COMPASIS Mid-Term Evaluation

Evaluation Report (2nd Revised Version)

Prepared By:

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Timor-Leste and New York City
November to December 2011
December 14, 2011

The Project Steering Committee
and the Project Implementation Unit
COMPASIS Project

Colleagues in Development Work:

I am now submitting to you this revised version of the mid-term evaluation report on the COMPASIS Project. This report was modified based on the factual corrections and comments made on the earlier draft. Still, the actual formulation of this report was done independently. As such, the findings stated in this report fairly describe the situation of the COMPASIS Project as of this date. The opinions and recommendations stated in this report are also mine, and these may not necessarily be the same as those held by everyone.

I would also like to state that the mid-term evaluation exercise has been positively carried out. I wish to acknowledge the efforts provided by the PIU and the focal persons from the UN Agencies (UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, ILO, WFP and UNFPA) in organizing and participating in the evaluation activities. Key informants from the GoTL (particularly from the national agencies and the district offices in Ermera and Oecusse) and the NGO FEEO, likewise provided valuable cooperation and support to the process. The project beneficiaries, most of whom are women, also participated meaningfully in this evaluation. May this report contribute to the furtherance of their well-being and their ultimate success.

Very Truly Yours,

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Briarwood NY USA

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## Acronyms Used In This Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Centro de Desenvolvimento Empresarial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPASIS</td>
<td>Community Mobilization for Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion in Service Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Country Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPCU</td>
<td>District Project Coordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEEO</td>
<td>Fundasaun Esperanza Enclave Oecusse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoTL</td>
<td>Government of Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG-F</td>
<td>MDG Achievement Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAP</td>
<td>Oecusse Ambeno Community Activation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIU</td>
<td>Project Implementation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Programme Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-Based Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Sloping Agricultural Land Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHG</td>
<td>Self-Help Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Time-Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEST</td>
<td>United Nations Electoral Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTFHS</td>
<td>United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Executive Report

In September 2011, the process leading towards the conduct of a mid-term evaluation for the COMPASIS Project started with the drafting of its Terms of Reference (TOR), planning by the UN Agencies, and selection of an International Consultant to undertake the task. The overall goal of the evaluation is to “determine whether the objectives and performance indicators outlined in the funding proposal are achievable within the allotted timeframe.” The process was also viewed to “serve as an opportunity for reflection, allowing the project partners to make course corrections and refine objectives, indicators and implementation timeframes, as needed.”

COMPASIS is a three-year (March 2010 to February 2013) project which is responding to the human security situation in Timor-Leste, particularly in the context of the social violence that occurred in 2006-2008 and the then threats to the economic survival and continued loss of dignity by the Timorese. It is being implemented by 6 UN Agencies: UNDP (also the Lead Agency), FAO, ILO, WFP, UNICEF, and UNFPA. These agencies are, in turn, working with local government and NGO counterparts. By far, COMPASIS is the biggest joint effort by the UN Agencies in Timor-Leste, under the UN’s Delivering As One framework. It is funded by the UNTFHS at a cost of USD4.088 million.

The project is being implemented in 17 sucos (communities) in the districts of Ermera (10 sucos) and Oecusse (7 sucos). The original target is to strengthen 200 Self-Help Groups (SHGs) in these areas, to reduce the vulnerability of households to hunger and poverty. This is being done by UNDP which is in charge of the strengthening of these SHGs, FAO which is implementing agricultural trainings and providing inputs to the SHGs, and ILO which is conducting entrepreneurship trainings to selected SHG members. Components on micro-finance and small infrastructure rehabilitation by UNDP are also part of the intervention. The other agencies are also delivering services to the sucos based on their specializations: WFP is implementing food-for-work schemes in the sucos, UNICEF is in charge of putting up WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) facilities in the areas and conducting literacy classes, and UNFPA is conducting activities related to family planning and reproductive health. A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is tasked with the overall coordination of project activities.

The first phase of the mid-term evaluation featured the preparation of an Inception Report based on the preliminary documents that were sent by the PIU to the Consultant. This Inception Report contained the initial findings and understanding by the Consultant on the project and the areas for further inquiry. It also included the specifications on the assessment criteria that will be applied for the task. The Inception Report was discussed in a meeting with the UN Agencies and the PIU on November 9, 2011 in Dili.

A field mission by the Consultant to Timor-Leste was carried out on November 8 – December 3, 2011. The mission included meetings with the focal persons and project staff from the various UN Agencies, officials and staff from the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) who are either members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) or counterpart institutions of the UN Agencies, project beneficiaries in Ermera and Oecusse, an NGO which is tasked with the strengthening of the SHGs (i.e. the Fundasaun Esperanza Enclave Oecusse or FEEO), and the PIU staff. Additional documents and updated data were also sought during the field mission.

Based on the interviews, discussions, and data obtained from the field mission, the following findings were reported:

- The COMPASIS Project is clearly responding to the human security needs in the sucos. However, it will take more time to completely solve these issues because of personnel and budgetary constraints in the GoTL, land ownership problems in some areas, and the unpreparedness of some groups to assume local responsibility in maintaining community infrastructure.

- The project is thematically aligned with the national government priorities, the UNDAF, and the MDGs.

- The design phase of the project followed the standard consultative process and the UNTFHS Guidelines. At the same time, there are gaps on the methodology and the intervention logic. The design to put together the work of 6 UN Agencies was ambitious because of the level of effort
involved and the lack of integration in the project design on the relevant lessons on joint programming and experiences from similar projects. The project design was nonetheless strong on the gender and stakeholder participation aspects. There are flaws in the financial design of the project, which was not reviewed and changed prior to project implementation.

- The overall spending pattern in the project is low (i.e. only 66% of the mid-term budget has been spent), which is an indication that the project is delayed. The causes of the delay are: the delay in the delivery of the basic financial and human inputs; the sequential nature of some activities; the time taken by the development of implementation details and the conduct of inclusive processes; the need to work with the pace of the local counterpart institutions; a lengthy procurement process that had to be followed; a need to time the activities with the season and beneficiary needs; and the occurrence of unexpected weather conditions. Still, there are indications of progress in the achievement of Output 1.1 which was observed from the site visits in Oecusse.

- There is complementation between the different components being implemented by the 6 UN Agencies and there are synergistic effects being created by the project under the Delivering As One Concept, specifically in the components related to Output 1.1/Outcome 1. On the other end, the synergy from the combined activities of the agencies in Outcome 2 will still have to be determined. The effectiveness of the Delivery As One framework is also affected by the lack of a synchronized plan, the multi-tasking of part-time project staff, the rotation and nature of contracts of some agency personnel who are involved in the project, and the absence of a district-level coordinator.

- The effectiveness of the project has also been affected by external factors, such as extreme weather conditions, the presence of similar interventions and lack of facilities in the area, the intrinsic endowments of the target groups, the values and behavior of the beneficiaries that will take a long time to change, and the literacy level of the target group.

- There are efforts to strengthen the operational efficiency of the project through the functioning of the PSC and the organization of the District Project Coordination Units (DPCUs). However, there are basic constraints in obtaining information for decision-making because the M&E for the project has not yet started and there is no budget for M&E. Problem-solving is also not straightforward in a multi-agency setting, where there are sensitivities to be considered in terms of agency autonomies, mandates, and lines of authority.

- There are budget inadequacies which were not corrected before the project was implemented. There were also delays in the transfer of the first tranche of funds to the country offices. Cost efficiency procedures are nonetheless being followed in the project.

- There are challenges to the creation of impact by the COMPASIS Project due to the different targets that were set by the UN Agencies, the limited scope of the impact that can be expected from the intervention, the gap between the impact from Outcome 2 with the impact from Outcome 1, the gap between the Outcome 2 targets with the total population of sucos being covered by the project, the different impacts that can be expected from the 2 districts given their unique situations, and the lack of a clear impact on the suco development plan.

- While sustainability strategies are being applied by the project, there are indications and there have been precedents which show that these strategies do not necessarily lead to sustainability of the intervention. An exit phase within the original three-year time frame will not be appropriate.

In view of these and other findings, the following conclusions were stated in the report:

- The overall human security situation has been stable and the COMPASIS Project is contributing to this stability. However, there are continuing challenges to this situation. Interventions that are aimed at further raising the level of human security in Timor-Leste should continue.

- The project has been aligned with the GoTL priorities and it is likely that the project will continue to be relevant in this regard.
While COMPASIS is contributing to the success of the UNDAF/CP and the MDGs, it will not be able to report on its distinct contributions because of the current reporting system being followed by the UNCT.

While the multi-agency approach in the COMPASIS Project is its best strength, this feature is also its biggest challenge. The level of difficulty in implementing the COMPASIS Project is high.

The project design had gaps and strengths. Donor guidelines also affected the quality of the project design.

The lapse in reviewing and revising the project document prior to implementation affected the performance of the project.

The project is delayed and it is unlikely that the intended results and objectives will be achieved by February 2013. There is a need to extend the project period.

There is also a need to adjust the project targets, strategies and budgets to raise the chances of project success. The planning and coordination system will also have to be adjusted.

The management structures and systems in COMPASIS are complex and have not yet developed into fully efficient mechanisms and systems for inter-agency coordination and timely problem-solving.

Cost efficiency in the project is high, but there are budget inadequacies that were not corrected in the financial design.

The project’s potential to create impact is challenged by basic gaps in the project design and its outreach limitation.

The present situation and special circumstances in Timor-Leste indicate that local capacities have not yet matured to a sustainable level. This will affect the sustainability of the intervention.

In the end, the following recommendations were forwarded in the report:

First, it will be necessary for the project to express its interest for a 10 month extension with the UNTFHS;

A synchronized implementation plan for the next 22 months should be made, bearing these main adjustments:

- A reduction in the target number of SHGs to be reached by UNDP from 200 to around 100-160
- A matching of the FAO target to the final revised number of SHGs
- An increase in the ILO target on trainings from 200 persons to around 750-2,000 SHG members
- An increase in the UNICEF target on water systems from 10 to 15;

A review and re-alignment of the project budget should be done to find out if a no-cost extension will suffice, or if additional funding will need to be requested from the UNTFHS;

The project logframe should be revised, and a common activity on RBM should be held among the participating agencies;

The district project officers should perform the role of over-all coordinator of COMPASIS in their respective districts;

The last 3 months of the project should be dedicated to the exit phase, with proactive activities to be done, specifically in fund sourcing for the local sustainable institutions such as FEEO and CDE; and
• An addendum to the project document, which includes the risk mitigation strategy, impact creation strategy, and exit phase details, should be developed and adopted.

• The project as a whole should coordinate with the suco councils and align its activities with the suco development plan.
I. Context of the Evaluation

A. Human Security Situation

The overall peace and order situation in Timor-Leste has so far been stable since the violent episode in 2006-2008. Except for minor and isolated cases of social conflicts which were observed in Oecusse, there have been no reported occurrences of civil strife that could be comparable to the magnitude of violent behavior seen in the previous period.\(^1\)

Improvements in the economic well-being of the Timorese and the development of the political system in the country could have been key factors for the present state of social stability. Latest [2009] estimates of the economic growth rate in Timor-Leste have been positive (at 5.0% - 7.4%). Income poverty is believed to have been reduced as an effect of overall economic growth, together with the direct wealth transfers being done by the government and its approach towards employment. Survey data also suggest a significant reduction in the proportion of the population with no formal education [Table 2].

The second village-level (i.e. suco) elections were also completed in Timor-Leste in 2009-2010. The members of the suco councils were elected through this process. The overall turnout of voters in these elections was high, at 68% [Table 1]. The UN Electoral Support Team (UNEST) noted that the process has been successful, based on the turnout rate and the absence of election-related violence.\(^2\)

Table 1. Data on Sucos and Suco Elections (2009-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Sucos</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oecusse</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Local Governance Report, March 2011

Still, there are continuing challenges to the full achievement of human security in Timor-Leste. The latest [2009/2010] survey data show that employment patterns have basically remained the same as it was in 2004. Although showing some incremental progress, the quality of life in the villages have also been largely unchanged in terms of the people's access to electricity, improved water sources, and basic sanitation facilities. The rural villages continue to be placed at a greater disadvantage than the urban areas [Table 2]. The growth of the population (i.e. 2.41% from 2004 to 2010) was also noted to be higher than in most Southeast Asian countries, and this was taken to be a long-term concern.

In Ermera and Oecusse, the two districts where the COMPASIS Project is being implemented, the survey data show mixed results. While the employment rates in both districts have been at par with the national trend, there appears to have been improvements in Oecusse in terms of access to improved sources of drinking water and sanitation facilities, compared to the situation in Ermera where it may have regressed [Table 2]. Voter turnout in both these districts during the 2009/2010 suco elections has however been high [Table 1].

\(^1\) According to the district staff, there was an incidence of stoning in Passabe Sub-District in a suco near the border with Indonesia.

\(^2\) This was the observation of Mr. Dan Radulescu, Project Manager of the UNEST Project, when he was interviewed by the Consultant on April 26, 2011 for the Women in Politics Programme of UN Women.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Selected Socio-Economic Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment Rate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oecusse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% of Households with Access to Drinking Water from an Improved Source</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oecusse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% of Households with Access to Basic Sanitation/Improved Facilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oecusse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% of Population with No Education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% of Population with Access to Electricity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Description of the Intervention

The Community Mobilization for Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion in Service Delivery (COMPASIS) Project is a human security intervention in Timor-Leste which is responding to the social conflict that transpired in 2006-2008 and the threats of extreme poverty and loss of human dignity. Funded through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), the project was designed from 2006 until December 2009. Approval by the UNTFHS was done in January 2010, and a Project Document was formally adopted in February 2010.

COMPASIS is designed to be a three-year intervention, scheduled to run from March 2010 until February 2013. However, due to various factors that are discussed later in this report, the project is delayed and the results of this evaluation show that an extension of the time frame will be necessary. It is being implemented by 6 UN Agencies: UNDP (also the Lead Agency), UNICEF, WFP, FAO, ILO, and UNFPA. These agencies are working with their counterpart government agencies in Timor-Leste, as well as with NGOs and private sector groups.

Based on the project document, the objectives of COMPASIS are: (1) to reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support; and (2) to promote social inclusion in the service delivery system. To achieve these objectives, the participating UN Agencies are implementing 18 activities based on their specializations and competencies: UNDP is in charge of strengthening Self-Help Groups (SHGs), and also the components on micro-finance and rehabilitation of small infrastructure in the target sucos; FAO is supporting the SHGs on agricultural training and production; and ILO has a component on entrepreneurship training to SHG members. Within the same sucos covered by the project, WFP is implementing food-for-work schemes, UNICEF is in charge of conducting literacy classes and the construction of facilities related to WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene), while UNFPA is responsible for family planning and reproductive health activities.

At the time of this evaluation, 89 SHGs (59 in Oecusse and 30 in Ermera) have been profiled by UNDP for the intervention. FAO has also completed the home garden training and distributed seeds and hand tools to 60 SHGs (30 in Oecusse and 30 in Ermera). ILO, through its local counterparts, has identified over 500 SHG members for entrepreneurship training and has conducted 16 of such training courses (12 in Ermera and 4 in Oecusse) for 356 beneficiaries. WFP has finished 40 food-for-work projects (30 in Ermera and 10 in Oecusse). UNICEF has conducted 22 literacy classes (15 in Ermera and 7 in Oecusse) and has finished the assessment of 7 water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. UNFPA has also trained the 17 facilitators (10 in Ermera and 7 in Oecusse) on family planning and reproductive health.

As the Lead Agency for the project, UNDP is also in charge of the overall coordination of activities across the participating UN Agencies. This is being done through a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) which is composed primarily by an International Coordinator and a National Coordinator. Overall guidance is also being provided by a Project Steering Committee (PSC).

The project is being implemented in 17 sucos in Ermera District (10 sucos), specifically in the sub-districts of Letefoho and Atsabe, and in Oecusse District (7 sucos), more particularly in the sub-districts of Passabe and Nitibe. The original plan is to strengthen 200 SHGs in these areas.

The total cost of the intervention was estimated at USD4.088 million over the three-year time frame. Because the components of UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and FAO include components that incur capital expenditures (e.g. construction and rehabilitation costs), their budget shares are comparatively higher: 27% for UNDP, 27% for UNICEF, 15% for WFP, and 14% for FAO. The shares of and ILO and UNFPA to the total project budget are 9% and 8%, respectively [Table 3].
### Table 3. Cost Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Share of UN Agencies</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Consultant’s Estimates based on the budget data

C. **Key Features of the Evaluation**

1. **Background and Objectives**

   The conduct of a mid-term evaluation is included in the UNTFHS Guidelines and is also stated in the project document itself. The process leading towards the conduct of this mid-term evaluation started in September 2011 with the drafting of its Terms of Reference (TOR), planning at an inter-agency meeting, and final selection of a consultant.

   Based on the TOR and the UNTFHS Guidelines, the overall goal of the evaluation is “to determine whether the objectives and performance indicators outlined in the funding proposal are achievable within the allotted timeframe.” In addition, the evaluation process will “serve as an opportunity for reflection, allowing the project partners to make course corrections and refine objectives, indicators and implementation timeframes, as needed.”

2. **Approach and Methodology**

   The evaluation was undertaken in accordance with the standard principles and overall approach set by the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG). These features were integrated in the TOR for the task.

   Based on the TOR and a review of the initial documents sent to the consultant, an Inception Report was made. This report described the consultant’s understanding about the intervention and how the evaluation will proceed based on this preliminary assessment. The Inception Report was discussed with the UN Agencies and the PIU in a meeting held on November 9, after the consultant’s arrival in Dili [Annex A].

   A mission to Timor-Leste was carried out from November 8 until December 3, 2011. Individual interviews and small group discussions with the focal persons from the stakeholder groups (i.e. beneficiaries, UN Agencies, counterpart government ministries and district offices, and private sector groups) were held. Field visits to the project areas in Ermera and Oecusse were completed within the weeks of November 14 - 25. During the mission, a review of additional documents was done, as well as the collection of primary data. The collection of information during the mission was based on the assessment criteria and points of inquiry that were identified in the Inception Report.

   A Draft Evaluation Report was prepared during the course of the mission and its highlights were discussed with the project stakeholders on December 2. Factual corrections and revisions based on comments made on the draft version were done until December 14 (New York Time), after which this Revised Evaluation Report was submitted.

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3 The base amounts exclude the costs of project coordination.
3. Disclosure of Limitations

A random sampling method in the selection of the sucos and SHGs covered by the evaluation was not possible because of the following constraints: (a) at the time of the evaluation, the profile of SHGs to be covered by the project was still being finalized; and (b) the time frame for the field visits in Ermera and Oecusse allowed only one day for the site visits to the sucos because of the other meetings that had to be held in the area, and also in consideration of the remote locations of the sucos. 4 sucos (3 in Ermera and 1 in Oecusse) were visited, and 7 SHGs (2 in Ermera and 5 in Oecusse) were consulted.

The local dialects had to be used in several meetings with informants. In these meetings, the project staff served as translators. Errors could have occurred in translating the information from English to the local dialects, and vice-versa. These meetings were nevertheless digitally recorded.

The financial data stated in this report are the latest that have been made available by the PIU and the participating agencies. Although some of the data are more current than others, these are the best approximations that could be done at the time of this writing. The financial data were updated in this report.

Information related to the design phase of the project (2006) were obtained from a limited number of individuals who are still with the project as of this date. Many of the key persons who participated in the design phase are no longer working for their respective agencies or could no longer be reached, and there has been a weakness in the turnover of documents and information from the design phase to the implementation phase. There are statements in this report which were based on the recollection or understanding by some individuals as to how the project was designed.
II. Findings

A. Relevance and Quality of Design

1. Relevance of the Intervention

It is clear that the COMPASIS Project is responding to the human security problems in the covered sucos that have persisted as of this period. These problems are: the low incomes of the suco residents owing to limited agricultural productivity and unemployment; their inability to access safe and clean water; the poor conditions of roads and basic infrastructure in the area; a high proportion of residents with no formal education; and a high population growth rate in the districts. While these problems are being addressed by the project and similar development interventions, and by the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) itself through its own priorities and mechanisms, it will take time to completely solve these predicaments because of personnel and budgetary constraints in the GoTL, land ownership issues in some areas which prevent the completion of road projects, and the unpreparedness of some groups to assume responsibility in maintaining the small infrastructure (e.g. water system) projects in their communities.

The project is also aligned with the priorities being set by the GoTL through its annual priorities system. In 2010 and 2011, the GoTL identified the areas of Basic Infrastructure (to include roads and water systems), Rural Development (to include agricultural productivity and micro-credit), and Public Services Delivery (to include health and education services) as among the priorities. Overall national government spending limits have increased, from USD637 million in 2010 to USD 985 million in the current fiscal year. However, the district-level consultations suggest that the increased amounts are not enough to cover the requirements in the project areas: the 2010 capital development budgets for Ermera and Oecusse were set at only USD7 million and USD11 million, respectively. Hence, it could be stated that in addition to being thematically relevant to the priorities of the national government, the COMPASIS Project is also supplementing the limited government resources that are made available to the districts, through the project investments in related activities and small infrastructure projects, and the personnel that are being supported by the project to deliver these.

At the district level, there is also complementation between the COMPASIS Project and the District Administration Offices in terms of identifying specific sub-districts and sucos where the interventions will be most needed and appropriate. A clear example of this complementation was seen in Oecusse District where the component on the construction of water systems was decided to be focused on Nitibe Sub-District where it was deemed to be more relevant.4

The COMPASIS Project was also intended to be relevant to the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Timor-Leste, specifically on the achievement of Outcome 2 (i.e. By 2013, vulnerable groups experience a significant improvement in sustainable livelihoods, poverty reduction and disaster risk management within an overarching crisis prevention and recovery context) and Outcome 3 (i.e. By 2013, young people, women and men have improved quality of life through reduced malnutrition, morbidity and mortality, strengthened learning achievement, and enhanced social protection). However, it was declared in the project document that these "UNDAF outcomes relate directly to the strategic programme framework of each participating UN agency." This is being done operationally through the direct reporting by the 6 UN Agencies on their contribution to the achievement of outputs which are linked to the 2 Country Programme (CP) outcomes. The design and the reporting system will therefore not be able to show how the project, as a distinct intervention and as a collaborative effort by the 6 UN Agencies, is actually contributing to the achievement of the UNDAF/CP outcomes.

The project will also contribute to the achievement of MDGs 1, 2, 3 and 5, either directly because the components are linked to the goal indicators, or thematically because the project results are not associated with the goal indicators. The MDGs that could be operationally linked to the COMPASIS Project are: MDG 1 (i.e. the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger) through the poverty headcount indicator; MDG 2 (i.e. the achievement of universal primary education) through

4 The USAID has a similar project in Oecusse (i.e. DWASH Project) which is being implemented in Passabe Sub-District.
the indicator on the literacy rate of 15-24 year olds); and MDG 5 (i.e. the improvement of maternal health) through the indicator on contraceptive prevalence rate. The contribution of COMPASIS to MDG 3 will only be thematic because none of the indicators here match the project results. Like the situation in the UNDAF however, the participating agencies will be directly reporting their results to the MDGs, and it is unclear whether or not the project will be able to report its results distinctly to the MDG Framework.

2. Quality of Project Design

After the approval of a Concept Note by the UNTFHS in August 2009, the project was designed until December 2009 with the completion of a full project proposal which was based on the UNTFHS Guidelines, and which was thereafter approved by the UNTFHS in January 2010. This project proposal eventually became the project document which was signed by the 6 participating UN Agencies and the Ministry of Economic Development in February 2010.

The design phase included consultations with the Ministry of Economy and Development (MED), the Ministry of Finance, the Secretary of State for Oecusse, and the participating UN Agencies. From these consultations, the narrative of the project document was developed together with the logical framework and the budget. Being the lead agency for the initiative, UNDP was tasked with the overall write-up of the project plans. No major revisions have been formally made on the plans, except for the additional indicators which were put in the Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) Framework.

While there were consultations with various stakeholders during the design phase, it seems that there was no methodology which was applied in designing the project (e.g. analysis of problems using a problems tree and construction of the logframe based on these as part of the logical framework approach), and this affected the quality of the design, in terms of its intervention logic. While the UNTFHS Guidelines specified the construction of a logframe for the project, it did not indicate the methodology by which the logframe will be developed.

The UNTFHS Guidelines also specified a template for the logframe which was the one applied in the project document. In the structure of the logframe, 4 outputs are linked to 2 objectives/outcomes and these objectives/outcomes are expected to lead towards the project goal/impact. There are 18 activities which need to be done to deliver the results of the intervention [Table 4].

Based on this evaluation’s appraisal of the intervention logic, the COMPASIS Project may have to make improvements or clarifications on the following aspects:

(a) The gap in the cause-and-effect relationship (or logical link) between Outcome 2 and the Impact – While it is logical for poverty reduction (i.e. Outcome 1) to lead towards the Impact (i.e. the protection of households against threats to human security), the same does not appear to hold for Outcome 2 (i.e. the promotion of social inclusion in the service delivery system). It may not be social inclusion per se that will be relevant to human security in the long-run, but the improvement of basic services (e.g. water, health) delivery in the sucos; and

(b) The redundancy of Output 1.1 with Outcome 1 – There is only one output associated with Outcome 1, and this weakens the hierarchical relationship between the two results (i.e. it means that the output and the outcome are the same). There is a need to add at least one more output to this outcome.

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5 There were changes made on some components which were not formalized, in the sense that these did not lead to an amendment of the project document and budget. For instance, the hiring of international consultants was put on hold in Timor-Leste, and this affected the UNDP and UNFPA components. The microfinance component of UNDP was also put on hold after a study done by a regional expert.

6 The UNTFHS template and the Project Document had made use of the terms “Project Objective” and “Project Goal”. The definitions in the UNTFHS Guidelines and the clarifications made by UNDP however indicate that these are the “Outcomes” and “Impact” of the COMPASIS Project.
Table 4. Summary of the Intervention Logic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>No. of Indicators</th>
<th>In Pro Doc</th>
<th>In M&amp;E Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact:</strong> Vulnerable households in Ermera and Oecusse are protected against threats to human security</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1:</strong> Poverty is reduced among vulnerable groups</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1:</strong> Improved income generation and food security for vulnerable groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Activities: 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Participating UN Agencies: 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2:</strong> Social inclusion in the service delivery system is promoted</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.1:</strong> Increased education participation of out-of-school children</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.2:</strong> Increased community awareness of maternal and child health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.3:</strong> Increased capacity of service providers in planning and executing community-based water, sanitation, primary health, and hygiene schemes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Activities: 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Participating UN Agencies: 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Consultant’s summary based on the Project Document and the M&E Plan

It is also apparent that there are missing indicators at the outcome and impact levels, and this is a basic gap that could easily be addressed later on by project management.

The logframe and the project document had further indicated the 18 activities that will have to be implemented by the 6 participating UN Agencies in order to deliver the outputs. It is clear from the (original) design as summarized in Table 4 that Output 1.1. (and therefore Outcome 1) will be more difficult to achieve than the other outputs because its correlated activities will be undertaken by a greater number of agencies (i.e. 4). It will be pointed later on in this report that the activities under this output also turned out to be sequential (i.e. one of the UNDP activities was a requisite for the activities by ILO and FAO), and this is one of the causes for the overall project delay. The project document was not able to elaborate down to this level of operational detail.

A key feature in the design of the COMPASIS Project is the collaboration of 6 participating UN Agencies towards the achievement of common objectives stated in a Results Framework. While this raises the quality of the project design in terms of its adherence to the Delivering as One concept in the UN System, it could have also been ambitious because the number of participating agencies is high and is in fact the highest among similar joint efforts in Timor-Leste. In addition, the lessons in joint programming in the country have only begun to be realized with the conduct of
programme evaluations that started last year [2010]. It was therefore impossible to incorporate such lessons in the project design phase which was done earlier (in 2009).\footnote{As noted in the Inception Report, there are 4 on-going Joint Programmes (JPs) in Timor-Leste. One of these JPs involve 5 UN Agencies, another JP is being implemented by 4 UN Agencies, and 2 JPs are run by 2 UN Agencies. The identification of lessons in joint programming in Timor-Leste started last year with the mid-term evaluation of the MDG-F JP entitled “Supporting Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Timor-Leste”.}

The lessons from the Oecusse Ambeno Community Activation Programme (OCAP), from which much of COMPASIS was patterned after, were not also incorporated in the project design. This was reportedly because COMPASIS was designed before OCAP ended in 2009.\footnote{Implemented by UNOPS and UNDP, OCAP also featured the organization of SHGs under the MYRADA Approach and had similar components on agricultural productivity, entrepreneurship and rehabilitation of community infrastructure.}

It is not also clear from the text of the project document and the consultation minutes if COMPASIS was regarded to be a Joint Programme (JP) or not from the start: there was no mention of the JP concept in the project document, and the collaboration among the UN Agencies was described as a multi-agency approach which was a plus factor in the UNTFHS Guidelines. It was only in the later minutes of the PSC meetings that the understanding of COMPASIS being a JP was brought up, and this late recognition could have added to the gap in understanding the JP concept.

Based on the Guidance Note developed by the UNDG in 2003, COMPASIS would qualify as a JP: (a) a common work plan (i.e. the AWP) and budget has been adopted; (b) there are more than 2 UN organizations and national partners involved; (c) the common work plan and budget (for the first year) is part of the project document; and (d) the project document is signed by all the participating UN Agencies and the MED. Beyond the parameters set by the UNDG however, the synergy in COMPASIS as a whole is difficult to establish [see the later section about the “Effectiveness of the Delivering As One Concept”]. Because of this difficulty, the evaluation views COMPASIS as actually 2 JPs that have been put together.

Gender considerations were included in the project design: there is a separate section in the project document which discussed the gender issues and strategies which are related to the project. Environmental concerns were not however covered in the project design, and this theme was not likewise included in the UNTFHS Guidelines. By practice nonetheless, the COMPASIS Project is adhering to environmental sustainability principles and approaches (e.g. the promotion of organic farming methods by FAO in the home gardens and the advocacy by UNICEF to put up water systems without compromising the agro-forestry initiatives in the area) Also, the WFP food-for-work schemes have incorporated environmental sustainability goals and approaches, such as the Sloping Agricultural Land Technology (SALT) applied for the terracing project in Suniute Suco in Oecusse [Inset 1].

Local stakeholder support is explicit in the design of the COMPASIS Project. Aside from the participation of the relevant ministries during the design phase, the mechanisms for local stakeholder participation are clearly identified in the project document and are either already functional or are being made functional. These are: the Project Steering Committee (PSC) which involves the MED, the Secretary of State for Oecusse, and the District Administrators for Ermera

While not included in the UNTFHS Guidelines, the theme of environmental sustainability is being applied in the project. This land terracing project built through the WFP food-for-work scheme is aimed at controlling soil erosion in the area.
and Oecusse; and the District Project Coordination Units (DPCUs) for both Ermera and Oecusse which include the district-level offices of the GoTL, as well as some sub-district representatives.

Notwithstanding its limitations [see the section on Prospects for Sustainability], the intervention was also designed to embed the project activities of the participating UN Agencies onto the annual work plans of their counterpart GoTL Ministries (e.g. UNICEF develops an annual work plan with the Ministry of Infrastructure in which the water systems under the COMPASIS Project are included). The district offices of the COMPASIS Project staff are also housed in the district administration offices of the GoTL in district centers of Ermera and Oecusse.

The lack of relevant lessons on joint programming in the project design was further complicated by the budget design which allocated most resources for the first year of implementation. As will be elaborated later in this report, joint and pioneering efforts such as this intervention normally take up considerable start-up time. A design in which most activities are to be implemented within the first year of operation would therefore be inconsistent with the limitations which are normally encountered in joint programming, and in any similar first-time intervention. This was unfortunately the situation in the COMPASIS budget: 41% was allocated for Year 1, 32% in Year 2, and 26% in Year 3 [Table 5].

**Table 5. Budget Allocation Per Year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yearly Allocation</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Consultant’s Estimates based on budget data*

Aside from the glitch in resource allocation, some UN Agencies have also noted that their budgets could have been underestimated during the design phase. This was one reason cited on why different targets were set by the agencies [see later section on Impact Prospects] and why most agencies only have part-time staff working for the project [see later section on Efficiency of Project Inputs]. The PIU further reported that there is no budget for M&E in the project.

There is a realization at this time that the financial design of COMPASIS, as well as its general plan as described in the project document and as discussed previously in this section, could have been reviewed and revised at an earlier stage. The UNTFHS Guidelines do allow changes to be made on the project document, subject to certain procedures.⁹

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⁹ These procedures can be found in Annex 4 of the UNTFHS Guidelines.
B. Effectiveness of the Intervention

1. Achievement of Outputs and Outcomes

The budget (i.e. financial input) structure of the COMPASIS Project shows that the 4 outputs are expected to be achieved by the end of the whole three-year period. This means that the 2 outcomes will be attained together with the delivery of the 4 outputs (i.e. the outputs and outcomes will be simultaneously delivered by the intervention). It is therefore not plausible to explore the full achievement of the outputs as of this mid-term point.

However, using the spending rate as a proxy indicator for the achievement of outputs (i.e. through the completion of activities associated with such outputs), the evaluation found the overall spending pattern to be low, at only 66% as of the date of this review. Also, the spending rate for the achievement of Outcome 2 is comparatively lower than in Outcome 1 [Table 6]. These findings imply that: (a) the project as a whole is delayed; (b) there is a greater delay in the achievement of Outcome 2 compared to Outcome 1; (c) within Outcome 2, there is a sizable delay in the achievement of Output 2.2 compared to the other outputs associated with that outcome; and (d) corrective measures should be taken to raise the chances of success of the intervention.

Table 6. Budget and Expenditure Data, in USD (as of November 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1/Output 1.1</th>
<th>Mid-Term Budget</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>Spending Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>485,432</td>
<td>277,296</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>368,250</td>
<td>229,712</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>295,000</td>
<td>264,696</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>153,941</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,351,682</td>
<td>925,645</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 2</th>
<th>Mid-Term Budget</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>Spending Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1 &amp; 2.3 (UNICEF)</td>
<td>482,500</td>
<td>328,225</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2 (UNFPA)</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>71,750</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>657,500</td>
<td>399,975</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Financial Reports and Consultant’s Estimates

10 The mid-term budget is computed as the budget for the first year plus one-half of the budget for the second year of project implementation.
11 Data as of August 2011
12 Data as of November 2011
13 Data as of December 2010
14 Data as of November 2011
15 Data as of November 2011
16 Data as of November 2011
It appears that the following factors contributed to the delay in the COMPASIS Project:

(a) The delivery of the basic financial and human resource inputs required for the intervention was itself delayed – Three UN Agencies were able to receive the first fund transfer from the UNTFHS Secretariat only in June 2010 (i.e. Project Start or PS + 4 months). This was reportedly because the finalization of their financial agreements with the UNTFHS had to be done at headquarters, which took some time to be completed. There was also an additional delay in the transfer of the said funds from headquarters to the country offices of some agencies [Table 7].

The staffing of key positions in the project also took time. The National Coordinator came on board in November 2010 (PS + 9 months), and an International Coordinator was hired by March 2011 (PS + 12 months). According to UNDP, it took time to hire the national coordinator because the selected person had to finish his previous contract with UNOPS. The international coordinator was also filled in through an International UNV posting which went through a lengthy process with the sponsoring government. Also, the recruitment activity did not start right away because the task manager lacked authority to commence the process immediately after the financial agreement with the UNTFHS was signed.17

Project staffing by the other participating UN Agencies was also delayed: at least one project staff reported to have come on board for the project only in December 2010 (PS + 9 months), one agency still has to fill up all the project items for its component as of this mid-term period. Aside from the delay in the agencies’ receipt of the first fund transfers [Table 7], language and technical skill requirements were also cited as reasons for the difficulty in hiring project staff.

(b) Some activities were sequential and there was a delay in the implementation of the prerequisite activity – It turned out that the identification and profiling of SHGs (i.e. Activity 1.1.1 c/o UNDP) was a first step towards the conduct of at least two other activities (i.e. Activity 1.1.3 c/o ILO and Activity 1.1.4 c/o FAO). The first step was delayed because there was a time interval between the end of the former OCAP Project in Oecusse and the start of the COMPASIS Project. It was also the first time for UNDP to implement the MYRADA approach in Ermera, and this required more time to link up with the SHGs which were erstwhile unknown to UNDP. However, since this was the first step and it was delayed, the profiling and training of these groups by FAO and ILO were also affected.

(c) The development of the implementation details and the conduct of inclusive processes took time – It appeared that the actual inception of the COMPASIS Project went through a gradual process: the decision to focus on 17 sucos in 4 sub-districts was done on June 2010 (PS + 4 months); and the plan to work with 152 potential SHGs in Ermera and 55 SHGs in Oecusse was presented in February 2011 (PS + 11 months). District-level consultations about COMPASIS took place from April to June 2010 (PS + 1 to 3 months) because these involved various government offices at the districts and suco chiefs. Project management also reported that some wrong expectations were created during the first round of socialization activities (e.g. it was perceived that the project was going to give away carpentry tools), and this required the conduct of another round of meetings to correct this misconception.

(d) There was a need to work with the pace of the local counterpart institutions – It was explained that the UN Agencies also had to integrate their work activities for the project with the annual work plans that they make together with their counterpart ministries. The timing of the preparation and finalization of these joint work plans also had to coincide with the schedules of the counterpart ministries.

(e) Lengthy procurement process – FAO explained that the procurement of vegetable seeds and hand tools that were distributed to the project beneficiaries took more time than expected (i.e.

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17 The National Coordinator hired for the COMPASIS Project was the former National Project Manager for OCAP.
3-5 months) because they had to import the seeds from Indonesia, as the locally-available seeds could not comply with quality requirements.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{(f) There was a need to time the activities with the season and beneficiary needs} – Beneficiaries of the FAO seed distribution activity reported that by the time they received the seeds, they could not proceed with the planting because they had to wait for the rainy season. WFP also pointed out that the food-for-work projects had to coincide with the proper time when the food stocks of the target groups were nearing depletion, in order to make the project relevant to their needs.

\textit{(g) Unexpected weather conditions delayed the implementation of some key activities} – It was reported that there was too much rain last year [2010], which caused the postponement of some key activities. The sucos being covered by the project are located in remote areas which are more difficult to access in times of heavy rains which make the roads impassable due to mud and rock slides. Rivers which are normally used as short cuts to the sucos are also impassable when there is heavy rain.

The project has not yet adopted a remedial plan that will address the delay in the implementation schedule. This is because the reflection process about the project is still on-going as part of this mid-term evaluation exercise, and its results are being awaited to identify corrective measures that ought to be taken. Several UN agencies and their GoTL and NGO counterparts have also raised a need for an extension of the intervention to enable them to catch up with their commitments.

The site visits nevertheless show indications of progress in the achievement of the output related to the improvement of incomes and food security among the target groups (i.e. Output 1.1). The women from Oecusse who are members of a self-help group which is being strengthened through the UNDP component, and who have already availed of the home garden training and seeds distribution activities of FAO said that they are just waiting for the rainy season to get their home garden projects started. One woman, though, was already able to start her home garden project because she has the advantage of having a water well in her backyard [Inset 2]. A second woman from another SHG was also able to put up a kiosk last September after attending the training on entrepreneurship under the ILO component in August. Based on the discussion, part of the capital used for the kiosk came from her savings which was kept in the group as part of the MYRADA approach of UNDP [Inset 3].

\textsuperscript{18} It was explained that original (i.e. not hybrid) seeds had to be procured in order to comply with the quality standards set by FAO Headquarters. This feature was also necessary to promote the sustainability of the crops (e.g. vegetables) to be planted by the beneficiaries.
3. Effectiveness of the Delivering As One Concept

The preceding examples are also indications that there is complementation between the UN agency components and that synergistic effects are being created through the joint project. In the first case mentioned earlier, the reduction of food insecurity in the household of the beneficiary is made possible through the FAO component which brought technological and material inputs on home gardening. At the same time, the woman was identified as a beneficiary because she is a member of the SHG being assisted by the Fundasaun Esperanza Enclave Oecusse (FEEO) through the UNDP component. In the second case above, it is clear that the additional income expected from the kiosk of the woman-entrepreneur was facilitated by the combined activities of ILO and UNDP.\(^{19}\)

In the site visit to Oecusse, it appeared that the WFP component was also somehow linked to the UNDP component because some women in one SHG reported that they also participated in the food-for-work project of WFP in their suco. This scheme implies that the same target group would immediately benefit from the food items brought by the WFP initiative, while their longer-term needs in food security and income generation are being addressed by FEEO/UNDP through the development of their SHGs. However, participation in the food-for-work projects of WFP was not necessarily limited to the SHG members: men were also reported to have been involved in the fencing of the project in Sunuwe Suco as part of the WFP approach, and another group which is not being covered by the COMPASIS Project also participated in the initiative [Inset 1]. Hence, there are some gray areas on the synergy of the WFP effort with the activities of the other UN Agencies that need to be clarified further, especially because these components have been designed under one output/outcome (i.e. Output 1.1/Outcome 1).

The synergy of the UNICEF and UNFPA activities with each other under Outcome 2, and with the rest of the components, is also another area that needs to be elaborated further. It is believed that the synergy with the UNICEF and UNFPA activities is expected at the level of the sucos where the benefits of improved water, increased literacy, and greater knowledge of family planning and reproductive health will be combined with the benefits of food security and income generation. Still, the UNICEF and UNFPA components are not necessarily being coursed through the same target groups that the UNDP, FAO, ILO, and WFP are working with. Hence, the synergy expected from the UNICEF and UNFPA activities are abstracted to a higher level (i.e. the suco in general).\(^{20}\)

As noted earlier, one weakness of the project is that it failed to recognize that some activities are related and sequential. The work planning system being followed in COMPASIS is basically an integration of the disparate annual work plans of each participating UN Agency. The synchronization of activities has been overlooked, and this has affected the effectiveness of the Delivering As One concept. Aside from this, there is also no three-year integrated plan which affects the effectiveness of the concept over the whole period of the intervention. It is also felt that the multi-tasking of part-time project staff is affecting the implementation of their activities. There have also been some rotations among project staff who have been assigned to new positions in their agencies, with no proper turnover of the documents and knowledge to the replacement staff. Contract limitations have also hindered the work of a focal person who had to wait for a contract renewal.

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19 FEEO is an NGO contracted by UNDP to mentor the SHGs in Ermera and Oecusse.

20 One reason cited (by UNFPA) is that there will be a missed opportunity if the other members of the community will not be included in the awareness-raising activities on family planning and reproductive health.
In the recent DPCU workshops in which the topic of district-level coordination was discussed, it was realized that there is a gap in the coordination of the various activities being done by the UN Agencies and their counterpart ministries at the districts. This is also affecting the effectiveness of the Delivering As One concept. One remedy that has been forwarded is to empower the district project officers of UNDP with the local inter-agency coordinative function.

4. External Factors Affecting Project Effectiveness

The factor of extreme weather conditions was identified in the project document as an external risk, and it has actually affected the effectiveness of the COMPASIS Project. As mentioned in the preceding section, heavy rains occurred in Timor-Leste last year [2010] which caused the delay in some activities. Should the situation continue, it is also expected to negatively affect the home gardens that are targeted to be set up in the 17 sucos. Even though this factor was identified in the project document, there was no corresponding mitigating measure adopted for it and for all the other risks which were included in the analysis. On the whole, project planning has been weak in this aspect.

The presence of similar interventions and the lack of facilities in the project area is also another factor which is affecting the effectiveness of COMPASIS. It turned out that USAID is implementing a project called DWASH in Oecusse which is also aimed at improving the water sources in the area in the same methodology that UNICEF is applying for COMPASIS. This meant that the UNICEF WASH component will no longer be implemented in the target sucos located at Passabe Sub-District, and it is hoped that there will be coordination with the DWASH Project as a viable substitute for the UNICEF component. It was also reported that there are no schools in Suniufe Suco (in Nitibe Sub-District) which will create a gap in the UNICEF Literacy component. The synergy expected from the joint effort will be affected by the absence of the agency components.

Based on the field discussions, the intrinsic endowments of the target groups is also an external factor which is associated with the effectiveness of the project. It is clear from the case of the woman mentioned earlier that having a facility to store water (i.e. a well) within the household premises facilitated the action to put up a home garden [Inset 4]. In the case of the other woman who was able to put up a kiosk, it is apparent that she also had some financial resources ready to start up her enterprise.

There is also a realization in the agencies that the results sought by the project require changes in the beneficiaries’ values and behavior which will take time. The specifics that were cited along this line of thinking are: the trust factor among the SHG members, especially because the SHGs are pooling their members’ savings; the shift to organic farming methods which FAO is promoting; the concern for the environment which WFP is advocating in the food-for-work schemes; and the basic entrepreneurial values (e.g. risk-taking) which ILO is trying to develop among the trainees. UNICEF also added an intention to change its community sanitation strategy in promoting family latrines. The Community Approach to Total Sanitation (CATS), which focuses on behavior change and a non-subsidized approach in the design and construction of family latrines, is envisioned to be more sustainable although it will also take more time to implement and show results.

The literacy level of the target group was also added as a factor in project effectiveness. It has been acknowledged that there are minimum literacy requirements for the beneficiaries to become effective members in their SHGs, and for them to also participate well in the entrepreneurship and agricultural training activities. One idea forwarded to address this situation is to align the literacy
component of UNICEF with the needs of the adult SHG members, but it is still uncertain whether this approach will be realistic given the mandate of UNICEF (on children and the youth).

C. Efficiency of the Intervention

1. Efficiency of Operation

The Project Steering Committee (PSC) is composed by the top-level officials from both the GoTL and the participating UN Agencies. On the part of the GoTL, the PSC members are the Vice-Minister of the MED, the Secretary of State for Oecusse, and the District Administrators (2) for Ermera and Oecusse. The Country Directors/Representatives and Chief Advisor of each of the UN Agencies (6) are also part of the PSC. Based on the minutes of meetings, the PSC has so far convened on 4 occasions: June 2010; July 2010; March 2011; and June 2011.21

The key actions taken by the PSC in these meetings were the approval of the work plans by each UN Agency for 2010 and 2011, the adoption of an M&E Plan, and the affirmation of a proposed communications strategy. The PSC is also briefed on the progress of the COMPASIS Project in these meetings, and some operational issues are discussed and at the least are noted or acted upon.22

Actions by the PSC which are related to the management of results are not yet visible from the minutes of the meetings. This is because the M&E Plan is still to be implemented: hence, the basic information needed for results-oriented decision-making at the level of the PSC are not yet available. It is not also clear if the PSC itself has common understanding about the concept of Results-Based Management (RBM), which implies that even if the data are made available by the M&E System, these may not necessarily lead into decisions for the achievement of results. There may therefore be a need for the COMPASIS Project to implement common RBM appreciation activities at this top level of decision-making (i.e. the PSC), and elsewhere in the project operating structure [Figure 1]. The problem of the overall project delay has not yet been discussed by the PSC because they are waiting for this mid-term evaluation report.

A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is lodged at UNDP, being the lead agency for the project. The core staff at the PIU (i.e. the International Coordinator and the National Coordinator) are responsible for the overall coordination of the project and the implementation of activities under the UNDP component. They have taken RBM Training in August 2011, and they are supposed to attend a follow-up training activity at the time of this evaluation [November 2011]. The PIU reported a difficulty in reporting project results because of the lack of a common M&E System for COMPASIS.

Further, it is unknown if the project staff from the other UN Agencies have taken similar training on planning for results and results-oriented monitoring. There is a similar challenge at the level of the PIU and the project officers because even if the monitoring system is already functional, this is no guarantee that the operating system will be efficient in achieving results. Their coordination of activities among the UN Agencies is also difficult because they do not have direct lines to the project staff who are accountable to their own unit heads in their respective agencies [Figure 1].23

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21 According to the TOR of the PSC, the PSC “will meet every six months or more frequently, if required.”
22 One example is the issue of the lack of salaries for teachers starting in August 2011 which was raised by UNICEF in the PSC Meeting held on March 2011. Based on the minutes of this meeting, the Vice-Minister committed to discuss this problem with the Minister of Education.
23 Compare, for example, the operating system applied in another JP [1998] in which all project staff across the UN Agencies are lodged in one project office, and where it was agreed that the project staff are functionally accountable to the JP Manager but still administratively responsible to their respective agencies.
As earlier reported, the budget for M&E has been overlooked in the financial design. This is one reason why the baseline study for COMPASIS has taken time. Nonetheless, the results of the baseline study have already been presented recently, and its final completion is expected soon.\footnote{Because of the lack of a budget, the baseline study had to be funded and implemented through another project and unit at UNDP.}

It was also noted in the earlier section that there is no synchronized work plan among the 6 UN Agencies at the moment. The annual work plans that have been approved by the PSC for the COMPASIS Project are the disparate work plans by the 6 agencies that have been put together in one template. It has been realized however, that the activities are related and sequential, and the absence of a synchronized work plan creates a gap in organizing these activities well, especially if these are going to be implemented with the same target groups and in the same sucos.

The UNTFHS Guidelines also did not require an integrated schedule of activities for the whole three-year project period. The absence of this planning tool is limiting the ability of project management to methodically determine the critical activities in the project, and to measure the lag time associated with the delays in the implementation of activities.

The District Project Coordination Units (DPCUs) were formed in November 2010 and are being re-activated at the time of this evaluation. The project's ability to address problems at the level of the districts in real-time would nevertheless still depend on the functionality of the M&E System, and the authority of the district project officers to coordinate the field activities of the project staff of all UN Agencies. It turned out from the DPCU workshops that the district project officers are not yet empowered to do so.\footnote{UNDP clarified that the district project officers are actually coordinating the activities of UNDP, ILO, FAO and also UNFPA, although this role will have to formalized.}
2. Efficiency of Financial Inputs

The initial financial inputs for the intervention were transferred by the UNTFHS Secretariat to the 6 UN Agencies after their letter of agreements were formally signed. The timing of the first fund transfers however depended on the speed by which the agreements were signed by the duly designated authorities. In the case of COMPASIS, 3 agencies were able to receive their 1st fund transfers to headquarters by April 2010 (i.e. PS + 1 month) while 3 other agency HQs were able to get the transfers only by June 2010 (i.e. PS + 3 months). The eventual transfer of the funds from headquarters to the country or regional offices was also a separate transaction which took additional time. Based on the reports, an additional 1 to 2 months was taken up by this step. Hence, the mean delay in the first transfer of funds alone could be 3.5 months, which is significant in an intervention with only a 36-month time frame [Table 7].

Table 7. Schedule of 1st Fund Transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Dates of 1st Fund Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>From UNTFHS to Agency HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From Agency HQ to CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>April 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNTFHS and UN Agencies

The cost efficiency of the project budget is being ensured through the agencies' compliance with the standard procurement procedures in the UN System. Agencies which have major procurement activities for the food-for-work schemes and small infrastructure projects are following the basic quality and cost control methods such as: maintenance of a registry of vendors; pre-qualification and public bidding procedures; and separate management of logistics and procurement processes.

Non-cash cost counterparts are also being provided by the GoTL Ministries and district offices through their personnel who deliver various services for the COMPASIS Project, as well as the physical offices and other facilities which are provided for use by the project district teams.26

D. Impact Potential

A pioneering approach being piloted in the COMPASIS Project is the training by UNFPA of focal persons on family planning and reproductive health in each of the 17 sucos being covered by the project. This was reported to be different from the previous approaches done, and if successful in the long-run could be one of the potential impact contributions of the project.

On the whole however, and based on the discussion with project management, the impact definition of COMPASIS is the same as its goal statement. This means that the expected impact from the COMPASIS Project is that Vulnerable households in Ermera and Oecusse are protected against threats to human security. There are no indicators that have been set yet for this result [Table 4]. However, it does appear immediately that this could be a vague formulation of a result because the change implied by the said definition will be difficult to ascertain (i.e. how will

26 The district offices of the COMPASIS Project are housed within the compound of the District Administrators in Ermera and Oecusse.
"protection" be measured as a change from one state or condition to another?). It may therefore be helpful for the project to improve its impact statement.

The project’s intervention logic summarized in Table 4 also suggests that the envisioned impact will be a consequence of: (a) the reduction of income poverty and hunger (i.e. Outcome 1); and (b) their access to basic education, health, and water services (i.e. Outcome 2). By itself, Outcome 1 is a complex result (i.e. it may by itself already be the impact of a development intervention) because it requires the occurrence of major economic, political and social conditions. Also, while Outcome 2 is easier to accomplish because it involves the delivery of tangible services by existing providers, the sustainability of this outcome that will link it with the achievement of the impact is still a challenge in the context of Timor-Leste.27

One of the operational challenges to the impact potential of the COMPASIS Project is the different targets set by the UN Agencies for their various components under Outcome 1. In the original project design, 200 SHGs (i.e. 3,000 to 4,000 persons) are supposed to be covered by the UNDP component. It however appears that the plan is for FAO to support this target outreach in 3 different ways: 120 SHGs will be trained on agricultural-based livelihood skills, 50 SHGs will be provided with technical support and post-harvest equipment, and 30 SHGs will be assisted on integrated agriculture activities. For ILO, the plan indicates that 200 persons (i.e. SHG members) will be trained on vocational, business development, and financial literacy courses. Even for the micro-finance component of UNDP, only 100 SHGs will be covered according to the plan. These imply that there will be varied inputs across the 200 SHGs: some will get more, some will get less. Unless the intervention is tailor-fit to match the specific capacity needs of each SHG, it will be difficult to expect that the same impact will be created among the target groups. This situation may also create social jealousy in the communities, which the project will have to watch out for.28

A related challenge is the limited scope of impact which can be expected from the intervention under Outcome 1. The latest [2010] census data reported that there could be around 11,000 households in the sub-districts being covered by COMPASIS. This means that the impact reach of the project will be 45% of this total population, at the most.29

A third obstacle is the gap between Outcome 2 and Outcome 1. While Outcome 1 works through the SHGs, most of Outcome 2 (plus the WFP component and the UNDP component on small infrastructure) activities will have an effect on the broader communities (i.e. the impact will be on the sucos, and not limited to the level of households). These include the literacy and WASH components of UNICEF, and the family planning and reproductive health component of UNFPA. As noted earlier in this report, this feature of the COMPASIS Project now abstracts the expected results (including the impact) to a wider range.

There is also a gap between some of the Outcome 2 targets and the total number of sucos being covered by the project. Based on the budget, the UNICEF WASH component will only be able to support 10 water supply systems, 10 school latrine and hygiene facilities, and improved sanitation facilities for 300 families. On the other hand, the UNFPA activity which is linked to the SHGs under Outcome 1 will only be for 150 SHGs. These imply that not all the 17 sucos and 200 SHGs under the COMPASIS Project will benefit from these inputs. Hence, the long-term impact at the sucos may not turn out to be the same.30

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27 Outcome 2 has been reformulated in this report to emphasize the point that it will be the target groups’ access to basic services that will be logically linked to the achievement of the impact, and not their inclusion in the delivery of such services.

28 This possibility came about during the site visit to Suniufe Suco in Oecusse. Based on the discussion, one SHG which participated in the food-for-work scheme of WFP is not being covered in the other components under Outcome 1.

29 Based on the census data, there are 3,704 households in Letefoho, 3,056 in Atsabe, 2,609 in Nitibe, and 1,767 in Passabe. The 45% impact outreach estimate is based on a total coverage of 200 SHGs by COMPASIS, and a maximum membership of 25 persons per SHG.

30 In the project document, UNFPA also has an activity aimed at the SHGs (i.e. 2.2.3 Orientation of self-help groups to family planning and reproductive health issues). Still, the budget details indicate that this activity will be limited to only 150 SHGs.
Project management also added a point that there could be different impact expectations from the 2 districts being covered under COMPASIS. The differentiating factors are the geographic nature of Oecusse (i.e. it is an enclave which is physically separated from the rest of Timor-Leste) and the newness of Ermera as an intervention area for SHG formation.\footnote{It is believed that there could be greater impact in SHG formation in Oecusse because of a need by the local people to work together due to their isolation from the rest of Timor-Leste. The impact of savings build-up will also be greater because of the limited circulation of money within the area. Compared to Ermera, Oecusse was also the site of previous SHG formation under the OCAP Project.}

Lastly, the project’s potential contribution to the community development plan will still have to be established. While some components (e.g. the WFP food-for-work schemes) were reported to have been implemented in coordination with the suco and aldeia chiefs, and presumably in line with the suco priorities as set out in the suco development plans, the same was not visible with the other project components and the intervention as whole.

E. Prospects for Sustainability

One of the sustainability strategies adopted by the COMPASIS Project is the embedding of the activities into the programme of action by the GoTL, specifically the counterpart ministries of the UN Agencies. This is being done by integrating the activities of the annual work plan of COMPASIS into similar annual work plans that are jointly made between the agencies and their counterpart ministries (e.g. the annual work plans between UNICEF and the Ministry of Infrastructure for the construction of the water systems and the annual work plans between UNDP and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Territorial Management for the rehabilitation of community infrastructure). It is assumed that this approach will in the end, lead to the continuation of activities by the GoTL itself after the project has exited. The experience however shows that the GoTL operates on a system of annual priorities which can change over time. This system naturally also alters the budget priorities of the GoTL which places this sustainability strategy at risk.\footnote{A discussion with a GoTL official for instance noted that there was a budget shift towards support to the veterans (i.e. combatants of the resistance movement) which was decided upon by the national parliament last year (2010).}

Another strategy is the organization and strengthening of local institutions and mechanisms that will supposedly be responsible for the continuation of project activities and the maintenance of the rural assets that will be rehabilitated through the project. The local institutions being referred to in this strategy obviously include the SHGs, Water Users’ Groups, and NGOs (e.g. FEEO) that the project is working with. The local mechanisms could be the DPCUs that the project is supporting, which enable the local stakeholders to interact on matters that are related to the intervention. The site visits and discussions however indicate that previous applications of this strategy do not necessarily lead to sustainability.

For example, the SHGs in Oecusse which are being covered by the COMPASIS Project were actually organized before, during the OCAP period. The previous OCAP was implemented for 4.5 years (compared to 3 years in COMPASIS) and this time frame was not enough to make the SHGs sustainable. There were also water users’ groups which were organized before the time of COMPASIS, but these did not also turn out to be sustainable. It is also obvious from the discussion with FEEO that the NGO will need external funding support in order to continue its mentoring services to the SHGs after the exit of COMPASIS. The DPCUs and the limited district assemblies have also only started to be convened during the course of this evaluation, so there is not enough basis to say whether these will become sustainable mechanisms or not.

A third strategy is the training of beneficiaries and GoTL personnel, with an end-in-view of the trainees being able to ultimately carry on with the tasks which have otherwise been provided by hired project staff. While the technical personnel of the GoTL at the level of the districts have apparently been empowered through their years of cooperation with the UN Agencies, the practical constraint that they face is that they are usually understaffed and therefore overworked (e.g. the extension worker of the MAF trained by FAO is covering 3 sucos in Ermera) and underfunded. This situation will most likely persist until after COMPASIS has ended, which will affect the sustainability of the intervention. There were also several training activities for SHG
members under the previous OCAP, which did not necessarily lead to their self-reliance and the continuity of their SHGs.

Nonetheless, positive steps have been taken in the COMPASIS Project and by the UN Agencies in their bilateral activities with their respective national counterparts, which should lead towards sustainability. One of these is the cooperation with FEEO, a local NGO which was put up by former OCAP staff, in the strengthening of the SHGs. Through the cooperation, the capacity of FEEO to continue supporting the SHGs is being built and assistance in obtaining future funding for its operations may also be extended by UNDP in the remaining period. A second positive feature is the development of the capacities of the Centro de Desenvolvimento Empresarial (CDE) in entrepreneurship training by the ILO. It is CDE which is already implementing the entrepreneurship trainings for ILO under COMPASIS and in the discussions with them in Ermera and Oecusse, it looks like that they are ready to continue with the training activities, subject to the availability of funds.

While there is no clear exit phase indicated in the project plan, it seems that the exit phase is part of the original three-year time frame. Given the delay in project implementation and the realization that more time will be needed to achieve substantive results, a project exit by the original terminal date (i.e. February 2013) will not be appropriate. It is also believed that the national elections in Timor-Leste scheduled in early 2012 will also affect the pace of project activities within that period, which will be another factor to consider in the time frame of the project and its exit phase.
III. Conclusions and Lessons Learned

A. Conclusions

1. For the past 3 years, the overall human security situation in Timor-Leste has been stable due to progress in the economy and in governance. The COMPASIS Project is contributing to the stability of human security in the country by helping reduce the threat of hunger and income poverty among its target groups, and by helping improve the quality of life in certain communities. These are being done as a collective effort by 6 UN Agencies and their counterpart ministries and offices in the Government of Timor-Leste, as well as in partnership with NGOs.

2. There are however, continuing challenges to the full attainment of human security in Timor-Leste. While the threat of renewed social conflict and violence has largely diminished, it is still too early to completely dismiss this possibility. While the threat of hunger and poverty is believed to have been reduced in Timorese society, it remains extensive. Poverty in Timor-Leste also remains pervasive, in terms of limited incomes and inadequacy of basic social services. There are basic social, cultural, institutional, and economic factors underlying the problem that will require long-term solutions. Interventions that are aimed at further raising the level of human security in the country should therefore continue.

3. The project has so far been aligned with the priorities of the GoTL for the past two years, and it is likely that the COMPASIS Project will continue to be relevant to these national priorities in the immediate period. The project is also complementing the operationalization of these priorities at the sub-district and suco levels through resource counterparting and targeting.

4. The project is contributing to the success of the UNDAF/CP and the MDGs in some aspects that are covered by the intervention. However, the project by itself will not be able to report on these contributions because of the reporting system being followed by the UNCT in Timor-Leste. The project is also piloting the application of the Delivering As One concept in the UN System.

5. The COMPASIS Project was designed to be a multi-agency intervention to appropriately address the complex challenges to human security in the country. While this is the main strength of the project, it is also its biggest challenge. The level of difficulty in implementing this project is high, because it involves 6 UN Agencies and several GoTL and NGO counterparts. Additionally, the project did not have the benefit of learning the lessons from similar and related experiences.

6. There were also gaps in the project design in terms of its intervention logic and financial plan. At the same time, there are design strengths on gender integration, environmental sustainability, and stakeholder participation. Donor guidelines also influenced the quality of the project design.

7. There was a lack of a review and revision of the project document prior to the implementation of activities. This lapse has affected the performance of the COMPASIS Project.

8. On the whole, the project is delayed and it is unlikely that the intended results and objectives will be achieved within the original time frame. Because of this situation, there is a need to extend the project period. The project delay is partly due to the ambitiousness of the design, plus the lack of previous experience or knowledge about joint programming. Institutional constraints and weather conditions also affected the pace of project implementation. The project delay is also due to basic weaknesses in planning and operations management.

9. Aside from the additional time in the extended period, there is also a need to make adjustments on the project targets, strategies and budgets in order to increase the chances of project success. The planning and coordination system will also have to be upgraded based on the lessons that have so far been learned as of this mid-term period.

10. The management structures and systems for COMPASIS are in place and are, except at the district level, already functional. However, it is a complex structure and a first-time experience which has not yet developed into a fully efficient mechanism for inter-agency coordination and timely problem-solving. There are also institutional boundaries that have to be respected among the agencies.
11. Cost efficiency in the project is high because of institutional procedures that are being followed to ensure that financial inputs are being managed in the best possible way. Still, there are budget inadequacies that are rooted in the inability to review and revise the financial design.

12. The project’s potential to create impact is challenged by fundamental gaps in the project design and its outreach limitation. The project design, logframe, and implementation plan will have to be revised in order to arrive at a realistic impact expectation from the intervention.

13. The project’s sustainability strategy is mainly dependent on the capacities of the state institutions, NGOs, and beneficiaries to carry on with the intervention even after the project has ended. The present situation and special circumstances in Timor-Leste however indicate that these capacities have not yet developed to such a level. Expectations about sustainability may have to be clarified among the stakeholders, and the project will have to take pro-active measures to increase the chances of project continuity.\textsuperscript{33}

B. Lessons Learned

1. The achievement of full human security in Timor-Leste is a long-term process. At the same time, it is important for a development intervention to show immediate activities and visibility in the areas, especially in a difficult and post-conflict situation, where it is necessary, as a first step, to build up public confidence on the project.\textsuperscript{34}

2. When designing a project, it will be helpful to adopt a methodical approach (such as the Logical Framework Approach) throughout the whole process of project development: from the analysis of problems and solutions up to the construction of a logical framework. Donor guidelines should specify the approach to be applied by the proponent in the project design phase.

3. It should have been recognized at the start that the level of difficulty in implementing COMPASIS would be high because the scope of agency participation is wide, and it will practically be a first-time experiment. Knowledge inputs on previous and similar interventions (such as other JPs and OCAP) would have been helpful.

4. A joint and inclusive intervention such as COMPASIS requires a considerable start-up phase which should be included in the project plan. A lengthy start-up phase would be significant in an intervention with a time frame of only three years.

5. It is of paramount importance to conduct a review of the project plans (i.e. project document, logframe, and budget) and revise these, as may be necessary, prior to the implementation phase. It would also be helpful if a proper turnover of documents and knowledge is made by those who participated in the design phase, to those who will actually implement the project.

6. In a joint intervention such as COMPASIS and in the context of Timor-Leste, it should be recognized that the pace of project implementation depends not only on the pace of the participating UN Agencies but also the pace of their counterpart institutions.

\textsuperscript{33} UNFPA clarified that it is particularly the weak monitoring system from the national level to the sub-villages (i.e. aldeias) which is still the problem in their case, and not the capacity of the Ministry of Health, as they have invested in capacity-building activities for the past years. The evaluation nevertheless views that local capacities in M&E will still be a key element for the sustainability of the intervention.

\textsuperscript{34} This has been the distinct contribution of WFP’s food-for-work schemes in the COMPASIS Project.
IV. Recommendations

1. As a first step, it will be necessary for the project to sound off a 10 month extension (i.e. until December 2013 to also coincide with the UNDAF time line) with the UNTFHS, with the last three months of the extended period being allotted for the exit phase of the project. Whether it will be a no-cost extension or not will depend on the results of the re-planning and budget review as described in the succeeding recommendations.

2. The second step would be to develop a synchronized implementation plan for the remaining portion of the original time frame plus the extended period (i.e. a total of 22 months excluding the exit phase), subject to the following adjustments:

   2.1 A reduction in target number of SHGs from 200 to 100-160 – Based on the discussions, the original target number of 200 SHGs is unrealistic considering the time frame, budget, staff complement, and the lack of previous experience in doing the work in Ermera. The number of SHGs will also have to be downsized to match the complementary work to be done by FAO and ILO, in order to raise the chances of project impact.35

   2.2 Matching of the FAO target to the revised number of SHGs – The targets of FAO should correspond to the final reduced number of SHGs. The FAO component may just be focused on the home gardening component, as long as all the SHGs are provided with the same level of inputs.

   2.3 An increase in the ILO target on entrepreneurship trainings to at least half of the members of the 100-160 SHGs – This means that the ILO target should be upgraded from 200 SHG members to around 750-2,000 SHG members.

   2.4 An increase in the UNICEF target on water systems from 10 to 1536 - This should be done to ensure that at least one water system is in place for each suco.

   The UNFPA activity related to the orientation on family planning and reproductive health issues (i.e. Activity 2.2.3) should also correspondingly adjust to the revised number of SHGs.

   WFP may retain its original target of 76 food-for-work schemes until the extended period.

   UNICEF may also maintain its original targets for the literacy classes and the other WASH sub-components.

3. The third step would be to review the budget to find out if the remaining portion of the current budget would still be able to carry the activities in the revised implementation plan, plus the cost of project coordination (including the cost of M&E) and the agency administration costs.

   For the UNDP component, the budgets for microfinance and the uncommitted portion of small infrastructure rehabilitation are suggested to be re-aligned for the costs mentioned above. This will also be suggested for the FAO component on post-harvest equipment and livestock.

   Should it be determined that the agency budget balances are adequate to cover the costs of the extension, a no-cost extension should be proposed to the UNTFHS. Otherwise, the project may exercise its option to request for additional funding from the UNTFHS.

4. Aside from the work to be done with the extended period, there is also a need to revise the logframe of COMPASIS. Some comments have already been forwarded in this report. However, there may be a need to level-off first on the basic RBM concepts not only among the UN Agencies, but also among the key government offices and NGOs that may be involved in project monitoring. The cost of M&E to be added onto the project budget should also include some preliminary workshops on RBM.

35 The target of 100-160 is based on the estimates of UNDP. The Consultant prefers lower limits within this range with priority to SHGs in their advanced stages of development.

36 This target excludes the 2 sucos in Passabe where the DWASH Project will instead be implemented.
In the process of revising the logframe, the evaluation is suggesting the transfer of the WFP component from Outcome 1 to Outcome 2. This is because the food-for-work schemes of WFP are not necessarily limited to the SHGs. The UNDP component on the rehabilitation of small community infrastructure should also be moved to Outcome 2. This is because the benefits from both components are open to the whole community, which are similar to the situation of the UNICEF and UNFPA components.

The project is looking forward to the data from the recently completed baseline study, and also the 2010 Census where the data could be disaggregated at the suco level, to finalize the indicators for the COMPASIS logframe. This can be done, as long as the indicators to be adopted follow the basic SMART criteria, and are kept simple as much as possible.

5. The evaluation is supporting the suggestion arising from the DPCU workshops that there should be district-level coordinator of COMPASIS (aside from the national-level coordinators in the PIU). The district project officers of UNDP may be empowered to coordinate the inter-agency activities at the district level. Aside from this task, the visibility of COMPASIS in the districts and sucos should also be ensured by the district project officers.

6. As stated earlier, the last 3 months of the extended period should be dedicated to the exit phase of the project. Aside from the handover of project responsibilities to the local institutions, the project should also take proactive steps in helping these local institutions (e.g. FEOO and CDE) to have access to funding opportunities. Endorsement to donor agencies on the proposed projects of the local institutions should be done by the UN Agencies within the exit phase. Balances of the project fund, if any, may also be transferred to these local institutions.

7. An addendum to the project document (or a similar instrument) should be developed and adopted by the PSC. The addendum should include: (a) the risk mitigation strategy on climate change or variability that has been experienced by the project; (b) an elaboration of the strategy for impact creation, and an acknowledgement of the limitations on project impact; and (c) details on the extension period and the activities to be undertaken within the exit phase.

8. Within the remaining period, the project should also clearly establish its approach and strategy towards the strengthening of local governance in Ermera and Oecusse, by coordinating its activities with the suco councils and aligning these with the suco development plans.

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37 For example, FAO’s view that it would be alright to continue with the different sub-components on agricultural productivity should be included as among the project strategies in the addendum.
Annex A. Mission Schedule

November 8 (Tuesday)  Arrival in Dili
November 9 (Wednesday)  Presentation of the Inception Report in Dili
                          Meetings with UNDP/PIU, UNICEF (Literacy) and ILO in Dili
November 10 (Thursday)  Meetings with FAO, WFP, UNFPA and UNICEF (WASH) in Dili
November 11 (Friday)    Meetings with the Vice-Minister of the MED, the PIU, the DSS, and UNDP in Dili
November 12 (Saturday)  Write-Up of Draft Report
November 14 (Monday)    Travel to Ermera District
                          Meetings with the District Development Officer (DDO) and IADE in Gleno
November 15 (Tuesday)   Interview the UNICEF (WASH) Focal Person for Ermera in Lauana Suco
                          Observe the DPCU Workshop and Interview GMF Chairperson in Lauana Suco
November 16 (Wednesday) Site Visit to the FAO Demonstration Garden in Catrai Leten Suco
                          Meetings with SHGs in Catrai Leten and Baboi Craic Sucos
                          Observe ILO Training and UNFPA Orientation in Lauana Suco
November 17 (Thursday)  Meeting with District Project Team in Gleno
                          Travel to Dili
November 18 to 19 (Friday to Saturday)  Write-Up of Draft Report
November 21 (Monday)    Travel to Oecusse District
                          Meetings with the District Project Team and the FEEO in Oecusse
November 22 (Tuesday)   Meetings with the District Administrator and District Development Officer in Oecusse
                          Meetings with WFP and Staff of the MOH, MOE, DSS, and CDE in Oecusse
November 23 (Wednesday) Site Visit to Suniufe Suco
                          Meetings with 6 SHGs in Suniufe Suco
                          Visits to WFP Food-For-Work Project and Beneficiary Projects
November 24 (Thursday)  Observe the DPCU Workshop in Oecusse
November 25 (Friday)    Travel to Dili
                          Write-Up of Draft Report
November 26 (Saturday to Wednesday)  Write-Up of Draft Report
December 2 (Friday)     Presentation of the Draft Report
December 3 (Saturday)  Departure from Dili
Annex B. List of Reference Documents

Publications


Minutes of Meetings

Minutes of the 4th PSC Meeting held on June 10, 2011
Minutes of the 3rd PSC Meeting held on March 21, 2011
Minutes of the Inter-Agency Meeting held on September 26, 2011
Minutes of the Inter-Agency Meeting held on May 23, 2011
Minutes of the Inter-Agency Meeting held on February 8, 2011
Minutes of the 2nd PSC Meeting held on July 26, 2010
Minutes of the 1st PSC Meeting held on June 15, 2010
Minutes of the LPAC Meeting held on October 19, 2009

Others

COMPASIS Substantive Progress Report dated 31 March 2011
Annual Work Plan 2011
COMPASIS Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 2010
COMPASIS Project Document dated 25 February 2010
Annual Work Plan 2010
2010 State Budget of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
Final Report on the Rehabilitation and Community Development in Rural Areas Programme
UNDG Guidance Note on Joint Programming dated 19 December 2003
Annex C. List of Informants

UN Agencies

1. Mr. Fernando Encarnacao – ILO Focal Person
2. Mr. Caesar Hall – UNICEF WASH Focal Person
3. Mr. Agapito Da Silva – UNICEF Literacy Focal Person
4. Dr. Gina Pangilinan – UNFPA Focal Person
5. Mr. Ruben Flamarique Urdin – FAO Focal Person
6. Mr. Manuel Barbosa – WFP Focal Person
7. Ms. Katherine Lester – UNDP Focal Person
8. Mr. Joao Ferreira – UNICEF Literacy Project Officer
9. Mr. Elijeu Silva – WFP Project Officer
10. Mr. Carion Da Costa – UNICEF WASH Officer
11. Ms. Luis Colo – WFP Project Officer
12. Ms. Yolanda do Rosario – WFP Project Officer

Government of Timor-Leste

1. Vice-Minister Cristiano da Costa – Ministry of Economy and Development
2. Mr. Jose Tanesib Anuno – Oecusse District Administrator
3. Mr. Joao Jeronimo – Director of Sanitation and Services
4. Mr. Joao Mestre Medeiva – Ermera District Development Officer
5. Mr. Miguel Bucan – Oecusse District Development Officer
6. Mr. Bernardino de Meneses – Ermera CDE Director
7. Ms. Beatriz dos Santos – Ermera CDE Trainer
8. Ms. Lucia Taeki – Oecusse Health Coordinator
9. Mr. Gil da Sousa – Oecusse SAS Officer
10. Mr. Hernani Soares – Oecusse CDE Officer
11. Mr. Remigio Lelan – Oecusse CDE Officer
12. Mr. Mario Salu – Oecusse SEFOPE

Beneficiaries

1. Chairperson of Water Users' Group in Lauana Suco Limiluhi Aldeia, Ermera
2. SHG Members in Catrai Leten Suco, Letefoho, Ermera
3. SHG Members in Baboi Craic Suco, Atsabe, Ermera
4. SHG Members in Suniufe Suco, Nitibe, Oecusse

NGO

1. Ms. Merita de Jesus – FEEO Executive Director

Project Implementation Unit

1. Ms. Beatriz Marciel – International Project Coordinator
2. Mr. Reinaldo Soares – National Project Coordinator
3. Mr. Jose Rodrigues – Ermera Project Officer
4. Mr. Antonio Sequeira – Oecusse Project Officer
5. Mr. Tonilo Baptista – Ermera Facilitator
6. Mr. Miguel Maia – Ermera Facilitator
7. Mr. Alfonso Taco – Oecusse Facilitator
8. Mr. Jose Luis – Oecusse Facilitator