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COUNTRY EVALUATION:
ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS
NIGERIA

United Nations Development Programme
Evaluation Office

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Contents

Foreword

This report presents the findings of the Nigeria country evaluation carried out by the Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in March 2003. The evaluation forms part of a series of independent country evaluations, termed Assessments of Development Results (ADRs), that the Evaluation Office undertakes every year in selected countries. These are forward-looking exercises that seek to capture and demonstrate UNDP's contributions to development results at the country level with a view to generating lessons on how best to improve the performance and the development effectiveness of the organization. ADRs also support the UNDP Administrator's substantive accountability to the Executive Board.

Despite Nigeria's significant natural and human resources, and its considerable economic potential, the country's human development index (HDI) and all other social indicators have declined since the 1970s. The challenges of revitalising the economy while dealing with globalisation and consolidating the transition to democracy demand a rethinking of past approaches in favor of a stronger human development agenda.

During the period under review, UNDP was able to stay the course throughout the difficult political situation prior to 1999 and to embark on innovative and participatory downstream activities in all 36 states of the federation, targeting the poorest of the poor. Some of these interventions have the potential for replication and scaling up to upstream policy levels. In addition, the National

Executive summary

BACKGROUND

This report presents the findings of the Nigeria country evaluation, which was undertaken by the UNDP Evaluation Office in March 2003. The evaluation is part of a series of independent Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) that the Evaluation Office undertakes every year in selected countries. The purpose is to assess the key development results and overall contribution of UNDP support to Nigeria during the period 1997-2002 and to recommend strategies for strengthening the organization's performance.

The Nigeria ADR seeks to assess how UNDP has responded to Nigeria's development challenges and strategically positioned itself to bring added value in such a populous and relatively well-endowed country. The evaluation is, above all, a forward-looking exercise intended to draw lessons for the strategic positioning of UNDP's support in the future and to serve as a basis for dialogue between UNDP and the government as Nigeria consolidates its transition to democracy. The report draws upon findings gathered through detailed background desk studies, field visits and interviews, as well as in-depth studies on poverty and governance, the two thematic areas to which the bulk of UNDP resources were allocated during the period under review.

NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

With an estimated population of 120 million people, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $50 billion makes it one of sub-Saharan Africa's largest economies. Although well endowed with natural resources, it is a country emerging from a long-standing economic and political crisis that started with the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s and was exacerbated by periods of increasingly arbitrary military rule. Despite having the seventh largest oil and gas reserves in the world and being the world's 6th largest exporter of crude oil, Nigeria's GDP per capita annual growth rate in real terms has been negative or zero for more than two decades. Current GDP per capita, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) is US $896, which is significantly lower than the 1977 figure of US $1,160. In addition, there are large income disparities between the rich and poor, and between men and women. For example, the poorest 10% of the population accounts for a mere 1.6% share of national income while the richest 10% accounts for 40.8%. The economy is dependent on a single commodity (oil) that is subject to serious price fluctuations. Total federal public debt (internal and external) amounts to approximately 41 percent of GDP and the cost of debt servicing is equivalent to 42 percent of exports.

Nigeria is ranked low on the Human Development Index[1] and the Nigeria 2000/2001 National Human Development Report (NHDR) also reveals that there are significant regional disparities. Compared to other countries of similar size but fewer resources, Nigeria's economic performance and human development have not matched its potential.

While the restoration of democracy in 1999 is widely seen as a turning point for the better, Nigeria faces a number of development challenges. Greater freedom of association and expression has led to increased tension in the north and in the Delta region and, despite the steady increase in oil prices since 1998, the economy has yet to show any marked improvement. The Presidential election of April 2003 took place relatively peacefully and renewed the mandate of the incumbent, but Nigeria's democratic consolidation remains fragile and much still needs to be done to build a strong culture of open and accountable government at all levels.

As the report shows, the economic and social challenges are enormous and there is, above all, an urgent need to restore the non-oil productive sectors, increase employment and combat poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS.

FOCUS OF UNDP PROGRAMMES 1997-2003

The 1997-2002 Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) was drafted when Nigeria was still under a military government and when most bilateral donors were withdrawing from the country. Given these circumstances, the UNDP Executive Board approved the CCF on the condition that 80% of UNDP core resources would "directly benefit the poorest sections of the population and deliver their benefits at the grassroots level".[2] Consequently, UNDP's activities were mainly targeted at the grassroots level and dispersed throughout Nigeria's 36 states and the Abuja Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

The original 1997-2002 CCF document identified poverty alleviation as its overall objective and provided support under four thematic areas of concentration: poverty reduction, governance, gender and the environment. Programmes under these thematic areas of concentration, which were also used as the framework for the new initiatives that were introduced after 1999, were organised under the following umbrella programmes: the National Management of Socio-Economic Development (NMSED) programme, under which governance and capacity building for policy planning and economic management were provided; and

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1. See Nigeria's National Human Development Report, 1996, 1998 and 200/2001
2. 1997 Executive Board Decision, DP/1998/2, 8 October 1997.

the Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme, the Social Development Programme and the Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development Programme, the three programes under which poverty reduction, gender, the environment and HIV/AIDs were addressed. (See Annexes 4-6 for a map of intended development results and resource allocation by theme.)

When democracy was restored in 1999, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) introduced a new economic programme for the period 1999-2003 which stressed raising living standards and creating employment opportunities. The FGN immediately requested UNDP to undertake a variety of initiatives at the federal level in the areas of policy and strategy formulation and capacity building for poverty alleviation and good governance. Significantly, about half way through the CCF period, UNDP found itself adding a new dimension to its Nigeria programme in addition to having to realign its ongoing programmes in accordance with the corporate results-based management (RBM) tools introduced in 1999.

MAIN FINDINGS

I. Strategic Positioning and Relevance of UNDP Support

The findings of this evaluation suggest that UNDP is well known and enjoys relatively high visibility in the country, particularly within institutions and among the states where it has programmes. Domestic constituencies and external donors alike clearly respect UNDP's role and expect the organization to play an even stronger facilitation role vis-a-vis the country's human development agenda. UNDP's role as a neutral convener, its access to global knowledge networks, and its advocacy on critical issues of human development and human rights clearly emerge as the organization's comparative advantages in Nigeria.

Based on the ADR, the following conclusions can be reached regarding the strategic positioning of UNDP and the relevance of its

programmes from 1997-2003. In general terms, UNDP has responded flexibly to the evolving development challenges in Nigeria and to the expressed priorities of the government. The downstream orientation required by the Executive Board at the beginning of the first country cooperation framework (1997-2002) was appropriate and UNDP positioned itself accordingly. After the restoration of democracy, UNDP made a serious effort to respond to the government's need for policy advice and capacity building in strategic institutions, but its approach was not sufficiently structured or coherent.

UNDP's comparative advantage in Nigeria has translated into a high degree of government trust and access to the most senior government representatives at both the federal and state level. At the beginning of the period under review, UNDP was appreciated as one of the few donors to remain in the country. After the restoration of democracy in 1999, the new government immediately requested UNDP to intervene in crucial and sensitive areas such as elections and conflict prevention. This type of support, combined with UNDP's involvement with promoting national dialogue on the country's human development agenda through the publication of the National Human Development Reports (NHDRs) and the 2010 Vision, a national consultative envisioning process, has reinforced its coordination and advocacy role.

With respect to strategic partnerships, UNDP has developed a number of useful linkages with government and non-governmental organizations and donors, but to be strategic, these initiatives need to be anchored within a coherent development policy framework. Partnerships with government, especially at the state level, often seem to have been driven by resource mobilisation imperatives rather than substantive development concerns. Furthermore, partnerships in grassroots projects tend to have been UNDP-dominated, without a planned UNDP exit strategy or enough local ownership to support scaling up and long-term sustainability.

UNDP's partnership initiatives with the private sector seem to be the most promising ones

developed during this period. Partnerships with the potential for replication have been developed through the National Partnership Forum (NPF) and the Human Development Fund and with Chevron Oil Company. UNDP's relationship with the National Partnership Forum and the Human Development Fund (HDF) stands out as a good example of strategic partnering and advocacy on human development and corporate responsibility. As of the end of 2001, the NPF was supported by sixty organizations (including major Nigerian and foreign corporations, oil companies and banks) in an initiative for the implementation of the Global Compact at the national level and for the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The HDF acts as the resource mobilisation instrument for the NPF and focuses on providing support to community development activities that benefit the poor or marginalised and vulnerable groups. Yet, while these partnership initiatives are commendable, they seem to suffer from the same problems of dispersion and weak supervision that affect the UNDP grassroots programmes.

A more recent UNDP agreement with Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (concluded at the end of 2002) also offers a promising example of collaboration with the private sector, in this case with one of the country's major oil companies. The agreement between UNDP and Chevron recognises the company's social obligation to the communities where it operates and UNDP's potential role in providing advisory services for Chevron's community development activities. For this initiative to be judged a success from the organization's point of view, UNDP must be seen to be playing a neutral, facilitative and development-oriented role and not simply that of an adjunct to a corporate public relations exercise.

While partnerships with other external development partners seem promising, they are at best uneven. The basis for UNDP partnerships with bilateral donors is the comparative advantage that stems from its neutrality. This has allowed UNDP to play a strategic and important role in areas where

political sensitivities prevail, such as (i) elections, (ii) conflict prevention and resolution, and (iii) the fight against corruption. For example, UNDP played a key role in coordinating and managing various donor inputs to the 2003 elections. It is also collaborating with NORAD on conflict prevention and has joined the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID) in supporting the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution's (IPCR) joint Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA). Collaboration with the other development partners in the United Nations system is weak, especially in the area of HIV/AIDS and micro projects, and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) has not provided a sufficiently robust framework for synergies and strategic focus of UN efforts.

With respect to challenges ahead, there are a number of areas that should be addressed if UNDP is to make the most of its comparative advantage. These include frequent changes in senior management, the failure to move to Abuja and the perception by some stakeholders that UNDP is overburdened with bureaucracy and more concerned with process than substance. UNDP's efforts at convening and coordination have also been hamstrung by the lack of a strong national donor coordinating body and a clear, overarching government policy framework. The National Planning Commission (NPC), which is responsible for donor coordination, is relatively weak, like many Nigerian institutions that are being revitalised after years of military rule; and may require time to truly take charge of Nigeria's development agenda setting and donor coordination efforts.

With respect to the strategic focus and relevance of UNDP's support, the ADR team concluded that the original orientation of CCF-1 to grassroots development activities was appropriate during the difficult years prior to 1999. It also recognised the equity considerations that have led to coverage in all 36 states and the FCT. However, this approach spread UNDP's activities too thin and reduced the capacity of the UNDP Country Office to provide adequate supervision and monitoring. This extensive

coverage of the whole country has also meant that hardly any of the interventions have achieved sufficient critical mass either to encourage scaling up or replication or to influence upstream policy formulation.

In assessing how well UNDP has performed or strategically positioned itself to play its role better in the future, there is a need to balance expectations against reality. Nigeria is a country with domestic resources that dwarf Official Development Assistance (ODA) by a considerable margin and this has implications on the role of external aid, including UNDP assistance. Nigeria also has a complex three tier federal system with 36 states and 774 local government authorities whose autonomy is guaranteed under the Constitution. Moreover, Nigeria's political history has resulted in a situation where any intervention will be hampered by the tensions that are often evident at every level of government. It is possible for UNDP to provide strategic support at both the federal and state level, but without a strong institutional and policy framework, and reforming champions from within to carry forward the development agenda, coordination and facilitation alone may not lead to concrete results. This suggests that the Nigeria government and UNDP will need to work together on a new or revitalised agenda.

The Nigerian development context seems to require a highly focused and agile role on the part of the UNDP, yet one that is multifaceted and flexible enough for the organization to remain strategic and relevant in view of the complex challenges and opportunities that the country presents. With the return of most donors to Nigeria following the democratic elections of 1999, UNDP may well need to focus on doing a few critical things, and doing them well. It will also be necessary to work with the government to establish a strong policy framework for promoting the human development agenda at the federal and state level.

II. Key Development Results

Overall, the findings of the Nigeria ADR show mixed results. In line with Executive

Board decision 97/25 that at least 80% the CCF-1 resources should be directed to the community level, UNDP was able to redirect its operations and initiate participatory poverty reduction interventions throughout the country aimed at supporting the poorest segments of society. Despite positive results registered at the community level, evidence from the ADR shows that in terms of sustainability and cumulative impact, UNDP's integrated community development programmes, with their wide geographical spread, have led to dispersion, overextension and limited impact. Development results have been largely dependent on institutional capacities and the dynamism and interest of state governments, and issues of ownership and sustainability of UNDP interventions will need to be addressed.

Advocacy, Partnerships and Policy Support
UNDP's most significant achievements have been in the area of advocacy for human development through the national human development reports of 1996, 1998, 2000-2001, Vision 2010, the National Partnership Forum and the Human Development Fund. The NPF and HDF have established an important dialogue forum that brings together government, the private sector and civil society organizations. The major innovation has involved corporate responsibility initiatives with Shell and Chevron, key oil companies in the Delta Region, around issues of conflict resolution, peace-building and resource mobilisation for community-based poverty reduction programmes.

Capacity Development
The main output of the original National Management of Socio-Economic Development Programme was the training of large numbers of statisticians in state and local government and the establishment of Sustainable Human Development (SHD) databanks in the Local Government Authorities (LGAs). This should help to improve the quality of statistics over time and have a positive impact on development planning and implementation at the state and local level.

Governance

Within the framework of the FGN's National Governance Programme (NPG), UNDP has provided capacity building for the National Assembly and support to civil society organizations, political parties and business groups for civic education, political participation and conflict management. UNDP also provided a Senior Governance Adviser to the NPG, who helped to guide and coordinate its initiatives. In addition, UNDP has collaborated with NORAD to support the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution. One other intervention in this area was to assist in setting up an Independent Policy Group (IPG) to provide direct advice to the President, an initiative that was undertaken in collaboration with the Soros Foundation and Africare.

Although it is too early to identify specific development outcomes, the ADR team was favourably impressed by these initiatives. The NPG provides an important framework for supporting governance interventions in Nigeria and strengthening democracy, even if it has not as yet adopted a very systematic approach to the governance challenges facing the country. The process of preparing the programme undoubtedly promoted consensus building among national and international partners around the importance of promoting good governance initiatives. Support for anti-corruption initiatives and civic education is a necessary condition for democracy and should continue to be actively promoted. The Independent Policy Group performs a useful function but it is not sufficiently institutionalised to have a long-term impact and its status will need to be reviewed during the second CCF period.

Poverty Reduction
(i) Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods
Since 1999, the political leadership has become increasingly concerned about the linkage between youth unemployment and civil unrest, and has stressed the importance of skills development and micro-credit schemes to tackle poverty. UNDP has established Skills Development Centres (SDCs) and, in parallel

with the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), has promoted micro-finance and micro-credit schemes in all 36 states and the FCT. The results of these initiatives have varied widely depending on local conditions, especially the degree of local ownership. Furthermore, given the size of Nigeria's population, these projects have had only a marginal impact on the unemployment problems of each state. In some states it was also noted that there was little synergy between the Skills Development Centres and the micro-credit programme. An important development, however, is that UNDP/UNCDF's micro-credit programme has encouraged the Central Bank to develop guidelines and a national policy framework for micro-credit. In the poverty reduction area, UNDP's interventions have been less significant. Their impact has been inevitably limited, given the fact that 70 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty threshold. As the analysis of key development results in subsequent sections of this report show, much more must be done to ensure that the outcomes of UNDP's interventions are durable and sustainable.

(ii) Social Development Programme
The Integrated Community Development Projects (ICDPs) provided the framework for the Social Development Programme. By 2002, some 750 ICDPs were bringing basic social services to deprived communities. These projects included water and sanitation, renovation of health facilities, training for community health workers, and functional literacy classes. These initiatives have undoubtedly been highly appreciated locally but suffer from the same issues of limited ownership, lack of replication and low impact on policy as the Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme.

Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development
This programme has not had sufficient resources and its interventions have largely been subsumed under the ICDPs or the

micro-credit projects. For example, grinding machines and drying areas have been financed for women's groups in more than twenty states. With regard to the environment, it must be recognised that, despite the magnitude of the environmental problems facing Nigeria, UNDP's attention to environmental issues has been marginal during the period under review.

Gender Mainstreaming

With respect to creating an enabling policy environment on gender issues, UNDP is undoubtedly making an impact and this is highly appreciated by its government counterparts, especially in the Ministry of Women in Development. Perhaps one of UNDP's most significant contributions has been advocacy for legislation against harmful practices to women, which has contributed to a number of legislative changes. Despite cultural differences among states in the area of female genital mutilation (FGM), the following has been achieved: (a) passage of a federal bill on FGM; (b) passage of FGM-related legislation and legislative changes in Enugu and Edo States; (c) prohibition of early marriage in Kebbi and Niger States; (d) legislation against withdrawal of girls from school (Kano, Borno Gombe and Bauchi States); (e) laws against trafficking in women and children (Edo and Zamfara States) and a bill before the Lower House of the National Assembly; (f) various state laws on sexual abuse and prostitution; (g) safe houses for victims of domestic and sexual violence in three states and the FCT; and (h) censorship of pornographic and violent films.

It is too early to expect full implementation of the UN global agreements on gender equality but these are encouraging steps. Mainstreaming gender sensitivity in structural and institutional terms is not something that can be accomplished through "quick fix" type interventions, and a long range view will be necessary. The UN system treats gender as a cross cutting theme and provides advocacy regarding global norms and practices, but the challenge is how to "domesticate" global norms in ways that are sensitive to local cultural and religious traditions.

LESSONS LEARNED AND EMERGING ISSUES

■ **Political will and an enabling policy environment are crucial for achieving results.** With hindsight it is always possible to see areas where UNDP might have made a more effective contribution through advocacy or policy formulation. However, it is also important to take into account the fact that there is a lack of an overarching poverty reduction and macro-economic policy framework in Nigeria, and the FGN policy influence over the states is relatively weak. It is the view of the ADR team that even if UNDP had intervened more strongly in this area, it is unlikely that it would have had a significant impact, given the reality of federal/state relations.

■ **Partnerships for resource mobilisation and delivery are critical ingredients for achieving development results, but partnerships need not be only about resource mobilization.** Partnerships can also promote UNDP's core messages on human rights and human development. Too much emphasis on resource mobilisation is not always compatible with coherent programming and effective delivery. UNDP's experience in Nigeria has shown that focusing on resource mobilisation and delivering UNDP resources within a given timeframe is not always compatible with 'making a difference'. Moreover, pressure from UNDP Headquarters to accelerate resource mobilisation can inadvertently lead to compromising of UNDP's goals.

■ **Micro level projects should be catalytic and linked to broader policy goals, and should establish clear exit and replication strategies in order to minimise the 'dependency syndrome' and promote ownership and sustainability.** Direct delivery of resources, and too strong a presence by UNDP in grassroots level projects

without substantive local commitment, can create the impression that UNDP is acting as a substitute for government. If UNDP is to work successfully at the grassroots level, projects and programmes need clear exit strategies and direct links to broader policy goals in order to generate long-term sustainable results. When there is a requirement that UNDP must support projects in all 36 states (as was the case under CCF-1), programme flexibility will be reduced and there will be different levels of quality and impact. It should be noted, however, that it takes longer to produce results at the macro or policy level (outcomes) than at the micro or downstream level (outputs), and thus modification is required in the definitions of outcomes in the Strategic Results Framework (SRF) to reflect this reality. External agencies tend to find it easier to intervene directly than to stand on the sidelines with advice and encouragement. This approach, however, is more suited to achieving outputs than outcomes and is a major reason why so many projects fail once the donor has withdrawn. This has certainly been the case with UNDP projects where issues of ownership, scaling up, replication and exit strategies do not seem to have been sufficiently incorporated at the design stage of the programmes. This has contributed to the phenomenon of 'micro-successes' in a sea of 'macro-failure', which can justifiably be said of many of the UNDP grassroots poverty reduction projects in Nigeria, especially as they are not linked to any macro-level policy framework.

■ **Learning and internalisation of new RBM concepts and innovations take time, and frequent changes at the corporate level can undermine the process.** Since 1999, UNDP has developed many concepts and corporate RBM tools and procedures. However, as is the case with most UNDP offices, the Country Office staff members seem somewhat overwhelmed by the frequent corporate changes and have not had the time to internalize them fully or to put them into practice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the high transaction costs and the lack of coherence created by undertaking a large number of widely dispersed projects, the ADR team recommends narrowing the focus of UNDP's activities and adopting a judicious mix of micro and macro-level interventions that draw on the organization's comparative advantage. To do this effectively, UNDP will need to identify good practices and seek local partners to scale up and consolidate the positive outcomes of its most successful pilots. UNDP has been a responsive and trusted partner to the government and its future challenge is to leverage the lessons learned from its projects, and its organizational assets, to influence policy and agenda setting at the federal and state level. Specific recommendations based on the findings are as follows:

■ **UNDP's role should be catalytic and not a substitute for government or local efforts.** Due to Nigeria's size and oil wealth, the total level of donor contributions to the country is insignificant in relation to GDP, and the level of donor influence over government policy is commensurately small. In this context, if UNDP is to make a difference, this must derive from the level of trust accorded to it by the government and from the optimal exploitation of its comparative advantage. UNDP should therefore seek to strengthen its advocacy and policy support for poverty reduction and human development and concentrate on strengthening the enabling policy environment to address the high levels of poverty in Nigeria. NHDRs should be complemented by the launch of State Human Development Reports (SHDRs) to broaden and deepen national dialogue on poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals.

■ **Narrow the focus and geographical spread.** UNDP should narrow its focus and geographical spread and sharpen the substantive elements of its support. The

ADR team supports the 2003-2007 CCF thematic focus on governance, poverty and HIV/AIDS but recommends that UNDP should not aim to support all three focus areas in all 36 states and the FCT. There should be some judicious winnowing out of ongoing activities at the state level.

■ **Deepen and strengthen support to consolidation of democracy.** UNDP support should deepen and continue to strengthen its support towards the consolidation of democracy, conflict prevention and anti-corruption initiatives. This support should build on the existing National Governance Programme (NGP) and the ongoing initiatives of other partners and focus on strengthening of key government institutions such as Parliament, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). The approach should be within a clear conceptual framework and not pursued on a purely ad hoc basis. Conflict prevention and promoting peace and stability remain major challenges for Nigeria. UNDP should, therefore, continue to support the government in improving peace and stability through the IPCR, an important new national institution which needs to be nurtured and substantially strengthened if it is to fulfill its role effectively. Similarly, support to the ICPC should be continued, but this should be results-driven and any initiative should be highly sensitive to the degree of political will behind anti-corruption measures. To strengthen Nigeria's democracy, UNDP should continue support to the Independent Policy Group and the National Planning Commission. Support to the IPG should focus on advocating the institutionalisation of its role as a think tank rather than as an ad hoc presidential advisory body. With respect to the NPC, UNDP should examine the political support for this institution and its potential to become effective, and should plan its approach accordingly.

■ **Accord priority to states as strategic entry points for upstream policy support.** Under Nigeria's federal system, the states are important entry points for upstream policy support. In Nigeria, the states enjoy considerable freedom of action in both policy formulation and project implementation and due to population size, can have an impact on relatively large numbers of people. Consequently, strategic and macro-level policy interventions by UNDP at the state level can be as important as those at the federal level, and should be accorded some priority.

■ **Build and expand partnerships with the private sector.** With regard to partnerships, resource mobilisation and operational modalities, UNDP should seek to expand opportunities for cost-sharing, including in collaboration with the private sector. The cost-sharing modality is not always consistent with maximum programme impact but in the case of Nigeria where domestic resources dwarf ODA by a wide margin, government and domestic private sector cost sharing can offer a positive way to expand UNDP's capacity to promote its human development agenda, and this should be actively encouraged.

■ **Build substantive capacity within the Country Office**. UNDP should build substantive capacity within the Country Office to meet Nigeria's development challenges and complexities. Every effort should be made to avoid the frequent changes of Resident Representative and the long gaps between the assignments of Resident Representatives that have weakened UNDP's leadership role during the past decade. With regard to the staffing of the Country Office, with the transition from the Government Counterpart Cash Contributions (GCCC) modality to cost sharing for the operational programmes in the states, cost sharing resources should be used to strengthen the number of programme (and possibly administrative) staff in the Country Office. In order to strengthen its coordination role, UNDP

should move immediately to Abuja. The absence of the Country Office from Abuja has undoubtedly weakened UNDP's leadership within the UN system and among donors.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The ADR team recognises that due to Nigeria's size and relatively complex administrative structures, it is not a place where one can expect "quick results." The evaluation team also recognizes the difficult political environment the CCF operated under. The ADR team's conclusion is that, while the picture is mixed, there have been some important contributions during the period under review and UNDP has definitely made a difference in Nigeria. Notable contributions include the awareness and policy dialogue engendered through advocacy using the NHDR series (1996, 1998, 2000/2001), the Vision 2010 process and the National Partnership Forum. UNDP's contributions to legislation barring harmful practices against women and establishing a regulatory framework for micro-credit are also important contributions in the policy arena. A contribution that could prove useful in addressing conflict has been the initiation of corporate responsibility initiatives with Shell and Chevron around issues of conflict resolution, peace building and resource mobilisation for community-based poverty reduction programmes. In the governance area, UNDP is also starting to provide capacity building for institutions that drive the development agenda.

Nigeria has considerable human and natural resources of its own. However, as the report has underlined, it is still possible for UNDP to carve out a niche and work on key human development issues if it focuses on areas where it has a clear comparative advantage, is selective in its choice of entry points, maintains flexibility and brings substantive capacities to meet the challenges.

A number of opportunities place UNDP at an advantage as it begins the implementation of the 2003-2007 country cooperation framework. UNDP has high-level access to the government at the federal, state and local government level. It has also been able to mobilise sizeable additional resources from both the federal and state governments and the private sector. The challenge is to make the most of these assets and leverage them to influence policy and agenda setting at both the federal and state level. Even more important, it should aim at doing a few things and doing them well.

The re-election of the government in April 2003, the launching of the 2003-2007 CCF and the move to Abuja taken together offer UNDP an opportunity to reassess where it can make a real difference.Even though UNDP's 'development effectiveness' depends to a large extent on the political will of the Nigerian government, UNDP's 'organizational effectiveness' could be significantly improved through a more strategic and selective approach to programming and stronger collaboration between UNDP Headquarters and the country office.

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1 Introduction

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide an overall assessment of the key development results achieved through UNDP support and in collaboration with other key development partners from 1997-2003. It seeks to capture and demonstrate the added value of UNDP's contributions to Nigeria's development priorities, either directly or in partnership with other organizations, and to identify lessons that can guide current and future UNDP programming and the strategic choices the organization must take to enhance its development effectiveness at the country level. ADRs also support the UNDP Administrator's substantive accountability to the Executive Board.

The Nigeria ADR principally covers the 1997-2002 Country Cooperation Framework (CCF-1), but it also takes into account, as appropriate, both the results of earlier country programmes and the 2003-2007 CCF.

As the continent's most populous country, Nigeria is of strategic importance both to Africa and to UNDP and it presents considerable development challenges and opportunities. A thriving and stable Nigeria could easily become a rallying point for regional and continental economic integration efforts within the Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS) and the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The Nigeria ADR seeks to assess UNDP's contributions and how it has strategically positioned itself to respond to national development priorities.

The purpose is to determine how the organization can make a difference in such a populous and relatively well-endowed country. The ADR also aims to provide guidance for the programming and implementation of UNDP's 2003-2007 CCF. In addition, it is intended to serve as a basis for dialogue between UNDP and the government and other development partners on the strategic choices to be made to strengthen support for human development in Nigeria as the country consolidates its transition to democracy.

RATIONALE FOR THE EVALUATION

In line with UNDP's results-based management (RBM) orientation, the Nigeria ADR focuses on outcomes and examines both achievements and constraints. It addresses in particular the issues of enabling policy environments, country ownership, sustainability and capacity development as all these factors ultimately determine the development effectiveness and long-term impact of development interventions at the country level. The Terms of Reference (TORs) and methodology used are detailed below and in Annex 1.

The evaluation of UNDP support to Nigeria at this juncture is significant for various reasons. First, the timing is extremely opportune. In May 1999, after 16 years of military rule, a new phase began in Nigeria's political history when a democratically elected government was installed. On 19 April 2003, a second round of democratic elections returned the incumbent President to office and this coincided with the beginning of UNDP's new 2003-2007 CCF. The return to democracy has created an opportunity for enhanced dialogue with the government and offers both a chance to review the community focus of UNDP's earlier programmes and to identify what real value-added UNDP can bring to Nigeria.

Second, although Nigeria is relatively rich in natural resources, it has yet to fulfill its economic and human development potential.

Its size, wealth and diversity generate high expectations but it remains "a rich country with poor people."[3] Its oil wealth and considerable agricultural potential have not translated into better living conditions for most of its people. Over two thirds of the population lives on less than US $1 per day. Furthermore, the number of people living in poverty has doubled in recent years and, according to most recent economic and social indicators, most Nigerians seem to be worse off than they were in the 1970s.

Third, from a development perspective, Nigeria offers a chance to draw some interesting lessons. At only 0.4 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), ODA is of relatively little financial significance in Nigeria compared with most other countries in Africa, which are extremely aid-dependent. Its rich resource base offers the potential for rapid development but has also contributed to inequalities in terms of income distribution and to social exclusion. The country is therefore a good place to test some of the variables that are considered to be 'key drivers of development', including an enabling policy environment, country ownership and capacity development, and for gauging how best to deliver pro-poor programmes in a multi-tiered federal system.

METHODOLOGY

In accordance with UNDP's results-based management approach, the ADR focuses primarily on any analysis of development outcomes to which UNDP has contributed rather than on specific programme or project outputs. The mix of evaluation methods adopted by the team took into account the UNDP Evaluation Office's ADR Guidelines, which advocate the "triangulation" of information gathered, through cross-referencing of sources, corroboration and validation of the perceptions and views of stakeholders against documentary evidence, and on-site project visits.

The evaluation was carried out in four phases: desk research, an exploratory mission to Nigeria,

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3.   See Nigeria's National Human Development Report, 1996

in-depth studies and a country evaluation mission. During the first phase, the Evaluation Office undertook a comprehensive desk study to review background information and data on Nigeria and conduct a thorough mapping and trend analysis of the entire UNDP portfolio from 1992-2003.

This was followed by an exploratory mission to Nigeria to lay the groundwork for the ADR by identifying key areas for in-depth investigation. Based on initial stakeholder views, the ADR team decided to conduct in-depth studies on poverty and governance, two critical areas where UNDP had concentrated most of its resources during the period under review. These studies were undertaken by two Nigerian research centers, the Institute for Governance and Social Research and the Development Policy Centre, respectively. They form an integral part of the main evaluation and their findings have been incorporated into this report.

The main evaluation mission was conducted over a period of 3 weeks and employed various methodologies, including desk reviews of key background and policy documents, individual and focus group interviews, stakeholder meetings, questionnaires and selected project site visits. (See Annex 2 for the full list of documents consulted.)

The ADR team interviewed UNDP Country Office staff, both at the beginning and end of the mission. These interviews helped to provide crucial information on UNDP programmes, clarify expectations, and validate stakeholder views. The team also interviewed key UNDP Headquarters units and senior managers on corporate priorities and expectations regarding UNDP's role in Nigeria. During the three weeks spent in Nigeria, the team visited several UNDP projects and interviewed and administered questionnaires to a large number of people in the Federal Territory Capital of Abuja, Lagos State, Nassarawa, Akwa Ibom and Kano States. Those interviewed included federal, state and local government officials, traditional authorities and stakeholders in target communities, research institutions,

non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, the private sector, United Nations agencies, Bretton Woods Institutions, regional multilateral banks, and bilateral donors. (See Annex 3 for a list of key persons met.)

OVERVIEW OF UNDP'S PROGRAMME: 1997-2003

The 1997-2002 CCF, in essence, carried over most of the nine core national programmes that had been initiated during the Fourth Country Programme (1992-1996) and it reflected the difficult political and social situation that obtained in the country at the time. Against the backdrop of a worsening political and economic climate, the UNDP Executive Board approved Nigeria's CCF-1 on the condition that at least 80% of programme resources must directly benefit the poorest sections of the population and deliver their benefits at the grassroots level. (See Box 1). The CCF-1 had a combined resource allocation of US $76.8 million which included a carry-over of US $30.4 million from the previous cycle and US $97,000 government cost sharing (Box 2). Its overriding objective was poverty reduction and there were four thematic areas of concentration:

a) National Management of Socio-Economic Development and policy support for Sustainable Human Development (SHD);

b) Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods;

BOX 1: UNDP EXECUTIVE BOARD DECISION 97/25

Decision 97/25 of 19 September 1997, of the Executive Board approved the first cooperation framework for Nigeria (DP/CCF/NIR/1) with the provision that the UNDP Administrator apply the following guidelines:

(a) The programme must directly benefit the poorest sections of the population and deliver their benefits at grassroots level;

(b) The components of the programme must be prepared with the full participation of the intended beneficiaries, in particular from the poorest sections of the community, and implemented through organizations of civil society, including national and international non-governmental organizations;

(c) The programme should be developed with clear monitoring components to enable the Administrator to report back to the Executive Board at its third regular session in 1998 on the content of the programme and to conduct regular evaluations of the programme at not less than annual intervals." (Executive Board of the United Nations Programme and the United Nations Population Fund, Decisions adopted by the Executive Board during 1997, DP/1998/2, 8 October, 1997.)

TABLE 1. UNDP STRATEGIC AREAS OF SUPPORT (SAS) AND INTENDED OUTCOMES IN NIGERIA, 1999-2003				
Governance	**Policy**	**Environment**	**Gender**	**UNDP Support to UN**
■ Globalisation ■ Policy Dialogue ■ Parliamentary capacity ■ Electoral processes ■ Decentralisation policies	Policies developed/ implemented: ■ HIV/AIDS ■ Access to assets ■ Access to social services	■ Policy/ regulatory framework ■ Monitoring sustainability ■ Global conventions	National action plans	Coordi-nation

Source: UNDP SRF 1999-2003

FIGURE 1: BUDGET SUMMARY FOR NIGERIA BY GOAL, 1999-2002

Governance – 43%
Other – 5%
Gender – 1%
Special development situations – 1%
Environment – 9%
Poverty reduction – 41%

Source: UNDP SRF/ROAR 1999-2003

c) Social Development;
d) Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development.

Table 1 summarises the CCF's Strategic Areas of Support (SAS) and intended outcomes while Figure 1 provides the breakdown of resource allocation across the themes.

NATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AND POLICY SUPPORT FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (NMSED)

The NMSED's stated overall goal, which is clustered under the governance Strategic Area of Support within the Strategic Results Framework (SRF), is the creation of "enabling policies and institutional strengthening for

BOX 2: OVERVIEW OF CCF RESOURCES (1997-2002)(IN THOUSANDS OF US$)		
IPF CARRYOVER	=	**$30,354**
TRAC Resources (including AOS savings)	=	**$41,755**
Montreal Protocol	=	**$830**
RMT	=	**$76 797**

the achievement of the national objective of poverty reduction". This is to be achieved through capacity development for development planning, good governance, the production of data and information and sound management of the development processes. Support in this area (which received 22.2% of the 1997-2002 CCF resources) focused on the following objectives: (i) improving national development planning and decision-making at all levels, (ii) strengthening the national institutional capacity to formulate policies and strategies on social, economic, financial and debt management issues and (iii) supporting the government's attempts to improve its database for planning, monitoring and evaluation at all levels. Management and public sector capacity development as well as strengthening the capacity of national institutions to underpin the government's transition to democratic rule and good governance were also key elements of the NMSED. At the beginning of the 1997-2002 CCF the governance component was limited to supporting statistical offices but after 1999 there was a shift to supporting government efforts (a) to reinforce the links between good policies, leadership and institutions, (b) to promote public service reform, (c) to build partnerships with civil society and (d) to strengthen the capacities of NGOs and CBOs. This orientation has been adopted more vigorously in the 2003-2007 CCF.

JOB CREATION AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

The stated overall goal of this programme (which falls under the Poverty Reduction SRF theme) is to contribute to Nigeria's efforts to

create jobs and sustainable livelihoods in rural and urban communities through the "expansion of opportunities for enterprise creation and development, by improving access of micro and small enterprises/entrepreneurs to improved skills, micro finance and ownership of productive assets and empowering the poor at community level." The Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods programme was allocated 34.5% of CCF resources. The strategic objectives were to establish a market-oriented economy and to open trade and investment opportunities with the aim of reducing poverty. Specific objectives were job creation, access to credit for market operators and penetration of export markets.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Social Development programme, whose stated goal is "to contribute to the reduction of poverty through the social and economic emancipation of the poor men, women and the disadvantaged segments of the population," carried over a number of projects and initiatives that had been started during the fourth and, in some cases, even the third Country Programmes (1987-1991 and 1992-1996 respectively). This programme, which is now grouped under the poverty reduction SRF theme, received 19.8% of CCF resources. Using an integrated community development approach, support was channelled through the following four sub-programme areas:

- Functional Mass Literacy in response to the government plan to increase the adult functional literacy rate in the country from 60 percent to 90 percent by 2010. UNDP supported non-formal and adult functional education targeted at girls, women, farmers, informal sector operators and other community members.
- Health support for improved productivity through: (i) improving the nutritional status of the people, (ii) eradicating the guinea worm, (iii) reducing diarrhoea, (iv) helping to rehabilitate the disabled, and (v) preventing and controlling the spread of HIV/AIDS.
- Empowerment of women so that they can play a greater role in the development process.

- Harmonised UN programming for poverty reduction. This involved joint programming with other UN agencies in some of the communities to support the development of model poverty-reduction projects.

SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (SAERD)

The overall goal of the SAERD programme, which received 23.5% of the CCF resources, was "to assist the insecure and disadvantaged rural poor, especially women, increase their productivity, and improve their employment opportunities, income and food security through participatory environmentally friendly rural development." As agriculture is the mainstay of 60% of the rural-based population, this programme aimed to contribute to poverty reduction by (a) eliminating post-harvest food losses, (b) strengthening agricultural extension services, (c) adopting appropriate methods and technology, (d) establishing small irrigation development schemes, (e) improving input supply services and credit to farmers, and (f) promoting the role of the private sector. The programme also had a component on natural resources and soil conservation which included projects for combating drought and desertification, water resources management and the provision of alternative/sustainable energy.

THE SECOND COUNTRY COOPERATION FRAMEWORK – 2003–2007

The second CCF is more firmly grounded within UNDP's results-based management strategic results framework (SFR) and draws its inspiration from the priority themes and cooperation strategy of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and of Nigeria's draft National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), its draft Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and, through the NAPEP, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The second CCF has a narrower and more strategic focus

than the first one and has identified only three major thematic areas. With a core resource allocation of US $62.8 million, it covers the following themes: (a) Governance and Human Rights, (b) Poverty Eradication and (c) HIV/ AIDS. Information and Communication Technology and gender are cross cutting themes.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

UNDP's programme implementation strategy encompassed a two-pronged approach: (a) policy support to assist in creating an enabling environ-ment and building capacity for human-centred development through improved macro-economic strategies and policy frameworks and instruments and (b) programme support which would seek to direct UNDP activities towards the state and community levels in the areas of job creation and sustainable livelihoods, social development, and sustainable agriculture and rural development.

Annexes 4 and 5 provide a matrix of the objectives and strategic results areas (outputs and outcomes) that the 1997-2002 and the 2003-2007 CCFs have sought to address. Annex 5 provides a map of the SRF and the intended development results for UNDP's programmes in Nigeria for the period 1997-2003 and articulates the intended outcomes and results for the poverty, governance, environment and gender themes across the 1997-2002 and 2003-2007 CCFs and the UNDAF. This annex also shows the alignment of the intended results with the UNDAF. It should be noted that the SRF as a RBM tool was adopted by UNDP only in 1999. As has been the case with most other country offices, while UNDP grouped the four thematic programme areas of the 1997-2002 CCF under specific outputs and outcomes within the four programme areas, this was by and large a 'retrofitting' exercise to meet corporate imperatives. The 100 plus projects were retroactively clustered around themes in line with SFR intended outcomes. This means that while the country evaluation is concerned with outcome level results, the analysis has had to go beyond the stated SFR outcomes to an analysis of project level outputs.

All the CCF programmes were nationally executed. UNDP operated programmes in all 36 states and in FCT Abuja and sought to further decentralise the implementation and management of the programme to the state and local government level and communities, including villages. At the federal level, the National Planning Commission (NPC) was the counterpart agency that approved and coordinated UNDP's programmes and oversaw the CCF through the National Programme Coordinating Commission (NPCC).

The same structure was replicated at all 36 states. UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with those states which undertook to provide a specific percentage of the government cash counterpart contributions (GCCC) for the agreed programmes. In the interest of equity, each of the states and the FCT received 80 million Naira from 1997-2002 CCF resources and had programmes in each of the four thematic focus areas. State Planning Commissions (SPCs) interfaced with UNDP and implemented the programmes through State Planning Coordinating Commissions (SPCCs). To bring in a community participatory approach, Stakeholder Boards were set up which included the line ministries involved, community representatives and members of civil society.

To undertake monitoring of the programmes, UNDP staffed the Monitoring and Evaluation Units within the SPCCs with State Programme Monitoring Advisors (SPMAs). These SPMAs and other Unit staff are seconded from the government and UNDP pays for the former. There is no doubt that these seemingly parallel structures are the lifeline of UNDP's programmes at the state and local level without which coverage in every state would not be possible. However, this approach also raises the issue of administrative overheads and institutionalising national execution as well as questions of ownership and sustainability. All the four thematic focus areas incorporated elements of the Integrated Community Development Programme's micro-credit schemes and Skills Development Centres (SDCs).

According to UNDP records, the rule of thumb was to allocate 50% of earmarked resources to rural communities, 30% to state level poverty reduction and policy dialogue and 20% to federal level activities focusing on upstream policy formulation. These programmes brought UNDP to the grassroots level but at the same time created top heavy and somewhat unwieldy implementation arrangements. This has earned UNDP the reputation of being "too bureaucratic", cumbersome and process oriented even while it was viewed as a trusted partner and noted in some circles, as a "household name." The ADR examines some of these issues in the next chapters.

This introductory chapter has summarised the rationale of the evaluation and the methodology used and provided an overview of UNDP's programmes in Nigeria between 1997-2003. Chapter 2 examines Nigeria's development context and some of the country's most pressing challenges. Chapter 3 assesses UNDP's strategic positioning and the relevance of its programmes, while Chapter 4 examines the development results achieved and UNDP's contribution to the country's development priorities. Chapter 5 summarises the lessons and recommendations that may be derived from UNDP's experience during the period under review and concludes with some suggestions for future directions.

Photo: Galbe.com

2 Nigeria's development context

KEY DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES FACING NIGERIA

This chapter provides a brief overview of Nigeria's key development challenges in order to provide a basis for assessing UNDP's responses and contributions to the country's development priorities during this period.

Nigeria is a relatively large country of considerable wealth. It has a rich natural resource endowment and relatively high levels of human and social capital. With an area of 923,773 sq km and estimated population of 120 million people,[4] Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and is home to some 250 ethnic groups. Its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $50 billion makes the country one of sub-Saharan Africa's largest economies.

Notwithstanding its wealth and considerable economic potential, Nigeria has had a chequered political history and has not as yet succeeded in effectively translating its potential into economic growth, human development and overall social transformation. Nigeria's colonial legacy and subsequent political instability have undermined its development. In the 43 years since

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4. Estimates of Nigeria's population tend to vary depending on the source. The figure of 120 million is from UNDP, United Nations and World Bank figures.

Size	923,773sq km
Population(2000 est)	113.9million
HDI Rank (2002)	148
Life Expectancy at Birth (2000)	51.7 years
Adult Literacy Rate (age 15 and above) (2000)	63.9%
GDP Per Capita (2000 in PPP US$)	896.00
GDI Rank (2000)	124
Real GDP Growth Rate (2001 est)	3.5%
HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate (2001)	5.8%

Source: UNDP SRF/ROAR 1999-2003

FIGURE 2: REAL GDP GROWTH, 1997-2002

Source: UNDP SRF/ROAR 1999-2003

independence, Nigeria has endured civil war and frequent military coups and has had only three short periods of civilian government. Prolonged military rule, spanning altogether 28 years out of Nigeria's four decades of independence, has led to the repeated supplanting of constitutional provisions by military decrees. However, the return to democracy on 29 May 1999 ushered in a new era which holds great promise for the future.

ECONOMIC TRENDS

Despite having the seventh largest oil and gas reserves in the world and being the world's 6th largest exporter of crude oil, Nigeria's GDP per capita annual growth rate in real terms has been negative or zero for more than two decades (see Figure 2). Current GDP per capita, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) is US $896, which is significantly lower than the 1977 figure of US $1,160. In addition, there are large income disparities between rich and poor, and between men and women. For example, the poorest 10% of the population accounts for a mere 1.6% share of national income while the richest 10% accounts for 40.8%. Nigeria is ranked low on the Human Development Index (HDI)[5] and the Nigeria 2000/2001 National Human Development Report (NHDR) also reveals that there are significant regional disparities. Compared to other countries of similar size but without its rich natural resource endowment, Nigeria's economic performance and human development have not matched its potential.

Nigeria displays many characteristics of a dual economy, with a modern sector dominated by oil overlaid on a traditional agricultural and trading economy. The dominance of oil and the government's dependency on oil resources have all but crowded out productive economic activity in other sectors, especially agriculture from which more than 70% of the population derives its livelihood. While agriculture employs over 70% of the active labour force and accounts for about 40% of GDP, the oil sector employs only 5% of Nigerians but accounts for over 90% of Nigeria's foreign exchange and 80% of the federal government's revenues.

The economic situation is also affected by a serious debt burden. In 1998, external debt stood at US $22.8 billion with an annual debt service of about US $4 billion per annum, or 42% of exports. Many observers also attribute the weak state of the economy to the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) during the 1990s, which led to the undermining of Nigeria's agricultural and industrial sectors.[6] With regard to environmental resources, Nigeria confronts severe problems such as land degradation, deforestation, desertification, erosion and pollution. At present cutting rates, Nigeria's forests will disappear by 2020, while large-scale destruction of the ecosystem in the Niger Delta area has a significant effect on human and marine life.

5. See Nigeria's National Human Development Report, 1996, 1998 and 2000/2001.
6. See, for example, National Human Development Report, 2000/2001.

POVERTY AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

As the data in Box 1 shows, the level of poverty has increased significantly over the last decade. In 1992, 42.7% of the population fell below the official poverty line, compared to 70.2% in 2000. Moreover, 90.8% of the population lives on less than $2 a day. On the Human Development Index, Nigeria is ranked 148 out of 173 countries. This reflects the lack of basic social services available in the country. Less than 10% of annual public expenditures is allocated to health and education; and, while as little as 0.8% of public expenditure as a percentage of GDP is used on health, more than three times that amount is used to service Nigeria's intractable external debt. Adult literacy remains low at 63.9% (55.7% of adult females as compared to 72.4% of adult males). Life expectancy was 53 years in 1991 but by 2000 it had dropped to 51.7. There has also been an increase in childhood mortality during the last decade from 91 deaths/1000 in 1990 to 105/1000 in 1999. 57% of the Nigerian people have access to improved water sources, and 63% have adequate sanitation facilities.

The above situation is compounded by the 5.8% HIV/AIDS infection rate (8.1% among the 20-24 age group). While there are marked regional variations in the infection rates (Benue state, the worst affected has 13.5% of the population affected while Jigawa has only 1.8%) it is expected that as many as 10-15 million people will be infected by 2010.

With regard to gender equality, women face many obstacles. Nigeria's gender-related development index (GDI) ranking is 124 out of 146 countries. In general, women have limited access to education, employment, credit and agricultural land. In 2000, women filled only 5% of government ministerial posts. Long-standing gender-discriminatory practices and harmful traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation, still abound.

CHALLENGES OF
CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

Prior to 1999, years of military rule, characterized by neglect of the social sector and by declining economic performance, had seriously eroded the political and social fabric of Nigeria and resulted in the near collapse of the economy and social infrastructure. The emergency situation precipitated by the annulment of the 1993 elections and another military take over only served to exacerbate the situation and to deepen human poverty among the majority of Nigerians. Virtually all the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries suspended their ODA during this period, leaving UNDP and other United Nations (UN) agencies as the sole external development actors in the country. By 1998, Nigeria's HDI standing had plummeted to an all time low. Per capita income fell to less than US $3 per day and about 70 % of the population was living below the poverty line.

Since May 1999, when Nigeria installed its first elected government after 16 years of uninterrupted military rule, there have been significant improvements in human rights and individual freedoms. However, Nigeria's nascent democracy is by no means assured and much needs to be done to consolidate the transition and build a strong culture of open and accountable government at all levels. As the 2001 UNDP HDR aptly notes: "Although Nigeria's human development freedom index has improved considerably since 1999, the effort of building sustainable democracy from the ashes of a brutal past requires healing of deep wounds, taming of repressive institutions, changing attitudes born of conflict and creating a culture of consensus. And all these take time and require persistence." (Nigerian Human Development Report 2000/2001 Millennium Edition, UNDP, Lagos, 2001.)

There are many institutional complexities in managing Nigeria's large federation of states. These include: tensions arising out of the legacy of unitary and authoritarian military rule; the ongoing search for balance among

the new institutions, especially between the executive and legislative branches; and the need to establish an independent judiciary and anti-corruption bodies. The civil service needs rejuvenation and professionalisation after years of political mismanagement. Nigeria also needs to build credible civil society institutions that will be in a position to push the democratic agenda and to play a role as public advocates and government watchdogs. Presently, there is also fragmentation with respect to national policy-making functions and an apparent lack of a common national development vision and comprehensive policy framework. Nigeria also needs to vitalise its private sector and to win foreign investor confidence by, among other things, reforming the legal and regulatory framework in order to create a more predictable and competitive business environment.

MANAGING ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

As with any ethnically and religiously diverse country, Nigeria is faced with the challenges of nation-building and upholding the social and political cohesion of the state. While the need for a federal constitution is generally accepted, many Nigerians tend to feel a stronger identification with their ethnic group and home state than with Nigeria as a whole. There are tensions over the number of states (which have continued to increase over time), and over their autonomy in such matters as the introduction of Sharia law and over the distribution of federal funds to the states.

To enhance its viability, the democratic system must be seen to work for the benefit of the people of Nigeria both in political and in socio-economic terms. Nigeria, however, has had little experience in making democratic institutions work or in promoting civil society, which is a necessary component of any functioning democracy. Military rule has tended to strengthen the influence of the federal government at the expense of the states but, with the restoration of democracy, the states enjoy considerable freedom of action. Since 1999, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) has found it relatively difficult

to obtain consensus on nationwide policies or to promote them throughout the country. Operational activities for development or poverty alleviation are largely undertaken at the state level, a factor no donor can ignore.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN PRACTICE

The new constitution adopted in 1999 guaranteed the rule of law and established a three-tiered autonomous federal system of government comprised of 36 states plus the Abuja Federal Capital Territory and 774 Local Government Authorities.

This federalism, combined with Nigeria's wealth and size, means that the country functions in a very different way from other countries. First, as 90% of the federal government's revenue comes from oil, it is not obliged to make a major effort to raise direct or even indirect taxes from the population. As a result, it can avoid making the deals and compromises that are necessary in other countries if citizens are to be persuaded to contribute to government revenues. Second, although the federal constitution grants power to the 36 states, the federal/state relationship is dominated by the fact that virtually all revenue is centrally generated and distributed to the states in accordance with an agreed formula. The current revenue sharing formula is as follows: federal government 48%; state governments 24%; and local government authorities 20%. Consequently, states have considerable political but little economic power since they have virtually no local revenue base and are dependent on the FGN for resources. On the other hand, federal influence over the states is limited by the fact that federal budgetary allocations are made in accordance with a pre-determined formula and not on a discretionary basis.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Since coming into power in 1999, the present Nigerian government has adopted a number of policies and strategies to address the country's

development challenges. The government's Economic Policy for 1999-2003 aimed at raising the living standards of the people, creating employment opportunities and making Nigeria an important regional and global economic player. To address poverty, the government has launched a National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) is in the pipeline. A dialogue and partnership forum on poverty eradication has also been initiated with donors. An HIV/AIDS Emergency Action Plan (HEAP) and a National Action Committee on AIDS (NACA) have been instituted as a response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.[7]

Many serious problems remain to be tackled if Nigeria is to improve the standards of living of all its citizens. These include the need for economic growth and economic diversification, particularly the expansion of the non-oil sectors of the economy and job creation, a reduction of both human and income poverty and a reduction in income inequality, a plan to combat rising HIV/AIDS infection rates, diffusion of religious-ethnic tensions and consolidation of the democratic system of governance.

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7. Economic Policy, Government of Nigeria, 1999

3 Strategic positioning and relevance of UNDP programmes

This chapter analyses UNDP's programmes undertaken between 1997-2003 with a view to determining the overall responsiveness and relevance of these interventions to Nigeria's human development priorities. The focus is on how UNDP strategically positioned itself to respond to these priorities and emerging issues and leveraged its resources and comparative advantage to build strategic partnerships with the government and other development partners to support the country's development agenda. The key parameters this evaluation used to assess strategic positioning and relevance of UNDP support and its overall contributions to development outcomes were:

■ **Relevance,** to gauge whether the most strategic opportunities for assistance were tapped effectively;

■ **Responsiveness,** to review retrospectively the flexibility and timing of UNDP engagement in what turned out to be major development priorities and turning points in the country;

■ **Linkages and partnerships,** to determine the extent to which UNDP was able to forge productive and strategic relationships to achieve results with both national and international development partners within the wider framework of development cooperation in the country.

Source: "People's Vision of Development – 2010," UNDP, Lagos, Nigeria, 2000

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF UNDP SUPPORT

The 1997-2002 CCF was drafted in less than ideal conditions. The military dictatorship created a difficult policy environment, and UNDP was one of the only development actors to remain in Nigeria during that time. As has been noted, the UNDP Executive Board gave instructions that 80 percent of the programme resources be directed towards grassroots activities, which in practical terms meant that UNDP mainly initiated operational projects at the level of the states or the local government authorities. By 1999, UNDP had a commitment to support projects in all thirty-six states and in the FCT. The restoration of democracy in 1999 meant a sudden shift in the federal government's policies and priorities. The new government clearly wanted UNDP to focus more on policy support, especially in the governance arena. However, at that time, many of the UNDP-supported grassroots projects at the state and local levels were just becoming operational and these absorbed a large proportion of UNDP's resources and staff time. UNDP had also made substantial financial commitments to states that had already allocated cash counterpart contributions (GCCC) to UNDP-supported projects, making it difficult for the organization to immediately move upstream in line with the new government's policy direction. Although there was no policy blue print, as such, the incoming government underlined economic growth, poverty reduction, provision of basic social services and reducing unemployment as its core priorities. The most pressing challenges facing the new government were to restore trust and confidence in government and to revitalise the economy. The Economic Policy of 1999-2003 identified a number of targets related to achieving higher economic growth rates and lower inflation, increased employment and access to education, safe water and electricity for a larger percentage of the population. While the change in government presented a considerable challenge to UNDP, especially given the inflexibility of its programming cycles, it also created opportunities for making strategic shifts and building networks with a broad range of new development constituencies, especially within the pro-democracy groups and the democratically elected government. UNDP increased efforts to play a role in advocacy, policy advice and in networking both with national stakeholders and with returning members of the international donor community, and supported the following initiatives:

- Financing a Macro-Economic Adviser in the Vice President's Economic Policy Coordination Committee;

- Partnering with the Soros Foundation and Africare to support the Independent Policy Group (IPG), an advisory body to the President;

- Supporting the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD);

- Supporting the HIV/AIDS Emergency Action Plan (HEAP).

In addition, a UNDP study entitled 'Peoples Vision of Development – 2010' that was undertaken in 2000 at the grassroots level across all zones and states articulated some of the country's key development priorities as seen by the general public. (See Box 4.)

RELEVANCE TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

Support to Poverty Reduction

Since the restoration of democracy, the Federal Government of Nigeria has revived or created several new institutions aimed at strengthening the federal policy framework for combating poverty. The most prominent of these is the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). In addition, within the framework of the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative, the federal government has set up a National Forum on the PRSP process and adopted an interim PRSP. The preparation of a fully-fledged PRSP is under way. While UNDP anti-poverty programmes are fully consistent with the PRSP, the World Bank has clearly been the lead agency and UNDP has not been substantively involved in the PRSP policy formulation process.

Nigeria has not developed a national strategic plan for meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but the goals and targets set in the National Poverty Eradication Programme are aligned with the human development goals of the MDGs. The UNDP poverty programmes have strong links with the NAPEP, which targets income, food, shelter, employment, water supply, health and transport, education, gender development and HIV/AIDS.

Nigeria's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper targets the informal sector and capacity development. UNDP programmes have addressed skills enhancement in collaboration with the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) which coordinates the national skills acquisition programme, and has been the main implementing agency of the UNDP-supported Skills Development Centres (SDCs). The skills acquisition programme is also closely aligned with UNDP's job creation and sustainable livelihoods programmes, especially the micro-start and micro-credit portfolios. The same is true of UNDP's Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development programme, whose goals coincide with

those of various Nigerian institutions, including the Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB), the Community Banks, the Agricultural Development Programmes (ADP), the Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit (FACU), the National Land Development Agency (NALDA) and the River Basin Development Authority (RBDA) which all aim at improving sustainable agriculture in Nigeria.

UNDP's Social Development Programme, which places emphasis on mass education and adult literacy, is well-aligned with the national development priorities, especially the government's Universal Basic Education programme and the National Commission for Mass Literacy. In addition, UNDP's support to the National Action Committee on HIV/AIDS (NACA) and the HIV/AIDS activities of the Federal Ministry of Health are well aligned with the country's HEAP and have strong links with the programmes of various government agencies.

Judging from the foregoing, at the institutional level, UNDP's programmes have strong links with the public sector institutions charged with poverty reduction in Nigeria. Nonetheless, while this is impressive, the ADR team's view is that, in some cases, the linkages were more of form than of substance. For example, the synergies between UNDP's thematic focal areas and the activities of NEPAD or the MDGs appear to be weak. Perhaps the major obstacle to developing more substantive policy level and operational links is that the government itself has tended to approach poverty reduction from what a number of stakeholders have termed a "fire-fighting" approach.

Since Nigeria lacks a comprehensive, targeted overarching policy framework for addressing and monitoring poverty reduction, it would be useful to place the MDGs at the center of a national poverty reduction strategy, so there would be clear targets and benchmarks and a national rallying point around which domestic and international development partners could direct their efforts.

Support to Governance

There is strong evidence to suggest that under the circumstances of the military dictatorship before 1998, it was neither possible nor easy for the first CCF to address issues of governance directly. Governance was indirectly addressed through capacity building in the federal and state statistical offices, and advocacy through the National Human Development Reports. After 1999, however, UNDP moved quickly to meet the federal government's new requirements in this area. Specific measures included the following:

- Financing a National Governance Adviser to support and advise the National Planning Commission (NPC);
- Assistance to the preparation of the National Programme on Governance which was inaugurated on 23 October 2000;
- Initial support to the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission;
- Support to the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR);
- Support to capacity building for civic education, including voter education. (See Annexes 4 and 5.)

As with its support in the poverty arena, UNDP has linkages with an impressive array of national institutions, especially at the local level. At the upstream level, UNDP also has strong linkages to NEPAP and the National Planning Commission as well as to the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING AND RESPONSIVENESS TO EMERGING PRIORITIES

The Executive Board's requirement that the first CCF should concentrate at the grassroots level may have led to compromises with respect to focusing on the "big picture." While the nine national programmes from the Fourth Country Programme (1992-1996) were indeed consolidated into four areas of concentration and CCF-1 did shift its focus to the community level, there was probably too much stress on participatory processes and micro level project outputs without due attention to facilitating synergies among the four programmes and to developing a clear strategy on how these grassroots interventions would contribute to macro level results. Overall, UNDP's grassroots programmes have been spread too thin and this may have jeopardised the possibility of attaining the requisite depth and concentration necessary for realising substantive, replicable and sustainable development results. This factor may also have led to a concentration on monitoring procedures and processes rather than development results.

The projects also suffered from a lack of a coherent and comprehensive policy framework at the state and national level which would have allowed for strategically scaling up the results beyond the target communities.

However, given the difficult operational environment and the Executive Board decision regarding the CCF's grassroots orientation, the evaluation team believes that the initial alignment of UNDP's programmes was appropriate in the circumstances. UNDP's readiness to make a shift towards policy guidance to the new democratic government showed that it was responsive to the country's changing circumstances and operational environment. This notwithstanding, UNDP's approach to policy and strategy formulation and capacity building in strategic institutions has been essentially ad hoc and the organization has not developed a coherent approach, particularly with respect to linking downstream project successes with policy level work, either at the state or federal level. With regard to the balance between upstream and downstream support, UNDP's inputs to Nigeria still remain heavily weighted towards the grassroots, and the evaluation team questions whether this is still relevant, let alone strategic, given the changed political and policy environment and the very high transaction costs that the wide geographical coverage entails. To make a difference and to have long-term impact, UNDP will need to rethink the approach of the past cycle and select areas where its comparative advantage can yield the best

results in terms of scaling up, replication and sustainability. It should also consider whether its resources and capabilities are compatible with maintaining programmes throughout the country.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND RESOURCE MOBILISATION

Resource mobilisation has become an integral part of UNDP's partnership building strategy. Because of the country's vast oil revenues, partnership building for resource mobilisation assumes greater importance in the Nigerian context than in most African countries. There is considerable potential for tapping this source of funding and leveraging UNDP's resources in order to promote a strong human development agenda at both the state and federal level.

During the period 1997-2002, UNDP took steps to build partnerships with a broad range of institutions, with varying degrees of success. These included government agencies, especially at the state, local government and community level, bilateral and multilateral donors, the private sector, NGOs, and other UN entities.

Partnerships with State Governments

State governments have provided additional resources for UNDP programmes through the Government Cost Contribution in Cash (GCCC) modality. The additional resources garnered in this manner have assisted in augmenting the delivery of social services, especially at the community level. While this has contributed towards improving the quality of life of the target beneficiaries, the evaluation team was not convinced that this has always respected the need to ensure that core and non-core funding are applied within a coherent country-level policy framework.

The selection of projects or programmes often seems to have been driven by the interests of the funding partners rather than by established UNDP criteria. Projects have been accepted for funding that fall outside the current thematic focus of UNDP and cannot be justified with respect to the CCF orientation. The very broad interpretation to which the overarching theme of Poverty Alleviation lends itself has in a way encouraged this trend.

Many of the community-based development initiatives seem to have been "supply driven", responding to the availability of UNDP resources and derived from the ability of state governments to provide matching funds, in some instances, in order to win votes at election time. Moreover, it is not clear that UNDP made a considered assessment of the managerial, technical and leadership capacities of the Country Office to backstop the resultant eclectic mix of integrated community development projects.

The evaluation team also concluded that the large number of projects funded from non-core programme resources overstretched UNDP's human resources to a point where issues of ownership and sustainability may have been compromised. The Programme Monitoring Units (PMUs) established by UNDP in every state were not consistently effective.

UNDP's presence in every state that could come up with matching GCCC funds has been achieved at the expense of strategic focus and policy coherence. In some communities, UNDP is perceived as a substitute for the government rather than as a catalytic and strategic partner for government development programmes. Such direct delivery of projects tends to reduce country ownership and capacity building.

The change in modality from GCCC to cost-sharing, which is expected to take place in 2003, offers the UNDP and its government partners an opportunity to rethink the scope of UNDP's operational activities at the state level.

Partnerships with the Private Sector: Two Success Stories
UNDP's effort to build partnerships with the private sector stands out as a nascent success story in strategic partnering and advocacy

for human development and corporate responsibility. Two initiatives, the National Partnership Forum (NPF) and the Human Development Fund (HDF), launched in December 2000, can be cited as cases in point.

National Partnership Forum (NPF)

The NPF seeks to promote corporate social responsibility in accordance with the aims of the Global Compact and the Millennium Development Goals. In addition, it serves as a vehicle for mobilising non-traditional resources to support community-based development initiatives. Four subgroups have been established on various topics, with UNDP serving as chair and secretariat. As of December 2001, the NPF included as many as 60 active organizations, including Nigerian as well as transnational corporations such as Price Waterhouse Coopers, Cadbury, Texaco, Chevron, and Union Bank, among others.

An important initiative of the NPF was the creation of a Learning Bank for sharing and encouraging best practices in social responsibility, which used publications, workshops, seminars, and a web site for dissemination of information. Through this initiative, UNDP showed its understanding of how partnerships can complement UNDP's advocacy role in the promotion of its core human development messages, rather than interpreting partnerships solely in terms of resource mobilisation.

UNDP should, however, put even greater emphasis on this component of partnership building in the future. UNDP's ability to influence private sector programmes so that they reflect and enhance UNDP's development priorities should be counted as indicator of success.

The Human Development Fund (HDF)

The HDF was designed as the resource mobilisation instrument for the National Partnership Forum, to implement grassroots community development activities which benefit the poor, the marginalised and vulnerable groups. Projects to be supported under the HDF include the provision of basic social infrastructure such as water and sanitation, basic health care, job creation avenues for the youth, functional literacy, and micro credit. They may also include local governance and capacity building. Another rationale of the HDF is to provide smaller prospective financial contributors to poverty alleviation with an opportunity to pool their resources to avoid the high overhead costs of setting up parallel management structures.

The assessment of the evaluation team is that these programmes basically mirror those supported under the CCF. A factor in the success so far of the HDF was the personal backing and involvement of the former Resident Representative himself. One immediate impetus has been the President's repeated call on development partners to complement national efforts in the priority areas of rural transformation and universal access to basic social services. Many state governments have also made formal requests to UNDP to augment resources through this modality.

Since the same modalities are used for HDF programme delivery as for UNDP programmes funded from core resources, they are likely to increase the backstopping pressures on the UNDP Country Office, and to suffer from the same deficiencies in ownership and capacity building to enable national institutions to deliver the key needs of disadvantaged communities by themselves when UNDP involvement is phased out. They are also likely to be deficient in design, in terms of the number of lives actually touched, and the potential for replication and scaling up. These weaknesses in the delivery of community level programmes should be addressed seriously if these partnership programmes are to realise the development objectives for which they were instituted.

Partnerships with oil companies operating in Nigeria

UNDP has begun to work with the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta region, whose activities have led to criticism and unrest, especially among the youth. For

example, in November 2002, UNDP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Chevron Nigeria Limited on community development projects in the Niger Delta region.

Chevron approached UNDP Nigeria because they determined that UNDP would have greater credibility with beneficiary communities. UNDP received this vote of confidence because of its neutrality and mandate as a UN agency. The criterion for success of this initiative will be the degree to which UNDP is able to play a neutral, facilitative and development-oriented role and not be seen by the community as just an adjunct to a corporate public relations exercise. If successful, the best practices from Nigeria's experience could serve as a model for mobilisation of non-core resources by UNDP in other countries.

Partnerships with NGOs and CBOs

While the evaluation team was impressed by some of the partnerships that have been forged with the private sector, it felt that more could have been done to establish partnerships with other civil society groups, such as NGOs and CBOs, especially at the grassroots level, where they might play a more active and effective role in the social programmes that are currently directly managed by UNDP. In particular, the capacities of NGOs and CBOs should be strengthened so that they can assume the direct delivery of micro level activities in which UNDP was involved during the first CCF. At the same time, UNDP should simplify its system for accounting and reporting on non-core resources to enable NGOs and CBOs to collaborate with UNDP in the implementation of micro-projects.

Partnerships within the United Nations System

While the resources of individual UN agencies may be relatively small, collectively they bring to the table sizeable ODA that could make a huge difference if joint collaborative approaches were strengthened. (See Figure 3.) The formal United Nations Country Team coordination mechanisms, specifically the Common Country

FIGURE 3: ODA DISBURSEMENTS BY DONORS, 1999 (IN THOUSANDS OF US$)

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

Assessment (CCA) and UNDAF, were initiated with the first CCA in March 2000. The first UNDAF, which covers the same period as the second CCF, was completed in January 2001. There is coherence and synergy between the CCF's objectives, strategic areas of support and intended outcomes and those of the UNDAF, which include promoting good governance and human rights, reducing poverty and reducing the incidence and impact of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases. (See Annex 5.)

Notwithstanding the coincidence of goals, the evaluation team felt that the UN system coordination in Nigeria under UNDAF has not been effectively translated into a coherent unified approach to tackling poverty and for strengthening strategic partnerships within the UN family around key development outcomes. For example, while HIV/AIDS is a core priority under both the UNDAF and the UNDP/CCF, there are multiple UN system initiatives in this sector.

Partnerships with Nigeria's bilateral and multilateral donors

Since UNDP has a somewhat different status from that of other donors, this gives it a unique comparative advantage. Elements of UNDP's unique status include the following: (a) its neutrality, both among donors and between donors and partner governments; (b) the power of the UN flag, which gives it considerable convening power and ability to

FIGURE 4: ANNUAL ODA DISBURSEMENTS, 1988–2000 (IN MILLIONS OF US$)

Note: The US $184.8 million translates into US $1.60 per person, which represents only 0.4% of Nigeria's GDP. Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

FIGURE 5: TOP TEN DONORS BY DISBURSEMENTS, 1999 (IN THOUSANDS OF US$)

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

of the country's oil wealth, the total level of donor contributions to the country represents only 0.4% of GDP, and the level of donor influence over government policy is commensurately small. (Figures 4 and 5 and Annex 7 show the volume of ODA from UNDP and other 10 top donors to Nigeria and the areas to which ODA was generally directed during 1998-1999.) In this context, if UNDP is to make a difference, it must be due to the level of trust accorded to it by the government and to the optimal exploitation of its comparative advantage in the Nigerian context.

There is a general consensus both among partner governments and donors in Nigeria that UNDP is uniquely suited to operating in sensitive fields and heading multi-donor initiatives, especially in the governance and poverty alleviation sectors. As Nigeria's traditional development partners have returned to the country since 1999 and started to build up their programmes, it is now increasingly possible for UNDP to develop partnerships with these donors and to leverage its resources, as it has done in the areas of governance and HIV/AIDS. UNDP's neutrality has permitted it to play a strategic and special role in politically sensitive areas such as elections, conflict prevention and the campaign against corruption. For example, UNDP played a key role in coordinating and managing the inputs of various donors, including the European Union (EU), to the 2003 elections for the National Assembly and the Presidency. It is also collaborating with NORAD on conflict prevention and has participated in a joint Strategic Conflict Assessment with the World Bank and DFID led by the government's Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). UNDP's unique position has also put it in a strong position for convening donors, in an ad hoc manner or in more structured meetings. For example, it has taken the lead in sector/thematic groups in such areas as (a) capacity building for economic management, (b) poverty alleviation and job creation, (c) health and HIV/AIDS, (d) micro-finance and private sector promotion, (e) environment and natural resources, and (f) good governance.

work on "sensitive issues"; (c) its access to policy makers; (d) its annual publication of the Human Development Report and periodic publication of the Nigerian National Human Development Report; (e) its access to global knowledge networks; and (f) its capacity to provide independent advice on emerging issues.

In Nigeria it is particularly important to leverage UNDP's comparative advantage since, because

Donor representatives in Nigeria indicated that UNDP could have done more to facilitate a policy dialogue between the government and donors on developing a national comprehensive framework for poverty reduction and macro-economic management around which partners could rally their support. While donors seem to feel that UNDP could play a stronger role in convening and coordination, there is a perception among a few partners that, because of its projects focus, UNDP may be too buried in its micro-projects. The fact that UNDP is not more substantively involved in the preparation of the PRSP is perhaps a confirmation of this observation.

UNDP's relationship with the major multilateral and bilateral donors has undoubtedly been impaired by its failure to move to Abuja and the frequent changes of and relatively long gaps between Resident Representatives. However, it should be recognised that UNDP's efforts at convening and coordination have also been limited by the lack of a strong national donor coordinating body and a clear government overarching policy framework. The National Planning Commission, which is responsible for donor coordination, is relatively new and weak. Clearly coordination and partnering for results are a challenge. There is a thin line between doing too little and doing too much and UNDP could easily end up doing only a little of everything. There is also the issue of keeping the government in the driver's seat to promote country ownership and sustainability. In order to effectively play the coordination role expected of it and promote country ownership and sustainability, UNDP will have to balance the sometimes multiple and conflicting demands of its partners with the country's interests.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF UNDP

During the period 1997-2003, UNDP has generally enjoyed the good will of the Nigerian government at both the federal and state level, and of various local constituencies. Its mandate and its core human development

values have given it comparative advantage and access to government at the highest levels. The UNDP has developed the reputation of a trusted and neutral partner and its role in Nigeria goes beyond its relatively meagre resources. The roles of setting the development agenda, advocacy, and engendering national policy dialogue on key development issues have probably been its greatest contribution to Nigeria during this period. Of particular significance is UNDP's global and national flagship product, the Human Development Report which measures human poverty. Nigeria's first National Human Development Report was published in 1996 and generated considerable debate with its comprehensive coverage and analysis of the poverty situation in the country. In particular, this NHDR helped to highlight and generate debate on one of the country's most enduring paradoxes: that Nigeria is a resource rich country with unacceptably large numbers of poor people living below the poverty line. The 1996 NHDR was followed by the 1998 and 2000/2001 NHDRs which covered the equally important human development themes of poverty and globalisation, respectively.

In addition to this strategic and catalytic role on policy dialogue and advocacy on human development issues, UNDP has also assisted in promoting national dialogue around more inclusive future development agendas by articulating a long term strategic vision (for example, Nigeria's Vision 2010) and by promoting conflict resolution and participatory planning processes. UNDP's perceived neutrality and convening power have also allowed it to play a coordinating role in these sensitive areas, especially under the aegis of the United Nations Resident Coordinator system. During the period under review, UNDP also sought, through coalition building and fostering partnerships between government and civil society, to play a key role as broker and catalyst in the area of governance and democracy.

In short, the following conclusions can be reached regarding the strategic positioning of UNDP and the relevance of its programmes

during the period 1997-2003. In general terms, UNDP has responded to the evolving development challenges in Nigeria and to the expressed priorities of its successive governments. The downstream orientation required by the Executive Board at the beginning of CCF-1 was appropriate and UNDP positioned itself accordingly. After the restoration of democracy, UNDP made a serious effort to respond to the government's need for policy and strategy advice and capacity building in strategic institutions but the approach was not structured or coherent. UNDP has developed a number of useful linkages and partnerships with government and non-governmental and donor organizations but, to be strategic, these need to be anchored within a coherent development or policy framework. Partnerships with government, especially at the level of the states in UNDP's downstream programmes, have often been driven by resource mobilisation imperatives rather than substantive development concerns. Furthermore, partnerships in grass-roots projects tend to be UNDP-dominated and there is neither a planned UNDP exit strategy nor enough national ownership to signal the potential for scaling up and for long term sustainability.

Promising partnerships have been developed through the National Partnership Forum and the Human Development Fund, and with Chevron Oil Company in Nigeria, and these might be able to be replicated. While partnerships with other external development partners seem promising, they are at best uneven. Collaboration with the other development partners in the United Nations system is weak, especially in the area of HIV/AIDS and micro projects, and the UNDAF has not provided a framework for synergies and strategic focus of UN efforts.

In assessing how well UNDP has performed or strategically positioned itself to play its role better in the future, there is a need to balance expectations against reality. UNDP's roles as coordinator, neutral convener and broker, and advocate for human rights and human development, clearly emerge as UNDP's comparative advantages. UNDP is well known and enjoys high visibility in the country, particularly within institutions and among the states where it has programmes. Domestic constituencies and external donors alike clearly respect UNDP's role and expect it to play an even stronger facilitator role vis-a-is the government and the human development agenda. However, there are a number of constraints that have militated against UNDP taking full advantage of these positive threads. In a country where domestic resources dwarf the ODA by a considerable margin, the role of external aid, and that of the UNDP in particular, should be taken in context. UNDP's assumed comparative advantage and the traditional role it plays elsewhere must take into account the realities of the Nigerian context. Besides having considerable human and natural resources of its own, Nigeria also has a three tier federal system of 36 states and 774 local government authorities whose autonomy is guaranteed under the Constitution. Nigeria's political history has ensured that any inter-vention will have to come to terms with constant tensions that are evident at every level of government. It is possible for UNDP to provide strategic upstream support at both the federal and state level, but without a strong institutional and policy framework, and reforming champions from within to carry forward the development agenda, coordination and facilitation alone will not automatically lead to concrete results. This suggests that the Nigeria government and UNDP will need to work together on a new or revitalised agenda on this front.

The Nigerian development context seems to require a highly focused and agile role on the part of the UNDP, yet one that is multifaceted and flexible enough for the organization to remain strategic and relevant to the complex challenges and opportunities that the country presents at this juncture. With the return of most donors to Nigeria following the democratic elections of 1999, UNDP may well need to build on the federal government's good will by focusing sharply on a few critical things and doing them well. It should also work with the federal government to establish a strong policy framework for promoting a stronger development agenda at the federal and state level.

Photo: Galbe.com

4 Assessment of UNDP's contribution to development results

This chapter examines the overall performance of UNDP's programmes during the period under review. The analysis focuses on assessing the development results achieved through UNDP support and how UNDP has contributed to Nigeria's socio-economic development. Since outcomes are the results of many actors' efforts, the analysis does not seek to isolate UNDP's contributions from those of other partners as such, but rather to establish a credible or plausible link between perceived or reported development outcomes and UNDP support.

Given the political changes that have occurred in Nigeria since 1997 and the time that it will inevitably take for them to have a significant impact on development outcomes, CCF-1 might be considered as a transitional programming period. By 2002, many of UNDP's projects had only been in operation for about three years and, in some cases, they are only just gathering momentum. (See Table 2.) This country evaluation is therefore essentially a 'snapshot' of 'work in progress' and the

FIGURE 6: BUDGET SUMMARY FOR NIGERIA BY SAS (IN MILLIONS OF US$)

TABLE 2. FINANCIAL STATUS – TRAC 1.1.1 AND 1.1.2 (1997-2002)						
	1997	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**
Expenditure	30,940	12,745	3,594	5,901	7,987	12,421
Implementation rate	98%	45%	40%	77%	85%	114%
Peak budgets	31,727	28,322	8,984	7,663	9,397	10,896

conclusions reached should be understood accordingly.

Figure 6 provides the budget summary for Nigeria by goals and strategic areas of support (SAS). Table 2 gives Financial Status by TRAC 1997-2002 in terms of expenditure, implementation rate and peak budgets. The rate drops to lows of 45% and 40% in 1998 and 1999 but peaks at 114% in 2002.

KEY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS ACHIEVED

GOVERNANCE

The focus of UNDP's governance support at the start of the CCF-1 was on strengthening

development planning and management tools. The most concrete results derived from the sub-programme **Decentralisation and Capacity Building for Development Planning and Improved Record Keeping and Statistics.** Training programmes were organised for statistics officers at the state and local level, and there is a broad consensus that local capacity for accurate data collection, collation, processing and analysis has been strengthened. Relatively reliable statistical yearbooks have been published for the years 1998 to 2001. A **Sustainable Human Development (SHD) Data Bank** has been established for the 774 local government authorities, which provides data on SHD indicators such as maternal and infant mortality, environmental sanitation, access to safe drinking water and school enrolment. Training workshops on monitoring and evaluation were also designed in some states to assist the development process. Nigerian statistics still remain weak, but it may be assumed that, over time, this improvement in statistics will have a positive impact on development planning.

After the transition to democracy in 1999, the new government asked UNDP to play a much

more active role in the area of governance and UNDP's initiatives moved to upstream policy support. Nigeria's transition to democracy coincided with the adoption of RBM throughout UNDP and its governance portfolio in the country was refocused towards the following outcomes:

■ National policies address more effectively the social impact of economic liberalisation;

■ Increased use by decision-makers of sustainable human development concepts in policy formulation;

■ Increased effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative and oversight functions;

■ Improved conformity of the legal and electoral framework with international standards;

■ Financial and human resources mobilised and allocated in support of decentralisation and local governance in rural and urban areas. (See the Strategic Results Framework in Annexes 5-6.)

The initiatives were, however, launched in an essentially ad hoc manner on the basis of urgent requests from government and reflect the fragmented government institutional framework in which UNDP operated. Notwithstanding this, a number of significant initiatives were launched which confirm that, in this area, UNDP was flexible enough and ready to take up new challenges.

Most significant was UNDP's assistance to the National Planning Commission (NPC) in the preparation of the framework document entitled **National Programme on Governance (NPG)** for SHD which was approved in August 2000. The National Programme on Governance for SHD provides an important framework for government interventions, but it has not yet produced a very systematic approach to supporting governance initiatives in the country. Nevertheless, the process of preparing the programme was undoubtedly an important form of consensus building among key national stakeholders about the importance of promoting good governance initiatives.

The National Planning Commission coordinates the National Programme on Governance and

UNDP has provided a Senior Adviser on Governance to the NPC to support its activities. The federal government showed a degree of political will for supporting the NPC by committing $4 million to it from the 2001 federal budget, but the funds had not been disbursed as of March 2003 and the NPC has not shown itself able to play the coordinating role that was expected of it. There is some question whether the NPC should be moved to a more politically powerful body such as the Vice-President's Office.

The NPG is comprised of ten sub-programmes and UNDP has provided support under several of them including in particular the following two.

(i) **Promoting transparency, accountability and integrity in the public and private sectors.** Under a project for capacity building for the National Assembly, UNDP assisted in the organisation of workshops on transparency and accountability for all elected political officers. A similar workshop has been held at the level of Lagos State. UNDP also supported the creation of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) with funding for capacity building, and especially computers.

(ii) **Support to civil society, political parties and business communities for civic education, political participation and conflict management.** UNDP supported the Transition Monitoring Group in observing the 1999 elections and has been working with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) to sensitise the public on voter education. Together with other donors (DFID, JICA and the EU) UNDP has also contributed to capacity building at the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), especially in the area of public education. Under the 2003-2007 governance programmes, officials at the federal and state level will be trained to develop manuals for voter education.

Regarding conflict management, UNDP has been collaborating with NORAD to support

the newly established **Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution.** It has also organised training workshops on conflict prevention in the Niger Delta region, and for traditional leaders from the oil producing communities. The overall goal is to promote the culture of dialogue among youths to curb violence, including during elections.

One other UNDP initiative that is not specifically related to the National Programme on Governance should be added at this point. Together with the Soros Foundation and Africare, UNDP has assisted in the establishment of an **Independent Policy Group,** a body of experts to provide direct advice to the President. The IPG undertakes studies on key policy issues, especially where there is concern that ongoing initiatives are not being adequately coordinated. It also organises forums to bring together policy makers and academics, such as the Consultative Forum on Harmonisation of Poverty Agencies, Policies and Mechanisms in Nigeria which took place in Abuja in March 2003.

There is evidence to suggest that the Independent Policy Group may not be sufficiently institutionalised to have concrete results. It is difficult to make a substantive judgment on an institution which is mainly concerned with providing ad hoc advice to the Office of the President. However, it is important to recognise that the current IPG arrangement may be diverting attention from the lack of a permanent mechanism to support cabinet decision-making and to formulate policy and assess or monitor its impact.

UNDP has contributed to several important governance initiatives in Nigeria since 1999. As far as the achievement of outcomes is concerned, support to the consolidation of democracy will take a much longer time than one or two cycles of UNDP assistance. Sustained partnerships and advocacy will be required to achieve the intended outcomes, and long-term sustainability. Although initiatives to stem corruption can only bear fruit where

there is a strong political will, UNDP's initial support is clearly in the right direction. It may be questioned whether the best entry points have been found but this should be monitored closely on the ground and modified as appropriate. Civic education initiatives and support for electoral reform are also highly necessary for establishing democracy, and UNDP has contributed to launching what should be a long-term initiative in these areas.

In terms of policy environment, ownership and capacity building, the following observations can be made about UNDP's governance programme.

The transition to democracy has undoubtedly improved the enabling policy environment. This has made possible a whole range of initiatives for bringing Nigerians into the political and decision-making process that would not have been conceivable in 1997 when the CCF-1 was drafted and approved.

Ownership in governance programmes requires political will to make the programmes work. This has not always been in evidence, as for example in assigning the National Governance Programme to the National Planning Commission, which seems to lack the capacity and the political backing needed for it to play the role expected of it. This has undoubtedly weakened the effectiveness of UNDP support, and the institutional status of UNDP's inputs may need to be reviewed during the 2003-2007 CCF if the intended outcomes are to be realised.

With perhaps one exception, all the governance projects have capacity building components and seem to make a contribution in this area. The exception is the Independent Policy Group which is more of a facilitator than an institution and its role and UNDP's contribution should also be reviewed during the next cycle. The recent elections provide a positive direction for the country and for UNDP's support in the governance area. There is clearly a window of opportunity for improving the policy environment further as Nigeria seeks to consolidate its young democracy.

POVERTY REDUCTION

Poverty alleviation programmes require a clear definition of poverty in order to determine the type of anti-poverty activities to be undertaken and to provide a basis for programme evaluation.[8]

The first CCF did not seem to have a clear definition of poverty and its approach was essentially pragmatic. UNDP approached the issue of poverty alleviation from four angles: (a) policy and strategy formulation and governance, (b) job creation in the small enterprise and informal sectors, (c) delivery of social services, especially health and education, and (d) agriculture and rural development. Under national poverty frameworks or strategies, UNDP aimed to achieve the following outcomes:

■ National anti-poverty strategy/plan/programme developed through a participatory process involving, in particular, the poor themselves; and

■ Institutional capacity built to plan and implement multi-sectoral strategies to limit the HIV/AIDS and mitigate its social and economic impact.

Conclusions regarding overall programme performance and development outcomes have to be viewed in terms of the realities obtaining in the operational environment. Before 1999, even the best-managed donor programme would have had difficulty in achieving significant and concrete results.

UNDP created a vast geographical spread of grassroots projects which have undoubtedly benefited a small number of the poorest of the poor. However, their impact is essentially limited given the fact that 70 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty threshold. Without links to macro policy frameworks, these interventions on their own do not have the critical mass to create momentum for development. There are clearly problems of ownership, scaling up, replication and exit strategies. The lack of a government overarching

framework and a coordinated machinery for poverty reduction in Nigeria have substantially undermined the effectiveness and potential contribution of UNDP to poverty reduction, an issue that will need to be squarely addressed in the upcoming cycle if the organization's support is to be strategic and results driven.

Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods

During the 1980s, employment rates declined due to structural adjustment type programmes and economic liberalisation. Almost one fifth of the labour force is unemployed and only three percent of graduates can expect to find jobs in the formal sector of the economy, which is dominated by public service employment. At the same time, trade liberalisation has led to a dramatic contraction in the organized private sector, worsened by Nigeria's continued failure to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) outside the oil sector. During the second CCF period and especially after 1999, the federal and state political leadership became increasingly concerned about the linkage between youth unemployment and growing civil unrest (as has already happened in the Delta and some parts of the north) and put increasing emphasis on promoting sustainable livelihoods, especially through skills promotion and micro-credit. The main practical thrust of UNDP support in this area is therefore to tackle growing poverty related to youth unemployment and other disadvantaged groups, such as women, through skills development centres, micro-credit schemes, and the provision of basic social services.

The objectives of the job creation and sustainable livelihoods programme as outlined in the CCF document are: "To promote a market-oriented economy, open trade and investment opportunities". The relevant SRF outcomes under the rubric of access to assets are:

■ Increased access of the poor to finance (formal, informal and micro); and

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8. There are many ways to approach the problem of poverty and many different definitions of poverty in the literature. For example, Amatya Sen in "Development as Freedom", p. 87, suggests that the emphasis should be on the aspects of poverty, such as 'capability deprivations', that are *intrinsically* significant rather than on those, such as low income, which are only *instrumentally* significant. These may also be termed 'human poverty' and 'income poverty'. A similar idea is captured in a more general way in UNDP's Human Development Index which is based on the idea that poverty cannot simply be measured in terms of GDP per capita and must include such human aspects as literacy and life expectancy.

■ Increased capacity of the poor to sustain their livelihoods.

UNDP has supported the creation of **Skills Development Centres (SDCs)** in all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. Depending on their capacity and on local needs, the SDCs provide training in areas ranging from motor mechanics, air-conditioning and electronic data processing to shoemaking and sewing.

Findings of the evaluation indicate that some of the SDCs in states such as Lagos, Akwa Ibom and the FCT seem to be working effectively, but in other cases, such as those in Nassarawa and Kano, they seem to have had little impact. Reasons for success include a strong local sense of ownership and political will as well as good management. In some cases, such as Akwa Ibom where the centres have an institutional home and are closely associated with local government authorities, efforts are being made to replicate the projects outside the original target communities.

In parallel with UNDCF's Microstart Programme, UNDP has also promoted micro-credit schemes for people without assets or collateral. The micro-credit schemes aim to complement the banking sector (whose services are generally not available to the poor) and fill an important gap in the promotion of small and micro enterprises. During the period under review, UNDP has provided training to forty micro-finance institutions and micro-finance support to 350 communities in the 36 states and the FCT.

At the policy level, UNDP/UNCDF's advocacy and policy work have born fruit in the decision by the Central Bank to develop guidelines for a **National Micro-Finance Policy.** In addition, it should be noted that the Micro-Start Advisory Board includes representatives from the Central Bank, NAPEP and the National Planning Commission. This board is proving to be an effective facilitator of policy linkages and it is hoped that under the upcoming cycle, NAPEP will use the micro-credit programme as a vehicle for programming part of its funds and that lessons learned could influence its other programmes.

There are shortcomings in UNDP's micro-credit interventions, including the smallness of the micro-credit loans and the cumbersomeness of the repayment procedures. Most communities felt that a two-month repayment period is far too short. There is also concern among other donors involved in micro-credit about the use of interest rates below the market rates in UNDP micro-credit projects, as this is likely to undermine the potential for sustainability.

In several states, there is concern about the weakness of the linkage between the skills development centres and the micro-credit institutions. Graduates of the centres need credit to buy tools so that they can become employed and productive. Some efforts have been made to bridge this gap. For example, in Nassarawa State, under their Guidelines for Effective Operation of Basic Skills Development Centres, graduates are provided with a certificate that can be used for applying for an equipment loan. In other places, the SDCs or their sponsors provide graduating trainees with a modest amount of capital equipment (e.g. sewing machines) so that they can start their own businesses.

The question, however, must also be asked why UNDP has involved itself in the direct management of micro-credit projects when UNCDF, which is a specialised technical partner in this area with a presence in Nigeria, could have managed the whole sub-programme. There is also a question of cost-effectiveness. UNDP's overheads are relatively high compared with those of NGOs or CBOs, and these organizations can also ensure closer supervision, especially as they (unlike UNDP) frequently have sub-offices at the level of state capitals.

The evaluation team is of the opinion that micro projects such as SDCs can be of very limited impact in tackling poverty and unemployment, particularly, in the absence of

clear linkages between them and comprehensive macro level policy frameworks and strategies. Given the size of Nigeria's population, present unemployment problems, and the small numbers that can be reached by SDCs, even the most successful UNDP supported skills development and micro-credit projects can make only a marginal impact on the wider unemployment problems of each state.

Social Development Programme

The objectives of the Social Development Programme were to support the government's promotion of capacity building in the sectors of health and functional education. In the health sector, the programme sought synergies with other donors to strengthen the primary health care system, especially in its coverage of the poor, women and children, through the establishment of village health schemes for water and sanitation, nutrition, the eradication of guinea worm and the treatment of diarrhoea in selected communities. The programme also includes prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and vocational centres for the disabled.

As of the end of CCF-1, some 750 **Integrated Community Development Projects** had been established with the aim of bringing basic social services to deprived communities. These services included construction or repair of 1250 water points and 850 demonstration sanitation facilities, renovation and equipment of 120 health facilities, and training of 2,500 village health workers and 1,500 traditional health attendants. In addition, 2574 basic functional literacy classes have been organised. Working with the government's Universal Basic Education programme, which aims to raise adult functional literacy from the current level of 60 percent to 90 percent by 2010, UNDP has focused on non-formal and adult functional education targeted at girls, women, farmers and informal sector operators. The programme also has a component for the empowerment of women through advocacy and strengthening women's institutions to ensure the greater participation of women in the development process. In addition, 160 public health education stands have been established

to provide information on HIV/AIDS and harmful traditional practices against women.

The UNDP Country Office reports that 6.46 million people in 29 states are impacted by these projects, but it is unclear whether this number refers to all the people in the communities served or indicates those whose well-being has actually been affected by project investments or activities.

The ICDP projects are undoubtedly widely appreciated as they typically target the very poor at the community or village level for whom any intervention would be welcome. As with the SDCs and micro-credit programmes, the development results achieved (observable only at the output levels at this stage), and their possible impacts, vary greatly from state to state and depend on such factors as local ownership and the level of management both by the local authorities and UNDP.

Overall, the answer as to whether UNDP's ICDP interventions are contributing meaningfully to poverty reduction is mixed, especially when it comes to the extent of actual development outcomes. The ICDP community-based projects are an eclectic mix of micro projects that generate high transaction costs and benefit a relatively small number of people, albeit in many communities. To have significant and wider impact, the activities would have to be substantially scaled-up through replication at the state level and around the country and through influence on state and federal government policies. These are the challenges ahead if UNDP's contributions through ICDP are to translate into sustainable long-term impacts.

On the policy front, UNDP has made significant contributions in terms of awareness building and broadening of policy dialogue through advocacy work in connection with the **National Human Development Reports** (1996, 1998, 2000/2001), the **"People's Vision of Development – 2010",** and the **National Partnership Forum (NPF)** and Human Development Network (HDN). The NPF and HDN have initiated a forum for dialogue

which brings together government, the private sector and civil society organizations. A major innovation has been corporate responsibility initiatives with Shell and Chevron around issues of conflict resolution, peace building and resource mobilisation for community-based poverty reduction programmes in the affected states. UNDP water and sanitation projects provided basic information and experience for the 1998 **National Water and Sanitation Policy.** The policy is evidence of strategic partnership between government on one hand and the UNDP and UNICEF on the other. Similarly, the vocational rehabilitation for disabled persons in four states influenced the 2002 draft **National Policy on Social Development.** UNDP upstream advocacy and its support for the Mass Literacy Programme led to the inclusion of non-formal education in the 2001 **Universal Basic Education Programme.** UNDP's health education programmes have also contributed to the **Action Committee on AIDS Council (NACA)** and the formulation of the national HIV/AIDS strategic plan.

Since 1999, the poverty programmes have seen increasing political support as the democratic government struggles to increase its legitimacy by improving the well-being of the population, and to reduce community violence. The policy environment, therefore, seems to be relatively favourable at the federal level and in at least some of the states.

However, the programmes seem to have been developed in an ad hoc manner, without a carefully thought out policy or strategy concerning the substantive or geographic linkages between projects. In addition, the evaluation team found that there was a sense of dependency in a number of states. Stakeholders (even in large relatively well-endowed states such as Lagos) did not seem to envisage the possibility of UNDP's withdrawal and had no contingency plans or concerns about the project's sustainability without UNDP. One exception is Akwa Ibom State where the state authorities had started to programme with their own budgeted resources in anticipation of a possible reduction in UNDP inputs. Dependency on UNDP has serious implications for the effectiveness and sustainability of the poverty reduction programmes and raises questions about the level of state and community ownership and of the principle of partnership with UNDP.

Sustainable Agriculture and Environment

UNDP's work on rural development, sustainable agriculture and environmental protection is closely linked with its support for poverty reduction. Agriculture remains the mainstay of at least 65-70% of the Nigerian population. The combination of population growth, poverty and the expansion of traditional agricultural practices into ecosystems where they are inappropriate is causing serious problems of environmental degradation in virtually all parts of the country. In addition, there is a serious environmental crisis brought on by oil exploitation in the Niger Delta region.

The objective of the **Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and Development (SAERD)** programme is to increase agricultural productivity and food security, and the stated SRF outcomes are "access to assets" through:

- Increased access of the poor to micro-finance; and
- Increased capacity of the poor to sustain their livelihoods.

UNDP's strategy focused on: (a) agricultural productivity improvement for the small farmer to enhance food security; (b) labour-based infrastructure to support government efforts to improve rural roads and the rural transport system for the benefit of the agricultural sector, (c) increasing women's access to land, credit and other facilities, and (d) land/environment management aimed at instituting projects for soil conservation.

UNDP's support to the environment has been subsumed under the SAERD programme. The stated goal is "to support Government efforts in land and environmental management in 8-15 communities per state". The SRF outcomes, under the rubric of Environment and

Energy for Livelihoods and Instruments for Environmentally Sustainable Management are:

■ increased budget resources for natural resource management;

■ improved national capacity to monitor environmental conditions and assess policy performance; and

■ integration of global environmental concerns into national development policy.

Gender Mainstreaming

UNDP treats gender as a crosscutting issue and puts the emphasis on mainstreaming gender concerns. The intended SRF outcome for the country cooperation frameworks regarding implementation of gender-related global commitments is for an action plan for the advancement of women to be adopted by the government and civil society, according to time bound goals. The Social Development Programme included "the empowerment of women" as one of its goals, and the SAERD programme aimed to increase access of women to agricultural land and credit. The second CCF goals include a requirement that: "Gender issues will be mainstreamed so that at least 50% of target beneficiaries will be women".

With the approval of a **Gender Policy Framework for Nigeria** in 2001 and with the passing of legislation concerning Harmful Practices against Women in a number of states, Nigeria is making considerable progress in providing a positive policy and regulatory framework for gender issues. However, improving the lot of women in practice is greatly complicated by the cultural and religious diversity of the country and by the considerable political autonomy of states and local government authorities. Traditional and modern cultural values and instruments of governance continue to exist side by side and there is constantly the risk that fear of change will reinforce traditional values and practices and undermine progress that has already been achieved.

Through advocacy, UNDP has been able to make UN norms and global compacts better known, and at the policy level it contributed to the drafting of the Gender Policy Framework. In addition, under the Governance programme the National Office of Statistics has incorporated gender into data collection and analysis. At the same time, a national data bank has been created at the National Centre for Women in Development. At the level of the 774 local government authorities, the Human Development Data Banks collect statistics on maternal and infant mortality and other gender specific areas.

Country Programme activities that are now yielding results in terms of SRF outcomes include: inputs into the development of a **National Policy on Women;** capacity building for advocacy through grants to NGOs supporting women's participation in international conferences and women's education; and support to income generation activities for women in 55 local government authorities. The Ministry of Women in Development works with NAPEP with regard to skills development centres. It also supports the National Council on Women's Affairs, and wants each Ministry to have a gender desk. The recently drafted Action Plan is now with ministries for comment but implementation will be the main challenge. Differences in cultural, religious and other practices regarding women across the country also pose a fundamental challenge.

Perhaps one of UNDP's most significant contributions has been advocacy against harmful practices to women, which has contributed to a number of legislative changes. Despite cultural difference amongst states, in the area of female genital mutilation (FGM), the following has been achieved: (a) passage of a federal bill on FGM; (b) passage of FGM related legislation and legislative changes in Enugu and Edo States; (c) prohibition of early marriage in Kebbi and Niger States; (d) legislation against withdrawal of girls from school (Kano, Borno Gombe and Bauchi States); (e) laws against trafficking in women and children (Edo and Zamfara States) and a bill before the Lower House of the National Assembly; (f) various state laws on sexual abuse and prostitution; (g) safe houses for victims of

domestic and sexual violence in three states and the FCT; and (h) censorship of pornographic and violent films.

As a crosscutting theme, gender is a matter for partnership across the entire UN system. The government recognises that the UN system has a unique role to play in this area, particularly by providing advocacy for global norms and practices, but the challenge is how to "domesticate" global norms in ways that are sensitive to local cultural and religious traditions. While it is too early to expect full implementation of global agreements, there have been encouraging steps, and a long-range approach to gender mainstreaming will be necessary.

CONCLUSIONS ON UNDP'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

Given its size and relatively complex administrative structures, Nigeria is not a place where one can expect "quick results." Nevertheless, the evaluation team's conclusion is that, while the picture is mixed, there have been some important contributions during the period of 1997-2003 and that UNDP support has definitely made a difference in Nigeria.

Notable contributions include the awareness raising and policy dialogue engendered through advocacy using the NHDR series (1996, 1998, 2000/2001), the Vision 2010 process and the National Partnership Forum and Human Development Fund. UNDP's contributions to legislation barring harmful practices against women and towards establishing the regulatory framework for micro-credit are also important contributions in the policy arena. In the governance area, UNDP is also starting to provide capacity building for institutions that drive the development agenda.

With regard to poverty, UNDP's interventions upstream have been much less significant.

Regarding UNDP's organizational effectiveness, a majority of respondents and stakeholders pointed out constraints and challenges that will need to be addressed if UNDP is to play its role in line with its comparative advantage. Key among the constraints and challenges most respondents cited were the following:

- relatively high staff turn-over at senior management levels;
- UNDP's continued location in Lagos and failure to move to Abuja at a time when most key partners, including a number of UN agencies, have already moved;
- "too much bureaucracy" and apparent concern with processes rather than substance and content;
- poor internalisation of RBM planning and monitoring tools such as the SRF/ROAR and managing for development results;
- lack of synergy and interface among and within the four thematic areas of concentration that seem to function as separate discrete clusters of projects rather than as strategic conceptual frameworks around core development outcomes;
- too frequent changes in corporate mandates and directions, a factor that works against an outcome focus, especially with programmes spread so thin throughout the country;
- risk of over-commitment and over-extension in a climate of declining resources and possible failure to match UNDP's evident high visibility with concomitant concrete durable results and development effectiveness.

Conclusions regarding overall programme performance and development outcomes, nonetheless, have to be counterbalanced against the realities obtaining in the operational environment. Before 1999, even the best-managed donor programme would have had difficulty in achieving significant and concrete results. With the restoration of democracy, UNDP moved flexibly, although in an ad hoc and unsystematic way, to support new government initiatives at the policy level in the governance area and this augurs well for the future.

5 Conclusion: Lessons, recommendations and future directions

The evaluation has aimed to highlight UNDP's contributions and successes in Nigeria during the past six years and to draw attention to some of the challenges the organization will need to address to enhance its development effectiveness. Overall, if UNDP takes due account of past experience, it will be well positioned to support Nigeria's democratic consolidation and contribute significantly to the country's development. This final chapter provides some pointers on how UNDP could enhance its strategic positioning and bring real added value to its role in Nigeria in the future.

LESSONS LEARNED AND EMERGING ISSUES

■ **Political will and an enabling policy environment are crucial for achieving results.** With hindsight it is possible to see areas where UNDP might have made a more effective contribution through advocacy or policy advice. However, it is also important to take into account the

fact that there was a lack of an overarching poverty reduction and macro-economic policy framework in Nigeria, and that the FGN policy influence over the states is relatively weak. It is the view of the evaluation team that, even if UNDP had intervened more strongly in upstream policy support, it is unlikely that it would have been able to have a greater impact, given the reality of federal-state relations.

■ **Partnerships for resource mobilisation and delivery are critical for achieving development results, but partnerships need not be only about resource mobilisation.** Partnerships can also promote UNDP's core mandate messages on human rights and human development. Resource mobilisation is not always compatible with coherent programming and effective delivery. UNDP's experience in Nigeria has shown that resource mobilisation and delivery of UNDP resources within a given timeframe may not always be compatible with 'making a difference'. Pressures from UNDP Headquarters to accelerate resource mobilisation to justify the high levels of transaction costs relative to the size of the programme can inadvertently lead to compromising of UNDP's goals. Resources mobilised usually have some 'strings attached' and each case should be taken on its merits, and UNDP must ensure that its programmes are not distorted by the need to obtain cost-sharing resources.

■ **Micro level support should be catalytic and linked to broader policy goals and should establish clear exit and replication strategies in order to minimise the 'dependency syndrome' and engender ownership and sustainability.** Direct delivery of resources, and too strong a presence by UNDP in grassroots level projects without the requisite local commitment and clear strategies for scaling up, replication or exiting, can reduce ownership and create the impression that

UNDP is a substitute for government. If UNDP is to work successfully at downstream levels, projects and programmes need clear exit strategies and direct links to broader policy goals that can generate long-term sustainable results. When there is a formulaic approach (e.g. that UNDP must support projects in all 36 states, as was the case under the CCF-1 cycle), programme flexibility will be reduced and there will be uneven levels of quality and impact. It should, however, be noted that it takes longer to produce results upstream at the policy level than at the downstream level and thus modification is required in the outcomes definitions of the SRF to reflect this reality. External agencies tend to find it easier to intervene directly than to stand on the sidelines with advice and encouragement. This approach, however, is more suited to achieving outputs than outcomes and is a major reason why so many projects fail once the donor has withdrawn. This has certainly been the case with UNDP downstream projects where issues of ownership, scaling up, replication and exit strategies do not seem to have been sufficiently incorporated at the design stage of the programmes. This has contributed to the phenomenon of 'micro-successes' in a sea of 'macro-failure', which can justifiably be said of many of UNDP grassroots poverty reduction projects in Nigeria, especially as they are not linked to any macro-level policy framework at either the state or federal level.

■ **Learning and internalisation of new RBM concepts and innovations takes time, and frequent changes at the corporate level can undermine the process.** Since 1999, UNDP has developed many concepts and corporate RBM tools and procedures (SRF/ROAR), with the result that Country Office staff seem overwhelmed by the changes and often do not have the time to fully internalise them, let alone put them into practice. In the case of Nigeria, this is evidenced, for

example, by a lack of synergy and inter-face among the four thematic areas of concentration of CCF-1, which seem to function as separate discrete clusters of projects rather than strategic conceptual frameworks around core development outcomes. In addition to new concepts and procedures, the approach taken by UNDP Headquarters towards the Country Office has not always been consistent — oscillating from little attention in "normal" times to concern in times of political crisis or low delivery. The last two are, of course, not un-connected.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the high transaction costs and risk of dispersal involved in grassroots support, the ADR team recommends narrowing UNDP's focus and adopting a judicious mix of micro and macro-level interventions that draw on the organization's comparative advantage. To do this effectively, UNDP will need to identify good practices and seek local partners to scale up and consolidate the positive outcomes of its most successful pilots. UNDP has been a responsive and trusted partner and its future challenge is to leverage the lessons learned from its projects, and its organizational assets, to influence policy and agenda setting at the federal and state level. Specific recommendations based on the findings, and emerging lessons, are as follows:

■ **UNDP's role should be catalytic and not a substitute for government or local efforts.** Due to Nigeria's size and oil wealth, the total level of donor contributions to the country is insignificant in relation to GDP, and the level of donor influence over government policy is commensurately small. In this context, if UNDP is to make a difference, this must derive from the level of trust accorded to it by the government and from the optimal exploitation of its comparative advantage. UNDP's focus should therefore be on the "big picture", outcome driven, and geared

towards leveraging the organization's unique comparative advantage to influence positive policy changes and make a difference at both the macro and micro level. In choosing areas for intervention, UNDP should pay particular attention to two factors: (i) the level of political will on the national side and (ii) UNDP's comparative advantage, including in relation to other donors. UNDP should therefore seek to strengthen its advocacy and policy support for poverty reduction and human development in Nigeria, and concentrate on strengthening the enabling policy environment to address the high levels of poverty in the country. NHDRs should be complemented by the launch of State Human Development Reports to broaden and deepen national dialogue on poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals.

■ **Narrow geographical spread, winnow out ongoing activities and sharpen substantive focus.** UNDP should narrow its focus and geographical spread and sharpen the substantive elements of its support. The ADR team fully supports the 2003-2007 CCF thematic focus on governance, poverty and HIV/AIDS, but recommends that UNDP should not aim to support all three focus areas in all 36 states and the FCT. Criteria to narrow the geographical coverage should be applied to avoid the risk of dispersal and limited localised impact experienced during the last cycle. For example, support to combating HIV/AIDS should only be undertaken in the most affected states; governance support should be in states genuinely committed to good governance; and poverty reduction would make the most sense in the poorest states with the lowest HDIs. To achieve an appropriate balance between UNDP's upstream and downstream interventions, there should be some judicious winnowing out of ongoing activities at the state level. This should, however, be done on a pragmatic basis and not on the basis of an 'ideological'

imperative to move upstream. At the same time, a greater effort should be made to ensure that interventions at the state level are selected in such a way that they provide feedback and can influence federal and state level policy and strategy formulation processes. Emphasis should be on projects which can produce credible results and which others will want to emulate or build upon — whilst taking care to avoid any particular state feeling neglected. The cost-sharing modality should be used to mobilise non-core resources to strengthen UNDP Country Office staff as necessary so that it does not commit itself to supervision and monitoring responsibilities for non-core funded programmes that it cannot effectively carry out.

■ **Accord priority to states as strategic entry points for upstream policy support.** In Nigeria, states enjoy considerable freedom of action in both policy formulation and project implementation and, given the size of the population, can have an impact on relatively large numbers of people. Consequently, strategic and macro-level policy interventions by UNDP at the state level can be as important as those at the federal level and should be accorded some priority. UNDP should therefore identify successful interventions for replication in other states and pursue upstream policy support at the state level.

■ **On poverty reduction, strengthen advocacy and policy support role.** UNDP needs to strengthen its advocacy and policy support for poverty reduction and human development in Nigeria. UNDP should concentrate on strengthening the enabling policy environment to address the high levels of poverty in Nigeria. In particular, it should examine critically government's pre-occupation with reaching the poor by

the creation of poverty alleviation funds/programmes (such as the National Programme for Eradication of Poverty, the National Directorate for Employment, and the Human Development Fund) rather than trying to mainstream support for the poor.[9] UNDP should accord high priority to reviewing the needs of the National Poverty Eradication Programme and to intervening strategically in the formulation of a poverty eradication policy which takes into account the MDGs, the requirements for a PRSP, and NEPAD. As part of its advocacy role, UNDP should build upon the successes it has had with the NHDRs and actively continue the regular preparation and publication of the National Human Development Reports. To foster links between micro-level support and upstream activities, and engender policy work at the state level, UNDP should also start producing State Human Development Reports.

■ **Deepen and strengthen support to consolidation of democracy.** UNDP should deepen and continue to strengthen its support for the consolidation of democracy, conflict prevention and anti-corruption initiatives. After thirty years of military rule, and in the absence of a constructive parliamentary culture, support to the national and state legislatures at all levels (electors, elected and the executive) should be broadened and deepened. Support should also be directed at strengthening civil society and the role of civic education throughout the country. Post-electoral assistance leading to civic education with other partners has been important and UNDP should continue in this area. In this process, UNDP should also move towards strengthening the capacity of NGO and CBO networks to take on some of these roles. This would help to broaden and extend the political

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9. This approach to funding special programmes is symptomatic of underlying budgetary institutional weaknesses as well as lack of overall policy coherence — especially the lack of synergy between Presidential initiatives and line ministries. For example, the channelling of vast sums of public finance via NAPEP to the line ministries for poverty related projects undermines any transparent, accountable budget system in favour of a handout (or, in the words of one of the national consultants, "pork barrel") system. In turn this reflects the total disconnect between the largely oil revenue base of public finance and the relative absence of any tax based sources that would elicit more citizen interest.

space to other actors and hopefully consolidate democracy. This support should build on the existing National Governance Programme and the ongoing initiatives of other partners, and focus on strengthening of key government institutions such as Parliament, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission. The approach should be within a clear conceptual framework and not pursued on a purely ad hoc basis. Conflict prevention and promoting peace and stability remain major challenges for Nigeria, and UNDP should, therefore, continue to support the government in improving peace and stability through the IPCR, an important new national institution which needs to be nurtured and substantially strengthened if it is to fulfil its role effectively. Similarly, support to the ICPC should be continued, but this should above all be results-driven and any initiative should be highly sensitive to the degree of political will behind anti-corruption measures, and be modified as appropriate. To strengthen Nigeria's nascent democracy, UNDP should continue support to the Independent Policy Group and the National Planning Commission. Support to the IPG should focus on advocating the institutionalisation of its role as a think tank rather than as an ad hoc presidential advisory body and on giving it greater access to UNDP's global knowledge networks and best practices. With respect to the NPC, UNDP should examine its political support and the potential of this institution to become effective, and take a decision accordingly. Any review of the NPC's role should examine its relationship with other key elements in national economic management — the Presidency and Vice Presidency, Federal Executive, Cabinet, Finance Ministry and Central Bank.

- **Build and expand partnerships with the private sector, NGOs and CBOs.** With regard to partnerships, resource mobilisation

and operational modalities, UNDP should seek to expand opportunities for cost sharing, including in collaboration with the private sector. The cost-sharing modality is not always consistent with maximum programme impact but in the case of Nigeria where domestic resources dwarf ODA by a wide margin, government and domestic private sector cost sharing can offer a positive way to expand UNDP's capacity to promote a human development agenda, and this should be actively encouraged. Generally, links to the private sector and to civil society (CBOs/NGOs) should be further developed as they constitute an alternative or complementary delivery modality to government. UNDP should also develop stronger partnerships with NGOs and CBOs at the grassroots level so that they can more effectively take over from UNDP as its support is reduced and progressively withdrawn. Each case, however, should be taken on its merits and UNDP should ensure that the validity of its programmes is not distorted by the need to obtain extra funds from other sources. With regard to the partnership with the NPF and the HDF, the execution modalities are similar to those of UNDP's grassroots programmes and are likely to suffer from some of the same weaknesses. The operation of these projects needs to be reviewed and, if necessary, corrected in the same way. The partnership with Chevron is an important initiative and should be evaluated within a year or two of its inception so that lessons may be drawn for other possible partnerships with oil companies.

- **Build substantive capacity within the Country Office.** UNDP should build substantive capacity within the Country Office to meet the challenges and complexities of Nigeria. In contrast to its position in a number of other countries, UNDP's financial support alone is of relatively little importance to Nigeria. Every effort should be made to avoid the frequent changes of Resident

Representative and the long gaps between the assignments of Resident Representatives as this has tended to weaken UNDP's leadership role during the past decade. As regards the staffing of the Country Office, with the transition from the GCCC modality to cost sharing for the operational programmes in the states, cost sharing resources should be used to strengthen the number of programme (and possibly administrative) staff in the Country Office. In order to strengthen its co-ordination role and leverage its comparative advantage, UNDP should move immediately to Abuja. The absence of UNDP from Abuja has undoubtedly weakened its leadership within the UN system and reduced the opportunities for linkages and partnerships with both government and donor partners. This delay is, of course, partly due to the time taken to complete the UN House in Abuja but it is recommended that no further time be lost in effecting the transfer.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

During the period under review, there is evidence to suggest a strong sense of UNDP's presence and appreciation of its role, especially in the areas of advocacy, policy dialogue, convening power and brokerage. NEPAD, MDGs, consolidation of democracy and good governance, and conflict prevention, where domestic and external partners may all have divergent agendas, are areas where UNDP could bring its comparative advantages to the fore and support government in setting a different human development agenda. These comparative advantages are not so much about the size of resources the UNDP can bring to the table but rather about the organization's neutrality, advocacy, coordination and convening power and its access to global knowledge and good practices. These special attributes, combined with UNDP's global reach and its long standing experience in advocacy on human development, its

capacity to raise and work on sensitive issues, and the evident good will of the Federal Government of Nigeria place it in a good position to build on past achievements and forge a new strategic focus where it could have greater impact. Looking ahead, it would seem that UNDP will need to identify good practices, and seek local partners to replicate and consolidate the outcomes of its most successful pilots. Given the high transaction costs and risk of dispersal in supporting a large number of projects, it is prudent for UNDP to scale down and adopt a judicious mix of micro and macro level interventions that draw on its comparative advantages. Obvious choices involve developing policy frameworks for poverty reduction, and advocacy and coordination around the MDGs, NEPAD and governance, especially conflict prevention, themes within the core focal areas that the 2003-2007 CCF is targeting.

Nigeria is a large and rich country still searching for a way out of its political and economic difficulties. In financial terms, UNDP's inputs are extremely modest when compared to the size of the Nigerian economy, and the organization will only make a difference if it uses its resources strategically. UNDP seems to be widely respected in Nigeria for what it is and for its approach to development (although there is some disagreement about the quality of what it does) and this provides a good basis for increasing its impact. Given the return of most donors to Nigeria following the elections of 1999, UNDP will need to build upon its strengths and the good will by sharply focusing on a few critical things and doing them well.

Owing to UNDP's credibility with government officials and other leading Nigerians, there is a sympathetic audience for UNDP's advocacy in different sectors and at different levels, and this should be pursued. There are also several entry points at the level of the FGN where UNDP can help to influence policy and strengthen the operations of some key federal institutions. At the same time it should be recognised that the states are an extremely important component of the Nigerian polity

and UNDP should not ignore opportunities to pursue advocacy and policy support at the level of the states. In Nigeria, both the private sector and civil society are relatively weak. It is suggested that some initiatives be taken in these areas with a possible view to more active collaboration and partnerships at a later date.

Nigeria has considerable human and natural resources of its own. However, as the report has underlined, it is still possible for UNDP to carve out a niche and work on key human development issues if it focuses on its comparative advantage and is selective in its choice of entry points and maintains flexibility to meet the challenges. A number of opportunities place UNDP at an advantage as it begins the implementation of the 2003-2007 cycle. UNDP has high-level access to the government at the federal, state and local level. It has also been able to mobilise sizeable additional resources from both the federal and state governments and the private sector. The challenge is to make the most of these assets and leverage them to influence policy and agenda setting at both the federal and state level and to bring to bear the full weight of its comparative advantage. The re-election of the government in April 2003 and the launching of the 2003-2007 Country Programme both offer UNDP an opportunity to reassess where it can make a real difference. UNDP's 'development effectiveness' depends as much on the political will of the Nigerian government as on UNDP. On the other hand, UNDP's 'organizational effectiveness' could be significantly improved and UNDP Headquarters and the Country Office should work together to ensure that this is done.

Photo: Galbe.com

Annexes

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. BACKGROUND

The Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched a series of country evaluations, called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs), in order to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP's contributions to development results at the country level. Undertaken in selected countries, the ADRs focus on outcomes and critically examine achievements and constraints in the UNDP thematic areas of focus, draw lessons learned and provide recommendations for the future. The ADRs will also recommend a strategy for enhancing performance and strategically positioning UNDP support within national development priorities and UNDP corporate policy directions.

The overall objectives of the Assessments of Development Results are:
1. Support the Administrator's substantive accountability function to the Executive Board and serve as a vehicle for quality assurance of UNDP interventions at the country level.
2. Generate lessons from experience to inform current and future programming at the country and corporate level.
3. Provide to the stakeholders in the programme country an objective assessment of results (specifically outcomes) that have been achieved

through UNDP support and partnerships with other key actors for a given multi-year period.

An Assessment of Development Results is planned for Nigeria beginning autumn 2002. It will cover the period 1997 to 2002, i.e. the 1997-2002 Country Cooperation Framework (CCF). The assessment will as necessary also cover preceding periods where there is evidence that support prior to 1997-2002 has served as foundation for present developments.

2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

With an area of 923,773 sq km and estimated population of 115 million people and its rich endowment of natural resources, Nigeria is a country of tremendous potential. Successive and prolonged military rule, spanning a cumulative period of 28 years out of Nigeria's 42 years of independence, led to the supplanting of constitutional provisions by military decrees and severe economic stagnation. The return to democracy on 29 May 1999 ushered in a new era. A new constitution was introduced and efforts have been directed at reduction of poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS and to combating corruption and curbing the excesses of the past. The present government has also maintained existing market reforms and expectations of the "democracy dividend" remain high. Notwithstanding these positive signals and its high resource endowment, Nigeria nonetheless confronts many social, economic and political problems, among which are corruption, poverty, high income disparities and the formidable challenges that attend any transition to democracy. Significantly, Nigeria is ranked low on the Human Development Index.

3. UNDP COOPERATION IN NIGERIA

The first Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Nigeria, 1997-2002, was preceded by and based on the recommendations of the Country Strategy Note and the Advisory Note. Due to the difficult political situation prevailing in the country at the time, the Executive Board approved the CCF on condition that 80% of UNDP's programme resources would be directed at community level. The Executive Board directive has therefore influenced the strategic focus and mode of programme delivery and it will be important to assess not only how Nigeria's recent political past has affected the operational environment and influenced UNDP contributions but also how this mode of programme delivery has influenced outcomes and results. Four thematic areas of concentration were identified, with poverty reduction as the overriding objective:

(i) **Socio-economic management and policy support for SHD**
ii) **Job creation and sustainable livelihoods**
iii) **Social Development**
iv) **Sustainable agriculture and rural development**

Support activities to the four programme areas adopted a two-pronged approach. Policy support was aimed at providing assistance to create the enabling environment and build capacity for human-centred development through improved macro-economic strategies and policy frameworks and instruments. Programme support involved assistance at state and community levels in the areas of job creation and sustainable livelihoods, social development, and sustainable agriculture and rural development. Gender and environment were considered crosscutting themes.

The second CCF will cover the period 2003-2007. In consonance with the priority themes and cooperation strategy of UNDAF, NAPEP, the IPRSP and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the new CCF will focus on three major thematic areas:

1) **Governance and human rights**
2) **Poverty eradication**
3) **HIV/AIDS**

Information and communication technology (ITC) will be a crosscutting theme, while gender issues will be mainstreamed so that at least 50 percent of the target beneficiaries will

be women. Annex 1 contains an overview of the Strategic Results Framework (SRF) for UNDP's programmes in Nigeria and articulates the intended outcomes and results for the poverty, governance, environment and gender themes.

The ADR evaluation will look at the results achieved for the period of 1997 to 2002. The evaluation will also take account of envisaged results under the 2003-2007 CCF as expressed in the SRF. The evaluation will consider the totality of the key results and goals in this period, as described in Annex 2, with the main intended objectives described in the various planning instruments of UNDP (UNDAF, CCF, SRF) and the UNDP programme portfolio.

4. OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

The purpose of the evaluation is to review the experience of UNDP in Nigeria, draw lessons learned and recommend improvements for strengthening UNDP's overall performance and support to the country. The Assessment of Development Results in Nigeria will:

■ Provide an overall assessment of the results achieved through UNDP support and in partnership with other key development actors during 1997-2002 with specific in-depth assessments within **poverty** and **governance** which were identified during the exploratory mission undertaken in November. (See In-Depth Studies TORs.) The evaluation should also cover preceding periods in order to bring out the historic presence of UNDP in Nigeria and draw links from current achievements to early UNDP interventions prior to 1997 as appropriate. The analysis should focus on how the results were achieved, identify the factors that accounted for success or failure and draw lessons, with particular attention to:
   a. How UNDP support was used to leverage the Nigeria reform process in the area of governance;
   b. How effective UNDP support was in

contributing to poverty alleviation; and
   c. The contribution of UNDP support to policy advice and dialogue, aid coordination and brokerage in delivering development results.

■ Provide an analysis of how UNDP has positioned itself strategically to bring added value and responded effectively to national development needs and priorities, and to changes in the national development situation, with special attention to:
   a. The entry points and strategy selected by UNDP in support of the national development agenda, especially within its areas of focus, especially the overarching goal of poverty reduction;
   b. The key current strategies of the CCF: partnerships for development, moving to upstream policy support, results orientation and intended entry points within the current framework; and
   c. The nature and level of cooperation with different development partners.

■ Based on the analysis of key achievements and overall findings, draw key lessons and provide clear and forward-looking recommendations in order to suggest optimal strategies for the UNDP in the future.

5. SCOPE OF THE ASSESSMENT

The evaluation will undertake a comprehensive review of the UNDP programme portfolio and activities during the period under review, with a more in-depth focus on governance and poverty. Specifically, the ADR will cover the following:

a. Strategic Positioning

■ Ascertain the strategic focus of UNDP support and its relevance to national development priorities, including relevance and linkages with the overarching goal of reducing poverty and the Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs). This may include an analysis of the perceived comparative strengths of the programme and a review of the major national challenges to development. The evaluation will assess UNDP support in relation to the government's macro-economic and social development policies and strategies, the NAPEP and Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). The aim is to ascertain the added value of UNDP support in effectively contributing to and influencing national development through strategic priority setting and intervening at optimal entry points.

■ Assess how UNDP has anticipated and responded to significant changes in the national development context within its core areas of focus. In this regard, the ADR may, for example, consider key events at the national and political level that influence and affect the development environment; the risk management of UNDP; any missed opportunities for UNDP involvement and contribution; its efforts at advocacy and policy advice and UNDP's responsiveness. The evaluation should bring out the choices made by UNDP in response to government reforms and explain the rationale behind these choices.

■ Review the synergies and alignment of UNDP support with other initiatives and partners, including that of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the Global Cooperation Framework (GCF) and the Regional Cooperation Framework (RCF). This may include examining how UNDP has leveraged its resources and that of others towards the achievement of results, the balance between upstream and downstream initiatives and the work on MDGs.

■ The Evaluation should consider the influence of systemic issues, i.e. policy and administrative constraints affecting the programme, on both the donor and programme country sides, as well as how the development results achieved and the partnerships established have contributed to ensuring a relevant and strategic positioning of UNDP support.

b. Development Results

■ Provide an examination of the effectiveness and sustainability of the UNDP programme, by: (a) highlighting main achievements (outcomes) at the national level in the last five years or so (some results have their origin in efforts prior to 1997) and UNDP's contribution to these in terms of key outputs; and (b) ascertaining current progress made in achieving outcomes in the given thematic areas of UNDP's support. The evaluation should qualify the UNDP contribution to the outcomes with a fair degree of plausibility, and consider anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative outcomes. It should also gauge the contribution to capacity development at the national level as well as the degree of national ownership and sustainability of these results. The assessment will cover the key results and support in all thematic areas (governance, poverty, environment, gender, HIV/AIDS, ICT, and any other areas as appropriate).

■ Identify and analyse the main factors influencing results, including the range and quality of development partnerships forged and their contribution to outcomes, the provision of upstream assistance and policy advice and partnership strategy and how the positioning of UNDP influences the results.

■ Assess the anticipated progress in achieving intended outcomes, against the benchmarks and indicators set out under the SRF Outcomes (see Annex 1) and the 1997-2002 CCF objectives and proposed future programmes and, where this is relevant, against the MDG targets.

- Provide an in-depth analysis of the two thematic areas, **governance and poverty,** and identify the key challenges and strategies for future interventions in each area. These two subjects have been selected based on notable UNDP involvement in the past, complexity in terms of inter-linkages and synergies with other areas, and the growing challenges expected in the next stage of the country's development challenges.

c. Lessons Learned and Good Practices

- Identify key lessons in the thematic areas of focus and on strategic positioning that can provide a useful basis for strengthening UNDP support to the country and for improving programme performance, results and effectiveness in the future. Through in-depth thematic assessment, identify good practices for learning and replication and draw lessons from intended and unintended results where possible.

6. METHODOLOGY

The assessment will employ a variety of methodologies including desk reviews, stake-holder meetings, client surveys, focus group interviews, and selected site visits. (See Annex for a range of evaluation techniques.) The Evaluation Team will review national policy documents (including the National Poverty Eradication Plan, the President's National Economic Policy (1999-2003), the HIV/AIDS Emergency Action Plan (HEAP), the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, etc.) which give an overall picture of the country context. The Team will also consider any thematic studies/papers, selected project documents and Programme Support Documents, reports from monitoring and evaluation at the country level, as well as available documentation and studies from other development partners. Statistical data will be assessed where useful. Empirical evidence will be gathered through three major sources of information: documented

records, interviewee perceptions, and the validation of and cross-referencing of all sources and the information gathered through a process of 'triangulation'. (See ADR Methodology Guidelines.)

A wide **stakeholder** consultation and involvement is envisaged. The Evaluation Team will meet with Government Ministries/institutions at the central and province level, research institutions, civil society organizations, NGOs and private sector representatives, UN Agencies, Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries.

The Team will visit **field/project sites** in a representative sample of states and communities to ensure a balanced coverage of all the country's regions as will be decided by the Evaluation Team and the EO in consultation with the country office.

In terms of methodology, the ADR will follow the guidance issued by the Evaluation Office, and consist of preparation (with preliminary desk review, programme mapping, TOR proposal, exploratory mission to the Country Office, theme-specific desk research and local studies and research); conducting the ADR by the country evaluation mission; and use of the ADR and follow-up (dissemination, corporate discussions, country office management response, stakeholder consultations, learning events).

Preparatory work at the local level will be carried out in advance to provide substantive background for the Evaluation Team. These in-depth studies in poverty and governance will be conducted by local research institute or companies. The Nigerian team will also be charged with conducting select surveys of key partners through questionnaires. The in-depth study work may entail the review of available reports, collecting additional doc-umentation, conducting select interviews, field visits and analysis and focus group discussions. This work will be based on specific TOR in addendum to these generic terms of reference.

7. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The main expected output is the comprehensive final report on "Nigeria Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results", including relevant annexes with detailed data. In addition, supporting studies in poverty and governance will be available.

8. EVALUATION TEAM

The composition of the Evaluation Team should reflect the independence and the substantive results focus of the exercise. The Team Leader and all the members of the review Team will be selected by the UNDP Evaluation Office in consultation with the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA), UNDP, New York and the Country Office. The Team Leader must have a demonstrated capacity in strategic thinking and policy advice and in the evaluation and management of complex programmes in the field. The Team composition should reflect a good knowledge of the country and region, excellent experience in evaluation and particular expertise in poverty, governance, environment and gender.

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UNDP NIGERIA

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ANNEX 4: NIGERIA STRATEGIC RESULTS FRAMEWORK – LIST OF OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES

OUTCOMES	OUTPUTS
G1 - GOVERNANCE	
SGN1 - Dialogue that Widens Development Choices **SASN1 – Globalisation:** National policies address more effectively the social impact of economic liberalisation	■ UNDP will prepare National Human Development Reports as a basis for policy advice, dialogue and advocacy. UNDP will also organise the Donor and Stakeholders Conference on the Niger-Delta and on the Governance Programme.
SASN2 – Policy Dialogue: Increased use by decision-makers of sustainable human development concepts in policy formulation and implementation	■ Aid Coordination framework for overall donor assistance put in place.
SGN2 - Key Governance Institutions **SASN1 – Parliament:** Increased effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative and oversight functions	■ Formulation of a comprehensive National Governance Programme for Sustainable Human Development. This is a framework that will cover activities related to 9 areas plus cross-cutting issues. ■ Capacity building to enhance the performance of legislators and Judiciary at the Federal and State levels.
SASN2 – Electoral Systems: Improved conformity of the legal and electoral framework with international standards	■ The capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission to train electoral officers and the current outreach of its voter and civic education programmes strengthened.
SGN3 - Local Governance **SASN2 – Decentralisation policies:** Financial and human resources mobilised and allocated in support of decentralisation and local governance in rural and urban areas	■ Under National Management for Socio-Economic Development programme provides capacity enhancement for financial management at the State and local level.
G2 – POVERTY REDUCTION	
SGN1 - National Poverty Frameworks **SASN1 - Poverty Reduction Strategies:** National anti-poverty strategy/plan/programme developed through a participatory process involving, in particular, the poor themselves	■ The 1998 Draft National Policy on Poverty Alleviation Document approved and published; the State Statistical Year books published and disseminated. ■ The strategy for the implementation of the National Policy on Poverty Alleviation in place by the end of the year.
SASN3 – HIV/AIDS: Institutional capacity built to plan and implement multi-sectoral strategies to limit the spread of HIV/AIDS and mitigate its social and economic impact	■ Strategy to mainstream Information Education and Communication (IEC) on HIV/AIDS in all programmes designed in 2000 ■ Support NACA to develop state specific action plans to combat HIV/AIDS in the year 2001.
SGN2- Access to Assets **SASN1 - Productive Resources and Assets:** Increased access of the poor to finance (formal, informal, micro)	■ Microfinance institutions operational in 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory.
SASN2 – Basic Social Services: Increased capacity of the poor to sustain their livelihoods	■ Design and implementation of Integrated Community Development projects in 300 communities ■ Establishment of skills development centres will contribute to provide jobs to poor people
G3 – ENVIRONMENT	
SGN1 - Environment and Energy for Livelihoods **SASN1 – Policy Framework:** Increased devolution of decision-making and budgetary resources for natural resource management and provision of environmental energy services	■ ZERI principles adopted as modality for sustainable development by Government.
SASN3 – Monitoring Assessment: Improved national capacity to monitor environmental conditions and trends and to assess policy performance in promoting environmental sustainability	■ The development and production of key aggregate indicators for the environment sector to be defined

OUTCOMES	OUTPUTS
SGN2 - Instruments for Environmentally Sustainable Management **SASN2 - Global Conventions and funding mechanisms:** Global Environment concerns and commitments integrtated in national development planning and policy	■ National Action Plan to combat desertification available by the year 2000. Integrated pilot projects to combat desertification with policy input. ■ National strategy to address issues of climate change and biodiversity available by the year 2002. National Communications on Climate change and Biodiversity regularised.
G4 – GENDER **SGN2 - Implementation of Global Commitments:** **SASN1 – National Action Plans:** National action plan for the advancement of women, jointly adopted, implemented and monitored by government, legislature and civil society, according to time-bound goals	■ National Policy on Women approved. ■ Put in place an effective mechanism for monitoring the implementation of national policy on women.
G6 - UNDP SUPPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS **SGN2 - Effective Operational Activities:** **SASN2 – Resident Coordinator System:** Mobilisation of UN partners to adopt common positions on development issues and achieve concrete development outcomes through the UNDAF.	■ Finalise CCA and prepare UNDAF. Design and implement joint projects in identified communities. ■ Increase in the number of projects that are jointly formulated, funded and managed by the UN System to combat poverty in Nigeria.

Source: Nigeria SRF List of Outcomes and SRF/ROAR Outcomes and Outputs, 2001

ANNEX 5: NIGERIA MAP OF INTENDED DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

UNDP THEMES	CCF 1997-2002 OBJECTIVES: RMT: US$ 76 797 000	CCF 2003-2007 OBJECTIVES* RMT: US$ 62 812 000	UNDAF 2002-2007: FOCUS AREAS*	NIGERIA SRF OUTCOMES (CCF 1997-2002, CCF 2003-7)
Governance	**Socio-economic management and policy support for SHD:** ■ **National institutional capacity to formulate social, economic and debt management policies.** ■ Improve public sector's capacity to manage resources ■ National institutions' capacity to underpin government's transition to democracy. ■ Promote sustainable urban growth by strengthening local governments.	Governance and Human Rights: ■ Strengthen national capacities to coordinate governance policies ■ Strengthen anti-corruption agencies and civil society to improve transparency. ■ Enhance judiciary's capacity to dispense justice expeditiously. ■ Improve awareness of human rights; strengthen institutions to uphold human rights, rule of law. ■ Skills for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.	Good Governance and Human Rights: ■ Build capacity of national institutions to protect human rights. ■ Harmonize national laws with international instruments. ■ Strengthen national capacity for economic management and the reduction of corruption. ■ Strengthen national capacity for emergency preparedness. ■ Promote partnerships for the formulation, implementation and assessment of national sectoral policies.	Dialogue that widens development choices: ■ **Address social impact of economic liberalisation.** ■ **Use SHD concepts in policy formulation.** Key Governance Institutions: ■ **Effectiveness of parliament.** ■ **Conform legal, electoral framework with international standards.** Local Governance: ■ **Decentralisation**
Poverty Reduction	Job creation and Sustainable Livelihoods: ■ Market-oriented economy, open trade and investment opportunities. **Social Development:** ■ Control of HIV/AIDS. ■ Improve nutritional status. ■ Increase adult literacy. ■ Harmonize UN programming for targeted poverty reduction. Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development: ■ Agricultural productivity, food security.	Poverty Eradication: ■ Support capacity-building of national institutions responsible for poverty eradication. ■ Skills development programme. ■ Strengthen microfinance institutions and use them for development of micro, small and medium enterprises. HIV/AIDS: ** ■ Enhance awareness of HIV/AIDS. ■ Preventive interventions targeted at high risk populations and reduce HIV/AIDS rate. ■ Improved coping mechanisms for people affected by HIV/AIDS.	Reducing Poverty: ■ **Enhanced food security.** ■ Increase social services by 20 percent. ■ Support National Population Policy, Millennium Declaration Commitments. ■ Employment preservation and generation. **Reducing the Incidence of HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB and other infectious diseases:** ■ National programmes to reduce HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. ■ Reduce impact of HIV/AIDS on PLWHAs; National Policy for giving anti-retroviral drugs to vulnerable groups. ■ Anti-discriminatory policies and practices towards PLWHAs.	National Poverty Frameworks: ■ National anti-poverty strategy developed through a participatory process. ■ Built institutional capacity to implement strategies to limit spread of HIV/AIDS and mitigate its social and economic impact. **Access to Assets:** ■ Increase the poor's access to finance. ■ Increase capacity of poor to sustain their livelihoods.
Environment	Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development: ■ Improved land/environment management.	Poverty Eradication: ■ Provide advisory services and capacity-building for sustainable environmental management. ■ Promote adoption of alternative renewable energies. ■ At least three Zero Emissions Research Initiatives pilot projects.	Reducing Poverty: ■ **Promote resource conservation and sustainable environmental management.** ■ **Transfer appropriate technology for environmental management.**	Environment and Energy for Livelihoods: ■ Budgetary resources for natural resource management ■ Monitor environmental conditions. **Instruments for Environmentally Sustainable Management:** ■ Global environment concerns in national development policy.
Gender	Social development: ■ Empowerment of women. Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development: ■ Increase women's access to agricultural land and credit.	Gender issues will be mainstreamed so that at least 50 percent of the target beneficiaries will be women.	Good Governance and Human Rights: ■ Gender equity, females in governance. Reducing Poverty ■ Women in development processes. HIV/AIDS ■ Mainstream gender-related issues in all HIV/AIDS policies.	Implementation of Global Commitments: ■ **National action plan for advancement of women adopted by government and civil society.**

Sources: Country Cooperation Frameworks and Related Matter for Nigeria, 1997-2002; Country Cooperation Frameworks and Related Matters for Nigeria, 2003-2007; United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Nigeria, 2002-2007; Nigeria SRF/ROAR Outcomes and Outputs, 2001.
*Note: Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is a cross-cutting theme in the CCF 2003-2007 and UNDAF 2002-2007.
**Note: There is not a specific UNDP theme for HIV/AIDS. In following the ROAR schema of SRF goals, HIV/AIDS was placed under 'Poverty Reduction'.

ANNEX 6: UNDP SHARE OF GROSS BUDGET

GROSS BUDGET = US$175,953,835

UNDP – 94%
(US$164,973,574)

Cost-sharing – 6%
(US$10,980,261)

ANNEX 7: DATA ON ODA ENVIRONMENT IN NIGERIA

ANNUAL ODA DISBURSEMENTS, 1988–2000 (IN MILLIONS OF US$)

Note: The US $184.8 million translates into US $1.60 per person, which represents only 0.4% of Nigeria's GDP.
Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

TOP TEN DONORS OF NET ODA ACCORDING TO OECD/DAC (1998–1999 AVERAGE) (IN MILLIONS OF US$)

Source: OECD DAC

ODA DISBURSEMENTS BY UN SYSTEM, 1999 (IN THOUSANDS OF US$)

FAO	453
UNDP	3,971
ILO	50
UNESCO	307
UNICEF	8,727
WHO	6,378
UNHCR	360

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

ODA DISBURSEMENTS BY TERMS, 1999

Grants 47%
Loans 53%

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

TOP TEN ODA SECTORS, 1999 (PERCENTAGE)

Health sector	19.8
Transport	17.9
Natural resources	16.6
Governance	12.5
Social development	12
Agriculture	10.3
Economic management	2.1
Energy sector	1.2
Education	1.2
Industrial sector	1

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

ODA DISBURSEMENTS BY TYPE, 1999

Investment Project Assistance 58%
Free-Standing Technical Cooperation 40%
Investment-Related Technical Cooperation 1%
Programme/ Budgetary Aid or BOP Support 1%
Emergency and Relief Assistance 0%

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

ANNEX 8: COMPARISON OF KEY INDICATORS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES 2001-2002										
Country	HDI Rank	Population (in millions)	Area (in sq kms)	GDP per capita (in PPP US$)	Life Expectancy	Adult Literacy (%)	GDI Rank	Adult HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rate	Population below $1/day (in millions)	Corruption Perception Index Rank/102
Nigeria	**148**	**113.9**	**923,773**	**896**	**51.7**	**63.9**	**124**	**5.80**	**70.2**	**101**
Bangladesh	145	137.4	144,000	1,602	59.4	41.3	121	<0.10	29.1	102
Benin	158	6.3	112,620	990	53.8	37.4	134	3.61	n/a	n/a
Botswana	126	1.5	600,370	7,184	40.3	77.2	104	38.80	33.3	24
Brazil	73	170.4	8,511,965	7,625	67.7	85.2	64	0.65	11.6	45
Cote d'Ivoire	156	16	322,460	1,630	47.8	46.8	132	9.65	12.3	71
Ghana	129	19.3	239,460	1,964	56.8	71.5	108	3.00	44.8	50
India	124	1,008.9	3,287,590	2,358	63.3	57.2	105	0.79	44.2	71
Indonesia	110	212.1	1,919,440	3,043	66.2	86.9	91	0.10	7.7	96
South Africa	107	43.3	1,219,912	9,401	52.1	85.3	88	20.10	11.5	36
Tanzania	151	35.1	945,087	523	51.1	75.1	126	7.83	19.9	n/a
Uganda	150	23.3	236,040	1,208	44.0	67.1	125	5.00	26.0	93

ANNEX 9: SELECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN NIGERIA

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Life Expectancy (number of years)	52	53	53	54	54	54	54
Infant mortality Rate (per 1,000 births)	114	114	114	75.1	75.1	75.1	75.1
Real GDP growth Rate (%)	2.2	3.3	3.2	2.4	2.8	3.8	3.9
Manufacturing Capacity Utilization (%)	29.3	32.5	30.4	32.4	35.9	36.1	39.6
Credit to the Private Sector (growth rate)	23.7	34.7	-23.9	27.4	29.2	30.9	43.5
Credit to the Government (Million Naira)	82.5	109.6	-53.5	144.9	32.0	-170.1	79.7
Inflation Rate	72.8	29.3	8.5	10.0	6.6	6.9	18.9
Government Expenditure of Health (% of total expenditure)	6.33	8.12	3.92	5.05	3.33	7.07	5.87
Interest Rate differentials (%)	7.57	8.03	12.3	11.6	17.7	16.0	19.2
Overall Balance of payment as % of GDP	-3.1	-5.6	0.04	-7.7	-9.7	6.3	0.5

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Account, Various Issues

ADR	Assessment of Development Results		NDE	National Directorate of Employment
ADP	Agricultural Development Programme		NHDR	National Human Development Report
CBO	Community Based Organization		NAPEP	National Poverty Eradication Programme
CCA	Common Country Assessment		NGO	Non Government Organization
CCF	Country Cooperation Framework		NPF	National Partnership Forum
CO	Country Office		NMESD	National Management of Socio-Economic Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee		NORAD	Norwegian Aid
DFID	Department for International Development of the United Kingdom		NPC	National Planning Commission
			NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States		ODA	Official Development Assistance
EO	Evaluation Office (of UNDP)		OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
FACU	Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit			
FCT	Federal Capital Territory		PAP	Poverty Alleviation Programme
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria		PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
GDI	Gender Development Index		PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
HEAP	HIV/AIDS Emergency Action Plan		RBDA	River Basin Development Authority
HDF	Human Development Trust Fund		RBM	Results Based Management
HDI	Human Development Index		RMT	Resource Mobilization Target
HDN	Human Development Network		ROAR	Results Oriented Annual Report
HDR	Human Development Report		SAERD	Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product			
GCCC	Government Cash Counterpart Contribution		SAS	Strategic Areas of Support
			SDC	Skills Development Centre
ICDP	Integrated Community Development Programme		SHD	Sustainable Human Development
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices Commission		SPCC	State Programme Coordinating Committee
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission		SPMA	State Programme Monitoring Adviser
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution		SRF	Strategic Results Framework
IPG	Independent Policy Group		TRAC	Target of Resources Allocated to the Core
MDG	Millennium Development Goals		UBE	Universal Basic Education
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding		UN	United Nations
NACA	National Action Committee on AIDS		UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
NACRDB	Nigeria Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank		UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
			UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
NALDA	National Land Development Agency		UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
NCML	National Commission for Mass Literacy		UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
			WB	World Bank