cooperation.
- Several excellent brochures and materials on the RRDP in Tajikistan were produced that were useful in resource mobilization and in informing a broader range of interested people about the basic characteristics and achievements of the programme. The information collection, analysis and public affairs aspects of the programme nevertheless need strengthening with ongoing attention to identifying and updating information on the many exciting developments that are emerging from the programme.

- Steps need to be taken to assure that the benefits of the programme are as fairly spread across districts and across population groups as possible with some special emphasis on assuring that the situation of excluded areas and vulnerable people are addressed.
- There is some concern that the programme is not maintaining balances across various sectors and is becoming focussed primarily on the rehabilitation of education and health facilities. This is an issue in the aggregate as well as in the different area programmes. In the past, availability of UNDP resources provided the programme with the flexibility to maintain these balances; in the future, these balances will need to be maintained through further resource mobilization.
- A new project document needs to be developed that defines realistic challenges and objectives. Comprehensive workplans need to be developed which provide a basis for programme monitoring and assessment both by UNDP and UNOPS.
- The new project document (RRDP) should provide a framework for continuation of current projects, those anticipated to be supported by donors, and UNDP's priorities on poverty alleviation and sustainable livelihoods as well as decentralization and governance. The next phase of the programme should build on, not replace, current capacities and initiatives. The mission saw significant opportunities for the programme to integrate UNDP programme priorities through capacity building and strengthening of local governmental authorities and through continued support for decentralization and increased programming to support agricultural, commercial and other productive enterprises that were initiated in RRDP.
- The implementation of the ADB programme will have an impact on the RRDP and issues of coordination between these programmes need to be addressed. There are likely also to be impacts of the ADB programme on capacities to mobilize resources for RRDP as there are many areas of overlap between these programmes. These issues must be addressed as soon as possible and a strategy for programme coordination and future resource mobilization devised that takes into account the impacts of the ADB programme on RRDP.
- It is not too early to begin designing and implementing an exit strategy. Designing such a strategy is difficult because it is unclear as to what the future governance structure of the country will be and what will be the pattern of decentralization, if any. Nevertheless, steps should be taken to strengthen capacities of local authorities to do planning, priority setting and monitoring.

## **Management**

- The RRDP is a well managed programme that has had significant success and impact in addressing programme objectives and in mobilizing additional resources.
- The significant programme delivery capacity, both in terms of quality and quantity, the programme has developed in the field obviously is attractive to donors. Both UNDP and UNOPS have taken initiative in seeking out donor support. A resource mobilization plan needs to be developed jointly by UNDP and UNOPS that defines the responsibilities and roles of each in its implementation.
- While the programme has been very successful at project delivery and resource mobilization, sufficient priority has not been given to strategic and forward planning. Recent requests by the UNDP Resident Representative for a forward planning document are helpful and this should be used as a means of establishing an on-going process of discussions about strategy and programme planning.
- UNDP, as the administering agency for the programme, has provided inconsistent and varied styles of leadership for the programme. In a variety of areas UNDP has essentially delegated, usually not in writing, the responsibility for various activities such as relationships with donors, resource mobilization, reporting and public affairs. Evaluations and tripartite exercises have been delayed and there have been highly infrequent field visits of UNDP staff and these usually for protocol purposes or when a delegation from headquarters was in the country. UNDP feels the programme operates too independently and needs to be more effectively integrated with UNDP goals and priorities. Further, UNDP feels that there is not sufficient appreciation in the country that the programme is a UNDP programme. To address these matters UNDP must assert its leadership by devoting greater attention to the programme in ways that enhance and not impede programme initiative.

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- UNOPS/RRDP has not maintained their information and reporting systems in a manner that gives

a clear and fair picture as to what have been the tremendous contributions UNDP resources have made to building the programme delivery, management and resource mobilization capacity of the programme.

- The required departure by the Tajik government of the CTA of a successful UNDP administered programme is having negative effects on the programme. The perceived inaction by UNDP, and slow response by UNOPS, is negatively affecting staff confidence that the UN will support them. It is also having a negative influence on donor perception of the programme's capacity to adhere to its principles, methods of operation and to stand by its employees.
- The original project document overstates what could reasonably be accomplished within the timeframes of the programme. This project document was modestly revised, but never signed. Such broad project documents provide needed flexibility but they also make oversight and monitoring of the performance of an executing agency by the administering agency difficult. This problem has been compounded by the lack of comprehensive annual work plans that state objectives and outputs against which progress toward those objectives could be measured. The initial project document has been only modestly redefined and this document was never signed.
- UNDP/UNOPS/RRDP, in mobilizing new resources, did not adequately take into account the effects on management of additional resources. A calculation of project delivery costs (salaries, premises, vehicles etc.) should be apportioned to each project. In new proposals a portion of the costs of programme management and administration are included. However, the decision to include such costs should have been made earlier, as UNDP no longer has resources to cover core operations.
- Core and administration costs as a percentage of overall programme expenses have averaged about 40% over the period of the programme. In 1999, core and administrative costs were 37% of the total programme and this percentage is expected to drop yet further in 2000. As many programme costs are included in core and administration we were not able to determine rates for administration, overall or by year. It is likely that this data is available but it apparently is not regularly analyzed and reviewed. This should be corrected.
- The signing of the agreement with ADB without inclusion of \$1 million in programme management costs compounds this difficulty enormously. In short, there is a question as to whether in the future the programme will have sufficient programme delivery and management capacity to fulfill obligations under the new agreements. Particularly regarding the ADB decision UNDP and UNOPS must find ways jointly to cover the shortfall of core and administrative funds.
- Effective management information systems are in place for the management of sub-projects and reporting to donors. Management and staffing of data collection, monitoring and evaluation needs to be rethought in relation to programme planning and impact assessment in addition to maintaining capacity for donor reporting and subproject monitoring.
- The programme should continue to be executed by UNOPS as it has been effectively managed. Further, there is no capacity at UNDP to directly execute the programme. The programme is a multidonor supported programme and resources are made available based upon a successful track record of project delivery. Donor funds would not be available at this time for a nationally executed programme like RRDP.

## **Mission Evaluation Report of UNDP Project: Tajikistan Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme(RRDP)**

### **Part One: Background to Project and**

#### **Country Context 1. Background to the**

##### **Mission**

The Project Document (TAJ/95/002) of the Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Development Programme (RRDP) calls for the conduct of external evaluations on an annual basis. The last evaluation of the programme was conducted in 1997 but no substantive project revisions were made. An addendum to the project was signed in 1999, to expand the project to include re-integration programmes for ex-combatants in Tajikistan.

The Project Document refers to a 4-year timeframe for the programme. This time period is ending

and therefore there is a special need to evaluate the programme to determine what adjustments, if any, should be made for the programme's future either in terms of programme priorities or in management arrangements. Indeed, the Terms of Reference (TOR-see Annex) for the evaluation calls for advice as to whether the programme should be moving into an exit rather than continuation mode.

UNDP and UNOPS are preparing for a Tripartite Review of RRDP and the evaluation should provide a useful input to this process. Further, UNDP is preparing to undertake a Country Programme Review (CPR) as a step in preparing a new Country Cooperation Framework (CCF). As the RRDP is by far the largest programme of UNDP in Tajikistan, the evaluation of the RRDP should provide insights for preparation of both the CPR and CCF.

According to the TOR, the objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the relevance, performance, success and weaknesses of the RRDP programme.

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- Identify future directions of the programme taking especially into account the relationship of the programme to other UNDP activities.
- Make recommendations for resource mobilization and donor relations.
- Identify which elements of RRDP can be integrated into or provide support to the new UNDP programme focus.
- Make recommendations on the future operational structure to accommodate the new programme strategy.
- Design, if needed, an exit strategy for the programme.
- Identify lessons learned and best/worst practices, if any.
- Identify ways under which the UNDP CO can better support and integrate programme resources and objectives with RRDP.

In order to accomplish the above the evaluation team comprised of two international external experts, visited Tajikistan between 26 June and 14 July 2000. Key documents related to the programme were assembled and reviewed and interviews were held with stakeholders in the capital, Dushanbe, and in each of the four areas in which the programme operates-Shartuz, Kulyab, Gharm and Khujand. Prior to visiting the country there was a briefing with the UNOPS-RESS programme officer in Geneva and with the RRDP Programme Director, who was in Geneva for debriefings prior to his exit from the programme.

In general, the evaluation team found the documentation base for the programme to be excellent regarding the operations of the current and past program. The evaluation, however, was complicated by the fact that the Project Document is out of date. There also were no annual or other workplans that laid out immediate objectives by which the progress of the program could be measured. Regarding the task of making recommendations for the future that integrate RRDP with UNDP priorities, we were constrained by the fact that there are few strategy papers that explain the longer-term orientation of the RRDP and UNDP has not as yet formulated a new country cooperation framework against which the programme could be assessed. The result is that the evaluation team can only assess the program's achievements essentially on their own merits and, to a degree, in relationship to the purposes cited in the, original and amended project document.

We feel that our discussions with stakeholders were open, frank, substantive and informative. We, however, did not have communications with the Central Government that would give us a clear sense of the priority the Government attaches to RRDP. Further, ultimately, the national expert assigned to work on the team was unable to participate due to scheduling conflicts.

The program is a large and complex one. In the time available to us we needed to make choices as to what we could focus on. With 600 plus sub-projects we obviously could not review, let alone visit, more than a few. As many of the sub-projects are ones that are technical in nature we were not in a position to assess ourselves their technical merits, although we certainly sought the views of others regarding this. We did, however, seek to understand the context in which decisions were taken to undertake these sub-projects, what challenges had to be overcome and what innovations resulted. We also attempted to assess the extent to which steps have been taken to increase the potential

sustainability of the various dimensions of the programme (processes, procedures, capacities and hardware).

## 2. Context of Project and Current Development Context

RRDP was initiated in 1996 as Tajikistan was emerging from a bloody civil war. Indeed, the programme was initiated prior to a peace agreement but during a fragile cease-fire agreement that was signed by the contending parties. The problems associated with the physical and psychological damage caused by this war were compounded by the fact that Tajikistan was a newly independent state that had not developed the instrumentalities of statehood. Further, like other CIS states, Tajikistan was struggling with the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the economic capacities of the country. So much needed to be done but the means and resources to identify, prioritize and address these problems were absent.

Conceived as a programme to help support and stabilize efforts toward building a peaceful society, it was decided that the programme would work in several rural areas severely damaged by the war and to which large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons were returning or would be returning. At the time of the development of the project, a peace agreement had not yet been signed between the Tajik Government and the United Tajik Opposition.(UTO). As some of the war-torn areas were still controlled by opposition forces, a decision was taken to balance engagement in these areas by assistance to other areas that were in social and economic distress but were not heavily damaged during the war and were, essentially, in the government's control throughout the conflict. Three areas agreed upon were (1) Shartuz, severely damaged by the war and receiving returnees from Afghanistan; (2) Kulyab, a government area which had not directly suffered from the war but was one of the poorer regions of the

RRDP did provide a Draft Forward Planning Document on 3 July, midway through the mission.

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country and (3) Gharm, an opposition area in the Karategin valley. Khujand was added in late 1999, but is just starting up its programmes and will not be included in this evaluation.

With peace more stabilized, if not wholly secured, the United Nations Military Office in Tajikistan (UNMOT) has just been closed. Presidential elections were held in 2000 and various laws passed which represented potential steps toward state-building. Former UTO leaders are now senior members of the Government. There continues to be active opposition groups that have not yet been brought into the Government, and the Tajik Government has looked to Russia for support. The Shanghai Five(Russia, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Krygzstan) met in Dushanbe during the time of the mission and agreed on increased regional cooperation in fighting terrorist and extremist groups. Russia formalized that it will have a permanent military base in Tajikistan.

The programme is now operating in a less volatile environment and where changes from an emergency to a development orientation can be considered and steps taken to encourage and support any positive possibilities or changes toward improved governance and poverty alleviation. This having been said, it needs to be recognized that the environment in Tajikistan continues to be one that is not enabling of social and economic development in the country:

- The country remains highly centralized but where the central government has no resources to support its priorities. Laws and arrangements discourage local initiatives and private sector developments.
- Agricultural land remains in the hands of large collectives and efforts to change this have led basically to sharecropper arrangements where farmers are indebted to collectives, having to turnover large portions of their produce to pay for their privilege to farm their plots.
- Cotton remains king on the collectives and steps to diversify agricultural production to other crops are legally discouraged. As housing is often owned by the collectives, farmers are required to work on the cotton fields without compensation in order to maintain a place to live.
- The law and order situation is very poor. Efforts to develop businesses and competitive processes are often threatened. The costs of operating businesses and attempting to market products are driven up by "taxes" that are imposed at roadblocks and by power interests that

- demand a share of whatever is produced.
- Efforts to strengthen local governance processes are discouraged in part because they are not understood, run counter to historical patterns of governance and indeed represent threats to such patterns.
- The process of state-building in Tajikistan is far from complete. Indeed, there is significant popular sentiment that Tajikistan, like Byelo-Russia, should re-join with Russia in hopes that doing so would reduce its sense of isolation and to restore some of the social and economic security of the previous period.

### 3. Programme Concept and Design

The RRDP programme concept evolved from the UNDP/UNOPS experience in countries emerging from or caught in civil strife. The RRDP approach was mentored by the RESS unit of UNOPS with roots in the UNDP Programmes in Central America (PRODERE), Afghanistan, Somalia and Cambodia.

The programme employs a multi-sectoral, area-based focus, which is to be driven by priorities elaborated by community leaders at the district (*rayon*) level. RRDP encouraged the establishment of District Development Advisory Committees (DDAC) whose intended role was to provide local representation, ideas and points of view to augment the local government ability to prioritize the rehabilitation and developmental needs of the area.

Each RRDP area office is centrally located within the area being served. The Area Office (PIO) is headed by an internationally-recruited Area Manager, two or three Civil Engineers, and sectoral national professionals (health, education, agriculture, women) and administrative support staff. Implementation of sub-projects is carried out by national contractors who are selected by a bidding process run by a Tender Committee.

### Conclusion

The programme concept and design has proven adaptable to 4 quite distinct area situations in Tajikistan. Area programme managers have been successful in adapting the concept and design to the particular conditions of the areas in which they operate, each of which has particular constraints and opportunities due to differing political, social and economic conditions but also due to funding opportunities. Given the proven flexible and adaptive nature of the programme there is reason to believe that the programme can adjust to evolving circumstances but success in this regard will depend upon continued innovative management, responsible risk-taking in terms of setting conditionality for assistance and fundraising to fill in programme gaps.

### 4. Development Objectives

In the development of the RRDP, important cross-cutting objectives were central to the development of the immediate objectives, target areas and priority activities. As a country, emerging from war and with continuing civil strife, the

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overriding objectives was that the RRDP promote *peace and reconciliation* among the Tajik people and their institutions. At the same time the projects should have the impact of *reducing poverty* of the families in the target areas, so as to ensure a sustainable livelihood for larger numbers of persons. The methodology of the RRDP was to promote *good governance and increased citizen participation* through its local level implementation mechanisms and to promote *sustainability of the programme*.

### Conclusion

The programme has played a role in contributing to the development of more peaceful and stable conditions in the areas in which it is operating. Further, the opening of the new area office in Khojand is relating to the issues of cross border tensions between Tajikistan and Krygystan that result from resource sharing issues. Therefore, promoting peace and reconciliation should remain one of the development objectives of the programme. Other objectives, such as poverty reduction,



good governance, sustainability and citizen participation should not be seen in future as simply facilitative objectives but rather as themselves development objectives.

## Part Two: Programme Performance, Outputs, Outcomes and Impact

### 1. Program Performance and Impact by Program Objective'

#### 1.1. 1 o increase the variety of agricultural products in Tajikistan and strengthen

the agricultural sector **A ricultural Sub- ro ects**

Area	Activities	Beneficiaries	No of Sub-projects	Budget(USD)	% of Total
Shartuz: Sub-Office began implementing projects in August 1997. Works in 4 Districts in Khatlon (Shartuz, Kabodian, Bishkent, Kolkhozobad).	Rehabilitation of irrigation water pumping stations, De-silting irrigation/drainage canals, rehabilitation of tractors, provision of agricultural inputs)	10,000 hectares of land irrigated, 154 km of irrigation/drainage canals de-silted, 23,360 farmers benefited, 96 operators of water pumping stations received 68 ha of land	29	\$394,363	13.7%
Kulyab: Sub-office began implementing projects in August 1997. Works in 7 districts: Kulyab, Vose, Moskovski, Muminibad, Khlovaling, Farkhor, Shurabad,	Rehabilitation of tractors, flour mill, vet laboratory, irrigation aqueducts, provision of agricultural inputs, wheat seeds, agricultural equipment, training for farm management, potato seed multiplication, support to Poultry Farm	3,096 farmers, 130,500 inhabitants of target areas, 458 ha of land; training beneficiaries- 754 farmers	23	\$364,403	12.7%
Gharm: Sub-office began implementing projects in 1997.	Rehabilitation of Water pumps, tractors, combines, potato seeds	6800 benefited from water pump stations and received 166 ha of	35	\$543,065	18.2%

<sup>2</sup> There were slight inconsistencies in the financial information on the sub-projects provided by the Central RRDP in Dushanbe and the PIOs. Also the sectoral attribution of sub-projects varied. For example, water projects linked to sanitation were sometimes in the health sector and sometimes in water. Sewage systems were sometimes in health and sometimes in infrastructure. This made the analysis difficult with out disaggregating - 7 -it, which was not feasible for the mission. However, the numbers used are considered accurate in the sense of being indicative of programme trends and priorities.

Works in Darband, Gharm, Jirgital, Tajikabad, Tavildara Districts (5)	multiplication, rehabilitation of irrigation canals, training on control of Colorado potato beetle	land, 4401 of land was irrigated, 59 km of irrigation canals were rehabilitated and constructed			
Total:			87	\$1,301,831	

- 11.5% of sub-project resources allocated to agricultural sector. An additional \$212, 442 of sub-projects supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants in Gharm were in the agricultural sector.
- Sub-projects prioritized support to family sector food production so as to alleviate poverty and increase food security.
- Seed multiplication programmes in wheat introduced in Kulyab and Gharm and potatoes in Gharm have potential to become private businesses.
- Tractor repair and workshops to repair agricultural machinery supported by project subsequently privatized in Gharm.
- Private farmers associations supported in all areas.
- Repair of agricultural irrigation systems important to increasing productive land available to farmers.
- Taxation and high cost of transport (in part due to road blocks) are a disincentive to agricultural marketing.
- Support needed for agricultural business in business planning, financial management and how to run a business.

## Conclusion

The areas in which the programme operates are ones in which agriculture will be the primary source of future economic development. A number of important factors have constrained development in these areas including the continued dominance of cotton production, slow processes of privatizing land, collapse of systems for the support of agriculture production irrigation systems and availability of agricultural implements and inputs, and lack of banking and credit facilities. Another obstacle that has frustrated agricultural development is the lack of experience in rural Tajikistan with the operation of private farms and private businesses that support the agricultural sector. The programme cannot overcome constraints on agricultural development that result from the failure of central government authorities to enact policies that enable agricultural development but the programme can encourage, and has encouraged, innovation at the local level that rests within the competence of the local authorities and people. These steps will not only improve economic opportunities in these localities in the short-term but will position these areas to benefit from central level policy changes when they do eventually occur.

1.2. To support income generation, small enterprise development (SED) and the

### economic infrastructure **Income eneration and Small Enter rise Develo ment**

Area	Activities	Beneficiaries	No of Projects	Budget(USD)	% of Total
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Shartuz: Sub-Office began implementing projects in 2000 with funds from UNHCR. Works in 2 districts (Shartuz, Kabodian).	Rehabilitation and provision of equipment to rice and flourmills at village level and one carpet industry.	50,000 people of 17 villages indirect beneficiaries; 24 direct-operators and 43 returnee families received permanent income	13	\$97,338	3.4%
Gharm: sub-office started implementing projects in 1999. Works in Jirgital, Tajikabad and	Rehabilitation of Canteen, Central Markets, Asphalt factory, Carpet Workshop	Population of 3 districts- indirect; direct- 143 ex combatants and 40 skilled workers will be benefited,	13	\$286,075	9.6%

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Gharm Districts (3)		where 76 ex combatants will get permanent job			
Total:			26	\$383,413	

- RRDP has had a significant impact on enterprise development through its contracting of sub-project. \$8.9 million has been sub-contracted to 570 private and public contracting firms employing an average of 25 workers each( 14,250 workers) who gained short term employment through the project.
- These funds were inserted into the local economies and through the circulation has a positive economic impact on activating the local economy.
- Income generating projects and small enterprise development supported indirectly in other sectors (especially agriculture and WID).
- Shartuz PIO is implementing an income-generating project(\$97,338) for UNHCR to set up milling station for returnee families. Economic viability of these mills not ensured and no business training being done.
- Gharm PIO sub-projects for agricultural inputs, agricultural machine workshops, and many reintegration projects have potential to become viable business enterprises, if RRDP provided technical assistance and training in business development.
- WID projects developed by the Women's Centers in the three PLO's have supported small incomegenerating initiatives. Need for further business training.
- Kulyab PIO supported two agricultural enterprises (vaccine production and agricultural spare parts and tools) which can become economically viable.

## Conclusion

Fundamental to improvement of the economic conditions of these areas, including addressing the problem of high unemployment, is generation of small business opportunities. Many constraints operate on the start up and success of such enterprises but despite this there are possibilities at the local level for productive and profitable enterprises. The programme has demonstrated that in selected instances it has been able to facilitate the creation of such businesses. Greater priority needs to be given to this in the next phase of the programme. In doing so, opportunities must be examined to support activities that vulnerable populations can benefit from in terms of ownership, job creation and income generation.

- 1.3. To increase the availability of adequate water for agriculture and clean water for human consumption. *(This objective is being applied to potable water only, as water for irrigation systems included within agriculture).*

### Water projects

Area	Activities	Beneficiaries	No of Projects	Budget(USD)	% of Total
Shaartuz: Sub-Office began implementing projects in 1997. Works in Shaartuz, Bishkent, Kabodian, Bokhtar Districts (4)	Rehabilitation of 41 Water Supply Systems	87 operators and 580,000 people supplied with potable water.	62	\$496,156	17.3%
Kulyab: Sub-Office started implementing projects in 1996. works in Kulyab, Muminibad, Shurabad, Vose, Moskovski, Farkhor Districts (6)	Rehabilitation and reconstruction of 20 rural water supply systems, Water purification and sanitation in Kulyab City	58 operators, 62,400 rural dwellers were provided with potable water; 65,000 urban inhabitants		\$559,611	19.6%
Gharm: sub-office started	Rehabilitation of water supply	7000 inhabitants	3	\$15,100	0.5%

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implementing projects in 1997 in Gharm Area	systems and water pump	Gharm City			
Total			83	\$1,070,867	

- 11.5% of sub-project resources have gone to water supply projects for human consumption.
- In Shartuz, 41 potable water supplies systems rebuilt for 500,000 inhabitants.
- In Kulyab, most of the resources were allocated to the Kulyab City Water system (65,000 beneficiaries) and smaller systems repaired in 11 rural villages( 50,000 inhabitants).
- In Gharm, few resources have been allocated to water supply systems, as mountain springs provide water to most rural villages.
- In Kulyab and Shartuz, health officials confirmed that improved water supply decreased water borne diseases in the region.
- Shartuz has linked the allocation of land( 57 hectares) to water project operators as a conditionality for RRDP support, so as to support the sustainability of the water systems maintenance.
- Shartuz and Kulyab have introduced user fees to cover some maintenance costs.
- Further support needed in management and financing of municipal

services, such as water. Conclusion

Drinking water systems have deteriorated significantly in Tajikistan due to the conflict and to

neglect. Support for the rehabilitation of these systems has improved the health conditions in the areas in which these facilities have been improved. Insistence upon user fees and availability of agricultural land for the operators of these systems increases the likelihood that these systems will be maintained.

1.4. To improve the health status and increase health facilities

in rural Tajikistan Health Sub-Pro ects

Shaartuz: Sub-Office began implementing projects in 1997. Works in 5 Districts in Shaartuz, Kolkhozobad, Vakhsh, Bokhtar, Jilikul	Rehabilitation and provision of medical equipment to 36 hospitals and health posts and training of health workers	356 doctors, 676 nurses and doctor assistants, 183,226 patients of 7 districts; 110 ha distributed among 200 nurses and 50 doctors in rural health posts	67	\$816,572	28.2%
Kulyab: Sub-Office began implementing project in 1996. Works in District in Kulyab, Vose, Dangara, Sovetski, Moskovski, Baljuvon, Muminabad, Khovaling (8)	Rehabilitation of 46 health care facilities, provision of medical equipment and furniture to 31 health care facilities, training of health workers	258 doctors, 593 nurses and doctor assistants, 173,700 patients of Kulyab City, 4 district Centers, 91 villages, 51 ha of land (rehabilitation of 46 health facilities); 150 doctors, 300 nurses and doctor assistants, 110,500 patients of Kulyab City, I	64	\$962,642	33.7%

		District Center and 84 villages  (provision of equipment to			
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		31 health care facilities); training beneficiaries 30 managers of health posts, 5,283 medical personnel			
Gharm: sub-office started implementing projects in 1997. Works in Gharm, Darband, Tavildara, Tajikabad, Jirgital District (5)	Rehabilitation and provision of medical equipment to 48 health and medical posts and training of health workers	101 doctors, 543 nurses, 171,140 patients of districts; 45 ha of land distributed among 30 doctors and 100 nurses in rural health posts	54	\$666,951	22.3%
Total			185	\$2,446,165	

- Health sector projects have been the largest sector in RRDP with 29.5% of the sub-projects.
- Central Hospitals and rural clinics have been rehabilitated and supplied with medical equipment, electricity, water and sewage systems in all PIOS.(Shartuz: 36 hospitals and clinics, Kulyab: 45 hospitals and clinics, Gharm: 48 health posts and central hospital).
- Some coordination with NGOs(MSF, ACTED) to ensure medicine distribution to rehabilitated health services.
- Some initiatives taken by PIOs to support health workers in gaining access to land( Shartuz: 110 hectares). Given overall crisis of health care system, sustainability not ensured.
- PIOs recommend that health system as whole be reformed , and RRDP projects should not just rehabilitate an overbuilt system of health care delivery.
- Some initiatives taken in user fees to recover some costs, but so systematic support given in this area by RRDP. Local authorities supportive of these initiatives.

## Conclusion

The rehabilitation of health facilities addresses felt needs of the localities in which the programme operates. Establishment of user fees and insistence that health care workers be provided land as partial payment for their services increases the likelihood that these facilities will be maintained. Monitoring and assessment systems need to be put into place to determine what the health impacts will be of the rehabilitation of these facilities. While it is likely that communities will continue to identify the rehabilitation of such facilities as high priorities efforts need to be made to assure that the rehabilitation of such facilities fits in with longer-term plans for the improvement of health systems in Tajikistan.

- 1.5. To improve the availability and quality in the education sector through improved educational facilities and curriculum

### Education

Area	Activities	Beneficiaries	No of Projects	Budget(USD)	% of Total
Shaartuz: Sub-Office began implementing projects in	Rehabilitation, provision of school furniture,	294 teachers, 9000 students, 11 trainers, 85 trainees, 73 ha of agricultural land	43	\$640,297	22.3%

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1997. Works in 7 Districts in Shaartuz, Bishkent, Bokhtar, Kolkhozobad, Vakhsh, Jilikul, Kabodian	school teaching materials and sport facilities to 22 primary schools, training of primary school teachers	distributed among 200 teachers of rural schools			
Kulyab: Sub-Office began implementing projects in 1996. Works in 5 District in Kulyab, Moskovski, Dangara, Vose, Khovaling	Rehabilitation of 9 schools, provision of school furniture and educational materials, training of educational specialists	463 school teachers, 5,852 schoolchildren of Kulyab City, 4 district Centers, 4 Villages, 6 ha of land 60 school teachers benefited from conducted training	20	\$372,826	13%
Gharm: sub-office began implementing projects in 1997. Works in Gharm, Jirgital, _ _ Darband, Tavildara, Tajikabad Districts (5)	Rehabilitation of 28 schools and colleges, provision of teaching materials to 15 schools	1,888 teachers, 31,454 students; 52 ha of land distributed among 520 teachers in 26 schools	34	312,836	10.5%
Total			97	\$1,325,959	

- The Education Sub-projects make up 13% of the project resources.
- Sub-projects have focussed on rehabilitation with very limited resources for teacher training or educational equipment. (Shartuz:22 primary school rehabilitated, Kulyab: 9 schools rehabilitated, Gharm: 28 schools)
- PIOs have been working with local authorities (Hukumats, Kolhotz, Solhotz) to provide land to teachers( Shartuz:73 hectares)and to the schools since salaries not paid and few state funds for maintenance of schools
- School fees have been introduced in some schools, but school based budgeting is not undertaken to determine what real fees should be.
- Teachers and Parent Councils are beginning to be activated to support the

maintenance of school facilities.

- Initial efforts to involve communities in thinking about how to resolve crisis of school financing. Conclusion

Primary and secondary schools have fallen into significant disrepair in Tajikistan due to the conflict, lack of resources and neglect. The priority given to the rehabilitation of schools reflects the priority community people give to the education of their children. Continued priority to rehabilitation of schools needs to be complemented by improvements in teacher training, educational material and curricula development and to school nutrition initiatives. The programme may not be able to address these priorities but through setting of conditions and through cooperation with other initiatives (such as the Asia Development Bank programme) building improvements can be more effectively coordinated with other educational improvement endeavors.

1.6. To improve the status

of rural women **Women in**

#### Development Projects

Area	Activities	Beneficiaries	No of Projects	Budget(USD)	% of Total
Shaartuz: Sub-Office started implementing	Rehabilitation and provision of furniture to	55,000- women as indirect beneficiaries;	17	\$77,682	2.7%

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projects in 1997. Works in Shaartuz District	2 women's centers, support to small scale micro-enterprises	direct- 10 employees of the W'sCs and 100 widowed women			
Kulyab: Sub-Office started implementing projects in 1997. Works in Kulyab, Muminabad, Shurabad, Vose Districts (4)	Rehabilitation of Women's Center, micro-credit program, training, potato production, beekeeping, wheat and vegetable production	160 direct beneficiaries and 100,000 indirect beneficiaries, 5 ha of land received 30 women	13	\$103,535	3.6%
Gharm: sub-office began implementing projects in 1997. Works in Gharm and Jirgital Districts (2)	Women's center, micro credit and training, seminars on gender issues, rehabilitation of kindergarten, W'sCs, establishing of art and crafts school	1200 women (rehabilitation and provision of equipment to two Women's Centers); 660 women (support to small women business), 300 women (potato seeds multiplication)	10	\$238,955	8%



Total			40	\$420,172	
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- WID programs only made up 4.6% of project resources.
- Women's Centers set up in all PIO areas to support the social and economic advancement of women.
- Small revolving credit funds set up to support women's micro-enterprises.
- In the Gharm PIO, 17 women received small loans from the Women's Center for commercial initiatives and procurement of dairy cows.
- Water, health and agriculture sector projects have improved the status of women.

## Conclusion

While women related programming has occupied only a small portion of the resources of RRDP the investments that have been made seem to have produced good returns. In future, efforts should be made to increase the resources that are made available that support income generation activities for women, both in small-scale enterprise and in agriculture.

### 1.7. To improve local ability to initiate, design, implement and sustain development

- District Development Advisory Committees(DDACs) set up in each PIO to provide advise and approve RRDP PIO work plans.
- Shartuz PIO and Gharm PIO have a DDAC in each District where they work while Kulyab PIO has one DDAC which is dominated by Kulyab City(50% of seats) and each district only has one seat. Kulyab Hukumat resistant to decentralization.
- DDAC Chair is the Hukumat Chief and few non-governmental representatives on the DDACs.(In Ghaini, Former Commanders are included on the DDAC)
- DDAC members and local authorities have not received training in regional planning to assess needs and determine priorities.
- RRDP resources have favored the areas in which PIO is located, with significantly fewer resources going to the outlying districts.
- Tender Committees have been established in all areas where there is a DDAC and have introduced accepted transparent bidding procedures to determine sub-project contractors.

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- In Gharm, Reintegration Committees have been established to advise on the Reintegration programme for Ex-Combatants.
- PIOs have been unable to identify or integrate non- governmental community leaders into the DDACs.

## Conclusion

The DDAC's have been important mechanisms for assuring that programme priorities reflect those of local people. While there are constraints on the ability to expand the membership of these committees to include civil society representatives, increased priority needs to be given to encouraging participation of such representatives on these committees, and particularly women. Further, efforts should be made to reduce the dominance on these committees of people from the key rural towns. The effect of these actions should be a better distribution of programme resources across population groups and geographic areas.

1.8.To improve the capacity of rural authorities to provide

effective administration Institution and Ca acit buildin

Area	Activities	Beneficiaries	No of Projects	Budget(USD)	% of Total
Shartuz	Rehabilitation and provision of Office  Equipment to Shartuz and Bishkent Distrcist Hukumat offices	110,000 inhabitants	4	\$51,672	1.8%
Kulyab: sub-office began implementing projects in 1997. Kulyab town.	Rehabilitation and provision of equiment to Kulyab Hukumat , support to Kulyab TV station	470 employees employees, 690,000 population of Kulyab area (TV station project)	3	\$56,635	1.9%
Gharm: sub-office began implementing projects in 1997.	Equipment for Hukumat	85,000 inhabitants of Gharm Distrcit	4	\$10,500	
Total:			7	\$90,685	

- Minimal resources (1.8%- \$167,990) have been allocated to rehabilitation of infrastructure or provision of equipment to local Hukumats.
- The approach of RRDP has been to work with authorities and hope that they will earn through the process. There has not been any organized training or capacity building strategy for local authorities included within the programme.
- There is no clear counterpart relationship for the NPPs with local departments nor a division of responsibility between RRDP and local authorities for monitoring and implementation to promote "ownership" of the projects.

Conclusion

In future, greater attention to capacity building for members of local government and of local advisory committees (DDACs and TCs). Consideration should be given to creating Technical Working Committees (TWCs) as has typically been the case in other post conflict, area development programmes executed by UNOPS. Such a step would increase the objective area planning capacity of the programme, reduce the proportion of local government officials on the DDACs and create space for civil society representatives on the DDACs.

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1.9. To increase the adsorption capacity of rural Tajikistan for development and assistance programmes

- The presence of the RRDP in these areas has encouraged other international organizations to work in the areas. PIOs provide support through their Guest Houses

to UN agencies and NGOs.

1.10. To support the peace and reconciliation process(1999)

- The reintegration programme for ex-combatants had a direct impact on the stabilization process in the Karategin Valley. Fighters and war widows were employed in the summer months(1999/2000) reducing possible return to armed actions.
- Report of the SG on the situation in Tajikistan recognizes direct impact of the RRDP reintegration programme to peace consolidation.
- In Shartuz, RRDP has encouraged the reconciliation process between Tajik and Uzbek populations after the civil war. The Women's center has played an important role in this process.
- The rebuilding of war damaged social infrastructure and housing in the Shartuz area built confidence of Tajik returnee communities in the peace process
- The presence of RDDP with UNDP support in the Gharm area in the early years of the peace process(1996) enabled the RRDP to be positioned and have the confidence of the local officials and commanders to implement the re-integration programme for ex-combatants.
- The RDDP worked under very difficult security conditions having to close the office or restrict for 20 of the 45 months that it was in operation.

Conclusion

The programme has supported the process of peace and reconciliation in Shartuz and Kulyab by addressing key social rehabilitation needs, providing employment opportunities for people working on funded projects and providing a psychological boost to local people by demonstrating that international attention and resources were being focused on their needs and priorities. In Gharm, the reintegration programme for ex-combatants addresses the need of these people for employment and income. These projects ex-combatants work on also address community priorities. The process of integration of ex-combatants will require additional time and resources. Strategies for assisting combatants should stress opportunities for both ex-combatants and other people in the community to work on projects that address community priorities. The area programme starting in Khojand is addressing cross border regional tensions between Tajikistan and Krygystan.

1.11 To provide immediate jobs, income and vocational skills training for former combatants(1999)

- 78 projects were implemented in 5 Districts in the Karategin Valley in 1999/2000 which employed 1202 excombatants, 304 skilled workers and 81 war widows. It is anticipated that 485 will gain permanent employment through these projects.

Conclusions:

The employment programme for ex-combatants has been viewed as most important in terms of political stabilization and in the insertion of capital into the Karategin Valley. Though the project suffers from hastily planned sub-projects so as to respond to political pressures, if more attention is given to following up and providing technical assistance in business planning and management, many of the projects could become self-sustaining in economic terms. The delays by donors (EU) in releasing the funds for the 2000 phase of the reintegration programme has disrupted the dynamic of the process, and frozen most rehabilitation and temporary employment projects in the Karategin valley.

1.12 To rehabilitate damaged and neglected

infrastructure(1999) **Infrastructure projects:**

Area	Activities	Beneficiaries	No of Projects	Budget (USD)	% of Total
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Shaartuz: Sub-Office began implementing projects in	Rehabilitation of electric supply systems,	110,000 inhabitants indirect beneficiaries	6	\$92,026	3,2%
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1997. Works in Shaartuz, Beshkent, Kolkhozabad Districts (4)	private Market, Multi-Purpose Community Center, provision of equipment				
Kulyab: sub-office started implementing projects in 1999 in Shurobod District	Construction of Power supply line	6,675 people of target villages, 34,000 population of Shurobod District (construction of Power Supply Line;  26 employees, 7,200 inhabitants of Kulyab City and I village (procurement and installation of transformer	3	\$85,631	3%
Gharm: sub-office started implementing projects in 1997. Works in Gharm, Jirgital, Darband, Tajikabad Districts (4)	Rehabilitation of electricity supply systems, transformers, street lighting system, micro power stations; rehabilitation of community centers, markets	231,448 people- indirect beneficiaries	38	\$698,876	23.4%
Total			51	\$928,205	

- The rehabilitation of Infrastructure (excluding the reintegration programme) utilized 11.8% of the resources (\$1,063,764). These sub-projects included roads, bridges and electrical repair.
- Infrastructure repair in Gharm carried out by the sub-projects in the re-integration programme carried out \$ 555,376 additional infrastructure projects in 1999/2000. These included not only roads and bridges, markets, sports fields and parks.
- The category of infrastructure needs to be clearly defined in terms of what is included so as to not overlap with other categories of intervention.

#### Shelter

Area	Activities	Beneficiaries	No of Projects	Budget(USD)	% of Total
Shaartuz: sub-office began implementing projects in 1999 in Bokhtar, Vakhsh, shaartuz, Kurgan-Tube Districts (3 and I town)	Reconstruction of houses	128 returnee families	13	\$207,264	7.2%
Gharm: sub-office began implementing	Reconstruction of houses	300 Returnee families	10	\$183,480	6.1

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projects in 1999. Works in Tavildara, Gharm District (2)					
Total			23	\$390,744	

1.13 To create preliminary mechanisms for assessing veterans for other post- conflict programmes (1999)

- The RRDP has not undertaken work in response to this objective.

1.14 To improve local conditions so as to facilitate the return and reinsertion of former combatants to their communities of origin(1999)

- The RDDP work in the Karategin Valley since 1996 supported the rehabilitation of basic services (health, education), infrastructure and the increase of agricultural food production. \$2.9 million (197 sub-projects) were implemented from 1997 to 31 May 2000.

## 2. Programme Impact on Cross-cutting Issues

### 2.1. Peace consolidation and reconciliation

- The RRDP, as a post-conflict recovery programme, has had a great impact on the peace and stability of Tajikistan, through the implementation of \$ 8,947,947 of sub-projects(589) in three important regions of the country (Gharm, Kulyab, Shartuz)between 1997 and May 31 2000.
- The selection of Gharm as a programme target area, despite the significant security constraints, prepared an important foundation for opposition commanders working with governmental authorities, which was essential to the later success of the programme for the re-integration of ex-combatants.
- Through significant investment in war-torn or neglected areas of Tajikistan at a time when government resources were greatly diminished due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the RRDP sub-projects injected revenue into the communities and provided improved services. According to local officials, the RRDP provided some hope and

confidence in the future.

- In Shartuz area, RRDP promoted the reconciliation between the Tajik returnees and the Uzbek population.

## 2.2 Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Livelihoods

- The RRDP has made small but important advances in reducing poverty in its target areas. Though there is not reliable or relevant statistical evidence, the improved conditions in health services and clean water supply are cited as important factors in reducing disease among the affected population.
- The RRDP support for household level food production in the agricultural sector coupled with the increase in land distribution due to PIO pressures (conditionalities) on relevant local authorities has increased food production in the target areas.
- Short and long-term employment generation through the RRDP has increased the economic livelihoods of the direct beneficiaries.

## 2.3 Governance and participation

- The RRDP has promoted decentralization in linking the programme to local governmental authorities in its implementation mechanisms (DDACs, Tender Committees, Reintegration Committees).
- The participation of local representatives on these committees has increased the experience of community members in democratic mechanisms.
- Local area contractors have participated in the open tender processes for sub-contracts, and increased competition has been promoted among local businesses.
- These mechanisms have become accepted procedures in the target areas and have been adopted by local officials in other contexts.
- Sustainability mechanisms/approaches for projects are discussed with DDAC's so that the communities are involved in sustainability.

## 3. Impact by target area

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### Findings:

- The target areas for the programme (Gharm, Kulyab, Shartuuz, and now Khojand) were strategically selected to balance war affected areas, opposition controlled areas with government controlled areas.
- In all three areas, the programme has built a strong and positive working relationship with local authorities. The size and breadth of the programme and technical capacity to be able to deliver resources and high quality products at reasonable cost has provided the programme with substantial clout in these areas.
- Citizen participation on the DDACs and Tender Committees is virtually non-existent and additional attention needs to be given the governance, decentralization, participatory dimensions of the programme's philosophy as spelled out in the original programme document.
- The social and economic climate has improved in all of the regions and the programme should and can move into a more development mode. The types of opportunities for economic development will vary from one region to another based upon the political, social and economic base of the region.

- *Shaartuz* is the most heavily war-damaged area of the country. The majority of the population of the district are Uzbeks. A substantial number of refugees have also returned to the area from Afghanistan. The need for the rehabilitation of social infrastructure is even greater in this area than in the others. The Chief of the Hukumat in Shaartuz pointed out that the impact of the RRDP was not just in improving physical facilities. The tendering process is now being used when local governments seek bids on contracts for their work. Most of the initial assistance was provided in Shaartuz town but the percentage of resources going to other districts has increased in the last two years as DDACs and Tender Committees have been established in these areas. The ADB programme will be implemented in Shaartuz district but there is concern that, given the strained relations between Kulyab and Shaartuz residents, that Shaartuz will not get a fair share of resources available through this programme. If substantial ADB resources flow to Shaartuz substantial pressure will be placed on the existing staff.
- The *Kulyab* region was not damaged by the war but substantial deterioration of basic education, health, water and sanitation, irrigation and other facilities has occurred. There is only one DDAC and Tender Committee in the entire region that is chaired by the Chief Hukumat of Kulyab. The majority of representatives on the Tender Committees are from Kulyab town. Given this a substantial percentage of the resources provided through the programme have gone to Kulyab town (55%). While the area is in need of international assistance, it has not been damaged to the extent of the other districts the programme serves. Additionally, the area does not feel as isolated from central governmental interests. As a result, the area programme office often has less leverage and has to work hard to assure that procedures and principles of the programme are observed and that resources are distributed fairly to various areas and in accordance with real priority needs. Outreach of the programme to other districts is improving. The representatives of the other districts are satisfied that the programme is addressing their concerns and that mechanisms for addressing their priorities and interests exist. The tender committees are working in a transparent way and this practice is being extended to contract bidding processes other than those conducted by RRDP. Practices of self-financing of schools, clinics, hospitals and water systems have been encouraged in Kulyab as they have in Shaartuz. Finally, implementation of the ADB programme will substantially increase the workload of existing staff and ways must be sought to increase their efficiency without degrading the programme's quality.
- *Gharm* was the center of opposition activity during the civil war. Security problems have interrupted the programme operations since opening in October 1996. The most recent security incident being in June 2000. Because of long winters, the construction activity of the programme can only be conducted during 5 months. This places substantial pressure on the office to have procedures that enable as much to get done during short period as possible and on donors to release funds in a timely manner. The area is desperately awaiting another allocation of resources as the summer season of 2000 is passing and no new projects have started because no new resources have as yet become available. Despite these constraints more programme resources have been expended in Gharm than in the other areas both overall and on a per capita basis. The funds made available for reintegration programmes for ex-combatants being the major reason for this. While security considerations continue to be an issue social and economic circumstances in the area are improving. Given the type of funds available to Gharm, there is greater flexibility to promote income generation and job creation programs and opportunities seem to exist for this in production of agricultural products, rearing of cattle, processing of agricultural and animal products and in the servicing of these production capacities.

#### 4. Recommendations

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##### 4.1 Overall Programme Orientation:

- Participatory Structures (DDACs, Tender Committees, Reintegration Committees) should increase the percentage participation of non-governmental bodies and community leaders and/or outlying districts so as to reflect the diverse elements of the communities served.

- Capacity-building in local and regional planning, including information gathering, assessments and mapping should be provided to the local authorities, the membership of the DDACs. Efforts should be made to train contractors in the tender bidding and project implementation process so that only a few firms do not dominate and so that the specific communities in which projects are being implemented benefit.
- Training and technical assistance in small enterprise development, business planning and management is necessary for agricultural enterprises, women's commercial initiatives, newly privatized firms and emerging economic initiatives that are developing out of the re-integration programme so that they can become sustainable economic enterprises.
- Project resources should be distributed more equitably throughout the districts included in the target areas so as to redress regional imbalances.
- Increased priority should be given to sub-projects which provide short or long term employment and increased agricultural food production while diminished priority should be given to new rehabilitation of health and educational facilities.

#### 4.2 Programme Implementation Issues:

- Wherever possible the output of projects should be the privatization of land or other assets and the start up of new enterprises and associations where non-elites have a fair opportunity to benefit. When enterprises supported by the RRDP are privatized, pay back schemes must be set up to recover the assets created by the RRDP to support other community businesses or priorities.
- Procedures in tendering and the TOR of the DDACs should be prepared and distributed to all members. Efforts should be made to train contractors in the tender bidding and project implementation process so that only a few firms do not dominate and so that the specific communities in which projects are being implemented benefit.
- The requirement that contractors employ only ex-combatants in the implementation of re-integration projects can lead to management problems and delays in implementation. Some flexibility needs to be provided in letting these contracts that acknowledge these potential difficulties.
- The current processes of priority setting and decision making through the DDACs need to be strengthened. The conduct of survey and mapping exercises which provide either, or both, a more objective and participatory dimension to the priority setting and decision making process should be encouraged.
- Written Terms of Reference need to be developed regarding the purposes of the various committees and the responsibilities of membership. Training should be provided members of the committees in how the further decentralization of priority setting and decision making can work to the benefit of all concerned.
- Monitoring mechanisms need to be improved to include better measures of beneficiaries and of social and economic impacts.
- Through the reintegration programme, ex-combatants should be provided opportunity for short-term employment but should not be provided exclusive entitlement to the work opportunities afforded through the programme. There is need to pursue strategies that integrate rather than separate ex-combatants from other workers.
- There is need for training of staff, contractors and others in small and medium scale enterprise development as well as in community development techniques. Collaborative arrangements with other organizations, such as NGO's, that have capacities concerning these matters should be explored.



- Ways must be explored for expanding the delivery capacity of the current staff in view of the likely increase in the volume of work. This may require developing and implementing more collaborative and trusting relationships with local counterparts in the monitoring of projects.

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- Care should be taken to assure that the benefits of the programme are spread to women and to vulnerable groups.

### **Part Three: RRDP Program**

#### **Management 5. Management of**

RDDP

The management structures of the RRDP in its start-up were developed for a \$20 million dollar project despite the fact that the project only had start up funds of \$1.3 million from UNDP in 1995/96. In the 1997 evaluation it was noted that the large structure could not be justified in terms of actual project delivery. However, it was justified as a strategy to develop in the three target areas a capable implementation team that would prove its operational capacity in the difficult Tajik context and attract future funding.

In effect, this is what happened, though the funding did not come until 1998/99, in part a reflection of the tenuous security situation in Tajikistan. The project never reached the \$20 million target, but rather \$16.7 million by mid 2000. RRDP has been effective and efficient in delivering close to 600 sub-projects. At this juncture it is important to examine the current and future demands on the management structure, and to streamline the staffing at all levels to ensure cost effectiveness without sacrificing efficiency.

RRDP has total staff of 95 persons of which 6 are international staff. The central office in Dushanbe has 28 staff, including two internationals as Programme manger and Deputy Programme Manager. Departmental organization includes: Office of Programme Management, Programme Section, Administrative and Logistics Section, Finance Section. All financial control of sub-projects and payments are carried out by the Dushanbe Office. The original proposal anticipated 10 international staff and 50 national staff in Phase one(two PIOs) and 92 Nationals in phase 11(4 PIOs).

The RRDP has had one Programme Manager (PM) since the start up of the project. The PM was seen as the driving force in the development of the project and guiding the project through difficult periods. The success of the project at this point was closely linked to the management style of the PM. Though the PM was praised by donors and local government as very results oriented and effective, some Tajik Central Government entities viewed the RRDP as becoming too strong and functioning too independently from central authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs verbally informed the UNDP RR in June 2000 that the PM's visa would not be renewed. He subsequently left the country. The Deputy PM is acting PM, while a new PM is being recruited. The institutional structure developed by the RRDP has been secured, and in the visits by the mission the PIOs and the central staff though disheartened by the way the PM left the country, they were able to carry on the work.

Project Implementation Offices (PIOs) are located in four regions (Shartuz, Gharm, Kulyab, Khujand) . This evaluation will only assess the functioning of the Gharm, Shartuz and Kulyab offices as the Khujand office as just started- up in terms of programming. The PIOs have an international area manager, National Project professionals (Engineers, education, health, agriculture, WID), project assistants, administratives asssttants and support staff. The staff in the PIOs is: Shartuz: 21 staff; Kulyab: 17 staff ; Gharm 16 staff; Khujand: 13 staff. There has been some interchange between the PIO staff to stimulate the cross-fertilization of ideas and practices. This not only promotes professional interchanges, but also contact between different regions of the country. It should be encouraged and expanded.

The initial proposal included NPP posts at PIO level that were never filled. These were 2 NPPs at the PIO level (Private Sector/Business protection Officer and Public Sector Officers.) During the 1997

evaluation, it was determined that support for business development was not viable given the local political context. In 2000, these business development positions should be re-examined as it is one of the priority needs to ensure the sustainability of the many of the completed sub-projects, especially in the agriculture sector and the re-integration programme in Gharm. In addition, a public sector capacity-building component is now more relevant than during the first phase, as the local governmental authorities should be assuming greater responsibilities in project implementation.

The RRDP is a decentralized programme in which each programme area has an efficient implementation unit. The implementation of all sub-projects (identification, sub-contracting, monitoring) is carried out by the PIOs. The number and TOR of the NPPs should be consistent with the current programme priorities. The NPPs in each PIO have a sectoral approach. The work in health and education has been essentially rehabilitation of existing facilities in which the majority of the work/responsibility was carried out by engineers. Little emphasis in this phase was placed on improving the quality of education, health practices or teacher (re)training. The number of engineers increased in each PIO to three or four, as the RRDP became essentially a physical rehabilitation programme.

## 5.1

### Structure and Staffing

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Though the PIOs work with the local government structures and involve them in the DDACs, there is not a clear counterpart relationship with these local entities in terms of training, technical assistance or division of responsibilities. It will be particularly important in the future to define clearly the responsibilities of local structures, not just in identifying projects and participating in DDACs and Tender Committee, but in the actual overseeing and monitoring of projects so that "ownership" of the sub-projects is assumed by the respective authorities and communities. This could eventually allow the PIOs to reduce some of the professional NPP staff and well as ensure sustainability of the sub-projects.

There has been no analysis of the cost of management and staffing in terms of what is tied to sub-project implementation and what can be called "administrative overhead".

### 5.2 Administration/Operations Costs in relation to project delivery

The ratio of administrative/operations costs to project delivery has improved, but is still too high. In 95/96 only 1% of the resources were utilized for sub-projects. In 1997/98, approximately 50% of the resources were for administration and 50% for project delivery. In 1999, the ratio was reduced to 37% and in 2000, it will reduce to approximately 2530%.

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000(Jan-June)	TOTAL
Project		\$30,808	\$1,246,272	\$1,237,673	\$3,653,783	\$3,360,180	9,528,716
CORE + Admin	\$68,503	\$1,206,371	\$1,202,351	\$1,278,603	\$2,121,135	\$1,206,642	\$7,082,605
Total	\$68,503	\$1,237,179	\$2,448,623	\$2,516,276	\$5,774,918	\$4,565,822	\$16,611,321
Ratio	100%	98%	49%	51%	37%	26%	43%

However, as stated before, the way that the staffing and operating costs are planned, managed and

analyzed does not allow to calculate the real costs of administration nor project implementation. Sub-project costs are viewed as strictly the input of the direct implementation through contracting. For example, the staff time for sub-project design, the engineers monitoring of the contracted work, the fuel used for visiting the sites, the staff time to prepare reports and the consumable for operations are not included in the projects costs.

Based on information that was made available to us it was not possible to separate out administrative costs from costs that could fairly be attributed to project delivery. While this information can be culled from the expenditure reports it is apparently not regularly analyzed and made available to project management. Based on what we were given we were unable to determine what the administrative rate of the program is.

This methodology of attributing core/administrative costs also had an impact on resource mobilization, as the real costs of implementation were not passed on to the donors. This has created a deficit at this point in which there will be a shortfall of more than one million USD in 2000/2001 for core administrative costs. UNDP and UNOPS are currently discussing strategies to cover this short fall.

### 5.3 Operational constraints

The external constraints have significantly increased the costs of the project. To be able to deliver in the context of Tajikistan, in which two of the three project sites (Shartuz and Gharm) had to be evacuated for security reasons, is a feat in and of itself. The Gharm Office was only open 60% of the time during the first phase of the project. Frequently the RRDP was the only international project operating in its target area. The culture of lawlessness, corruption and over-centralization were additional obstacles for the RRDP in promoting and adhering to transparent democratic procedures.

The Government of Tajikistan, despite statements to the contrary, has not committed itself to economic reform. The government system is still highly centralized yet few resources are available at the central level for distribution to localities and these resources tend not to be distributed equitably. Local initiative, either through local government and through private initiative, is frustrated because of centralized policies, a non-functioning banking system, unavailability of credit and also because of corruption and intimidation. In any case, a tradition of individual or local community initiative to create opportunities or address problems is not prevalent. Roadblocks, where unofficial

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"taxes" are taken, increase the costs of trade and commerce beyond local areas. The security situation in some areas continues to be of concern. Given all of the above there is little external interest in investment in Tajikistan. The civil society sector is extremely weak and few associations or societies exist that can bring people with common interests, needs or capabilities together to represent themselves. All of these factors and others create operational constraints on the programme most of which can only marginally be addressed by the programme.

### 5.4 Institutional links to Government

According to the initial project document and the recommendations of the TPR in 1998, the UNDP was to establish a RRDP national steering committee so that the central government could provide guidance and oversight of the RRDP. This was never undertaken. At this point, as the RRDP has gained significant visibility and donor resources, the central government has expressed an interest in being more closely involved and consulted on programme policy and direction. The programme is operating in sensitive local environments and the failure to establish a central level forum or advisory committee for the programme leaves the programme, and its staff, isolated and potentially subject to uninformed and politicized criticism.

It is important that some kind of linkage to government be made, but which government entity(ies) is appropriate is difficult to determine, as none are concerned specifically focussed on local level planning and implementation.

At the local level, the RRDP is closely tied to the Hukumats, the local government, through the DDACs and the Tender Committees. There is not a counterpart link to the Hukumats or regional governmental entities (in the case of Kulyab). These links will be important to define, especially with the ADB project starting up in which the governmental implementing role is much stronger than in RRDP I.

#### 5.5 Institutional links to UN partner. agencies and NGOs

UNHCR contracted the RRDP to implement projects valued at \$810,000 in 1999/00 in the returnee areas in Shartuz. An agreement between UNOPS and UNHCR at the headquarters level was signed in 1998. Therefore, successful performance at the field level through the RRDP was of particular importance. While the work done under the agreement by RRDP was considered excellent, there were communication difficulties between the agencies that led to a cut in resources made available to RRDP.

There was a pilot programme with UNFPA for \$40,590 in 1999. It had been hoped that this would expand, but as of yet it has not materialized.

In Gharm, RRDP assisted with the implementation of the World Bank's post-conflict initiative and the work done under this agreement was considered excellent. This agreement between the World Bank and UNOPS to use the RRDP as the executing for a World Bank project was also the first such agreement between these two entities. Further, RRDP links with the SRSG's office were excellent. The importance of programme to peace and stability is recognized by the current SG representative in Tajikistan and it was cited in the reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council.

There is not a significant presence of domestic or international NGOs in Tajikistan. We found few examples, either at the central level or in the programme areas, of cooperation or communication between the programme and NGOs. These linkages could usefully be strengthened in the future to mutual advantage of the programme and NGOs. In particular, partnership with NGOs that have strengths in small-scale business development, micro finance and capacity building for civil society formation would add strength to the current RRDP programme.

#### 5.6 UNDP Support to RDDP

As a UNDP project, UNDP has provided \$8.8 million to the RRDP since 1996 from TRAC 1.1.1 and TRAC 1.1.3 resources. This support launched the project and maintained its programme activities almost exclusively until 1998/99, when other donors began to support the RRDP. The RRDP represents a substantial part of the UNDP programme in Tajikistan and is one of the largest UNDP/UNOPS collaborations in RBEC.

UNDP has demonstrated weak, inconsistent and/or passive support to the RRDP project at different points over the past four years. The usual responsibilities of UNDP, which include programme monitoring, resource mobilization and reporting to donors, public affairs, regular TPRs, external evaluations and other matters have either been relatively neglected or responsibility, formally or informally, transferred to RRDP.

UNDP was passive in dealing with the issue of the forcible departure of the RRDP programme director. This is having a negative effect upon RRDP staff morale and is negatively impacting on resource mobilization. USAID, which has been a major donor to the programme is particularly disturbed by what they perceive to be improper handling of this issue.

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The Asia Development Bank initiative represents an opportunity and challenge for RRDP. UNDP has not, to date, paid sufficient attention to key decisions that are being made regarding appointments of staff, both in terms of procedure and qualifications. It is important early on in this initiative that UNDP demonstrate that it is supporting RRDPs capacities and responsibilities concerning ADB programme implementation. As the RRDP staff and programme mechanisms will be employed in ADB programme implementation, and as no financial resources have been allocated by ADB for these obligations, UNDP and UNOPS must find the resources necessary for successful implementation of these responsibilities.

## 5.7 UNOPS Support to RRDP

RRDP staff are UNOPS staff and therefore the excellent performance of the staff must to UNOPS' credit just as their poor performance would reflect on UNOPS had it occurred. All of the international staff of UNOPS were trained in other settings where UNOPS was the executing agency and this experience has been invaluable in programme implementation. From what we could determine, UNOPS-RESS headquarters staff have *provided* appropriate oversight functions and have provided technical assistance where headquarters or the programme office felt such assistance was required. While we did not have time to delve into this matter in depth, in several instances we found that the technical advice provided by headquarters was not followed, and we were unable to determine whether this was because the advice was not good or because the programme office did not give priority to it. While effective management systems are in place for monitoring donor funded projects, insufficient attention has been given to forward planning. Certainly, UNDP needs to be involved with this process but RRDP and UNOPS have a key responsibility in this regard as well. Further, encouragement of the development annual workplans related to achievement of key programme objectives by UNOPS would have been helpful and should be insisted upon for the future.

## 5.8 Effectiveness of Execution Modality

The programme is working well under the current execution modality. While the objective of every such programme should be to move toward national execution the time clearly -has not arrived for this to happen in Tajikistan regarding a programme such as RRDP. We did, however, find substantial evidence of strained relationships between UNDP and UNOPS and between UNDP and RRDP as well. The programme is a successful one that has significant potential for the future. These communication and relationship issues should be addressed as they will have an influence on future programme performance and resource mobilization. We found neither need nor capacity at UNDP to consider direct execution.

## 5.9 Findings and Recommendations:

- The professional staff needs (NPPs) at both central and PIO level should be re-examined and redefined in terms of current and future programmes priorities. This should include a new look at whether the sectoral approach to NPP responsibilities at the PIO level is the most effective at this stage and for future. The project must focus more on training and technical assistance for the local authorities in planning, monitoring and evaluation.
- Support staff functions should be analyzed in relation to desired outputs of the programme.
- Management and staffing of data collection, monitoring and evaluation needs to be rethought in relation to programme management planning and impact assessment in addition to maintaining the capacity for donor reporting and sub-project monitoring.
- There are no annual overall management work plans for the RRDP nor for each staff member. Work plans should be developed for the overall management as well as each professional and non-professional staff member.
- The PLO's and the staff should be evaluated at this stage in terms of delivery capacity (i.e. per engineer what value of projects can be managed). This has implications for increasing or reducing staff according to workload.
- Core and administration costs as a percentage of overall programme expenses have averaged about 43% over the period of the programme. In 1999, core and administrative costs were 37% of the total programme and this percentage is expected to drop yet further in 2000. As many programme costs are included in core and administration we were not able to determine rates for administration, overall or by year. It is likely that this data is available but it apparently is not regularly analyzed and reviewed. This should be corrected.
- In the start-up phase of the programme (1995-96) few resources were spent on programme delivery. As plans and programmes have been put in place an increasing amount of programme resources are going directly for programme delivery. However, it is difficult given how information is organized to arrive at an informed opinion as to whether the ratio between programme delivery and core/administrative costs is high or low.
- A large portion of the core/administrative costs are expenses related to salary and support

for international staff. Assertions were made from some that the programme was "top heavy" and that expenses for

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international staff could be reduced. It is important that international staff remain in the positions of Programme Director and the four Area Managers. Resources permitting, it is also advisable for the Deputy Programme Director to be an international staff. Assuming that the programme will need to continue to bear these costs the extent to which the ratio between programme delivery and core/administrative costs can be further reduced is questionable.

- Administrative costs should be more carefully identified and defined and reports regularly produced that track these expenditures.
- Budget line analysis that enables monitoring of administrative rates should be closely and regularly reviewed by programme management. The financial management of the project reflects an accounting approach rather than financial management and planning.
- UNDP should work with the RRDP to determine what kind of central government oversight would be appropriate for the RRDP II programme, ensuring that the support for locally driven rehabilitation and development is not undermined.
- Specifically, UNDP should give consideration to the formation of a RRDP Programme Steering Committee that consists of government, UN agencies and donor members, with RRDP acting as the Secretariat.
- Institutional linkages in which Hukumat and regional governments are counterparts which assume increasing responsibility for the RRDP design and monitoring with the PIOs should be developed.
- The RRDP should be seen as an implementation vehicle for the UN system as a whole, and within the context of the CCA closer relations should be developed with the UN agencies operating in Tajikistan.
- The RRDP has possibilities to benefit from NGO partnerships in the area of business development and micro-finance. Such a collaborative efforts could also attract donor financing.
- UNDP must assume its responsibilities for RRDP as a UNDP project, especially in the areas of monitoring, evaluation, reporting to donors and resource mobilization.
- UNOPS, as the implementing agent, should provide the oversight necessary to ensure that workplans are developed and adhered to.
- The RRDP should continue as a UNOPS executed project. There is no other viable execution modality that would ensure effective management of multi-donor resources.

## 6 Resource Mobilization Strategies

### 6.1 1996-1999: Donor Support: Impact on Program Direction

When the RRDP was designed, it was hoped that UNDP and other donors would contribute to the overall programme without specifically earmarking the funds for particular sub-projects or geographic target areas. Given the lack donor interest in funding programmes in Tajikistan, in large part due to the security situation, the programme was entirely supported from UNDP resources for the first 2.5 years. 60% (\$8.7 million) of all resources for the RRDP have been provided by UNDP. During this period a management and programme delivery base was established that was substantial enough to impress donors who had significant reluctance to invest in Tajikistan because of the many constraints referenced above.

#### Contributions to RRDP in USD

Donors	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	TOTAL
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UNDP	<b>68,503</b>	<b>1,237,179</b>	2,023,555	<b>3,056,670</b>	<b>1,782,682</b>	<b>550,683</b>	8,719,272
Sweden			<b>280,000</b>				<b>280,000</b>
USAID			<b>200,000</b>		<b>2,270,000</b>		<b>2,620,000</b>
UK							<b>20,000</b>
ECHO				<b>330,000</b>	<b>1,890,750</b>		<b>2,220,750</b>
SDC				<b>290,000</b>		<b>1,050,633</b>	<b>1,340,633</b>
CIDA					331,125		331,125
Norway					<b>500,000</b>		<b>500,000</b>
W13					<b>198,625</b>		<b>198,625</b>
UNHCR				<b>218,000</b>	<b>650,000</b>	<b>160,000</b>	<b>1,028,000</b>
Japan					<b>518,000</b>	<b>181,260</b>	<b>699,260</b>
UNFPA					<b>40,590</b>		<b>40,590</b>
Total	<b>68,503</b>	1,237,179	2,503,555	<b>3,894,670</b>	<b>8,181,772</b>	2,112,576	16,692,573

Source: RRDP, July 2000.

The percentage of programme resources made available from other UN agencies or from third party sources has increased each year since 1998. In 1995 and 1996 100% of the funds were from UNDP, in 1997 24% came from other

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sources, by 1999 % 78% of funds came from sources other than UNDP even as total programme resources have increased from \$2.5 million in 1997 to \$8.1 million in 1999.<sup>3</sup>

When UNDP was the primary donor, the RRDP had substantial flexibility and the DDACs with the PIOs could determine priority sub-projects. The RRDP, with UNDP and UNOPS concurrence, decided upon a strategy of resource mobilization that was sub-project or sectorally oriented. This strategy re-enforced the RRDP as a physical rehabilitation project. This strategy has another problem, in that the core/ administrative costs were seen as a UNDP contribution. This was reasonable in 1997/98, but UNDP resources reduced significantly in 1999 and more in 2000, thereby creating the deficit that exists at present.

UNDP no longer has substantial resources to contribute to the programme. Lack of these resources reduces the flexibility the programme has to fill gaps in its current programme. Given that this situation is not likely to change, a resource mobilization strategy that both sustains current capabilities but builds on them to address next stage challenges is required. An important part of this will be to incorporate full implementation costs in resource mobilization efforts.

## 6.2 2000- 2002: Donor Commitments: Impact on Program Direction

The RRDP has built up its credibility and capacity as an implementer in tough circumstances of physical rehabilitation projects with transparent bidding procedures. Therefore, the current funding perspectives (ADB, US AID, ECHO, DGRELEX, Japan, SDC) for 2000/2001 are positive with the RRDP having committed itself to an extensive programme of sub-project implementation in physical rehabilitation projects. The problem is that UNDP/UNOPS and RRDP did not adequately plan for core/administration costs and there is an anticipated shortfall of \$603,941 for 2000 and at least \$1.2 million for 2001.

A large part of the problem stems from an apparent "misunderstanding" in which the ADB thought that UNDP would contribute \$1 million in 2000/2001 for the RRDP administration and staff to provide technical assistance to the startup of a large ADB Social Rehabilitation Programme in three of the four RRDP target areas (Shartuz, Kulyab and Khojand). The project was funded by the ADB in large part because of the RRDP capacity to support the startup and the UNDP commitment. This agreement is important to UNDP and UNOPS at the corporate level, a first if the first time the two institutions are working with the ADB. However, it will drain RRDP resources and UNDP and UNOPS must come up with plans to guarantee the insertion of resources.

Another potential problem is that the current hard pipeline resources for 2000/2001 lock the RRDP into a programme of physical rehabilitation. If it is to build on its past programme and provide more technical assistance and capacity building in business development and local administration in the next phase, there must be additional funds procured. These would be smaller amounts, as the projects would be "software" to complement the current "hardware". RRDP should work with UNDP to develop resource mobilization strategies respond to such needs.

### 6.3 Funding of CORE Operations Costs

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
UNDP	68,503	1,206,371	1,202,351	1,271,503	1,750,692	Not available
USAID					96,829	
SDC					59,511	
ECHO					77,295	
UNHCR				7,100	7,263	
Norway					129,545	
Total	68,503	1,206,371	1,206,371	1,278,603	2,121,135	

Source: RRDP Finance section, July 2000

In 1999, the RRDP began to include some administrative implementation costs within its project proposals. However, it appears that the way it was done was not based on calculated implementation costs, but rather placing, in the case of Gharm, the costs of the PIO Area manager and some current expenses within a project proposal. In 1999, donors other than UNDP contributed 17% of the core/administrative costs.

### 6.3 Findings/Lessons Learned

<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that these figures for donor contributions are the year in which the resources were received, not necessarily expended. In 2000, most of the programme is being carried out with 1999 resources.

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- UNDP provided the funds for 60% of all costs of RRDP and 94% of core/administration costs since the start-up in 1995. This investment was critical to establishing the programme delivery base and programmatic flexibility that have been key aspects of the programme's success.
- RRDP/UNOPS has not given sufficient recognition to UNDP's contribution.. <sup>4</sup>
- UNDP and UNOPS with RRDP should develop a resource mobilization strategy in which the real costs of implementation are integrated into the programme budgets and donors other than UNDP assume responsibility for a portion of what are now considered core/administrative costs.
- With support from RRDP and UNOPS, UNDP should assert its lead responsibility for developing and implementing a resource mobilization strategy and for reporting to donors on programme progress. To complement this responsibility UNDP must strengthen its programme planning, monitoring and evaluation responsibilities.
- The original programme document expressed very ambitious goals for the programme with criteria for assessing whether these goals were being achieved. As the programme evolved it was clear that these goals, and even more the criteria for assessing the extent to which the programme was meeting them, were not in synchronization. Monitoring, evaluation and planning capacities were not built up and used to make formal adjustments to the programme based upon actual practice. Not making formal en route programme adjustments leaves the programme open to criticism of being opportunistic and ad hoc even when this might not be the



case.

- Future programmes and resource mobilizations should have a better balance between the hardware of rehabilitation with the software of technical assistance and capacity building to ensure greater longer-term sustainability. To achieve this the programme should seek to build partnerships with NGOs that have experience in programmatic areas where RRDP has, to date, no strength.
- Given that UNOPS has received an AOS of 10% and UNDP 3%, some donors are hesitant to pay additional administrative implementation costs. UNDP and UNOPS should consider reducing the AOS percentage on the RRDP project at this stage.

## 7 Stakeholders

### Assessment of RRDP 7.1

#### Government

At the local level, Hukumats, in all areas visited had strong praise for the project. Government officials not only gave testimony to the importance of the projects in terms of community priorities, but were supportive of the DDACs as an initiative to involve local governmental officials in determining priorities of intervention. The high quality of the interventions was cited. In the Gharm area, the Hukumat representatives were critical of the delays in funding since there are only five months a year when rehabilitation projects can be carried out. The Government officials attributed the mechanisms of the tender committees as key aspects to the high quality of work.

#### 7.2 Beneficiaries

In all visits to the field, the local communities and beneficiaries praised the projects in terms of the priorities and the quality of work. In meetings with representatives of the various Districts in the Karategin Valley, the major complaint was the delays in donor funding in 2000, which meant that the 5 month work period(summer months) was lost in terms of reintegration programmes and new rehabilitation programmes.

#### 7.3 Donors

Donors met by the mission (US Ambassador, ECHO) were very positive and praised the RRDP delivery capacity as very efficient and cost effective. USAID was the first donor to support the RRDP in 1997 and continued through 1999. Both praised the reporting done by the RRDP to donors. However, the US Ambassador stated that the UNDP/UNOPS handling of the "expulsion" of the RRDP Programme Manager could affect the future funding. Few donors are based in Dushanbe.

#### 7.4 UNDP

UNDP recognizes the importance and the contribution of the RRDP. It was stated that it is virtually the only programme of UNDP, aside from the Human Development Report, that will have any lasting impact. At the same time, UNDP CO, indicated that at times the RRDP acted too autonomously. However, it recognized that UNDP had not fully assumed its responsibilities in monitoring, evaluation and resource mobilization, leaving a vacuum filled by RRDP. There have been 4 UNDP Resident Representatives during the life of the project, the most recent arriving in March 2000. Therefore, the RRDP had more continuity than UNDP with more on the ground understanding and experience. The previous UNDP RR was also the DRSG of UNMOT, had a good working relationship with the

<sup>4</sup> At the time of the mission visit, RRDP had a conference with posters of the contributions of all donors, except UNDP.

RRDP understanding its importance to the peace process. Therefore, certain UNDP responsibilities were assumed by RRDP in terms of on-the -ground contacts with donors, preparation of resource

mobilization plans and reporting back to donors. Usually the formal resource mobilization contacts were done jointly, with the UNDP RR and the RRDP PM traveling together to important meetings in Europe and Asia. Since UNOPS cannot receive support from donors directly, all support for RRDP had to be part of the UNDP project RRDP.

## 7.5 UNOPS

UNOPS sees the RRDP as one of its more successful area based post-conflict recovery programmes. UNOPS sees that their long institutional experience with post-conflict area development programmes elsewhere and their deployment of people who had gained significant experience with post-conflict recovery via them have made a significant contribution to the programme's success. From UNOPS' perspective, RRDP has broken new ground through the agreements with the World Bank, UNHCR and UNFPA as well as through the agreement with the Asia Development Bank. While grateful for the resource support UNDP has provided the programme, UNOPS feels that UNDP has not provided consistent programme leadership particularly in terms of creating stronger relationships with the central government, field presence and regarding third party resource mobilization. UNOPS also feels that UNDP's decision to move to separate office space from RRDP has had a negative effect upon communications between RRDP and UNDP.

## **Part Four:** Future Directions

for RRDP 1. Future

### Directions of the RDDP

RRDP faces significant programmatic and management challenges in the future. In the main these challenges are a result of the programme's growth, success and influence. The future programme must build on the current, successful programme. A substantial volume of work is ongoing and new funds will be coming in to support current priorities. The first responsibility is to perform this work at a high quality level. Also, there is continuing need for further work in the current areas.

### Findings/Recommendations:

- The programme needs to make adjustments to the evolving social and economic situation of the country. Time and priority must be given to developing the future strategy for the programme. The programme cannot remain static but must evolve to new areas of opportunity. Balances across different sectors need to be sustained and enhanced and the interactions between various sectors, in supporting social and economic development, must be examined and used as a base for programming and resource mobilization.
- While the programme has established excellent working relationships with authorities at the local level the programme has not succeeded in establishing effective working relationships at the central level. It is essential that this be done but in a manner that reinforces rather than undermines the relationship of the programme to local decision making and decentralization. Recognizing the multidonor nature of RRDP at this time, consideration should be given to forming a tripartite steering committee at the national level involving appropriate government representatives, UNDP and representatives of donors with RRDP acting as secretariat.
- While maintaining capacities to rehabilitate social infrastructure there are increasing opportunities for the programme to focus on job creation and support for small and medium scale economic enterprises. The capacity of the programme to provide technical assistance regarding economic development and small enterprise development needs to be improved as do the capacity building and gender components of the programme.
- Temporary employment opportunities through the reintegration programme for ex-combatants should be opened to both ex-combatants and others in the community. In this way, ex-combatants will be integrated in a workforce with others in the community rather than maintaining their military brigades. In the development of the enterprises supported through the reintegration programme the ex-combatants should be provided training and other encouragements to move into positions of permanent employment including considerations of management and ownership of such enterprises.
- The programme does an excellent job of monitoring and reporting on project progress for donors. However, it needs to do a better job of measuring programme impacts and beneficiaries. This will be particularly important as the programme makes adjustments toward more development activities.

- The area planning and local capacity building dimensions of the programme need to be strengthened. This is an important component of many post-conflict programmes implemented by UNDP/UNOPS in other countries; this experience should be drawn on in the Tajikistan context. This is particularly important in relation to developing an exit strategy.
- The DDACs and Tender Committees while serving vital functions need to be strengthened. The Terms of Reference of these committees needs to be reviewed, rearticulated and shared with the membership of the committees. The Terms of Reference should include reference to what are the longer term purposes of establishing these committees. The membership of the committees needs to be expanded or revised to include

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representatives of civil society and strategies for citizen participation and input to the priority setting process should be encouraged.

- The cooperation/collaboration/partnership of the programme with other UN agencies and NGOs working in the country needs to be encouraged. The programme has laid a base for many improvements that the programme will not have the capacity to follow up on. This problem can be addressed by developing partnerships and cooperation.
- Several excellent brochures and materials on the RRDP in Tajikistan were produced that were useful in resource mobilization and in informing a broader range of interested people about the basic characteristics and achievements of the programme. The information collection, analysis and public affairs aspects of the programme nevertheless need strengthening with ongoing attention to identifying and updating information on the many exciting developments that are emerging from the programme.
- Steps need to be taken to assure that the benefits of the programme are as fairly spread across districts and across population groups as possible with some special emphasis on assuring that the situation of excluded areas and vulnerable people are addressed.
- There is some concern that the programme is not maintaining balances across various sectors and is becoming focussed primarily on the rehabilitation of education and health facilities. This is an issue in the aggregate as well as in the different area programmes. In the past, availability of UNDP resources provided the programme with the flexibility to maintain these balances; in the future, these balances will need to be maintained through further resource mobilization.
- A new project document needs to be developed that defines realistic challenges and objectives. Comprehensive workplans need to be developed which provide a basis for programme monitoring and assessment both by UNDP and UNOPS.
- RRDP in the future should integrate drug prevention and education and aids awareness within its programming, especially through the women's centers.
- The new project document (RRDP II) should provide a framework for continuation of current projects, those anticipated to be supported by donors, and UNDP's priorities on poverty alleviation and sustainable livelihoods as well as decentralization and governance. The next phase of the programme should build on, not replace, current capacities and initiatives. The mission saw significant opportunities for the programme to integrate UNDP programme priorities through capacity building and strengthening of local governmental authorities and through continued support for decentralization and increased programming to support agricultural, commercial and other productive enterprises that were initiated in RRDP.
- The implementation of the ADB programme will have an impact on the RRDP and issues of coordination between these programmes need to be addressed. There are likely also to be impacts of the ADB programme on capacities to mobilize resources for RRDP as there are many areas of overlap between these programmes. These issues must be addressed as soon as possible and a strategy for programme coordination and future resource mobilization devised that takes into account the impacts of the ADB programme on RRDP.
- It is not too early to begin designing and implementing an exit strategy. Designing such a strategy is difficult because it is unclear as to what the future governance structure of the country will be and what will be the pattern of decentralization, if any. Nevertheless, steps should be taken to strengthen capacities of local authorities to do planning, priority setting and monitoring.

## 2. RDDP and UNDP CO Programme

UNDP staff comment that the programme is not sufficiently related to UNDP programme priorities. In the corporate sense, the RRDP is consistent with the UNDP emphasis on poverty alleviation and

governance in post-conflict recovery programmes. UNDP in Tajikistan has not had a clear programme, and so *de facto* the RRDP was the UNDP programme. However, UNDP did not always assume the RRDP as its programme, so the RRDP developed an externally perceived identity of its own, in spite of UNDP as opposed to because of UNDP. As UNDP moves to preparing a CCA, the RRDP provides a very solid base for UNDP and UN system programming. The RRDP is an important resource to inform UNDP programming.

In RRDP II, a new project document must be developed which should refine and strengthen the technical assistance and capacity building aspects of the RRDP- precisely the areas of UNDP competence and priority.

#### **Part Five: Lessons Learned**

The RRDP is an important programme to look at from the point of view of lessons learned in post-conflict peacebuilding, rehabilitation and economic recovery.

- The RRDP demonstrates that post-conflict recovery can and should start during the conflict resolution process. Such programmes can have an important impact on the dynamic of the peace process and assist in its consolidation.

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- The time frame for post-conflict recovery programmes in their initial phase should be three to five years. National administrative structures are weak. Restructuring of the economic and political system is often an integral part of the recovery process.
- Physical rehabilitation is an important visible starting point in the recovery process, but should not become the only end objective of the programmes.
- The sub-contracting of implementation to local firms has an important economic impact in reactivation of local economies.
- Transparent tendering procedures of post-conflict recovery projects encourage local authorities to adopt more transparent procedures.
- In economies that are in transition from command to market driven economies and from centralized to decentralized means of governance and decision-making, efforts to develop local capacities for planning, priority setting, decision making and implementation must be complemented by efforts to gain central-level appreciation and support for local initiative. This is particularly the case in post-conflict societies where working on rehabilitation of areas affected by conflict are often difficult, sensitive and at times even dangerous to work in.
- Just as in business, programme management can be as much challenged by success as by failure. Evaluation, monitoring and planning as well as resource mobilization strategies based on these processes are essential components of assuring that programmes are making necessary adjustments to remain relevant for the future and/or are taking appropriate steps to transfer responsibilities where programme exit can occur without the collapse of the capacities the programme has worked hard to develop.
- Programmes must build on success and fulfill responsibilities and expectations of current supporters even as a base is built for appropriate revisions in programme priorities and capacities.

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