# Table of Contents

List of Acronyms: ................................................................. 4  
Executive Summary: ............................................................. 6  
1. Introduction: ............................................................... 9  
  1.1 General context: ......................................................... 9  
  1.2 The Purpose of the evaluation report: ... 10  
  1.3 Objective: .............................................................. 11  
  1.4 Gauging of results: ..................................................... 11  
  1.5 Methodology: .......................................................... 12  
2. The Programme Environmental Context in the North: ................. 12  
  Governance and the Political context: ................................... 12  
  The Prevailing Security Situation: ....................................... 13  
  The Socio economic Context: ............................................ 14  
3. Progress towards achieving results of the crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) portfolio for the ongoing CPAP (2009-2012): ........................................... 14  
  3.1 Progress made in mine action, ...................................... 15  
  3.2 Progress made in DDR: ............................................... 17  
    3.2.1 Progress made in arms control and community security: ... 21  
  3.3 Progress made in reintegration of combatants: .................... 21  
  3.4 Progress made in livelihoods: ....................................... 22  
4. Cross-Cutting Issues: ..................................................... 26  
  4.1 Gender: .................................................................. 26  
  4.2 Partnership: ............................................................ 27  
5. Assessment of CPAP Outcome 7 Portfolio: ................................ 29  
  5.1 Relevance of Outcome 7 portfolio: ................................ 29  
  5.2 Effectiveness of Outcome 7 portfolio: ......................... 29  
  5.3 Efficiency of CPAP Outcome 7 portfolio: ....................... 30  
  5.4 Impact and sustainability of CPAP Outcome 7.................... 30  
6. Conclusions: .................................................................. 32
7. Recommendations .................................................................................................................................................. 34

7.1 DDR: .............................................................................................................................................................. 34

7.2 Demining: .......................................................................................................................................................... 35

7.3 Economic and social reintegration: .................................................................................................................. 35

7.4 Sustainable Livelihoods: .................................................................................................................................... 36

7.5 Capacity building: .............................................................................................................................................. 36

7.6 Gender: ............................................................................................................................................................. 36

7.7 Monitoring of results: .......................................................................................................................................... 36

Annexes: ................................................................................................................................................................. 38

Annex (A): The CPAP Result Framework

Annex (B) Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Mid-term Evaluation ................................................................. 38

Annex (C): The list of Informants .......................................................................................................................... 57

Annex (D): The list of Documents Consulted ......................................................................................................... 58
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNS</td>
<td>Blue Nile State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Common Country Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAC</td>
<td>Community Security and Arms Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>Emergency Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remittent of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESPA</td>
<td>Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internal Displaces Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRT</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGAs</td>
<td>Local Government Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDDRCC</td>
<td>National DDR Coordination Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMMA</td>
<td>National Mine Action Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMAC</td>
<td>National Mine Action Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/SSDDRC</td>
<td>North/South Sudan DDR Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PU</td>
<td>Planning Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Red Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROM</td>
<td>Reintegration Opportunity Mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDC</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Demining Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Term of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMID</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

- The CPA (2005) and the ESPA (2006) have ended decades of civil war and social unrest, however, conflict in Darfur created a new front of instability, which has engaged a number of peacemaking efforts over the past few years. Recent efforts culminated into the signature of a peace agreement framework for Darfur, albeit still awaiting its endorsement by the main two factions.

- In the mishmash of the events and in order to meet the rising challenges of implementing the CPA and addressing the pervasive human development deficits across the country, the UNDP Sudan programme has focused attention on three areas: (a) poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs; (b) democratic governance; and (c) crisis prevention and recovery.

- This evaluation comes as part of UNDP’s mid-term evaluation of its Country Action Programme (CPAP) (2009-2012), UNDP contracted a team to undertake an outcome evaluation of CPAP Outcome 7: Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated which falls under CPR initiative. Main components, namely DDR, Demining, social and economic reintegration, livelihoods and the cross-cutting issues.

- The timing of the implementation of the CPR programme coincided with a number of security and political events that commingled to directly affect the programming, implementation and attainment of the outcomes of the CPR portfolio.

- The purpose of the evaluation was to closely review, assess and record the progress made towards achieving the Crisis Prevention and Recovery component of the ongoing CPAP (2009-2012)”.

- The environment where CPR is being implemented is characterized by dynamic security, political, economic and social contexts. For instance, the break of violence in a number of hot spots, differences in opinion pertaining to the stipulations of the CPA and the repetitive international pressure have curtailed government capacity to reinstate a post conflict good governance.

- The sudden shift from a rather restrained national economy into an oil boom type has led to an increased consumption of imports rather than of domestic supply. Though investment in physical infrastructure was remarkably visible, albeit little was done in support of other important sectors of the economy namely, agriculture and industry.

- The CPAP results framework for outcome (7) provides the starting point for the evaluation, identifying desired results and indicators of success which guided project formation and implementation to date.

- The three core sub-programmes of CPR namely, Mine Action, DDR and Social and Economic Reintegration showed uneven progress towards achieving
planned outcomes.

- To construe, effective implementation of DDR is specifically affected by lack of resources, the inclusion of some non-combatants and the extended phase between the “DD” and the “R”.

- The Mine Action component witnessed visible progress in enhancing the national capacity to manage and technically deal with mines with the need to ameliorate social and economic impacts. To that effect, the outcome of UNDP capacity support programme remains to be instrumental in further catching above results. Government entities concerned that with additional minimal support, they would be able to sustain mine action activities.

- The DDR has some contribution regarding community security, perpetuation of peace building at the local level and enhancement of social integration with the communities of origin of the combatants. This is evident in areas where a group of real combatants returned back to their society and further being fully targeted by the “DD” and “R” programmes.

- The evaluation team did not come to a positively flat conclusion regarding circulation of small arms control (CSAC) and related community security outside the context of DDR. To the contrary, a number of small arms still rest with a number of informal combatants and community members who were presumably not targeted by the core DDR programme.

- The progress made so far towards enhancing livelihood opportunities and building social capital (from the inception of the programme until June 2011) is detected in a number of fronts: assessments, partners’ capacity building, training of beneficiaries and water supply. These components contribute to the macro-sectors outcome of capacity development and institutional strengthening, improved livelihoods and basic services.

- The overall assessment of the CPAP outcome (7) portfolio touched on its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Most of the activities have been implemented within a conflict context (some might not last for long), thus the essence of sustainability is centered on capacity building (institutions and individuals). For those projects where sustainability remains captive to the prevailing security situation, judgment on long-term durability is difficult to confirm. In the circumstances where security doesn’t factor in, sustainability could be guaranteed under productive capacity building programmes.

- The sense of ownership, an essential factor of sustainability, has been developed through establishment of effective partnership with the primary stakeholders.
• The gender dimension was well taken care of in planning of all CPR related programme components. There has been a noticeable progress in gender outcomes, albeit that was not well qualified by desegregated monitoring records both in type and geography indicating level of contribution as well as performance.

• It is imperative to note that the security-governance - recovery nexus proved to be an efficient mechanism of coordination of funds in post conflict situations, a tool to build stronger partnership and a fruitful way of strengthening the technical and institutional capacities of the government entities as well as the productive capacity of beneficiary groups.

• Under the new oil environment Sudan went into a massive expansion of its physical and social infrastructure. Albeit the era of oil has created dependency on a single commodity and completely neglected the non-oil sectors of the economy with the fear that this situation could hardly be sustained.

• The political challenge to steady growth and prosperity arises from Sudan’s legacy of persistent spatial disparity between the center and the periphery (World Bank, June 2009).

• The capacity building component of the outcome 7 portfolio has left behind a remarkable impact on the target institutions as well as community members. Most of the target individuals are now capable of running small business and other income generation activities. The emergence of such a rudimentary private entity would help perpetuate rural economies through local owns' investments and viable injection of rural credit.

• A set of findings and lessons learned were recorded. Along with that some recommendations were made on mine action, DDR, reintegration, sustainable livelihoods, gender, environment and monitoring and evaluation for further consideration mostly by UNDP, being a lead agency in CPR. In addition, the programme as a whole should be revisited in the new context: (beyond the CPA) to achieve desired outcomes.
1. Introduction:

1.1 General context:

In 2005, the Government of Sudan, led by National Congress Party (NCP), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ending the second phase of war between the North and the South. The agreement was concluded within the framework of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and supported by the regional grouping of East African States, and a Troika of countries (USA, UK & Norway). As a result, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) was formed at the national level (comprising members of NCP and SPLM) and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was formed in the South. In October 2006 the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) was signed between the government and the Eastern Front. Although these agreements ended decades of civil war and social unrest, conflict in Darfur created a new front of instability, which has engaged a number of peacemaking efforts over the past few years.

Sudan’s conflicts have generated mounting development and humanitarian challenges, undermining advances in human development. Against this background UNDP Sudan’s strategy reflects the findings of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2009-2012, and is detailed in the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for 2009-2012. The CPAP constitutes the legal agreement between UNDP and the Government of Sudan and details the programme design and capacity development strategies. UNDP in Sudan works on the basis of “one country – two systems”. The Country Office, located in Khartoum manages programmes both at the national and regional level, and collaborates closely with the UNDP Regional Office in Juba in Southern Sudan. UNDP has opened 18 sub-offices and project offices across the country, located in Eastern Sudan, Southern Sudan, the Three Protocol Areas and Darfur in order to keep development gear as close as possible to the periphery.

In response to the challenges of implementing the CPA and addressing the pervasive human development deficits across the country, the UNDP Sudan programme has focused attention on three areas: (a) poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs; (b) democratic governance; (c) crisis prevention and recovery.

As part of UNDP’s mid-term evaluation of its Country Action Programme (CPAP) (2009-2012), UNDP contracted a team to undertake an outcome evaluation of CPAP Outcome 7: Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated. This outcome falls under the Crisis Prevention
and Recovery Thematic area of the CPAP.

The CPAP follows and builds upon the Common Country Framework (CCF2) which covered 2001-2006 and an important Bridging Programme (2007-2009). An evaluation of these two programme periods was carried out in 2008 and its relevant conclusions and recommendations will be considered within this evaluation. Following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the SPLM/A and the NCP, which established the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), UNDP developed its programming on the basis of “one country – two systems”. An Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement was signed in 2006 that brought improved stability to that region. The conflict in Darfur has continued to create instability and undermines the potential and capacities for advancing recovery and development, despite repetitive efforts to contain the conflict and bring sustained peace to the region.

With the UNDP Country Office in Khartoum and in the context of the North UNDP opened satellite offices in some priority operational areas namely, in Eastern Sudan, Darfur, and the three Protocol Areas; Abyei, Kadugli and the Blue Nile. UNDP operates within a context of the peacekeeping mission which is mandated to look into unresolved internal political issues, social and economic tensions, security, human rights records, governance and the rule of law and daunting humanitarian and development challenges. It is worth noting that UNDP is running one of the largest complex programmes, worldwide, focusing on building the continuum from relief to recovery, running rehabilitation and development initiatives, restructuring governance and promoting technical and productive capacities.

The timing of the implementation of the CPR programme coincided with a number of events: (a) the escalation of violence in its target areas; (b) an uneven political terrain which led to differences in opinion between parties to the CPA; and (c) the security repercussions of the war in Darfur and the recent fighting in Kadugli that, all, commingled to directly affect the programming, implementation and outcomes of the CPR portfolio.

1.2 The purpose of the evaluation report:

Within UNDP planning to conduct a mid-term evaluation of its Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2012, an evaluation of CPAP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Portfolio was planned for May-June 2011. Specific reference was given to Outcome (7): Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure
restored, economy revived and employment generated. The evaluation was meant to closely review, assess and record the progress made towards achieving the Crisis Prevention and Recovery component of the ongoing CPAP (2009-2012)". As specific objectives, the evaluation would focus on the following:

- UNDP’s overall contribution to restoring infrastructure, economic revival, income generation and community security;
- Progress made in four thematic programmes areas of focus namely, Mine Action Capacity Development Programme; the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Portfolio; and
- Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) Programme.

In addition the evaluation was further requested to assess:

- Progress towards achieving objectives related to the cross-cutting issues of gender and capacity building; and
- The effectiveness of early recovery coordination in Sudan and how this has contributed to overall progress towards CPR objectives;

Moreover, in its findings and recommendations, the evaluation team is expected to reflect on the suitability of indicators and verification tools used to measure progress towards outcomes and outputs and some issues pertaining to the design and implementation that can inform future CPR programming. The scope of this report is limited to the progress made in DDR, Mine Action, reintegration, Livelihoods, small arms control and sustainability of the overall progress/achievements.

1.3 Gauging of results:
The CPAP results framework for outcome 7 (Annex A) provides the starting point for the evaluation, identifying desired results and indicators of success which guided project formation and implementation to date. The evaluation is expected to measure the suitability of the indicators in measuring the progress and achievements of the CPR programme.
1.5 Methodology:
The methodology pursued by the evaluation team was dictated by the nature of the assignment, the broad portfolio of CPAP and the accessibility to the project sites. Whereas CPAP is a national programme and encompasses a variety of projects, the evaluation approach had to include field visits to gather data from UNDP and partners through interviews. However, the main source of data remains to be the secondary data where the progress and review reports were the main references in addition to reports collated by other partners.

Central to the adopted methodology was the critical analysis of the available information and reports. This necessitated in-depth understanding of the CPAP through interviews with UNDP programme managers and reading the programme document together with understanding the external context where CPAP is being implemented.

The focus of the evaluation, as outlined in the TOR, is the assessment of the programme design and the main five aspects: Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Field visits made to Kassala and North Darfur States, while a trip to South Kordofan State was cancelled due to eruption of violence. At the desk level the following reports have been reviewed:

- Annual Progress Report 2009, Darfur Livelihoods Project;
- Annual Progress Report 2010, Darfur Livelihoods Project;
- UNDP: The RRP Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation (2009 – 2011);
- Reports on DDR;
- Reports on Mine Action;
- Sustainable livelihoods;
- DDR Client Satisfaction Survey;
- DDR review
- CPA related documents.

2. The Programme Environmental Context in the North:

2.1 Governance and the Political context:

The Mid-term review of the UNDP CPR programme was launched at times when the referendum on self-determination of South Sudan, being one of the most important stipulations of the CPA, was actually conducted and that the South finally opted to remain as a separate state neighboring the North. To that effect, the implementation of the CPA itself went into a series of conflicting interests of the
parties to the agreement; a typical to the situation when you have apparently one state, two systems and two commander separated armies.

The break of violence in a number of hot spots, failure to resolve some outstanding issues due to differences in opinion pertaining to the stipulations of the CPA and the repetitive international pressure have curtailed government capacity to reinstate a post conflict good governance; both in structure and practice.

Not the least to say, otherwise, much more efforts could have been exerted in strengthening service delivery; enforcing the rule of law; articulating a national conceptual framework for power and resource sharing among various states; enhancing the role of civil society organizations, including political parties; and ossifying the structure of various government institutions. Finally promotion of the federal system remains captive to lack of resources which were grossly siphoned for bailing out some perpetual conflicts, weak institutional setting of the government apparatus and rudimentary capacity to deliver as sanctioned by respective organizational mandates.

2.2 The Prevailing Security Situation:

Since the break of the first post-independence civil war in 1955 there was a continued period of unrest, over two million people died, four millions remained as displaced and more than 600,000 were expelled as refugees in the diaspora. The short lived Addis Ababa Agreement (1972) only culminated into temporary peace and tranquility which was followed by a violent break of war in 1983.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005, brought peace to the country, yet with frequent security skirmishes, particularly in the North-South buffer zones. Recently there was flair of war in Abyei which is covered by a separate CPA protocol. The Appendix of this protocol has some important provisions relating to wealth and political power sharing in Southern Kordofan. To sustain peace and enhance development “Popular Consultations” about the implementation of the CPA will be held subsequent to the last elections conducted in April 2011. Based on the results of the due consultations, the legislature will negotiate with the national government views to rectify shortcomings found in the CPA implementation. Undoubtedly, this will enlist more development challenges that should be pursued for the general welfare of the people. In this context, the suddenly irrupted break of violence in South Kordofan has interrupted the very recent efforts to reset governance in the state, including the launching of “Popular Consultation due shortly then. In addition, to the dismay of many observers, the recent deterioration in the security situation in Southern Kordofan, including Abyei, has constrained on-going efforts to address issues pertaining to DDR, de-
mining and social reintegration of combatants. The unique security situation flashed by the events would definitely curtail efforts intended for rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure; pursue plans for rural development; ascertain devolution of power; strengthen service delivery; and promote the rule of law as a prerequisite for social order, equity, peace and mutual respect.

Conclusively, the present fragile security situation in many geographical areas of the country and related violence will keep the north - south relations at constant turmoil and the intra south potential conflict, if not early nursed, will undoubtedly spill over the north and revert the current path of reconstruction and development into a persistent state of displacement and hence a quick revert to a constant delivery of emergency assistance. It is worth noting that the recent state of violence in South Kordofan had turned the once witnessed good working relations between both government partners into an environment of animosity that would take sometimes before it could be effectively curbed.

2.3 The Socio economic Context:

It was accepted over decades that uneven distribution of wealth and less inclusive development among various states remained the most important factors that triggered the long unabated potential conflict between the north and the South and the North and the west (Darfur). The sudden shift from a rather restrained national economy into an oil boom type has led to an increased consumption of imports rather than of domestic supply. Though investment in physical infrastructure was remarkably visible, albeit little was done in support of other important sectors of the economy namely, agriculture and industry. Since then, agricultures’ share of GDP in the economy has declined, rural incomes have decreased and poverty in rural areas may have intensified (World Bank, June 2009). Fewer incentives from agriculture have encouraged many farmers to move to the urban centers, adding much to an already constrained labour market, weak service sector and a devastating urban poverty. The on-going government efforts to enhance employment, both through the public sector as well as micro financing in support of self-employment, failed to effectively bail out the situation.


The three core sub-programmes of CPAP outcome (7) namely, Mine Action, DDR and Social and Economic Reintegration showed uneven progress towards achieving planned outcomes. Such judgment relates to a multiple of factors
pertaining to capacities, prevailing security over certain geographical areas and funding limitations. To construe, effective implementation of DDR is specifically affected by lack of resources, the inclusion of some non-combatants and the extended phase between the “DD” and the “R”. Of utmost importance, is lack of fundamental enabling environment relating to the inappropriate consumption of a number of political commitments stipulated under the CPA. For example, nothing was done to put the security sector reform into an operational perspective.

The mine action component witnessed visible progress in covering some priority areas relating to sustainable livelihoods namely, agriculture, pastoral and income generation (mostly trade) as well as reduction of causalities and hence improvement in human security. Nevertheless, mine victims were not effectively rehabilitated in terms of exploring possible economic opportunities. Moreover, the cost involved in running the demining programme remains a limiting factor for its conclusion. Though the Government acquired some capacities in future running of the programme, some capacities in comprehensive planning and priority setting still need to be enhanced.

3.1 Progress made in mine action:

A prolonged North-South conflict which remained unabated for decades, the war in the East and the conflict in Darfur, all, littered many areas with landmines. As such, these fatal products have curtailed efforts for rehabilitation and development, posed serious threats to human security, impeded smooth transportation within affected areas, restricted movements of pastoralists and their access to watering places and kept vast areas out of reach of traditional farmers. Clearing of land mines is then regarded as a prerequisite for implementation of recovery and post conflict rehabilitation and Development initiatives and further enabling commencement of safe relief operations.

The core UNDP intervention is the Khartoum based Mine Action Capacity Development project with the objectives to: (a) threats to human security caused by landmines and small arms reduced; and (b) the crisis affected groups returned and reintegrated. The Project has four specific outputs:

- Output (1): Institutional and management capacity of NMAA, NMAC, NSDC developed/strengthened to conduct business according to the international standards;
- Output (2): Mine clearance quality of the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDUs) developed;
• Output (3): Linking between mine action and broader recovery and development processes and initiatives enhances; and

• Output (4): Sudan assisted to meet its obligations under the Mine Ban Convention and other relevant treaties.

The grand success indicator is to enhance national capacity to manage and technically deal with mines with the need to ameliorate social and economic impacts. To that effect, the evaluation team came across a main finding that the UNDP capacity support programme remains to be instrumental in further catching above outputs. Across the board it was ascertained to the evaluation team that the role played by UNDP, through the capacity support project, was adequate.

Moreover, in terms of capacity the contribution made by UNDP was remarkable in building technical knowledge of concerned NMAA, NMAC staff, both in mine clearance and at the functional level. In this context, national authorities were capacitated to manage and lead the mine action coordination activities and that the technical quality of the programme has effectively improved.

Secondly, the outcomes of the mine action programme were indicatively positive in many ways. In the first place, the fact that many areas were just littered with mines remains to be forfeited by areas being credibly delineated, in terms of human security, as dangerous, suspected hazard areas and typical mine fields. Such clarity would help the government to set priority areas of focus. In terms of human security it is evident about 0.5 million people benefited in some way or another, where causalities were reduced due both to demining and awareness raising; restricted movements throughout many areas was lifted; access to water points, agricultural and pastoral lands improved; and cross border trade with Eritrea was significantly enhanced. In some areas while 50% of the mine infested areas were cleared, human security in other locations still at the red tape; especially taking into consideration the scattered nature of mine within various fields such as those in the East. In this new front, achievements could have been made, in the event resources were being made available to continue the demining programme.

Thirdly, linking demining to post conflict recovery activities can be invariably judged in many ways; be that in technical or geographical contexts. For example, in the East, it is evident that demining is clearly giving space to recovery and rehabilitation activities, particularly those focusing on food security, animal production and regional trade. Taking demining as security and development
challenge, the state government expressed some satisfaction that the areas freed from mines would avail potential land resources that could further facilitate the implementation of food security component of their up-coming 5-year strategic development plans to be orchestrated, in due course, at the level of each governorate.

Fourthly, nothing is more appropriate than effective demining giving opportunities for water harvesting and spreading and establishment of micro catchments that facilitate small scale irrigated agricultural production, improvement of pastoral land and spatial settlements. Not only that, but also the improved water management practices would allow testing some adaptation techniques to climate change that resulted in the failure of many traditional production systems.

Fifthly, it is evident in the East that due to the restricted use of land resource because of mines, clearance of more land has visibly led to the revival of local economies and reduction of poverty through income generation activities and regional trade.

3.2 Progress made in DDR:

The evolution of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in the past twenty years into a detailed doctrine has been the subject of intense analysis and debate. The three components are largely considered to be sequential, although there is increasing fluidity around the order and overlapping nature of the components. There is also a growing shift at the conceptual level to recognize the overtly political nature of DDR, questioning the largely technical status assigned in peace processes and related security matters (Richard Barltrop, November 2, 2008). In addition, Barltrop indicated that from an operational perspective DDR, especially reintegration, usually faces multifarious challenges in fragile post war context, that is:

- Complex coordination problems;
- An absence of reliable baseline data;
- Under or delayed funding;
- Omission of some armed actors;
- Policy limitations;
- Emphasis on short term disarmament; and
- A tendency to neglect substantive reintegration measures.
Though not always forthcoming, the political and financial commitment of the recovering country is just vital in facilitating the DDR programme and ensuring its final success.

Subsequent to the adoption of the CPA, the security concept in support of DDR was unclear and that there was disconnect between the political entities and the technical core of the programme. Within the context of Northern Sudan, DDR programme was designed as a unitary national model, based on a single design concept used simultaneously in the North and in Southern Sudan. The model focused on individual support packages to the eligible beneficiary group, under Sudanese leadership, but delivered by the UNDP and its Implementing Partners using the DEX modality. A National DDR Coordinating Council (NDDRCC) was established in 2007 with responsibility for policy formulation, coordination and oversight. DDR Commissions were created in the North and Southern Sudan with responsibility for implementation and management, to be supported by State level offices. Within this structure, decision-making on key policy, design and funding issues rested in the national structure. The UNDP’s internal management framework reflected the same national framework with overall management responsibility lies in Khartoum. As such, the institutional structure appears to be adequate and less cumbersome to manage provided that division of labour is clear and a robust coordination framework is enacted. To that effect the Evaluation Team was satisfied with the institutional architect of the DDR programme.

From an operational perspective, DDR was identified as an integral part of the CPA and further formulated with the objective to bring sustained days of comprehensive peace and tranquility within a relatively fragmented society characterized by proliferations of small arms and broad spectrum military groups. In essence, the CPA has been anticipated to avail a secured, politically stable and a distinctly defined socio economic environment under which the DDR programme would presumably function. Due to a set of factors that impeded smooth implementation of the CPA, such environment was difficult to verify, though DDR scored some distinct progress in a number of fronts. Though in areas like the East the cause of conflict might be solely of an economic nature which is defined by what is known literally as “marginalization”, yet the dynamics of DDR appeared to be of the same nature.

At the onset, of the main findings that the knowledge about the DDR programme is precarious over many target areas. A number of beneficiaries indicated little or no knowledge about DDR prior to its commencement. This apparently relates to the
inadequacy of building the pre-programme enabling environment, particularly relating to early sensitization at the local level, aggressive advocacy and psychological preparedness. However, decision making on reintegration options and training component of the reintegration support appeared to be well worked out.

As with regards to the real beneficiaries, there was a debate among some parties to the DDR programme that one of the most important observations is that: “there is an ambiguity regarding the selection and the final authentication of the combatants for further reintegration”. To this effect, there was a feeling that some of the beneficiaries are not true “arms holders/combatants” and hence their inclusion does neither serve the community security objective nor recession of local conflicts.

While the verification process only labeled with some minor criticism, however the fact that UNDP was not part of the verification exercise cannot be logically justified; knowing that UNDP is the custodian of the reintegration component of the DDR intervention and hence getting early contact with the beneficiaries is vital.

Undoubtedly, a major finding is that DDR has some visible contribution regarding community security, perpetuation of peace at the local level and enhancement of social integration with the communities of origin of the combatants. This is evident in areas where a group of real combatants being fully targeted by the “DD” and “R” programmes. It was confirmed that many combatants get engaged in alternate livelihoods and that non-recurrence to guns was ascertained by some people. The gap between the “DD” and the “R” is detrimental to the success of the reintegration programme. Sometimes, delay in reintegration normally forces combatants to lose confidence in the DDR programme and henceforth, the likelihood of recurrence to weaponry was documented in similar programmes elsewhere (Afghanistan).

The evaluation team found that a number of officials indicated that the gap between the “RR” and the “D” was unnecessarily prolonged with some combatants clearly losing confidence in the viability of the DDR programme.

The DDR in North Darfur State is at the preparation stage for demobilization and reintegration. So, it is too early to assess the progress made so far to achieve its desired objectives. However, the UNDP/DDR has developed the following clear objectives:

• Updating of the project document;
• Building capacity of Government DDR Commission; and
• Public information and sensitization of community and local government on what DDR and community security mean.

The focus on building the capacities of the relevant institutions at State level as a strategy to ensure success of project implementation, achievement of objectives and sustainability of the intended impact is an appropriate strategy; taking stock and learning lessons from past experience elsewhere.

Besides the above programmatic objectives the UNDDR is willing to contribute to one-UN, yet it is hindered by territorial culture that exist among the UN agencies regarding information sharing on the set of the UN programmes that contribute to CPAP. Furthermore, the DDR Coordinator believes that there is no sufficient or effective involvement of senior field staff members in the decision-making process. However, there is a good coordination with UNAMID DDR. In future UNAMID will assist the Government in demobilization and (if agreed on division of labour) and UNDP will lead on reintegration. The DDRC at State level is promising, but the FDDR is very bureaucratic. At the planning level the DDR in North Darfur targets 20,000 ex-combatants (Out of 90,000 in CPA areas of the North) and is thinking of ensuring relevance to community needs and deriving lessons from previous experiences in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. There is a plan for conducting a market survey which is required in order to identify new skills for training (such as compressed bricks making). Furthermore, a consultant will also be hired to conduct reintegration opportunity mapping and explore new opportunities (economic, education …etc).

Although the adopted plan seems to be realistic, the targeted number of ex-combatants is likely unrealistic, since it might not be possible to train 20,000 ex-combatants in one State, given the operational capacities of the DDRC and other partners. The plan adequately considers the two cross-cutting issues of CPAP, the gender equity and capacity building, albeit is short of any environmental perspective. To make sure they are satisfactorily addressed, the DDR is recruiting Gender Advisor but, meanwhile, they coordinating with UNAMID Gender Advisor. It is worth noting that UNAMID is heavily involved in community security project.
3.2.1 Progress made in small arms control and community security:
The evaluation team did not come to a positively flat conclusion regarding circulation and/or small arms control (CSAC) in relation to community security outside the context of DDR.

To the contrary, a number of small arms still rest in the hands of some informal combatants and other community members who were not presumably targets of the core DDR programme. The issue of the reduction of the small arms would better be addressed by basic stipulations and management actions pertinent to the planned security sector reform which did not commence, despite the readiness of UNDP in providing support to policy development. The Ministry of Interior could have taken that as a unique opportunity to articulate a radical policy on small arms control. In this regard, achievements made by the DDR; and the small arms knowledge, attitude, practice and awareness on control could provide an appropriate environment for the implementation of the security sector reform and further maintenance of law and order. Though not having a national coverage, awareness efforts on small arms control were useful in triggering the interest of local communities regarding their focus on security dimension. For example, initiatives like CSAC stakeholders’ workshop and pilot community security activities are good tools in support of additional efforts intended to maintain community security. In this regard, an important finding is that much ground work within the DDR programme has been done in favor of pushing the security sector reform initiative; albeit that opportunity was not grasped by the government to further enhances the objective of community security.

3.3 Progress made in reintegration of combatants:
Reintegration is the last in the tripartite sequence of the DDR programme, where progress made in community security and socio-economic wellbeing of beneficiaries remain as primary objective indicators. Effective verification process, career counseling, reintegration opportunity mapping (ROM), labour market survey, assessment of combatants’ profiles and close analysis of the market functions are prerequisites for effective reintegration.

It is imperative to learn that the above pre-programme context has been largely met. The mission found that, within the DDR conceptual framework and in-built programme, that the focus for reintegration was not only made on ex-combatants, but went further to include small scale farmers, women, youth, vulnerable
communities and special groups. Such a wider coverage was appropriate in catalyzing the social stability process in target areas. At most, agriculture, livestock production, small business and vocational training are opportunities for socio-economic reintegration and building of a solid base for future development endeavors.

The evaluation team noted that before embarking on reintegration priority programming, emphasis should be given to building a solid reinsertion-reintegration continuum; known as the adjustment phase. During this phase carefully screened combatants and properly identified community beneficiaries, as stated hereto above, should be identified/listed as reintegration core group for follow up reintegration phase. This would eventually create early social harmony among community groups “a priori” to any integration attempts.

3.4 Progress made in livelihoods:

| Target by 2012: Improve livelihoods of 1,200,000 Sudanese nationals, by increasing agricultural and livelihood productivity, stimulating economic activity and contributing to improvement in health and quality of life. Expected outcomes to cover three macro-sectors of Capacity Development and Institutional Strengthening; Improved Livelihoods; and Support to Basic Services. |

The livelihoods and economic recovery programme was developed in response to a miserably complex situation in Darfur as explained by the UNDP Review Report, March 2010, as the deteriorating situation in Darfur towards 2008 led to the design and development of this programme. The conflict was escalating, the numbers of IDPs skyrocketing and coping strategies in general were failed to adjust the population. This is further compounded by the international community being engrossed in humanitarian assistance creating dependency and disempowerment of millions of people affected by the conflict”.

The CPAP was designed to address the medium and long term socio-economic problems. Since no individual organization can shoulder this recovery responsibility, CPAP emphasized the synergy of all interventions of its areas of focus be guided by one-UN approach. However, on the ground the practice faced so many internal and external challenges. Internally, for instance, the implementation was affected by the slow procurement procedures, the inadequate information sharing and the tendency among UN agencies to work separately. The
last two points being described by one of our interviewees as lack of culture of information sharing. However, it is the conviction of the evaluation team that in terms of the programme planning, design and the division of labour the UN team worked coherently together.

On the other hand, external limitations were manifested by the insufficiency of funding and reluctance of donors and their changing priorities, the protracted insecurity in Darfur and instability in other CPAP (outcome 7) areas. Henceforth, the geographical coverage of livelihood interventions was limited to safe and accessible areas. These include the IDP camps in urban centers and some villages in the surroundings. Whatsoever the case, the geographical focus is an advantage if not a pre-requisite for tangible and sustainable impact. The confined project spatial boundaries, also, help in conducting a comprehensive baseline survey. However, due to lack of funds and insecurity the UNDP derived livelihoods baseline indicators from secondary sources, which could be better in the event a holistic approach was based on primary sources of data. These two major factors not only hindered carrying out of a comprehensive baseline survey, but also acted as an obstacle against implementation of livelihoods activities. Under such circumstances scaling up of livelihoods programme is still possible in quantitative and qualitative terms, nevertheless, will be constrained by various uncertainties such as marketing difficulties and limited capacities of training centers. The UNDP attempts to overcome these problems is to develop a comprehensive recovery strategy to make a shift from humanitarian assistance into self-reliance. In Kassala, for example, the livelihoods programme focuses on agriculture, microfinance and vocational training; while in South Kordofan the project aims at developing a longer term recovery strategy taking full consideration of the nature of the conflict in the area.

In light of the above, the progress made so far towards enhancing livelihood opportunities and building social capital (from the inception of the programme until June 2011) is detected in a number of fronts. At the onset, the livelihood interventions covered assessments, partners’ capacity building, training of beneficiaries and water supply. These components contributed to the outcomes of the macro-sectors pertaining to capacity development, institutional strengthening, improved livelihoods and basic social services.
The total number of beneficiaries at the time of conducting this midterm evaluation is 1126 in Darfur, while exact numbers are not available for Kassala and South Kordofan. These numbers included women, youth and government officials under two main categories: deprived rural poor and IDPs.

The idea of Early Response (ER) is an appropriate initiative because it links conventional emergency interventions to recovery and development processes. Thus it could be considered as a factor of sustainability if well-articulated to other humanitarian and development interventions.

A similar trend was pursued before by Save the Children Sweden where they ran education projects for displaced children against the traditional emergency relief (ER) that focuses on distribution of food and non-food items. Looking into that experience may enrich the ongoing debate and help reach good conclusions. The evaluation team believes that the capacity building and most of the income generation activities perfectly fit into the ER.

One important development is the establishment of the Livelihoods and Natural Resources Management Network bringing CBOs, NGOs and GOS partners working on livelihoods together in order to enhance knowledge and Information sharing, including dissemination of best practices. The Sudanese Environmental Conservation Society (SECS) is designated as the national focal point managing the forum website in Darfur and Kassala. For technical enhancement a link was established with Eastern Sudan Research Group, which is presently engaged with Bergin University on similar issues. Here, attention should be given to the fact that how to communicate and use the information rather than just getting access to information. This principle is substantial in using information technology for development purposes. The successful design of a web-based knowledge sharing platform on livelihoods and natural resources management is a big step forward, yet it needs to be online.

Another key development is the Value Chain Analysis to enhance improvement of harvest and handling and packing of goods and products, but no resources have yet been put for this important activity. On providing support to partners there is a potential for building the capacity of NGOs and CBOs engaged in sustainable livelihoods, both software and hardware. Assessment of capacities of local NGOs (67 NGOs) was, also, a good start, however, the subsequent institutional capacity building is not sufficient as reported by all interviewed partners. More capacity
support is desperately needed for them to effectively participate in recovery and economic revival. Preliminary capacity matrix was developed with TOR being finalized, but waiting for actual launching of capacity building programme.

For further enforcement of productive vocational skills a Vocational Training Council was established with the livelihoods project to be designated as a secretariat for the council. The vocational training and job creation is the strongest part of CPAP portfolio. What is really impressive about vocational training is the new initiatives of marketable skills. The UNDP moved away from ad hoc replication of the traditional ideas more towards an innovative approach. Some good examples include the training of IDP youths on mobile phone maintenance, training of youth on satellite installation and training on car driving. The drawback about this is that the number of beneficiaries is increasing while chances to get employed are decreasing due to the competitive market opportunity. As a result of that, for example, in Darfur the initial number was 928 in 2009 and went down to 783 in 2010.

The aforementioned achievements in the livelihoods component have complemented the RRP livelihood component. The overall objective of the RRP was to “reduce poverty and increase food security amongst conflict affected rural households, especially including IDPs across Sudan”. This was planned to be achieved through capacity building of Local Government Authorities (LGAs) and active community involvement and emphasis on self-reliance and community ownership. The RRP covered 10 States namely, 4 in the South, 4 in the North and 2 transitional areas. Three of the northern States are currently covered by other CPAP components. So, there are thematic and geographical intersections between different CPAP components. That is why the design and implementation of the successive livelihood activities of other CPAP components benefited from the RRP experience. The most important complementarities between CPAP livelihood components is that all were designed to address post-conflict recovery needs and both have achieved a positive change of the mindset of the local communities and Local Government Authorities. On the other hand, new more appropriate initiatives for income generation activities have been introduced (driving, mobile maintenance and TV/receiver installation), and more emphasis was put on institutional capacity building. Consequently, the impact is more tangible as
concluded by this assessment. Furthermore, capacity building component covered all levels of State governance while former efforts were confined to LGAs only.

This has basically drawn the attention to the fact that technical assistance for rural development in general and improvement of livelihoods in particular, under post conflict situation, should address the contextual changes in technology, environment, security, development politics, community governance and microfinance.

Another programme that used as a platform for CPAP in one of the three protocol areas is Abyei Area Post-conflict Recovery and Development Programme. One of Outcome (7) subcomponents which reads: “Post-conflict recovery accelerated in strategic areas to ensure peace dividends are visible and tangible to conflict affected populations”. This is exactly conforming to the objective of Abyei Area Recovery Programme. Outcome (7) not only complements Abyei Recovery Programme, but also accelerates the recovery process although it is a national programme. It is worth mentioning that the continuous instability in Abyei Area and the armed conflict between the SAF and SPLA have abolished the achievements and reversed the recovery process. However, field visit for conducting/confirming such assessment is not possible.

4. **Cross-Cutting Issues:**

4.1 **Gender:**

The gender dimension was well taken care of in planning of all CPR related programme components. There has been a noticeable progress in gender outcomes, albeit that was not well qualified by desegregated monitoring records both in type and geography regarding the level of contribution as well as performance. While the features of the gender dimension is crystal clear in all sub-components of CPR programme, albeit one consolidated assessment for the entire CPR was not monitored and subsequently recorded. Nevertheless, the evaluation team came to the following findings:

- UNDP has a well-articulated gender strategy that informs all recovery, rehabilitation and development initiatives;
- All projects have a gender component vested into them, particularly emphasizing outputs and outcomes, being visible clear in reintegration projects; and
In Darfur, UNAMID Gender Advisor is taking a distinct lead role in ensuring the gender dimension of development projects.

At the implementation level outcome (7) achieved over 20% female beneficiaries and participation. This is still half way to the target which is 40%.

4.2 Partnership:
Partnership is central to the CPR implementation strategy due to the complexity of the programme and the immense beneficiary needs that warrant the importance of pulling all materials, financial and human resource together. Striving to reinstate effective partnership, UNDP managed to involve appropriate key actors in the CPAP outcome (7) implementation process. This goes online with UNDP’s Partnership Strategy that states ‘UNDP will continue to build on its partnership with the Government at all levels, with international organizations, donors, civil society, and the relevant organizations of the United Nations system such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women, United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and United Nations Volunteers (UNV). Partnership modalities are clearly stated in the Partnership Strategy, they include joint programming based on the “One UN” principle, collaborative technical assistance, achievement of synergies, using limited UNDP core resources as seed money to leverage pooled funding mechanisms and overall coordination. However, progress against each modality differs from the other according to the ruling factors.

In the above context, the evaluation team reviewed the essence of partnership within the CPR portfolio, particularly referring to DDR, Mine Action and Sustainable livelihoods. For instance, there is still a long way to go to fulfill the “One UN Principle” at coordination and implementation levels. The achievement of synergies is seen by the evaluation team as satisfactory, yet there is always a room for improvement. At the implementation level of the three CRP core sub-programmes, UNDP has managed to effectively bring in convoke of implementing partners (UN agencies, NGOs, CBOs, government entities. However, the evaluation team observed that the main problem with the Civil Society partners is the limited institutional capacity building and little amount of grants given to them to implement livelihood or IGAs where no grant exceeded US$15,000. This maybe the reason why only a little number of local implementing partners was engaged
though the initial capacity assessment exercise identified a big number (up to 57) of potential CSOs in each State.

At the planning level a strong link was created with the GOS and main UN partners nationwide throughout the CPR sub-programmes.

For example, in North Darfur the Planning Unit coordinates new initiatives between all concerned parties. The two parties (UNDP and PU) agreed upon coordination mechanism, but the implementation was not successful due to lack of an appropriate mechanism and poor perusal of the idea by concerned parties. However, the coordination of the Livelihoods Project started from the initial stages by organizing a coordination workshop in September 2008 in an ample time before implementation commences. It was not only early preparation, but also participatory in nature where all relevant governmental departments participated in prioritization of interventions. It is also observed that the nature of the DDR and mine action programmes warranted the presence of a limited number of specialized partners; whereas for the reintegration there is always a spatial room for many partners.

For resource mobilization, UNDP is determinant to create a stronger partnership with multilateral funding sources. Moreover, the partnership strategy, also, includes tapping on internal and regional resources in order to maintain a sustainable flow of funding. However, to enhance the technical capacity of the NGOs implementing partner, especially the national ones, UNDP has to endeavor to provide such support. The evaluation team didn’t observe well established regular UNDP – NGOs forum for solid coordination and to continuously dwell on programme implementation, monitoring and management issues.

4.3 Project Design:

It is apparent that the design of the Mine Action, DDR and livelihood project documents were influenced by the nature of these programmes where the Government and the UNDP are the key stakeholders leading a number of other partners. Principally there was a focus on the situation analysis, implementation strategy and monitoring and evaluation. The descriptive part of the project is not as strong as the other parts of the document. It mentions the targets, but it did not follow the standard format where the overall objective, specific objectives and expected outputs are SMARTLY phrased. For that matter the monitoring and
evaluation section would not appear to be strong without SMART description of the objective hierarchy. It is also observed that the logical framework and the work plan are not attached to the project document.

5. Assessment of CPAP Outcome (7) Portfolio:

5.1 Relevance of Outcome (7) portfolio:
Following the footprints of the CPR conceptual framework, the design of the intended programme is logical, coherent and its various components are complementary by nature and design (DDR, Demining and Reintegration). However, based on the magnitude of the problem, the geographical coverage of the CPR portfolio appears to be limited. Though the evaluation team noticed clear indications towards achievement of outcome (7); a magnitude of an accelerated change remains to be hindered by the limited geographical coverage.

The primary stakeholders have all confirmed their perception of CPAP as relevant to and complementing strategic plans at national and state levels. (National Council for Strategic Planning Five Year Plan (2007-2011); North Darfur State Strategic Five Year Plans (2007-2011, 2012-2016) and Kassala State Strategic Plan). All, more or less, agree on result areas, objectives and targets. However, some partners argued that capacity building activities are relevant to the scope, but not to the priorities. They mean that they are relevant to needs of the targeted communities.

The cross-checking of this argument indicated that it doesn’t hold across the board. It was interesting to know that partnership with UNDP shifted the focus of the W&D and PB Network from the urban areas to rural areas. This fact denotes the relevance to the MDGs and other similar frameworks.

5.2 Effectiveness of Outcome 7 portfolio:
From a planning perspective, closer coordination and pre-implementation arrangements of CPAP outcome 7, the evaluation team formed a positive impression. However, field based teams indicated centralization and conclusion of a number of operational at headquarter led to slippage in meeting some planned targets. Delays pertaining to centralization of procurement and logistic procedures have been overcome by direct use of local implementing partners, being faster and
less bureaucratic. Local partners have also contributed to the cost effectiveness of the implementation of CPAP. In putting the above issues upfront, it could be mentioned that the effectiveness of implementation of CPAP has been to some extent affected negatively by the UN bureaucracies and positively by the less bureaucratic local partners.

The recovery and development initiatives have covered the targeted 10 States and benefited an average of 60% (excluding RRP) of targeted beneficiaries. The gender balance has been relatively maintained and in 2010 reached an average of 20%.

5.3 Efficiency of CPAP Outcome (7) portfolio:
Assessment of efficiency of CPAP implementation requires review and in-depth analysis of the human resource, procurement and logistics documentation. Since these were not available for the evaluation team judgment had to be derived from the views of the interviewees and the figures mentioned in the reports. Undoubtedly the efficiency of CPAP implementation has been negatively affected by the centralization of admin support (procurement, logistics and human resource). The longer the delivery of goods and services to the field takes, the lower is the efficiency rate.

5.4 Impact and sustainability of CPAP Outcome (7):
Most of the activities of CPAP outcome 7 have been implemented within a conflict context (some might not last for long), thus the essence of sustainability is centered on capacity building (institutions and individuals). For those projects where sustainability remains captive to the prevailing security situation, judgment on long-term durability is difficult to confirm. In the circumstances where security doesn’t factor in, sustainability could be guaranteed under productive capacity building programmes. The sense of ownership, an essential factor of sustainability, has been developed through establishment of effective partnership with the primary stakeholders. Another factor that enhances sustainability is the built-in mechanism of capacity building and income generating activities. In this context, agriculture, livestock and income generation programmes stand a good chance for sustainability as compared to the small business oriented programmes where the working capital could often be eroded by a number of changing economic factors. Conclusively, the evaluation team observed that the
comprehensive preparatory work for sustainable livelihoods and the reintegration programmes, with the groundwork been done, so far, and investment in institutional, technical and productive capacity building, sustainability could most likely be attained.

6. **Lessons Learned:**

Following the assessment of the CPR portfolio and the findings related to the outcome (7), the evaluation team came up with a number of lessons learned that could be observed in designing future similar programmes. These could be listed as follows:

- It is always possible to enlarge the CPR coverage, enhance its effectiveness and promote a broader partnership within it through adequate mapping of on-going assistance in target areas in order to create proper synergies with the ongoing assistance programmes at the early design stage;

- Achievement of results out of a too complex CPR portfolio, knowing the need for rapid delivery of peace and tranquility, could be possible through proper gauging of closer and rigorous result based monitoring indicators;

- In order to avoid delays in the reintegration of ex-combatants, a perpetual of loss of confidence, it could be possible to develop a pre-integration adjustment phase (DD and R bridging phase), including the insertion and other support programmes, as part of the initial consolidated CPR planning framework;

- Sustainability of CPR portfolio can better be achieved if a proper road map is developed during the initial planning stage. In this context, the focus should be given to the institutional and productive capacity building, accountability, ownership and proper integration of the essence of CPR within the overall government national and local plans; and

- In order to build a wealth of culture and achievements under CPR portfolio for further dissemination within the country and elsewhere, it is better to properly document the best practices.
7. Conclusions:

- The CPA, signed by the government and SPLM/A in January 2005, put an end to a long unabated civil war which led to the loss of lives, massive displacement, huge amount of resources drained in weaponry and destruction of infrastructure, including that for basic services. The agreement accounted for the North/South conflict that started in Sudan during 1983 leaving behind a potential war in Darfur, which yet to be addressed under a separate framework (Daoha Accord). The war has left a huge portfolio to be done on recovery and rehabilitation, development, human security, reduction of small arms, governance, delivery of basic services within the context of MDGs, capacity building, to name, but only a few. The effect of war and the related human loss (1 – 2 million people claimed to be lost) is further compounded by recurrent drought cycles and the impact of climate change on already loose production systems. The results of which are evident within a number of courtiers of the Horn of Africa.

- The country’s economic turmoil witnessed during the period 1970 – 1980 was further reversed following the onset of oil. Under the new oil boom environment Sudan went into a massive expansion of its physical and social infrastructure.

- Albeit the era of oil has created dependency on a single commodity and completely neglected the non-oil sectors of the economy with the fear that this situation could hardly be sustained. The political challenge to continued growth and prosperity arises from Sudan’s legacy of persistent spatial disparity between the centre and the periphery (World Bank, June 2009).

- The CPAP was designed and further implemented in a rather volatile post conflict transitional situation characterized by insecurity, limited state and community capacity, a high state of poverty, underemployment, intermittent break of violence, proliferation of small arms, displacement, serious impact of climate change on traditional livelihoods and poor governance. During the preliminary planning stage the challenge was to come up with a comprehensive programme that addresses the immediate needs for recovery, upgrade the prevailing low capacities of various state-based institutions and the threat of insecurity. To adjust to the situation, UNDP and its other UN partners were able to develop a security – cum – governance – cum- recovery conceptual framework (Scanteam, Oslo, 2011) that led the planning of the CPR portfolio. It is imperative to note that the security –governance- recovery nexus proved to be an efficient mechanism of coordination of funds, a tool to build stronger partnership and a fruitful way of strengthening the technical and institutional
capacities of the government entities as well as the productive capacity of beneficiary groups.

- The capacity building component of the outcome (7) portfolio has left behind a remarkable impact on the target institutions as well as community members. Most of the target individuals are now capable of running small business and other income generation activities. The emergence of such a rudimentary private entities would help perpetuate rural economies through local investments and viable injection of rural credit. Expanding the scope and coverage of the capacity building programmes would eventually lead to the revival of the local economy. As with regards to the capacity support extended to the government entities, it is important to learn that, in most of the cases, these institutions were able to take the lead role to plan and implement recovery and development programmes. Lack of funding for development may eclipse the improved capacity of the government institutions to perform their tasks. The situation may even worsen if donor support is finally switched to build the adolescent government of Southern Sudan and what has been done so far ends up as a waste of investment.

- There is now a growing concern regarding the period following the final separation of the South – July onwards.

- Many observers hinted out that the UN system may face new challenges and that early recognition of due developments may help UNDP to orchestrate an X-pager note on: “Beyond the implementation of the CPA”. In this new context, the gear of focus should be shifted to the states in a manner that strikes the balance between the centre and the periphery and further ensures equitable distribution of wealth and material resources.

- The debate on the early response is expected to result in appropriate initiatives within or beyond the context of linking emergency to development. It needs to be more inclusive (bottom-up) and well-documented in order to be reflected in the strategic planning process.

- The strategic approach of building the national capacities for effective Mine Action programme has proved to be successful. The supported institutions have managed to run successful demining projects.

- The DDR framework of the UNDP is relevant to the international one and perceived as appropriate and essential post-war intervention. The DDR programme in question was, generally, believed to be successful; however, there is still a noticeable gap between the DD and the R. This gap could be attributed to inadequate emphasis on the adjustment phase that includes proper verification of ex-combatants and market surveys.
• It is clear that the targets of the livelihoods sector are so ambitious. Moreover, the livelihood interventions have faced serious internal and external challenges. The implementation of livelihood activities is directly affected by the micro grants that given to the local NGOs (mistrust) at long intervals.
• The partnership is noticed to be more effective at the planning level and within the UN arena. Partnership with the government and national NGOs faces several challenges such as mistrust, limitation of technical and operational capacities and ineffective communication.

8. Recommendations:

8.1 On core CPR programme:

8.1.1 DDR:

• Collaboration between UNAMIS and UNDP went quite well; the former in giving military and political support and the latter providing field based capacity building. However coordination between the upper echelon and field based entities should be further strengthened;
• UNDP should give more weight to its decentralized management offices in the field with more delegation of authority, while taking the leverage of putting local accountability mechanisms and procedures. Only then activities related to reintegration will get the full momentum;
• While it is agreeable that Demobilization should be planned with a military precision, albeit it has to be realized within a clear development context, being recognized as a first step in moving from a military to a civilian life, and that effective reintegration is the only guard ensuring non-recurrence to weaponry;
• Demobilization should smoothly lead to reinsertion activities that constitute the interface between Disarmament and Reintegration. It should be well planned, short and constructive in preparing ex-combatants to move into a full civilian life through the reintegration process. That said UNDP should be an important partner in the verification process since they are the custodians of reintegration;
• Delays in the startup phase of reintegration should be avoided and the ideal situation that planning for “R” should simultaneously coincide with that of “D”, otherwise a relaxing period will force the ex-combatants to lose confidence in the DDR exercise and recurrence to carrying weapons could be a strong possibility;
• A robust Monitoring and Evaluation system should be placed from day “one” in order to generate all basic data that could be used to gauge the success of the DDR programme and further monitoring of gender indicators; and
• A strategy for the small arms control should be put in place with UNDP planning guidance and logistical support as a prerequisite for effective DDR programme.
• In view of the achievements made so far under DDR, the Evaluation Team highly recommends that UNDP is to remain engaged in the continuation of the DDR programme with the objective to: provide a leading role in resource mobilization for comprehensive reintegration; support launching of aggressive DDR advocacy within the context of maintenance of comprehensive national peace; and guide the articulation of a national strategy for security sector reform and control the proliferation of small arms.

8.1.2 Demining:

• While the link between mine action and early recovery was visibly detected by the evaluation team, but that was not clear during the pre-project planning phase. For similar programmes in the future early recovery should be envisaged in the initial planning phase of demining, including a recovery – cum clearance strategy with priority rating of mine action activities as applicable to given geographical locations; and
• It is evident that the threat from mines has been reduced and the mine action technical and managerial skills were put in place, yet it is important to revisit the cost of mines’ clearance, which presently far above the world average. In this context, if resources could be donated, significant achievements could be made in terms of human security.

8.1.3 Economic and social reintegration:

• In order to ensure an effective economic and social reintegration a detailed adjustment phase, albeit too short, has to be in place. This phase is to harness activities related to re-profiling of the ex-combatants, reinsertion, building a solid data base, skill development and putting the planning framework for early launching of the time sensitive reintegration activities; and
• A client protection strategy has to be developed where beneficiary groups get the right advice on job opportunities, marketing structures, investment
opportunities, value change analysis and many others. It is good to learn that most of these key issues were dealt with within the CPR portfolio.

8.1.4 Sustainable Livelihoods:

In order to maximize benefits from the livelihoods programme, the synergies should be two-fold: firstly, at the institutional level to allow partners to come close together; and secondly, at the programmes’ level to ensure coherence among various technical components and anticipated results.

8.1.5 Capacity building:

While capacity building initiatives proved to be adequate both in type and quality, yet full translation of these capacities into material work was less than expected, particularly in areas of life sustenance. It would be appropriate if target groups are provided with enough material support and UNDP provides strategic orientation to enable the government to link beneficiary groups with financial institutions in order to enhance local investments.

8.2 On cross cutting issues:

8.2.1 Gender:

While the gender dimension features well in all CPR programme portfolio, yet the monitoring system should provide gender segregated achievements gauged against specially designed indicators and based on a preliminary set of baseline data.

8.2.2 Environment:

- Under post conflict situations environment remains to be an important issue, since it is always subject to serious deterioration during the times of conflict. That is in addition, to the failure of the traditional production systems under the changing climate. It therefore remains vital to fully factor the environmental component as a main cross-cutting variable in the design of future CPR programmes.

8.2.3 Monitoring of results:

- A robust monitoring system has to be established which effectively gauges achievement of outcomes, provides gender segregated results, looks into the
environmental variables and further enhances information sharing with partners.

8.3 General:

- For follow up of the current CPR programme or having similar future interventions, being complex in nature, it is important to follow a comprehensive/consolidated tripartite planning framework comprising security – governance – recovery nexus in order to ensure better allocation of resources, promote effective coordination, build a broader a partnership and strengthen the technical and institutional capacities of the concerned government entities;

- At this critical juncture the concept of CPR still remains valid to address a number of challenges. In that context, the vocational training initiative should be expanded as an employment conduit to absorb more ex-combatants and promote income generation activities, as potential means to restore rural economy. These income generation activities should be enhanced through injection of rural microfinance; and the reintegration component should be considered as a satellite programme to attract/encapsulate other similar programmes in target localities; and

- The CPRU staff should be given the necessary training in the identification and documentation of best practices.
Annexes:

Annex (A): The CPAP Results Framework:


Indicator: Change in human security (mines, small arms, socio-economic) of crisis affected groups. National mine action management and technical expertise in place to address social/economic impacts of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

Baseline 1: National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), National Mine Action Center (NMAC), and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) established through presidential Decrees. Head offices of NMAC-Khartoum and SSDC-Juba and six field offices staffed, equipped and functional.

Target 1 by 2012: At least 80% of high priority roads/routes cleared by national deminers and handed to public for productive use

Baseline 2 and 3: Interim DDR Programme active in the North, South and East.

Target 2 and 3 by 2012: National Institutions technically supported for development of joint DDR policies and strategies and enabled to manage the DDR process.

Baseline 4: Support to livelihoods of 800,000 Sudanese nationals, by increasing agricultural and livelihood productivity, stimulating economic activity and contributing to improvement in health and quality of life.

Target 4 by 2012: Improve livelihoods of 1,200,000 Sudanese nationals, by increasing agricultural and livelihood productivity, stimulating economic activity and contributing to improvement in health and quality of life. Expected outcomes to cover three macro-sectors of Capacity Development and Institutional Strengthening; Improved Livelihoods; and Support to Basic Services.
7.1 National/sub-national capacities strengthened to manage the national mine action programme.

| Indicator: National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) capacitated to implement their mandate and lead the mine action activities
| Indicator: No. of national de-miners trained/equipped/field deployed for clearance of mine/ERW affected areas.

Baseline: 240 JIU de-miners trained/equipped & 110 de-miners field deployed; 446 km of Babanusa-Wau railway line and 234 km of roads in Kassala state. National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) established through presidential Decrees.

Targets:
2009-2010: Knowledge of concerned NMAA, NMAC and SSDC staff developed at the technical (mine clearance) and functional level.
2011: National authorities capacitated to finance and lead the mine action coordination activities; knowledge of 130 national de-miners developed to conduct mine action activities.
2012: National authorities capacitated to assume full responsibility of mine action process; 130 JIU de-miners equipped and deployed.
Annex (B) The Terms of Reference (TOR):

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Outcome evaluation “Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated”

Under the CPAP 2009-2012

Terms of Reference

1. Background

1.1 The Sudan Context

In 2005, the Government of Sudan, led by National Congress Party (NCP), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ending the second phase of the war between the North and the South. The agreement was concluded within the framework of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and supported by the regional grouping of East African States, and a troika of countries (USA, UK & Norway). As a result, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) was formed at the national level (comprising members of NCP and SPLM) and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was formed in the South. In October 2006 the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) was signed between the government and the Eastern Front. Although these agreements ended decades of civil war and social unrest, conflict in Darfur created a new front of instability, which has engaged a number of peacemaking efforts over the past few years.

Sudan’s conflicts have generated mounting development and humanitarian challenges, undermining advances in human development. Against this background UNDP Sudan’s strategy reflects the findings of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2009-2012, and is detailed in the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for 2009-2012. The CPAP constitutes the legal agreement between UNDP and the Government of Sudan and details the programme design and capacity development strategies. UNDP in Sudan works on the basis of “one country – two systems”. The Country Office, located in Khartoum manages programmes both at the national and regional level, and collaborates closely with the UNDP Regional Office in Juba in Southern Sudan. UNDP has opened 18 sub-offices and project offices across the country, located in Eastern Sudan, Southern Sudan, the Three Protocol Areas and Darfur.

In response to the challenges of implementing the CPA and addressing the pervasive human development deficits across the country, the UNDP Sudan programme has focussed attention on three areas: 1) poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs, 2) democratic governance, and 3) crisis prevention and recovery.
This mid-term evaluation will focus on outcome 7 of the CPAP, one of 7 outcomes which frame the UNDP programme in Sudan for 2009-2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Area</th>
<th>Intended Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs</td>
<td>1. Enhanced national and sub-national capacities to plan, monitor, evaluate, and implement the MDGs and related national development policies and priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Improved impact of resources to fight HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Fostering and consolidating democratic governance</td>
<td>3. Institutions, systems and processes of democratic governance strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. National/sub-national/state/local levels of governance expand their capacities to manage equitable delivery of public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Rights upheld and protected through accountable, accessible and equitable Rule of Law institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Crisis prevention and recovery</td>
<td>6. Strengthened capacity of national, sub-national, state and local institutions and communities to manage the environment and natural disasters to reduce conflict over natural resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For further details on the UNDP crisis prevention and recovery interventions across Sudan, See [http://www.sd.undp.org/security.htm](http://www.sd.undp.org/security.htm)

2.1 The UNDP Policy Environment

All UNDP programming is designed to build national ownership and capacity, in line with the Paris Declaration and the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011. At the same time, CPR programming is developed and implemented in line with the Eight Point Agenda for Gender
Equality and Women’s Empowerment (8PA). In the context of increasing UN harmonization, UNDP’s programme is also designed to support progress towards ‘One UN’.

2. Purpose and Objectives

2.1 Purpose

The evaluation will review and analyze the progress towards achieving results of the crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) portfolio for the ongoing CPAP (2009-2012), assess the extent to which the relevant projects and programmes have contributed to the achievement of CPAP results and the relevance of the outcome and the associated output achievements to the current context. At the same time, the evaluation will consider the cumulative effect of CPR programming over the period of the Common Country Framework (CCF2) (2002-2006) and the Bridging Programme (2007-2008), drawing on the findings of the CCF2 evaluation.

The evaluation should include an analysis of synergies between crisis prevention and recovery and key human development dimensions, which help support the achievement of the MDGs. Assessment of UNDP in early recovery coordination, will be an important component of the evaluation.

2.2 Objectives

The overall objective of this outcome evaluation is, therefore, to evaluate, at the mid-point of the CPAP, progress in restoring infrastructure, reviving the economy and generating income in all North and South Sudan and assess the contribution of UNDP Sudan has been to this progress since 2009.

Specific Objectives are to:

- Assess progress made in mine action, DDR, arms control and community security (including livelihood) programming to reduction of conflict and restoration of peace and analyze the setting in which real progress towards the MDGs can be made in Sudan.

- Assess the extent to which CPR programmes have been successful in building national capacities.

- Evaluate the differential progress on women, men and youth in the UNDP CPR programmes.

- Assess the effectiveness of early recovery coordination in Sudan and how this has (or has not) contributed to overall progress towards CPR objectives.

- From a longer term perspective (from 2002), make an assessment of overall progress (or lack of progress) on restoring infrastructure, economic revival and income generation and community security, and of the contribution of UNDP to this progress.

- Advise on the suitability of indicators and other verification tools used to measure progress towards outcomes and outputs.
• Evaluate the degree to which the programmes adjust and contribute to progress towards One UN.

The findings and recommendations of the evaluation will feed into the mid-term review of the CPAP in 2011, and inform the formulation of the next programming cycle 2013-2017.

The CPAP results framework for outcome 7 (below) provides the starting point for the evaluation, identifying desired results and indicators of success which guided project formation and implementation to date. While these results and indicators will be a central feature of the assessment methodology, the evaluation is expected to assess their suitability so as to measure progress towards the achievement of the outcome.

**OVERALL OUTCOME:** Post–conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated.

**Outcome indicators:** Change in human security (mines, small arms, socio-economic) of crisis affected groups. National mine action management and technical expertise in place to address social/economic impacts of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected outputs</th>
<th>Annualised output targets and indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| National/sub-national capacities strengthened to manage the national mine action programme. | **Indicator:** National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) capacitated to implement their mandate and lead the mine action activities  
**Indicator:** No. of national de-miners trained/equipped/field deployed for clearance of mine/ERW affected areas.  
**Baseline:** 240 JIUde-miners trained/equipped & 110 de-miners field deployed; 446 km of Babanusa-Wau railway line and 234 km of roads in Kassala state. National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) established through presidential decrees  
**Targets:**  
2009-2010: Knowledge of concerned NMAA, NMAC and SSDC staff developed at the technical (mine clearance) and functional level  
2011: National authorities capacitated to finance and lead the mine action coordination activities; knowledge of 130 national de-miners developed to conduct mine... |
| **Reintegration of ex-combatants completed in accordance with the national DDR strategy with support of UNMIS** | action activities

**2012:** National authorities capacitated to assume full responsibility of mine action process; 130 JIU de-miners equipped and deployed |

**Indicator:** Number of ex-combatants and associated groups, demobilized & reintegrated, disaggregated by age, gender and disability;

**Indicator:** Percentage of participants that report successful individual reintegration projects in client satisfaction surveys;

**Baseline:** 1,700 ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized in ESPA areas.

**Target:**

2009:
- 2,900 participants, including 200 disabled, disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated in East;
- 30,000 participants in CPA areas, including 1900 women and 2000 disabled, participating or completing reintegration.
- 70% per cent of participants report sufficient household income in client satisfaction surveys
- Preparatory support provided to parties in Darfur, DDR of participants, pending political negotiations;

2010:
- 60,000 participants, including 4100 women and 15,500 disabled, participating or completed reintegration
- 70% per cent of participants report sufficient household income in client satisfaction surveys
- DDR of candidates in Darfur, pending political process.

2011:
- 45,000 participants, including 4100 women and 15,500 disabled, participating or completed reintegration
- 70% per cent of participants report sufficient household income in client satisfaction surveys
- DDR of candidates in Darfur, pending political process.

2012:
- 45,000 participants, including 4100 women and 15,500 disabled, participating or completed reintegration
- 70% per cent of participants report sufficient household income in client satisfaction surveys
- DDR of candidates in Darfur, pending political process.

- N/SSDDRCs successfully implementing nationally-owned DDR.

**Proliferation and circulation of small arms reduced**

**Indicator:** Number of state level community security and arms control action plans developed and implemented. Number of communities benefitting from CSAC activities

**Baseline:** No community security and arms control action plans developed. Five small CSAC projects being implemented in BNS, SKS, KRT, RS and Kassala.

**Targets:**

**North:**
2009: 5 sub-projects developed and implement community security and arms control action plans
2010: 10 sub-projects (cumulative) developed and implement community security and arms control action plans
2011: 20 sub-projects (cumulative) developed and implement community security and arms control action plans

**South:**
2009: 3 states develop and implement community security and arms control action plans; 1 Platform for Peace
2010: 6 states (cumulative) develop and implement community security and arms control action plans; 3 Platforms for Peace
2011: All 10 states (cumulative) develop and implement community security and arms control action plans

**Indicator:** Number of recovery projects established and/or people benefiting including returnees and ex-IDPs from recovery and development initiatives through strengthening CBOs/Civil Society and Local Govt. Authorities.

**Baseline:** 10 community-based integrated recovery & rehabilitation projects running.

**Targets:**
- 2009: Rural livelihood initiatives in 10 states; 100,000 beneficiaries: 30% female; 30% youth
- 2010: 200,000 beneficiaries (cumulative): 35% female; 35% youth
- 2011: 300,000 beneficiaries (cumulative): 40% female; 40% youth.

2.3 Additional Evaluation Objectives

In addition to informing mid-term discussions on the CPAP, the evaluation will:

- Strengthen UNDP Sudan accountability to internal and external partners by gathering evidence on programmes and progress towards desired results at outcome and output level.
- Identify areas of strength, weakness and gaps especially in regard to:
  - The appropriateness of the UNDP partnership strategy
  - Impediments to the outcome
  - Assess the need for midcourse adjustments
  - Lessons learned for the next programme cycle
    In order to ensure that programmes remain on target, or are adjusted to remain relevant to current needs and the current context.
- Inform higher level evaluations (e.g. at the country or regional level) and subsequent programming.
- Identify lessons learned and good practice to support learning across UNDP of crisis prevention and recovery programming.
3. Scope of the Evaluation and Main issues

3.1 Scope

The evaluation will cover all North and South Sudan and focus on the CPR portfolio of the CPAP. Setting the assessment of progress in the context of the history and current political and socio-economic setting will be important for the analysis and interpretation of results, so the evaluation will draw on existing situational/context/conflict assessments, particularly the work of the Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis Project in Sudan.

3.2 Issues influencing the evaluation

Exploring linkages between crisis prevention and key human development features

In Sudan, deficits in human development are among the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs. The evaluation will look at the role of crisis prevention and recovery activities in supporting the effort to achieving MDGs in Sudan. It is hoped that this type of assessment will help set the frame for the “big picture” story which will emerge from the outcome evaluation, in recognition of the significant and inextricable linkages between UNDP’s crisis prevention and recovery portfolio and the other major pillars of the 2009-2012 CPAP.

Strengthening national capacities, particularly governance and coordination mechanisms, in crisis, prevention and recovery response

Governments (national and local) play a critical role in addressing crisis, prevention and recovery that affects national development goals. In view of the role played by good governance (legal frameworks and policies, administrative and institutional systems, coordination among different government agencies), in risk reduction and crisis prevention and recovery, the evaluation should remain mindful of UNDP’s support to local institutions and community participation in improving crisis prevention and recovery management. The interplay of different local actors and the extent of civil society participation in decision-making will be a key feature of the overall assessment. One possible line of enquiry in the evaluation will be UNDP’s support to furthering coordination efforts and the lessons that can be drawn for strengthening coordination strategies.

Early Recovery

UNDP defines early recovery as the application of development principles of participation, sustainability and local ownership to humanitarian situations with the aim of stabilizing local and national capacities. This means that early recovery should start as early as possible during humanitarian action and that early recovery activities should be foundational in nature and designed to ‘seize opportunities that go beyond saving lives and contribute to the restoration of national capacity, livelihoods and human security’. This definition is the basis of resources and guidance provided by the UNDP-led Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER). It situates early recovery within humanitarian settings and also firmly roots UNDP’s approach to early recovery in humanitarian coordination and funding systems.

Since 2005 the Country Office has placed a greater emphasis on early recovery in Sudan with strong support from the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). Issues gravitate around questions of livelihoods, housing and social economic infrastructure, social equity, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity and activities have focused mainly on Abyei and Darfur (through the BCPR funded Darfur Area Focus Action Plan).
Ultimately, this evaluation will assess the effectiveness of these initial early recovery initiatives and advise how these may be better defined in terms of design, implementation and monitoring progress.

**Addressing the linkages between conflict and natural resources**

Conflict-prone countries pose challenges for natural resource management efforts. While coordination among UN agencies and partnerships with donor and development organizations are crucial in maximizing the contribution to human development, complex crisis situations require programme strategies that are sensitive to such situations and have an integrated approach. The evaluation will examine the main issues pertinent to UNDP’s programming, paying attention to conflict over natural resources and the manner in which conflict impacts on resource management strategies and policies.

**Conflict Sensitivity**

All programming (including the evaluation design and conduct) in settings of actual or potential conflict need to be conflict sensitive – e.g. reflect an awareness of and be appropriate to the specifics of potential or actual tension. Principles of conflict sensitivity include:

(i) All programming needs to be sensitive to the inherent (or overt) tensions or to potential or actual conflicts, and be conducted in such a way to – at a minimum - not heighten tensions and – at best – reduce tensions
(ii) Security of all involved (programme staff; beneficiaries; and evaluation staff ) needs to be factored into all decisions
(iii) Crisis settings are characteristically dynamic, and it is not unusual for changes in the setting to happen in short periods of time. Therefore, flexibility needs to be built in around the need to re-visit programming objectives to ensure they are still appropriate to the situation, as well as over the timing and appropriate methods of data collection according to what is feasible and can realistically be achieved
(iv) All programming should maintain a ‘big picture’ perspective

The evaluation will consider to what extent the CPR portfolio in Sudan has been designed and implemented in a conflict sensitive manner, and to what extent it has heightened or lessened tensions, either as an explicit or an implicit part of the programmes.

**Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women**

The UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 states that “Gender empowerment will be given special emphasis throughout all UNDP activities in crisis-affected countries. The UNDP ‘Eight Point Agenda for Women’s Empowerment’ and ‘Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery’ will guide the activities within this area”.1 Issues of how programmes have been designed and implemented to support this commitment, taking into account the different needs of men, women, girls and boys, need to inform the evaluation in terms of data collection and analysis.

---

1 UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008-2011, DP/2007/43/Rev.1, p29
In light of these issues, the evaluation will seek to respond, at a minimum, to the following questions:

a) What factors underlie the development situation in respect to the CPAP outcome 7?

b) What progress has been made towards the achievement of CPAP outcome 7?

c) What contribution has UNDP made towards the achievement of the outcome and in this context how has UNDP positioned itself among other CPR actors and partners to add value in response to the needs and changes in the national development context?

d) What unintended consequences have emerged from the UNDP programme interventions?

e) What have been the factors which have impeded progress and to what extent has UNDP’s contribution been curtailed by these factors? Under such circumstances are there actions which UNDP could have taken or should still take to reverse such challenges?

f) What has been the key contribution made by UNDP through "soft" assistance and advocacy in support to achieving the outcome?

g) What are the gaps/weaknesses in the current programme design and management/operational features in so far as they apply to the implementation of projects and programme under the crisis prevention and recovery portfolio?

h) What are the lessons learned from the programme activities thus far and how should these be applied to inform management decisions in order to strengthen UNDP’s programme in the crisis prevention and recovery area, both in determining the direction for the remainder of the current CPAP and for consideration for the new programme cycle?

3.2 Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation will use the following criteria:

**Relevance:** Assess if UNDP policy goals and programmes in Sudan address the development needs at the country level, particularly in addressing critical gaps in crisis prevention and recovery priorities identified by various stakeholders and aligned to the national priorities. The evaluation will seek to draw lessons from UNDP’s response to national priorities vis-à-vis the Government and other agencies.

**Effectiveness:** Assessment of the performance of UNDP’s support to crisis prevention and recovery in terms of achievement of results. The evaluation will assess the extent to which UNDP’s contribution has strengthened national capacity and contributed to real progress in the eyes of different stakeholders in the relevant areas.

**Efficiency:** The extent to which UNDP has instituted systems and clear procedures to provide coordinated support and the relationship of inputs (financial and staff) to results gained.
This will involve looking at the suitability of UNDP operational and financial management procedures in responding to crises prevention and the extent to which these procedures have helped or hindered efficiency and the achievement of results.

**Sustainability** This will assess whether UNDP has been able to support development institutions, frameworks and procedures and develop the capacities of national institutions. The evaluation will examine the sustainability of the programmes results and benefits and explore whether UNDP projects and programmes develop/strengthen mechanisms to promote scaling up and replication of successful results.

**Impact**: Examine the impact of the programme in terms of whether the design and implementation of the relevant projects and programmes has facilitated or hindered progress towards the outcomes of the CPAP and UNDAF. Determine whether the current programmes design and implementation will allow for the optimum achievements of the planned impact on the target groups.

**Connectedness**: In conflict/post-conflict settings, it is important to assess not only the progress made against project or programme goals, but the contribution of individual projects to the overall conflict prevention and peace building process. Assessment of connectedness should also include the extent to which projects and programme were complementary or contradictory.

**4. Methodology and Approach**

The evaluation team shall propose the approach, design, methods and data collection strategies to be adopted for conducting the evaluation in the inception report, whereby the evaluation team agrees with the UNDP Sudan office the approach, design, methods and strategy required to successfully complete the exercise. The evaluation will be a transparent, participatory process involving all the development stakeholders at the country level. It will be carried out within the framework of UNDP Evaluation Policy and UNEG norms and standards. The methodology should make reference to the OECD Guidelines on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace building as they are relevant to this situation.

The evaluation team is encouraged to develop a Theory of Change (TOC), which will represent the framework for examining the effectiveness of UNDP’s support to crisis prevention and recovery. Given that this will reflect the thinking behind the choice of specific interventions to address identified gaps and needs; this will need to be developed retrospectively with the help of programme staff, ideally who were there at the time the programmes/projects were developed. The relevance and appropriateness of the TOC will then be tested by the evaluation in terms and may need to be adjusted going forward if the needs/gaps or even the wider context changed.

The evaluation itself will follow 3 distinct phases:

1. Preparation - review of the Terms of Reference, preliminary desk review, meetings with the UNDP programme and production of Inception Report;
2. Conduct of the evaluation – 3 week mission in the field including meeting with donors and relevant stakeholders

---

4 [http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf)
3. Follow up – Production of the final Evaluation Report, dissemination of results and organizing stakeholder consultations, development of management response and relevant management actions.

4.1 Preparation

A programme portfolio review/document review

This desk review will be carried out prior to the evaluation team arriving in Sudan. Due to the broad scope of UNDP’s work in crisis prevention and recovery a very large number of documents and reports (published and unpublished) are available for review. Some may be subject to only a general review while others will require detailed scrutiny. Key sources of information will include programme and project documents, results frameworks, quarterly and annual reports, evaluations and documents related to relevant work of other organisations. UNDP will create an online repository for these documents so that the evaluation team can access this data before the evaluation mission.

Stakeholder analysis

Based on the desk review and professional knowledge of the issues, the evaluation team should conduct a stakeholder analysis which will be carried out to identify organizations working in the area of crisis prevention and recovery in Sudan. With the support of the UNDP Sudan office, this analysis should be used to ascertain which individuals and organizations need to be included as part of the consultation process during the evaluation mission.

Production of the Inception Report

Based on the desk review, the Evaluation Team will produce a draft Inception Report. The final inception report will be finalized after initial meetings with the UNDP programme unit and the evaluation manager.

The inception report should outline at a minimum the following issues:

a. A clear purpose and scope of the evaluation, which includes a clear statement of the objectives of the evaluation and an outline of the main issues to be examined
b. An outline of the evaluation criteria and questions that the evaluation will use to assess performance.
c. The evaluation methodology, including methods used for collecting data and their sources (which include qualitative and quantitative data collection strategies), including a rationale for their selection, as well as data collection tools with an explanation of their reliability and validity and a sampling plan. The methodology will take into consideration country-level data limitations.
d. An evaluation matrix which identifies the key evaluation questions and an indication of how the team expects these questions to be answered.
e. Evaluation Work Plan outlining tasks, a revised schedule of the evaluation milestones and responsibility of each evaluation team member in the delivery of the overall evaluation.

4.2 Conduct of the Evaluation

Prior to the evaluation field mission, UNDP will designate an Evaluation Manager, who will assume the day-to-day responsibilities for managing the evaluation process and serve as the focal point for ensuring the evaluation runs smoothly. In addition UNDP will identify an
Evaluation Reference Group comprised of the key national stakeholders. This group will ensure the national ownership of the evaluation and work closely with the Evaluation Manager to guide the process. It is therefore imperative that the evaluation method ensures that the perspectives of different stakeholders are captured and recommendations are validated through the prism of nationally-owned priorities.

Against this background the field mission will be based on the following modules:

- Inception meeting of the core evaluation team will be held for preliminary discussions with the country office and the Ministry of International Cooperation.
- The main source of information will be through structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews and consultations. In some cases, focus group discussions may be held to capture the dynamic of information sharing and debate, and to enrich the findings. The consultations will involve a wide range of development stakeholders, including government officials, UN agencies, UNDP project managers, donors, NGO, INGOs, and groups of beneficiaries.
- Consultations will involve visits to locations outside Khartoum. Therefore exploration of the reality/implementation of CPR programme will be carried out mainly through in-depth study involving field visits to selected project sites and analysis of relevant secondary data, in conjunction with partners, stakeholders and staff involved in delivery of the programmes and operation activities.
- Preparing the draft report
- Meeting of the Reference Group and other key stakeholders to present the initial findings of the evaluation at the end of the field mission
- Incorporating comments and producing the Final Evaluation Report

4.3 Follow-up and Learning

The findings of the evaluation report will be reviewed jointly by UNDP and national stakeholders and partners to ensure that the key recommendations are incorporated into the design of new projects and programmes. The UNDP CO will draft a management response outlining how the evaluation findings will be applied.

5. Evaluation outputs and time-frame

The key evaluation outputs include:

- Inception report of the evaluation, which includes the evaluation methodology and evaluation work plan outlining tasks and responsibilities of each evaluation team member (as detailed above).
- Power Point presentation for UNDP, the government counterparts and other stakeholders on the preliminary findings, lessons learned, and recommendations
- Draft full report covering the issues outlined in the terms of reference and inception report including evaluation findings and conclusions, lessons and recommendations.
- Final evaluation report, which should at a minimum include the following components:
  - Executive summary
  - Introduction
  - Description of the evaluation methodology
• Analysis of the situation with regard to outcome, outputs, resources, partnerships, management and working methods and/or implementation strategy
• Key findings
• Conclusions and practical, actionable recommendations for the future program implementation
• Annexes including
  • Itinerary
  • List of persons interviewed
  • Summary of field visits
  • List of documents reviewed
  • Client online survey and/or questionnaire (if any) used and summary of results
  • Any other relevant material that supports evaluation findings and recommendations

6. Indicative Time-frame of the Evaluation

The final implementation plan for the evaluation will be outlined in the inception report, but it is expected that the final Evaluation Report should be delivered by 20 November 2010.

Tentative Evaluation schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk review</td>
<td>6-11 September (6 days)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>All team members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial meeting and discussion among the team members</td>
<td>12 September</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>All team members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct meetings with the UNDP programme unit</td>
<td>13 – 14 September (2 days)</td>
<td>Khartoum &amp; Juba</td>
<td>All team members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting/ finalizing Inception Report, outlining evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan</td>
<td>15-17 September (3 days)</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Primary Responsibility lies with the Team Leader, but the National Evaluation Specialists should provide their input and support the production of the final product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Inception Report</td>
<td>By September 21</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Timeframe</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Responsible Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-country field mission</td>
<td>19 September - 9 October (21 days)</td>
<td>Selected locations throughout Sudan</td>
<td>All team members and UNDP Evaluation Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of preliminary findings and Draft Recommendations to senior management and Reference Group</td>
<td>10 - 12 October (2 Days)</td>
<td>Khartoum &amp; Juba</td>
<td>All Team members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of First draft of full evaluation report</td>
<td>By 28 October (Team leader 10 days and Evaluation Specialists 5 days)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of second draft, following feedback from UNDP</td>
<td>By 20 November (Team leader 5 days and Evaluation Specialists 2 days)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Management of the Evaluation

UNDP Sudan will institute the evaluation manager function which will act as the focal point for managing the evaluation process. The Khartoum and Juba offices will each nominate their respective evaluation managers, who will provide administrative and substantive backstopping support. The Evaluation Managers will ensure the coordination and liaison with concerned agencies in north and south Sudan respectively, and ensure the evaluation is conducted in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System.

8. Quality Assurance

The Reference Group will comprise of government counterparts and UNDP staff and will provide oversight of the evaluation process, exercising quality assurance. The Reference Group will play an important role in providing strategic, methodological and substantive advice into the evaluation process as well as a peer review for the key outputs including the main report. Meetings of the Reference Group will be specified in the evaluation work plan.

However, the evaluation will be fully independent and the evaluation team will retain enough flexibility to determine the best approach to collecting and analyzing data for the outcome evaluation. Ultimately, the findings and recommendations of the evaluation will be those of the evaluation team alone.
9. Evaluation Team Constitution, Roles and Responsibilities

The core evaluation team will be comprised of three independent consultants, an International consultant (team leader), one national evaluation specialist, based in Khartoum and one national evaluation specialist based in Juba. The profiles of the individual consultants are specified below:

A. Team Leader responsibilities and technical competencies

The team leader will take a lead role during the evaluation and coordinate the work of all other team members. The team leader will ensure the quality of the evaluation process, outputs, methodology and timely delivery of all products. The team leader, in close collaboration with the other evaluation team members and the UNDP evaluation managers, will take the lead role in conceptualization and design of the evaluation and shaping the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the report. The tasks of the team leader include:

- Develops an inception report and details the design, methodology (including the methods for data collection and analysis criteria for selection of projects, required resources), and work plan of the evaluation team. The inception report will be produced in collaboration with the two national consultants and will clearly define the specific division of labour of the 3 team members in the delivery of the overall evaluation.
- Directs and conducts the research and analysis of all relevant documentation;
- Decides the division of labour within the evaluation team and coordinates team tasks within the framework of the TORs;
- Oversees and quality assures the preparation of the study and takes a lead in the analysis of the evaluative evidence;
- Oversees the administration, and analysis of the results of the data collection exercise;
- Drafts the evaluation report, and coordinates the inputs from team members;
- Prepares for meetings with UNDP and other stakeholder to review findings, conclusions and recommendations.
- Leads the stakeholder feedback sessions, briefs UNDP on the evaluation through informal sessions and finalizes the report based on feedback from the quality assurance process;
- Delivers the final evaluation report.

**Required skills and experience:**

- Master’s Degree in a relevant discipline
- At least 10 years of working experience in evaluation of crisis prevention and recovery projects and programmes,
- Experience with participatory approaches, organizational assessments partnership strategies and capacity development preferred.
- Regional expertise in either Africa or Arab countries
- Experience with regional organizations and the UN system in the area of crisis prevention and recovery.
• Proven experience as an evaluation team leader with ability to lead and work with other evaluation experts.
• Facilitation skills and ability to manage diversity of views in different cultural contexts
• Ability to produce well written reports demonstrating analytical ability and communication skill
• Fluent in English.

B. Evaluation specialist responsibilities and technical competencies

(2 National Consultants – one based in Juba and one based in Khartoum)

The Evaluation Specialist will provide the expertise in the crisis prevention and recovery with sound understanding of the Sudan context. The evaluation specialist is expected to perform the following tasks:

• Review relevant documents;
• Participate in the design of the evaluation methodology and provide inputs to the inception report;
• Conduct an analysis of the outcome, outputs, and partnership strategy
• Carry out fieldwork and data collection as per the inception report and Terms of reference
• Draft related parts of the evaluation report as agreed on the division of labor with the team leader
• Assist the Team Leader in finalizing the evaluation final report including incorporating suggestions received on draft related to his/her assigned sections.

Required skills and experience:

• At least a master’s degree in a relevant field
• At least seven years work experience in the areas of crisis prevention and recovery
• At least 5 years experience in evaluation
• Demonstrated understanding of the social and economic conditions of the country
• Proven experience in results based management systems
• Strong quantitative and qualitative research skills
• Good analytical ability and drafting skills
• Excellent coordination and team working skills
• Fluent in English.

10. Reference materials
At a minimum, the evaluation team should study and make reference to the following documents during the conduct of the outcome evaluation:

• UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results
- UNEG Ethical Guidelines For Evaluation
- Evaluation report template and quality standards (UNDP)
- UNDP Results-Based Management: Technical Note
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan (2009-2012)
- UNDP Results-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) for Sudan (2007-2009)
- CPRU project documents, project reports and project evaluation reports.
- CCF-2 and the Bridging Programme documents
- Sudan 5 year strategic Plan
- Other documents and materials related to the outcomes to be evaluated (from the government, donors, etc.)
Annex (C): The list of Informants:

**UNAMIS:**

1. Ahmad Adam Hamid, UNDP, Economic and Social Reintegration
2. Anne Mari, Public Information and Sensitization Officer
3. Eveline, CSAC and Social Reintegration
4. Osman Adam Tagaeldin, UNDP, Economic and Social Reintegration
5. Tomo, CSAC and Social Reintegration

**UNDP:**

1. Adam Mohammed, M&E, Kassala
2. Argentina – Programme Officer, Fashir
3. Asma Shalabi, Programme Specialist, UNDP, Khartoum
4. Hanan Mutwakil, CPRU
5. Mohammed Ibrahim, Agriculture and Natural Resource Analyst
6. Mr. Stephen – Programme Manager, Fashir
7. Omer Haroun – M&E Officer, Fashir
8. Nuha Abdel Gadir, CPRU
9. Shama Mekki, CPRU
10. Surayo Buzurukova, Regional Programme Manager, Governance and Rule of Law Unit Eastern Region, KASSALA

**State Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning:**

11. Abdallah Suliman Hagar, Children Friendly Initiative (CFI)
12. Alawiya Abdelrahman, CFI Coordinator
13. Eiman Alemam, Director of Planning, Kasala State
14. Gihan Elzain Mohammed, CFI
15. Mohammed Elhadi Abdallah Planning Unit
16. Mousa Mohammed Osheik, Director General State Ministry of Finance, Kasala
17. Noha Abdelrahman Abbas, Planning Unit
18. Rasha Farouq Ali Dinar, General Administration for Economic Planning and Development
19. Salih Ahmed Idris, General Administration for Economic Planning and Development
20. Yahia Bakhat Ishaq, Deputy Manager
21. Zahraa Abdelrahman, General Administration for Economic Planning and Development

**Darfur Rehabilitation Association (DRA):**

22. Mr. Khalil Wagan, Coordinator
El Fashir Technical School:
23. Ibrahim Ahmed Abdelbari, Headmaster
24. Eleven Teachers
25. DRA Representative

FAO:
26. Dr. Mutasim Elsharief,
27. Mr. Jazy Souleymane, Overall FSL Cluster Coordinator
28. Wegdan Abdel Rahman, Head of Field Office

DDR:
29. Mr. Steven Moore, UNDDR, Northern Darfur
30. Yassin Gafar Abdella, NSDDR – Coimmission, Kassala

Mine Action:
31. UNMAO, Kassala

Women Development Association:
32. Suaad Abdallah Mohammed, Finance Secretary
33. Rawda Mohammadani, Communication Secretary
34. Eman Abdelrahman, Network Secretary
35. Badeaa Adam Abdelrahmen, Gender
36. Azza Suliman Hammad, Information Management

Women Development and Peace Building Network:
37. Zubeida Suliman Omer, Secretary General
38. Fatheia Abdallah Khair, Finance Secretary
39. Fatima Ahmed Zain el Abdeen, Training

Community Development College
40. Dr. Jihad Mohammed Yousif

Annex (D): The list of Documents Consulted
1. Annual Progress Report 2009, Darfur Livelihoods Project
3. CCF-2 and the Bridging Programme documents
5. DDR Client Satisfaction Survey
6. DDR review UNDP: The RRP Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation (2009 – 2011)
7. DDR Progress Reports
8. North Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NSDDRC) February/March 2011
10. Reports on Mine Action
11. Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), Joint Northern Sudan Lessons Learned Report, 19 April 2011
12. Sustainable livelihoods
13. Sudan 5 year strategic Plan
16. Towards Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth, World Bank, June 2009
17. UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP, 2009 -2011)
19. UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results
20. United Nations Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation
22. UNDP Southern Sudan: Conflict Prevention and Recovery Programme Mid Term Outcome Evaluation (2009 – 2011)