



UNDP Southern Sudan: Crisis  
Prevention and Recovery  
Programme Mid-Term Outcome  
Evaluation

Programme Period: 2009-2012



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**Project:** Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme in Southern Sudan  
**Client:** UNDP Southern Sudan Programme  
**Period:** December 2010 – May 2011

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## List of Acronyms

CCA	Common Country Assessment
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
BCSSAC	Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CPR	Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CPRU	Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (of the UNDP)
CRMA	Crisis Risks Mapping and Analysis Project
CSAC	Community Security and Arms Control Programme
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
GoNU	Government of National Unity
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IP	Implementing Partner
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JVT	Joint Verification Team (DDR Programme)
LGRP	Local Governance and Recovery Project
LSC	Local Steering Committee (CSAC project)
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs (GoSS)
MDTF	Multi-donor Trust Fund- Southern Sudan (World Bank managed)
MFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NCP	National Congress Party
NDDRCC	National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Coordinating Council
OAG	Other Armed Groups
PRC	Policy and Review Committee (of the RRP)
REIP	Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project
RRP	Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SNG	Special Needs Groups (DDR Programme)
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRF	Sudan Recovery Fund
SSDC	Southern Sudan Demining Commission
SSDDRC	Southern Sudan Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission
SSPC	Southern Sudan Peace Commission
WAAFG	Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups (DDR Programme)
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMAO	United Nations Mine Action Office

UNMAS      United Nations Mine Action Service  
UNMIS      United Nations Mission in Sudan

## Executive Summary

### *Introduction*

UNDP Sudan commissioned a *Mid-term Outcome Evaluation of CPAP Outcome 7: Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated*. Objective 7 projects comprise the UNDP's *Crisis Prevention and Recovery* portfolio, and are part of the overall *Country Action Programme for Sudan, 2009-2012* (CPAP). The purpose of the evaluation was to: i) review and analyse progress towards achieving the *Crisis Prevention and Recovery* (CPR) portfolio objectives of the current CPAP (2009-2012); ii) assess the extent to which the relevant projects and programmes have contributed towards CPAP results, and; iii) assess the relevance of the outcome and associated output achievements to the current context. The methodology for the evaluation combined document review with a field mission to Southern Sudan in November and December 2010. During the mission, the Evaluation Team interviewed key stakeholders from Government (national, state and local levels), the donor community, NGOs, beneficiaries, and UNDP and United Nations personnel.

**The Crisis Prevention and Recovery portfolio was comprised of six projects:** *Mine Action Capacity Development*; the *Individual Reintegration Component* of the national Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme; *Community Security and Arms Control*, and; three recovery oriented projects (*Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme*, the *Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project* and the *Sudan Recovery Fund - Southern Sudan*, which was implemented over three rounds). The evaluation also considered the role of the extent to which the *Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis Project in Sudan* has provided analytical support to the CPR portfolio.

### *Programme Context*

**CPAP Outcome 7 projects were implemented in a volatile context** characterised by insecurity in some parts of Southern Sudan, limited State and community capacity and significant physical challenges to project implementation. Three main factors shaped conflict and recovery dynamics during the evaluation period: Ongoing tensions between the North and Southern Sudan over CPA implementation, leading to the 2010 elections and 2011 referendum; the limited presence and capacity of the State in many areas of the South, and; an escalation of intra-South conflict, ranging from the community to the political levels, often with articulation between them. These challenges were faced in the context of acute humanitarian and recovery needs. They will carry forward into the post-referendum period, and combine with fundamentally new dynamics in post-independence South Sudan.

### *Overall Trends*

**There has been a maturing in the overall CPR portfolio and strengthening of UNDP performance in key areas.** Performance shows particular improvement as the UNDP, Government and Donors move away from a "projectised" recovery approach towards integrated programming. Improvements have been enabled by positive changes with both external conditions and those internal to the UNDP. Externally, there has been a gradual expansion of Government to the state and local levels. Capacity of Government remains a binding constraint. However, taking 2005 as a starting point there has been important progress strengthening the GoSS and sub-levels of government, including their ability to



define priorities and take meaningful leadership roles, even if Government is not involved in project delivery. Government is increasingly assertive in this regard.

**At the same time, the UNDP shows a maturing in its own internal programme capacity.** Concerns remain about efficiency of outputs, including delivery of project works by some Implementing Partners and the strength of the UNDP's field supervision capacity. Regardless, there are improvements in the quality of what the UNDP is delivering, and a push to expand its own capacity down to the state level in tandem with, or ahead of Government. Trends are supported by innovations with programme concepts, tools and methodologies. These allow for better integration of UNDP resources within and across CPAP/CPR programmes, and strengthen of the UNDP's ability to identify high value interventions. The UNDP, therefore, is moving from a portfolio of individual CPR *projects* to a more coherent CPR *programme*. The UNDP has also provided the Government and Donors with more effective approaches to sensitive issues in the areas of security, governance and recovery.

**More recent CPAP Outcome 7 projects are anchored within these trends show the strongest performance.** Projects are better positioned within Government priorities, are less likely to outstrip the Government's capacity to exercise ownership and have better political and institutional support. Improvements demonstrate the UNDP's ability to learn, adapt and innovate under difficult conditions. There was also evidence of the UNDP providing a stronger conceptual role in identifying solutions to the complex recovery challenges facing Southern Sudan. On this basis, the agency was described by Government and Donor informants as positioning itself to be an attractive partner. Both noted improved UNDP performance, a better focus on core priorities and functions and the importance of its expansion to state and local levels.

### *Progress towards CPAP Outcome 7 Objectives*

**The most significant contribution of the Objective 7 portfolio to improving human security has been in the area of reducing threats from violence and conflict.** Contribution was made primarily through the *Community Security and Arms Control* project, the *Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis* project and potentially through Round III of the *Sudan Recovery Fund*. Most projects also made a contribution in the area of strengthening the capacity and presence of the state to deliver basic services, security being the first among these. These are areas of success that the second half of CPAP implementation can build on. However, the portfolio made only a limited contribution the economic dimensions of human security. While providing short-term economic benefits, mainly through the three recovery projects, the CPR portfolio's contribution to sustainable livelihoods and the reduction of poverty was negligible. This was particularly the case in the agricultural sector, where most Southern Sudanese are economically active. *Livelihoods, therefore, is a critical gap to be addressed in the second half of CPAP implementation.* This is a generalised problem faced by Government and international entities, and is not unique to the UNDP.

**The key variable affecting performance was ownership;** the capacity of the GoSS and beneficiary communities to exercise its ownership of the projects, related to programme strategy, design and implementation. Earlier projects performed less effectively as, in part, the capacity of Government and beneficiaries for ownership was also less robust. Early CPR projects, therefore, faced the existential challenge of many conflict-affected situations: how

to deliver urgently needed recovery assistance while simultaneously building ownership and capacity, in a low capacity environment that is still volatile. Such a situation generates multiple and often contradictory priorities.

**The *Mine Action Capacity Development* appeared to be on track to meet its project objectives, and contribute to CPAP outcomes.** There were important gains establishing and improving the operational effectiveness of the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC). Achievements notwithstanding, the project appeared to lack a clear capacity building strategy that links the Institutional, Organisational and Individual levels of capacity building requirements. As well, it was unclear how the project promoted a linkage between demining and recovery activities, beyond raising awareness of issues within Government. The existence of an overarching GoSS demining strategy and the integration of demining into other UNDP projects may compensate for this gap.

**The *Individual Reintegration Component* project will not meet project objectives and must be redesigned for the post-referendum period.** The fundamental enabling conditions for effective DDR did not exist within the CPA framework. Project design was not based on the principle of “One Country-Two Systems”, and was not relevant to the context in Southern Sudan. Subsequently, the reintegration project had low Government ownership and commitment, particularly from the SPLA. Donor confidence deteriorated over time, with poor overall DDR performance and allegations of irregularities in Government’s management of the reintegration process. These were critical political enabling factors, for which project implementation by UNDP Juba could not compensate. The exception was support to establishing GoSS DDR institutions, where the project played a positive role.

**The three *recovery-oriented* programmes only partially met their project objectives** (the *Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme*, the *Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project* and the *Sudan Recovery Fund - Southern Sudan*, Round I and Round II). The projects delivered a significant amount of training and material outputs to communities, which were generally valued by Government and beneficiaries. However, the funds were highly “projectised”, with a large number of small and uncoordinated projects delivered by NGOs and international organisations. Their governance structures allowed for national ownership, but the actual ability of authorities at the local and state levels to engage was uneven, and often low. In addition, the quality of projects was uneven, and many projects showed deterioration within a short period after handover.

**It is unlikely, therefore, that the immediate benefits delivered by recovery projects to communities are being sustained.** There was little evidence of a sustained contribution to poverty reduction, increased resilience to food security shocks, improved access to public services or of local capacity having been strengthened. The lack of sustainability may actually have a negative impact on Government credibility. Results create some concern about UNDP’s performance in supervising the portfolios. At a higher level, they also call into question the effectiveness of projectised funds to meet core recovery objectives.

**In contrast, the *Community Small Arms Control (CSAC)* project showed significant progress towards its project objectives, as did Round III of the *Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF)*, which began implementation during 2010.** For the CSAC, there was evidence of a reduction in violent conflict in areas where the project is being implemented. It is noted that

the project is only one of several variables, and results must be sustained in the post-referendum context. Regardless, community-level conflicts in project areas were reduced. Both projects are situated at the core of Government priorities around the security, governance and recovery nexus. The extended consultation process around design has contributed to, and benefited from the gradual expansion of State capacity to the state and local levels. In turn, the consultation and implementation processes have strengthened the State's presence in rural areas. This is a virtuous circle that will create benefits outside of the boundaries of the project.

**As a result, the CSAC and SRF Round III projects demonstrated more robust Government ownership.** They reflect an evolution in design, away from "projectised" funds towards: i) integrated programming around the security, governance and recovery nexus, and; ii) implementation in better equilibrium with national capacity- State and beneficiary. The projects used effective community-level analytical tools, and there was evidence that the methodology has improved the targeting of security and recovery interventions. The tools build on work done by the *Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis* project. These conceptual advances also have broader benefits for Government and Donors. Within the UNDP itself, there was evidence of improved coordination between different programmes, resulting in better integration and leveraging of resources. These have been possible through improved understanding of dynamics within the security, governance and recovery, and the subsequent interconnection between UNDP projects.

#### *Relevance of the Outcome 7 Portfolio*

**The overall relevance of the CPAP Outcome 7 portfolio was high.** All projects in the CPR portfolio were directly relevant to the CPAP Outcome 7 objective, and to the priority recovery needs identified by Government, with its international counterparts. Each project in the portfolio integrated most or all of Outcome 7's main elements, into its supporting analysis, conceptual framework and design. There is no project that fell outside of the Outcome framework. The evaluation, therefore, did not identify any critical gaps with relevance that must be addressed in the second phase of CPAP implementation.

**Relevance was strengthened by two factors.** First, projects had multi-stakeholder governance processes, providing strategic guidance and oversight to implementation. The governance systems created an opportunity for Government and Donors to clearly articulate objectives and priorities and to supervise adherence during implementation. Second, the UNDP's tools for programme assessment were strengthened during implementation of the current CPAP, allowing projects to improve the quality of analysis supporting project design and targeting of resources. A factor undermining relevance was the limited ability of Government to define its priorities, particularly at the state and local levels and in the context of the earlier recovery projects. *Relevance, therefore, is an area of strength that can be built on with note on the important role of ownership.*

#### *Efficiency of the Outcome 7 Portfolio*

**The efficiency of the Outcome 7 portfolio was satisfactory, but uneven.** The Mid-Term Evaluation did not conduct a robust analysis of the manner in which projects converted resources into outcomes. Note was made of difficult, sometimes extreme implementation conditions related to weather, poor infrastructure, lack of national sources for materials and skilled personnel and security, among other factors. The overall trend for project efficiency

appeared positive, albeit uneven across the five projects. The CSAC and SRF Phase III models show the highest possibility for efficiency gains, in part as they allowed for leveraging of resources from multiple sources. The recovery projects showed lower efficiency, with fragmented implementation structures and activities that were not mutually reinforcing.

**In the case of all projects, UNDP, Government and Donors expressed concern over their perception of poor quality, high costs and the late delivery of many UNDP-supervised projects, implemented by Implementing Partners.** There was particular concern for the performance of UNOPS, and its implementing role under UNDP supervision. Site inspection verified that quality problems exist. Of the 18 project sites visited, most completed works were in a state of disrepair. The evaluation was not in a position to determine whether problems originated from poor project delivery, or were subsequently damaged through the lack of maintenance or misuse. There was evidence of both. Regardless, deterioration meant that some works were no longer providing benefits, and investments have been lost. Also, the expectations of stakeholders often appeared out of alignment with what could reasonably be delivered under the difficult prevailing conditions. *Both delivery performance and creating realistic expectations, therefore, are efficiency gaps to be addressed in the second half of CPAP implementation.*

#### *Connectedness of the CPAP Outcome 7 Portfolio*

**The connectedness of projects was uneven, showing real improvements over time.** The connectedness within the overall portfolio was good, and embedded in design. Projects generally had mutually reinforcing objectives and activities. These create a basis for performance improvements in the future. However, internal coordination did not optimise the possibilities. In particular, the three recovery projects (RRP, RIEP and SRF Round I and II) did not develop synergies, internal to projects or between them. In contrast, the CSAC and SRF III demonstrated a high level of connectedness in their concept, design and implementation. The key performance variable was design innovations that allowed the UNDP to integrate resources from multiple sources and programmes, and target them against the different dimensions of an issue. In this regard, connectedness depended on the ability of all stakeholders to analyze and conceptualise the interrelationships between issues. *It is an area of strength that can be built on during the second half of CPAP implementation.*

#### *Sustainability of the Portfolio*

**Sustainability was uneven across the portfolio, showing improvements overtime.** Sustainability emerged as the key variable determining the effectiveness of the “peace dividends” being delivered. The sustainability of goods delivered in most projects was uneven, particularly for the three recovery projects. These delivered a significant amount of goods and services at the community level. However, the capacity of Government and communities to plan, absorb and maintain the works delivered was low. Site inspection verified that part of the programme investments will be lost and the quality of the “peace dividend” diminished accordingly. The possibility for sustainability of the CSAC and SRF III is higher. The key performance variable is that the projects did not outstrip Government or community capacity to engage, and the programme model allows both to exercise more robust ownership. *Sustainability, therefore, represents a programme gap that can be strengthened.*

*There are important lessons on sustainability that can be integrated into CPAP design for the remaining implementation period.*

### **Mainstreaming of Gender into the Portfolio**

**There was evidence of positive progress towards gender outcome objectives.** All projects integrated the UNDP's overarching gender strategy, had some basis in gender-context analysis and integrated gender issues in their results frameworks and resource allocation decisions. The project governance systems placed an emphasis on gender issues in defining their strategy and resource allocation. The quality of project governance interventions at the level of state authorities to support gender objectives is less clear, but field observations indicate their adherence to gender-based objectives was not as strong.

**Gender, therefore, was fully mainstreamed into the Outcome 7 portfolio.** Regardless, coming to a determination on outcomes was hindered by the reporting systems. Projects are generating a large amount of gender disaggregated data, but with little analyses to provide context and meaning. Data is mainly at the activity and performance levels, with some output information and nothing on outcomes. *Gender reporting, therefore, is a gap in the Outcome 7 portfolio, as insufficient analysis is being generated to support gender programme design and management.*

## Summary of Recommendations

1. The UNDP should give high priority to re-design of its project-level monitoring and evaluation system. A re-designed system would: i) distinguish clearly between performance and output data; ii) demonstrate the accumulation of output results over time specifically against project indicators, and; iii) synthesise project data to report at the outcome level, including follow up after project closure. The latter is particularly important for projects where sustainability is a concern. The GoSS should strengthen its leadership and participation.
2. There is a critical gap in the area of livelihoods that should be addressed during the second half of CPAP implementation. An overall livelihoods strategy is required for the UNDP Country Programme in Southern Sudan, developed with Government and other stakeholders. The strategy can be mainstreamed into relevant ongoing projects.
3. Conflict reduction is an area of success where the UNDP has developed unique programme tools that can be scaled up, and applied from the CPR across other elements of the CPAP portfolio. There are also important lessons on connectedness and sustainability that can be integrated into future portfolio design.
4. Capacity development is most effective when delivered as part of an institutional strategy, integrating development at the institutional, organisation and individual levels and linked to programme delivery. The gap to be addressed in the second part of CPAP implementation is ensuring that such strategies exist as the basis for programming.
5. Stakeholders should reduce or eliminate “projectised” recovery funds that outstrip the State’s capacity to lead. Rather, focus should be placed on projects that are in equilibrium with leadership capacity. The trade-offs between “rapid” and “quality/sustainability” must be defined, understood and accepted by all stakeholders.
6. The UNDP should convene an *efficiency study* with relevant project implementing agencies, including UNOPS, to identify bottlenecks affecting timely delivery and the quality of project deliverables. Government and donors should have representation in the study to ensure that all perspectives and alternatives are included.
7. A product of the efficiency study should be shared expectations on what can be delivered under prevailing conditions. Also, requirements for promoting private sector development in Southern Sudan through national procurement should be considered.
8. Sustainability is an area where important programme gaps exist. The Project Governance systems, UNDP as Administrative Agent and the Implementing Partners should ensure that robust sustainability requirements are built into project assessment and design. Of particular concern is the ability of local stakeholders to “own” and maintain projects after completion. Project evaluation should track sustainability for a reasonable period after project closure.

9. The UNDP and project stakeholders should take steps to improve the quality of monitoring and evaluation on gender indicators, ensuring that results are contextualised and reach the output and outcome levels.

## Summary of Lessons Learned

1. Stakeholders should ensure during the design phase that projects are supported by good enabling conditions. A key enabler in the context of Southern Sudan is the political consensus between stakeholders on project goals. Projects should be assessed, on an ongoing basis, for whether the original consensus still holds or if conditions and the positions of stakeholders have changed. Where change occurs, it is the responsibility of the project's governance structure to define the new parameters of consensus. Government has the lead responsibility. Projects that do not establish and maintain a consensus among stakeholders can usually not be sustained. The clear example from the CPR portfolio is the *Individual Reintegration* project.
2. Key outcome performance factors in the CPR portfolio have been the extent to which projects are *owned* by Government and beneficiaries, do not exceed Government capacity to *lead*, are based on robust initial *assessment* and planning and have a clear *sustainability* plan, focusing on the ability of Government or communities to absorb and maintain outputs. CPAP Outcome 7 performance has been sub-optimal where one or more of these elements are missing. Performance is also enhanced where projects take a *systemic* approach rather than addressing single element of a system in isolation. This favours an integrated approach where the entire system is addressed through a coordinated set of initiatives.
3. Early CPR implementation found stakeholders managing the essential challenge of programming in conflict affected situations: On the one hand, responding to the urgent political and human need for the rapid delivery of a tangible peace dividend. On the other hand, simultaneously attempting to strengthen national ownership and capacity, in a low capacity and often volatile programme context. These dynamics severally tested the delivery of international assistance in the early years after the CPA was signed and are well understood. An effective programme response has not yet emerged, although there are positive lessons on the CSAC model. However, highly projectised funding modalities that outstrip Government's leadership capacity may in fact serve to disempower national authorities, and work against the objectives of enhancing State visibility, presence and credibility.
4. In this context, the trade-off between "Rapid", "Sustainable" and "Quality" needs to be understood as the basis for decision-making. Experience demonstrates that "Rapid" can be achieved, including when national implementation capacity is expanded through international organisations. However, heavily projectised funds tend to have problems with relevance (weak ownership), efficiency (priority setting, targeting, assessment and planning, internal coherence and mixed quality of delivery), effectiveness (activity and output focused, with weak performance on outcomes) and sustainability (inadequate planning for handover and no government/community resources to sustain). Indeed, within existing programme models there are often inverse relationships between "Rapid" and "Sustainable" and "Quality".



# 1 Purpose of the CPR Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation

## 1.1 Objectives of the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation

UNDP Sudan commissioned a Mid-term Outcome Evaluation of the CPAP Outcome 7: *Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated*. Outcome 7 falls within the UNDP *Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme (CPR)*, one of the CPAP's three thematic pillars. The purpose of the evaluation was to:

“.. Review and analyse the progress towards achieving of the Crisis Prevention and Recovery portfolio for the ongoing CPAP (2009-2012), assess the extent to which the relevant projects and programmes have contributed towards CPAP results and the relevance of the outcome and associated output achievements to the current context...”<sup>11</sup>

As specific objectives, the evaluation was asked to assess:

- The UNDP's overall contribution to restoring infrastructure, economic revival and income generation and community security, from a longer term perspective and using existing UNDP information and data; and
- Progress made in four thematic programmes areas: *The Sudan Mine Action Capacity Development Programme*; the *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (Individual Re-integration Component)*, and; the *Community Security and Arms Control Programme*. There were three programmes in the area of post-conflict recovery: the *Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme*; the *Public Works Component of Rapid Impact Emergency Project*, and; the *Sudan Recovery Fund* (implemented over three phases).

Within this framework, the evaluation considered:

- Progress towards achieving objectives related to the cross-cutting issues of gender and capacity building;
- The effectiveness of early recovery coordination in Sudan and how this has contributed to overall progress towards CPR objectives;
- Whether the design and implementation of the programming is conflict sensitive in approach, ability to respond to dynamic and changing contexts and in guaranteeing the security of staff and assets; and
- The degree to which programmes adjust and contribute towards One UN objectives.

Other important considerations for the evaluation included:

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<sup>11</sup> The *Terms of Reference* are included as Annex A to this report.

- Assessing the differential progress in relation to women, men and youth (defined as less than 25 years of age), dependent upon the breakdown of data collected by the projects;
- Assessing UNDP lead in Early Recovery Coordination and its contribution (if any) to progress in defined CPR objectives;
- Linkage of the CPR Programmes to progress towards one UN will be looked at, including through the Joint UN Programme on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding; and
- Effectiveness in building national capacity in crisis prevention and recovery, based on the national institutions increasing ability through demonstrated actions and decision-making as well as incorporation activities and annual plans within national budgets and planning processes.

Finally, in its findings and recommendations the evaluation report was asked to:

- Provide advice on the suitability of indicators and verification tools used to measure progress towards outcomes and outputs; and
- Reflect on good and bad practices in design and implementation that can inform future CPR programming.

The Terms of Reference note that, while attribution to single action or institution is difficult to determine, it is important that the contribution of UNDP be examined. The outcomes, targets and indicators as stated in the ToR were used as the primary foundation of the evaluation. The assessment of progress was to be made in relation to available baseline data and the specific targets and indicators determined at the time of programme design, or revised through the monitoring process.

## 1.2 Evaluation Methodology

The original intent was to conduct a comprehensive Sudan CPAP evaluation, simultaneously reviewing the programme components at the national level, and in the North and Southern Sudan. Conditions did not permit for evaluation of the National and Northern components to be conducted at this time as in Southern Sudan. The Southern Sudan component, therefore, was written as a stand-alone report that may be integrated into a future national report.

The methodology for the *Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation of the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme* combined three elements: i) a review of programme documents; ii) interviews in Southern Sudan with almost seventy stakeholders from Government, international donors, national and international NGOs and programme officers in the UNDP, and; iii) visits to a random sample of project sites, for verification results and interviews with beneficiaries and implementing organisations. UNDP also formed an evaluation Steering Committee consisting of representatives of Government, Donor and the UNDP to guide and support the process.

The CPR portfolio was comprised of six projects: *Mine Action Capacity Development*; the *Individual Reintegration Component* of the national Disarmament, Demobilisation and

Reintegration programme; *Community Security and Arms Control*, and; three recovery-oriented projects (the *Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme*, the *Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project* and the *Sudan Recovery Fund - Southern Sudan*, which was implemented over three Rounds). The evaluation also considered the role of the extent to which the *Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis Project in Sudan* has provided analytical support to the CPR portfolio.

Within this framework:

- The evaluation team for Southern Sudan was comprised of three members, including two international consultants and one national consultant. One of the international consultants contributed in an advisory role and did not participate in the field study;<sup>2</sup>
- Some documentation from the CPR portfolio and projects was reviewed during November 2010. Documentation on the general context and the *Threat and Risk Mapping* project were also reviewed. Additional documentation was gathered during the field mission;<sup>3</sup>
- An *Inception Report* was finalised on 08 December 2010, in discussion with the UNDP in Juba and Khartoum. The report confirmed the scope of the evaluation, in addition to identifying the key questions to be reviewed in each project area;<sup>4</sup> and
- The evaluation team met with the Steering Committee early in the field mission, and the Committee was also invited to comment on the draft evaluation report.

The field study took place in Southern Sudan between 29 November and 17 December 2010. Interviews were conducted in Juba with key stakeholders, from Government, the Donor community, international NGOs and with United Nations and UNDP personnel.<sup>5</sup>

The team travelled in the vicinity of Juba, and to Jonglei State (Bor and vicinity) and Eastern Equatoria State (Torit and vicinity). While travelling, the team conducted interviews with project stakeholders from state and local government, project beneficiaries and implementing entities (project governance bodies, UN agencies, government agencies, community organisations and national and international NGOs).

The team also conducted site visits to 18 randomly selected sub-projects projects from the CPR portfolio. A universe of possible sites was identified by the team based on the document review, and using criteria identified in the *Inception Report*. They were confirmed in discussion with the Steering Committee, and through discussions with UNDP personnel that focused on relevance and practical considerations. The sub-project sites were intended as a random but not necessarily a representative sampling, to complement findings from other elements of the methodology.

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<sup>2</sup> The second international consultant was originally designated Team Leader to the national evaluation, and supervised drafting of the *Inception Report*. On postponement the national evaluation, the consultant provided advice, peer review and other support to the Southern Sudan component.

<sup>3</sup> The *List of Documents Consulted* is included as Annex F to this report.

<sup>4</sup> The revised Evaluation Matrix is included in Annex C to this report.

<sup>5</sup> The *List of Informants* is included as Annex D to this report.

### 1.3 Limits of the Mid-term Evaluation

The Evaluation Team encountered three limitations. The team received an incomplete set of documents prior to the field mission. Final documentation was provided during the mission. The document review and summary of initial findings, therefore, were not complete before drafting of the *Inception Report* or deploying to the field. Some of the document review took place during and after the mission. As a result, the team had incomplete information to support the field work.

Delays in confirming the evaluation process pushed the field mission dates close the Christmas period, and the January 2011 CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination. Government stakeholders had limited availability, given the immediacy and significance of referendum. The combination of Christmas vacations and the referendum also meant that most Donor representatives were not available. UNDP personnel gave the evaluation a high priority and made every reasonable effort to provide support. However, referendum-related responsibilities also affected their availability.

Finally, the evaluation found that not all project reporting was reliable as the basis for assessing outcomes. This created some difficulty using the reporting as the baseline data where the Evaluation Team could not confirm findings with site verification. It is also a source of performance and reputation risk for the UNDP and stakeholders.

Project reporting provides an extensive amount of activity and performance data, mixed with raw output data. However, the reporting often does not contextualise the activity/performance data, or synthesise it into output or outcome statements that show progress against the original results matrix. Performance reporting, therefore, can be difficult to use as evidence. The problem relates to the robustness of monitoring and evaluation systems, particularly for the three recovery-oriented projects where a significant body of activity was delivered by national and international NGOs over a broad geographic area.

Importantly, there is also limited follow up and outcomes are not captured. The Evaluation Team encountered examples of positive monitoring and project closure reports that were contradicted by site inspections; outputs were lost or undermined because projects could not be sustained or for reason of poor design and implementation (eg: a road has deteriorated for lack of maintenance) with the consequent erosion of outcomes. However, problems were not captured in the project reporting, owing to the lack of follow up. It also means that the original project reporting may have missed factors that contributed to loss of outcomes or impacts (eg: local government does not have resources for road maintenance).

Monitoring generally stops with the handover of deliverables to beneficiaries and project closure. Results are expressed as outputs (eg. road project was completed and the road opened). However, systems do not have capacity to follow up at the outcome level, including after an appropriate period of time has passed (eg. what was the situation one year after project closure?). Remaining at the output level provides a snapshot at the point of closure. However, the picture is incomplete and sometimes inaccurate as there is

no additional information on what happened after project closure, when the outcomes and impacts would normally accumulate.

*Recommendation: The UNDP should give high priority to re-design of its project-level monitoring and evaluation systems. A re-designed system would: i) distinguish clearly between activity, performance and output data; ii) demonstrate the accumulation of output results over time against project indicators, and; iii) synthesize project data to report at the outcome level, including follow up at an appropriate point after project closure. Follow up is particularly important where sustainability is a concern. Strengthening monitoring systems will have resource implications that should be taken into account by donors. The GoSS should strengthen its leadership and participation.*

## 1.4 Acknowledgements

The Evaluation Team recognises the contribution of officials of the Government of Southern Sudan, the Donor community, Implementing Partners and personnel from the United Nations Development Programme and UNOPS. All stakeholders engaged the evaluation in a spirit of cooperation and learning. This occurred despite the fact that they participated under difficult conditions in advance of the January 2011 CPA-mandated Referendum on Southern Sudan's self-determination. The high quality of inputs notwithstanding, any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the Evaluation Team. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the UNDP.

## 2 The Programme Environment in Southern Sudan

### 2.1 The Programme Environment in Southern Sudan 2009- 2011

The Evaluation Team did not have the resources for a full situation analysis. However, it made the following observations on the programme environment for implementation of CPR Outcome 7 projects, based on documentation, interviews and the field mission. Three main factors shaped conflict and recovery dynamics during the evaluation period: Ongoing tensions between the North and Southern Sudan over CPA implementation, leading to the 2010 elections and 2011 referendum; the limited presence of the State in many areas of the South and resulting vacuum of authority and services, and; an increase of intra-South conflict, ranging from the community to the political levels often with articulation between them. These occurred in the context of immense humanitarian and development challenges, which remain among the most acute in the world.

In this context, there were two fundamental pre-requisites for recovery and development. First, avoiding relapse into violent conflict between the North and South, while simultaneously managing intra-South security and conflict. Second, building a State that is responsive, with a presence throughout Southern Sudan and the ability to deliver basic public goods and services. The programme environment has also been fluid. The first part of the CPR programme was implemented during a transitional period leading to the referendum. Issues related to security, governance and development are not new and will carry forward into the post-referendum context. However, the dynamics will be fundamentally different with independence.

#### *Governance and the Political Context*

**The Government of Southern Sudan was focused on CPA implementation and preparation for the January 2011 referendum on self-determination.** The *Sudan Country Analysis* (2007) noted CPA implementation was the overarching challenge for the CPAP period. As of the referendum, significant CPA issues were unresolved. These included the Abyei's status and demarcation of the North-South border, with implications for control of oil revenues, the holding of Popular Consultations in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, and security arrangements between the North and the South. Resulting tensions had an impact on the programme environment, undermining confidence between the CPA parties and contributing to areas of instability along Southern Sudan's northern border. An assumption was expressed by many Sudanese informants that the North continues with efforts to destabilise the South, and that results of the referendum results would need to be defended.

**Consolidating the State was a key challenge in Southern Sudan during the implementation period.** The *Sudan Country Analysis* (2007) notes the importance of strengthening service delivery and rule of law institutions, in a decentralised framework that distributes political power and institutional authority between the central and sub-levels of government. There were important advances by early 2011 building capacity of the State, particularly when considering the starting point of 2005. Gains reflect significant efforts on the part of Sudanese and international counterparts. Regardless,

simultaneously establishing accountable government, delivering security and public services and providing civic education was an ambitious task over such a short and politically fluid period of time. Also, efforts to build state and local authorities are recent and are showing only initial results.

**Consequently, formal State institutions remained weak, particularly when moving away from Juba.** Non-state actors and informal governance and power structures fill the vacuums left by the State's absence. Governance is based, in large part, on accommodation and brokering between the Southern Sudan's many centres of power, which consumes a large part of its material and political resources. At the same time, the State remains challenged by capacity and resource constraints, and initial efforts to expand outwards to the state and local levels have been slow to progress. Government struggles to deliver basic goods and services (health, education and infrastructure) and to provide the security and rule of law guarantees. At a higher level, a unifying concept of Southern identity must still be built, and the relationship between State and citizens defined.

**In the immediate future, the Government of Southern Sudan must manage a complex transition to independence.** Among the challenges are: Negotiations with Khartoum (boundaries, security arrangements, citizenship rights, external debt and resource management, among other issues); managing intra-South tensions and bringing the non-state actors into an inclusive political process; strengthening government entities and the presence of the State throughout the new national territory; adopting an interim constitution and building the basis for broad participation. This will occur at the same time as challenges to the State's authority from within Southern Sudan must also be managed.

### *The Security Situation*

**Security concerns during the implementation period had three basic dimensions.** Sources of conflict and conflict triggers were often articulated or interconnected:

- *The relationship between North and Southern Sudan around the CPA.* Slow progress on technical implementation reflected the fact that resolution of important issues depended on the 2011 referendum. An extended period of uncertainty created incentives for both CPA Parties to consolidate positions and keep their options open, rather than coming to agreements;
- *Regional dynamics,* including instability in neighbouring countries, the cross border flow of small arms and raiding by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), among other issues; and
- *Intra-South tensions* with multiple and interconnected levels of conflict, from resource-based disputes between communities to political competition using violence. These have often been articulated by armed groups or "personalities" able to exploit local grievances and insecurity for their own purposes.

**Of these, there was particular concern for the increase of intra-South conflict during 2008/2009.** Violence resulted from the fragmentation in Southern Sudan, itself a legacy of the civil war period. Important progress has been made scaling up and deploying rule of law institutions, including the Southern Sudan Police Force, the judiciary and the prison

service. However, the absence of State presence created a vacuum and opportunity for power to be exercised by persons outside of the state, including by “personalities” and groups that contest the GoSS’s authority and are positioning for influence. Fragmentation reflects historical splits within the SLPA, the alliance of some militias with the North and unresolved grievances. The prelude to the interim period was not a single North-South conflict, but multiple and inter-locked North-South and South-South conflicts occurring simultaneously, with constantly shifting alliances. These carried forward to the CPA period and will continue to exist after independence.

**The 2011 referendum on self-determination represents a fundamental reconfiguration and has contributed to further politicisation of intra-South conflict.** Early tensions were to some extent contained by the *Juba Declaration* agreement (2006), which integrated Other Armed Groups (OAG) that were not party to the CPA into the SPLA and political structure. The 2010 elections exposed some of these fault lines, when some results were violently contested. Ceasefires negotiated to stabilise the referendum period appeared as temporary accommodations, albeit with the possibility of providing a framework for post-referendum reconciliation in the South. The tensions themselves were suppressed beneath the priority of a successful referendum. Regardless, there has been an escalation of violent conflict since the referendum results were announced, as groups and “personalities” inside and outside of the Government manoeuvre for position and advantage. Some informants believed that the violence could potentially be an existential threat to Southern Sudan. Reports indicate a significant number of civilian casualties and displacement.

**There was also an escalation during the implementation period in inter-communal violence.** Violence was driven by multiple factors, many of which were identified in consultation undertaken by the *Community Small Arms Control (CSAC)* project. In some cases, local conflict has been articulated with events at the political level, by groups or persons seeking to consolidate their positions. Among conflict drivers:

- *Competition for resources at the local level* was exacerbated by drought, food insecurity and disputed boundaries. Competition was frequently expressed as conflict over cattle grazing and water resources;
- *Rural communities remain deeply impoverished*, with limited or no progress improving livelihood opportunities since 2005. In this context, cattle rustling has increasingly become a form of wealth accumulation, changing its traditional rationale;
- *Uneven government presence and authority at the local level* can intensify conflicts, particularly where the state is unable to guarantee the rule of law or facilitate the resolution of conflict. Existing systems do not command confidence;
- *States and communities are marginalised from the political dynamic at the centre*, and are not likely to benefit from process of accommodation between major power brokers. The sense of marginalisation and frustrated popular expectations for improvement are an important source of instability;
- *Small arms are still widely present in communities*, with limited progress in collecting arms or reducing internal or cross border arms flows. In the absence of rule of law guarantees, there is little incentive for communities to surrender their weapons.
- *Previous unilateral and forced arms collection by the SPLA tended to escalate rather than mitigate conflict*, with evidence that communities have re-armed and many of the



weapons collected have leaked back into the market through re-sale. Forced disarmament in the absence of security guarantees breed suspicion and resentment towards the SPLA;

- *There is an articulation between community level conflict, and larger political manoeuvring.* In areas where community and tribal identities carried over to political loyalties, local conflicts can be manipulated for larger political gain, as groups and personalities seek to consolidate their positions;
- *The lack of accountability within power structures, including State and non-state.* Informants noted cases where justice was not administered in a transparent manner, abusive, violent or corrupt acts committed by State officials went unpunished or where actions were driven by personal political agendas. All of these had a corrosive effect on the legitimacy of state before citizens, even as Government and international counterparts attempted to expand decentralisation.

In this context, slow delivery of tangible “peace dividends” at the local level was increasingly seen as a destabilising factor and an issue of high political sensitivity for Government. The peace dividend required was not just material; it was also composed of security guarantees, political inclusion and the presence of the state and delivery of goods and services. These elements are part of an integrated human development/security concept and mutually reinforcing.

**Intra-South conflict will remain a serious concern over the medium term.** Looking forward to the post-referendum period, comment and analysis indicates political competition will be the most important intra-South conflict-driver. The period leading to the referendum was marked by relative stability, as stakeholders focused on the objective of independence. However, the “referendum dividend” was short-lived. Competition for position, influence and material gain in the newly independent South Sudan renewed even before the referendum result was announced, contributing to a serious escalation of violence during February 2011.

### *The Economic, Humanitarian and Development Contexts*

**Development indicators have improved since signing the CPA, but remain low among the lowest in the world.** The incidence of poverty for Southern Sudan cited in the *Sudan Country Assessment* was 90 percent (2007: 11), based on the first *MDG Progress Report* (2005).<sup>6</sup> Other key MDG indicators were among the lowest in the world (2005: 50). The *Second MDG Progress Report* placed the poverty level at 51 percent, noting significant spatial patterns. The poverty headcount was significantly higher in rural areas (55.4%) than urban areas (24.4%), with differences also between states. The incidence in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (75.6%) was three times the rate in Upper Nile State (25.7%), with States on the border with the North showing much higher incidence. More than two million persons returned to the South during the interim period, and an estimated half

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<sup>6</sup> The report notes that the rate of 90 percent was a “deductive estimate” as extensive field work was not possible during the conflict. Work done since 2005 provides a baseline for future comparison, but the lack of historical trend analysis means direct comparisons between the 2005 and 2010 MDG Progress Reports are not possible.

million will return in the period between the referendum and independence, further stretching resources.

**Important disparities, therefore, exist across Southern Sudan** (spatial and gender and demographic-based). These interact with, or are part of, conflict dynamics. Poverty has declined in some urban areas, and there has been an important population movement from the rural to urban areas. However, 83 percent of the population still lived in rural areas as of the 2008 census. Importantly also, Sudan has a young population, with 72 percent being under 30 years of age. The lack of economic opportunity is particularly felt by youth, also with implications for stability. Weak capacity within all levels of Government means that international entities, including United Nations agencies and NGOs, continue to play an important role in the delivery of basic goods and services.

**Humanitarian conditions improved, but Southern Sudan remains vulnerable to natural and conflict-related shocks.** High levels of food insecurity continued through 2010, with an estimated 50 percent of the population reported as food insecure. Ongoing humanitarian vulnerability related to violence (displacement resulting from internal and regional conflict) and climate (flooding and crop failure). FEWS Net reported for the second half of 2010 that “in Southern Sudan, food security conditions have improved in most livelihood zones due to ongoing harvests and consumption of groundnuts and maize.” This appeared to be an improvement the previous assessment, which warned “food insecurity has significantly increased since the beginning of the year following escalated inter-tribal/clan and cattle raiding conflicts during 2009, combined with poor rainfall and crop performance across the country.”<sup>7</sup> FEWS net reporting notes the relationship, therefore, between deep poverty, violent conflict and natural conditions.

**The current CPAP is being implemented during a period of acute financial restraints on Government.** Economically, the implementation period showed no significant progress diversifying the non-oil economy. Oil revenues accounted for approximately 95 to 98 percent of the State budget, also making the State the most important economic actor in Southern Sudan. Government revenues expanded between 2005 and 2007/8, as oil production and price increased. However, the combination of global recession, disputes with Khartoum over revenue sharing and increased expenditures, particularly for recurrent costs (payroll), left the GoSS with acute fiscal pressures by 2008 and through to the end of 2010.<sup>8</sup> High recurrent costs were, in part, a consequence of resolving intra-South conflict by political accommodation (bringing opponents into the public sector). Also, there was little positive change in the balance of resource allocation between the military and other service delivery. As a result, the Government’s ability to finance development objectives was undermined. Much of the benefit from oil revenues was captured by specific individuals and groups, and by security spending.

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.fews.net/pages/country.aspx?gb=sd&l=en>

<sup>8</sup> Recurrent costs related to salaries for the military and public service account for up to 80 percent of expenditures. The Government relies on international assistance for its capital spending.

**Petroleum revenues will be critical to achieving Southern Sudan's development objectives**, and their effective management an important governance challenge. Oil dependence leaves Sudan highly vulnerable to external shocks, including the recent global recession. Dependence on oil, which may be depleted within a few decades, underlines the need for economic diversification and reform.

**Diversification and growth in non-oil sectors, including in the private sector, was limited.** Seventy-eight percent of South Sudanese depend on animal husbandry or agriculture as their primary source of livelihood and only 12 percent reported having paid employment (World Bank 2010). Agriculture holds the largest economic potential for Southern Sudan. However, it still has limited means to generate surpluses from the agricultural production to boost local incomes and create the basis for other forms of economic activity. There was limited private sector development, although the presence of regional companies has grown taking advantage of construction and infrastructure development opportunities. The Southern Sudan private sector was not robust enough to take advantage of opportunities, particularly with a shortage in human capital and weak enabling environment.<sup>9</sup> There has been particularly little growth in economic opportunity in rural areas and for youth.

### *The Evolving Aid Architecture in Southern Sudan*

Bilateral and multilateral support to Sudan was estimated at approximately USD 8 billion during the CPA period. In the South, assistance was focused on short-term humanitarian assistance, provision of basic services by humanitarian organisations, and implementation of the CPA. An important part of assistance was implemented through pooled modalities and coordinated processes, including Multi-donor Trust Funds managed by the World Bank and United Nations. However, an estimated 70 percent of assistance to the South was bilateral.

United Nations and donor support to GoSS was constrained within the Sudanese national framework, as Southern Sudan was an integral part of the Government of Sudan within the interim constitutional arrangement. This placed limits on the kind of relationship that could be maintained with the GoSS and levels of Donor representation in Juba. Similarly, support to building institutions at sub-levels of Government was limited. As independence approaches, the focus of the international community's support is being redefined within the context of the new State and constitution:

- The GoSS is drafting a *Development Plan* for 2011-2013 scheduled for presentation in mid-2011, which will have the characteristics of an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The plan is being organised into 4 pillars and one cross cutting theme;
- The GoSS leads all pillars with co-leadership from international partners. The pillars include Economic Development, Governance, Social and Humanitarian

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<sup>9</sup> The World Bank reported there were 7333 formal businesses in Southern Sudan by 2010. Of these, 84 percent were shops or restaurants and almost 40 percent were located in Juba (2010: 4).

Development, and Conflict Prevention and Security. The latter is particularly relevant to the CPR portfolio; and

- Most members of the international community were in the preliminary stages of identifying future interventions in Southern Sudan. No thorough, forward-looking Donor mapping seems to exist. While a number of different aid coordination mechanisms are currently in place, Donors may not use them in the future.

**The future aid architecture for Southern Sudan, therefore, is being defined.** Given the fragility of State structures and legislative frameworks, it was not expected that the bulk of donor funds will be channelled through Government institutions during 2011-2014. Rather, funds will likely be disbursed in coordination with GoSS and local government institutions using forms of bilateral and joint implementation mechanisms. At the same time, an emphasis is being placed on capacity development within Government at all levels. The Government's objective is that by the end of the *Development Plan* period, obstacles to sector budget support will have been removed and a fully-fledged five-year plan presented.

## 2.2 Challenges to the UNDP from the Programme Environment

**The first two years of the CPAP implementation period (2009-2011) were marked by important accomplishments.** There was some progress consolidating GoSS institutions and capacity, particularly when compared to the 2005 baseline when no such structures existed. Informants particularly noted a gradual expansion of the Government's presence and some improvement to service delivery at the state level, which has accelerated since 2008. Through much of the period prior to, and at the outset of the CPAP, there appeared to be a gradual movement into a recovery situation, after an extended period of humanitarian need. This was noted with vulnerabilities of conflict and natural shocks notwithstanding.

**Regardless, CPAP Outcome 7 projects have been implemented in a volatile programme environment,** characterised by low capacity, difficult physical conditions and ongoing insecurity and conflict in some areas of the South. There have been large variations in security conditions, which in turn undermine recovery efforts. Variations have existed over time, by location, the factors that drive conflict dynamics and their articulation with other dimensions of conflict. The primary example was a conflict spike in a number of states during 2008/9, which decreased during 2009/10 and then escalated again in 2010 around the election results.

**There have been different drivers to conflict dynamics.** The initial spike was driven by community-based competition for resources, with some political articulation. The escalation in non-community based conflict reflected discontent over the 2010 election results, and claims by some groups as being excluded from political-level participation and opportunity. The 2011 referendum was a unifying factor that kept different groups together, and had a stabilising effect. With passage of the referendum, divisions and competition between the groups have re-emerged. There was evidence of articulation between political competition and community-level grievances resulting from both the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum. There has also been a shift in the focus of

political attention, from North-South tensions to intra-South tensions, although both continue to present security concerns.

**Within this context, the Evaluation Team observed the UNDP was challenged to respond to constant changes in the programme environment,** among them the need to:

- *Ensure the relevance of CPAP projects to the Southern Sudan context, within the national “One Country Two Systems” programme framework managed from Khartoum that placed important constraints on its operations;*
- *Adapt to constantly changing programme environment, particularly as this relates to conflict drivers and dynamics, and evolving security threats in the field;*
- *Working with emerging recovery concepts and programmes, in an effort to deliver “peace dividend” that had growing political significance for Government and Donors. In part, this has involved situating the Outcome 7 and other programmes at the nexus of security, governance and development;*
- *Strengthen its analysis and internal and external coordination structures to facilitate these changes, including innovating with analytical and programme tools; and*
- *Adapting also to the changing aid architecture, Government and Donor priorities and changes in the relationship between Government and Donors. In particular, the lack of definition on architecture as independence approaches creates planning challenges for the UNDP, as well as an opportunity to shape the process.*

## 3 Progress towards CPAP Outcome Objectives

### 3.1 Summary of Progress towards CPAP Portfolio Outcomes

#### *Framework for Assessing Results*

The overall outcome for the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme was *Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated*. The main indicator for determining whether the outcome has been achieved was *Change in human security (mines, small arms, socio-economic) of crisis-affected groups*. Progress was considered against the three fundamental issues emerging throughout the portfolio objectives and literature: Avoiding relapse into violent conflict between the North and South, and with intra-South security and conflict; Building a State that is responsive, present throughout Southern Sudan and the ability to deliver basic public goods and services, and; generating sustainable livelihoods, in communities and for individuals, which are the economic basis for human security.<sup>10</sup>

#### *Summary of Progress towards Outcomes*

**The most significant contribution of the Objective 7 portfolio to improving human security has been in the area of reducing threats from violence and conflict.** It has also made an important contribution in the area of strengthening the capacity and presence of the state to deliver basic services, security being the first among these. Contribution was made primarily through the *Community Security and Arms Control* project, the *Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis* project and potentially through Round III of the *Sudan Recovery Fund*. Most projects also made a contribution in the area of strengthening the capacity and presence of the state to deliver basic services, security being the first among these. These are areas of success that the second half of CPAP implementation can build on.

**The portfolio made only a limited contribution to the economic dimensions of human security.** While providing short-term economic benefits, mainly through the three recovery projects, the CPR portfolio's contribution to sustainable livelihoods and the reduction of poverty was negligible. This was particularly the case in the agricultural sector, where most Southern Sudanese are economically active. *Livelihoods, therefore, is a critical gap to be addressed in the second half of CPAP implementation.*

**The key variable affecting performance affecting outcomes was ownership;** the capacity of the GoSS and beneficiary communities to exercise its ownership of the projects, related to programme strategy, design and implementation. Earlier projects tended to perform less robustly, in part because the capacity of Government and beneficiaries for ownership was also less robust. In this regard, projects faced the existential challenge of most conflict-affected situations: how to deliver urgently needed recovery assistance while simultaneously building ownership and capacity, in a low capacity environment that is still volatile.

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<sup>10</sup> The CPAP documentation does not provide a definition of Human Security, or the framework used to conceptualise it. The term "Human Security" appears in the indicators.

### *Outcome Progress in Key Areas*

**The overall CPAP Outcome 7 portfolio showed good but uneven progress towards Outcome targets.** Progress varies between projects, over time and across the different dimensions of human security addressed in the portfolio. The overall trend is towards improvement in later projects.

**The weakest area of Outcome contribution was *livelihoods*, where there were immediate benefits but sustainable outcomes were negligible.** Results reflect both the acute economic difficulties across Southern Sudan and programme design and targeting. Most UNDP livelihood assistance was channelled through the three recovery projects. These moved a significant amount of assistance to rural areas, through NGO implementing Partners and within the framework of a “peace dividend”. Reporting notes, but generally does not qualify, an immediate and beneficial impact from delivery money and materials into a situation of severe deprivation. There was evidence in the reporting that important productive skills and capacity development were delivered, in communities and for individuals. There was also some evidence that the projects contributed to some improvement to incomes and food security, although these achievements were specific to certain individual projects and not generalised.

**There was little evidence to link project outputs with a sustainable reduction in poverty or improved income and food security over the medium-term.** In part, this is a consequence of the overall lack of economic opportunity and productive infrastructure in Southern Sudan. However, livelihood emerges as the weakest area of delivery and performance for all projects. Six of the seven projects were below target in terms of the amount of livelihood assistance actually delivered. This was most pronounced with the recovery projects, which placed less emphasis on livelihoods than specified in the original design. Also, the sustainability of livelihoods beyond project closure was an important performance concern. Few if any livelihood opportunities were created by *Individual Reintegration* project, and the *Community Security and Arms Control* project has not yet reached the implementation stage where it can focus on livelihood creation. Supporting economic recovery was an objective of the *Mine Action Capacity Development* project. However, there was no documented linkage between capacity development in the State mine action institution and the improvement of livelihoods.

*Recommendation: There is a critical gap in the area of livelihoods that should be addressed during the second half of CPAP implementation.*

**The CPR portfolio made an important contribution to avoiding and reducing conflict, focused primarily on intra-South conflict.** This appeared to be the strongest area of performance. The *Individual Reintegration*, *Mine Action*, *Community Security and Arms Control* and Round III of the *Sudan Recovery Fund* were specifically targeted to reduce conflict and security threats. The *Community Security and Arms Control* shows the most robust contribution. While attribution is given to multiple variables, there was evidence that the project contributed to a tangible reduction in violent conflict resulting from community-level tensions, and strengthened the ability of the Government to provide a security services. The project works within an integrated governance-security-recovery framework that addresses issues in a comprehensive manner. It has also contributed with an approach and analytical framework and tools that are being increasingly used

across Government, and elsewhere in the UNDP portfolio. The *Individual Reintegration* project did not have the basic enabling conditions, at the political or operational level, to achieve its security-related objectives.

*Recommendation: Conflict reduction is an area of success where the UNDP has developed unique programme tools that can be scaled up.*

*Note is made that the tools focus on conflict at the community level, and are not directed at politically-motivated conflict that is driving the post-referendum context. However, there is evidence that the tools can be used to avoid the articulation between community and political conflict dynamics, which gives the latter its social base and momentum.*

**All projects have made some contribution to strengthening State capacity, presence throughout Southern Sudan and its delivery of basic public goods and services.** The projects made two basic forms of contribution: capacity development to State entities, including various forms of technical assistance; support to service delivery, either in a gap-filling role (the recovery portfolio) or in closer collaboration with State entities (Mine Action, CSAC, SRF III). Over time, more of the capacity development effort has been targeted at sub-levels of government (state and local authority), either through national or state-level entities.

**Performance with Capacity Development Outcomes has been uneven, with examples of both good to poor results.** The recovery portfolio delivered some capacity development assistance to local government. However, the outcome of that assistance appears negligible; resource allocation to capacity development was below output targets, the quality of assistance was uneven and not delivered within an overall strategy to strengthen local authority. Implementing NGOs did not always have the appropriate competence and initiatives were generally not sustainable. There is evidence that, in some situations, recovery projects may have undermined the credibility of the State. This perception was strong held by Government informants. Implementation did not attribute projects or improve its visibility, as the State was not present to claim that attribution.

**In contrast, the *Individual Reintegration*, *Mine Action* and *CSAC* projects have all made important contributions to establishing and building State entities, and to moving the presence of the State out to the sub-levels of government.** These projects contributed to capacity at both the central and sub-levels of Government, where the presence of the state has been weakest. UNDP delivered good quality material and technical assistance at all of these levels, which has been appreciated by Government. For the CSAC, contributions have been multiplied by bringing other governance and security entities into the process. For example, combining conflict analysis, direct capacity development to state-levels institutions with security initiatives, such as police training. The CSAC, therefore, appears to be contributing to more effective capacity development outside of the project's scope. The *Individual Reintegration* project also contributed to establishing State DDR capacity, although that capacity has not yet been effectively used.

*Recommendation: Capacity development is most effective when delivered as part of an institutional strategy, integrating development at the institutional, organisational and individual levels and linked*



to programme delivery. The gap to be addressed in the second part of CPAP implementation is ensuring that such strategies exist as the basis for programming.

## 3.2 CPAP Project Outcomes

### *The Mine Action Capacity Development Project*<sup>11</sup>

#### *Summary of Findings*

**The Mine Action Capacity Development appears to be on track to meet its project objectives and contribute to CPAP portfolio outcomes.** There are important gains in establishing and improving the operational effectiveness of the SSDC. Achievements notwithstanding, the project does not have a clear capacity building strategy that links Institutional, Organisational and Individual capacity building requirements. In part, this results from the lack of an organisational strategy within the SSDC itself. As well, it is unclear how the project promotes the linkage between demining and recovery, beyond raising awareness of issues within Government. This may be compensated for by the existence of an overarching GoSS demining strategy, and the integration of demining into other UNDP projects. Effectiveness will be undermined by continuing Government dependence on international funding to sustain the SSDC.

#### *Overview*

**The objective of the Mine Action Capacity Development project was “threats to human security (mines, small arms) reduced, and crisis affected groups returned and reintegrated”.** The project’s outcome indicator was “reduced threat levels from mines, and the mine action management and technical capacity in place to address the social and economic impacts of mines”. Based on available information, the *Mine Action Capacity Development* project shows good progress towards meeting its objectives in the outcome area of strengthening management and technical capacity. The evaluation did not have sufficient information to assess whether the actual threat level from mines was reduced as a result of progress.

**Managing project in a national structure did not appear to place significant constraints on implementation in Southern Sudan.** Mine Action was one of three national projects in the CPR portfolio. Reporting indicates that the relationship between the UNDP project office in Khartoum and sub-office in Juba functioned well and collaboration between the GoNU and GoSS has been sufficient for the project to proceed. Government officials in the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) expressed dissatisfaction with the national scope of the project, stating that most of the mines are located in the South but the national government plays the dominant role in allocating demining resources. Government informants also cited Northern interference in some aspects of the overall project delivery. However, within these tensions the project has

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<sup>11</sup> Background and output information on the *Mine Action Capacity Development* project is included in Annex A.1.

progressed against objectives. UNDP was perceived by Government as providing quality services in an impartial manner.

**The evaluation of Phase One (2004-2008) was positive.** The evaluation concluded that the Mine Action project made an important contribution to: peace-building in the lead-up to the CPA and in its aftermath; the return of displaced persons and the delivery of humanitarian assistance; the restoration of internal security and the expansion of secure areas, and; the provision of an important point of entry for constructive engagement by the international community in the Sudan. It was also identified as one of the fields in which the GoNU and GoSS cooperated effectively. The institutional and operational infrastructure of the overall project was established and functioning, including both the Government and UN components in the North and South. UNDP assistance helped the Sudanese governments put in place the basic building blocks of a national mine action programme “with (for the most part) a sound institutional and organisational make-up”. The main concerns identified by the evaluation was that the UNDP has not yet focussed sufficient attention on helping Sudanese authorities formulate their own strategic plans (CIDH 2008).

**The documentation shows important progress towards achieving project objectives.** It was not possible to quantify how much capacity has been built in the SSDC, and whether that capacity is sustainable without UNDP and international support. UNDP reporting focused on the activity and output levels. Regardless, reporting identified progress towards strengthening national capacity and ownership of Mine Action activities. The SSDC is fully operational, at the central and sub-levels. This includes in its planning, coordination, priority setting, quality assurance and reporting roles. Reporting indicates that training and technical support was provided consistent with output targets, and that the performance of individual staff in their roles has improved.

**Government officials interviewed stated strong satisfaction with the quality of UNDP support,** and considered it essential to the establishment and operation of the SSDC. Financially the SSDC has no budget from the GOSS and it has depended in funds channelled through the UNDP. UNDP-channelled funds also provided much of the physical infrastructure for operations (building renovation and office equipment, for example). UNDP training support to individual SSDC personnel was considered of high value, with officials’ specifically citing training for financial management, programme management and information systems.

**Of concern, there does not appear to be a coherent capacity development strategy being articulated either by the SSDC or the UNDP.** The strategy would be based in assessment, and link the three levels of Institutional, Organisational and Individual. By 2010, the legal and policy framework for the SSDC and mine action were in place (Institutional) and there was support to the Organisational level (building infrastructure, strengthening systems and procedures and identifications of programmes). However, much of capacity development support was focused on Individual training, and the links back to institutional priorities at the Institutional and Operational levels were not clear. The project document does not define a strategy that links these three levels, nor does one emerge in the reporting or through informants.

**There was little information available on the functioning of the Joint Integrated Demining Units.** UNDP reporting indicates the units were established, trained and accredited. However, there was limited information on operations. Report states that the units have helped build confidence between North and South, but the claim is not qualified this evidence. Actual activity with the units appears to be well below project targets (Annual Report 2009). Government perception was that units have served to build confidence and facilitate cooperation. As a specific example, maps on the location of mines in the South were released by Northern sources through the units.

**The outcome of efforts to link demining with recovery activities was unclear.** The UNDP project document focused on efforts to increase the allocation of GoSS resources to demining activities, and ensuring that demining was considered as an element of recovery and development planning. This was to occur within the framework of the overall GoSS demining strategy, and subsequently through the strategic plans of various GoSS and UN agencies. However, the Project Document is silent on the specifics of how demining was linked to recovery and development activities, and UNDP reporting states only that the project increased *awareness* of mine action issues within Government. There are no examples given of actual joint planning on demining and recovery/development cited in the reporting (Annual Reports 2008 and 2009).

**Informants from Government and the UNDP stated that the linkage between demining and recovery occurs within the government planning framework.** The actual removal of mines is beyond the scope of the UNDP capacity development project, but there was clear evidence that a significant progress has been made in clearing roads and agricultural land and facilitating resettlement, which are areas of high government priority. Regardless, it is unclear the extent to which the linkage between demining and recovery has been facilitated by the Capacity Development project.

### *Individual Reintegration Project Component of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project<sup>12</sup>*

#### *Summary*

**The Individual Reintegration Component project did not meet project objectives and will make a limited contribution to portfolio outcomes, in the area of capacity development.** The project will need to be redesigned in the post-referendum period. Most importantly, the fundamental enabling conditions for effective DDR did not exist within the CPA framework. Government, Donors and the UN all share responsibility for poor conditions. Subsequently, the reintegration project was showed low Government ownership and commitment, particularly from the SPLA. Output delivery from the project was low, given serious deficiencies in project design. The possible exception was support to establishing GoSS DDR institutions. Performance was further jeopardised by the significant difficulties in the relationship between the UNDP and its Implementing Partners.

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<sup>12</sup> Background and output information on the *Individual Reintegration Component* is included in Annex A.2.

## Overview

**The Individual Reintegration Component project did not make a positive contribution to achieving CPAP Outcome 7.** As currently designed, the programme has not been an effective tool to return former combatants, OAGs, WAAFGs or SNG to civilian life. Neither output nor outcome indicator targets were met by the mid-term implementation point, with only four percent of the intended Phase 1 beneficiaries receiving full reintegration benefits. The balance of outcomes may actually be negative, when benefits are weighted against the tensions generated between the GoSS, United Nations and Donors, the destabilising impact of unmet expectations of candidates and communities and other consequences. These date back to the original negotiations at the national level.

**The Disarmament and Demobilisation components of the project did not contribute to the enabling conditions for effective reintegration activities.** The overall DDR programme did not achieve a reduction or rightsizing of SPLA or SAF force levels. In Southern Sudan, there has been no reduction in force levels, the military budget, which remains at 37 percent of total GoSS expenditures, or reallocation of resources to development challenges. Also, the DDR programme does not appear to have contributed to stabilising the overall security situation or building confidence between the North and Southern Sudan (DDR Review 2010). Rather, tensions escalated during the referendum period.

**The reintegration project has not contributed to generation of livelihoods or employment.** The overall context of limited growth and diversification in the non-oil sector must be noted, as few new livelihood opportunities were being created externally. Within the project, the main factor was low coverage; that only a small percentage of the beneficiary group received the full benefit package. The project was described as “an expensive livelihoods support programme for a limited group of people [and not] a relevant contribution to the peace and security of Southern Sudan” (DDR Review 2010: 1).

**Of beneficiaries completing the reintegration process, few appear to have found sustainable income generating opportunities.** Evidence from the UNDP *Quarterly Progress Reports* (2010) and the *DDR Review* (2010) indicates 55 percent of candidates chose the small business option, and that the large majority of those businesses failed within months of start-up. Employment for candidates enrolled in vocational programmes was limited given lack of opportunity in the Southern Sudan economy itself, particularly outside of state capitals.<sup>13</sup> UNDP informants observed that “employment creation in Southern Sudan is almost nil. There are opportunities for local companies to get contracts [from the GoSS and international entities], but very few local companies have been created to take advantage and there is no support for the idea of creating them.”

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<sup>13</sup> There was no data available on the number of persons who found employment on completing vocational-oriented training. The project does not provide post-graduation support for beneficiaries who have completed their training and are in the market, such as an employment placement service. Also, the monitoring process does not track whether they found a livelihood opportunity.

**An important factor contributing to poor livelihood results appeared to be the individual-focused programme model,** which was not appropriate to conditions in Southern Sudan. Generating opportunities required a greater emphasis on economic development in communities, particularly in agriculture where the majority of the population are economically active. However, recipient communities did not have the economic means to support beneficiaries or generate livelihood opportunities, especially in rural areas. There was also limited connectedness with other recovery initiatives in this regard, in part because of the project's narrow mandate and scope. Some discussions were held with the SRF and CSAC projects, although it is not clear how these eventually contributed to creating livelihoods.

**There was some innovation in community programming, which can serve as a basis of structure and experience for the future.** The UNDP, Implementing Partners and the SSDDRC developed a *Community Based Reintegration* programme, intended to promote broader recipient community participation. The programme responded to Government and identified forms of life skill training, development and reconciliation activities of value to both the reintegration beneficiaries and the communities, with donor support. There have also been creative initiatives to develop opportunities with the private sector. Social reintegration was an innovation undertaken by the UNDP and SSDDRC, to compensate for design flaws in the existing project concept. However, it was not included in the core *Individual Reintegration Component* design and, therefore, was not mainstreamed or adequately resourced.

**There are mixed results for capacity development outcomes.** The reintegration component has contributed to building operational capacity in the SSDDRC, including at the state level. This represents progress in building the commission's capacity to function, and provides a basis for post-referendum programming. One particular benefit has been to push capacity out of Juba, and strengthen the SSDDRC's presence at the state level. Capacity at the organisational and institutional levels has been less clear. The commission's strategic (policy and planning) and management capacities remain limited. The attribution to the UNDP for these deficiencies is unclear, as they certainly also reflect the lack of GoSS ownership.

#### The Community Security and Arms Control Project<sup>14</sup> *Summary*

**The Community Small Arms Project showed significant progress towards project objectives, and is making an important contribution to portfolio outcomes.** The CSAC has developed an innovative programme model, based on strong national ownership (Government and communities), robust analysis and integration of resources across the security, governance and recovery nexus. There was evidence of a marked reduction in violent conflict the areas where the project is being implementation. Design represents a "good practice" for use across the international portfolio in Sudan. Less progress has been made against livelihood objectives. The project is only one of several variables

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<sup>14</sup> Background and output information on the *Community Security and Arms Control Project* is included in Annex A.3.

affecting conflict dynamics, and results must be proven sustainable in the post-referendum context.

### *Overview*

**The CSAC project is making important progress towards the CPAP Outcome 7 objective.** The project is in the early stages of implementation and some outcomes have yet to emerge or prove their sustainability. This will particularly be the case when confronted with post-referendum dynamics, which will change the programme environment. Progress is more advanced in the areas of security and governance. These have been the main focus of activities, and are a pre-requisite for later implementation of economic recovery and livelihoods activities. There was limited evidence of progress regarding livelihoods, which will be the most difficult component. Also, there has been limited reduction of small arms available at the community level, owing in part to weaknesses with arms registration and storage but also the large scale arms flows in the region. Post-referendum dynamics notwithstanding, the team observed good conditions for scaling up the CSAC project to other states. The model appears relevant to conditions in other parts of the country and has proven to be both adaptable and scalable.

**The CSAC process is producing an effective model for integrating security, governance and recovery activities in a unified conceptual and programme framework.** Previous efforts at forced and unilateral disarmament of communities by the SPLA were counterproductive. They tended to increase conflict, resentment and suspicion towards the Government and a sense of insecurity in communities. There was a strong incentive to replace arms, and many of the arms collected appear to have leaked back into market. These factors may have contributed to an increase in the small arms flows. The CSAC provided an alternative model, based on consultation, strengthening the relationship between state and community, security guarantees and linked to recovery benefits. It focused on creating the conditions for reducing the need for using small arms, as well as their eventual collection. Importantly, the programme concept allowed for coordination of resources from across multiple programme areas (security, governance and livelihoods) and counterparts (Government, Donors, UNMIS and UN agencies, and national and international NGOs).

**The CSAC project contributed to a reduction of violence in areas of implementation.** The most robust data was available in Jonglei State, where CSAC operations were first established. Cattle raiding and inter-communal violence over grazing and water rights have been the main concerns. Internal borders are disputed, and there is a significant trade in small arms from multiple sources. Officials in Jonglei State reported that violent deaths resulting from cattle raiding declined from 2043 in 2009, to 161 as of December 2010. The number of injuries declined during the same period from 435 to 152 and child abductions from 435 to 39. Further, the number of cattle raided in Jonglei declined from 850,000 in 2009 to 100,000 in 2101.<sup>15</sup> Effective systems for data collection on violent incidents appeared to exist, and the incidents were documented. The post-referendum

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<sup>15</sup> Data was provided by BCSSAC personnel in Bor, and accepted by the UNDP as credible. The evaluation team reviewed supporting incident documents and reports, but was not allowed to take copies.

escalation in political violence may undermine these results, although it appears politically oriented and not driven by community-level conflict.

**Police and state officials in Eastern Equatoria also reported a decline in the levels of violence and criminality during 2010, which they related to project activities.** Officials reported the incidence of cattle raiding and related violence and criminality is down, significantly in some areas. State officials did not have data on the number of violent incidents. Evidence, therefore, was anecdotal and based on perception and knowledge of specific local conditions. Effective systems for data collection on violent incidents do not exist within the CSAC in Eastern Equatoria. Regardless, statements from Government informants indicate that the results are positive and, in some areas, have led to a significant reduction in violence.

**All informants were careful not to over-attribute the reduction in violence to the CSAC project.** There are multiple contributing factors from outside of the project's scope. The Government was in dialogue with militias and other groups, to create ceasefire conditions prior to the referendum. The agreements reduced the immediate level of violence, and possibly some of the articulation between community-level and larger political conflicts. Most of the cattle raiding occurred during the dry season, which was just beginning. Also, drought and food security conditions had improved from previous years, possibly reducing the level of resource competition. An escalation in violence was possible after the referendum, therefore, subject to a change in any of these or other conditions.

**Regardless, Government informants attributed the reduction in conflict, in whole or in part, to the interaction between external condition and the following CSAC interventions:**

- *Strengthening the presence and visibility of Government at the state and local levels.* The consultations were often the first point of contact between Government and communities. In many cases, a sense of marginalisation from Government was an important conflict factor. The consultations, therefore, were an initial step in establishing a Government presence at the local level, and building a relationship between State and citizens. This approach was preferable to forced unilateral disarmament, and a more arbitrary use of Government authority. Also, it contrasted to the lack of Government presence resulting from many of the rapid recovery initiatives;
- *Effective targeting of security and development interventions, with robust community support.* The CSAC is producing unique and actionable analysis and identifying high-value governance, security and recovery interventions. This includes both the type of intervention required, the most effective geographic positioning for implementation, and kinds of approaches needed. The methodology is robust, and appears more effective as a support to targeting interventions than those used in the other CPAP Outcome 7 programme areas, particularly the recovery-oriented projects;
- *There was evidence from the field observation that CSAC information is being used in the practical design and targeting of security and recovery interventions, including actions such as the positioning of police resources and the location of patrols to reduce cattle raiding.* Information has been combined with the *Crisis Recovery Mapping and*

*Analysis* initiative, which provided a conceptual basis for methodology design. Informants also noted that baseline information is more robust, leading to an overall improvement in targeting and effectiveness from other recovery initiatives. In addition to opening relationships with communities, therefore, the consultation provided robust analysis on the sources of security threats and built community support for action;

- *Initial positioning of police posts in high risk areas, disrupting criminal movement and cattle transport routes after trading.* The project is providing the basis for more effective police action, through improved positioning of police resources and infrastructure. Statements across all informant groups that, beyond improved enforcement actions, the simple presence of police have deterred criminal activity and inter-communal attacks, along established routes. The mission observed that communities are being established around police posts that have not yet been completed, in the hope that the area around the posts will be secure; and
- *CSAC projects are strengthening public infrastructure, in areas where no public infrastructure or services were previously available.* For example, communities requiring roads for increased police access will also benefit from improved transportation.

**CSAC has generated a high level of political support, including at the state level.** The GoSS and state governments have mobilised support for operations, and have adapted project structures and analysis into their own planning. Government has exercised the central role in approval of the project, and its management role has become more robust. CSAC, therefore, is effectively a Government initiative, with strong vertical (between the GoSS and state and local governments) and horizontal (intra-GoSS, between various ministries) linkages between state entities. The project's integrated programme concept allows for the easy combining of resources from multiple sources, allowing space for broad participation.

**CSAC has strengthened Government leadership and capacity, particularly at the state and local levels.** CSAC has strengthened the capacity and coherence of state institutions, horizontally between GoSS entities and vertically between the GoSS and sub-levels of government at the state and county. The BCSSAC and SSPC are now leading the consultations and coordinating activities and stakeholders. State and local government appeared fully engaged, including through the Local Steering Committees.

**CSAC has not yet contributed to the reduction of small arms and light weapons.** A significant internal and regional trade in small arms continues and communities remain heavily armed. On the supply side, action will be needed to reduce arms trade flows are outside of the scope of the project, and many require regional cooperation. Also, the lack of an effective registration and storage systems means that arms collected from civilian often leak back onto the market. On the demand side, CSAC is contributing to conditions in which communities may eventually perceive that arms are not needed for their security. Essential will be a determination by communities that the security guarantees offered by Government are real and sustainable. The CSAC project appeared to be contributing towards establishing the more secure conditions at the community level, and reducing the incentives and opportunities for small arms to be used. However,



Government officials noted that abusive behaviour in communities by agents of the state would have a corrosive effect on the State's legitimacy.

**CSAC has not yet made a tangible contribution to livelihood creation.** The focus of early implementation has been on improving security conditions, as a prerequisite for livelihood generation. While conditions for existing livelihood activities may be improved, there was no concrete evidence that new opportunities have yet been created.<sup>16</sup> Livelihoods are both an outcome of more secure communities, and a prerequisite for sustaining security. The consultation process has produced useful data on the economic preferences of communities and opportunities. However, other programmes have had marginal success at generating opportunities. Livelihoods, therefore, will be the next important challenge to CSAC implementation.

## Overview of UNDP-Managed Recovery Projects

### Overview

**There are three recovery-oriented programmes in the CPAP Outcome 7 portfolio.** Combined, the three projects had a net value of almost USD 300 million, the largest financial component of the overall CPR portfolio. The three projects also accounted for a significant component of UNDP personnel and stakeholder participation. In sequence from the earliest, the projects included: the *Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP)*; *The Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP)*, and; *Sudan Recovery Fund - Southern Sudan (SRF-SS)*. While the RRP was a national programme implemented in both North and Southern Sudan, the RIEP and the SRF were specific to the South.

As common features, the three projects:

- *Had multi-tier governance and implementation structures, integrating Government, Donors, the UNDP and Implementing Partners at various levels of decision-making (national, state and local) and implementation. A core objective was to enhance national ownership and the relevance of projects to nationally defined recovery priorities;*
- *Were designed to address early recovery (RRP) or "recovery gap" (RIEP and SRF) needs that emerged soon after the CPA was signed. Moving away from the CPA signing in 2005, with slow consolidation of Government structures at the state and local levels, the absence of tangible "peace dividends" was increasingly understood as a potential source of instability within-Southern Sudan. In this regard, the recovery focus increased as a political priority for the GoSS and its international counterparts; and*
- *Were comprised of large project-oriented portfolios, delivered at the state and community level with some combination of livelihoods, basic service delivery and capacity development, for communities and government entities. The exception was SRF*

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<sup>16</sup> An exception was in Torit, where police officials stated that new communities were growing around police posts as they were being constructed, including economic activity. The project, therefore, was having an effect on settlement patterns.

Phase III, which had significant funding but focused on larger scale projects, including infrastructure.

**There was a marked evolution in the conceptual and programme tools used by the UNDP and other stakeholders for recovery programming.** These are shown in design innovations and early performance to the SRF Phase III, which was under early implementation during 2010. The evolution depended on the expansion of Government planning and implementation capacity, at all levels but particularly the sub-levels of government. This allowed for closer integration of projects into Government priorities.

**An additional factor has been the strengthening of the UNDP's capacity to coordinate a broad range of resources,** from within the UN system and elsewhere, and apply new conflict and community needs assessment methodologies. Based on these advances, the defining feature of SRF Phase III is that it does not rely on large-scale NGO implementation capacity, but rather is based on better defined Government priorities and an integrated approach to security, governance and recovery initiatives.

### Summary

**The three recovery-oriented programmes (RRP, RIEP and SRF Round I and Round II) have only partially met their project objectives, making an uneven contribution to portfolio outcomes.** The projects delivered a significant amount of training and material outputs to communities, which were generally valued by Government and beneficiaries. However, they were highly “projectised”, with a large number of small and uncoordinated projects delivered by NGOs and international organisations. The governance structure allowed for national ownership, but the actual ability of authorities at the local and state levels to engage was mixed. In addition, the quality of many projects was poor, with many projects showing deterioration only a year after handover. This situation raises concerns about UNDP's performance in supervising the portfolios. It is unlikely, therefore, that the immediate benefits delivered to communities are being sustained. Accordingly, there was little evidence of a contribution to poverty reduction, increased resilience to food security shocks, improved access to public services or of local capacity having been strengthened.

**SRF Round III has better potential to meet its outcome objectives, in a manner similar to CSAC.** Round III is situated at the core of Government priorities around the security, governance and recovery nexus. The extended consultation process around design has both contributed to, and benefited from the gradual expansion of State capacity to the state and local levels. As a result, Round III has more robust Government ownership. It also reflects an evolution in design from the projectised model, based on integrated programming around the security, governance and recovery nexus.

### *The Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Project*<sup>17</sup>

The *Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme* (RRP) was initiated in 2005 as a national project, with a three year implementation cycle between 2006 and 2010. The project was active in 10 states across Sudan, including five states in Southern Sudan. Total original budget was a Euro 54 million grant from the European Commission, with an additional USD 2 million from Norway.

The objective of the RRP was to “reduce the prevalence and severity of poverty and increase food security among conflict-affected rural house-holds across Sudan by achieving tangible improvements at the community and local authority level (Project Document 2005).” Project implementation was ongoing during 2009, but completed before the mid-point of the current CPAP. It was subject to a *Mid-Term Evaluation* (2008), a *Final Evaluation* (2010) and a UNDP lessons learned process (2010) just prior to the field mission. The evaluation team, therefore, relied on the existing documentation, and did not conduct additional site verification of the projects.

**The RRP only partially met its project objective of reducing poverty and increasing food security.** RRP outputs contributed to short term increases in productivity. However, most projects did not have the potential to improve the long term resilience of communities against shocks (food security) or income generation (2010: 39). The portfolio comprised a large number of individual initiatives aimed at strengthening single elements of productive systems, rather than looking at the overall system. In the absence of an integrated approach, achievements could not be sustained or scaled up. Many projects had serious design and implementation deficiencies. Outputs and outcomes were inconsistent across the three areas of programme focus. The weakness of local planning systems and the predisposition of NGO implementers were important factors in shaping portfolio design, rather than clearly defined priorities. Combined, these factors undermined the RRP’s value of peace dividends delivered by the RRP.

**The *Final Evaluation* (2010) found that the five projects in Southern Sudan delivered a significant amount of material and technical assistance at the community level.** Regardless, delivery of supporting outputs was not consistent with the balance foreseen in the original resource allocation. Generally, outputs and the number of beneficiaries did not match original targets. While the final evaluation did not provide an estimate, the Mid-Term Review concluded that only 25 percent of the intended beneficiary target had been reached two years into implementation. The review attributed the shortfall to inflated expectations and poor understanding of conditions during planning (2008: vi).

**Based on outputs, the RRP produced “immediate impacts at the community level, in line with an early recovery and rehabilitation programme.”** Compared to the baselines described in the project documents, health service delivery had improved, more children had access to school facilities, local government has been strengthened with more capacity to deliver and administer services, and the capacity of local organisation has also been increased (2010: 38). In the absence of clearly defined baselines and output

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<sup>17</sup>Background and output information on the *Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Project* is included in Annex A.4.

data, the final evaluation was not able to qualify outcomes precisely. However, both the *Final Evaluation* and *Mid-term Review* differentiated between outcome achievements as follows.

**Most achievements occurred in the area of strengthening of physical infrastructure for basic social service delivery**, in the areas of school construction, water infrastructure and health clinics, leading to improved access and use of services. However, outcomes will be undermined by the weak alignment with local plans and priorities (where these existed during the project planning phase in 2006), and insufficient local resources to staff, operate and maintain facilities. In particular, the final evaluation observed that there has been limited use of health care facilities delivered by the RRP. A contributing factor to the over-delivery of service infrastructure was determined to be the predisposition of humanitarian-oriented NGOs (2010: 38) to deliver physical works, as the area of RRP activity they were “most comfortable with” (2008: 22). In this regard, the institutional strengths and dispositions of the implementing NGOs appeared to play an important role in shaping portfolio design, and not necessarily local priorities.

**There were few tangible benefits delivered by the livelihood components.** The RRP produced an “impressive” number of activities in support of livelihoods, and the final evaluation concluded these provided some immediate improvements to household incomes”. Regardless, relevance and sustainability emerged as the key outcome issues. Project components had serious design problems (absence of market or needs survey for targeting) and were output oriented (delivery of a training package and/or provision of material support, such as goats, boreholes and agricultural implements, among others). The RRP’s poorest performance, therefore, was in areas related to agriculture and food security, which was the project’s top priority.

**The RRP also delivered a significant number of activities for capacity development, but the capacity was generally not sustained.** Projects supported various local governance and community organisation initiatives, such as the formation of school committees or health service user committees. Efforts were made to link RRP capacity development initiatives to social service physical infrastructure, to be mutually reinforcing and strengthen both use and sustainability. The *Final Evaluation* found some improvements in local government capacity that was sustained beyond the life of the projects. These became contributions to the scaling up of state-level presence of Government that has intensified since 2008. Regardless, the evaluation concluded that community organisations were generally not sustained beyond the life of individual initiatives (2010: 39-40). The *Mid-Term Review* added that NGOs did not have the capacity or experience to build government structures, nor was it within “their traditional comfort areas” (2008: 8). The objective, therefore, did not appear to match the competence of some implementing partners.

**The objective of expanding the presence and visibility of the State was not met, despite the fact this was an area of high political sensitivity.** Projects delivered by NGOs were not attributed to Government, created little or no visibility for project as being a State initiative. The *Mid-Term Review* observed that the lack of attribution to Government meant its presence at the community level was not enhanced, and citizens could not make the linkage between the project and a CPA-related “peace dividend”. As such, the review concluded that the RRP was not an appropriate model “for convincing

communities ... that there were real gains from peace” (2008: 26). MoFEP officials interviewed confirmed that services delivered by NGOs did not provide visibility to the Government, nor was Government’s presence in people’s daily lives increased. “The effect is to reduce credibility of Government over time, which can be destabilising.”

**Government stakeholders expressed general satisfaction with the RRP, deficiencies notwithstanding.** Officials involved with the project acknowledged that Government was “heavy at the centre” in 2006 with limited capacity to deliver in the states. The project filled a gap in Government capacity, and played its role accordingly. Officials noted RRP projects were “a drop in a much larger ocean of needs”. However, they were considered to be progress. “All improvements are relative. When the project began, there were no public services. Government had limited capacity to provide services in many of the beneficiary communities. Anything we saw, therefore, was the result of the [RRP] projects.”

**Regardless, Government perceived that a limited amount of capacity has been built at the local level, and livelihoods were not sustained.** Overall, state and local structures were often assessed as too weak to absorb and manage project outputs. Government, therefore, identified the main concerns as project sustainability and ownership. “Effectively, resources do not exist to maintain services or pay personnel. If government does not have capacity and resources, then the facilities left by the projects will collapse in time, or might never really function.” Collapse of the projects will also affect GoSS credibility, which has a secondary effect on the credibility and stability of Southern Sudan.

**National ownership was weak during the design and inception period.** Government official acknowledged that GoSS capacity to promote local recovery plans and priorities, and then participate in RRP governance was weak during 2006 and 2007. The *Mid-Term Evaluation* also noted that Government participation at the local level (planning and priority setting) and decision-making (Policy and Review Committee) was limited, with the AMU and Donors dominating the process nationally, and NGOs locally. The review described Government as “a spectator in the process through which its own money is spent” (2008: 24).

#### *Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project*<sup>18</sup>

**The objective of the Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP) was to “increase the quality of basic services in Southern Sudan and build the capacity of local organisations.”** The project was to provide quick impact activities in state capitals, using a “Cash for Work” model. Local government and organisations were involved in planning and implementation. The RIEP, therefore, combined public service delivery, temporary employment generation and capacity development for local government authorities and community organisations.

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<sup>18</sup> Background and output information on the *Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project Sudan* is included in Annex A.5.

**The RIEP was initiated in 2007 and closed in 2009.** The final portfolio included 147 sub-projects in 10 states, with most implementation occurring during 2008. A final evaluation of the RIEP was released in March 2009. This provided the current CPAP Mid-Term Evaluation an opportunity to assess recovery-oriented projects one year after their closure. The evaluation subsequently visited 12 projects located in Juba, Bor and Torit, in addition to interviewing Government officials in those locations.

**The 2009 RIEP final evaluation concluded that the project “made significant progress and tangible achievements in attaining its development objective and outputs,** especially Output 1 in respect to the provision of basic social service delivery. Where it did not, it was mainly due to challenges relating to the environmental and weather challenges that were way beyond the control of the programme and the late start up... These factors affected project implementation and contributed to hindering the program from fully securing its progress and achievements on time” (2009: 10).

**Review of the RIEP one year after closure indicates that project objectives were only partially met, and contribution to portfolio outcomes is mixed.** In this regard, the positive outputs identified in the 2009 evaluation were not sustained. The evaluation did not capture important issues that would have affected sustainability, including the quality of some sub-project works and local ownership. The inspection of project sites found that a number of RIEP activities were delivered, with broad reach into communities. Local committees were involved and played a role in identifying priorities and project selection, and short term employment and service delivery benefits were achieved. The evaluation was not in a position to identify the impact of these benefits. However, the inspection also noted significant problems at most of the projects sites visited, which undermined the value of the public services and local capacity delivered.

**The key issues affecting RIEP outcomes were the relevance, quality and sustainability of project deliverables.** Of the 12 project sites visited, all projects showed some level of deterioration beyond what should be reasonable with normal usage by beneficiaries. Seven of the projects were in an advanced state of deterioration or no longer serviceable, one year after handover to local authorities. There was also limited evidence of community involvement being sustained around the projects. As examples:

- Market stalls in Bor were well constructed and highly appreciated by market official. However, the scope of the project was smaller than expected and a source of disappointment;
- A school rehabilitation project in Bor showed signs of deteriorating concrete work, which was a source of concern and disappointment for the school administration;
- A market had been constructed outside of Bor town, with the objective of opening a new area for settlement and shifting the commercial centre of town. However, a year after finalisation there was little of other activity to develop the area and the market was unoccupied, with some signs of deterioration. Local officials could not say when development would begin, or when the market would be occupied;
- Flood control ditches at the Bor market were clogged for lack of maintenance, and pedestrian bridges were in a state of disrepair, with erosion and structural damage to concrete works. Some damage had been caused to the bridges through inappropriate

use by cars, and had not been repaired. The stagnant water was a breeding area for mosquitoes and vulnerable to flooding during the rainy season;

- Public toilets at the Bor market were being maintained, but two other toilet projects in Torit were closed for lack of maintenance. One of the toilet projects, located at a school, was in an advanced state of disrepair. The septic tanks were overflowing with human waste and the project appeared to be a public health hazard, given its close proximity to the school and the student playground;
- A basketball court in Torit was missing one basket stand (broken and knocked over as the result of a poor weld on the metal tubing). Seventy percent of the concrete surface of the court was broken up and beyond recreational use. Local youth gathered around the court stated the problems had existed for approximately six months, expressed their disappointment and asked when repairs would be done;
- The evaluation team inspected three road sub-project sites in Torit. All showed disrepair after the rainy season, and there were no plans for maintenance; and
- There were a number of anecdotal stories, told by Government informants, of projects that failed. Among them, a slaughter house in Bor was built on the Nile flood plain. It flooded before completion and had to be abandoned. As well, the animal carcasses attracted wild animals and crocodiles.

**It appears, therefore, that the expansion of urban public services achieved by the RIEP was short term and of mixed sustainability, with exceptions such as the Bor market.** The sites visited were a random sample and not intended to be representative. However, given the prevalence of the deterioration, they indicate that serious problems may also exist elsewhere in the RIEP portfolio. That project shortcomings undermined the value of recovery outcomes was shown in the frustration and disappointment of community members interviewed on three sites. In most of these cases, the community members could not identify who was responsible for the projects.

Deterioration resulted from a combination of difficult local conditions (intense rains), lack of maintenance (no government resources, capacity or ownership, no assessment of these factors in the planning phase), poor/inappropriate targeting and location (project built on a flood plain, market built away from community and roads), inappropriate use (cars using pedestrian bridge) and poor quality design, materials and construction by the contractors.

**The latter raised concern about the quality of UNDP oversight and supervision.** Interviews with UNDP and UNOPS personnel indicated that the UNDP often relied on UNOPS supervision and had limited capacity of its own for field-level oversight. Government officials interviewed at the state level unanimously expressed frustration with the quality of the works provided by UNOPS, even while acknowledging the difficult conditions.

**At projects sites visited, local authorities played a role in setting priorities, although the actual process of priority setting appeared *ad hoc*.** Government, therefore, shares responsibility for project outcomes. Government officials in Juba expressed a high level of dissatisfaction with RIEP outputs. The GoSS wanted fast delivery, tangible visible

results, to enhance its credibility and a labour intensive programme that would generate employment and income in communities, including for ex-combatants. GoSS officials in both counterpart Ministries considered that the RIEP has not delivered significant benefits to the participating communities. Works were perceived as not appropriate to need, often poorly constructed and were generally delivered late.

**The actual quality of “ownership” was mixed, meaning that the projects did not have adequate direction and planning from local authorities.** In this context, implementing organisations were often perceived to just proceed with works without proper consultation. Mixed ownership means that projects cannot be sustained. There was no clarity built into the projects over who would maintain and operate them after handover. According to one official, “no one was consulted, no one owns the projects and so no one is responsible. We are told some people came, did the project and then they left.”

### *The Sudan Recovery Fund Round I, Round II and Round III*<sup>19</sup>

#### *Background*

The Sudan Recovery Fund - Southern Sudan (SRF-SS) was established in May 2008 at the Oslo meeting of the Sudan Consortium. The fund will be operational over three rounds through to 2012. Implementation of Round 1 began during the first quarter of 2009. Although the implementation of individual projects is ongoing, the funding allocation process of Round I and Round II is complete. Round III was approved by the SRF Steering Committee in April 2009 and is moving into allocation and implementation.

The *SRF Log Frame* defines the purpose of the SRF as to “meet the priority recovery needs [of Southern Sudan] with multi-year coordinated donor support aligned with the GoSS recovery strategy and priority expenditures (November 2009)”. The SRF was established to specifically address the “recovery gap”; “the range of needs that were too long term, predictable and structural in nature to be met through humanitarian assistance, but at the same time too urgent to be met through longer term instruments” (SRF Project Document: 2008).

In this context, the SRF-SS was to support “the timely allocation and disbursement of donor resources to activities that demonstrate quick recovery impacts and yield more immediate peace dividends for the population.” It responded to high expectations in post-CPA Southern Sudan for a peace dividend; understood as improvements in basic living conditions, public service delivery, infrastructure and livelihoods (Project Document 2008). By the time that the SRF was being designed, the delivery of a dividend had become a matter of high priority and sensitivity for the GoSS and its international counterparts, given implications for security, recovery and political stability.

The SRF has been adapted over its three rounds, in response to changing priorities and field conditions:

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<sup>19</sup> Background and output information on the *Sudan Recovery Fund* is included in Annex A.6.



- Phase 1 focused on livelihood generation, through projects in agriculture and social recovery. In total, 18 projects were implemented by 12 national and international NGOs, with coverage in all 10 states. Total allocation was USD 20 million;
- Round II included a small grants fund, supporting 68 small scale projects being implemented by national NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in all ten states, with the objective of building capacity and delivering livelihood activities. An additional allocation was made for capacity development support to the Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF); and
- Round III is now focused on larger interventions in four high priority states, in support of *Integrated Stabilisation and Recovery Plans* and *Recovery Planning* (approximately USD 90 million divided between the recipient states), and a second funding window focused on sectoral-based service delivery in health, education, water and sanitation and agriculture (approximately USD 30 million), of which the UNDP reported having USD 40 million in deposits.

**The SRF objective of rapid delivery of a peace dividend has only been partially achieved.** Round I and Round II of the SRF experienced implementation delays, related in large part to the combination of difficult field conditions, the challenges of identifying and approving a large number of community-level projects and the limited capacity of state and local governments to set priorities and plan. The delays were generally not been significant, and compared favourably with other similar Funds.<sup>20</sup> However, the first two rounds will comprise only 20 percent or less of the final anticipated SRF expenditure. INGOs, NGOs and CBOs had limited absorptive capacity, as did state-level Government entities when the fund was initiated. Expenditures will not accelerate until mid-2011 and Round III will eventually account for approximately 80 percent of fund dispersals. The programme infrastructure needed for rapid delivery will not have been built, therefore, until three years after inception.

**There is limited evidence that the SRF projects from Round 1 and Round II have enhanced livelihoods, improved food security.** The SRF moved funds through a large number of projects, with a broad geographic spread including all 10 states. Resources were moved to the local level and projects have generated a large number of activities. UNDP reporting indicates up to 214,000 people would benefit by the end of March 2011, roughly consistent with targets.<sup>21</sup> Projects had an immediate impact, improving livelihoods and infrastructure. The actual outcome of a resource infusion is not assessed in the reporting, although it is often referred to in documentation as implicitly being positive. Improvements to the capacity of local government and community organisations were less evident.

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<sup>20</sup> The statement is based on comparison of a Scanteam assessments of the MDTF-SS conducted in 2006 and 2007, which included some assessment of MDTF-SS relative performance with other funds in Southern Sudan.

<sup>21</sup> SRF, *1st Quarter 2010 Progress Report*, June 2011

**Regardless, Round 1 and Round II projects demonstrate a problem with sustainability**, comparable but less significant than what was experienced with RRP and RIEP. The SRF projects visited are unlikely to generate sustained livelihood opportunities, and project reporting is unclear on how activities, such as short term vocational training will lead to such opportunities under prevailing conditions.<sup>22</sup> Many of the projects would require sustained interventions outside of the scope of the SRF to be successful. Community organisations did not appear to have the management skills to make commercial ventures viable at the end of funding, and Government's capacity to sustain project outputs is mixed. In part, sustainability issues were not properly addressed during the planning phase.

**The overall SRF portfolio for Round 1 and Round II was fragmented and "projectised"**. The portfolio lacked a coherent strategy and the quality of targeting and priority setting was mixed. An important factor was the mixed capacity of local authorities and organisations to assume ownership and planning roles. Rather, the portfolio constitutes a large number of interventions with some similarities, but generally implemented on an individual basis and without connection between them. In part, problems related to the *ad hoc* nature of some priority setting at the state level. As a result, the relationship to state-level recovery strategies (which in some cases may not have existed at the time of inception) was unclear. Also, ownership of the projects by both beneficiaries and the local governments appeared inadequate. Performance was undermined by design and management deficiencies, with uneven needs and planning assessments during the design phase and inadequate capacity development support in areas such as business management to sustain activities beyond funding.

**Overall, therefore, the strategy of using NGOs to deliver large scale "recovery gap" assistance in the absence of State capacity was not effective against the intended objectives.** NGOs were chosen as Implementing Partners in the absence of State capacity. Mixed implementation performance notwithstanding, NGOs and the SRF Governance structure did not have the ability to provide overall coordination at this level. Rather, scaling up delivery required that state-level capacity be strengthened through other initiatives. Also, Round I and Round II achievements were process and labour intensive for the stakeholders, and consumed a significant amount of attention from high-levels UN, Donors and Government officials relative to the dollar value and potential impact of the projects.

**The SRF made a contribution to government leadership and ownership of recovery efforts**, particularly relative to the RRP and RIEP. There has been an improvement in overall Government capacity, at the centre and to a lesser extent at sub-levels, which facilitates stronger ownership. Government was assigned a formal leadership role in the Governance structure of the SRF; in the Steering Committee, through the IMAC project

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<sup>22</sup> The most recent quarterly progress report for SRF I includes only one reference to livelihood outcome: "A survey conducted by Oxfam in Lakes State determined that 381 households have increased their profits in the range of 25 percent after receiving training in previous quarter, and the household member that they are using parts of their profits to expand their businesses" (2010: 11).

approval and at the state-level through the Local Steering Committee process. All of these structures were operational, including in all 10 states, and formally empowered Government stakeholders.

**However, the actual ability of government to play leadership role was determined by capacity on the ground:**

- Capacity was mixed at the state level during Round I and Round II, and Government participation of state and local governments was uneven;
- The limited role of Government in Monitoring and Evaluation appeared to have a negative impact on Government's understanding portfolio design and project performance;
- The "projectised" nature of Round I and indirect implementation by NGOs had a mixed impact on ownership, with the main variable being Government's capacity and interest to engage. There was evidence that Government played a role in the Bor and Torit projects visited. However, project reporting indicates that the role was weaker in other states;
- Government was involved in Round II decision-making. However, officials had a more limited knowledge of the portfolio given its size, and there was two layers of separation between them and implementation (the Grant Manager and the CBO); and
- Ownership is significantly stronger in Round III, where Government in the four implementing states have played a robust role in the consultation and planning Rounds, and will also have direct implementing and oversight roles during the operational phase. Round III is also integrated into a broader process of analysis and priority setting, where Government has access to more robust tools.

**Scale up is possible with Round III, as it is based on a different design concept.** Changes were made possible based on lessons learned from the earlier Rounds, and design innovations achieved through the CSAC and other projects. There were two additional and essential enabling conditions. First, Government's capacity to articulate priorities and to plan and manage interventions has improved, including at the state level. There was some evidence that earlier SRF phases contributed to this capacity. Second, the Round III design concept shows an important evolution, from a "projectised" model relying on NGO implementation to one fully integrated into government security and recovery plans at the central and state levels.

**While focused as a *recovery* initiative, these conditions took more time and effort to establish, and could not have met the criteria of being "rapid".** Round III was over a year in its design and discussion process, with other options being discussed during the interim. This included an extensive discussion during 2009 on whether to focus on construction of feeder roads. The project concept was approved in July 2009, and evolved through consultations and planning in 2010.

**The overall Round III strategy, therefore, shifted away from direct implementation of individual projects by NGOs, into a process more clearly led by the GoSS and**

**integrated into state-level security and recovery initiatives.** The Round III Governance and planning model includes approval by initiatives by the SRF Steering Committee, alignment with state-level security and recovery plans and budget processes and was based on country-level consultations. The CSAC and CRMA provided both conceptual tools and the programming framework into which the SRF could integrate with a greater potential impact on SRF objectives. Also, scaling up of expenditures was integrated around the security-governance-recovery nexus, more closely into Government priorities and other UN activities.

*Stakeholders should reduce or eliminate “projectised” recovery funds that outstrip the State’s capacity to lead. Rather, focus should be placed on projects that are in equilibrium with leadership capacity. The trade-offs between “rapid” and “quality/sustainability” must be defined, understood and accepted by all stakeholders.*

*The UNDP should convene an efficiency study with relevant project implementing agencies, including UNOPS, to identify bottlenecks affecting timely delivery and the quality of project deliverables. Government and donors should have representation in the study to ensure broad access to information, and that all perspectives and alternatives are included.*

*A product of the study should be shared expectations on what can be delivered under prevailing conditions. Also, requirements for promoting private sector development in Southern Sudan through national procurement should be considered.*

## 4 Relevance of CPAP Outcome 7 Portfolio

### 4.1 Relevance of the CPAP Portfolio

**The overall relevance of the CPR portfolio was high.** All projects were directly relevant to the CPAP Outcome 7 objective of restoring socio-economic infrastructure, reviving the economy, generating employment, and contributed towards the primary indicator of enhanced human security. Each project in the portfolio integrated most or all of Outcome 7's main elements, into its conceptual framework and design. There is no project that fell outside of the Outcome framework. The evaluation, therefore, did not identify any critical gaps with relevance that must be addressed in the second phase of the current CPAP implementation. The finding is made notwithstanding the need to adapt to changing conditions in the future.

**All projects responded to priority recovery needs as defined in the CPA and identified by Government, in collaboration with international counterparts.** Levels of national ownership varied, strengthening over time with the gradual expansion of State capacity. Regardless, each project was developed within the CPA framework, officially stated GoSS development plans and priorities and conceived and implemented within a multi-tiered governance structure.<sup>23</sup> There was no instance of a project that was out of alignment with these priorities. A factor undermining relevance was the limited ability of Government to define its priorities, particularly at the state and local levels and in the context of early recovery projects.

**The expectation was the *Individual Reintegration* project, which had mixed relevance.** The project was formally relevant to the CPA process and the officially stated priorities of Government and international counterparts. However, it was *de facto* not owned by Government, politically contentious and not relevant to the context of Southern Sudan in design. All stakeholders carry responsibility for these problems, which rest at the level of political enabling conditions rather than project implementation. The project itself could not substitute for the absence of this higher-order support.

**The positive finding on relevance is made notwithstanding the need to adapt to post-referendum dynamics.** It appears that Outcome 7 objectives will remain relevant to the Southern Sudan context. Regardless, new dynamics may require changes in the focus of the Outcome. Also, the project delivery modalities must continue to evolve. Integrated programmes based on robust analysis have performed well, and appear relevant to changing conditions. Those same conditions make less relevant the projectised model for delivering a material peace dividend, particularly in the absence of enabling governance and security requirements.

**Relevance of the portfolio was strengthened by three factors:**

- Most projects had multi-stakeholder governance processes, providing oversight, strategic guidance and serving as a forum for dialogue between stakeholders. The

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<sup>23</sup> The Governance structure of the *Mine Action Capacity Development* project was the exception.

governance systems provided opportunity for Government and Donors to articulate and build consensus around priorities and objectives, to supervise adherence during implementation or otherwise take corrective action if the relevance of projects declined;

- The UNDP's tools for programme assessment strengthened during implementation of the current CPAP, allowing projects to improve the quality of analysis supporting project design; and
- There was evidence of strengthened internal leadership and planning inside of UNDP over time, promoting better coherence within the overall portfolio. The UNDP appears better to define its strategic positioning, communicate that position to other stakeholders, and to focusing effort within those parameters.

## 4.2 Relevance of the CPAP Projects

### *The Mine Action Capacity Development Project*

**The relevance of the Mine Action Capacity Development project was high.** The project was aligned with the requirements of the CPA and the recovery priorities of Government. Project design was relevant to conditions, integrating the capacities of multiple UN agencies in support of building Government capacity and the removal of mines. The project assisted the GoSS in establishing a legal framework for mine action, and demining policy. It addressed the high incidence of mines and Explosive Remnants of War, which continue to be an existential threat to human security and obstacle to recovery efforts.

### *Individual Reintegration Project Component of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project*

**The relevance of the Individual Reintegration Component project was mixed.** While embedded within the CPA, the overall DDR project was based on a set of incorrect assumptions about the CPA context and the priorities of the CPA Parties during the Interim Period. In particular, uncertainty prior to the 2011 referendum and important intra-South tensions did not produce incentives to right-size the SPLA. The project's unitary national design and management framework was not consistent with the principle of "One Country Two Systems" or the needs and conditions in Southern Sudan. It was not part of a plan for new security architecture for Southern Sudan, nor did it reflect prevailing security conditions or the priorities of the GoSS. Rather, the DDR model appeared to have been imposed on the South, with United Nations support and minimal GoSS involvement in developing the programme document.

**The GoSS agreed to the project and allowed it proceed, including setting up an institutional structure.** GoSS, therefore, must accept some responsibility for low relevance. GoSS ownership and involvement was mixed, and weak regarding the SPLA's engagement. The project was not aligned with either the context or GoSS priorities and, therefore, lacked the basic enabling conditions for success. Efforts to develop a social reintegration component were innovative, but were small scale could not compensate for overall design flaws. Further, irregularities in the official candidate lists have undermined Donor confidence. The critical gaps, therefore, between programme design

and the expected CPAP Outcomes are significant and cannot be reconciled within the existing project framework.

### *The Community Security and Arms Control Project*

**The relevance of the CSAC project is high, and the project design is suitable for scaling up in other states.** The project is situated at the core of Government priorities, and of the programme objectives of both the UNDP and donors. It provided an innovative methodology to conceptualise and act on the security, governance and development nexus, in a context where previously: a) unilateral and forced arms collection was creating conflict at the community level; b) security, governance and development interventions were less effective at being mutually reinforcing, and; c) interventions in all of these areas had mixed effectiveness, in part because of poor quality of targeting information. Relevance is expressed by the high level of political support within the GoSS, sub-levels of government and communities, requests to scale up the project, and the adoption of the methodology and analysis in other programme areas.

### *Relevance of the Three Recovery Projects*

**The relevance of all three recovery programmes to GoSS priorities was good.** Recovery and rapid delivery of a “peace dividend” were GoSS priorities after 2007 and to the present. The priority emerged from a combination of: i) acute unmet human needs; ii) slow movement out of humanitarian assistance, and; iii) growing instability in resulting from slow expansion of the State and service delivery. Also, there was slower than expected delivery of gap-filling assistance from the international community. In this regard, the three recovery projects were a response to GoSS requests, and reflected the core priorities of Government and Donors. Both stakeholders groups were involved in strategic and project-level decision-making through the multi-tiered, as were local authorities where capacity permitted.

**The relevance of project design to context was mixed, and undermined by the inability of local authorities and communities to establish priorities and assume full ownership.** Projects design based on discreet activities could not address larger systemic issues, and reflected the orientation and competence of the implementing NGOs. Implementation through international entities also could not provide a substitute for an effective state presence, and may have undermined the larger objective of building the visibility and credibility of the State, to fill the vacuum. There is a marked improvement in relevance with Round III of the SRF, which is better integrated in Government planning and priorities. However, improvements were achieved based on enabling conditions that did not exist earlier with earlier SRF or recovery programmes; expanded State capacity and drawing on conceptual and programme innovations from other programmes.

## 5 Efficiency of CPAP Outcome 7 Projects

### 5.1 Efficiency of the CPAP Portfolio

**The efficiency of the Outcome 7 portfolio appears satisfactory, but uneven over some projects.** The Mid-Term Evaluation focused on outcomes, and did not conduct a robust analysis of management and performance issues affecting the manner in which projects converted resources into outcomes. Regardless, the overall trend for project efficiency was positive, although uneven across the five projects. The CSAC and SRF Phase III models show the highest possibility for efficiency gains. The recovery projects showed lower efficiency, with fragmented implementation structures and activities that were not mutually reinforcing. Performance was undermined by difficulties in the UNDP's internal administrative and programme procedures.

**In the case of all projects, UNDP, Government and Donors expressed concern over their perception of poor quality, high costs and late delivery of many UNDP supervised projects.** There was particular concern for the performance of UNOPS, and its implementing role under UNDP supervision. Site inspection partially verified there were problems, observing that many works were in a state of disrepair. The evaluation was not in a position to determine whether problems originated with poor project delivery, or were subsequently damaged through the lack of maintenance or misuse. Regardless, expectations of stakeholders often appeared out of alignment with what could be delivered under the difficult prevailing conditions.

### 5.2 Efficiency of the Individual Projects

#### *The Mine Action Capacity Development Project*

The evaluation did not have sufficient information to assess the efficiency of the *Mine Action* project.

#### *Individual Reintegration Project Component of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project*

**Financial efficiency for the Individual Reintegration project outcomes achieved was low.** Of the approximately USD 14.5 million expended from the Southern Sudan reintegration budget as of December 2010, USD 4.5 million went to beneficiaries in the form of goods and services, or about 30 percent.<sup>24</sup> The remaining USD 10 million was expended by the UNDP, SSDDRC and Implementing Partners as overhead and operating costs. At the same time, few beneficiaries completed the programme or are preparing to enter the reintegration process. The project, therefore, had a very high cost per beneficiary; infrastructure was established but the caseload was too low for it to be cost effective.

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<sup>24</sup> Expenditures summarised by the DDR Review (2010: 77).



**A factor affecting efficiency was the unpredictable case load.** The UNDP and Implementing Partners were required to establish and sustain programme infrastructure to meet output targets. However, that capacity was not used effectively given start-up delays, and the small case load coming into the system from the demobilisation process. Also, last minute changes in the candidate profile and numbers resulted in a requirement to adjust the programme options, requiring additional effort and negating the results of preparation work already done, such as the economic opportunity surveys. Maintaining programme infrastructure during periods of delay, and then making adjustments to the programme content, involved high costs for Implementing Partners. These concerns were also the source of tensions between the UNDP and the Implementing Partners.

### *The Community Security and Arms Control Project and SRF Round III*

**The efficiency of the CSAC and SRF Phase III project model and its implementation has been high.** In addition to resources managed by the UNDP, the projects have been successful in combining specialised resources from a broad spectrum of national and internal sources, under increasingly effective GoSS coordination and with community inputs. The result has been effective leveraging of resources and expansion of what the project can address. Efficiency for the CSAC has been undermined by the mixed quality of some project works being delivered by various entities under UNDP supervision. Difficult field conditions and inappropriate stakeholder expectations notwithstanding, the UNDP did appear to have the supervision capacity to ensure timely and quality delivery. Government informants had a strong perception that poor material delivery was affecting the credibility of the project at the community-level and, therefore, ultimately the project's impact.

### *Efficiency of the Three Recovery Projects*

**The efficiency of the three recovery projects was uneven.** Heavy programme structures established in the absence of Government capacity involved significant overhead and transactions costs, particularly given the structures had relatively short life spans. Efficiency was further undermined by the uneven quality of assessments and planning, which affected the quality of the interventions. Indeed, there appeared to be an inverse relationship between the pressure for rapid implementation, often a product of political concerns, and the quality and sustainability of interventions. These trade offs were not articulated or managed in the project design.

## 6 Sustainability of CPAP Objective 7 Projects

### 6.1 Sustainability of the CPAP Portfolio

**Sustainability was uneven across the portfolio, showing improvements overtime.** Sustainability emerged during the *Mid-Term Evaluation* as a key issue determining the effectiveness of the peace dividends being delivered. Sustainability also had important consequences for the credibility of the Government and the extent with which citizens will identify with the State. However, the sustainability of goods delivered in most projects is mixed to low, particularly in the case of the three recovery projects. They delivered a significant amount of goods and services at the community level. However, the capacity of Government and communities to plan, absorb and maintain the works delivered was low. Site inspection verified that part of the programme investments will be lost and the quality of the peace dividend diminished accordingly. The possibility for sustainability of the CSAC and SRF III is higher. The key performance variable is that the projects did not outstrip Government or community capacity to engage, and the programme model allows both to exercise more robust ownership.

**Project monitoring does not track sustainability issues.** Monitoring provides a snapshot of performance during implementation and outcomes at the point of handover. However, the lack of follow up at the outcome level means that the snapshot can be misleading. There were incidents of positive output reporting statements throughout the portfolio where later outcomes were undermined by the lack of sustainability. In this regard, reporting is incomplete and may create an inaccurate picture of what has been delivered. It also indicates that factors related to sustainability were not being monitored effectively, or considered in the design phase.

### 6.2 Sustainability of Individual CPAP Projects

#### *The Mine Action Capacity Development Project*

**The sustainability of the Mine Action Capacity Development project appeared good.** Government has established the institutional and organisational framework for the SSDC, and UNDP contributions were found to be enhancing capacity. Sustainability will be undermined by dependence on international assistance and the low level of GoSS financial support to the commission.

#### *Individual Reintegration Project Component of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project*

**The Individual Reintegration project has not produced sustainable outcomes, nor is the project model itself sustainable.** The possible exception is capacity development to the SSDDRC, which itself may be at risk. The GoSS has not allocated sufficient core budget to sustain the SSDDRC infrastructure and it depends on a sceptical donor community. The current reintegration project will not produce benefits that continue to be enjoyed beyond the project's duration. Of the four percent of the target group that completed the reintegration process, only a few persons have found sustainable

livelihoods. The majority have exhausted their benefits, small business failed and most of those with vocational skills appear unable to find employment. Regarding the sustainability of the process, the current reintegration project in its current form lacks the political support necessary from the GoSS and Donors to proceed, particularly under post-referendum conditions. Again, sustainability gaps result from the inappropriate design of the project.

### *The Community Security and Arms Control Project*

**The potential sustainability of the CSAC project appears high.** The GoSS has assumed full ownership of the process, given its location at the core strategic interests of Government. Sustainability will ultimately be determined by the ability of the GoSS to deliver security guarantees to communities, with follow-on strengthening of service delivery and livelihoods. The confidence of communities will be a key factor. In this regard, stakeholders identified the following risks to sustainability that must be considered during the next phase of CSAC implementation:

- *A deterioration in the overall security situation, likely through the politicising of referendum results and escalating violent conflict, would disrupt implementation;*
- *There was particular concern for the professionalism of the police, avoiding corruption or abuse in communities that would erode confidence. Training, professionalism, salary payments are all determining factors;*
- *Late delivery of projects and failure to create livelihoods would also undermine confidence;*
- *Despite Government commitment and improved capacity, the project will require continued international support, particularly in the post-referendum period; and*
- *Government will need to provide the BCSSAC adequate operational and programme budget, to reduce dependence on donors.*

### *Sustainability of the Three Recovery Projects*

**The sustainability of the recovery portfolio is low, with the exception of SRF Phase III.** Recovery initiatives delivered immediate benefits to communities, although the impact of those benefits can be difficult to quantify. However, many of the livelihood, infrastructure and capacity building deliverables were found already to be in a state of deterioration or disuse by the time of the *Mid-Term Evaluation*. A portion of the funds' investment will be lost, as result. The key performance variable was lack capacity in Government and communities to absorb and then maintain project deliverables.

## 7 The Connectedness of the CPAP Outcome 7 Portfolio

### 7.1 Connectedness of the CPAP Portfolio

**The connectedness of projects was uneven, showing improvements over time.** The design connectedness within the overall portfolio was good. Projects generally had mutually reinforcing objectives and activities. These create a basis for performance improvements in the future. However, internal coordination did not optimise the possibilities during the evaluation period, with the exceptions of CSAC and SRF III. The key performance variable was design innovations that allowed the UNDP to integrate resources from multiple sources and programmes, and target them against the different dimensions of an issue. In this regard, connectedness depended on the ability of all stakeholders to analyze and conceptualise the interrelationships between issues within a larger conflict dynamic.

### 7.2 Connectedness of the Individual CPAP Projects

#### *The Mine Action Capacity Development Project*

**The Mine Action Capacity Development Project showed a good level of connectedness, within Government and the UNDP system.** The actual mechanisms for linking demining and recovery activities were not clearly articulated in the project document or reporting. Regardless, the project was supported by a policy framework and recognition within the overall systems of Government, the UN and other stakeholders. Within the UN system, there was evidence of effective coordination through United Nations Mine Action Office.

#### *Individual Reintegration Project Component of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project*

**The Individual Reintegration project was not well connected with other CPAP programme elements, showing weak and non-reinforcing relationships.** The project combined the resources and knowledge of UNMIS and Implementing Partners. The evaluation team also observed efforts by UNDP personnel and management to link the project to CSAC and SRF activities, among others. However, the project's scope and mandate constrained the possibility of coordinating with other security or recovery-related activities, particularly the CSAC and the SRF.

Contributing factors included the lack of GoSS ownership and the unitary national design, including locating key decision-making functions in Khartoum and away from other programme decisions in Juba. Also, the project became increasingly out of align with the conceptual development of the overall CPAP Objective 7, as activities were not integrated into governance-security-recovery nexus that shaped other projects. These factors resulted in a project that:

- Was situated outside of, if not incompatible with, the Government's security strategy and priorities and not connected with related Government initiatives;

- Had national design principles that were inconsistent with those of project's developed in Southern Sudan; and
- Had little or no flexibility to adapt to conditions in the South, some innovations such as the community-based reintegration pilot notwithstanding.

The closest example of a compatible project is the *Community Small Arms Control* project. However, the reintegration project's focus on individuals was not aligned with CSAC's focus on an integrated security, governance and development approach within communities.

### *The Community Security and Arms Control Project*

**The CSAC has a high level of connectedness, showing strong and mutually reinforcing relations with other programmes;** conceptually, programmatic and for resource mobilisation. The project concept is based on creating a critical mass of resources around an integrated security, governance and development concept. In this regard, the project is serving as a platform around which initiatives and resources can gather and/or contribute. There is a strong basis in analysis through the consultation process, to work through the inter-relationship between security, governance and development/recovery. Within Government, the project is based on integration vertically (Juba to the state level) and horizontally (between Juba based GoSS ministries and UNDP programmes). CSAC is coordinated with, or provides the coordination structure for multiple areas of Government interventions.

**The connectedness of CSAC within the UNDP is also high.** As some examples, contributing interventions include the *Conflict and Risk Mapping* project (consultation methodology and analysis), funding through the *Sudan Recovery Fund* (recovery and livelihoods), the Local Governance and Recovery Project, the UNDP Rule of Law Programme. UNMIS and UNPOL contribute on security and training arrangements. Various NGOs (Safeworld, BICC, Small Arms Survey and PACT Sudan) are also contributing. In this regard, the project concept has elements of a model for coordinating and leveraging resources.

### *Connectedness of the Three Recovery Projects*

**The connectedness of the three recovery projects was mixed to low.** The portfolios were projectised, and showed little internal synergy, between individual projects or with other UN or external initiatives. Project governance and Government systems were not strong enough to ensure integration of activities into overall recovery efforts, and the UNDP as administrator was in a position to compensate. Projects tended to be implemented as individual initiatives, and not intended to be mutually reinforcing within the portfolio. They usually addressed individual components of systems (eg. vocational training for agriculture) without relation to other improvements in the system (provision of agricultural extension services). There was also limited connectivity with the UNDP programmes, between the three recovery initiatives and other programmes. **The exception was the Phase III of the SRF, which had a high degree of interconnectivity with other Government and UNDP initiatives built into its design concept.**

## 8 Cross Cutting Issue of Gender

### 8.1 Findings and Conclusions on Gender

**There has been positive progress towards gender outcome objectives, under difficult circumstances.** Assessment of progress was undermined by the lack of data desegregating gender outputs and outcomes in favour of performance data, the value of which cannot be qualified (for example, the percentage of women participating in a workshop). The projects generated a large amount of raw information, but with little effort to analyse its meaning. Also, coverage of gender in the reporting is irregular for most projects. All projects have gender indicators within their results matrix. However, actual reporting against those indicators often does not occur. Concerns particularly apply to the three recovery projects, where the gender-based content of the individual projects is unclear. Also, it was unclear how local authorities took gender considerations into account while setting project priorities and making decisions. Evidence from interviews with authorities at project sites suggests concern for gender issues was mixed.

Given these deficiencies, the evaluation did not have sufficient data to come to a clear determination of progress towards gender-based CPAP outcomes. Regardless, the following observations were made:

- The UNDP has an overarching gender strategy in place, which guides the development of projects;
- All projects had a gender analysis component in the project document. The quality of the analysis appeared robust in the case of the Individual Reintegration and CSAC projects, and less clear for the recovery projects.
- All projects in the CPR portfolio had gender-based objectives and indicators in their results matrix;
- All projects had resource allocations to gender-based activities. In the case of the Individual Reintegration, CSAC and Recovery projects, this allocation was significant; and
- The minutes of project governance system meetings demonstrates a concern for gender issues in defining strategy and resource allocation.

Gender, therefore, appears to be mainstreamed into the Outcome 7 portfolio. However, reporting problems constitute a critical gap in the Outcome 7 portfolio, as insufficient analysis is being generated to support programme design and management.

*Recommendation: The UNDP and project stakeholders should take steps to improve the quality of monitoring and evaluation on gender indicators, ensuring that results are contextualised and reach the output and outcome levels.*

## 9 Concluding Observations

The first half of the current CPAP was defined by ongoing conflict at multiple levels, but with the gradual expansion of the State. There were significant tensions between the North and Southern Sudan, prior to and during CPAP-implementation. Given these dynamics, the GoSS was focused on military and security issues, and less on service delivery or expanding the State's governance presence. The dynamic is shown in the ratio of Government spending for security vs. services. Early GoSS and Donor efforts focused on establishing the central institutions of State, in Juba and with limited expansion down to the state and local levels. The combined effect was over-centralisation of the State, and weak delivery of public goods and services at the local level.

The Government's lack of presence has become a destabilising factor, resulting from the vacuum that it left in many parts of Southern Sudan. Inside this vacuum, there has been growing concern for tensions within Southern Sudan itself. The tensions have deep historical roots, and there is an articulation between their various levels; regional, North-South, community-level (ethnic, tribal, community around resource competition), political level intra-South reflecting splits within the SPLA and with OAGs, and the articulation and politicization of all these levels in the post-election (2010), post-referendum and soon post-independence (2011) context. All of these benchmarks in the CPA process have created incentives for groups inside and outside of the GoSS to manoeuvre for influence, position and/or material gain.

There was recognition within Government and its international counterparts that the State's absence at the state and local levels was a contributing factor. Its credibility was undermined, the relationship between State and citizens left undefined and other actors filled the vacuum and contested State authority. Many informants noted a realisation that Government was too centralised emerged well before the current CPAP (informants tend to cite events during 2007 as the turning point). This was accompanied by a further recognition that aid delivery mechanisms were also not providing a "peace dividend". Expanding the State presence and delivering recovery programmes became: a) conceptually linked, and; b) an issue of high political sensitivity, related to stabilising the South and addressing acute human need.

The three recovery programmes (RRP, REIP and SRF Round I and Round II) emerged from the combination of high political sensitivity and low state capacity. The projects were delivered through international and local organisations acting through Government-led governance structures. The original concepts of "recovery" and "peace dividend" had a narrow focus on the delivery of material goods and some capacity development. The concept appeared to assume that governance and security were being addressed through other means, but were being addressed nonetheless.

The critical performance variable for all CPAP Outcome 7 projects was the ability of Government to assume leadership of recovery initiatives. Performance issues certainly related to the fragmentation of the recovery portfolios. However, this was not necessarily a result of the international organisations' role but the lack of a State for them to articulate with. Recovery programme implemented with the objective of expanding State

presence and credibility must, by definition, be firmly State-led. However, if the projects exceed the capacity of Government then neither leadership nor the projects will be effective.

The recovery programmes assessed as part of the *Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation* moved approx. USD 250 million, and were reported to have contributed to stabilisation in the area of recovery. The actual “immediate benefit” frequently cited is difficult to qualify. It does not appear as a medium-term improvement to human security, although projects appear to have been important for short term stabilisation, Quality was uneven, sustainability was low and the outcomes are hard to identify. Some projects had the unintended consequence of disempowering the state, in large part because the state was not there to guide them and claim visibility. NGOs played State service delivery roles, and the goods delivered were generally not perceived as coming from the Government. The project concept, therefore, may have been correct but intended results were difficult to achieve in the absence of a more robust state. Performance problems were compounded by the mixed quality of works delivered by the international counterparts.

The fundamental trade-off that emerged was between “rapid” as enhancing State leadership capacity and “rapid” in the context of the quality and sustainability of what was delivered. This was not a debate about decentralisation (allocation of power and resources within the system). Rather, it was about extending the presence of the State to the sub-levels of Government; the State in its role as delivering essential public goods and services. Human security guarantees were the first among these goods.

Early recovery efforts, therefore, did not achieve their higher goal of expanding State presence or filling the destabilising vacuum, regardless of the amount of goods they moved. During the current CPAP period the concepts of “recovery” and “peace dividend” have come to encompass, or be dependent on, enhancing the presence of the State and the delivery of public goods (security, governance and rule of law), services (health, education and infrastructure) and tangible recovery benefits (livelihoods and economic opportunity). There were two trends that changed the programme environment. These exist as the conflict dynamics become more politicised around post-referendum arrangements inside the South.

First, the State has had some success expanding its presence downward. Growth in capacity should not be overstated. However, there has been some success and this is important. The UNDP has also had marked success pushing its own capacity out to the state and local levels, in tandem or ahead of Government and Donors. This is a factor strengthening relevance and strategic positioning that has made the UNDP an attractive partner. An implication for UNDP programmes is that Government is now better able to provide a policy and capacity anchors for UNDP-managed programmes. Results are seen in CSAC and SRF Phase III, which showed robust early performance. However, their delivery was not “rapid”, but based on an extended period of consultation and planning that appeared consistent with Government capacity.

Second, the UNDP and others have been able to develop a *security-governance-recovery* conceptual framework, around which resources can be mobilised and coordinated. This has been based on a number of sources, but the CRMA appears to have played a catalytic role. It also reflects core GoSS priorities. The CRMA and CSAC analytical/consultation



methodologies are producing information that are significantly improving the understanding of conflict dynamics and recovery needs, and building the presence of state. Equally important, the consultation process builds a relationship between State and communities, and increases the responsibility

Progress is real, albeit fragile. The current post-referendum political violence may undermine gains. If these trends are accurate, then design considerations for future programme should consider the following:

- Reduce or eliminate “projectised” recovery funds that outstrip the State’s capacity to lead. Rather, focus on projects consistent with capacity and designed to deliver on all three aspects of the emerging “peace dividend” equation (enhance state presence and visibility, strengthen State systems, deliver a benefit that is tangible and sustainable);
- Focus on delivering through State processes and/or systems where possible, to expand presence and capacity. Understand that this will take longer, and build that into expectation management. In the end, poorly delivered “rapid” recovery activities do not consolidate the State’s presence have disempowered the State and contribute to vacuums, short term benefits notwithstanding;
- This means that the trade-offs between “rapid” and delivery of effective “peace dividends” must be properly understood. There may be cases where delivery is necessary outside of State systems or ownership. However, objective must be agreed and expectations managed;
- Focus on the security-governance-recovery nexus, conceptually and expand use of the analytical tools that are being developed. These create a natural synergy for programme/ resource coordination within the UNDP, and the UN system; and
- Achieving and maintaining political consensus around projects is a task of fundamental importance. DDR is an example of what happens where the consensus does not exist.

Within the Donor community, there has been some discussion on the post-independence architecture of international assistance. By early 2011, the GoSS had proposed a four-pillar structure, around which some donors were beginning to organise. Regardless, there appears to be growing fragmentation as Donors strengthening their bilateral focus and the pursuit of national interests. Post-referendum/post-independence dynamics in South Sudanese state will further drive the re-orientation.

The UNDP, therefore, should expect that the Donor community will be increasingly difficult to coordinate and “align”. The SSRDF was created to deal with donor coordination, but has been too weak to play that function. Donor behaviour may create a pressure for fragmentation in the UNDP programme through funding, as they use the UNDP to implement bilateral priorities. UNDP must be proactive in managing this tension. It must also be willing to refuse funding that fragments or distracts from core objectives and competencies.

## Annex A: Project Output Annexes

### Annex A.1: Mine Action Capacity Development Project

#### *Background and Objectives of the Mine Action Project*

Decades of armed conflict left Southern Sudan a significant problem with landmines and Explosive Remnants of War. Their presence posed an existential problem to human security, economic recovery, and development and free movement. UNDP reporting indicates that 19 of 25 Sudanese states were affected, including all of the states in Southern Sudan where most of the mines were laid. Clearing mines was identified, therefore, as a pre-requisite to recovery activities.

The Mine Action Capacity Development project was national in scope, implemented simultaneously at the national level (National Mine Action Authority-NMAA) and in Southern Sudan (Southern Sudan Demining Commission- SSDC). UNDP project management was located in Khartoum, with a sub-office in Juba covering the South.

The project developed over two phases. For Southern Sudan, the first phase (2004 to 2008) focused on establishing the basic legal and institutional frameworks, and the training of personnel. The second and current phase (2009-2012), is focused on consolidation of the institutional management and technical capacity needed to plan, coordinate, monitor, accredit, quality assure and implement mine action programmes (Project Document 2008). The UNDP project was one component of a larger initiative, coordinated under UNMIS and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), through the unified United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO). A total of five UN agencies were involved.

The objective of the Mine Action Capacity Development project was “threats to human security (mines, small arms) reduced, and crisis affected groups returned and reintegrated”. The UNDP component had four specific outputs:

- Output 1: Institutional and management capacities of the NMAA, NMAC and SSDC developed/strengthened to be able to manage national mine action in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS);
- Output 2: Mine/ERW clearance capacities of the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDUs) developed/strengthened and accredited to meet International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
- Output 3: Linkage between mine action and the broader recovery and development processes and initiatives enhanced.
- Output 4: Sudan assisted to meet its obligations under the Mine Ban Convention and other relevant treaties.

The indicator cited in the project document is reduced threat levels from mines, and the mine action management and technical capacity in place to address the social and economic impacts of mines.

## Annex A.2: Individual Reintegration Project

### *Individual Reintegration Component Project Background and Objectives*

The expected Outcome of the *Individual Reintegration Project Component* of the *Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme* was “Reintegration of ex-combatants completed in accordance with the national DDR strategy with support of UNMIS”. The authorising environment for the programme was set out in Comprehensive Peace Agreement. DDR was identified as an integral part of the agreement, with the objective of “creating an enabling environment to human security and support to post-peace agreement social stabilisation across Sudan.” Programme objectives were subsequently outlined in the *National Strategic Plan* (2007), which also guided the *Individual Reintegration Component*.

The DDR programme was designed as a unitary national model, based on a single design concept used simultaneously in the North and in Southern Sudan. The model focused on individual support packages to the eligible beneficiary group, under Sudanese leadership but delivered by the UNDP and its Implementing Partners using the DEX modality. A National DDR Coordinating Council (NDDRCC) was established in 2007 with responsibility for policy formulation, coordination and oversight. DDR Commissions were created in the North and Southern Sudan with responsibility for implementation and management, to be supported by State level offices.<sup>25</sup> Within this structure, decision-making on key policy, design and funding issues rested in the national structure. The UNDP’s internal management framework reflected the same national framework, with a programme office in Juba but overall management responsibility in Khartoum.

The *Individual Reintegration Component Project Document* identified successful DDR as a core security and development challenge (2008). The Project Document noted that Sudanese society was “highly militarised and fragmented”, characterised by “a proliferation of armed groups, shifting military alliances between a wide variety of actors, and the emergence of armed civilians and community vigilantes”. The reintegration of the diverse beneficiary covered within the project’s scope, including members of Other Armed Groups (OAGs), would “enhance short-term security through capitalising on peace dividends through reintegrating [ex-combatants] and [special needs groups] while also contributing to longer-term peace and stability though ... rightsizing the SAF and SPLA.”<sup>26</sup> Reintegration into civilian life would also avoid a situation where ex-combatants would “undermine public security and constrain progress towards development and sustainable peace” (2008: 8).

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<sup>25</sup> The Southern Sudan Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC).

<sup>26</sup> The eligible beneficiary group identified in the Project Document included former combatants, Special Needs Groups (SNG), the disabled and Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups (WAAFG).

The *Individual Reintegration Component*, therefore, implemented in a unified national framework and linked in a programme sequence following the disarmament and demobilisation components. The project integrated both security and livelihood objectives within two medium-term Outcome Indicators:

- Change in human security (mines, small arms, socio-economic) of crisis affected groups; and
- Percentage of DDR participants that perceive an increased ability to support themselves and their families.

The second livelihood indicator relates most directly to CPAP Outcome 7, reflecting the project focus on reintegration of beneficiaries into productive civilian life (a reinsertion package, reintegration counselling, vocational training and material and financial support for final reintegration). Improvements to human security were both a requirement for, and an outcome of, effective reintegration.

### *Observations on the DDR Programme Context*

**Implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process began in 2009**, four years after the signing of the CPA, and two years before the 2011 referendum. The programme was established during a period of growing political tensions and insecurity, as core CPA issues went unresolved. Delays resulted from a combination of protracted negotiations, real challenges establishing DDR institutions at the national level, and in the North and Southern Sudan and what informants described as a lack of political will to reduce SPLA and SAF force levels.

**The enabling conditions for an effective DDR programme did not exist during Phase 1 implementation of the *Individual Reintegration Component*.** The CPA was an “insufficient basis for the demobilisation of active duty combatants. The agreement was characterised as a “*de facto* ceasefire”, with important issue pending resolution after the 2011 referendum (DDR Review 2010: 78). With these uncertainties, both parties to the CPA sought to consolidate their positions and make security and political gains for leverage in future negotiations. In Southern Sudan, there was an assumption that the GoSS would need to defend a referendum result for independence, and it was simultaneously managing regional and internal security issues. Under prevailing conditions, neither the SAF nor the SPLA had an incentive to reduce their core operational capacity. It was not realistic, therefore, to expect either the CPA Parties to comply with DDR commitments in the absence of referendum outcomes.

**The Reintegration Component of the DDR programme did not respect the principle of “One Nation Two Systems”.** The conditions for reintegration were significantly different in the North and in Southern Sudan: different culture, social and economic structures and conflict impacts. While originally agreeing to an individually-oriented programme, the GoSS subsequently favoured a community-based reintegration design better suited to conditions in Southern Sudan. One SSDDRC informant noted “the individual reintegration model was relevant to the North, but the war was fought in the South inside of our communities... the communities were the battle ground and they must be rebuilt at the same time as reintegration occurs. It is precisely the concept of community security and recovery that must be at the heart of the DDR process.” There

was particular concern for the destabilising impact of placing the economic burden of reintegrating ex-combatants on impoverished communities.

**Regardless of conditions, the programme implemented a single national model for individual reintegration packages.** There were no provisions for addressing the unique conditions in Southern Sudan, and the UNDP Juba implementation team's flexibility was constrained by the terms of the project document. GoSS officials maintained that it played no meaningful role in the design process, but rather an individual model was imposed. In this regard, the DDR process did not comply with the CPA principle of "One Country Two Systems". There was a perception within the GoSS that not only was the model inappropriate, but that it favoured the North; that the DDR process was intentionally designed by the NCP with UN complicity to disadvantage Southern Sudan. The perception was reinforced by the management structure of the DDR process, which was centred in Khartoum. Both the SSDDRC and the UNDP support unit in Juba deferred to national decision-making structures on key policy, management and funding issues. Tensions between the SSDDRC and the national DDR structure, including the UNDP in Khartoum, had significant and negative implications for relations between the UNDP and SSDDRC in Southern Sudan.

**The Government of Southern Sudan did not demonstrate clear ownership of the Individual Reintegration Component.** There was further GoSS perception that the project was not being co-managed. Use of the DEX implementation model and UNDP Juba's deferral to UNDP Khartoum left the GoSS without a sense of shared responsibility for implementation (DDR Review 2010: 71). SPLA support was essential to effectiveness. However, SPLA had limited or no involvement in the initial design negotiations. Its lack of buy-in was subsequently shown in a lack of presence in planning meetings, representation by relatively junior officers and the placing of DDR participants back onto the military payroll after being demobilised.

**Irregularities in Candidate Lists undermined stakeholder confidence.** A 2009 assessment conducted at the request of donors found that the process for generation and certification of DDR candidates lacked transparency, and was "a source of corruption in the DDR process" (Rowe and Banal 2009). The GoSS abandoned the original Master List of candidates, which the assessment concluded was reliable, for lists that were being generated locally on a daily or weekly basis. One result was a significant shift in the candidate profile, with a reduction in the number of SNG and increase in the number of WAAFGs candidates reporting for reintegration benefits. The assessment determined that up to 40 percent of the WAAFG candidates were not eligible (Rowe and Banal 2009). The *DDR Review* reported that revisions to Standard Operating Procedures in late 2009 resulted in the up to 60 percent of WAAFG candidates being rejected as ineligible, along with large numbers from other categories (2010: 15). Stakeholder concerns appeared to also be affected by the results of the 2009 audit, which concluded that the SSDDRC has weak internal control systems (2010).<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> The system audit also concluded that actions already proposed by the SSDDRC would address their most important concerns.

**Irregularities in the Candidate Lists also had the following impact on programme implementation:**

- Changes in the candidate profile resulted in implementation delays and resource inefficiencies, as the UNDP and Implementing Partners were required to design new on reintegration packages to match the needs of WAAFGs. Last minute changes were also a source of tension between the UNDP and its Implementing Partners, as all adjusted on short notice; and
- The suspicion that ineligible candidates were receiving reintegration packages undermined the integrity of the reintegration process, the confidence of donors and other stakeholders and resulted in damage to the reputation of the SSDDRC. Donors appeared hesitant to fund future reintegration activities without integrity guarantees on the candidate list.

**The Public Information campaign has not improved understanding of the DDR, and the absence of a campaign contributed to frustrated expectations.** The DDR process had high political sensitivity for Southern Sudan. Former combatants were considered the “heroes of their communities” with high expectations that they would receive an economic benefit from the government. Such expectations were driven by longstanding SPLM/A statements that former combatants would receive recognition, pensions and other forms of development-oriented benefits such as homes, healthcare and education for themselves and their families. These went far beyond the scope of the reintegration support package. As a result, there was a high level of disappointment with the contents of the package, and a sense that the package was “insufficient and unworthy of their sacrifices during the war...” (DDR Review 2010: 65). At the same time, potential beneficiaries and communities continue to receive incorrect information from GoSS sources.

**In this context, a significant amount of UNDP Juba management and programme efforts went to redress project deficiencies.** This included calling for the *DDR Review*, at the level of the Deputy Special Representative/UNDP Resident Representative, given concerns around the project. The UNDP also responded to Government requests to adapt the project to conditions in Southern Sudan. In particular, the UNDP and Implementing Partners piloted a series of Community-Based Reintegration (CBR) projects during 2010, in Central Equatoria and Lakes State. However, these pilots were small and conditions did not appear to favour scaling up.

***Summary of Progress towards Individual Reintegration Component Project Outputs***

The Individual Reintegration Project had four output categories:

- Provision of reintegration packages to DDR participants;
- Capacity of the State DDR commissions to implement national owned DDR enhanced on both technical and managerial aspects;
- Public awareness on DDR process and procedures raised among the main stakeholders and beneficiaries of the programme, partnership between the relevant actors strengthened; and

- Technical, operational and management support for effective functioning of the state and regional offices of SSDDRC and project staff provided.

**As of late 2010, the project showed limited progress towards Phase 1 outputs.** Specifically, there was limited or no meaningful progress towards Output 1 (delivery of reintegration support packages) and Output 3 (public information campaign to support reintegration). These reflect the fact that the SPLA actually demobilised only a small percentage of the original target group. According to the CPA, 90,000 SPLA combatants were to be demobilised, including 36,641 during the first phase. However, less than 10,000 of the Phase 1 cohort were actually demobilised and only 7,728 registered for reintegration. As a result, the case load received by the project was significantly below target, late in arrival and not consistent with the original beneficiary profile. This situation places the low project achievement in the larger context of the low demobilisation, which was an SPLA responsibility.

As subsequent outputs:

- *The lack of progress against Output 1 reflected low coverage of the reintegration programme during Phase 1.* Only 11 percent of the overall demobilisation target and 26 percent of the Special Needs Group (SNG) target were met during Phase 1 implementation. In addition, the cohort of Women Affiliated with Armed Forces or Groups (WAAFG) candidates for reintegration was significantly higher than initially planned, changing the candidate profile and, therefore, design requirements. Of the Phase 1 target, about 20 percent of candidates registered with the Implementing Partners to begin the reintegration process and four percent have subsequently completed the programme and received all reintegration benefits. Compared to the final target for Phase 2 target for 2012, approximately one percent of the total potential beneficiaries have completed full reintegration process by the project's mid-term point.<sup>28</sup>
- *A comprehensive public information campaign was not delivered.* A draft *Public Information Plan* for DDR was developed. However, the plan was not implemented in a comprehensive manner prior to the start of reintegration activities. Informants and the *DDR Review* noted that key information has not been provided in a timely manner, and the messaging has not been coherent (2010). Implementation has been hindered by structural problems in the division of labour between the UNDP and the SSDDRC, slow progress within the SSDDRC itself and an overall lack of coordination and resources. It appears that many planned communication activities were not implemented. A Global Public Information Planning Committee was created in 2010 to strengthen delivery, but without adequate budget, human resources or infrastructure (DDR Review 2010; 62-66). As a result, the public information campaign has made a limited contribution towards ensuring that candidates and recipient communities had correct information and expectations before entering the reintegration process.

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<sup>28</sup> Data is summarised from the DDR Review (2010: 14-15).

- *There has been some progress against Output 2 and Output 4, relating to the delivery of capacity development and material support to the SSDDRC, including at the state level. The UNDP has delivered material support to the SSDDRC, consistent with the work plan. Support included vehicles, construction of office facilities, provisions of furniture and computers, in Juba and at the state level. UNDP also provided seconded personnel in key line functions and training for staff development. UNDP support was appreciated by Government, and recognised as important to establishing the SSDDRC and its operations.*
- *There was less evidence of capacity development results at the institutional and organisational levels. The structure of the commission was established and expanded to the state levels. However, a 2010 audit found that the SSDDRC has been working without a strategic plan, and that internal programme and financial control systems were weak, and constituted “significant deviations from established policies and practices” that exposed the commission to high risks.<sup>29</sup> Institutional management, planning, systems and procedures, therefore, appeared to be of mixed quality. However, the share of attribution for results between the UNDP and the commission was unclear.<sup>30</sup>*

### Annex A.3: Community Security and Arms Control Project

#### *Community Security and Arms Control Background and Objectives*

The objective of the *Community Security and Arms Control* project (CSAC) was to “improve security for individual civilians, families and communities by peacefully reducing small arms proliferation and its associated negative impacts” (Project Document 2008). The objective was to be achieved through “supporting the state to improve the security of communities, by targeting the drivers of conflict through peacebuilding dialogue and conflict-sensitive development while reducing the number of uncontrolled small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the hands of civilians in Southern Sudan.”

The CSAC project was based on a series of coordinated and inter-dependent activities linking enhanced security at the community level, improved governance and delivery of recovery and development benefits. The activities were to include “arms control, provision of training, [strengthening of] security infrastructure, police equipment, recovery, development and support to civilian governance and rule of law institutions that together improve the security environment of communities... (Project Document 2008: 5).

In support of its objective, the CSAC had three main Outputs:

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<sup>29</sup> PriceWatershouseCoopers 2010: 7. The report also concluded that the SSDDRC is taken action to strengthen planning and systems. The DDR Review also expressed concern about weak planning within the SSDDRC and ineffective organisational structures (2010: 71-75).

<sup>30</sup> A more summary comprehensive of outputs is included in Annex Two of this report.



- Output 1: The GoSS CSAC Bureau is fully operational and established, integrating gender dimensions into policy development. The BCSSAC had been established in 2008, but had no facilities in Juba, or activities and presence at the state level;
- Output 2: Improved Security environment allows for development at the community level with specific attention to women's security needs. The baseline noted that community insecurity was too great in 2008 for many communities to engage in sustainable development; and
- Output 3: The Capacity of the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) is enhanced in supporting peacebuilding, conflict mitigation and transformation at the state level, reflecting the variety in leadership including women at the county level. The SSPC was established, but lacked the capacity to fulfil its mandate at the state level.

The project had two design innovations, responding to stakeholder assessment of conflict dynamics:

- *“Connectedness” was an essential design component.* The project integrated analysis and resources across the thematic areas of governance, security and livelihood generation, from multiple GoSS entities, multiple UNDP programmes and from across the United Nations system (UN mission and agencies), and elsewhere in the international community (donors and international NGOs). By creating a platform under GoSS leadership, there was space for scaling up the coverage of the project, and the scope of activities under within the reach of its coordination structure; and
- *Implementation was to be informed by a series of consultations,* lead by Government, with broad geographic coverage, conducted at the community level and identifying localised conflict drivers and security and recovery needs. The consultations were based on methodology innovation, and built on knowledge and capacity established in the *Crisis and Risk Mapping Assessment (CRMA)* project.

### *Observations on the CSAC Programme Context*

**The CSAC project benefited from strong enabling conditions, which were essential to good performance.** The project was closely aligned with the core political, security and development priorities of Government, in Juba and at the state and local levels. These included expanding the presence and capacity of the state at the local level, in its core rule of law functions. Alignment appeared to strengthen with the escalation of political and inter-communal violence in 2008/9, as the initial pilots were being rolled out in Jonglei. Many factors contributing to that violence fell within the scope of the project, particularly dynamics at the community level. Politically-oriented conflicts were beyond the scope of the project, but it had the ability to influence linkage between tribal loyalties and political manipulation for the gain of armed groups and personalities. As a result, Government has given a high-level political support to the project.

The evaluation team noted the escalation of conflict following the 2011 referendum. Interviews and reporting indicate the violence relates primarily to the politicisation of referendum results, and manoeuvring among powerbrokers. In some locations, political-level dynamics have been articulated with local grievances as a means of building support. Violence has also resulted in civilian casualties, large scale displacement and

economic disruption. These dynamics will have a negative impact at the community-level, and on the security and physical conditions around CSAC activities. Regardless, CSAC objectives appeared highly relevant to the context, given the project's focus at the community level.

### *Summary of Progress towards CSAC Project Outputs*

**The CSAC made robust progress towards most of its output targets, and has generally met or surpassed those targets.** Early delays resulted from the combination of protracted approval within the GoSS and requirements for establishing an institution, which contributed to follow-on administrative delays in the UNDP financial administration and recruitment systems. Regardless, the project has subsequently made good progress. It was assessed by the end of 2009 as being “on track to meet many of project's output [targets] (Eavis, Thompson and Morris 2009),” and reporting continued to show progress through 2010.

The field mission observed the following output accomplishments, which were supported in the *Quarterly* and *Annual Progress Reports*:

- *The BCSSAC has been strengthened and is taking an increasingly effective leadership role.* Together with the SSPC, the Bureau is now present at the state level throughout the South. It is playing an active role leading the consultation processes, follow-up on the projects and overall coordination. Its profile has been strengthened through the relationships being established with regional, GoSS and state-level entities with security and governance responsibilities. These relationships expand the resources available to the BCSSAC (political, analytical, technical and financial);
- *Progress towards strengthening the capacity and the role of the SSPC was less clear.* The commission has received material support and was present in the state-level consultations. UNDP also provided an advisor that sits within the SSPC/Ministry. However, its participation appeared constrained by capacity and commission members expressed concern regarding a lack of clarity regarding the SSPC's role in relation to CSAC;
- *CSAC structures in Juba and at the state-level were established and operational, including the Local Steering Committees (LSC) and coordinating structures.* CSAC appeared most robust in Jonglei where it was first piloted, in terms of structure, programme capacity and integration into overall Government strategy. The mission to Eastern Equatoria observed that programme structures are also in place and receiving material and technical support from the UNDP, which was appreciated;
- *Important material and technical support to the CSAC, consistent with output targets, in Juba and to state level structures.* This included UNDP seconded personnel at the state level, integrated into Government structures. UNDP support is well integrated into Government structures, in Juba and at the state level, and the working relationships appear constructive;
- *CSAC met or surpassed targets related to the Community Consultations.* The consultation methodology was piloted in Jonglei in 2009 and implemented in Eastern Equatoria and Upper Nile States during 2010. Consultation reports were completed and validated for three states, consistent with output targets. The reports were considered

by stakeholders to be a high quality, and to contain unique and actionable information and analysis; and

- *CSAC showed good progress towards the planning and implementation of projects identified by communities through the consultation process.* Implementation was well advanced in Jonglei, and had started in Eastern Equatoria. Information generated by the consultations was being used as the basis for decision-making and design. CSAC initiatives were also integrated into larger law and order strategy, linking the construction of police posts, provision of communications equipment, police training, construction of prisons and infrastructure development, using both CSAC resources integrated into the broader portfolio of the United Nations, Government and others. In this regard, CSAC analysis and coordination appeared to reach beyond the project itself.

**The CSAC project demonstrated significant implementation progress**, providing the basis for scaling up the project into other states during the second half of the CPAP period. Progress notwithstanding, BCSSAC and state-level officials expressed concern on four issues:

- *The BCSSAC was established by the GoSS without an independent operating budget*, in part reflecting the Government's difficult financial situation after 2007. The BCSSAC remains dependent on donors and the United Nations for programme resources, meaning that the programme is being implemented at the pace that donor and UN systems and priorities allow. Dependence undermines national ownership and the Bureau's programme flexibility;
- *UNDP assistance to the BCSSAC has not always arrived in a timely manner*, affecting the overall pace and quality of implementation. In particular, the BCSSAC noted that recruitment processes for UNDP secondments and procurement often involve delays. Regardless, BCSSAC officials expressed general satisfaction with the quality of material support, seconded UNDP personnel and capacity development activities;
- *Late delivery of projects at the community level has the potential to undermine the credibility of the CSAC process, and of the GoSS and state level entities.* Officials stressed that CSAC interventions were often the first points of contact between the GoSS and communities. It was effectively a process of establishing a relationship between state and society, in a fluid context. Failure to deliver projects undermined the credibility of the Government and the UN. According to one official "when we say we will deliver and then we don't deliver, or deliver late, the community no longer believes in us." Further, officials stated that late delivery, or poor quality, could increase rather than mitigate conflict risk.
- *Government expressed mixed satisfaction with the quality and cost of some projects.* Officials stated that some works supervised by the UNDP (with implementation through UNOPS) have been of inadequate quality, too expensive or not to the specifications that were expected. While expressing these concerns, officials also noted the high costs and logistical difficulties involved in working at the state level, particularly for imported construction materials.

## Annex A.4: Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Project

### *Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme Background and Objectives*

The *Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme* (RRP) was initiated in 2005 as a national project, with a three year implementation cycle between 2006 and 2010. The project was active in 10 states across Sudan, including five states in Southern Sudan. Total original budget was a Euro 54 million grant from the European Commission, with an additional USD 2 million from Norway.

The objective of the RRP was to “reduce the prevalence and severity of poverty and increase food security among conflict-affected rural house-holds across Sudan by achieving tangible improvements at the community and local authority level (Project Document 2005).” With the design phase occurring shortly after signing of the CPA, the project reflected the *Joint Assessment Mission* (JAM) finding that most rural areas were characterised by a high incidence of poverty and lack of access to basic services, food security and productive investment capital. The marginalisation of rural areas in favour of Khartoum was defined as a major root cause of civil conflict. Project alignment, therefore, was to reflect both JAM priorities and emerging GoSS and local authority recovery plans.

In this context, the expected outcomes from the original project document included:

- Capacity development and institutional strengthening of local government authorities and community organisations;
- Improved and sustainable livelihoods, contributing to poverty reduction and improved food insecurity; and
- Support to basic service delivery, in collaboration with local authorities.

The RRP had a three-tiered governance and management structure:

- A Policy and Review Committee (PRC), with representation from the GoNU, the GoSS, the European Commission and the UNDP. The PRC had responsibility for setting overall direction for the programme, oversight and project review;
- An Action Management Unit (AMU), with an office in Khartoum and sub-office at UNDP Juba, responsible for operational management; and
- Ten NGO consortia, each comprised of a lead NGO and gathering other national and international NGOs were responsible for implementation. A total of 23 Sudanese and 28 international organisations were eventually involved in the national programme.

The RRP, therefore, was intended to deliver a peace dividend at the community level, through projects that would strengthen community livelihoods, basic service delivery

and local government capacity. Implementation occurred through national and international NGOs under UNDP supervision, responding to limited Government capacity at the local level and perceived need to deliver quickly. Government ownership was to be assured through a multi-tiered governance structure, which included local committees in the key role of defining priorities within the RRP framework and recommending projects. The national structure also provided for donor participation at the strategic level, with the UNDP as the administrative agent. Geographic coverage included five states in Southern Sudan, with multiple project locations in each of those states.

## Annex A.5: Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project

### *Rapid Impact Emergency Project Background and Objectives*

The Public Works Programme Component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP) was initiated in 2007 and closed in 2009. Most implementation took place in 2008. As of 31 December 2008, the UNDP reported 60 sub-projects had been completed and an additional 68 were ongoing, against the total target of 141 sub-projects.<sup>31</sup> The majority of projects were to be completed as of February 2009. Activities, therefore, carried into the current CPAP, but the RIEP was largely complete and nearing closure. A final evaluation of the RIEP released in March 2009. This provided the current CPAP Mid-Term Evaluation an opportunity to assess recovery-oriented projects one year after their closure. The evaluation subsequently visited 12 projects located in Juba, Bor and Torit, in addition to interviewing Government officials in those locations.

The Public Works Programme Component was administered by UNDP in partnership with the Ministry of Housing, Environment and Physical Planning (MoHEPP) and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP). Five international organizations implemented the project under UNDP supervision; IRD, Caritas, World Vision International, IOM and UNOPS. There were activities in all 10 States of Southern Sudan, giving the RIEP broad geographic coverage. The project model was chosen on recognition by the GoSS that the urban centres selected lacked the absorptive and implementing capacity to undertake quick emergency public works. Capacities existing within the INGOs and CBOs community as well as UN agencies were used to augment local communities.

The objective of the Public Works Programme Component was to “increase the quality of basic services in Southern Sudan and build the capacity of local organisations.” The project was to provide quick impact activities in state capitals, using a “Cash for Work” model. Local government and organisations were to be involved in planning and implementation. The RIEP, therefore, was to combine public service delivery, temporary

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<sup>31</sup> UNDP reporting indicates that the final RIEP portfolio included 147 projects in 10 states. The RIEP was operationally closed in September 2009, nine months into the current CPAP period.

employment generation and capacity development for local government authorities and community organisations.

The results matrix identified three programme outputs:

- Output 1: Provide basic services to urban populations while generating temporary employment for the communities in the 10 states of Southern Sudan;
- Output 2: Increase in Community Awareness on the issue of Provision of Basic Services; and
- Output 3: Survey/mapping and Rapid Assessment of Non-State Actors involved in CDD/CDR type interventions in all the 10 States of Southern Sudan.

The RIEP had a multi-tiered governance structure, with the UNDP serving as administrative agent with overall responsibility for implementation. At its highest level, the RIEP Project Board provided strategic guidance and oversight, and made final determinations on projects. At the community level, projects were identified by a Local Steering Committee comprised of local authorities. Responsibility for strategic and project-level decision-making, therefore, rested with Government and Donors.

### ***Summary of Outputs from the RIEP Final Evaluation (2009)***

*The Final Evaluation of the RIEP concluded that the project made significant progress and tangible achievements in attaining its development objective and outputs especially output 1 in respect to the provision of basic social service delivery. Where it did not, it was mainly due to challenges relating to the environmental and weather challenges that were way beyond the control of the programme and the late start up... These factors affected project implementation and contributed to hindering the program from fully securing its progress and achievements on time (2009: 10).*

The evaluation noted sizable benefits accruing to beneficiaries in 11 urban areas as a result of the project (2009: 6). It also found a “sizable number of beneficiaries”, noting that 654,469 persons directly benefited (2009: 23). This included almost 200,000 person days of work created, of which 40 percent went to women (2009: 23).

*The Final Evaluation determined that the RIEP made an important contribution to access to vital infrastructure. It found that “The construction of roads, markets, hospitals, schools, sanitation facilities has resulted in increased access to services. The benefits of such infrastructure are evident in increased attendance and enrolment in schools ... control of floods ... curbing of diseases prevalence due to improved sanitation and environmental public health through toilet building, town clean up campaigns... improved health services resulting from the constructed health centres/hospitals and clinics. This has also led to reduction of congestion at the old facilities” (2009: 6-7; 22-24).*

The Final Evaluation also determined that the RIEP made an important contribution to access to vital infrastructure. It found that “The construction of roads, markets, hospitals, schools, sanitation facilities has resulted in increased access to services. The benefits of such infrastructure are evident in increased attendance and enrolment in schools ... control of floods ... curbing of diseases prevalence due to improved sanitation and environmental public health through toilet building, town clean up campaigns...

improved health services resulting from the constructed health centres/hospitals and clinics. This has also led to reduction of congestion at the old facilities.” Construction was found to generally be a good quality.

The project “by design aimed at enhancing the capacity of the local population especially for purposes of sustainability and operation and maintenance of the implemented projects... a number of skills were imparted to the local population ... [and] skills were both at individual and group level. For example, local groups ... participated in borehole repairs and gained skills which enable them to frequently offer their services in repairing broken boreholes in the community. This is ... a source of income ... [and] a mechanism for ensuring sustainability (2009: 7-8).

The RIEP “with its emphasis on work for cash has been very instrumental in offering an opportunity to the local populace to get employed. The project increased a sense of Community Ownership. “Setting up of Local Steering Committees to oversee the project has greatly enhanced a sense of community ownership and responsibility over the implemented projects. This has led to laying out a foundation for enhancing partnerships between NGOs, the community and government. This is key to project sustainability.”

On this matter of sustainability, the *Final Evaluation* noted that important elements for supporting sustainability were embedded into the RIEP design, through the governance structure, capacity development of local organisations and individuals and community ownership. The evaluation did not make an actual assessment on whether sustainability is likely to be achieved. It notes that ongoing support may be required to some projects, but does not make a recommendation (2009: 41-42).

## Annex A.6: The Sudan Recovery Fund

### *Sudan Recovery Fund - Southern Sudan Background and Objectives*

The Sudan Recovery Fund - Southern Sudan (SRF-SS) was established in May 2008 at the Oslo meeting of the Sudan Consortium. The fund will be operational over three rounds through to 2012. Implementation of Round 1 began during the first quarter of 2009. Although the implementation of individual projects is ongoing, the funding allocation process of Round I and Round II is complete. Round III was approved by the SRF Steering Committee in April 2009 and is moving into allocation and implementation.

The *SRF Log Frame* defines the purpose of the SRF as to “meet the priority recovery needs [of Southern Sudan] with multi-year coordinated donor support aligned with the GoSS recovery strategy and priority expenditures (November 2009)”. Two outcome indicators were assigned to the objective:

- Improved GoSS and States leadership and ownership of recovery; and
- Percentage increase in size of the population that report having access to basic services, opportunities for employment and income generation.

The SRF was established to specifically address the “recovery gap”; “the range of needs that were too long term, predictable and structural in nature to be met through humanitarian assistance, but at the same time too urgent to be met through longer term instruments” (SRF Project Document: 2008). Such instruments included the World Bank-

managed Multi-donor Trust Fund-Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS), which delivered more slowly than anticipated.

In this context, the SRF-SS was to support “the timely allocation and disbursement of donor resources to activities that demonstrate quick recovery impacts and yield more immediate peace dividends for the population.” It responded to high expectations in post-CPA Southern Sudan for a peace dividend; improvement in basic living conditions, public service delivery, infrastructure and livelihoods (Project Document 2008). By the time that the SRF was being designed, the delivery of a dividend had become a matter of high priority and sensitivity for the GoSS and its international counterparts, given implications for security, recovery and political stability.

The SRF has adapted over its three rounds, in response to changing priorities and field conditions:

- Phase 1 focused on livelihood generation, through projects in agriculture and social recovery. In total, 18 projects were implemented by 12 national and international NGOs, with coverage in all 10 states. Total allocation was USD 20 million;
- Round II included a small grants fund, supporting 68 small scale projects being implemented by national NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in all ten states, with the objective of building capacity and delivering livelihood activities. An additional allocation was made for capacity development support to the Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF); and
- Round III is now focused on larger interventions in four high priority states, in support of *Integrated Stabilisation and Recovery Plans* and *Recovery Planning* (approximately USD 90 million divided between the recipient states), and a second funding window focused on sectoral-based service delivery in health, education, water and sanitation and agriculture (approximately USD 30 million), of which the UNDP reported having USD 40 million in deposits.

There are two basic differences between Round I and Round II, with Round III. First, Round I and Round II were comprised of a large number of small initiatives. Projects were planned with state and local authorities and implemented by international and national NGOs. In contrast, Round III focuses on significantly large investments made in a limited number of priority states. The investments are based on much more extensive consultation and planning with state-level authorities. Second, Round I and Round II were effectively stand-alone activities, albeit with the intention of being integrated into Government priorities. Round III design takes an integrated approach to linking SRF funding into other security, governance and livelihood activities. These differences reflect both an increase in Government capacity to lead processes, particularly at the state level, and a conceptual shift among stakeholders on how best to deliver a peace dividend.

Output for Round 1	Output and Project Focus for Round 2	Output and Project Focus for Round 3
Rural Households have increased sustainable	Operational and administrative capacity of national	Community security is increased and conflict mitigated



agricultural productivity and diversified livelihoods.	organisations to contribute to the recovery process strengthened. Capacity of the SSRDF strengthened, to support expanded delivery of public service at the state and community levels.	in target states. Increased access in target states to predictable and multi-year funded capacity building and systems to deliver basic services GoSS ministries implement targeted transformative sector specific projects to contribute to basic service delivery.
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### *Summary of Operational Progress for SRF Round I and SRF Round II*

As of November 2010, 18 Round I projects were approved in 10 states, for implementation by 12 national and international NGOs. Three projects were completed, 13 projects were still active and two projects had been suspended over performance concerns. No further projects will be considered. Eleven of the active projects were scheduled for completion by 31 December 2010. The total approved budget was USD 21 million, of which 76 percent had been advanced to the implementing agency and 53 percent was actually expended (as of the end of Q2 2010). UNDP reported that only a small number of projects had met their output objectives to that point. Other projects were being implemented with varying degrees of difficulty, and one project had been suspended for non-performance. Corrective action was under consideration for several other projects to address performance concerns.

For Round II, the total project budget was USD 2,675,000, of which 82 percent was expended by the end of 2010. A cumulative total of 64 small grant projects to CBOs were funded, short of the target of 70 projects, or seven per state. One project was reported completed and 13 projects had received their third and final grant allocation. All Round II activities were scheduled for completion during 2011. Capacity development support to the SSRDF included support to development of a strategic plan and a review of its organisational and management structure. The Support to SSRDF project achieved a total delivery of USD 410,077.56, amounting to 75 percent of the total project budget. The delivery throughout the year has been less than originally planned, as additional allocation decisions by the Steering Committee were not made.

### *Field Observations on SRF Round I Project Outputs*

The field mission visited two Round I projects on a random basis, one in Bor (Jonglei) and one in Torit (eastern Equatoria). The project in Bor has been managed by Save the Children, for education and child protection activities. Implementation occurred over 18 months and the project closed in 2010. The project built on previous Save the Children activities and contributed to an existing area in the NGO's strategic plan. The value added of the SRF over other funding sources was bringing Save the Children into closer contact with Government, which improved project relevance and coordination between other Save the Children and Government activities. The relationship with Government was sustained after the project in other programme areas. The difficulty in working with Government was implementation delays, related to Government capacity limitations.

Education services were delivered by Save the Children as per output targets, albeit with delays. The Education components were moved back to regular Save the Children funding envelope after SRF funds were exhausted, and are continuing on that basis. Child protection activities, including training of Government personnel and strengthening child protection services, were delivered through Government systems. They depended on SRF funding, and on Government to assume responsibility for the programme. Save the Children advised that Government decided not to continue the programmes, owing to capacity and resource constraints.

The Save the Children project, therefore, created valuable outputs in the area of education and training, although the downstream outcome of the project for improving livelihoods is unknown. In part, outcomes will depend on opportunity in the employment market. The child protection component also appeared to create valuable outputs related to issues such as child abduction. From interviews, the SRF investment had a short term impact improving child protection services. However, Save the Children advised that Government closed the programme for lack of resources. Personnel trained were subsequently transferred to other positions. These outputs, therefore, will not be sustained and the investment is likely to have been lost.<sup>32</sup> Coordination between Save the Children and Government improved as a result of the project. Coordination is ongoing and appears valued by both parties.

The second SRF Round I project was a model market implemented by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Site inspection confirmed that the market project is near completion, and ready for hand over. The quality of works appeared good and implemented to UNDP and Government general satisfaction. The project has been implemented under close oversight from the Local Steering Committee, which also played an active role in identification and planning. There was a delay of one year, given significant changes to Government specifications and design. The original design built on previous NCA projects developing seven village-level markets. However, moving to a single large market design changed the concept. The negotiations were described as difficult, but concluding to the mutual satisfaction of stakeholders.

The model market is located outside of the existing Torit town site, and was designed as part of the Government's strategy to relocate the town's commercial centre. However, there was no infrastructure in the area surrounding the market. The bridge and road leading to the market were in poor condition with no apparent plan for maintenance.<sup>33</sup> Also, there was no evidence of other construction, planned construction or occupation in

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<sup>32</sup> Save the Children trained local NGOs to continue working on child rights and child protection related issues, which may contribute to sustainability.

<sup>33</sup> Local NCA and Government officials could not provide information on if or when repairs would take place. UNDP reporting indicates that following several consultation with stakeholders and meetings between SSC, NCA and UNDP, it was agreed that the project implemented by "NCA would be granted with extra funding to cater for procurement of road equipment and machines for the State" (Q4 Progress Report). The additional grant was intended to improve farmer's access to the market and improve feeder road conditions of the area. The evaluation did not have further information on the overall urban planning process (information was requested).

the area around the market, which was agricultural. Government officials interviewed did not have a timeline for opening the market or development of the adjacent areas. It was unclear, therefore, how the market will support the Government's urban planning objectives, and when the completed facilities will be occupied. The evaluation team also noted that design changes meant that NCA's experience in community development was not used. Rather, the NCA functioned as a general contractor.

### *Field Observations on SRF Round II Project Outputs*

A tracking matrix to gather data against individual project outputs indicators was developed by the UNDP and distributed to the 18 projects as the basis for performance reporting. Implementing Partners are required to attach the matrix as an annex to progress report. On this basis, SRF monitoring gathered a large amount of *performance* data and information on project activities, which is sometimes mixed with raw output data/information. The data has been used to make a determination of progress against budget expenditure targets and whether a specific project requires additional supervision. It includes an assessment of actions required to improve implementation performance.

Monitoring, therefore, has been used effectively by the UNDP as a management tool. However, there has been:

- No meaningful attempt to gather and/or synthesise data against the output indicators;
- There is no attempt to monitor for project outcomes, as design is not structured to report at the outcome level;
- The SRF did not have a baseline against which assessment could be made, as per the Monitoring and Evaluation guidelines used by the Technical Secretariat; and
- There has been no evaluation of the Fund. The exception was an audit conducted in mid-2010 for the Steering Committee.<sup>34</sup>

To complement reporting data, the field mission made a random visit to two SRF II sites in Bor (Jonglei), in addition to an interview with the Grant Coordinator in Bor. The first project was a sewing centre, providing training for the local manufacture of clothing. The centre had been operating for one year, and was one month away from receiving its third and final tranche of funding. The Centre was established in good facilities relative to local standards, and appeared to have a high level of activity. Support was appreciated by the centre management and students present. Regardless, there was no evidence of capacity building support for business development or management being provided by the Grant Coordinator, BRAC.<sup>35</sup> The centre had no income generating strategy, such as through sale of articles made during training into the local market. Also, there was no plan for sustainability, or alternate source of income after the final tranche was exhausted.

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<sup>34</sup> UNDP advised an evaluation and audit are planned for 2011.

<sup>35</sup> Documentation indicates that BRAC provided management and financial training.

Approximately 30 percent of the sewing machines were broken and not in use. There was no maintenance plan and the centre had no funds for repair or replacement. BRAC advised that maintenance was the responsibility of the centre, and repair would be accomplished with money from the third payment. In contrast, centre management had the expectation that BRAC would provide maintenance and expressed frustration that the machines could not be used, as it reduced training capacity. After completing training, students were to return to their communities without additional start up support, such as ownership of a sewing machine and provision of start-up materials. Participants did not appear to have sufficient personal resources to establish themselves, and it was unclear whether other options exist, such as access to micro-credits. Prospects for achieving outcome objectives and sustainability, therefore, appeared low.

The second project in Bor was a women's poultry cooperative implemented by a widow's association, where the team visited the site and spoke with three members of the collective. The collective had been established for a year and was working in good facilities compared to local standards. The third and final project payment was pending from the Grant Coordinator. The collective had little poultry stock (20 hens and one rooster) or feed available on hand at the end of the second payment cycle. The reason given was that stock has just been sold into the market. At the same time, the members had SDG 1000 (USD 400) in savings, which was insufficient to replenish poultry stock or feed. They were waiting, therefore, to receive the final tranche before making purchases.

There was no evidence that capacity building or management support had been provided for business development.<sup>36</sup> The project was generating insufficient income to sustain itself after the third tranche was exhausted. Nor did it appear that the members had the necessary business skills to generate that income, but rather were expecting further funding support. From member statements it appeared that some of the poultry was being consumed by cooperative members as a food source and on a non-commercial basis. Prospects for achieving project objectives and sustainability, therefore, appeared low. As examples of support to local capacity development, UNDP reporting noted:

- Two hundred and thirty six (236) extension workers and more than 100 staff of different state ministries were trained in a variety of fields (project management, child protection, farming, etc.) across all ten States;
- Capacity building support was provided to twenty one (21) community based organizations in a variety of areas, such as child protection, farming and food security and WATSAN, amongst others. Some of these organizations received sub-grants to implement small, community based projects;
- One Pharmacy Unit was established under the State Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Animal Resources in Lakes State. Fourteen (14) veterinarians from the Awerial County received management training to supply and run the Pharmacy. In total, 95 para-veterinarians were trained and equipped and are now operational; and

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<sup>36</sup> Again, documentation indicates that BRAC provided management and financial training.

- A County Agriculture Office was constructed in Arroyo, Aweil Centre (Northern Bahr El Ghazal).

### *Field Observations on SRF Round III Project Outputs*

Round III was under early implementation and the evaluation team did not have a complete list of the outputs to date. Regardless, the evaluation noted good progress towards output targets and three initial outputs, which was confirmed by Government informants in Eastern Equatoria. First, there was clear evidence of an extensive collaborative effort within the UNDP Country Team to develop the Round III concept, including from within the Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit (CSAC and CRMA) but also drawing on other UNDP programmes. In this regard, Round III planning drew on resources and experiences from across the UNDP Country Team, working within the security-governance-recovery conceptual framework development within CSAC.

Second, early activities were based on the signing of *Joint Programme Documents* in Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria, to initiate Stabilisation Programmes. The documents were the result of extensive consultation with state official and were embedded in state-level initiatives to improve security (focused on reduction of community-level conflict around issues such as cattle raiding) and the delivery of public services (defined as peace dividends). The plans appeared to be comprehensive, and based on high level Government ownership and commitment. UNDP provided technical and financial support to the process. In this regard, Round III appeared to be situated in an area of high priority to Government, with appropriate political and resource commitments and evidence that planning capacity had been strengthened. Third, work had begun to identify and develop projects within the framework of the *Joint Programme Documents*.

### *Outcome Perception of Government for SRF Round I and SRF Round II*

**There was a strongly stated perception that projects in the first two rounds did not meet their outcome objectives, with concerns for quality and relevance.** The evaluation made particular note of the *perceptions* of SRF performance held by Government informants, related to Round 1 and Round II, at the SSRDF and in Bor and Torit. Government was also critical of the UNDP in its role as the Administrative Agent and managing the Technical Secretariat, stating the agency has not been forceful in its oversight roles. The SRF was created after the other donor mechanisms were not delivering a quick impact for communities. There were high expectations for performance, driven by concern for both political stability and achieving recovery results. The SRF was quick to establish and begin dispersing. However, the quality of the results was seen as inadequate.

**Government expressed concern about the mixed quality and relevance of the projects, and the limited impact.** Government had the perception that many of the NGOs were not doing good quality work, and the UNDP was not assertive enough in its supervision

and monitoring roles to ensure quality.<sup>37</sup> At the same time, the NGOs have tended to not communicate well with the GoSS. This is partly a problem with the structure of the SRF itself, as Government has had limited involvement in the monitoring and evaluation activities.

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<sup>37</sup> UNDP advises that starting in early 2011 nine states were visited covering on average four LNGOs during each visit. Therefore more than 50 percent of the LNGOs and projects sites have been visited. However, this is occurred after the evaluation field visit, and information was not available.

## Annex B: Terms of Reference

### UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Outcome evaluation “*Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated*”

*Under the CPAP 2009-2012*

#### Terms of Reference

##### Context:

This terms of reference is for an evaluation of the UNDP CPR programme outcome “*Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated.*” The evaluation will be conducted in 2 phases – an assessment of the projects/programmes in southern Sudan which contribute to the outcome (November – December 2010) and a mirror exercise in January 2011 for northern Sudan. This Terms of Reference is for the international evaluation expert, who will conduct the assessment process for southern Sudan.

The full evaluation Team will consist of:

1. International Team Leader
2. International Consultant for southern Sudan (This terms of reference and assignment)
3. International Consultant for northern Sudan
4. National Consultant for southern Sudan
5. National Consultant for northern Sudan.

### 1. Background

#### 1.1 The Sudan Context

In 2005, the Government of Sudan, led by National Congress Party (NCP), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ending the second phase of the war between the North and the South. The agreement was concluded within the framework of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and supported by the regional grouping of East African States, and a troika of countries (USA, UK & Norway). As a result, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) was formed at the national level (comprising members of NCP and SPLM) and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was formed in the South. In October 2006 the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) was signed between the government and the Eastern Front. Although these agreements ended decades of civil war and social unrest, conflict in Darfur created a new front of instability, which has engaged a number of peacemaking efforts over the past few years.

Sudan’s conflicts have generated mounting development and humanitarian challenges, undermining advances in human development. Against this background UNDP Sudan’s strategy reflects the findings of the *UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2009-2012*, and is detailed in the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for 2009-2012. The CPAP constitutes the legal agreement between UNDP and the Government of Sudan and details the programme design and capacity development strategies. UNDP in Sudan works on the basis of “one country – two systems”. The Country Office, located in Khartoum manages programmes both at the national and regional level, and collaborates closely with

the UNDP Regional Office in Juba in Southern Sudan. UNDP has opened 18 sub-offices and project offices across the country, located in Eastern Sudan, Southern Sudan, the Three Protocol Areas and Darfur.

In response to the challenges of implementing the CPA and addressing the pervasive human development deficits across the country, the UNDP Sudan programme has focussed attention on three areas: 1) poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs, 2) democratic governance, and 3) crisis prevention and recovery.

This mid-term evaluation will focus on outcome 7 of the CPAP, one of 7 outcomes which frame the UNDP programme in Sudan for 2009-2012.

<b>Thematic Area</b>	<b>Intended Outcome</b>
I. Poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs	1. Enhanced national and sub-national capacities to plan, monitor, evaluate, and implement the MDGs and related national development policies and priorities.
	2. Improved impact of resources to fight HIV/AIDS
II. Fostering and consolidating democratic governance	3. Institutions, systems and processes of democratic governance strengthened
	4. National/sub-national/state/local levels of governance expand their capacities to manage equitable delivery of public services
	5. Rights upheld and protected through accountable, accessible and equitable Rule of Law institutions
III. Crisis prevention and recovery	6. Strengthened capacity of national, sub-national, state and local institutions and communities to manage the environment and natural disasters to reduce conflict over natural resources.
	7. Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated.

For further details on the UNDP crisis prevention and recovery interventions across Sudan, See <http://www.sd.undp.org/security.htm>

### 2.1 The UNDP Policy Environment

All UNDP programming is designed to build national ownership and capacity, in line with the Paris Declaration and the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011. At the same time, CPR programming is developed and implemented in line with the Eight Point Agenda for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (8PA). In the context of increasing UN



harmonization, UNDP's programme is also designed to support progress towards 'One UN'.

## **2. Purpose and Objectives**

### 2.1 Purpose

The evaluation will review and analyze the progress towards achieving results of the crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) portfolio for the ongoing CPAP (2009-2012), assess the extent to which the relevant projects and programmes have contributed to the achievement of CPAP results and the relevance of the outcome and the associated output achievements to the current context. At the same time, the evaluation will consider the cumulative effect of CPR programming over the period of the Common Country Framework (CCF2) (2002-2006) and the Bridging Programme (2007-2008), drawing on the findings of the CCF2 evaluation.

The evaluation should include an analysis of synergies between crisis prevention and recovery and key human development dimensions, which help support the achievement of the MDGs. Assessment of UNDP in early recovery coordination will be an important component of the evaluation.

### 2.2 Objectives

The overall objective of this outcome evaluation is, therefore, to evaluate, at the mid-point of the CPAP, progress in restoring infrastructure, reviving the economy and generating income in all North and South Sudan and assess the contribution of UNDP Sudan has been to this progress since 2009.

*Specific Objectives are to:*

- Assess progress made in mine action, DDR, arms control and community security (including livelihood) programming to reduction of conflict and restoration of peace and analyze the setting in which real progress towards the MDGs can be made in Sudan.
- Assess the extent to which CPR programmes have been successful in building national capacities.
- Evaluate the differential progress on women, men and youth in the UNDP CPR programmes.
- Assess the effectiveness of early recovery coordination in Sudan and how this has (or has not) contributed to overall progress towards CPR objectives.
- From a longer term perspective (from 2002), make an assessment of overall progress (or lack of progress) on restoring infrastructure, economic revival and income generation and community security, and of the contribution of UNDP to this progress.
- Advise on the suitability of indicators and other verification tools used to measure progress towards outcomes and outputs
- Evaluate the degree to which the programmes adjust and contribute to progress towards One UN.

The findings and recommendations of the evaluation will feed into the mid term review of the CPAP in 2011, and inform the formulation of the next programming cycle 2013-2017. The CPAP results framework for outcome 7 (below) provides the starting point for the evaluation, identifying desired results and indicators of success which guided project formation and implementation to date. While these results and indicators will be a central feature of the assessment methodology, the evaluation is expected to assess their suitability so as to measure progress towards the achievement of the outcome.

<b>OVERALL OUTCOME:</b> Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated.	
<b>Outcome indicators:</b> Change in human security (mines, small arms, socio-economic) of crisis affected groups. National mine action management and technical expertise in place to address social/economic impacts of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).	
<b>Expected outputs</b>	<b>Annualised output targets and indicators</b>
National/sub-national capacities strengthened to manage the national mine action programme.	<p><b>Indicator:</b> National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) capacitated to implement their mandate and lead the mine action activities</p> <p><b>Indicator:</b> No. of national de-miners trained/equipped/field deployed for clearance of mine/ERW affected areas.</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 240 JIU de-miners trained/equipped &amp; 110 de-miners field deployed; 446 km of Babanusa-Wau railway line and 234 km of roads in Kassala state. National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) established through presidential decrees</p> <p><b>Targets:</b>  2009-2010: Knowledge of concerned NMAA, NMAC and SSDC staff developed at the technical (mine clearance) and functional level  2011: National authorities capacitated to finance and lead the mine action coordination activities; knowledge of 130 national de-miners developed to conduct mine action activities  2012: National authorities capacitated to assume full responsibility of mine action process; 130 JIU de-miners equipped and deployed</p>
Reintegration of ex-combatants completed in accordance with the national DDR strategy with support of	<p><b>Indicator:</b> Number of ex-combatants and associated groups, demobilized &amp; reintegrated, disaggregated by age, gender and disability;</p> <p><b>Indicator:</b> Percentage of participants that report successful individual reintegration projects in client satisfaction surveys;</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 1,700 ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized in ESPA areas.</p> <p><b>Target:</b>  <u>2009:</u>  -2,900 participants, including 200 disabled, disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated in East;  -30,000 participants in CPA areas, including 1900 women and 2000 disabled, participating or completing reintegration.  -70 % per cent of participants report sufficient household income in client satisfaction surveys  -Preparatory support provided to parties in Darfur, DDR of participants, pending political negotiations;  <u>2010:</u>  -60,000 participants, including 4100 women and 15,500 disabled, participating or completed reintegration  -70 % per cent of participants report sufficient household income in client satisfaction surveys  -DDR of candidates in Darfur, pending political process.</p>

UNMIS	<p><u>2011:</u> -45,000 participants, including 4100 women and 15,500 disabled, participating or completed reintegration -70 % per cent of participants report sufficient household income in client satisfaction surveys -DDR of candidates in Darfur, pending political process.</p> <p><u>2012:</u> -45,000 participants, including 4100 women and 15,500 disabled, participating or completed reintegration -70 % per cent of participants report sufficient household income in client satisfaction surveys -DDR of candidates in Darfur, pending political process. -N/SSDDRCs successfully implementing nationally-owned DDR.</p>
Proliferation and circulation of small arms reduced	<p><b>Indicator:</b> Number of state level community security and arms control action plans developed and implemented. Number of communities benefitting from CSAC activities <b>Baseline:</b> No community security and arms control action plans developed. Five small CSAC projects being implemented in BNS, SKS, KRT, RS and Kassala. <b>Targets:</b> <b>North:</b> 2009: 5 sub-projects developed and implement community security and arms control action plans 2010: 10 sub-projects (cumulative) developed and implement community security and arms control action plans 2011: 20 sub-projects (cumulative) developed and implement community security and arms control action plans <b>South:</b> 2009: 3 states develop and implement community security and arms control action plans; 1 Platform for Peace 2010: 6 states (cumulative) develop and implement community security and arms control action plans; 3 Platforms for Peace 2011: All 10 states (cumulative) develop and implement community security and arms control action plans</p>
Post-conflict recovery accelerated in strategic areas to ensure peace dividends are visible and tangible to conflict affected populations	<p><b>Indicator:</b> Number of recovery projects established and/or people benefiting including returnees and ex-IDPs from recovery and development initiatives through strengthening CBOs/Civil Society and Local Govt. Authorities. <b>Baseline:</b> 10 community-based integrated recovery &amp; rehabilitation projects running. <b>Targets:</b> 2009: Rural livelihood initiatives in 10 states; 100,000 beneficiaries: 30% female; 30% youth 2010: 200,000 beneficiaries (cumulative): 35% female; 35% youth 2011: 300,000 beneficiaries (cumulative): 40% female; 40% youth.</p>

### 2.3 Additional Evaluation Objectives

In addition to informing mid-term discussions on the CPAP, the evaluation will:

- ❑ Strengthen UNDP Sudan accountability to internal and external partners by gathering evidence on programmes and progress towards desired results at outcome and output level.
- ❑ Identify areas of strength, weakness and gaps especially in regard to:
  - The appropriateness of the UNDP partnership strategy
  - Impediments to the outcome
  - Assess the need for midcourse adjustments
  - Lessons learned for the next programme cycle

In order to ensure that programmes remain on target, or are adjusted to remain relevant to current needs and the current context.

- ❑ Inform higher level evaluations (e.g. at the country or regional level) and subsequent programming.
- ❑ Identify lessons learned and good practice to support learning across UNDP of crisis prevention and recovery programming.

### **3. Scope of the Evaluation and Main issues**

#### 3.1 Scope

The evaluation will cover all North and South Sudan and focus on the CPR portfolio of the CPAP. Setting the assessment of progress in the context of the history and current political and socio-economic setting will be important for the analysis and interpretation of results, so the evaluation will draw on existing situational/context/conflict assessments, particularly the work of the Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis Project in Sudan.

#### 3.2 Issues influencing the evaluation

*Exploring linkages between crisis prevention and key human development features*

In Sudan, deficits in human development are among the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs. The evaluation will look at the role of crisis prevention and recovery activities in supporting the effort to achieving MDGs in Sudan. It is hoped that this type of assessment will help set the frame for the “big picture” story which will emerge from the outcome evaluation, in recognition of the significant and inextricable linkages between UNDP’s crisis prevention and recovery portfolio and the other major pillars of the 2009-2012 CPAP.

*Strengthening national capacities, particularly governance and coordination mechanisms, in crisis, prevention and recovery response*

Governments (national and local) play a critical role in addressing crisis, prevention and recovery that affects national development goals. In view of the role played by good governance (legal frameworks and policies, administrative and institutional systems, coordination among different government agencies), in risk reduction and crisis prevention and recovery, the evaluation should remain mindful of UNDP’s support to local institutions and community participation in improving crisis prevention and recovery management. The interplay of different local actors and the extent of civil society participation in decision-making will be a key feature of the overall assessment. One possible line of enquiry in the evaluation will be UNDP’s support to furthering coordination efforts and the lessons that can be drawn for strengthening coordination strategies.

### *Early Recovery*

UNDP defines early recovery as the application of development principles of participation, sustainability and local ownership to humanitarian situations with the aim of stabilizing local and national capacities. This means that early recovery should start as early as possible during humanitarian action and that early recovery activities should be foundational in nature and designed to ‘seize opportunities that go beyond saving lives and contribute to the restoration of national capacity, livelihoods and human security’. This definition is the basis of resources and guidance provided by the UNDP-led Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER). It situates early recovery within humanitarian settings and also firmly roots UNDP’s approach to early recovery in humanitarian coordination and funding systems.

Since 2005 the Country Office has placed a greater emphasis on early recovery in Sudan with strong support from the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). Issues gravitate around questions of livelihoods, housing and social economic infrastructure, social equity, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity and activities have focused mainly on Abyei and Darfur (through the BCPR funded Darfur Area Focus Action Plan).

Ultimately, this evaluation will assess the effectiveness of these initial early recovery initiatives and advise how these may be better defined in terms of design, implementation and monitoring progress.

### *Addressing the linkages between conflict and natural resources*

Conflict-prone countries pose challenges for natural resource management efforts. While coordination among UN agencies and partnerships with donor and development organizations are crucial in maximizing the contribution to human development, complex crisis situations require programme strategies that are sensitive to such situations and have an integrated approach. The evaluation will examine the main issues pertinent to UNDP’s programming, paying attention to conflict over natural resources and the manner in which conflict impacts on resource management strategies and policies.

### *Conflict Sensitivity*

All programming (including the evaluation design and conduct) in settings of actual or potential conflict need to be conflict sensitive – e.g. reflect an awareness of and be appropriate to the specifics of potential or actual tension. Principles of conflict sensitivity include:

- (i) All programming needs to be sensitive to the inherent (or overt) tensions or to potential or actual conflicts, and be conducted in such a way to – at a minimum - not heighten tensions and – at best – reduce tensions
- (ii) Security of all involved (programme staff; beneficiaries; and evaluation staff ) needs to be factored into all decisions
- (iii) Crisis settings are characteristically dynamic, and it is not unusual for changes in the setting to happen in short periods of time. Therefore, flexibility needs to be built in around the need to re-visit programming objectives to ensure they are still appropriate to the situation, as well as over the timing and appropriate methods of data collection according to what is feasible and can realistically be achieved

(iv) All programming should maintain a 'big picture' perspective

The evaluation will consider to what extent the CPR portfolio in Sudan has been designed and implemented in a conflict sensitive manner, and to what extent it has heightened or lessened tensions, either as an explicit or an implicit part of the programmes.

#### *Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women*

The UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 states that "Gender empowerment will be given special emphasis throughout all UNDP activities in crisis-affected countries. The UNDP 'Eight Point Agenda for Women's Empowerment' and 'Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery' will guide the activities within this area".<sup>38</sup> Issues of how programmes have been designed and implemented to support this commitment, taking into account the different needs of men, women, girls and boys, need to inform the evaluation in terms of data collection and analysis.

**In light of these issues, the evaluation will seek to respond, at a minimum, to the following questions:**

- a) What factors underlie the development situation in respect to the CPAP outcome 7?
- b) What progress has been made towards the achievement of CPAP outcome 7, including contributions made through "soft" assistance and advocacy?
- c) What contribution has UNDP made towards the achievement of the outcome and in this context how has UNDP positioned itself among other CPR actors and partners to add value in response to the needs and changes in the national development context?
- d) What unintended consequences have emerged from the UNDP programme interventions?
- e) What have been the factors which have impeded progress and to what extent has UNDP's contribution been curtailed by these factors? Under such circumstances are there actions which UNDP could have taken or should still take to reverse such challenges?
- f) What are the gaps/weaknesses in the current programme design and management/operational features in so far as they apply to the implementation of projects and programme under the crisis prevention and recovery portfolio?
- g) What are the lessons learned from the programme activities thus far and how should these be applied to inform management decisions in order to strengthen UNDP's programme in the crisis prevention and recovery area, both in determining the direction for the remainder of the current CPAP and for consideration for the new programme cycle?

### 3.2 Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation will use the following criteria:

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<sup>38</sup> UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008-2011, DP/2007/43/Rev.1, p29

**Relevance:** Assess if UNDP policy goals and programmes in Sudan address the development needs at the country level, particularly in addressing critical gaps in crisis prevention and recovery priorities identified by various stakeholders and aligned to the national priorities. The evaluation will seek to draw lessons from UNDP's response to national priorities vis-à-vis the Government and other agencies.

**Effectiveness:** Assessment of the performance of UNDP's support to crisis prevention and recovery in terms of achievement of results. The evaluation will assess the extent to which UNDP's contribution has strengthened national capacity and contributed to real progress in the eyes of different stakeholders in the relevant areas.

**Efficiency:** The extent to which UNDP has instituted systems and clear procedures to provide coordinated support and the relationship of inputs (financial and staff) to results gained. This will involve looking at the suitability of UNDP operational and financial management procedures in responding to crises prevention and the extent to which these procedures have helped or hindered efficiency and the achievement of results.

**Sustainability** This will assess whether UNDP has been able to support development institutions, frameworks and procedures and develop the capacities of national institutions. The evaluation will examine the sustainability of the programmes results and benefits and explore whether UNDP projects and programmes develop/strengthen mechanisms to promote scaling up and replication of successful results.

**Impact:** Examine the impact of the programme in terms of whether the design and implementation of the relevant projects and programmes has facilitated or hindered progress towards the outcomes of the CPAP and UNDAF. Determine whether the current programmes design and implementation will allow for the optimum achievements of the planned impact on the target groups.

**Connectedness:** In conflict/post-conflict settings, it is important to assess not only the progress made against project or programme goals, but the contribution of individual projects to the overall conflict prevention and peacebuilding process. Assessment of connectedness should also include the extent to which projects and programme were complementary or contradictory.

#### **4. Methodology and Approach**

The evaluation team shall propose the approach, design, methods and data collection strategies to be adopted for conducting the evaluation in the inception report, whereby the evaluation team agrees with the UNDP Sudan office the approach, design, methods and strategy required to successfully complete the exercise. The evaluation will be a transparent, participatory process involving all the development stakeholders at the country level. It will be carried out within the framework of UNDP Evaluation Policy<sup>39</sup> and UNEG norms and

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<sup>39</sup> <http://intra.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf>

standards<sup>40</sup>. The methodology should make reference to the OECD Guidelines on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace building as they are relevant to this situation.<sup>41</sup>

The consultant is expected to work with the Team Leader to develop a Theory of Change (TOC), which will represent the framework for examining the effectiveness of UNDP's support to crisis prevention and recovery. Given that this will reflect the thinking behind the choice of specific interventions to address identified gaps and needs; this will need to be developed retrospectively with the help of programme staff, ideally who were there at the time the programmes/projects were developed. The relevance and appropriateness of the TOC will then be tested by the evaluation in terms and may need to be adjusted going forward if the needs/gaps or even the wider context changed.

The evaluation in southern Sudan will follow 3 distinct phases:

1. Preparation - review of the Terms of Reference, preliminary desk review, meetings with the UNDP programme and support the process to produce an Inception Report;
2. Conduct of the evaluation – Field mission including meeting with donors and relevant stakeholders
3. Follow up – Production of an evaluation report on the situation in southern Sudan, and coordination with other team members to finalise the overall report.

#### 4.1 Preparation

##### *A programme portfolio review/document review*

This desk review will be carried out prior to the consultant arriving in Sudan. Due to the broad scope of UNDP's work in crisis prevention and recovery a very large number of documents and reports (published and unpublished) are available for review. Some may be subject to only a general review while others will require detailed scrutiny. Key sources of information will include programme and project documents, results frameworks, quarterly and annual reports, evaluations and documents related to relevant work of other organisations. UNDP will create an online repository for these documents so that the evaluation team can access this data before the evaluation mission.

##### *Stakeholder analysis*

Based on the desk review and professional knowledge of the issues, the consultant should conduct a stakeholder analysis which will be carried out to identify organizations working in the area of crisis prevention and recovery in Sudan. With the support of the UNDP Sudan office, this analysis should be used to ascertain which individuals and organizations need to be included as part of the consultation process during the evaluation mission.

##### *Production of the Inception Report*

Based on the desk review, the consultant will support the Team Leader to produce an Inception Report for the overall evaluation. The Consultant will however, be expected to provide particular input on the southern Sudan portion of the report. The inception report should outline at a minimum the following issues:

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<sup>40</sup> [http://www.unevaluation.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc\\_id=21](http://www.unevaluation.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=21)

<sup>41</sup> [http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en\\_21571361\\_34047972\\_39774574\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf)



- a. A clear purpose and scope of the evaluation, which includes a clear statement of the objectives of the evaluation and an outline of the main issues to be examined
- b. An outline of the evaluation criteria and questions that the evaluation will use to assess performance.
- c. The evaluation methodology, including methods used for collecting data and their sources (which include qualitative and quantitative data collection strategies), including a rationale for their selection, as well as data collection tools with an explanation of their reliability and validity and a sampling plan. The methodology will take into consideration country-level data limitations.
- d. An evaluation matrix which identifies the key evaluation questions and an indication of how the team expects these questions to be answered.
- e. Evaluation Work Plan outlining tasks, a revised schedule of the evaluation milestones and responsibility of the evaluation team members.

#### 4.2 Conduct of the Evaluation

Prior to the evaluation field mission, UNDP will designate an Evaluation Manager, who will assume the day-to-day responsibilities for managing the evaluation process and serve as the focal point for ensuring the evaluation runs smoothly. In addition UNDP will identify an Evaluation Reference Group comprised of the key national stakeholders. This group will ensure the national ownership of the evaluation and work closely with the Evaluation Manager to guide the process. It is therefore imperative that the evaluation method ensures that the perspectives of different stakeholders are captured and recommendations are validated through the prism of nationally-owned priorities.

Against this background the field mission will be based on the following modules:

- ❑ The main source of information will be through structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews and consultations. In some cases, focus group discussions may be held to capture the dynamic of information sharing and debate, and to enrich the findings. The consultations will involve a wide range of development stakeholders, including government officials, UN agencies, UNDP project managers, donors, NGO, INGOs, and groups of beneficiaries.
- ❑ Exploration of the reality/ implementation of CPR programme will be carried out mainly through in-depth study involving field visits to selected project sites and analysis of relevant secondary data, in conjunction with partners, stakeholders and staff involved in delivery of the programmes and operation activities.
  - ❑ Meeting of the Reference Group and other key stakeholders to present the initial findings of the evaluation at the end of the field mission
  - ❑ Incorporating comments and producing the substantive assessment of the situation on southern Sudan, as a major contribution to the final evaluation report. Delivery of the final evaluation report will be the responsibility of the Team Leader.

#### 4.3 Follow-up and Learning

The findings of the evaluation report will be reviewed jointly by UNDP and national stakeholders and partners to ensure that the key recommendations are incorporated into the

design of new projects and programmes. The UNDP CO will draft a management response outlining how the evaluation findings will be applied.

### 5. Evaluation outputs and time-frame for Consultancy (Based in Juba)

The key evaluation outputs include:

- Support the Team Leader in drafting the Inception Report of the evaluation, which includes the evaluation methodology and evaluation work plan outlining tasks and responsibilities of the evaluation team members (as detailed above). This will be done by remote access and discussion between the consultant and the Team Leader.
- Power Point presentation for UNDP, national counterparts and other stakeholders on the preliminary findings, lessons learned and recommendations in southern Sudan.
- Draft the section of the report covering the issues outlined in the terms of reference and inception report including evaluation approach, findings and conclusions, lessons and recommendations, as they relate to the situation in southern Sudan.
- Provide a Peer Review of the work of the other consultants in the team
- Attend a final coordination meeting with the Team Leader in February 2011 outside Sudan (location to be confirmed) to discuss final issues and validate the final results/conclusions of the overall evaluation.

The consultant will deliver a coherent report which will constitute a substantive contribution to the overall evaluation report. The following components provide guidance to how this section could be structured. However, the agreed structure for this contribution should be articulated in the inception report, in agreement with the direction set by the Team Leader and the endorsement of the Country office.

- Introduction
- Analysis of the situation with regard to outcome, outputs, resources, partnerships, management and working methods and/or implementation strategy
- Key findings
- Conclusions and practical, actionable recommendations for the future program implementation
- Annexes including
- Itinerary
- List of persons interviewed
- Summary of field visits
- List of documents reviewed
- Client online survey and/or questionnaire (if any) used and summary of results
- Any other relevant material that supports evaluation findings and recommendations

### 6. Time-frame of the Evaluation

#### Evaluation schedule

Activity	Timeframe	Days of Effort	Location	Responsible Party
Desk review and support the draft of the inception report outlining evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan, with specific	9-15 November 2010	7	Home-based	Consultant in collaboration with Team Leader

input on south Sudan				
Provide final inputs into inception report, based on CO feedback.	Before 27 November 2010	1	TBD	Consultant in collaboration with Team Leader
In-country field mission, including presentation of preliminary findings and Draft Recommendations to senior management and Reference Group in Juba	24 November – 9 December 2010	16	Juba, with visits to other states in Southern Sudan as required.	International consultant and national consultant
Finalization of assessment report on southern Sudan	Before 15 January 2011	7	Home-based	Consultant
Peer review of other contributions of consultancy team	Before 15 February 2011	1	Home based	Consultant
Out of Sudan coordination meeting	Before 15 February	2	TBD	Consultant

## 7. Management of the Evaluation

UNDP Sudan will institute the evaluation manager function which will act as the focal point for managing the evaluation process. The Juba office will nominate its evaluation manager, who will provide administrative and substantive backstopping support. The Evaluation Manager will ensure the coordination and liaison with concerned agencies in southern Sudan and ensure the evaluation is conducted in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System.

## 8. Quality Assurance

The Reference Group will comprise of government counterparts and UNDP staff and will provide oversight of the evaluation process, exercising quality assurance. The Reference Group will play an important role in providing strategic, methodological and substantive advice into the evaluation process as well as a peer review for the key outputs including the main report. Meetings of the Reference Group will be specified in the evaluation work plan. However, the evaluation will be fully independent and the consultant will retain enough flexibility to determine the best approach to collecting and analyzing data for the outcome evaluation. Ultimately, the findings and recommendations of the evaluation will be attributed to the Consultant and if agreed upon by the full Evaluation Team, reflect the opinion of evaluation team alone.

## 9. Evaluation Team

The core evaluation team will comprise of 5 independent consultants, an International Team Leader, 2 international consultants and 2 national consultants.

The *Team Leader* will take a lead role during the evaluation and coordinate the work of all other team members. The team leader will ensure the quality of the evaluation process, outputs, methodology and timely delivery of all products. The team leader, in close collaboration with the other evaluation team members and the UNDP evaluation managers,

will take the lead role in conceptualization and design of the evaluation and shaping the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the report.

- The Tasks of the International Team Leader will include the following:
- Develops an inception report and details the design, methodology (including the methods for data collection and analysis criteria for selection of projects, required resources), and work plan of the evaluation team.
- Directs and conducts the research and analysis of all relevant documentation;
- Decides the division of labour within the evaluation team and coordinates team tasks within the framework of the TORs;
- Oversees and quality assures the preparation of the study and takes a lead in the analysis of the evaluative evidence;
- Oversees the administration, and analysis of the results of the data collection exercise;
- Drafts the evaluation report, and coordinates the inputs from team members;
- Prepares for meetings with UNDP and other stakeholder to review findings, conclusions and recommendations.
- Leads the stakeholder feedback sessions, briefs UNDP on the evaluation through informal sessions and finalizes the report based on feedback from the quality assurance process;
- Delivers the final evaluation report

- The International consultant assigned to conduct the evaluation in southern Sudan (this terms of reference) will provide support to the Team Leader and be responsible for the deliverables outlined in section 5 & 6 above, as well as other responsibilities (division of labour) agreed with the Team Leader and subsequently defined in the Inception report. The International Consultant will work together with the National Consultant assigned to support the evaluation process in southern Sudan. The responsibilities of the National Consultant will be defined in the Inception report, and will focus on the following tasks:

The **National Consultant in Juba** will provide the expertise in the crisis prevention and recovery with sound understanding of the Sudan context. The evaluation specialist is expected to perform the following tasks:

- Review relevant documents;
- Conduct an analysis of the outcome, outputs, and partnership strategy
- Carry out fieldwork and data collection as per the inception report and Terms of reference
- Draft related parts of the evaluation report as agreed on the division of labor with the team leader
- Assist the International Consultant in finalizing the southern Sudan input for the final evaluation report including incorporating suggestions received on draft related to his/her assigned sections.

## 10. Reference materials

At a minimum, the Consultant should study and make reference to the following documents during the conduct of the outcome evaluation:

- UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results

- UNEG Ethical Guidelines For Evaluation
- Evaluation report template and quality standards (UNDP)
- UNDP Results-Based Management: Technical Note
- United Nations Common Country Assessment (CCA) for Sudan (2007)
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan (2009-2012)
- UNDP Country Programme Document and UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (2009-2012)
- UNDP Results-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) for Sudan (2007-2009)
- CPRU project documents, project reports and project evaluation reports.
- CCF-2 and the Bridging Programme documents
- CCF2 Evaluation Report (2009)
- Sudan 5 year strategic Plan
- Other documents and materials related to the outcomes to be evaluated (from the government, donors, etc.)

## Annex C: Inception Report Evaluation Matrix<sup>42</sup>

### Project Sampling

The evaluation will conduct a review of a representative sampling of projects from across the CPR portfolio through review of monitoring reports and site visits. The overall sampling:

- a. Should select sites that represent at least 20 percent of the total value of project activities
- b. Include at least one project/activity from each of the four programme areas, with actual project allocation reflecting the major areas of programme investment
- c. Include a geographic spread that reflects the main areas of programme concentration and the resources and time available to travel:
- d. Prior monitoring and/or evaluation documentation is available, to ensure adequate documental support. However, the evaluation shall avoid sites where significant pervious evaluation has been done.
- e. Accessibility, given the current situation with the referendum.
- f. Preference will be given to sites where there is more than one project ongoing.
- g. Sites where there are activities women and youth will be purposively selected.

### Possible sites for visit

The Evaluation Team was not in a position to confirm the sites for field visits as the Inception report was being drafted. A list of proposed sites will be confirmed by finalization of the report, at which time documents will have been further reviewed and the field study in Southern Sudan initiated.

#### *Possible locations for Northern Sudan:*

- Khartoum
- South Kordofan (Muglad and Babanusa for MA, Kadougli and Delenj for DDR and RRP and the Joint Programme)
- Kassala for livelihoods and women empowerment, MA and DDR
- Abyei for recovery and RRP
- Blue Nile for WAAF, MA and RRP
- Darfur (Capitals of the 3 States and some accessible areas) for livelihoods.

#### *Possible sites for Southern Sudan*

- Juba and Central Equatorial State
- 2 states to be selected (Lakes Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Upper Nile)

### Meetings with Stakeholders

The evaluation could not undertake a stakeholder analysis in the inception phase. The country office did not provide inputs to this. Therefore a preliminary list taken from project documents was compiled. In the case of the South, this was discussed with the country office when preparing the programme for the team. In the North, it is hoped that this can be

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<sup>42</sup> The Annex C *Evaluation Matrix* is an excerpt from the final *Inception Report*, dated 08 December 2010.

undertaken by the National Consultant with the evaluation manager before the preparation of the field programme.

### **Common Evaluation Questions**

To ensure coherence between the evaluation of programmes in the North and Southern Sudan, the evaluation shall refer to a set of common questions. These questions shall inform both the review of documents and the interview and verification activities undertaken during the field mission. The questions shall also:

- Address the more generic issues of efficiency and effectiveness identified in under the evaluation criteria; and
- Include specific questions developed for common programmes under taken in both the North and Southern Sudan, including for DDR, Mine Action and the Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme. The full set of questions for these programmes will be developed on completion of the document review.
- There will be an adaptation of the questions for the specific programmes and that adapt to contextual conditions, but the core will be maintained so that there can be some comparability in evaluating progress in outcomes.
- Given the short visits to few sites, it is important to recognize that the information gathered though the interviews are not comprehensive but indicative. It will be analyzed in conjunction with available data, previous evaluations, and internal reporting.

### **Common questions on the Evaluation Criteria**

#### *Questions on Relevance*

1. What perception of the programme's relevance do stakeholders (UNDP, Donors, Government and beneficiaries) have?
2. Does the programme, in its objectives and design, effectively address the key national policy goals and development needs and relevant to the operational context in the sector of intervention? Why or why not?
3. Are the objectives and design of the project still relevant given changed circumstances? If not, what adjustments are required?

#### *Questions on Effectiveness*

4. What perception of programme effectiveness do stakeholders have?
5. What progress has been made towards achieving the objectives of the programme, based on the indicators and baseline information provided in the document?
6. What factors have affected the progress (or expected to affect results) either positively or negatively (politically, sociological, economically) and how have these factors limited or facilitated the progress
7. Have there been significant deviations from the original objectives and design? What were the causes of these deviations, how has the programme been adapted and what achievements have been realized?

#### *Questions on Efficiency*

8. What is the perception of major stakeholders of the efficiency of the UNDP's management of the programmes? What are major areas of stakeholder concern?

9. Have programme outputs delivered in a timely manner? If not, what have been the reasons for the delays?
10. How efficient has the UNDP's management and implementation of the programme been? Have the systems and procedures implemented by UNDP increased or hindered efficiency?
11. What were the major factors affecting efficiency, positively or negatively? Within the UNDP? Within the donor and counterpart organizations? Within the programme environment? What actions has UNDP taken to address constraints?
12. Are there specific obstacles to implementation that affect efficiency? How has the UNDP adapted to the situation?
13. To what extent have coordination mechanisms contributed or detracted from overall efficiency?

#### *Questions on Sustainability*

14. What perception do stakeholders have of outcomes that have been achieved by the programme?
15. What evidence of outcomes can be observed? Were these intended, or unintended? Positive or negative outcomes?

#### *Questions on Outcomes*

16. What perception do stakeholders have of outcomes that have been achieved by the programme?
17. What evidence of outcomes can be observed? Were these intended, or unintended? Positive or negative outcomes?

### **Common Questions for Cross-cutting Issues**

#### *Gender/Youth*

18. Were/how did the project incorporate gender/youth concerns into its design, targets and indicators?
19. Did the project disaggregate information by gender and age? How and when was it done and did it help in implementation?
20. Were there missed opportunities in which gender and youth concerns could have been addressed and were not?

#### *Conflict Sensitive of Programming*

21. Did the programme undertake a conflict assessment in the design or Implementation phase? Did the project utilize the services of the CRMA/TRMA in designing the programme? Was this information integrated into the programme design?
22. When delivering services in a conflict environment, it is important to reduce tensions and grievances and "do no harm". Can you provide examples of how the programme ensured that it did not aggravate rivalries or tensions?
23. Where there particular geographic areas that were particularly hard to work in due to the existing conflicts? How did the project deal with these situations to reduce tensions?

### **Common questions for the National Programmes**



24. Common questions for the National Programme will be completed after the Southern Sudan Assessment and the Document review of National programmes and Northern Programmes completed, due to late recruitment of consultant assigned to Northern Programmes.

#### **Possible Questions for Focus Groups**

25. In the event that focus groups are included into the methodology, the following questions may be used with stakeholders. Given the difficulties in organization of the field missions, it is unclear if focus groups will be possible and viable in terms of a data collection method. It will be pursued at the field level with the country office. As we have no lists of stakeholders at this point, it may not be a workable approach.

These questions summarize the main evaluation issues:

- a. Did UNDP do what it stated it would do?
- b. What can the UNDP learn about what worked, and what did not work?
- c. What difference did it make that UNDP participated in any particular project or programme?
- d. What could UNDP do differently?
- e. How does UNDP plan to use the evaluation findings for continuous learning?
- f. What considerations will be important for the UNDP, as recommendations for working in post-referendum Sudan?

## Annex D: List of Informants<sup>43</sup>

### Government of Southern Sudan

1. Aguti Adut Aguti, CSAC Bureau Senior Inspector, Jonglei State
2. Teddy Akello, Demining Commission on Mines Action Project
3. Rev. James Apay Ochalla, Chairman, Peace Commission, Jonglei State
4. Tobias Atari, Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation
5. Madelena Biato Atiol, Minister, Ministry of Culture & Social Development, Torit,
6. Simon Auwas, Acting Director General, Ministry of Local Government
7. Colonel Ben Bilal Mamur, Deputy Police Commissioner, EES, Torit, Eastern Equatoria State
8. Eng. Silvas Clark Amozay, Director General of Housing and Urban Development, Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment
9. Beshir Deng, Chairman, State Steering Committee, Jonglei State
10. Maj. General Daniel Deng Lual, Head CSAC Bureau and two CSAC Bureau officials
11. Nyang Chol Dhuor, Deputy Chairman Person, Southern Sudan Demining Commission, and Makuei Philemon Majok, Akello Teddy Shiela and Mike Rashid Fulla, SSDC personnel
12. Gabriel Duop Lam, Minister, Ministry of Law Enforcement in Jonglei State
13. Achomo Mary Buyu, State Director for EES, Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
14. Charles Col, Ministry of Financial and Economic Planning
15. Abe Enosa, Director General, Southern Sudan Mine Action
16. Gabriel Albert Lochoria, Director, Peace Commission, EES, Torit, Eastern Equatoria State
17. Kamillo Loku Cornelius, Director for Programs, Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
18. Duom Kuol, Chairman of the RIEP Local Steering Committee for Jonglei State, and Kuol Aluong, Gabriel Gai, Andrew Wal, Committee members, Bor
19. Moses Mabior, Ministry of Financial and Economic Planning

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<sup>43</sup> The evaluation team held a number of groups meetings. Under conditions, it was not always possible to get complete information on all the informants present. The team apologises, therefore, for any errors or omissions in the Informant List.

20. Labanya Margaret Mathya Ugila, Director General, Southern Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics and Evaluation
21. George Ujjiga, Head of Programmes, Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund

#### **UNDP South Sudan**

1. Judith Achieng Omondi, Coordinator/Programme Specialist, TRMA project, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
2. George Conway, Deputy Head of Office (Programme), UNDP Southern Sudan Programme.
3. Challa Getachew, UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist / Team Leader a.i, Business Management Unit
4. Kunal Dhar, Programme Co-ordinator, Southern Sudan Recovery Fund, UNDP
5. Martin Dramani, Acting RRP Programme Manager and Programme Analyst for CPRU
6. Gariyu Ipaye, Senior Programme Specialist, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
7. Betsy Lippman, Project Coordinator/Programme Specialist, Individual Reintegration Project (and members of the project team).
8. Gian Luca, Technical Advisor, UNDP Southern Sudan Mine Action
9. Philip Lutara, UNDP Peace & Community Security Expert, Based at Peace Ministry, EES, Torit
10. Arike James, Programme Analyst, Governance and Rule of Law Unit, UNDP
11. Morning John, Programme Associate, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
12. Joris Magenti, Monitoring and Evaluation officer SRF, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
13. Sam Muhumure, Field Programme Manager, CSAC Project, CPR Unit, UNDP
14. Andrew Shuruma, Programme Analyst, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit

#### **United Nations Agencies and Mission**

1. Ibrahim Kamau, Engineer, UNOPS Juba
2. Stephen Pritchard, Capacity Development Advisor, Southern Sudan Mine Action Office

#### **Donors**

1. Emily Alexander, Policy Officer, Governance and Rule of Law Team, Joint Donor Team

#### **Others/NGOs**

2. Rachel Ayan, Chairperson, Poultry Project, Bor Widow Association, and Elizabeth Anger, Association member

3. SRF Project Manager Gasim, Norwegian Church Aid, Torit Model Market, Torit, Eastern Equatoria State
4. Members of the BRAC SRF- Round II programme staff, Bor, Jonglei State
5. Jean-Christophe Goussaud, Project Coordinator, Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, German Technical Cooperation
6. Kees Kingma, Consultant in Conflict and Development (DDR specialist)
7. Kathrin Nutt, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, German Technical Cooperation
8. Rose Wahome, Area Program Manager, Jonglei and Unity, Save the Children in South Sudan, Bor, Jonglei State
9. RIEP Project Manager and personnel, CARITAS, Torit, eastern Equatoria State
10. Elizabeth Yom, Member of the Administrative Board and Trainer, Jale Women Association, Bor, Jonglei State

## Annex E: List of Documents Consulted

### General Reference Documents

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