

**UNDP SUDAN
COUNTRY PROGRAMME ACTION PLAN 2009 - 2012**



MID-TERM REVIEW

FINAL REPORT

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Richard M. Chiwara, Ph.D
rm.chiwara@verizon.net

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Richard M Chiwara, Ph.D.

rm.chiwara@verizon.net

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As a general rule, UN agencies are expected to conduct mid-term reviews (MTR) of their agency specific programmes to provide information that feeds into the review of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which in the case of Sudan, is scheduled for June 2011. In this regard, the UNDP Country Office (CO) in Sudan is undertaking this MTR, and has decided that the MTR would go beyond the routine requirement of assessing progress towards expected results, but would analyse the implications of the changing context in Sudan and provide a basis for UNDP to re-position itself and refocus its strategies for the remainder of the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP).

The review covered the three CPAP themes - Poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs; Fostering and consolidation of democratic governance; and Support to crisis prevention, conflict management and recovery; and had the following specific objectives:

- a) To review the achievements and progress made up to the mid-point of the CPAP (31 December 2010);
- b) To develop and recommend a plan of action for the remaining period of the CPAP; and,
- c) To formulate initial directions for the next Country Programme cycle.

The overall approach of the MTR was based on assessment of a sample of projects and outputs implemented within each component, and further triangulated with information obtained from interviews with key stakeholders in the UN system, government, Development Partners (DPs) and civil society organisations (CSOs); as well as observations from the regions. The scope and findings of the review were affected by (a) failure to cover all four regions in which UNDP implements its projects, due to time constraints as well as other intervening factors; (b) limited focus on North Sudan, following the referendum in which the South voted for separation.

Based on the evaluation terms of reference (TOR), the MTR made the following key findings and conclusions:

- (1) Sudan faces a mixture of post-CPA challenges and opportunities when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Government of National Unity (GoNU) expire in July 2011. Among the key challenges are (a) a possible loss of and decline in oil revenues, (b) continuing conflict in Abyei and Darfur, (c) high and growing unemployment exacerbated by rapid urbanization, (d) increasing desertification and the effects of climate change on rural livelihoods, (e) negative effects of globalization, including the global financial, fuel and food crises, as well as the effects of unrest in the Arab region and neighboring countries.
- (2) The CPAP is relevant to the National Strategic Plan 2007-2011, MDGs and the UNDAF 2009-2012; and the current programme areas will continue to be relevant for the remaining period of this CPAP cycle. Notwithstanding, some specific projects and interventions may require some adjustments as dictated by particular conditions associated with the ending of the CPA, or in response to lessons learnt in the initial phase of CPAP implementation.

- (3) While some important results were achieved as a result of UNDP interventions, it is not possible to specifically ascertain progress made towards CPAP outcomes due to various factors, including: (i) insufficient causal linkages between projects and outcomes; (ii) use of inappropriate and inadequate indicators, in some cases with no established baseline data and targets; and (iii) ineffective project monitoring and reporting systems.
- (4) Integration of crosscutting issues into the CPAP was satisfactory, although there is need to strengthen targeted design and reporting of specific crosscutting issues.
- (5) Financial delivery is below expectations, with expenditure totaling 35.6% of the budget at the end of December 2010, which is less than 50% which may be expected at the mid-term.

Based on the observations made and information obtained from various stakeholders, the evaluation drew 5 key lessons from the first two years of the CPAP implementation:

Lesson 1: Conflict analysis and social cohesion

The conflict situation in Sudan is complex, and cannot be effectively addressed with generic one-size-fits all strategy; therefore conflict analysis is essential. Building social cohesion can be done through a combination of two strategies: bottom-up, by addressing localised conflicts through community-based conflict resolution mechanisms and improving access to resources and strengthening livelihood opportunities; and top-down, by strengthening the governance system, decentralisation and devolution of power to the States.

Lesson 2: MDG achievement

To accelerate progress towards MDGs requires that government pursues a pro-poor policy agenda with a coherent multi-sectoral approach, combined with community-based interventions to improve service delivery and access to public services at the grass-roots level. This requires strengthening evidence-based planning, policy-making, monitoring and coordinated effort by all development actors.

Lesson 3: Effective strategic framework and flexibility

Effective resource mobilisation requires a broad framework that is consistent with the priorities of government and the donors; in addition to effective design and implementation of projects, and the ability to show impact and results. Given the diversity of issues and challenges between regions, identifying such a framework requires that a country assessment and mapping exercise be conducted in order to identify the key actors and their priorities defined in the context of the changing situation.

Lesson 4: National ownership and capacity development

In order to consolidate the recovery process and ensure sustainability, it is critical to change the way that government at all levels conducts business through an effective capacity development strategy. Current approaches have not given enough attention to addressing strategic gaps and develop institutional capacity of targeted line Ministries and departments as change agents for government beyond the confines of their immediate departments.

Lesson 5: Performance monitoring and reporting

Time and resources devoted to staff capacity development and effective knowledge sharing and management can improve results-based performance and reporting.

The evaluation recommended that the CO does not embark on any major changes to the current programme areas and strategies in the remaining period of the current CPAP, but instead, the CO should use the remaining 18 months to review the situation, strengthen and modify some of its approaches and reconfigure its operational systems and structures in preparation for more effective results-based performance management in the next CPAP.

The following recommendations are suggested for the remaining implementation period of the CPAP:

Recommendation # 1: It is recommended that the CO should continue the current programme areas with the following slight modifications in approach:

- (a) Poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs.
 - (i) Complement and build on the results of the Governance Unit on pro-poor policies in eastern Sudan by strengthening macro-economic policies and decision-making at central government level, including advocacy for equitable resource allocations to States.
 - (ii) Strengthen interventions that expand livelihood opportunities for poor people in their communities, including strengthening micro-finance providers linked to vocational and entrepreneurship skills training.
- (b) Fostering and consolidating democratic governance.
 - (i) Strengthen national capacities, especially civil society to engage and participate effectively in the Constitutional process.
 - (ii) Strengthen national institutions and processes to enhance transparency and accountability, including in combating corruption and protecting/promotion of human rights.
 - (iii) Strengthen synergies between interventions to leverage performance based on outcomes of successful projects.
- (c) Crisis prevention and recovery

Continue to build the foundation for social cohesion and early recovery by targeting localised conflict between different communities and tribes through:

 - (i) Engaging the communities and their traditional leaders to develop home-grown solutions to the conflicts;
 - (ii) Engage State and local administration institutions early in the planning and implementation of projects to demonstrate in real time how the models work; and
 - (iii) Improve access to public services and expand livelihood opportunities to reward and provide a peace dividend to successful communities and to motivate other communities to replicate.
 - (iv) Strengthen support for addressing challenges of climate change.

Recommendation # 2: It is recommended that the CO should undertake a country analysis to identify programme priorities for the next CPAP 2013-2017.

Recommendation # 3: It is recommended that the CO should develop and pilot a Capacity Development Strategy targeting one key line Ministry or Department to build its capacity including development of the mandate, institutional capacity and individual skills to operate as a change agent for government in its sector.

Recommendation # 4: It is recommended that the CO should review the CPAP indicators, particularly the output indicators for which UNDP is accountable.

Recommendation # 5: It is recommended that the CO should review and streamline its organizational structure with a view to increase efficiency gains in programme management and operations support.

Recommendation # 6: It is recommended that the CO should develop and continuously implement a Learning and Knowledge Sharing Plan to develop a strong work ethic and team spirit.

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C. ACRONYMS

CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CCF	Country Cooperation Framework
CDA	Conflict-related Development Analysis
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CO	Country Office
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPRU	Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
CRMA	Conflict Risk and Mapping Analysis
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organisation(s)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEX	Direct Execution
DP(s)	Development Partner(s)
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
EMR	Eastern Mediterranean Region
ESPA	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
ESSCA	Eastern Sudan States Coordinating Council
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
GFATM	Global Fund to combat Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GFS	Government Financial Statistics
GoNU	Government of National Unity
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HCDG	Higher Council for Decentralised Governance
HCENR	Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HRBA	Human Rights-based Approach(es)
IDPs	Internally Displaced Person(s)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
INC	Interim National Constitution
IP(s)	Implementing Partner(s)
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LDF	Local development Fund
MACD	Mine Action Capacity Development
MDGs	Millennium Development Goal(s)
MDTFs	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MHA	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
MIC	Ministry of International Cooperation

MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MoFNE	Ministry of Finance and National Economy
MoHRD	Ministry of Human Resources Development
MoL	Ministry of Labour
MoWSS	Ministry of Welfare and Social Security
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAPA	National Adaptation Plan of Action
NBHS	National Baseline Household Survey
NCP	National Congress Party
NDDRP	National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
NEC	National Elections Commission
NER	Net Enrolment Ratio
NEX	National Execution
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
NHDR	National Human Development Report
NPC	National Population Council
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PEM	Public Expenditure Management
PPAC	Political Parties Affairs Council
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
REDD	Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SAID	Sudan Aid Information Database
SAN	Sudan AIDS Network
SDG	Sudanese Pound
SEDP	Support to Elections and democratic Process (project)
SHHS	Sudan Household Health Survey
SNAP	Sudan National AIDS Control Program
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
U5MR	Under-Five Mortality Rate
UNAMID	Africa Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UN Women	United nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
WHO	World Health Organisation

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Rationale for the Mid-Term Review

1. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan covers a four-year period 2009 – 2012, one year less than the conventional UNDAF. This was done in order to get the UNDAF cycle to coincide with the two referenda for Southern Sudan and Abyei that were scheduled for January 2011 and the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in July 2011; the two events which would define the future of Sudan. Guided by the decision of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) on the UNDAF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also developed its Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for the four-year period 2009-2012.

2. A mid-term review (MTR) of the UNDAF is scheduled for June 2011, to provide opportunity for the UNCT to reassess the UNDAF strategy in the context of the changing political situation in Sudan, in particular the separation of South Sudan, the expiration of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) mandate in and the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) later in July. As a requirement, UN agencies are expected to conduct their agency specific programme MTRs to provide information that feeds into the UNDAF review. This is the background against which UNDP is conducting the present MTR of its CPAP. The UNDP Country Office (CO) decided that this MTR would go beyond the routine requirement of assessing progress towards expected results, but would analyse the implications of the changing context in Sudan and provide a basis for UNDP to re-position itself and refocus its strategies for the remainder of the CPAP.

1.2. Description of the Programme

3. When the CPAP was developed in 2008, it was for all Sudan then covering both Northern and Southern Sudan, but following the referendum held in February 2011 in which the South voted for independence, there are now two separate programmes and two independent COs. Accordingly, all reference to Sudan in the report shall be taken to mean North Sudan (excluding South Sudan), except where explicitly stated otherwise. The CPAP was based on the priority needs and challenges of the country, as identified in the 2007 Common Country Analysis for Sudan 2007, and the UNDAF 2009-2012; the National Strategic Plan 2007-2011 of the Government of National Unity (GoNU), the Three-Year rolling Sector Plans of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the CPA of 2005.

4. UNDP in Sudan fulfils three roles: (1) support the promotion of coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations system as a whole at the country level; (2) provide policy and technical support by working on and advocating for the multi-sectoral challenges of poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery and environment and

sustainable development; and (3) administrative agent for several pooled funding arrangements.¹ The UNDP country programme 2009-2012 aims to help realize the National Strategic Plan for timely achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as articulated in the UNDAF for the period 2009-2012.

5. UNDP focuses on three programme areas; (a) Poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs; (b) Democratic governance; and (c) Crisis prevention and recovery. UNDP's programme is based on the understanding that conflict and development are inextricably linked. Whereas the programme aims to support the implementation of the CPA and thus contribute to peace and stability in Sudan, it is also intended that it is implemented in a conflict-sensitive way to create an enabling environment for long-term and continuous conflict prevention across all sectors of society. To this end, a security threat and socio-economic risk mapping methodology undertaken in 2009 provides a basis for mainstreaming conflict and disaster risk sensitive programming across the UNDP Country Programme. The programme components and expected outcomes are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: UNDP CPAP Outcomes

Poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs	
Outcome 1:	Enhanced national and sub-national capacities to plan, monitor, evaluate, and implement the MDGs and related national development policies and priorities.
Outcome 2:	Improved impact of resources to fight HIV/AIDS
Fostering and consolidating democratic governance	
Outcome 3:	Institutions, systems and processes of democratic governance strengthened.
Outcome 4:	National/sub-national/state/local levels of governance expand their capacities to manage equitable delivery of public services
Outcome 5:	Rights upheld and protected through accountable, accessible and equitable Rule of Law institutions
Crisis prevention and recovery	
Outcome 6:	Strengthened capacity of national, sub-national, state and local institutions and communities to manage the environment and natural disasters to reduce conflict over natural resources.
Outcome 7:	Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated.

6. UNDP also identified gender equality, capacity building and balanced development as the key cross cutting issues that would be mainstreamed in all its programmes. UNDP aimed to integrate a gender perspective into its three focus areas based on the UNDP Eight Point Agenda for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery. To this end, UNDP planned to support national partners to: (a) incorporate gender equality into MDG-based planning and monitoring; (b) reduce violence against women, the vulnerability of women and girls to HIV infection, and the burden of care that falls on them; and (c) expand women's

¹ UNDP Sudan; CPAP 2009 -2012, Part IV, paragraph 4.3, page 14.

participation in governance and decision-making processes.

7. UNDP recognised that achievement of the MDGs and the promotion of sustainable national and local development agendas depended on the transformational capacities of individuals, organizations and societies. While financial resources are vital to success, they are not sufficient to promote human development in a sustainable manner. Through a comprehensive capacity-development approach, UNDP aimed to create an enabling environment, well-functioning national institutions and a high-performing human resource base to support Sudan in the planning, implementation and review its national and local development strategies. Particular emphasis would be given to building the capacities of civil society organizations as a crucial resource, constituency and partner for UNDP in advancing sustainable human development goals and principles.

8. Due to the diverse socio-economic and political contexts in Sudan, UNDP decided that differentiated programming interventions based on a unified strategic intent would be the best response to the needs of its varied constituencies to achieve balanced development. Given the complexity and geographic scope of Sudan, UNDP decided to interpret its outcomes differently across the different regions through specific regional strategies in order to ensure that the specific challenges of each region were addressed in an effective and systematic way.

1.3. Purpose and Scope of Work

9. The purpose of the MTR was to assess progress made towards programme outcomes, and provide recommendations to enable UNDP to reposition itself in order to effectively respond to the changes in the situation in Sudan. In particular, it was expected that the MTR would inform UNDP's programming in the context of the UNDAF mid-term review in June 2011; while also taking into account the expected expiry of the UNMIS mandate in April, and the end of the CPA in July, and how these two events might affect its current strategies.

10. The specific objectives of the MTR are:

- d) To review the achievements and progress made up to the mid-point of the CPAP (31 December 2010);
- e) To develop and recommend a plan of action for the remaining period of the CPAP; and
- f) To formulate initial directions for the next Country Programme cycle.

11. The review covered the three CPAP themes - Poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs; Fostering and consolidation of democratic governance; and Support to crisis prevention, conflict management and recovery; as well as a review of review capacity development and gender equality as cross-cutting issue in all three components. The review included both the national and regional programme perspectives in the three main Sudan regions - Eastern Sudan, the Three Protocol Areas and Darfur.²

² Due to the separation of South Sudan following the referendum in February 2011, it was not included as part of the MTR.


12. The findings, lessons and recommendations were generated in the following areas:
- An assessment of programme outcomes to determine the extent to which they have been or are likely to be achieved; and appraisal of effect of any unintended results.
 - An analysis of factors beyond UNDP's control that influenced performance and results.
 - An analysis of whether UNDP's interventions can be credibly linked to achievement of the outputs.
 - An assessment of UNDP's partnership strategy and whether the strategy contributed to improved programme delivery.
 - Assessment of sustainability and national ownership for programme results.

1.4. Structure of the Report

13. This report contains six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the report, description of the programme and methodology of the evaluation. Chapter 2 describes the background and country context; and Chapter 3 contains the evaluation findings. Chapter 4 contains the evaluation conclusions and summary of key findings. Chapters 5 and 6 contain the Lessons Learnt and Recommendations respectively.

1.5. Methodology

14. The overall approach was based on assessment of a sample of projects and outputs implemented within each component, and further triangulated with information obtained from interviews with key stakeholders in the UN system, government, Development Partners (DPs) and civil society organisations (CSOs); as well as observations from the regions. Figure 1 below provides an overview of the evaluation frame, showing the complete architecture of the evaluation and how the various elements were linked with each other.



15. To gain a broad understanding of the programme and government priorities, the mission read extensively and reviewed a wide range of materials including official UN and government strategy documents as well as project annual and evaluation reports. The list of documents reviewed is shown at Annex 1 to this report. A total of 79 individual and group discussions with management and programme staff of UN agencies, local and central government officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and beneficiaries in different communities in the regions were also undertaken as part of the primary data collection. The list of individuals consulted is shown at Annex 2. The evaluation mission also visited one Field Office in Nyala (Darfur). A final stakeholder meeting and preliminary draft report was presented to UNDP management and programme staff to further validate the conclusions and findings; and the present report incorporates their feedback and comments.

1.6. Limitations

16. A major limitation of the evaluation was on separating the possible influence on performance and results that may be attributed to the scope of the programme and size of the country, which in the first two years of the CPAP implementation, included South Sudan. The evaluation team was unable to come up with a practical design that would isolate the effects of having had South Sudan as part of the initial programme. South Sudan was not a part of the MTR after its separation following the referendum. In addition, the evaluation was unable to visit all the field offices; but due to the diversity of issues between the regions, it is not practical to generalise findings across all regions. The evaluation mission had intended to visit two field offices in Darfur and the Protocol Areas. However, due to the South Kordofan State elections in early May and atmosphere of tensions that preceded the announcement of results, the visit to that State was cancelled; and so only one region (Darfur) was visited. Since UNDP had a differentiated strategy for each region, there is always a possibility that a visit to other regions could have resulted in additional pertinent observations.

17. A second limitation was about the sheer size of the country programme, which made it virtually impossible to review in-depth all (or even most) of the ongoing and closed projects undertaken within the period under review. According to information posted on the CO website, there were a total of 28 ongoing projects and 20 closed projects at the time of the MTR.

Chapter 2: COUNTRY BACKGROUND

2.1. Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Separation of the South

18. The Sudan has had civil conflict for all but 11 of the years since it became independent in January 1956. For more than two decades, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) fought over resources, power, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination. Over two million people died, four million were displaced and some 600,000 people fled the country as refugees.³ Darfur, a region in western Sudan also experienced protracted localized violence exacerbated by ethnic, economic and political tensions and competition over scarce resources, most notably grazing land. The conflict escalated in early 2003 after attacks on government targets by the SPLM/A and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the Government's decision to respond by deploying its national armed forces and mobilizing local militia.

19. In January 2005, the Government of the Sudan and SPLM/A signed the CPA. The CPA included agreements on outstanding issues remaining after the Machakos Protocol⁴ and had provisions on security arrangements, power-sharing in the capital of Khartoum, some autonomy for the south, and more equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil. The parties decided to set up a six-and-a-half-year interim period during which interim institutions would govern the country and international monitoring mechanisms would be established and operationalized. The United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in March 2005, with a mandate: to support implementation of the CPA; to facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and humanitarian assistance; to assist the parties in the mine action sector; and to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in the Sudan.

20. However, as the civil war in the south concluded with the signing of the CPA, conflict continued in the Darfur region. In May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed and the Africa Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established and deployed to Darfur in July 2007. To date, the country is still hosting the two peacekeeping missions: UNMIS which was established in March 2005 to support the implementation of the CPA;⁵ and UNAMID, which was established in July 2007 to provide a secure environment for humanitarian assistance and early recovery preparation activities in advance of a cease fire arrangement and comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur.

21. In this broad context, the signing of the CPA between the GoS and the SPLM ended Africa's

³ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis>

⁴ In July 2002, the parties to the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol, in which they reached specific agreement on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion.

⁵ The mandate of UNMIS expires in April 2011; at the time of drafting, it was not known whether it would be extended or not.

longest armed conflict with the subsequent forming of the GoNU and the GoSS. Significant progress was made towards peace and the democratization processes through signing of the CPA, including, (a) the adoption of national and state constitutions and establishment of representative local legislatures, (b) the national women's empowerment policy endorsed by the President of the GoNU in 2007 reflecting national commitment in support of women's political and civil rights. In accordance with the provisions of the CPA, the referendum in Southern Sudan was conducted in January 2011, in which the South voted for separation.

22. As a conceptual foundation for post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation in Sudan, the CPA includes detailed instructions for the sharing of power and resources between the GoS, SPLM/A, the and other stakeholders. These power-sharing arrangements are particularly crucial in the Three Protocol Areas (Abyei, Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan State), so called because the three areas were the subject of special protocols within the peace agreement. These areas are rich in natural resources, including oil, agricultural land, water, Gum Arabic, and minerals; but were located along the frontlines during the North-South civil war and were therefore particularly affected with unique challenges, including an influx of returnees (both refugees and IDPs), widespread poverty, insecurity, and a lack of basic infrastructure. In recognition of this unique situation, Abyei, Blue Nile State, and Southern Kordofan State were each afforded special status under the CPA. For example, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict provides for an interim period of a few years following the signing of the CPA, during which Abyei shall have special administrative status under the institution of the Presidency and shall be administered locally by an Executive Council. At the end of the interim period to coincide with the referendum for Southern Sudan, residents of Abyei would vote whether to retain their special administrative status in the North or to become part of Bahr el Ghazal State in the South.

23. However, a separate referendum to determine whether the future of the area of Abyei lies in northern or southern Sudan was not held in January 2011 as originally planned, as a result of a failure to establish a referendum commission and lack of agreement on who could vote. Renewed fighting broke out in the area at the beginning of March 2011, displacing an estimated 20,000 people from their homes, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Protocol for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, which grants these two states a degree of autonomy within the National Government, expected to serve as a national model for the relationship between the center and the states in a federal system are also not fully implemented, further exacerbating potential for renewed tensions and conflict. Moreover, the provision for the establishment of a State Land Commission in each of the two states, which will work alongside the National Land Commission to settle land disputes is still pending implementation.

24. Following the separation of the south, 15 States will comprise what remains as the Republic of Sudan.⁶ The June 2005 Interim National Constitution (INC) led to decentralised

⁶ Al Jazirah, Al Qadarif, Blue Nile, Kassala, Khartoum, North Darfur, North Kordofan, Northern, Red Sea, River Nile, Sennar, South Darfur, South Kordofan, West Darfur and White Nile.

administrative structures and mandated three tiers of Government (Federal, State and Local) in northern Sudan. The key institutions of executive, legislature, and judiciary have been established at all levels of governments. However, even with the end of the north-south conflict, the challenge of nation building and social cohesion in northern Sudan is far from over. Several regions still have pending issues and are currently governed by transitional bodies. In the three States that make up Darfur, a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority was established by the Darfur Peace Agreement to act as coordinating body for Darfur. The Eastern Sudan States Coordinating Council (ESSCA) was established under the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) as a coordinating body for the three eastern States of Al Qadarif, Kassala and Red Sea. And, the Abyei Area currently has a special administrative status governed by the Abyei Area Administration pending a referendum on whether to join the independent South Sudan or to remain as part of the Republic of Sudan.

2.2. Economic Sector and Livelihoods

25. Sudan is endowed with rich natural resources and has been experiencing strong growth over the last 10 years. GDP growth averaged 7% per annum, reaching a peak of 10% in 2007⁷ before declining to just over 5% in 2008, 2009 and 2010 following the onset of global financial and economic crisis. During the last six years, the service sector has been growing faster than agriculture and industry, which probably explains the increasing trend in inflation in recent years. The Structure of the Sudanese Economy has shifted from predominant reliance on agriculture for growth and exports, to the oil sector. On average the share of Agriculture in GDP declined from around 46% during the 1996-99 period to about 33% during the period 2004-2007 while the share of industry increased from 9% to 21% during the same period (World Bank, 2008). Currently oil accounts for 90% of Sudan's export earnings and over 50% of its national revenue.

26. Although Sudan is one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa, growth has not been pro-poor and broad-based as it has been driven by the oil sector which has limited linkages with the rest of the economy. There is high level of unemployment, currently estimated at 20 %. This indicates that high level of growth witnessed during the last several years has not been employment intensive and therefore has little impact on poverty reduction. The weak capacity of government institutions and the poor status of infrastructure, which are consequences of decades of conflict, have reduced the country's ability to formulate and implement macro-economic reforms, address poverty eradication policies or to deliver services efficiently. The pattern of growth has been unbalanced and largely concentrated in the center such as Khartoum and other irrigation areas such as Gezira at the detriment of the peripheries such as the eastern regions and Darfur (Tahir, 2010: Overview of Socioeconomic trends in Sudan)

27. The trends in the level of income poverty and its profile across states as well as rural and urban areas in Northern Sudan reflect this phenomenon. According to the recently issued 2009

⁷ United Nations, Sudan Common Country Analysis 2007, November 2007, p.8.

National Baseline Household Survey-based Poverty Analysis Report(CBS, 2010), 46.5% of the population of Northern Sudan is found to fall below the national poverty line of SDG 1365.6 per person per annum, with 26.5% of the urban population and 57.6% of the rural population being below the poverty line. This shows that poverty is a rural phenomenon as bulk of the population of North Sudan (about 60%) still lives in rural areas. The analysis also indicate that Khartoum is the region with the lowest poverty incidence, followed by Northern, Eastern and Central regions ranking third, while Kordofan and Darfur are the poorest regions. Poverty levels vary greatly by state. The incidence of poverty ranges from one fourth in Khartoum to more than two thirds in Northern Darfur (CBS, 2010).

28. The labour market structure in Sudan is also highly skewed, with the majority of people employed in sectors with high dependence on the environment. According to the Arab Labour Organisation (2004) and Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics (2008), majority of Sudanese were employed in agriculture, fisheries and forestry (51.8%, 48.6%); followed by services (23%, 31%); industry (8.9%, 7.7%); and other sectors (1.2%, 12.24%) in 2004 and 2008 respectively.⁸ This structure indicates that agriculture is still the predominant activity in Sudan. The livelihoods of majority of wage-earners are therefore at risk of natural disasters and climate. Sudan suffers from a chronic shortage of freshwater overall. Insufficient and highly variable annual precipitation is a defining feature of the climate of most of Sudan. In addition to the variability in precipitation, available evidence indicates a long-term regional climate change in several parts of the country, most notably in Kordofan and Darfur. Table 2 shows changes in rainfall in Darfur, where records have been consistently kept from the 1930s.

Table 2: Changes in Rainfall in Darfur, 1946 - 2005

Location	Average annual rainfall (mm) 1946-1975	Average annual rainfall (mm) 1976-2005	Annual Reduction	%
El Fasher N. Darfur	272.36	178.90	-93.46	-34%
Nyala S. Darfur	448.71	376.50	72.21	-16%
El Gemeine W. Darfur	564.20	427.70	136.50	-24%

Source: Natural Disasters and Desertification in Sudan

29. According to UNEP (2003) study in Northern Kordofan, climate modeling for years 2030 to 2060 indicated a 0.5° to 1.5° C rise in the average annual temperatures and an approximate 5% decline in rainfall. The models were then used to project the scale of potential changes in crop yields for sorghum, millet and gum Arabic. The results showed a major and potentially disastrous decline in crop production for Northern Kordofan, and lesser but also significant in Southern Kordofan. For example, sorghum production in the region of El Obeid is predicted to decline by 70% from 495kg/ hectare to 150kg/hectare.

30. Sudan also faces a growing trend of desertification from three compounding and related

⁸ United Nations University (2010); Working Paper Series: Labour Market Structure in Sudan

processes.⁹ The first is climate-based conversion of land types from semi-desert to desert. This may result from the reduction in rainfall and increase in temperature noted above, manifesting in the death of trees during a drought event, and not followed by recovery. The second is degradation of existing desert environments, including wadis and oases. Most of the water catchment areas in Sudan are degraded due to deforestation, over-grazing and erosion. The third is conversion of land types from semi-desert to desert by human activities. In Sudan this problem manifests through conversion of fragile rangelands into traditional and mechanized croplands. Floods are also common in Sudan, mostly localised floods caused by exceptionally heavy rains and run-off, and widespread floods caused by overflow of the Nile and its tributaries.

31. All of the above are linked directly or indirectly to one or more of the three most pressing issues facing Sudan – conflict, human displacement and food insecurity. These three issues have also been the main reasons for the current international humanitarian assistance effort in Sudan, and therefore constitute a basic impediment to sustainable development.

2.3. Status of MDGs and Basic Services

32. Sudan has launched a Five-Year Development Plan within a 25 years strategy (2007-2031). The Government of Sudan has stated in its Five-Year Development Plan (2007-2011) its intention to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. However, the financial and economic crisis impacted Sudan through a decline in oil prices and hence oil revenue. The IMF ranked Sudan as one of the most vulnerable low income countries to the global financial crisis due to its high vulnerability to shocks transmitted through trade decline in oil revenues, aid and remittances. According to the latest Global Human Development Report (HDR, 2010), Sudan's is ranked 154th out of 182 countries, which is a drop from its ranking of 150th in 2009. The Report also notes that Sudan has a Human Development Index (HDI) value of 0.379, making it the lowest HDI performer in the Arab States in the 2010 ranking. However, the assessment of progress towards the MDGs has to be situated in the context of the impediments imposed by the conflict situation in Sudan. The most critical of these impediments include: (a) the diversion of development resources towards support for state authority; (b) increasing demands for humanitarian assistance, security and protection to the victims of armed conflicts; and (c) limited or lack of access to areas affected by conflict.

33. According to the Sudan MDG Report 2010, Sudan has made significant progress towards achieving most of the MDGs, although progress is unevenly distributed among regions. With regards to MDG 1, the 2009 National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS) poverty analysis estimated the poverty incidence based on income/consumption at 46.5% for North Sudan; which indicates that nearly half of the population is below the poverty line in North Sudan. In addition, the poverty gap ratio and poverty severity index for 2009 were 16.2% and 7.8%, respectively, also implying that income/consumption poverty is wide and deep in North Sudan.

⁹ Desertification is defined in the UN Convention to Combat Desertification as the degradation of land in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas caused by climate change and human activities.

With regards to MDG 2 for Universal Primary Education, the Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) for Northern Sudan increased by 1.1% between 2004 and 2009. Currently the GER is 71.1%, but with wide disparities among States ranging from 93.75% in Khartoum and 36.1% in the Red Sea. Data for Net Enrolment Rate (NER) is not available due to lack of birth certificates among many children.

34. With regards to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (MDG 3), the MDG Report indicates mixed progress; with gender parity more or less achieved in education, and an increase in women's representation in parliament;¹⁰ while disparities exist in women's participation in formal employment. There is no up to date data on MDG 4 and MDG 5 on reducing child and maternal mortality respectively. However, based on 2006 data, the MDG Report indicates regional variations with the Blue Nile, South Kordofan, West Darfur and Red Sea states having the lowest indicators.

35. The MDG Report also indicates low HIV prevalence in North Sudan, which is consistent to the patterns in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. However, malaria is the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Sudan; and the country also carries 15% OF THE tb BURDEN IN THE Eastern Mediterranean Region. With regards to MDG 7 (sustainable Environment), Sudan is experiencing a general deterioration in biodiversity and pressures on habitats. According to the National Desertification Control Programme Monitoring Unit, more than half of Sudan (50.5% or 1.26 million km²) is affected by desertification as a result of inappropriate land use, over-grazing and deforestation. The MDG report also indicates that access to safe drinking water decreased while improved sanitation increased. Further details on the Status of MDGs for North Sudan are shown at Annex 3 to this report.

2.4. Post-CPA: Challenges and Opportunities

36. When South Sudan becomes an independent country in July 2011, the CPA, Interim Constitution and the GoNU will cease to exist and North Sudan will have 15 States under its jurisdiction. The mandate of UNMIS is also expiring and it is not expected that it will be renewed, at least not in its present form as a peacekeeping mission with a military component, while the conflict situation in Abyei and Darfur continues. There are still six key CPA issues not yet fully addressed – border demarcation, citizenship, Abyei, Darfur, oil revenues and division of national debt. These issues and foregoing events are likely to have profound implications for the UN agenda in general, and for UNDP specifically.

2.4.1. Macroeconomic considerations

37. Oil has been central to Sudan's economy, contributing an average rate of economic growth of nearly 7% over the last decade. Oil production and export accounted for about 15% of GDP in 2008 (\$10 billion in oil exports and \$60 billion GDP)¹¹, and more than 75% of the

¹⁰ Proportion of women in the national legislative council increased from 9.7% in 2004 to 25% in 2010.

¹¹ IMF (2009), Sudan Country Report.

government budget. During this period, Southern oil production accounted for over 80% of total crude output. North Sudan will therefore lose considerable revenues after the separation. On the other hand, the South remains attached to over 1,600 kilometers of oil pipeline connected to the export terminals in Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

38. The growth of oil has tended to camouflage a critically weak economy. Since the advent of Oil, agriculture has performed poorly in North Sudan. The average growth of agriculture declined from 10.8% in the 1990s to about 3.6% in the last decade; and as a result, agriculture's share to GDP has fallen sharply, leading to decrease in incomes and increased poverty in rural areas. Over the last five years, Sudan has been burdened with twin deficits, running an average current account deficit over \$4 billion. The importation of capital goods and foreign services has also fed a growing national debt. According to the Central Bank of Sudan, the total external debt of Sudan stood at \$35.7 billion at the end of 2009, and is expected to reach \$40 billion by the end of 2011. Whether or not Sudan will get debt relief is therefore an issue of significant importance.

2.4.2. Official development assistance (ODA)

39. Following the signing of the CPA several donor conferences took place in Oslo which generated lots of pledges. With the end of the CPA these pledges will no longer be valid. The end of CPA will therefore create new opportunities and challenges in the complex relationship between the Government of Sudan and its donor partners. In 2009, Sudan received \$2.4 billion in ODA from donors, slightly less than in 2008.¹² Most of this aid flows outside of state mechanisms. The USA, the largest global donor of ODA suspended economic assistance to Sudan in 1989; and the European Commission has not programmed bilateral development funds for Sudan under its 10th European development fund after Sudan failed to ratify the Cotonou Agreement by June 2009. However, Sudan was ranked the 9th largest ODA recipient in 2009, although a large proportion of this is received in the form of humanitarian aid. The volumes and patterns of aid spending in Sudan are closely linked to humanitarian assistance in Sudan's conflict-affected areas. A number of leading government donors began to scale up their humanitarian funding to South Sudan in the period of negotiations leading to the signing of the CPA. During the same period, conflict in Darfur broke out and attracted significant humanitarian funding.

40. There is a visible preference by traditional donors for South Sudan on the basis that it faces more pressing challenges to establish national systems and institutions of government. Arab countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been relatively small donors, providing 2.3% of total aid between 2000 and 2009. However, Sudan has an array of pooled donor funding mechanisms that enable donors to support development activities in the north without channeling them directly through the government. The largest pooled fund is the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), established in 2006, which allocates funds to humanitarian and early recovery activities identified in the UN-led Humanitarian Work

¹² OECD-DAC (2010), Development Initiatives

Plan for Sudan across all regions. Between 2006 and 2010, the CHF received donor funds totaling \$796.5 million. Two multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) were agreed at the Oslo donor conference in 2005 to receive reconstruction and development funds for North Sudan and South Sudan. The national MDTF is administered by the World Bank and the Government of Sudan, but according to government, only 18% of the commitment has been so far delivered. Several countries have announced plans for large programmes in the South, but few have given indications on the size of their North Sudan programmes post-secession. Sudan continues to have humanitarian and crisis programming needs in both Darfur and the East; while recent events in the region have highlighted economic, political and security factors which could lead to unrest and instability in the country.

2.4.3. Governance and rule of law

41. The CPA provided entry points and opportunities for government reforms and the long-term stability of Northern Sudan, enshrined in the National Interim Constitution. Elections were an important part of this agenda, but are not a panacea for democratic and transparent government reform. The CPA provisions such as national civil service reform and the establishment of a functioning and transparent Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission to regulate the distribution of financial resources from the central government to the states are critical components of the reforms. Progress on the implementation of this agenda will provide the foundation for resolution of the Darfur conflict, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and the far north post the CPA.

42. There is now a general trend to expunge all reference to South Sudan and plans for a permanent Constitution for North Sudan by July 2011. This will be the seventh constitution since independence. The questions of citizenship are likely to be high on the agenda, as will be the need to address the “secession dividends” for Darfur, the East and other regions of Sudan. It will therefore be important to support a consultative process and broad dialogue that will ensure entrenchment of the rights of vulnerable and marginalised groups and regions. The events taking place in the Arab region and more specifically in Egypt and Libya will also have some degree of influence on prospects for stability in Sudan. This will be exacerbated by the wider global trends of general increase in fuel and food prices, the financial crisis and its effects on remittances and ODA.

43. Given the macro-economic situation, there is reasonable concern of further decline of resource allocations from the center to the states. In addition, the majority of the federal and state budgets go to chapter one (salaries) and only little money is allocated for development/public service delivery activities. Since some of the root causes for conflict in Sudan are associated with the dynamics and relations between the center and regions, perceptions of neglect and marginalization of local communities, and inequitable distribution of national resources will aggravate tensions. Addressing the issues of public administrative reform and decentralization therefore will remain a very important priority in future.

2.4.4. Considerations for long-term stability

44. Since 2007, the SPLM has prioritised self-determination over unity with Northern Sudan, which weakened its solidarity with the Darfur insurgency. Consequently, Darfur has been an issue between the Government of Sudan and the international community, rather than a question discussed on the national agenda. The conflict will likely continue unresolved in the short to medium term, and will thus become an issue for North Sudan. The situation in Abyei continues to represent a threat to North-South relations, as failure to resolve the stalemate could see conflict spilling over into South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

45. The CPA-mandated popular consultations in Blue Nile and Kordofan states, which were meant to culminate in a position by the respective state legislatures on whether the interim period yielded sufficient peace dividends, are still pending. South Kordofan has experienced some political and social volatility although state level elections were conducted in early May. Parties have agreed in January (Kadugli agreement) to withdraw all unauthorized armed forces in and around Abyei. According to the agreement, a joint technical committee would implement the agreement and only Joint Integrated Units from the armed forces both from the North and South would be deployed in the area.

46. The situation in Darfur is mixed, with improvements in some areas and deteriorations in others. Low-intensity conflict in the West has escalated since December, with an estimated 70,000 people fleeing fighting in past months. In other areas, however, improved security is resulting in returns, further highlighting the need for the international community to step up early recovery programming and provision of basic services. In the absence of a peace agreement however, the international donor community in Darfur has not been keen to move from humanitarian to more development-oriented support. This affects UNDP's ability to embark on early recovery and livelihoods due to lack of funding.

47. East Sudan has to an extent been neglected (both by the Sudanese government and the international community) due to other competing pressing needs in the country. However, the region is lagging behind on key MDG indicators and is in dire need of development support to back up the implementation of the ESPA signed in 2006. A donors' and investor's conference was held in Kuwait in December 2010 and resulted in pledges of around USD 3.4 billion, but delivery is yet to start.

Chapter3: EVALUATION FINDINGS

3.1. Programme Relevance

48. The concept of “relevance” describes how pertinent, connected or applicable something is to a given issue or defined objective; in other words, something is relevant if it serves as a means to achieving a given purpose. In this context therefore, to determine whether or not the CPAP is relevant, one must first answer the question – relevant to what? The CPAP was developed within a political context in Sudan when the Government of Sudan led by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A had signed the CPA, formally ending the civil war between the north and south. It therefore appears very logical to assume that the relevance of the CPAP should be assessed against the CPA. However, this may be taking a rather simplistic view of a more complex matter. In the first instance, this view characterizes the CPA as an end in itself; and secondly it constitutes a rather narrow definition of the purpose and mandate of UNDP in Sudan.

49. While no doubt the CPA was a necessary and important condition for achieving peace in Sudan, the overall purpose of the UN system effort cannot be limited only to its successful implementation. The UNDAF 2009 – 2012, which forms the basis of the CPAP actually states: *“Consolidating peace and stability represents the overarching goal of the UNDAF, which serves as the common strategic plan for the UN in Sudan”* (page 6). In the CPAP itself, UNDP articulates its purpose thus: *“The UNDP Country Programme aims to help realise the Sudan National Strategic Plan (and the GoSS Three-Year Rolling Sector Plans) for timely delivery of the MDGs as articulated in the UNDAF”* (CPAP, page 15). What this means therefore, is that the relevance of CPAP must be assessed against the stated purpose of support to the National Strategic Plan and achievement of the MDGs. The second question that needs to be clarified is on the extent to which the expiration of the CPA (in July 2011) affects the purpose, in other words, whether or not Government’s priorities will change at the end of the CPA. If this were to be the case, then clearly this would also affect the relevance of the CPAP.

50. The evaluation understands that the Government had developed a new National Strategic Plan 2012 – 2017, which is still in draft stage and therefore unavailable for review by the evaluation team. However, no major changes were expected because the new plan was also said to be within the framework of the Twenty-Five Year Strategy 2006 - 2031. In this regard, the CPAP relevance is therefore assessed against the current National Strategic Plan 2007 – 2011, which is based on the following eight strategic results:¹³

- a) Sustainable peace, national sovereignty and national harmony;
- b) Citizenship and Sudanese identity;
- c) Sustainable development;
- d) Poverty reduction and realization of MDGs;
- e) Good governance and the rule of law;
- f) Institutionalization, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation;

¹³ National Council for Strategic Planning: The Five-Year Plan 2007 – 2011; Volume 1, page 11.

- g) Informatics; and
- h) Development of scientific research mechanisms.

51. These are therefore the national priorities that define the relevance of the CPAP. However, the question may also be raised, whether or not the CPAP has responded to all the priorities. To a large extent, this depends on three issues: (a) whether all the priorities are within the UNDP mandate, (b) whether UNDP has a comparative advantage relative to other development partners, and (c) whether UNDP has the requisite capacity and resources to respond to all the priorities. To answer the first one, the mandate of UNDP is to provide development advice, advocacy and grant support on behalf of the UN. All activities of UNDP “serve to promote Sustainable Human Development”, through its specialised expertise in the following areas:¹⁴

- a) **Democratic governance** – to develop political, legal and regulatory frameworks that are more responsive to the needs of ordinary people, including the poor;
- b) **Poverty reduction** – to address the multi-dimensional roots of poverty, including through the creation of economic opportunity, the empowerment of women and the protection of human rights;
- c) **Crisis prevention and recovery** – supporting innovative approaches to crisis prevention, recovery, early warning and conflict resolution; and bridging the gap between emergency relief and long-term development;
- d) **Information and Communication Technologies** – to encourage greater competition, thereby cutting transaction costs for delivery of public services to the poor;
- e) **Energy and environment** – to build national capacity for environmentally sustainable development and supporting catalytic interventions; and
- f) **HIV and AIDS** – to help countries to prepare, fund and implement strategic HIV/AIDS plans that mobilize all sectors of Government and civil society.

52. The CPAP has three programme areas – Poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs; Fostering and consolidation of democratic governance; and Support to crisis prevention, conflict management and recovery. UNDP’s specific strategies and objectives under each of the three components is shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3: CPAP programmes by Programme Component

Poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs	
Aid management and coordination	To support the establishment of government-led and results-based aid management system that handles external humanitarian and development resources in a transparent and accountable manner.
Pro-poor livelihoods and private sector development	To create an enabling environment for access to financial services, support the role of the private sector for generating growth and employment opportunities, reducing poverty and providing the poor with greater access to markets, goods and services
Responding to HIV and AIDS	To enhance the commitment and capacity national institutions, including government and civil society to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS and prevent its further spread

¹⁴ UNDP Starter Kit (2002); UNDP Mandate, Programming Tools and Systems

Fostering and consolidation of democratic governance	
Citizen Participation and Democracy	To build national capacity to administer and finance future elections in a sustainable manner and promote meaningful and comprehensive participation of voters
Local Government Development and Public Expenditure Management	To support the process of devolution of power through decentralization and to support the equitable and gender-sensitive wealth distribution from central to local levels in order to maximize the development impact at the community level.
Strengthening access to justice and promoting the rule of law	(1) Strengthening access to justice at the community level for vulnerable groups including women and people living with HIV/AIDS; (2) Promoting of accountable, accessible justice sector institutions through capacity development and advisory support to critical rule of law institutions, such as the Judiciary, Ministry of Justice/Ministry of Legal and Constitutional Development, Law-Enforcement and Corrections; (3) Supporting the adoption of public policies addressing access to justice for the poor and marginalized.
Support to crisis prevention, conflict management and recovery	
Disaster risk reduction and natural resource management	(1) Strengthening state capacities in North and Southern Sudan to reduce risks of future disasters by reducing socio-economic and environmental vulnerabilities, as well as to move from a reactive, civil defense-based mode of dealing with disasters to a more proactive and coherent approach incorporating risk management into the strategic development planning process. (2) Promote sustainable livelihood systems by informing legal and policy reform processes in land rights, coordinating existing conflict management mechanisms and implementing direct programmatic interventions designed to consolidate alliances among community stakeholders around shared interests.
Post-conflict socio-economic recovery	(1) Contribute to the socio-economic recovery of Sudan's conflict-affected areas; (2) Provide strategic information on security threats and socio-economic risks into national and sub-national policy for conflict management (3) To support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; (4) To strengthen national capacities to address land mine contamination in Sudan to recreate an environment in which people can live safely.

Source: Excerpts from CPAP paras 4.11 to 4.31

53. Based on content analysis of the national priorities and UNDP strategies, the evaluation is of the opinion that the CPAP is relevant to national priorities, now and in the next two years of implementation. Are there any projects that were designed specifically to respond to the CPA, and how will they be affected by the end of CPA in July? The answer to the first question is yes; some projects were solely informed by the need to ensure that the CPA process would be successful; particularly those related to elections, referendum and the DDR projects. However, how these projects will be affected by the end of the CPA varies from project to project, and will be considered more appropriately in subsequent sections.

3.2. Efficacy of CPAP Strategy

54. The overall CPAP continues to be relevant in terms of its alignment to national priorities and UNDP mandate. However, the CPAP was also developed in a specific political, humanitarian and development context, at the time defined by the National Interim Constitution (NIC) and the CPA. In this regard, some significant components of the programme, and more specifically the formulation of outcomes will have been tailored to respond to these realities. Specifically,

the development of the CPAP was preceded by a bridging programme, which essentially extended the Country Cooperation Framework 2002 – 2006 (CCF II) by a period of two years. The bridging programme was developed to fill the gap while the UN system developed a strategy that would align the UNDAF to the NIC and CPA. As a result, the CPAP has some components specifically tailored to the CPA. Interventions under the pillar of Crisis Prevention and Recovery such as DDR; and under the Governance pillar – Support to Elections and Democratic Processes (SEDP) and the referendum were designed in direct response to the CPA. In addition, the need to provide peace dividends for the population is also reflected in other projects such as support to livelihoods, microfinance and the Strategic Partnership for Sudan, which are all directly linked to the CPA. It is therefore imperative that this review should also assess the relevance and efficacy of the strategy and CPAP outcomes in the context of the CPA, the changes expected with the end of CPA in July and the separation of the South.

3.2.1. Overall Strategy

55. In the first two years of CPAP implementation, UNDP strategy differentiated its interventions according to the specific situation and issues in different regions. On the whole, this was an effective strategy that enabled it to target its interventions to specific groups. Specifically, given that the CPA was an agreement between the NCP and SPLM/A, this meant that the Government was not the only counterpart, and as such the strategy had to be inclusive and sensitive to the needs of the different parties. In addition, the conflict situation in Sudan was (and continues to be) not only defined by the north-south civil war, but included the conflict in Darfur, which culminated in the DPA; the conflict in East Sudan, which culminated in the ESPA; and the volatile security situation in the Three Protocol Areas, some of whose CPA provisions (Abyei referendum) have not been implemented until now. In addition, the fact that UNDP had to work in the framework of an integrated mission with UNMIS on the one hand and UNAMID on the other hand, also defined its strategic options.

56. Moreover, for a long time from 1989, the focus of the UN in Sudan was centered on 'Operation Sudan Lifeline', which basically was a consortium of UN agencies and NGOs operating in southern Sudan to provide humanitarian assistance throughout war-torn and drought-afflicted regions in the South. To some extent, the UNDAF also reflects emphasis on humanitarian assistance – for example in basic services, special focus is given to quick impacts projects for war-affected communities. The establishment of UNMIS further encouraged this because by its very nature, peacekeeping tends to focus on short-term quick impact results rather than long-term development approaches such as support for policy-making and institutional capacity. This was therefore the environment in which UNDP developed its strategy, which was largely based on a project approach predominantly implemented through direct execution (DEX). To support this strategy, regional field offices were established in four regions – South Sudan, Darfur, South Kordofan (Protocol Areas) and Eastern Sudan.

57. After July 2011, three issues that will significantly define UNDP's strategic planning environment in future, which may call for refocusing the strategy and programme implementation approach. The first one is the end of CPA and the consequences of the

separation of the South. In the first place, there will now be a single government counterpart, and consequently a stronger impetus for closer partnership and national ownership of programmes. Among some of the implications for this are that UNDP may be compelled to shift its implementation modalities towards national implementation (NIM) much more, this would require emphasis on institutional capacity building. Secondly, Northern Sudan may be affected by flight of donor funding as more donors focus more on the South where it is perceived there is a more pressing need to develop systems and institutions for State administration. If this happens, this could affect UNDP's capacity to implement the current large number of projects, hence a shift away from a project-based approach towards programme-based approach. In addition, this may also affect the CO capacity to maintain field offices in the regions, or at the very least, may require a significant reduction of field staff.¹⁵

58. Another significant change that may occur between now and July is the withdrawal and exit of UNMIS from Sudan, or possible restructuring into a Special Political Mission. Such an eventuality will deprive UNDP (and other UN agencies) access to the vast logistical resources available to the mission, specifically security and transport. This may also affect their ability to operate in some parts of the country, given the volatile security situation and the lack of efficient transportation services to some areas. However, this may be compensated by the continued operation of UNAMID in Darfur; although this also means that the conflict in Darfur has to be reassessed comprehensively in order to develop appropriate strategies to prepare for its transition from recovery to development, including laying the foundation for institutional development and capacity for local government.

59. The third significant change is on the external environment. The events unfolding in the Arab region in general and in Egypt and Libya specifically are bound to influence developments in Sudan in the long run, given the large youth unemployment problem in Sudan, high population growth rate of 2.5%¹⁶, and rising food prices. The long term impacts of climate change in terms of productivity of the land in the light of a growing population also create conditions for conflict over resources. Some possible implications are that on one hand, UNDP may have to reassess its strategies with regards to the geographic locations for its interventions, and on the other hand, faced with declining resources, the most effective way for UNDP to have more impact may be to concentrate more on 'upstream' interventions to influence policy decisions as opposed to service delivery at the community level. In addition, UNDP will have to invest more resources in evidence-based programming in order to generate necessary data to inform its strategic decision-making and to strengthen the demand side effects for government accountability.

3.2.2. Poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs.

60. The evaluation noted that Sudan does not have a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and there is no specific strategy to guide UNDP activities on poverty reduction. At present,

¹⁵ The CO comments that 'several donors are showing concrete interest in funding programmes in the Protocol Areas and Darfur; so the situation of funding to the North may not significantly alter'.

¹⁶ UNFPA Country Programme Document: DP/FPA/CPD/SDN/5, July 2008.

there is no comprehensive national strategic vision on poverty reduction and the mandate for addressing poverty tends to be scattered among different government ministries. This offers opportunities and entry points for engaging at macroeconomic policy level. In addition, UNDP is not doing much in terms of substantive pro-poor interventions at the community level. The microfinance interventions for example do not seem to have adequately addressed the linkages between the policy level and actual capacity needs of microfinance providers. The CPAP has two outcomes; Outcome 1 addresses national capacity at central and local government levels, to plan, implement and monitor MDG related policies and programmes. The MDGs are reflected in the CPA as a pre-requisite to achieving stability in Sudan; and also in the NIC and the Five-Year Development Plan 2007-2011. In addition, poverty reduction is central to UNDP's mandate; and its global experience has shown that strengthening national and sub-national capacities for MDG-based planning and reporting are key to achieving the MDGs. In this sense therefore, the Outcome is relevant to the overall objective of UNDP in Sudan.

61. The outcome also refers to strengthening national capacities to support 'related national development policies and priorities'. Arguably this is a caveat that enables all other socio-economic interventions to be included under the outcome. However, there may be need for more focused reference, including in the indicators, to specific issues identified in the outcome. For example, UNDP could emphasise in its outcome statement the critical need for a diversified economy that presently generates about half of the national income and 90 percent of export earnings from oil revenue alone. This is even more important with the separation of the South, which will result in decline of oil revenues to the north. The issue of income distribution, social safety nets and inclusive development may also warrant mention in CPAP outcomes as this is critical to poverty reduction, and could be UNDP's value added to the policy dialogue. Other important areas such as pro-poor policies including employment-led growth, and localised job creation through strengthened SME sector are also fundamental macroeconomic issues that may be clearly articulated in the CPAP outcomes. One advantage of this is that these issues can be targeted at 'upstream' level in terms of supporting central government in developing coherent macroeconomic policies, thereby enabling UNDP to run a manageable portfolio commensurate with resource availability while also aligning to the global UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011.

62. This may require the formulation of an additional outcome, but the point being made here is that the CPAP outcomes falls short as a guide for defining UNDP's strategy and programme approach. In addition, considering the challenges of youth unemployment in the context of events currently taking place in the Arab region, it would appear that a specific outcome on employment and macroeconomic policy support are more critical outcomes than the second outcome on "Improved impact of resources to fight HIV/AIDS". The importance of controlling the spread of HIV and AIDS and its devastating effect on the economy and in particular on the poor cannot be overemphasized. Under this outcome, UNDP is principal recipient of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and as such manages the fund on behalf of partner UN agencies. In addition, it has two projects; one on awareness and advocacy; and the other on service provision to people living with AIDS and at-risk groups. These interventions contribute to outputs and do not necessarily require a CPAP outcome.

3.2.3. Fostering and consolidating democratic governance

63. UNDP has a specific strategy for Governance and Rule of Law developed by the Programme Unit. The three outcomes under this Pillar cover the spectrum of UNDP's response to the national strategic framework in the context of the mandate. Some of the interventions are directly linked to the CPA and may need to be refocused and broadened when the CPA comes to an end in July. For example, the SEDP project was defined in the context of CPA.

The goal of electoral assistance stretches beyond holding of a single electoral event, aiming instead for the development of professional, inclusive and sustainable institutions and processes that enable people to freely choose their representatives. Electoral assistance can only be defined as “sustainable” and effective” when its impact is nurtured and endures a single electoral event. To achieve this, capacity development should focus on developing a supporting environment for credible elections that reflect the will of the people.

Evaluation of SEDP Project, December 2010

64. There are also several unknown factors that may fundamentally alter the country context and eventually impact on the continued relevance of the programme outcomes. For example, were the Government to change its policies on decentralization and devolution of power to the States, then UNDP would have to rethink its Outcome 4. Although there are no such drastic changes that are expected, until now, the decentralisation agenda has not been formally institutionalised by an Act of Parliament. Moving forward however, UNDP can expect that the Government will demand more engagement and partnership with the UN. In fact, some government counterparts consulted as part of this evaluation said: *“future cooperation should be based on mutual agreement, more transparency and coordination with central government on any initiatives undertaken in the States”*. They also noted that unlike the South, government has well established systems and institutions with certain levels of capacity, and there is not much need for policy support at the federal level. Their demand for assistance in policy development is likely to be very minimal, instead they will be demanding that the UN demonstrate its value-added through tangible service delivery on the ground.

65. UNDP must therefore be prepared to engage at both the ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ levels. There will be more pressing demand for policy support and institutional building at the State level, because systems are less developed there. However, for decentralisation to work, it must also be supported by an enabling federal policy framework and efficient federal and state civil service. UNDP may therefore wish to expand its programmes to include reform of the civil service and capacity building for public administration. In addition the pockets of conflict that continue to exist in the political landscape of Sudan should be reviewed more comprehensively in order to develop targeted programmes that will strengthen effective state governance that responds to the needs of its population. For instance, the area of civic participation and engagement in governance is fundamental to stability, and this is an area that needs to be strengthened.

3.2.4. Crisis prevention and recovery

66. The Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) is finalising the CO CPR strategy currently in draft stage. The two outcomes under this component are linked to the issues to do with the conflict and CPA. Under Outcome 6, UNDP addresses the challenges of sustainable environment and disaster risk reduction. An analysis of the conflicts in Sudan shows that scarcity of resources is either a cause or aggravating factor in a context where almost 80% of the population depends on the natural environment for their livelihoods. In addition, post CPA, the popular consultations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States will be a challenge if they are not conducted as per the CPA. Other challenges may also arise from (i) land issues that remain unresolved and (ii) the issues around North-South migration. Outcome 7 includes infrastructure and livelihood interventions, mainly in the conflict-affected areas of Darfur and the Protocol Areas.

67. The link between environment and livelihoods is a fundamental one in the context of the current situation in North Sudan. Disaster Risk Reduction and building community resilience is an issue that cuts across all of Sudan and has potential to provide the flagship theme for UNDP in the same way that the CPA did. The three States comprising eastern Sudan have the weakest social indicators; and Red Sea State in particular, has the least developed infrastructure compared even to some of the States in Darfur; and in order to accelerate progress towards MDGs, these areas need to have strengthened livelihood opportunities that affect people at the community level. This implies that there should be more evidence-based programming. The evaluation noted that the CPRU has undertaken Conflict Risk Mapping Analysis (CRMA) and situational analyses for all three states in the east, Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Early recovery is an important part of UNDP's work and should not be viewed as an option between humanitarian and development work, but rather as what development actors do in conflict areas during the humanitarian phase. In Darfur, for example, the conflict continues to weaken capacities of state institutions to provide public services and capacities of communities to cope. Early recovery interventions are therefore critical to provide coping mechanisms for communities and also as foundation for transition to development.

3.3. Contribution to Outcomes

3.3.1. Poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs

68. The Poverty Reduction Unit manages the CPAP component on poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs, which focuses on four areas of intervention: (1) Development of national and sub-national capacities to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate the MDGs, (2) Aid management and coordination, (3) Pro-poor livelihoods and private sector development, and (4) Responding to HIV and AIDS. In terms of programme design, the focus areas sufficiently address the important aspects for poverty reduction and acceleration of MDGs and provide UNDP appropriate entry points for developing relevant interventions.

69. On the whole, some progress was achieved towards stated outcomes and many of the

outputs have either been accomplished or are on track to be achieved. The evaluation found that effective programme performance is affected by the lack of a national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which articulates the government's strategy and plan for poverty reduction specifically. While useful, the National Five-Year Plan 2007 - 2011 is basically a broad framework with too many gaps and lacks detail. In addition, the constant changes in the structure of government have not helped. For example, there are two Poverty Units located in the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE) and Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MoWSS); and on employment policy and job creation, the distinction between the roles of the Ministry of Labour (MoL) and Ministry of Human Resources Development (MoHRD) is not clear. There is much that can be done for UNDP to respond to existing gaps in government poverty reduction policies and strategies and to effectively impact poor people in tangible ways; including for example, support for diversification of the economy and support for localised job creation opportunities.

CPAP Outcome 1: Implementation capacities to plan and monitor development priorities

Outcome Indicator 1: Change in allocation of government budgets towards MDGs and pro-poor spending related activities, policies and priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pro-poor spending = 10.3% of total expenditure for all Sudan (including South Sudan) - 9% for North Sudan (2009 data)
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Source: UNDP Report (2011), Baseline Values for CPAP Indicators

70. The established baseline for the indicator was 5.5% (2006) with a target of 15% by 2012. Based on the data above, there is good progress being made and the programme is on track to achieve the outcome. The MDG Progress Report 2010 provided trend data on pro-poor spending between 2004 and 2009, which also indicates a steady increase in pro-poor spending in all Sudan (including South Sudan). The data shows a decline of pro-poor spending from 13.7% in 2008 and 10.3% in 2009. While it may be too early to raise alarm bells, it could be worth a closer look to see what may have caused the sudden decline in order to address any structural issues that may be associated with the decline before it develops into a trend.

2004.....	6.2%
2005.....	7.6%
2006.....	8.3%
2007.....	13.0%
2008.....	13.7%
2009.....	10.3%

71. The UNDP report on baselines values and indicators notes that government counterparts identified four challenges that affected availability of reliable data; (a) weak information systems, (b) poor M&E systems, (c) lack of robust statistics, and (d) inadequate research capacity. This points to the need for more targeted interventions on capacity development in data and information management systems, and more particularly for the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Officials from the National Population Council (NPC) consulted during this review also noted that lack of harmonised indicators and integrated mechanism for tracking indicators were their main constraints. They added that out of a total 60 MDG indicators, they were currently able to track 39, although the quality and reliability of the data was also an area of concern.

72. At output level, considerable progress was achieved with most of the outputs either accomplished or on track to be achieved. The National MDG Progress Report 2010 was published and a draft of the Eastern Sudan Regional MDG progress report is currently under review pending approval expected in April 2011. Four other Regional MDG Reports will also be produced in 2011/2012 with data collection currently on going for Darfur Region. The first draft of the National Human Development Report (NHDR) is under review by the key stakeholders including government, civil society and academia. UNDP also supports strategic development of the statistical system to establish a database for Sudan.

73. UNDP collaborated in a joint programme with 10 UN agencies to support decent job opportunities for youth in three states with emphasis on establishing market based jobs and supporting youth access to microfinance. With regards to strengthening aid management and coordination, UNDP implemented a robust institutional and human capacity development programme of the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) leading to establishment of an Aid Coordination Unit and Sudan Aid Information Database (SAID). The project ‘Building Capacities for Aid Effectiveness’ will be closed at the end of 2011. The evaluation is of the opinion that this may be premature given that Aid management systems have so far been established in 5 States only; and with the expectation that resource mobilisation and ODA support will be more difficult in the future, effective management and transparent reporting on aid is likely to be a priority for donors.

CPAP Outcome 2: Improved impact of resources to fight HIV and AIDS

Outcome Indicator 2: Percentage of eligible clients enrolled on ARV combination therapy disaggregated by gender	- 13.2% for 2010 (gender disaggregated data unavailable)
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Source: UNDP Report (2011), Baseline Values for CPAP Indicators

74. Based on the data above, progress has been less than satisfactory given that the baseline was 10% (2008) with a target of 50% by 2012. However, according to UNDP reports, programme outputs were all achieved. UNDP is Principal Recipient of six GFATM grants: HIV/AIDS – Round 3 and 5; Malaria – Round 2 and 4; and TB – Round 5 and 8. The grants also cover a component for strengthening the health service delivery system including human resources and service delivery points. Through these grants, UNDP supports capacity development for 35 NGOs working on HIV and AIDS in four States (Gedaref, Kasalla, Blue Nile and Khartoum).

75. UNDP also has some initiatives on HIV and AIDS funded through its core resources. One of the projects is “capacity Development for HIV/Aids Response”. Through this intervention, UNDP supported the preparation of HIV/AIDS plans for the Ministries of Justice and Labour, and Strategic Plan for the Sudan Aids Network (SAN). A survey of the socioeconomic impact of HIV and AIDS was also completed in 2010. Clearly, these results are not adequately reflected in the outcome or its indicator. As currently formulated, the outcome emphasises UNDP role as fund manager for the GFATM, which as discussed earlier does not warrant an outcome. Moreover,

Output 1.2 is about strengthening aid effectiveness and coordination, which could very well include UNDP's role as principal recipient of the GFATM funds.

3.3.2. *Fostering and consolidating democratic governance*

76. The CPAP component on fostering and consolidating democratic governance is managed by Governance and Rule of Law Unit. At the beginning of CPAP implementation, the Unit managed a total of 19 projects in the 8 States target by UNDP. Based on assessment of its effectiveness and delivery, the Unit decided to restructure its implementation modality from a project-based to programme based approach. A Medium-Term Policy Focus and Programme Framework was developed informed by the programme focus of the UNDP global components on Governance and Rule of Law, National Strategic Plan and the CPD 2008-2012.¹⁷ The Unit reviewed its project portfolio, closed and merged some projects, gradually reducing them to 15, of which eight were ongoing at the time of writing. Based on this, the projects were rationalized into three clusters:

- 1) **Citizen participation and democratization**, which includes support to free and fair elections, capacity development for civil society organisations (CSOs) including organisations for the poor, women, IDPs and other marginalised groups;
- 2) **Local government development and public expenditure management (PEM)**, includes capacity development at community level aimed at empowering communities to seek greater accountability and transparency in the provision of public services; and capacity development for local government through technical assistance focused on strategic planning and resource management.
- 3) **Strengthening access to justice and promoting the rule of law**, which includes human rights awareness and legal information for communities and their organisations; as well as capacity development and infrastructure support for justice sector institutions.

77. The evaluation team is of a view that the Unit has an effective strategy that enables it to focus on developmental issues; and more specifically, the emphasis of the strategy on building institutional and civil society capacities provides a strong and important balance between the supply side (duty bearers) and demand side (rights holders) issues on governance. The evaluation finds that progress and contribution to expected outcomes varies and to some extent, does not fully reflect the developmental objectives articulated in the Unit's programme framework.

CPAP Outcome 3: Democratic governance strengthened

Outcome Indicator 3 a: Elections conducted and deemed free and fair by	- Elections conducted; mixed assessment about whether they were free and fair. ¹⁸
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¹⁷ UNDP (2008), Governance and Rule of Law: Medium-Term Policy Focus and Programme Framework 2009 - 2012

¹⁸ In October 2010 UNDP issued an independent assessment of the 2010 elections entitled "Lessons Learned from Sudan Elections Project" (Al-Alaily and Eicher, 2010). The report concluded that voter turnout, including among women was high; that the quota system resulted in the election of a significant number of women; that the election days were generally peaceful; and that civil society groups participated actively in the process. However, a number of concerns were raised associated with the process of voter registration, the lack of transparency in the operations of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), media

domestic and international observers; referendum conducted as per CPA.	- South Referendum conducted as per CPA; but Abyei referendum still pending
Outcome Indicator 3 b: Change in the level of political knowledge and understanding of political system among citizens	- 41% feel they have solid understanding of the political system and understand their rights and obligations as citizens - 71% were aware of at least some of the political parties in the elections (in their areas) -
Outcome Indicator 3 c: Level of public confidence in media, political parties and other civil society leaders in holding government accountable	- Media: 35% say they can access media that helps hold government accountable - Political parties: 47.4% feel political parties were strong enough to hold government to account - Civil society: 23.8% feel CSOs were strong enough to hold government to account -

Source: UNDP Report (2011), Baseline Values for CPAP Indicators

78. Based on the status of outcome indicators above, it appears that there is mixed progress towards expected outcomes, albeit at a rate slower than would be required to achieve the established target by end of programme period.¹⁹ However, if as seems to be the case, the indicators relate to the 2010 elections only, then on that basis, the expected outcome was not achieved. The final evaluation of the SEDP also made the same conclusion, further highlighting some of the design weaknesses of the project as: (1) lack of quantifiable targets and indicators; (2) lack of coherence between outputs and activities; (3) inadequate capacity assessment of national partners; (4) inadequate integration of gender equality; (5) inadequate risk analysis; and (6) inadequate analysis of institutional and implementation context. However, UNDP commented that some of its projects such as the Political Parties Development Project and Good Governance and Equity in Political Participation directly contributed to the achievement of the outcome. In the evaluator's opinion, the difficulty lies in that the outcome indicators do not appropriately measure the changes in the outcome.

79. UNDP's comparative advantage in electoral assistance in conflict-affected countries is based on its neutrality, which enables it to engage on equal terms with government, political parties and civil society, thus enabling it to build trust with key institutions and influence the development of appropriate legal framework focusing on long-term electoral cycles. The study on baselines noted that government counterparts raised concerns that *"...there was less focus on civic education that would support institutional and systems strengthening for the long term"*. Also as shown in the status of indicators, less than half of respondents had confidence in the capacities of the media, political parties and civil society to hold government accountable. However, there were some significant outputs that were delivered. UNDP managed donor funds of more than \$56 million that constituted the bulk of international assistance for the

imbalance, poor quality voter education, and inaccuracies in the tabulation of voting results. This combination of heavy turnout and irregularities is corroborated by local and international media which reported "chaos and confusion" (quoting a local news service Al-Rakoba, 2010).

¹⁹ See also report on Indicators and Baseline Values for further discussion on baselines and targets for these outcome indicators.

referendum process and provided logistical and technical assistance to the National Elections Commission (NEC) and Political Parties Affairs Council (PPAC) to conduct the first multi-party elections in two decades. UNDP established a Women’s Legislator’s Forum and more than 1200 women took part in a series of leadership training sessions in the North and the South. There is a specific quota for women in the national assembly called the “women’s list” established in 2008 and implemented for the first time in the 2010 parliamentary elections.

CPAP Outcome 4: Capacity enhancement of Local Government

Outcome Indicator 4 a: Percentage of citizens satisfied with local public services (No baseline; but target established as 60% of citizens in target areas are satisfied with public services)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 56% rated average satisfaction - 28% rated poor satisfaction - 15% rated high satisfaction - 1.5% rated very high satisfaction
Outcome Indicator 4 b: Number of laws which seek to devolve power being implemented by central government (No baseline; target established as increasing trend)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One law: Local Government Law

Source: UNDP Report (2011), Baseline Values for CPAP Indicators

80. The status of indicators above show limited progress made towards the outcome. However, the indicators did not have established baselines and on the face of it, they do not seem to measure changes that can be directly linked to UNDP outputs. For example, indicator 4a measures satisfaction with basic services, which are usually understood to include education, health, water and sanitation. Admittedly, local government capacity should lead to improved delivery of basic services, but this also depends on other variables such as resource allocations and predictability of allocations to enable planning.

81. The evaluation finds that there are many outputs that effectively contribute to the outcome that are not captured by the outcome indicators. For example, the outputs delivered under the public expenditure management (PEM) project, which is implemented in all the 8 targeted States are not adequately reflected.

82. In 2010, six states completed their Strategic Annual Plans and Budgets based on Conflict Risk and Mapping Analysis (CRMA) thereby improving linkages between county/locality, state and central government planning and budgeting processes. In North Darfur, UNDP completed state capacity assessment to strengthen revenue management and accountability. UNDP launched a Locality Development Fund (LDF) to provide block grant allocations that supports 59 locality projects in Red Sea State jointly funded by UNDP and the State. All 10 localities in Red Sea State developed their locality plans for 2011 with active participation of civil society; and the plans have since been approved by the State Government. In Eastern Sudan, UNDP piloted training on the Government Financial Statistics (GFS) in the Red Sea State in 2009, and has since been upscaled to Kasalla and Gedaref States. The training improved budget preparation and financial reporting. A Budget Policy Unit was established in the Red Sea State Ministry of Finance to coordinate the State budgeting process. In Kasalla and Gedaref States, a high-level inter-ministerial working group on macroeconomic policy formulation was established to

provide a basis for future strategic planning and budgeting.

83. At central government level, UNDP supported dialogue on implementation of decentralisation. Among some of the key results of this dialogue was establishment of the Higher Council for Decentralised Governance (HCDG) inaugurated in 2010 to replace the former Ministry of Federal Governance. The evaluation met with the Council of States who also expressed satisfaction with UNDP's support in strengthening capacities of State Legislatures through one of its projects.

CPAP Outcome 5: Access to justice and rule of law

Outcome Indicator 5 a: Percentage of citizens who know how to access justice systems and/or report that they have confidence in the rule of law institutions to provide effective and quality services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access: 43% aware how to access government justice systems; and 19% report easy access - Confidence: 46% have high confidence; and 29% have medium confidence
Outcome Indicator 5 b: Proportion of citizens indicating confidence in fair treatment if arrested, or if they file a complaint with the local law and order institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 16% have high confidence - 47% have moderate confidence - 29% have low confidence - 2.6% have no confidence

Source: UNDP Report (2011), Baseline Values for CPAP Indicators

84. As noted in the study on baseline values, progress towards this outcome is directly affected by the situation in different states, particularly the State's population characteristics and conflict history. The study noted that Eastern Sudan hosts a large number of refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as large IDP population from across Sudan; and has the worst indicators on poverty and basic services, which affects citizens' knowledge of their rights and institutions that promote and protect those rights. In the Protocol Areas and Darfur, State institutions were severely compromised by a long and enduring conflict situation such that their operational and institutional capacities are very limited.

85. Notwithstanding, there is considerable progress and contribution towards the outcome. To increase access to justice for vulnerable and marginalized groups, UNDP has set-up 13 legal aid centers in North Sudan and legal aid lawyers' networks, which have helped resolve over 2,600 cases and mediate over 4,000 in North Sudan alone.

86. UNDP has built 8 court houses, four police stations and community aid posts in seven states in North Sudan, which significantly improved availability and access to justice institutions. UNDP collaborated with UNMIS Police (UNPOL) in a community policing project for IDP camps which resulted in strengthening citizens' confidence

One of UNDP's Implementing Partners – Mutawenat – a local NGO noted "...the legal aid centers have been very effective, especially in conflict-affected States. In El Fisher, the Legal Aid for Women has 3 lawyers who provide pro-bono services on cases related to human rights, gender-based violence (GBV) and cases on family law"

in the police and reduction in crime. The UNPOL officers consulted noted that in the beginning community members would all run away upon the arrival of the police, but now they all voluntarily assemble and in larger numbers. The project has since been extended to Darfur with collaboration of UNAMID Police.

3.3.3. Crisis prevention and recovery

87. This component of CPAP contributes to the creation of an enabling environment for the consolidation of peace in Sudan, by means of confidence building and risk reduction of recurrence of conflict and natural disasters and climate change, as well as through the socio-economic recovery of conflict-affected populations and host communities, including mine-action, small arms reduction and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

88. The component is managed by the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit, and aims to integrate a gender-sensitive analysis into all post-conflict and post-disaster planning tools and processes to ensure that the recovery efforts provide economic opportunities for all; including access to assets, such as land and credit.

CPAP Outcome 6: Disaster risk reduction and natural resources management

Outcome Indicator: Change in government commitments and resource allocations for the environmental and natural disaster management.	- Perceptions of change in commitment positive, but serious concerns about severe under-financing remain
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Source: UNDP Report (2011), Baseline Values for CPAP Indicators

89. Based on the status of the outcome indicator as reported in the report on baseline values, progress has been less than satisfactory. Government officials consulted during this review felt that the CPA did not give sufficient priority to the environment as a sector and consequently, the sector suffered inadequate funding. They further noted that a national strategy and plan to address desertification was available but was not implemented due to a lack of funding. To date, the government response to environmental issues in Sudan is governed by the Environmental Framework Act (2001). A 2007 UNEP study observed that the Act “...had many deficiencies, (was) obsolete, incomplete, unclear and therefore difficult to enforce”.²⁰

90. Despite the weaknesses, there are several national projects under the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Most of these projects are soft assistance on capacity development to help the government meet its environmental and reporting commitments. A project on Reduction of Resource-based Conflict was piloted in Upper Nile and North Kordofan States and is now planned for replication in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. A National Information Centre for Early Warning on Natural Resource Conflicts has been established with technical

²⁰ UNEP (2007), The Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment

support from UNDP. Another project on Solar Energy was also implemented in 16 States (including South Sudan) and is considered one of the most successful in the Arab Region. The government has committed to sustain this by providing solar-based lighting to 4,000 villages in Sudan per year.

91. Currently UNDP supports two projects: (1) Preparation of the 2nd National Communication Report, which includes capacity development to assist Sudan with the enabling activities necessary to prepare and report the Second National Communication in accordance with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) . Under this initiative, UNDP also supports capacity development associated with Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). Carbon trading is expected to start in 2012; (2) National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) to build resilience for adaptation to climate change, including water harvesting techniques and forestation activities in 5 states in North Sudan. The CO implements both projects through the National Implementation Modality (NIM). NAPA is currently implemented in 5 states representing different ecological zones. Since the project cuts across many sectors, there is collaboration with the Ministries of Agriculture and Health, although no engagement has been established with UN agencies working in those sectors such as FAO, UNICEF and WHO. A national Disaster Risk management project for North Sudan was developed and endorsed by Humanitarian Affairs Council (HAC) and is now pending approval by MIC.

92. Through the conflict-sensitive development analysis (CDA), UNDP identified some of the main issues that cause or exacerbate conflict in Sudan. In the Three Protocol Areas for example, since the signing of the CPA, there has been lack of effective government-led institutions or mechanisms with the requisite leadership and authority to ensure comprehensive follow-through. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms such as native administration leaders and *ajaweed* (arbitrators/mediators) who possess the stature and expertise in customary law to adjudicate intra- and inter-tribal conflicts have similarly been challenged by a breakdown of their authority during the course of war, a politically-polarised environment, and lack of a legal framework within which to operate. Meanwhile, effective peace building efforts at the grassroots level and/or within particular constituencies carried out by national and international non-governmental agencies have lacked opportunities to maximize their impact through meaningful and sustainable linkages across diverse political and interest groups and with supportive state institutions. Past peace conferences led by state and/or national level actors have largely been carried out as one-off events with resulting peace agreements and follow-up recommendations left unimplemented. Linkages between reconciliation activities and recovery interventions delivered by international and local actors, where present, have also been weak, with few agencies demonstrating basic principles of conflict sensitivity such as 'Do No Harm'. Given the environmental challenges discussed in an earlier section and the close linkages between natural resources and conflict, as well as between poverty and environment, there are many opportunities that remain unexplored. The whole area of environmental governance for instance, is one where there has been very limited focus. The energy sector and rural development are other areas closely linked to sustainable environment that also provide strong entry points for UNDP engagement.


CPAP Outcome 7: Post-conflict socioeconomic recovery and job creation

Outcome Indicator: Change in human security (mines, small arms, socio-economic) of crisis-affected groups. National mine action management and technical expertise in place to address social/economic impacts of mines and explosive remnants of war.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 64% feel weapons pose a security threat in their area. - 40% feel landmines are a problem in their area - 80.4% of them argued that the problem had declined in the previous two years.
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Source: UNDP Report (2011), Baseline Values for CPAP Indicators


93. The link between the outcome and the outcome indicator is not very clear. This is in part due to the complexity of the indicator itself, which probably needs to be unpacked into three or four separate indicators that are directly connected to the outcome. The reference study provides further detailed discourse about the indicator.

94. Overall, the evaluation finds that this outcome faced a considerable number of challenges. One of the flagship projects under this outcome is the National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP). Based on a UNDP review, the programme has substantial design flaws and did not achieve its intended results. The Figure below provides some excerpts from the report which illustrate some of its major weaknesses.



95. UNDP's specific role in NDDRP was focused on the 'R' part, which is the Reintegration process and sustainable livelihoods. The report had this to say about this component of the programme: *"...the concept of reintegration is often referred to as an activity, rather than a process with a set of outcomes. The suggestion or assumption that once an ex-combatant has received her/his 'reintegration package', she/he has been reintegrated is misleading. Moreover, since the support is also supposed to include a longer term follow up with the ex-combatants, the concept of a 'reintegration package' also does not comply with the concept of 'reintegration programmes' as elaborated in the international DDR lexicon"* (page 50).

96. The report also makes the following additional observations on the reintegration component:



97. The report provides the following suggestions of strategies that could be followed as a way forward:

- Focus individual support to community-based programme,
- Include agriculture projects that build on the value chain, such as food processing and packaging,
- Integrate capacity building,
- Improve linkages between communities and government services to prepare for development,
- Develop linkages with the private sector, and
- Strengthen synergies with other UN agencies such as FAO and ILO.

98. The other flagship project was the Community-based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), which was closed in 2010. The evaluation of the project questions the *"...apparent accidental menu of activities that have been supported (they are) not defined in terms of their impact on households' resilience and coping"*.²¹ The evaluation report further notes that basic social services did not give enough attention to the real accessibility of service by the poor; e.g. through mobile, temporary and outreach services for education and health. In addition, early recovery efforts in Darfur did not go well either, due to the continuing conflict.

99. While these challenges are real, they pertain to specific projects and should not overshadow some important outputs that were successful. Through the NDDRP, a total 25,784 ex-combatants received psycho-social counseling and reintegration contracts for 18,750 participants were finalised (9,560 in South Sudan and 9,350 in the Transition Areas). A total of 6,539 participants received reintegration packages in eastern Sudan and by end of 2010, contracts for reintegration services for all 2,254 ex-combatants demobilized in Phase 2 were completed. UNDP also provided technical support for development of Sudan Arms Control Policy.

100. UNDP piloted a new approach towards conflict prevention and resolution in the Three Protocol Areas and successfully established 17 peace processes between key state-level stakeholders in South Kordofan resulting in the resolution of local conflicts. Over 2,000

²¹ UNDP (2010), Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme: Independent Final Evaluation – Phase 1; page 39.

participants attended UNDP supported AAA peace-building meetings between the Dinka and Missiriya in Abyei, which marked the first time leadership of the two communities were meeting since the outbreak of fighting in May 2008. In Darfur, a CSO/NGO mapping and capacity assessment as well as capacity assessment of the main economic actors were completed in 2009. Value chain analysis studies for six commodities (ground nuts, sheep, cattle, oranges, hibiscus and honey) were completed. UNDP is currently undertaking baseline studies in targeted areas in preparation for the launch and implementation of the recommended set of interventions in all 3 Darfur States. Several infrastructure rehabilitation projects were also successfully completed in all conflict regions.

101. The Mine Action Capacity Development (MACD) project was closed in 2010. Significant results were achieved, including the adoption of the Sudan Mine Action Law (2010) by Presidential Decree. Over 80% of mine-infected areas were either cleared or marked, with more than 22,500 anti-personnel mines, 4,500 anti-tank mines, 12,000 small arms munitions and 88,000 unexploded explosive ordinance removed or destroyed.

102. A key challenge for this outcome is that most of the issues that need to be addressed tend to be highly politicized. For example, the issue of disarming the various militia forces cannot be achieved without political commitment and support of the parties in conflict. That said, in the new dispensation, the challenges are going to be fundamentally different with end of CPA and there is need to reconsider current strategies and develop alternative and appropriate approaches that respond better in the new post CPA Sudan.

3.4. Programme Implementation, Communication and Coordination

3.4.1. Programme implementation

103. Being a post-conflict country, UNDP programme implementation in Sudan should be guided by a set of principles geared towards building social cohesion and economic recovery leading to inclusive sustainable development. This includes addressing the supply-side issues such as building institutional capacity and strengthening advocacy for socio-economic reforms towards transparent and accountable governance. On the demand side, programmes should address disparities in access of public goods and services and encourage broad-based participation and opportunities for disadvantaged and excluded groups.

104. The CO has made commendable efforts towards developing tools to address social cohesion and inclusiveness. However these tools are not being effectively used in programme implementation. For example the Conflict Risk and Mapping Analysis (CRMA) tool is not broadly utilized for planning and implementation. Programme staff indicated that although they were familiar with the CRMA, it was not being used in the planning of projects. In general, the evaluation observed that there is minimal attention paid to risk analysis at the design and planning stage of projects. For example, the NDDRP evaluation found that the “Three Areas First” strategy had launched DDR in the areas where it was least likely to be appropriate or have

meaningful impact. In Darfur, the livelihoods projects did not progress as well as expected due to continuing conflict, another indication of ineffective application of risk analysis.

105. In addition, there is no effective follow up to ensure that results of interventions are fully implemented by relevant government departments. The evaluation noted an apparent lack of follow-up to ensure that policies are effectively implemented after adoption by government. One example is the Women Empowerment Policy, which marks an important step towards inclusive development but has so far not been implemented since its adoption in 2009. Government officials from NPC observed that gender was not being mainstreamed in various government programmes and line Ministries.

106. All UNDP projects except the NAPA project are implemented through the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). This modality was probably appropriate in the context of CPA in which the government counterparts included two main parties to the conflict, and also lack of adequate institutional capacities. However, this does not encourage national ownership of processes and results. In its 2010 annual progress report for the MDGs Report project, UNDP noted that *“full participation by national counterparts increased their technical and political commitment”*. In the 2010 Annual Progress Report for the Capacity Development for Aid Effectiveness and Coordination, UNDP identified one of the key constraints as lack of commitment from major technical Ministries –MoFNE and Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (MHA), further underscoring the importance of national implementation.

107. The CPAP states that implementing partners will be drawn from government, UN agencies, national research or training institutions, NGOs or the private sector (paragraph 6.3). The Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) is the Implementing Partner (IP) for the NAPA project, and government officials indicated that they were very satisfied with this implementing arrangement. They noted that as the main IP, they had knowledge of the local context and were able to successfully lead the national process to identify the most vulnerable communities where adaptation is needed; and they were better positioned to develop and lead a broad partnership with the Ministries of Agriculture, Water Resources and Health for an integrated approach across all relevant sectors. However in other consultations with government officials of MIC, they noted that UNDP was not effectively engaging at the working level and they were not fully aware of the activities being implemented in the States as there was no joint monitoring. UNDP should therefore strengthen national institutional capacities and draw relevant lessons from the NAPA project with a view to shifting implementation to national execution in order to get more government buy-in and commitment.

The NDDRP evaluation noted that:
“government counterparts did not feel that they were sufficiently in charge of their own DDR processes. The reintegration support was supposed to be implemented as co-management by government and UNDP, but since the concept of co-management does not exist in UNDP regulations, it directly executed the programme”.


3.4.2. Communication

108. There is a policy that one percent of programme resources should be spent on communication, and the CO has a communication strategy and plan. This is very a very useful and effective way to highlight UNDP's work and success with stakeholders, including civil society, donors and government counterparts; and should also contribute to pushing the UNDP agenda on advocacy for the MDGs. The CO currently has an English website but plans to launch the Arabic website within the month of May 2011. The website includes links to social media such as UNDP You Tube, Twitter and Flickr. With regards to knowledge sharing and management, there is a Knowledge Management Group, and UNDP Sudan has been among the front runners in terms of adopting and use of the Teamworks knowledge management platform. The evaluation observed however that the Teamworks platform is currently only used to upload documents and has not effectively evolved into a discussion forum for problem solving and repository of institutional memory.

3.4.3. Programme Coordination

109. The CO is organised thematically with three Programme Units located in Khartoum and an area-based programme structure with Sub-Offices in the regions where UNDP has interventions. The programme side of the CO structure is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Country Office Programme Structure



110. There are 6 Field Offices (3 in Darfur: El fasher, Nyala and El Geneina; 2 in Protocol Areas:

Kadugli and Abyei; and one in Eastern Sudan: Kassala) and two project offices in Port Sudan and Damazin. The function of the Field Offices is to provide a centrally managed UNDP presence at the field level in order to acquire efficiency gains and scale economies by sharing common services such as security, transport and accommodation. This provides UNDP with a comparative advantage in terms of representation and coordination with local government administrations, international NGOs and other development partners in the field as well as inter-agency collaboration. Field offices play a critical role in programme delivery and coordination between UNDP and State governments. For example, in the field visit to Nyala, the evaluation observed that the Rule of Law and Livelihood components had developed good relations with State government counterparts, thereby getting them to participate in various Working Groups, which is essential for developing national ownership of processes and results. The evaluation noted however that some of the portfolios are really very thin to be effective at all. The evaluation observed however that these efficiency gains depend on UNDP's ability to put enough projects on the ground for optimum utilisation of sub-office capacity. Table below provides a cost-comparative analysis between two field offices and a project office, which demonstrates that project costs are lower for a sub-office with more projects.


Table 4: Field office budget expenditure for 2010

	Nyala sub-office	El Genein sub office	Damazin project office
Total expenditure in 2010 (US\$)	601,049	538,129	419,320
Number of projects	6	3	1
Operational cost/project (\$)	100,000	179,000	419,000

Source: Field Office Support Unit

111. The above table demonstrates that in order to reduce operational costs per project, field offices should support an optimum number of projects, and also have sufficient functional mandate to support the projects at field level. Programme units in Khartoum should eliminate the operations functions and delegate that fully to the field offices. The evaluation noted that at present, programme units still maintain their operations units, which is duplicative and adds to the operations costs. The 2009 Guidance Note on Establishing UNDP Presence Outside the CO provides relevant guidelines on the terms of reference for field offices. With expectations of future resourcing constraints, the notion that scrapping the field offices will reduce costs is not founded on solid cost-benefit analysis.

112. The evaluation did not get a sense, however, that there was effective coordination between the programme units. There are a number of projects – for example livelihood projects – that could be better coordinated to achieve synergies for all the programme units. For example, the following outputs under the different units have potential to benefit from more coordination if associated projects are integrated and implemented in a common geographic region so that their results are complementary in a way that one project provides the basis and framework to start implementing the others as illustrated below.



113. A project-based approach generally does not enable synergy and is not conducive to integrated approach. As the above example hopefully illustrates, this is essentially an integrated programme with possibly 3 outputs all contributing to a common outcome. In yet another example, the evaluation noted that the Livelihood portfolio in South Darfur includes a project on capacity building for State government, with components for capacity in development planning and financial management. This is very much similar to the work that the Governance and Rule of Law Unit is doing in Eastern Sudan. However, there is no collaboration at all to at least learn from the experiences of the Governance and Rule of Law Unit in Eastern Sudan. This is clearly a case where information sharing and a culture of learning could improve programme performance in the CO. In a second example, UNDP supports law graduates of Nyala University for their bar examinations; however, this has not been linked to other projects such as for example, that graduates who pass the bar examination provide service in the Legal Aid project.

114. UNDP-Government coordination was generally found to be good, but effective coordination varies between projects. At central government level, this is partly due to the frequent changes in government structure that have been experienced during the CPA period as well as the fragmentation of functions in different government ministries and departments. For example, the evaluation observed that Aid Coordination is split among three Ministries – MoFNE, MHA and MIC – each having a department that deals with some aspects of development financing. One interviewee also observed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even has an environment department. This underscores the need to strengthen support for central government reforms to streamline the functions of various ministries and departments. Based on observations from the field visits, there is much more effective coordination between UNDP and State government counterparts at that level.

115. There appears to be minimal coordination between UNDP and other UN agencies, particularly at the programme planning and design level, although there is some degree of collaboration at the field level. In South Darfur for example, the evaluation observed that UNDP was a member of several UN Working Groups including: (i) Protection Working Group, chaired by UNHCR; (ii) Child Protection Working Group, chaired by UNICEF; (iii) Rule of Law Working Group, co-chaired by UNAMID and UNDP; and (iv) Monitoring Reporting Mechanism on the 6 grave violations of child rights, chaired by UNICEF. At project level, there are also several projects that include a certain level of inter-agency collaboration but not through any formal mechanisms. For example, the UNDP Livelihoods portfolio has no formal collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) although they have many related livelihood interventions. In a different but relatively more positive example, the DDR portfolio in South

Darfur collaborates with UNICEF on issues of child soldiers and water service delivery; and with UN Women on identifying and coordination women's organisations in the context of SCR 1325 and 1820, but again this is not specifically included in the project design although it takes place in the implementation.

116. The evaluation reviewed documents for one JP 'Creating opportunities for youth employment' is a partnership of 11 UN agencies, but even there, annual reports for 2009 and 2010 have both pointed to challenges in UN agency coordination as an impediment to progress. In consultations with heads of Programme Units, they all acknowledged that more could be done to strengthen inter-agency collaboration, and that this will be even more important post CPA in view of the challenges envisaged around resources.

3.5. Integration of crosscutting issues

117. The CPAP identified human-rights based approach (HRBA), capacity development and gender equality as the principles that guide programming. By and large, this has been the case at project level where all the projects basically address a specific human rights issue. However, some crosscutting issues are not specifically mentioned in the design, although they generally tend to constitute the mainstay of the implementation process. Overall, the evaluation was satisfied with integration of crosscutting issues in the CPAP.

3.5.1. Human Rights-based Approach

118. Most projects address one or more human rights issues as a default position. For example, it is not very difficult to link a specific human rights issue to projects that address livelihoods, access to justice or access to public services. Many projects do have a very strong participatory approach and a strong component for developing civil society capacity and awareness of their right to public service. This is especially true for Governance and Rule of Law. For example, the project "Strengthening Rule of Law in Darfur" includes among its objectives: *'To empower local stakeholders to actively engage in preventing and bringing an end to the existing violations of domestic law and international human rights standards'*.²²

119. The evaluation observed that the template for project annual reports does not include specific questions on the integration of crosscutting issues, and consequently they generally are not reported on.

²² UNDP (2010), Strengthening Rule of Law programme in Darfur: Annual Work Plan 2011.

3.5.2. Gender equality

120. Some aspects of gender equality and empowerment of women generally tend to be included in the projects as a matter of course; for example in micro finance, majority of borrowers are women. The CO has a gender strategy developed, which emphasises mainstreaming as opposed to having a stand-alone gender equality programme. However, the evaluation observed that gender is often measured through the number of women that are participating in a given activity as opposed to whether or not the expected results address problems from a gender perspective. As mentioned earlier, the CO does not have a Gender Adviser. Although there is a gender focal point, there is no mechanism that actually coordinates and checks that the gender checklist is integrated in programme development. Before 2009, this function was performed by the Gender Task Force, but due to changes in staff, the task force no longer exists. If gender is to be addressed in a more coherent manner, the CO should reinstitutionalise a mechanism to ensure that gender mainstreaming is integrated in project design, monitored and implementation of the gender strategy is tracked and reported. The CO should also establish stronger collaboration and engagement with other UN agencies such as UN Women and UNFPA who have complementary work and skills in other areas of gender equality and women empowerment.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council defines gender mainstreaming as “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women, as well as of men, an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated.


3.5.3. Capacity development

121. The evaluation finds inadequate attention on capacity development in the design and implementation of CPAP interventions. Based on observations from field visits to Darfur for example, there are Rule of Law projects targeting institutional capacity development in the justice delivery system including the State Legal Administration and the Corrections department. In addition, and much more important in the context of long-term development, there are also interventions to build a pool of legal expertise through support to the Law faculty of Nyala University. There are also interventions under the CPRU on building capacity of State institutions. In Governance and Rule of Law programmes, interventions are specifically designed to build State-level institutional and civil society capacity in participatory development planning, implementation and management. In the Poverty Reduction Unit, UNDP is building government capacity in effective aid management and also in collecting, analysing and managing of data for use in decision-making. UNDP also supports capacity development for NGOs working in HIV and AIDS in the context of the national multisectoral response to HIV and AIDS.

122. While the emphasis of capacity development in CPAP is commendable, the CO does not have a specific capacity development strategy that guides how it is implemented. The evaluation noted that most staff members tended to view capacity development only as individual skills, and consequently when asked about capacity development, they talk mostly

about training of government ministry staff and workshops. Effective capacity development should be based on a specific strategy, which recognises that a country's capacity resides at three levels – individual, institutions and enabling environment. A capacity development strategy will therefore help to focus UNDP interventions on all three. Figure 3 below illustrates the process of developing a capacity development strategy.

Figure 3: Capacity development process



3.6. Financial Performance

123. Based on the ATLAS Finance Updates, the CO financial performance shows some interesting trends. The Resource Mobilisation targets were exceeded consecutively in 2009 and 2010 by 15% and 7% respectively; while overall delivery was 77.1% of the balanced score card (BSC) delivery target in 2009 and 109.9% on target in 2010. However, what is also interesting to note is that available cash resources exceeded the total resources mobilized in both years. The difference between available cash and total resources mobilized in any given year is made up of unspent cash carried over from the previous year. This means that in 2009, the CO expenditure was 54% of available cash, and therefore 48% of the cash (\$109, 184,164) was carried over to 2010. Delivery relative to available cash improved slightly in 2010 to 60%, but that still implies that 40% was carried over into 2011. This information indicates that the CO does not have sufficient capacity to deliver on available resources. Table 4 below shows the summary financial data for the two years 2009 and 2010.


Table 4: Summary Financial Performance Data for 2009 and 2010

	2009	2010
Resource mobilisation target (US\$)	155,000,000	195,493,000
Total resources mobilized (US\$)	178,979,159	209,085,882
% on target	115.47%	106.95%
Available cash (US\$)	241,843,989	317,111,290
Budget (US\$)	166,237,772	258,810,460
Expenditure (US\$)	132,659,825	190,707,357
Expenditure as % of Budget	79.8%	73.7%
Expenditure as % of Available Cash	54%	60%

Source: ATLAS Monthly Programme Finance Updates

124. The total CPAP budget was \$1,466,831,000 inclusive for both North and South. It is also indicative that by end of 2010, total expenditure (for both North and South) was \$522,778,000 or 35.6 percent, which is below 50% that should be expected at the mid-point. As percent of total delivery, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) had the highest delivery in 2009, which reflects the high expenditures under the DDR programme. In 2010 Governance and Rule of Law Unit (G&ROLU) had highest contribution to total delivery, which reflects high expenditures on elections and referendum in 2010 relative to total delivery. However, what is also interesting to note is that the share of delivery of the Fund Management Unit (FMU) relative to total delivery is also quite high (second in 2009, and third in 2010). UNDP serves as Administrative Agent for other UN agencies, and therefore in very strict sense, delivery of the FMU is not really programme delivery. The delivery rates by programme unit are illustrated in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Programme Units Delivery Rates based on 2009 and 2010 AWP



Source: ATLAS Monthly Programme Finance Updates

3.7. Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) and Reporting


3.7.1. M&E

125. UNDP guidelines on M&E provide that “...the primary responsibility for planning, monitoring and evaluation rests with programme officers. M&E specialists are expected to provide technical guidance and support to enhance the quality of M&E”.²³ Some commendable progress has been made to improve M&E processes. An outcome evaluation for Outcome 7 (Post-conflict socioeconomic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated) was undertaken covering both North and South; and the CO plans to conduct two outcome evaluation for Outcomes 1 and 2 in 2011. In addition, several end of project evaluations were also conducted, including the Support to Democratic Elections Project, DDR

²³ Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results; Section 5.4, page 139.

Review, and the RRP evaluation jointly with the European Commission. An evaluation for HRBA and Gender mainstreaming was conducted for the Strategic Partnership framework. The CO also conducted lessons learned exercise on the Elections, Mine Action and RRP projects. A study to establish the baseline values and indicators for the CPAP is in its final reporting stage, and marks an important milestone for strengthening the M&E and results-based reporting.

126. The CO has two M&E officers – M&E Analyst and M&E Capacity Development officer. The evaluation finds M&E and reporting to be inadequate and this is partly due to the quality of the M&E Framework. In some of the outcomes, the evaluation observed that there was no direct causal link between the outcomes, outputs, projects and associated indicators. Figure 5 below provides two examples to illustrate the point.



127. In the first example, the indicator is not an appropriate measure of the outcome. In the first place, an increase or decrease in allocations alone does not necessarily mean improved capacity to plan, implement and evaluate MDG-related policies. This may actually occur as a result merely of changes in the national budgets. Secondly, UNDP does not currently have any interventions that directly seek to influence budget allocations. The Governance Unit is currently working on addressing pro-poor policy issues at the State level in eastern Sudan, but there are no complementary initiatives at the central level. The evaluation noted that the Poverty Reduction Unit has started to think about expanding its portfolio of activities to include support for macroeconomic policy development.

128. In the second example, the two indicators are not consistent measures of the outcome over time. In the first instance, satisfaction with local public services is a function of both access to, and quality of service. Clearly, the ability of local governments to provide public services depends to a large extent on resource allocations, which are outside the sphere of influence of current UNDP interventions. With regards to the second indicator, it is not clear why there should be more than one law on devolution of powers. Rather, what should be specified by the indicator is the content of the law. In addition, this would be more appropriate as an output indicator, because it can be fully attributable to specific and targeted interventions that assist the government to develop the appropriate legislation. Annex 4 and the report on baseline values and indicators provide further comments and analysis on the indicators.

3.7.2. Reporting

129. The CO has a Reporting Officer whose functional role is quality assurance of reporting. The actual responsibility for reporting lies with the programme officers. The evaluation observed that most reporting is focused on activities and not adequately linked to actual results as defined by the expected outputs and measured through the output indicators. The CO uses the standard UNDP templates for developing AWP and reporting. However, many of the project AWP and quarterly reports produced by the project officers often lack relevant data on baselines and indicators. As reporting is strongly linked to the CO's ability to mobilize resources, this is an area that needs due attention through continuous training on results-based management (RBM) approaches.

4. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

4.1. Post CPA Opportunities and Challenges

130. The CPA and GoNU will cease to exist in July 2011 when South Sudan officially becomes an independent State. This also marks a defining moment for North Sudan, which in a sense also becomes a new country as of that date, defined by a different set of dynamics, opportunities and challenges. In addition, there are currently six CPA issues that still remain unresolved, which will also influence the trend of events in North Sudan politically, economically and socially. The six unresolved issues are: (1) border demarcation between North and South, (2) citizenship status of people who have settled in either of the two, (3) whether Abyei becomes part of North or South, (4) conflict in Darfur, (5) sharing of oil revenues, and (6) allocation of the national debt between North and South.

131. In the macroeconomic sector, the loss of oil revenues is a key challenge for North Sudan. Oil production and export accounted for about 15% of GDP in 2008 and more than 75% of the government budget; and yet 80% of total crude output is in the South. The growth of oil had also brought about the “Dutch disease” and somewhat affected growth of other sectors such as for example agriculture, whose average annual growth declined from 10.8% in the 1990s to about 3.6% in the last decade. Sudan also has a huge current account deficit of over US\$4 billion, and the Central Bank of Sudan estimates that the total external debt will reach \$40 billion by the end of 2011, from \$35.7 billion in December 2009. North Sudan faces challenges in its relations with its creditors, and ODA has been declining with most donors expressing preference for increased assistance to the South.

132. The CPA provided entry points and opportunities for government reforms and long-term stability of North Sudan, including the national civil service reforms and establishment of a mechanism to regulate allocation of resources between the central government and States. However, major challenges including conflict and potential of it still persist in North Sudan. The situation in Darfur remains volatile and highly polarised with West Darfur recently experiencing a surge in conflict that displaced an estimated 70,000 people. Conflict in Darfur manifests at two levels; the first is with central government, with the region generally feeling politically and economically marginalised. The second level is between different tribes and communities, which generally manifests in conflict over scarce resources such as land and water. State institutions have been weakened due to the long enduring conflict and lack capacity to effectively provide public services. This situation provides opportunities for UNDP to engage at that level to build State institutional capacities while also providing livelihood opportunities to ameliorate aggravation of conflict between different communities.

133. In the Blue Nile and Kordofan States, the popular consultations which were meant to provide the population and State legislatures the opportunity to decide on their status as a special administration region have not been conducted. This is further complicated by the pending resolution on the status of Abyei and the conflict between pastoralists and nomads in and around the migration corridors. While the political resolution of these issues is beyond

UNDP programme mandate in the context of a CPAP, there exists opportunities and entry points to strengthen social cohesion in these communities through creation of opportunities for sustainable livelihoods and developing State institutional capacities to better plan and manage resources for development results. In eastern Sudan, the region continues to suffer the worst social indicators owing to prolonged neglect and insufficient attention during the period of the North-South conflict. Poverty reduction work at community level combined with development of State institutional capacities will strengthen the peace dividends for the population in the region.

134. High and growing unemployment aggravated by rapid urbanization; increasing desertification and the effects of climate change on rural livelihoods; the global financial, fuel and food crises; as well as the recent unrest in the Arab region and neighboring countries all pose further challenges to stability in North Sudan. On the other hand, they also provide opportunities and entry points for UNDP to leverage its position as a neutral partner and its global network to assist the country in developing appropriate and coherent policies and strategies for sustainable peace and development.

4.2. Relevance of programme and strategies

135. The CPAP is relevant to the National Strategic Plan 2007-2011, MDGs and the UNDAF 2009-2012; and the current programme areas will continue to be relevant for the remaining period of this CPAP cycle. Is this to be taken to mean that UNDP will continue “business as usual” over the next one-and-half years? Not quite. There are specific projects and interventions which may require some adjustments as dictated by particular conditions associated with the CPA, or in response to lessons learnt in the initial phase of CPAP implementation. In Darfur and the Protocol Areas, UNDP may wish to review its approaches on early recovery and conflict prevention by giving more focus to building social cohesion at community level. This entails strengthening interventions that assist communities to resolve conflicts at local level and expanding livelihood opportunities and community access to public services. State institutional capacity building may then be introduced to piggy-back on successful outcomes in order to provide the venue for sustainability.

136. In eastern Sudan, UNDP could also build on the results of its Governance and Rule of Law programme which have so far capacitated participatory planning at the lowest level of local administration. In order to consolidate these results, the population should be able to see tangible benefits accruing to them through expanded livelihood opportunities and access to quality public services. UNDP assistance at policy level to influence allocations to the States as well as community level interventions to provide substantive meaning to pro-poor policies and planning, for example through strengthening the microfinance interventions are some of the possible entry points.

137. Looking forward to the next CPAP cycle, the end of CPA removes a common flagship for UNDP programmes. The diversity of issues between the regions however will still demand that UNDP pursues a differentiated strategy in each region. There will be a need to identify some

common themes that can provide a framework for programmes similar to what the CPA did. Some of the emerging themes that are common to all regions include (a) social cohesion and inclusive development, and (b) disaster risk reduction and climate change. These areas cut across all sectors and therefore require effective national champions to lead implementation and mainstreaming across sectoral boundaries. In the remaining phase of the CPAP, UNDP could therefore focus on developing and piloting effective strategies around these themes to lay the stage for roll-out in the next CPAP cycle. Other interim issues that will prepare the stage for effective programming in the next cycle will be further elaborated below.

4.3. Contribution to outcomes

4.3.1. Poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs

138. Expected outputs under Outcome 1 have been either successfully accomplished or on track to be achieved. However, these outputs are not appropriately aligned to the outcome indicator, and UNDP does not currently have any interventions that could lead to the realization of the outcome indicator. With regards to Outcome 2 on impact of GFATM funds, the outcome is too limited in scope and does not currently capture the results of other interventions associated with impacting the disease. The overall observation is that current interventions do not adequately respond to the existing gaps in the government policy sector, nor do they effectively impact the poor in tangible ways. It also does not help that the government has not developed a specific poverty reduction strategy, and its current response is uncoordinated.

4.3.2. Fostering and consolidating democratic governance

139. Although there does not appear to have been much progress made towards outcomes based on the stated outcome indicators, some important milestones were achieved in the targeted areas of intervention. Elections and referendum were accomplished, although UNDP role appeared too limited and focused on "event" not long-term systemic issues. In the area of enhancing capacity of local governments, the targeted States in eastern Sudan have all made remarkable progress in their planning and management of public resources. All 10 localities in Red Sea State produced locality development plans for 2010 and Kassala State is in the process of doing the same. On access to justice, important work is ongoing in Darfur and the Protocol Areas including in State institutional capacity building as well as actual provision of justice services to disadvantaged groups. A key gap that remains to be addressed is how to ensure that the results achieved so far, particularly in the area of pro-poor planning and State management of public resources can actually translate into tangible benefits for the population measured through improved access to services and expanded livelihood opportunities.

4.3.3. Crisis prevention and recovery

140. The overall situation in the country is generally characterized by very slow progress towards recovery, particularly in Darfur and the Protocol Areas, both of which continue to experience sporadic outbreaks of violent conflict. The environment-livelihood-conflict nexus

has proven to be among the basic underlying impediments to recovery. These three issues also provide strong entry points for UNDP interventions with a potential for building the basic foundation for social cohesion. Some significant results were achieved at the output level, particularly in the areas of mine action and building national capacity for reporting on environment and climate change. The major gap that requires further attention is on how to ensure that sustainable environment management actually impacts those communities that are losing livelihoods to the increasing desertification and negative effects of climate change.

4.4. Programme Implementation, Communication and Coordination

141. Programme implementation is mainly based on the Direct Implementation Modality, which is not consistent with the principles of national ownership and capacity development. There are some good tools for evidenced-based planning and programme implementation that have been developed in the CO, but they are not being used effectively. The apparent lack of progress of the livelihoods interventions in Darfur for example, could be partly attributed to ineffective application of conflict and risk analysis. There also appears to be lack of effective follow-up to ensure that implemented activities lead to the best possible outcomes. For example, some government officials commended UNDP support for development of the Women Empowerment Policy, which was formally adopted in 2009, but note that there has been a lack of effective follow up on its implementation.

142. The CO has good communication policy and has developed some good tools including the UNDP website and use of social media. While there is broad awareness and use by staff of the Teamworks knowledge management platform, it is not effectively used as a discussion forum for problem solving and decision-making.

143. The establishment of field offices provides UNDP with a comparative advantage and strengthens the CO programme delivery in the field. Given the diversity of issues between different regions, this structure makes sense, but it should also be accompanied by a lean structure at the top. Field offices also helped UNDP establish good coordination with government at the State level; while coordination is also good at central government level, the fragmentation of functions among several line ministries makes UNDP-Government coordination difficult. More coordination and synergy between programme units will also strengthen the CO delivery, but this requires a shift from project-based to a programme-based approach.

4.5. Cross cutting issues

144. Although crosscutting issues such as HRBA and gender equality generally tend to be a part of project implementation due to the nature of community-based interventions, they are not effectively integrated into the project design and reporting mechanisms. The gender strategy, for example, lacks a formal institutional mechanism to monitor its implementation. The CO does not have a capacity development strategy, and therefore capacity development tends to be looked at only as providing training through workshops for government counterparts.

4.6. Financial performance

145. The CO met its BSC delivery targets which were established at 70%. However, given the expectations of future resourcing constraints, there is need to demonstrate sufficient capacity to deliver on available resources. Atlas finance updates for 2009 and 2010 indicate that combined North and South delivery was only about 35.6% of total CPAP 2009 – 2012 budget.

4.7. M&E and Reporting

146. There has been considerable progress made to strengthen the M&E performance in the CO, including through outcome and project mid-term reviews and evaluations, lessons learned exercises and the study on baseline values and indicators. Much more still needs to be done to strengthen the CPAP M&E framework and to harmonise with national indicators as well as strengthening capacities for government at all levels, particularly the Bureau of Statistics in data management systems.

147. With regards to reporting, this is a function that is closely linked to UNDP's capacity for resource mobilisation, and more should be done to develop project and programme staff capacities in results-based reporting.

5. LESSONS LEARNED

148. Sudan has experienced some fundamental changes in its political, economic and social context over the last six years, the most significant of which has been the end of the North-South conflict that brought an end to one of the longest civil wars in the world. Although welcome, this change has also significantly altered the social dynamics in the country, essentially creating a new country that has fundamentally different population characteristics and probably will also change the way that the government and general populace will define their priorities in the future. As a key partner along the way, UNDP has been at the center of these changes, both in terms of framing the form and content of the change as well as managing the change process that culminated with the new status quo. Consequently, there are a number of important lessons that UNDP has learned and will want to apply in the most effective way in order to maintain its position as a relevant and trusted development partner in the new Sudan.

5.1. Lesson 1: Conflict analysis and social cohesion

149. North Sudan is faced with multi-level conflicts in different parts of the country. In addition to the north-south conflict which formally ended with signing of the CPA in 2005, there were two other major conflicts in Darfur and eastern Sudan which also ended with signing of the DPA in May 2006 and ESPA in October 2006 respectively. Central to all three conflicts is the perception of political and economic marginalization of the people in those regions, particularly with respect to sharing of national resources from central government to the States. In addition, Sudan is also a multi-cultural and multi religious society with a strong tribal system which controls traditional administration and justice systems. Consequently, there has also been conflict between different tribal groups and communities which is aggravated by an increasing scarcity and unwillingness to share natural resources such as land and water. There is also a large nomadic population which traditionally migrates from one region to another and is often in conflict with host communities over resources.

150. The lesson for UNDP is that conflict analysis is essential in Sudan and that the conflict situation is complex, and cannot be effectively addressed with generic one-size-fits all strategy. Building social cohesion can therefore be done through a combination of two strategies: bottom-up, by addressing localised conflicts through community-based conflict resolution mechanisms and improving access to resources and strengthening livelihood opportunities; and top-down, by strengthening the governance system, decentralisation and devolution of power to the States.

5.2. Lesson 2: MDG achievement

151. The MDG Progress Report 2010 shows that the country has made good progress towards achieving many of the MDGs. However, the report also indicates that the nature of progress has been patchy and uneven, with wide disparities between regions. With only four years left to

achieve the MDGs by 2015, there is an urgent need to scale-up and accelerate progress through efficient and effective utilisation of resources and strong partnership between the government, NGOs, civil society and the private sector.

152. The key lesson for UNDP is that to accelerate progress towards MDGs requires that government pursues a pro-poor policy agenda with a coherent multi-sectoral approach, combined with community-based interventions to improve service delivery and access to public services at the grass-roots level. This requires strengthening evidence-based planning, policy-making, monitoring and coordinated effort by all development actors.

5.3. Lesson 3: Effective strategic framework and flexibility

153. The CPA provided all the development actors in Sudan with the overarching framework for effective coordination of effort. Following the signing of the CPA in 2005, several donor conferences took place in Oslo, resulting in pledges by the international community to support and provide funding to implement the CPA. Substantial resources were made available to many development actors, making Sudan the ninth largest recipient of ODA in 2009.

154. The key lessons for UNDP are that effective resource mobilisation requires a broad framework that is consistent with the priorities of government and the donors; in addition to effective design and implementation of projects, and the ability to show impact and results. Given the diversity of issues and challenges between regions, identifying such a framework requires that a country assessment and mapping exercise be conducted in order to identify the key actors and their priorities defined in the context of the changing situation. Secondly, UNDP's experience over the last two years has been that differentiating its strategies between regions and establishing field offices also provides the flexibility to develop relationships with different actors and stakeholders within a local context.

5.4. Lesson 4: National ownership and capacity development

155. Programme implementation during the CPA period was defined by existence of two major parties, each representing specific interests; and there was constant and consistent changes of government structure and lack of coordination and distinction of functions between different line Ministries. This made it difficult for UNDP to develop a targeted capacity development strategy to build a national champion to lead and mainstream sectoral policies across the government apparatus. Consequently, there was an apparent lack of commitment at various levels on the part of government to assume full ownership of various processes and results as demonstrated by the NDDRP. On the other hand, where a national champion was identified and engaged, there was evidence of increased commitment and national ownership.

156. The main lesson for UNDP is that in order to consolidate the recovery process and ensure sustainability, it is critical to change the way that government at all levels conducts business through an effective capacity development strategy. Current approaches have not given enough attention to addressing strategic gaps and develop institutional capacity of targeted

line Ministries and departments as change agents for government beyond the confines of their immediate departments.

5.5. Lesson 5: Performance monitoring and reporting

157. The last two years have been marked by the absence of adequate performance indicators resulting in ineffective performance monitoring and reporting of results. There is also an apparent lack of common understanding and definition of key results-based management terms such as outputs, outcomes and indicators; and consequently, programme staff with responsibility for planning, monitoring and reporting did not have a clear and common understanding of the degree of accountability that they have for different levels of results.

158. The key lesson for UNDP is that time and resources devoted to staff capacity development and effective knowledge sharing and management can improve results-based performance and reporting.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD

159. Based on the findings of this mid-term evaluation and the key lessons learnt, it is recommended that the CO does not embark on any major changes to the current programme areas and strategies in the remaining period of the current CPAP. The CO should use the remaining 18 months to review the situation, strengthen and modify some of its approaches and reconfigure its operational systems and structures in preparation for more effective results-based performance management in the next CPAP.

160. The following recommendations are suggested for the remaining implementation period of the CPAP.

Recommendation # 1.

It is recommended that the CO should continue the current programme areas with the following slight modifications in approach:

(d) Poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs.

- (iii) Complement and build on the results of the Governance Unit on pro-poor policies in eastern Sudan by strengthening macro-economic policies and decision-making at central government level, including advocacy for equitable resource allocations to States.
- (iv) Strengthen interventions that expand livelihood opportunities for poor people in their communities, including strengthening micro-finance providers linked to vocational and entrepreneurship skills training.

Issues to address:

Based on the analysis in Section 3.2.2 there is no national strategic vision on poverty reduction. UNDP should provide support towards a national policy dialogue on poverty reduction, which should culminate in coherent sector policies on issues such as developing a national road map on employment-led growth, and economic diversification strategy based on labour-intensive localised job-creation to reverse the increasing trends in rural-urban migration.

(e) Fostering and consolidating democratic governance.

- (iv) Strengthen national capacities, especially civil society to engage and participate effectively in the Constitutional process.
- (v) Strengthen national institutions and processes to enhance transparency and accountability, including in combating corruption and protecting/promotion of human rights.
- (vi) Strengthen synergies between interventions to leverage performance based on outcomes of successful projects.

Issues to address:

With end of CPA, the government will embark on a process of developing a new Constitution for North Sudan. This is an opportunity for North Sudan to strengthen its democracy and governance system. The Government has also established an Anti-Corruption Commisiion as part of the national reform process, again giving UNDP entry points to support transparency and accountability. As the country reviews its systems and structures after the CPA and GoNU, UNDP should identify opportunities to engage more effectively. In addition, prior achievements should be strengthened and built upon to ensure greater impact of results.

(f) Crisis prevention and recovery

Continue to build the foundation for social cohesion and early recovery by targeting localised conflict between different communities and tribes through:

- (v) Engaging the communities and their traditional leaders to develop home-grown solutions to the conflicts;
- (vi) Engage State and local administration institutions early in the planning and implementation of projects to demonstrate in real time how the models work; and
- (vii) Improve access to public services and expand livelihood opportunities to reward and provide a peace dividend to successful communities and to motivate other communities to replicate.
- (viii) Strengthen support for addressing challenges of climate change.

Issues to address:

Based on the conflict-related development analysis (CDA) conducted in Nyala and the analysis made in section 3.2.4, the conflict between central government and the States is a political issue which requires policy-level interventions. However, at the local level, building social cohesion and community resilience to disaster risk can provide a solid basis for sustainable peace. The gains made through such community-based interventions can only be sustainable if there is a high sense of community ownership and support by the State and local administration system. In addition, in order to build community resilience to risk, livelihood opportunities should be closely linked to local market opportunities. The impact of desertification and climate change is a serious challenge for Sudan's development. These are the entry point for UNDP.

Recommendation # 2.

It is recommended that the CO should undertake a country analysis to identify programme priorities for the next CPAP 2013-2017.

Issues to address:

Based on the findings discussed in Section 2.4, North Sudan is essentially a new country with a different set of social dynamics and challenges. While the current programme areas continue to be relevant in the context of the National Strategic Plan 2012 – 2017, UNDP should undertake a mapping exercise to identify the areas in which it can add value relative to other development actors based on its comparative advantages. The country analysis should also help the CO to identify the flagship development objective around which to build and focus its interventions; for example, (i) social cohesion and inclusive development, or (ii) disaster risk management and community resilience.

Recommendation # 3.

It is recommended that the CO should develop and pilot a Capacity Development Strategy targeting one key line Ministry or Department to build its capacity including development of the mandate, institutional capacity and individual skills to operate as a change agent for government in its sector.

Issues to address:

Capacity development is one of the principles of UNDP programming, and in the context of Sudan where government and state level institutions have been affected by the long period of conflict; it is a key factor in recovery and sustainable development. The pilot interventions should target a department with a mandate for mainstreaming a cross-sectoral policy such as environment, HIV/AIDS or disaster risk management, to develop institutional capacity of the department as change agent across the government.

Recommendation # 4.

It is recommended that the CO should review the CPAP indicators, particularly the output indicators for which UNDP is accountable.

Issues to address:

As discussed in the analysis in Section 3.7, performance monitoring and reporting has been constrained by lack of effective performance indicators. The review should also address the linkage between activities, outputs and indicators to ensure that performance is appropriately focused on delivering expected results. In addition, the review should also examine the gaps in the national capacity for monitoring and tracking indicators with a view to harmonizing CPAP indicators with national indicators.

Recommendation # 5.

It is recommended that the CO should review and streamline its organizational structure with a view to increase efficiency gains in programme management and operations support.

Issues to address:

The current structure is based on thematic programme areas at the CO and area-based programming in the Field Offices. At present, programme areas have not made effective use of the operational capacity established in Field Offices, and some projects such as the GFATM, DDR and SDEP continue to have independent operations units, which duplicates functions and increases transaction costs for the CO.

Recommendation # 6.

It is recommended that the CO should develop and continuously implement a Learning and Knowledge Sharing Plan to develop a strong work ethic and team spirit.

Issues to address:

Based on the evaluator's observations and the discussion in section 3.4.2, there do not appear to be a culture of learning and knowledge-sharing in the CO. Although the CO has adopted some of the knowledge management tools such as Teamworks and social media, so far they are not effectively used for problem solving and decision-making. Creating a learning environment will strengthen results-based performance within the CO and also build a strong work ethic and team spirit.

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ANNEX 2: INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

UN AGENCIES			
1.	Aarons, N.	Assistant to RC/HC	UNRCO
2.	Achieng, S.	Project Officer	FAO (Darfur)
3.	Aden, A.	Head: Field Management Unit	UNDP
4.	Ahmed, A.	Judicial Affairs Officer	UNAMID Rule of Law
5.	Al-Qussari, M.	Community Policing Coordinator	UNMIS
6.	Behrelden, E.	Project Officer	UNDP R of L, S. Darfur
7.	Beris, Y.	Deputy Country Director	UNDP
8.	Bott, M.	CPR Project Coordinator (Darfur)	UNDP
9.	Bovey, R.	Programme Manager	UNEP
10.	Buzurukova, S.	Regional Programme Manager (East)	UNDP R of L
11.	Caldarone, C.	Country Director	UNDP
12.	Chacha, H.	Corrections Officer	UNAMID Rule of Law
13.	Charpentier, G.	DSRSG/RC/HC	UN Sudan
14.	Daldoum, M.	JP Youth Employment	FAO
15.	Elhag, A.	Senior Poverty Reduction Officer	UNDP
16.	Elgali, I.	Communication Specialist	UNDP/GFATM
17.	Elsheikh, F.	Head, Poverty Reduction Unit	UNDP
18.	Gadeh, A.	JP Youth Employment	UNESCO
19.	Ireg, M.	Reintegration Officer (DDR)	UNDP South Darfur
20.	Ishag, O.	Head, CPR Unit	UNDP
21.	Ismail, E.	Capacity Development Analyst (HIV/AIDS)	UNDP
22.	Kamara, M.	Project Manager	UNDP, Abyei
23.	Kilumbi, A.	Corrections Officer	UNAMID Rule of Law
24.	Kreuzer, F.	Assistant to Programme Manager	UNEP
25.	Kumar, T.	Head: Communications Unit	UNDP
26.	Lootsma, A.	Former Deputy Country Director	(now) UNDP Rwanda
27.	Marenge, D.	Corrections Officer	UNAMID Rule of Law
28.	Mohammad, A.	HIV/AIDS Officer	UNDP
29.	Mungai, L.	Corrections Officer	UNAMID Rule of Law
30.	Musa, E.	Reporting Officer	UNDP
31.	Musa, M.	Judicial Affairs Officer	UNAMID Rule of Law
32.	Mutwakil, H.	Programme Analyst, Environment	UNDP
33.	Noor, M.S.	Area Programme Coordinator	FAO S. Darfur
34.	Nugud, M.	Project Manager (South Darfur)	UN Habitat
35.	Prieto, L.	Assistant Programme Officer	UNHCR
36.	Rizk, S.	Peace & Development Advisor	UNDP
37.	Qusari, M.	Community Policing Coordinator	UNMIS Police
38.	Rukasha, C.	Head of Office	UNDP, Abyei
39.	Saeed, A.	Livelihood Project Officer	UNDP South Darfur
40.	Serumaga, A.	Head, Governance and Rule of Law	UNDP
41.	Sharma, S.	Reform & Restructuring Coordinator	UNMIS Police
42.	Sinada, S.K.	JP Youth Employment	UNIDO
43.	Suliman, E.	Rule of Law Officer	UNDP South Darfur
44.	Ugolo, J.	Judicial Affairs Officer	UNAMID
Government Counterparts			
45.	Abdalla, W.H.	Research officer	NPC
46.	Adod, I.A.	M&E Officer	MoFNE South Darfur

47.	Ahmed, A.H.	Director	MIC
48.	Almaged, R.	Research officer	Higher Council for Environment
49.	Ali, M.A.	Deputy Coordinator	NAPA
50.	Ali, S.	Project Officer	MIC/UNDP
51.	Bojaleh, A.	Research officer	NPC
52.	Elamin, N.		MIC
53.	Elgad, S.M.	Research Assistant	NPC
54.	Elgizonli, I.	Project Manager	Higher Council for Environment
55.	El-Sayed, K.	Research officer	NPC
56.	Eltahir, W.	Project Coordinator	NPC
57.	Gen. Elomda, T.	Director General	Humanitarian IDPs Commission
58.	Ibrahim, K.	Research Assistant	NPC
59.	Ishag, A.I.	Acting Chief Prosecutor	State Legal Admin. (S. Darfur)
60.	Mamadalla, H.	Senior Researcher	Higher Council for Environment
61.	Mohammed, K.A.	Acting Secretary-General	Higher Council for Environment
62.	Hassam, H.		MIC
63.	Hassan, R.A.	Mitigation Team Leader	Higher Council for Environment
64.	Mgzoub, T.	Legal Advisor	Council of States
65.	Nimir, M.B	Project Coordinator	NAPA
66.	Rahim, N.A.	Research Assistant	NPC
67.	Rahman, A.		MIC
68.	Saed, I.M.	Deputy Statistical officer	NPC
69.	Yousif, M.A.	Director of Social/Population Statistics	Central Bureau of Statistics
Civil Society Organisations			
70.	Abdaelnabi, M.A.	Dean	Nyala Technical College
71.	Ahmed, D.A.	Coordinator	SNAP (S. Darfur)
72.	Ali, M.H.	Coordinator	Humanity Organisation
73.	Elabdin, A.H.	Director	Humanity Organisation
74.	Hassan, E.	Paralegal member	Kalma IDP Camp (S. Darfur)
75.	Hashmi, A.	Co-founder	Mutawenat
76.	Ishag, A.H.	Paralegal member	Kalma IDP Camp (S. Darfur)
77.	Ismail, O.K.	Paralegal member	Kalma IDP Camp (S. Darfur)
78.	Mohamed, H.	Deputy Dean	Nyala Technical College
79.	Munsoor, A.	Dean	Faculty of Law (Nyala)

ANNEX 3: NORTHERN SUDAN MDGs AT A GLANCE

Goals	Targets	Indicators	Baseline(1990)	Status in 2004	Achievement		2015 Target
					Current Level	Reference Year	
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar-a-day	The proportion of the population below one dollar per day	-	64%	25%?	2009	32%
		The proportion of the population below the national poverty line	90% (1992)		46.5%	2009	23.2%
		Poverty Gap			16.2%	2009	
		Poverty Severity			7.8%	2009	
	Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people	Employment rate	89 % (1993)		83%	2008	
		Proportion of own-account in total employment(workers	41.1% (1993)		34%	2008	
		Proportion of contributing family workers in total employment(workers-family workers)	26% (1993)		22%	2008	
	Reduce by half, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age			31.8%	2006	
		Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption	-	-	28.0%	2009	
Achieve Universal primary education	Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling	Gross enrolment in basic education	57% (1990)	65.1%	71.1%	2009	100%
		Literacy rates of 15-24 year olds, women and men	27.1% (1990)	69% (2008)	77.5%	2009	100%
Promote gender equality and empower women	Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015	Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education			53.9 to 46.1%	2007	100%
		-secondary			51.6 to 49.4%	2007	100%
		-tertiary			54.1% females	2008	100%
		Share of women in employment in the non-agricultural sectors			59%	2008	100%
		Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament		9.7%	25%	2010	100%
Reduce child mortality	Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the mortality rate among children under five	Under five mortality rate	123 (1990)	102 (2006)	102	2008	41
		Infant mortality rate	80 (1990)		71	2006	53
		Proportion of one year old children immunized against measles	50% (2000)		85%	2009	
Improve maternal health	Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio	Maternal mortality ratio	537 (1990)		534	2006	134
		Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel	24% (1990)		57%	2006	
	Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health	Contraceptive prevalence rate (current use)	7.0% (2000)		7.6%	2006	
		Adolescent birth rate (12-14) years			76/1000	2008	
		Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four visits	70%(2000)		70%	2006	

Goals	Targets	Indicators	Baseline(1990)	Status in 2004	Achievement		2015 Target
					Current Level	Reference Year	
Combat HIV / AID, malaria and other diseases	Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24 years			0.5% males & 1.24% females	2009	
		Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS			4%	2006	
		HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24 years			0.5% for males and 1.24% (combined north & south)	2009	
	Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it	Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs			13.12%	2009	
	Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	Incidence and death rates associated with malaria	7.5 million 35,000 (2001)		3.1 million reported cases 8,844 death cases	2009	
		Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bed nets	21% (2005)		41%	2009	
		Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis			120		
		Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course			81.8%		
Ensure environmental sustainability	Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	Proportion of land area covered by forest		29.6(2004)	29.4%	2010	
		CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per \$1 GDP (PPP)	20.1 Gig (1995)		14.2 Gig	2010	
	Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss	Proportion of total water resources used			31.5%	2010	
	Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation	Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source	64% (1990)		65%	2009	82%
		Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility	33% (1990)		42%	2009	67%
Develop a global partnership for development	In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries	Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis			Public health sector (40% - 55%) & private sector (90%)	2009	
	In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications	Telephone lines per 100 population	2% population. (2005)		0.9 % of populations	2009	
		Cellular subscribers per 100 population	9% population (2005)		28 % of population	2009	
		Internet users per 100 population	8.2% Population (2009)	-	10.4 % of Population	2010	

Source: Sudan MDGs Progress Report 2010

ANNEX 4: ASSESSMENT OF CPAP INDICATORS

(A) POVERTY REDUCTION AND ACHIEVEMENT OF MDGs

Outcome/Output	Indicators	Comments
Outcome 1. Enhanced national and sub-national capacities to plan, monitor, evaluate, and implement the MDGs and related national development policies and priorities.	Change in allocation of state government budgets towards MDGs and pro-poor spending related activities, policies and priorities	The indicator is not a measure of “capacity”. A change in budget allocations towards pro-poor spending is desirable, but is not sufficient indicator for the outcome.
Output 1.1 MDG reports and National Human Development Report (NHDR) produced and disseminated to inform policy processes	Number of MDG reports and NHDRs produced	This is a good indicator, but a secondary indicator focusing on the quality of the reports would enhance its functionality.
Output 1.2 Strengthened aid management and coordination to implement Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	Database/analytical capacity for development aid coordination strategies and alignment to MDG-based national and sub-national development strategies in place and used.	Indicator should be unpacked so that it appropriately reflects what is being measured. a) Database in place b) Analytical capacity
Output 1.3 Policy and regulatory reforms for micro, small and medium scale enterprises strengthened and social and economic opportunities for poor and vulnerable groups broadened	Indicator1: No. of regulatory policy and reforms for micro, small and medium scale enterprises developed and implemented Indicator 2: Number of micro-entrepreneurs accessing microfinance and business development services disaggregated by gender.	The quantitative number of policies is not as important as the content of the policy. Indicator # 2 is useful.
Outcome 2. Improved impact of resources to fight HIV/AIDS	Percentage of eligible clients enrolled on ARV combination therapy disaggregated by gender.	-This would be appropriate as an output indicator. -The indicator should measure impact of resources in terms of reduction in prevalence of HIV and new cases, etc.
Output 2.1 Better delivery/usage of the GFATM funds for response to HIV/AIDS and other diseases.	Indicator1: No. of services delivery points (SDPs) providing counseling & testing in accordance with determined minimum standards, disaggregated by type of service provided Indicator 2: Number of Ministries with a functional HIV/AIDS unit and with strategic plans with budget for HIV/AIDS in place	-The number of SPDs by itself is not a sufficient indicator. This may need to be complemented with a qualitative indicator to measure the quality of services. -Indicator 2 is more appropriate aligned to the output. -The two indicators do not sufficiently measure all UNDP interventions, for example

(B) FOSTERING AND CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Outcome/Output	Indicators	Comments
Outcome 3. Institutions, systems and processes of democratic governance strengthened	Elections conducted and assessed as free and fair by domestic and international observers; Referendum conducted as per CPA Change in the level of political knowledge and understanding of political system among citizens disaggregated by gender	The indicator focuses on a single election event. Second indicator is very difficult to measure and may not produce consistent results over time.
Output 3.1. Support to free and fair elections and referenda based on international standards provided	Number of institutions, strategic planning, oversight, training, logistical support through the elections project, disaggregated by North and South Comprehensive civic and voter education programme developed and implemented	A quantitative indicator can not sufficiently measure this output. And the whole notion of measuring number of ‘logistical support’ or number of ‘oversight support’ is vague. This is not an indicator, but more of an activity or output.
Output 3.2. Capacities strengthened of national, sub-national and state assemblies	Number of national/sub-national legislative assemblies with capacities strengthened for standard parliamentary procedures and oversight functions	This quantitative indicator leads to oversimplifying the concept of capacity to mean only number of participants who attend training workshop
Output 3.3. Capacities strengthened of political parties, media and civil society including women to play their mandated roles in the democratic process	Number of diverse geographical and/or constituencies based political parties prepared to participate in democratic elections disaggregated by region % of supported media entities regularly reporting on electoral processes and % of supported governance-related CSOs engaged in civic and voter education	A quantitative indicator of “number of political parties” is inappropriate, because UNDP cannot determine the number of active political parties. A better indicator would be to measure the degree of ‘balanced and independent’ reporting by the media.
Outcome 4. National/sub-national, state or local levels of governance expand their capacities to manage equitable delivery of public services	% of citizens in target areas satisfied with public services Number or % of laws which seek to devolve power being implemented by the central government	No comment. The number of ‘laws’ is not as important as ‘what the law says’.
Output 4.1. Capacities developed of regional state and local governments to plan, budget and manage expenditure, accelerating progress towards MDGs	Number of states empowered to complete and implement locality strategic plans and urban management policies/frameworks	This is a good indicator, but an additional indicator on the quality of plans would enhance functionality.
Outcome 5. Rights upheld and protected through accountable, accessible and equitable Rule of Law institutions	% of citizens who know how to access justice systems and/or respond that they have confidence in the rule of law institution to provide effective and quality services disaggregated by gender and age	No comment.

Output 5.1. Capacities strengthened of Rule of law institutions	% of Rule of Law institutions assisted to provide quality legal services to population through infrastructural support and strategic and operational planning	No comment.
Output 5.2. Access to justice, particularly for vulnerable groups improved	Number of JCSs established and functioning; case tracking system for access to justice in target communities established	No comment.

(C) CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

Outcome/Output	Indicators	Comments
Outcome 6. Strengthened capacity of national, sub-national, state and local institutions and communities to manage the environment and natural disasters to reduce conflict over natural resources	Change in government commitments and resource allocations for the environmental and natural disaster management	Some of the results implied in the outcome cannot be measured by this indicator: - Community capacity to manage the environment and natural disasters - Reduction of conflict
Output 6. 1. National and sub-national, state and local institutions and communities capacities for effective environmental governance, natural resources management, conflict and disaster risk reduction enhanced	Natural resource management system for disaster, risk and conflict reduction available and operational	The term 'natural resource management system' is vague It may be useful to specify what exactly will be "available and operational" – policy or institution
Output 6.2. Socio-economic threat and risk mapping and analysis conducted by state governments to reduce conflict through prioritised planning and spending	Number of states covered with threat/risk mapping assessments Number or % of states integrating social threat/risk mapping recommendations endorsed, implemented and analysis used in planning and decision-making	These indicators are good.
Output 6.3. Comprehensive strategic frameworks developed at national and sub-national levels regarding environment and natural resource management	% of supported national and sub-national institutions adopting and implementing environment and natural resource management framework	Good indicator.
Outcome 7. Post-conflict socioeconomic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated	Change in human security of crisis-affected groups. National mine action management and technical expertise in place to address social economic impacts of mines end ERW.	The indicators need to be 'unpacked' "Change in human security" is vague
Output 7.1. National and sub-national capacities strengthened to manage the national mine action programme	National Mine Action Authority and South Sudan Demining Commission capacitated to implement their mandate and lead the mine action activities	The output and indicator sound to be the same thing expressed differently

	Number of national de-miners trained/equipped deployed for clearance of mine/ERW-affected areas	Second indicator is good.
Output 7.2. Reintegration of ex-combatants completed in accordance with the national DDR strategy with support of UNMIS	<p>Number of ex-combatants and associated groups, demobilized and reintegrated, disaggregated by age, gender and disability</p> <p>% of participants that report successful individual reintegration projects in client satisfaction surveys</p>	Good indicators.
Output 7.3. Proliferation and circulation of small arms reduced	<p>Number of state level community security and arms control action plans developed and implemented.</p> <p>Number of communities benefiting from CSAC activities</p>	<p>Should be more specific – e.g. number of States with CSAC plan</p> <p>Second indicator is vague – how do you measure "benefitting"?</p>
Output 7.4. Post-conflict recovery accelerated in strategic areas to ensure peace dividends are visible and tangible to conflict-affected populations	Number of recovery projects established and/or people benefiting including returnees and ex-IDPs from recovery and development initiatives through strengthening CBOs/CSO and Local Government Authorities	No comment.