COUNTRY EVALUATION: SUDAN

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COUNTRY EVALUATION: SUDAN
Foreword

Learning from what works and does not work is critical to improving performance. The Sudan country review* set out to review UNDP’s experience in Sudan during the recent past with a view to improving the organization’s positioning and role as a development partner to the Sudanese people. As such, the Sudan country review looks at three areas in depth and provides lessons and recommendations in each: 1) strategic positioning and relevance; 2) programme performance; and 3) programme management, insofar as it affected the first two. The resulting report is a frank assessment of the recent past of UNDP’s development assistance to Sudan. It holds a number of important lessons for how the country office can reorient itself to maximize its assistance and leverage progress made to date. It provides lessons for national stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries in partnering for results and building ownership. And it serves as a guide for UNDP corporately in understanding what works, what does not work and why in countries such as Sudan which face a complex mix of dynamic political, humanitarian and development challenges. As the report surveys the past five years with a forward-looking perspective, it is intended to help UNDP and national stakeholders in Sudan to draft a new country programme for Sudan that will set the framework for the next five years of assistance.

A number of people helped to bring the Sudan review and its report to fruition. First among these is Rajeev Pillay, General Partner, Abacus International Management L.L.C., who led the review and is the chief author of this report. Linda Maguire, of the UNDP Evaluation Office, served as the task manager of the review as well as provided methodological

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* The cover page titles the report on ‘Country Evaluation’. Here the generic term “Evaluation” refers to both the Country Reviews (done under the new outcome based ADR approach) and to future ADRs.
support for the earlier outcome evaluation from which this review draws selected analysis. Two additional UNDP staff members provided invaluable thematic expertise and organizational insights to this report. Bruno Lemarquis, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP/Haiti, provided rural development and programme management expertise, and Wandia Gichuru, Policy Advisor, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, contributed her knowledge of conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues. Finally, Hassan A. Abdel Ati, Director of EDGE for Consultancy and Research in Sudan, served as an important intermediary with Sudanese interlocutors and helped to ground the review in the reality of the Sudanese context.

This report would also not be possible without the assistance and support of H.E. Dr. Karam Eldin Abdel Moula, Minister of International Cooperation, who took a personal interest in the work of the review, organised a stakeholders brainstorming session and provided valuable, supportive and constructive comments.

Last, but certainly not least, the report owes a debt of gratitude to Roger Guarda, the UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, Anne-Marie Cluckers and especially Mohammad Pournik of the UNDP office in Sudan for their untiring efforts and the time they took to provide substantive analysis and inputs to the work of the review.

Khalid Malik
Director
UNDP Evaluation Office
Abbreviations

**ADS/ARS**  
Area Development and Area Rehabilitation Schemes

**BCPR**  
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (of UNDP)

**CAP**  
Consolidated Appeals Process

**CCA**  
Common Country Assessment

**CBO**  
Community-Based Organisation

**CCF**  
Country Cooperation Framework

**CR**  
Country Review

**DEX**  
Direct Execution

**DFID**  
Department for International Development  
(of the United Kingdom)

**EO**  
Evaluation Office (of UNDP)

**EU**  
European Union

**FAO**  
Food and Agriculture Organisation

**GEF**  
Global Environment Fund

**GOS**  
Government of Sudan

**IBRD**  
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
(of the World Bank)

**IDA**  
International Development Association  
(of the World Bank)

**IUCN**  
International Union for the Conservation of Nature

**ILO**  
International Labour Organisation
JMC  Joint Military Commission
MIC  Ministry of International Cooperation
MOF  Ministry of Finance
NEX  National Execution
NEX/MSU  Management Support Unit for National Execution
NHDR  National Human Development Report
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation
RBAS  Regional Bureau for Arab States (of UNDP)
TPR  Tripartite Review
UNCDF  United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDESA  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDAF  United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO  United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNOPS  United Nations Office of Project Services
UNSO  United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office
          (under the authority of the UNDP Administrator)
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WFP  World Food Programme
WHO  World Health Organisation
This report of the Sudan Country Review covers the period from 1997 through 2001, although the geneses of some of the results studied—most notably with those of the ADS/ARS\(^1\) programme—date to the late 1980s. This executive summary presents the key findings, lessons learned and recommendations of the Country Review Mission in the three main areas of programme relevance and strategic positioning, programme performance and programme management, while also offering some analysis on the issues of coordination, partnerships and resource mobilisation.

**PROGRAMME RELEVANCE AND STRATEGIC POSITIONING**

1. The structure and design of the First CCF did not reflect or address issues associated with conflict or the endemic nature of natural disasters in Sudan. Nevertheless, the ADS/ARS programme very directly addressed some of the most fundamental issues associated with poverty alleviation, gender in development and participatory development in Sudan.

2. UNDP’s programme in Sudan has been compartmentalized and its results dispersed. A rationale exists for UNDP to develop a more coherent and relevant country programme for the next cycle. Specifically, a window of opportunity for peace has opened in Sudan’s civil war and UNDP is uniquely placed to bridge the gap from humanitarian assistance to development. In the past year UNDP’s nascent peacebuilding\(^2\) activities

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1. Area Development Scheme / Area Rehabilitation Scheme programmes.
2. Peacebuilding is “a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict... UNDP peacebuilding aims to build and enable durable peace and sustainable development in post-conflict situations,” excerpted from “Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations,” DP/2001/4
have shown considerable potential in terms of strategic positioning and relevance. This area has also demonstrated potential in terms of resource mobilization.

3. That said, UNDP does not yet appear to have a clear strategy to guide its work in the area of peacebuilding, which can potentially involve work on a range of conflicts in addition to the North-South civil war. There is a need for UNDP to develop such a strategy as soon as possible based on a systematic analysis of each of the conflicts. Furthermore, UNDP’s involvement in all other areas—energy and the environment, governance and strategic planning—has been relatively ad hoc and lacked concerted analysis, strategy or focus.

4. External debt is in excess of US$20 billion. Debt repayments as a result place a heavy burden on the Government, which is currently in default on its debt obligations. Increasing collaboration between UNDP and the World Bank by helping to introduce some of the policy foundations for a possible future participation of Sudan in HIPC is likely to create opportunities for future dialogue on the peace process.

5. The “flagship” ADS/ARS (80% of UNDP’s programme) represent a viable development model that could be used in peacebuilding initiatives, however the sustainability of ADS/ARS results and their cost-effectiveness remain deep concerns. The programmes established participatory development mechanisms centred on community-based organizations—a groundbreaking development in Sudan that has translated into real improvements in people’s lives. Yet the government has not replicated the ADS/ARS, and the absence of recurrent government budgets, wages and essential infrastructure investments at the local level have diverted finances away from village revolving funds to cover basic social services. This weakened the viability of the funds, which was already low due to a combination of low repayment rates and the reluctance to charge interest in an era of high inflation.

6. The energy and environment component of the portfolio produced significant results, despite being for the most part focused on international conventions. Many of these results—increased access to safe water, increased vegetation cover and production of seedlings—have had a positive effect on people’s lives. Although there is little to say about outcomes—and the ultimate sustainability of the outputs produced—the energy and environment projects do seem to have raised awareness of environmental issues—both locally and nationally—perhaps laying the groundwork for eventual policy change. That said, activities in this sector have been treated in relative isolation and the potential linkages with UNDP’s other programmes—such as the ADS/ARS—have not been exploited.

7. UNDP has initiated preparatory activities in civil service reform and support to the National Assembly. Such projects are unlikely to be strategic at the present time, but could of course be reconsidered further into the country programme if circumstances permit. New initiatives in the area of local governance, however, do appear to hold some promise in terms if an enabling environment and linkages to UNDP’s prior assistance.

8. Activities in peacebuilding to date have also been preparatory in nature and have focused on the creation of mechanisms and processes for information sharing and coordination. They appear to constitute an important beginning, but need to be complemented with a move into more practical peacebuilding activities based on a systematic analysis of relevant conflicts and a strategy for the sector.

9. The past CCF and Country Programmes have demonstrated the value of a number of patterns of intervention—least the area development approach. Lessons learned from them should be taken into account in the formulation and design of future programmes.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

10. Insufficient substantive and financial monitoring on the part of the NEX Management Support Unit (MSU) and UNDP resulted in a serious financial
crisis. Annual audits by the Sudanese Auditor General warned repeatedly of serious shortcomings but neither the NEX-MSU nor the UNDP country office followed up on the findings and recommendations.

11. At its peak, the Area Development and Area Rehabilitation Schemes (ADS/ARS) supported a total project staff of approximately 450, consisting mostly of government officials on secondment. These officials were recruited on a special salary scale that was higher than that of the Government, but lower than that of National Programme Officers at the UN. This was an unsustainable and less-than-ideal use of UNDP programme resources, and also raises concerns of sustainability and national capacity building.

12. Overall, the management issues greatly impacted programme performance and UNDP’s reputation in Sudan. The current UNDP country office Senior Management Team has improved UNDP’s image among donors and national partners, but the office will need to build its internal capacities to deliver on its programmes and account for resources. One means to do so would be the continuation of the recently adopted direct execution modality combined with capacity building for UNDP and government counterparts; other means could be informed by the programme management mechanisms in force at UNDP’s sister funds and programmes.

13. This state of affairs and the subsequent inroads made by the current country office Senior Management Team to turn the situation around under very difficult conditions have been clearly noted by the international community in Khartoum. Many prominent members of the international community praised the current Resident Representative and expressed confidence in his ability to coordinate and to manage the UNDP programme. At the same time, these same people expressed strong reservations about the current lack of depth in the substantive and management capacity of the country office — particularly following the recent downsizing.

14. UNDP headquarters has provided very little support to the country office during the programming cycle. If UNDP is to have a credible presence in Sudan, headquarters will have to provide extensive support to the country office as well as resources aimed at strengthening the office and its capacity for programming and delivery. If UNDP is unable to effectively address its resource and capacity constraints in countries such as the Sudan where it is already and will in the future be under increasing scrutiny from the international community, it should consider closing down its office and re-allocating its resources to other priority offices.

COORDINATION

15. Development assistance in Sudan is dwarfed by humanitarian assistance and Inter-Agency rivalries are strong, both of which affect UNDP’s ability to take the lead in coordination within and beyond the UN system. Any achievements in coordination have been due largely to the personal professional standing of the Resident Coordinator concerned. Based on previous experience and on the emerging development opportunities, the new Resident Coordinator should have a UNDP background and experience. This will bolster both the UNDP country office and the development agenda just at a time when the country office needs support and the development agenda needs leadership.

PARTNERSHIPS

16. Partly because of the nature of international aid to Sudan, the UNDP programme has been implemented largely in isolation of the programmes of other agencies that have focused on humanitarian assistance. UNDP needs to create greater general awareness of its programmes among potential development partners. The failure to do so, at least prior to 2000, negatively affected its profile and credibility.

17. UNDP’s key partners in Sudan have been the government and the local beneficiaries in the ADS/ARS. UNDP was restricted somewhat in developing partnerships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) due to their relative scarcity after restrictions were placed on them, and to their reorientation towards humanitarian assistance. These factors have undermined areas of potential collaboration with
NGOs originally envisaged in the areas of advocacy and rural development.

**RESOURCE MOBILISATION**

18. Although the UNDP office has managed to mobilise US$4 million in cost sharing, resource mobilisation has been negatively affected by the sanctions leading to an exclusive emphasis on humanitarian assistance and the use of the CAP as the sole mechanism for pledging of assistance to Sudan. Although UNDP has managed to secure funding for its peacebuilding portfolio under the CAP, the potential use of the CAP as a mechanism for securing funds for other activities is limited as a result of an exclusion of projects with multi-year budgets.
A. RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW
This Country Review represents the fourth of its kind conducted applying a new results-based methodology. This methodology, premised on the concept of Assessment of Development Results (ADR), is intended to provide senior management of UNDP, host countries and other stakeholders a measure of development effectiveness of UNDP’s interventions in a given country. This review was neither a full-fledged ADR per se, nor a “run-of-the-mill” country review; rather, it represents a bridge between the past and future approaches to country evaluation. The review was at once backward and forward looking, assessing both the results UNDP has achieved and their relevance to Sudan’s development context. As such, the resultant report intends to be an independent assessment and “validation” of the results achieved during the First Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Sudan (1997-2001), drawing lessons from the past in order to inform the design of the next Country Programme for Sudan.

B. THE METHODOLOGY
The Country Review was conducted over a two-week period in Sudan (2-14 March 2002) followed by one week for report preparation. The Country Review Team was asked to review and assess the relevance and strategic positioning of UNDP, the performance of its programmes and their

3. The Evaluation Office (EO) conducted five country reviews in 2001-02, which were in line with UNDP’s results-based management for the purpose of validating results. These took place (in chronological order) in India, Fiji (with Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu), Kenya, Sudan and Jordan.
management by UNDP during the period covered by the First CCF (see the Terms of Reference in Annex II). However, the unusually long lifetime of the Area Development and Area Rehabilitation Schemes, the first of which were launched in 1987/88, should have enabled the review to assess programme impact. However, because baseline data on indicators collected at the outset of the programme were not monitored regularly, in practice a comprehensive assessment of outcomes and impact in a satisfactory manner did not prove feasible.

Programme Relevance
Programme relevance was assessed principally utilising economic and political analyses of the situation in Sudan and consultations with key embassies, UN agencies and national staff working in the country. The mission also reviewed the CCF document, the Common Country Assessment/United Nations Development Assistance Framework, draft National Human Development Reports and the Global Human Development Report and a variety of other documentation and reports concerning poverty, the environment, economic and political trends and conflict in the Sudan.

Programme Performance
The Review, which involved extensive consultations with UNDP staff and in headquarters and in the field and with partners and stakeholders in Sudan, relied heavily on secondary assessments including performance reports, thematic or project evaluations and other programme reviews conducted during the course of implementation to the extent that they were available.

As discussed below in the section of this report on management, termination of key projects and turnover of both project and programme staff resulted in a marked lack of continuity, institutional memory and substantive knowledge of project and programme outcomes. Closure of the Management Support Unit for National Execution (NEX-MSU, see below) without adequate handover and the lack of adequate files and record keeping militated against any systematic assessment of programme outcomes—let alone impact. Most importantly, given the relative importance of the Area Development and Area Rehabilitation Schemes (ADS/ARS), an in-depth outcome-oriented Terminal Evaluation of the ADS/ARS immediately preceded the mission and fed into the findings of the Country Review mission. The Country Review Mission also had access to two previous evaluations of the ADS/ARS. The Country Review Mission also reviewed evaluations of projects and programmes in other focus areas of the CCF.

On the management side, the mission reviewed the audits of NEX and the NEX-MSU by the Auditor General of Sudan—as well as internal audits of the UNDP office itself. The mission also undertook its own interviews with project personnel and programme, administrative and finance staff of the country office.

The Country Review Team visited the area surrounding El Obeid in North Kordofan State where it was able to visit project activities undertaken by the ADS (the oldest and largest of the Schemes) as well as a vocational training project. Both provided the mission with the opportunity to consult project beneficiaries, project staff and state government officials. The Country Review Team consulted a wide range of government officials in Khartoum from the Ministry of International Cooperation as well as a number of line ministries involved in the management and implementation of projects and programmes under the CCF.

The report summarizes findings, lessons learned and recommended actions in the areas of the programme relevance and strategic positioning; programme performance; and programme management, as well as in the areas of partnerships, resource mobilisation and coordination.

5. The draft National Human Development Report has had to undergo numerous revisions because the data and conclusions drawn in one version were unacceptable to the GOS and in another version were unacceptable to other national actors. A final version has not yet been issued. The controversial nature of the data, and resultant lack of broad-based buy-in to the analysis of the data, made this source quite difficult to use in accurately assessing the development situation in Sudan.

Programme Relevance and Strategic Positioning

A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROGRAMME

Roots of the Programme
The UNDP programme in Sudan differs from most others in that it has demonstrated a singular level of continuity over an extended period of time in the form of the area development approach which was instated as the centrepiece of UNDP’s assistance in 1987/1988 and has represented more than 80 per cent of the UNDP’s contribution to Sudan since its inception.

The area development approach was intended to be a bold break with the past, having been created based on an assessment in 1986/1987 done at the peak of overseas development assistance to the country. That assessment opined that prior assistance channelled through government or in support of capacity development within government had either failed to achieve sustainability or had resulted in a further perpetuation of dependency as a result of intractable structural problems. As such, the Area Development Schemes (ADS) were designed to address this issue by focusing on civil society and creating capacity at the grassroots level with a view to raising

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7. It is estimated that at its peak, ODA to Sudan was just short of US$2 billion per year. This figure declined dramatically to just US$100 million in 1991.
**Figure 1: Phases in the Evolution of UNDP’s Programme in Sudan**

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<th>Activities</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Institution building throughout government ministries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Management Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agriculture and rangeland management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feasibility studies for large-scale infrastructure development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure development</td>
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<td><strong>1987-2000</strong></td>
<td>Grass-roots based area development schemes as the main delivery mechanism for income growth, employment generation, environmental management and social development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Focus on capacity building at community level</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Environmental programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2001-PRESENT</strong></td>
<td>Preparatory work for post-conflict peace-building</td>
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<td>Governance, public administration reform</td>
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**Box 1: Important Political Events Affecting Development in the CCF Period**

- **June 1989:** Brig. General Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir seizes power in a coup and, annulling all prior agreements with the SPLA, declares a state of emergency and creates the Revolutionary Command Council.
- **May 1994:** The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace talks between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) result in an agreement in principle to hold a referendum on southern self-determination.
- **March 1996:** Elections are held for first time. Elections boycotted by National Democratic Alliance. Bashir wins; Turabi elected Speaker of the National Assembly.
- **May 1996:** The UN Security Council imposes sanctions on Sudan in response to Khartoum’s refusal to hand over information regarding individuals suspected of involvement in the attempted assassination of the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, in 1995. The US imposes its own sanctions on Sudan the following year.
- **April 1997:** Peace Agreement signed in Khartoum.
- **June 1998:** The government enacts a new constitution; this includes reference to Sharia (Islamic law) as the basis for Sudanese law, and promises a referendum on self-determination for the south. Further legislation in January 1999 allows political parties ("associations") to be formed and contest elections.
- **August 1998:** The US attacks a suspected chemical weapons factory close to Khartoum, alleging Sudanese support for international terrorism; the government asserts that the installation is a privately owned pharmaceuticals factory.
- **August 1999:** Completion of a 1,610 km oil pipeline linking southern oilfields to the export terminal near Port Sudan. Oil exports begin.
- **December 1999:** President Bashir imposes a state of emergency. He suspends parliament and removes from government supporters of Hassan al-Turabi. The state of emergency is extended for a further year in January 2001.
- **March 2000:** The Umma Party, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, a former prime minister, leaves the opposition alliance, following several months of talks with the government.
- **June 2000:** Mr. Turabi is expelled from the ruling National Congress (NC). He forms his own party, the Popular National Congress (PNC).
- **December 1999:** Bashir declares a new state of emergency, dismisses Turabi as Speaker and dissolves Parliament two days before it was to vote on a bill designed to reduce presidential powers.
- **December 2000:** Elections are held; Mr. Bashir wins the vote to be elected president for another five-year term. The NC wins the overwhelming majority of seats in the National Assembly.
- **February 2001:** Mr. Turabi is arrested on sedition charges after signing a co-operation agreement with the SPLA.
- **March 2002:** Signature of the U.S.-facilitated Nuba Mountains Agreement laying down a road map for a localised peace process in the Nuba Mountains.

**The Political Context**

The political environment in Sudan has been a complex one ever since the formulation and implementation of the ADS/ARS, which throughout the cycle under review have constituted the principal channel for UNDP assistance to Sudan.

Formulated during the democratically elected government of Sadiq el Mahdi, the ADS/ARS were fully launched following the 1989 coup d’etat of Brigadier General Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir. Since 1989, both the war in the south and government’s efforts to preserve internal stability have served to divert resources away from development and the social sectors. There have been, over the years, a number of third-party mediation attempts to end the North-South conflict, most of which ended in deadlock over the issues of religion and state, the political system, security during the interim period, socio-economic policies and a referendum on self-determination.

The Government of Sudan officially transformed itself from a military to a civilian one in 1993. Elections, which were boycotted by the opposition and questioned by international observers, were held for the first time in March 1996, resulting in the confirmation of the al Bashir government. Also in 1996, Sudan became the object of Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054 and 1070, which imposed sanctions on the country for allegedly failing to turn over to the appropriate authorities information concerning suspects involved in incomes on a sustainable basis through the encouragement of productive schemes and income generation through the establishment of small, primarily agri-based businesses. The ADS were the vehicle adopted for the purpose and have remained the principal vehicle for the achievement of these objectives ever since. As a consequence, subject to the availability of data, the Area Development Schemes and—the younger Area Rehabilitation Schemes—have matured sufficiently to enable a measurement of impact as long as appropriate data exists.
the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in 1995 (all three resolutions were repealed in September 2001).

In 1996, the Government and SPLA-United (now called the Southern Sudan Independence Movement), signed a “Peace Charter” which in 1997 was transformed into a “Peace Agreement” (the “Khartoum Peace Agreement”) on the understanding that a referendum on southern Sudanese independence after an “interim period” of four years. The SPLA increased its contacts with the National Democratic Alliance, ultimately forming an alliance that includes key players in both the North and South. Commitments were made to change the government, but details of an interim government and constitution produced fierce debate that demonstrated the weaknesses in the alliance and disagreements among the wide array of members that make up its ranks.

Human Development Trends and their Impact on the Programme

The 1997-2001 CCF must be viewed within the broader context of human development trends in Sudan that have taken place not just during the period in question, but over the past decade. This is because the programme’s roots date to 1987 and such developments have had either a direct or indirect effect on the relevance and results of UNDP’s operations.

Sudan is characterised not only by the long-standing civil conflict but also by widespread poverty—although accurate information on poverty indices remains problematic. For example, a decline of the average per capita income from over US$ 500 in the late 1970s to around US$ 300 in 1996 may in large part be due to the correction of an overvalued exchange rate. Other human development indices, however, help to round out the picture.

According to the UNDP Human Development Report, Sudan features the following human development figures:

- The development of the country, particularly in the South, is negatively affected by the prolonged conflict, which is now entering its sixth decade. The war has placed a heavy toll on the country resources and has been the principal cause of the displacement of an estimated 4 million people, of which 1.8 million have converged in Khartoum.

- The CCF period and the implementation of the ADS/ARS schemes over a longer period of time have also been severely affected by the quite dramatic changes in the economic environment. Overseas development assistance to Sudan dropped from about US$800 million in 1989 to US$225 million in 1994 (from a per capita ODA of US$23 to US$8), to almost nil by 1995. Support from Arab nations was halted after the Gulf War in 1990 (Sudan supported Iraq in the War) although a few charitable Islamic organisations continued to operate. The few international NGOs that remained reduced their budgets and scaled down their activities.

- The total debt stock of Sudan, according to World Bank figures, stood at US$23.7 billion at end-1999, a rise of 5.5 per cent from its level in 1998 and a dramatic rise of 77.4 per cent over its debt level in 1989. Debt service alone has doubled 12 times over 20 years, from US$117 million in 1979 to a massive US$1.4 billion in 1998. Bilateral and private creditors together constitute 81 per cent of Sudan’s debt while the IBRD, IDA and IMF loans together comprise 13 per cent of the total. Severe austerity measures were imposed during the CCF measures (currency devaluation, lifting of subsidies, privatisation, reduction of spending on social services). The Sudanese Pound has dropped in value from LS 13=US$1 in 1989 to LS 2560.

- Harsh measures taken against the private sector including the confiscation or freezing of assets and the introduction of high taxes in 1989 and 1990 led to the flight of domestic private capital. According to World Bank figures published in 2000, total FDI in

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Sudan, on the other hand, has witnessed a marked upswing since the discovery of oil in the mid-1990s and reached US$371 million in 1998. It is estimated that over 60 per cent of FDI has been concentrated in Khartoum State, and 22 per cent in the Red Sea State. A total of 39 per cent of FDI was invested in transportation infrastructure, 26 per cent in agriculture and 22 per cent in industry. Some 73 per cent of all investment derives from the Arab States and the Middle East while 14 per cent has derived from Asia (principally companies with oil technology such as Malaysia's Petronas).

In addition to effects from the economic environment, the UNDP programme in Sudan has been heavily affected by political developments in Sudan. The perpetuation of the civil war between North and South of the country, persistent national and international allegations of human rights abuses, the imposition of a rather strict form of sharia, reports of slavery as well as purported links of the government to radical groups, have all contributed to the introduction of sanctions by certain countries on Sudan and the elimination of virtually all development assistance to the country. Indeed, since 1989, UNDP has been the only agency that has provided a programme of assistance that has been principally developmental in nature. Because UNDP's programme was oriented largely towards the grassroots level, however, it was able to circumvent some of the concerns of undertaking development initiatives in such a complex political environment.

The UNDP programme, originally intended to work principally with civil society, was constrained in this effort as a result of the government’s closing or placing restrictions on international and national NGOs working in Sudan, some of which were perceived as siding with the rebels in the South, in the mid-1980s. The heavy preponderance of humanitarian assistance also resulted in major reorientation of the programmes of the remaining NGOs, which in many cases commenced parallel operations in Kenya in order to be able to channel humanitarian assistance to areas behind SPLA lines. Since 1997, however, there has been a substantial increase in the number of international and national NGOs working in the north.

Since the mid-1980s, the sustainability of UNDP programmes and projects—which focused primarily at the grassroots level and on building local capacity to sustain livelihoods—has been severely affected by the very limited resources allocated by the Government to cover recurrent budgets and the running of essential services, particularly in rural areas. For example, resources from revolving funds at the local level, which were created as part of the ADS/ARS to encourage local development programmes, were diverted to supplement basic services, thereby threatening the sustainability of those funds. The war effort has continued to divert budgetary resources away from the social sectors and from development except in areas such as Khartoum where preserving stability is a clear government priority.

One political factor influencing government’s capacity to deliver basic social services was the relatively recent introduction of a federal system of government. In early 1994, the country was divided into 26 states, superseding the nine states established after 1991, with the President appointing state governors. The 1998 constitution upheld this structure. The creation of these new structures has added significant costs to the government budget, making fewer resources available to fund social services at the local level. Indeed, the increase in number of states and their corresponding structures has corresponded with a general decline in services to local populations.

It is also argued that the new state structures
have only selectively increased voice in Sudan, given that the majority of deputies to state assemblies are nominated by the state-level popular congresses or by the President on the advice of the State Governor (55%) whereas a minority are elected (45%). In addition, elections to state assemblies for the 45% were held in most of the northern states in 1999 but did not take place in the south, further diluting participation.

Since the 1989 coup, the regime has introduced a series of political reforms. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the Revolutionary Command Council of National Salvation (RCC) was given full legislative and executive powers, and Mr. Bashir, its Chairman, was named Head of State. The constitution has since been changed, and the president is now elected by universal suffrage every five years. In 1990 the government instituted a system of popular congresses in a pyramidal structure reminiscent of the Libyan popular participation model. These groups act at the village level and are selected every two years. The system was supplemented in 1992 by the creation of a 300-member National Assembly (expanded in 1996 to 400 deputies). Of the deputies, 275 are elected every four years by popular vote and the President appoints the remainder.

Political parties were banned following the revolution, but legislation was introduced in January 1999 allowing “political associations” (known as congresses) to form and operate as parties in all but name, and campaign in local and national elections. A new constitution, introduced in June 1998, promised basic liberties such as freedom of religion, freedom of association and self-determination for Southern Sudan. Despite the changes introduced in the new constitution, power continues to rest firmly with the National Congress. The Congress still controls, for example, the selection of candidates for local and national office and the sanctioning of new political associations. Its institutional dominance is underpinned by its control of the armed forces, both the military and its own Popular Defence Force (PDF). The nature of the political environment in Sudan has of course greatly affected both the possibility of UNDP conducting governance programming during the CCF, as well as the content and entry points of such assistance.

B. RECENT STRATEGIC CONTEXT
A number of internal and external factors have converged in the past 18 months to create a moment that is considered ripe for change and potential resolution of the conflict in Sudan including:

- Revived geopolitical interest in the Sudan resulting from the exploitation of oil reserves;
- The interest of Sudanese government in attracting foreign investment and technology for the extraction of oil;
- Reduced influence of the Popular National Congress;¹³
- The unification of a number of rebel factions in the South and their advances on the battlefield that have provoked a reassessment by the Government of the likelihood of an outright military victory;
- A focusing of rebel activity on disruption of oil production; and
- The aftermath of the September 11 attacks that has increased pressure on the Government to adhere to Security Council resolutions to, among other things, provide information on radical groups that have operated in Sudan in the past.

This has resulted in a greater openness to the idea of negotiations and the launching of both the EU critical dialogue and the US initiative that have shown some progress to date. The EU initiative is a dialogue covering terrorism, the creation of democratic structures and the enforcement of human rights with the Government of Sudan with the aim of normalising relations. With respect to the US, positive post-September 11th interaction between the Government of Sudan and the US has also resulted in some movement on the peacebuilding front. The US has appointed former Senator John Danforth as a mediator and a confidence building process has been launched with the signature of a four-point accord in March 2002 comprising the provisions for:

1. The cessation of bombing of civilian targets;
2. A full ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains linked to a programme of developmental and humanitarian assistance there;

¹³. Five actors: the Government, the SPLA, the Umma Party, the Popular National Congress and the National Democratic Alliance dominate the political scene. The Government in Khartoum is composed of the Popular National Congress (formerly the National Islamic Front). Militarily it is opposed primarily by the SPLA, the dominant rebel group, led by Col. John Garang, and politically by the National Democratic Alliance, an opposition coalition that includes a wide array of northern parties and the SPLA. The Umma Party, the largest political party in Sudan, dropped out of the coalition in 2000.
3. The designation of “days of tranquillity” for humanitarian operations; and
4. Creation of a commission to investigate and monitor abduction and slavery.

A Joint Military Commission (JMC) has been established to monitor and verify implementation of the Nuba component of the agreement and was fielded for the first time in March 2002. The other three points of the agreement will have their own monitoring systems as agreed to by the SPLM and the Government of Sudan.

Despite these encouraging signs, numerous risks continue to endanger the achievement of a lasting peace. These include:

- The lack of grassroots political pressure for change in the Sudan because of widespread dispersal of the population and the absence of communications infrastructure;
- The neutralisation of the opposition despite the formation of alliances across political lines, which was unheard of in the past; and
- The rapid increase in oil revenues which are currently managed largely off-budget; increase in oil revenues could be a factor that enhances peace if such revenues are directed towards development, or they could detract from peace if used to reinforce political control and strengthen the military capacity of the Government.

It is generally recognised, however, that there exists a brief window of opportunity to address the main conflict in Sudan.

Achievement of a resolution to the conflict should pave the way for a return of development assistance to the Sudan and a change in the emphasis away from humanitarian assistance; a change which will enhance UNDP’s role and effectiveness in the coordination of development assistance. As discussed below, the UNDP programme has made some initial changes to reorient its efforts to support nascent efforts at peacebuilding. This reorientation will need to be consolidated and strengthened if UNDP is to play a central and effective role in this effort—something that entails risk but also presents opportunities.

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14. Some bilateral donors informed the mission that they were already making plans to allocate development assistance funds from their budgets to the Sudan. Others were taking a more cautious approach and were not yet prepared to even discuss a possible change in policy.

C. THEMATIC FOCUS AND POSITIONING OF THE PROGRAMME

Programme Structure

The structure and design of the First CCF did not reflect or address issues associated with conflict or the endemic nature of natural disasters in Sudan. Nevertheless, the ADS/ARS programme very directly addressed some of the most fundamental issues associated with poverty alleviation, gender in development and participatory development in Sudan.

Indeed, the ADS/ARS programme, which had, until its closure in calendar year 2000, constituted in excess of 80 per cent of total UNDP assistance to the Sudan, was the most significant internationally supported development programme targeting the rural poor. Approximately US$67 million have been channelled through UNDP to these schemes over their lifetime.

ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED

The imposition of sanctions by the Security Council on Sudan in May 1996 reinforced what had already become a major trend on the part of the international community to focus its assistance on the achievement of peace in the Sudan. Coming as it did in the wake of an already pronounced emphasis on humanitarian assistance by the international donors since the military coup in 1989/90.

Despite this sea change, the UNDP programme has followed the same core programme strategy that was developed in 1986/87—one that is centred on the implementation of the ADS/ARS schemes. The UNDP programme has not evolved with changes in the development environment and while achieving some successes on the development front, has as a result become increasingly marginalized in the central policy dialogue and debate surrounding Sudan. This is borne out in the rather minimal cost-sharing channelled through UNDP despite its relatively large programme of assistance.

Over this same period of time, some Resident Coordinators have made major efforts and have been widely recognised for the lead role they have played in the triangular dialogue between the Government, opposition parties and international community, but this has been because of their personal energy and commitment; not having a programme to
support them in this dialogue has undoubtedly handicapped their efforts vis-à-vis the opposition and in particular the other agencies involved (see Section 4.G on Coordination below).

This presents some issues for UNDP to consider in countries such as this where UN sanctions are imposed restricting support for development. First, it presents the issue of how UNDP, as sometimes the only developmental actor, keeps development on the agenda in such a context. Second, it presents the issue of how UNDP can programme in a comprehensive way so that it does not simply address one distinct area of development, but addresses the root developmental causes of the crisis in question. In such contexts, UNDP is ideally placed to broker the transition from humanitarian to developmental assistance, while at the same time ensuring that its development approach is appropriately positioned before, during and after the crisis.
A detailed, project/programme-based analysis of the majority of the CCF is contained in Annex I of this report. What follows below are the general results, issues, lessons learned and, to some extent, recommendations that emerged from that detailed analysis.

A. PROGRAMME STRUCTURE

Analysis of Programme Structure
In its very general orientation, the First CCF for Sudan drew inspiration from the Government of Sudan’s 10-year Comprehensive National Strategy (1992-2002) in so far as the strategy identified the elimination of poverty and the improvement of the living conditions of the Sudanese people as the principal development objectives of the country. Using this as its central theme, the CCF document identified i) participatory area development; ii) area rehabilitation and reconstruction; iii) strategic planning; iv) energy, environment and natural resource management; and v) “service areas” which in practice has been a grab bag of activities developed over time including governance, peacebuilding, gender, human development, etc. as the main areas of focus for the UNDP programme.15 The CCF as drafted outlined a normal development-oriented frame of reference and provided no

15. The fourth country programme (1992-1996) covered three main areas: sustainable rural development (ADS/ARS); promotion of food security; and strengthening national capacity to manage development and implement macroeconomic reform.
analysis of the ongoing conflict. Furthermore it provided for the continuation of the existing programme with relatively little substantive adjustment to meet changing needs.

In practice, about 80 percent of total expenditures, amounting to US$29.8 million, was devoted to the two components of Area-based Development and Area Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (expenditures in these two components were dominated by the Area Development Schemes [ADS] and Area Rehabilitation Schemes [ARS], which accounted for $25.7 million of the $29.8 million total expenditures, but included other non-ADS/ARS projects as well). US$4.1 million was delivered for Energy and the Environment, US$2.9 million for Strategic Planning, US$1.3 million for so-called Service Areas, and US$873,000 for other areas.

Excluding UNCDF funds, but including all cost sharing, total expenditures amounted to somewhat over US$39 million. UNCDF contributed approximately US$5 million more over and above this total. The figure of US$39 million in resources mobilized was lower than the resource mobilization target of between approximately $48 and $66 million originally set in the CCF document’s resource mobilization target table.

Of the resources channelled through UNDP/Sudan from 1997 to 2001, approximately 75 to 88 percent came from TRAC resources whereas 12 to 15 percent came from non-core funding sources\textsuperscript{16}—most of which was from third party cost-sharing and trust funds rather than government cost-sharing. Delivery was generally high, according to the country office amounting to 72 per cent per year as an average over the programme cycle. Over-expenditures were recorded in the case of the ADS/ARS programme as a result of poor financial controls.

Four different kinds of execution modalities applied, including national execution (NEX), agency execution, international NGO execution and, towards the end of the CCF cycle, direct execution (DEX). The vast majority of the programme, however, was delivered under NEX. This considerable dominance of NEX is noted until end-1999 when the situation was dramatically altered with the closure of the NEX-MSU and the ADS/ARS programme as an emergency measure in 2000. The rise in DEX in particular after the NEX crisis is noted but in general there has also been a dramatic decline in annual delivery because of the limited funds available and because of internal reorganisation at the UNDP office in Khartoum.

**Issues**

The CCF was formulated before the introduction of results-based management—or the Strategic Results Framework/Results-Oriented Annual Report (SRF/ROAR)—in UNDP. As a result, many of the projects examined during the review adhered to the pre-SRF system of including in the project document reference to a development objective, immediate objectives, outputs and activities, but no reference to a result at the outcome level. In line with this system, and as would be expected, periodic monitoring and evaluation mechanisms tended not to focus on results.

This lack of results orientation has been partially addressed in the years of the CCF following the introduction of the SRF/ROAR (2000-2001), as the newer initiatives do refer

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\textsuperscript{16} The difference in percentages reflects the difference in the non-core figures with and without UNCDF funding.
to results, however it would appear that results-based management has been applied during the annual preparation of the ROAR but does not yet fully permeate the project design phase. It is difficult, for example, to discern the relationship between the new initiatives being proposed by the country office in the area of governance and the outcomes identified as strategic in the SRF.

In addition, although the country office initiated a “retrofitting exercise” to align pre-existing projects with SRF outcomes, there is little evidence that programme and project strategies were reoriented to take into account the new results-based approach. Rather, the classification of projects by outcomes seems to have been an organizational and reporting tool rather than a planning tool. As a result, it was difficult for the review mission to make a comprehensive assessment of outcomes.

For many of the interventions examined in detail in Annex I, therefore, there is far more to say about outputs than there is about the effect these outputs had on outcomes, the relevance of the outcomes selected or the partnership strategy employed by UNDP in pursuing outcomes. Key exceptions to this are the ADS and ARS projects, which, having been operational for as long as 12 years (at least in the case of the original five ADS), are expected to yield concrete information on progress towards development change (outcomes), and even impact.

In a similar vein, partnership strategies (and what partners were doing in the same sectors) would typically be a major focus of a results-oriented country review. In the case of Sudan, much can be said for the national partners, particularly within the context of the ADS/ARS projects as well as for the environment projects, where the local community and national partners, and UNDP’s strategy for working with them, are fairly well documented. On the international side, however, UNDP was the only major international actor on the development landscape during the CCF period. Donors and most international organizations restricted their assistance to humanitarian activities, meaning that there is little information available about development partnership strategies among international partners or what these partners may have done to contribute to outcomes along with UNDP.

In terms of programme content, the CCF document highlights many of the key challenges facing Sudan. However, in the translation of the context into programme design, the CCF did not adequately take into account the enduring civil war or the recurrent natural disasters in Sudan, and indeed integrated no real peacebuilding or disaster mitigation components, except for within the context of preparing the ground—primarily through the ADS/ARS—for once peace comes.

In addition, there were few linkages—either explicit or implicit—envisaged between the five distinct areas of the CCF, meaning that area-based development initiatives were not explicitly envisaged to integrate environment or governance or peacebuilding components of the programme. In short, there was a compartmentalized approach to the different areas. The formulation of the CCF and, indeed, the eventual formulation of specific projects within it, did not make a concerted effort to discern root causes of problems and design interventions to address these. Two exceptions to this were the ADS/ARS projects, which were carried over from previous cycles and some of the environmental projects, which attempted to build on the ADS/ARS model of community empowerment.

A number of general issues emerge from an analysis of programme performance. First, there is the issue of project formulation before the SRF. Such projects were designed with development objectives that varied in scope and content, and the activities and outputs planned and produced were in some cases not logically linked to the development objective(s) in question. And, in most cases, baseline information was not gathered or, if it was gathered, was not used in periodic monitoring and evaluation. Indeed, there were in many cases poor monitoring and evaluation systems in place in the sense that what systems there were tended to monitor inputs, activities and sometimes outputs, rather than providing a periodic check—via indicators, meetings, reports and other means—on whether progress was being made at the level of development change and whether UNDP’s support for this change was still relevant.

Lessons Learned
Specific lessons learned with respect to each of the areas of the CCF are detailed in Annex I. At a general level, however, one of the lessons
The primary objective of the ADS was therefore to empower local populations including minority and non-sedentary groups at the village level to manage their own development and to raise their quality of life. This was to be achieved through an effective management of local assets and resources as well as through the injection of external resources aimed at the strengthening of village-level decision making bodies in the form of Village Development Committees, the strengthening of other community-based organisations, the stimulation of village-level economic activities and the generation of incomes.

The objectives of the ARS were to restore household food security and self-reliance; rehabilitate and reconstruct the basic social infrastructure; and prepare the ground for post-conflict recovery and development programmes. ARS targeting areas either close to, or in the midst of conflicts of various types, were subsequently launched once international sanctions on development assistance were instated. In reality, there were few differences between the approach and objectives of the ADS and ARS, except in their size and their timeframes, with ARS, having started later in the process, tending to be far shorter and with smaller budgets. The ARS did not appear to explicitly address issues of conflict between communities and attempt to broaden the base for decision-making beyond to the traditional elite any more than their predecessors—the ADS—had.

Between them, the ADS and ARS represented approximately 80 percent of UNDP’s country programme during the years of 1997 to 2001. There were five ADS (in chronological order of establishment):
1. El-Obeid/North Kordofan
2. Idd El Fursan
3. Umm Kaddah/North Darfour
4. Lower Atbara
5. Central Butana

The total amount expended on the ADS since its inception in the late 1980s, including through the corollary projects such as those on vocational training centres, water supply and research, was approximately $56.7 million.\textsuperscript{17} The total amount expended on the ADS in this CCF period (1997-2001) was approximately $18 million.

\textsuperscript{17} This figure does not include assistance to the displaced in ADS/ARS areas or the Nyalla Fursan Road project.
There were seven ARS (in chronological order of establishment):
1. Wau
2. Juba
3. Kadugli
4. Abyei
5. Red Sea Hills
6. Malakal
7. Lagawa

For the ARS, the total amount expended since its inception, including through corollary projects such as training centres, was $10.6 million. The total amount expended on the ARS in this CCF was approximately $7.6 million. In sum, a total of approximately $67 million was spent on the ADS/ARS and their immediate corollary projects over their total lifetime from 1989 to 2001, of which $25.7, or 38 percent, was expended during this CCF.

The findings on results, issues and lessons learned below rely heavily on the preliminary findings of the outcome-oriented final evaluation of the ADS/ARS programme, conducted in February and March 2002 by an independent team of evaluators.

Results
A total of four evaluations of the ADS/ARS programme have been undertaken over the course its lifetime—in 1992, 1997, 1999 and 2002—as well as a number of ADS- or ARS-specific evaluations and progress reports. The first three evaluations bear some similarity to each other in that they identify similar key achievements in the establishment of Village Development Committees (VDCs), sanduqs sub-committees, and the initiation of sub-projects. For example, as early as the 1992 evaluation certain issues were raised that were still being highlighted in the terminal evaluation of 2002, such as the need to replicate the ADS model; concerns about the sustainability of the initiative in general and the sanduqs in particular; and the worry that substantive monitoring was insufficient.

The findings of the 2002 terminal evaluation are used extensively in the analysis presented in Annex I. For all of the ADS and ARS examined it is difficult to separate out the results that were achieved prior to the CCF review period and those that were achieved within it. There are indications from previous ADS evaluations, however, that many of the more significant results of the ADS in particular occurred quite early on in their lifetime (that is, prior to 1997). For the ARS, however, which started later than the ADS, the CCF review period generally covers their lifetime.

Outputs: The ADS/ARS produced a vast number of outputs in terms of numbers of VDCs created, sanduqs initiated, repayment rates improved and all of the outputs associated with myriad local initiatives funded through the sanduqs. The legislation to legalize the VDCs and protect their autonomy and freedom against takeover was also a notable “mainstreamed” output of the programmes. There is evidence, in addition, that the ADS/ARS model was replicated, albeit not in the manner originally foreseen by the programme—i.e., UNICEF replicated it through the “child-friendly village initiative” as did other UNDP projects such as the Urban Poor project (UPAP) in Khartoum.

Outcomes: The final evaluation of the ADS/ARS programmes, the preliminary findings of which were completed in April 2002, found that as a concept the ADS/ARS were valuable, flexible and successful in promoting self-reliance, improving food security, generating incomes and providing basic social services in health and education. And, the evaluation found that the ADS/ARS were instrumental in partially achieving the SRF outcome of “increased capacity of the poor to sustain their livelihoods”. Colloquial evidence indicates that people have been empowered and have changed the way they think about participating in decisions that affect their lives. However, while the capacity of the poor to improve their living conditions was increased in almost all of the villages—perhaps covering as much as three percent of the population of Sudan—the sustainability of this partially achieved outcome appears troubling. Indeed, the 2002

18. Source: FIM. This figure does not include the Khartoum Urban Poverty Project, which took the ADS as a model; nor does it include the Nuba Mountains Project, which is classified under the CCF component of Area Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.
23. Sanduqs, an integral part of the ADS/ARS, were revolving funds intended to help promote development and sustainable livelihoods at the local level.
evaluation concluded, “It is no longer an extension of financial contributions, the fine-tuning of the concept or the improvement of performance that will secure ... sustainability in the mid term and the long term. It is the socio-economic and political roots of the poverty in the rural areas, which need to be tackled to ensure the mid-term and long-term sustainability.”

Issues

The lack of state funds have prevented replication of the ADS model by the Government on its own, but key elements of the project’s design have been subsequently used by UNDP/HABITAT/GOS in the UPAP project and by UNICEF in its Child Friendly Village Initiative in the South. It also constitutes a viable model that with some adjustments could be used for fostering grassroots responses for multidimensional peacebuilding across communal lines.

Failure to address recurrent budgets, wages and essential infrastructure needs continue to constitute major impediments to sustainability. New and innovative opportunities need to be pursued in order to raise the likelihood of programme sustainability in Sudan. The number of significant funds that either operate outside the main state budget or operate autonomously from the Ministry of Finance has grown rapidly. Some, such as the Zakat Fund, are very significant in size and target the poor. Under the next Country Programme UNDP should consider partnering with some of these national funds with a view to maximising sustainability particularly in the management of essential services at the grassroots level. If appropriately packaged and monitored, such funds could also serve as partners in peacebuilding programmes.

By most accounts, the ADS in particular managed to gather very comprehensive and reliable “baseline” data—although much of it was gathered years after the initiation of the projects—and develop clear development objectives. However, it is also clear that the follow through on using these data was weak. The lack of periodic data collection to test conclusions makes it difficult to know, for example, how much income levels have been raised in the communities affected or whether other social indicators have improved (infant mortality, malnutrition, access to safe water, etc.). There is, nonetheless, considerable colloquial evidence that the communities that had the ADS/ARS are better off and household surveys conducted as part of periodic evaluations confirm this.

Monitoring of substance in the ADS/ARS projects was generally weak. And, what monitoring reports did emerge from the local level received no reaction from the NEX-MSU or UNDP; likewise for audit reports.

Although it cannot be disputed that the ADS/ARS projects had a definite and positive impact on the lives of many of the beneficiaries, there are lingering and troubling questions regarding the cost-effectiveness of the ADS in particular and regarding the sustainability of both the ADS and ARS. The results of the ADS/ARS came at a huge price—almost 80 percent of the entire CCF programme from 1997 to 2001 and $67 million over its entire lifetime, including corollary projects—when there is some evidence that many of these results may have materialized very early on in the ADS lifetime and for modest resources. The gains made through the ADS/ARS may or may not be sustainable, and will likely depend on the extent to which state government steps in or UNDP makes further use of the ADS/ARS as platforms in the next country programme.

There also appears to have been a lack of clarity on a number of the concepts related to the ADS/ARS, including the concept of ownership, use of the sanduqs as a trickle-up mechanism, mainstreaming, accountability, sustained democratic processes and resources allocation. There was a clear sense of ownership for the projects at the community level, but this was not always the case at the state level.

The revolving fund has proven a useful means of support to community development but there was generally an uneven resource allocation system among sanduqs. In addition, sanduq resources have been decreasing over the years, due to a number of causes—inflation, devaluation and being forced to fund social services that do not recover costs. This last point has serious implications for ADS/ARS sustainability, as many villages were forced to come up with schemes to balance provision of basic needs for development (water, schools) with profitable investments. While the National Fund for State Support was created to help devolve resources to the state level, in practice it does not have enough
funds to provide adequate social services in many rural areas.

There is also the issue of whether the ADS/ARS have been working mostly with the elites, in the North and especially in the South. The original concept of the schemes was that the poorest of the poor would benefit and that “non-elites”, including women and minorities, would be brought into the development process. However, it may be possible that non-elites and the poorest of the poor may not be the de facto beneficiaries, particularly of the ARS in the south due in large part to the limits on movement of project activities into unsecured zones. In such instances, the ADS/ARS may have actually helped to exacerbate local tensions and further add to the marginalisation of non-elites.

**Lessons Learned**

- The ADS/ARS model of community empowerment and grassroots-based development is valid and should be replicated.
- The buy-in of states is critical to the sustainability of the ADS/ARS and to their replication in other areas of the country.
- The ADS in particular proved that a great deal could be produced relatively quickly and for relatively few resources. However, the next step of consolidation and replication then needs to be made rather than simple repetition of the same activities over and over again.
- ADS/ARS were unable to hook up strategically with other partners and, for the most part, with other UNDP initiatives. There was also a missed opportunity to open a dialogue at the policy level on the issue of replication.
- Even though UNDP had always planned to withdraw direct support from the ADS/ARS and made this known to National Programme Managers and beneficiaries, the decision to close these projects seems to have come as a surprise to many. Even if they are not surprised, many are uncomfortable with the way UNDP has closed these down, and this has had direct effect on results (e.g., the rate of repayment fell from 97 percent in 2000 to 67 percent in 2001 over rumours of UNDP’s pull out).

- Sudden closure of the ADS/ARS programme because of the financial and management problems uncovered probably negatively affected sustainability pointing to the need for a systematic exit strategy in the case of all projects and programmes in Sudan. The achievement of capacity to continue the implementation of activities should be the central objective to be achieved prior to UNDP’s exit. Exit strategies should be defined with clear milestones and be built into the design of projects and programmes from the very outset. Progress towards the achievement of sustainability should be reviewed regularly throughout the project cycle.

**C. STRATEGIC PLANNING**

Constituting a total of 7 per cent of budgets, this component of the CCF was the third most significant in terms of resources and focused on the preparation of a number of national strategies. Specifically, the component was to cover preparation of a national human development strategy, a national strategy for marginalized groups, a national shelter strategy, a national action plan to combat desertification, a poverty reduction strategy and a national strategy for the use of alternative sources of energy. Also included in this area was elaboration and implementation of a basic education system, in partnership with UNESCO.

This component was also supposed to help build programme planning and management capacities at national and state levels (for NEX, for project planning and implementation, for aid coordination and for monitoring and evaluation).

**Results**

Results measured in terms of outputs (mostly the number of strategies produced) appear quite significant. It is difficult to say however, to what extent intended outcomes—such as increased national capacities to formulate or implement strategies, or a changed policy environment—were influenced in the process.

Few, if any of the strategies were actually owned, adopted and implemented by the Government, their effects on such outcomes therefore seem negligible. While the processes followed in the preparation of the strategies in most instances involved consultation with beneficiaries, government ownership—at least by the ministries with control over the national
purse strings—was minimal. As a result, they constituted largely academic exercises. It is also worth noting that most of these strategies were prepared with ministries of relatively low importance within the government structure but required the full participation and buy-in of ministries with considerably more resources and “clout”. It is apparent that such buy-in was never fully secured.

**Issues**

In keeping with the somewhat scattered nature of the planned interventions, the results produced in this area of the CCF form a somewhat disconnected series. A number of outputs were produced, however the utility and sustainability of these outputs is put into question given their lack of ownership by national stakeholders and their lack of progress beyond the formulation stage. For example, UNDP helped to develop a number of national strategies and action plans, but many have yet to be implemented. In addition, a number of the strategies and action plans originally conceived of in this area were actually developed within the environment portfolio (e.g., policies on water and desertification). These are therefore discussed in Section 4.D below.

One of the important stated goals in the CCF under this area was to help build capacities at the state level to cope with the new and fairly unwieldy federal structure. Specifically, the CCF planned, among other things, to help build a more efficient federal system that would provide services to the rural populations who were not benefiting from the increased investment in the centre of the country. There seems to have been little work done in this area, however, with the exception of the work done with the National Fund for State Support (NFSS). This represents a lost opportunity, particularly to link up with the accomplishments and challenges of the ADS/ARS at the state level.

Similarly, another area highlighted in the CCF document for support but in which UNDP did not work from 1997 to 2001 was support to the preparation of state-specific poverty reduction and development strategies. This work, in tandem with building the capacities of states to manage in the federal structure, might have been a logical outgrowth or synergistic effort of UNDP’s work with the NFSS. It may yet serve as the basis for the eventual preparation of a poverty reduction strategy for Sudan at the national level as well.

UNDP’s work in the area of strategic planning produced mixed results. While tangible outputs were produced through most of the projects, it is difficult to discern any positive development change as expressed in SRF outcomes as a result of these outputs. Part of this can be attributed to a lack of good monitoring and outcome indicators that would help to indicate changes in national capacities to plan, but part of it can also be attributed to project formulation which was in many cases based on a dubious results chain. There is also the issue of whether the requisite capacities and political will exist at the national levels to develop and, more importantly, implement pro-poor strategies.

**Lessons Learned**

- There is a need to approach the area of strategic planning in a coherent manner, looking at how planning is done, how policies are made and, most importantly, how plans and policies are implemented. If the political will or the resources necessary to carry a policy forward are absent, even an extremely well-crafted policy will go nowhere.
- Strategic planning is an area that can benefit from upstream-downstream linkages—for example, by pilot testing approaches at the local or state levels and then seeking the replication of successful models on a larger scale.
- The strategic planning outcome UNDP is intending to affect should be taken as a starting point and only then should outputs be designed to forward that outcome. The status of strategic planning capacities should be well documented before UNDP begins work and the factors affecting strategic planning (policies in place, capacities of institutions, context) should be documented. Based on the outcome and the outputs planned, UNDP should develop a partnership strategy.

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24. A national “interim” Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2002 to 2027 was produced in 2000 by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy; this was not part of a World Bank/UNDP PRSP effort.
D. ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The overall objectives of the energy and environment component of the 1997-2001 CCF were to promote the efficient use of available energy sources, build capacities and strengthen energy institutions. As in the previous country programme, the energy and environment projects were heavily GEF (Global Environment Facility) driven, with GEF providing the bulk of financial resources and UNDP contributing small costs that usually went to producing publications. The energy and environment portfolio was a low profile part of the 1997-2001 CCF, but there are indications that it was a productive area.

There were 10 projects in the area of environment and energy during the CCF cycle. Of these, seven were focused at the level of national strategic planning for environmental and energy issues, or at the level of implementing international conventions. Three were focused more at the community level, two of which made conscious use of the ADS/ARS methodology of working with VDCs and using credit systems at the local level.

Results

The environmental portfolio represented 10 percent of the overall CCF resources and was fairly GEF driven25. There are, however, significant results to report, particularly at the level of outputs. These, which have been among the more tangible and constructive of the CCF, have had real effect on people’s lives. The installation of hafirs (small reservoirs), increased use of hand pumps, production of seedlings and tree planting, and improvement in vegetation cover, are among some of the outputs of the energy and environment projects that have improved quality of life.

On the issue of outcomes—and the ultimate sustainability of outputs produced—the main progress here seems to be in awareness raising on environmental issues—both locally and nationally—and laying the groundwork for eventual policy change. One possible indicator of awareness raised is that there is more press coverage of environmental issues now than there was at the beginning of the CCF cycle.

25. There are two kinds of GEF projects—the “enabling projects” which are GEF initiated and for which the country office prepares project proposals—these mostly focus on accession to international conventions; and those projects that the country office initiates and for which it seeks GEF funding.

Also, environmental concerns (and other SHD issues) have increasingly made their way into Government statements. Certainly, some of these effects can also be attributed to the activity of the Sudanese Environmental Conservation Society (SECS), which conducts awareness-raising and advocacy campaigns with community groups and the private sector.

Issues

No concerted strategy appears to underlie UNDP’s involvement in energy and the environment. Indeed, the rather fragmented approach has largely been driven by the availability of non-core resources (mainly through the GEF and Capacity 21) and obligations under international conventions. This has reduced national ownership to some degree. As a result, action plans and strategies produced have remained unimplemented and pilot projects on biodiversity and conservation (Dinder National Park) have not received adequate funding from the Government for replication or continued implementation.

Capacity issues—on the part of Sudanese counterparts and the UNDP country office exist and need to be more effectively taken into account. The Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources—which is the institution that handles the environment portfolio—employs only four full-time staff members to fill a rather large mandate of reviewing the environmental impact of all planned investments and infrastructure projects. Also, the Council is actually a technical arm of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism and often the President of the Republic is involved in its affairs. This proximity is a double-edged sword that brings benefits of access and interest, but also poses risks to the independence of the Council. For UNDP, there is only one programme manager who works full-time on the energy and environment portfolio. With the multi-million dollar Nile Basin regional project anticipated to begin in 2002, with Sudan “housing” one of the 10 components, the country office will need to boost its capacity if environmental programming is to continue in the next country programme.

The environment portfolio has been treated in relative isolation and potential linkages with other components of the programme have not been exploited. While Village Development Councils of the type
used under UNDP’s ADS/ARS programme have indeed been used as a planning and management mechanism under some environment projects, environmental programmes have not been mainstreamed within the ADS/ARS scheme. Furthermore, the potential linkages between environmental management and conflict—particularly between minority groups and the general population and between semi-nomadic pastoralists and farmers—have not been effectively built upon. For instance, the Dinder National Park project operates in an area in which conflicts between settled populations and semi-nomadic farmers have been endemic. Conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities linked to effective rangeland management principles and land (re-)distribution and local governance would have been an obvious substantive linkage that would have made more effective use of limited resources while rendering the UNDP programme more relevant to priority concerns in the Sudan. The work already done on the ADS and ARS could have served as a useful model and, in some cases, platform, for integrated initiatives that address the complex nature of conflicts over natural resources.

It is unclear why early warning and disaster management did not constitute a part of the environment portfolio as environmental disasters (drought, desertification, pests and floods) have proven to be a chronic problem in Sudan and given the subsistence nature of most farming and livestock herding, regularly proves quite devastating to the economy.26 With the exception of some work on biodiversity, as with the rest of the programme, work in the environment has been restricted to areas of the North of the country. Under the next country programme this promises to be a region that could benefit from integrated programming—for example through peacebuilding and environment initiatives that address the effects of war on southern farms and forests, and the needs for rehabilitation.

Sudanese non-governmental organizations in the field of energy and environment—notably the Sudanese Environment Conservation Society—have been underutilised under the programme. A more systematic assessment of these organisations and a strategic assessment of their possible use as partners under UNDP’s programme should be undertaken.

**Lessons Learned**

- It is encouraging that the approach taken to the environment activities applied some lessons learned from previous assistance. These initiatives also sought to create linkages with other parts of UNDP’s development assistance. For example, the mid-term review of the 1992–1996 country programme and the 1996 impact assessment of the ADS both found that participatory sustainable development, energy and environment are inseparable. As a result, during the 1997–2001 cycle, UNDP consciously tried to use the ADS approach as a main framework for its support to environment, energy and natural resource management with an emphasis on empowering grassroots communities to sustain and manage development.

- To be even more effective and sustainable, energy and environment activities should take a comprehensive approach to the issues, by looking at root causes of problems such as environmental degradation—i.e., competition for scarce resources—and help the Sudanese to design policies and strategies to address these. Land tenure is one of the areas that could benefit from an integrated series of interventions that address the energy and environment side of the issue, as well as the poverty and conflict prevention and resolution sides.

- The environment projects were among the few that featured a balance between upstream policy advice activities and downstream community-based initiatives. However, attempts to link the upstream and the downstream mostly met with failure, as successful local experiences were not replicated elsewhere or brought on board by government at the meso or macro levels.

- The environment portfolio has succeeded in producing a number of outputs that have made real and positive change in people’s lives—for example, increased access to safe drinking water. However, these outputs will not necessarily aggregate up to progress towards sustainable outcomes at a national level. Key to making this transition is the political buy in and

26. A brief concept paper on disaster management has been produced by the country office, but no follow-through has yet taken place.
commitment to making the necessary policy changes.

The role of public ownership is a major factor in the success of environmental projects. The evaluation of the Community-Based Rangeland Rehabilitation for Carbon Sequestration and Biodiversity Project found that the ownership of the local Rural Council over the resources provided through the project contributed to a “high degree autonomous self-monitoring.” Another lesson highlighted by that evaluation was the importance of encouraging the engagement of private assets, which was a notable though unanticipated development of the Carbon Sequestration project as private grazing allotments became a locally driven development.

UNDP has retained more flexibility and control over the focus of programmes when it approached GEF as a source of funds, rather than waiting to have a GEF global agenda imposed from above. By approaching GEF for funding specific initiatives, UNDP can help to develop an environment agenda that responds to Sudan’s specific needs, as well as carve out a niche for itself in adding to GEF’s portfolio.

E. SERVICE AREAS

This component of the CCF mainly uses SPPD resources in support to UNDP programming in different areas. The stated overarching goal is to harmonise technical co-operation programmes and promote better coordination among UN agencies, donors and the Government. As such, it included the preparation of a common country assessment (CCA); the promotion of Sustainable Human Development, poverty eradication and good governance; and support to administrative reforms. This area also included support to nascent peacebuilding and conflict-related initiatives (which are covered in greater detail in Section 4.F below) and preparatory assistance to governance initiatives.

Results

In enhancing programme performance through better coordination among UN agencies, donor and the Government, some progress is noted, notably the joint preparation of the Common Country Assessment and UNDAF (see also Section 4.G below).

Beyond the CCA and UNDAF, a number of studies, concept papers and exploratory initiatives were produced in new areas for UNDP. In this sense, policy dialogue on new areas of potential collaboration was opened somewhat. The CCF also stated, however, that through these policy dialogue and programme formulation activities, the ADS/ARS model would be used as an instrument to narrow the gap between policy dialogue and operational activities. There is little evidence that this approach is being adopted in the new governance initiatives although some linkages could be sought between the work being initiated on local governance and informal community-based governance under the ADS/ARS.

Issues

The preparatory assistance work in governance that has been undertaken within this area of the CCF touched on a variety of areas. The three main current proposals—on civil service reform, local governance and the National Assembly—have a logical governance link between them but no operational links. And, with the exception of the local governance proposal, there is no building on previous UNDP work such as the ADS/ARS or peacebuilding activities. Each also addresses huge areas requiring considerable funding and support over an extensive period of time if they are to have any meaningful impact.

Given the rapid proliferation of government ministries and agencies as well as the introduction of the federal system, it would appear that very little potential exists for real reform of the civil service at the present time. Furthermore, the lack of representation in the National Assembly and its absence from national decision-making would make support to the institution on the part of UNDP non-strategic, unless some significant changes take place. On the other hand, the local governance proposal holds considerable potential—not least because it consciously tries to make use of the ADS/ARS model and exploit linkages with the Urban Poor Project.

Lessons Learned

The nature of exploring new programming areas is such that a strategy is not always apparent, or indeed necessary. In the case
of Sudan, however, it would appear there were not only several disconnected initiatives that were begun in this area, but that they never went anywhere (or were initiatives about which the Country Review team could find little information). These include UNDP’s support to University for Women, Investment Advisory, Development Fisheries, Food Processing, Investment Promotion and Industrial Survey. Perhaps a more results-oriented approach could have helped UNDP and its partners to identify early on the less relevant initiatives and focus in on those that address development priorities in country and hold the greatest promise to influence development change.

The approach taken to formulating some of the initiatives—e.g., the use of UNDESA, which brought in international consultants to Sudan for a brief period to formulate a project document—lacked comprehensiveness and participation. Stakeholders were not adequately consulted. For example, there is no evidence that UNDP sought the opinion of constituents before considering a project to strengthen the linkages between members of the National Assembly and their constituents. Nor is there evidence that UNDP undertook a baseline survey with the documentation unit of the National Assembly to assess the amount and quality of information available to it before proposing that this needed to be improved.

F. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING

The CCF scarcely makes any mention of ongoing conflicts. However, civil war between North and South has been a fact of life, on or off, over the past 35 years and conditions perpetuating the conflict continue, to a large extent un-addressed.

Conflict in the Sudan exists at multiple levels, from the “main” conflict between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, to a number of “meso-level” conflicts such as that in the Nuba Mountains that began between the Nuba and local Mesasiya tribes and has subsequently become part of the conflict between the SPLA and the Government due to Nuba frustration over issues of political representation, land access, identity, etc., to several very localised conflicts, for example between pastoralists and farmers. Both the meso-level and localised conflicts are virtually all over access to productive resources—most notably over access to arable or pastoral land—and over participation in decision-making at the local community level. While it is difficult to adequately characterise the “main” conflict, it is once again principally over issues relating to i) access to equal opportunity and rights; ii) access to resources; and more recently iii) self-determination. Religious and ethnic overtones are of course important, but are probably overlying factors that have been manipulated for political purposes.

Failure to put an end to the “main” conflict per se has not been for want of initiative. Indeed, there has been a plethora of peace initiatives in the country, dating back as far as the Juba Conference in 1947.

The SPLA and the government have conducted direct negotiations since 1994 under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an association of neighbouring African states. Talks have been held regularly, producing an agreement in principle to resolve the conflict in the south through a referendum on self-determination. Little else has been achieved, since mid-1997 however, despite the efforts of the many states that form the IGAD Partners Forum, an associated entity that underpins and supports the work of IGAD. As discussed earlier, however, IGAD has been revitalised somewhat since September 11th 27.

BOX 3: SELECTED PEACE AND DIALOGUE INITIATIVES SINCE 1986

- Nuba Mountain Initiative (USA—2001)
- Libyan-Egyptian Initiative (1999)
- EU-Sudanese Dialogue (1999)
- Sudanese Women’s Peace Initiative (1997)
- Fashoda Agreement (1997)
- Political Document for Peace (1996)
- Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD—1994)
- Carter Initiatives (1989-90)
- Sudanese Peace Initiative (1988)
- Ambo/Koka Dam 2 (1988)
- Deng-Obasanja Mediation (1987)
- NIF Sudan Charter (1987)
- Church Leaders & Southern Parties Dialogue w/SPLA (1986)
- Koka Dam Declaration Initiative (1986)

27. Egypt and Libya also launched a peace initiative in 1999, winning agreement from the government and opposition for a national reconciliation conference drawing together the government and all rebel groups—in contrast to IGAD, which includes only the SPLA. By August 2001, however, the conference had not taken place, reflecting not only the difficulty of drawing up an agenda for talks that would be acceptable to all parties concerned, but also the concerns of Western powers and the SPLA that the initiative would detract from the IGAD process and replace African influence over the peace process with Arab control.
UNDP has been involved to some degree in the process associated with IGAD even though it was not explicitly part of the CCF. UNDP’s initial involvement dates back to 1996, and the “UNDP-Sudan Dialogue Programme”—a series of roundtable meetings intended to promote the peace process by bringing together various levels of Sudanese society. The meetings were held in Spain, the Netherlands, Sudan, Germany, Italy and Poland and focused on poverty alleviation; a development strategy for the South; basic education acceptable to all Sudanese; and governance.

The UNDP Resident Representative at the time received much praise for his personal efforts in this regards. Although the sessions were considered useful in that they brought together decision-makers from different sides of the conflict, it was felt their impact was mitigated by the fact that they did not entail broad-based representation.

The stakeholders in the dialogue process eventually decided that there needed to be a shift from “talking” to “action”. UNDP was encouraged to integrate peacebuilding into the ADS/ARS programmes, training in negotiation and conflict resolution, and the provision of development assistance to both sides of the conflict in areas such as the Nuba Mountains. Rather than trying to undertake a number of grassroots initiatives itself, UNDP was encouraged to provide the glue between the different actors and initiatives, creating a continuum between initiatives at the various levels, from grassroots to the IGAD peace process and beyond. It is in this direction UNDP has attempted to move during the CCF period. The rationale behind this has been that UNDP, with its coordinating function, would be best placed to provide the umbrella and framework for the large number of activities that fall within the peacebuilding arena.

**Results**

This is a relatively new area for UNDP/Sudan, and it is too soon for there to be any progress in outcomes to measure. Although a comprehensive strategy for UNDP/Sudan in peacebuilding has not been developed, a number of initiatives have started or are in the process of being developed. Progress has been made in re-positioning the office over the past 18 months to take a central role with the support of key donors (especially the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, the EU and Italy), who have provided close to $2 million in cost-sharing resources to UNDP for peacebuilding initiatives since 1999.

**Issues**

Peacebuilding and the response to the effects of the war have largely been a story of missed opportunities on the part of UNDP to make itself more relevant and central to the ongoing dialogue between the GOS, the SPLA and the international community. It has also resulted in missed opportunities for more significant resource mobilisation. Issues such as support for the internally displaced have seen UNDP involved only in a marginal way. The new, largely preparatory work currently underway, however, constitutes an important step forward and holds out potential for a far more significant role for UNDP in the future.

Peacebuilding in Sudan is a complex matter given the variety of conflicts that exist. This requires clarity in UNDP’s strategy as well as an understanding of the range of options and approaches that can be applied. UNDP’s present involvement, while based on opportunity and demand, is fragmented and lacks a concerted strategy. While risks exist, given the interest among key partners and given the developmental roots of most of the conflicts in Sudan, it behoves UNDP to place conflict resolution and peacebuilding (with all of its spin offs) at the centre of its future programme.

In order to launch this, it would appear imperative for UNDP to quickly undertake a detailed analysis of the half dozen or so most important conflicts in the country, identifying root causes of conflict; accelerators and triggers of conflict; entry points for peacebuilding activities; and the potential approaches and modalities for addressing the causes, accelerators and triggers.

While the Nuba Mountains and the North-South conflict between the SPLA and the GOS are indeed the most significant conflicts bearing attention, several others bear consideration including those in Northern and Southern Darfur and in what was formerly known as the “Eastern Region”.

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29. At the height of the problem, with about 4 million displaced persons, Sudan had the largest population of internally displaced persons in the world.
30. The former “Eastern Region” now comprises the three states of Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref.
in such secondary conflicts while requiring different modalities and approaches, would serve to offset the obvious risks associated with placing too much programme emphasis on the North-South divide and on the conflict in the Nuba Mountains.

The important changes that have taken place in the political environment over the past 18 months demonstrate that the Government of Sudan and the military opposition both may now be receptive to peace initiatives. While on its own the palpable fatigue of the general public resulting from 36 years of war is unlikely to result in acceleration of the peace process due to a variety of factors, a window of opportunity for peace has presented itself and failure to capitalise on this window will dramatically set back any hope of a return to normal development.

Oil production, although still at relatively low levels in absolute terms, has, in relative terms, made a dramatic difference in the revenue picture for the Government of Sudan. Most of this revenue is handled outside the national budget, however. External debt is in excess of US$20 billion. Debt repayments as a result place a heavy burden on the Government, which is currently in default on its debt obligations. Increasing collaboration between UNDP and the World Bank by helping to introduce some of the policy foundations for a possible future participation of Sudan in HIPC is likely to be a promising area of support in the next country programme.

As highlighted in the programme analysis, the linkages between the various peacebuilding initiatives require strengthening. To date they appear to have been developed somewhat in isolation of each other, and the synergies they bring have not been exploited. It is important to link the various peacebuilding/conflict resolution efforts at different levels, and not see them in isolation of each other; to do so will require strong management of the peacebuilding team. The office is considering making peacebuilding a central theme to underpin all its work in the coming phase. While this would be a sensible approach and given the current window of opportunity for peace in Sudan is one that should be taken on board as soon as possible, it raises a number of challenges. As has been mentioned in the sections on the ADS/ARS schemes and the environment portfolio, there were several opportunities of addressing peace issues through these programmes that were wasted.

A major issue for UNDP in the peacebuilding area has been in getting access to all parts of Sudan. UNDP has only had a presence in the GOS-controlled areas of Sudan, which has made it difficult to work and build partnerships with actors from both sides of the political divide, and work on cross-line initiatives. This has also impacted on the perception of UNDP, especially with actors working in the SPLM/SPLA controlled areas, who do not necessarily see UNDP as a credible and neutral partner. Logistically this has presented challenges as well, as the majority of other agencies/ international actors work out of Kenya (Nairobi and/or Lokichogio), and UNDP is unable to engage in their policy or coordination discussions. For UNDP to seriously take on peacebuilding as one of its central and crosscutting themes, gaining access to all of Sudan will be critical.

There are also issues of capacity within the office. Success to date of any of the peacebuilding initiatives has rested largely on certain individuals, without an institutionalised capacity and/or ownership to take forward this agenda. This includes the current Resident Representative who has been personally committed and dedicated to strengthening UNDP’s contribution and role in peacebuilding in Sudan. In future, UNDP will need to substantially strengthen its capacity if it is to effectively deliver on this agenda. The capacity for thorough conflict analysis will be key to any peacebuilding work. There will be the need to differentiate between the various types and levels of conflict in Sudan and ensure that any interventions address the root causes of the conflict. Given the sensitivity of and multitudinous actors involved in any peacebuilding programme, it is probably more effective for UNDP to directly or collaboratively implement such interventions in order to maximize neutrality, responsiveness, flexibility and delivery speed. Direct execution, however, will require strong internal programmatic, financial and administrative capacity, and UNDP will need to closely review its current capacities to address any weaknesses and needs.

Financial support for peacebuilding to date has been almost exclusively extra-budgetary, with no GOS contribution, which raises issues of sustainability and ownership
on the part of the Government. It is not clear to what extent this is an externally driven agenda. There is also a certain degree of growing donor impatience. Several donors have contributed generously to these various peacebuilding initiatives without yet seeing many tangible results. While many are sympathetic with the internal management and administrative issues that the office has had to deal with over the past year, it is clearly now time for UNDP to consolidate its efforts and begin to demonstrate the impact of its initiatives.

Developing key partnerships will be fundamental for any peacebuilding initiatives. Perhaps even more so than in other areas of UNDP’s work, peacebuilding will require new partnerships and new ways of working; it will require being on the ground more and forging stronger linkages with a wider group of actors, on all sides of the conflict. UNDP should structure itself differently and look for creative ways to ensure this happens. The office may also need to find ways of being more flexible, and be ready to take advantage of peacebuilding opportunities as they arise (as it has done in the Abyei region). Being plugged in, and having a wide network of partners will likely better place UNDP to take advantage of changing conflict dynamics. This might require much closer collaboration between Regional Bureaux (RBAS and RBA) and indeed between Resident Representatives working in two different Bureaux.

A key lesson from the recent past is the importance of getting in early, doing groundwork and getting buy-in from partners and other UN agencies (for example on the IDP programme and the Planning for Peace Framework). The fact that UNDP had already been engaged in the Nuba Mountain area (even before access was possible to actually implement a programme) meant that it was well placed to take a central role when the opportunity for peace arose.

As has been shown in Nuba Mountains, a peacebuilding approach can provide the necessary linkage between humanitarian assistance and medium/longer term development needs. By encouraging the right principles and promoting shared utilisation, management and ownership or resources, peacebuilding approaches can help ensure that humanitarian assistance is used in a more sustainable way. Although confidence building through facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogue is important, there will still be the need to deliver concrete benefits (e.g. through resource interventions designed to build social capital through common assets) as well.

**Lessons Learned**

- Despite the significant risks militating against success in ending the “main” conflict, peacebuilding and conflict mitigation in its various forms in Sudan, peacebuilding holds out major opportunities if it were to be made the principal underlying theme of UNDP’s future involvement in Sudan. Not least because it enables UNDP to apply numerous valuable lessons learned from its past programmes including those relating to community-based development, grassroots mobilisation, the development of community-based institutions and participatory development management including the management of critical natural resources at the local level. Whether it is in the governance, socio-economic, environment or education sectors, all UNDP’s development assistance should be looked at through this lens, and wherever possible, be used to contribute to the preparation for peace.

- The concept of peacebuilding should be extended to include recovery (e.g. reintegration/rehabilitation activities) initiatives, so that peacebuilding is not only seen as the “softer” dialogue initiatives but also includes concrete operational activities.

- It is clear that embarking on this agenda involves risks. The office should be prepared to exploit the window of opportunity that currently exists, but should remain aware that this may not last forever. To a large extent, 2002 may be the “make or break” year. If things do not begin to improve quickly, the momentum and the opportunity for peacebuilding—principally around the “big” North/South Conflict may be lost for years to come. However, inclusion of other, secondary conflicts that have been an endemic and debilitating feature elsewhere in the country for years would tend to offset the risks somewhat; work on these secondary conflicts are more immediately developmental in nature and are generally politically more amenable to resolution.
UNDP should be more proactive and creative in seeking peacebuilding and recovery opportunities, even on a case-by-case basis (such as in Abyei) where it can work across military lines. By demonstrating its added value in such circumstances, the question of gaining access to other parts of Sudan may be easier.

Over time, the support for the peacebuilding portfolio of initiatives should cease being entirely externally driven, and cost-shared by external donors. It will be important for issues of sustainability and ownership that the GOS and other Sudanese institutions (including the private sector and various social funds) also contribute financially to their implementation. This has been true in the case of the Khartoum IDPs, where the GOS (specifically, Khartoum State Government) has made significant contributions through the Urban Poverty Project (UPAP). During the next CCF negotiations, UNDP should propose using some of the TRAC 1.1.1 or 1.1.2 funds for peacebuilding-related activities.

In the immediate term, UNDP should concentrate on delivering the ongoing peacebuilding portfolio. The office should also develop an overall peacebuilding strategy, perhaps using the Planning for Peace Framework as a guiding tool. The office should also strengthen its capacity to provide crosscutting peacebuilding/conflict analysis to the rest of UNDP, in particular on the governance (local governance, decentralisation) and environment (natural disaster reduction) programmes. Eventually, as and when opportunities arise, UNDP should consider new peacebuilding/recovery areas—such as demobilisation, small arms, mine action and developing regional strategies. It is important that the office maintains a sense of realism of what can be achieved, so as not to raise expectations that cannot be met. Support should be sought from the appropriate units in UNDP for capacity building and technical assistance for the office. Cost-recovery mechanisms should be built into the peacebuilding initiatives, and the office should ensure that projects are designed to allocate sufficient resources for substantive programme management and administration.

G. COORDINATION

Humanitarian Assistance dominates the ODA environment in Sudan. Within the UN system, WFP and UNICEF dominate in terms of the sheer volume of aid. The major development agency operating in Sudan is UNDP; most other assistance is provided from humanitarian and relief assistance sources, which has been the case ever since the mid-1990s. This situation weakens the ability of the Resident Coordinator to adequately play his/her role, and can reduce his/her ability to use the UNDP programme to take the lead in programmes implemented in key areas. The further decline in UNDP core resources foreseen under the next cycle will likely affect UNDP in this regard; the inability to “put its money where its mouth is” and its heavy dependence on cost-sharing contributions, in the words of one embassy official, have severely limited UNDP’s ability to lead the other UN agencies.

Inter-agency competition and open rivalry between UN agencies, NGOs and others has been an unfortunate feature of aid to the Sudan for a number of years and was widely mentioned by political and development partners as an issue affecting UNDP’s role in the country. Rivalry and, in the words of one bilateral embassy official, outright “deceit” (for example in the case of the “Child Soldiers” issue) has served to undermine the position of both UNDP and the Resident Coordinator. Donors and the GOS however, unanimously praised the performance of the current Resident Coordinator despite the difficult environment in which he operates.

UNDP’s ability to work across military lines has been severely circumscribed by the Government of Sudan, essentially preventing access to SPLA-held territories in the South for the purpose of conducting development activities, although humanitarian access is permitted. UNDP’s inability to work in SPLA-held territories and inbuilt rigidities (to do with its internal financial and organisational structure that draws a clear separation between regional bureaux), which prevent UNDP from operating across national boundaries have affected its ability to effectively position itself in peacebuilding activities across the North/South.
South divide. All of the other major agencies operate both from Khartoum, in the case of assistance to areas held by the Government of Sudan, and from Nairobi and Lokichogio, in the case of assistance to areas in Southern Sudan held by the SPLA.

UNDP’s inability to work in areas held by the SPLA has been exploited by other agencies in ongoing inter-agency rivalries, and while it may have negatively affected the credibility of UNDP among other UN agencies able to work in the South and among NGOs operating through Kenya, it appears not to have in itself negatively affected UNDP’s standing with key governments providing aid to Sudan.

The UNDP Resident Representative, who is also the Resident Coordinator, has since the mid-1980s been forced to spend a very high percentage of his or her time on Operation Lifeline Sudan and the coordination of humanitarian assistance. This has reduced the amount of time and effort that the Resident Coordinator can devote to UNDP affairs. Now that additional development opportunities are emerging, a new Resident Coordinator with UNDP background and experience will be the best placed to positively affect both the UNDP country office and the development agenda just at a time when the country office needs support and development agenda is moving ahead.

The CCA and UNDAF

The CCA and UNDAF preparation process was initiated in 1998 and has gone through several incarnations due to concern on the part of the UN Country Team over the quality of the drafts. In May 2001 the UN Country Team decided that given the crisis and humanitarian situation prevailing in Sudan, the CCA and the UNDAF should be combined into a single document that would be developed as a loose framework in the form of a short action plan for the period 2002-2006. As of March 2002 a fourth draft of the combined document has been produced, incorporating all the comments made during the final review and validation processes, in particular those intended to introduce a Southern perspective in the document. This draft, expected to be the final one, is still to be reviewed and approved by the UN Country Team, before being presented to the Government.

Because of the special situation of Sudan, the UN Country Team decided not to use the process of reflection and analysis of the country situation inherent in preparing a CCA/UNDAF to foster a broad dialogue, engage in common analysis and discuss development constraints and potentials with non-UN development partners. As a result, the document’s preparation has been an entirely internal UN process, with no involvement from other development partners, including the GOS or civil society.

UNDP leadership of the process has also been uneven. The process featured an early lack of leadership on the part of UNDP, although this has improved of late. The preparation of the CCA/UNDAF did not fall within the priorities of the previous Resident Coordinator, however a new dynamic emerged in 2000 with the arrival of the new Resident Coordinator, who gave the process a fresh start. The arrival of the UNDP Senior Economist in 2001 also contributed further to this renewed UNDP leadership.

The final validation of the CCA/UNDAF document should take place as soon as possible, including consultations with the Government. The approved document should be published and used as a reference document by all UN agencies. An inter-agency UNDAF monitoring structure should be established under the leadership of the RC. The role of this structure would be to (i) monitor progress against targets and indicators; and (ii) ensure inter-agency joint programming.
A. MODALITIES OF EXECUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION

National Execution (NEX) was the principal mode of execution, followed by Agency Execution (see pie chart below). In this regard, it is important to note that various UN agencies were appointed as cooperating agencies for specific programme components (most notably under the ADS/ARS scheme). Cooperating agency agreements were principally with UNOPS during the CCF period, although in earlier years, cooperating agency arrangements were also entered into with DESA, FAO and ILO for the ADS/ARS programme.

Although NEX was applied under almost three-quarters of the programme, the share of NEX was cut dramatically during 2000-2001 following the uncovering of serious shortcomings in resource management. During the last two years of the CCF, NEX was replaced principally by DEX and UNOPS execution. The Country Office in 2001 began using DEX in line with Executive Board decision 98/2 principally within the context of countries in special circumstances and for peacebuilding-related initiatives.

Agency execution has been undertaken by FAO, ILO, DESA, Habitat, WHO, UNESCO and UNIDO. The programme also experimented with NGO execution during the CCF period under one of the GEF funding projects employing International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as the executing agent.

National Execution

As in most countries, NEX in the Sudan has generally meant execution by the government and government institutions and has not been extended to
include other national entities. The fundamental intent of the ADS/ARS programme’s design was to bypass government institutions based on negative past experience with the sustainability of projects predicated on the support from government institutions. This intent was altered with the change from UNOPS and agency execution, the original modalities, to NEX, which took place in April 1994, four years after launching the original five ADS.

The 1997-2001 CCF foresaw the continued application of National Execution guided by a systematic, case-by-case assessment of management, technical and financial capacities of prospective institutions to serve as executing agent. In practice, however, all NEX in Sudan has been undertaken in a centralised manner, through the establishment of the NEX-MSU, which was initially intended as the replacement for the Central Co-ordination Unit of the ADS programme and was essentially an entity under the authority of the Ministry of International Cooperation.

A financial crisis—precipitated by poor substantive and financial monitoring on the part of the NEX-MSU as well as the UNDP Programme and Administration Sections and compounded by computer system problems—resulted in the sudden closure of the ADS/ARS programme in 2001. In June 2000, UNDP realised that its entire funding for the year 2000 was virtually exhausted and took immediate steps to close projects and investigate the source of the crisis. It was found that requests for advance payment by NEX-MSU and other project staff received only cursory review in the Programme Section of UNDP prior to certification and submission to Administration for payment. There is also no evidence that the programme section verified work plans against the project documents prior to certification.

In addition, there were issues of programme delivery. A number of project activities under the ADS/ARS which the Review Mission visited and which were provided for in the budget and included in the work plan, never received funding, resulting in severe development setbacks and a failure to achieve long-term results.

Projects prior to the ADS/ARS had paid salary supplements in order to remain competitive with other donor-supported projects which all paid incentives to government staff. Following the shift to NEX, the ADS/ARS programme at its peak supported a total project staff of approximately 450 consisting mostly of government officials on secondment. The latter were recruited on a special salary scale that was higher than that of the Government, but lower than that of National Programme Officers at the UN. This raises concerns of sustainability and national capacity building.

The original objectives of the NEX-MSU project, launched in 1994, were to: (i) provide policy, training, monitoring and evaluation support to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (subsequently called the Ministry of International Cooperation) on NEX projects;

32. DDSMS (Department for Development Support and Management Services), along with DPCSD (Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development) and DESIPA (Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis) were consolidated in 1998 to become the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN (UNDESA).
and (ii) provide support services to NEX projects in financial reporting, logistics, procurement and recruitment and as such has played a very central role in the management of UNDP resources throughout the cycle. The CCF also made mention of the establishment of a Sudanese Agency for National Execution (SUDANEX) as an autonomous, self-financing institution to provide the necessary operational support and meet other capacity building needs, presumably as a spin-off of the NEX-MSU. This however never materialised in wake of the discovery of severe financial and substantive shortcomings noted above and the subsequent closure of the NEX-MSU. As noted in the 2001 Audit Report:

"The overall NEX model adopted by the Office was not successful and needed to be fully reassessed and reviewed."

Although country office support to the NEX-MSU was intended to be temporary, with a limited two-year duration, this initial support was extended until June 2001. A staff of 15 was foreseen under the original NEX-MSU project document. The NEX-MSU ended up with a staff of 37 (54 per cent support staff; 38 per cent professionals; 8 per cent senior management), all paid for by UNDP since 1998 based upon an agreement between UNDP and the Government of Sudan. The Government of Sudan did not contribute to the funding of the NEX-MSU beyond the provision of office space.

Six years after the establishment of the NEX-MSU there now seems to exist a consensus among UNDP and the Ministry of International Cooperation that the NEX modality has not been cost effective and did not contribute to building sustainable national project management capacity. However, NEX did probably succeed in creating a strong sense of ownership on the part of the Sudanese Government for individual projects and programmes. The Sudanese General Auditing Chamber conducted audits of the NEX-MSU on an annual basis throughout the cycle and consistently flagged severe problems, none of which were apparently addressed. Audit reports of the country office during 1997-2001 raised similar issues with respect to the NEX-MSU including: weak programme and financial monitoring and improper use of UNDP programme resources for the payment of salary supplements to Government officials and employees, including NEX-MSU staff. The NEX-MSU in essence functioned as a financial and administrative management unit and did not provide additional technical capacities of relevance to the programme with the exception of those in the areas of information technology and communications. Indeed, they did not address the other technical management and capacities required for effective management and backstopping of a heavily rural development based programme.

Despite very clear warnings by the annual audits, there was little action to remedy the situation prior to 2000 on the part of the Government, the NEX-MSU or UNDP. From mid-2000 onwards important discussions took place between UNDP’s new country office Senior Management Team and the Government on the future of both the ADS/ARS programme and the NEX-MSU. UNDP’s new orientation and budget constraints were explained. As a result, a phasing-out transition plan was developed for the ADS/ARS and a decision taken to close the NEX-MSU by June 2001. Due credit and recognition must be given to the UNDP Resident Coordinator who confronted the problems and negotiated this mutually agreeable solution with the Government.

Other Execution Modalities

The CCF also featured three other types of execution: Direct Execution, Agency Execution and NGO Execution. Direct execution (DEX) was first employed in 2001 for peacebuilding initiatives and following the execution difficulties experienced in the ADS/ARS programme.

Direct execution has demonstrated advantages in countries in special development situations as it provides for a flexible and responsive relationship with national entities in the management of projects and programmes while not undermining core capacity building and national ownership objectives. DEX can also be useful in countries in or emerging from crisis if perceived as a more neutral modality and that allows cross-line work. While the UNDP country office in Sudan has been working through DEX since 2001, it is too early to comment on the experience to date. If DEX is pursued further, however, it does raise significant capacity issues for the country office.

The 2001 audit of the country office warned
that the level of systems and competencies available would not sustain the extensive use of DEX. It is clear to this mission as well that the office needs a pragmatic and systematic assessment and strengthening of its capacity that takes account of the workload involved. The need to mobilise resources and the likely difficulties in the establishment of systems in the country office both dictate a gradualist approach and the introduction of additional capacity in programme, administration and finance. To be effective the strengthening of capacity should be closely and regularly monitored to ensure that it is translating into improvements in performance.

UN Agency execution was employed primarily during the early stages of the ADS programme. Agencies have since been used principally as cooperating agents under National Execution in the ADS/ARS programme. While Agency Execution appears to have worked relatively satisfactorily, it too has been subject to delays and inaccuracies in reporting. Some UNOPS executed projects also resulted in over-expenditure due to weak financial controls.

The complex cooperating agency agreements under NEX in the ADS/ARS programme, coupled with the inherent complexity of the ADS/ARS and NEX/MSU programmes, resulted in confusion and fragmentation in the management information available to the NEX-MSU for effective management of the programme.

As in most countries, use of NGO execution has not been extensive. Indeed, NGO execution has only been used in the context of a largely headquarters-coordinated Sudan National Bio-diversity and Action Plan (CBD) (SUD/97/A/19/71). For a programme so heavily grassroots based, it may appear surprising that UNDP/Sudan has not had a more direct substantive and continuous interaction with national and international NGOs. Indeed, during the formulation and inception phase of the ADS schemes national and international NGOs—then numerous in Sudan—were intended as an important factor in implementation. The absence of NGOs in the UNDP programme is largely due to the difficult relationship between the GOS and NGOs since 1989, coupled with the fact that many NGOs that were previously involved in development have gravitated towards humanitarian assistance—particularly in the North of the country. Although there was an initial tendency by some international NGOs in the North of Sudan to run parallel operations from Kenya, there has also, since 1995, been a large increase in international NGOs in the north.

The discussion of UNDP’s relationship with NGOs as general partners in development is covered in more detail in Section 5.B below.

B. PARTNERSHIPS

The Sudan is characterised by a relatively rapid turnover of staff in all organisations. The mission found that a large percentage of those interviewed in other agencies had only served in Sudan a relatively short period of time. As a result, institutional memory has been relatively limited, and the conclusions drawn are affected accordingly. Furthermore, it cannot be stressed enough that under international sanctions, normal development partners have, almost without exception, gravitated towards humanitarian and relief assistance. As a result, the potential for direct collaboration has been severely limited. The new peacebuilding programme holds out the potential for UNDP to increase its collaboration with some natural partners, however.

Non-Governmental Organisations

Although UNDP has placed the development of the Sudanese community-based organisations (CBOs) at the very centre of its strategy for participatory area development, its work with national NGOs has been for the most part restricted to the environment portfolio. This is largely because of the considerable tension that has existed between the Government and national NGOs as a result of restrictive policies (a number of national NGO staff were detained during the early years of the Bashir Government). This work has been largely in the context of the preparation of national action plans and strategies. UNDP also worked with individuals with national NGO affiliations in the preparation of the National Human Development Reports.

Restrictions placed on non-governmental organisations have also resulted in a sharp decline in international NGOs operating in Sudan. Many have left, while the remainder are either operating largely in the area of humanitarian or relief assistance in the North, or are operating in the South through Kenya.

Although thematic groups exist, it is apparent that interaction between UNDP and
International NGOs has been relatively limited and those consulted knew very little about UNDP’s programmes in the country. The only example of NGO execution was in the context of the environmental portfolio with IUCN in the context of a headquarters-managed GEF programme.

**Bilateral Donors**
Bilateral donors have contributed to activities under the ADS/ARS scheme, but for broader political reasons, the level of this contribution has been far lower than originally expected and planned for. UNDP has received encouragement and support from a few key donors—most notably the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway—for its recent work in the area of peacebuilding. Concern has, however, been expressed about the lack of capacity at the UNDP office as well as the long periods of time for which contributions remain unutilised.

**The World Bank**
Banned from the provision of humanitarian assistance and from direct involvement in the political debate in its Letters of Agreement and because of Sudan’s outstanding debt, the World Bank, once an important donor, has not had a programme of assistance to Sudan for over a decade. The Sudan, as a country in conflict, remains on a “Watching Brief” and the World Bank monitors its macroeconomic position and development issues on a periodic basis. The UNDP office under the current Resident Coordinator has sought to encourage support to the World Bank as a potential partner in development in Sudan. Nevertheless, UNDP has not grasped the potential importance of this partnership particularly as the Sudan makes progress towards addressing the conflict and laying the foundation required for normalisation of relations with the international community. As discussed elsewhere in this report, a mixture of positive incentives and pressure are essential factors in ensuring continued progress towards peace. The prospect of once again receiving access to loans constitutes the type of positive incentive that could contribute to the achievement of peace. Because of its continuous presence in country, UNDP could certainly cultivate a solid partnership with the World Bank in the following areas:

- The collection of reliable economic and social statistics and the re-establishment of systems for effective monitoring of economic, social and development trends;
- The provision of advice and capacity building in the introduction of structural changes in role and management of government functions, fiscal and public expenditure policies; and
- Generalised support to visiting World Bank missions in organising and convening meetings with government and its aid partners within the country.

The UNDP office’s ability to fulfil the above role will depend to a large degree on the extent to which the organisation is able to rapidly strengthen its own capacity to engage effectively at the centre of the policy dialogue and its ability to remain at the centre of the UN’s system-wide role in the country.

**C. RESOURCE MOBILISATION**
Although the UNDP office has managed to mobilise some cost sharing, resource mobilisation has been negatively affected by the exclusive emphasis on humanitarian assistance and use of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) as the sole mechanism for pledging of assistance to Sudan. Consolidated Appeals have been the principal mechanism for aid coordination and resource mobilisation. This process has been led by OCHA under the Resident Coordinator and has been very successful in mobilising resources for humanitarian aid. However, the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA’s) strict requirement that only short-term interventions be included (with single-year budgets) has been taken quite literally and has, as a consequence, severely hampered UNDP’s ability to mobilising rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance. Therefore, although UNDP has managed to secure funding for its peacebuilding portfolio under the CAP, its potential use as a mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funds</th>
<th>Total US$ Amount (1997-2001)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust Funds</td>
<td>430,989</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDP Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity 21</td>
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<td>UNSO</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
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<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>4,397,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,107,775</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP/Sudan
for securing funds for UNDP’s core ADS/ARS activities has been circumscribed as a result of the exclusion of projects with multi-year budgets.

D. HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT
UNDP Headquarters has been most notable for its absence from the Sudan programme. No visits have been received from the Regional Bureau for Arab States staff since 1998. The UNDP operation in Sudan has received deficient audits of varying degrees since 1993. When the current management staff of the office discovered that the accounts of the office had not balanced over the prior two years since the introduction of IMIS, it took an entire year for the Bureau of Management to mount a two-person mission to help in reviewing the problem, despite repeated requests. Authorization was not provided for the recruitment of additional support in the form of administrative and finance personnel to correct the problems concerned—again despite repeated requests.

The fact that Sudan was nominated by the Regional Bureau for inclusion among those countries to receive country reviews is perhaps a positive sign that the country will receive more substantive and operational support. Indeed, the Regional Bureau also named Sudan as a priority post-conflict country, although the significance of this nomination still needs to be seen.

Sudan is a country in which all players are under a spotlight and have been for a number of years. This requires adequate staffing and operations both on the ground and in UNDP headquarters. If the resources cannot be found to devote to these needs, UNDP may need to consider the closure of offices where it is unable to perform effectively.
The following constitute a few broad recommendations for immediate attention. They should be read and viewed in conjunction with the arguments contained in the main text of the report.

Relevance/Positioning

1. In order to increase the relevance of its programme, and in view of the important role that development is going to play in peacebuilding efforts in all of the conflicts in Sudan, UNDP should refocus its programme on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, building on and adapting the approaches and models of community-based development applied during the past several cycles, most importantly the experience gained with the ADS/ARS programme.

2. The refocused programme should work in support of the IGAD Framework as well as other viable ongoing initiatives placing emphasis on the North/South conflict, the Nuba Mountains conflict as well as at least three to four lesser conflicts elsewhere in the country applying participatory development and decision-making approaches wherever appropriate. Where appropriate and necessary, the UNDP programme could be used to facilitate the involvement of the peace and security arms of the United Nations.

3. UNDP should explore ways that would enable it to operate in rebel-held territories in Southern Sudan and work across Regional Bureaux lines. This should also be done with a view to more effectively extending UNDP’s support to coordination in Southern Sudan. This expansion should be the immediate focus of discussions with the Government and other relevant domestic and international parties as necessary.

4. UNDP should further cultivate linkages with the World Bank, particularly with a view to creating conditions that would be conducive to the continuation of the peace process and to more effective resource management.
5. UNDP should urgently make a realistic assessment of the preparatory projects in its current portfolio with a view to weeding out those projects and programmes that, irrespective of their obvious merits under ideal conditions, are unlikely to be politically viable or worthwhile at the present time (one obvious example is the proposed project for strengthening the National Assembly). Such projects and programmes may of course be resuscitated at a later date.

6. While not entirely precluding other modalities of execution, the importance of raising the direct responsibility of UNDP for the management of its programme and the importance of securing a greater perception of neutrality in the ongoing conflicts, UNDP should apply a variation of Direct Execution as the central modality for the delivery of its future, peacebuilding-focused programme.

**Programme Content and Management**

7. UNDP should link its area-based peace-building with programmes to help strengthen local governance. This may require it to address national policies and approaches to local governance that are so essential to the creation of capacity.

8. The UNDP programme should focus even more heavily on the achievement of sustainability in all of its dimensions. Such considerations should be incorporated into the design of projects and programmes and progress in the achievement of sustainability should be monitored on a regular basis throughout the project cycle. The achievement of capacity to continue the implementation of activities should be the central objective to be achieved prior to UNDP’s exit. Exit strategies should be defined with clear milestones and be built into the design of projects and programmes from the very outset.

9. Innovative mechanisms and partnerships will need to be entered into in order to ensure sustainability. Where government contributions and/or budget allocations may prove insufficient to ensure a smooth and sufficient transfer over to national hands at the end of the project cycle, UNDP should, from the very outset of project design explore partnerships with entities that have access to off-budget resources such as the Zakat fund and other special purpose funds.

10. If UNDP is to adequately reposition itself, the country office needs to have access to sufficient resources of its own. This may require the allocation of additional TRAC 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 as well as funds from the Thematic Trust Funds, among other sources.

11. Programmes funded from central resources such as the GEF should be contingent upon the allocation of sufficient national resources to ensure follow-up and implementation on the part of national entities. Failure to allocate such resources should be viewed as a sign of insufficient national ownership and commitment.

12. Activities in the area of peacebuilding should graduate from the current focus on the creation of mechanisms and processes for collaboration and dialogue to an increased focus on concrete programmes geared to addressing the developmental dimensions of each conflict. While progress on the political front is a central determinant in this effort, the lead-time required for the effective deployment of development programmes for peacebuilding dictates that preparation needs to proceed earlier rather than later.

13. While programme build-up needs to enable the UNDP office to exploit opportunities as they arise as a result of the political process, it should, as a general principle, be gradualist with a view to enabling the office to build its capacity sufficiently to meet the challenge. If this approach threatens to reduce the relevance of the UNDP programme, the organisation will likely need to urgently re-deploy staff on a temporary basis from other offices with relevant experience—particularly if Sudan is indeed to be treated as a priority country. UNDP will need to create management mechanisms at headquarters that enable this to take place on an urgent basis as need be.

**Coordination**

14. There is a most urgent need for UNDP to appoint a Resident Coordinator with sufficient development experience to be able to place the international response to peacebuilding needs on an appropriate footing that goes beyond the current emphasis on humanitarian assistance. Irrespective of the type of Resident Coordinator appointed, however, the heavy workload entailed in coordination suggests that UNDP should appoint a Country Director with direct responsibility for the management of the UNDP programme.
The following is a breakdown, by CCF component, of a project-by-project analysis made by the Country Review team. This does not represent an exhaustive list of projects and programmes that the country office undertook during the CCF period, but does attempt to cover the breadth and depth of the programme.

PARTICIPATORY AREA DEVELOPMENT
There were five ADS (listed below in chronological order of establishment). All of them sought to increase the incomes and improve the standard of living of villagers in areas of the country that had been left out of development; rehabilitate the environment; involve women in development; and integrate nomadic pastorals. In pursuing these results, the ADS promoted the direct involvement of beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of small-scale, community-based development initiatives. Activities were based on the principle of community participation and cost recovery. A main element of the approach was the provision of development capital at the community level through a revolving fund, commonly referred to as the sanduq.

**El-Obeid/North Kordofan** (SUD/90/002 TRAC $399,229; started in 1990 and completed; SUD/97/002 TRAC $3,261,783; started in 1997 and completed)\(^3\). The El Obeid ADS was the longest, largest and most expensive of the ADS. It was initially implemented in four rural councils of the Sheikan province in the North Kordofan State: Umm Ishera, Abu Haraz, Khor Targat and Kargail. These councils cover approximately

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\(^3\) All figures shown in project analysis are for expenditures during the CCF period only (1997-2001). The El-Obeid ADS, for example, expended almost $16 million over its lifetime, approximately $3.6 of which was spent during the CCF period under review.
184,000 people over 8,000 square kilometres. The programme originally began in 1990 after a two-year preparatory phase. In 1997 it was decided to expand the programme to two new rural councils: Bara (southern part of the Bara province) and El Rahad (eastern part of the Um Ruwaba) that comprise 25 villages covering 8,000 square kilometres.

In terms of results, 147 VDCs were created in the consolidation area and 25 in the expansion area. In early 1994, UNDP envisaged to leave the ADS programme after the end of the first phase. Therefore the project team was concerned about the future of the villages and the transfer of assets financed by the central sanduq. It approached the State Government who asked the Attorney General to advise on the issue of how to legalise the status of village associations. A State Governmental decree was issued in 1994, which helped the VDCs in the consolidation area to get a preliminary legal status before 1997. Later the VDCs in the expansion area benefited from this decree to get the same status. In February 2002, a Rural Development Organization law was adopted by the State Government, which provides the final legal framework for the VDCs.

The ADS in El Obeid was the first to establish a legal central institution—the Sheikan Company for Rural Development and Investment (SCRDI)—which was created in 1996. Since the company was created before the expansion phase its title refers to the Sheikan province where the consolidation area was located. When the expansion phase started, the 147 VDCs from the consolidation area accepted to admit the VDCs in the expansion area in SCRDI on the basis of the number of villages covered by each rural council. VDCs are the shareholders of the SCDRI. They contributed on an equal basis to the capital of SCDRI and elect though their representatives 10 members of the SCDRI Board. The Board comprises five other members: the representative of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the Government Project Coordinator, a representative of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, the National Project Manager and a representative of the Locality Development Funds.

The ADS/ARS terminal evaluation found that in El Obeid the concept of the ADS was successfully introduced and is reflected, more or less, in each village. Women have been well targeted in general and have appreciated the positive contribution of the programme. Benefits to the population are visible, except in some villages where VDC members took advantage of the scheme. Income generating activities contributed to improvements in living conditions of the poor and women. Sheep fattening was also profitable to village sanduqs. Small communal activities such as flourmills and water supply were successful. However, success was mostly limited to individual villages and did not lead to any mainstreaming of activities.

The terminal evaluation team also found that the growth and depletion of the sanduq resources was a source of concern: only 10% of sanduqs had more than 10% of growth while 55% of sanduqs saw their resources depleted over the lifetime of the project. Despite a decline in the inflation rate, the sanduq resources were subject to de-capitalization. Risk diversification was not a guiding principle for managing sanduq resources.

The major results of the programme are obviously seen at the village level. Yet, there are some serious sustainability issues. For example, provision of social services is generally left to the initiative to rural communities, which support the financial burden. And there is no formal strategy to ensure that sanduq resources are used as seed money and provide the maximum of return for the whole community.

Idd El Fursan/South Darfur (SUD/90/003 TRAC $1,101,373 STS $995; started in 1990 and completed; SUD/97/003 TRAC $2,004,695; started in 1997 and completed). The Idd El Fursan ADS covered nine rural councils, or “localities”, within two provinces—Idd El Fursan and Reheid El-Birdi, the latter having been designated as a separate province from Idd El Fursan in 1996. Unlike other ADS projects, this ADS adopted a strategy of total coverage of the area in which it was located.

As of 1996—after Phase I and in Phase II—the grassroots institutions had not been established although 158 village clusters were covered by the ADS. Design for Phase III therefore excluded expansion and has been focused on consolidation. In the period of this CCF review, Village Development Committees (VDCs) were created and all have been registered as Voluntary Societies. A new central body, the Reheid El Fursan Company for Development,
Investment and Services (REFCO) was formed, and assets transferred to it. In terms of sub-projects that the project supported, it appears that little attention was given to forward planning. VDC discussions of desired project/credit support tended to be a function of immediate needs. For example, at the start of the rainy season, credit was requested for improved seeds; during the dry season, requests came for water carts. By the time the project staff arranged the approval and procurement process and then delivered the equipment or supplies requested, the need had often passed and the beneficiaries were less interested—especially as they were expected to provide inputs equivalent to about 20% of the total value.

In terms of results and sustainability, some VDCs have established a basis for future community sanduq finances (e.g., Sinsin with the village herd of cattle for fattening; Mabroka with grain stored). None has developed a strong cash reserve; few have established cash recycling between community members. The terminal evaluation of the ADS/ARS found that the most sustainable aspect of the ADS in Fursan at this point in time is the fact that some thinking has been triggered in terms of community roles and their own potential for supporting their development. Some VDCs will almost certainly be able to continue activities in line with what they are doing now. Most communities have at least one community service (such as a flour mill or oil mill) developed, and in principle these should continue to provide some funds for community activities—or at least, provide at-cost services. Most communities, however, have not yet internalised the sense of community responsibility for the sanduq, and while a select few will continue to benefit from investments made during the project lifetime, other community members will only benefit very indirectly.

Also, the evaluation found that the quality of monitoring data and reports is far from optimal, making it very difficult to give a realistic assessment of the present situation, even in those villages visited.

Umm Kaddadah/North Darfur (SUD/90/004 TRAC $532,123 STS $42,914; started in 1990 and completed; SUD/97/004 TRAC $3,431,421; started in 1997 and completed).

The ADS in Umm Kaddadah had the following four objectives:
- Conservation of the environment;
- Raising rural incomes;
- Improvement of food production; and
- Promotion of women’s role.

The above objectives were to be achieved through organizing and involving the beneficiary communities as partners in development, animation, formation of groups, training and establishment and operating of sanduqs as a credit delivery system.

The project financed a number of activities and sub-projects, resulting in stronger purchasing power in the local communities; greater women’s involvement in economic life; a high repayment rate (until 2000); and the establishment of three CBOs in Umm Keddada, El Lait and El Tiweisha to promote credit and investment activities in the project. However, it should also be noted that a good number of activities financed by the sanduq lacked technical and economic feasibility; the available resources were limited to accommodate the financial needs of the communities and were spread thinly, particularly in the case of the expansion area; and the CBOs exist as different bodies without sufficient operational capital and are unclear about the size of investment they can afford.

The terminal ADS/ARS evaluation noted that the project has laid the basis for a workable integrated development model but that it has not yet made significant progress towards outcomes. Specifically, the project area still shows clear symptoms of poverty; limited resource potentialities, unsteady production systems, depressed incomes and impoverished social services, which call for development approaches that take into consideration the nature of the physical and human factors prevailing in the area. On the one hand, the project created different institutional set-ups that succeeded in moving many interventions and became part of the village web of community organizations and societal life. While these results pivoted on the project guidance, they have not reached the stage of self-reliance. And on the other, given the current situation of the local economy, the financial resilience of the sanduqs looks precarious.

Lower Atbara/River Nile (SUD/90/005 TRAC $394,674; started in 1988 and completed;
SUD/97/005 TRAC $3,026,532; started in 1997 and completed). The ADS in Lower Atbara aimed to stimulate village-level economic activity and local self-reliance through the strengthening of community-level institutions for sustained area-based development. Specifically, it sought to:

- Establish a fully functioning organizational framework and processes, for planning and implementing a comprehensive community-based development programme; and
- Increase wealth and improve the quality of life of the area’s inhabitants through the implementation of community management sub-projects.

The project area originally covered two Locality Councils (Seidon and Ed Damer) targeting a total population of 55,000 people within 51 village clusters (20 in Ed Damer and 31 in Seidon). The project area was expanded to include the eastern side of Kaboushia Locality Council, and part of South Ed Damer Locality Council, with the addition of 7,500 square kilometres inhabited by 13,000 people in 21 villages, bringing the total number to 72 villages in the consolidation and expansion areas.

Implementation of the Lower Atbara ADS began as early as 1988. During the review period, however, activities included adding the new expansion areas; continuation of activities in the consolidation area with concentration on viable sub-projects; and creation of central bodies and the women voluntary society.

In terms of results, the project succeeded in establishing linkages with the central and area institutions and within the project area. The project was able to create a good number of VDCs (with male and female members), two companies and the women central body. These efforts resulted in an effective community development shown in:

- Emergence of village and women groups identity with decision making abilities and their recognition by the local and state authorities as viable and representative bodies;
- Financial capabilities through the sanduq to support economic activities; and
- Resource mobilization, through accumulation of capital in the hands of the two companies to investment, and support activities at the grassroots level.

The establishment of the village sanduqs and the building of credit capital under the two companies in particular are major achievements, where rural credit has been lacking in the project area. Organizing credit and educating the communities in managing it to become a village system is a remarkable achievement for the project. However, credit has shown weaknesses in the following areas:

- Low commitment on the part of beneficiaries to contribute by their own resources to the sanduq;
- Poorly designed investment activities;
- Strict repayment procedures are not applied to powerful members of the village;
- Poverty and vulnerability of area resources sometimes interrupt investment activities; and
- Inadequate credit training of committee members.

While the ADS in Lower Atbara has made positive in-roads in the environment, its efforts fell short of addressing the magnitude of the problems encountered. Also, while women have become a more dynamic presence in the communities as a result of the project, women are still subject to a considerable gender gap. In terms of increased social services, the project received high marks. Services mentioned by communities included improved village water supply, schools, village clinics, vaccination and training of midwives.

**Central Butana/Gedaref** (SUD/90/006 TRAC $–471,100 STS $11,125; started in 1990 and completed; SUD/97/006 TRAC $3,328,085; started in 1997 and completed). As the economy of Central Butana is mostly based on agro-livestock, most of the ADS activities were related to agriculture. There were wide differences in the VDC performance. Some VDCs showed a high degree of success, such as that in Id El Homur, while others showed complete failure, such as that in Gadalla. Most of the sub-projects were based on very poor preparatory studies, especially in the area of marketing (e.g., the oil mill in El Tokoun). The women’s goat programme was almost a complete failure due to poor selection of goats, poor veterinary extension services and poor supervision by the VDC. Obvious laxity on repayment and lack of accountability were also main reasons of failure.

The lack of basic services such as water, health and education not addressed by the
 ADS project led to a loss of confidence in the ADS initiative at the beginning. After 1999, however, when the water programme was finally initiated, the beneficiaries showed more trust, commitment and desire to sustain the intervention. Women in some VDCs proved to be responsive to new developmental initiatives, and to be successful in managing communal activities. The impact of the ADS in the area of gender has been quite positive but limited.

The ADS in Central Butana passed through difficult times of instability between 1995 and 1998. More than three managers were involved; the revolving funds were completely frozen in 1998; basic services such as water provision were excluded from 1997 to 1999, which impeded the development of the villages; animation and training for capacity building was far less than what was actually required; lack of a credit and M&E specialist in the project staff reduced the efficiency of the sanduq system; there were no linkages with the banking and finance institutions made sustainability uneasy to realize; and traditional and religious forces reduced the important role of women in the development process.

During the implementation of the ADS, a decision was made to launch the programme in other areas of Sudan that were considered poor and vulnerable to natural disasters and the effects of civil war. As a result, seven Area Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS) came into existence. The analysis below is based on the Terminal Evaluation of the ADS/ARS programme, which only examined two ARS in depth—the Juba and Sinkat ARS. These are therefore examined in more depth in the next section.

**Juba/Bahr El Jebel** (SUD/95/001 TRAC $-17,192 Add-on $137,250 STS $-205; started in 1995 and completed; SUD/97/032 TRAC $1,588,283 Add-on $331,074; started in 1997 and completed). Six villages around the town of Juba were identified as a target for the ARS project. The ARS Juba started in 1997/1998 with 12 village clusters that included 52 sub-villages with a total population of 20,000, of which many are internally displaced.

In terms of results, it appears that the ARS in Juba has succeeded to a large extent in breaking the cycle of aid dependency and helped inspire a sense of self-help in the communities, although this is not a result seen equally in all villages. A number of VDCs, women’s groups and CBOs have been formed in the villages and they have in turn developed a set of rules and regulations in order to run the sanduq and other activities in an effective manner.

The terminal ADS/ARS evaluation found that the Juba ARS managed in a very short time and little resources to establish a well-connected set of institutions. Effort was made to ensure a satisfactory performance of project implementation and its training component. The baseline survey for the Juba ARS was done in mid-1998, a year and a half after project implementation began, and it does not appear to have been used periodically to check progress. This makes it difficult to know the extent of UNDP’s role in changing outcomes such as increased capacity to sustain livelihoods over the past four years.

**Sinkat/Red Sea** (SUD/96/008 TRAC $614,831; started in 1996 and completed). Sinkat is one of the four provinces of the Red Sea State with a total area of about 8,000 square kilometres and a total population of about 136,000 (45,000 households). A baseline survey was carried out in March 1997 and implementation began in July 1997. The main objective was to improve the livelihood of the people through:

- Human capacity building;
- Institutional capacity building;
- Productive capacity building;
- Women’s empowerment; and
- Environmental capacity building.

As the ADS/ARS terminal evaluation found, the work started in three villages in 1997 and was extended to only 11 villages between 1998 and 2000 and not the 17 foreseen at the beginning. The priority was given to village mobilization, organization of general meetings and designation of VDC members by General Assemblies. Women had separate mobilisation meetings for cultural reasons. Despite this, the ARS project managed to organize women separately with success and now 25% of VDC members are women. Activities were selected by the VDC in consultation with the beneficiaries of the village and they were different village from village based on their specific needs. The

34. According to the 1997 baseline survey, 17 villages were supposed to be chosen for the ARS intervention. These villages were considered to be the poorest in the province.
project checked the feasibility of the activities before accepting the financing.

Activities covered under this project were mainly goat and cow rearing, poultry, agriculture farming, training in grain milling, water, soap manufacturing, cultivation, restocking and drug revolving. Most of these activities were financed through group loans and a few were directed towards individuals, such as sewing machine and commodities shops. The repayment rate to the sanduq is on average quite low (about 33% in 2001). As a result, the sanduq has not managed so far to recycle resources.

In general, the terminal evaluation of the Red Sea ARS found that it is too early to measure the effect the project may have had on outcomes. However, it noted that the State Government has demonstrated a strong commitment to the project, which may bode well for its sustainability. Militating against sustainability are the lack, respectively, of a Credit expert and a Monitoring and Evaluation officer, as well as a lack of adequate training, specifically on credit principles and procedures.

The remaining five ARS were:

- **Wau/Bahr El Ghazal** (SUD/94/001 TRAC $2,816; started in 1994 and completed; SUD/95/002 TRAC $-32,225 Add-on $115,721; started in 1995 and completed; SUD/97/033 TRAC $490,748; started in 1997 and completed).
- **Kadugli/South Kordofan** (SUD/95/004 TRAC $46 Add-on $40,153 AOS $-206; started in 1995 and completed; SUD/97/034 TRAC $775,634; started in 1997 and completed).
- **Abyei/West Kordofan** (SUD/96/007 TRAC $817,882; started in 1996 and completed).
- **Malakal/Upper Nile** (SUD/96/009 TRAC $524,653; started in 1996 and completed).
- **Lagawa/West Kordofan** (SUD/97/032 TRAC $867,086; started in 1997 and completed).

In addition to the ADS/ARS, this area of the CCF portfolio also included the Khartoum State Urban Upgrading and Poverty Alleviation Project, or “UPAP” (SUD/97/017 TRAC $2,135,772; started in 1998 and completed; SUD/99/005 SPPD $85,401; started in 1999 and ongoing). UPAP is a pilot project based on UNDP’s experience in supporting area-based development and based on the UNCHS (Habitat) mandate for improving urban environments. UPAP is essentially an urban governance project, piloting an integrated approach to development planning and programme implementation in seven out of 26 localities in Khartoum State. The localities were to be selected based on several criteria, including the fact that they have high concentration of urban poor, new arrivals living on the edge of urban centres and populations living in camps.

The final evaluation of the UPAP project (28 November 2001) found that the project had “achieved stunning success” in helping to improve inter-agency and inter-sectoral cooperation for poverty alleviation. It also found that the project had succeeded in developing local community institutions—notably local development councils—that can provide effective leadership in income generation and basic social services. Indeed, 95% of the project’s activities are being undertaken by LDCs. There is evidence that the project has had real and immediate effect on the lives of its beneficiaries, through the micro-credit activities, water programme and income-generation activities.

The UPAP project appears to have succeeded in piloting an integrated approach to development planning, etc., and at relatively low cost. The key from this point onward, however, is replicating this positive experience elsewhere. The conditions in Khartoum State may have been uniquely disposed to UPAP’s success—i.e., the legal framework, support from the state government, and the fact that the project was addressing a visible and immediate need that the national government would also recognize and support. It remains to be seen if the second half of UPAP’s objective can be fulfilled—namely the implementation of the model in other parts of Sudan.

**STRATEGIC PLANNING**

**National Strategy for Human Development** (SUD/95/003 TRAC $268,302; started in 1997 and completed). Building on work done in the previous country programme, UNDP supported preparation of a *National Human
There is no evidence that Sudan’s capacity to plan and implement a national human development strategy has been enhanced as a result of the outputs produced by this project.

**Basic Education** (SUD/99/018 SPPD $235,000; started in 2000 and ongoing). This project, executed by UNESCO, has two stated objectives—to support a basic education system that is suitable to the multi-cultural, multi-linguistic and multi-religious Sudan; and to support an effective education system that copes with the global technological advancement. This was to be achieved through the production of strategies covering: i) extending access to basic education for girls; ii) enhancing effectiveness and improving quality of basic education; iii) ensuring maximum relevance of a learning programme for all; iv) teacher training; v) developing the science, technology and mathematics teaching education; vi) increasing capacity of educational administration and management system; and vii) linking distance learning with basic education.

The project is still ongoing. UNESCO missions have visited Sudan to prepare a national education survey. Field surveys throughout Sudan were completed and a national team is in the process of analysing the returns. Once a report is finalized, a workshop will be organized with Government to review the conclusions. It is too early to draw any conclusions regarding results, but based on the current situation in the country, it is doubtful that a strategy that is developed will have much impact without commitment to sufficient follow-up financing and without full national buy-in. Furthermore it is unclear to what extent synergies with UNICEF and international and national non-governmental organisations have been taken advantage of.

**NEX-MSU** (SUD/93/001 TRAC $723,349; AOS $763,581; started in 1994 and completed). Support to the NEX-MSU accounted for just under a third of the resources expended under this component of the CCF. The stated overall purpose of the support rendered was to ensure a more efficient and effective management of all NEX projects, including through bolstering the NEX-MSU capacity to plan, monitor, evaluate and report. A corollary reason was to foster participatory approaches in the design and implementation of development activities. The types of activities that took place under this project included contracting and procurement; supervision of private contractors; personnel identification, recruitment and training; and supervision of the NEX audits.

The failure of the NEX-MSU to efficiently and effectively manage NEX projects is documented in greater detail in the main body of this report. Based on this analysis, it would appear that the NEX-MSU project failed to meet either of its stated objectives.

**Support to National Fund for States’ Support** (SUD/99/025 TRAC $198,106; started in 1999 and completed). Technically, this project falls within the “other” component of the CCF, however because its objective was to develop the capacity of the National Fund for States’ Support (NFSS) to plan and provide technical and financial support to target states, it is addressed here.

There were three outputs of this project. First—and this is more accurately an activity of the project rather than a result—equipment was provided to the NFSS to help improve its capacity to fulfil its mandate. Second, the staff of the NFSS was trained in providing technical and financial support. Third, and potentially most useful, was the production of state-oriented baseline data produced in the form of an encyclopaedia. This third product is potentially useful because it could serve as an important starting point for UNDP support to the NFSS in the next programming cycle. By most accounts, the NFSS is still a weak entity in need of capacity building as well as financial resources to fulfil its mandate of complementing state provision of basic social services, particularly in rural areas. If UNDP decides to work more at the state level in the next country programme, building on the community level work accomplished in the ADS/ARS programmes, support to the NFSS would logically form an integral part of this work. If this is the case, the work that
was done through this project should be folded into a wider state-level support strategy so that any progress that may have been made towards the achievement of the outcome (increased capacity of the NFSS to provide technical and financial support to states) is not lost.

Development Strategy for the South (SUD/96/016 TRAC $65,682; started in 1997 and completed). This project was actually a run-up activity to the last of the five round tables supported by UNDP between 1995 and 1998. Specifically, the Government of Sudan, the SPLM and other factions, and some representatives of civil society were asked to give their respective viewpoints of how the South could be developed in a post-war Sudan. The participants prepared position papers, which were then compiled into a document for discussion at the fifth and final round table meeting, which was held in Warsaw in 1998. The process and outputs (the compiled position papers) of this project were productive in influencing the agenda of the Warsaw meeting and helping to develop a consensus on how a strategy to develop southern Sudan should proceed. Unfortunately, the consensus developed through the compilation of viewpoints and through the discussions in Warsaw did not endure beyond the round table itself. Still, there may be room to make use of the work already completed through this and other efforts, should current peace initiatives take hold.

Export Development and Promotion (SUD/93/004 TRAC $217,193; started in 1993 and completed). Technically, this project falls within the “other” programme area of the CCF, however it is addressed here for its capacity building qualities. The project sought to enhance the capacity of Sudanese local producers to export various agriculture and animal products by first building the capacity of the Information Center of the Ministry of External Trade. Staff of the Information Center of the Ministry of External Trade participated in seminars on sorting and grading of agricultural products and the Center was provided with materials and equipment to disseminate trade-related information.

It is unclear from the information available whether the capacity of the Information Center was increased—and increased in a sustainable way—through the project. More importantly, it is also unclear how a change in the capacity of the Information Center was expected to have contributed to increased capacity of Sudanese local producers to export various agriculture and animal products.

Also in the area of strategic planning are a group of miscellaneous interventions about which the review team was able to find little information concerning outputs and progress towards outcomes. These include UNDP’s support to the third LDC conference (SUD/01/002); support to macroeconomic reforms (SUD/95/005) and aid coordination and management (SUD/97/029).

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
Elodaya Integrated Resource Management for Desertification Control (SUD/89/026 TRAC: $1,525,708; SUD/90/X01 UNSO: $150,000; started in 1991 and completed in 2000). This programme sought to establish, on a pilot basis in the area of Elodaya (West Kordofan), integrated natural resource rehabilitation, conservation and management systems in Sudan that could be replicated elsewhere in the region. The project was successful in establishing a community-based structure to oversee the management of the natural resources (22 VDCs were created, as well as other specialized committees). Working with these VDCs and other village committees, the project introduced natural resource management techniques (e.g., agro-forestry, production of seedlings and tree planting, fire lines, range reserves, improved stoves), established a credit system at the village level, implemented a training and capacity building programme for the VDC members and the community (special attention was given to women), and increased provision of drinking water for both human and animals (more than 10 hafris were made and 20 hand pumps installed).

The project was successful in producing a number of concrete outputs, and beneficiaries in the project say that their lives are better as a result, particularly with respect to increased access to safe water, and this certainly indicates positive progress towards outcomes. There is also some evidence that awareness has been raised at the community level on environmental issues and the use of credit schemes to raise
and sustain income via activities that are productive but also environmentally friendly. Interestingly, this project consciously made use of the ADS model in supporting VDCs and sanduqs. Overall, it appears that the project has successfully established an integrated natural resource rehabilitation, conservation and management system in the locale.

Despite these gains, however, there is evidence that the village structures are still weak, that sanduqs are not linked to financial institutions and that the capacity of the VDCs might not be strong enough—all factors that will ultimately affect the sustainability of the initiative. There is also no evidence that the pilot has been replicated elsewhere.

**Community-Based Rangelands Rehabilitation for Carbon Sequestration and Biodiversity** (SUD/93/G31 GEF: $1,500,000; SUD/96/017 TRAC: $522,930; started in 1996 and completed in 2000). This project was designed to 1) to create a locally sustainable natural resource management system that would both prevent overexploitation of marginal lands and rehabilitate rangelands for the purposes of carbon sequestration, preservation of biodiversity and reduction of atmospheric dust; and 2) to reduce the risk of production failure by increasing the number of alternatives for sustainable production strategies, thereby leading to greater stability for the local population.

Like the Elodaya pilot, this project focused on one geographic area (Bara Province of North Kordofan State) and used the ADS model to establish and/or strengthen institutional structures (i.e., 17 VDCs as well as other specialized committees) at the community level to handle natural resource management as well as other development activities, and established a credit system, managed at the village level, that financed environmentally friendly income-generating activities. Activities included the implementation of a training programme covering range management, sand dune stabilization and shelterbelts, fodder production, contingency planning, improved stoves and buildings, and resource management; and the introduction of improved seeds/varieties to increase production and land fertility.

Although this project understandably fell short of its stated objectives, the terminal evaluation of the project found that progress had been made towards them. Specifically, the evaluation found that the project strategy to rehabilitate and improve marginal lands successfully demonstrated the potential to enhance carbon sequestration. The evaluation further found that within the project area there were trained local committee members who took on the project administration in the absence of the project staff. It also found evidence outside the project area of positive leakage as several villages that were not involved in the project have, by virtue of accepting the premises of the intervention through contact with project villagers, begun to implement some of the project strategies. In general, the project can also be said to have been successful in raising awareness of environmental issues among local communities. To take one example, some local communities have begun to issue regulations governing new building in order to prevent deforestation and other environmental degradation.

**Support to Strategic Planning Process Aiming at Environmentally Sustainable Development** (SUD/93/G81 CAP21: $500,000; started in 1995, completed in 1999). Funded through Capacity 21, this project aimed to support the Government of Sudan in preparing a Sudanese national strategy for environmentally sustainable development. This process was to be achieved through involving a broad cross-section of the Sudanese Society including NGOs, CBOs and the private sector in the development of initiatives that contributes to the formulation of Sudan's National Agenda 21.

The project supported some 18 small projects implemented by NGOs, CBOs, academic institution and the private sector, which promoted the concept of sustainable development through community-based organizations. The project also introduced environment-related curricula in three target universities to raise awareness of environmental issues. Environmental Action Plans were produced for four states.

In May 2000, an assessment was undertaken of this project and each of the 18 projects was reviewed in depth for results. The nature and extent of the results varied across the 18 pilots, with many of them reaping real benefits for the local communities, in the form of safer
drinking water, better access to health care and more sustainable livelihoods. For example, in the Town of Gedaref, the project supported a public health project whereby the local community-based organization (the Salamat El Bay Popular Committee) was able to manage its own public health through a revolving fund that was used to pay health care worker salaries.

While there have been indications that some states are interested in the lessons learned from the pilots in their regions, there has been little apparent attempt to link up the lessons learned from the 18 pilots to a national dialogue on environmentally sustainable development. As a result, a national strategy was never produced and the development objective of the project was not achieved. The project did generate a considerable amount of information, however, that could eventually contribute to the development of a national strategy for environmentally sustainable development if the will exists to pursue it.

The Government has entrusted the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources with coordinating the activities of the National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD), once one is established, and a Steering Committee for the preparation of the NSSD has been formed. UNDP’s work in the next programme cycle would presumably build on the work accomplished in this project to help develop the NSSD.

**Capacity Building to Enable the Sudan’s Response to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change** (SUD/95/G31 GEF: $390,000; SUD/00/020 TRAC: $10,000; started in 1998 and ongoing). A GEF “enabling project,” this intervention sought to build national capacity to advance national climate change interests. Activities ranged from facilitating implementation of the UNFCCC itself, to pursuing energy and natural resource management directly or indirectly related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Project outputs included 30 government employees trained in energy and natural resource management through specific courses and on-the-job training. At least three studies were also produced—one on Greenhouse Gases, one on Vulnerability and Adaptation, and one on Mitigation. In addition, the first ever National Communication under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change was issued, a steering committee on climate change was established in the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources and a network to address climate change issues was established, comprising five ministries.

The training that took place may have contributed to building some capacity among government officials, as, since the training, Sudan has begun to prepare for global meetings on climate change that they had not prepared for before. However, it is unknown whether this capacity is sustainable or whether this capacity will actually advance national climate change interests. The project, like most in the CCF, did not include indicators of progress or the periodic accumulation of data to check progress. This project is ongoing, however, therefore its role in changing outcomes may still be forthcoming.

**National Action Plan to Combat Desertification** (SUD/96/X11 GEF: $160,000; SUD/96/013 TRAC: $60,000; started in 1996 and completed in 1999). This project sought first to assist the Government of Sudan to develop a national framework to combat desertification and second, through this framework, to help Sudan better meet national and international obligations.

The first component was achieved with the production of a National Action Plan to Combat Desertification. However, this plan failed to receive political support from upper levels of government and failed to secure domestic political support. The National Drought and Desertification Unit in the Sudanese government remains very weak and lacks sufficient political support in order to take forceful action. There is also no indication that Sudan is better able to meet its international and national obligations as a result of the project.

**National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan** (SUD/97/G31 GEF: $448,000; SUD/00/012 TRAC: $10,000; started in 1998 and ongoing). This project sought to develop a national Biodiversity and Action Plan (NBSAP) for Sudan and a Country Report to be submitted to the Convention on Biodiversity Commitments within the Framework of the Convention Biological Diversity. However, there are also capacity building and awareness raising components implicit in the project, which sought to promote human resource development and institutional mechanisms
for capacity building for the country, and also to enhance public awareness among stakeholders through a participatory and a multidisciplinary approach to the NBSAP, including the involvement of civil society.

This project has been among the more successful in achieving intended results. First, the NBSAP was produced in April 2001 and approved by the Council of Ministers that August. The First National Report (the “Country Report”) to the Convention on Biodiversity was also produced; the Country Report essentially presents an abridged version of the Plan. Although the NBSAP has yet to be implemented, there are indications that it has received strong political support from the upper levels of government. The President of the Republic attended the Council of Ministers meeting that approved the Plan, during which he both highlighted the Plan and asked the Minister of Finance to appoint extra funds to print the Plan properly and disseminate it. The Plan not only proposes a road map for comprehensively addressing biodiversity in Sudan, but also serves as an excellent baseline survey of the current state of biodiversity across the country and analyses the threats and opportunities in the area.

In addition to the two immediate products of the project, the process of coming up with the plan included the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, including government institutions, NGOs, academic institutions and more than 50 national consultants in the various stages (i.e., preparatory studies, biodiversity stocktaking and the preparation of the NBSAP itself). There was also a series of capacity building and awareness raising activities around the Plan at both the national and state levels.

**Conservation and Management of Habitats and Species and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Dinder National Park** (SUD/98/G41 GEF: $750,000; SUD/00/014 TRAC: $575,000; started in 2000 and ongoing). The expansion of mechanized farming, as well as recurrent crises in the form of civil wars and droughts, have profoundly affected the activity within and bordering Dinder National Park. This project, which is still in its beginning stages (even though the original project, now much reduced in size, was originally submitted to UNDP some 12 years ago), seeks to preserve biodiversity in the Park.

To achieve this, the project aims to encourage species conservation and sustainable use of resources through the integration of local communities in the utilization of and management of the natural resources in the Park. It also aims to improve the standards of living of the communities surrounding the Park and to build the capacities of the Wildlife Administration staff that work in the Park.

To date, the project has produced a number of outputs as planned. These include the establishment of a core group of national consultants to work on the management plan; the establishment of VDC-like structures in eight villages; initiation of a dialogue on the preparation of land use plans for three states involved in the Park; and the organization of two training courses for the Wild Life Administration staff in the Park.

Because the project is so new, it is not possible to say whether it is having an effect on environmental outcomes identified by UNDP/Sudan in the SRF. On the one hand, the project looks promising given its integrated approach (including biodiversity, sustainable livelihoods and capacity development components), but on the other, it may not adequately address the negative impact of project activities on livelihoods of pastoralists in the area. The project will continue into the new country programme, where it will perhaps also incorporate some conflict resolution components as well.

**Barrier Removal to Secure Market Penetration for Photo-voltaic Systems in Semi-urban Sudan** (SUD/99/G35 GEF: $750,000; SUD/00/013 TRAC: $250,000; Government cost-sharing $250,000; started in 2001 and ongoing). This project, which is very new, aims to meet suppressed and growing demand for electricity in semi-urban Sudan through reliable photo-voltaic systems as a substitute for fossil-based generating units.

To date, the project has established eight project focal points in eight states (Gezira, Red Sea, Northern State, Northern Kordofan, West Kordofan, South Darfur, North Darfur and Bahar El Gabal) to manage the process of integrating the PV technology into the local market economy and streamline it into the energy sector. It has also conducted some awareness-raising activities with the

38 A ninth focal point—in Kassala State—was added in early 2002, which is beyond the time scope of this review; and the process to establish a tenth focal point in Naher El Nil State is ongoing.
involvement of the Sudanese Conservation Society (SECS) and the private sector, in these same eight states. The project is currently in the process of establishing a credit fund mechanism in collaboration with local financial institutions, to help finance the initial cost of using photovoltaic systems, which is quite high. In addition to the work in eight states, the project has also supported the preparation of a policy reform proposal on tax exemption for customs, duties and taxes on PV systems; private sector encouragement to invest in renewable energy; government accreditation for PV systems; and institutional support to the Renewable Energy Administration within the Ministry of Energy. The proposal has been submitted to the Ministry of Finance for approval. A technical government committee has been established to finalize the formulation of standards for accreditation of certain PV systems. In addition, as a follow up to the proposal, the PV project, in collaboration with the Energy Committee of the National Assembly, will hold a symposium to discuss PV systems in the first quarter of 2002. The Federal Ministers of Finance and Energy, National Assembly members and other stakeholders are expected to attend. The Government of Sudan, through the Ministry of Energy, contributed $250,000 to this project in advance of starting activities. Among the reasons for the Government’s interest in this project are its relevance to the Ministry’s work, in that it addresses a pressing need and promises a fairly quick and visible payoff in the form of increased number of citizens living in semi-urban areas who have access to electricity.

**Water Policy and Strategic Framework for Sudan** (SUD/98/005 SPPD $100,000; started in 1998 and completed in 1999). Rehabilitation Study of the Rahad Scheme (SUD/00/017 SPPD: $92,000; started in 2000 and completed in 2001). These two projects were SPPD, or project formulation, initiatives, both of which were executed by FAO. The purpose of the first was to develop a national policy and strategic framework for Sudan’s water sector. The outcome of the initiative was to be used to put forward a national action programme for the development of the water sector. The purpose of the second was to support a comprehensive review of the present Rahad Scheme.

Both projects relied on bringing in international consultants to undertake the work, however there were no linkages made with ongoing initiatives, stakeholders or, apparently, national priorities. As a result, a National Water Policy draft document was produced in November 1999 through the first initiative, but it was never approved. A review of the Rahad Scheme was completed through the second initiative, but was not taken forward.

**SERVICE AREAS**

**Support to Programme Formulation** (SUD/01/003 TRAC $17,934; started in 2001 and ongoing). Financially speaking, this project fell within the area-based development programme area of the CCF, however it is addressed here because of its nature as an exploratory initiative in the area of governance. The project’s role was to support the efforts of the Government of the Sudan and UNDP in formulating and developing a sound development programme for the country. During 2001, three main activities took place under this project. First, UNDP organized a workshop on Local Governance in Khartoum State. Second, UNDP conducted a Governance Study Tour to Lebanon for six “government officials” (one each from the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of International Cooperation, National Assembly, Human Rights Commission, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance for Khartoum State) to observe their counterparts in action. And third, UNDP formulated a Disaster Management project document.

With respect to the first activity, the workshop on local governance and decentralization took place in May 2001 and was attended by 72 participants. The workshop addressed the following four themes: financing systems and structures of local governance; staffing and institutional relationships; community development and popular participation; and localities information centres. Growing out of the workshop and addressing this last issue, UNDP formulated a project document on Strengthening the Localities’ Institutional Capacities (SUD/01/012). This is a pilot project in Khartoum State, focusing on eight localities, with the stated objective of enabling “the localities to plan properly, raise local revenue to meet the basic social services and involve the communities in the decision making process.” The means of doing this is to build the capacities of the three different
institutions that form the basis of support and guidance to the localities, namely the Khartoum State Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the Local Government Chamber and the Local Development Fund.

Khartoum State was selected as the pilot for this initiative because it could provide cost sharing on behalf of the local government, had favourable legislation (i.e., the 1999 Local Governance Act), and presented opportunities to link up with the Urban Poverty Project already underway in the State.

The country review mission also learned that UNDP/Sudan has explored the possibility of working with the Sudanese National Assembly in the next country programme cycle. To date, the issue has been discussed internally in UNDP and with the Secretary-General of the National Assembly, but no project document or proposal has been formulated. The discussions thus far have focused on building the capacities of the Members to interact with their constituents, on the one hand, and to provide Members with access to knowledge bases to help them better conduct legislative research and with study tours to share knowledge with their counterparts.

Civil Service Reform (SUD/01/01 SPPD $134,562; started in 2001 and ongoing). This project seeks to support the Government of Sudan’s efforts in reforming the civil service sector. UNDP used SPPD resources to bring in the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA); DESA fielded an advisory mission, which participated in a national conference on the reformation of the public service and produced a mission report, an aide-memoire and, ultimately, a project proposal. The project proposal focuses on the following five areas: human resources, legislation, organization linkages, compensation and benefits, and work environment. These five areas mirror those to emerge from the national conference and be incorporated into the Ministry of Labour’s 25-year strategy for public service.

Multi-Purpose Training Centers, Juba and Dongola (SUD/96/001 TRAC $315,730 and SUD/97/036 TRAC $541,438; both completed). These projects were early precursors to UNDP’s current proposals to work in the area of civil service reform and sought to enhance the technical and administrative capacities of civil servants in Juba and Dongola. As a result of the projects, training plans were produced in both states and training activities in bookkeeping, finance and management were conducted. Mobile vocational training programmes were, in addition, conducted in Juba and a “Training of Trainers” programme took place in Syria.

Although the Ministry of Labour praised these two projects as being useful, it is unclear whether the technical and administrative capacities of civil servants in Juba and Dongola were improved. What does seem clear, however, from UNDP’s governance concept paper, interviews with the Ministry of Labour and the national conference on public service, is that the case of the problems with the public service in Sudan goes to its very roots and would necessitate a major overhaul of the entire system from the organizational set-up to the salary structure. Therefore, training programmes that operate independent of a larger and deeper effort at reform are unlikely to effect sustainable change.

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

Capacity Building for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: The aim of this project is to establish a peacebuilding resource centre to facilitate coordination, information and experience exchange amongst the various actors involved in peacebuilding work in Sudan, with a primary focus on the grassroots level. The Dutch Government has provided full funding, but the project is only in its early stages of implementation. It is expected to produce a database on organisations involved in peacebuilding, a library of hard copy and electronic material, a collection of best practices and lessons learned from peacebuilding initiatives within Sudan and elsewhere, a roster of experts/consultants, etc. Building relationships with similar institutions outside Sudan is a key priority and the centre will also develop a website. A Steering Committee has been set up including representatives of civil society, the Government of Sudan, other UN Agencies, donors and academia. Through this programme it is envisaged that there will be stronger collaboration between the different actors, and plans are already underway for UNDP to undertake a conflict mapping exercise jointly with UNICEF.

The programme needs to take full advantage
of the various other peace-related initiatives that UNDP has embarked on. For example, the Planning for Peace Framework should be supported more explicitly through the network. There is also a need to better involve more of the Khartoum-based intellectual groups and influential civil society actors so as to provide the linkage between grassroots and policy levels. To date, actors of central importance to the peace process that operate in SPLA-controlled areas have not been included in the network. It will be important to revisit this issue and to bring on board as many actors from across the North/South divide for the network to have any real and lasting impact. Through the network UNDP should also be able to facilitate a number of workshops, seminars or training sessions in key peacebuilding themes or focus areas.

Despite all of its potential, the work programme of the project is ambitious for a modestly staffed and capacitated structure. There is a real danger that expectations may be raised that cannot be met. Indeed it does not appear as if the current budget will allow for all activities to be implemented, especially with regard to the capacity building elements. Senior management within the UNDP office will need to closely monitor and provide guidance to the project staff, most of which have little concrete experience in running such a network. There are also risks in the programme relying solely on one donor, and UNDP should try to widen the donor base, and if possible, find some cost-sharing agreement with the Sudanese Government and/or private sector partners.

Nuba Mountains Programme: Although first designed in 1999, this joint UN/NGO programme designed to address the prevailing needs in both GOS- and SPLA-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains region experienced several implementation delays because of a stalemate reached between the GOS and the SPLA during negotiations on the issue of access. The recent United States-led initiative has drastically altered the situation, and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) will now provide the security and access needed. UNDP, through the Office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, has redesigned the programme, turning it into an explicit peacebuilding opportunity. UNDP has also been designated the overall lead/coordinator for the programme. A thorough needs assessment bringing actors from across the political divide together was successfully carried out and considered a strong achievement. This has resulted in the design of a full and comprehensive programme dealing with health, education, agriculture, water and sanitation, capacity building, gender equality promotion, peacebuilding and income generation. UNDP is also advocating an innovative programme management structure, with an advisory group that includes non-UN representatives. The programme has not yet begun implementation and it is therefore impossible to measure any concrete results, but UNDP is well placed to demonstrate its added value in bridging the gap between relief and development and leading recovery efforts through this programme.

This programme has an extremely high profile, given the involvement of several parts of the Government, the SPLM, local Nuba leaders, civil society and external actors (most importantly the US). A window of opportunity exists now, but may not last very long, and all partners must pool together to try and sustain its momentum. Several donors have already contributed to UNDP’s activity in this initiative, including the Governments of Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. The Nuba Mountains initiative, despite its seemingly secondary nature, is implicated in the North/South conflict as a result of the alliance between the Nuba and the SPLA that originated in the late 1980s. It therefore could serve as a trial case that, if successful, could provide lessons for other peacebuilding programmes in areas on the frontline between the North and South. For the Nuba Mountains programme to work, there will need to be strong advocacy/lobbying of government at the highest levels to ensure that relevant laws—particularly those concerning land use and tenure—and activated, adjusted as necessary and enforced. The position of project coordinator will be extremely important, as it will require someone with strong political/management skills able to withstand institutional rivalries.

UNDP also needs to create a presence in Southern Kordofan to oversee the day-to-day management of the project, as this cannot be done effectively from Khartoum. Lessons learned from UNDP’s experience with the ADS/ARS
schemes—positive and negative—should be taken on board for this initiative as well. The fact that UNDP has not historically worked in non-GOS-controlled areas has meant that it has relatively few credible partnerships with actors working on that side of the conflict. It will also be very important for UNDP to extend its role beyond that of overall coordination, and ensure that it delivers some concrete operational benefits on the ground, such as in rehabilitation of infrastructure, IDP reintegration, micro-credit schemes, etc. UNDP will also need to demonstrate added value to the other agencies/implementing bodies in ensuring that peacebuilding opportunities are not lost through their various sectoral interventions (e.g. education, health, water and sanitation). The eventual participation of the UN at a political level (i.e. providing a political umbrella for the initiative) should not be ruled out, and UNDP would be a key partner in backstopping such a task, should it be taken on.

Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Re-integration of IDPs: Project formulation began in 1999 but because implementation did not begin until 2001 as a consequence of the lack of capacity in UNDP, potential funding from TRAC 1.1.3 was lost. The programme therefore had to delay planned activities such as the establishment of information systems, an IDP database (in partnership with OCHA), provision of support for the development of inter-agency and government policies for IDPs and capacity building. UNDP has adopted a flexible approach, seizing opportunities presented. For example, with the pilot resettlement project of IDPs in Abyei UNDP has stepped into a void to work with stakeholders to ensure effective resettlement of up to 1,500 Dinka IDP households. It was viewed as an opportunity for UNDP to link its policy advice to actual practice on the ground. Another positive experience has been in South Darfur where the GOS provided land for resettlement.

UNDP has worked to set up an inter-agency thematic IDP group, bringing together UN agencies and other actors with interest/involvement in IDP-related initiatives for information needs, common programming concerns, coordination and collaboration on IDP issues. Good work has also been undertaken with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for IDPs, Mr. Francis Deng, who together with UNDP will assist the GOS in developing an IDP policy. Although resistance from other UN agencies to UNDP’s involvement was initially registered, there now appears to be a clearer division of labour and responsibilities between them (especially between UNDP and OCHA). As with other programmes in the peacebuilding portfolio, more work can be done to capitalise on potential linkages with other programmes such as the Planning for Peace Framework, the Peacebuilding Network, and the governance portfolio.

IPF’s Planning for Peace Framework: Initially conceived to provide a means for supporting the consolidation of peace “once peace arrives in Sudan”, this project was conceived within the framework of the request by the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) for coordination and facilitation by UNDP. The project has funded a number of thematic studies and working group meetings chaired by a UNDP staff member based in Geneva. The latter could only dedicate a portion of his time to the project, resulting in several delays. Eventually a number of grassroots studies and technical reports were completed, although it was suggested by some partners that the process could have been more consultative and participatory.

In late 2001, the office took a proactive decision to transform the programme into a more proactive and constructive initiative contributing more directly to peacebuilding in Sudan by creating an integrated framework that would guide ongoing interventions (and suggest new ones) in support of peacebuilding. This new approach was scheduled to be presented for endorsement to an IPF meeting in Rome in April 2002. The plans as conceived are ambitious, addressing issues ranging from demobilisation and reintegration of IDPs, to governance and human rights development, social infrastructure, securing livelihoods, natural resources, infrastructure and information systems. The proposed programme will also try to ensure linkages between grassroots, community and mid-level initiatives and reconciliation at the political level. While ambitious, the programme could put UNDP at centre-stage in the operationalisation of peacebuilding in Sudan. Already many partners see the Nuba Mountains Programme as a concrete
example of how the Planning for Peace Framework can be made operational on the ground. If UNDP continues with this second phase, it will be important to link it with other peacebuilding efforts, and in particular with the Peace Network. The personal involvement of the Resident Coordinator in this initiative over the past six months has been of central importance and recognised as such by the IPF. Commitment of the next Resident Coordinator will be similarly important for UNDP to preserve its role.

Reduction of Natural Resource-Based Conflict among Pastoralists and Farmers: This programme has been designed to help reduce natural resource-based conflict among pastoralists and farmers in three regions in Sudan (North Darfur, North Kordofan and Sobat Basin). The preparatory phase, which is just beginning, will look into traditional mechanisms for resolving conflict, the existing land tenure system, and how to raise awareness of the pastoralist way of life among decision makers. The programme will be implemented through international and national NGOs and is cost-shared with the Canadian and Norwegian Governments. Delays in implementation because of insufficient capacity within the UNDP office and financial considerations have been registered. However, this is an important initiative that attempts to address a fundamental issue that is a source of conflict and tension through many parts of Sudan; it also benefits from support from the Government—at federal and state levels. It is important that the project not be seen as a stand-alone initiative in isolation of other support that UNDP is providing through its environmental, peace-building and governance portfolios.
Annex II: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference
Country Review for Republic of the Sudan
(Country Cooperation Framework from 1997 to 2001)

1. BACKGROUND
The Executive Board approved the first Country Co-operation Framework (CCF) for the Sudan covering period 1997-2001 in September 1997. The CCF was drafted by a joint Government of Sudan (GOS)-UNDP Task Force after extensive consultations with representatives from Government bodies, UNDP, other UN agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs and leaders of civil society. Because of the particular situation and complex emergencies in the Sudan, the first CCF was recognised to operate in a country facing Special Development Situation (SDS).

The first CCF is based on the Government’s 10-year Comprehensive National Strategy (1992-2002) that identifies the elimination of poverty and the improvement of the living conditions of the Sudanese people as the principal and ultimate development objective of the country. The Sudan is characterised not only by the long-standing civil conflict but also by widespread poverty, with estimates indicating that more than 90% of the population lives below the poverty line. Indicators of rising poverty and low human development include: the decline of the average per capita income from over US$ 500 in the late 1970s to around US$ 300 in 1996; low life expectancy at birth (55 years); high infant under-five mortality rates of 73 and 115 per 1,000 live births, respectively; a maternal mortality rate of 660 per 100,000 births; high illiteracy rate of 46.7% (36.6% among men and
a low rate of access to safe drinking water (10% in rural areas and 55% in urban areas) and a high incidence of endemic diseases like malaria and more recently HIV/AIDS. The development of the country, particularly in the South, is negatively affected by the prolonged conflict, which is now entering its sixth decade (apart from a pause from 1972 to 1983). The war has placed a heavy toll on the country resources and has been the principal cause of the displacement of an estimated 4 million people, of which 1.8 million have converged in Khartoum.

In light of the above, the main goal of the CCF is to promote sustainable human development (SHD), with a specific focus on poverty eradication. Furthermore, since peace is a prerequisite to development, the CCF also aims to promote efforts to resolve the current conflict, which is draining national resources (natural, financial and human) that would otherwise be available for development purposes. The main strategy to achieve these goals is to address relevant SHD issues in area development schemes, implemented in peaceful areas of the country, and area rehabilitation and reconstruction schemes in areas affected by the civil war (particularly in the South and in the transitional zone). The CCF is structured along five thematic areas:

1. Participatory Area Development
2. Area Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
3. Strategic Planning
5. Service Areas

To implement the first CCF, it was expected that $ 35.6 million would be mobilized from UNDP core resources and that $ 13 million would be mobilized from non-core resources.

A review of the CCF—the “Country Review”—will be carried out as a pre-requisite for the preparation of the follow-on Country Programme, which will cover period 2002 to 2006. The Review’s findings will also be used to revise UNDP/Sudan’s Strategic Results Framework (SRF), as may be necessary, including possible adjustments in resource allocation which could transcend the next programming period.

The Review will rely heavily upon an outcome evaluation of the Area Development Schemes (ADS) and Area Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS), which have constituted an estimated 80 percent of the country programme over the course of the CCF. This evaluation will be completed in January-February 2002.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE COUNTRY REVIEW

The purpose of the Country Review is to provide an in-depth assessment and validation of results and outcomes achieved during the CCF period through UNDP support and to draw lessons for future directions and the next CCF. The Review will examine achievements and constraints in each of the key thematic areas of strategic support, extract lessons learned and recommend future areas of focus and a strategy for repositioning and aligning UNDP with the emerging national development priorities and UNDP corporate priorities. Specifically it will:

Relying heavily upon the findings of the ADS/ARS outcome evaluation:

a. Assess progress and achievements towards expected results especially outcomes as articulated under the SRF and ROARs, including the sustainability of the progress, and account for internal and external factors that led to the results (using baseline data and benchmarks at the start of the CCF period);
b. Assess the adequacy and the effectiveness of the linkages and partnerships with the partners identified in the SRF;
c. Analyze the coverage of advocacy on an ongoing basis;
d. Review adequacy of resources and distribution among outputs and outcomes, particularly in light of the prevailing social, economic and political situation in the Sudan, in view also of its classification as a country in Special Development Situation;
e. Draw lessons learned and suggest direction for the future.

The Review will rely on the findings of the ADS/ARS evaluation for some outcomes and do more explorative work in other outcomes that the ADS/ARS evaluation did not cover.

3. SCOPE OF THE COUNTRY REVIEW

It is expected that the Review will be able to suggest clear directions, based on lessons learned from past experience, with regard to UNDP future programming at the country level. The Review will cover the totality of UNDP assistance (funded from both core and
non-core resources) and will address a set of core issues in four main areas below:

The Country Review will be expected to look at the following three issues to the extent that they are not covered by the ADS/ARS evaluation and, in cases where they have been covered by the ADS/ARS evaluation, to use the analysis contained therein:

a. Strategic Positioning and Programme Relevance

- How relevant is the UNDP programme to the Sudan’s national development goals, UNDP’s corporate goals, and the goals of the UN System as expressed in the UNDAF? Particular attention will be given to the complex emergencies that affect the country.

- To what extent is the UNDP programme strategically linked to the goal of reducing poverty and achieving other international development targets (IDTs)?

- How has UNDP anticipated and responded to significant changes in the national development context affecting the specific strategic/thematic areas that it seeks to support?

b. Programme Performance

- Based on the CCF and the Strategic Results Framework (SRF), do UNDP programmes and other initiatives focus on key strategic areas and effectively deliver results? Refer to ADS/ARS evaluation for what progress has been made in terms of achieving outcomes; what outcomes have been achieved, partially achieved, not achieved; what the contributions of major outputs to the achievement of outcomes have been; and the sustainability of results.

- To what extent does UNDP’s support contribute to development effectiveness at the country level and to the effectiveness of UNDP as an organization vis-à-vis other development players? Is UNDP a relevant player in Sudan’s development efforts and recognized as such?

- What kinds of development partnerships have been forged and what contribution have those partnerships made towards achieving the outcomes?

- What other factors (internal/external) have played a critical role in the achievement of outcomes?

c. Lessons Learned

- What key lessons in the strategic areas and on organizational issues could provide a useful basis for strengthening UNDP’s strategic position and improving results?

- What approaches or mechanisms have proved to be effective in transforming UNDP into a learning and knowledge-based organization, specifically, in terms of leveraging and applying knowledge in initiatives supported under the CCF/SRF?

- In addition, the review is expected to look at issues of programme management, particularly insofar as they have impacted on strategic positioning/relevance and programme performance.

d. Programme Management

Programme management will be an important part of the Country Review exercise in the sense that the ADS/ARS evaluation is not expected to address this issue to a large extent. Therefore some programme management analysis will need to be done in order to fashion the follow-on country programme. The programme management component will look at some of the following issues:

- How effectively has the CO managed the programme to achieve outcomes?

- How has the CO responded to changes in its operational environment during the CCF period? How has it managed the process of shifting programme priorities? How have the leadership and the staff responded to the corporate demand for greater emphasis on upstream initiatives such as advocacy and advisory services?

- How adequate were the resources (financial, human) to deliver expected results? How has the CO managed its resources?

- What was the magnitude of the resources mobilized by the CO and what is the potential for resources mobilization from domestic and external resources?

- What is the experience with the execution modalities utilised (NEX, Agencies and DEX) and what are the adjustments or

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39. In this context, the term refers not to an individual programme but to the broader UNDP cooperation with a country, as reflected in the CCF and the Strategic Results Framework (SRF).

40. CCF areas are participatory area development; area rehabilitation and reconstruction; strategic planning, particularly at the state level; energy, environment and natural resource management; advocacy on conflict resolution and post-conflict management.
changes that need to be made in the management arrangements of the programme? Particularly for NEX what is the extent of the CO support to this execution modality, what are the exit strategies that have been imparted and what capacity-building measures need to be strengthen for the selection of the NEX modality in future?

On each of the above areas, the Review will provide specific recommendations for follow-up by the GOS, UNDP (both Headquarters and Country Office) and other partners.

4. ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, PROCESS AND MANAGEMENT

The review will use a mixture of methodologies, including those noted below. The Evaluation Office will be responsible for the organization, financing and fielding of the mission with the support of and in consultation with the RBAS and UNDP/Sudan. UNDP/Sudan will be responsible for all in-country arrangements necessary for the successful conduct of the review, including any preparatory studies (including the ADS/ARS outcome evaluation) and all background documentation, project site visits, etc.

5. REVIEW TEAM COMPOSITION

No member of team will have been involved in the formulation and management of the CCF or of its associated programmes/projects. EO will select the team, which will comprise an EO staff member, one external international consultant, one local consultant, and one additional member, as follows:

- **Team Leader/International consultant.** The team leader will have extensive hands-on experience in the evaluation and management of complex programmes particularly in the field and has a demonstrated capacity for strategic thinking. She/He will be trained on the results-driven nature of the country review.
- **EO staff member.** The EO staff member will bring into the team the RBM perspective, knowledge of the country review methodology, familiarity with UNDP operations and knowledge in at least one of UNDP’s thematic/strategic areas.
- **National consultant.** The national consultant possesses broad expertise and knowledge of the national development context and in at least one thematic area of the CCF or

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<th>TABLE 4: ASSESSMENT PROCESS, METHODOLOGY, SCHEDULE AND PARTNERS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Process and methodology</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 1: TOR prepared.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 2: Review Team composition and responsibilities decided.</td>
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<td>Step 3: Team Leader identified and briefed by EO, RBAS and BCPR; CCF, SRF, ROAR, CO annual reports, programme/projects reports, TPR reports, audits, evaluations, RC annual reports, CCA and other such docs are provided for team's review.</td>
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<td>Step 4: ADS/ARS outcome-oriented evaluation conducted.</td>
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<td>Step 5: Review Team arrives; briefed by the CO and examines any other secondary data not received early (i.e., Evaluation Report of the ADS/ARS independent evaluation team).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 6: Review Team holds consultations/discussions with GOS (MIC), relevant line ministries, UNDP CO, NEX-MSU, UN Agencies, INGOs, project staff, bilateral donors, civil society, and other relevant partners in Khartoum. Although the Team should feel free to discuss with the above partners, no commitments are to be made on behalf of UNDP.</td>
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<td>Step 7: Selected field visits (team breaks up into two groups of two—perhaps two visits per team of sites close together) to speak with community members (men and women) and interviews/discussions with field teams, local government authorities, UN agencies and NGOs working in the area.</td>
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<td>Step 8: Review Team prepares outline of Country Review Report, which will foreshadow the findings and recommendations on the issues identified in the TOR and shares it with UNDP and stakeholders at a Stakeholder Meeting. A record of the proceedings of the meeting is prepared by the CO and then reviewed by the GOS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 9: Finalisation and distribution of the Country Review Report, which will take into account the outcome of the discussion of the Review Meeting.</td>
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<td>Step 10: Country Review Report is reviewed at HQ (RBAS) and prepared for final publication.</td>
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strategic area under the SRF.

**Additional UNDP staff member.** The additional staff member will bring into the team country operations expertise in managing UNDP country programmes in crisis situations. Ideally, this individual should be a Deputy Resident Representative for operations in a crisis or post-crisis country, or a staff member from the Bureau of Management, UNDP Headquarters.

### 6. STAKEHOLDER MEETING

The UNDP Country Office will convene a Stakeholder Meeting to discuss the report outline and preliminary findings of the Review Team. The participants to the Meeting will include staff from the Government (Ministry, representatives from key line ministries co-operating and/or associated with UNDP programmes/projects), the UNDP country office, other UN Agencies in the country, bilateral donor organisations, NGOs, civil society and other relevant partners. The Meeting will be co-chaired by the Minister of International Co-operation and UNDP Resident Representative, with the active involvement of the members of the Review Team.

### 7. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

It is expected that the Country Review Team will produce the following outputs:

- A succinct and analytical Country Review Report presenting the findings and recommendations based on an analysis of the four main areas; this should include a brief three-page summary of recommendations. In preparing the Review Report, the Review Team will be guided by EO guidelines on the subject.
- A record of the proceedings of the stakeholder meeting and key meetings with stakeholders, with a maximum length of five pages.
- A financial summary of the core and non-core resources actually mobilized during the first CCF and the estimated expenditures incurred during the period under review.
Annex III: Documents Consulted by the Mission

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High Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR), *Journal Issue No. 1*, Elbeea, June 1998
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, *Budget Plan for the year 2002*, Sudan
Draft, Mahdi Bashir,

UNDP RESULTS-ORIENTED AND EVALUATION REPORTS
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ADS Lower Atbara, Development and Some Success Stories in ADSLA, Jan. 2002
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Report of the Terminal Evaluation, Community Based Rangeland Rehabilitation for Carbon Sequestration and Biodiversity, Project Sudan/G31, April/May 2001
UNDP Sudan, Results-Oriented Annual Report 2001, for Sudan
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Assessment of Implemented Activities, Project Sudan/?/???, Capacity 21, Support to Strategic Planning Process, May 2000
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UNDP/ADSCB, Summary of Changes Observed in the ADSCB project area, Programme Handover Note, Not Dated
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Conservation and Management of Habitat and Species and Sustainable Community Use of Bio-diversity in Dinder National Park, SUD/00/014, 2000
Area Rehabilitation Scheme, Juba, Project Document, 1997
Area Rehabilitation Scheme, Kadugli, Project Document, 1997
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UNDP/GOS/ADSCB, Annual Project Report, April 2000
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Terminal Evaluation of ADS/ARS, ADS/ARS, Powerpoint Presentation by the Evaluation Team, 2 March 2002
UNDP Sudan, Survey of Achievements Identified in the CCF, March 2002
UNDP Sudan, Disaster Management Concept Note, 2001
UNDP Sudan, Energy and Environment Concept Note, 2001
UNDP Sudan, Governance Concept Note, 2001
Local Project Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes, UNDP Sudan, 3 December 2001
Notes from Meeting to discuss Support to Sudan National Parliament, UNDP office, 3 September 2001
Report on Workshop on Local Governance and Decentralization, 23 May 2001, Grand Holiday Villa, Khartoum
UNDP Support for Poverty Reduction Strategies, the PRSP Countries: An Interim Report, UNDP/BDP/MDG, September 2001
UN SYSTEM DOCUMENTS

AUDIT REPORTS
Auditor General's Office, Government of Sudan, Sudan Audit, UNDP/OAPR, 2000
KPMG/OAPR, Internal Audit Report, UNDP Office in Sudan (1999), issued August 2000 (report # RCM0041)

OTHER
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Sudan, Country Report, Feb. 2001
Annex IV: List of Persons Met

GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN

Ministers
H.E. Dr. Karam Eldin Abdel Moula, Minister of International Cooperation
H.E. Maj Gen. (Rtd.) Mr. Alison Monani Magaya, Minister of Labor and Administrative Reform
H.E. Mr. Idris Abdel Gadir, State Minister for Peace

Ministry Staff
Mr. Saeed A. Saeed, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Welfare and Social Development
Ibrahim Al Dalil, Director National Fund for States Support
Amna Abbaker Abdel Rasoul, National Fund for States Support
Fadlalla Makki, National Fund for States Support
Hashim M. El Hassan, NCCD National Focal Point Coordinator
Limya Abdelgaffar Khalafalla, Ministry of Welfare & Social Development, Women Division
Rabab Hamid Al Meheina, Ministry of Welfare and Social Development
Usama Hussien Shammad, Social Development Foundation
Mohamed Galal Eldin, Director, Technical Assistance Department, MIC
Abdel Ati Gabir, MIC
Ekhllass Mohammed Ali, MIC
Hassan Gaafar, MIC, ex Coordinator NEX-MSU
Ibrahim Khalid, Ministry of Labor
Murad Abbas, Ministry of Labor
Bashir Egaili Ahmed, Ministry of Foreign Trade
Humanitarian Action Committee Members

UNDP SUDAN
Roger Guarda, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative
Anne-Marie Cluckers, Senior Deputy Resident Representative
Irenée Dabare, Deputy Resident Representative (Operations)
Mohammad Pournik, Chief, Strategic Policy Unit
Amir Baker, Governance Policy Advisor, Strategic Policy Unit
John N. Akol, Programme Analyst, Peacebuilding Unit
Intisar Salih, Programme Analyst, Environment Unit
Sara Pantuliano, Team Leader, Peacebuilding Unit
Marv Koop, Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), IDPs Project, Peacebuilding Unit
Walid Ibrahim, Assistant Resident Representative (Operations)
Renato Pinto, UNV Programme Officer
Woldie Geleta, Finance Specialist, Finance Section
Ashraf Abdel Moniem Programme Associate, FIM Section
Shama Mekki, Programme Assistant
Mariam Zagloul, UNV Operations Assistant

WORLD BANK ECONOMIC SECTOR MISSION
Albert Agbonyitor, Coordination,
Contribution to Public Expenditure Issues
Jumana Farah, Consultant, Rural Development 2, Africa Region,
Washington D.C.
Moncef Guen, Public Resource Management
Ernst Lutz, Agriculture
Maude Svensson, Senior Economist,
Macroeconomic Performance and Reforms
Jack van Holst Pellekaan, Consultant,
Country Evaluation and Regional Relations, Operations Evaluation Department, Washington D.C.

UN AGENCIES
Stefano Porretti, Deputy Country Director, WFP
Kadayapreth Ramachandra, Assistant Country Director, UNICEF

PROJECT STAFF
Abdel Rahman Mustafa, NPM, UPAP
Yagoub Abdalla Mohamed, Coordinator, Capacity 21 Project
Mutassim Bashir Nimir, Dinder National Park Project
Adil Mohamed Ali, Deputy Project Manager, Dinder National Park Project
Ahmed Suleiman El Wakeel, Coordinator, Biodiversity Project
Abd El Hafiz Osman, Government Project Coordinator, Dinder National Park Project
Nagm El Din Gutbi, Climate Change Project

EMBASSIES AND DELEGATIONS
H.E. Halvor Aschjem, Counsellor/Special Representative to the Sudan, Government of Norway
H.E. Luigi Costa Sanesuerino, Ambassador of Italy
Nicholas Coghlan, Counsellor and Consul, Office of the Canadian Embassy, Khartoum Sudan
Jean-Michel Le Dain, Counsellor, French Embassy
Agnes Coutou, Humanitarian Attaché, French Embassy
Xavier Marshal, Head of Delegation, European Union
Jacquelyn Poole-Galdas, Programme Officer, USAID OFDA, Khartoum
Jan Waltmans, Counsellor, Embassy of the Netherlands

CIVIL SOCIETY
Mustaque Ahmed, Assistant Country Director, CARE, Sudan
Annabelle Gambe, Technical Advisor, CARE, Sudan
Emmanuel Isch, Country Director, Fellowship for African Relief (FAR)
Gaafar Karrar, Secretary Sudanese Civil Society Peace Initiative Committee
Joseph Modestu, Former Member of Parliament, Editor, Nile Courrier
ADS/ARS TERMINAL
EVALUATION TEAM
Abenour Benbouali,
Team Leader (by telephone)
Mohamed Osman Al Samani
Badawi B. Osman
Amal Abdel Rahman Hamza

EL OBEID, NORTH KORDOFAN

El-Obeid ADS
Residents of Bititigha Village – ADS North Kordofan
El Mahi Abakar Ali, PVP, North Kordofan State
Mohammed El Fatih, Director of Planning, N. Kordofan State
Yousif Awdoan, Acting Manager, Sheikan Company (CBO)
Ismail Al Rahil, NPM, ADS, North Kordofan State
Kalatoum Abdalla, Um Garaba VDC
Mosa Abda Musa, Ministry of Health/EPA Director, N. Kordofan State
Abdel Rahim Ahmed El Mustfa, UNICEF-APO, N. Kordofan State
Gaber El Dar Abu El Nour, GPC/ADS/N. Kordofan

Sheikan Company (CBO)
(El Obeid)
Yousif Awdoan, Acting Manager, Sheikan Camp.
Adam Mohed Adam, Chairperson, Board of Directors
Al Maged El Zein, Deputy Chairperson, Board of Directors
Mohammed Ali El Degail, Member, Board of Directors
Ali Yousif Dawina, Member, Board of Directors
Gaber El Dar Abu El Nour, GPC and Member, Board of Directors

Vocational Training Center
(El Obeid)
Abdel Rahman Hussein Kabbashi, Director, Vocational Training Centre
Adam Eisa Ali Manager, Training Programme
Gamila Mohammed Rajab, Head, Women in Development Unit

ANNEX III: LIST OF PERSONS MET

Saad Yousif, Sheikan Company
Ibrahim Omda Khatir, MIC (Federal)

Gabr El Dar Abu El Nour, GPC/ADS/N. Kordofan