



United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Afghanistan

**PROGRAMME EVALUATION OF Afghanistan Sub National Governance
Programme – I (ASGP I) 2006 to 2010**

**PROGRAMME REVIEW of Afghanistan Sub National Governance Programme – II
(ASGP II) 2010 to 2014**

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

September 2011

Independent External Evaluators:

Geraldine Gibbons MBA, FIMS, BA.
Team Leader
geraldine.gibbons@yahoo.com

Nameer Al-Hadithi B.Eng, MSc.
Programme Management
nalhadithi@sanami.co.uk

Kalimuddin Ghauri FCA, CFE.
Financial Management
kalim.ghauri@pk.pwc.com

Abdul Moien Jawhary MBA, MSc.
Sub National Governance
moienjawhary@gmail.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	4
2. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED	5
3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	7
4. THE METHODOLOGICAL PROCESS	12
5. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF ASGP	14
6. OVERALL FINDINGS	16
6.1 ASGP I	16
6.2 ASGP II	21
6.3 Assessment of Programme Management	27
6.4 Assessment of Sub National Governance	29
6.5 Assessment of Financial Management	36
6.6 Summary of Findings based on SWOT Analysis	43
7. THE WAY FORWARD	45
7.1 Critical Success Factors/Recommendations	45
7.2 Analysis of Options for the Way Forward	45
7.3 Recommended Options	47

ANNEXES

Note: The Annexes are attached as a separate word document

Annex I	Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited	A-3
Annex II	Financial Management Paper	A-11
Annex III	Programme Management Paper	A-27
Annex IV	Sub National Governance Paper	A-43
Annex V	List of Persons Consulted	A-57
Annex VI	Documents and Records Reviewed	A -61
Annex VII	Terms of Reference for the Evaluation and Review	A- 67
Annex VIII	Record of Meetings	A-76

1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Programme Evaluation of ASGP I and Programme Review of ASGP II would not have been possible without the open and informed contributions from the Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG); the regional offices of ASGP; the staff of ASGP in Kabul; representatives of the donor community and the UNDP Country Office. Their generous time and valuable suggestions is sincerely appreciated.

The Evaluation and Review team were provided with full logistical and administrative support which enabled the team to visit four regional offices and to meet with a wide range of national and international partners during their three week mission. Over one hundred project participants were willing to express their opinions about the project and their ideas for the future in an honest and impartial manner. Records of these meetings are summarised in Annex VIII A-76.

Particular thanks go to Mr. Ahmad Zubair Fattahi for acting as the main point of contact and facilitating our mission. Without him we could not have achieved our goals.

Thanks also go to DFID and the UK mission to Helmand for their support in facilitating our mission under such difficult conditions.

The team would also like to thank Their Excellencies the Governors of Herat, Mazar, Helmand, Urzogan and Bamyan for giving us their valuable time and input during our provincial visits.

Finally, we wish to express our appreciation for the open access to information and generous use of their time provided by all the persons with whom the team consulted. For reasons of confidentiality and privacy the names and positions of the persons consulted have been removed from the records of meetings.

2. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
APR	Annual Project Review
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (UNDP)
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ASGP	Afghanistan Sub National Governance Programme
ASP	Afghanistan Stabilization Programme
CD	Capacity Development
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CO	Country Office UNDP
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGO	District Governor's Office
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality (UNDP)
EU	European Union
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GOFORGOLD	Sub National performance measurement system Governance for Good Local Development
HR	Human Resources
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
LoA	Letter of Authority
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOE	Ministry of Economy
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NDF	National Development Framework
NIBP	National Institutional Building Programme (UNDP)
NIM	National Implementation Modality
OSS	Operations Support Services (UNDP)
PAA	Provincial Administrative Assembly
PAD	Provincial Affairs Department (IARCSC)
PAR	Public Administration Reform
PC	Provincial Council
PCRDC	Provincial Council Relations and Cooperation Directorate (IDLG)
PDC	Provincial Development Committee
PDP	Provincial Development Plan
PGO	Provincial Governor's Office
PRR	Priority Reform and Restructuring Programme
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSP	Provincial Strategic Plan
RIAP	Revenue Improvement Action Planning
SNG	Sub National Governance
SNGP	Sub National Governance Policy
TA	Technical Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

The ASGP programme has considerable National and Sub National importance to peace, security and stability in Afghanistan. It was a flagship programme when it was first launched in 2006 and it was largely successful in its early years. These years were characterised by stable and professional project management, close oversight by UNDP and a high level of interest and commitment on the part of national authorities. The most notable achievements during ASGP I were the considerable capacity building for the newly created Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG); the development and approval of Sub National Governance Policy (SNGP) and for the intensive training of sub national government officials and the sub national roll out of public administration reform (PAR) leading to the sub national implementation of pay and grading and merit based appointments.

As a result, a far more ambitious programme of Sub National support was designed and a considerable amount of donor funding sought. The aim was to transition support from the Kabul centred focus that characterised ASGP I and to transition support to the regional sub national governance level across all regions in Afghanistan. In hindsight this proved to be a step too far and too fast. The security situation deteriorated to the point where it was simply not possible to attract and retain committed professionals to work in Kabul and the regions; the market was becoming crowded as more donors began to prioritise support for the SNG, and IDLG continued to call for yet more capacity building. This was combined with a number of inherent difficulties as the UNDP, as an institution, struggled to project manage a country wide programme led to considerable donor dissatisfaction which as largely culminated in the request for this evaluation and review.

The following extracts from the main report summarise the key challenges for UNDP which need resolution if ASGP is to succeed. This will require UNDP to provide the leadership, commitment, and professional oversight needed to make ASGP a success.

Programming and Project Management

ASGP is a multilateral funded programme through the support of which, IDLG has been created and a comprehensive SNGP had been developed and adopted. However, the programme was designed with no initial consideration given to risk management, sustainability and exit strategy factors. However risk logs were made available in the ASGP II Annual Report for 2010 and in the ASGP II Inception Report developed late 2010. Baseline data was only recently developed and recorded in ASGP II Annual Report for 2010 and in the ASGP II Inception Report in late 2010. This now provided the base against which monitoring and evaluation could be quantified. Measures to promote sustainability have emerged over time with embedded LoA staff in the IDLG and PGO's subject to their phased transfer to GoA tashkeel.

Consistent and professional project management was absent and hence the expected outputs were not all delivered as originally planned in the project documents.

UNDP management has not been at optimum in relation to management of ASGP. The main criticisms include; micro-management, reactive and ever changing priorities on the part of Country Office management; over-emphasis on centralised and delayed decision making; inability to hire and retain good staff; delayed procurement and complicated procedures; no risk management framework, and LoA's signed without supportive standard operating procedures

Reporting

Progress reports were infrequent and consisted mainly of activities. The review team have examined the reports in detail and it is hard to get a clear picture as to what is actually happening in clear and concise terms. The repetition between reports is substantial and the end of ASGP I completion report was produced in June 2011 many months after the final closure of ASGP towards the end of 2010. The contents of this end of project completion report appears more as a compendium of earlier ASGP I progress reports rather than as a substantive reflection on lessons learnt to inform the future direction of ASGP II. It is to be hoped that with the appointment of a full time reporting officer the current situation is improved and that the UNDP CO approval process is streamlined to ensure the timely release of reports to the IDLG and the donor community.

Overall the extent to which ASGP was the major and direct contributor to SNG development in Afghanistan could not be distinguished from the efforts of other donor sponsored SNG projects operating simultaneously in IDLG and the provinces. Notwithstanding the difficulty of segregating and measuring the specific impact of individual development programmes this is crucial in relation to SNG where many different programmes and donors make a contribution.

Human Resource Management

Value for money achieved in relation to LoA staff provided by IDLG and funded by ASGP for IDLG, PGO and municipalities cannot be determined since all hiring and performance management of LoA staff is done through IDLG, and ASGP has not performed any assessment of quality of the processes and staff in place. Hence it is not possible to provide any view on the quality of the induction process for LoA staff and their performance to date since ASGP does not have any data in this regard.

During the field visits concerns were raised in relation to the process being followed by IDLG for hiring of LoA staff including the potential for conflict of interest of IDLG representatives in the hiring process. Whilst the importance of LoA staff in building up IDLG in its formative years is not to be underestimated, all LoA staff should be subject to transparent and independent hiring and performance management processes in line with the GoA Civil Service Commission regulations.

During early 2011, as part of new nationwide outreach strategy of ASGP, LoAs were signed with all provincial PGOs. These LoAs will allow transfer of funds from ASGP to each PGO for utilization on activities to be agreed as part of an implementation work plan of the PGO. This is a paradigm shift from a totally centralized control framework to providing funds in the project account of each PGO which is to be operated by LoA staff members working in each PGO. The evaluation team could not see what controls are, or will be, in place to enable the LoA staff to track local recruitment, budgets or staff expenses. However, the CO has assured the team that Standard Operating Procedures are under preparation to regulate the use of funds for each PGO and that no activities have been, or will be, undertaken until the time that SOP's are approved.

ASGP does not have accurate data available with respect to the number of staff trained either grouped by cluster, type of training or participating agency (from PGO, line ministries or municipalities etc). The team could only obtain vague information on overall percentages such as approximately 75% of all PGO, municipality and line ministry staff in provinces are trained. There is also no data or report available for the quality and impact of the training that was provided.

Financial Management

No external audit of costs claimed by IDLG has been initiated by UNDP. ASGP was audited by an independent audit firm for the years 2008 and 2009 and it does not mention in the scope of work that the auditors have reviewed the documentation of IDLG and has assessed their controls. Accordingly, it is concluded that Clause 9 requirements have not been initiated. The CO considers that according to the LoA, Clause 9 does not reflect the requirement for an audit of expenditure incurred by IDLG.

In addition Clause 14 of the signed LoA's required IDLG to perform a physical verification of inventory items procured under ASGP on periodic basis. ASGP has no evidence whether physical verification was performed or not. The CO have advised the team that no joint annual verification was done and that an inventory of procured equipment is available and it has been transferred in accordance with UNDP rules.

The utilization of financial resources has been quite conservative with unspent funds from ASGP I being used to extend ASGP I during 2010 to overlap with ASGP II. In ASGP II out of total USD 20.561 million, which was disbursed by donors, USD 11.936 million had been utilized by June 30, 2011. Thus approximately 42% of the amount is still unspent due to factors relating to the security situation, limited availability of professional staff and activities in some provinces. There is thus a need to revisit the 'one size fits all' regional work plans and to develop realistic work plans based on provincial priority needs and real staffing constraints and to then assess the funding implications. As at June 30 2011, UNDP has not utilized any funding from its own core funding in respect of ASGP II but the team were advised that such funds may be used for the proposed provincial development fund.

Financial controls are adequate but they have limitations with respect to timely processing of transactions. The financial data cannot be extracted on a regional basis and financial planning has been weak. The process of disbursement of funds, in advance, to regional managers for utilisation on particular activities, and its settlement, is also a potential issue requiring careful examination.

Until 2010, there was no forward procurement plan and procurement delays still result limited progress on the ground. A different procurement format was introduced every year during 2009, 2010 and 2011, and there is no tracking of items which were planned in any one single plan but were not delivered and carried forward to the next year's plan.

Significant Deliverables

Notwithstanding the above concerns at the management and nprogramme level, there are positive initiatives. Amongst others, ASGP I supported the creation and capacity building of IDLG; the development of an approved SNG policy and laid the framework for enabling legislation; Mazar was developed as a pilot for the sub national governance support to be rolled out across Afghanistan under ASGP II; and municipal revenue collection was successfully piloted and in now a source of additional income at the local level in many municipalities. Considerable resources also went into supporting the IARCSC PAR reform measures at the SN level with support to PAR implementation, Pay and Grading and Merit based appointments; in addition to the creation and equipping of provincial training centres for the development of local government councillors and public servants.

ASGP II is almost half way through its four year cycle and the main progress relates to the drafting of six laws to enable social policy implementation; continued capacity building for the IDLG; roll out of SNG across Afghanistan based on the positive results of Mazar albeit with varying degrees of success; and rollout of the municipal financing support to fifty municipalities with considerable success and good potential to expand to

approximately 150 municipalities by the end of 2014.

Donors Concerns

The donors have repeatedly expressed sustained and serious dissatisfaction with the lack of tangible progress against precise deliverables and their continued financial support is no longer assured. In the face of mounting criticism ASGP II remains reactive rather than proactive. It still remains without a clear sense of direction; key management positions are unfilled and are almost certain to remain so; work plans change frequently; the regions carry on with what they can do regardless and the focus shifts from Kabul centric out to the regions and back again to the centre.

The partnership arrangement established between ASGP, UNDP, the Donors, and IDLG in ASGP I, has continued in ASGP II. Whilst the partnership has been defined to an extent in both programme documents, in practise the partnership arrangements are fraught with difficulties and it is simply was not possible to identify the tangible contribution on the part of IDLG other than the appointment of LoA staff. Over time, IDLG appears to have come to dominate the partnership as the senior partner over the representatives of ASGP, UNDP and the donor community.

The Way Forward.

Transition planning is now an urgent matter, particularly in light of planned military drawdown for 2014 and donors' own transition goals. Currently ASGP has no document setting out such plans and this is a matter of concern for donors.

With the completion of the ASGP evaluation and review, ASGP should now form a working group with IDGL, MoF and MRRD to work on putting together a transition plan that is acceptable to all parties. These proposals should be shared with the IARCSC, other stakeholders and donors. This work should be completed within 6 months and no later than the start of the next budget year. This would give MoF and IARCSC sufficient time to start transitioning staff to the GoA tashkeel. The Programme Management paper Annex III A-34 outlines an indicative approach to be followed.

Although overall the ASGP programme has achieved some notable success in establishing IDLG and in helping deliver a policy for Sub National Governance, the consistently inadequate levels of staffing, combined with systemic failures in running the programme in line with its pre-agreed methodology, mean that the programme is now facing significant challenges. Unless urgent action is taken by UNDP to address the critical areas of staffing, team and project management structures, work planning, targeted reporting and transition, it is hard to see how ASGP II can deliver significantly more than ASGP I.

The review team have carefully considered the critical factors that must be addressed and resolved if ASGP is to move forward to success. The advantages and risks of all possible options for the way forward have been analysed and the details are recorded in Section 7 of the report.

The final decision should be reached in partnership with IDLG, the international donor community and UNDP. Reflection and frank dialogue is needed to reach a mutual resolution. The following options have resulted from the individual decisions made by each team member. Each option has been examined carefully and are recorded in section 7.3 of the report. The collective preference of the team is narrowed down to the following: The following four options represent the result of the individual decisions made by each team member as to which of the above options are most likely to succeed in bringing ASGP back on track and most importantly to focus primarily on direct arrangements to support SNG given the national importance of the Governors' Offices

and the Municipalities for the long term sustainable development of good governance in Afghanistan.

- **Option 2:** Transfer ASGP programme to a contractor to implement.
- **Option 5:** Reduce funding to IDLG and divert more direct funding to SNG activities in the regions (PGO, DGO and Municipalities). This is not just a stand alone option. It may well form part of other options.
- **Option 6:** Suspend donor funding for a six month period to ASGP subject to critical success factors being met.
- **Option 7:** Partial outsourcing of key functions such as Project Management, HR, Procurement etc.

4. THE METHODOLOGICAL PROCESS

The Terms of Reference for the mission comprised two parts:

- The primary purpose of the evaluation of Phase I is to assess if programme activities have been carried out and to see if programme outputs and objectives have been met as well as to present some key lessons learnt.
- The purpose of the review of Phase II is to undertake an in-depth assessment of the past, current and planned operation of ASGP and make recommendations to UNDP, Donors and Afghan counterparts on the options, changes and improvements for the way forward with the programme.

Three international and one national consultant were assigned to the team and each consultant was initially allocated 21 working days to complete the two assignments which included field visits to four regions, more than a hundred interviews and writing their reports. Other commitments meant that some consultants were unable to extend their available time.

The Evaluation and Review process provided an independent external evaluation of the UNDP ASGP phase I programme. It was commissioned by the UNDP in line with their end of project requirement for an external evaluator to provide a balanced assessment of the performance of the project and to draw on lessons learnt for the future development of ASGP phase II.

In addition this report serves as a review of progress to date in the implementation of ASGP phase II and to make recommendations to UNDP, donors and Afghan counterparts on the options, changes and improvements for the way forward with the programme.

The methodology for the evaluation and review mission has been designed for discussion, clarification and constructive contributions from project partners. It invoked a participatory approach that allowed programme stakeholders to assist in the generation and application of evaluative knowledge. The evaluation and review considered the findings in relation to the social, political and economic context in so far as it affects the overall performance of the programme outputs.

The evaluation was carried out in an objective, sensitive and independent manner with varied and balanced consideration of both positive and negative aspects and areas in which significant improvements would be required.¹

The evaluation and review methodology comprised extensive desk research and study of documentation in order to understand the projects progress towards achieving its mission, objectives, activities and achievements. Particular attention was paid to the analysis and assessment of the programmes management and delivery; the analysis and assessment of Sub National governance; and the assessment of the utilisation of financial resources with recommendations on the programmes financial management and reporting.

In conjunction with the desk research, representative samples of provinces in different regions were selected for in depth examination. The selection included those considered

¹ UNDP Vacancy Announcement No: 2011/04/139 ASGP Evaluation and Review Missions.

to have performed well, those that were average and those that could have done better. The regions selected comprised Herat, Mazar, Urozgon, Bamyan and Helmand. Regional managers from other regions were interviewed in Kabul.

Semi-structured interviews were held with senior officials from IDLG; the Provincial Councils and Governorates; the PRTs; the ASGP implementation team: UNDP and representatives from the donor community. A detailed time bound interview meeting schedule and schedule of visits to the regions was drawn up and provided to UNDP for information and logistical support.

A summary of the main contents of this evaluation and review report was presented to a meeting of international donors, UNDP and IDLG. The draft report was provided to UNDP and it should now be circulated between the UNDP, IDLG, and the donor community to exchange opinions, add information and clarify matters where necessary. A final report is then compiled and issued by UNDP.

5. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF ASGP

Developing the capacity of Sub National governance in promoting peace, stability and development in Afghanistan was endorsed in the London and Kabul Conferences in 2010 as a priority issue. At this time ASGP I and ASGP II were running concurrently and they both had the overall objective to strengthen the democratic state and government institutions to govern and to ensure quality public service delivery at the Sub National level through advocacy, policy advice and capacity development.

ASGP is fully in line with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) in relation to the 'Good Governance and Rule of Law' pillar which requires that the government machinery is restructured and rationalised. It is also fully in line with United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Outcome 2 which focuses on creating an effective, more accountable and more representative public administration at the national and Sub National levels, with improved delivery of services in an equitable, efficient and effective manner.

ASGP phase I commenced in 2006 with a planned duration of four years and a multi donor funded budget of approximately \$42 million. It was intended as a pilot phase for a larger follow on project ASGP II which was to implement the results of the pilot phase. ASGP I closed in December 2010.

ASGP I aimed to build the institutional structures and capacities for improved service delivery at the Sub National level. It began the Sub National reform process at the national level which saw the creation and development of the Independent Directorate for Local Government (IDLG) and the development and approval of the Sub National Governance Policy (SNGP).

ASGP I also supported the Sub National governance structures. Mazar in particular benefitted from being the main test case for the developing ideas and proposals emanating from the emerging SNGP. In addition there was extensive training for Sub National officials at the provincial, district and municipal levels of SNG including the establishment of civil service training centres and support to Sub National Public Administration Reform (PAR) initiatives under the auspices of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). Work also commenced on improving the capacity of SNG at the municipal level in the collection of revenues.

ASGP II then commenced in April 2010 with a multi donor funded budget requirement of approximately \$180 million. It was expected to significantly scale up the same programmes as existed in ASGP I in relation to policy development and policy implementation and in capacity development and coordination. ASGP II continues to support the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) to implement its Sub National governance reform agenda through its main national partner, IDLG, and through a network of Provincial Governors Offices (PGOs), District Governors Offices (DGOs), Provincial Councils (PCs) and municipalities.

ASGP II is implemented in varying degrees in the Central region; the Central Highlands region; the Eastern region; the Northern region; the North Eastern region; the Southern region and the Western region.

ASGP I focused primarily on support to IDLG through its central office in Kabul and this support continues in ASGP II with a technical and policy advisory team for the transfer of

know-how and support for competency based staffing that will build up the core capacity of IDLG.

ASGP II was designed to be less centred on Kabul and to reach out to the Sub National entities and this philosophy was further deepened during the inception phase. Support to SNG was to be channelled through seven regional project management teams to develop the capacity of PGOs, DGOs, PCs and municipalities by strengthening their planning, oversight, knowledge management and budgeting skills. It was expected that strengthening these skills should lead to improved service delivery and good governance at the Sub National level and the planned end result of ASGP II is to have a positive impact on the lives of ordinary citizens by improving local development and service delivery through participatory and more effective and efficient Sub National governance.

6. OVERALL FINDINGS

6.1. Evaluation of ASGP I²

Objectives

The intended outcome of the ASGP I was to ensure that the democratic state and government institutions be strengthened at all levels to govern and ensure quality public services through advocacy, policy advise and capacity development. However, whilst the expected outputs of ASGP I has been focussed to the direction of that objective there was no benchmarked verifiable evidence that it reached the intended outcome to ensure quality public services through advocacy, policy advise and capacity development.

Activities

The activities were in part in line with the objectives but in cases such as “the democratic state and government institutions strengthened at all levels to govern and ensure public services” there were no achievements to any great degree.

However within capacity development there was some progress towards policy development and advice. This mainly relates to initial support in relation to: the policy being developed and in supporting to the government’s public administration reform strategy to build institutional and administrative capacities in provincial and district administrations to manage basic service delivery and in strengthening the capacity of provincial councils and in strengthening central level national capacities in programming, administrative management.

There was only limited progress in relation to the deliverable of: developing the legal and regulatory framework, in the areas of reforming organization structures and streamlining management processes at Sub National level and in supporting knowledge sharing and exchange among provincial councils and in conducting awareness raising and civic education campaigns. No progress has been found in the areas of financial management and systems design to enable government counterparts in transition to full national implementation of the programme within three years.

Outputs

The four main outputs of ASGP I related to Sub National Governance are: policy and developing the legal and regulatory framework; support to the government’s public administration reform strategy; support for the development of representation and participation in Sub National Governance; support for knowledge sharing and exchange among provincial councils; and awareness raising and civic education campaigns.

Sustainability

There has been little reference to or account taken of the need to build in sustainability of ASGP I outputs. Although there are some references to the capacity enhancement of the national counterparts, but not sufficient to give the assurance that the programme outputs achievements are sustainable. There is evidence to suggest a more positive situation in relation to the support provided in relation to IARCSC Training and Sub National PAR implementation.

² Please refer to Annex IV SNG paper for details

Conclusions

ASGP I was a multilateral funded programme through the support of which, IDLG has been created and a comprehensive SNGP had been developed and adopted. The programme was designed with no consideration given to risk management, sustainability and exit strategy factors. Baseline data was never developed against which monitoring and evaluation could be quantified. Consistent and professional project management was absent and hence the expected outputs were not all delivered as originally planned in the Project document. Progress reports were infrequent and consisted mainly of activities.

Overall ASGP I lost its sense of direction and this continued as it transitioned into ASGP II. It remained severely understaffed and was neither properly managed, nor was it implemented according to the pre-agreed programme document. ASGP I was not properly closed through a transparent and managed process. The mandatory end of project completion report and the end of project evaluation were both extremely late in being commissioned.

- **The extent to which ASGP I has met the intended programme impact and outcomes is variable.** The project document records the intended outcome in the Country Results Framework as “the democratic state and government institutions strengthened at all levels to govern and ensure quality public services through advocacy, policy advice and capacity development”. This process commenced in ASGP I but there was no baseline data and no logical framework against which to measure the impact of the programme and to quantify its outcomes.

The progress reports of ASGP I record many activities but there is no clear logical progression towards specific outcomes. In the course of five years of implementation, the SNG policy was approved; IDLG was created and its institutional and human capacity developed; and there was considerable training of civil servants working in PGOs, DGOs and line ministries in the provinces. A pilot was initiated in the north of Afghanistan and revenue augmentation efforts in municipalities have shown tangible impact.

Without a defined methodology through which impact could be measured and assessed the focus of ASGP remained on the inputs and activities rather than on the intended outcome as defined when the project was designed.

- **The extent to which intended programme outputs and results have been met is variable.** Throughout the lifetime of ASGP I the emphasis was on the process rather than on the specific expected outputs defined in the project document.

Achievements with regard to the major expected outputs were derived from ASGP I progress reports as follows:

Output 1: Sub National Governance policy is approved but its implementation has seen limited progress thus far. There are a significant number of new laws which need to be promulgated in order to implement the SNG policy in measurable terms. Drafts of six such laws are pending but there has been only limited progress during the last year.

Output 2: There was good progress in supporting the GoA public administration reform strategy to build institutional and administrative capacities in provincial and district administrations to manage basic service delivery. However, there were no significant

results aimed at reforming organization structures and streamlining management processes at Sub National level.

Output 3: Some progress has been evident in strengthening the capacity of provincial councils, but limited progress is evident in knowledge sharing and exchange among provincial councils and in conducting awareness raising and civic education campaigns to help citizens participate in the democratic governance process.

Output 4: This output has made limited impact although some progress has been shown in the areas of strengthening national capacities in programming and administrative management. Little or no progress has been found in the areas of financial management and systems design to enable the government counterparts to transition to full national implementation of the programme within three years.

Overall the extent to which ASGP was the major and direct contributor to SNG development in Afghanistan could not be distinguished from the efforts of other SNG projects operating simultaneously in IDLG and the provinces.

During the last four years ASGP has been financing the LoA staff and other costs related to certain activities of IDLG. Currently out of a total IDLG staff of 495, 141 staff members are paid for by ASGP. The performance of ASGP funded LoA staff has never been assessed and no feedback has been sought from the clients of ASGP/IDLG in this regard during the last five years.

ASGP funds LoA staff at Central and Sub National levels. The key logistical functions performed by IDLG in respect of ASGP are hiring of LoA staff for IDLG, PGO and municipal SNG entities. IDLG has also facilitated the consultative process for definition of SNG policy and drafting of related laws.

The team were advised that IDLG collects time sheets and performance sheets from each LoA staff on a monthly basis and forwards these documents to ASGP / UNDP country office for payment of salaries, although the performance sheets could not be verified. As evidenced in Annex VIII Records of Meetings the feedback from PGOs, PCs and municipal entities with respect to IDLG has not been positive. They have a number of concerns with respect to the way that IDLG operates. The SNG entities pointed to some good aspects but in general there was only limited approval of the SNG work being done by ASGP.

- **The underlying factors that influenced programme impact in ASGP I were:**
 - Significant leadership turnover in the central and regional office and regional offices. Extreme shortage of skilled staff with 65% of planned staff positions not filled.
 - Insufficient and irregular communication between UNDP, the programme management and the donors and in relation to monthly meetings and quarterly board meetings. Only eight of the required quarterly board meetings were held under ASGP I between 2006 and 2010.
 - Limited skills in work planning and reporting against plans and absence of an information management and monitoring and evaluation systems.
 - Insufficient awareness among the stakeholders of the Programme objectives and its deliverables, especially in the provinces and IDLG.
 - Limited interest and coordination by IDLG in support of ASGP. IDLG appears to operate more as a dominant entity rather than as a partner and service provider for SNG at the sub national level.

- Lack of clear responsibilities and authority at the PGO level and no financial delegation to the provinces.
 - Recurrent costs of training for PC members. Approximately 70% of PC members are replaced following elections and the new members require retraining. This can no longer be assured since ASGP II component 3 to support PAR implementation and the IARCSC sub national offices was removed and responsibility placed elsewhere.
- **The extent to which achievement indicators have been achieved.**
There were no achievement indicators for ASGP I but there were output indicators. However, programme reporting was not done against output indicators only activities were reported on and these were seldom quantified. Institutional memory was lacking with no more than five professional and technical staff of the original ASGP I project still in place under ASGP II.

It was also not possible to verify achievement of outputs for ASGP other than that recorded in the progress reports because there was no institutional memory of specific results other than building the capacity of IDLG, the SNG policy, training centres for civil servants and supporting the implementation of PAR at the Sub National level.

- **The constraints that delayed implementation of activities.**
These included a significantly incomplete team and a slow response to the HR needs of the programme by UNDP Country Office. Planning was weak and there was a lack of any follow up monitoring, evaluation or risk management. Communication between UNDP, the ASGP programme management and the donors was insufficient and irregular and awareness among the stakeholders as to the programme objectives and deliverables appeared to be limited, especially in the provinces and IDLG.
- **The outputs of actual programme management.**
Work planning and progress reporting were the main deliverables from the programme management team. Progress reports were written on a weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual basis. The reports were largely on activities undertaken and lacked clarity and consistency. The headings in the UNDP template were not respected and reports were invariably late in production.

Work plans were constantly being changed from a central Kabul focus to regional focus and then again back to Kabul centric. The work plans used were designed for financial tracking in line with the Atlas financial management requirements. As technical operational work plans they were of limited usefulness since they could not and did not track actual results against planned targets. With each different work plan for the ASGP, there were different approaches in relation to each activity by different ASGP and UNDP stakeholders. The regional programme managers produced their individual different work plans and had their own different priorities and approaches. There were also reports of parallel approaches to the same activity both by IDLG and the programme management personnel.

The ASGP organigram changed frequently at central and regional levels in response to the leadership style at the time, the limited number of available staff and in reaction to external criticism.

- **The appropriateness, quality and delivery of activities.**
The progress reports focussed mainly on recording activities which are largely appropriate namely in relation to SNG policy development; IDLG capacity building;

training centres for IARCSC and support to Sub National PAR. With limited institutional memory amongst the people interviewed by the team and incomplete internal information management system and monitoring system it is not possible to comment exhaustively on the quality and timely delivery of activities in ASGP.

Many documents were developed as part of ASGP I and Annex VI A-61 includes those made available to the team. Whilst they largely appear appropriate when verified at the provincial level the value test will be in implementation.

- **The utilisation of financial resources.**

The utilization of financial resources has been quite conservative with unspent funds from ASGP I being used to extend ASGP I during 2010 to overlap with ASGP II. The tools for value for money analysis were not developed and it is not possible to say that value for money has been achieved as required by the Terms of Reference Annex VII A-71 (f).

- **The outputs of sub-contracted technical inputs including training.**

As a result of reports received and interviews with officials in the IARCSC and in the regional offices it is estimated that 7,583 civil service employees were trained under ASGP I at the provincial training centres of IARCSC that were established and maintained with ASGP support in the amount of approximately 18% of the ASGP I budget. The results and impact of this training was never measured. Since this component and related funding was withdrawn during the inception phase of ASGP II the team were advised that support to provincial training centres and support to Sub National PAR has now ceased.

Subcontracted technical inputs also relate to the baseline data collection exercise by a local contractor. The review team were advised that this exercise took a number of months to be completed.

- **The communication and information flow among stakeholders.**

ASGP I has largely operated in a vacuum with limited direct communication with other stakeholders and particularly the international donor community. Information flow has largely comprised an array of weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual reports. Aside from the delay in actually producing these reports and in obtaining clearance for them from the UNDP Country Office support unit the quality and completeness of reports is highly questionable.

The review team have examined the reports in detail and it is hard to get a clear picture as to what is actually happening in simple concise terms. The repetition between reports is substantial and the end of ASGP I completion report was produced in June 2011 some months after the final closure of ASGP towards the end of 2010. The contents of this end of project completion report appears more as a compendium of earlier ASGP I progress reports rather than as a substantive reflection on lessons learnt to inform the future direction of ASGP II.

The quality of reporting is so poor that the international donor community do not appear to have much idea what the programme has been doing and what are its constraints. This criticism has resulted in a tendency for the CO to then micro manage aspects of the project in line with their views on what should happen. This may, or may not, be properly communicated to ASGP and adds further complexity to the programme. One example was the recent introduction of "Golden Questions" to refocus the priorities of the regional activities rather than realistic and achievable

regional work plans that matched the limited numbers of staff available to work in the regions.

The precise role of the programme board was clearly defined in the project document as the senior level forum for making key decisions. The minutes suggest that the board meetings were more of a general discussion forum for all stakeholders rather than a formal approval mechanism for the most important decisions.

The Sub National Governance Forum (also referred to as the sub national cluster) was an internal CO mechanism through which the local government stakeholders could communicate and receive information. The minutes of meetings available to the review team were limited.

6.2. ASGP II

Objectives

The overall objectives set for ASGP II are appropriate and in line with UNDAF. The immediate objective to enhance the capacity of IDLG to formulate implement and coordinate policies and PAR at the Sub National level applies only to the PGO and DGO. The immediate objective of building the capacity of Sub National entities to deliver effective services to enhance the legitimacy of local government and improve stability cannot be achieved by IDLG alone who have only limited authority over the line ministries at the SNG level who are the responsible agencies to work with SNG entities in relation to delivering essential services.

Activities

The programme has variable progress in relation to the activities at the SNG level.

The regional matrix in Annex I 'Implementation of ASGP II in the regions visited illustrate the variable progress against each ASGP component in each of the ASGP II regions examined during the review process. The best performing region is the Northern Regional (Mazar) wherein ASGP I was piloted. Herat in the Western Region also performs well in part due to the transfer of competent senior level international staff from Mazar to Herat.

As evidenced in Annex V List of persons consulted and annex VIII Record of Meetings it was not possible to meet with a representative sample of ASGP participants in either Helmand or Kandahar in the Southern Region. However, the limited information obtained suggests that there was only extremely limited progress.

In Urzogan there was the potential for good progress based on the results already produced but as in other regions it was almost totally reliant on an experienced and professional technical regional manager being selected and remaining in place rather than on the availability of funding. Support to Urzogan is funded by the Australian Government

At the municipal level activities related to revenue collection have increased to cover approximately 50 municipalities with plans to roll out the capacity building to approximately 150 municipalities by the close of ASGP in 2014. This component has made remarkable progress and was greatly appreciated at the SNG level. However, it is

important for ASGP, UNDP and IDLG to ensure that there is no overlap with the USAID RAMP UP programme which specifically targets capacity building to increase revenue collection at the municipal level.

Component 3 of ASGP to support the training of civil servants and the implementation of public administration reform at the SNG level was terminated in the ASGP II Inception Report.

At the central level, capacity building activities continue with IDLG staff and this primarily relates to work on the development of enabling legislation to implement the SNGP.

Outputs

The output to develop legal frameworks for the SNG policy has been slower than expected as support to developing the regulatory framework was included in component (i) of ASGP I. However, given that the process is time consuming the production of six draft legal frameworks is appropriate.

The output to build the capacity of PGO/DGO has varied from region to region with Mazar and Herat performing well and with Helmand appearing to perform less well.

The output and resources for further support to SNG offices of IARCSC and PAR Sub National reform was deleted at the inception phase in order to harmonise with the IARCSC national level responsibility for SNG training and PAR.

The output to support the PGO in representing their electorates and to the DGO in representing their communities' interests has been limited thus far.

The output to increase revenue collection at the municipal level has performed well in Mazar and Herat and in these two regions there is the potential for some improved service delivery within the jurisdiction of municipal legislation and at the discretion of the Mayor. Overall in 29 municipalities the revenue generation has increased from 6% to 300%.

Sustainability

The issue of sustainability was not initially considered in the development of the ASGP II. It was not designed in at the project document or inception stage. The risks associated with not building in measures relating to sustainability and an exit strategy were evident with the collapse of the IARCSC training centres and SN PAR after funding, irrespective of source of funds, was withdrawn.

Conclusions

Whilst ASGP I focussed on the central government and did not significantly address SNG other than as a pilot in Mazar, ASGP II was designed to be different. It planned to be implemented more or less simultaneously in all seven regions of Afghanistan. This country wide outreach proved to be too fast, and too soon given the serious and sustained staffing problems. Implementation has been mixed and variable between regions with the exception of Mazar, Herat and Urozgan where experienced professionals and committed Governors have had a very positive impact. Annex 1 illustrates this variable progress against the work plan in the regions visited.

The donors have repeatedly expressed sustained and serious dissatisfaction with the lack of tangible progress against precise deliverables and their continued financial support is no longer assured. In the face of mounting criticism ASGP II remains reactive rather than proactive. It remains without a clear sense of direction; key management

positions are unfilled and are almost certain to remain so; work plans change frequently; the regions carry on with what they can do regardless and the focus shifts from Kabul centric out to the regions and back again to the centre.

Eighteen months into the four year programme there is limited progress in the output to increase 1.6 'SNG policy awareness for citizens regarding roles and responsibilities of Sub National authorities'. This is a priority given the approved SNG Policy document and the draft of six legal frameworks to facilitate its implementation.

Appropriateness of the ASGP II Goal, Purpose and Outputs.

The overall objective of ASGP II has been to support the UNDAF outcomes 2 and 3 which are "Government capacity to deliver services to the poor and vulnerable is enhanced" and "the institutions of democratic governance are integrated components of the nation".

The programmes intended outcome confirms this with the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, number 3, which records "State has improved ability to deliver services to foster human development and elected bodies have greater oversight capacity".

To reach the ASGP goal and purpose there are five clearly defined outputs. Of which one was deleted during the inception phase, namely: "IDLG and IARCSC have the capacity to coordinate PAR implementation in the IARCSC Sub National offices and have the capacity to deliver public administration reform to all Sub National government institutions by 2011".

The remaining four outputs are:

- National systems, procedures and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor the SNGP are in place
- PGOs and DGOs have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security in accordance with ANDS
- Provincial Councils have improved capacity to represent citizens' interests and monitor Sub National governance
- Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services

The design of the outputs is in line with the goals of the programme but delivering the outputs is a different matter.

Recorded progress in relation to the performance of each output.

The programme reports when compared with the most recently available work plan records that 22 indicative activities are expected to produce outputs in line with the results. The Q1 progress report for 2011 records a good level of progress in 11 activities; insufficient progress in 7 activities and in the remaining 4 activities the programme had reportedly no progress.

Without a clear time bound work plan that tracks actual progress against the work plan established in the project document/inception report, and which is fixed for the remainder of the project, it is not possible to verify actual progress against planned targets.

Activities which are recorded as showing some progress comprise:

- Drafting all necessary laws and associated rules of procedure and guidelines under the area of authority of IDLG
- Development of key institutional, organizational and individual capacities in IDLG
- Capacity Development of Policy unit of IDLG with respect to its key functions and capacities
- Introduction of functioning modern administrative management systems in PGOs and DGOs
- Strengthening provincial and district offices to fulfil their roles and responsibilities
- Provincial Strategic Planning (PSP) and Provincial Development Planning (PDP) guided by PSP
- Capacity development of PCs and DCs so that they are compliant with roles of procedures and conduct public outreach
- Improving capacity of municipalities to generate own source revenues
- Organizational restructuring of municipalities to improve service delivery, including at least 15% female staff by 2014
- Strengthening municipality outreach programme
- Strengthening modern office management systems in municipalities

Activities in which some, but not enough, progress appears to have been made comprise:

- Improving municipal capacities to apply minimum service standards, improved procedures, performance measurement system and FMS
- Capacity Development of IDLG with respect to key capacities related to Sub National finance and planning
- Establishing performance measurement systems for all provinces and government institutions
- Establishing interaction mechanisms for effective interaction between Sub National government and public to improve access to information
- Strengthen public financial management at Sub National level to make it fully compliant with applicable laws and MoF procedures
- Establishing knowledge sharing systems for Provincial and District Councils
- Strengthening PCs and DCs oversight over local service delivery, strategic and annual budgetary and planning, M&E for service delivery

Areas of the programme with no evident progress comprise:

- Meetings of inter-ministerial coordination structures to review progress of SNGP implementation
- SNG policy awareness for key staff of PGOs and DGOs and members of PCs and DCs
- SNG policy awareness for citizens regarding roles and responsibilities of sub-national authorities
- Creation and maintenance of a functional website and e-government applications for selected municipalities

These areas are all essential if the GoA is to take over the programme and to sustain the development of SNG after ASGP donor funding stops. The areas are all essential for IDLG to lead and develop.

Reporting mechanisms.

There are reporting mechanisms in place on a weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual basis. These reports are not helpful to the reader who is trying to track progress in implementation and the reports are not structured in such a way as to do justice to the

achievements of the programme. The different reports repeat information that has been reported on earlier, and elsewhere, and they report in unquantifiable terms against activities. The reports do not compare actual progress towards planned outputs as should be the case. The reports are delayed in production and the content does not help the reader to understand exactly what results ASGP II has, and will, deliver. The reports are produced to a standard UNDP reporting format which in itself is sound. The need is for more clarity and simplicity of reporting based on quantifiable measurable results particularly since ASGP is a complex matrix of five components spread across seven sub regions.

Consistency of the programmes management, leadership and delivery with the GoA public administration reform and capacity development commitments.

The direct link between ASGP I and the GoA public administration reform and capacity development commitments was fractured after the inception phase of ASGP II when component 3 was removed from ASGP II and funding for Sub National Training and Sub National PAR was located with different projects.

Systemic factors directly impacting on the ASGP and inherent risks.

There are many stakeholders in the delivery of ASGP namely the UNDP, IDLG, the donor community, PGOs, DGOs PCs and the Municipalities. Each had their own priorities, demands and cultures. These different bureaucratic processes slowed down the ASGP activities and decision making and made simple issues more complex. In particular in relation to reporting, work planning and hiring of staff.

Assessment of ASGP funding status

Out of total USD 20.561 million which was disbursed by donors, USD 11.936 million has been utilized by June 30, 2011. Thus approximately 42% of the amount is still unspent. As at June 30 2011 in ASGP II UNDP has not utilized any funding from its own core funding.

Adequacy of financial controls and value for money in the programme

Financial controls are adequate but they have limitations with respect to timely processing of transactions. The financial data cannot be extracted on a regional basis and financial planning has been weak. Advance management in that the process of disbursement of funds, in advance, to regional managers for utilisation on particular activities, and its settlement, is also an issue.

Procurement was also not properly followed up, there is no forward procurement plan and procurement delays led to limited progress on ground.

Analysis of the programme for its value for money

There was no integrated Human Resource (HR) planning process in ASGP and there is no evidence to suggest value for money from the HR utilisation which accounts for the greatest proportion of project expenditure.

- The current project management structure of ASGP is dysfunctional and requires structural changes to make it more function oriented and to distinguish between general support functions and technical/regional implementation functions. A succession of different organigrams was developed by ASGP at various stages of the programme and new positions were created but largely unfilled. There was no clear

cut HR strategy based on the needs of individual regions and the realities of the labour market.

- A proposed organigram for consideration is outlined in Annex III 'Programme Management Paper' A-27 which properly segregates and clearly distinguishes between the support functions and the technical/regional implementing functions. This distinction should be properly defined and enforced.
- Staff are usually given job descriptions when they are hired but in practise a staff member will usually cover a number of different jobs due to the staff shortages. It was observed during the field visits that many of the LoA staff in the provinces were either not aware of their job responsibilities, or if they were aware, they were actually not doing the work for which they were employed.
- Performance assessment of the LoA staff hired by IDLG and either working in IDLG or in the provinces, and funded under the project, has never taken place and there was no evidence that performance assessment is planned for the future.
- No assessment of the HR processes of IDLG by ASGP is performed to ensure that the selection and recruitment processes are appropriate, transparent and merit based.
- There appears to be no oversight of the management of LoA staff such as the performance evaluations and no external feedback on the performance of LoA staff by ASGP Regional Managers.
- ASGP has been making payment for salaries of all LoA staff, including those for IDLG and PGOs and municipalities but ASGP do not have data through which they could actually verify the performance of LoA staff and perform analytical control testing to verify the accuracy of claims being raised by IDLG.
- Neither was there any evidence of any audit being conducted for costs incurred by IDLG and IARCSC specifically in relation to the HR processing.
- According to the latest HR plan for ASGP II, of the 119 recorded positions some 79 positions are vacant. Further, it is evident from the review of staffing tables that the negative variance of allocated and filled positions has existed for years and are likely to remain so. This has a significant and negative impact on the performance of staff that remains in place and brings into question the potential of ASGP to achieve its potential.
- Concerns were raised by senior level provincial staff that the induction process adopted by IDLG for induction of LoA staff has not been fully transparent and competitive. The team were advised that in the induction process there was no involvement of provincial government staff and in number of cases, and following complaints from SNG officials, the positions had to be re-staffed since the staff hired by IDLG did not meet the requirements of the position. Is it to be hoped that merit based appointments are introduced for LoA staff, in line with GoA regulations, and before any possible transition to GoA tashkeel.

Partnership arrangements between ASGP, UNDP, Donors and IDLG.

The partnership arrangement established between ASGP, UNDP, the Donors, and IDLG in ASGP I, has continued in ASGP II. Whilst the partnership has been defined to an

extent in both programme documents, in practise the partnership arrangements appear to be fraught with difficulties and it is simply was not possible to quantify the tangible contribution on the part of IDLG other than the appointment of LoA staff and contribution to social policy documentation and enabling legislation. Over time IDLG appears to have come to lead the partnership as the senior partner over the representatives of ASGP, UNDP and the donor community. The team were advised that this approach is in line with a shift of its major projects from the Direct Implementation modality to the National implementation modality and in line with the post Kabul conference decisions.

Interface arrangement between ASGP activities and other programmes

There is no evidence of any formal or informal regular interface arrangements between ASGP activities and other SNG programmes. Nonetheless there are future opportunities for ASGP to identify and adjust accordingly.

Effectiveness of UNDP's management of the programme

UNDP management have been identified to be weak in relation to management of ASGP. The main criticisms include; micro management, reactive and ever changing priorities on the part of Country Office management; over-emphasis on centralised and delayed decision making; inability to hire staff; delayed procurement and complicated procedures; LoA's signed in a hurry and without supportive standard operating procedures;

This lack of a clear, consistent and supportive direction makes a difficult situation worse when ASGP already suffers from unstable management and ever changing demands from the donor community and from the Country Office.

6.3. Assessment of Programme Management ³

The overall programme goals and purpose remain relevant. But the rate of progress made on ASGP I was insufficient to deliver the goals set out for that phase and if the current rate of progress under AGSP II continues it is likely also to fail to provide sufficient high quality technical assistance to ensure achievement of the agreed outcomes for the programme as a whole. Indeed some of the achievements claimed by ASGP to date could not be attributed solely to the ASGP programme. It is accepted that in some cases where many donors are working towards the same result then the development impact is invariably achieved as a result of several similar initiatives.

Nonetheless, both ASGP phases have suffered from poor programme and project design and implementation, frequent leadership changes, failure to adhere to the agreed programme governance structure and design or to commonplace project management methodologies and from on-going staffing issues.

It is of concern that the programme in both phases failed to follow the agreed governance control mechanisms put in place at the start. The role and responsibilities of the Project Executive Group were clearly defined for both ASGP I and II. But in practice the role of the PEG in approving and steering the programme was often neglected or

³ Full details of the assessment of Programme Management are recorded in Annex III.

marginalised. Over time, IDLG took on a greater role in running and steering the PEG to the extent that it effectively sidelined the ASGP implementation team, UNDP and the donors. PEG meeting minutes frequently record IDLG reporting on ASGP and UNDP key progress. Programme decisions are recorded as having been taken by IDLG and presented to other PEG member as a *fait accompli*. There is no evidence to suggest that UNDP took any action to remedy this and indeed, on a number of occasions, it is clear that UNDP effectively encouraged this status quo. National leadership can be highly effective provided it takes full account of the needs of all stakeholders including the needs of donors to report to their agencies on verifiable tangible progress at the SNG level in the provinces, districts and municipalities and the needs of the SNG stakeholders in the regions whom ASGP was primarily intended to support.

The original scope of the programme was perhaps overambitious, given the realities of operating in the hostile, post-conflict environment of Afghanistan, particularly in the regions, and the relatively limited resources available for the programme. The challenge was further compounded by the difficulties encountered in recruiting and retaining sufficient qualified staff and in maintaining team continuity and cohesion. Project progress has been heavily reliant throughout on a small number of key personnel covering multiple positions. The team thus has had no capacity to cover for staff absences. The loss of a single member of the team for any period of time has had a direct adverse impact on programme delivery in a number of different work areas and/or regions.

The lack of a single, authoritative agreed work plan to direct activity and facilitate reporting and tracking of progress has been a significant weakness of the programme, resulting both in slower and less effective delivery than might otherwise have been the case and to delays in identifying issues that need addressing. There is a clear need both for a single overarching work plan for the full five-year programme as well as specific annual and regional work plans which should all be clearly related.

The creation of LoAs to give more flexibility for the programme to channel funding and support via IDLG is innovative in its approach. However the current format requires some urgent strengthening. The LoA and associated SOPs should be reviewed, including by a legal expert, and additional clauses should be included to strengthen accountability and auditing, clarify the steps for termination of these agreements (including a sunset clause) and set out actions in the event of non-compliance.

Partly as a result of the lack of a clear, definitive work plan, the reporting mechanism in place has not adequately monitored progress against agreed work plan milestones. Greater emphasis has been given to the quantity of reporting than to its quality or utility. So while much staff time has been taken up with reporting designed to satisfy the needs of UNDP and donors, staff have suffered reporting fatigue. The reporting produced has failed to identify issues sufficiently early to enable mitigating action to be put in place and has not satisfied donors.

While the pressure from UNDP on ASGP management to deliver frequent reports is understandable, the effect has in practice been to divert effort away from delivering project outputs and to focus effort on delivering quantity rather than quality of reporting. Fewer, better quality reports, more clearly reporting progress against the agreed work plan would provide better targeted and actionable information, allowing early steps to be taken where necessary to adjust focus and inputs to ensure delivery of agreed outputs and outcomes.

Transition planning is now an urgent matter, particularly in light of planned military drawdown for 2014 and donors' own transition goals. Currently ASGP has no document

setting out such plans and this is a matter of concern for donors. ASGP should look to form a working group including, but not limited to, IDGL, MoF, IARCSC and MRRD to work on putting together a transition plan that is acceptable to all parties. Annex III Programme Management paper A-27 sets out an indicative Transition to Afghanistan Implementation Schedule. This work should be completed within 6 months and no later than the start of the next budget year. This would give MoF sufficient time to start transitioning staff to the tashkeel from the next budget year.

Overall the ASGP programme has achieved some success in establishing IDLG and in helping deliver a policy for Sub National Governance. However, the consistently inadequate levels of staffing, combined with systemic failures in running the programme in line with its pre-agreed methodology, mean that the programme is now facing significant challenges. Unless urgent action is taken by UNDP to address the critical areas of staffing, team and project management structures, work planning, targeted reporting and transition, it is hard to see how ASGP II can deliver significantly more than ASGP I. On the other hand, sustained focus on these issues for a period of six months with the right resources could put this programme back on track and help restore donor faith in UNDP.

6.4. Assessment of Sub National Governance ⁴

The detailed Sub National Governance Paper on the “Compatibility of ASGP II with Afghanistan Sub National Governance Policy and the Kabul Conference, the effectiveness of the programme activities, and the interface with other donor-funded SNG programmes” is attached as Annex IV.

Analysis of the appropriateness of ASGP II overall goal, purpose and outputs in the light of the Kabul Conference commitments and the Sub National Governance Policy (SNGP).

- The following components of the SNGP are to be covered under ASGP II expected outputs:
 - The indicative activities related to output 1, ASGP II are focused to support and lobby for establishment and support of institutional framework for Sub National governance mainly through IDLG as its main national counterpart.
 - In order to address and identify the responsibilities of the provincial, district and village administration, ASGP II has set a target for itself that the principal associated laws and procedures are in place by 2014
 - The output 2 of ASGP II is expected to have the PGOs and the DGOs have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance and security strategies in accordance with ANDS. It is to better define and emphasis on the roles of the provincial and district governors’ offices.
 - In order to better clarify the roles of the provincial and district councils ASGP II has its output 4 focusing the activities to make sure that the provincial and district

⁴ Full details on the status of SNG in ASGP are in Annex IV.

councils have the improved capacity to represent citizen's interests and monitor Sub National governance.

- There has been embedded consideration of Sub National planning under the expected output 1 of ASGP II.
 - With regards to the municipal governance, ASGP II has captured this under its expected output 5 which states that the municipalities have the institutional and organization framework and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.
 - With relation to gender in Sub National governance there are a number of benchmarks set out under its expected output 2, focusing the activities to municipalities and PCs support.
 - Under expected output 2, establishment of provincial information service centers have been considered to address the public right to information.
 - PAR and capacity enhancement of Sub National government was planned to be considered under the expected output 3 that states IDLG and IARCSC have the capacity to coordinate PAR implementation and the IARCSC Sub National offices have the capacity to deliver PAR to all Sub National government institutions by 2014. This was subsequently removed and relocated with to another project/donor.
 - Performance measurement component in Sub National civil service institutions has also been covered under the expected output 3.
 - According to the log frame of the programme the public service standards part of the SNGP has been expected under its output 3.
- The following components of the SNGP are not considered under ASGP II:
 - The authority and function of IDLG
 - Line ministry departments and district offices
 - PDCs, PAAs, DDAs, and DAAs, CDCs
 - Code of conduct and code of ethics in public service institutions
 - Sub National jurisdiction
 - Local economic development
 - Community based natural resources management including land administration.
 - The following components of the Kabul Conference are considered in ASGP II:
 - Public Administration Reform
 - Concept of partnership with Afghans and national institutions
 - Improve governance
 - The following components of the Kabul Conference are receiving little or no consideration specifically in ASGP II:
 - Effectiveness, Accountability, and Transparency in the government
 - Security and economic opportunity
 - Human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption
 - Sub National finance and budget

Nonetheless some of the above areas are being addressed by other UNDP projects.

Summary of the effectiveness of the ASGP activities and progress in relation to the expected outputs

No.	Expected Outputs	Major Activities	Progress recorded in progress reports	Assessment of Effectiveness
1	National systems, procedures, and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor Sub National governance policy are in place by 2014	Drafting all necessary laws and associated rules of procedure and guidelines under the area of authority of IDLG	In progress and in line with the work plan but without a time bound work plan this activity is not measurable	The activity has been identified to be highly effective to reach the required output. It still requires more lobbying and advocacy of IDLG. The progress reported on drafting new laws could be improved.
		Development of key institutional, organizational and individual capacities in IDLG	In progress and in line with the work plan, but without a time bound work plan this activity is not measurable.	This activity has a timeline until end 2013. However the progress requires more speed; especially in strengthen in the financial management, budgeting, internal audit systems, and M&E in IDLG.
		Capacity Development of Policy unit of IDLG with respect to its key functions and capacities	In progress and in line with the work plan but without a time bound work plan this activity is not measurable.	The progress over the sub-component related to the development of the internal capacity building and ToT for policy unit of IDLG has been identified to be slow, and requires faster progress.
		Meetings of inter-ministerial coordination / implementation structures to review progress of SNGP implementation	No substantial progress found. However, the CO informed the team that IDLG has mechanisms in place for this purpose.	The timeline for this activity is close to its end. It was identified to be highly effective and critical to be executed as early as possible.
		SNG policy awareness for key staff of PGOs and DGOs and members of PCs and DCs	No substantial progress found	Some parts of the timeline planned for this activity have already pseed. It has been identified highly effective and critical to be executed as early as possible.
		SNG policy awareness for citizens regarding roles and	No substantial progress found	Some part of the timeline for this activity has already passed. It is

No.	Expected Outputs	Major Activities	Progress recorded in progress reports	Assessment of Effectiveness
		responsibilities of Sub National authorities		essential to be executed as soon as possible; especially it's sub-component for assisting the conduct of public hearings.
		Capacity Development of IDLG with respect to key capacities related to Sub National finance and planning	Some progress in HR but not yet any progress with other sub-components	This activity is a key indicator for SNG. However, more implementation is required especially in Sub National Finance.
2	Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS.	Strengthening provincial and district offices to fulfil their roles and responsibilities	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More focus should be made on to the components of provincial recruitment and appointment committees.
		Introduction of functioning modern administrative management systems in PGOs and DGOs	In progress with the work plan, not measurable	More work is required to be done in training of the PGOs and DGOs staffs on their roles and responsibilities.
		Establishing performance measurement systems for all provinces and government institutions	Little or no progress shown	This major activity is highly effective and critical for improved service delivery in Sub National institutions. More lobbying role of IDLG will be required for this to be executed.
		Establishing interaction mechanisms for effective interaction between Sub National government and public to improve access to information	Some progress shown, more needed to be done in this regards	In the areas with regards to establishing provincial information services centres, creation of public grievance system and e-government, little have been done. More work is required.
		Provincial Strategic Planning (PSP) and Provincial Development Planning (PDP) guided by PSP	Recorded as In progress in accordance with the plan. Two were completed at the time of this review and others are planned for the	It is effective; some more work will be required in the components of support to PDCs, strategic profiling and development databases.

No.	Expected Outputs	Major Activities	Progress recorded in progress reports	Assessment of Effectiveness
			future.	
		Strengthen public financial management at Sub National level to make it fully compliant with applicable laws and MoF procedures	Little or no progress shown The CO informed the team that this activity was being supported by another UNDP project.	This exercised is critical for Sub National governance improvement and requires a great deal more attention and improvement.
3	Provincial and District Councils have improved capacity to represent citizen interests and monitor Sub National governance	Establishing knowledge sharing systems for Provincial and District Councils	Some progress shown, more required to be executed	More focus of the programme will be required to this major activity and its related sub-activities in order to achieve synergy and cross cutting methodology and results between provinces and districts.
		Capacity development of PCs and DCs so that they are compliant with roles of procedures and conduct public outreach	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	Specific thematic training and capacity building programmes are required for both the PCs and DCs.
		Strengthening PCs and DCs oversight over local service delivery, strategic and annual budgetary and planning, M&E for service delivery	Little progress has been shown in this regards	More training and capacity building programmes are required on M&E and annual budgetary topics to both the PCs and DCs
4	Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under PAR) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services	Improving capacity of municipalities to generate own source revenues	In progress in line with the work plan. This activity is measurable but more support is required in relation to development of a database for revenues in the municipalities	This major activity has been identified as highly effective..
		Improving municipal capacities to apply minimum service standards, improved	Little progress shown	It has been expected to be more effective. Work will be required on FMS and provision of service

No.	Expected Outputs	Major Activities	Progress recorded in progress reports	Assessment of Effectiveness
		procedures, performance measurement system and FMS		standards.
		Organizational restructuring of municipalities to improve service delivery, including at least 15% female staff by 2014	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work will be required in its timeframe, especially in HR sections of municipalities.
		Strengthening municipality outreach programme	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work needs to be executed in the areas of customer satisfaction survey, participatory planning, and public hearing mechanisms.
		Strengthening modern office management systems in municipalities	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work is required in its component to apply modern office management procedures in municipalities.
		Creation and maintenance of a functional website and e-government applications for selected municipalities	No progress shown yet	The web-sites and e-government will be essential for successful municipalities in order to close the disconnect between IDLG, provinces and municipalities. The activity was planned to start by early January 2011. It is essential that it now start as soon as possible.

Analysis of the interface and potential overlap of ASGP with other donors funded Sub National governance support programmes:

Sub National Governance Support Programmes	Areas of Support	Analysis of potential overlap with ASGP
ASGP Afghanistan Sub National	1. Support to development and implementation of SNGP. 2. Capacity building of the Provincial Governors.	Not Applicable

Sub National Governance Support Programmes	Areas of Support	Analysis of potential overlap with ASGP
Governance Programme	Offices (PGOs) and the District Governors Offices (DGOs). 3. Support to the Provincial Councils(PCs) 4. Support to Municipalities.	
Afghanistan Local Government Facilities Development Programme (ALGFDP)	1. Construction of district complexes. 2. Residential buildings and guest houses for civil servants in the provinces and districts. 3. Construction of provincial council buildings, and <i>Jirga</i> Halls. 4. Supply of vehicles for DGs. 5. Provision of refurbishment and equipment.	Provision of similar equipment
Performance Based Governors Fund (PBGF)	The Provincial Governors through this programme will have a flexible budget up, 25000 USD at first stage to use for the governance and government support areas and activities in the province for which they will not be able to get funding through their operational budget. The budget will be spent in six categories for which the governor's performance will be annually evaluated.	Since the modality under which the funds will be provided to the PGs is more flexible through this programme there is a possibility of potential overlap with ASGP activities and assistance.
District Delivery Programme (DDP)	DDP has been an inter-governmental programme working through an inter-ministerial secretariat led by IDLG. It focuses on the districts with insecurity background. Programme activities includes: 1. Assess and cooperates to recruit and fill all the needed civil servants in the district. 2. The civil servants receive their salaries and some hazards allowance on time. 3. Some development projects requested at the district level got required resources and being implemented.	No overlap
Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP)	1. Support and facilitation of <i>Jirga</i> process in the districts under the coverage of the programme 2. Facilitation of traditional election process inside the district Jirga, and formation of community councils or district community councils (DCC). 3. Training and capacity building of the DCCs members. 4. Provision of the monthly stipends to the DCCs members.	There is the potential for overlap in training and capacity building of the DCCs members.
Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP)	1. Capacity building of the municipalities through embedded advisors in the mayors offices. 2. Provision of provisional service delivery grants to the municipalities making them able to procure municipalities services. 3. Improve revenue generation by building systems to measure revenues and	Considerable overlap in: Capacity building of the municipalities through embedded advisors in the mayors offices. Potential overlap in:

Sub National Governance Support Programmes	Areas of Support	Analysis of potential overlap with ASGP
	expenditures, methods of collecting legal taxes.	Improve revenue generation by building systems to measure revenues and expenditures, methods of collecting legal taxes.
Regional Afghan Municipalities Programme for Urban Population (RAMP-UP)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity building of the municipalities through embedded advisors in the mayors offices. 2. Provision of provisional service delivery grants to the municipalities making them able to procure municipalities services. 3. Improve revenue generation by building systems to measure revenues and expenditures, methods of collecting legal taxes. 	<p>Considerable overlap in: Capacity building of the municipalities through embedded advisors in the mayors offices.</p> <p>Potential overlap in: Improve revenue generation by building systems to measure revenues and expenditures, methods of collecting legal taxes</p>

6.5. Assessment of Financial Management and Value for Money.⁵

The detailed Financial Management Paper is attached as Annex II. The following is a summary of the key issues:

Based on numerous discussion, consultations with management team of ASGP, UNDP, IDLG, IARCSC, Donors, PGOs Municipalities etc., review of documents and records of ASGP, field visits to Helmand, Mazar, Herat and Urozgan during June and July 2011, research of available material generated by 'think tanks' and experts on Sub National governance, our comments on the operational, financial management and project management environment under which ASGP is delivered are offered by the Evaluation/Review Team.

It has long been recognised by key political, military and social players of Afghanistan both internal and external to Afghanistan that for peace and stability and economic growth the GoA need to reach to each corner of the country. Realizing this need in 2006, UNDP designed and initiated a programme called Afghanistan Sub National Governance Programme (ASGP) which is known as ASGP I. This programme is commonly understood to be the design phase of the UNDP Sub National Governance programme in Afghanistan II.

Key achievements of ASGP I comprise:

Creation of Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) reporting directly

⁵ Please refer to Annex II A-11 for more detail on Financial Management

reporting to the President of Afghanistan; development and Approval of a detail Sub National Governance Policy (SNGP); and a pilot run of selected aspects of Sub National Governance Policy in Mazar.

ASGP emerged as the flag ship programme for Sub-Governance in Afghanistan through core funding of UNDP and contributions from number of bilateral donors. After the promulgation of SN efforts from other key players like International Donors, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and other development programmes implemented through multilateral funding, directly or indirectly, started to address the subject of Sub National governance. But all such unilateral efforts remained restricted either to a particular geographic region or a particular institution and lacked coordinated national effort.

There are number of milestones which need to be achieved to implement Sub National Governance in Afghanistan in real terms, which include;

- Promulgation of new laws and regulations in line with SNP;
- Modifications in existing laws to bring them in line with SNP;
- Build capacity of provincial and district governments along with line ministries in provinces;
- Building capacity of judicial system at Provincial level;
- Allocation budgetary funding to provinces with defined delegated financial powers for recurring and development activities; and
- Implementation of provincial and district performance monitoring mechanism.

ASGP as a programme had a number of log frame targets as defined in the Project Document of ASGP I. Since ASGP I was the design phase of a larger Sub National Governance initiative it went through an evolution process during its life from 2006 until 2010. Due to programme evolution and weak and changing leadership planning process of the programme remained sub-optimal leading to weak tracking of performance and disintegrated work progress.

ASGP is implemented under Directly Executed (DEX) modality of UNDP in coordination with the related government counterpart Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). As part of ASGP I a number of donors provided funds for implementation of this programme in addition to core funding from UNDP HQ. Whereas, as part of ASGP II the funding was provided by DFID, EC, Italy and the Netherlands. As part of DEX modality the programme is implemented by UNDP Country Office directly and it has the directly fiduciary responsibility in accordance with the funding agreements between donors and UNDP.

As part of the programme design of ASGP I the implementation of certain fiduciary responsibilities were transferred to the Government of Afghanistan's counter parts namely IDLG and IARCSC under Letter of Agreements (LoAs) signed between UNDP, IDLG and IARCSC. This transfer of fiduciary responsibility was only to the extent of activities being performed by them as part of ASGP subject to post payment review of UNDP and other conditions. But ultimate fiduciary responsibility for ASGP rests with UNDP Afghanistan.

Since, ASGP is implemented under DEX modality hence all financial management rules and regulations of UNDP were applicable and ALTAS the business application of UNDP was used for, budgeting, work planning, transaction processing, procurement

processing, payment of transactions, allocation of costs to activities and donors and inventory management.

Key heads of cost related to ASGP are as follows:

- Personnel cost related to staff working in IDLG, staff working in PGOs and Municipalities as LoA staff and fixed term international and short term local and international staff;
- Capital expenditure related to procurement of vehicles, furniture and fixtures, office equipment and information and technology equipment and others;
- Costs related to programme activities
- Operational costs of the Programme
- Programme Management Cost

With the objective to facilitate the flow of funds for activities and capacity building of government counter parts namely IDLG and IARCSC UNDP signed Letter of Agreements (LoA) as per of following responsibilities were given to counter parts:

Selection of staff members to work as LoA staff in IDLG and PGO and Municipal offices through a competitive and transparent manner. As per design the following are the sequence of task for selection of staff members and deployment at intended offices;

- Request is sent by the Provincial Governor or Mayor of Municipality to the IDLG specifying the functional area for which staff is required;
- IDLG process the request through a competitive hiring process;
- Deploys the staff at the PGO or Municipal office;
- The staff could be from the related province or they could be from any other province;
- The new staff member is attached to the IDLG or in the PGO or municipality to facilitate SNG.
- On a monthly basis time sheets and performance reports are submitted by LoA staff after approval of their supervisors to IDLG;
- In ASGP I on a monthly basis IDLG on the basis of these time sheets and performance report compiled a claim for the transfer of salaries to LoA staff and submits it to ASGP for direct payment through UNDP country office;
- ASGP then processes the payment through UNDP country office;
- Standard monthly salaries of LoA staff working at PGOs are USD 1,500 per month and of LoA staff working at the municipality are USD 1,300.

IDLG also forwards claims for the staff working on various positions at IDLG to ASGP for direct payment.

During the period starting from 2006 until June 30, 2011 ASGP incurred aggregate costs of USD 43.632 million and USD 8.625 million on ASGP I and II respectively. On an overall basis out of the total cost 54% was spent on personnel or related costs. This includes 37% on personnel cost of ASGP staff working in centre (Kabul) and in regions and 17% on staff hired by IDLG under LoA for work in IDLG or PGOs and Municipalities. The share of LoA staff costs has increased substantially during 2010 and 2011.

The capital expenditure constitutes 20% and 8% of total cost of ASGP I and II respectively. As compared to planned procurements as indicated in the procurement

plans the actual capital expenditure is significantly low, which is apparent from the following analysis.

The direct programme activities which includes cost of workshops, field trips, communication publications etc is only 6% and 3% during ASGP I and II respectively,

The operational cost also includes certain direct costs associated with programme activities such travel, per diems etc., but this cannot be separately classified since head of expenditures are noted clustered in operational and direct programme activities.

The programme management is charged as a percentage of all other costs chargeable to donors. The standard rate is 7%. In case of ASGP II the current reported figure for Project Management is less than standard since the full cost has not been charged in ATLAS until June 30, 2011.

As per our review following are findings related to financial management and fiduciary risk of ASGP:

- **Issue:** The financial management system used by UNDP for ASGP as per their policies is satisfactory and has reasonable controls in place including good segregation of duties. But in certain cases it is not effective:
 - Delays in payments to suppliers and service providers;
 - Long chain of approvals required for approval of activities irrespective of importance, size and financial value of activity;
 - Numbers of small activities are performed at regional level for which funds are disbursed to fixed term international staff only through hawalla dealers in cash. The advance holders are not allowed to open their personal bank accounts in which they could ask for transfer of advances and use the advance as per requirement of the activities. After execution of activity when advances are settled, all remaining balance of fund against any advance need to be sent back to the country office through Hawala dealer which is again a time consuming effort.
 - Procurements as defined in the procurement plans are not in the same way defined in ATLAS leading to delays.
 - We understood from different discussions that all approvals are centralized in Country office at Country Director or Deputy Country Director level. This needs to be examined closely in relation to the real need for three separate CO approval points for all requisitions, purchase orders and vouchers.
 - Physical control on inventory items is not effective especially on those items which are procured for IDLG, PGOs and Municipalities under LoAs.

Recommendations:

- The approval and payment processes must be redesigned to reduce processing times without compromising on effective controls;
- A delegation of powers is designed and approved on the basis of materiality, type of activity and sensitivities around a particular transaction;
- Funds transferred to fixed term international staff for advances are given as a pool of funds for execution of activities in particular regions against which payment by activities should be traceable, but any remaining balance should be held in the advance account and offset against future advance funds requests.
- The advance funds to regions should be transferred to personal bank accounts of ASGP staff;
- Physical inventory controls are enforced through securing receipt

acknowledgments from the assigned offices of PGOs and municipalities and effective tracking system of items starting from the assignment of time to a particular office to receipt of the equipment/by the assigned item. On a sample basis, items should be checked by the regional staff during their visits. The list of items provided to in particular region should be provided to the Regional Managers which should be updated on quarterly basis.

- **Issue:** Weak procurement planning and delays in procurement process. Our key findings related to the procurement are as follows:
 - Different procurement format used every year during 2009, 2010 and 2011;
 - There is no formal procurement tracking system from procurement plan, requisition, processing and delivery of items;
 - There is no tracking of items which were planned in one plan but were not delivered and carried forward to the next year's plan; and
 - Significant delays in procurement process leave to marginalized programme impact of such procurements.

Recommendations:

A consultative process within ASGP and UNDP Country office is initiated to devise a common strategy for doing procurement planning in focused, targeted and systematic manner so that following objectives could be achieved:

- Only those items are planned which are actually required and necessary and which will add value to the programme objectives;
 - The procurement processing time is considering is planned delivery dates of items
 - The time lines of procurement are defined in the plan in various stages including requisition, approval, processing and delivery with assigned responsibilities so that accountability for unplanned delays could be assigned.
 - All cancelled planned procurements should be properly documented and tracked;
 - All carried forward planned procurements should be separately identified in the plan;
- **Issue:** Value for money achieved related to LoA staff provided to IDLG, PGO and Municipalities cannot be determined since all hiring and performance management of LoA staff is done through IDLG and ASGP has not performed any assessment of quality of systems in place nor its effectiveness compliance. Nor does ASGP have the data through which the team could extract the information such as number LoA staff by each PGO / Municipality per year.

During our field visits we were concerned on the process being followed by IDLG for hiring of LoA staff including potential conflict of interest of IDLG staff members in hiring process. On overall basis at the moment it is not possible to provide any view on the quality of induction process of LoA staff and their performance to date since ASGP does not have any data in this regard. Further, as part of this evaluation there was not enough time to really go into IDLG's related systems and provide an independent assessment.

In relation to LoA, again ASGP does not have accurate data available with respect to number of staff trained clustered in type of training, origin of participants like from PGO, Line Ministries or Municipalities etc. Only an estimated overall percentage was made available such as: almost 75% of all PGO, Municipality and Line Ministry staff in provinces are trained. No data/report is available for the quality and impact of trainings imparted.

Recommendations:

- An independent review of processes being used by IDLG for hiring and performance management of LoAs staff is performed to assess its effectiveness;
 - ASGP should be able to track the number of LoAs along with basic information about each LoA. This will be very critical to plan activities in each province especially after signing of LoAs with PGO and Municipalities;
 - The performance of LoA staff working in IDLG should also be assessed at least on half yearly basis in comparison to the defined objectives of the programme
 - An assessment of quality and impact of staff trained through IARCSC should be performed to assess the value for money achieved.
- **Issue:** As per Clause 9 of the LoAs signed between UNDP, IDLG and IARCSC, UNDP has the right to initiate an external audit of costs claimed by IDLG. Until now no such audit was initiated by UNDP. ASGP is audited by an independent audit firm for the years 2008 and 2009, which does not mentioned in the scope of work that the auditors have reviewed the documentation of IDLG and has assessed their controls. As per Clause 14 of LoA IDLG was required to perform physical verification of inventory items procured under ASGP on periodic basis but ASGP has no evidence whether physical verification was performed or not.

Recommendations:

- The external audit or assessment as recommended above should be immediately be initiated to comply with the assurance requirements of LoA;
 - IDLG and IARCSC should asked to conduct physical verification of items procured and funded through ASGP and provided report to ASGP.
- **Issue:** During early 2011 as part of new outreach strategy of ASGP LoAs were signed with all provincial PGOs. These LoAs will allow transfer of funds from ASGP to each PGO for utilization on activities to be agreed as part of implementation plan or a work plan of PGO. This is a paradigm shift from a totally centralized control framework to providing funds in the project account of each PGO which is to be operated by LoA staff members working each PGO. Although, there are number risk management related observations on this new LoA mechanism but since these are already signed and executed hence at minimum following risk management controls are suggested for inclusion in this framework as noted in the recommendation below:

Recommendations:

- Basic information about each LoA staff to be operating the bank account should be maintained. Said information should include, name, address, contact numbers, tazkara number, name of father, names, contact number, tazkara number of at least two close family members. Further, all said information verified through on site reference checks and confirmations;
 - For the operations of the project bank account standing instructions should be given that the transactions could only be processed when along with bank transfer instruction or cheque pre-authorization signed by the Governor or his nominee and the Regional Manager is provided;
 - Standing instruction are given to the Bank that bank statement of project bank account is forwarded to ASGP office in Kabul on monthly basis.
- **Issue:** As per our review we found no monitoring and evaluation function with ASGP accordingly there appears to be no independent mechanism available within ASGP

for operational assurance.

Recommendation:

- A monitoring and evaluation function is created in the project management structure of ASGP reporting directly to Programme Manager with the objective have independent operational assurance on programmatic activities.
- **Issue:** The management letter of the external financial audit for the year ended December 31, 2009 following observations were reported:
 - Understaffing and staff turnover is high
 - Non-execution of planned activities
 - Monitoring and evaluation plan not developed
 - Quarterly meetings of Project Board not held as planned
 - "Paid" stamp not affixed on supplier vouchers
 - Irregularities in respect of assets physical verifications
 - Discrepancies in cash verifications

On an overall basis the assurance framework of ASGP remained weak since;

- The role of the Board as outlined in the Project Documents of ASGP I and II as a Governance Functions does not seems to be operative. Key milestones of the programme such as work plan, budgets, inception reports, monitoring and evaluation reports, financial audit reports and matters like LoA with provinces are not approved by the Board;
- The internal monitoring and evaluation functions was not in place;
- We understand that UNDP country office initiated some internal programme assessment results of which remained at the level of top management of UNDP Afghanistan;
- Financial audits were delayed until now we have only seen the audit reports for the year ended December 31, 2008 and 2009;

The review team observed that at the UNDP Country Office senior management team there is a strategic vision for SNG and ASGP but this has not been inculcated in the programme management team of ASGP. Internal and external communication has been consistently weak during both ASGP I and II.

ASGP's information management remains weak. UNDP Country Office has an intranet database that captures data about all projects of UNDP in Afghanistan. The main folders in the database are related to Project Board Meetings including the minutes; procurement plans; resource mobilisation; financial management; project documents; risk management; and communication and training etc. These are certain standard readily available reports/information. However, during the course of the evaluation/review certain information when requested by the review team was not readily available, instead it was requested from IDLG, or compiled by the staff of ASGP and UNDP Country office on a special request basis.

ASGP has been significantly affected by high staff turnover especially on senior management positions and an incomplete team. This has led to an uncontrolled drain of programme intellect and multi tasking by staff members which in turn has negatively impacted on the qualitative performance of staff members. The review of the staff list indicated that there are three staff members the cost of whom is fully charged to ASGP. These staff members are stationed in the UNDP Country office and also provide services to other UNDP projects. In cases where such staff are not dedicated working

for ASGP then the costs should be allocated to all projects to whom the staff also provide their services instead of charging the whole cost to ASGP.

It is concluded that in the current business environment of ASGP it is very difficult to implement ASGP's activities and to achieve its objectives. This programme needs strong governance; dedicated leadership of its own; a full team; the complete use of tools for the management of its intellectual property and information; quality assurance functions; as well as well planned professional and timely procurement and disbursement procedures.

ASGP has raised the level of expectation in the provinces through its advocacy but has failed to meet these expectations and to deliver through joint commitment and work of IDLG, UNDP and Donors in providing strong SNG laws and support, a strong, complete and effective project management team and efficient and transparent systems and mechanisms in relation to funding.

6.6. Summary of Findings based on SWOT Analysis

An exhaustive analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats was conducted by the team on completion of the research, meeting schedule and regional missions. The findings are as follows:

ASGP I	
Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supported the establishment of IDLG • Sub National Governance Policy Approved • Municipality revenue augmented • SN PAR Strategy Implemented • Provincial and district operational manuals prepared, published and introduced to all PGOs and 80% of district civil servants • Thousands of civil servants trained • 60% of Provincial Council members trained • Number of conferences and forums of PC members held • Technical support provided to PCs and PGOs
Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Design weak and without risk management framework • Project influx counterpart changed • Poor Project Management, Revolving Leadership, recruitment and procurement • Poor reporting, with excessive delays • No M&E • Weak external and Internal communications • Weak information management, including archiving document control, institutional memory • Staff appraisals / LoA Quality checks missing • Weak Risk Management of LoAs • No end of Project Evaluation report • No Inception Reporting

ASGP II	
Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant changes over the past 6 months • 141 LoA staff working in IDLG • 130 LoA staff working PGOs and Municipalities • Innovative fund transfer modality for quick fund transfer to provinces with the objective to build capacity of PGOs in managing their projects and funds • Continuity of Counterpart and Government Support • Programmatic Approach to development • Multilateral approach to development
Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No regular board meetings • Donor and UNDP Micro Management • Ineffective Program Governance • All Subjective Deliverables • Non-result based programme document • Weak Quality Assurance of Reporting • Delayed Inception Report (this was not a UNDP requirement but it was prepared on the request of the donors) • Weak / multiple / overlapping work planning • Deviated Regional Implementation • DGO support – no progress so far • Ineffective lobbying for Sub-National Financing • Weak external and internal communication • Insufficient staffing, reactive, impatient management • UNDP HR Process non-compatible with long term Programs

7. THE WAY FORWARD

7.1. Critical Success Factors/Recommendations

Based on the summary of findings that resulted from the SWOT analysis, the following recommendations are the critical success factors for UNDP/ASGP/IDLG if the programme is to improve its performance:

- Redefine the responsibilities and contribution of both UNDP, IDLG and the donors in respect of ASGP.
- Donors to closely track the achievements as reflected in the programme document and inception report and issue tranches of funding when time bound deliverables are evident.
- Agree on Programme Management Structure including separate functions with a specific function for the management of LoAs – fully staffed with effective professionals and for monitoring and evaluation.
- A detailed, integrated, time bound, output oriented approved work plan;
- Written tangible commitment from IDLG to support ASGP Work Plan
- Mandatory quarterly Board Meetings to track and review quantifiable progress of ASGP II implementation against the Board approved Work Plan.
- Secure formal legal advice on LoAs and related procedures with respect to its legal applicability, conflict with any UN procedures or laws of Government of Afghanistan;
- A detailed procurement plan is prepared and a time and cost effective procurement process is devised and implemented;
- Dramatically improve project reporting to enable the implementation of timely, output oriented plans. actual quarterly reporting function;
- Implementation of internal objective field based monitoring and evaluation;
- Enforce a documentation control and information management system;
- A continuous appraisal system for all LoA staff including those in IDLG, PGO and Municipality is implemented;
- Perform mapping of Sub National efforts within UN Afghanistan and by other donors and identification of mechanism for improved communication and collaboration
- Establish monthly Regional Manager meetings in the regions for progress review and knowledge sharing.
- Considerably enhance regional support for SNG in respect of capacity development on SN finance and planning, revenue collection and financial management; SNG policy awareness for PGO's, DGO's, PC's, DC's and increase awareness for citizens on the roles and responsibilities of Sub National authorities.
- Develop an exit strategy for transition from ASGP funded experts to GoA Tashkeel in conjunction with regional managers and IDLG and within the lifespan of the programme.

7.2. Analysis of Options for the Way Forward

Options	Advantages	Risks
1. Close ASGP	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Save donor funding/re-allocate to more tangible projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Loss of UNDP credibility• Loss of network of LoAs• Loss of procurement

Options	Advantages	Risks
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sends message to GoIRA to be more active on SN • Removes overlap with other projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • funding • Loss of infrastructure support to a number of PGOs (incl. high speed internet)
2. Transfer ASGP programme to a contractor to implement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved professional project management experienced in delivering time bound results within tight budgets • Reduced organisational overheads and more economies of scale • Focus on tangible deliverables • Professional reporting • Easier to enforce delivery and compliance • Potential synergies with other contracted SNG projects of bilateral donors • Operational flexibility, incl. staffing management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential increased in project costs • Short term focused intervention • May try to apply previously developed solutions • Perception risks (from country, overpriced) • Less scope for national ownership and the move from direct to national implementation modality
3. Sub National Governance from Multilateral to Bilateral – ASGP may continue with UN core funding..	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor funding targeted at regions/provinces of their choice • Closer tracking of Technical and Financial Deliverable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficult to enforce a countrywide standard approach • Overlap • Earmarking is a development problem and can lead to a limited consensus in approach • Does not encourage national ownership
4. UNDP to carry on ‘as is’	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP longevity in development arena in country • Common approach across provinces • UNDP neutrality • UNDP will be in Afghanistan beyond the 2014 military drawdown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current issues and risks which need to be resolved are identified in SWOT analysis and in the evaluation report if this option is to be successful.
5. Reduce funding to IDLG and divert funding to SNG activities (PGO, DGO and Municipalities) This is not just a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shifting focus and financing from IDLG to SNG level in line with the spirit and intent of ASGP II • Transition IDLG from Donor dependence to GoA tashkeel in common with 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationship risk • Other funding contributors may have more leverage to push their priorities • Potential delays to regulation drafting and promulgation

Options	Advantages	Risks
stand alone option. It may well form part of other options.	other Government Ministries	
6. Suspend donor funding for a 6 month period to ASGP subject to critical success factors being met and substitute with UNDP core funds to maintain current successful SNG initiatives in certain provinces.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunity to apply critical success factors • Continuity of institution memory • Continuity of support to GoIRA and Provincial entities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Probability of failure • Further delay to planned project expansion
7. Partial outsourcing of key functions such as Project Management, HR, Procurement etc. This is also not just a standalone option. It may well form part of other options	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved project functions • Focus on tangible deliverables • Professional reporting • Easier to enforce delivery and compliance in these functions • More project resources focusing on delivery and not project management and support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential increased in project costs • Short term focused intervention in these functional areas • Dependence on external providers
8. DEX to NEX (to IDLG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsibility of implementation transferred to counterpart entity (with UNDP support) • Critical step towards sustainable framework for delivery • Flexibility for counterpart entity to implement GoIRA priorities • Increased national ownership in alignment with the transition process • Provides an appropriate exit strategy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity of counterparts may not be ready to take on modality • Issues on transparency

7.3. Recommended Options for the Way Forward

The following four options represent the result of the individual decisions made by each team member as to which of the above options are most likely to succeed in bringing ASGP back on track and most importantly to focus primarily on direct arrangements to support SNG given the national importance of the Governors' Offices and the Municipalities for the long term sustainable development of good governance in Afghanistan.

- **Option 2:** Transfer ASGP programme to a contractor to implement.
- **Option 5:** Reduce funding to IDLG and divert more direct funding to SNG activities in the regions (PGO, DGO and Municipalities). This is not just a stand alone option. It may well form part of other options.
- **Option 6:** Suspend donor funding for a six month period to ASGP subject to critical success factors being met.
- **Option 7:** Partial outsourcing of key functions such as Project Management, HR, Procurement, etc.



**United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP)**

Afghanistan

FINAL ANNEXES TO THE ASGP EVALUATION REPORT

September 2011

LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex I	Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited	A-3
Annex II	Financial Management Paper	A-11
Annex III	Programme Management Paper	A-27
Annex IV	Sub national Governance Paper	A-43
Annex V	List of persons consulted	A-57
Annex VI	Documents and Records Reviewed	A-61
Annex VII	Terms of Reference for the Evaluation and Review	A-67
Annex VIII	Record of Meetings	A-76

ANNEX I

Status of ASGP II PROGRESS IN THE REGIONS VISITED

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Note: This matrix reflects only those activities that were relevant to be implemented at the regional level. Helmand and Kandahar have been excluded from this matrix because of the limited verifiable information available during our missions.

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
1	1.6	SNG policy awareness for citizens regarding roles and responsibilities of sub national authorities				
	1.6.1	Designing public awareness & communication campaigns on SNGP		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.6.2	Implementation of public awareness and communication campaigns		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.6.3	Assist in conducting public hearings		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.7	Capacity Development of IDLG with respect to key capacities related to sub-national finance and planning				
	1.7.1	Build IDLG capacity on sub national finance, including HRD & M&E		In progress		No evidence No evidence
	1.7.2	Planning, communication & collaboration with MoF & other stakeholders		In progress		No evidence No evidence
	1.7.3	ToT for UNDP-ASGP ROs on local planning and budgeting		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.7.4	Development of planning and budgeting manual		In progress		No evidence No evidence
	1.7.5	Development of a system for tracking provincial resource allocations		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.7.6	Development and implementation of Provincial Development Plans		In progress	In progress	No evidence
2	2.1	Strengthening Provincial and District Offices to fulfil their roles and responsibilities				
	2.1.1	Strengthening Provincial Recruitment Committee through the PGO	Done	In progress	In progress	Not done In progress
	2.1.2	Support PGO to implement guidelines for appointment procedures	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done No evidence
	2.1.3	Provide support in the organization of special recruitment campaigns	In progress	In progress	Not done	Not done No evidence
	2.1.4	Provide support to regional & provincial	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress In progress

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
	capacity building working groups					
2.1.5	Support to Provincial and District Administrative Assemblies	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done	No evidence
2.1.6	Training to provincial specialists of PGOs employed for technical services	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress
2.2	Introduction of functioning modern administrative management systems in PGOs and DGOs					
2.2.1	Introduction of provincial & district operating manuals (OMs)	Done	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress
2.2.2	Training for staff in application of provincial and district OMs	Done	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress
2.2.3	Provide guidelines, forms & equipment required to implement OMs	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress
2.2.4	Training on SNGP to PGO/DGOs regarding their role & responsibilities		In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress
2.3	Establishing performance measurement systems for sub-national governance for all provinces and government institutions					
2.3.1	TA to implement performance measurement systems for service delivery	Not done	In progress	Not done	Not done	In delay
2.3.2	TA to develop minimum service standards for sub-national govt entities	No done	In progress	In progress	Not done	In delay
2.3.3	Streamline IDLG reporting system and harmonize it with ANDS M&E	In future plan	In progress	In future plan	In future plan	In future plan
2.3.4	Support the periodic surveys	Done	In progress	Not done	In progress	In progress
2.3.5	Support PGO for annual reporting conference and production of reports	Done	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.4	Establishing interaction mechanisms for effective interaction between sub-national government and public to improve access to information					
2.4.1	Support to operation 34 provincial Information Service Canters	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.4.2	Support creation of a public grievances system at province/district level	Not done	In progress	No evidence	In delay	In delay

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
2.4.3	Establish effective provincial communication and information systems	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In delay
2.4.4	Support PGO & DGO in organization of public consultations & hearings	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	Not done
2.4.5	Support the development of ICT infrastructure in PGO and DGO	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In slow progress
2.4.6	Support functioning of e-government features in provinces	Not done	In progress	Not done	Not done	In progress
2.5	Provincial Strategic Planning (PSP) and Provincial Development Planning (PDP) guided by the PSP					
2.5.1	Support to PGOs and DGOS in strategic and annual planning	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In delay
2.5.2	Support PDCs in implementation of strategic and development plans	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.5.3	Training to provincial staff in strategic profiling, planning & implementation	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.5.4	Support for introduction of development databases to improve monitoring	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.5.5	Support to organization of training, workshops, FGD, etc to develop PSP	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	Not done
2.6	Strengthening public financial management at sub-national level to make it fully compliant with applicable laws and MOF procedures					
2.6.1	Deliver training to all PGO internal auditors in Internal Audit Manual	In delay	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.6.2	Fully equip, staff and make operational PGO internal audit offices	In delay	In progress	Not done	Not done	No evidence
2.6.3	Establish a system to follow on and implement audit recommendations	In future plan	In future plan	In future plan	In future plan	In the future plan
2.6.4	Introduction of AFMIS and regular financial reporting in PGO and DGO	In progress	Not done	Not done	Not done	No evidence
4	4.1 Establishing Knowledge sharing system for Provincial and District Councils					
4.1.1	Support to PC and DC Information Centre &	In delay	Not done	Not done	No evidence	Not done

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited							
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul	
	Platform (staff, equipment)						
4.1.2	Strategy & action plan devt for PC & DC Information Centre & Platform	In delay	Not done	Not done	No evidence	Not done	
4.1.3	Website development for the PC & DC Information Centre	In delay	Not done	Not done	No evidence	Not done	
4.2	Capacity Development of PCs and DCs so that they are compliant with rules of procedure and conduct public outreach						
4.2.1	Training for PCs & DCs on monitoring, conflict resolution & rules	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	In progress	
4.2.2	TA to PC and DC to apply M&E techniques, conflict resolution methods	In progress	Not done	Not done	In progress	In progress	
4.2.3	TA & equipment support to PC & DC for their effective functioning	In delay	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	
4.2.4	Programme of public communication and outreach for all PCs and DCs	In progress	In progress	Not done	No done	Not done	
4.3	Strengthening PCs' and DCs' oversight over local service delivery: strategic and annual budgeting & planning; M&E for service delivery; etc.						
4.3.1	Training and TA to PC & DC for strategic and annual planning	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	No evidence	
4.3.2	TA to improve effectiveness of oversight of PC & DC	In progress	Not done	Not done	In progress	Not done	
4.3.3	TA to set up and operate M&E working groups chaired by the PC	In progress	Not done	No evidence	Not done	In delay	
4.3.4	Provincial Monitoring Team (PMT) constructed and led by PC	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	In delay	
5	5.1	Improving capacity of municipalities to generate own source revenues					
	5.1.1	Manuals, guidelines, systems and procedures for revenue enhancement	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	No evidence
	5.1.2	Design and introduce databases for municipal revenues	In progress	In progress	Not done	No evidence	No evidence
	5.1.3	Introduce performance measurement	In delay	In progress	Not done	No evidence	No evidence

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
	system for revenue generation					
5.1.4	CD for revenue generation, tax assessment & rate setting, etc.	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	No evidence
5.2	Improving municipal capacities to apply minimum service standards, improved procedures, performance measurement system and FMS					
5.2.1	Manuals, guidelines and procedures for delivery of municipal services	In progress	In progress	In progress	No evidence	
5.2.2	Developing minimum service standards and re-engineering procedures	In progress	In progress	Not done	No evidence	
5.2.3	Introduce performance measurement system for municipal services	In future plan	In progress	In future plan	In the future plan	
5.2.4	Introduce Public Service Excellence Programme to municipalities	In progress	In progress	Not done	In future plan	
5.2.5	Design municipal customer service centre (one stop shop)	In delay	In progress	Not done	In delay	
5.2.6	Assist municipalities to implement transparent and accountable FMS	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	
5.3	Organisational restructuring of municipalities to improve service delivery, including at least 15% female staff by 2014					
5.3.1	Functional analysis in municipalities to develop organizational structures	No evidence	In progress	Not done	Not done yet	
5.3.2	CD for conducting functional analysis for organizational development	In progress	In progress	Not done	Not done	
5.3.3	Design and introduce HR database to municipalities	In progress	In the progress	In progress	In progress	
5.3.4	Design and introduce knowledge management and sharing mechanism	No evidence	In progress	Not done	In progress	
5.4	Strengthening municipality outreach programme					
5.4.1	Development of municipal public participation & communication programme	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	
5.4.2	Manuals and guidelines for participatory strategic planning & budgeting	Not done	In progress	Not done	Not done	

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
5.4.3	Capacity Development programmes for municipal elected bodies	No evidence	Not done	Not done	Not done	
5.4.4	Support municipalities in conduct of public consultations and hearings	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	
5.4.5	Institute customer satisfaction surveys for feedback on service delivery	No evidence	In progress	In progress	Done	
5.5	Strengthening modern office management systems in municipalities					
5.5.1	Develop Municipal Office OM for provincial and district municipalities	Not done	Not done	No evidence	No evidence	
5.5.2	Develop and deliver training to introduce the OM	In delay	Not done	In progress	In delay	
5.5.3	Provide technical support for the implementation of the Manual	In delay	Not done	In progress	In delay	
5.5.4	Identify needs and deliver equipment for implementation of the OM	In delay	Not done	In progress	Not done	
5.6	Creation and maintenance of a functional website and e-government applications for select municipalities					
5.6.1	Design a generic municipal website	Not done	No evidence	Not done	Not done	
5.6.2	Design generic e-government applications for municipalities	Not done	No evidence	Not done	Not done	
5.6.3	Training to municipal staff in management of e-government applications	In future plan	No evidence	In future plan	In future plan	
5.6.4	Public awareness about e-government and its applications	In future plan	Not done	In future plan	In future plan	
5.6.5	Design and introduce computerized information management systems	In future plan	In progress	In future plan	In future plan	

ANNEX II

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PAPER

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Evaluation / Review Performed by

Kalimuddin Ghauri FCA. CFE

1. Financial Management Environment of ASGP

ASGP is implemented under Directly Executed (DEX) modality of UNDP in coordination with the related government counterpart Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). As part of ASGP I number of donors provided funds for implementation of this programme in addition to core funding from UNDP HQ. Whereas, as part of ASGP II the funding remained restricted to only two donors namely, and in addition to core funding of UNDP HQ. As part of DEX modality the programme is implemented by UNDP Country Office directly and it has the directly fiduciary responsibility in accordance with the funding agreements between donors and UNDP.

As part of programme design of ASGP I certain fiduciary responsibilities were transferred to the government counter parts namely IDLG and IARCSC under Letter of Agreements (LoAs) signed between UNDP, IDLG and IARCSC. This transfer of fiduciary responsibility was only to the extent of activities being performed by them as part of ASGP subject to post payment review of UNDP and other conditions. But ultimate fiduciary responsibility for ASGP rests with UNDP, Afghanistan.

Since, ASGP is implemented under DEX modality hence all financial management rules and regulations of UNDP were applicable and ALTAS the business application of UNDP was used for, budgeting, work planning, transaction processing, procurement processing, payment of transactions, allocation of costs to activities and donors and inventory management.

On the basis of process for execution of transactions, the financial transactions of ASGP could be clustered in following categories:

2. DIRECT PAYMENTS FROM UNDP COUNTRY OFFICE

These payments include directly payments to suppliers and service providers all over Afghanistan wherever programme activities were performed, payment of salaries to ASGP staff directly in their bank accounts, payments of advance funds to IDLG for onward payments for activities of IDLG within their approved work plans (only in ASGP II), disbursement of advances to regional managers for onward disbursement of funds at local level in case the estimated cost of activity is less than certain maximum threshold. Payments to LoA staff are made as per claims submitted by IDLG for staff working in IDLG and PGO offices. These transactions are processed in coordination between the finance staff of ASGP Kabul and UNDP country office.

3. PAYMENTS MADE BY UNDP / ASGP STAFF IN REGIONS

For activity having budgeted costs of less or equal to AF 100,000 in regions the funds for execution of said activity are disbursed as advance to a UNDP fixed term international staff in regions as personal advance to them through Hawalla dealer (money changer) in Afghani. The fixed term international staff of UNDP makes payment in cash for approved activities and submit claims per activity to settle the outstanding advances with UNDP Country Office.

Key heads of cost related to ASGP are as follows:

- Personnel cost related to staff working in IDLG, staff working in PGOs and Municipalities as LoA staff and fixed term international and short term local and international staff;
- Capital expenditure related to procurement of vehicles, furniture and fixtures, office equipment and information and technology equipment and others;
- Costs related to programme activities
- Operational costs of the Programme
- Programme Management Cost

With the objective to facilitate the flow of funds for activities and capacity building of government counter parts namely IDLG and IARCSC UNDP signed Letter of Agreements (LoA) as per of following responsibilities were given to counter parts:

Selection of staff members to work as LoA staff in IDLG and PGO and Municipal offices through a competitive and transparent manner. As per design the following are the sequence of task for selection of staff members and deployment at intended offices;

- Request is sent by the Provincial Governor or Mayor of Municipality to the IDLG specifying the functional area for which staff is required;
- IDLG process the request through a competitive hiring process;
- Deploys the staff at the PGO or Municipal office;
- The staff could be from the related province or it could be from any other province;
- The hired / designated staff is attached to a government director in the PGO or Municipal office for facilitation;
- On monthly basis times sheets and performance reports are submitted by LoA staff after approval of their supervisors to IDLG;
- In ASGP I on monthly basis IDLG on the basis of these time sheets and performance report was compiling the claim for transfer of salaries to LoA staff and submitting it to ASGP for direct payment through UNDP country office;
- ASGP was processing the payment through UNDP country office;
- Standard monthly salaries of LoA staff working at PGOs are USD 1,500 per month and of LoA staff working at Municipal office are USD 1,300.

IDLG also forwards claims for the staff working on various positions at IDLG to ASGP for direct payment.

For overall risk management analysis a detailed head of expenditure wise risk management matrix have been filled for ASGP including considering risks associated with value for money objectives of the Programme. The analysis is presented on following pages:

Personnel Cost (both LoA and non LoA)	Cost incurred	USD
	ASGP I - LoA	15,950,953
	ASGP I – Non - LoA	6,285,366
	ASGP II - LoA	3,180,236
	ASGP II – Non - LoA	2,654,668
	Total	28,071,223
Key Transactions:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Payment of salaries of ASGP Fixed Term International Staff through Global Payroll Processing; ii. Payment of salaries of ASGP Fixed Term Local Staff through UNDP Country Office, Afghanistan; iii. Payment of Salaries of LoA staff of IDLG and PGOs as per claims submitted by IDLG through processing by the HR department of IDLG; and iv. Payments related to some other personnel cost including insurance, volunteers etc. 		
Potential Fiduciary Risks:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The staff actually worked on the programme to the extent he / she was required to perform as per contract; ii. Funds were actually paid to the staff member for which these were intend for; and iii. The salary and benefit payments were made in-accordance with the terms of the contract. 		
Potential Value for Money Related Risk:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The HR planning not effectively performed and the plan was also not effectively implemented due which outputs from deployed staff were not properly secured; ii. Staff hired under LoA arrangement with IDLG are hired and contracted by IDLG and their performance with judged by the HR department of IDLG. We which extent the performance and deployment of related staff is appropriate. 		
Mitigating Controls:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. All staff members for ASGP other than LoA staff were hired through UNDPs HR procedures for hiring including all fixed term international and domestic staff and short term international and local staff and staff under consulting contracts. Hence, all hiring related controls of UNDP's systems were applicable; ii. All staff contracts were in accordance with standard terms and conditions of UNDP; and iii. Staff hired under LoA arrangement with IDLG were hired and contracted by IDLG and their performance was also judged by the HR department of IDLG. There was some involvement of ASGPs staff in the induction process but it was not to the extent that it could be ensured that all staff members were selected through a comprehensive competitive process; and iv. All costs incurred under LoA were subject to an external audit. 		
Evaluators Comments:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. We have not found any evidence of an integrated HR Planning process at ASGP. Number of organigrams were developed at various stages of the programme and various positions were created and fully or partially filled; ii. For staff hired job descriptions are given but in number of cases due to shortage of staff they were forced to do multitasking and get involved in 		

	activities which were not part of their job descriptions;
iii.	During our field visits it was observed that a number of staff members were either not aware of their job responsibilities or if they were aware they were actually not doing the work for which they were hired;
iv.	No performance assessment was performed of the LoA staff working in IDLG since inception of the Programme to-date;
v.	An assessment of the HR Processes of IDLG is not performed to ensure whether the procedures defined are appropriate and are effectively implemented to ensure hiring on competitive basis and management of LoA staff including collection of performance evaluations, time sheets and independent feedback from ASGPs Regional Managers;
vi.	We have not found any evidence of any audit being conducted for costs incurred by IDLG and IARCSC specifically including processes being used by said organizations;
vii.	As per latest HR Plan for ASGP II in total 119 positions are planned out which 79 positions are vacant. Further, it is evident from the review of staffing tables that the negative variance of allocated and filled positions has been there from years now. If significant positions remain vacant it has significant effect on the performance of staff in place;
viii.	Concerns are being raised by provincial functionaries that the induction process adopted by IDLG for induction of LoA staff was not fully transparent and competitive since, in the induction process there was no involvement of provincial government staff and in number of cases the positions were has to be refilled since the hired staff was not at par with the requirements of the position and we don't have any evidence to prove that said concern are correct or not;
ix.	ASGP has been making payment for salaries of all LoA staff including for IDLG and PGOs and Municipality but they don't have any data through which they could track the LoA staff and to perform analytical control testing to ensure accuracy of claimed being raised by IDLG; and
x.	The currently adopted project management structure of ASGP does not work, hence require structural changes to make it more function oriented, with creation of positions for specialists such as Municipality, Management Information Systems, Communication, Monitoring and Evaluation etc. Further, since in the currently system there is no proper segregation of duties the preparation / creation, review, approval tasks are not properly defined and enforced.
xi.	There are a few staff members whose cost has been fully charged to ASGP but these staff are stationed in UNDP Country Office and also provide services to other projects of UNDP in Afghanistan. It is important that UNDP ensures that in case of shared services the costs are properly shared amongst various projects.

Capital Expenditure	Cost incurred	USD
	ASGP I	8,751,324
	ASGP II	699,941
	Total	9,451,265
Key Transactions:		
i.	Annual Procurement Plans are prepared and approved and are defined in ATLAS;	
ii.	Procurement of capital nature items including vehicles, furniture and fixtures, office equipment, leasehold improvements etc. All such procurements were	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> done through UNDP country office; iii. The inventory items are recorded in the inventory listing as per policy of UNDP; iv. Procurements done on LoA were done by IDLG but payments were done directly by UNDP country office; and v. The physical custody records of ASGP inventory items are with the country office where the physical custody records of items procured by IDLG and used by IDLG or transferred to PGO are with IDLG.
<p>Potential Fiduciary Risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The procurement planning may not be accurate enough to go close with the actually procurement process leading to weak fund planning; ii. The procurement may be done without complying with competitive transparent process; iii. Conflict of interest are not controlled; iv. The procurement process is delayed to the extent that the importance or productivity of said asset is marginalized; and v. Weak physical controls due to items are not in place or are being used for the purposes other then for which they were intended.
<p>Potential Value for Money Related Risk:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The procurement process is delayed to the extent that the importance or productivity of said asset is marginalized; and ii. The items procured are not used for the intend purpose.
<p>Mitigating Controls:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Procurement procedures of UNDP are followed; ii. Payments related all material payments are made directly to suppliers; and iii. Profiles of suppliers are created in vendor registration system of UNDP and background checks are performed.
<p>Evaluators Comments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The procurement plans for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 were reviewed and following critical matters were noted: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For 2009 and 2011 there was only a plan available we were not able to review any progress or tracking of procurements actually done; ▪ For 2010 we got the procurement plan and the actually procurement done according to which in total procurement having aggregate value of USD 3.7 million against which actual procurement of aggregate value of USD 166 million was made; ▪ As per status sheet number of requirements were cancelled but there is no mentioned of reasons for cancellation; and ▪ We don't see any relation between the procurement plan and the tacking sheet. ii. The procurement plan only talks about the requirements it does not cover the strategy how going through the defined process the items could be procured within the time frame when items are required. It means that if we are aware that X number of days will be required we work backward and initiate the

- process as quickly as possible;
- iii. If procurements are done through long term procurements contract of UNDP with suppliers such as for computer equipment as part of which rates are already agreed, in which prices are not as competitive as we could get from the local market or through current negotiations with suppliers.

Direct Programme Activities	Cost incurred	USD
	ASGP I	2,580,722
	ASGP II	270,865
	Total	2,851,587
Key Transactions:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Payments related to programme activities including workshops, meetings, field trips, printing of new letters and other materials etc. ii. Approval for all such activities are processed through the regional manager to the programme manager; and iii. Activity execution report submitted by regional manager to the programme manager. 		
Potential Fiduciary Risks:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Amount paid an activity which actually didn't occurred; ii. The cost paid for the activity is not competitive; and 		
Potential Value for Money Related Risk:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The activity for which cost was paid was not for the purpose of the programme 		
Mitigating Controls:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. All contracting for services is centralized and is done in accordance with UNDP contracting regulations; ii. Most of the material payments are made directly to service providers; 		
Evaluators Comments:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The process have good controls but it seems it lack in competitive cost benefit worth due to long documentation chain, registration of service provider on UNDP's vender list and then directly payment to supplier; and ii. The project activities are some times delayed hence lose its importance. 		

Operational Costs	Cost incurred	USD
	ASGP I	7,785,315
	ASGP II	1,410,209
	Total	9,195,524
Key Transactions:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Operational costs includes payment for number of head of expenditure including travel, board and lodge, rentals, communication, suppliers, security, other professional services etc. 		
Potential Fiduciary Risks:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The payment is made for services or supplies which are not actually received 		

ii. by ASGP; and The prices paid are not competitive.
Potential Value for Money Related Risk: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The costs paid were not required for the implementation of the ASGP; ii. Costs were not incurred on timely basis due to which value from said services or suppliers could not be ensured; iii. In case said services or suppliers were for persons or parties external to ASGP / UNDP these were not incurred for the purpose of ASGP.
Mitigating Controls: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. All such costs were approved by regional managers and programme manager and reviewed by the team of UNDP country office; ii. All material payments were made directly to the service provider and suppliers
Evaluators Comments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Delays in payment were observed due to which some times higher than current market prices are paid;

4. FINANCIAL PROGRESS

The financial progress of ASGP I and II has been analysed at three levels namely at macro cost of account level, funds flow level and individual head of expenditure level: The analysis is presented on the following paragraphs.

During the period starting from 2006 till June 30, 2011 ASGP incurred aggregate costs of USD 43.632 million and USD 8.625 million on ASGP I and II respectively. On an overall basis the costs out of the total cost 54% was spent on personnel or related costs. This includes 37% on personnel cost of ASGP staff working in centre (Kabul) and in regions and 17% on staff hired by IDLG under LoA for work in IDLG or PGOs and Municipalities. The share LoA staff costs has increased substantially during 2010 and 2011.

	ASGP I		ASGP II	
	Note	USD	USD	%
Personnel cost (other than LoA Staff)	A	15,950,953	3,180,236	37%
Personnel cost (LoA Staff)	B	6,285,366	2,654,668	31%
Capital Expenditure	C	8,751,324	699,941	8%
Direct Programme Activities	D	2,580,722	270,865	3%
Operational Costs	E	7,785,315	1,410,209	16%
Program Management	F	2,278,442	409,465	5%
		<u>43,632,121</u>	<u>8,625,385</u>	

The capital expenditure constitutes 20% and 8% of total cost of ASGP I and II respectively. As compared to planned procurements as indicated in the procurement plans the actual capital expenditure is significantly low, which is apparent from the following analysis:

Procurement Plan vs. Actual

	Planned	Actual	%
USD			
2009	4,713,388	2,751,490	58%
2010	3,705,900	1,037,496	28%
2011 (till June 30 only)	6,845,501	887,333	13%

The direct programme activities which includes cost of workshops, field trips, communication publications etc is only 6% and 3% during ASGP I and II respectively, The operational cost which also include certain direct costs associated with programme activities such travel, per diems etc., but this cannot be separately classified since head of expenditures are noted clustered in operational and direct programme activities. The programme management is charged as percentage of all other costs chargeable to donors. The standard rate is 7%. In case of ASGP II the current reported figure for Project Management is less than standard since the full cost has not been charged in ATLAS till June 30, 2011.

The funds flow summary of ASGP I is as follows:

Table A
ASGP I - Funds Flow Schedule

Donor	Income			Expenditure incurred till June 30, 2010	Funds received but not utilized
	Commitment	Received	Receivable		
USD					
Netherlands	8,108,108	8,108,108	-	8,114,729	(6,621)
Norway	10,377,398	10,377,398	-	10,387,964	(10,566)
EU	6,938,339	6,264,061	674,278	6,263,687	374
CIDA	4,637,934	4,637,934	-	4,162,396	475,538
SDC	3,473,478	3,473,478	-	3,445,248	28,230
Italy	374,532	374,532	-	374,532	-
UNDP Core Fund	10,256,688	10,256,688	-	10,256,688	-
UNDP Temporary Funds (CCF)				674,278	(674,278)
	44,166,477	43,492,199	674,278	43,679,522	(187,323)

The head of account, activity and donor wise expenditure summaries clustered in years of the programme are as follows:

Table B
ASGP I - Cost Incurred Summary by Head of Account
USD

Account	Account Description	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Grand Total
61100	Salary Costs - NP Staff		10,310					10,310
61200	Salaries Costs - GS Staff		8,133					8,133
61300	salary & Post Adj Cst-IP Staff		7,796			300,755	9,709	318,260
62100	Recur Payroll Costs - NP Staff		1,997					1,997
62200	Recur Payroll Costs-GS Staff		1,541			(41)		1,501
62300	Recurrent Payroll Costs-IP Stf		3,702			106,259	7,845	117,805
63300	Non-Recurrent Payroll - IP Stf		6,714	38		147,370	15,179	169,300
63400	Learning Costs			2,471	15			2,486
63500	Insurance and Security Costs	1,794	20,667	87,624	(0)	33,625	874	144,584
64300	Staff Mgmt Costs - IP Staff		2,074			155,390	14,543	172,008
65100	After Service Insurance	96	1,572	802	0	17,982	541	20,992
71100	ALD Employee Costs	112,072	1,187,046	1,476,863	2,998,812	607,139		6,381,932
71200	International Consultants	139,263	608,259	1,620,126	1,419,400	484,341	1,530	4,272,919
71300	Local Consultants	17,193	236,308	1,150,451	2,222,811	3,609,757	30,789	7,267,309
71400	Contractual Services - Individ	5,886	282,107	603,793	1,239,342	1,015,601	32,142	3,178,870
71500	UN Volunteers		5,809	57,261	103,718	1,124		167,912
71600	Travel	6,868	365,304	428,464	817,587	287,620	5,623	1,911,466
72100	Contractual Services-Companies	34,209	470,310	114,431	762,321	1,179,506	19,946	2,580,722
72200	Equipment and Furniture	192,343	873,881	1,534,171	1,404,360	1,771,488	187,392	5,963,636
72300	Materials & Goods		4,682	30,712	116,382	1,021		152,798
72400	Communic & Audio Visual Equip	3,456	52,090	252,365	90,913	67,947	(0)	466,772
72500	Supplies	6,390	38,189	105,254	183,937	142,119		475,889
72700	Hospitality	5,211	4,110	23,636	-			32,956
72800	Information Technology Equipmt	17,689	435,288	378,268	1,139,834	197,040	-	2,168,119
73100	Rental & Maintenance-Premises	296	83,002	397,790	413,232	510,083		1,404,403
73200	Premises Alternations				-			-
73300	Rental & Maint of Info Tech Eq			3,291	18			3,309
73400	Rental & Maint of Other Equip	526	56,220	209,486	269,327	300,195	19,106	854,860
73500	Reimbursement Costs		541	71,407	802,246	-		874,193
74100	Professional Services			68,470	19,448	11,960	(7,176)	92,701
74200	Audio Visual&Print Prod Costs	110	48,383	97,458	223,861	107,090		476,902
74400	Provisions & Write-offs				-			-
74500	Miscellaneous Expenses	9,574	37,800	52,154	82,585	52,710	855	235,677
74600	Prepaid Project Expenses		1,639	24,690	198,684	(286,925)		(61,913)
75100	Facilities & Administration		281,497	502,193	623,896	855,946	14,910	2,278,442
75700	Prepaid Project Expense				466,456	941,553	42,676	1,450,685
76100	Foreign Exchange Currency Loss		(42)	29,958	826	3,555	(112)	34,185
77200	Salary and related Costs-TA/GS					-		-
		552,977	5,136,929	9,323,625	15,600,010	12,622,208	396,372	43,632,121

Table C
ASGP I - Cost Incurred Summary by Activity
USD

Activity Code	Activity Description	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Grand Total
	Exchange Loss		(42)	29,958				29,916
ACTIVITY01	Support to Policy	43,043	1,023,818	2,869,464	2,707,179	912,050	-	7,555,554
ACTIVITY02	Support to PAR and Training Centers	116,057	2,248,703	3,784,880	3,437,892	3,768,988	53,378	13,409,899
ACTIVITY03	Representative Democracy	371,270	625,629	533,398	948,293	961,707	29,957	3,470,254
ACTIVITY04	Development Management	22,608	850,174	1,879,166	4,350,650	3,319,313	79,195	10,501,106
ACTIVITY05	Support to Kandahar Province		388,646	226,759	825,131	1,190,669	206,256	2,837,462
ACTIVITY06	Support to Uruzgan and Dai Kundi				130,434	700,508	32,442	863,384
ACTIVITY07	ASGP Management				3,200,431	1,768,971	(4,857)	4,964,545
		552,977	5,136,929	9,323,625	15,600,010	12,622,208	396,372	43,632,121

Table D
ASGP I - Cost Incurred Summary by Donors

Donor Code	Donor Title	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Grand Total
00012	UNDP Core	552,977	992,608	2,193,319	6,546,603	598,252		10,883,760
00137	Italy		276,072	90,036	272	8,152		374,532
00182	Netherlands				1,648,325	6,459,783	6,622	8,114,730
00187	Norway		3,040,308	1,592,786	1,610,962	4,133,236	10,674	10,387,965
00280	European Commission			2,926,743	3,110,071	226,877	-	6,263,691
00550	CIDA		827,941	880,681	862,950	1,211,547	379,076	4,162,195
10282	Swedish Development Cooperation			1,640,060	1,820,828	(15,639)		3,445,249
		552,977	5,136,929	9,323,625	15,600,010	12,622,208	396,372	43,632,121

1

The funds flow summary of ASGP II is as follows:

¹ Australia is not listed as a specific donor to ASGP II in the Project Document and Project Reports. However, Australia is a valuable and significant contributor to SNG in Urozgan. Accordingly the team met with His Excellency the Governor and with the Development Adviser.

Table E
ASGP II - Funds Flow Schedule

Donor	Commitment	Income Received	Receivable	Expenditure incurred till June 30, 2011	Funds received but not utilized
USD					
Department for International Development (DFID) UK	37,760,000	9,600,000	28,160,000	7,343,706	2,256,294
Swedish Development Cooperation (SDC)	3,788,808	3,389,208	399,600	1,075,899	2,313,309
Italy	1,965,924	1,965,924	-	205,780	1,760,144
European Commission (EC)	15,831,554	5,606,314	10,225,240	-	5,606,314
	59,346,286	20,561,446	38,784,840	8,625,385	11,936,061

The head of account, activity and donor wise expenditure summaries of ASGP II clustered in years of the programme are as follows:

Table F
ASGP II - Cost Incurred Summary by Head of Account
USD

Budget Code	Budget Code Description	Grand Total		
		2010	2011	Total
61300	salary & Post Adj Cst-IP Staff	263,290	302,268	565,558
62300	Recurrent Payroll Costs-IP Stf	108,735	118,207	226,942
63300	Non-Recurrent Payroll - IP Stf	216,262	147,427	363,689
63400	Learning Costs	2,179	-	2,179
63500	Insurance and Security Costs	29,020	37,549	66,569
64300	Staff Mgmt Costs - IP Staff	55,991	44,607	100,598
65100	After Service Insurance	13,807	17,161	30,968
71100	ALD Employee Costs	-	-	-
71200	International Consultants	468,861	449,910	918,771
71300	Local Consultants	825,648	1,691,614	2,517,262
71400	Contractual Services - Individ	208,244	665,787	874,031
71600	UN Volunteers	86,274	82,063	168,337
72100	Travel	244,111	305,152	549,263
72200	Contractual Services-Companies	208,778	62,087	270,865
72300	Equipment and Furniture	2,223	2,901	5,124
72400	Materials & Goods	26,452	51,881	78,333
72500	Communic & Audio Visual Equip	22,094	24,025	46,118
72700	Supplies	-	91	91
72800	Hospitality	120,928	75,084	196,012
73100	Information Technology Equipmt	258,228	312,138	570,366
73200	Rental & Maintenance-Premises	57,842	52	57,895
73300	Premises Alternations	-	35	35
73400	Rental & Maint of Info Tech Eq	54,834	114,358	169,192
74200	Rental & Maint of Other Equip	14,191	23,895	38,086
74500	Reimbursement Costs	19,001	15,680	34,681
75100	Facilities & Administration	252,858	156,608	409,465
75700	Prepaid Project Expense	305,208	53,182	358,391
76100	Foreign Exchange Currency Loss	59	(460)	(401)
77300		-	6,967	6,967
		3,865,117	4,760,267	8,625,385

Table G**ASGP II - Cost Incurred Summary by Activity, Donor and Period****USD**

Budget Code	Budget Code Description	Grand Total		
		2010	2011	Total
ACTIVITY01	National systems, procedures and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor the SNGP are in place by 2014	453,474	989,806	1,443,281
ACTIVITY02A & 2	Support to Provincial and District Governors on National Level	1,914,317	2,110,944	4,025,260
ACTIVITY02B	Support to Provincial and District Governors Central region	185,098	220,458	405,555
ACTIVITY03A & 3	The subnational offices of IARCSC are successfully delivering public administration reforms to all subnational government institutions under the effective management of IARCSC by 2014.	6,534	33,804	40,338
ACTIVITY04A & 4	Support to Provincial and District Councils on National Level	288,567	171,946	460,513
ACTIVITY04B	Support to Provincial and District Councils Central Region	1,419	5,369	6,788
ACTIVITY05A & 5	Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under Public Administration Reform) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services	404,302	414,497	818,799
ACTIVITY05B	Support to Municipality Central Region	17,680	16,854	34,534
ACTIVITY06	ASGP Management	593,727	796,589	1,390,316
		3,865,117	4,760,267	8,625,385

Donor	Donor Title			
00551	Department for International Development (DFID)	3,309,100	4,034,606	7,343,706
10282	Swedish Development Cooperation (SDC)	556,017	519,882	1,075,899
00137	Italy	-	205,780	205,780
		3,865,117	4,760,267	8,625,385

Period	Month			
1	January	-	342,931	342,931
2	February	-	1,031,380	1,031,380
3	March	-	1,152,277	1,152,277
4	April	-	750,545	750,545
5	May	-	1,018,184	1,018,184
6	June	-	464,950	464,950
7	July	-	-	-
8	August	11,469	-	11,469
9	September	713,532	-	713,532
10	October	577,172	-	577,172
11	November	975,381	-	975,381
12	December	1,587,563	-	1,587,563
		3,865,117	4,760,267	8,625,385

5. FINDINGS

As per our review following are findings related to financial management and fiduciary risk of ASGP:

A. The financial management system used by UNDP for ASGP as per their policies is good and have effective controls in place including good segregation of duties. But in certain cases it is not effective:

- Delays in payments to suppliers and service providers;
- Long chain of approvals required for approval of activities irrespective of importance, size and financial value of activity;
- Numbers of small activities are performed at regional level for which funds are

disbursed to fixed term international staff only through hawalla dealers in cash. The advance holders are not allowed to open their personal bank accounts in which they could ask for transfer of advances and use the advance as per requirement of the activities. After execution of activity when advances are settled, all remaining balance of fund against any advance is need to be sent back to the country office through Hawala dealer which is again a time consuming effort.

- Procurements as defined in the procurement plans are not in the same way defined in ATLAS leading to delays.
- We understood from different discussions that all approvals are centralized in Country office at Country Director or Deputy Director Levels.
- Physical control on inventory items are not effective especially on those items which are procured for IDLG, PGOs and Municipalities under LoAs.

Recommendations:

- The approval and payment processes are reconsidered to reduce process times without compromising on effective controls;
- A delegation of powers is designed and approved on the basis of materiality, type of activity and sensitivities around a particular transaction;
- Funds transferred to fixed term international staff for advance are given as pool of funds for execution of activities in particular regions in which payment by activities should be traceable, but there should not be any reason to asking remaining balance back to country office;
- The advance funds to regions should be transferred to personal bank accounts of ASGP Staff; and
- Physical inventory controls are enforced through securing receipt acknowledgments from assigned offices of PGOs and Municipalities and effective tracking system of items starting from assignment of time to a particular office to receipt of the equipment / item by the assigned item. On sample basis items should be checked by the regional staff during their visits. The list of items provided to in particular region should be provided to the Regional Managers which should be updated on quarterly basis.

B. Weak procurement planning and delays in procurement process. Our key findings related to the procurement are as follows:

- Different procurement format used every year during 2009, 2010 and 2011;
- There is no formal procurement tracking system from procurement plan, requisition, processing and delivery of items;
- There is no tracking of items which were planned in one plan but were not delivered and carried forward to the next year's plan; and
- Significant delays in procurement process leave to marginalized programme

impact of such procurements.

Recommendations:

A consultative process within ASGP and UNDP Country office is initiated to devise a common strategy for doing procurement planning in focused, targeted and systematic manner so that following objectives could be achieved:

- Only those items are planned which are actually required and necessary and which will add value to the programme objectives;
- The procurement processing time is considering is planned delivery dates of items
- The time lines of procurement are defined in the plan in various stages including requisition, approval, processing and delivery with assigned responsibilities so that accountability for unplanned delays could assigned.
- All cancelled planned procurements should be properly documented and tracked;
- All carried forward planned procurements should be separately identified in the plan;

C. Value for money achieved related to LoA staff provided to IDLG, PGO and Municipalities is not be determined since all hiring and performance management of LoA staff is done IDLG and ASGP has not performed any assessment of quality of systems in place, its effectiveness compliance. ASGP does have the data through which they could extract the information such as number LoA staff by each PGO / Municipality per year. During our field visits concerned were raised on the process being following by IDLG for hiring of LoA staff including potential conflict of interest of IDLG staff members in hiring process. We have not found any evidence during of our review to substantiate the concern raised by provincial functionaries not we have evidence to ignore said concerns. On overall basis at the moment it is not possible to provide any view on the quality of induction process of LoA staff and their performance to date since ASGP does not have any data in this regard. Further, as part of this evaluation there was not enough time to really go into IDLG's related systems and provide an independent assessment. With respect to LoA with IARCSC again ASGP does not have accurate data available with respect to number of staff trained clustered in type of training, origin of participants like from PGO, Line Ministries or Municipalities etc. We just informed of certain percentages like almost 75% of all PGO, Municipality and Line Ministry staff in provinces is trained. There is also no data / report available for the quality and impact of trainings imparted.

Recommendations:

- An independent review of processes being used by IDLG for hiring and performance management of LoAs staff is performed to assess its effectiveness:
- ASGP should be able to track the number of LoA's along with basic information about each LoA. This will be very critical to plan activities in each province especially after signing of LoAs with PGO and Municipalities;
- The performance of LoA staff working in IDLG should also be assessed at least

on half yearly basis in comparison to the defined objectives of the programme

- An assessment of quality and impact of staff trained through IARCSC should be performed to assess the value for money achieved.

D. As per clause 9 of the LoAs signed between UNDP, IDLG and IARCSC UNDP has the right to initiate an external audit of costs claimed by IDLG. Till now no such audit was initiated by UNDP. ASGP is audited by an independent audit firm for the years 2008 and 2009, which does not mentioned in the scope of work that the auditors have reviewed the documentation of IDLG and has assessed their controls. Accordingly we conclude that clause 9 requirements have not been initiated. Further, as per clause 14 of LoA IDLG was required to perform physical verification of inventory items procured under ASGP on periodic basis but ASGP has no evidence whether physical verification was performed or not.

Recommendations:

- The external audit or assessment as recommended above should be immediately be initiated to comply with the assurance requirements of LoA;
- IDLG and IARCSC should asked to conduct physical verification of items procured and funded through ASGP and provided report to ASGP.

E. During early 2011 as part of new outreach strategy of ASGP LoAs were signed with all provincial PGOs. These LoAs will allow transfer of funds from ASGP to each PGO for utilization on activities to be agreed as part of implementation plan or a work plan of PGO. This is a paradigm shift from a totally centralized control framework to providing funds in the project account of each PGO which is to be operated by LoA staff members working each PGO. Although, there are number risk management related observations on this new LoA mechanism but since these are already signed and executed hence at minimum following risk management controls are suggested for inclusion in this framework as noted in the recommendation below:

Recommendations:

- Basic information about each LoA staff to be operating the bank account should be maintained. Said information should include, name, address, contact numbers, name of father, names, contact number, tazkara number of at least two close family members. Further, all said information verified through on site reference checks and confirmations;
- For the operations of the project bank account standing instructions should be given that the transactions could only be processed when along with bank transfer instruction or cheque pre-authorization signed by the Governor or his nominee and the Regional Manager is provided;

F. As per our review we found no monitoring and evaluation function with ASGP accordingly, currently there is not independent mechanism available within ASGP for operational assurance

Recommendation:

- A monitoring and evaluation function is created in the project management structure of ASGP reporting directly to Programme Manager with the objective have independent operational assurance on programmatic activities.
-

- G. The management letter of the external financial audit for the year ended December 31, 2009 following observations were reported:
- Understaffing and staff turnover is high
 - Non-execution of planned activities
 - Monitoring and evaluation plan not developed
 - Quarterly meetings of Project Board not held as planned
 - “Paid” stamp not affixed on supplier vouchers
 - Irregularities in respect of assets physical verifications
 - Discrepancies in cash verifications

ANNEX III

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT PAPER

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Evaluation / Review Performed by

Nameer Al-Hadithi B.Eng, MSc.

The documentary evidence suggests that ASGP II represents a significant development on ASGP I as a result of lessons learned by UNDP and support from donors. For example, there have been improvements with regard to the project management, documentation and specific processes such as those relating to HRs and procurement. However, the programme remains in a critical state, in large part due to the lack of a permanent management team. UNDP's primary focus in the immediate future should therefore be on agreeing a new structure for the project and on urgently recruiting a full management team capable of delivering sustained results over time.

This brief assessment focuses on those aspects of the programme and project management in need of particular attention.

1. GOVERNANCE

Programme Executive Group

The project document defines the governance structure designed to ensure leadership and oversight of the overall programme. In phases I and II of the programme, the oversight role has been assigned to the Programme Executive Group (PEG). The membership of the PEG is principally made up of representatives from UNDP, GoA and relevant donors. In the early stages of ASGP I, the PEG was chaired by UNDP and included representatives from UNAMA and a number of different Gogra entities (OAA, IARCSC, Moa). After the formation of IDLG in 2007, IDLG became the main GoA representative on the PEG. Since the start of ASGP II, the PEG has been co-chaired by UNDP and IDLG.

The records of PEG meetings show that the PEG met as follows:

Programme	Meeting No.	Date
ASGP I	1	Sep-06
	2	May-07
	3	Nov-07
	4	May-08
	5	Sep-08
	6	Dec-08
	7	May-09
	8	Dec-09
ASGP II	1	No meeting due to programme re-structuring
	2	Apr-10
	3	Aug-10
	4	Nov-10
	5	May-11

The table shows that whilst meetings were held, they were not always held as regularly as stipulated in the project document, at times dropping to just two meetings a year rather than four quarterly meetings as required

The agendas for PEG meetings have followed a set format. This could be seen as beneficial, in so far as it can help ensure that meetings are disciplined and focused. But donors have commented that in practice, the meeting agendas have been too rigid and

tightly controlled by IDLG in a way that has discouraged open discussion, limited the time for reviewing key issues and for donors to raise their concerns.

The PEG is required to approve major changes to the programme and provide a steer for the Project Manager on key issues. The group is mandated specifically to approve the following:

- a) Annual Work plans
- b) Completion report of ASGP I
- c) Budget of ASGP I and II along with any revisions
- d) Organization structure of ASGP
- e) Letter of Agreement signed between IDLG and UNDP and now with PGOs and Municipalities
- f) Audited Report for 2008 and 2009
- g) Progress reports
- h) Monitoring and Evaluation Reports.

In practice, many of these documents were not submitted to the PEG for approval and were simply approved by IDLG and UNDP bilaterally. This is a clear violation of the terms of the programme - as well as of good professional programme management principles e.g. Prince II methodology - and demonstrates a non-transparent process which was raised by donors as a significant concern.

UNDP Country Office

The UNDP Country Office in Afghanistan has taken an active interest in the running of the ASGP. In general terms, it is positive that they are concerned to ensure that the programme is successful. In practice, some ASGP and stakeholder staff have suggested that the Country Office's close interest in the programme has at times verged on micromanagement and as such has at times been counterproductive. This may have been due to anxieties within the Country Office about the way the programme is performing and their resulting desire to be involved in more of the operational activities to support the programme. But the consequence is that it is adding to the burden of excessive reporting (see below).


The UNDP Country Office should delegate the day-to-day management of the programme to a capable Project Management professional, and focus its own efforts on lobbying with UNAMA and GoA to promote wider policies and reforms in support of the programme outcomes.

2. HRS

Project Management Team Structure

International best practice for projects of this scale usually calls for a Team Leader (or chief of party) function to manage the policy and technical aspects of the programme with a separate full time dedicated Project Manager to direct and track the progress of the project, assess and mitigate risks to delivery, exercise fiduciary/budget control and manage day-to-day staff and office issues. For projects spanning multiple years a Deputy Team Leader is usually also engaged to provide cover when the Team Leader is out of country or travelling. This structure is used by the majority of international, non-governmental and commercial contractors to deliver projects similar to AGSP in comparable development environments. Indeed, the more challenging the development

environment, the more critical it is to have the right project management structure in place. (See diagram below on proposed structures). Please note: a diagram showing the current organisational structure of ASGP is shown at the end of this section.



The project management structure originally proposed for ASGP in both phases I and II contained some elements of the structure depicted above but due to the lack of suitable candidates identified a single person was hired to act both as Team Leader and Project Manager. As a result, the jobholder was severely overstretched and the constraints on management capacity have impacted on both the quality and rate of delivery of outputs by the programme. For example, reports were frequently late, visits to the provinces were rare and staffing issues took longer to resolve than might otherwise have been the case.

Frequent changes have been made to the project management structure during both ASGP I and ASGP II. This said, it was only following the creation of IDLG that ASGP I followed the formal process set out in programme documentation for revising the programme leadership structure. It appears no formal process has been followed in ASGP II. This seems to have been partly due to changes in the operational environment e.g. in relation to security issues, and partly due to changes of senior management on the programme. While it is clear that the nature of the programme and the operating environment may have required changes to the project management structure over time, there is little evidence to demonstrate that changes made have been consistently thought through or adequately justified.

Overall, the project management structure could also benefit from greater clarity and consistency. Over time, changes made have contributed to the existence of multiple

reporting lines confusing authority and responsibility. Attention should be devoted to clarifying a suitable and sustainable organisational project management structure which included clear ToRs for each position setting out roles and responsibilities as well as identifying reporting lines.

Four different individuals have acted as team leader/project manager for the programme to date:

- Mr Paul Lundberg Dec 2006 – May 2009
- Ms Joanne Adams February 2009 – February 2010
- Mr Ram Krishna Pokharel April 2010 – January 2011
- Mr Basil Comnas January 2011 – July 2011

While the first Team Leader for the project was in post for some two and a half years, subsequent team leaders have been in post for one year or less. Given the importance of leadership to a project of this nature in an environment as difficult as that currently present in Afghanistan, this lack of continuity at the top, together with the relative lack of overall staff capacity in the programme, has inevitably impacted on the overall effectiveness of the programme.

Capacity of Project Staff

The programme documents for ASGP I and II specify the need for qualified and experienced staff to provide capacity building and technical assistance to the GoA. There is a distinct lack of Public Administrative Reform and Governance expertise at all levels of the project. To date, within the international staff there has been just one senior policy advisor with significant governance experience and a small number of staff with limited governance experience for the whole project. This is too few to support a programme which is designed to work in close partnership with the relevant central government ministry and reach all 34 provinces across Afghanistan.

In terms of general capabilities of national staff, the situation is relatively good in Kabul and in some of the provinces e.g. Mezar, Uruzgan, where LoA staff (particularly at IDLG) have reasonable capacity and are able to draft useful reports and work comfortably in Pashto, Dari and English, facilitating their communication with other local staff in Kabul and in the regions and with UNDP and international donors. The challenge is significantly greater in other provinces e.g. Helmand, Kandahar where it is difficult to attract and retain suitably qualified staff. Donor feedback gained from interviews in the provinces suggests that LoA Task Order Staff have limited or no experience in the areas they are supporting. Interviews of these staff confirm that they have limited skill sets and a number of them do not speak English and thus are unable to interact directly with donors or the ASGP management team. This affects the ability of staff to implement the programme and to evaluate and report on the impact of their activities at the provincial level. For example, the relative weakness in local staff capacity is apparent in the varying quality of field reports received by ASGP in Kabul.

Staff Recruitment and Retention

Recruitment and retention of the necessary staff has been a challenge throughout the project. High turnover of project staff, especially of the lead project manager is not unique for development projects in difficult environments. Equally, in the case of a multiyear programme like ASGP, it is important to have long term staffing in place. During ASGP I and II, 177 staff were employed on the programme. At the start of 2011 only 85 remained on the programme, and since the start of 2011 to-date (July 2011) a

further 20% of staff left, leaving in place just under 70 of the required 119 staff. Of the 20% leaving this year, well over half had occupied key positions on the programme.

One possible factor contributing to this high turnover of staff is the way in which UNDP is recruiting staff to the programme. Given that staff hired on long term contracts (more than 6 months) cannot easily be removed e.g. in the case of poor performance, UNDP has preferred to hire staff using short term contracts (3-6 month terms) and then to extend the person when the contract expires. This has made planning - particularly important for a long term project such as ASGP - more difficult. And it has done nothing to incentivise staff to stay longer than the minimum term. Combined with the difficult environment in which many of the staff have to operate, this has led to low motivation and lack of commitment to stay for the duration of the programme.

UN rules on recruitment have also negatively affected UNDP when they have sought to move staff from short term IC contracts to long term FT contracts. The process requires staff to reapply for their own positions in competition against other candidates. When not managed correctly, this leads to staff having to leave the project and wait to go through a recruitment process before coming back if they are successful. In the meantime there is a gap in support and, due to the large number of vacancies on the project roster, no effective cover can be put in place to ensure the work is continued. Staff who leave as a result of this process or when their contracts end, also take away with them their accumulated institutional knowledge. The relatively high turnover and frequent gaps in staff coverage contribute to a lack of sustained team cohesion and, together with a limited number of people often engaged on multiple tasking, can lead to significant reduction in quality of outputs and burnout of staff in post.

3. PROJECT MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY

Work Plans

Fundamental to effective programme and project management is clear agreement to a single, authoritative work plan governing the duration of the programme/project, identifying clearly the outcomes to be achieved and the inputs/activities linked to these, backed up with effective monitoring and evaluation of progress against the agreed work plan. Adjustment of the original work plan can take place where necessary and agreed in line with the approved project governance and management structures.

In practice, this is the area of project management where ASGP has displayed greatest weakness and control and it is the area of greatest contention with donors. ASGP I and II have failed to have a single agreed work plan for the duration of the programme at any stage. This has significantly hindered implementation, delivery and monitoring and evaluation of progress at all stages.

Reviewing the programme and project documentation, it is difficult to identify a single authoritative work plan for the programme in time. It is clear that there have been a number of revisions to the work plan used over time. While these may have been done for legitimate reasons e.g. to refocus delivery from a national to a provincial level, it is difficult to identify either the single guiding work plan at any point or to see the rationale for changes made e.g. removing the component supporting IARCSC training.

Similarly, it has been difficult to relate the differences in regional/provincial work plans over time to a single overarching national work plan. Differences in the developmental levels of provinces are an accepted fact of life in Afghanistan. GoA recognises this and accordingly classifies provinces from Grades 1 to 3 in line with the level of development in each province. Provinces such as Herat, Balkh and Nangarhar are classified as

Grade 1 whilst Nouristan and Paktika are classified as Grade 3. This difference in provincial development is cited as an issue by regional managers which they have overcome by having regional work plans. The variation across these regional work plans – without clear linkage to a single national work plan - makes it difficult for the team in Kabul both to manage the work and provide support and to measure progress consistently across the country. In addition, IDLG and MRRD have not always coordinated effectively together or with ASGP and donors and ASGP in turn has not sought to ensure coordination between IDLG and MRRD activity and their national and regional work plans. In part as a result, IDLG has tended to focus on the Provincial and Municipal Levels while MRRD has focused on the District level with relatively little coordination between the two.

UNDP has taken positive steps recently to address this issue by providing a single national unified basic work plan and organising the first coordination meeting between IDLG and MRRD. This combined work plan sets-out the basic activities and outcomes that ASGP II hopes to achieve while allowing regional managers the scope to work with LoA to deliver them. As the new work plan was only issued in June 2011, it is difficult to comment further on its impact at this stage. This said, discussions with the regional managers suggest there is still some cause for concern as these managers still consider the new work plan as an optional nice to have rather than as an essential guide for delivery. They still believe they must have the flexibility to deliver what they individually see as the best options within their provinces, rather than being bound by any national plan. This again highlights the need for strong UNDP and ASGP leadership, with better internal communications to staff, regular progress tracking and field visits to verify results if delivery is to be achieved.

Activities Workflow

In evaluating the project documents for ASGP I, it is possible to identify some workflow streams for the components of the programme. Critically a number of the stated deliverables were linked to external deliverables to be performed by other work being supported by other donors or GoA agencies. This unrealistic sequencing of activities essentially fed into or relied on third party outcomes. As in the case of the RIMUs, when a decision was taken not to fully implement the RIMUs structure, IDLG-ASGP instead opted to use Task Order Staff to fulfil this role, but only within IDLG. This change affected the project by:

- increasing the demand on the project resourcing, as more resources had to be committed in order to cover the shortfall; and
- delaying progress, as time and resources had to be spent on managing changes to the programme.

Better programme management and coordination with donors would have helped to avoid this kind of problem and to facilitate better risk management, thereby minimising the impact on the programme delivery and resourcing.

Letters of Agreement

New Letters of Agreement were agreed in February 2011 between UNDP and the relevant GoA partner entity e.g. IDLG or the Provincial Governor. They were designed to be a novel way forward to enable UNDP to disburse funds and support to government entities within Afghanistan whilst maintaining accountability standards and fiduciary control. The system of LoAs, originally used in ASGP I to provide staff for IDLG, was later extended to all provinces in ASGP II to provide staff and equipment to PGOs and

municipalities in each province. The LoA facilitated payment of salaries to national staff and enabled small scale funding (approx. eleven thousand dollars) to be made available for procurement activities. It is reported that it took over 8 months to complete agreement and signature of the LoAs between UNDP and the provinces. There remains a number of outstanding questions on the terms of the LoAs that need to be clarified as soon as possible e.g. on how the allocation of eleven thousand dollars can be spent and whether the allowance is for eleven thousand dollars per item or per invoice.

UNDP recently issued a draft set of Standard Operating Procedures (July 2011) to accompany the LoA. The SOPs cover important issues such as the utilisation of funds, HR processes, M&E requirements and so on. Although the SOPs are clearly intended to improve effective use and accountability of funds in support of the LOAs, given that they have only just been issued, some months after the original LoAs were signed, and that there is no reference within the LoAs themselves to the new SOPs, it is unclear to what extent the SOPs are likely to be implemented. The SOPs themselves have no legal status. It seems likely that at least the SOPs and possibly both LoAs and SOPs will have to be re-signed following approval of the Programme Executive Group.

There are wider challenges, too, in relation to the LoAs. Although the LoAs have been signed by UNDP and the relevant GoA partner entity, they have not been approved by the Programme Executive Group. And the LoAs were signed by all parties without the vital attachment 3 (the work plan) detailing the expected activities and responsibilities for each PGO. It is not clear whether the LoA documents have any recognised legal status. Perhaps most importantly, there is no mention within the LoAs of what action might be taken in response to any failure of compliance or default on commitments.

Project Reporting and Information Sharing

The project documents call for a number of reports to be used to track progress. These include the requirement for quarterly and annual reporting to be provided to IDLG and the donors.

Under ASGP I, project reports were infrequent and often of poor quality, tending both to be insufficiently focused on reporting against the project requirements and to contain superfluous information covering areas not relevant to or outside the project remit. Under ASGP II, these trends have continued despite attempts to improve the format by donors and UNDP. Reports were often late (deadlines for submission to stakeholders were regularly missed), tended to be overlong and contain too much operational detail and too little qualitative analysis against the project plan.

Donors have commented that the quarterly reports which were shared with them too often contained non verifiable claims or reported on activity not within the current approved work plan. Most importantly, ASGP reports have consistently failed to identify what incremental progress has been achieved since the immediately preceding report in each province or area of support, thereby making tracking progress against the work plan difficult or impossible to assess.

In addition to the quarterly reporting required for donors and stakeholders, ASGP II has required field staff to provide weekly reports, with UNDP requiring completion of a monthly questionnaire to report on progress. These requirements have added to the overall ASGP staff workload and contributed to reporting fatigue.

The main consequences of late reports have included:

- Disruption to coordination efforts between the donors and GoA. If donors were informed of planned activity in time, they would be able to better coordinate with their PRTs and highlight areas of overlap.
- Delays in tackling issues leading to increased costs in resolving them e.g. staffing issues which take time to plan and implement.

Document Control

It is important to highlight another key issue for the ASGP on archiving and document management. There is strong evidence to suggest that no document version controls were ever put in place or enforced across the teams. It is difficult to identify when key documents were originally released or, in some cases, which version is currently the latest draft. Version numbers and/or dates are frequently missing. The use of simple techniques, such as clearly marking version numbers and dates would help a great deal in ensuring correct identification and control of document drafts and final versions.

Programme Monitoring and Evaluation

ASGP I and II both identified monitoring and evaluation as key to the effective implementation of the project. Both inception reports highlighted the importance of M&E and outlined a variety of possible methods for ensuring credible monitoring including regular reviews, field visits and interviews. Revisions to ASGP I underlined the need for project assurance which was later incorporated under UNDP's role in ASGP II.

There is little evidence that regular M&E activity took place during ASGP I. The EC carried out a monitoring review, but, based on the data supplied by ASGP I, there was no other regular formal monitoring.

There is no evidence of any formal M&E activity having taken place under ASGP II to date. The UNDP devised monthly questionnaire could be regarded as an internal M&E tracking mechanism, but the evaluation team has not been given any formal reports based on the information provided in these questionnaires. Certainly no external M&E review has taken place since the start of ASGP II in early 2010.

Capability to Deliver PAR

Due to the limited time available on this assignment and the fact that support to the IARCSC and PAR have been dropped in ASGP II, this area will only be explored briefly and in the body of the main report.

4. TRANSITION TO AFGHAN IMPLEMENTATION

The current strategy and timelines for transition of the overall programme to IDLG are vague. Current statements refer to timelines for transition of one to three years. There are no detailed statements of how the transition period might be managed or identification of key milestones on the way to full transition of the programme. The IDLG exit strategy simply lists a number of posts against suggested years of transition without giving further detail on how this will be achieved or what conditions might be necessary in order to ensure any transition is sustainable.

There is a clear need for a more detailed strategy setting out how transition will be managed successfully. UNDP, IDLG and donors together need to agree on an outline transition plan, including appropriate milestones and identifying a final deadline by when transition should have been achieved. A target date should be agreed by the transition

committee with IDLG and the MoF identifying by when all LoAs should have transitioned to the GoA payroll. UNDP should propose a viable date e.g. the start of the penultimate budget cycles before the end of the project, in order to allow enough time to resolve any outstanding issues.

A team should be established to plan and monitor the transition process. This team should inter alia:

- Review contracts of LoA staff. One obvious option would be to transfer LoA to tashkeel positions where possible. Where this is not possible, then perhaps senior level staff could be transferred to the MCP programme and middle management and advisory staff be placed on NIBP contracts.
- Agree a timeline with IDLG for ending support to the LoAs.
- Agree a timeline and funding mechanism with the MoF.
- Agree the point beyond which no more LoA staff will be recruited.
- Agree a reporting format for the transition period.
- Conduct an asset survey and prepare asset handover documentation.
- Set a date for project closure and prepare staff disengagement.

5. CONCLUSION

The overall programme goals and purpose remain relevant. But the rate of progress made on ASGP I was insufficient to deliver the goals set out for that phase and if the current rate of progress under AGSP II continues it is likely also to fail to provide sufficient high quality technical assistance to ensure achievement of the agreed outcomes for the programme as a whole. And at least some of the achievements claimed by ASGP to date could not be attributed solely to the ASGP programme. Both phases have suffered from poor programme and project design and implementation, frequent leadership changes, failure to adhere to the agreed programme governance structure and design or to commonplace project management methodologies and from on-going staffing issues.

It is of concern that the programme in both phases failed to follow the agreed governance control mechanisms put in place at the start. The role and responsibilities of the Project Executive Group were clearly defined for both ASGP I and II. But in practice the role of the PEG in approving and steering the programme was often neglected or marginalised. Over time, IDLG took on a greater role in running and steering the PEG. This effectively sidelined the ASGP implementation team, UNDP and the donors. PEG meeting minutes frequently record IDLG reporting on ASGP and UNDP key progress. Programme decisions are recorded as having been taken by IDLG and presented to other PEG member as a fait accompli. There is no evidence to suggest that UNDP took any action to remedy this and indeed, on a number of occasions, it is clear that UNDP effectively encouraged this status quo.

The original scope of the programme was perhaps overambitious, given the realities of operating in the hostile, post-conflict environment of Afghanistan, particularly in the regions, and the relatively limited resources available for the programme. The challenge was further compounded by the difficulties encountered in recruiting and retaining sufficient qualified staff and in maintaining team continuity and cohesion. Project progress has been heavily reliant throughout on a small number of key personnel covering multiple positions. The team thus has had no redundancy or capacity to cover for staff absences. The loss of a single member of the team for any period of time has

had a direct adverse impact on programme delivery in a number of different work areas and/or regions.

The lack of a single, authoritative agreed work plan to direct activity and facilitate reporting and tracking of progress has been a significant weakness of the programme, resulting both in slower and less effective delivery than might otherwise have been the case and to delays in identifying issues that need addressing. There is a clear need both for a single overarching work plan for the full five-year programme as well as specific annual and regional work plans which should all be clearly related.

The creation of LoAs to give more flexibility for the programme to channel funding and support via IDLG is innovative in its approach. However the current format requires some urgent strengthening. The LoA and associated SOPs should be reviewed, including by a legal expert, and additional clauses should be included to strengthen accountability and auditing, clarify the steps for termination of these agreements (including a sunset clause) and set out actions in the event of non-compliance.

Partly as a result of the lack of a clear, definitive work plan, the reporting mechanism in place has not adequately monitored progress against agreed work plan milestones. Greater emphasis has been given to the quantity of reporting than to its quality or utility. So while much staff time has been taken up with reporting designed to satisfy the needs of UNDP and donors, staff have suffered reporting fatigue. The reporting produced has failed to identify issues sufficiently early to enable mitigating action to be put in place and has not satisfied donors.

While the pressure from UNDP on ASGP management to deliver frequent reports is understandable, the effect has in practice been to divert effort away from delivering project outputs and to focus effort on delivering quantity rather than quality of reporting. Fewer, better quality reports, more clearly reporting progress against the agreed work plan would provide better targeted and actionable information, allowing early steps to be taken where necessary to adjust focus and inputs to ensure delivery of agreed outputs and outcomes.

Transition planning is now an urgent matter, particularly in light of planned military drawdown for 2014 and donors' own transition goals. Currently ASGP has no document setting out such plans and this is a matter of concern for donors. ASGP should look to form a working group with IDGL, MoF and MRRD to work on putting together a transition plan that is acceptable to all parties. This work should be completed within 6 months and no later than the start of the next budget year. This would give MoF sufficient time to start transitioning staff to the tashkeel from the next budget year.

Overall the ASGP programme has achieved some success in establishing IDLG and in helping them deliver a policy for Sub national Governance. However, the consistently inadequate levels of staffing, combined with systemic failures in running the programme in line with its pre-agreed methodology, mean that the programme is now facing significant challenges. Unless urgent action is taken by UNDP to address the critical areas of staffing, team and project management structures, work planning, targeted reporting and transition, it is hard to see how ASGP II can deliver significantly more than ASGP I. On the other hand, sustained focus on these issues for a period of six months with the right resources could put this programme back on track and help restore donor faith in UNDP.

6. ASGP HR PLAN 2011


No	Post Title	Expected Level	Status Vacant or Incumbent
1	Chief Technical Advisor	P6	Basil Comnas, acting
2	Project Manager	P5	VACANT
3	Executive Associate	SB 3	Samiullah Nazemi
4	Senior Policy Advisor	P5	Going to filled soon by SSA
5	Project Associate	SB 3	VACANT
6	Programme Specialist (Advisor to IDLG)	P 4	VACANT
7	Technical Specialist (Advisor on SNG to IDLG Director General	SB 5	VACANT
8	Technical Specialist (Advisor on Sub-national Planning and Management)	P 4	VACANT
9	Technical Specialist (Advisor on Budget and Fiscal Planning and Management)	P 4	VACANT
10	Provincial Governance and Development Specialist (PGO)	SB 4	VACANT
11	Provincial Governance and Development Specialist (PC)	SB 4	Hasmat Hijran
12	Project Associate	SB 3	Parwan Wafa
13	Knowledge, Information and Communication Manager & Trainer	P 4	VACANT
14	Knowledge Management and Training Specialist	SB 4	VACANT
15	Reporting Officer	P 3	VACANT
16	Results and Reporting Specialist	SB 4	VACANT
17	Provincial Statistics and Information Management Specialist	SB 4	VACANT
18	Municipal Information Management Specialist	SB 4	Fawad Anwarzia
19	Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist	SB 4	VACANT
20	Project Associate	SB 3	Haroon Hazem
21	Municipal Governance/ Reform Team Leader	SB 5	Nasir Hamidi
22	Technical Specialist (Municipal Planning and Governance Advisor)	P 4	VACANT
23	Revenue Enhancement and Administration Analyst	SB 4	Nasir Salihzada
24	Municipal Service Delivery Specialist	SB 4	Zabi Issa
25	Project Associate	SB 3	Shah wali
26	Logistical Manager and Trainer	P 4	VACANT
27	Operations Specialist	SB 4	Jawid Qaumi
28	Administration Associate	SB 3	VACANT
29	Budget Officer	SB 4	Freshta Mahiudin
30	Finance Officer	SB 4	VACANT
31	Finance Associate	SB 3	Fazel Sediqi
32	Finance Associate	SB 3	VACANT
33	Asset and Logistics Associate	SB 3	Shafiqullah Safi
34	Logistic and Customs Associate	SB 3	VACANT
35	ICT Associate	SB 3	Wais Ahmadi
36	Travel Assistant	SB 3	M.Din Taheri

No	Post Title	Expected Level	Status Vacant or Incumbent
37	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Nasir
38	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Qasim
39	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Jamshid
40	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Shoaib
41	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Zemari
42	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Nooragha
43	Cleaner (Kabul)	SB 1	Ghulam Sakhi
44	CENTER Technical Specialist (Governance-Kabul)	P 3	Sara Van Galeen
45	NORTH Technical Specialist (Governance-Mazar)	P4	Anil Chandrika
46	WEST Technical Specialist (Governance-Herat)	P4	Atul Shekhar
47	NORTHEAST Technical Specialist (Governance-Kunduz)	P4	VACANT
48	EAST Technical Specialist (Governance-Jalalabad)	P4	VACANT
49	SOUTH Technical Specialist (Governance-Kandahar)	P4	Samuel Sarpong (acting)
50	Uruzgan Technical Specialist (Governance-Tirin Kot)	P3	Yugesh Pradhanang
51	Central Highland Technical Specialist (Governance-Bamiyan)	P4	Yuichi Tanada
52	Provincial Governance Manager (Helmand)	P4	VACANT
53	Provincial Governance Manager (Kunar)	P 3	VACANT
54	Provincial Governance Manager (Takhar)	P 3	VACANT
55	Provincial Governance Manager (Pulkhumri)	P 3	VACANT
56	Provincial Governance Manager (Badakhshan)	P 3	VACANT
57	Provincial Governance Manager (Sar e Pul)	P 3	VACANT
58	Provincial Governance Manager (Maimana)	P 3	VACANT
59	Provincial Governance Manager (Sheberghan)	P 3	VACANT
60	Provincial Governance Manager (Qala e Naw)	P 3	VACANT
61	Provincial Governance Manager (Ghor)	P 3	VACANT
62	Provincial Governance Manager (Nimroz)	P 3	VACANT
63	Provincial Governance Manager (Zabul)	P 3	VACANT
64	Provincial Governance Manager (Matun/Khost)	P 3	VACANT
65	Provincial Governance Manager (Daykundi)	P 3	VACANT
66	CENTER Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	Zarif Akbari
67	NORTH Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
68	WEST Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
69	NORTHEAST Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
70	EAST Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
71	SOUTH Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
72	CENTER Regional Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	VACANT
73	NORTH Regional Municipal Governance and	SB 4	VACANT

No	Post Title	Expected Level	Status Vacant or Incumbent
	Development Specialist (Mazar)		
74	WEST Regional Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
75	NORTHEAST Regional Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
76	EAST Regional Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
77	SOUTH Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
78	CENTER Regional Communication Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	VACANT
79	NORTH Regional Communication Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
80	WEST Regional Communication Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
81	NORTHEAST Regional Communication Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
82	EAST Regional Communication Specialist(Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
83	SOUTH Regional Communication Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
84	CENTRAL Highland Regional Communication Specialist (BAMYAN)	SB 4	VACANT
85	EASTERN Regional Communication Specialist (GARDEZ)	SB 4	VACANT
86	CENTER Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	Rahmanullah Rahmani
87	NORTH Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
88	WEST Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
89	NORTHEAST Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
90	EAST Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
91	SOUTH Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
92	CENTER Regional Program Finance Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	VACANT
93	NORTH Regional Program Finance Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
94	WEST Regional Program Finance Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
95	NORTHEAST Regional Program Finance Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
96	EAST Regional Program Finance Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
97	SOUTH Regional Program Finance Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT

No	Post Title	Expected Level	Status Vacant or Incumbent
98	CENTER Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	VACANT
99	NORTH Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
100	WEST Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
101	NORTHEAST Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
102	EAST Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
103	SOUTH Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
104	34 Chief Provincial Governance and Development Advisors to Provincial Governors	SB 4 or P2/P3	VACANT
105	25 Chief Municipal Governance and Development Advisors	SB 4 or P2/P3	VACANT
106	CENTER Regional Finance Associate (Kabul)	SB 3	VACANT
107	NORTH Regional Finance Associate (Mazar)	SB 3	Shahram
108	WEST Regional Finance Associate (Herat)	SB 3	Kifayat Ali
109	NORTHEAST Regional Finance Associate (Kunduz)	SB 3	VACANT
110	EAST Regional Finance Associate (Jalalabad)	SB 3	Mansoor Khan
111	SOUTH Regional Finance Associate (Kandahar)	SB 3	VACANT
112	CENTRAL HIGHLAND Finance Associate (Bamyan)	SB 3	M.Reza Balkhi
113	CENTER Regional Admin Associate (Kabul)	SB 3	VACANT
114	NORTH Regional Admin Associate (Mazar)	SB 3	Habibullah Holkar
115	WEST Regional Admin Associate (Herat)	SB 3	Ahmad Rafi Rasuli
116	NORTHEAST Regional Admin Associate (Kunduz)	SB 3	M. Basir Habibi
117	EAST Regional Admin Associate (Jalalabad)	SB 3	Rizwanullah Sadat
118	SOUTH Regional Admin Associate (Kandahar)	SB 3	Basir Ahmad
119	CENTRAL HIGHLAND Admin Associate (Bamyan)	SB 3	M.Sakhidad Amin

7. CURRENT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ASGP



ANNEX IV

SUB NATIONAL GOVERNANCE PAPER

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Evaluation / Review Performed by

Abdul Moien Jawhary MBA, MSc

1. ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ASGP II CURRENT GOAL, PURPOSE AND OUTPUTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE KABUL CONFERENCE COMMITMENTS AND THE SUB NATIONAL GOVERNANCE POLICY

The existing Goal, Purpose and Expected Outputs of ASGP II are as follows:

ASGP II Goal: According to the signed ASGP II programme document and its Inception Report; this programme has been designed to support Outcomes 2, and 3 of UNDAF effective for 2010 – 2013², and the expected Country Programme Outcome 3³. However with reference to the outcome 3 there are two specific expected outputs identified⁴.

Purpose: According to the signed ASGP II programme document and its Inception Report the programme has been demand driven and has been developed after consultations with government partners at both central and provincial level. The purpose has been that through a provincial approach ASGP II will significantly scale up activities in sub national policy development and implementation; national capacity building of IDLG; assistance to provincial, district, and municipal administrations, respective councils, and, support to local coordination mechanisms at the provincial and district levels.

Expected Outputs:

I. According to the signed ASGP- II programme document effective (2010-2014)

1. National systems, procedures, and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor sub national governance policy are in place by 2014
2. Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS.
3. IDLG and IARCSC have the capacity to coordinate PAR implementation, and the IARCSC sub national offices have the capacity to deliver public administration reports to all sub national government institutions by 2014.
4. Provincial and District Councils have improved capacity to represent citizen interests and monitor sub national governance; and,
5. Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under PAR) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.

II. According to the Inception Report⁵ developed in December 2010, it has been decided that out of the five outlined expected outputs the third one "IDLG and IARCSC have the capacity to coordinate PAR implementation, and the IARCSC sub national offices have the capacity to deliver public administration reports to all sub national government institutions by 2014.", will no longer be delivered by ASGP II.

Moreover in the last part of the work plan in the inception report covers ASGP II Management, which provides information and direction to its managers on certain requirements for progress and quality check through the timeframe of the programme

² Outcome2. Government capacity to deliver services to the poor and vulnerable is enhanced.

Outcome3. The institutions of democratic governance are integrated components of the nation.

³ Outcome3. The State has improved ability to deliver services to foster human development and elected bodies have greater oversight capacity.

⁴ 3.1. Inclusive legislation, policies, and programmes are in place and government institutions are strengthened to improve the quality of service delivery.

3.2. Improved capacity of elected bodies to provide effective oversight.

⁵ Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme-II, December 2010, Inception Report, Ps 47-52

Expected areas of the Sub national Governance Policy (SNGP) and the Kabul Conference to be covered by ASGP II are as follows:

Contents of the SNGP:

- IDLG and its functions
- The institutional framework for sub national governance in Afghanistan
- Roles and responsibilities of the provincial governors
- Responsibilities of the provincial, district, and village administrations
- Roles of the provincial and district councils
- Roles of the line departments of the ministries
- Roles of the PDCs, PAAs, DDAs, and DAAs, and CDCs
- Codes of conduct and code of ethics
- Sub national jurisdiction
- Sub national planning, and sub national financing
- Municipal governance
- Gender in sub national governance
- Rights to information
- Participation of civil society and media in sub national governance
- Public administration reform and capacity development in sub national government
- Performance measurement in sub national governance
- Public service standards and customer service orientation in public service
- Local economic development
- Community-based natural resources management including land administration

Kabul Conference related commitments: Kabul Conference held on the 20th July 2010 in Kabul-Afghanistan. According to the communiqué of the conference it has had a number of governance improvement commitments and provisions such as items 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 28.⁶

⁶ “2.....a mandate to adopt a “whole of state”, approach and a “whole of government” path to national renewal”, “The essence of the “whole of government” approach is structural reform to create an effective, accountable, and transparent government that can deliver services to the population and safeguard national interests.”

“3.....these events reaffirmed the commitment of the Afghan Government to improve security, governance, and economic opportunity for its citizens. In addition, these events reaffirmed the international community’s commitment to support the transition to Afghan leadership and its intention to provide security and economic assistance to realize our shared objectives.”

“5..... The international community welcomes the Afghan Government’s committed reforms outlined in its new National Priority Programmes.”

“6.....The Kabul Process recognizes that the Afghan Government can guarantee security only when its people are confident in its ability to deliver public services, good governance, human rights protection including gender equality, and economic opportunities.”

“7.....To achieve success in Afghanistan, the partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community should be based on the leadership and ownership of the Afghan Government, underpinned by its unique and irreplaceable knowledge of its own culture and people. This partnership should include coherent support by the international community, lending its resources and technical knowledge to the implementation of Afghan- defined programmes.”

“9. Good governance, the rule of law, and human rights form the foundation of the strategy to achieve a stable and prosperous Afghanistan”, “Increase the efficiency and effectiveness by continuing to implement broad-based policy, legal, and structural reform in public administration”, “Seek understanding with donors, over the next six months on a harmonized salary scale for donors funded salaries of persons working within the Afghan Government”, “ Implement over the next twelve months,

Good governance has been identified as a priority area of support for UN in Afghanistan. It has been outlined in UNDAF for 2010 to 2013. The UNDP framework in Afghanistan supporting democratic governance has been identified one of the important development areas.

In addition to other initiatives, UNDP has designed and launched the Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme (ASGP). ASGP's phase one has come to an end by 2010, and in early 2010 a new phase of the programme (ASGP II) started to operate.

A. ANALYSIS OF ASGP II EXPECTED OUTPUT COMPATIBILITY WITH THE KABUL CONFERENCE COMMITMENTS

I. The following components of the Kabul Conference are considered in ASGP II:

- Public Administration Reform
- Concept of partnership with Afghans and national institutions
- Improve governance

II. The following components of the Kabul Conference received little or no consideration in ASGP II:

- Effectiveness, Accountability, and Transparency in the government
- Security and economic opportunity
- Human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption
- Sub national finance and budget
- Afghans ownership, and implementation of National Priority Programmes

2. ANALYSIS OF ASGP II EXPECTED OUTPUTS COMPATIBILITY WITH THE CONTENTS OF SNGP

I. The following components of the SNGP are covered under ASGP II expected outputs:

- The indicative activities related to output 1, ASGP II are focused to support and lobby for establishment and support of institutional framework for sub national governance mainly through IDLG as its main national counterpart.
- In order to address and identify the responsibilities of the provincial, district and village administration, ASGP II has set a target for itself that the principal associated laws and procedures are in place by 2014
- The output 2 of ASGP II is expected to have the PGOs and the DGOs have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance and security strategies in

in a phased and fiscally sustainable manner, the Sub national Governance Policy, and strengthen local institutional capacity, including training of civil servants and development of training curricula, and develop sub national regulatory, financing, and budgetary frameworks.”

“28. The Afghan Government is to focus on reform of service delivery institutions, policy decisions and the implementation of the National Priority Programmes, within the framework of a prioritized Afghanistan National Development Strategy, in its rolling 100-days action plans.”

accordance with ANDS. It is to better define and emphasis on the roles of the provincial and district governors' offices.

- In order to better clarify the roles of the provincial and district councils ASGP II has its output 4 focusing the activities to make sure that the provincial and district councils have the improved capacity to represent citizen's interests and monitor sub national governance.
- There has been embedded consideration of sub national planning under the expected output 1 of ASGP II.
- With regards to the municipal governance, ASGP II has captured this under its expected output 5 which states that the municipalities have the institutional and organization framework and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.
- With relation to gender in sub national governance there are a number of benchmarks set out under its expected output 2, focusing the activities to municipalities and PCs support.
- Under expected output 2, establishment of provincial information service centers have been considered to address the public right to information.
- PAR and capacity enhancement of sub national government has been considered under the expected output 3 that states IDLG and IARCSC have the capacity to coordinate PAR implementation and the IARCSC sub national offices have the capacity to deliver PAR to all sub national government institutions by 2014
- Performance measurement component in sub national civil service institutions has also been covered under the expected output 3.
- According to the log frame of the programme the public service standards part of the SNGP has been expected under its output 3.

II. The following components of the SNGP are not considered under ASGP II:

- The authority and function of IDLG
- Line ministry departments and district offices
- PDCs, PAAs, DDAs, and DAAs, CDCs
- Code of conduct and code of ethics in public service institutions
- Sub national jurisdiction
- Participation of civil society and media in sub national governance
- Local economic development
- Community based natural resources management including land administration.

3. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ASGP II ACTIVITIES IN RELATION TO THE GOAL, PURPOSE, AND OUTPUTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR RE-FOCUSSING REQUIRED IF ANY

The existing Goal, Purpose and Expected Outputs of ASGP II are as follows:

ASGP II Goal: According to the signed ASGP II programme document and its Inception Report; this programme has been designed to support Outcomes 2, and 3 of UNDAF effective for 2010 – 2013, and the expected Country Programme Outcome 3. However

with reference to the outcome 3 there are two specific expected outputs identified.

Purpose: According to the signed ASGP II programme document and its Inception Report the programme has been demand driven and has been developed after consultations with government partners at both central and provincial level. The purpose has been that through a provincial approach ASGP II will significantly scale up activities in sub national policy development and implementation; national capacity building of IDLG; assistance to provincial, district, and municipal administrations, respective councils, and, support to local coordination mechanisms at the provincial and district levels.

Expected Outputs: I. According to the signed ASGP- II programme document effective (2010-2014)

1. National systems, procedures, and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor sub national governance policy are in place by 2014
2. Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS.
3. Provincial and District Councils have improved capacity to represent citizen interests and monitor sub national governance; and,
4. Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under PAR) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.

Since early 2010, ASGP II has been working to achieve four out of five expected outputs. The fifth one was deleted according to the inception report – December 2010. The programme documents of ASGP II, the available progress reports, the field visits and the interview made, indicate that there have been numerous work plans with different indicative activities. However the review team decided to track the indicative activities reflected in the results and resources framework of the signed programme document of ASGP II. These are also those indicated in the work plan of the inception report.

Analysis summary of the effectiveness of the activities and the rates of progress in relation to the programmes expected outputs

The following table is prepared to show the summary of the analysis of the effectiveness of the ASGP indicative activities and the rates of progress in relation to the programmes expected outputs:

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
1	National systems, procedures, and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate	Drafting all necessary laws and associated rules of procedure and guidelines under the area of authority of IDLG	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	The activity has been identified to be highly effective to reach the output. It still requires more lobbying and advocacy of IDLG. The progress reported on

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
	and monitor sub national governance policy are in place by 2014			drafting new laws are slow.
		Development of key institutional, organizational and individual capacities in IDLG	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	This activity has a timeline until end 2013. However the progress requires more speed; especially in strengthen in the financial management, budgeting, internal audit systems, and M&E in IDLG.
		Capacity Development of Policy unit of IDLG with respect to its key functions and capacities	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	The progress over the sub-component related to the development of the internal capacity building and ToT for policy unit of IDLG has been identified to be slow, and requires faster progress.
		Meetings of inter-ministerial coordination / implementation structures to review progress of SNGP implementation	No substantial progress found	The timeline for this activity has come near to be over. This was identified to be highly effective and critical to be executed as early as possible.
		SNG policy awareness for key staff of PGOs and DGOs and members of PCs and DCs	No substantial progress found	Some parts of the timeline given to it have already gone. It has been identified highly effective and critical to be executed as early as possible.
		SNG policy awareness for citizens regarding roles and responsibilities of sub-national authorities	No substantial progress found	Some part of the sit timeline for this activity has already gone. It is effective to be executed as soon as possible; especially it's sub-component for assisting in conducting public hearings.
		Capacity Development of IDLG with respect to key capacities related to sub national finance and planning	Some progress in HR but not yet any progress with other sub-components	This activity is a key indicator for SNG. However, more acceleration is required especially in sub national finance.

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
2	Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS.	Strengthening provincial and district offices to fulfill their roles and responsibilities	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More focus should be made on to the components of provincial recruitment and appointment committees.
		Introduction of functioning modern administrative management systems in PGOs and DGOs	In progress with the work plan, not measurable	More work is required to be done in training of the PGOs and DGOs staffs on their roles and responsibilities.
		Establishing performance measurement systems for all provinces and government institutions	Little or no progress shown	This major activity is highly effective and critical for improved service delivery in sub national institutions. More lobbying role of IDLG will be required for this to be executed.
		Establishing interaction mechanisms for effective interaction between sub national government and public to improve access to information	Some progress shown, more needed to be done in this regards	In the areas with regards to establishing provincial information services centers, creation of public grievance system and e-government, little have been done. More work is required
		Provincial Strategic Planning (PSP) and Provincial Development Planning (PDP) guided by PSP	In progress in accordance with the plan, not measurable	It is effective; some more work will be required in the components of support to PDCs, strategic profiling and development databases.
		Strengthen public financial management at sub national level to make it fully compliant with applicable laws and MoF procedures	Little or no progress shown	This exercised has been identified to be highly critical for sub national governance improvement and requires more speed in its process
3	Provincial and District Councils have improved capacity to represent citizen interests and	Establishing knowledge sharing systems for Provincial and District Councils	Some progress shown, more required to be executed	More focus of the programme will be required to this major activity and its all related sub-activities
		Capacity development of PCs and DCs so that they are compliant with	In progress in line with the work plan, not	Specific thematic training and capacity building programmes are required

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
	monitor sub national governance	roles of procedures and conduct public outreach	measurable	for both, the PCs and DCs.
		Strengthening PCs and DCs oversight over local service delivery, strategic and annual budgetary and planning, M&E for service delivery	Little progress has been shown in this regards	More training and capacity building programmes are required on M&E and annual budgetary topics to both the PCs and DCs
4	Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under PAR) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services	Improving capacity of municipalities to generate own source revenues	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	This major activity has been identified highly effective. More work will be required in relation to development of a database for revenues in the municipalities.
		Improving municipal capacities to apply minimum service standards, improved procedures, performance measurement system and FMS	Little progress shown	It has been expected to be more effective. Work will be required on FMS and provision of service standards
		Organizational restructuring of municipalities to improve service delivery, including at least 15% female staff by 2014	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work will be required in its timeframe, especially in HR sections of municipalities
		Strengthening municipality outreach programme	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work needs to be executed in the areas of customer satisfaction survey, participatory planning, and public hearing mechanisms.
		Strengthening modern office management systems in municipalities	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work is required in its component to apply modern office management procedures in municipalities.
		Creation and	No progress	The web-sites and e-

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
		maintenance of a functional website and e-government applications for selected municipalities	shown yet	government will be essential for a successful municipality to operate. The activity was supposed to start by early January 2011, when it did not. It should start as earlier as possible.

It is highly important for ASGP II to note and take serious the identified areas where little or no progress has been made. However order to improve the implementation and keep the pace, it will be vital to first review the project work plan once again, adjust and accelerate the execution of the activities especially-those with little or no progress-accordingly.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ASGP AND OTHER DONOR FUNDED SUB NATIONAL GOVERNANCE (SNG) PROGAMS

The present coordination mechanism in SNG programmes⁷

There are currently a number of initiatives in support and empowerment of SNG in Afghanistan. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) has been identified to be the official national government institution to coordinate and support the efforts and the initiatives to support and strengthening the sub national governance in Afghanistan.

However, in order to better assist and coordinate the efforts, track the progress of the different initiatives and most importantly avoid overlaps and duplication, IDLG has established a strategic programme unit. The unit also has the responsibility to lobby with the national, international institutions and the donors to ensure that all the programmes have enough operational resources.

The table below illustrates the different donor funded programmes in progress to support the SNG in Afghanistan and which are coordinated by IDLG:

The current donors funded sub national Initiatives coordinated under IDLG

Name of the programme	Donor(s)	Brief description and main objectives of the programme
Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme (ASGP)	UNDP, UK, European Commission, Italy, Netherlands,	The Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme (ASGP) supports IDLG, the provincial and district governors' offices, the municipalities, the provincial and the district councils with the development of strategies and policies, provides advisory and technical services and backstopping, develops institutional and organizational

⁷ The Strategic Programmes Coordination Unit, IDLG

Name of the programme	Donor(s)	Brief description and main objectives of the programme
		capacity, provides human, material and technical resources with the ultimate goal to improve and strengthen sub national governance process and institutions in Afghanistan. ASGP has had two phases, ASGP-I ended by end 2010 and ASGP-II has started in early 2010 and continues to date.
Afghanistan Local Government Facilities Development Programme (ALGFDP)	Ministry of Finance, Special Accounts, bi-lateral arrangement	The Afghanistan Local Government Facilities Development Programme (ALGFDP) formerly was called Afghanistan Stabilization Programme (ASP). The implementation of this programme was started with the Ministry Interior of Afghanistan. However, as soon as IDLG was formed it has been coordinated by IDLG. ALGFDP provides infrastructure and equipment for provincial and district administration including offices, residence, generators, walls, power supply, water supply, equipment, etc...The programme enables the Provincial and District Governors Offices to have proper infrastructures (office buildings, houses, and facilities and operate properly. It is expected that the programme continue till 2012.
Performance Based Governors Fund (PBGF)	USAID, DFID, and Belgium	Performance Based Governors Fund (PBGF) Provides the Provincial Governors Offices with a flexible budget for addressing operational and community outreach programmes with annual performance-based adjustment to the funds. PBGF was started in March 2010 by the Asia Foundation as the implementation partner to IDLG. The programme covers all 34 provinces.
District Delivery Programme (DDP)	Multi-donors including the US, UK/DFID, Germany, France	The District Delivery Programme (DDP) aims to establish or visibly improve the government presence at the local level in the districts that have recently been secured. The DDP considers the most vulnerable districts and population in Afghanistan. It is being implemented through an inter-ministerial secretariat led by IDLG in partnership with the MAIL, MoE, MoA, MoJ, MoPH, MRRD, MoF, the SC, AGO, and AIRIARCSC. DDP was started in 2010 and is expected to continue till March 2012. During its life span DDP is expected to cover 80 districts of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP)	US/USAID	Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) has been designed aiming to improve and strengthen peace, stability, security and relation of the communities and the district and provincial government. ASOP supports and facilitates the district-level councils and empowering them to engage with communities and strengthen relationship between people and government. ASOP is expected to cover up to 135 districts of Afghanistan in more than 20 provinces. The councils are established through a traditional election mechanism called Jirga. It will improve security and stability restoration in the districts and communities. The programme has been implemented with the overall management of IDLG, and support of AECOM International (a USAID

Name of the programme	Donor(s)	Brief description and main objectives of the programme
		contractor).
Regional Afghan Municipalities Programme for Urban Population (RAMP-UP)	USAID	The Regional Afghan Municipalities Programme for Urban Population (RAMP-UP) was started in 2010 and is aimed to provide an integrated package of capacity building for municipalities into a package of three components: Capacity building, Service delivery grants, and Improve revenue generation. RAMP-UP is expected to be implemented through different USAID contractors in three years in South, East, North, and Western provinces of Afghanistan.

There are also other initiatives and support mechanisms that contribute to government empowerment such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The PRTs in each province have their own different approach, and commonly in order to operate in a province they are expected to have good working relationships with the provincial governors and the district governors. However, they work on ad-hoc and case by case basis according to the needs of the governors. The PRTs sometimes provide assistance to the sector line ministry provincial. The PRTs work outside the framework of IDLG's coordination.

There are also a number of other USAID funded programmes contributing to the SNG. However their contributions have not been coordinated by IDLG. IDLG has been identified to be the only national government institution to coordinate and support the efforts and the initiatives to support and strengthening the sub national governance in Afghanistan. However, to better assist and coordinate the efforts, track different progress initiatives, and most importantly avoid overlaps and duplication, a strategic programme unit has been established in IDLG. The unit has also the responsibility to lobby with the national, international institutions, and the donors to ensure that all the programmes have enough operation resources.

There are also other initiatives and support mechanisms that contribute to government empowerment such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The PRTs in each province have there own different approach, and commonly in order to operate in a province they are expected to have good working relationships with the provincial governors and the district governors. However, they work on ad-hoc and case by case basis according to the needs of the governors. The PRTs sometimes provide assistance to the sector line ministry provincial. The PRTs work outside the framework of IDLG's coordination.

There are also a number of other USAID funded programmes contributing to the SNG. However their contributions have not been coordinated by IDLG.

IDLG) has been identified to be the only national government institution to coordinate and support the efforts and the initiatives to support and strengthening the sub national governance in Afghanistan. However, to better assist and coordinate the efforts, track different progress initiatives, and most importantly avoid overlaps and duplication, a strategic programme unit has been established in IDLG. The unit has also the responsibility to lobby with the national, international institutions, and the donors to ensure that all the programmes have enough operation resources.

Analysis of the interface and potential overlap of ASGP with other donors funded sub national governance support programmes:

Sub national Governance Support Programmes	Areas of Support	Existing or possible areas of potential overlaps with ASGP
ASGP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support to development and implementation of SNGP. 2. Capacity building of the Provincial Governors Offices (PGOs), and the District Governors Offices(DGOs) 3. Support to the Provincial Councils(PCs) 4. Support to Municipalities. 	Not Applicable
ALGFDP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Construction of district complexes 2. Residential buildings, and guest houses for civil servants in the provinces and districts 3. Construction of provincial councils buildings, and <i>Jirga</i> Halls 4. Supply of vehicles for DGs, and; 5. Provision of refurbishment and equipment 	Provision of similar equipment
PBGF	The Provincial Governors through this programme will have a flexible budget up, 25000 USD at first stage to use for the governance and government support areas and activities in the province for which they will not be able to get funding through their operational budget. The budget will be spent in 6 categories for which the governor's performance will be annually evaluated.	Since the modality under which the funds will be provided to the PGs is more flexible through this programme there is a possibility of potential overlap with ASGP activities and assistance.
DDP	DDP has been an inter-governmental programme working through an inter-ministerial secretariat led by IDLG. It focuses on the districts with insecurity background. Programme activities includes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assess and cooperates to recruit and fill all the needed civil servants in the district. 2. The civil servants receive their salaries and some hazards allowance on time. 3. Some development projects requested at the district level got required resources and being 	No overlap

	implemented.	
ASOP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support and facilitation of <i>Jirga</i> process in the districts under the coverage of the programme 2. Facilitation of traditional election process inside the district Jirga, and formation of community councils or district community councils (DCC). 3. Training and capacity building of the DCCs members. 4. Provision of the monthly stipends to the DCCs members. 	Potential overlap in training and capacity building of the DCCs members.
RAMP-UP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity building of the municipalities through embedded advisors in the mayors offices. 2. Provision of provisional service delivery grants to the municipalities making them able to procure municipalities services. 3. Improve revenue generation by building systems to measure revenues and expenditures, methods of collecting legal taxes. 	<p>Considerable overlap in: Capacity building of the municipalities through embedded advisors in the mayors offices.</p> <p>Potential overlap in: Improve revenue generation by building systems to measure revenues and expenditures, methods of collecting legal taxes</p>

There are a number of areas that ASGP needs to consider throughout its implementation to avoid overlaps and duplicating activities. However, this will require a review of all the log-frame activities before being executed. The activities supporting the PGOs with IT and equipments must be checked with PBGF, and the activities being executed to support the municipalities must be checked with RAMP-UP.

It will be also be possible for ASGP regional personnel to discuss with the PRTs and any other SNG donor funded initiatives not coordinated by IDLG to make sure that their activities do not duplicate and overlap with ASGP's activities.

ANNEX V

LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Name	Title
Abdul Baqi Popal	General Director - General Directorate of Municipal Affairs - IDLG
Abdul Hai Shakib	Municipal Economic Development and Private Sector Specialist
Abdul Karim (Matin)	General Director - General Directorate for Local Councils Affairs - IDLG
Abdul Salam	IARCSC, Herat
Abdul Zaher Faizzada	Provincial Council Chairman, Herat Provincial Council
Abdy Yeganeh	Head of Population Engagment Team - StratCom - Helmand PRT
Abigail Mambo	HRs Analyst - UNDP
Aferdita Mekuli	Technical Specialist, Kunduz Regional Office, (ASGP)
Ahmad Dawar Aryapou	HR, UNDP Afghanistan
Ahmad Jawid Qayumi	Operations Specialist, ASGP
Ahmad Marood Kabiri	Provincial Governance Specialist, Herat PGO LoA staff, Herat PGO
Ahmad Shah Amirzai	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Ahmad Zai Ferozpur	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Ahmad Zubair Fattahi	National Programme Officer, UNDP Afghanistan
Alhaj Mohammad Salim Taraki	Mayor of Herat Province
Anil Chandriga	Regional Manager, ASGP Mazar Sharif
Anna Morris	Socio-Economic Development Team Leader - Helmand PRT
Arash Barez	Local Economic Development & Private Sector Specialist, Herat PGO
Asiluddin Jami	Deputy Governor, Herat
Atta Hask	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Attilio Aleotti	Senior Technical Advisor, Italian Development Agency
Atul Shekhar	Regional Manager, ASGP Herat
Barna Karimi	Deputy Minister (Policy) - IDLG
Basil George Comnas	Senior Advisor / ASGP Acting CTO and PM - UNDP/ASGP
Cynthia Rawe	Sr. Governance Advisor, Governance Reform Team, DFID Afghanistan
Dawood Shah Saba	Herat Governor, Herat PGO
Farid Mamundzay	Senior Advisor for Governance and Economic Development - IDLG
Feriba Majeed	Director of provincial directorate of Ministry of Women Affairs

Habiba Sarabi	Governor of Bamyaan Province
Habibullah Holkar	Administration ASGP Mazar Sharif
Haji Abdul Salam	Civil Service Commission Regional Director
Hamed Sarwary	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, IDLG
Hamid Azim	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Hashmat Hijran	UNDP / ASGP Afghanistan
Hassan Elhag	Head of Governance Unit - UNAMA
Humam Miscone	Senior Policy Advisor / ASGP Acting DPM - UNDP/ASGP
Jan-Jilles Van Der Hoeven	Deputy Country Director UNDP Afghanistan
Khalid Saboor	UNDP Afghanistan
Khalilullah Totakhail	HR, UNDP Afghanistan
Khan Mohammad Khadim	Regional Governance Specialist Kandahar - UNDP/ASGP
Laure-Helene Piron	Team Leader - Governance Reform Team - DFID
Manoj Basnyat	Country Director UNDP Afghanistan
Mark Miller	Deputy DFID Representative - Helmand PRT
Maroof Kabiri	LoA Staff, ASGP West Region
Massuad Yosufi	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Michael O'Neill	Head of Mission and NATO Senior Representative - Helmand PRT
Mirwais Ramaki	Management Oversight Specialist, UNDP Afghanistan
Mirza Hussain	Budget Officer, ASGP
Mohammad Haroon Sahib	Regional Governance Specialist, ASGP Mazar Sharif
Mohammad Hashmat Hijran	Provincial Governance Development /PCs Specialist - UNDP/ASGP
Mohammad Lal Ahmadi	Chief of Staff - Governor's Office – Helmand
Mohammad Nader Yama	Director - Strategic Coordination Unit – IDLG
Mohammad Naseer Hamidi	Municipal Governance Director, ASGP
Mohammad Omar Shirzad	H.E. Governor - Urzogan
Mohammad Yonus Moqim	Mayor of Mazar City, Mazar Province
Mohammad Yousof	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Muhammad Saleem Taraqi	Mayor, Herat
Naseer Hamidi	UNDP / ASGP Afghanistan
Nazir Ahmad Haidarzada	Provincial Council Member of Herat Province
Nic Bowler	Governance Advisor - Coffey International Development - Helmand PRT
Noor Ahmad Azami	Finance Associate - Helmand - UNDP/ASGP

Paul Tholen	Head of Development Cooperation – Kingdom of the Netherlands
Predrag Perunovic	Operations Manager & Head of Procurement
Robin Dartell	Reporting Officer - UNDP/ASGP
Saifuddin Sanginwal	Governance Specialist - Helmand - UNDP/ASGP
Samiullah Nazimi	Executive Associate to Project Manager ASGP
Samiullah Popal	Provincial Public Communication specialist - Helmand - UNDP/ASGP
Sara van Gaalen	Regional Project Manager (Central Region) - UNDP/ASGP
Sayed Hafeezullah Rohany	Municipal Governance & Development Advisor
Sayed Khalid Khushbin	Assistant Country Director and Head of Local Governance, UNDP
Shahram Sonmez	Finance ASGP Mazar Sharif
Shohab Deshmukh	Deputy Programme Manager, GRT, DFID - Afghanistan
Simone Kreutzer	Deputy Head of Development and Cooperation, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Sofia Dahiya	Capacity Development Advisor, National Institution Building Project, UNDP
Tamara Al-Zayyat	Technical Specialist (Eastern Region) - UNDP/ASGP
Virginie Wyart	Attaché, Public Administration/Sub national Governance, European Union, Delegation to Afghanistan and Office of the Special Representative
Waisuddin Rahimi	M&E ASGP Mazar Sharif
Yugesh Pradhanang	Technical Specialist - UNDP/ASGP
Yuichi Tanada	Governance Specialist, ASGP
Zabeta Moutafis	Development Adviser Uruzgan - AusAID

ANNEX VI

DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS REVIEWED

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Documents:

ASGP Annual reports
ASGP Annual Work plans
ASGP Board Meeting Minutes
ASGP Organization Structure
ASGP Progress Reports
ASGP Quarterly Reports
Completion report of ASGP I
District Development Plan (on sample basis)
Finance Manual of UNDP
Financial Audit Report of ASGP I and II
Helmand Plan – Final
IDLG Exit Strategy List of Staff
Kabul Conference Communiqué
Letter of Agreements between IDLG, IARCSC and UNDP
Letter of Agreements between PGOs and UNDP
Minutes of Programme Executive Board meetings
Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Procedures
Procurement Law of Afghanistan 2008
Procurement Manual of UNDP
Project Document ASGP I
Project Document ASGP II
Project Inception Document ASGP II
Provincial Briefs
Provincial Development Plan (on sample basis)
Quarterly Financial Progress Reports
Standard Staff Contracts
Sub National Governance Policy 2009
UNDP Project Profiles – MBAW, NABDP, NIBP, GEP, JHRA, LOTFA, ACT, APRP, ELECT

Records:

DIAG Project Listing
District Development Plans (DDP) – on sample basis
ERDA Project Listing
Expenditure Ledger
Fixed Asset Listing
Funds Flow Statements
List of NABDP Staff
LoA staff salary claims
Monitoring and Evaluation Field Reports – on sample basis
Payment Documents – on sample basis
Procurement Plans
Procurement Records – on sample basis
Project Processing Documents – on sample basis
Staff Performance Evaluations – on sample basis
Staff Personal Files – on sample basis

Financial Documents:

2003-12-2- Framework of Norway with UNDP.
2006-12-14 - Cost Sharing Agreement with Norway - ASGP.

2007-03-19 - Contribution 3m from Italy - ASGP.
2007-05-30 - Cost Sharing Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2007-05-30 - Cost Sharing Agreement with CIDA - ASGP - Annex A.
2007-12-05 - Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2007-12-13 - Third Part Cost Sharing Agreement with SDC - ASGP.
2008-02-19 - Cost Sharing Agreement with EC (Special Conditions) - ASGP.
2008-02-19 - Request for disbursement of funds to EC - ASGP.
2008-02-24 - ASGP Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement - EC.
2008-03-30 - Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement with EC - ASGP(Signed).
2008-06-15 - Cost Sharing Agreement with Norway - ASGP.
2008-07-30 - Request for disbursement of 1st tranche to Norway - ASGP.
2008-08-06 - Request for disbursement of 3rd tranche to CIDA - ASGP.
2008-09-14 - Request for Disbursement to EC - ASGP.
2008-09-24 - Request for Disbursement to EC - ASGP Annex I Detailed Expenditure Report (EUR) Final.
2008-09-24 - Request for Disbursement to EC - ASGP Annex I Detailed Expenditure Report (EUR) Final4.
2008-10-06 - Letter of Agreement No. 1 with SDC CHF 4 million - ASGP (final signed).
2008-10-27 - Request for Disbursement of 2nd Tranche to Norway - ASGP.
2008-11-01 - Cost Sharing Agreement with the Netherlands - ASGP.
2008-11-05 - CIDA Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement - ASGP.
2008-11-05 - Request for disbursement of 2nd tranche from SDC - ASGP.
2008-11-06 - Request for disbursement of 2nd tranche from SDC - ASGP.
2008-11-08 - Letter of Amendment to the Cost Sharing Agreement with Canada - ASGP.
2008-12-16 - Letter of Amendment to Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2008-12-16 - Letter of Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement with Norway - ASGP.
2008-12-22 - Amendment to Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2008-12-22 - Letter of Request for Amendment to Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2009-01-27 - Acknowledgement of Receipt of Funds from Norway - ASGP.
2009-06-16 - Request for Disbursement of Fourth Tranche to CIDA - ASGP.
2009-06-16 - Request for Disbursement of Third Tranche of Norwegian Contribution - ASGP.
2009-10-11 - Request for Payment of Fourth Tranche - ASGP.
2009-11-02 - Request for Disbursement of Funds to Norway - ASGP.
2009-11-24 - CSA with SDC - ASGP II.
2009-12-22 - CSA with DFID - ASGP.
2010-03-04- Contract implementation period extension of EC-ASGP.
2010-03-23- Annual Progress Report of 2009- ASGP.
2010-03-23- Annual Progress Report of 2009- ASGP.
2010-03-23- Italian Contribution for ASGP.
2010-03-24- Acceptance letter to Italian contribution- ASGP.
2010-03-24- Amendments to CIDA cost sharing agreement- ASGP.
2010-03-24- Amendments to CIDA CSA- ASGP.
2010-03-25-Acceptance letter to Italian contribution-ASGP.
2010-03-31- AusAID cost sharing agreement draft.
2010-05-27- Appreciation Letter to Italy-ASGP.
2010-06-01- Delay of Inception report to DFID-ASGP.
2010-06-09- Letter to DFID on extension of report-ASGP.
2010-07-12- Netherlands letter on request of report.
2010-08-23- Request for last tranche of Netherlands-ASGP.
2010-09-01- Dutch approval of last tranche release.
2010-09-02- Approved letter of released fund of Dutch.

2010-09-1- Dutch Letter for release of last Tranche.
2010-09-13- Letter to Norway on ASGP.
2010-09-15- Letter to Norway on ASGP.
2010-10-24- Bank account for EU contribution.
2010-10-27- Fully executed Mod 1.
2010-12-13 Annex 1- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP - Copy.
2010-12-13 Annex 1- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Annex 3- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Annex 4- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Annex 5- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Annex 6- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Anex2- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-17-02- Cost Sharing Agreement SDC-ASGP.
2010-17-02- Letter of Agreement SDC-ASGP.
2011-01-31- Amendment No 4 to ASGP- CIDA.
2011-02-14- Request of the second tranche - DFID.
2011-02-22- Amendment No 4 to ASGP- CIDA-singed.
ASGP Presentation for Donor Coordination Meeting (final) 11102010 (3) 11.10.2010.
ASGP 00051486 2QPR 2009-08-04 - Second Quarter Progress Report 2009.
ASGP 00051486 3QPR 2009-11-15 - Third Quarter Progress Report 2009.
ASGP 00051486 APR 2006.
ASGP 00051486 APR 2007.
ASGP 00051486 APR 2008.
ASGP 00051486 APR Annex 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Asset Inventory Record - CO Asset MU 090929.
ASGP 00051486 Audit Management Letter final 2009.
ASGP 00051486 AWP (Revised Version 2009) Sept. 2009 Document (3).
ASGP 00051486 AWP 2007.
ASGP 00051486 AWP 2008 2009 values 2007.
ASGP 00051486 AWP 2009.
ASGP 00051486 AWP 2010 (Signed Version) 2010.01.20 Scan001.
ASGP 00051486 AWP Approved 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Board Minutes Dec 4 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Justification for the ASGP PBM for the 1st Qtr 2010 22.02.2011.
ASGP 00051486 Justification for the ASGP PBM for the 1st Qtr 2010 22.02.2011.
ASGP 00051486 Mid Term Review 2009.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of ASGP 8th project board meeting (061209).
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of LPAC 2006.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of PB Meeting 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of PBM 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board 2007.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board 2009.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board Meeting (English) 2007.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board Meeting 2007.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board Meeting Minutes 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Steering Committee Meeting 2006.
ASGP 00051486 Monitoring Report EC 2009.
ASGP 00051486 MTE TOR 2009.
ASGP 00051486 PB minutes Dec 4 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Presentation of Strategy for 2011 - Jan 12012011.
ASGP 00051486 Procurement Plan 2009.
ASGP 00051486 Procurement Plan 2010 - ASGP Phase I 2010.01.26.

ASGP 00051486 Project Revision IARCSC IDLG UNDP 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q1 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q1 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q1 2009.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q1Annex1 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 2007.pdf
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 2008.pdf
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 Annex 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 Annex1 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 Dari 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q3 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q3 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q3 Annex1 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q3 Q4 2006.
ASGP 00051486 QP Review Q1 Presentation 2009.
ASGP 00051486 Signed Project Document 2006.
ASGP Agenda-LPAC-Meeting 060913.
ASGP Annual HR Plan for 2009 081224 Document.
ASGP APR -Annual Report
ASGP Donor meeting minutes Aug-09th 2010 new (2).
ASGP Donor meeting minutes Aug-09th 2010.
ASGP Draft Minutes of ASGP last PBM 02.08.2010.
ASGP Draft Minutes of ASGP last PBM 02.08.2010.
ASGP HR PLAN 2010.
ASGP HR Staffing Plan 090718.
ASGP II 2nd QPR 2010.
ASGP II 3rd QPR 2010.
ASGP II 1st QPR 2010.
ASGP II 2nd Board Meeting Minutes Aug-09th 2010 draft.
ASGP II 2nd Board Meeting Minutes Aug-09th 2010 draft.
ASGP II Minutes of LPAC of ASGP II (signed version) Dec. 06 2009 090210 Scan001.
ASGP II Organogram 2011(Final Signed Version) 28.03.2011.
ASGP II Presentation for DONOR MEETING - 8 March 2011.
ASGP II Procurement Plans.
ASGP MID-TERM REVIEW, Ernest Leonardo, Consultant to UNDP, June 28, 2009.
ASGP Org Ops 090716.
ASGP Org PGODGO 090716.
ASGP Org Programme and SnrMgt 090718.
ASGP Presentations for Board Meetings and Donor Meetings.
ASGP SNG Policy learning Group 26102010.
ASGP SNG Policy Presentation for Donors Meeting.
ASGP SNGP Presentation Nov. 2009.
ASGP SSA Staffing Plan 090718.
ASGP Sub national Governance Policy SNGP Executive Summary (2) 2009.
ASGPI Revised AWP (Version B) 2010.
ASGP-II Organizational Chart (2011).
ASGP-II 00051486 Project Document Signed Version 2010.01.11 doc.
ASGP II AWP Central Region - 2010.
ASGP II AWP East Region - 2010.
ASGP-II AWP LAST DRAFT 1 June 2011.
ASGP II AWP National Level - 2010.
ASGP II AWP North East Region - 2010.
ASGP II AWP North Region - 2010.

ASGP-II AWP South Region - 2010.
ASGP-II AWP West Region - 2010.
ASGP-II Cover Page for AWP - 2010.
ASGP-II Draft 3rd Board Meeting Minutes November 8 2010.
ASGP-II Draft 3rd Board Meeting Minutes November 8 2010.
ASGP-II Handover note of December -R R 2010 - Copy.
ASGP-II HR PLAN FINAL Draft 06 March 2011.
ASGP-II INCEPTION Report for DFID- ASGP 04.11.2010.
Donor feedback on ASGP Annual Progress Report 2010 (3 July 2011)
Final CPAP AFG 2010-2013 (2).
Final CPD 2010-2013.
UNDAF English.

ANNEX VII

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

Location :	Kabul, AFGHANISTAN
Application Deadline :	22-Apr-11
Additional Category	Management
Type of Contract :	Individual Contract
Post Level :	International Consultant
Languages Required :	English
Duration of Initial Contract :	21 Working Days

[Background](#)

UNDP Global Mission Statement:

UNDP is the UN's global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. We are on the ground in 166 countries, working with national counterparts on their own solutions to global and national development challenges.

UNDP Afghanistan Mission Statement:

UNDP Afghanistan is supporting the Government to find innovative solutions to its development challenges based on the on-going Country Programme Document approved by the Executive Board for the period 2006 – 2009. A new Country Programme Document was approved by the Executive Board during September 2009 for the period 2010-2013. Key priority areas for UNDP assistance are in strengthening democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and reducing poverty. UNDP is strengthening the institutional capacities of key national government and sub national authorities which aim to enhance human security, human development, peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Organizational Context:

Developing sound and functional sub national governance systems is a vital item on the Afghanistan development agenda. Strengthening institutional capacities and arrangements for sub national governance and development were priorities approved in the London and Kabul Conferences in 2010. It is increasingly recognized that capacity of sub national governance and development institutions is key to peace, stability and development of the Afghan people and commitments by the international community.

The key objective of the Afghanistan Sub national Governance programme (ASGP), launched in October 2006 is to strengthen the democratic state and government institutions to govern and ensure quality public service delivery at the sub national level through advocacy, policy advice and capacity development. At the central level, ASGP is actively involved in institutional strengthening and capacity development of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). ASGP has also assisted IDLG in the development of the Sub national governance policy (SNGP). At the Sub national level the programme's primary focus is to empower governors at the provincial and district level to oversee and coordinate all provincial (or district) governance, public administration reform and donor activities in the province or district. The programme

also supports provincial councils so that they have the necessary tools to effectively represent their electorates and hold Sub national government administrations accountable. ASGP's municipal reform programme has been implemented in several municipalities.

Based upon the lessons learnt from the implementation of the first phase of the programme i.e. ASGP I, its successor, the second phase of the programme i.e. ASGP II was launched in 2010. In the phase I, ASGP had initiated the sub national governance reform process at national (IDLG), provincial, district and municipal levels. The objective of Phase II is to roll out these reforms comprehensively across the country.

The above objectives of ASGP II will be achieved by delivering the following four specific outputs within the lifetime of the programme:

- National systems, procedures and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor sub national governance policy are in place;
- Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS;
- Provincial and District Councils have the improved capacity to represent citizen interests and monitor sub national governance and development;
- Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under public administration reform) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.

ASGP phase I was implemented from October 2006 till early 2010. Phase II is under implementation since early 2010 and shall end in December 2014. It is now proposed to conduct an end of programme evaluation for ASGP Phase I and a review for ASGP II.

Purpose of the evaluation and review

The primary purpose of the evaluation of Phase I is to assess if programme activities have been carried out and to see if programme outputs and objectives have been met as well as to present some key lessons learnt. The UNDP views programme evaluations as rigorous and credible assessments of measurable progress toward achievements of stated outcomes. As such, the final evaluation should invoke a participatory approach in order to allow programme stakeholders to assist in the generation and application of evaluative knowledge.

The purpose of the review of Phase II is to undertake an in-depth assessment of the past, current and planned operation of ASGP and make recommendations to UNDP, donors and Afghan counterparts on the options, changes and improvements for the way forward with the programme.

Scope and Objectives

Evaluation of Phase I

The objective of the evaluation of Phase I of ASGP is to address the following questions/issues:

- a. Indicate whether or not intended programme impact and outcomes have been met and/or, for specific outcomes, whether satisfactory progress was made.
 - b. To what extent has the programme contributed to the intended outputs, and in what specific areas did the programme excel in contributing most to intended outputs. To assist in assessing the outputs and results of the programme, the evaluation team will ensure the following (though not restricted to these):
- Assess outputs to determine if they have been achieved in line with programme design.
 - Assess overall quality, timeliness, effectiveness and sustainability of management arrangements, technical inputs and assistance.

- Evaluate the degree to which intended beneficiaries participated in programme activities.
- Assess ways in which information was gathered, shared and used within the programme.
 - c. Analyze underlying factors that could have influenced programme impact and outputs.
 - d. State whether or not achievement indicators have been achieved;
 - e. Identify and analyze barriers and constraints that may have delayed implementation, including challenges emanating from the Government of Afghanistan as well as from the international community.
 - f. Analyze the effectiveness of programme management. Bearing in mind the limitations identified in the programme design and possible variances and/or barriers and constraints inherent in the programme 's implementation environment, the evaluation team will:
- Assess outputs of actual programme management, including allocation of time and other resources.
- Assess approaches toward each activity by all direct programme stakeholders.
- Assess the appropriateness, quality and delivery of activities.
- Assess the outputs of sub-contracted technical inputs, including training.
- Assess utilization of financial resources.
- Assess efficiency of communication and information flow among stakeholders.
 - a. Identify a list of 'lessons learned'. To assist future UNDP programmemeing, the evaluation team should list lessons learned (what worked, what did not work, and why?), and recommend concrete action that could have been taken to rectify undesired impact and/or outcomes, and to improve performance.

Review of Phase II

The objective of the review of Phase II of ASGP is to address the following questions/issues:

- a. In the light of the Transition process, the Kabul Conference commitments, and the Sub national Governance Policy, how appropriate are the programme's current Goal, Purpose and Outputs? How might they be re-focused? How effective and efficient are the programme's activities and approach in relation to the ultimate Goal, Purpose, and desired sustainable results of the programme?
- b. What evidence-based progress has the programme made in respect of each of the programme Output? To assist UNDP in this the review team shall assess progress against the ASGP inception report using triangulated evidence. To what extent are activities replicable and upscale-able outside the ASGP programme environment?
- c. What are the existing reporting mechanisms in place in ASGP? The review team shall assess the progress reports as well as financial reports with special focus on issues such as the quality of reports and recommendations for improvement.
- d. How consistent is the programme's management and delivery with the Government Public Administration Reform and capacity development commitments? The review team should especially examine if counterpart capacities have been developed through planned and consistent transfer of skills. It shall also recommend a exit strategy of transition from ASGP funded experts to government Tashkeel.
- e. Which systemic factors are directly impacting on the ASGP, and to what extent

do these systemic factors present risks in achieving the outputs of the programme?

- f. What are the financial controls in the programme and how may these be improved? Does the programme represent value for money, including the appropriateness of expenditure activities? Are expenditures in line with ASGP II Purpose and Outputs?
- g. The review team shall analyze the partnership arrangements between UNDP, ASGP donors and IDLG? Has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
- h. What is the interface between ASGP and other donor funded Sub national Governance (SNG) programmes? Is there a process in operation for the coordination of efforts? Is there an over-lap between ASGP activities and other programmes?
- i. How effective is UNDP's management of the programme? Highlight strengths, weaknesses and provide recommendations.

Existing information sources

Detailed information can be found in programme annual, quarter and monthly reports, CPAP and outcome evaluation and also some external documents on Afghanistan Sub national governance etc. As soon as possible after the selection process the evaluation team will be provided with copies of:

- a. UNDAF
- b. CPAP
- c. ASGP Phase I & II Project Document and ASGP Inception report;
- d. Annual Progress Reports;
- e. All available quarterly progress reports;
- f. Financing Agreements between UNDP, GOA and donors for the purpose of implementing ASGP;
- g. All other reports, presentations, booklets etc. so far produced in the programme.

Methodology

The evaluation and review will be based on a stakeholder approach where all groups and individuals, who affect and/or are affected by the programme activities, deliverables and outputs, are involved in the analysis. Furthermore, the evaluation and review will take into consideration the social, political and economic context, which affects the overall performance of the programme outputs.

At the outset of the assignment the evaluation cum review team will discuss and agree on their approach and work plan with IDLG, the ASGP donors and UNDP. The fieldwork for the evaluation and review should include the following:

- a. Desk review of relevant documentation, official and programme reports, logical framework, financial records etc.
- b. Semi-structured interviews with key respondents including, but not limited to: government counterparts, beneficiaries at provincial, municipal and district levels, other programme providers, donor representatives, PRT personnel and UNDP officials. Detailed notes with English language summaries should be kept for each interview.
- c. Field visits to the following four provinces in different regions of Afghanistan:

Helmand, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar.

The evaluation and review will be carried out in an objective, sensitive and independent manner with varied and balanced consideration of both positive/negative aspects and areas in which significant improvement are required.

Evaluation Products (Deliverables)

All documents, materials, questionnaires, surveys or intermediate reports that might be established for the purpose of the mission should be submitted to UNDP.

All drafts and final reports with applicable annexes and attachments will be submitted in both hard copy and digital formats, and shall be in English. Digital version should be submitted on disk, CD, or via email, and shall be submitted in Microsoft Word format. The expected evaluation outputs include the following:

- a. A draft **evaluation cum review report** written according to UNDP evaluation reporting requirements, with an executive summary, within 5 working days of completion of the field assessment.
- b. A final **evaluation cum review report** to the UNDP, Afghanistan, Kabul 5 working days after receipt of IDLG, ASGP donor and UNDP comments on the draft final report.

The evaluation cum review report will address all the questions/issues specified in section 3 of these Terms of Reference including the following:

- a. Performance of Phase 1.
- b. Evaluation of and recommendations on the Outputs performance of Phase II to-date.
- c. Evaluation of and recommendations on the programme's financial management and reporting.
- d. Evaluation of and recommendations on programme management and leadership.
- e. Evaluation of and recommendations on consultative and oversight arrangements between IDLG, ASGP donors and UNDP.
- f. Recommendations on the future course of action for the programme on whether to maintain its current scope of activities or incorporate relevant modifications in the scope.
- g. Recommendations to donors regarding continuation of support to ASGP and accompanying terms and conditions including timelines.

Evaluation and review team composition and required competencies

A team of four consultants would undertake this evaluation and review: two international consultants and two Afghan nationals. One of the international consultants will act as team leader, be responsible for work planning, liaising with IDLG, ASGP donors and UNDP and be the lead author for the evaluation cum review report.

All team members must have:

- a. Track record in working on governance reform programmes;
- b. Demonstrated expertise in programme evaluation;
- c. Familiarity with basic evaluation standards and principles;
- d. Familiarity with results-based management concepts and the logical framework

- approach;
- e. Ability to work under tight deadlines
- f. Good understanding of UN and donor systems
- g. Fluency in English

Time frame for the evaluation and review process

The evaluation and review will be conducted over a period of 21 working days. The evaluation and review period would consist of 4 days of preparatory desk review, 4 days of interviews and meetings with key stakeholders in Kabul, 8 days of field mission in the provinces and 5 days for debriefing and preparation of draft evaluation cum review report. The first draft of the report will be presented to UNDP, IDLG and donors within 5 working days of completion of the field mission to the provinces. The final report will be submitted within 5 working days of receiving feedback and comments on the draft report.

Implementation Arrangements

This evaluation and review has been jointly commissioned by IDLG, UNDP and ASGP donors (Netherlands, EU, Switzerland, UK, Canada, Italy, Norway). The Netherlands will lead the donors. The evaluation and review will be jointly managed by IDLG, UNDP and the ASGP donors. A steering committee shall be established for this purpose which shall consist of UNDP, the ASGP donor representative(s) and IDLG. In consultation with IDLSG and the ASGP donor representatives (through the steering committee), UNDP will be responsible for:

- a. Providing the evaluation and review team with induction and the relevant documentation.
- b. Supporting the team with logistics, interpreting, workspace and life support services.
- c. Facilitating the consultants' meetings with key respondents.
- d. Overseeing the conduct of the evaluation and review, including having progress meetings with the consultants.
- e. Ensuring the team has progress meetings with the steering committee at the start, mid way and end of review.
- f. Keeping the steering committee informed of any developments during the conduct of the review.
- g. Ensuring that UNDP and the donors consider and agree the recommendations made by the evaluation and review.

The evaluation and review team shall be responsible to UNDP Afghanistan (acting on behalf of the steering committee) for deliverables under the ToR. All members of the team shall be jointly responsible for the completeness of the deliverables prescribed in section 6 of this ToR in accordance with the scope of work. Within the scope of work, each member of the team shall be individually responsible for a part of the assignment. While the team members shall decide on individual responsibilities by mutual consultation under the guidance of the team leader at the start of the assignment, a suggestive division of responsibilities is given below:

Sl.	Position	Responsibilities
-----	----------	------------------

1	Team Leader (international)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall responsibility for the deliverables including planning for the assignment, contents of the reports, coordination with UNDP, internal coordination within the team, division of responsibility within the team and compilation of contributions from individual members. • Evaluation of programme impact and assessment of achievement of programme outcomes and outputs. • Identification of 'lessons learned'. • Review of progress in respect of each of the programme Output against the ASGP baseline report. • Risk analysis. • Analysis of partnership arrangements between UNDP, ASGP donors and IDLG. • Assessment of existing reporting mechanisms.
2	Consultant (international) – programme management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of the effectiveness of programme management including assessment of allocation of time and other resources. • Assessment of programme's management and delivery with the Government Public Administration Reform and capacity development commitments. • Analysis of an exit strategy of transition from ASGP funded experts to government Tashkeel.
3	Consultant (national) – Sub national governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of the appropriateness of programme's current Goal, Purpose and Outputs in the light of the Kabul Conference commitments and the Sub national Governance Policy. • Assessment of the effectiveness of programme's activities in relation to the Goal, Purpose, and Outputs and suggestions for re-focusing, required if any. • Analysis of the interface between ASGP and other donor funded Sub national Governance (SNG) programmes.
4	Consultant (national) - financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment of utilization of financial resources. • Assessment of ASGP funding status. • Assessment of the financial controls in the programme and recommendations for improvements, required if any. • Assessment of the appropriateness of expenditure activities and analysis of the programme for its value for money.

Field Mission: The team shall undertake field mission to the four provinces mentioned in section 5 of this ToR. The team shall split into two groups for field mission. Each group shall visit two provinces over the prescribed field mission days. The group composition and associated mission planning shall be decided in consultation with UNDP, ASGP donors and IDLG.

Evaluation Ethics

The evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation', June 2008 (available at <http://www.uneval.org>).

ANNEX VIII

RECORD OF MEETINGS

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

For reasons of confidentiality and privacy the names and positions of the persons consulted have been removed from the records of meetings. This Annex records the individual record made by each team member and in some cases this is in respect of the same meeting.

Meeting	Date
UNDP and DFID	23 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mr. Zubair Fatahi is the focal point for the Program and will assist the review mission with the travels arrangements. • In any review and evaluation of the program the government counterpart has been the lead. • The review recommendation on the duration of the Program, its so-far progress, impact, and future will be important for DFID to consider. • There were major points of ASGP substance; in Mazar the municipality, in Heratt there has been a consolidated team, Kandahar visit will be a good example for challenges of ASGP, and in Urozgan provincial planning will be found. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP and DFID	23 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close collaboration between UNDP, IDLG, DFID, and the Dutch Embassy. • UNDP agreed to provide all the logistics where possible. • Afghanistan is at a cross road, with a new horizon to a possible sustainable transition beyond the military effort. The situation is very dynamic and this will impact the UNDP programme. • JJ in Afghanistan since Feb 2010. • The documents for ASGP II were written sometime back and will need to evolve to the changing context. • There are issues with poor donor coordination across Afghanistan. • The role of ASGP, from the donor's and GoA perspective, is causing some worries for the development partners. Hence the need for an independent and constructive review. • DFID are looking forward to the review. They hope to see a constructive report including improvements to the process, work plan and team. The review should also examine the progress and its impact on the ToR of ASGP II, including any implications for the future. • CR on 2nd rotation arrived in May 2011. • UNDP recommended visiting the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mezar – to review the municipal component of ASGP, evaluate potential beyond what has been achieved, meet the national team leader and review the achievements (good). ○ Herat – Has a strong consolidated team. ○ Helmand/Kanderhar – by far very difficult to do capacity development in these provinces. hence why capacity is being substituted. ○ Orzughan – very engaged Australian PRT with US support. Governor is seen as good. New Executive Board appointed. ○ Bamyan – Not in the ToR but worth a visit as it is mainly shiaa and the Governor is a female. Relatively safe and secure province. • UNDP recommended covering several regions; ensuring meetings are beyond 30 min and to try to explore the context in depth. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP	23 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There were initially four provinces of ASGP for the evaluation cum review mission to visit; Mazar, Herat, Kandahar, and Helmand. • Some of the potential stakeholders of the projects that the mission would be better to meet were; IDLG leadership, IDLG line departments' directors, the donor community of ASGP, UNAMA. • When in the field; the mission would better meet; the governors or their deputies, mayors, PC chairs and their members if possible, CSC, and the regional or provincial managers of ASGP. • In the morning of Friday the 24th June, the mission was expected to meet the DCD of UNDP-Mr. JJ. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP	24 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manoj OoC back 3rd July 2011 and JJ leaving today back 4th July 2011. • Recommendation to meet both male and female members of the PC (separately if possible); and ToS at the PGO. • Quality of staff in ASGP is the main criticism for the provinces. • Capacity substitution is the main game in town. • UNDP views DDP as unhelpful and similar to governance in a box. • UNDP diametrical decision (to Donors) to use ToS but maintain direct responsibility for delivery. However they wanted to GoAto also take responsibility through the use of LoAs. • Currently they have around 200 ToS staff (all nationals) and not on Tashkeel. • Despite the fact that ToS pose capacity substitution issues, at least they are national staff. Hired and managed by fellow Afghans. • Transition focus (by international) allows UNDP (as dev. org) to talk about long term development. Transition obliges GoAto take over delivery by deadline of 2014. • UNDP are keen to make the development argument to the donors. • Kanderhar Governor lives in a security bubble, not able to travel and not in synch with the region due to the security threat. (He is an Afghan Canadian). • Recommend to meet Masood Kamal (MoF) and his provincial budget person to gain more understanding of how the process of provincial budges works.. • For ASGP I have to rely on Governors' and Manoj's for institutional memory. • IDLG is a young organisation, highly criticised, but efficient compared to other organisations. They do have a working structure. • ASGP I focused on getting IDLG off the ground. Recommend talking to Humam Masconi. ASGP is an essential partner to IDLG. Manoj sees ASGP I to be very centralised and believes Subnational should focus more on and within the subnational regions. Hence the move to ASGP II where decision making should be pushed to the provincial level. • LoAs could then be used at the provincial level to allow governors to do small scale procurement, organise events etc. without the need to refer back to ASGP or IDLG. • Other projects via MoF or other agencies, focus more on trying to make budgets and financial management work at the SN level. • ASGP II should also focus on making governance work at SN level. Otherwise human 	

development gains will not be realised.

- For this to work, there is a critical need for credible local government and governors (especially in remote areas).
- ASGP, as part of a virtual circle, could work with other programmes to complement them.
- The plan is for ASGP II to move to on-budget support. From UN to MoF and then to Project Budget. (Review mission should check this).
- Provincial governors have no authority to sign for budget disbursement. All financial controls are under the mustafyat (MoF regional offices). Mustafyat are supported but this is not sufficient.
- UNDP have proposed a Provincial Development Fund (PDF) to enable PCs and the governors to do small scale projects. This could be used e.g. to establish a Saffron Certification Institute in Afghanistan, to enable in country certification. Which could lead to Afghani Saffron being sold at the full international price (currently being sold for 1/3 of the intl. price).
- Other programmes are also looking at supporting SNG. Including RAMPUP which is focusing on afghan regions and has funding of 600 Mil USD from USG.
- Donors are exerting pressure on UNDP to only focus on one area leaving others (e.g. RAMPUP) to focus on other areas.
- Orzughan is worth a visit to see how one competent staff could achieve results across thematic and programme areas.
- Recruitment is a key issue for ASGP and was previously badly managed. Now UNDP are focusing on bringing better staff into ASGP and better ToS staff into GoA offices.
- ToS are local contract with the governor and so can travel freely across Afghanistan. Unlike UNDP staff that require 2 armoured vehicles and heavy security from GoIRA.
- UNDP are looking for an implementation model that could be supported by a recruitment process which will offer a balance between results (i.e. service delivery to improve people's lives) versus national ownership, accountability for the funds and security for UN staff.
- Currently there is an increased focus from the UNDP side on sustainable exit. This includes an implicit drive to people to become (transition) to Tashkeel.
- This will pose a challenge as Tashkeel salaries range from 100-600 USD per month.
- There is a need to move staff to national and local government contracts via a controlled process with national ownership.
- ASGP II has three component thinking:
 - IDLG – including policy setting and regulations
 - Municipalities
 - PGOs, DGOs and PCs
- Signing of LoAs with Provincial Offices took from Feb 2010 to June 2011. These LoAs enable ~10k USD procurement, staffing etc.
- LoAs are annual and require re-negotiation every year. (time and resource consuming). (note: no sunset clause).
- 1 LoA for the Centre and 34 for each province.
- UNDP also signed LoA with IDLG. This provides for 100 ToS staff (70% professionals and 30% support staff), contracted and reporting to IDLG. This is great for national ownership and security issues, but not great for accountability. However as part of the exit strategy 70% should be moved to tashkeel by end of 2014.
- There is a concern over the quality of ToS staff being hired.
- IDLG working on SN Strategy. Though the further the SN strategy is moving forward the further it is drifting from the constitution and from the centralised structure.
- Donors and GoA are not assessing the Pol-Mil vs Development strategy and looking at scale and scope for transition (note: For exit strategy: should donor staff transition to UNDP as part of moving from Bilateral to multilateral support?).
- UNDP are reviewing if they should be working in high risk/low security environment. Especially in light of recent elections problems.
- UNDP also asking how sure could they be of other programmes delivering, e.g. RAMPUP.

--

Meeting	Date
IDLG	26 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been some main outcomes of ASGP so far; improvement central – local governments relations improvement, policy framework development for IDLG, design of a strategic framework for sub-national governance. • By the support of ASGP the PAR implementation strategy at the sub-national level has been finalized. • There has been training and capacity building programs for the civil servants conducted through CSC in support with ASGP at the sub-national level. • The capacity of the sub-national representative bodies (the PCs) have been enhanced through training programs of ASGP. • There were no comments on the ASGP before 2007 where it was supporting Mol as its sub-national partner. • There has been a capacity building strategy for civil servants developed by IDLG with the assistance of ASGP. • All offices in the center and the provinces except the municipalities have gone through PAR process in line with CSC with the support of ASGP. • Support to public participation in municipal governance as stated in the project document, did not yet take place. • Support to the capacity enhancement of the PCs has been carried out through ASGP • IDLG could not know how the local service delivery has improved in result of ASGP contribution. • There has been task orders formality in place supported by the ASGP. They worked relatively well. However, it has had created some capacity in IDLG to take the reform process forward. • Through the support of ASGP in March 2010 the SNG policy has been published in Dari, Pashto, and English. Under this 4 new relative laws have been drafted. • IDLG expects that UNDP can carry on with ASGP. However it was recommended that the project and its personnel should not keep the capacity in their own, but to shift or transfer it to the government counterpart(s) in Afghanistan. • IDLG has not been supporting the beauricratic procedures of UNDP in terms of program delivery and support. There should be a transition plan for ASGP into IDLG. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP	25 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IDLG directors incl.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Policy ○ PCs ○ HR and Finance ○ Municipality ○ Capacity Development ○ Afghan Stabilisation nprogramme (Eng. Farhad – Not director but key person and in charge of LoA). • ASGP I had 2 types of LoA: 	

- UNDP and CSC
- UNDP and IDLG
- From LoAs flow Task Orders, budgets, equipment, procurement process etc.
- ASGP II did not include Task Orders. Staff transferred to LoAs. ToS terminology changed over time and subsequently dropped.
- ASGP I delegated work at the provincial level via LoA with IDLG. ASGP II, under donor pressure, move to direct LoAs with provincial governorates.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	26 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PM joined the project in January 2011. • There were different work plans developed for the project, and by the beginning May 2011 the last work plan for ASGP has come out. It was signed in June 2011. One of the reasons that the work plan delayed was the request of IDLG for extra fund in the project. • In late January and early February 2011 the project expenditure has been slowed down by UNDP on the programmatic activities. • There have been frequent delays and weaker support of UNDP to ASGP, especially in HR support. 	

Meeting	Date
IDLG	26 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MoI -> IDLG in 2007. • SN Policy – expected outcome is from ASGP I, created good capacity to formulate and lead the process of SN Policy – ASGP’s biggest outcome is the creation of SN Policy. • PAR – IDLG with the help of ASGP developed capacity building strategy which later developed into a programme and was then used to reform the structure in IDLG and provincial offices (not in municipalities). • GoA not able to sustain salaries at the municipalities. • Participation – couldn’t be assured but ASGP worked to increase capacity of PCs via outreach programmes with nationals and internationals. • ASGP was designed to be comprehensive however when IDLG was created it started to monopolise the focus of ASGP (subsequently dropping support to CSC). • RIMUs never took off after IDLG’s creation due to Task Orders being created to fulfil the role. • Task Orders (nationals) helped create strategy. Bureaucracy is the main issue with ToS –both in the delay in processing contracts and the delay of procurement requests. • SN Policy approved March 2010, published in 3 languages (English, Dari, Pashto). • 4 new laws drafted: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Local government ○ Provincial ○ Municipality ○ District • UNDP believes it is viewed by implementing partners as a poor transferor of capacity to nationals. The solution could be to move from implementing partners to GoAs part of the 	

exit strategy.

- The attack on UNAMA impacted ASGP by taking away much of the capacity that has been developed over the programme. ASGP I and II (over the last year) suffered significantly from this.
- It is important to simplify the bureaucratic procedures of UNDP to allow ASGP to respond to needs.
- ASGP should have had a plan for transition to GoA over 2 years ago.
- ASGP II created:
 - SNG Policy Framework
 - 4 new laws
 - SN Finance Framework
- IDLG feels ASGP II's plan to hire expat advisors to work in governor offices – to build capacity – is a great idea. But a mechanism is required to merge into government structure (Exit strategy).
- PC platform – created in council PR officers to help in outreach and awareness campaigns, knowledge sharing, and capacity building of PC members. Not a large budget is dedicated to this but sufficient for the time being.
- Municipalities – Mezar and Herat Municipalities are important. With the help of ASGP managed to triple revenue.
- RAMP-UP programme does not have to overlap with ASGP as they can focus on smaller out of provincial capital municipalities.
- ASGP management is improving but there is still room to continue to do so.
- ASGP II designed to be decentralised, therefore better to have a smaller office in Kabul with separate LoAs for each province. This brings up the issue of finding enough capable people to lead in each province. But if other programmes can do this then why can't ASGP?

Meeting	Date
DFID	26 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For DFID there has been lack of enough information on the expenditure and utilization of resources in ASGP so far. • DFID has suspended its funding to ASGP, but subject to the recommendation expected to come out of the Review Report, DFID was expecting to spend on its committed fund to it. • As per DFID experience UNDP has not listened enough to the concerns of the donors on ASGP. • There has been formal and regular communication and feedback over ASGP's developments through DFID to UNDP. • DFID has experienced information gaps and questions over the validity of the information provided through ASGP reports, and the reports were not responding against the Log-Frame of ASGP. • DFID has been little informed of any project document revisions, or redirection of ASGP. • DFID expects the Review Team Recommendations on how to go forward with the support to the municipalities component of ASGP, when there were other initiatives such as RAMP-UP active. • According to IDLG, RAMP-UP was expected to take the support to provincial municipalities and ASGP could go with the district municipalities support. • DFID does not yet know enough about the LoA process carried in the project, and accordingly they were not properly utilized in the PGOs. 	

- In case DFID becomes sure of that UNDP could not be able to execute satisfactory the project, they make consider other possible alternatives to support sub-national governance.
- From the DFID side the goals and objectives of the Sub-national Governance Policy has been apparently considered in the project document of ASGP.
- DFID expects of the project development after the review to consider the risk management component taken care of.
- As per the observation of DFID cost effectiveness has been a consideration in ASGP, salary level and expenditure on equipment and supplies are high in the project.
- DFID expects the review mission to consider more the areas of over lap between ASGP and other sub-national governance support activities funded by other donors being implemented.
- According to DFID, development and preparation of the Sub-national Governance Policy has been a good achievement of ASGP.

Meeting	Date
IDLG Line Departments	27 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prior to October 2007 there were not enough information on ASGP and its progress available with them. • With the support of ASGP, IDLG has developed a 5 years strategic work plan for it, the sub-national governance policy has been developed, the institution development function, sub-national governance support, support to the local councils, and support to the municipalities, coordination and facilitation functions of IDLG have improved. • IDLG with the assistance of ASGP has been working on the implementation framework of SNGP, IDLG could improve its management system, and start the development process of its computerized pay role and employees attendance. • In line and with the support of ASGP, IDLG has been restructuring, its data base system including the one for HR has been developed and improved. • With the assistance of ASGP, IDLG has been able to conduct a needs assessment all over the country for capacity building and training of the civil servants. • ASGP has developed a number of manuals and guidelines for IDLG now being operationalized all over the country. There has been a strong coordination between ASGP and IDLG. • With the support of ASGP, the formulation SNG priority programs have started to be developed. • Phase one ASGP has been more in the shape of direct execution while in ASGP-II there is more of an execution role for IDLG as national execution partner. • Structure of the government in the provinces improved in result of ASGP contribution, still there were more to be done in districts in this regard. • The challenge of ASGP according to IDLG is its slow transfer and shifting process of responsibilities more to IDLG. Between 2011 and 2014 transition will be possible from ASGP to IDLG. 	

Meeting	Date
IDLG	27 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	

- IDLG created in October 2007 by breaking off MoI Finance and Admin departments and Boundary departments to form IDLG.
- ASGP supported restructuring of IDLG, created 5 year strategic workplan, clear SN policy function for the Policy directorate, Institution Development Function (incl. infrastructure, admin etc.), Local governance: starting with provincial and moving down to local councils, Coordination and facilitation – by supporting affairs of the governor’s office and the municipalities.
- The policy department is doing a great job with the support of ASGP.
- Supporting municipalities and institutional development requires a programmatic approach, which started in ASGP I and should continue in ASGP II.
- ASGP initially provided support to local councils with a focus on ANDS. However this soon ran into problems as they didn’t have a clear view of how local governments should function and how to create programmes to help local entities interact with each other. But did manage to support by creating local accountability.
- ASGP I had issues of ownership and leadership. In consultation with GoAASGP I ended the direct execution by UNDP. The end of ASGP I helped shape ASGP II.
- ASGP I provided support to Provincial and Municipal level. Not clear if any support was provided to the District levels.
- RAMP-UP has 3 components: capacity building, service delivery, and enhancing municipal revenue. The programme will cover 33 district municipalities and 15 provincial municipalities, mainly in the west of Afg. RAMP-UP is strong on service delivery, but ASGP provided stronger capacity building.
- Over the last year IDLG and ASGP had coordination issues.
- Municipal plan to replace the Taliban municipal law is at final stages – this is a big step and a product of ASGP.
- ASGP provided professional contributions including help increase revenues for municipalities and capacity building. Now a Development Fund is required to help ASGP go beyond participatory discussions.
- IDLG asked ASGP to place qualified engineers at the provincial level to support the Development Fund in year 2 and 3. These would then be transferred to the Tashkeel as part of the exit strategy.
- A key issue for ASGP is finding staff for difficult provinces, e.g. Helmand and Kanderhar. ASGP I failed to achieve this even with top-up salaries, however ASGP II has started to do this now.
- ASGP helped develop good databases including HR, Correspondence, visitor and meetings, Tax, and business registration database.
- IDLG asked RAMP-UP not to develop manuals again as ASGP is in the process of finalising them.
- RAMP-UP seems confused and has poor international advisors. IDLG are pushing back on RAMP-UP plans to cut and paste packages from other countries.
- IDLG wants ASGP to push down to local municipalities but should continue to support the municipalities within the provincial capital.
- General Directorate for Municipal Affairs (GDMA) supporting all municipalities (except Kabul). Focusing on rebalancing between Northern provinces and Southern provinces.
- ASGP in developing other programmes e.g. RAMP-UP etc. IDLG did not have the capacity, so ASGP provided the support to create these programmes.
- One issue is the balance of intervention. Provincial strategic plans developed in Herat, Mazar and Helmand, were later pushed to other provinces. The issue is that intervention and support whilst equally shared did not take into account the differences between the provinces. Hence some provinces were able to benefit more for interventions, e.g. where every province was allocated 5 development advisors, Helmand received 8 which later on increased to more than 10 advisors. Or in some cases provinces were able to better utilise the capacity of advisors.
- “Without having this programme [ASGP] in the centre as well as the provinces, operation

would not go well”.

- “IDLG is now managing all municipalities with the exception of Kabul”.
- IDLG believes that establishing a model at the district levels would require significant time to change the mentality of people to help them adapt to live in a city.
- “IDLG likely to have ASGP”.
- ASGP I focused on building IDLG in 2009 and helped it to expand and move out to provincial level.
- ASGP I terminated 1 year earlier than planned in 2010, and transitioned to ASGP II with a focus on the provincial level.
- Transition – IDLG wants to focus on delegation to provinces and bringing them more resources with accountability. Since 2011 lots of resources were made available but without the capacity to absorb and utilize them efficiently, this will only lead to corruption and waste.
- The Kabul conference requires more resources to be made available via the budget it’s. ASGP could move to national execution but requires further capacity building. It has been agreed that by the end of 2014 the exit strategy would be the transition to national execution.
- ASGP II could have a national project manager however this should be based on qualifications and skills.
- At IDLG ASGP helped with HRMIS, Computerised Attendance System, and Computerised Payroll System. These are now rolling out to the provinces.
- 24 provinces conducted TNA’s and now looking at Needs Assessments for Municipalities and Districts.
- A change of management is required at ASGP to bring ownership, and improve the programme, as well as the need to improve capacity within the team. The frequent change of leadership is a problem.
- The attack on the UN guest house, triggered a physical gap between ASGP I and II, due to experts being forced to evacuate. Experts lost from IDLG are not willing to come back not even via UNDP.
- Policy dept waiting a year to get staff. Current there is a need for Strategic Level advisors to support transition over the next 3 years.
- 2010 was a critical year due to the Kabul conference.
- 2007 strategic intervention with ASGP into IDLG, 2008 Task Order No.21 refocused from Centre to the Provinces, 2009 operationalization of intervention. In 2010 LoA could only be signed at the centre (between IDLG and ASGP).
- In late 2010, the process of signing LoAs for each province started was accelerated thanks to Basil.
- “Achieved new successes this year with this new ASGP Management”. Better and more regular communications, sharing of info, lots of inputs. “we have the feeling we are one team with one goal”.
- IDLG holds board meetings with donors and UNDP to review progress and challenges, and plot a way forward. This process is further enriched by the new ASGP management team.
- IDLG/ASGP are also learning from other projects. E.g. they will only accept advisors if they have counterparts to work with – a practice used on the CTAP programme.
- Issue with the way UNDP runs programmes: NABDP is via MRRD and ASGP is via IDLG. IDLG feels these programmes are similar and have some overlap. UNDP should cluster programmes to engage via single entity (e.g. at district level).
- ASGP hiring of staff should be more careful not to take staff into ASGP from local councils.
- IDLG initially presented a budget to UNDP of 11mil USD. But UNDP could only provide 2.9mil USD. So forcing IDLG to make internal cuts.
- ASGP should assess if their support (TA or other) is well balanced between the beneficiaries – PCs and PGOs.
- Training from ASGP I and II has built capacity with IDLG and created a Capacity Building and Training Directorate within IDLG. Now IDLG provides specialist training to CS and their staff in the provinces. CSC is left to provide the 5 common functions training across the

country. CSC and IDLG try not overlap.

- IDLG recommends cutting international staff from regional offices to spend the funds on hire more national staff in provincial and district levels.
- Reporting from IDLG changed from monthly in ASGP I to quarterly in ASGP II.
- Reporting and M&E should be institutionalised within IDLG and ASGP. A system should be put in place to focus on priorities.
 - Provincial
 - Municipality
 - District
- UNDP believes it is viewed by implementing partners as a poor transferor of capacity to nationals. The solution could be to move from implementing partners to GoAs part of the exit strategy.
- The attack on UNAMA impacted ASGP by taking away much of the capacity that has been developed over the programme. ASGP I and II (over the last year) suffered significantly from this.
- It is important to simplify the bureaucratic procedures of UNDP to allow ASGP to respond to needs.
- ASGP should have had a plan for transition to GoA over 2 years ago.
- ASGP II created:
 - SNG Policy Framework
 - 4 new laws
 - SN Finance Framework
- IDLG feels ASGP II's plan to hire expat advisors to work in governor offices – to build capacity – is a great idea. But a mechanism is required to merge into government structure (Exit strategy).
- PC platform – created in council PR officers to help in outreach and awareness campaigns, knowledge sharing, and capacity building of PC members. Not a large budget is dedicated to this but sufficient for the time being.
- Municipalities – Mezar and Herat Municipalities are important. With the help of ASGP managed to triple revenue.
- RAMP-UP programme does not have to overlap with ASGP as they can focus on smaller out of provincial capital municipalities.
- ASGP management is improving but there is still room to continue to do so.
- ASGP II designed to be decentralised, therefore better to have a smaller office in Kabul with separate LoAs for each province. This brings up the issue of finding enough capable people to lead in each province. But if other programmes can do this then why can't ASGP?

Meeting	Date
Regional Manager	27 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sara started with ASGP in October 2010. • Based on LoA, ASGP developed Annual and Quarterly WP with IDLG. Once items approved, accounts are opened and funds transferred. Funds could be drawn by ToS (in provinces where corruption is low). For this to happen 2 signatories are required. If ToS can sign then the governor may appoint 2 non-Tashkeel staff to accept the funds. • The same account is used to pay salaries for ToS and procurement. It is not yet clear if the limit of ~10K USD is per invoice or per item? • One of the biggest problems within ASGP is recruitments and the constant contract extensions. • Procurement and salary payments currently follows UNDP rules and procedures and not that 	

of GoIRA. This is leading to delays, and governors asking when they will get their computers, when will their staff be paid etc.

- ASGP II had a shaky start due to capacity and lack of experience of the PM at the time, as well as the fact he had to cover the role of Chief Technical Advisor. He wasn't able to manage the relationship with IDLG and agreed to their request. This caused lasting damage to the programme.
- Regional cover is questionable with Jalalabad (the second largest city and region) left with no regional manager and covered on and off by another region.
- Confusion in the last 6 months as the WP was changed from the regional plan in the IR to an annual plan without full consultation with the governors or the regional teams.
- Under pressure from the donors, UNDP have decided to push for Provincial Strategic plans. IDLG agreed to take over this work. However they plan to fly in into a province, get the date, go back to Kabul and finalise the plan. Then send it to the governor.
- The feeling is that donors did not have any issues with Joanne Adams (former PM for the ASGP in 2009). But she lost her position when she had to re-apply for it due to UN recruitment rules.
- ToS reported to IDLG upto end of 2010. From 2011 they also report to UNDP.
- ASGP has provided hi speed internet to PGOs.
- Municipality component of ASGP is seen as separate sub-project from the other parts of the programme. With Naseer Hamidi heading it up.
- Support to the CSC (component 3) was removed from the WP after donor request.
- MRRD and IDLG do not see eye to eye.
- PCs should be doing oversight on projects in their province and on PGO activity.
- Not clear if PCs report to IDLG or will report to IDLG as part of the SN policy.

Meeting	Date
Region Manager	27 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In ASGP central region office covers Panjshir, Parwan, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, and Kabul Provinces. • Based on the LoAs quarterly and annual work plans have been developed. The signatories of LoAs are to be ASGP, IDLG, and the Governors. • Some times UNDP management does not quickly respond to the needs of ASGP in the regions. There has been relatively slow procurement, and HR services provided by UNDP to the provinces. • One of the challenges of ASGP in the past has been felt to be its own weaker management. • The program can better deliver by more focused direction and leadership to ASGP, more communication and coordination meetings among the regional managers, and delegation of the authorities. • There were two separate training assessments being exercised by IDLG, and ASGP in the province. • In accordance to the SNGP the PCs have to report to IDLG. 	

Meeting	Date
Donor Netherlands and EU	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In ASGP-I the project personnel could not get to the provinces and the project 	

manager(s) have been considered to be weak.

- As per the Dutch observation most of the donors had found it difficult to see the results of ASGP. Because of other sub-national governance support initiatives they were not able to distinguish between the outputs resulted of ASGP and the one of other actors.
- Canada and Norway have poled out of the support to ASGP, the Dutch were not in ASGP-II, and DFID was considering its further support subject to the findings and recommendations of the review mission. They were worried of further investment to ASGP.
- In December 2010 the Dutch request a review of the project resulted their meeting with JJ, the DD of UNDP.
- The Swiss and UNAMA were positive about ASGP.
- By December 31, 2010 the Dutch were informed that their funds were spent all in ASGP.
- IDLG has been using ASGP as a cash cow and has been filling their gaps through it. IDLG has been monopolized ASGP.
- The achievements expected in the project documents of ASGP were not reflected in its progress reports.
- The weak performance of ASGP-I to some extent is associated to its under-staff situation which goes to weak project management and accordingly to UNDP who is more involved in recruitment process than the extent that it should be.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basil arrived on the project in January 2011. • Confirmed a new WP released 11 days ago, signed by ASGP, UNDP-CO and IDLG. • Efforts in 2010 to create an annual work plan required several revisions. UNDP-CO decided in May that the plan no longer needed to be regional and so a combined national plan was created. • The new WP has also been entered into ATLAS (financial tracking system). • IDLG requested 10-14 mil USD. It took a long time to negotiate them down to 3 mil USD. • Project concept changed significantly even from the IP. • During the last 6 months of 2010 the regional managers had no WP to follow. • On arrival, CTA didn't have a team to deliver any WP and was told to commence recruitment asap. • Soon afterwards ASGP II told to stop all activity by donors. CTA had to redraft the WP to maintain some work progress. • Last 6 months very challenging with numerous false starts, replanning and rethinking, significant interest from UNDP-CO (micromanagement), no team to implement the work. • Donors – UK, Dutch and Swiss – most critical. DFID have particularly fed back on the reporting, stating that reports are not clear and that activities as being confused with results. To resolve this ASGP hire Robin as reporting officer to support a new reporting format. • CTA currently redrafting ToRs to advertise for new staff and head hunting. Key to recruit Logistics manager and Knowledge manager. Security and resource issues at UNDP may hinder the process. • The Kabul Conference layed out a timetable for transition and how future donor support should be channelled via MoF to the line ministries. • Provincial Development Fund – approx. 15 mil USD – from UNDP to provinces to use for projects. 	

- Current areas of engagement:
 - IDLG supported by ASGP Policy Advisor
 - PGO/DGO level main focus of ASGP (with IDLG) – this section of the work is still catching up.
 - Municipal Level – delivering support on revenue collection. Note: significant donor funding went direct to municipalities. Strongest part of ASGP with capacity ahead of other parts of the programme. RAMPUP are also focusing on this area.
 - PCs – Oversight function – many lost track of goal and got into “bricks and mortar inspection”. This led to questions of corruption in receiving payoffs to stop hassling contractors.
- PGO and PCO should have outreach programmes via the media to increase public awareness. Agreed 1 ToS to support PC chairperson on public awareness; facilitate regional, local and national conferences; and knowledge sharing forums.
- ASGP should move away from training.
- ASGP working with PGOs to come up with PDPs for each province and not just a project wish list.
- PDPs – IDLG teams will be drafting after a short visit to each province – are not ready or not doable. President ordered plans to remain secret and not released until he approves them.
- ASGP wants Governor Development Plans.
- NIBP could help ASGP to push forward with MoEc and line ministries – communicating one message.
- RAMPUP being implemented by Chemonics and DAI.

Meeting	Date
UNDP	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Inception Report has not been identified as the principal ASGP program document. The UK-DFID after six months of the start of ASGP-II requested for the Inception Report, and one of the reasons for this request has been lack of baseline for ASGP-II project document. • Achievements in ASGP-II have been relatively related to the progress made in ASGP-I. • Since January 2011, activities of ASGP-II have been slowed down in result of some donors' suspension in funding. • The last quarterly report of ASGP-I has been mixed with the first quarterly report of ASGP-II. • Golden Questions have been derived of the project documents to prioritize the objectives. • Program section of UNDP has had bi-weekly monitoring visits of the regions and has been quality checking the progress of ASGP. • The project manager reports verbally or presents a narrative report to senior management of UNDP. Quarterly reports produced have also been sent to the donors. • The management of ASGP-I has been identified inefficient in performance related to the project. 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP	28 June, 2011

Key Issues Discussed:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prince 2 qualified, recruited to help with reporting. • Q1-2011 report drafted based on IP WP, now with PSU awaiting release. • WP reporting is mainly focusing on IDLG and Municipality work. Otherwise teams reporting monthly against the five strategic priorities (AKA the Golden Questions). • Deadlines for reporting are set by PSU. Deadlines for reporting mainly achievable unless weekly, monthly and quarterly fall in the same week. • Quarterly reports cant be finalised within the 2 week deadline. Usually achievable within 4 weeks. • Final report is usually given 3 months to close out commitments. • Quality of reports from the field is very variable, linguistic issues etc. Pushing to ensure reports include information on gender, M&E, approvals by donors, etc. • UNDP corporate projects require Prince 2 methodology to be used. • Risks matrix now in Final ASGP I report (why?), Quarterly reports and in ASGP II IP. • ASGP II is using Results Based Management with examples, best practice and idea for knowledge sharing. • Reporting: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ weekly – inform NY on products/results completed within a week. ○ monthly – track the workplan and track the strategic priorities. ○ quarterly – aimed at donors and based on Prince 2 requirements. ○ annual – again aimed at donors.

Meeting	Date
UNDP	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP do not see IR as binding document only the signed project document or WP. But UNDP didn't update the project document with the IR plan. • DFID requested IR with baseline 6 months after ASGP II started. • UNDP focus on delivery rate (rate of spend) as an indicator for progress. Not results or outcomes. • Donors told ASGP to slow down on spending. So ASGP now believes that lack of progress is the fault of the donors. • Qtr reports in 2010 combined ASGP I and II activities. • UNDP uses delivery rate (i.e. rate of spend) as the indicator for successful achievement of outcomes. This is confusing the managing to results with burn rate. • Golden Questions are sent by Zubair to ASGP via the reporting officer, used as a quality check based on the project documents and WP. In addition to increase quality assurance both Zubair and Khalid carryout 2 field visits every month to meet ASGP staff and Government counterparts. They usually go direct not via the ASGP central team. • The project manager provide a monthly verbal report (second Monday of every month) to UNDP Snr management team. This cover previous month's activities. • Ram Bukhary – P5 level, very weak PM, resigned in Dec 2010 before his 1 year FT contract term. • Plan is to have 1 international for each region and the rest nationals under LoA with process support centrally provided. 	

Meeting	Date
----------------	-------------

Donors Dutch and EU	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASGP suffered from poor project management. • Not possible to see clear cause of results between ASGP or other donor programmes. • Norway pulled out, DFID pulled out (withholding further funding), Canada pulled out, Dutch not funding on ASGP II until outcome of review. • ASGP is the best tool for SN Policy. • IDLG (with ASGP support) stage manage the Qtr Board Meetings. • IDLG monopolising ASGP. • IDLG saw ASGP as a cash cow. When ASGP is challenged by donors, it was IDLG that defended them. • Switch over from ASGP I to II was not clear or transparent. • UNDP reported spending in non accessible provinces, this raises questions of correct reporting. • Dutch looking at committing 4mil USD subject to other donors contributing and continuation of ASGP II. • In ASGP I the focus on IDLG was the right thing to have, But they remain unable to stand on their own feet. Asia Foundation was hired in provinces to help train IDLG staff in the field and to ensure no fund flow back to IDLG. • Concern over supply of capable nationals due to other donor (e.g. RAMPUP) and UN programmes. 	

Meeting	Date
UNAMA	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNAMA as a political mission mandated by the security council of the UN has had offices in 8 regions in Afghanistan to support the stabilization process, and the national institutions to practice good governance at the national and sub-national level. In each region it has one international and one up to two national staffs. • In governance section UNAMA was working with IDLG, the CSC, the High Office for Oversight Anti-corruption. It has been politically supporting the governances support initiatives with coordination among the national and international partners. • UNAMA has also been working closely with civil society and the provincial councils. • AS per UNAMA in most cases the PCs were side lined by the governors in the provinces. • Staffing will be a difficult challenge for ASGP in an open and competitive market. • ASGP's support to strengthening IDLG has been considerable. • ASGP supported the establishment and functioning of CSC training centers in the provinces • ASGP has been out of PAR which has been later taken over by IDLG. • As per UNAMA the activities carried out by ASGP were in line with the sub-national governance policy and the Kabul Conference directives. However, since the SNGP has been drafted very ambitious its implementation would be challenging. • ASGP supported the district operation manual being used by IDLG. • ASGP has gone through various changes in its management through the course of its implementation and it has affected negatively the project outputs. • The donors were consulted by UNDP when it has been designed or revised. • There is coordination to some degree in between different actors in sub-national governance support initiatives in the provinces, and it differs from province to 	

province. There has been a forum on sub-national governance initiatives support where ASGP and other actors coordinate at the national and sub-national level.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the municipal pillar there is no regional structure directly working with municipalities. They are using ToS and providing technical support and management from Kabul. • ASGP I component base management with Kabul centric approach, working directly with the municipalities, districts and provinces. Focusing on PGOs/DGOs, PCs etc. • ASGP II provincial approach using regional structures and changed to more implementation/responsibility by the regional offices. Refocusing on pillars: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ IDLG – supporting policy and institutional capacity building ○ Municipalities ○ Provinces – supporting PGOs/DGOs and PCs • LoA Municipal support is done via ToS national staff embedded within the municipality. No international staff. • ASGP II current modality started only 3 months back. Developed a plan with each municipality under LoA to produce ASGP objectives and results. • Plans now feed in from SN unlike in ASGP I when plans were developed in Kabul and fed down to SN levels (to municipality, province etc.). • Resources being transferred to municipality including bank accounts. • PAR – not being implemented in municipalities. Only in some line ministries, regional directorates and in PGOs/DGOs. • Law for municipalities does not set out details on structure, budget, positions etc. Hence each municipality has its own individual structure with staff number from 2 (manager and 1 admin staff) to 600 (Herat is the biggest). • ASGP I developed 3 models for structure with CSC and IDLG. This is continuing in ASGP II and OAA approved these, and agreed to pay top up salaries for 1 year. • ASGP helped define minimum standards for 12 municipalities. • Municipalities get no transfers or share of national income, so they generate revenue from charges, fees and taxes. • There are different categories of municipalities within the different grades of provinces and districts. • ASGP focusing on developing capacity of municipalities by drafting manuals and providing training on revenue collection. So far 50 have been provided by training. 30 have a 5 year plan for revenue projections in the provincial action plan. Target is to reach 50 by year end and all 153 by end of the project. • Resourcing constraints may impact this goal, but they have requested additional staff from UNDP and are working on strategic partnership with UN Habitat to share knowledge. • Municipalities have no legal requirement to provide services. Line ministries are required to provide water, health, electricity etc. Municipalities have a defined service plan to: asphalt roads, dig tunnels, collect and process waste, maintain parks and markets etc. • ASGP-Municipality currently not connecting to MRRD directly only via DDPs. Main connection to IDLG. • Training faculty established in each regional/provincial municipality (note not the same as CSC training centres). Costs and resources provided by ASGP. Training carried out by local universities to local staff (of district, province). • ASGP I developed Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP) later to become RAMPUP. 	

- ASGP I products:
 - Office operating manuals produced for PGOs and DGOs
 - Provincial Strategic Planning guide (PSP)
 - Provincial Profiles/books
 - Improved filing system in PGOs
 - Some training with CSCs
 - Procurement of computers, tools etc.
 - Governor forums
 - PC Conference in Kabul and PC training (on their role)
 - District governors conference (364 governors attending)
 - International exposure visits
 - Good deal of resources went into CSC-PAD.
- ASGP funded 7 CSC regional training centres and 200 of the 400 ASGP staff at the time, supported the CSC.
- Naseer reports to both Basil and JJ. Incl. Written reporting.

Meeting	Date
UNAMA	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNAMA mission mandated by SC to lead the international coordination effort in Afg in support of the national institutions. • Currently they have 8 regional offices (7+Kabul) plus offices in 11 provincial cities, to help in stabilisation and promote good governance in provinces via the provincial offices. • Provincial offices have 1 international and 2 national staff. 60-70% of international positions are currently staffed with 90% of national positions staffed. • The UN is changing its recruitment system to move to long term contracts. • Hassan has been in Afg for 8 years. Good continuations, working in support of partners in IDLG, CSC, HOO. Providing coordination and political support. E.g. ensuring Afg priorities are focused on within PAR and reform is implemented and coordinated well. • With PC capacity building UNAMA are only making sure workshops etc are being carried out by others, e.g. NDI. Otherwise they would look at providing them via own staff. • Recognise staffing is a problem for ASGP due to competition over the labour resources in the market. • Strength of ASGP I was to recognise and fill the gap to supporting IDLG when it was created. • UNAMA engages with/via US Emb to find out more about DDP implementation being carried out by ISAF/PRTs. • ASGP I also played a part in logistics, training and the setup for the CSC regional training centres. CSC is poor in supporting and prioritising focus on the training centres. • Donors felt ASGP support was spread too wide (all over Afg), and so PAR support was later dropped by ASGP. • IDLG is part of the palace, they see the president daily and so have a great influence. • Decree establishing IDLG says it should be a lead and coordination unit not an implementer. Hence there is a struggle between IDLG and MRRD. MoEc not in the picture at all. • Governance has to be taken within a political context, processes take time to establish and District Operational Manuals should have been developed in ASGP I (not training). Hence UNAMA feels UNDP-ASGP need time to reform [Confusion on who should be reformed? UNDP or Afg?] • UNAMA rarely attend the ASGP Board meetings despite the fact they are part of the group, they should be doing coordination, and they are the champions of governance. • UNAMA main coordination is in the provinces between donors and ASGP [Not clear how 	

UNAMA coordinates in the provinces when they or ASGP have no rep there due to security issues?]

Meeting	Date
ASGP	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In ASGP-I there have been 8 to 9 program staffs working on support to the PCs. • ASGP-I has been focusing on PAR, Pay and Grading Reform of ministries at their sub-national directorates. • Under Task Orders there were 195 employees scanned to the government engaged in PAR process all over the country. They were doing M& E of PAR, and the Pay and Grading process establishment. • There were 23 CSC training centers established through ASGP-I to train the government employees in the provinces for 4 years. Each one of them trained 120 civil servants, each for 6 months, out of which 25 to 30 % were women trainees. • Through ASGP-I a number of training manuals were developed for the 23 training centers in the provinces. • Funding through ASGP-I to the provincial training centers stopped in October 2010 by the direction of the country director of UNDP, and PAR component has been shifted to NIBP. However the training centers stopped operation in the provinces. • More focus of the ASGP to the PGOs, the DGOs and the PCs started since September 2010. • 60% of the total ASGP-I budget went to CSC, and the rest to IDLG support. • There were PGOs and DGOs manuals prepared through the support of ASGP-I. • Around 60% of the PC members have received training supported by ASGP-I. The PC members were exposed to other countries for their capacity enhancement purpose. • ASGP-I has offered ICT and other office equipments to the PCs. • On March 2009 the new coming PCs members have also received training through ASGP. • The PCs law has been amended by the support and assistance of ASGP. • A relatively stronger team and a coordinator has been required to support the PCs pillar of ASGP. • IDLG has been providing salaries to the PCs members through the MoF operation budget. • There was no LoA staff in ASGP-II to support PCs component of the program. • .There has been a PCs platform established in 2008 with the support of ASGP. • ASGP-II relatively has got more funds for training and capacity enhancement of the PCs. • The only PCs support specialist in ASGP-II management office has been providing training and capacity enhancement programs through the program to the PC. 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP:	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In present structure ASGP do not have staff to assist in municipalities support in the 	

provinces. However, the pillar was supporting the municipalities through the LoA employees in the provinces.

- At the beginning ASGP-I has had a Kabul-centric and component wise approach to support the sub-national governance municipalities development in the provinces, later it turned to support directly the regions through the regional managers, at this stage – start of ASGP- II decentralization started and ASGP has been working from the center directly with the LoA employees in the provinces based on a plan to reach the project objectives. The municipalities support section has 4 staffs in Kabul.
- ASGP-I has been working on supporting to the PGOs, DGOs, Municipalities, Policy Development, PCs, and Capacity Development.
- In ASGP- II the program implementation has been carried on according to the allocated budget and the annual work plan. However, ASGP for its implementation has four pillars:
 1. Municipalities Support Pillar, 2. IDLG Support Pillar, 3. PGOs, DGOs, PCs Support Pillar, and 4. Technical Assistance and Management Pillar.
- In ASGP-II Mr. Humam is responsible to support the IDLG, Mr. Hashmat to support the PCs, Mr. Nasir Hamidi responsible to support the municipalities pillar, the project manager beside his management role takes care of the technical support section, and the PGOs, DGOs support sections which were vacant by the time of the meeting.
- At this part of time in the project the plans and policies were coming from the provinces under which they were expected to execute in the project.
- PAR has been implemented in PGOs and DGOs with the support of ASGP, but not yet implemented in the municipalities.
- For municipalities restructuring and reform ASGP has cooperated with IDLG and CSC and developed three modules. Now the modules have been approved by OAA and are expected to be applied in the municipalities in the 34 provinces.
- The municipalities generate revenues that will cover their expenses. No fund has been going to the municipalities from anywhere else. The municipalities also do not send their revenues to anywhere else.
- Based on the SNGP a new law for the municipalities have drafted with the assistance and support of ASGP.
- Out of the 153 municipalities, 30 of them have developed revenue generation five years' plans.
- The process to develop standard operation procedures for municipalities has started after completion of which all the municipalities can apply that to their operation.
- There was an agreement between the CSC and ASGP to consider 20% female employees in the municipality's staff's recruitment.
- There is section in the sub-national governance policy over the operation of the municipalities. However, based on that the issue of mayors' election will be dealt. However the timely elections of the mayors depend mostly to other political developments in the country.
- The project document for RAMP-UP has been developed with the assistance of ASGP-I.
- With the support of ASGP, Governors and PC orientations forums were formed, a DGs conferences has been supported for the 364 districts, international exposures for the district governors has been supported, and PGOs office operating manuals and guidebooks for provincial development plans have been prepared.

Meeting	Date
DFID	29 June, 2011

Key Issues Discussed:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASGP II 23.6 mil GBP (around 40mil USD) commitment from DFID. No plans to spend any more. First 6mil GBP paid out, rest in tranches. • Main issue is the lack of info on how and where funding is being spent. • DFID issued guidelines on how to report (despite the fact these were already agreed at the start). • Challenge with UNDP – they don't listen or provide an opportunity for donors. The project board meeting is stage managed using powerpoints and no time for discussions. • DFID resorted to communicating concerns in a numbers of ways including a meeting with Head of UNDP in Kabul, and later UK Director in NY meeting Head of UNDP in NY. • DFID internal evaluation of ASGP II scored 4 (close project). • Qtr reports are poor quality, not at the agreed specification, contain information gaps, show little evidence of claimed achievements, in some cases content is not accurate. Lack information/update against indicators to enable reporting against logframe. • DFID asked ASGP PM on vision, but was told no comments PM only focusing on staffing crisis. • ASGP is seen as an nationwide invest not just in the Helmand area. • SNG Policy – too long, too complicated, and questionable method of approving it across government. • LoA – is a massive recruitment issue only flagged by DFID after reading the IR (UNDP did not inform DFID prior). • DFID visit to Helmand asked ASGP staff on current work, told ASGP staff (ie LoAs) were doing nothing and waiting for instructions. • UNDP asked DFID to find staff for the programme but DFID unable/unwilling to do this. Duty of Care concerns. • DFID questions the affordability of this programme post transition to GoAon budget support. • DFID concerned over: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ how risk is managed within the programme ○ the programme's value for money – salaries, budget, airfares etc. ○ UNDP's transition planning and support ○ Provincial logframes need to be reviewed and focused down ○ UNDP breadth of activities beyond the objectives, e.g. Teacher training, conferences etc. ○ Propose Provincial Development Fund: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ accountability, ▪ duplication with funds incl. Other DFID funds, ▪ fund given to non-elected governors to use for out-side government activit and control.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 60% of ASGP I spent on CSC and 40% on IDLG. 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the municipal pillar there is no regional structure directly working with municipalities. 	

They are using ToS and providing technical support and management from Kabul.

- ASGP I component base management with Kabul centric approach, working directly with the municipalities, districts and provinces. Focusing on PGOs/DGOs, PCs etc.
- ASGP II provincial approach using regional structures and changed to more implementation/responsibility by the regional offices. Refocusing on pillars:
 - IDLG – supporting policy and institutional capacity building
 - Municipalities
 - Provinces – supporting PGOs/DGOs and PCs
- LoA Municipal support is done via ToS national staff embedded within the municipality. No international staff.
- ASGP II current modality started only 3 months back. Developed a plan with each municipality under LoA to produce ASGP objectives and results.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	30 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He gave us a good background how this ASGP was envisaged and what roles were played by the team of ASGP for SN in Afghanistan along with IDLG • He explained the role of CSC in the program and has substantial component in ASGP I and has significant portion of the budget and actual costs incurred in ASGP I • He informed that in total there were 23 training centers established in which civil servants of s, and Line Ministries were trained in management, planning, financial accounting, general administration, English language and computer skills. • He explained the structure of the PGO office in a province, how a governor and elected and what is the role of various staff members working under the governor. • He also explained the current role of IDLG in functioning of the PGO and DGOs 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP	30 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He explained that procedure of payments against expenditure claims and also informed that there are various expenditures which mainly include salaries, procurement of capital or supply items, training costs, services, rental of premises, communication and publications, operational costs, contracting of service providers, UNDP overhead costs etc. • He informed that IDLG send invoice for LOA staff working with them and also those working with PGO and UNDP country office makes the direct payment • He explained the process how ASGP uses ALTAS for accounting purpose • He explained what is the process of advance disbursement and settlement for ASGP related costs which are not directly paid by UNDP country office • He explained where records are kept and how these are kept. • Matter related to review of documents on sample basis was discussed and it was informed to him to share the data related to costs incurred in specific format which will be shared with him through email and accordingly transactions will be selected for review purposes. 	

Meeting	Date
Regional Managers	30 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both recently arrived in the project. Both helped in the formulation of the new WP. Which was partly based on the previous regional WPs and the golden questions. They work thro LoA ToS to provide training and TA. Kundoz and other 4 provinces in the region completed a review of PCs. Working closely with UNAMA. UNAMA using ASGP as implementers. UNAMA providing facilities and local support. Nangarhar region also covers Nuristan – currently a no go area. Hence only able to establish relationship with 3 of the 4 governors, Nuristan governor is currently in hiding! Both regions are still at the early stages as no previous ASGP presence was in the regions. Cover was provided by the Urozgan RM. Target is by end of July to complete provincial WP – which depend on SOP sign off of IDLG. For PDF need new LoA and new SOP. PDP – currently a wish list – not complete for all provinces and should be realigned to the Provincial WP. Confusion if PDP or Provincial WPs are aligned to ANDS or the SNP. On arrival ASGP provided info pack and RMs escorted and introduced by PM to the regions, governors, PCs, LoAs, DropBox. RMs feel activities are achievable but may take more than one year to complete. View of current PM is positive – has strategy, vision, knowledge and experience required to lead ASGP. He gives clear direction and expects results. Project 3 pillars are similar and interconnected. Need current PM skills and position to connect and manage all three pillars across the programme/country. Golden questions are helpful, clearly define the CO direction, help define the progress (similar to indicators). Weekly and monthly report seem ok for now. 	

Meeting	Date
Coffey Helmand Team	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LoA ToS - relative to their titles, not doing anything useful. They have been useful in providing training and workshops. 	

Meeting	Date
Helmand Governor Office	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 years since the new governor took over and things are moving in the right direction. Helmand is 1/6 of AFG in agricultural land and 1/10 of the size of the country. The PGO has a good team and coordination. The international focus on the province has been very positive. ASGP gave a lot of training to build capacity of the governorate staff. The PGO has seen many positive initiatives working e.g. the complaint boxes. ToS now training many staff in PGO. ASGP helped to organise a peace concert in Lash. 60 thousand people came from around the 	

province.

- ASGP helped collect data from line departments and helped in publishing the yearly book with funding to pay for the printing provided by Asia Foundation.
- ASGP prepared a study tour to Bangladesh to study governance. Very positive. Want more visits e.g. sending Admin officers, PCs, scholars to Islamic countries to bring more learning from there!
- ASGP also pays for 1 MB internet connection. PGO hopes ASGP could expand this to other districts in the province.
- 10 active districts in the province with 3 committees in each district. PGO wants ASGP to provide training to social society committees (Peace Cmmtt, Judicial Cmmtt, Rehabilitation and Construction Cmmtt).
- ASGP is like the right hand of the governor.
- Issue: the speed of response of ASGP Kabul. Especially those due to security. E.g. peace conference requested by PGO, workshops for journalists, youth, women.
- IDLG regularly visit the province. But did not share SNP with the PGO.
- ASGP support to municipalities is good, especially on revenue collection, but need more time and support.

Meeting	Date
ASGP Helmand Team	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USED GOLDEN QUESTIONS TO CHECK PROGRESS – TIME VERY LIMITED DUE TO SECURITY RULES. • Currently no international within the team. OIC is Mr Saifuldean. Sending reports to RM in Kanderhar and Urozgan. • ASGP Kabul came once in the last year to check on accommodation and security situation. • 2/8 ToS speak English. Rest just simple understanding. • Still awaiting the bank account to be opened by ASGP. When the account is open they will give financial training to Financial Officers. To disburse funds requires the signature of the governor and the RM or Provincial Manager – yet to be hired. • The team received a copy of the SN Strategy from Kabul. Confusion if this is the same as the SNP. • ASGP team still coordinating with PAR effort of CSC. In the same building. 	

Meeting	Date
DFID Helmand	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concerns over overlap with UK funded work such as the provincial level governance support programmes via SU and Coffey. These are part funded by DFID and FCO conflict pool. Several advisers are engaged on this and based in Lash and focusing on Municipal, District and Provincial TA. • One area HMG are supporting is the Sector Services Department in PGO (with planning, admin and budgeting support). The PRT is providing the capacity building for this, but it should be provided by ASGP. • This raises the concern of double funding the same support. • UNHabitat implementing an urbanisation programme which includes waste collection at municipal level. Again raises the question of overlap with ASGP. 	

- DFID wanted to move from informal methods of supporting local government to a formal method e.g. via UNDP.
- Governor would say UNDP's presence has a negative impact.
- ASGP built a women's park – evidence suggests it is not used and contravenes UNDP mandate, as it's not a pro-poor outcome.
- IDLG regularly visits from Kabul, but ASGP visits are rare.

Meeting	Date
PRT	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP should increase presence in Helmand. UNAMA, MSF, ICRC, Journalist etc. all have a presence in Lash. All travel down on non-mil flights. So it is possible to operate in the south. 	

Meeting	Date
Regional Manager	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He informed us about the dynamics of the northern region and also informed that north was the first region where pilot of SN policy implementation was initiated. • He informed that he is the one who has been with ASGP from long time and has good knowledge of the activities how these were envisaged. • The progress of northern region was discussed and he informed that number of activities were performed in 5 provinces which are covered by the northern region of ASGP • In total there 5 staff members who work in the regional office. 	

Meeting	Date
Mazar Regional Office	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There have been five provinces and 29 municipalities under the coverage of ASGP-II regional office in Mazar; they were Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Faryab, and Maimana. • Provincial Strategic Plan for Balkh has been prepared with the assistance of ASGP and sent to IDLG in Kabul for further process. Beside this the regional office has been supporting the other four provinces to develop their PSPs. • Through the program there have been annual capacity assessments of PGOs and DGOs completed. • Each quarter there has been a sub-national governance coordination meeting in each province chaired by the governors and co-chaired by UNDP. • There has been a PDC meeting practiced monthly where in each province the LoA staffs participate and report accordingly to IDLG, and ASGP. These meetings were also chaired by the governors and UNAMA has been participating to them as observer. • In 2010 ASGP support to the PCs platform started. Training has been provided by 	

the LoA staffs support by ASGP.

- PCs operation manual has been developed with the assistance and support of ASGP-I in 2008.
- There has been little coordination and communication over the support to the PCs between the PCs coordination directorate in IDLG and the regional offices of ASGP.
- PAR assessment conducted by ASGP staffs and task order staffs in the Northern Region.
- There have been 9 regional municipalities' specialists in the regional or provincial offices of ASGP to support the municipalities support function of ASGP in coordination and communication with the related directorate for municipalities support in IDLG.
- Mr. Anil Chandrika has served as acting manager of ASGP from April 2010 to January 2011.
- Since 2006 the ASGP has experienced about 5 different managers with different management styles of project management.
- There has been relatively poor communication in between the ASGP and UNDP management.
- Reports from the regional office were communicated on the weekly, monthly, and quarterly according to the work plan to the project manager.
- There has been the need of a stronger technical staff has been required to be placed in each region to implement ASGP in the region.
- The Program Support Unit should more strongly support ASGP and fulfill its needs on time.

Meeting	Date
Provincial Council MAZAR	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PC has got 19 members, who were working in 4 committees; public relations, international relations, conflicts resolution, and development. • Two of the PC members have received training through ASGP support on proposal writing. • ASGP has supported the PC to visit two districts of Balkh province and meet with the people. • ASGP has logistically supported the PC to conduct an assembly of around 400 of 14 districts representatives and meet with them. • ASGP has supported the PC to publish its newsletter and a magazine in 3 volumes. • PC members were invited to take part in the planning sessions of ASGP in Balkh Province. • There has been a 3-days orientation workshop organized by ASGP and was provided to PC newly elected members. • NDI has also been supporting the PC with training. • PC has got not information yet on SNGP. • A strategic Development Plan for the province has been developed with the assistance of ASGP and existed with PC. • No more training or capacity building programs through ASGP has been carried out for the PC members in the province. • PCs platform has been identified to be weak and performance and not cooperative with the PCs. • IDLG could be able to do more and better in coordination of monitoring and oversight in the provinces. However, PC has also did not receive any training yet on M&E. 	

--

Meeting	Date
CSC Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been a great support of ASGP-I to CSC in the Northern Provinces. • 5 training centers of CSC in the Northern Provinces were supported by ASGP-I. • Since April 2011 all of the training centers of the CSC in the Northern Provinces have stopped operation, because of the seized support of ASGP to the CSC. • The data base system of the CSC regional office suspended because of the withdrawal of ASGP support to CSC. • According to the regional head of CSC 70% of the CSC activities in the Northern Provinces were covered by ASGP support. • PAR strategy on sub-national governance has been developed under Phase-I of the program. • The CSC in the North with the support of ASGP-I has been able to train around 3700 civil servants in its training centers. • Support to the CSC training centers in ASGP-II must continue. • SNGP had not yet been explained to the sub-national actors in the North. • The implementation of SNGP by 2014 with the current pace of IDLG, the CSC, and ASGP in the North will be difficult. • PAR implementation in municipalities has been started. However, IDLG needed to prepare ground for it. • ASGP has been a tangible partner to the CSC and the commission expects this to continue. 	

Meeting	Date
PGO Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been around 21000 USD supply and equipment were provided to the PGO office through ASGP since its cooperation start with them. • The internal bureaucracy of ASGP makes the provision of support to the PGO slow. • Since 2006 ASGP's support to the PGO has not been considered to be cost effective. • ASGP together with IDLG has contributed to them to prepare a 5 years strategic plan for the province in 2010. • ASGP has provided PGO with 30 units of PCs to empower its IT section and furniture to enhance the productivity of the PGO. • Capacity enhancements of the PGO staffs were completed. • An agency named KFW, and USAID were also supporting the PGO with office supplies and the vehicles on ad-hoc basis. • PBGF has not been supporting the PGO since last year because of different reasons. • SNGP had reached to PGP and accordingly to Balkh provinces and were distributed to the districts. • According to the director ASGP has been working in line with the SNGP. • PAR has been implemented in the PGO of Balkh and its 14 districts, but its strategy has not yet been developed in PGO. • Around 6300 civil servants were trained through the CSC training centers with the 	

support of ASGP-I.

- In ASGP-II a sub-national governance system should be developed through IDLG.
- PDP of Balkh has been developed in 2006 without the assistance of ASGP.
- Operation procedures for PGO which has been developed with the assistance of ASGP needed to be reviewed.
- Still the PGO and the DGOs were not capable enough to perform their duties satisfactorily because they did not have enough and proper infrastructures. ASP in IDLG has been recognized weak and needed improvement in its efficiency to provide services.
- IDLG has been gaining capacity with the assistance of ASGP to support better the PGOs and the DGOs.
- LoA staffs have had their public sector counterparts in the PGOs and DGOs to later on take their places.

Meeting	Date
Women Affairs Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASGP has been supporting the directorate to increase the female employees capacity, employment, and participation in the public sectors. • 90 female public servants of Balkh province have been trained with the support of ASGP and the CSC. All 15 female employees of the directorate for women affairs have received training through the CSC training centers. • Since April 2011 to date each 2 weeks there has been a training workshop provided by ASGP and CSC aiming to increase the employment capacity of female in public sector. The trainees in the training centers were receiving training on English Language, Computer literacy and Management. • Balkh directorate for women affairs had gone through PAR. • As per the director there were no publicity work has been carried over on SNGP in the province. • There has been approximately 10 % female employees in public sector organizations in Balkh Province. 	

Meeting	Date
Mazar Region PGOs	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As per the LoA staffs the HR and recruitment procedures applied to have them on board have been transparent. • LoA staffs have been contracted for one year and on different salaries. They were supporting the municipalities, the PGOs, and the DGOs according to their ToRs provided to them by IDLG. However, sometimes the PGOs and the DGOs were expecting more than their ToRs to perform to them. • Some of the LoA staffs did not have their government counterparts. • LoA staffs were provided with a two-days training workshop on sub-national government provided to them by IDLG. The LoA staffs were reporting on the monthly basis to the HR department of IDLG on their expected plans, ongoing plans, and completed plans. 	

- LoA staffs were required to receive more support form IDLG and ASGP in Kabul and its regional offices, to help them better coordinate with ASGP, the PGOs and the DGOs.
- There were reportedly no monitoring missions of IDLG in the provinces of North to see the performance of LoA staffs and consider their challenges.
- Little equipment has been provided to the LoA staffs in the North to make them more efficient to perform better.

Meeting	Date
PRT Helmand	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRT are paying salaries for Provincial Communication Network Project. Includes 1 head based in the PGO in Lash, 2 press officers and 6 comms advisers in the districts in DGOs. • Currently salaries are being paid direct, but about to sign an MoU with IDLG, Governor's office and NGO to administer the salaries. • J.Moss (Coffey) has direct dealings with IDLG. • PRT also paying for the salaries for press officers to support the PC and to work with PC members responsible for PR. Plans to start awareness campaign for the PCs in the province. • PRT not seen any ASGP activity supporting awareness campaigns or PR with the province. 	

Meeting	Date
Mayor of Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The mayor was happy with the support they have got from ASGP especially in revenue augmentation from 2006 there has been significant increase in the revenue of the municipality. • But he was worried about the use of funds since they have not done any proper planning how to use the additional revenue, when he tries to use anti corruption or other center government department comes and ask number questions and do investigations. Further, for all approval things need to go to center so in his view this was a very major bottle neck since IDLG talks about the SN Governance but actually it is not. • LoA staff has been of good help to him with respect to their computer skills but he wanted to be involved in the hiring process of staff and he has requested for number additional LoA staff but non- has been provided from number of months that's why he can't do any new initiatives. • Public communication has been a good initiative which need to be performed on continuous basis since this is a good feedback mechanism. 	

Meeting	Date
Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We were informed that in 4 wards of Mazar city SWM program is under implementation which has provided good cleaning facilities to the residents 	

- This program has also indirectly benefitted the revenue augmentation of the Municipality since residents are happy with the service.
- But there is no significant increase in the budget of the SWM department hence they have not got any benefit of revenue augmentation
- There has not been any increase in the size of the program from last two years
- Most of the revenue augmentation money has been spent on infrastructure projects by the Mayor.

Meeting	Date
PGOs in North Region	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the LoA staff has been working in PGO offices from last one year. • The inputs provided by LoA staff are generally related to other areas for which they are actually not hired • It was observed that communication is the area which has been mainly used by PGO offices in addition to that LoA staff has been used for computer skill and data collection. • On monthly basis all LoA staff has to submit their monthly time sheets and performance report approved by their supervisor in PGO to IDLG according to which their salaries are transferred directly to their bank accounts. • LoA staff feels that they could really add more value to PGO office if their skills are used by their supervisors more appropriately. • LoA staff was very happy with the help being provided by Regional staff of ASGP • LoA staff also mentioned the detailed hiring process through which they got selected. • There supervisors are not actually learning anything from them. 	

Regional Team, Mazar-e- Sharif	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipality is the success of the program we have data about all the municipalities of our region but only related to review as this has been communicated by the mayors • Lack of staff at regional level • Following new initiatives were taken at regional level; • Publications • Field offices and visits by governors and PGO office staff • MoUs amount municipalities • Expertise of municipal system are in place • All payments and approval as centralized in Kabul ASGP or UNDP country office • Procurement takes long time and some time it gets carry forward to next years and than it does not remain traceable • PSPs are in process • Regional office is satisfied with the performance of LoA staff but they were of the view that there should be more involvement of local PGOs representatives in the selection process • There are rumors of conflict of interest of IDLG staff in the selection process • Capacity of PGOs have been enhanced in management, computer skills and language 	

- Data base for municipalities has been developed in MS Access and spread sheet
- Share of experience and new initiatives with other regional offices of ASGP and HQ has been limited
- Tax mapping was done
- In ASGP I number of expat consultant came for the augmentation of Municipalities and they developed number of manuals which include the following:
 - Financial Accounting Guide Book
 - CSO Guide Manual
 - SWM Manual
 - Municipal Customer Satisfaction Survey Manual
 - Guide Book PAR Implementation
 - Tax mapping reports
 - PSM reports
 - District Governor's Office Manual
 - Full Governor Office Manual
 - GOFORGOLD hand book
 - HR Manual
 - Operational Manual
 - PGO-DGO Planning Guide
 - Provincial Profiling Guide
 - Training Center Manual
- Monitoring and evaluation is done by the Regional staff themselves other than that there is no formal independent function for M&E. Further, the M&E performed by Regional staff on their own is also not formally reported to anyone.
- Leadership for the program has been an issue.

Meeting	Date
Mayor Mazar City	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With the assistance of ASGP, a five years plan has been developed for Mazar municipality. • An annual operation plan for the municipality of Mazar has been developed with participation of the citizens and the assistance of ASGP, and it has been approved. • There have been a number of seminars, and trainings on revenue collection and enhancement, tax mapping provided to the municipality staffs through ASGP. ASGP's contribution to the municipality support has been considerable especially in revenue enhancement and waste management. ASGP's support has led to an increase in revenues from 60 million Afghanies before the project to 500 million Afghanies in 2010 and a forecast of 800 million Afghanies for 2011. • Through ASGP's support to increase public participation to municipalities' affairs, bi-lateral committees between municipality and the schools have been established. Discussions were going on to establish such a committee between Mazar municipality and the University of Mazar. • In order to increase efficiency and cooperation among the municipalities, LoAs have been signed with the assistance of ASGP between the provincial municipalities in the Northern provinces. • ToRs for municipalities have been developed through ASGP's support. • Through ASGP-I, there were support to prepare guidelines and manuals for municipalities, and in ASGP-II it has been planned to operationalise those guidelines and manuals. 	

- Through the revenue of municipality, the municipalities have been able to pave 6 KM of urban roads in Mazar city. 20 KM more roads were planned to be paved through the municipality of Mazar and its own revenues.
- The approval for expenditure on any municipality activity beyond 100'000 Afghanies has been going to IDLG for approval.
- 240 representatives of Mazar Citizens were meeting each week in their districts, each month in the municipality, and each quarter in the province with the governor or his/deputy.
- Mayors have to be elected the people.
- There were not any LoA in place to support directly the municipality of Mazar.
- PAR has been implemented in Mazar municipality. However the employees who were recruited through PAR in the municipality yet did not receive its benefits.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	4 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both Mr. Humam and Ms. Sofia have been assigned by ASGP Program Management to work full time in IDLG for the last two months as capacity enhancement advisors to IDLG. • ASGP in its phase II has exercised the capacity assessment in IDLG, and prepared tools for that together with the capacity enhancement unit of IDLG. • ASGO supported IDLG with the idea and concept of outsourcing the capacity enhancement activities. • ASGP-I supported and assisted the establishment and provided advocacy and technical support to IDLG to function effectively. • The Inception Report of ASGP has been prepared based on the request of DFID in October 2010, it has been widely discussed between all the stakeholders, and has been approved by UNDP country office. • Out of the 6 essential laws related to the SNGP, 5 of them have been drafted so far with the support of ASGP. • The part of ASGP to support Financial Management and Budgeting at the sub-national level has not yet been addressed by ASGP. • There were around 130 LoA staffs paid through ASGP and assigned to work in IDLG for their support. • More political will and support will be required to successfully implement ASGP and the SNGP. • More focus on the component for support the municipalities will be required with the logic that the municipalities were semi- autonomous, and through their windows the SNGs could be able to provide quicker services. • In ASGP-II more focus should be made to implement SNG. • More work by IDLG with the assistance of ASGP will be required to transform the SNGP into legal framework. • In ASGP there should be more clarity on the IDLGs sustainability, its present, and future. 	

Meeting	Date
Urzogan Governor and ASGP	5 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	

- Signed LoA with UNDP in Dec 2010.
- ASGP supported PDP process.
- ASGP helped organise a conference for the governor in Kabul – to negotiate with donors on the strategy for the province.
- ASGP achieved the following in Urozgan:
 - Rapid institutional assessment in PGO, DGO, PC and municipalities.
 - PAA, PC, PGO and DGO level capacity enhanced.
 - PDP – prioritised projects in conjunction with PC members and local participation.
 - resource mobilisation supporting workshop in Kabul and got financial resources from donors and NGOs.
 - Governance plan prepared for line departments
 - PGO supported with working agenda, follow up and standardisation of operations.
 - PGO Meetings activities follow up
 - NGO database project – showing who is working where and ongoing tracking of projects.
 - HR database
 - Provincial database with provincial data to be used for provincial profile.
 - Help in completing the year book.
 - Developing a manual on how to implement PDF.
 - etc.
- PDF is required to support small scale projects.

Meeting	Date
Regional Manager, Herat	5 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He informed that he has been working for ASGP for long now and has good knowledge of the program • East region has been doing well since it has done number of activities to augment the SN Governance in this region • With respect to work plan he informed that they have their regional work plan accordingly to which they operate. Their budget was also earlier segregated by region but now it has been consolidated again. • There number of reports being sent to Center on periodic basis which including weekly, monthly quarterly, six monthly and annual and number matters are repetition • He mentioned that municipalities is an areas where substantial improvement has been made especially in revenue collection but with respect to authority of mayor and other PGOs that progress has been very limited. • The new governor of Herat is very appreciative of the role of the program but worried about the progress. • The base line document for the province of Herat was finalized in 2010 but it has been still not be been approved by IDLG hence no further action in this regard is possible. • He shared the communication material being developed along with ASGP inputs which as per him have been a good interaction with communities and also educating them in how government could help them. • The approval and disbursement process has been long and slow due to which program activities suffer. • Number of DGO posts are vacant from number of months. • On a question with respect to justice system he mentioned in Herat there has been improvement but this area has been very weak in all other provinces. 	

--

Meeting	Date
Regional Team, Herat	5 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numbers of staff members are limited hence they can't work on number of activities. Further, reporting is to much. With respect to PC members trainings were imparted to almost all Old PC members but in last two year new PCs has come in which almost 75% new members have been elected and they are not trained. They get their salaries on time They are happy with the work environment Security has been becoming an issue in West now. They should us a video of the program in west Presentation was given on various components including PGO, Municipal and CSC In CSC they confirmed that allot of trainings have been imparted through training centers but since in ASGP II this component has been deleted now the training centers have been transferred to a USAID funded program and regional offices of CSC have very limited resources. On the question of quality of trainings there was mix reaction and it was clear that there was not monitoring and evaluation through which quality and impact could be assessed. 	

Meeting	Date
Urozgan RM	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provincial Governance Technical Specialist acting as RM in Urzogan and providing ad-hoc support to other provinces. Repeated achievements explained by Governor in previous meeting. 	

Meeting	Date
Mayor of Herat	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With the help of ASGP revenue of municipality has been increase significantly around 10 times but mayor looked frustrated that he can't use those funds and can't provide quality services to my residents. He even mentioned that he may like to leave the office if thing will not change. The revenue augmentation was mainly possible through some basis changes in the collection process as part of which now all collections are being done in the bank branches and all collection officers were given targets for collection and they were told that they need to meet their targets with justification working of households and rate applicable on them. That worked. As of now they have not done any working increasing the house hold they have just collected funds from already registered households as per old books. Now they intend to work on updating their revenue map. 	

- He informed that it is almost not possible for have to hire good staff so augment the capacity of the municipality
- He mentioned that he discusses it problems with IDLG.

Meeting	Date
LoA Staff Herat	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two LoA staff are stationed at PGO Herat one is an economic advisor and other is an communication person. • Economic advisor mentioned that he has worked on number of potential project feasibilities and have discussed the same with the Governor but there has been little progress on the said initiatives due to lacks of funds and long approval process. • They mentioned that they were elected through a long induction process. • They are happy to work for the PGO office since they feel they are adding value to their country • They may do allot more if projects and activities are approved and funded. • On the question that are their supervisors learning anything from them the answer was in negative 	

Meeting	Date
Governor of Herat	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He is actually not happy with the way SN has been implemented because in his view if he can't hire and fire a single staff of his office how come he could work. • As per him every government staff has some contact at various level and they tend to influence the decisions accordingly with respect to their continuity of their job • He has not fund to use except for this operations. • If that is the case than how he could be help to his people. • Earlier before IDLG governors were use to talk directly to the Minister of MOI and to the president but now there has been longer chain due to which decisions take long time. • He was of the view the since he has not been involved in the selection process for LoA staff that's why some unreasonable staff is hired and sent due to which 2 LoA staff were sent back. The hiring took number of months and we assessed them for few months so almost one year has been lost at the end. • It is always going to depend on the type of governor if he is influential and also like to use it he can do allot especially in the province like Herat which has significant custom revenue but he want to be a governor who comply with laws and regulations but laws and regulations are not good enough to serve the public. 	

Meeting	Date
PC Chairman Herat	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He explained how PCs are of help to people through monitoring of activities of PGO office and line ministries. But he mentioned that there are number of areas in which 	

augmentation is required.

- He mentioned that they have planned and executed field visit to understand the problems and also communicate with our people.
- He mentioned that they almost run their office from their own resource.
- They have attended number of trainings in which they raise number of questions but generally IDLG representatives are present.
- Donor have been talking to them
- All department have limited resources so they also can't do much

Meeting	Date
West Region	7 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They explained that they only keep record of the costs incurred from advance received by the regional manager in his personnel name through hawalla dealer. • In case of any left over from any activities the left over funds from advance for a particular activity has to be sent back to the country office for advance settlement. • They keep all funds in cash in office they don't have any back account. • They provide all the details of cost incurred to country office. 	

Meeting	Date
AusAid	8 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invested 2mil USD in ASGP II (over 2 Australian Financial Years). 2 mil USD is short term investment, with a view of a longer term investment subsequently. Not clear how much was invested by AUSAID into ASGP I. Supported internship programme in ASGP I. • ASGP I suffered from bad management, had difficulty in recruiting skilled staff. Same issue relevant for ASGP II. • The ASGP I evaluation review was not properly carried out. Too few team members, no Afg experts, under a restricted scope. • AUSAID's assessment of ASGP is generally positive in Urozgan. Progress is slow and requires PRT prompting. • ASGP person in Urozgan doing a good job in keeping a relationship with PRT, Governor, PGO and DGO. • Programme requires close monitoring and should be working with Statistics Office in the Province. • AUSAID under pressure to demonstrate tangible outcome to Aus Gov. Hence need a stronger M&E with verifiable indicators to assess progress. • AUSAID holds fortnightly meetings with ASGP TL in the province to share information. • PDF is planned to be allocated at 70% for PGO and 30% for the Mayor's office. However there is an issue with the capacity and transparency with the Mayor's office. AUSAID may hold funding until that concern is resolved. • ASGP has close links to IDLG and focusing support on PGO, DGO and PCs but there are other players in local government e.g. Line ministries that deliver services. So ASGP is self-limiting support to specific entities. So this feels very much like an IDLG programme and agenda rolled out to the provinces, whilst MoF agenda is not being rolled out and this is causing distortion. • Concern over ToS work. When checking what staff are doing, not clear if they are working on 	

their area of expertise (or responsibility).

- Governor is performing strongly, good leader. ASGP support for PDP was good but some way to go. Helped sharpening priorities, better than old doc.
- Programme should continue but needs to be strengthened in some areas. Security not an issue in the province. But still an issue to attract people to come to work in the province.
- RM is critical to the progress in the province.

Meeting	Date
Governor of Wardak Province	9 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASGP has assisted the PGO of Wardak using an integrated methodology, questionnaires, and public consultation to develop a PDS. • Two LoA staffs were provided to the PGO of Wardak through IDLG by the support of ASGP. • The PGO has a PDP prepared prior to ASGP. However ASGP contributes technically to its revisions and substantial change. It was expected that the revised PDP will be final by July 2011. • An internal auditor's coordination committee exists in PGO Wardak. There has not been any M&E person recruited through ASGP for the province. • The PGO in Wardak regular sector coordination meetings such as; internal auditors, gender support, rule of law, public complaints, and district governor's monthly meetings. • RAMP-UP, ASP, and NDI were also working in the province to support governance. 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP	10 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selected financial transactions were reviewed • The CDRs were discussed • The staff list with respect to personnel costs was discussed • The staff was asked to segregate the personnel costs in to LoA staff cost and non LoA staff cost • The funds transfer method as advance to regions was discussed • Audit observations on CDR audit was discussed • Inventory listing was discussed • The procurement planning and execution process was discussed. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP	16 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the question that to which extent he gets involved in the procurement planning process he informed the he is not involved. • He informed that he is not involved in the updation of the procurement plan this should be done by the program staff. 	

- He is managing number of UNDP projects for procurements hence he didn't have time to update the procurement plans.
- ASGP's Procurement Plan for 2011 is still not approved.
- He just have the procurement plan for 2010 and for 2009 and earlier these are not with him.



**United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP)**

Afghanistan

FINAL ANNEXES TO THE ASGP EVALUATION REPORT

September 2011

LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex I	Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited	A-3
Annex II	Financial Management Paper	A-11
Annex III	Programme Management Paper	A-27
Annex IV	Sub national Governance Paper	A-43
Annex V	List of persons consulted	A-57
Annex VI	Documents and Records Reviewed	A-61
Annex VII	Terms of Reference for the Evaluation and Review	A-67
Annex VIII	Record of Meetings	A-76

ANNEX I

Status of ASGP II PROGRESS IN THE REGIONS VISITED

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Note: This matrix reflects only those activities that were relevant to be implemented at the regional level. Helmand and Kandahar have been excluded from this matrix because of the limited verifiable information available during our missions.

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
1	1.6	SNG policy awareness for citizens regarding roles and responsibilities of sub national authorities				
	1.6.1	Designing public awareness & communication campaigns on SNGP		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.6.2	Implementation of public awareness and communication campaigns		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.6.3	Assist in conducting public hearings		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.7	Capacity Development of IDLG with respect to key capacities related to sub-national finance and planning				
	1.7.1	Build IDLG capacity on sub national finance, including HRD & M&E		In progress		No evidence No evidence
	1.7.2	Planning, communication & collaboration with MoF & other stakeholders		In progress		No evidence No evidence
	1.7.3	ToT for UNDP-ASGP ROs on local planning and budgeting		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.7.4	Development of planning and budgeting manual		In progress		No evidence No evidence
	1.7.5	Development of a system for tracking provincial resource allocations		In progress		Not done No evidence
	1.7.6	Development and implementation of Provincial Development Plans		In progress	In progress	No evidence
2	2.1	Strengthening Provincial and District Offices to fulfil their roles and responsibilities				
	2.1.1	Strengthening Provincial Recruitment Committee through the PGO	Done	In progress	In progress	Not done In progress
	2.1.2	Support PGO to implement guidelines for appointment procedures	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done No evidence
	2.1.3	Provide support in the organization of special recruitment campaigns	In progress	In progress	Not done	Not done No evidence
	2.1.4	Provide support to regional & provincial	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress In progress

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
	capacity building working groups					
2.1.5	Support to Provincial and District Administrative Assemblies	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done	No evidence
2.1.6	Training to provincial specialists of PGOs employed for technical services	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress
2.2	Introduction of functioning modern administrative management systems in PGOs and DGOs					
2.2.1	Introduction of provincial & district operating manuals (OMs)	Done	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress
2.2.2	Training for staff in application of provincial and district OMs	Done	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress
2.2.3	Provide guidelines, forms & equipment required to implement OMs	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress
2.2.4	Training on SNGP to PGO/DGOs regarding their role & responsibilities		In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress
2.3	Establishing performance measurement systems for sub-national governance for all provinces and government institutions					
2.3.1	TA to implement performance measurement systems for service delivery	Not done	In progress	Not done	Not done	In delay
2.3.2	TA to develop minimum service standards for sub-national govt entities	No done	In progress	In progress	Not done	In delay
2.3.3	Streamline IDLG reporting system and harmonize it with ANDS M&E	In future plan	In progress	In future plan	In future plan	In future plan
2.3.4	Support the periodic surveys	Done	In progress	Not done	In progress	In progress
2.3.5	Support PGO for annual reporting conference and production of reports	Done	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.4	Establishing interaction mechanisms for effective interaction between sub-national government and public to improve access to information					
2.4.1	Support to operation 34 provincial Information Service Canters	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.4.2	Support creation of a public grievances system at province/district level	Not done	In progress	No evidence	In delay	In delay

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
2.4.3	Establish effective provincial communication and information systems	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In delay
2.4.4	Support PGO & DGO in organization of public consultations & hearings	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	Not done
2.4.5	Support the development of ICT infrastructure in PGO and DGO	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In slow progress
2.4.6	Support functioning of e-government features in provinces	Not done	In progress	Not done	Not done	In progress
2.5	Provincial Strategic Planning (PSP) and Provincial Development Planning (PDP) guided by the PSP					
2.5.1	Support to PGOs and DGOS in strategic and annual planning	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In delay
2.5.2	Support PDCs in implementation of strategic and development plans	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.5.3	Training to provincial staff in strategic profiling, planning & implementation	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.5.4	Support for introduction of development databases to improve monitoring	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.5.5	Support to organization of training, workshops, FGD, etc to develop PSP	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	Not done
2.6	Strengthening public financial management at sub-national level to make it fully compliant with applicable laws and MOF procedures					
2.6.1	Deliver training to all PGO internal auditors in Internal Audit Manual	In delay	In progress	In progress	In progress	Not done
2.6.2	Fully equip, staff and make operational PGO internal audit offices	In delay	In progress	Not done	Not done	No evidence
2.6.3	Establish a system to follow on and implement audit recommendations	In future plan	In future plan	In future plan	In future plan	In the future plan
2.6.4	Introduction of AFMIS and regular financial reporting in PGO and DGO	In progress	Not done	Not done	Not done	No evidence
4	4.1 Establishing Knowledge sharing system for Provincial and District Councils					
4.1.1	Support to PC and DC Information Centre &	In delay	Not done	Not done	No evidence	Not done

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited							
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul	
	Platform (staff, equipment)						
4.1.2	Strategy & action plan devt for PC & DC Information Centre & Platform	In delay	Not done	Not done	No evidence	Not done	
4.1.3	Website development for the PC & DC Information Centre	In delay	Not done	Not done	No evidence	Not done	
4.2	Capacity Development of PCs and DCs so that they are compliant with rules of procedure and conduct public outreach						
4.2.1	Training for PCs & DCs on monitoring, conflict resolution & rules	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	In progress	
4.2.2	TA to PC and DC to apply M&E techniques, conflict resolution methods	In progress	Not done	Not done	In progress	In progress	
4.2.3	TA & equipment support to PC & DC for their effective functioning	In delay	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	
4.2.4	Programme of public communication and outreach for all PCs and DCs	In progress	In progress	Not done	No done	Not done	
4.3	Strengthening PCs' and DCs' oversight over local service delivery: strategic and annual budgeting & planning; M&E for service delivery; etc.						
4.3.1	Training and TA to PC & DC for strategic and annual planning	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	No evidence	
4.3.2	TA to improve effectiveness of oversight of PC & DC	In progress	Not done	Not done	In progress	Not done	
4.3.3	TA to set up and operate M&E working groups chaired by the PC	In progress	Not done	No evidence	Not done	In delay	
4.3.4	Provincial Monitoring Team (PMT) constructed and led by PC	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	In delay	
5	5.1	Improving capacity of municipalities to generate own source revenues					
	5.1.1	Manuals, guidelines, systems and procedures for revenue enhancement	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	No evidence
	5.1.2	Design and introduce databases for municipal revenues	In progress	In progress	Not done	No evidence	No evidence
	5.1.3	Introduce performance measurement	In delay	In progress	Not done	No evidence	No evidence

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
	system for revenue generation					
5.1.4	CD for revenue generation, tax assessment & rate setting, etc.	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	No evidence
5.2	Improving municipal capacities to apply minimum service standards, improved procedures, performance measurement system and FMS					
5.2.1	Manuals, guidelines and procedures for delivery of municipal services	In progress	In progress	In progress	No evidence	
5.2.2	Developing minimum service standards and re-engineering procedures	In progress	In progress	Not done	No evidence	
5.2.3	Introduce performance measurement system for municipal services	In future plan	In progress	In future plan	In the future plan	
5.2.4	Introduce Public Service Excellence Programme to municipalities	In progress	In progress	Not done	In future plan	
5.2.5	Design municipal customer service centre (one stop shop)	In delay	In progress	Not done	In delay	
5.2.6	Assist municipalities to implement transparent and accountable FMS	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	
5.3	Organisational restructuring of municipalities to improve service delivery, including at least 15% female staff by 2014					
5.3.1	Functional analysis in municipalities to develop organizational structures	No evidence	In progress	Not done	Not done yet	
5.3.2	CD for conducting functional analysis for organizational development	In progress	In progress	Not done	Not done	
5.3.3	Design and introduce HR database to municipalities	In progress	In the progress	In progress	In progress	
5.3.4	Design and introduce knowledge management and sharing mechanism	No evidence	In progress	Not done	In progress	
5.4	Strengthening municipality outreach programme					
5.4.1	Development of municipal public participation & communication programme	In progress	In progress	Not done	In progress	
5.4.2	Manuals and guidelines for participatory strategic planning & budgeting	Not done	In progress	Not done	Not done	

Status of ASGP II progress in the regions visited						
No.	Activities	Herat	Mazar	Urozgan	Bamyan	Kabul
5.4.3	Capacity Development programmes for municipal elected bodies	No evidence	Not done	Not done	Not done	
5.4.4	Support municipalities in conduct of public consultations and hearings	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	
5.4.5	Institute customer satisfaction surveys for feedback on service delivery	No evidence	In progress	In progress	Done	
5.5	Strengthening modern office management systems in municipalities					
5.5.1	Develop Municipal Office OM for provincial and district municipalities	Not done	Not done	No evidence	No evidence	
5.5.2	Develop and deliver training to introduce the OM	In delay	Not done	In progress	In delay	
5.5.3	Provide technical support for the implementation of the Manual	In delay	Not done	In progress	In delay	
5.5.4	Identify needs and deliver equipment for implementation of the OM	In delay	Not done	In progress	Not done	
5.6	Creation and maintenance of a functional website and e-government applications for select municipalities					
5.6.1	Design a generic municipal website	Not done	No evidence	Not done	Not done	
5.6.2	Design generic e-government applications for municipalities	Not done	No evidence	Not done	Not done	
5.6.3	Training to municipal staff in management of e-government applications	In future plan	No evidence	In future plan	In future plan	
5.6.4	Public awareness about e-government and its applications	In future plan	Not done	In future plan	In future plan	
5.6.5	Design and introduce computerized information management systems	In future plan	In progress	In future plan	In future plan	

ANNEX II

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PAPER

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Evaluation / Review Performed by

Kalimuddin Ghauri FCA. CFE

1. Financial Management Environment of ASGP

ASGP is implemented under Directly Executed (DEX) modality of UNDP in coordination with the related government counterpart Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). As part of ASGP I number of donors provided funds for implementation of this programme in addition to core funding from UNDP HQ. Whereas, as part of ASGP II the funding remained restricted to only two donors namely, and in addition to core funding of UNDP HQ. As part of DEX modality the programme is implemented by UNDP Country Office directly and it has the directly fiduciary responsibility in accordance with the funding agreements between donors and UNDP.

As part of programme design of ASGP I certain fiduciary responsibilities were transferred to the government counter parts namely IDLG and IARCSC under Letter of Agreements (LoAs) signed between UNDP, IDLG and IARCSC. This transfer of fiduciary responsibility was only to the extent of activities being performed by them as part of ASGP subject to post payment review of UNDP and other conditions. But ultimate fiduciary responsibility for ASGP rests with UNDP, Afghanistan.

Since, ASGP is implemented under DEX modality hence all financial management rules and regulations of UNDP were applicable and ALTAS the business application of UNDP was used for, budgeting, work planning, transaction processing, procurement processing, payment of transactions, allocation of costs to activities and donors and inventory management.

On the basis of process for execution of transactions, the financial transactions of ASGP could be clustered in following categories:

2. DIRECT PAYMENTS FROM UNDP COUNTRY OFFICE

These payments include directly payments to suppliers and service providers all over Afghanistan wherever programme activities were performed, payment of salaries to ASGP staff directly in their bank accounts, payments of advance funds to IDLG for onward payments for activities of IDLG within their approved work plans (only in ASGP II), disbursement of advances to regional managers for onward disbursement of funds at local level in case the estimated cost of activity is less than certain maximum threshold. Payments to LoA staff are made as per claims submitted by IDLG for staff working in IDLG and PGO offices. These transactions are processed in coordination between the finance staff of ASGP Kabul and UNDP country office.

3. PAYMENTS MADE BY UNDP / ASGP STAFF IN REGIONS

For activity having budgeted costs of less or equal to AF 100,000 in regions the funds for execution of said activity are disbursed as advance to a UNDP fixed term international staff in regions as personal advance to them through Hawalla dealer (money changer) in Afghani. The fixed term international staff of UNDP makes payment in cash for approved activities and submit claims per activity to settle the outstanding advances with UNDP Country Office.

Key heads of cost related to ASGP are as follows:

- Personnel cost related to staff working in IDLG, staff working in PGOs and Municipalities as LoA staff and fixed term international and short term local and international staff;
- Capital expenditure related to procurement of vehicles, furniture and fixtures, office equipment and information and technology equipment and others;
- Costs related to programme activities
- Operational costs of the Programme
- Programme Management Cost

With the objective to facilitate the flow of funds for activities and capacity building of government counter parts namely IDLG and IARCSC UNDP signed Letter of Agreements (LoA) as per of following responsibilities were given to counter parts:

Selection of staff members to work as LoA staff in IDLG and PGO and Municipal offices through a competitive and transparent manner. As per design the following are the sequence of task for selection of staff members and deployment at intended offices;

- Request is sent by the Provincial Governor or Mayor of Municipality to the IDLG specifying the functional area for which staff is required;
- IDLG process the request through a competitive hiring process;
- Deploys the staff at the PGO or Municipal office;
- The staff could be from the related province or it could be from any other province;
- The hired / designated staff is attached to a government director in the PGO or Municipal office for facilitation;
- On monthly basis times sheets and performance reports are submitted by LoA staff after approval of their supervisors to IDLG;
- In ASGP I on monthly basis IDLG on the basis of these time sheets and performance report was compiling the claim for transfer of salaries to LoA staff and submitting it to ASGP for direct payment through UNDP country office;
- ASGP was processing the payment through UNDP country office;
- Standard monthly salaries of LoA staff working at PGOs are USD 1,500 per month and of LoA staff working at Municipal office are USD 1,300.

IDLG also forwards claims for the staff working on various positions at IDLG to ASGP for direct payment.

For overall risk management analysis a detailed head of expenditure wise risk management matrix have been filled for ASGP including considering risks associated with value for money objectives of the Programme. The analysis is presented on following pages:

Personnel Cost (both LoA and non LoA)	Cost incurred	USD
	ASGP I - LoA	15,950,953
	ASGP I – Non - LoA	6,285,366
	ASGP II - LoA	3,180,236
	ASGP II – Non - LoA	2,654,668
	Total	28,071,223
Key Transactions:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Payment of salaries of ASGP Fixed Term International Staff through Global Payroll Processing; ii. Payment of salaries of ASGP Fixed Term Local Staff through UNDP Country Office, Afghanistan; iii. Payment of Salaries of LoA staff of IDLG and PGOs as per claims submitted by IDLG through processing by the HR department of IDLG; and iv. Payments related to some other personnel cost including insurance, volunteers etc. 		
Potential Fiduciary Risks:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The staff actually worked on the programme to the extent he / she was required to perform as per contract; ii. Funds were actually paid to the staff member for which these were intend for; and iii. The salary and benefit payments were made in-accordance with the terms of the contract. 		
Potential Value for Money Related Risk:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The HR planning not effectively performed and the plan was also not effectively implemented due which outputs from deployed staff were not properly secured; ii. Staff hired under LoA arrangement with IDLG are hired and contracted by IDLG and their performance with judged by the HR department of IDLG. We which extent the performance and deployment of related staff is appropriate. 		
Mitigating Controls:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. All staff members for ASGP other than LoA staff were hired through UNDPs HR procedures for hiring including all fixed term international and domestic staff and short term international and local staff and staff under consulting contracts. Hence, all hiring related controls of UNDP's systems were applicable; ii. All staff contracts were in accordance with standard terms and conditions of UNDP; and iii. Staff hired under LoA arrangement with IDLG were hired and contracted by IDLG and their performance was also judged by the HR department of IDLG. There was some involvement of ASGPs staff in the induction process but it was not to the extent that it could be ensured that all staff members were selected through a comprehensive competitive process; and iv. All costs incurred under LoA were subject to an external audit. 		
Evaluators Comments:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. We have not found any evidence of an integrated HR Planning process at ASGP. Number of organigrams were developed at various stages of the programme and various positions were created and fully or partially filled; ii. For staff hired job descriptions are given but in number of cases due to shortage of staff they were forced to do multitasking and get involved in 		

	activities which were not part of their job descriptions;
iii.	During our field visits it was observed that a number of staff members were either not aware of their job responsibilities or if they were aware they were actually not doing the work for which they were hired;
iv.	No performance assessment was performed of the LoA staff working in IDLG since inception of the Programme to-date;
v.	An assessment of the HR Processes of IDLG is not performed to ensure whether the procedures defined are appropriate and are effectively implemented to ensure hiring on competitive basis and management of LoA staff including collection of performance evaluations, time sheets and independent feedback from ASGPs Regional Managers;
vi.	We have not found any evidence of any audit being conducted for costs incurred by IDLG and IARCSC specifically including processes being used by said organizations;
vii.	As per latest HR Plan for ASGP II in total 119 positions are planned out which 79 positions are vacant. Further, it is evident from the review of staffing tables that the negative variance of allocated and filled positions has been there from years now. If significant positions remain vacant it has significant effect on the performance of staff in place;
viii.	Concerns are being raised by provincial functionaries that the induction process adopted by IDLG for induction of LoA staff was not fully transparent and competitive since, in the induction process there was no involvement of provincial government staff and in number of cases the positions were has to be refilled since the hired staff was not at par with the requirements of the position and we don't have any evidence to prove that said concern are correct or not;
ix.	ASGP has been making payment for salaries of all LoA staff including for IDLG and PGOs and Municipality but they don't have any data through which they could track the LoA staff and to perform analytical control testing to ensure accuracy of claimed being raised by IDLG; and
x.	The currently adopted project management structure of ASGP does not work, hence require structural changes to make it more function oriented, with creation of positions for specialists such as Municipality, Management Information Systems, Communication, Monitoring and Evaluation etc. Further, since in the currently system there is no proper segregation of duties the preparation / creation, review, approval tasks are not properly defined and enforced.
xi.	There are a few staff members whose cost has been fully charged to ASGP but these staff are stationed in UNDP Country Office and also provide services to other projects of UNDP in Afghanistan. It is important that UNDP ensures that in case of shared services the costs are properly shared amongst various projects.

Capital Expenditure	Cost incurred	USD
	ASGP I	8,751,324
	ASGP II	699,941
	Total	9,451,265
Key Transactions:		
i. Annual Procurement Plans are prepared and approved and are defined in ATLAS;		
ii. Procurement of capital nature items including vehicles, furniture and fixtures, office equipment, leasehold improvements etc. All such procurements were		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> done through UNDP country office; iii. The inventory items are recorded in the inventory listing as per policy of UNDP; iv. Procurements done on LoA were done by IDLG but payments were done directly by UNDP country office; and v. The physical custody records of ASGP inventory items are with the country office where the physical custody records of items procured by IDLG and used by IDLG or transferred to PGO are with IDLG.
<p>Potential Fiduciary Risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The procurement planning may not be accurate enough to go close with the actually procurement process leading to weak fund planning; ii. The procurement may be done without complying with competitive transparent process; iii. Conflict of interest are not controlled; iv. The procurement process is delayed to the extent that the importance or productivity of said asset is marginalized; and v. Weak physical controls due to items are not in place or are being used for the purposes other then for which they were intended.
<p>Potential Value for Money Related Risk:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The procurement process is delayed to the extent that the importance or productivity of said asset is marginalized; and ii. The items procured are not used for the intend purpose.
<p>Mitigating Controls:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Procurement procedures of UNDP are followed; ii. Payments related all material payments are made directly to suppliers; and iii. Profiles of suppliers are created in vendor registration system of UNDP and background checks are performed.
<p>Evaluators Comments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The procurement plans for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 were reviewed and following critical matters were noted: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For 2009 and 2011 there was only a plan available we were not able to review any progress or tracking of procurements actually done; ▪ For 2010 we got the procurement plan and the actually procurement done according to which in total procurement having aggregate value of USD 3.7 million against which actual procurement of aggregate value of USD 166 million was made; ▪ As per status sheet number of requirements were cancelled but there is no mentioned of reasons for cancellation; and ▪ We don't see any relation between the procurement plan and the tacking sheet. ii. The procurement plan only talks about the requirements it does not cover the strategy how going through the defined process the items could be procured within the time frame when items are required. It means that if we are aware that X number of days will be required we work backward and initiate the

- process as quickly as possible;
- iii. If procurements are done through long term procurements contract of UNDP with suppliers such as for computer equipment as part of which rates are already agreed, in which prices are not as competitive as we could get from the local market or through current negotiations with suppliers.

Direct Programme Activities	Cost incurred	USD
	ASGP I	2,580,722
	ASGP II	270,865
	Total	2,851,587
Key Transactions:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Payments related to programme activities including workshops, meetings, field trips, printing of new letters and other materials etc. ii. Approval for all such activities are processed through the regional manager to the programme manager; and iii. Activity execution report submitted by regional manager to the programme manager. 		
Potential Fiduciary Risks:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Amount paid an activity which actually didn't occurred; ii. The cost paid for the activity is not competitive; and 		
Potential Value for Money Related Risk:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The activity for which cost was paid was not for the purpose of the programme 		
Mitigating Controls:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. All contracting for services is centralized and is done in accordance with UNDP contracting regulations; ii. Most of the material payments are made directly to service providers; 		
Evaluators Comments:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The process have good controls but it seems it lack in competitive cost benefit worth due to long documentation chain, registration of service provider on UNDP's vender list and then directly payment to supplier; and ii. The project activities are some times delayed hence lose its importance. 		

Operational Costs	Cost incurred	USD
	ASGP I	7,785,315
	ASGP II	1,410,209
	Total	9,195,524
Key Transactions:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Operational costs includes payment for number of head of expenditure including travel, board and lodge, rentals, communication, suppliers, security, other professional services etc. 		
Potential Fiduciary Risks:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The payment is made for services or supplies which are not actually received 		

ii. by ASGP; and The prices paid are not competitive.
Potential Value for Money Related Risk: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The costs paid were not required for the implementation of the ASGP; ii. Costs were not incurred on timely basis due to which value from said services or suppliers could not be ensured; iii. In case said services or suppliers were for persons or parties external to ASGP / UNDP these were not incurred for the purpose of ASGP.
Mitigating Controls: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. All such costs were approved by regional managers and programme manager and reviewed by the team of UNDP country office; ii. All material payments were made directly to the service provider and suppliers
Evaluators Comments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Delays in payment were observed due to which some times higher than current market prices are paid;

4. FINANCIAL PROGRESS

The financial progress of ASGP I and II has been analysed at three levels namely at macro cost of account level, funds flow level and individual head of expenditure level: The analysis is presented on the following paragraphs.

During the period starting from 2006 till June 30, 2011 ASGP incurred aggregate costs of USD 43.632 million and USD 8.625 million on ASGP I and II respectively. On an overall basis the costs out of the total cost 54% was spent on personnel or related costs. This includes 37% on personnel cost of ASGP staff working in centre (Kabul) and in regions and 17% on staff hired by IDLG under LoA for work in IDLG or PGOs and Municipalities. The share LoA staff costs has increased substantially during 2010 and 2011.

	ASGP I		ASGP II	
	Note	USD	USD	%
Personnel cost (other than LoA Staff)	A	15,950,953	3,180,236	37%
Personnel cost (LoA Staff)	B	6,285,366	2,654,668	31%
Capital Expenditure	C	8,751,324	699,941	8%
Direct Programme Activities	D	2,580,722	270,865	3%
Operational Costs	E	7,785,315	1,410,209	16%
Program Management	F	2,278,442	409,465	5%
		<u>43,632,121</u>	<u>8,625,385</u>	

The capital expenditure constitutes 20% and 8% of total cost of ASGP I and II respectively. As compared to planned procurements as indicated in the procurement plans the actual capital expenditure is significantly low, which is apparent from the following analysis:

Procurement Plan vs. Actual

	Planned	Actual	%
USD			
2009	4,713,388	2,751,490	58%
2010	3,705,900	1,037,496	28%
2011 (till June 30 only)	6,845,501	887,333	13%

The direct programme activities which includes cost of workshops, field trips, communication publications etc is only 6% and 3% during ASGP I and II respectively, The operational cost which also include certain direct costs associated with programme activities such travel, per diems etc., but this cannot be separately classified since head of expenditures are noted clustered in operational and direct programme activities. The programme management is charged as percentage of all other costs chargeable to donors. The standard rate is 7%. In case of ASGP II the current reported figure for Project Management is less than standard since the full cost has not been charged in ATLAS till June 30, 2011.

The funds flow summary of ASGP I is as follows:

Table A
ASGP I - Funds Flow Schedule

Donor	Income			Expenditure incurred till June 30, 2010	Funds received but not utilized
	Commitment	Received	Receivable		
USD					
Netherlands	8,108,108	8,108,108	-	8,114,729	(6,621)
Norway	10,377,398	10,377,398	-	10,387,964	(10,566)
EU	6,938,339	6,264,061	674,278	6,263,687	374
CIDA	4,637,934	4,637,934	-	4,162,396	475,538
SDC	3,473,478	3,473,478	-	3,445,248	28,230
Italy	374,532	374,532	-	374,532	-
UNDP Core Fund	10,256,688	10,256,688	-	10,256,688	-
UNDP Temporary Funds (CCF)				674,278	(674,278)
	44,166,477	43,492,199	674,278	43,679,522	(187,323)

The head of account, activity and donor wise expenditure summaries clustered in years of the programme are as follows:

Table B
ASGP I - Cost Incurred Summary by Head of Account
USD

Account	Account Description	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Grand Total
61100	Salary Costs - NP Staff		10,310					10,310
61200	Salaries Costs - GS Staff		8,133					8,133
61300	salary & Post Adj Cst-IP Staff		7,796			300,755	9,709	318,260
62100	Recur Payroll Costs - NP Staff		1,997					1,997
62200	Recur Payroll Costs-GS Staff		1,541			(41)		1,501
62300	Recurrent Payroll Costs-IP Stf		3,702			106,259	7,845	117,805
63300	Non-Recurrent Payroll - IP Stf		6,714	38		147,370	15,179	169,300
63400	Learning Costs			2,471	15			2,486
63500	Insurance and Security Costs	1,794	20,667	87,624	(0)	33,625	874	144,584
64300	Staff Mgmt Costs - IP Staff		2,074			155,390	14,543	172,008
65100	After Service Insurance	96	1,572	802	0	17,982	541	20,992
71100	ALD Employee Costs	112,072	1,187,046	1,476,863	2,998,812	607,139		6,381,932
71200	International Consultants	139,263	608,259	1,620,126	1,419,400	484,341	1,530	4,272,919
71300	Local Consultants	17,193	236,308	1,150,451	2,222,811	3,609,757	30,789	7,267,309
71400	Contractual Services - Individ	5,886	282,107	603,793	1,239,342	1,015,601	32,142	3,178,870
71500	UN Volunteers		5,809	57,261	103,718	1,124		167,912
71600	Travel	6,868	365,304	428,464	817,587	287,620	5,623	1,911,466
72100	Contractual Services-Companies	34,209	470,310	114,431	762,321	1,179,506	19,946	2,580,722
72200	Equipment and Furniture	192,343	873,881	1,534,171	1,404,360	1,771,488	187,392	5,963,636
72300	Materials & Goods		4,682	30,712	116,382	1,021		152,798
72400	Communic & Audio Visual Equip	3,456	52,090	252,365	90,913	67,947	(0)	466,772
72500	Supplies	6,390	38,189	105,254	183,937	142,119		475,889
72700	Hospitality	5,211	4,110	23,636	-			32,956
72800	Information Technology Equipmt	17,689	435,288	378,268	1,139,834	197,040	-	2,168,119
73100	Rental & Maintenance-Premises	296	83,002	397,790	413,232	510,083		1,404,403
73200	Premises Alternations				-			-
73300	Rental & Maint of Info Tech Eq			3,291	18			3,309
73400	Rental & Maint of Other Equip	526	56,220	209,486	269,327	300,195	19,106	854,860
73500	Reimbursement Costs		541	71,407	802,246	-		874,193
74100	Professional Services			68,470	19,448	11,960	(7,176)	92,701
74200	Audio Visual&Print Prod Costs	110	48,383	97,458	223,861	107,090		476,902
74400	Provisions & Write-offs				-			-
74500	Miscellaneous Expenses	9,574	37,800	52,154	82,585	52,710	855	235,677
74600	Prepaid Project Expenses		1,639	24,690	198,684	(286,925)		(61,913)
75100	Facilities & Administration		281,497	502,193	623,896	855,946	14,910	2,278,442
75700	Prepaid Project Expense				466,456	941,553	42,676	1,450,685
76100	Foreign Exchange Currency Loss		(42)	29,958	826	3,555	(112)	34,185
77200	Salary and related Costs-TA/GS					-		-
		552,977	5,136,929	9,323,625	15,600,010	12,622,208	396,372	43,632,121

Table C
ASGP I - Cost Incurred Summary by Activity
USD

Activity Code	Activity Description	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Grand Total
	Exchange Loss		(42)	29,958				29,916
ACTIVITY01	Support to Policy	43,043	1,023,818	2,869,464	2,707,179	912,050	-	7,555,554
ACTIVITY02	Support to PAR and Training Centers	116,057	2,248,703	3,784,880	3,437,892	3,768,988	53,378	13,409,899
ACTIVITY03	Representative Democracy	371,270	625,629	533,398	948,293	961,707	29,957	3,470,254
ACTIVITY04	Development Management	22,608	850,174	1,879,166	4,350,650	3,319,313	79,195	10,501,106
ACTIVITY05	Support to Kandahar Province		388,646	226,759	825,131	1,190,669	206,256	2,837,462
ACTIVITY06	Support to Uruzgan and Dai Kundi				130,434	700,508	32,442	863,384
ACTIVITY07	ASGP Management				3,200,431	1,768,971	(4,857)	4,964,545
		552,977	5,136,929	9,323,625	15,600,010	12,622,208	396,372	43,632,121

Table D
ASGP I - Cost Incurred Summary by Donors

Donor Code	Donor Title	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Grand Total
00012	UNDP Core	552,977	992,608	2,193,319	6,546,603	598,252		10,883,760
00137	Italy		276,072	90,036	272	8,152		374,532
00182	Netherlands				1,648,325	6,459,783	6,622	8,114,730
00187	Norway		3,040,308	1,592,786	1,610,962	4,133,236	10,674	10,387,965
00280	European Commission			2,926,743	3,110,071	226,877	-	6,263,691
00550	CIDA		827,941	880,681	862,950	1,211,547	379,076	4,162,195
10282	Swedish Development Cooperation			1,640,060	1,820,828	(15,639)		3,445,249
		552,977	5,136,929	9,323,625	15,600,010	12,622,208	396,372	43,632,121

1

The funds flow summary of ASGP II is as follows:

¹ Australia is not listed as a specific donor to ASGP II in the Project Document and Project Reports. However, Australia is a valuable and significant contributor to SNG in Urozgan. Accordingly the team met with His Excellency the Governor and with the Development Adviser.

Table E
ASGP II - Funds Flow Schedule

Donor	Commitment	Income Received	Receivable	Expenditure incurred till June 30, 2011	Funds received but not utilized
USD					
Department for International Development (DFID) UK	37,760,000	9,600,000	28,160,000	7,343,706	2,256,294
Swedish Development Cooperation (SDC)	3,788,808	3,389,208	399,600	1,075,899	2,313,309
Italy	1,965,924	1,965,924	-	205,780	1,760,144
European Commission (EC)	15,831,554	5,606,314	10,225,240	-	5,606,314
	59,346,286	20,561,446	38,784,840	8,625,385	11,936,061

The head of account, activity and donor wise expenditure summaries of ASGP II clustered in years of the programme are as follows:

Table F
ASGP II - Cost Incurred Summary by Head of Account
USD

Budget Code	Budget Code Description	Grand Total		
		2010	2011	Total
61300	salary & Post Adj Cst-IP Staff	263,290	302,268	565,558
62300	Recurrent Payroll Costs-IP Stf	108,735	118,207	226,942
63300	Non-Recurrent Payroll - IP Stf	216,262	147,427	363,689
63400	Learning Costs	2,179	-	2,179
63500	Insurance and Security Costs	29,020	37,549	66,569
64300	Staff Mgmt Costs - IP Staff	55,991	44,607	100,598
65100	After Service Insurance	13,807	17,161	30,968
71100	ALD Employee Costs	-	-	-
71200	International Consultants	468,861	449,910	918,771
71300	Local Consultants	825,648	1,691,614	2,517,262
71400	Contractual Services - Individ	208,244	665,787	874,031
71600	UN Volunteers	86,274	82,063	168,337
72100	Travel	244,111	305,152	549,263
72200	Contractual Services-Companies	208,778	62,087	270,865
72300	Equipment and Furniture	2,223	2,901	5,124
72400	Materials & Goods	26,452	51,881	78,333
72500	Communic & Audio Visual Equip	22,094	24,025	46,118
72700	Supplies	-	91	91
72800	Hospitality	120,928	75,084	196,012
73100	Information Technology Equipmt	258,228	312,138	570,366
73200	Rental & Maintenance-Premises	57,842	52	57,895
73300	Premises Alternations	-	35	35
73400	Rental & Maint of Info Tech Eq	54,834	114,358	169,192
74200	Rental & Maint of Other Equip	14,191	23,895	38,086
74500	Reimbursement Costs	19,001	15,680	34,681
75100	Facilities & Administration	252,858	156,608	409,465
75700	Prepaid Project Expense	305,208	53,182	358,391
76100	Foreign Exchange Currency Loss	59	(460)	(401)
77300		-	6,967	6,967
		3,865,117	4,760,267	8,625,385

Table G**ASGP II - Cost Incurred Summary by Activity, Donor and Period****USD**

Budget Code	Budget Code Description	Grand Total		
		2010	2011	Total
ACTIVITY01	National systems, procedures and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor the SNGP are in place by 2014	453,474	989,806	1,443,281
ACTIVITY02A & 2	Support to Provincial and District Governors on National Level	1,914,317	2,110,944	4,025,260
ACTIVITY02B	Support to Provincial and District Governors Central region	185,098	220,458	405,555
ACTIVITY03A & 3	The subnational offices of IARCSC are successfully delivering public administration reforms to all subnational government institutions under the effective management of IARCSC by 2014.	6,534	33,804	40,338
ACTIVITY04A & 4	Support to Provincial and District Councils on National Level	288,567	171,946	460,513
ACTIVITY04B	Support to Provincial and District Councils Central Region	1,419	5,369	6,788
ACTIVITY05A & 5	Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under Public Administration Reform) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services	404,302	414,497	818,799
ACTIVITY05B	Support to Municipality Central Region	17,680	16,854	34,534
ACTIVITY06	ASGP Management	593,727	796,589	1,390,316
		3,865,117	4,760,267	8,625,385

Donor	Donor Title			
00551	Department for International Development (DFID)	3,309,100	4,034,606	7,343,706
10282	Swedish Development Cooperation (SDC)	556,017	519,882	1,075,899
00137	Italy	-	205,780	205,780
		3,865,117	4,760,267	8,625,385

Period	Month			
1	January	-	342,931	342,931
2	February	-	1,031,380	1,031,380
3	March	-	1,152,277	1,152,277
4	April	-	750,545	750,545
5	May	-	1,018,184	1,018,184
6	June	-	464,950	464,950
7	July	-	-	-
8	August	11,469	-	11,469
9	September	713,532	-	713,532
10	October	577,172	-	577,172
11	November	975,381	-	975,381
12	December	1,587,563	-	1,587,563
		3,865,117	4,760,267	8,625,385

5. FINDINGS

As per our review following are findings related to financial management and fiduciary risk of ASGP:

A. The financial management system used by UNDP for ASGP as per their policies is good and have effective controls in place including good segregation of duties. But in certain cases it is not effective:

- Delays in payments to suppliers and service providers;
- Long chain of approvals required for approval of activities irrespective of importance, size and financial value of activity;
- Numbers of small activities are performed at regional level for which funds are

disbursed to fixed term international staff only through hawalla dealers in cash. The advance holders are not allowed to open their personal bank accounts in which they could ask for transfer of advances and use the advance as per requirement of the activities. After execution of activity when advances are settled, all remaining balance of fund against any advance is need to be sent back to the country office through Hawala dealer which is again a time consuming effort.

- Procurements as defined in the procurement plans are not in the same way defined in ATLAS leading to delays.
- We understood from different discussions that all approvals are centralized in Country office at Country Director or Deputy Director Levels.
- Physical control on inventory items are not effective especially on those items which are procured for IDLG, PGOs and Municipalities under LoAs.

Recommendations:

- The approval and payment processes are reconsidered to reduce process times without compromising on effective controls;
- A delegation of powers is designed and approved on the basis of materiality, type of activity and sensitivities around a particular transaction;
- Funds transferred to fixed term international staff for advance are given as pool of funds for execution of activities in particular regions in which payment by activities should be traceable, but there should not be any reason to asking remaining balance back to country office;
- The advance funds to regions should be transferred to personal bank accounts of ASGP Staff; and
- Physical inventory controls are enforced through securing receipt acknowledgments from assigned offices of PGOs and Municipalities and effective tracking system of items starting from assignment of time to a particular office to receipt of the equipment / item by the assigned item. On sample basis items should be checked by the regional staff during their visits. The list of items provided to in particular region should be provided to the Regional Managers which should be updated on quarterly basis.

B. Weak procurement planning and delays in procurement process. Our key findings related to the procurement are as follows:

- Different procurement format used every year during 2009, 2010 and 2011;
- There is no formal procurement tracking system from procurement plan, requisition, processing and delivery of items;
- There is no tracking of items which were planned in one plan but were not delivered and carried forward to the next year's plan; and
- Significant delays in procurement process leave to marginalized programme

impact of such procurements.

Recommendations:

A consultative process within ASGP and UNDP Country office is initiated to devise a common strategy for doing procurement planning in focused, targeted and systematic manner so that following objectives could be achieved:

- Only those items are planned which are actually required and necessary and which will add value to the programme objectives;
- The procurement processing time is considering is planned delivery dates of items
- The time lines of procurement are defined in the plan in various stages including requisition, approval, processing and delivery with assigned responsibilities so that accountability for unplanned delays could assigned.
- All cancelled planned procurements should be properly documented and tracked;
- All carried forward planned procurements should be separately identified in the plan;

C. Value for money achieved related to LoA staff provided to IDLG, PGO and Municipalities is not be determined since all hiring and performance management of LoA staff is done IDLG and ASGP has not performed any assessment of quality of systems in place, its effectiveness compliance. ASGP does have the data through which they could extract the information such as number LoA staff by each PGO / Municipality per year. During our field visits concerned were raised on the process being following by IDLG for hiring of LoA staff including potential conflict of interest of IDLG staff members in hiring process. We have not found any evidence during of our review to substantiate the concern raised by provincial functionaries not we have evidence to ignore said concerns. On overall basis at the moment it is not possible to provide any view on the quality of induction process of LoA staff and their performance to date since ASGP does not have any data in this regard. Further, as part of this evaluation there was not enough time to really go into IDLG's related systems and provide an independent assessment. With respect to LoA with IARCSC again ASGP does not have accurate data available with respect to number of staff trained clustered in type of training, origin of participants like from PGO, Line Ministries or Municipalities etc. We just informed of certain percentages like almost 75% of all PGO, Municipality and Line Ministry staff in provinces is trained. There is also no data / report available for the quality and impact of trainings imparted.

Recommendations:

- An independent review of processes being used by IDLG for hiring and performance management of LoAs staff is performed to assess its effectiveness:
- ASGP should be able to track the number of LoA's along with basic information about each LoA. This will be very critical to plan activities in each province especially after signing of LoAs with PGO and Municipalities;
- The performance of LoA staff working in IDLG should also be assessed at least

on half yearly basis in comparison to the defined objectives of the programme

- An assessment of quality and impact of staff trained through IARCSC should be performed to assess the value for money achieved.

D. As per clause 9 of the LoAs signed between UNDP, IDLG and IARCSC UNDP has the right to initiate an external audit of costs claimed by IDLG. Till now no such audit was initiated by UNDP. ASGP is audited by an independent audit firm for the years 2008 and 2009, which does not mentioned in the scope of work that the auditors have reviewed the documentation of IDLG and has assessed their controls. Accordingly we conclude that clause 9 requirements have not been initiated. Further, as per clause 14 of LoA IDLG was required to perform physical verification of inventory items procured under ASGP on periodic basis but ASGP has no evidence whether physical verification was performed or not.

Recommendations:

- The external audit or assessment as recommended above should be immediately be initiated to comply with the assurance requirements of LoA;
- IDLG and IARCSC should asked to conduct physical verification of items procured and funded through ASGP and provided report to ASGP.

E. During early 2011 as part of new outreach strategy of ASGP LoAs were signed with all provincial PGOs. These LoAs will allow transfer of funds from ASGP to each PGO for utilization on activities to be agreed as part of implementation plan or a work plan of PGO. This is a paradigm shift from a totally centralized control framework to providing funds in the project account of each PGO which is to be operated by LoA staff members working each PGO. Although, there are number risk management related observations on this new LoA mechanism but since these are already signed and executed hence at minimum following risk management controls are suggested for inclusion in this framework as noted in the recommendation below:

Recommendations:

- Basic information about each LoA staff to be operating the bank account should be maintained. Said information should include, name, address, contact numbers, name of father, names, contact number, tazkara number of at least two close family members. Further, all said information verified through on site reference checks and confirmations;
- For the operations of the project bank account standing instructions should be given that the transactions could only be processed when along with bank transfer instruction or cheque pre-authorization signed by the Governor or his nominee and the Regional Manager is provided;

F. As per our review we found no monitoring and evaluation function with ASGP accordingly, currently there is not independent mechanism available within ASGP for operational assurance

Recommendation:

- A monitoring and evaluation function is created in the project management structure of ASGP reporting directly to Programme Manager with the objective have independent operational assurance on programmatic activities.
-

- G. The management letter of the external financial audit for the year ended December 31, 2009 following observations were reported:
- Understaffing and staff turnover is high
 - Non-execution of planned activities
 - Monitoring and evaluation plan not developed
 - Quarterly meetings of Project Board not held as planned
 - “Paid” stamp not affixed on supplier vouchers
 - Irregularities in respect of assets physical verifications
 - Discrepancies in cash verifications

ANNEX III

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT PAPER

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Evaluation / Review Performed by

Nameer Al-Hadithi B.Eng, MSc.

The documentary evidence suggests that ASGP II represents a significant development on ASGP I as a result of lessons learned by UNDP and support from donors. For example, there have been improvements with regard to the project management, documentation and specific processes such as those relating to HRs and procurement. However, the programme remains in a critical state, in large part due to the lack of a permanent management team. UNDP's primary focus in the immediate future should therefore be on agreeing a new structure for the project and on urgently recruiting a full management team capable of delivering sustained results over time.

This brief assessment focuses on those aspects of the programme and project management in need of particular attention.

1. GOVERNANCE

Programme Executive Group

The project document defines the governance structure designed to ensure leadership and oversight of the overall programme. In phases I and II of the programme, the oversight role has been assigned to the Programme Executive Group (PEG). The membership of the PEG is principally made up of representatives from UNDP, GoA and relevant donors. In the early stages of ASGP I, the PEG was chaired by UNDP and included representatives from UNAMA and a number of different Gogra entities (OAA, IARCSC, Moa). After the formation of IDLG in 2007, IDLG became the main GoA representative on the PEG. Since the start of ASGP II, the PEG has been co-chaired by UNDP and IDLG.

The records of PEG meetings show that the PEG met as follows:

Programme	Meeting No.	Date
ASGP I	1	Sep-06
	2	May-07
	3	Nov-07
	4	May-08
	5	Sep-08
	6	Dec-08
	7	May-09
	8	Dec-09
ASGP II	1	No meeting due to programme re-structuring
	2	Apr-10
	3	Aug-10
	4	Nov-10
	5	May-11

The table shows that whilst meetings were held, they were not always held as regularly as stipulated in the project document, at times dropping to just two meetings a year rather than four quarterly meetings as required

The agendas for PEG meetings have followed a set format. This could be seen as beneficial, in so far as it can help ensure that meetings are disciplined and focused. But donors have commented that in practice, the meeting agendas have been too rigid and

tightly controlled by IDLG in a way that has discouraged open discussion, limited the time for reviewing key issues and for donors to raise their concerns.

The PEG is required to approve major changes to the programme and provide a steer for the Project Manager on key issues. The group is mandated specifically to approve the following:

- a) Annual Work plans
- b) Completion report of ASGP I
- c) Budget of ASGP I and II along with any revisions
- d) Organization structure of ASGP
- e) Letter of Agreement signed between IDLG and UNDP and now with PGOs and Municipalities
- f) Audited Report for 2008 and 2009
- g) Progress reports
- h) Monitoring and Evaluation Reports.

In practice, many of these documents were not submitted to the PEG for approval and were simply approved by IDLG and UNDP bilaterally. This is a clear violation of the terms of the programme - as well as of good professional programme management principles e.g. Prince II methodology - and demonstrates a non-transparent process which was raised by donors as a significant concern.

UNDP Country Office

The UNDP Country Office in Afghanistan has taken an active interest in the running of the ASGP. In general terms, it is positive that they are concerned to ensure that the programme is successful. In practice, some ASGP and stakeholder staff have suggested that the Country Office's close interest in the programme has at times verged on micromanagement and as such has at times been counterproductive. This may have been due to anxieties within the Country Office about the way the programme is performing and their resulting desire to be involved in more of the operational activities to support the programme. But the consequence is that it is adding to the burden of excessive reporting (see below).


The UNDP Country Office should delegate the day-to-day management of the programme to a capable Project Management professional, and focus its own efforts on lobbying with UNAMA and GoA to promote wider policies and reforms in support of the programme outcomes.

2. HRS

Project Management Team Structure

International best practice for projects of this scale usually calls for a Team Leader (or chief of party) function to manage the policy and technical aspects of the programme with a separate full time dedicated Project Manager to direct and track the progress of the project, assess and mitigate risks to delivery, exercise fiduciary/budget control and manage day-to-day staff and office issues. For projects spanning multiple years a Deputy Team Leader is usually also engaged to provide cover when the Team Leader is out of country or travelling. This structure is used by the majority of international, non-governmental and commercial contractors to deliver projects similar to AGSP in comparable development environments. Indeed, the more challenging the development

environment, the more critical it is to have the right project management structure in place. (See diagram below on proposed structures). Please note: a diagram showing the current organisational structure of ASGP is shown at the end of this section.



The project management structure originally proposed for ASGP in both phases I and II contained some elements of the structure depicted above but due to the lack of suitable candidates identified a single person was hired to act both as Team Leader and Project Manager. As a result, the jobholder was severely overstretched and the constraints on management capacity have impacted on both the quality and rate of delivery of outputs by the programme. For example, reports were frequently late, visits to the provinces were rare and staffing issues took longer to resolve than might otherwise have been the case.

Frequent changes have been made to the project management structure during both ASGP I and ASGP II. This said, it was only following the creation of IDLG that ASGP I followed the formal process set out in programme documentation for revising the programme leadership structure. It appears no formal process has been followed in ASGP II. This seems to have been partly due to changes in the operational environment e.g. in relation to security issues, and partly due to changes of senior management on the programme. While it is clear that the nature of the programme and the operating environment may have required changes to the project management structure over time, there is little evidence to demonstrate that changes made have been consistently thought through or adequately justified.

Overall, the project management structure could also benefit from greater clarity and consistency. Over time, changes made have contributed to the existence of multiple

reporting lines confusing authority and responsibility. Attention should be devoted to clarifying a suitable and sustainable organisational project management structure which included clear ToRs for each position setting out roles and responsibilities as well as identifying reporting lines.

Four different individuals have acted as team leader/project manager for the programme to date:

- Mr Paul Lundberg Dec 2006 – May 2009
- Ms Joanne Adams February 2009 – February 2010
- Mr Ram Krishna Pokharel April 2010 – January 2011
- Mr Basil Comnas January 2011 – July 2011

While the first Team Leader for the project was in post for some two and a half years, subsequent team leaders have been in post for one year or less. Given the importance of leadership to a project of this nature in an environment as difficult as that currently present in Afghanistan, this lack of continuity at the top, together with the relative lack of overall staff capacity in the programme, has inevitably impacted on the overall effectiveness of the programme.

Capacity of Project Staff

The programme documents for ASGP I and II specify the need for qualified and experienced staff to provide capacity building and technical assistance to the GoA. There is a distinct lack of Public Administrative Reform and Governance expertise at all levels of the project. To date, within the international staff there has been just one senior policy advisor with significant governance experience and a small number of staff with limited governance experience for the whole project. This is too few to support a programme which is designed to work in close partnership with the relevant central government ministry and reach all 34 provinces across Afghanistan.

In terms of general capabilities of national staff, the situation is relatively good in Kabul and in some of the provinces e.g. Mezar, Uruzgan, where LoA staff (particularly at IDLG) have reasonable capacity and are able to draft useful reports and work comfortably in Pashto, Dari and English, facilitating their communication with other local staff in Kabul and in the regions and with UNDP and international donors. The challenge is significantly greater in other provinces e.g. Helmand, Kandahar where it is difficult to attract and retain suitably qualified staff. Donor feedback gained from interviews in the provinces suggests that LoA Task Order Staff have limited or no experience in the areas they are supporting. Interviews of these staff confirm that they have limited skill sets and a number of them do not speak English and thus are unable to interact directly with donors or the ASGP management team. This affects the ability of staff to implement the programme and to evaluate and report on the impact of their activities at the provincial level. For example, the relative weakness in local staff capacity is apparent in the varying quality of field reports received by ASGP in Kabul.

Staff Recruitment and Retention

Recruitment and retention of the necessary staff has been a challenge throughout the project. High turnover of project staff, especially of the lead project manager is not unique for development projects in difficult environments. Equally, in the case of a multiyear programme like ASGP, it is important to have long term staffing in place. During ASGP I and II, 177 staff were employed on the programme. At the start of 2011 only 85 remained on the programme, and since the start of 2011 to-date (July 2011) a

further 20% of staff left, leaving in place just under 70 of the required 119 staff. Of the 20% leaving this year, well over half had occupied key positions on the programme.

One possible factor contributing to this high turnover of staff is the way in which UNDP is recruiting staff to the programme. Given that staff hired on long term contracts (more than 6 months) cannot easily be removed e.g. in the case of poor performance, UNDP has preferred to hire staff using short term contracts (3-6 month terms) and then to extend the person when the contract expires. This has made planning - particularly important for a long term project such as ASGP - more difficult. And it has done nothing to incentivise staff to stay longer than the minimum term. Combined with the difficult environment in which many of the staff have to operate, this has led to low motivation and lack of commitment to stay for the duration of the programme.

UN rules on recruitment have also negatively affected UNDP when they have sought to move staff from short term IC contracts to long term FT contracts. The process requires staff to reapply for their own positions in competition against other candidates. When not managed correctly, this leads to staff having to leave the project and wait to go through a recruitment process before coming back if they are successful. In the meantime there is a gap in support and, due to the large number of vacancies on the project roster, no effective cover can be put in place to ensure the work is continued. Staff who leave as a result of this process or when their contracts end, also take away with them their accumulated institutional knowledge. The relatively high turnover and frequent gaps in staff coverage contribute to a lack of sustained team cohesion and, together with a limited number of people often engaged on multiple tasking, can lead to significant reduction in quality of outputs and burnout of staff in post.

3. PROJECT MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY

Work Plans

Fundamental to effective programme and project management is clear agreement to a single, authoritative work plan governing the duration of the programme/project, identifying clearly the outcomes to be achieved and the inputs/activities linked to these, backed up with effective monitoring and evaluation of progress against the agreed work plan. Adjustment of the original work plan can take place where necessary and agreed in line with the approved project governance and management structures.

In practice, this is the area of project management where ASGP has displayed greatest weakness and control and it is the area of greatest contention with donors. ASGP I and II have failed to have a single agreed work plan for the duration of the programme at any stage. This has significantly hindered implementation, delivery and monitoring and evaluation of progress at all stages.

Reviewing the programme and project documentation, it is difficult to identify a single authoritative work plan for the programme in time. It is clear that there have been a number of revisions to the work plan used over time. While these may have been done for legitimate reasons e.g. to refocus delivery from a national to a provincial level, it is difficult to identify either the single guiding work plan at any point or to see the rationale for changes made e.g. removing the component supporting IARCSC training.

Similarly, it has been difficult to relate the differences in regional/provincial work plans over time to a single overarching national work plan. Differences in the developmental levels of provinces are an accepted fact of life in Afghanistan. GoA recognises this and accordingly classifies provinces from Grades 1 to 3 in line with the level of development in each province. Provinces such as Herat, Balkh and Nangarhar are classified as

Grade 1 whilst Nouristan and Paktika are classified as Grade 3. This difference in provincial development is cited as an issue by regional managers which they have overcome by having regional work plans. The variation across these regional work plans – without clear linkage to a single national work plan - makes it difficult for the team in Kabul both to manage the work and provide support and to measure progress consistently across the country. In addition, IDLG and MRRD have not always coordinated effectively together or with ASGP and donors and ASGP in turn has not sought to ensure coordination between IDLG and MRRD activity and their national and regional work plans. In part as a result, IDLG has tended to focus on the Provincial and Municipal Levels while MRRD has focused on the District level with relatively little coordination between the two.

UNDP has taken positive steps recently to address this issue by providing a single national unified basic work plan and organising the first coordination meeting between IDLG and MRRD. This combined work plan sets-out the basic activities and outcomes that ASGP II hopes to achieve while allowing regional managers the scope to work with LoA to deliver them. As the new work plan was only issued in June 2011, it is difficult to comment further on its impact at this stage. This said, discussions with the regional managers suggest there is still some cause for concern as these managers still consider the new work plan as an optional nice to have rather than as an essential guide for delivery. They still believe they must have the flexibility to deliver what they individually see as the best options within their provinces, rather than being bound by any national plan. This again highlights the need for strong UNDP and ASGP leadership, with better internal communications to staff, regular progress tracking and field visits to verify results if delivery is to be achieved.

Activities Workflow

In evaluating the project documents for ASGP I, it is possible to identify some workflow streams for the components of the programme. Critically a number of the stated deliverables were linked to external deliverables to be performed by other work being supported by other donors or GoA agencies. This unrealistic sequencing of activities essentially fed into or relied on third party outcomes. As in the case of the RIMUs, when a decision was taken not to fully implement the RIMUs structure, IDLG-ASGP instead opted to use Task Order Staff to fulfil this role, but only within IDLG. This change affected the project by:

- increasing the demand on the project resourcing, as more resources had to be committed in order to cover the shortfall; and
- delaying progress, as time and resources had to be spent on managing changes to the programme.

Better programme management and coordination with donors would have helped to avoid this kind of problem and to facilitate better risk management, thereby minimising the impact on the programme delivery and resourcing.

Letters of Agreement

New Letters of Agreement were agreed in February 2011 between UNDP and the relevant GoA partner entity e.g. IDLG or the Provincial Governor. They were designed to be a novel way forward to enable UNDP to disburse funds and support to government entities within Afghanistan whilst maintaining accountability standards and fiduciary control. The system of LoAs, originally used in ASGP I to provide staff for IDLG, was later extended to all provinces in ASGP II to provide staff and equipment to PGOs and

municipalities in each province. The LoA facilitated payment of salaries to national staff and enabled small scale funding (approx. eleven thousand dollars) to be made available for procurement activities. It is reported that it took over 8 months to complete agreement and signature of the LoAs between UNDP and the provinces. There remains a number of outstanding questions on the terms of the LoAs that need to be clarified as soon as possible e.g. on how the allocation of eleven thousand dollars can be spent and whether the allowance is for eleven thousand dollars per item or per invoice.

UNDP recently issued a draft set of Standard Operating Procedures (July 2011) to accompany the LoA. The SOPs cover important issues such as the utilisation of funds, HR processes, M&E requirements and so on. Although the SOPs are clearly intended to improve effective use and accountability of funds in support of the LOAs, given that they have only just been issued, some months after the original LoAs were signed, and that there is no reference within the LoAs themselves to the new SOPs, it is unclear to what extent the SOPs are likely to be implemented. The SOPs themselves have no legal status. It seems likely that at least the SOPs and possibly both LoAs and SOPs will have to be re-signed following approval of the Programme Executive Group.

There are wider challenges, too, in relation to the LoAs. Although the LoAs have been signed by UNDP and the relevant GoA partner entity, they have not been approved by the Programme Executive Group. And the LoAs were signed by all parties without the vital attachment 3 (the work plan) detailing the expected activities and responsibilities for each PGO. It is not clear whether the LoA documents have any recognised legal status. Perhaps most importantly, there is no mention within the LoAs of what action might be taken in response to any failure of compliance or default on commitments.

Project Reporting and Information Sharing

The project documents call for a number of reports to be used to track progress. These include the requirement for quarterly and annual reporting to be provided to IDLG and the donors.

Under ASGP I, project reports were infrequent and often of poor quality, tending both to be insufficiently focused on reporting against the project requirements and to contain superfluous information covering areas not relevant to or outside the project remit. Under ASGP II, these trends have continued despite attempts to improve the format by donors and UNDP. Reports were often late (deadlines for submission to stakeholders were regularly missed), tended to be overlong and contain too much operational detail and too little qualitative analysis against the project plan.

Donors have commented that the quarterly reports which were shared with them too often contained non verifiable claims or reported on activity not within the current approved work plan. Most importantly, ASGP reports have consistently failed to identify what incremental progress has been achieved since the immediately preceding report in each province or area of support, thereby making tracking progress against the work plan difficult or impossible to assess.

In addition to the quarterly reporting required for donors and stakeholders, ASGP II has required field staff to provide weekly reports, with UNDP requiring completion of a monthly questionnaire to report on progress. These requirements have added to the overall ASGP staff workload and contributed to reporting fatigue.

The main consequences of late reports have included:

- Disruption to coordination efforts between the donors and GoA. If donors were informed of planned activity in time, they would be able to better coordinate with their PRTs and highlight areas of overlap.
- Delays in tackling issues leading to increased costs in resolving them e.g. staffing issues which take time to plan and implement.

Document Control

It is important to highlight another key issue for the ASGP on archiving and document management. There is strong evidence to suggest that no document version controls were ever put in place or enforced across the teams. It is difficult to identify when key documents were originally released or, in some cases, which version is currently the latest draft. Version numbers and/or dates are frequently missing. The use of simple techniques, such as clearly marking version numbers and dates would help a great deal in ensuring correct identification and control of document drafts and final versions.

Programme Monitoring and Evaluation

ASGP I and II both identified monitoring and evaluation as key to the effective implementation of the project. Both inception reports highlighted the importance of M&E and outlined a variety of possible methods for ensuring credible monitoring including regular reviews, field visits and interviews. Revisions to ASGP I underlined the need for project assurance which was later incorporated under UNDP's role in ASGP II.

There is little evidence that regular M&E activity took place during ASGP I. The EC carried out a monitoring review, but, based on the data supplied by ASGP I, there was no other regular formal monitoring.

There is no evidence of any formal M&E activity having taken place under ASGP II to date. The UNDP devised monthly questionnaire could be regarded as an internal M&E tracking mechanism, but the evaluation team has not been given any formal reports based on the information provided in these questionnaires. Certainly no external M&E review has taken place since the start of ASGP II in early 2010.

Capability to Deliver PAR

Due to the limited time available on this assignment and the fact that support to the IARCSC and PAR have been dropped in ASGP II, this area will only be explored briefly and in the body of the main report.

4. TRANSITION TO AFGHAN IMPLEMENTATION

The current strategy and timelines for transition of the overall programme to IDLG are vague. Current statements refer to timelines for transition of one to three years. There are no detailed statements of how the transition period might be managed or identification of key milestones on the way to full transition of the programme. The IDLG exit strategy simply lists a number of posts against suggested years of transition without giving further detail on how this will be achieved or what conditions might be necessary in order to ensure any transition is sustainable.

There is a clear need for a more detailed strategy setting out how transition will be managed successfully. UNDP, IDLG and donors together need to agree on an outline transition plan, including appropriate milestones and identifying a final deadline by when transition should have been achieved. A target date should be agreed by the transition

committee with IDLG and the MoF identifying by when all LoAs should have transitioned to the GoA payroll. UNDP should propose a viable date e.g. the start of the penultimate budget cycles before the end of the project, in order to allow enough time to resolve any outstanding issues.

A team should be established to plan and monitor the transition process. This team should inter alia:

- Review contracts of LoA staff. One obvious option would be to transfer LoA to tashkeel positions where possible. Where this is not possible, then perhaps senior level staff could be transferred to the MCP programme and middle management and advisory staff be placed on NIBP contracts.
- Agree a timeline with IDLG for ending support to the LoAs.
- Agree a timeline and funding mechanism with the MoF.
- Agree the point beyond which no more LoA staff will be recruited.
- Agree a reporting format for the transition period.
- Conduct an asset survey and prepare asset handover documentation.
- Set a date for project closure and prepare staff disengagement.

5. CONCLUSION

The overall programme goals and purpose remain relevant. But the rate of progress made on ASGP I was insufficient to deliver the goals set out for that phase and if the current rate of progress under AGSP II continues it is likely also to fail to provide sufficient high quality technical assistance to ensure achievement of the agreed outcomes for the programme as a whole. And at least some of the achievements claimed by ASGP to date could not be attributed solely to the ASGP programme. Both phases have suffered from poor programme and project design and implementation, frequent leadership changes, failure to adhere to the agreed programme governance structure and design or to commonplace project management methodologies and from on-going staffing issues.

It is of concern that the programme in both phases failed to follow the agreed governance control mechanisms put in place at the start. The role and responsibilities of the Project Executive Group were clearly defined for both ASGP I and II. But in practice the role of the PEG in approving and steering the programme was often neglected or marginalised. Over time, IDLG took on a greater role in running and steering the PEG. This effectively sidelined the ASGP implementation team, UNDP and the donors. PEG meeting minutes frequently record IDLG reporting on ASGP and UNDP key progress. Programme decisions are recorded as having been taken by IDLG and presented to other PEG member as a *fait accompli*. There is no evidence to suggest that UNDP took any action to remedy this and indeed, on a number of occasions, it is clear that UNDP effectively encouraged this status quo.

The original scope of the programme was perhaps overambitious, given the realities of operating in the hostile, post-conflict environment of Afghanistan, particularly in the regions, and the relatively limited resources available for the programme. The challenge was further compounded by the difficulties encountered in recruiting and retaining sufficient qualified staff and in maintaining team continuity and cohesion. Project progress has been heavily reliant throughout on a small number of key personnel covering multiple positions. The team thus has had no redundancy or capacity to cover for staff absences. The loss of a single member of the team for any period of time has

had a direct adverse impact on programme delivery in a number of different work areas and/or regions.

The lack of a single, authoritative agreed work plan to direct activity and facilitate reporting and tracking of progress has been a significant weakness of the programme, resulting both in slower and less effective delivery than might otherwise have been the case and to delays in identifying issues that need addressing. There is a clear need both for a single overarching work plan for the full five-year programme as well as specific annual and regional work plans which should all be clearly related.

The creation of LoAs to give more flexibility for the programme to channel funding and support via IDLG is innovative in its approach. However the current format requires some urgent strengthening. The LoA and associated SOPs should be reviewed, including by a legal expert, and additional clauses should be included to strengthen accountability and auditing, clarify the steps for termination of these agreements (including a sunset clause) and set out actions in the event of non-compliance.

Partly as a result of the lack of a clear, definitive work plan, the reporting mechanism in place has not adequately monitored progress against agreed work plan milestones. Greater emphasis has been given to the quantity of reporting than to its quality or utility. So while much staff time has been taken up with reporting designed to satisfy the needs of UNDP and donors, staff have suffered reporting fatigue. The reporting produced has failed to identify issues sufficiently early to enable mitigating action to be put in place and has not satisfied donors.

While the pressure from UNDP on ASGP management to deliver frequent reports is understandable, the effect has in practice been to divert effort away from delivering project outputs and to focus effort on delivering quantity rather than quality of reporting. Fewer, better quality reports, more clearly reporting progress against the agreed work plan would provide better targeted and actionable information, allowing early steps to be taken where necessary to adjust focus and inputs to ensure delivery of agreed outputs and outcomes.

Transition planning is now an urgent matter, particularly in light of planned military drawdown for 2014 and donors' own transition goals. Currently ASGP has no document setting out such plans and this is a matter of concern for donors. ASGP should look to form a working group with IDGL, MoF and MRRD to work on putting together a transition plan that is acceptable to all parties. This work should be completed within 6 months and no later than the start of the next budget year. This would give MoF sufficient time to start transitioning staff to the tashkeel from the next budget year.

Overall the ASGP programme has achieved some success in establishing IDLG and in helping them deliver a policy for Sub national Governance. However, the consistently inadequate levels of staffing, combined with systemic failures in running the programme in line with its pre-agreed methodology, mean that the programme is now facing significant challenges. Unless urgent action is taken by UNDP to address the critical areas of staffing, team and project management structures, work planning, targeted reporting and transition, it is hard to see how ASGP II can deliver significantly more than ASGP I. On the other hand, sustained focus on these issues for a period of six months with the right resources could put this programme back on track and help restore donor faith in UNDP.

6. ASGP HR PLAN 2011


No	Post Title	Expected Level	Status Vacant or Incumbent
1	Chief Technical Advisor	P6	Basil Comnas, acting
2	Project Manager	P5	VACANT
3	Executive Associate	SB 3	Samiullah Nazemi
4	Senior Policy Advisor	P5	Going to filled soon by SSA
5	Project Associate	SB 3	VACANT
6	Programme Specialist (Advisor to IDLG)	P 4	VACANT
7	Technical Specialist (Advisor on SNG to IDLG Director General	SB 5	VACANT
8	Technical Specialist (Advisor on Sub-national Planning and Management)	P 4	VACANT
9	Technical Specialist (Advisor on Budget and Fiscal Planning and Management)	P 4	VACANT
10	Provincial Governance and Development Specialist (PGO)	SB 4	VACANT
11	Provincial Governance and Development Specialist (PC)	SB 4	Hasmat Hijran
12	Project Associate	SB 3	Parwan Wafa
13	Knowledge, Information and Communication Manager & Trainer	P 4	VACANT
14	Knowledge Management and Training Specialist	SB 4	VACANT
15	Reporting Officer	P 3	VACANT
16	Results and Reporting Specialist	SB 4	VACANT
17	Provincial Statistics and Information Management Specialist	SB 4	VACANT
18	Municipal Information Management Specialist	SB 4	Fawad Anwarzia
19	Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist	SB 4	VACANT
20	Project Associate	SB 3	Haroon Hazem
21	Municipal Governance/ Reform Team Leader	SB 5	Nasir Hamidi
22	Technical Specialist (Municipal Planning and Governance Advisor)	P 4	VACANT
23	Revenue Enhancement and Administration Analyst	SB 4	Nasir Salihzada
24	Municipal Service Delivery Specialist	SB 4	Zabi Issa
25	Project Associate	SB 3	Shah wali
26	Logistical Manager and Trainer	P 4	VACANT
27	Operations Specialist	SB 4	Jawid Qaumi
28	Administration Associate	SB 3	VACANT
29	Budget Officer	SB 4	Freshta Mahiudin
30	Finance Officer	SB 4	VACANT
31	Finance Associate	SB 3	Fazel Sediqi
32	Finance Associate	SB 3	VACANT
33	Asset and Logistics Associate	SB 3	Shafiqullah Safi
34	Logistic and Customs Associate	SB 3	VACANT
35	ICT Associate	SB 3	Wais Ahmadi
36	Travel Assistant	SB 3	M.Din Taheri

No	Post Title	Expected Level	Status Vacant or Incumbent
37	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Nasir
38	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Qasim
39	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Jamshid
40	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Shoaib
41	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Zemari
42	Driver (Kabul)	SB 1	Nooragha
43	Cleaner (Kabul)	SB 1	Ghulam Sakhi
44	CENTER Technical Specialist (Governance-Kabul)	P 3	Sara Van Galeen
45	NORTH Technical Specialist (Governance-Mazar)	P4	Anil Chandrika
46	WEST Technical Specialist (Governance-Herat)	P4	Atul Shekhar
47	NORTHEAST Technical Specialist (Governance-Kunduz)	P4	VACANT
48	EAST Technical Specialist (Governance-Jalalabad)	P4	VACANT
49	SOUTH Technical Specialist (Governance-Kandahar)	P4	Samuel Sarpong (acting)
50	Uruzgan Technical Specialist(Governance-Tirin Kot)	P3	Yugesh Pradhanang
51	Central Highland Technical Specialist(Governance -Bamiyan)	P4	Yuichi Tanada
52	Provincial Governance Manager (Helmand)	P4	VACANT
53	Provincial Governance Manager (Kunar)	P 3	VACANT
54	Provincial Governance Manager (Takhar)	P 3	VACANT
55	Provincial Governance Manager (Pulkhumri)	P 3	VACANT
56	Provincial Governance Manager (Badakhshan)	P 3	VACANT
57	Provincial Governance Manager (Sar e Pul)	P 3	VACANT
58	Provincial Governance Manager (Maimana)	P 3	VACANT
59	Provincial Governance Manager (Sheberghan)	P 3	VACANT
60	Provincial Governance Manager (Qala e Naw)	P 3	VACANT
61	Provincial Governance Manager (Ghor)	P 3	VACANT
62	Provincial Governance Manager (Nimroz)	P 3	VACANT
63	Provincial Governance Manager (Zabul)	P 3	VACANT
64	Provincial Governance Manager (Matun/Khost)	P 3	VACANT
65	Provincial Governance Manager (Daykundi)	P 3	VACANT
66	CENTER Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	Zarif Akbari
67	NORTH Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
68	WEST Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
69	NORTHEAST Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
70	EAST Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
71	SOUTH Regional Governance and Development Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
72	CENTER Regional Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	VACANT
73	NORTH Regional Municipal Governance and	SB 4	VACANT

No	Post Title	Expected Level	Status Vacant or Incumbent
	Development Specialist (Mazar)		
74	WEST Regional Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
75	NORTHEAST Regional Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
76	EAST Regional Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
77	SOUTH Municipal Governance and Development Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
78	CENTER Regional Communication Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	VACANT
79	NORTH Regional Communication Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
80	WEST Regional Communication Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
81	NORTHEAST Regional Communication Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
82	EAST Regional Communication Specialist(Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
83	SOUTH Regional Communication Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
84	CENTRAL Highland Regional Communication Specialist (BAMYAN)	SB 4	VACANT
85	EASTERN Regional Communication Specialist (GARDEZ)	SB 4	VACANT
86	CENTER Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	Rahmanullah Rahmani
87	NORTH Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
88	WEST Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
89	NORTHEAST Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
90	EAST Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
91	SOUTH Regional Performance Measurement Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
92	CENTER Regional Program Finance Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	VACANT
93	NORTH Regional Program Finance Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
94	WEST Regional Program Finance Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
95	NORTHEAST Regional Program Finance Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
96	EAST Regional Program Finance Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
97	SOUTH Regional Program Finance Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT

No	Post Title	Expected Level	Status Vacant or Incumbent
98	CENTER Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Kabul)	SB 4	VACANT
99	NORTH Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Mazar)	SB 4	VACANT
100	WEST Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Herat)	SB 4	VACANT
101	NORTHEAST Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Kunduz)	SB 4	VACANT
102	EAST Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Jalalabad)	SB 4	VACANT
103	SOUTH Regional Civil Society and Public Mobilization Specialist (Kandahar)	SB 4	VACANT
104	34 Chief Provincial Governance and Development Advisors to Provincial Governors	SB 4 or P2/P3	VACANT
105	25 Chief Municipal Governance and Development Advisors	SB 4 or P2/P3	VACANT
106	CENTER Regional Finance Associate (Kabul)	SB 3	VACANT
107	NORTH Regional Finance Associate (Mazar)	SB 3	Shahram
108	WEST Regional Finance Associate (Herat)	SB 3	Kifayat Ali
109	NORTHEAST Regional Finance Associate (Kunduz)	SB 3	VACANT
110	EAST Regional Finance Associate (Jalalabad)	SB 3	Mansoor Khan
111	SOUTH Regional Finance Associate (Kandahar)	SB 3	VACANT
112	CENTRAL HIGHLAND Finance Associate (Bamyan)	SB 3	M.Reza Balkhi
113	CENTER Regional Admin Associate (Kabul)	SB 3	VACANT
114	NORTH Regional Admin Associate (Mazar)	SB 3	Habibullah Holkar
115	WEST Regional Admin Associate (Herat)	SB 3	Ahmad Rafi Rasuli
116	NORTHEAST Regional Admin Associate (Kunduz)	SB 3	M. Basir Habibi
117	EAST Regional Admin Associate (Jalalabad)	SB 3	Rizwanullah Sadat
118	SOUTH Regional Admin Associate (Kandahar)	SB 3	Basir Ahmad
119	CENTRAL HIGHLAND Admin Associate (Bamyan)	SB 3	M.Sakhidad Amin

7. CURRENT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ASGP



ANNEX IV

SUB NATIONAL GOVERNANCE PAPER

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Evaluation / Review Performed by

Abdul Moien Jawhary MBA, MSc

1. ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ASGP II CURRENT GOAL, PURPOSE AND OUTPUTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE KABUL CONFERENCE COMMITMENTS AND THE SUB NATIONAL GOVERNANCE POLICY

The existing Goal, Purpose and Expected Outputs of ASGP II are as follows:

ASGP II Goal: According to the signed ASGP II programme document and its Inception Report; this programme has been designed to support Outcomes 2, and 3 of UNDAF effective for 2010 – 2013², and the expected Country Programme Outcome 3³. However with reference to the outcome 3 there are two specific expected outputs identified⁴.

Purpose: According to the signed ASGP II programme document and its Inception Report the programme has been demand driven and has been developed after consultations with government partners at both central and provincial level. The purpose has been that through a provincial approach ASGP II will significantly scale up activities in sub national policy development and implementation; national capacity building of IDLG; assistance to provincial, district, and municipal administrations, respective councils, and, support to local coordination mechanisms at the provincial and district levels.

Expected Outputs:

I. According to the signed ASGP- II programme document effective (2010-2014)

1. National systems, procedures, and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor sub national governance policy are in place by 2014
2. Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS.
3. IDLG and IARCSC have the capacity to coordinate PAR implementation, and the IARCSC sub national offices have the capacity to deliver public administration reports to all sub national government institutions by 2014.
4. Provincial and District Councils have improved capacity to represent citizen interests and monitor sub national governance; and,
5. Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under PAR) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.

II. According to the Inception Report⁵ developed in December 2010, it has been decided that out of the five outlined expected outputs the third one "IDLG and IARCSC have the capacity to coordinate PAR implementation, and the IARCSC sub national offices have the capacity to deliver public administration reports to all sub national government institutions by 2014.", will no longer be delivered by ASGP II.

Moreover in the last part of the work plan in the inception report covers ASGP II Management, which provides information and direction to its managers on certain requirements for progress and quality check through the timeframe of the programme

² Outcome2. Government capacity to deliver services to the poor and vulnerable is enhanced.

Outcome3. The institutions of democratic governance are integrated components of the nation.

³ Outcome3. The State has improved ability to deliver services to foster human development and elected bodies have greater oversight capacity.

⁴ 3.1. Inclusive legislation, policies, and programmes are in place and government institutions are strengthened to improve the quality of service delivery.

3.2. Improved capacity of elected bodies to provide effective oversight.

⁵ Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme-II, December 2010, Inception Report, Ps 47-52

Expected areas of the Sub national Governance Policy (SNGP) and the Kabul Conference to be covered by ASGP II are as follows:

Contents of the SNGP:

- IDLG and its functions
- The institutional framework for sub national governance in Afghanistan
- Roles and responsibilities of the provincial governors
- Responsibilities of the provincial, district, and village administrations
- Roles of the provincial and district councils
- Roles of the line departments of the ministries
- Roles of the PDCs, PAAs, DDAs, and DAAs, and CDCs
- Codes of conduct and code of ethics
- Sub national jurisdiction
- Sub national planning, and sub national financing
- Municipal governance
- Gender in sub national governance
- Rights to information
- Participation of civil society and media in sub national governance
- Public administration reform and capacity development in sub national government
- Performance measurement in sub national governance
- Public service standards and customer service orientation in public service
- Local economic development
- Community-based natural resources management including land administration

Kabul Conference related commitments: Kabul Conference held on the 20th July 2010 in Kabul-Afghanistan. According to the communiqué of the conference it has had a number of governance improvement commitments and provisions such as items 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 28.⁶

⁶ “2.....a mandate to adopt a “whole of state”, approach and a “whole of government” path to national renewal”, “The essence of the “whole of government” approach is structural reform to create an effective, accountable, and transparent government that can deliver services to the population and safeguard national interests.”

“3.....these events reaffirmed the commitment of the Afghan Government to improve security, governance, and economic opportunity for its citizens. In addition, these events reaffirmed the international community’s commitment to support the transition to Afghan leadership and its intention to provide security and economic assistance to realize our shared objectives.”

“5..... The international community welcomes the Afghan Government’s committed reforms outlined in its new National Priority Programmes.”

“6.....The Kabul Process recognizes that the Afghan Government can guarantee security only when its people are confident in its ability to deliver public services, good governance, human rights protection including gender equality, and economic opportunities.”

“7.....To achieve success in Afghanistan, the partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community should be based on the leadership and ownership of the Afghan Government, underpinned by its unique and irreplaceable knowledge of its own culture and people. This partnership should include coherent support by the international community, lending its resources and technical knowledge to the implementation of Afghan- defined programmes.”

“9. Good governance, the rule of law, and human rights form the foundation of the strategy to achieve a stable and prosperous Afghanistan”, “Increase the efficiency and effectiveness by continuing to implement broad-based policy, legal, and structural reform in public administration”, “Seek understanding with donors, over the next six months on a harmonized salary scale for donors funded salaries of persons working within the Afghan Government”, “ Implement over the next twelve months,

Good governance has been identified as a priority area of support for UN in Afghanistan. It has been outlined in UNDAF for 2010 to 2013. The UNDP framework in Afghanistan supporting democratic governance has been identified one of the important development areas.

In addition to other initiatives, UNDP has designed and launched the Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme (ASGP). ASGP's phase one has come to an end by 2010, and in early 2010 a new phase of the programme (ASGP II) started to operate.

A. ANALYSIS OF ASGP II EXPECTED OUTPUT COMPATIBILITY WITH THE KABUL CONFERENCE COMMITMENTS

I. The following components of the Kabul Conference are considered in ASGP II:

- Public Administration Reform
- Concept of partnership with Afghans and national institutions
- Improve governance

II. The following components of the Kabul Conference received little or no consideration in ASGP II:

- Effectiveness, Accountability, and Transparency in the government
- Security and economic opportunity
- Human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption
- Sub national finance and budget
- Afghans ownership, and implementation of National Priority Programmes

2. ANALYSIS OF ASGP II EXPECTED OUTPUTS COMPATIBILITY WITH THE CONTENTS OF SNGP

I. The following components of the SNGP are covered under ASGP II expected outputs:

- The indicative activities related to output 1, ASGP II are focused to support and lobby for establishment and support of institutional framework for sub national governance mainly through IDLG as its main national counterpart.
- In order to address and identify the responsibilities of the provincial, district and village administration, ASGP II has set a target for itself that the principal associated laws and procedures are in place by 2014
- The output 2 of ASGP II is expected to have the PGOs and the DGOs have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance and security strategies in

in a phased and fiscally sustainable manner, the Sub national Governance Policy, and strengthen local institutional capacity, including training of civil servants and development of training curricula, and develop sub national regulatory, financing, and budgetary frameworks.”

“28. The Afghan Government is to focus on reform of service delivery institutions, policy decisions and the implementation of the National Priority Programmes, within the framework of a prioritized Afghanistan National Development Strategy, in its rolling 100-days action plans.”

accordance with ANDS. It is to better define and emphasis on the roles of the provincial and district governors' offices.

- In order to better clarify the roles of the provincial and district councils ASGP II has its output 4 focusing the activities to make sure that the provincial and district councils have the improved capacity to represent citizen's interests and monitor sub national governance.
- There has been embedded consideration of sub national planning under the expected output 1 of ASGP II.
- With regards to the municipal governance, ASGP II has captured this under its expected output 5 which states that the municipalities have the institutional and organization framework and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.
- With relation to gender in sub national governance there are a number of benchmarks set out under its expected output 2, focusing the activities to municipalities and PCs support.
- Under expected output 2, establishment of provincial information service centers have been considered to address the public right to information.
- PAR and capacity enhancement of sub national government has been considered under the expected output 3 that states IDLG and IARCSC have the capacity to coordinate PAR implementation and the IARCSC sub national offices have the capacity to deliver PAR to all sub national government institutions by 2014
- Performance measurement component in sub national civil service institutions has also been covered under the expected output 3.
- According to the log frame of the programme the public service standards part of the SNGP has been expected under its output 3.

II. The following components of the SNGP are not considered under ASGP II:

- The authority and function of IDLG
- Line ministry departments and district offices
- PDCs, PAAs, DDAs, and DAAs, CDCs
- Code of conduct and code of ethics in public service institutions
- Sub national jurisdiction
- Participation of civil society and media in sub national governance
- Local economic development
- Community based natural resources management including land administration.

3. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ASGP II ACTIVITIES IN RELATION TO THE GOAL, PURPOSE, AND OUTPUTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR RE-FOCUSSING REQUIRED IF ANY

The existing Goal, Purpose and Expected Outputs of ASGP II are as follows:

ASGP II Goal: According to the signed ASGP II programme document and its Inception Report; this programme has been designed to support Outcomes 2, and 3 of UNDAF effective for 2010 – 2013, and the expected Country Programme Outcome 3. However

with reference to the outcome 3 there are two specific expected outputs identified.

Purpose: According to the signed ASGP II programme document and its Inception Report the programme has been demand driven and has been developed after consultations with government partners at both central and provincial level. The purpose has been that through a provincial approach ASGP II will significantly scale up activities in sub national policy development and implementation; national capacity building of IDLG; assistance to provincial, district, and municipal administrations, respective councils, and, support to local coordination mechanisms at the provincial and district levels.

Expected Outputs: I. According to the signed ASGP- II programme document effective (2010-2014)

1. National systems, procedures, and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor sub national governance policy are in place by 2014
2. Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS.
3. Provincial and District Councils have improved capacity to represent citizen interests and monitor sub national governance; and,
4. Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under PAR) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.

Since early 2010, ASGP II has been working to achieve four out of five expected outputs. The fifth one was deleted according to the inception report – December 2010. The programme documents of ASGP II, the available progress reports, the field visits and the interview made, indicate that there have been numerous work plans with different indicative activities. However the review team decided to track the indicative activities reflected in the results and resources framework of the signed programme document of ASGP II. These are also those indicated in the work plan of the inception report.

Analysis summary of the effectiveness of the activities and the rates of progress in relation to the programmes expected outputs

The following table is prepared to show the summary of the analysis of the effectiveness of the ASGP indicative activities and the rates of progress in relation to the programmes expected outputs:

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
1	National systems, procedures, and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate	Drafting all necessary laws and associated rules of procedure and guidelines under the area of authority of IDLG	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	The activity has been identified to be highly effective to reach the output. It still requires more lobbying and advocacy of IDLG. The progress reported on

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
	and monitor sub national governance policy are in place by 2014			drafting new laws are slow.
		Development of key institutional, organizational and individual capacities in IDLG	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	This activity has a timeline until end 2013. However the progress requires more speed; especially in strengthen in the financial management, budgeting, internal audit systems, and M&E in IDLG.
		Capacity Development of Policy unit of IDLG with respect to its key functions and capacities	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	The progress over the sub-component related to the development of the internal capacity building and ToT for policy unit of IDLG has been identified to be slow, and requires faster progress.
		Meetings of inter-ministerial coordination / implementation structures to review progress of SNGP implementation	No substantial progress found	The timeline for this activity has come near to be over. This was identified to be highly effective and critical to be executed as early as possible.
		SNG policy awareness for key staff of PGOs and DGOs and members of PCs and DCs	No substantial progress found	Some parts of the timeline given to it have already gone. It has been identified highly effective and critical to be executed as early as possible.
		SNG policy awareness for citizens regarding roles and responsibilities of sub-national authorities	No substantial progress found	Some part of the sit timeline for this activity has already gone. It is effective to be executed as soon as possible; especially it's sub-component for assisting in conducting public hearings.
		Capacity Development of IDLG with respect to key capacities related to sub national finance and planning	Some progress in HR but not yet any progress with other sub-components	This activity is a key indicator for SNG. However, more acceleration is required especially in sub national finance.

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
2	Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS.	Strengthening provincial and district offices to fulfill their roles and responsibilities	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More focus should be made on to the components of provincial recruitment and appointment committees.
		Introduction of functioning modern administrative management systems in PGOs and DGOs	In progress with the work plan, not measurable	More work is required to be done in training of the PGOs and DGOs staffs on their roles and responsibilities.
		Establishing performance measurement systems for all provinces and government institutions	Little or no progress shown	This major activity is highly effective and critical for improved service delivery in sub national institutions. More lobbying role of IDLG will be required for this to be executed.
		Establishing interaction mechanisms for effective interaction between sub national government and public to improve access to information	Some progress shown, more needed to be done in this regards	In the areas with regards to establishing provincial information services centers, creation of public grievance system and e-government, little have been done. More work is required
		Provincial Strategic Planning (PSP) and Provincial Development Planning (PDP) guided by PSP	In progress in accordance with the plan, not measurable	It is effective; some more work will be required in the components of support to PDCs, strategic profiling and development databases.
		Strengthen public financial management at sub national level to make it fully compliant with applicable laws and MoF procedures	Little or no progress shown	This exercised has been identified to be highly critical for sub national governance improvement and requires more speed in its process
3	Provincial and District Councils have improved capacity to represent citizen interests and	Establishing knowledge sharing systems for Provincial and District Councils	Some progress shown, more required to be executed	More focus of the programme will be required to this major activity and its all related sub-activities
		Capacity development of PCs and DCs so that they are compliant with	In progress in line with the work plan, not	Specific thematic training and capacity building programmes are required

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
	monitor sub national governance	roles of procedures and conduct public outreach	measurable	for both, the PCs and DCs.
		Strengthening PCs and DCs oversight over local service delivery, strategic and annual budgetary and planning, M&E for service delivery	Little progress has been shown in this regards	More training and capacity building programmes are required on M&E and annual budgetary topics to both the PCs and DCs
4	Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under PAR) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services	Improving capacity of municipalities to generate own source revenues	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	This major activity has been identified highly effective. More work will be required in relation to development of a database for revenues in the municipalities.
		Improving municipal capacities to apply minimum service standards, improved procedures, performance measurement system and FMS	Little progress shown	It has been expected to be more effective. Work will be required on FMS and provision of service standards
		Organizational restructuring of municipalities to improve service delivery, including at least 15% female staff by 2014	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work will be required in its timeframe, especially in HR sections of municipalities
		Strengthening municipality outreach programme	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work needs to be executed in the areas of customer satisfaction survey, participatory planning, and public hearing mechanisms.
		Strengthening modern office management systems in municipalities	In progress in line with the work plan, not measurable	More work is required in its component to apply modern office management procedures in municipalities.
		Creation and	No progress	The web-sites and e-

No.	Expected Outputs	Indicative Major Activities	Rate of progress as per the programme reports	Effectiveness assessment
		maintenance of a functional website and e-government applications for selected municipalities	shown yet	government will be essential for a successful municipality to operate. The activity was supposed to start by early January 2011, when it did not. It should start as earlier as possible.

It is highly important for ASGP II to note and take serious the identified areas where little or no progress has been made. However order to improve the implementation and keep the pace, it will be vital to first review the project work plan once again, adjust and accelerate the execution of the activities especially-those with little or no progress-accordingly.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ASGP AND OTHER DONOR FUNDED SUB NATIONAL GOVERNANCE (SNG) PROGAMS

The present coordination mechanism in SNG programmes⁷

There are currently a number of initiatives in support and empowerment of SNG in Afghanistan. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) has been identified to be the official national government institution to coordinate and support the efforts and the initiatives to support and strengthening the sub national governance in Afghanistan.

However, in order to better assist and coordinate the efforts, track the progress of the different initiatives and most importantly avoid overlaps and duplication, IDLG has established a strategic programme unit. The unit also has the responsibility to lobby with the national, international institutions and the donors to ensure that all the programmes have enough operational resources.

The table below illustrates the different donor funded programmes in progress to support the SNG in Afghanistan and which are coordinated by IDLG:

The current donors funded sub national Initiatives coordinated under IDLG

Name of the programme	Donor(s)	Brief description and main objectives of the programme
Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme (ASGP)	UNDP, UK, European Commission, Italy, Netherlands,	The Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme (ASGP) supports IDLG, the provincial and district governors' offices, the municipalities, the provincial and the district councils with the development of strategies and policies, provides advisory and technical services and backstopping, develops institutional and organizational

⁷ The Strategic Programmes Coordination Unit, IDLG

Name of the programme	Donor(s)	Brief description and main objectives of the programme
		capacity, provides human, material and technical resources with the ultimate goal to improve and strengthen sub national governance process and institutions in Afghanistan. ASGP has had two phases, ASGP-I ended by end 2010 and ASGP-II has started in early 2010 and continues to date.
Afghanistan Local Government Facilities Development Programme (ALGFDP)	Ministry of Finance, Special Accounts, bi-lateral arrangement	The Afghanistan Local Government Facilities Development Programme (ALGFDP) formerly was called Afghanistan Stabilization Programme (ASP). The implementation of this programme was started with the Ministry Interior of Afghanistan. However, as soon as IDLG was formed it has been coordinated by IDLG. ALGFDP provides infrastructure and equipment for provincial and district administration including offices, residence, generators, walls, power supply, water supply, equipment, etc...The programme enables the Provincial and District Governors Offices to have proper infrastructures (office buildings, houses, and facilities and operate properly. It is expected that the programme continue till 2012.
Performance Based Governors Fund (PBGF)	USAID, DFID, and Belgium	Performance Based Governors Fund (PBGF) Provides the Provincial Governors Offices with a flexible budget for addressing operational and community outreach programmes with annual performance-based adjustment to the funds. PBGF was started in March 2010 by the Asia Foundation as the implementation partner to IDLG. The programme covers all 34 provinces.
District Delivery Programme (DDP)	Multi-donors including the US, UK/DFID, Germany, France	The District Delivery Programme (DDP) aims to establish or visibly improve the government presence at the local level in the districts that have recently been secured. The DDP considers the most vulnerable districts and population in Afghanistan. It is being implemented through an inter-ministerial secretariat led by IDLG in partnership with the MAIL, MoE, MoA, MoJ, MoPH, MRRD, MoF, the SC, AGO, and AIRIARCSC. DDP was started in 2010 and is expected to continue till March 2012. During its life span DDP is expected to cover 80 districts of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP)	US/USAID	Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) has been designed aiming to improve and strengthen peace, stability, security and relation of the communities and the district and provincial government. ASOP supports and facilitates the district-level councils and empowering them to engage with communities and strengthen relationship between people and government. ASOP is expected to cover up to 135 districts of Afghanistan in more than 20 provinces. The councils are established through a traditional election mechanism called Jirga. It will improve security and stability restoration in the districts and communities. The programme has been implemented with the overall management of IDLG, and support of AECOM International (a USAID

Name of the programme	Donor(s)	Brief description and main objectives of the programme
		contractor).
Regional Afghan Municipalities Programme for Urban Population (RAMP-UP)	USAID	The Regional Afghan Municipalities Programme for Urban Population (RAMP-UP) was started in 2010 and is aimed to provide an integrated package of capacity building for municipalities into a package of three components: Capacity building, Service delivery grants, and Improve revenue generation. RAMP-UP is expected to be implemented through different USAID contractors in three years in South, East, North, and Western provinces of Afghanistan.

There are also other initiatives and support mechanisms that contribute to government empowerment such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The PRTs in each province have their own different approach, and commonly in order to operate in a province they are expected to have good working relationships with the provincial governors and the district governors. However, they work on ad-hoc and case by case basis according to the needs of the governors. The PRTs sometimes provide assistance to the sector line ministry provincial. The PRTs work outside the framework of IDLG's coordination.

There are also a number of other USAID funded programmes contributing to the SNG. However their contributions have not been coordinated by IDLG. IDLG has been identified to be the only national government institution to coordinate and support the efforts and the initiatives to support and strengthening the sub national governance in Afghanistan. However, to better assist and coordinate the efforts, track different progress initiatives, and most importantly avoid overlaps and duplication, a strategic programme unit has been established in IDLG. The unit has also the responsibility to lobby with the national, international institutions, and the donors to ensure that all the programmes have enough operation resources.

There are also other initiatives and support mechanisms that contribute to government empowerment such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The PRTs in each province have there own different approach, and commonly in order to operate in a province they are expected to have good working relationships with the provincial governors and the district governors. However, they work on ad-hoc and case by case basis according to the needs of the governors. The PRTs sometimes provide assistance to the sector line ministry provincial. The PRTs work outside the framework of IDLG's coordination.

There are also a number of other USAID funded programmes contributing to the SNG. However their contributions have not been coordinated by IDLG.

IDLG) has been identified to be the only national government institution to coordinate and support the efforts and the initiatives to support and strengthening the sub national governance in Afghanistan. However, to better assist and coordinate the efforts, track different progress initiatives, and most importantly avoid overlaps and duplication, a strategic programme unit has been established in IDLG. The unit has also the responsibility to lobby with the national, international institutions, and the donors to ensure that all the programmes have enough operation resources.

Analysis of the interface and potential overlap of ASGP with other donors funded sub national governance support programmes:

Sub national Governance Support Programmes	Areas of Support	Existing or possible areas of potential overlaps with ASGP
ASGP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support to development and implementation of SNGP. 2. Capacity building of the Provincial Governors Offices (PGOs), and the District Governors Offices(DGOs) 3. Support to the Provincial Councils(PCs) 4. Support to Municipalities. 	Not Applicable
ALGFDP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Construction of district complexes 2. Residential buildings, and guest houses for civil servants in the provinces and districts 3. Construction of provincial councils buildings, and <i>Jirga</i> Halls 4. Supply of vehicles for DGs, and; 5. Provision of refurbishment and equipment 	Provision of similar equipment
PBGF	The Provincial Governors through this programme will have a flexible budget up, 25000 USD at first stage to use for the governance and government support areas and activities in the province for which they will not be able to get funding through their operational budget. The budget will be spent in 6 categories for which the governor's performance will be annually evaluated.	Since the modality under which the funds will be provided to the PGs is more flexible through this programme there is a possibility of potential overlap with ASGP activities and assistance.
DDP	DDP has been an inter-governmental programme working through an inter-ministerial secretariat led by IDLG. It focuses on the districts with insecurity background. Programme activities includes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assess and cooperates to recruit and fill all the needed civil servants in the district. 2. The civil servants receive their salaries and some hazards allowance on time. 3. Some development projects requested at the district level got required resources and being 	No overlap

	implemented.	
ASOP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support and facilitation of <i>Jirga</i> process in the districts under the coverage of the programme 2. Facilitation of traditional election process inside the district Jirga, and formation of community councils or district community councils (DCC). 3. Training and capacity building of the DCCs members. 4. Provision of the monthly stipends to the DCCs members. 	Potential overlap in training and capacity building of the DCCs members.
RAMP-UP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity building of the municipalities through embedded advisors in the mayors offices. 2. Provision of provisional service delivery grants to the municipalities making them able to procure municipalities services. 3. Improve revenue generation by building systems to measure revenues and expenditures, methods of collecting legal taxes. 	<p>Considerable overlap in: Capacity building of the municipalities through embedded advisors in the mayors offices.</p> <p>Potential overlap in: Improve revenue generation by building systems to measure revenues and expenditures, methods of collecting legal taxes</p>

There are a number of areas that ASGP needs to consider throughout its implementation to avoid overlaps and duplicating activities. However, this will require a review of all the log-frame activities before being executed. The activities supporting the PGOs with IT and equipments must be checked with PBGF, and the activities being executed to support the municipalities must be checked with RAMP-UP.

It will be also be possible for ASGP regional personnel to discuss with the PRTs and any other SNG donor funded initiatives not coordinated by IDLG to make sure that their activities do not duplicate and overlap with ASGP's activities.

ANNEX V

LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Name	Title
Abdul Baqi Popal	General Director - General Directorate of Municipal Affairs - IDLG
Abdul Hai Shakib	Municipal Economic Development and Private Sector Specialist
Abdul Karim (Matin)	General Director - General Directorate for Local Councils Affairs - IDLG
Abdul Salam	IARCSC, Herat
Abdul Zaher Faizzada	Provincial Council Chairman, Herat Provincial Council
Abdy Yeganeh	Head of Population Engagment Team - StratCom - Helmand PRT
Abigail Mambo	HRs Analyst - UNDP
Aferdita Mekuli	Technical Specialist, Kunduz Regional Office, (ASGP)
Ahmad Dawar Aryapou	HR, UNDP Afghanistan
Ahmad Jawid Qayumi	Operations Specialist, ASGP
Ahmad Marood Kabiri	Provincial Governance Specialist, Herat PGO LoA staff, Herat PGO
Ahmad Shah Amirzai	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Ahmad Zai Ferozpur	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Ahmad Zubair Fattahi	National Programme Officer, UNDP Afghanistan
Alhaj Mohammad Salim Taraki	Mayor of Herat Province
Anil Chandriga	Regional Manager, ASGP Mazar Sharif
Anna Morris	Socio-Economic Development Team Leader - Helmand PRT
Arash Barez	Local Economic Development & Private Sector Specialist, Herat PGO
Asiluddin Jami	Deputy Governor, Herat
Atta Hask	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Attilio Aleotti	Senior Technical Advisor, Italian Development Agency
Atul Shekhar	Regional Manager, ASGP Herat
Barna Karimi	Deputy Minister (Policy) - IDLG
Basil George Comnas	Senior Advisor / ASGP Acting CTO and PM - UNDP/ASGP
Cynthia Rawe	Sr. Governance Advisor, Governance Reform Team, DFID Afghanistan
Dawood Shah Saba	Herat Governor, Herat PGO
Farid Mamundzay	Senior Advisor for Governance and Economic Development - IDLG
Feriba Majeed	Director of provincial directorate of Ministry of Women Affairs

Habiba Sarabi	Governor of Bamyaan Province
Habibullah Holkar	Administration ASGP Mazar Sharif
Haji Abdul Salam	Civil Service Commission Regional Director
Hamed Sarwary	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, IDLG
Hamid Azim	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Hashmat Hijran	UNDP / ASGP Afghanistan
Hassan Elhag	Head of Governance Unit - UNAMA
Humam Miscone	Senior Policy Advisor / ASGP Acting DPM - UNDP/ASGP
Jan-Jilles Van Der Hoeven	Deputy Country Director UNDP Afghanistan
Khalid Saboor	UNDP Afghanistan
Khalilullah Totakhail	HR, UNDP Afghanistan
Khan Mohammad Khadim	Regional Governance Specialist Kandahar - UNDP/ASGP
Laure-Helene Piron	Team Leader - Governance Reform Team - DFID
Manoj Basnyat	Country Director UNDP Afghanistan
Mark Miller	Deputy DFID Representative - Helmand PRT
Maroof Kabiri	LoA Staff, ASGP West Region
Massuad Yosufi	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Michael O'Neill	Head of Mission and NATO Senior Representative - Helmand PRT
Mirwais Ramaki	Management Oversight Specialist, UNDP Afghanistan
Mirza Hussain	Budget Officer, ASGP
Mohammad Haroon Sahib	Regional Governance Specialist, ASGP Mazar Sharif
Mohammad Hashmat Hijran	Provincial Governance Development /PCs Specialist - UNDP/ASGP
Mohammad Lal Ahmadi	Chief of Staff - Governor's Office – Helmand
Mohammad Nader Yama	Director - Strategic Coordination Unit – IDLG
Mohammad Naseer Hamidi	Municipal Governance Director, ASGP
Mohammad Omar Shirzad	H.E. Governor - Urzogan
Mohammad Yonus Moqim	Mayor of Mazar City, Mazar Province
Mohammad Yousof	LoA Staff, ASGP North Region
Muhammad Saleem Taraqi	Mayor, Herat
Naseer Hamidi	UNDP / ASGP Afghanistan
Nazir Ahmad Haidarzada	Provincial Council Member of Herat Province
Nic Bowler	Governance Advisor - Coffey International Development - Helmand PRT
Noor Ahmad Azami	Finance Associate - Helmand - UNDP/ASGP

Paul Tholen	Head of Development Cooperation – Kingdom of the Netherlands
Predrag Perunovic	Operations Manager & Head of Procurement
Robin Dartell	Reporting Officer - UNDP/ASGP
Saifuddin Sanginwal	Governance Specialist - Helmand - UNDP/ASGP
Samiullah Nazimi	Executive Associate to Project Manager ASGP
Samiullah Popal	Provincial Public Communication specialist - Helmand - UNDP/ASGP
Sara van Gaalen	Regional Project Manager (Central Region) - UNDP/ASGP
Sayed Hafeezullah Rohany	Municipal Governance & Development Advisor
Sayed Khalid Khushbin	Assistant Country Director and Head of Local Governance, UNDP
Shahram Sonmez	Finance ASGP Mazar Sharif
Shohab Deshmukh	Deputy Programme Manager, GRT, DFID - Afghanistan
Simone Kreutzer	Deputy Head of Development and Cooperation, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Sofia Dahiya	Capacity Development Advisor, National Institution Building Project, UNDP
Tamara Al-Zayyat	Technical Specialist (Eastern Region) - UNDP/ASGP
Virginie Wyart	Attaché, Public Administration/Sub national Governance, European Union, Delegation to Afghanistan and Office of the Special Representative
Waisuddin Rahimi	M&E ASGP Mazar Sharif
Yugesh Pradhanang	Technical Specialist - UNDP/ASGP
Yuichi Tanada	Governance Specialist, ASGP
Zabeta Moutafis	Development Adviser Uruzgan - AusAID

ANNEX VI

DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS REVIEWED

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

Documents:

ASGP Annual reports
ASGP Annual Work plans
ASGP Board Meeting Minutes
ASGP Organization Structure
ASGP Progress Reports
ASGP Quarterly Reports
Completion report of ASGP I
District Development Plan (on sample basis)
Finance Manual of UNDP
Financial Audit Report of ASGP I and II
Helmand Plan – Final
IDLG Exit Strategy List of Staff
Kabul Conference Communiqué
Letter of Agreements between IDLG, IARCSC and UNDP
Letter of Agreements between PGOs and UNDP
Minutes of Programme Executive Board meetings
Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Procedures
Procurement Law of Afghanistan 2008
Procurement Manual of UNDP
Project Document ASGP I
Project Document ASGP II
Project Inception Document ASGP II
Provincial Briefs
Provincial Development Plan (on sample basis)
Quarterly Financial Progress Reports
Standard Staff Contracts
Sub National Governance Policy 2009
UNDP Project Profiles – MBAW, NABDP, NIBP, GEP, JHRA, LOTFA, ACT, APRP, ELECT

Records:

DIAG Project Listing
District Development Plans (DDP) – on sample basis
ERDA Project Listing
Expenditure Ledger
Fixed Asset Listing
Funds Flow Statements
List of NABDP Staff
LoA staff salary claims
Monitoring and Evaluation Field Reports – on sample basis
Payment Documents – on sample basis
Procurement Plans
Procurement Records – on sample basis
Project Processing Documents – on sample basis
Staff Performance Evaluations – on sample basis
Staff Personal Files – on sample basis

Financial Documents:

2003-12-2- Framework of Norway with UNDP.
2006-12-14 - Cost Sharing Agreement with Norway - ASGP.

2007-03-19 - Contribution 3m from Italy - ASGP.
2007-05-30 - Cost Sharing Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2007-05-30 - Cost Sharing Agreement with CIDA - ASGP - Annex A.
2007-12-05 - Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2007-12-13 - Third Part Cost Sharing Agreement with SDC - ASGP.
2008-02-19 - Cost Sharing Agreement with EC (Special Conditions) - ASGP.
2008-02-19 - Request for disbursement of funds to EC - ASGP.
2008-02-24 - ASGP Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement - EC.
2008-03-30 - Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement with EC - ASGP(Signed).
2008-06-15 - Cost Sharing Agreement with Norway - ASGP.
2008-07-30 - Request for disbursement of 1st tranche to Norway - ASGP.
2008-08-06 - Request for disbursement of 3rd tranche to CIDA - ASGP.
2008-09-14 - Request for Disbursement to EC - ASGP.
2008-09-24 - Request for Disbursement to EC - ASGP Annex I Detailed Expenditure Report (EUR) Final.
2008-09-24 - Request for Disbursement to EC - ASGP Annex I Detailed Expenditure Report (EUR) Final4.
2008-10-06 - Letter of Agreement No. 1 with SDC CHF 4 million - ASGP (final signed).
2008-10-27 - Request for Disbursement of 2nd Tranche to Norway - ASGP.
2008-11-01 - Cost Sharing Agreement with the Netherlands - ASGP.
2008-11-05 - CIDA Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement - ASGP.
2008-11-05 - Request for disbursement of 2nd tranche from SDC - ASGP.
2008-11-06 - Request for disbursement of 2nd tranche from SDC - ASGP.
2008-11-08 - Letter of Amendment to the Cost Sharing Agreement with Canada - ASGP.
2008-12-16 - Letter of Amendment to Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2008-12-16 - Letter of Amendment to Cost Sharing Agreement with Norway - ASGP.
2008-12-22 - Amendment to Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2008-12-22 - Letter of Request for Amendment to Agreement with CIDA - ASGP.
2009-01-27 - Acknowledgement of Receipt of Funds from Norway - ASGP.
2009-06-16 - Request for Disbursement of Fourth Tranche to CIDA - ASGP.
2009-06-16 - Request for Disbursement of Third Tranche of Norwegian Contribution - ASGP.
2009-10-11 - Request for Payment of Fourth Tranche - ASGP.
2009-11-02 - Request for Disbursement of Funds to Norway - ASGP.
2009-11-24 - CSA with SDC - ASGP II.
2009-12-22 - CSA with DFID - ASGP.
2010-03-04- Contract implementation period extension of EC-ASGP.
2010-03-23- Annual Progress Report of 2009- ASGP.
2010-03-23- Annual Progress Report of 2009- ASGP.
2010-03-23- Italian Contribution for ASGP.
2010-03-24- Acceptance letter to Italian contribution- ASGP.
2010-03-24- Amendments to CIDA cost sharing agreement- ASGP.
2010-03-24- Amendments to CIDA CSA- ASGP.
2010-03-25-Acceptance letter to Italian contribution-ASGP.
2010-03-31- AusAID cost sharing agreement draft.
2010-05-27- Appreciation Letter to Italy-ASGP.
2010-06-01- Delay of Inception report to DFID-ASGP.
2010-06-09- Letter to DFID on extension of report-ASGP.
2010-07-12- Netherlands letter on request of report.
2010-08-23- Request for last tranche of Netherlands-ASGP.
2010-09-01- Dutch approval of last tranche release.
2010-09-02- Approved letter of released fund of Dutch.

2010-09-1- Dutch Letter for release of last Tranche.
2010-09-13- Letter to Norway on ASGP.
2010-09-15- Letter to Norway on ASGP.
2010-10-24- Bank account for EU contribution.
2010-10-27- Fully executed Mod 1.
2010-12-13 Annex 1- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP - Copy.
2010-12-13 Annex 1- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Annex 3- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Annex 4- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Annex 5- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Annex 6- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 Anex2- EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-12-13 EC CSA EUR 12m to ASGP.
2010-17-02- Cost Sharing Agreement SDC-ASGP.
2010-17-02- Letter of Agreement SDC-ASGP.
2011-01-31- Amendment No 4 to ASGP- CIDA.
2011-02-14- Request of the second tranche - DFID.
2011-02-22- Amendment No 4 to ASGP- CIDA-singed.
ASGP Presentation for Donor Coordination Meeting (final) 11102010 (3) 11.10.2010.
ASGP 00051486 2QPR 2009-08-04 - Second Quarter Progress Report 2009.
ASGP 00051486 3QPR 2009-11-15 - Third Quarter Progress Report 2009.
ASGP 00051486 APR 2006.
ASGP 00051486 APR 2007.
ASGP 00051486 APR 2008.
ASGP 00051486 APR Annex 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Asset Inventory Record - CO Asset MU 090929.
ASGP 00051486 Audit Management Letter final 2009.
ASGP 00051486 AWP (Revised Version 2009) Sept. 2009 Document (3).
ASGP 00051486 AWP 2007.
ASGP 00051486 AWP 2008 2009 values 2007.
ASGP 00051486 AWP 2009.
ASGP 00051486 AWP 2010 (Signed Version) 2010.01.20 Scan001.
ASGP 00051486 AWP Approved 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Board Minutes Dec 4 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Justification for the ASGP PBM for the 1st Qtr 2010 22.02.2011.
ASGP 00051486 Justification for the ASGP PBM for the 1st Qtr 2010 22.02.2011.
ASGP 00051486 Mid Term Review 2009.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of ASGP 8th project board meeting (061209).
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of LPAC 2006.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of PB Meeting 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of PBM 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board 2007.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board 2009.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board Meeting (English) 2007.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board Meeting 2007.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Project Board Meeting Minutes 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Minutes of Steering Committee Meeting 2006.
ASGP 00051486 Monitoring Report EC 2009.
ASGP 00051486 MTE TOR 2009.
ASGP 00051486 PB minutes Dec 4 2008.
ASGP 00051486 Presentation of Strategy for 2011 - Jan 12012011.
ASGP 00051486 Procurement Plan 2009.
ASGP 00051486 Procurement Plan 2010 - ASGP Phase I 2010.01.26.

ASGP 00051486 Project Revision IARCSC IDLG UNDP 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q1 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q1 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q1 2009.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q1Annex1 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 2007.pdf
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 2008.pdf
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 Annex 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 Annex1 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q2 Dari 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q3 2007.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q3 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q3 Annex1 2008.
ASGP 00051486 QPR Q3 Q4 2006.
ASGP 00051486 QP Review Q1 Presentation 2009.
ASGP 00051486 Signed Project Document 2006.
ASGP Agenda-LPAC-Meeting 060913.
ASGP Annual HR Plan for 2009 081224 Document.
ASGP APR -Annual Report
ASGP Donor meeting minutes Aug-09th 2010 new (2).
ASGP Donor meeting minutes Aug-09th 2010.
ASGP Draft Minutes of ASGP last PBM 02.08.2010.
ASGP Draft Minutes of ASGP last PBM 02.08.2010.
ASGP HR PLAN 2010.
ASGP HR Staffing Plan 090718.
ASGP II 2nd QPR 2010.
ASGP II 3rd QPR 2010.
ASGP II 1st QPR 2010.
ASGP II 2nd Board Meeting Minutes Aug-09th 2010 draft.
ASGP II 2nd Board Meeting Minutes Aug-09th 2010 draft.
ASGP II Minutes of LPAC of ASGP II (signed version) Dec. 06 2009 090210 Scan001.
ASGP II Organogram 2011(Final Signed Version) 28.03.2011.
ASGP II Presentation for DONOR MEETING - 8 March 2011.
ASGP II Procurement Plans.
ASGP MID-TERM REVIEW, Ernest Leonardo, Consultant to UNDP, June 28, 2009.
ASGP Org Ops 090716.
ASGP Org PGODGO 090716.
ASGP Org Programme and SnrMgt 090718.
ASGP Presentations for Board Meetings and Donor Meetings.
ASGP SNG Policy learning Group 26102010.
ASGP SNG Policy Presentation for Donors Meeting.
ASGP SNGP Presentation Nov. 2009.
ASGP SSA Staffing Plan 090718.
ASGP Sub national Governance Policy SNGP Executive Summary (2) 2009.
ASGPI Revised AWP (Version B) 2010.
ASGP-II Organizational Chart (2011).
ASGP-II 00051486 Project Document Signed Version 2010.01.11 doc.
ASGP II AWP Central Region - 2010.
ASGP II AWP East Region - 2010.
ASGP-II AWP LAST DRAFT 1 June 2011.
ASGP II AWP National Level - 2010.
ASGP II AWP North East Region - 2010.
ASGP II AWP North Region - 2010.

ASGP-II AWP South Region - 2010.
ASGP-II AWP West Region - 2010.
ASGP-II Cover Page for AWP - 2010.
ASGP-II Draft 3rd Board Meeting Minutes November 8 2010.
ASGP-II Draft 3rd Board Meeting Minutes November 8 2010.
ASGP-II Handover note of December -R R 2010 - Copy.
ASGP-II HR PLAN FINAL Draft 06 March 2011.
ASGP-II INCEPTION Report for DFID- ASGP 04.11.2010.
Donor feedback on ASGP Annual Progress Report 2010 (3 July 2011)
Final CPAP AFG 2010-2013 (2).
Final CPD 2010-2013.
UNDAF English.

ANNEX VII

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

Location :	Kabul, AFGHANISTAN
Application Deadline :	22-Apr-11
Additional Category	Management
Type of Contract :	Individual Contract
Post Level :	International Consultant
Languages Required :	English
Duration of Initial Contract :	21 Working Days

[Background](#)

UNDP Global Mission Statement:

UNDP is the UN's global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. We are on the ground in 166 countries, working with national counterparts on their own solutions to global and national development challenges.

UNDP Afghanistan Mission Statement:

UNDP Afghanistan is supporting the Government to find innovative solutions to its development challenges based on the on-going Country Programme Document approved by the Executive Board for the period 2006 – 2009. A new Country Programme Document was approved by the Executive Board during September 2009 for the period 2010-2013. Key priority areas for UNDP assistance are in strengthening democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and reducing poverty. UNDP is strengthening the institutional capacities of key national government and sub national authorities which aim to enhance human security, human development, peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Organizational Context:

Developing sound and functional sub national governance systems is a vital item on the Afghanistan development agenda. Strengthening institutional capacities and arrangements for sub national governance and development were priorities approved in the London and Kabul Conferences in 2010. It is increasingly recognized that capacity of sub national governance and development institutions is key to peace, stability and development of the Afghan people and commitments by the international community.

The key objective of the Afghanistan Sub national Governance programme (ASGP), launched in October 2006 is to strengthen the democratic state and government institutions to govern and ensure quality public service delivery at the sub national level through advocacy, policy advice and capacity development. At the central level, ASGP is actively involved in institutional strengthening and capacity development of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). ASGP has also assisted IDLG in the development of the Sub national governance policy (SNGP). At the Sub national level the programme's primary focus is to empower governors at the provincial and district level to oversee and coordinate all provincial (or district) governance, public administration reform and donor activities in the province or district. The programme

also supports provincial councils so that they have the necessary tools to effectively represent their electorates and hold Sub national government administrations accountable. ASGP's municipal reform programme has been implemented in several municipalities.

Based upon the lessons learnt from the implementation of the first phase of the programme i.e. ASGP I, its successor, the second phase of the programme i.e. ASGP II was launched in 2010. In the phase I, ASGP had initiated the sub national governance reform process at national (IDLG), provincial, district and municipal levels. The objective of Phase II is to roll out these reforms comprehensively across the country.

The above objectives of ASGP II will be achieved by delivering the following four specific outputs within the lifetime of the programme:

- National systems, procedures and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor sub national governance policy are in place;
- Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to manage provincial and district governance, development and security strategies in accordance with ANDS;
- Provincial and District Councils have the improved capacity to represent citizen interests and monitor sub national governance and development;
- Municipalities have the institutional and organizational framework (under public administration reform) and capacity to collect revenue and deliver basic public services.

ASGP phase I was implemented from October 2006 till early 2010. Phase II is under implementation since early 2010 and shall end in December 2014. It is now proposed to conduct an end of programme evaluation for ASGP Phase I and a review for ASGP II.

Purpose of the evaluation and review

The primary purpose of the evaluation of Phase I is to assess if programme activities have been carried out and to see if programme outputs and objectives have been met as well as to present some key lessons learnt. The UNDP views programme evaluations as rigorous and credible assessments of measurable progress toward achievements of stated outcomes. As such, the final evaluation should invoke a participatory approach in order to allow programme stakeholders to assist in the generation and application of evaluative knowledge.

The purpose of the review of Phase II is to undertake an in-depth assessment of the past, current and planned operation of ASGP and make recommendations to UNDP, donors and Afghan counterparts on the options, changes and improvements for the way forward with the programme.

Scope and Objectives

Evaluation of Phase I

The objective of the evaluation of Phase I of ASGP is to address the following questions/issues:

- a. Indicate whether or not intended programme impact and outcomes have been met and/or, for specific outcomes, whether satisfactory progress was made.
 - b. To what extent has the programme contributed to the intended outputs, and in what specific areas did the programme excel in contributing most to intended outputs. To assist in assessing the outputs and results of the programme, the evaluation team will ensure the following (though not restricted to these):
- Assess outputs to determine if they have been achieved in line with programme design.
 - Assess overall quality, timeliness, effectiveness and sustainability of management arrangements, technical inputs and assistance.

- Evaluate the degree to which intended beneficiaries participated in programme activities.
- Assess ways in which information was gathered, shared and used within the programme.
 - c. Analyze underlying factors that could have influenced programme impact and outputs.
 - d. State whether or not achievement indicators have been achieved;
 - e. Identify and analyze barriers and constraints that may have delayed implementation, including challenges emanating from the Government of Afghanistan as well as from the international community.
 - f. Analyze the effectiveness of programme management. Bearing in mind the limitations identified in the programme design and possible variances and/or barriers and constraints inherent in the programme 's implementation environment, the evaluation team will:
- Assess outputs of actual programme management, including allocation of time and other resources.
- Assess approaches toward each activity by all direct programme stakeholders.
- Assess the appropriateness, quality and delivery of activities.
- Assess the outputs of sub-contracted technical inputs, including training.
- Assess utilization of financial resources.
- Assess efficiency of communication and information flow among stakeholders.
 - a. Identify a list of 'lessons learned'. To assist future UNDP programming, the evaluation team should list lessons learned (what worked, what did not work, and why?), and recommend concrete action that could have been taken to rectify undesired impact and/or outcomes, and to improve performance.

Review of Phase II

The objective of the review of Phase II of ASGP is to address the following questions/issues:

- a. In the light of the Transition process, the Kabul Conference commitments, and the Sub national Governance Policy, how appropriate are the programme's current Goal, Purpose and Outputs? How might they be re-focused? How effective and efficient are the programme's activities and approach in relation to the ultimate Goal, Purpose, and desired sustainable results of the programme?
- b. What evidence-based progress has the programme made in respect of each of the programme Output? To assist UNDP in this the review team shall assess progress against the ASGP inception report using triangulated evidence. To what extent are activities replicable and upscale-able outside the ASGP programme environment?
- c. What are the existing reporting mechanisms in place in ASGP? The review team shall assess the progress reports as well as financial reports with special focus on issues such as the quality of reports and recommendations for improvement.
- d. How consistent is the programme's management and delivery with the Government Public Administration Reform and capacity development commitments? The review team should especially examine if counterpart capacities have been developed through planned and consistent transfer of skills. It shall also recommend a exit strategy of transition from ASGP funded experts to government Tashkeel.
- e. Which systemic factors are directly impacting on the ASGP, and to what extent

do these systemic factors present risks in achieving the outputs of the programme?

- f. What are the financial controls in the programme and how may these be improved? Does the programme represent value for money, including the appropriateness of expenditure activities? Are expenditures in line with ASGP II Purpose and Outputs?
- g. The review team shall analyze the partnership arrangements between UNDP, ASGP donors and IDLG? Has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
- h. What is the interface between ASGP and other donor funded Sub national Governance (SNG) programmes? Is there a process in operation for the coordination of efforts? Is there an over-lap between ASGP activities and other programmes?
- i. How effective is UNDP's management of the programme? Highlight strengths, weaknesses and provide recommendations.

Existing information sources

Detailed information can be found in programme annual, quarter and monthly reports, CPAP and outcome evaluation and also some external documents on Afghanistan Sub national governance etc. As soon as possible after the selection process the evaluation team will be provided with copies of:

- a. UNDAF
- b. CPAP
- c. ASGP Phase I & II Project Document and ASGP Inception report;
- d. Annual Progress Reports;
- e. All available quarterly progress reports;
- f. Financing Agreements between UNDP, GOA and donors for the purpose of implementing ASGP;
- g. All other reports, presentations, booklets etc. so far produced in the programme.

Methodology

The evaluation and review will be based on a stakeholder approach where all groups and individuals, who affect and/or are affected by the programme activities, deliverables and outputs, are involved in the analysis. Furthermore, the evaluation and review will take into consideration the social, political and economic context, which affects the overall performance of the programme outputs.

At the outset of the assignment the evaluation cum review team will discuss and agree on their approach and work plan with IDLG, the ASGP donors and UNDP. The fieldwork for the evaluation and review should include the following:

- a. Desk review of relevant documentation, official and programme reports, logical framework, financial records etc.
- b. Semi-structured interviews with key respondents including, but not limited to: government counterparts, beneficiaries at provincial, municipal and district levels, other programme providers, donor representatives, PRT personnel and UNDP officials. Detailed notes with English language summaries should be kept for each interview.
- c. Field visits to the following four provinces in different regions of Afghanistan:

Helmand, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar.

The evaluation and review will be carried out in an objective, sensitive and independent manner with varied and balanced consideration of both positive/negative aspects and areas in which significant improvement are required.

Evaluation Products (Deliverables)

All documents, materials, questionnaires, surveys or intermediate reports that might be established for the purpose of the mission should be submitted to UNDP.

All drafts and final reports with applicable annexes and attachments will be submitted in both hard copy and digital formats, and shall be in English. Digital version should be submitted on disk, CD, or via email, and shall be submitted in Microsoft Word format. The expected evaluation outputs include the following:

- a. A draft **evaluation cum review report** written according to UNDP evaluation reporting requirements, with an executive summary, within 5 working days of completion of the field assessment.
- b. A final **evaluation cum review report** to the UNDP, Afghanistan, Kabul 5 working days after receipt of IDLG, ASGP donor and UNDP comments on the draft final report.

The evaluation cum review report will address all the questions/issues specified in section 3 of these Terms of Reference including the following:

- a. Performance of Phase 1.
- b. Evaluation of and recommendations on the Outputs performance of Phase II to-date.
- c. Evaluation of and recommendations on the programme's financial management and reporting.
- d. Evaluation of and recommendations on programme management and leadership.
- e. Evaluation of and recommendations on consultative and oversight arrangements between IDLG, ASGP donors and UNDP.
- f. Recommendations on the future course of action for the programme on whether to maintain its current scope of activities or incorporate relevant modifications in the scope.
- g. Recommendations to donors regarding continuation of support to ASGP and accompanying terms and conditions including timelines.

Evaluation and review team composition and required competencies

A team of four consultants would undertake this evaluation and review: two international consultants and two Afghan nationals. One of the international consultants will act as team leader, be responsible for work planning, liaising with IDLG, ASGP donors and UNDP and be the lead author for the evaluation cum review report.

All team members must have:

- a. Track record in working on governance reform programmes;
- b. Demonstrated expertise in programme evaluation;
- c. Familiarity with basic evaluation standards and principles;
- d. Familiarity with results-based management concepts and the logical framework

- approach;
- e. Ability to work under tight deadlines
- f. Good understanding of UN and donor systems
- g. Fluency in English

Time frame for the evaluation and review process

The evaluation and review will be conducted over a period of 21 working days. The evaluation and review period would consist of 4 days of preparatory desk review, 4 days of interviews and meetings with key stakeholders in Kabul, 8 days of field mission in the provinces and 5 days for debriefing and preparation of draft evaluation cum review report. The first draft of the report will be presented to UNDP, IDLG and donors within 5 working days of completion of the field mission to the provinces. The final report will be submitted within 5 working days of receiving feedback and comments on the draft report.

Implementation Arrangements

This evaluation and review has been jointly commissioned by IDLG, UNDP and ASGP donors (Netherlands, EU, Switzerland, UK, Canada, Italy, Norway). The Netherlands will lead the donors. The evaluation and review will be jointly managed by IDLG, UNDP and the ASGP donors. A steering committee shall be established for this purpose which shall consist of UNDP, the ASGP donor representative(s) and IDLG. In consultation with IDLSG and the ASGP donor representatives (through the steering committee), UNDP will be responsible for:

- a. Providing the evaluation and review team with induction and the relevant documentation.
- b. Supporting the team with logistics, interpreting, workspace and life support services.
- c. Facilitating the consultants' meetings with key respondents.
- d. Overseeing the conduct of the evaluation and review, including having progress meetings with the consultants.
- e. Ensuring the team has progress meetings with the steering committee at the start, mid way and end of review.
- f. Keeping the steering committee informed of any developments during the conduct of the review.
- g. Ensuring that UNDP and the donors consider and agree the recommendations made by the evaluation and review.

The evaluation and review team shall be responsible to UNDP Afghanistan (acting on behalf of the steering committee) for deliverables under the ToR. All members of the team shall be jointly responsible for the completeness of the deliverables prescribed in section 6 of this ToR in accordance with the scope of work. Within the scope of work, each member of the team shall be individually responsible for a part of the assignment. While the team members shall decide on individual responsibilities by mutual consultation under the guidance of the team leader at the start of the assignment, a suggestive division of responsibilities is given below:

Sl.	Position	Responsibilities
-----	----------	------------------

1	Team Leader (international)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall responsibility for the deliverables including planning for the assignment, contents of the reports, coordination with UNDP, internal coordination within the team, division of responsibility within the team and compilation of contributions from individual members. • Evaluation of programme impact and assessment of achievement of programme outcomes and outputs. • Identification of 'lessons learned'. • Review of progress in respect of each of the programme Output against the ASGP baseline report. • Risk analysis. • Analysis of partnership arrangements between UNDP, ASGP donors and IDLG. • Assessment of existing reporting mechanisms.
2	Consultant (international) – programme management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of the effectiveness of programme management including assessment of allocation of time and other resources. • Assessment of programme's management and delivery with the Government Public Administration Reform and capacity development commitments. • Analysis of an exit strategy of transition from ASGP funded experts to government Tashkeel.
3	Consultant (national) – Sub national governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of the appropriateness of programme's current Goal, Purpose and Outputs in the light of the Kabul Conference commitments and the Sub national Governance Policy. • Assessment of the effectiveness of programme's activities in relation to the Goal, Purpose, and Outputs and suggestions for re-focusing, required if any. • Analysis of the interface between ASGP and other donor funded Sub national Governance (SNG) programmes.
4	Consultant (national) - financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment of utilization of financial resources. • Assessment of ASGP funding status. • Assessment of the financial controls in the programme and recommendations for improvements, required if any. • Assessment of the appropriateness of expenditure activities and analysis of the programme for its value for money.

Field Mission: The team shall undertake field mission to the four provinces mentioned in section 5 of this ToR. The team shall split into two groups for field mission. Each group shall visit two provinces over the prescribed field mission days. The group composition and associated mission planning shall be decided in consultation with UNDP, ASGP donors and IDLG.

Evaluation Ethics

The evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation', June 2008 (available at <http://www.uneval.org>).

ANNEX VIII

RECORD OF MEETINGS

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan

Programme Evaluation of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme - I
2006 to 2010

Programme Review of

Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme – II
2010 to 2011

For reasons of confidentiality and privacy the names and positions of the persons consulted have been removed from the records of meetings. This Annex records the individual record made by each team member and in some cases this is in respect of the same meeting.

Meeting	Date
UNDP and DFID	23 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mr. Zubair Fatahi is the focal point for the Program and will assist the review mission with the travels arrangements. • In any review and evaluation of the program the government counterpart has been the lead. • The review recommendation on the duration of the Program, its so-far progress, impact, and future will be important for DFID to consider. • There were major points of ASGP substance; in Mazar the municipality, in Heratt there has been a consolidated team, Kandahar visit will be a good example for challenges of ASGP, and in Urozgan provincial planning will be found. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP and DFID	23 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close collaboration between UNDP, IDLG, DFID, and the Dutch Embassy. • UNDP agreed to provide all the logistics where possible. • Afghanistan is at a cross road, with a new horizon to a possible sustainable transition beyond the military effort. The situation is very dynamic and this will impact the UNDP programme. • JJ in Afghanistan since Feb 2010. • The documents for ASGP II were written sometime back and will need to evolve to the changing context. • There are issues with poor donor coordination across Afghanistan. • The role of ASGP, from the donor's and GoA perspective, is causing some worries for the development partners. Hence the need for an independent and constructive review. • DFID are looking forward to the review. They hope to see a constructive report including improvements to the process, work plan and team. The review should also examine the progress and its impact on the ToR of ASGP II, including any implications for the future. • CR on 2nd rotation arrived in May 2011. • UNDP recommended visiting the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mezar – to review the municipal component of ASGP, evaluate potential beyond what has been achieved, meet the national team leader and review the achievements (good). ○ Herat – Has a strong consolidated team. ○ Helmand/Kanderhar – by far very difficult to do capacity development in these provinces. hence why capacity is being substituted. ○ Orzogan – very engaged Australian PRT with US support. Governor is seen as good. New Executive Board appointed. ○ Bamyan – Not in the ToR but worth a visit as it is mainly shiaa and the Governor is a female. Relatively safe and secure province. • UNDP recommended covering several regions; ensuring meetings are beyond 30 min and to try to explore the context in depth. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP	23 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There were initially four provinces of ASGP for the evaluation cum review mission to visit; Mazar, Herat, Kandahar, and Helmand. • Some of the potential stakeholders of the projects that the mission would be better to meet were; IDLG leadership, IDLG line departments' directors, the donor community of ASGP, UNAMA. • When in the field; the mission would better meet; the governors or their deputies, mayors, PC chairs and their members if possible, CSC, and the regional or provincial managers of ASGP. • In the morning of Friday the 24th June, the mission was expected to meet the DCD of UNDP-Mr. JJ. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP	24 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manoj OoC back 3rd July 2011 and JJ leaving today back 4th July 2011. • Recommendation to meet both male and female members of the PC (separately if possible); and ToS at the PGO. • Quality of staff in ASGP is the main criticism for the provinces. • Capacity substitution is the main game in town. • UNDP views DDP as unhelpful and similar to governance in a box. • UNDP diametrical decision (to Donors) to use ToS but maintain direct responsibility for delivery. However they wanted to GoAto also take responsibility through the use of LoAs. • Currently they have around 200 ToS staff (all nationals) and not on Tashkeel. • Despite the fact that ToS pose capacity substitution issues, at least they are national staff. Hired and managed by fellow Afghans. • Transition focus (by international) allows UNDP (as dev. org) to talk about long term development. Transition obliges GoAto take over delivery by deadline of 2014. • UNDP are keen to make the development argument to the donors. • Kanderhar Governor lives in a security bubble, not able to travel and not in synch with the region due to the security threat. (He is an Afghan Canadian). • Recommend to meet Masood Kamal (MoF) and his provincial budget person to gain more understanding of how the process of provincial budges works.. • For ASGP I have to rely on Governors' and Manoj's for institutional memory. • IDLG is a young organisation, highly criticised, but efficient compared to other organisations. They do have a working structure. • ASGP I focused on getting IDLG off the ground. Recommend talking to Humam Masconi. ASGP is an essential partner to IDLG. Manoj sees ASGP I to be very centralised and believes Subnational should focus more on and within the subnational regions. Hence the move to ASGP II where decision making should be pushed to the provincial level. • LoAs could then be used at the provincial level to allow governors to do small scale procurement, organise events etc. without the need to refer back to ASGP or IDLG. • Other projects via MoF or other agencies, focus more on trying to make budgets and financial management work at the SN level. • ASGP II should also focus on making governance work at SN level. Otherwise human 	

development gains will not be realised.

- For this to work, there is a critical need for credible local government and governors (especially in remote areas).
- ASGP, as part of a virtual circle, could work with other programmes to complement them.
- The plan is for ASGP II to move to on-budget support. From UN to MoF and then to Project Budget. (Review mission should check this).
- Provincial governors have no authority to sign for budget disbursement. All financial controls are under the mustafyat (MoF regional offices). Mustafyat are supported but this is not sufficient.
- UNDP have proposed a Provincial Development Fund (PDF) to enable PCs and the governors to do small scale projects. This could be used e.g. to establish a Saffron Certification Institute in Afghanistan, to enable in country certification. Which could lead to Afghani Saffron being sold at the full international price (currently being sold for 1/3 of the intl. price).
- Other programmes are also looking at supporting SNG. Including RAMPUP which is focusing on afghan regions and has funding of 600 Mil USD from USG.
- Donors are exerting pressure on UNDP to only focus on one area leaving others (e.g. RAMPUP) to focus on other areas.
- Orzughan is worth a visit to see how one competent staff could achieve results across thematic and programme areas.
- Recruitment is a key issue for ASGP and was previously badly managed. Now UNDP are focusing on bringing better staff into ASGP and better ToS staff into GoA offices.
- ToS are local contract with the governor and so can travel freely across Afghanistan. Unlike UNDP staff that require 2 armoured vehicles and heavy security from GoIRA.
- UNDP are looking for an implementation model that could be supported by a recruitment process which will offer a balance between results (i.e. service delivery to improve people's lives) versus national ownership, accountability for the funds and security for UN staff.
- Currently there is an increased focus from the UNDP side on sustainable exit. This includes an implicit drive to people to become (transition) to Tashkeel.
- This will pose a challenge as Tashkeel salaries range from 100-600 USD per month.
- There is a need to move staff to national and local government contracts via a controlled process with national ownership.
- ASGP II has three component thinking:
 - IDLG – including policy setting and regulations
 - Municipalities
 - PGOs, DGOs and PCs
- Signing of LoAs with Provincial Offices took from Feb 2010 to June 2011. These LoAs enable ~10k USD procurement, staffing etc.
- LoAs are annual and require re-negotiation every year. (time and resource consuming). (note: no sunset clause).
- 1 LoA for the Centre and 34 for each province.
- UNDP also signed LoA with IDLG. This provides for 100 ToS staff (70% professionals and 30% support staff), contracted and reporting to IDLG. This is great for national ownership and security issues, but not great for accountability. However as part of the exit strategy 70% should be moved to tashkeel by end of 2014.
- There is a concern over the quality of ToS staff being hired.
- IDLG working on SN Strategy. Though the further the SN strategy is moving forward the further it is drifting from the constitution and from the centralised structure.
- Donors and GoA are not assessing the Pol-Mil vs Development strategy and looking at scale and scope for transition (note: For exit strategy: should donor staff transition to UNDP as part of moving from Bilateral to multilateral support?).
- UNDP are reviewing if they should be working in high risk/low security environment. Especially in light of recent elections problems.
- UNDP also asking how sure could they be of other programmes delivering, e.g. RAMPUP.

--

Meeting	Date
IDLG	26 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been some main outcomes of ASGP so far; improvement central – local governments relations improvement, policy framework development for IDLG, design of a strategic framework for sub-national governance. • By the support of ASGP the PAR implementation strategy at the sub-national level has been finalized. • There has been training and capacity building programs for the civil servants conducted through CSC in support with ASGP at the sub-national level. • The capacity of the sub-national representative bodies (the PCs) have been enhanced through training programs of ASGP. • There were no comments on the ASGP before 2007 where it was supporting Mol as its sub-national partner. • There has been a capacity building strategy for civil servants developed by IDLG with the assistance of ASGP. • All offices in the center and the provinces except the municipalities have gone through PAR process in line with CSC with the support of ASGP. • Support to public participation in municipal governance as stated in the project document, did not yet take place. • Support to the capacity enhancement of the PCs has been carried out through ASGP • IDLG could not know how the local service delivery has improved in result of ASGP contribution. • There has been task orders formality in place supported by the ASGP. They worked relatively well. However, it has had created some capacity in IDLG to take the reform process forward. • Through the support of ASGP in March 2010 the SNG policy has been published in Dari, Pashto, and English. Under this 4 new relative laws have been drafted. • IDLG expects that UNDP can carry on with ASGP. However it was recommended that the project and its personnel should not keep the capacity in their own, but to shift or transfer it to the government counterpart(s) in Afghanistan. • IDLG has not been supporting the beauricratic procedures of UNDP in terms of program delivery and support. There should be a transition plan for ASGP into IDLG. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP	25 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IDLG directors incl.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Policy ○ PCs ○ HR and Finance ○ Municipality ○ Capacity Development ○ Afghan Stabilisation nprogramme (Eng. Farhad – Not director but key person and in charge of LoA). • ASGP I had 2 types of LoA: 	

- UNDP and CSC
- UNDP and IDLG
- From LoAs flow Task Orders, budgets, equipment, procurement process etc.
- ASGP II did not include Task Orders. Staff transferred to LoAs. ToS terminology changed over time and subsequently dropped.
- ASGP I delegated work at the provincial level via LoA with IDLG. ASGP II, under donor pressure, move to direct LoAs with provincial governorates.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	26 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PM joined the project in January 2011. • There were different work plans developed for the project, and by the beginning May 2011 the last work plan for ASGP has come out. It was signed in June 2011. One of the reasons that the work plan delayed was the request of IDLG for extra fund in the project. • In late January and early February 2011 the project expenditure has been slowed down by UNDP on the programmatic activities. • There have been frequent delays and weaker support of UNDP to ASGP, especially in HR support. 	

Meeting	Date
IDLG	26 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MoI -> IDLG in 2007. • SN Policy – expected outcome is from ASGP I, created good capacity to formulate and lead the process of SN Policy – ASGP’s biggest outcome is the creation of SN Policy. • PAR – IDLG with the help of ASGP developed capacity building strategy which later developed into a programme and was then used to reform the structure in IDLG and provincial offices (not in municipalities). • GoA not able to sustain salaries at the municipalities. • Participation – couldn’t be assured but ASGP worked to increase capacity of PCs via outreach programmes with nationals and internationals. • ASGP was designed to be comprehensive however when IDLG was created it started to monopolise the focus of ASGP (subsequently dropping support to CSC). • RIMUs never took off after IDLG’s creation due to Task Orders being created to fulfil the role. • Task Orders (nationals) helped create strategy. Bureaucracy is the main issue with ToS –both in the delay in processing contracts and the delay of procurement requests. • SN Policy approved March 2010, published in 3 languages (English, Dari, Pashto). • 4 new laws drafted: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Local government ○ Provincial ○ Municipality ○ District • UNDP believes it is viewed by implementing partners as a poor transferor of capacity to nationals. The solution could be to move from implementing partners to GoAs part of the 	

exit strategy.

- The attack on UNAMA impacted ASGP by taking away much of the capacity that has been developed over the programme. ASGP I and II (over the last year) suffered significantly from this.
- It is important to simplify the bureaucratic procedures of UNDP to allow ASGP to respond to needs.
- ASGP should have had a plan for transition to GoA over 2 years ago.
- ASGP II created:
 - SNG Policy Framework
 - 4 new laws
 - SN Finance Framework
- IDLG feels ASGP II's plan to hire expat advisors to work in governor offices – to build capacity – is a great idea. But a mechanism is required to merge into government structure (Exit strategy).
- PC platform – created in council PR officers to help in outreach and awareness campaigns, knowledge sharing, and capacity building of PC members. Not a large budget is dedicated to this but sufficient for the time being.
- Municipalities – Mezar and Herat Municipalities are important. With the help of ASGP managed to triple revenue.
- RAMP-UP programme does not have to overlap with ASGP as they can focus on smaller out of provincial capital municipalities.
- ASGP management is improving but there is still room to continue to do so.
- ASGP II designed to be decentralised, therefore better to have a smaller office in Kabul with separate LoAs for each province. This brings up the issue of finding enough capable people to lead in each province. But if other programmes can do this then why can't ASGP?

Meeting	Date
DFID	26 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For DFID there has been lack of enough information on the expenditure and utilization of resources in ASGP so far. • DFID has suspended its funding to ASGP, but subject to the recommendation expected to come out of the Review Report, DFID was expecting to spend on its committed fund to it. • As per DFID experience UNDP has not listened enough to the concerns of the donors on ASGP. • There has been formal and regular communication and feedback over ASGP's developments through DFID to UNDP. • DFID has experienced information gaps and questions over the validity of the information provided through ASGP reports, and the reports were not responding against the Log-Frame of ASGP. • DFID has been little informed of any project document revisions, or redirection of ASGP. • DFID expects the Review Team Recommendations on how to go forward with the support to the municipalities component of ASGP, when there were other initiatives such as RAMP-UP active. • According to IDLG, RAMP-UP was expected to take the support to provincial municipalities and ASGP could go with the district municipalities support. • DFID does not yet know enough about the LoA process carried in the project, and accordingly they were not properly utilized in the PGOs. 	

- In case DFID becomes sure of that UNDP could not be able to execute satisfactory the project, they make consider other possible alternatives to support sub-national governance.
- From the DFID side the goals and objectives of the Sub-national Governance Policy has been apparently considered in the project document of ASGP.
- DFID expects of the project development after the review to consider the risk management component taken care of.
- As per the observation of DFID cost effectiveness has been a consideration in ASGP, salary level and expenditure on equipment and supplies are high in the project.
- DFID expects the review mission to consider more the areas of over lap between ASGP and other sub-national governance support activities funded by other donors being implemented.
- According to DFID, development and preparation of the Sub-national Governance Policy has been a good achievement of ASGP.

Meeting	Date
IDLG Line Departments	27 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prior to October 2007 there were not enough information on ASGP and its progress available with them. • With the support of ASGP, IDLG has developed a 5 years strategic work plan for it, the sub-national governance policy has been developed, the institution development function, sub-national governance support, support to the local councils, and support to the municipalities, coordination and facilitation functions of IDLG have improved. • IDLG with the assistance of ASGP has been working on the implementation framework of SNGP, IDLG could improve its management system, and start the development process of its computerized pay role and employees attendance. • In line and with the support of ASGP, IDLG has been restructuring, its data base system including the one for HR has been developed and improved. • With the assistance of ASGP, IDLG has been able to conduct a needs assessment all over the country for capacity building and training of the civil servants. • ASGP has developed a number of manuals and guidelines for IDLG now being operationalized all over the country. There has been a strong coordination between ASGP and IDLG. • With the support of ASGP, the formulation SNG priority programs have started to be developed. • Phase one ASGP has been more in the shape of direct execution while in ASGP-II there is more of an execution role for IDLG as national execution partner. • Structure of the government in the provinces improved in result of ASGP contribution, still there were more to be done in districts in this regard. • The challenge of ASGP according to IDLG is its slow transfer and shifting process of responsibilities more to IDLG. Between 2011 and 2014 transition will be possible from ASGP to IDLG. 	

Meeting	Date
IDLG	27 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	

- IDLG created in October 2007 by breaking off MoI Finance and Admin departments and Boundary departments to form IDLG.
- ASGP supported restructuring of IDLG, created 5 year strategic workplan, clear SN policy function for the Policy directorate, Institution Development Function (incl. infrastructure, admin etc.), Local governance: starting with provincial and moving down to local councils, Coordination and facilitation – by supporting affairs of the governor’s office and the municipalities.
- The policy department is doing a great job with the support of ASGP.
- Supporting municipalities and institutional development requires a programmatic approach, which started in ASGP I and should continue in ASGP II.
- ASGP initially provided support to local councils with a focus on ANDS. However this soon ran into problems as they didn’t have a clear view of how local governments should function and how to create programmes to help local entities interact with each other. But did manage to support by creating local accountability.
- ASGP I had issues of ownership and leadership. In consultation with GoAASGP I ended the direct execution by UNDP. The end of ASGP I helped shape ASGP II.
- ASGP I provided support to Provincial and Municipal level. Not clear if any support was provided to the District levels.
- RAMP-UP has 3 components: capacity building, service delivery, and enhancing municipal revenue. The programme will cover 33 district municipalities and 15 provincial municipalities, mainly in the west of Afg. RAMP-UP is strong on service delivery, but ASGP provided stronger capacity building.
- Over the last year IDLG and ASGP had coordination issues.
- Municipal plan to replace the Taliban municipal law is at final stages – this is a big step and a product of ASGP.
- ASGP provided professional contributions including help increase revenues for municipalities and capacity building. Now a Development Fund is required to help ASGP go beyond participatory discussions.
- IDLG asked ASGP to place qualified engineers at the provincial level to support the Development Fund in year 2 and 3. These would then be transferred to the Tashkeel as part of the exit strategy.
- A key issue for ASGP is finding staff for difficult provinces, e.g. Helmand and Kanderhar. ASGP I failed to achieve this even with top-up salaries, however ASGP II has started to do this now.
- ASGP helped develop good databases including HR, Correspondence, visitor and meetings, Tax, and business registration database.
- IDLG asked RAMP-UP not to develop manuals again as ASGP is in the process of finalising them.
- RAMP-UP seems confused and has poor international advisors. IDLG are pushing back on RAMP-UP plans to cut and paste packages from other countries.
- IDLG wants ASGP to push down to local municipalities but should continue to support the municipalities within the provincial capital.
- General Directorate for Municipal Affairs (GDMA) supporting all municipalities (except Kabul). Focusing on rebalancing between Northern provinces and Southern provinces.
- ASGP in developing other programmes e.g. RAMP-UP etc. IDLG did not have the capacity, so ASGP provided the support to create these programmes.
- One issue is the balance of intervention. Provincial strategic plans developed in Herat, Mazar and Helmand, were later pushed to other provinces. The issue is that intervention and support whilst equally shared did not take into account the differences between the provinces. Hence some provinces were able to benefit more for interventions, e.g. where every province was allocated 5 development advisors, Helmand received 8 which later on increased to more than 10 advisors. Or in some cases provinces were able to better utilise the capacity of advisors.
- “Without having this programme [ASGP] in the centre as well as the provinces, operation

would not go well”.

- “IDLG is now managing all municipalities with the exception of Kabul”.
- IDLG believes that establishing a model at the district levels would require significant time to change the mentality of people to help them adapt to live in a city.
- “IDLG likely to have ASGP”.
- ASGP I focused on building IDLG in 2009 and helped it to expand and move out to provincial level.
- ASGP I terminated 1 year earlier than planned in 2010, and transitioned to ASGP II with a focus on the provincial level.
- Transition – IDLG wants to focus on delegation to provinces and bringing them more resources with accountability. Since 2011 lots of resources were made available but without the capacity to absorb and utilize them efficiently, this will only lead to corruption and waste.
- The Kabul conference requires more resources to be made available via the budget it’s. ASGP could move to national execution but requires further capacity building. It has been agreed that by the end of 2014 the exit strategy would be the transition to national execution.
- ASGP II could have a national project manager however this should be based on qualifications and skills.
- At IDLG ASGP helped with HRMIS, Computerised Attendance System, and Computerised Payroll System. These are now rolling out to the provinces.
- 24 provinces conducted TNA’s and now looking at Needs Assessments for Municipalities and Districts.
- A change of management is required at ASGP to bring ownership, and improve the programme, as well as the need to improve capacity within the team. The frequent change of leadership is a problem.
- The attack on the UN guest house, triggered a physical gap between ASGP I and II, due to experts being forced to evacuate. Experts lost from IDLG are not willing to come back not even via UNDP.
- Policy dept waiting a year to get staff. Current there is a need for Strategic Level advisors to support transition over the next 3 years.
- 2010 was a critical year due to the Kabul conference.
- 2007 strategic intervention with ASGP into IDLG, 2008 Task Order No.21 refocused from Centre to the Provinces, 2009 operationalization of intervention. In 2010 LoA could only be signed at the centre (between IDLG and ASGP).
- In late 2010, the process of signing LoAs for each province started was accelerated thanks to Basil.
- “Achieved new successes this year with this new ASGP Management”. Better and more regular communications, sharing of info, lots of inputs. “we have the feeling we are one team with one goal”.
- IDLG holds board meetings with donors and UNDP to review progress and challenges, and plot a way forward. This process is further enriched by the new ASGP management team.
- IDLG/ASGP are also learning from other projects. E.g. they will only accept advisors if they have counterparts to work with – a practice used on the CTAP programme.
- Issue with the way UNDP runs programmes: NABDP is via MRRD and ASGP is via IDLG. IDLG feels these programmes are similar and have some overlap. UNDP should cluster programmes to engage via single entity (e.g. at district level).
- ASGP hiring of staff should be more careful not to take staff into ASGP from local councils.
- IDLG initially presented a budget to UNDP of 11mil USD. But UNDP could only provide 2.9mil USD. So forcing IDLG to make internal cuts.
- ASGP should assess if their support (TA or other) is well balanced between the beneficiaries – PCs and PGOs.
- Training from ASGP I and II has built capacity with IDLG and created a Capacity Building and Training Directorate within IDLG. Now IDLG provides specialist training to CS and their staff in the provinces. CSC is left to provide the 5 common functions training across the

country. CSC and IDLG try not overlap.

- IDLG recommends cutting international staff from regional offices to spend the funds on hire more national staff in provincial and district levels.
- Reporting from IDLG changed from monthly in ASGP I to quarterly in ASGP II.
- Reporting and M&E should be institutionalised within IDLG and ASGP. A system should be put in place to focus on priorities.
 - Provincial
 - Municipality
 - District
- UNDP believes it is viewed by implementing partners as a poor transferor of capacity to nationals. The solution could be to move from implementing partners to GoAs part of the exit strategy.
- The attack on UNAMA impacted ASGP by taking away much of the capacity that has been developed over the programme. ASGP I and II (over the last year) suffered significantly from this.
- It is important to simplify the bureaucratic procedures of UNDP to allow ASGP to respond to needs.
- ASGP should have had a plan for transition to GoA over 2 years ago.
- ASGP II created:
 - SNG Policy Framework
 - 4 new laws
 - SN Finance Framework
- IDLG feels ASGP II's plan to hire expat advisors to work in governor offices – to build capacity – is a great idea. But a mechanism is required to merge into government structure (Exit strategy).
- PC platform – created in council PR officers to help in outreach and awareness campaigns, knowledge sharing, and capacity building of PC members. Not a large budget is dedicated to this but sufficient for the time being.
- Municipalities – Mezar and Herat Municipalities are important. With the help of ASGP managed to triple revenue.
- RAMP-UP programme does not have to overlap with ASGP as they can focus on smaller out of provincial capital municipalities.
- ASGP management is improving but there is still room to continue to do so.
- ASGP II designed to be decentralised, therefore better to have a smaller office in Kabul with separate LoAs for each province. This brings up the issue of finding enough capable people to lead in each province. But if other programmes can do this then why can't ASGP?

Meeting	Date
Regional Manager	27 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sara started with ASGP in October 2010. • Based on LoA, ASGP developed Annual and Quarterly WP with IDLG. Once items approved, accounts are opened and funds transferred. Funds could be drawn by ToS (in provinces where corruption is low). For this to happen 2 signatories are required. If ToS can sign then the governor may appoint 2 non-Tashkeel staff to accept the funds. • The same account is used to pay salaries for ToS and procurement. It is not yet clear if the limit of ~10K USD is per invoice or per item? • One of the biggest problems within ASGP is recruitments and the constant contract extensions. • Procurement and salary payments currently follows UNDP rules and procedures and not that 	

of GoIRA. This is leading to delays, and governors asking when they will get their computers, when will their staff be paid etc.

- ASGP II had a shaky start due to capacity and lack of experience of the PM at the time, as well as the fact he had to cover the role of Chief Technical Advisor. He wasn't able to manage the relationship with IDLG and agreed to their request. This caused lasting damage to the programme.
- Regional cover is questionable with Jalalabad (the second largest city and region) left with no regional manager and covered on and off by another region.
- Confusion in the last 6 months as the WP was changed from the regional plan in the IR to an annual plan without full consultation with the governors or the regional teams.
- Under pressure from the donors, UNDP have decided to push for Provincial Strategic plans. IDLG agreed to take over this work. However they plan to fly in into a province, get the date, go back to Kabul and finalise the plan. Then send it to the governor.
- The feeling is that donors did not have any issues with Joanne Adams (former PM for the ASGP in 2009). But she lost her position when she had to re-apply for it due to UN recruitment rules.
- ToS reported to IDLG upto end of 2010. From 2011 they also report to UNDP.
- ASGP has provided hi speed internet to PGOs.
- Municipality component of ASGP is seen as separate sub-project from the other parts of the programme. With Naseer Hamidi heading it up.
- Support to the CSC (component 3) was removed from the WP after donor request.
- MRRD and IDLG do not see eye to eye.
- PCs should be doing oversight on projects in their province and on PGO activity.
- Not clear if PCs report to IDLG or will report to IDLG as part of the SN policy.

Meeting	Date
Region Manager	27 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In ASGP central region office covers Panjshir, Parwan, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, and Kabul Provinces. • Based on the LoAs quarterly and annual work plans have been developed. The signatories of LoAs are to be ASGP, IDLG, and the Governors. • Some times UNDP management does not quickly respond to the needs of ASGP in the regions. There has been relatively slow procurement, and HR services provided by UNDP to the provinces. • One of the challenges of ASGP in the past has been felt to be its own weaker management. • The program can better deliver by more focused direction and leadership to ASGP, more communication and coordination meetings among the regional managers, and delegation of the authorities. • There were two separate training assessments being exercised by IDLG, and ASGP in the province. • In accordance to the SNGP the PCs have to report to IDLG. 	

Meeting	Date
Donor Netherlands and EU	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In ASGP-I the project personnel could not get to the provinces and the project 	

manager(s) have been considered to be weak.

- As per the Dutch observation most of the donors had found it difficult to see the results of ASGP. Because of other sub-national governance support initiatives they were not able to distinguish between the outputs resulted of ASGP and the one of other actors.
- Canada and Norway have poled out of the support to ASGP, the Dutch were not in ASGP-II, and DFID was considering its further support subject to the findings and recommendations of the review mission. They were worried of further investment to ASGP.
- In December 2010 the Dutch request a review of the project resulted their meeting with JJ, the DD of UNDP.
- The Swiss and UNAMA were positive about ASGP.
- By December 31, 2010 the Dutch were informed that their funds were spent all in ASGP.
- IDLG has been using ASGP as a cash cow and has been filling their gaps through it. IDLG has been monopolized ASGP.
- The achievements expected in the project documents of ASGP were not reflected in its progress reports.
- The weak performance of ASGP-I to some extent is associated to its under-staff situation which goes to weak project management and accordingly to UNDP who is more involved in recruitment process than the extent that it should be.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basil arrived on the project in January 2011. • Confirmed a new WP released 11 days ago, signed by ASGP, UNDP-CO and IDLG. • Efforts in 2010 to create an annual work plan required several revisions. UNDP-CO decided in May that the plan no longer needed to be regional and so a combined national plan was created. • The new WP has also been entered into ATLAS (financial tracking system). • IDLG requested 10-14 mil USD. It took a long time to negotiate them down to 3 mil USD. • Project concept changed significantly even from the IP. • During the last 6 months of 2010 the regional managers had no WP to follow. • On arrival, CTA didn't have a team to deliver any WP and was told to commence recruitment asap. • Soon afterwards ASGP II told to stop all activity by donors. CTA had to redraft the WP to maintain some work progress. • Last 6 months very challenging with numerous false starts, replanning and rethinking, significant interest from UNDP-CO (micromanagement), no team to implement the work. • Donors – UK, Dutch and Swiss – most critical. DFID have particularly fed back on the reporting, stating that reports are not clear and that activities as being confused with results. To resolve this ASGP hire Robin as reporting officer to support a new reporting format. • CTA currently redrafting ToRs to advertise for new staff and head hunting. Key to recruit Logistics manager and Knowledge manager. Security and resource issues at UNDP may hinder the process. • The Kabul Conference layed out a timetable for transition and how future donor support should be channelled via MoF to the line ministries. • Provincial Development Fund – approx. 15 mil USD – from UNDP to provinces to use for projects. 	

- Current areas of engagement:
 - IDLG supported by ASGP Policy Advisor
 - PGO/DGO level main focus of ASGP (with IDLG) – this section of the work is still catching up.
 - Municipal Level – delivering support on revenue collection. Note: significant donor funding went direct to municipalities. Strongest part of ASGP with capacity ahead of other parts of the programme. RAMPUP are also focusing on this area.
 - PCs – Oversight function – many lost track of goal and got into “bricks and mortar inspection”. This led to questions of corruption in receiving payoffs to stop hassling contractors.
- PGO and PCO should have outreach programmes via the media to increase public awareness. Agreed 1 ToS to support PC chairperson on public awareness; facilitate regional, local and national conferences; and knowledge sharing forums.
- ASGP should move away from training.
- ASGP working with PGOs to come up with PDPs for each province and not just a project wish list.
- PDPs – IDLG teams will be drafting after a short visit to each province – are not ready or not doable. President ordered plans to remain secret and not released until he approves them.
- ASGP wants Governor Development Plans.
- NIBP could help ASGP to push forward with MoEc and line ministries – communicating one message.
- RAMPUP being implemented by Chemonics and DAI.

Meeting	Date
UNDP	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Inception Report has not been identified as the principal ASGP program document. The UK-DFID after six months of the start of ASGP-II requested for the Inception Report, and one of the reasons for this request has been lack of baseline for ASGP-II project document. • Achievements in ASGP-II have been relatively related to the progress made in ASGP-I. • Since January 2011, activities of ASGP-II have been slowed down in result of some donors' suspension in funding. • The last quarterly report of ASGP-I has been mixed with the first quarterly report of ASGP-II. • Golden Questions have been derived of the project documents to prioritize the objectives. • Program section of UNDP has had bi-weekly monitoring visits of the regions and has been quality checking the progress of ASGP. • The project manager reports verbally or presents a narrative report to senior management of UNDP. Quarterly reports produced have also been sent to the donors. • The management of ASGP-I has been identified inefficient in performance related to the project. 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP	28 June, 2011

Key Issues Discussed:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prince 2 qualified, recruited to help with reporting. • Q1-2011 report drafted based on IP WP, now with PSU awaiting release. • WP reporting is mainly focusing on IDLG and Municipality work. Otherwise teams reporting monthly against the five strategic priorities (AKA the Golden Questions). • Deadlines for reporting are set by PSU. Deadlines for reporting mainly achievable unless weekly, monthly and quarterly fall in the same week. • Quarterly reports cant be finalised within the 2 week deadline. Usually achievable within 4 weeks. • Final report is usually given 3 months to close out commitments. • Quality of reports from the field is very variable, linguistic issues etc. Pushing to ensure reports include information on gender, M&E, approvals by donors, etc. • UNDP corporate projects require Prince 2 methodology to be used. • Risks matrix now in Final ASGP I report (why?), Quarterly reports and in ASGP II IP. • ASGP II is using Results Based Management with examples, best practice and idea for knowledge sharing. • Reporting: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ weekly – inform NY on products/results completed within a week. ○ monthly – track the workplan and track the strategic priorities. ○ quarterly – aimed at donors and based on Prince 2 requirements. ○ annual – again aimed at donors.

Meeting	Date
UNDP	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP do not see IR as binding document only the signed project document or WP. But UNDP didn't update the project document with the IR plan. • DFID requested IR with baseline 6 months after ASGP II started. • UNDP focus on delivery rate (rate of spend) as an indicator for progress. Not results or outcomes. • Donors told ASGP to slow down on spending. So ASGP now believes that lack of progress is the fault of the donors. • Qtr reports in 2010 combined ASGP I and II activities. • UNDP uses delivery rate (i.e. rate of spend) as the indicator for successful achievement of outcomes. This is confusing the managing to results with burn rate. • Golden Questions are sent by Zubair to ASGP via the reporting officer, used as a quality check based on the project documents and WP. In addition to increase quality assurance both Zubair and Khalid carryout 2 field visits every month to meet ASGP staff and Government counterparts. They usually go direct not via the ASGP central team. • The project manager provide a monthly verbal report (second Monday of every month) to UNDP Snr management team. This cover previous month's activities. • Ram Bukhary – P5 level, very weak PM, resigned in Dec 2010 before his 1 year FT contract term. • Plan is to have 1 international for each region and the rest nationals under LoA with process support centrally provided. 	

Meeting	Date
----------------	-------------

Donors Dutch and EU	28 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASGP suffered from poor project management. • Not possible to see clear cause of results between ASGP or other donor programmes. • Norway pulled out, DFID pulled out (withholding further funding), Canada pulled out, Dutch not funding on ASGP II until outcome of review. • ASGP is the best tool for SN Policy. • IDLG (with ASGP support) stage manage the Qtr Board Meetings. • IDLG monopolising ASGP. • IDLG saw ASGP as a cash cow. When ASGP is challenged by donors, it was IDLG that defended them. • Switch over from ASGP I to II was not clear or transparent. • UNDP reported spending in non accessible provinces, this raises questions of correct reporting. • Dutch looking at committing 4mil USD subject to other donors contributing and continuation of ASGP II. • In ASGP I the focus on IDLG was the right thing to have, But they remain unable to stand on their own feet. Asia Foundation was hired in provinces to help train IDLG staff in the field and to ensure no fund flow back to IDLG. • Concern over supply of capable nationals due to other donor (e.g. RAMPUP) and UN programmes. 	

Meeting	Date
UNAMA	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNAMA as a political mission mandated by the security council of the UN has had offices in 8 regions in Afghanistan to support the stabilization process, and the national institutions to practice good governance at the national and sub-national level. In each region it has one international and one up to two national staffs. • In governance section UNAMA was working with IDLG, the CSC, the High Office for Oversight Anti-corruption. It has been politically supporting the governances support initiatives with coordination among the national and international partners. • UNAMA has also been working closely with civil society and the provincial councils. • AS per UNAMA in most cases the PCs were side lined by the governors in the provinces. • Staffing will be a difficult challenge for ASGP in an open and competitive market. • ASGP's support to strengthening IDLG has been considerable. • ASGP supported the establishment and functioning of CSC training centers in the provinces • ASGP has been out of PAR which has been later taken over by IDLG. • As per UNAMA the activities carried out by ASGP were in line with the sub-national governance policy and the Kabul Conference directives. However, since the SNGP has been drafted very ambitious its implementation would be challenging. • ASGP supported the district operation manual being used by IDLG. • ASGP has gone through various changes in its management through the course of its implementation and it has affected negatively the project outputs. • The donors were consulted by UNDP when it has been designed or revised. • There is coordination to some degree in between different actors in sub-national governance support initiatives in the provinces, and it differs from province to 	

province. There has been a forum on sub-national governance initiatives support where ASGP and other actors coordinate at the national and sub-national level.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the municipal pillar there is no regional structure directly working with municipalities. They are using ToS and providing technical support and management from Kabul. • ASGP I component base management with Kabul centric approach, working directly with the municipalities, districts and provinces. Focusing on PGOs/DGOs, PCs etc. • ASGP II provincial approach using regional structures and changed to more implementation/responsibility by the regional offices. Refocusing on pillars: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ IDLG – supporting policy and institutional capacity building ○ Municipalities ○ Provinces – supporting PGOs/DGOs and PCs • LoA Municipal support is done via ToS national staff embedded within the municipality. No international staff. • ASGP II current modality started only 3 months back. Developed a plan with each municipality under LoA to produce ASGP objectives and results. • Plans now feed in from SN unlike in ASGP I when plans were developed in Kabul and fed down to SN levels (to municipality, province etc.). • Resources being transferred to municipality including bank accounts. • PAR – not being implemented in municipalities. Only in some line ministries, regional directorates and in PGOs/DGOs. • Law for municipalities does not set out details on structure, budget, positions etc. Hence each municipality has its own individual structure with staff number from 2 (manager and 1 admin staff) to 600 (Herat is the biggest). • ASGP I developed 3 models for structure with CSC and IDLG. This is continuing in ASGP II and OAA approved these, and agreed to pay top up salaries for 1 year. • ASGP helped define minimum standards for 12 municipalities. • Municipalities get no transfers or share of national income, so they generate revenue from charges, fees and taxes. • There are different categories of municipalities within the different grades of provinces and districts. • ASGP focusing on developing capacity of municipalities by drafting manuals and providing training on revenue collection. So far 50 have been provided by training. 30 have a 5 year plan for revenue projections in the provincial action plan. Target is to reach 50 by year end and all 153 by end of the project. • Resourcing constraints may impact this goal, but they have requested additional staff from UNDP and are working on strategic partnership with UN Habitat to share knowledge. • Municipalities have no legal requirement to provide services. Line ministries are required to provide water, health, electricity etc. Municipalities have a defined service plan to: asphalt roads, dig tunnels, collect and process waste, maintain parks and markets etc. • ASGP-Municipality currently not connecting to MRRD directly only via DDPs. Main connection to IDLG. • Training faculty established in each regional/provincial municipality (note not the same as CSC training centres). Costs and resources provided by ASGP. Training carried out by local universities to local staff (of district, province). • ASGP I developed Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP) later to become RAMPUP. 	

- ASGP I products:
 - Office operating manuals produced for PGOs and DGOs
 - Provincial Strategic Planning guide (PSP)
 - Provincial Profiles/books
 - Improved filing system in PGOs
 - Some training with CSCs
 - Procurement of computers, tools etc.
 - Governor forums
 - PC Conference in Kabul and PC training (on their role)
 - District governors conference (364 governors attending)
 - International exposure visits
 - Good deal of resources went into CSC-PAD.
- ASGP funded 7 CSC regional training centres and 200 of the 400 ASGP staff at the time, supported the CSC.
- Naseer reports to both Basil and JJ. Incl. Written reporting.

Meeting	Date
UNAMA	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNAMA mission mandated by SC to lead the international coordination effort in Afg in support of the national institutions. • Currently they have 8 regional offices (7+Kabul) plus offices in 11 provincial cities, to help in stabilisation and promote good governance in provinces via the provincial offices. • Provincial offices have 1 international and 2 national staff. 60-70% of international positions are currently staffed with 90% of national positions staffed. • The UN is changing its recruitment system to move to long term contracts. • Hassan has been in Afg for 8 years. Good continuations, working in support of partners in IDLG, CSC, HOO. Providing coordination and political support. E.g. ensuring Afg priorities are focused on within PAR and reform is implemented and coordinated well. • With PC capacity building UNAMA are only making sure workshops etc are being carried out by others, e.g. NDI. Otherwise they would look at providing them via own staff. • Recognise staffing is a problem for ASGP due to competition over the labour resources in the market. • Strength of ASGP I was to recognise and fill the gap to supporting IDLG when it was created. • UNAMA engages with/via US Emb to find out more about DDP implementation being carried out by ISAF/PRTs. • ASGP I also played a part in logistics, training and the setup for the CSC regional training centres. CSC is poor in supporting and prioritising focus on the training centres. • Donors felt ASGP support was spread too wide (all over Afg), and so PAR support was later dropped by ASGP. • IDLG is part of the palace, they see the president daily and so have a great influence. • Decree establishing IDLG says it should be a lead and coordination unit not an implementer. Hence there is a struggle between IDLG and MRRD. MoEc not in the picture at all. • Governance has to be taken within a political context, processes take time to establish and District Operational Manuals should have been developed in ASGP I (not training). Hence UNAMA feels UNDP-ASGP need time to reform [Confusion on who should be reformed? UNDP or Afg?] • UNAMA rarely attend the ASGP Board meetings despite the fact they are part of the group, they should be doing coordination, and they are the champions of governance. • UNAMA main coordination is in the provinces between donors and ASGP [Not clear how 	

UNAMA coordinates in the provinces when they or ASGP have no rep there due to security issues?]

Meeting	Date
ASGP	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In ASGP-I there have been 8 to 9 program staffs working on support to the PCs. • ASGP-I has been focusing on PAR, Pay and Grading Reform of ministries at their sub-national directorates. • Under Task Orders there were 195 employees scanned to the government engaged in PAR process all over the country. They were doing M& E of PAR, and the Pay and Grading process establishment. • There were 23 CSC training centers established through ASGP-I to train the government employees in the provinces for 4 years. Each one of them trained 120 civil servants, each for 6 months, out of which 25 to 30 % were women trainees. • Through ASGP-I a number of training manuals were developed for the 23 training centers in the provinces. • Funding through ASGP-I to the provincial training centers stopped in October 2010 by the direction of the country director of UNDP, and PAR component has been shifted to NIBP. However the training centers stopped operation in the provinces. • More focus of the ASGP to the PGOs, the DGOs and the PCs started since September 2010. • 60% of the total ASGP-I budget went to CSC, and the rest to IDLG support. • There were PGOs and DGOs manuals prepared through the support of ASGP-I. • Around 60% of the PC members have received training supported by ASGP-I. The PC members were exposed to other countries for their capacity enhancement purpose. • ASGP-I has offered ICT and other office equipments to the PCs. • On March 2009 the new coming PCs members have also received training through ASGP. • The PCs law has been amended by the support and assistance of ASGP. • A relatively stronger team and a coordinator has been required to support the PCs pillar of ASGP. • IDLG has been providing salaries to the PCs members through the MoF operation budget. • There was no LoA staff in ASGP-II to support PCs component of the program. • .There has been a PCs platform established in 2008 with the support of ASGP. • ASGP-II relatively has got more funds for training and capacity enhancement of the PCs. • The only PCs support specialist in ASGP-II management office has been providing training and capacity enhancement programs through the program to the PC. 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP:	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In present structure ASGP do not have staff to assist in municipalities support in the 	

provinces. However, the pillar was supporting the municipalities through the LoA employees in the provinces.

- At the beginning ASGP-I has had a Kabul-centric and component wise approach to support the sub-national governance municipalities development in the provinces, later it turned to support directly the regions through the regional managers, at this stage – start of ASGP- II decentralization started and ASGP has been working from the center directly with the LoA employees in the provinces based on a plan to reach the project objectives. The municipalities support section has 4 staffs in Kabul.
- ASGP-I has been working on supporting to the PGOs, DGOs, Municipalities, Policy Development, PCs, and Capacity Development.
- In ASGP- II the program implementation has been carried on according to the allocated budget and the annual work plan. However, ASGP for its implementation has four pillars:
 1. Municipalities Support Pillar, 2. IDLG Support Pillar, 3. PGOs, DGOs, PCs Support Pillar, and 4. Technical Assistance and Management Pillar.
- In ASGP-II Mr. Humam is responsible to support the IDLG, Mr. Hashmat to support the PCs, Mr. Nasir Hamidi responsible to support the municipalities pillar, the project manager beside his management role takes care of the technical support section, and the PGOs, DGOs support sections which were vacant by the time of the meeting.
- At this part of time in the project the plans and policies were coming from the provinces under which they were expected to execute in the project.
- PAR has been implemented in PGOs and DGOs with the support of ASGP, but not yet implemented in the municipalities.
- For municipalities restructuring and reform ASGP has cooperated with IDLG and CSC and developed three modules. Now the modules have been approved by OAA and are expected to be applied in the municipalities in the 34 provinces.
- The municipalities generate revenues that will cover their expenses. No fund has been going to the municipalities from anywhere else. The municipalities also do not send their revenues to anywhere else.
- Based on the SNGP a new law for the municipalities have drafted with the assistance and support of ASGP.
- Out of the 153 municipalities, 30 of them have developed revenue generation five years' plans.
- The process to develop standard operation procedures for municipalities has started after completion of which all the municipalities can apply that to their operation.
- There was an agreement between the CSC and ASGP to consider 20% female employees in the municipality's staff's recruitment.
- There is section in the sub-national governance policy over the operation of the municipalities. However, based on that the issue of mayors' election will be dealt. However the timely elections of the mayors depend mostly to other political developments in the country.
- The project document for RAMP-UP has been developed with the assistance of ASGP-I.
- With the support of ASGP, Governors and PC orientations forums were formed, a DGs conferences has been supported for the 364 districts, international exposures for the district governors has been supported, and PGOs office operating manuals and guidebooks for provincial development plans have been prepared.

Meeting	Date
DFID	29 June, 2011

Key Issues Discussed:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASGP II 23.6 mil GBP (around 40mil USD) commitment from DFID. No plans to spend any more. First 6mil GBP paid out, rest in tranches. • Main issue is the lack of info on how and where funding is being spent. • DFID issued guidelines on how to report (despite the fact these were already agreed at the start). • Challenge with UNDP – they don't listen or provide an opportunity for donors. The project board meeting is stage managed using powerpoints and no time for discussions. • DFID resorted to communicating concerns in a numbers of ways including a meeting with Head of UNDP in Kabul, and later UK Director in NY meeting Head of UNDP in NY. • DFID internal evaluation of ASGP II scored 4 (close project). • Qtr reports are poor quality, not at the agreed specification, contain information gaps, show little evidence of claimed achievements, in some cases content is not accurate. Lack information/update against indicators to enable reporting against logframe. • DFID asked ASGP PM on vision, but was told no comments PM only focusing on staffing crisis. • ASGP is seen as an nationwide invest not just in the Helmand area. • SNG Policy – too long, too complicated, and questionable method of approving it across government. • LoA – is a massive recruitment issue only flagged by DFID after reading the IR (UNDP did not inform DFID prior). • DFID visit to Helmand asked ASGP staff on current work, told ASGP staff (ie LoAs) were doing nothing and waiting for instructions. • UNDP asked DFID to find staff for the programme but DFID unable/unwilling to do this. Duty of Care concerns. • DFID questions the affordability of this programme post transition to GoAon budget support. • DFID concerned over: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ how risk is managed within the programme ○ the programme's value for money – salaries, budget, airfares etc. ○ UNDP's transition planning and support ○ Provincial logframes need to be reviewed and focused down ○ UNDP breadth of activities beyond the objectives, e.g. Teacher training, conferences etc. ○ Propose Provincial Development Fund: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ accountability, ▪ duplication with funds incl. Other DFID funds, ▪ fund given to non-elected governors to use for out-side government activit and control.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 60% of ASGP I spent on CSC and 40% on IDLG. 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP	29 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the municipal pillar there is no regional structure directly working with municipalities. 	

They are using ToS and providing technical support and management from Kabul.

- ASGP I component base management with Kabul centric approach, working directly with the municipalities, districts and provinces. Focusing on PGOs/DGOs, PCs etc.
- ASGP II provincial approach using regional structures and changed to more implementation/responsibility by the regional offices. Refocusing on pillars:
 - IDLG – supporting policy and institutional capacity building
 - Municipalities
 - Provinces – supporting PGOs/DGOs and PCs
- LoA Municipal support is done via ToS national staff embedded within the municipality. No international staff.
- ASGP II current modality started only 3 months back. Developed a plan with each municipality under LoA to produce ASGP objectives and results.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	30 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He gave us a good background how this ASGP was envisaged and what roles were played by the team of ASGP for SN in Afghanistan along with IDLG • He explained the role of CSC in the program and has substantial component in ASGP I and has significant portion of the budget and actual costs incurred in ASGP I • He informed that in total there were 23 training centers established in which civil servants of s, and Line Ministries were trained in management, planning, financial accounting, general administration, English language and computer skills. • He explained the structure of the PGO office in a province, how a governor and elected and what is the role of various staff members working under the governor. • He also explained the current role of IDLG in functioning of the PGO and DGOs 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP	30 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He explained that procedure of payments against expenditure claims and also informed that there are various expenditures which mainly include salaries, procurement of capital or supply items, training costs, services, rental of premises, communication and publications, operational costs, contracting of service providers, UNDP overhead costs etc. • He informed that IDLG send invoice for LOA staff working with them and also those working with PGO and UNDP country office makes the direct payment • He explained the process how ASGP uses ALTAS for accounting purpose • He explained what is the process of advance disbursement and settlement for ASGP related costs which are not directly paid by UNDP country office • He explained where records are kept and how these are kept. • Matter related to review of documents on sample basis was discussed and it was informed to him to share the data related to costs incurred in specific format which will be shared with him through email and accordingly transactions will be selected for review purposes. 	

Meeting	Date
Regional Managers	30 June, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both recently arrived in the project. Both helped in the formulation of the new WP. Which was partly based on the previous regional WPs and the golden questions. They work thro LoA ToS to provide training and TA. Kundoz and other 4 provinces in the region completed a review of PCs. Working closely with UNAMA. UNAMA using ASGP as implementers. UNAMA providing facilities and local support. Nangarhar region also covers Nuristan – currently a no go area. Hence only able to establish relationship with 3 of the 4 governors, Nuristan governor is currently in hiding! Both regions are still at the early stages as no previous ASGP presence was in the regions. Cover was provided by the Urozgan RM. Target is by end of July to complete provincial WP – which depend on SOP sign off of IDLG. For PDF need new LoA and new SOP. PDP – currently a wish list – not complete for all provinces and should be realigned to the Provincial WP. Confusion if PDP or Provincial WPs are aligned to ANDS or the SNP. On arrival ASGP provided info pack and RMs escorted and introduced by PM to the regions, governors, PCs, LoAs, DropBox. RMs feel activities are achievable but may take more than one year to complete. View of current PM is positive – has strategy, vision, knowledge and experience required to lead ASGP. He gives clear direction and expects results. Project 3 pillars are similar and interconnected. Need current PM skills and position to connect and manage all three pillars across the programme/country. Golden questions are helpful, clearly define the CO direction, help define the progress (similar to indicators). Weekly and monthly report seem ok for now. 	

Meeting	Date
Coffey Helmand Team	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LoA ToS - relative to their titles, not doing anything useful. They have been useful in providing training and workshops. 	

Meeting	Date
Helmand Governor Office	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 years since the new governor took over and things are moving in the right direction. Helmand is 1/6 of AFG in agricultural land and 1/10 of the size of the country. The PGO has a good team and coordination. The international focus on the province has been very positive. ASGP gave a lot of training to build capacity of the governorate staff. The PGO has seen many positive initiatives working e.g. the complaint boxes. ToS now training many staff in PGO. ASGP helped to organise a peace concert in Lash. 60 thousand people came from around the 	

province.

- ASGP helped collect data from line departments and helped in publishing the yearly book with funding to pay for the printing provided by Asia Foundation.
- ASGP prepared a study tour to Bangladesh to study governance. Very positive. Want more visits e.g. sending Admin officers, PCs, scholars to Islamic countries to bring more learning from there!
- ASGP also pays for 1 MB internet connection. PGO hopes ASGP could expand this to other districts in the province.
- 10 active districts in the province with 3 committees in each district. PGO wants ASGP to provide training to social society committees (Peace Cmmtt, Judicial Cmmtt, Rehabilitation and Construction Cmmtt).
- ASGP is like the right hand of the governor.
- Issue: the speed of response of ASGP Kabul. Especially those due to security. E.g. peace conference requested by PGO, workshops for journalists, youth, women.
- IDLG regularly visit the province. But did not share SNP with the PGO.
- ASGP support to municipalities is good, especially on revenue collection, but need more time and support.

Meeting	Date
ASGP Helmand Team	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USED GOLDEN QUESTIONS TO CHECK PROGRESS – TIME VERY LIMITED DUE TO SECURITY RULES. • Currently no international within the team. OIC is Mr Saifuldean. Sending reports to RM in Kanderhar and Urozgan. • ASGP Kabul came once in the last year to check on accommodation and security situation. • 2/8 ToS speak English. Rest just simple understanding. • Still awaiting the bank account to be opened by ASGP. When the account is open they will give financial training to Financial Officers. To disburse funds requires the signature of the governor and the RM or Provincial Manager – yet to be hired. • The team received a copy of the SN Strategy from Kabul. Confusion if this is the same as the SNP. • ASGP team still coordinating with PAR effort of CSC. In the same building. 	

Meeting	Date
DFID Helmand	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concerns over overlap with UK funded work such as the provincial level governance support programmes via SU and Coffey. These are part funded by DFID and FCO conflict pool. Several advisers are engaged on this and based in Lash and focusing on Municipal, District and Provincial TA. • One area HMG are supporting is the Sector Services Department in PGO (with planning, admin and budgeting support). The PRT is providing the capacity building for this, but it should be provided by ASGP. • This raises the concern of double funding the same support. • UNHabitat implementing an urbanisation programme which includes waste collection at municipal level. Again raises the question of overlap with ASGP. 	

- DFID wanted to move from informal methods of supporting local government to a formal method e.g. via UNDP.
- Governor would say UNDP's presence has a negative impact.
- ASGP built a women's park – evidence suggests it is not used and contravenes UNDP mandate, as it's not a pro-poor outcome.
- IDLG regularly visits from Kabul, but ASGP visits are rare.

Meeting	Date
PRT	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP should increase presence in Helmand. UNAMA, MSF, ICRC, Journalist etc. all have a presence in Lash. All travel down on non-mil flights. So it is possible to operate in the south. 	

Meeting	Date
Regional Manager	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He informed us about the dynamics of the northern region and also informed that north was the first region where pilot of SN policy implementation was initiated. • He informed that he is the one who has been with ASGP from long time and has good knowledge of the activities how these were envisaged. • The progress of northern region was discussed and he informed that number of activities were performed in 5 provinces which are covered by the northern region of ASGP • In total there 5 staff members who work in the regional office. 	

Meeting	Date
Mazar Regional Office	2 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There have been five provinces and 29 municipalities under the coverage of ASGP-II regional office in Mazar; they were Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Faryab, and Maimana. • Provincial Strategic Plan for Balkh has been prepared with the assistance of ASGP and sent to IDLG in Kabul for further process. Beside this the regional office has been supporting the other four provinces to develop their PSPs. • Through the program there have been annual capacity assessments of PGOs and DGOs completed. • Each quarter there has been a sub-national governance coordination meeting in each province chaired by the governors and co-chaired by UNDP. • There has been a PDC meeting practiced monthly where in each province the LoA staffs participate and report accordingly to IDLG, and ASGP. These meetings were also chaired by the governors and UNAMA has been participating to them as observer. • In 2010 ASGP support to the PCs platform started. Training has been provided by 	

the LoA staffs support by ASGP.

- PCs operation manual has been developed with the assistance and support of ASGP-I in 2008.
- There has been little coordination and communication over the support to the PCs between the PCs coordination directorate in IDLG and the regional offices of ASGP.
- PAR assessment conducted by ASGP staffs and task order staffs in the Northern Region.
- There have been 9 regional municipalities' specialists in the regional or provincial offices of ASGP to support the municipalities support function of ASGP in coordination and communication with the related directorate for municipalities support in IDLG.
- Mr. Anil Chandrika has served as acting manager of ASGP from April 2010 to January 2011.
- Since 2006 the ASGP has experienced about 5 different managers with different management styles of project management.
- There has been relatively poor communication in between the ASGP and UNDP management.
- Reports from the regional office were communicated on the weekly, monthly, and quarterly according to the work plan to the project manager.
- There has been the need of a stronger technical staff has been required to be placed in each region to implement ASGP in the region.
- The Program Support Unit should more strongly support ASGP and fulfill its needs on time.

Meeting	Date
Provincial Council MAZAR	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PC has got 19 members, who were working in 4 committees; public relations, international relations, conflicts resolution, and development. • Two of the PC members have received training through ASGP support on proposal writing. • ASGP has supported the PC to visit two districts of Balkh province and meet with the people. • ASGP has logistically supported the PC to conduct an assembly of around 400 of 14 districts representatives and meet with them. • ASGP has supported the PC to publish its newsletter and a magazine in 3 volumes. • PC members were invited to take part in the planning sessions of ASGP in Balkh Province. • There has been a 3-days orientation workshop organized by ASGP and was provided to PC newly elected members. • NDI has also been supporting the PC with training. • PC has got not information yet on SNGP. • A strategic Development Plan for the province has been developed with the assistance of ASGP and existed with PC. • No more training or capacity building programs through ASGP has been carried out for the PC members in the province. • PCs platform has been identified to be weak and performance and not cooperative with the PCs. • IDLG could be able to do more and better in coordination of monitoring and oversight in the provinces. However, PC has also did not receive any training yet on M&E. 	

--

Meeting	Date
CSC Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been a great support of ASGP-I to CSC in the Northern Provinces. • 5 training centers of CSC in the Northern Provinces were supported by ASGP-I. • Since April 2011 all of the training centers of the CSC in the Northern Provinces have stopped operation, because of the seized support of ASGP to the CSC. • The data base system of the CSC regional office suspended because of the withdrawal of ASGP support to CSC. • According to the regional head of CSC 70% of the CSC activities in the Northern Provinces were covered by ASGP support. • PAR strategy on sub-national governance has been developed under Phase-I of the program. • The CSC in the North with the support of ASGP-I has been able to train around 3700 civil servants in its training centers. • Support to the CSC training centers in ASGP-II must continue. • SNGP had not yet been explained to the sub-national actors in the North. • The implementation of SNGP by 2014 with the current pace of IDLG, the CSC, and ASGP in the North will be difficult. • PAR implementation in municipalities has been started. However, IDLG needed to prepare ground for it. • ASGP has been a tangible partner to the CSC and the commission expects this to continue. 	

Meeting	Date
PGO Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been around 21000 USD supply and equipment were provided to the PGO office through ASGP since its cooperation start with them. • The internal bureaucracy of ASGP makes the provision of support to the PGO slow. • Since 2006 ASGP's support to the PGO has not been considered to be cost effective. • ASGP together with IDLG has contributed to them to prepare a 5 years strategic plan for the province in 2010. • ASGP has provided PGO with 30 units of PCs to empower its IT section and furniture to enhance the productivity of the PGO. • Capacity enhancements of the PGO staffs were completed. • An agency named KFW, and USAID were also supporting the PGO with office supplies and the vehicles on ad-hoc basis. • PBGF has not been supporting the PGO since last year because of different reasons. • SNGP had reached to PGP and accordingly to Balkh provinces and were distributed to the districts. • According to the director ASGP has been working in line with the SNGP. • PAR has been implemented in the PGO of Balkh and its 14 districts, but its strategy has not yet been developed in PGO. • Around 6300 civil servants were trained through the CSC training centers with the 	

support of ASGP-I.

- In ASGP-II a sub-national governance system should be developed through IDLG.
- PDP of Balkh has been developed in 2006 without the assistance of ASGP.
- Operation procedures for PGO which has been developed with the assistance of ASGP needed to be reviewed.
- Still the PGO and the DGOs were not capable enough to perform their duties satisfactorily because they did not have enough and proper infrastructures. ASP in IDLG has been recognized weak and needed improvement in its efficiency to provide services.
- IDLG has been gaining capacity with the assistance of ASGP to support better the PGOs and the DGOs.
- LoA staffs have had their public sector counterparts in the PGOs and DGOs to later on take their places.

Meeting	Date
Women Affairs Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASGP has been supporting the directorate to increase the female employees capacity, employment, and participation in the public sectors. • 90 female public servants of Balkh province have been trained with the support of ASGP and the CSC. All 15 female employees of the directorate for women affairs have received training through the CSC training centers. • Since April 2011 to date each 2 weeks there has been a training workshop provided by ASGP and CSC aiming to increase the employment capacity of female in public sector. The trainees in the training centers were receiving training on English Language, Computer literacy and Management. • Balkh directorate for women affairs had gone through PAR. • As per the director there were no publicity work has been carried over on SNGP in the province. • There has been approximately 10 % female employees in public sector organizations in Balkh Province. 	

Meeting	Date
Mazar Region PGOs	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As per the LoA staffs the HR and recruitment procedures applied to have them on board have been transparent. • LoA staffs have been contracted for one year and on different salaries. They were supporting the municipalities, the PGOs, and the DGOs according to their ToRs provided to them by IDLG. However, sometimes the PGOs and the DGOs were expecting more than their ToRs to perform to them. • Some of the LoA staffs did not have their government counterparts. • LoA staffs were provided with a two-days training workshop on sub-national government provided to them by IDLG. The LoA staffs were reporting on the monthly basis to the HR department of IDLG on their expected plans, ongoing plans, and completed plans. 	

- LoA staffs were required to receive more support form IDLG and ASGP in Kabul and its regional offices, to help them better coordinate with ASGP, the PGOs and the DGOs.
- There were reportedly no monitoring missions of IDLG in the provinces of North to see the performance of LoA staffs and consider their challenges.
- Little equipment has been provided to the LoA staffs in the North to make them more efficient to perform better.

Meeting	Date
PRT Helmand	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRT are paying salaries for Provincial Communication Network Project. Includes 1 head based in the PGO in Lash, 2 press officers and 6 comms advisers in the districts in DGOs. • Currently salaries are being paid direct, but about to sign an MoU with IDLG, Governor's office and NGO to administer the salaries. • J.Moss (Coffey) has direct dealings with IDLG. • PRT also paying for the salaries for press officers to support the PC and to work with PC members responsible for PR. Plans to start awareness campaign for the PCs in the province. • PRT not seen any ASGP activity supporting awareness campaigns or PR with the province. 	

Meeting	Date
Mayor of Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The mayor was happy with the support they have got from ASGP especially in revenue augmentation from 2006 there has been significant increase in the revenue of the municipality. • But he was worried about the use of funds since they have not done any proper planning how to use the additional revenue, when he tries to use anti corruption or other center government department comes and ask number questions and do investigations. Further, for all approval things need to go to center so in his view this was a very major bottle neck since IDLG talks about the SN Governance but actually it is not. • LoA staff has been of good help to him with respect to their computer skills but he wanted to be involved in the hiring process of staff and he has requested for number additional LoA staff but non- has been provided from number of months that's why he can't do any new initiatives. • Public communication has been a good initiative which need to be performed on continuous basis since this is a good feedback mechanism. 	

Meeting	Date
Mazar	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We were informed that in 4 wards of Mazar city SWM program is under implementation which has provided good cleaning facilities to the residents 	

- This program has also indirectly benefitted the revenue augmentation of the Municipality since residents are happy with the service.
- But there is no significant increase in the budget of the SWM department hence they have not got any benefit of revenue augmentation
- There has not been any increase in the size of the program from last two years
- Most of the revenue augmentation money has been spent on infrastructure projects by the Mayor.

Meeting	Date
PGOs in North Region	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the LoA staff has been working in PGO offices from last one year. • The inputs provided by LoA staff are generally related to other areas for which they are actually not hired • It was observed that communication is the area which has been mainly used by PGO offices in addition to that LoA staff has been used for computer skill and data collection. • On monthly basis all LoA staff has to submit their monthly time sheets and performance report approved by their supervisor in PGO to IDLG according to which their salaries are transferred directly to their bank accounts. • LoA staff feels that they could really add more value to PGO office if their skills are used by their supervisors more appropriately. • LoA staff was very happy with the help being provided by Regional staff of ASGP • LoA staff also mentioned the detailed hiring process through which they got selected. • Their supervisors are not actually learning anything from them. 	

Regional Team, Mazar-e- Sharif	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipality is the success of the program we have data about all the municipalities of our region but only related to review as this has been communicated by the mayors • Lack of staff at regional level • Following new initiatives were taken at regional level; • Publications • Field offices and visits by governors and PGO office staff • MoUs amount municipalities • Expertise of municipal system are in place • All payments and approval as centralized in Kabul ASGP or UNDP country office • Procurement takes long time and some time it gets carry forward to next years and than it does not remain traceable • PSPs are in process • Regional office is satisfied with the performance of LoA staff but they were of the view that there should be more involvement of local PGOs representatives in the selection process • There are rumors of conflict of interest of IDLG staff in the selection process • Capacity of PGOs have been enhanced in management, computer skills and language 	

- Data base for municipalities has been developed in MS Access and spread sheet
- Share of experience and new initiatives with other regional offices of ASGP and HQ has been limited
- Tax mapping was done
- In ASGP I number of expat consultant came for the augmentation of Municipalities and they developed number of manuals which include the following:
 - Financial Accounting Guide Book
 - CSO Guide Manual
 - SWM Manual
 - Municipal Customer Satisfaction Survey Manual
 - Guide Book PAR Implementation
 - Tax mapping reports
 - PSM reports
 - District Governor's Office Manual
 - Full Governor Office Manual
 - GOFORGOLD hand book
 - HR Manual
 - Operational Manual
 - PGO-DGO Planning Guide
 - Provincial Profiling Guide
 - Training Center Manual
- Monitoring and evaluation is done by the Regional staff themselves other than that there is no formal independent function for M&E. Further, the M&E performed by Regional staff on their own is also not formally reported to anyone.
- Leadership for the program has been an issue.

Meeting	Date
Mayor Mazar City	3 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With the assistance of ASGP, a five years plan has been developed for Mazar municipality. • An annual operation plan for the municipality of Mazar has been developed with participation of the citizens and the assistance of ASGP, and it has been approved. • There have been a number of seminars, and trainings on revenue collection and enhancement, tax mapping provided to the municipality staffs through ASGP. ASGP's contribution to the municipality support has been considerable especially in revenue enhancement and waste management. ASGP's support has led to an increase in revenues from 60 million Afghanies before the project to 500 million Afghanies in 2010 and a forecast of 800 million Afghanies for 2011. • Through ASGP's support to increase public participation to municipalities' affairs, bi-lateral committees between municipality and the schools have been established. Discussions were going on to establish such a committee between Mazar municipality and the University of Mazar. • In order to increase efficiency and cooperation among the municipalities, LoAs have been signed with the assistance of ASGP between the provincial municipalities in the Northern provinces. • ToRs for municipalities have been developed through ASGP's support. • Through ASGP-I, there were support to prepare guidelines and manuals for municipalities, and in ASGP-II it has been planned to operationalise those guidelines and manuals. 	

- Through the revenue of municipality, the municipalities have been able to pave 6 KM of urban roads in Mazar city. 20 KM more roads were planned to be paved through the municipality of Mazar and its own revenues.
- The approval for expenditure on any municipality activity beyond 100'000 Afghanies has been going to IDLG for approval.
- 240 representatives of Mazar Citizens were meeting each week in their districts, each month in the municipality, and each quarter in the province with the governor or his/deputy.
- Mayors have to be elected the people.
- There were not any LoA in place to support directly the municipality of Mazar.
- PAR has been implemented in Mazar municipality. However the employees who were recruited through PAR in the municipality yet did not receive its benefits.

Meeting	Date
ASGP	4 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both Mr. Humam and Ms. Sofia have been assigned by ASGP Program Management to work full time in IDLG for the last two months as capacity enhancement advisors to IDLG. • ASGP in its phase II has exercised the capacity assessment in IDLG, and prepared tools for that together with the capacity enhancement unit of IDLG. • ASGO supported IDLG with the idea and concept of outsourcing the capacity enhancement activities. • ASGP-I supported and assisted the establishment and provided advocacy and technical support to IDLG to function effectively. • The Inception Report of ASGP has been prepared based on the request of DFID in October 2010, it has been widely discussed between all the stakeholders, and has been approved by UNDP country office. • Out of the 6 essential laws related to the SNGP, 5 of them have been drafted so far with the support of ASGP. • The part of ASGP to support Financial Management and Budgeting at the sub-national level has not yet been addressed by ASGP. • There were around 130 LoA staffs paid through ASGP and assigned to work in IDLG for their support. • More political will and support will be required to successfully implement ASGP and the SNGP. • More focus on the component for support the municipalities will be required with the logic that the municipalities were semi- autonomous, and through their windows the SNGs could be able to provide quicker services. • In ASGP-II more focus should be made to implement SNG. • More work by IDLG with the assistance of ASGP will be required to transform the SNGP into legal framework. • In ASGP there should be more clarity on the IDLGs sustainability, its present, and future. 	

Meeting	Date
Urzogan Governor and ASGP	5 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	

- Signed LoA with UNDP in Dec 2010.
- ASGP supported PDP process.
- ASGP helped organise a conference for the governor in Kabul – to negotiate with donors on the strategy for the province.
- ASGP achieved the following in Urozgan:
 - Rapid institutional assessment in PGO, DGO, PC and municipalities.
 - PAA, PC, PGO and DGO level capacity enhanced.
 - PDP – prioritised projects in conjunction with PC members and local participation.
 - resource mobilisation supporting workshop in Kabul and got financial resources from donors and NGOs.
 - Governance plan prepared for line departments
 - PGO supported with working agenda, follow up and standardisation of operations.
 - PGO Meetings activities follow up
 - NGO database project – showing who is working where and ongoing tracking of projects.
 - HR database
 - Provincial database with provincial data to be used for provincial profile.
 - Help in completing the year book.
 - Developing a manual on how to implement PDF.
 - etc.
- PDF is required to support small scale projects.

Meeting	Date
Regional Manager, Herat	5 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He informed that he has been working for ASGP for long now and has good knowledge of the program • East region has been doing well since it has done number of activities to augment the SN Governance in this region • With respect to work plan he informed that they have their regional work plan accordingly to which they operate. Their budget was also earlier segregated by region but now it has been consolidated again. • There number of reports being sent to Center on periodic basis which including weekly, monthly quarterly, six monthly and annual and number matters are repetition • He mentioned that municipalities is an areas where substantial improvement has been made especially in revenue collection but with respect to authority of mayor and other PGOs that progress has been very limited. • The new governor of Herat is very appreciative of the role of the program but worried about the progress. • The base line document for the province of Herat was finalized in 2010 but it has been still not be been approved by IDLG hence no further action in this regard is possible. • He shared the communication material being developed along with ASGP inputs which as per him have been a good interaction with communities and also educating them in how government could help them. • The approval and disbursement process has been long and slow due to which program activities suffer. • Number of DGO posts are vacant from number of months. • On a question with respect to justice system he mentioned in Herat there has been improvement but this area has been very weak in all other provinces. 	

--

Meeting	Date
Regional Team, Herat	5 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numbers of staff members are limited hence they can't work on number of activities. Further, reporting is to much. With respect to PC members trainings were imparted to almost all Old PC members but in last two year new PCs has come in which almost 75% new members have been elected and they are not trained. They get their salaries on time They are happy with the work environment Security has been becoming an issue in West now. They should us a video of the program in west Presentation was given on various components including PGO, Municipal and CSC In CSC they confirmed that allot of trainings have been imparted through training centers but since in ASGP II this component has been deleted now the training centers have been transferred to a USAID funded program and regional offices of CSC have very limited resources. On the question of quality of trainings there was mix reaction and it was clear that there was not monitoring and evaluation through which quality and impact could be assessed. 	

Meeting	Date
Urozgan RM	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provincial Governance Technical Specialist acting as RM in Urzogan and providing ad-hoc support to other provinces. Repeated achievements explained by Governor in previous meeting. 	

Meeting	Date
Mayor of Herat	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With the help of ASGP revenue of municipality has been increase significantly around 10 times but mayor looked frustrated that he can't use those funds and can't provide quality services to my residents. He even mentioned that he may like to leave the office if thing will not change. The revenue augmentation was mainly possible through some basis changes in the collection process as part of which now all collections are being done in the bank branches and all collection officers were given targets for collection and they were told that they need to meet their targets with justification working of households and rate applicable on them. That worked. As of now they have not done any working increasing the house hold they have just collected funds from already registered households as per old books. Now they intend to work on updating their revenue map. 	

- He informed that it is almost not possible for have to hire good staff so augment the capacity of the municipality
- He mentioned that he discusses it problems with IDLG.

Meeting	Date
LoA Staff Herat	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two LoA staff are stationed at PGO Herat one is an economic advisor and other is an communication person. • Economic advisor mentioned that he has worked on number of potential project feasibilities and have discussed the same with the Governor but there has been little progress on the said initiatives due to lacks of funds and long approval process. • They mentioned that they were elected through a long induction process. • They are happy to work for the PGO office since they feel they are adding value to their country • They may do allot more if projects and activities are approved and funded. • On the question that are their supervisors learning anything from them the answer was in negative 	

Meeting	Date
Governor of Herat	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He is actually not happy with the way SN has been implemented because in his view if he can't hire and fire a single staff of his office how come he could work. • As per him every government staff has some contact at various level and they tend to influence the decisions accordingly with respect to their continuity of their job • He has not fund to use except for this operations. • If that is the case than how he could be help to his people. • Earlier before IDLG governors were use to talk directly to the Minister of MOI and to the president but now there has been longer chain due to which decisions take long time. • He was of the view the since he has not been involved in the selection process for LoA staff that's why some unreasonable staff is hired and sent due to which 2 LoA staff were sent back. The hiring took number of months and we assessed them for few months so almost one year has been lost at the end. • It is always going to depend on the type of governor if he is influential and also like to use it he can do allot especially in the province like Herat which has significant custom revenue but he want to be a governor who comply with laws and regulations but laws and regulations are not good enough to serve the public. 	

Meeting	Date
PC Chairman Herat	6 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • He explained how PCs are of help to people through monitoring of activities of PGO office and line ministries. But he mentioned that there are number of areas in which 	

augmentation is required.

- He mentioned that they have planned and executed field visit to understand the problems and also communicate with our people.
- He mentioned that they almost run their office from their own resource.
- They have attended number of trainings in which they raise number of questions but generally IDLG representatives are present.
- Donor have been talking to them
- All department have limited resources so they also can't do much

Meeting	Date
West Region	7 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They explained that they only keep record of the costs incurred from advance received by the regional manager in his personnel name through hawalla dealer. • In case of any left over from any activities the left over funds from advance for a particular activity has to be sent back to the country office for advance settlement. • They keep all funds in cash in office they don't have any back account. • They provide all the details of cost incurred to country office. 	

Meeting	Date
AusAid	8 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invested 2mil USD in ASGP II (over 2 Australian Financial Years). 2 mil USD is short term investment, with a view of a longer term investment subsequently. Not clear how much was invested by AUSAID into ASGP I. Supported internship programme in ASGP I. • ASGP I suffered from bad management, had difficulty in recruiting skilled staff. Same issue relevant for ASGP II. • The ASGP I evaluation review was not properly carried out. Too few team members, no Afg experts, under a restricted scope. • AUSAID's assessment of ASGP is generally positive in Urozgan. Progress is slow and requires PRT prompting. • ASGP person in Urozgan doing a good job in keeping a relationship with PRT, Governor, PGO and DGO. • Programme requires close monitoring and should be working with Statistics Office in the Province. • AUSAID under pressure to demonstrate tangible outcome to Aus Gov. Hence need a stronger M&E with verifiable indicators to assess progress. • AUSAID holds fortnightly meetings with ASGP TL in the province to share information. • PDF is planned to be allocated at 70% for PGO and 30% for the Mayor's office. However there is an issue with the capacity and transparency with the Mayor's office. AUSAID may hold funding until that concern is resolved. • ASGP has close links to IDLG and focusing support on PGO, DGO and PCs but there are other players in local government e.g. Line ministries that deliver services. So ASGP is self-limiting support to specific entities. So this feels very much like an IDLG programme and agenda rolled out to the provinces, whilst MoF agenda is not being rolled out and this is causing distortion. • Concern over ToS work. When checking what staff are doing, not clear if they are working on 	

their area of expertise (or responsibility).

- Governor is performing strongly, good leader. ASGP support for PDP was good but some way to go. Helped sharpening priorities, better than old doc.
- Programme should continue but needs to be strengthened in some areas. Security not an issue in the province. But still an issue to attract people to come to work in the province.
- RM is critical to the progress in the province.

Meeting	Date
Governor of Wardak Province	9 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASGP has assisted the PGO of Wardak using an integrated methodology, questionnaires, and public consultation to develop a PDS. • Two LoA staffs were provided to the PGO of Wardak through IDLG by the support of ASGP. • The PGO has a PDP prepared prior to ASGP. However ASGP contributes technically to its revisions and substantial change. It was expected that the revised PDP will be final by July 2011. • An internal auditor's coordination committee exists in PGO Wardak. There has not been any M&E person recruited through ASGP for the province. • The PGO in Wardak regular sector coordination meetings such as; internal auditors, gender support, rule of law, public complaints, and district governor's monthly meetings. • RAMP-UP, ASP, and NDI were also working in the province to support governance. 	

Meeting	Date
ASGP	10 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selected financial transactions were reviewed • The CDRs were discussed • The staff list with respect to personnel costs was discussed • The staff was asked to segregate the personnel costs in to LoA staff cost and non LoA staff cost • The funds transfer method as advance to regions was discussed • Audit observations on CDR audit was discussed • Inventory listing was discussed • The procurement planning and execution process was discussed. 	

Meeting	Date
UNDP	16 July, 2011
Key Issues Discussed:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the question that to which extent he gets involved in the procurement planning process he informed the he is not involved. • He informed that he is not involved in the updation of the procurement plan this should be done by the program staff. 	

- He is managing number of UNDP projects for procurements hence he didn't have time to update the procurement plans.
- ASGP's Procurement Plan for 2011 is still not approved.
- He just have the procurement plan for 2010 and for 2009 and earlier these are not with him.