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# Evaluation

# *Strengthening Capacities for Disaster Risk Management* in *the Islamic Republic of Iran 2005-2010*

***GoI and UNDP Programme***

**by**

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**July 2011**

3rd Draft

# List of Acronyms

ADPC Asian Disaster Preparedness Center

BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

BHRC Building and Housing Research Centre

CBDRM Community Based Disaster Risk Management

DEX Direct Execution

DRM Disaster Risk Management

DTF Disaster Task Force

EOC Emergency Operation Centre

GAR Global Assessment Report

GOI Government of Iran

IP Information Portal

IIEES International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology

IRIB Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting

IRSC Iran Red Crescent Society

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOE Ministry of Education

MOH Ministry of Health and Medical Science

MOI Ministry of Interior

MPO Management and Planning Organisation

NDMO National Disaster Management Office

NDRII Natural Disaster Research Institute of Iran

NDTF National Disaster Task Force

NEX National Execution

NPD National Project Director

NPM National Project Manager

NSET National Society for Earthquake Technology – Nepal

PO Programme Officer

PSC Project Steering Committee

SDC Swiss Development Cooperation

SDMC School Disaster Management Committee

SPAC Strategic Planning and Coordination Office

TCC Technical Core Committee

TDMMO Tehran Disaster Mitigation and Management Organisation

UERM Urban Earthquake Risk Management

UN United Nations

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNV United Nations Volunteers

WG Working Group

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# Executive Summary

In recognition of the high disaster risk status of Iran and the renewed commitment of the GoI and the UN in reducing future disaster risks after the Bam earthquake, the UNDAF Iran 2005-9/10 prioritized disaster risk management (DRM) as a key programming area. Consequently, in pursuit of common objectives UNDP Iran and GOI developed a Joint National Five-Year Disaster Risk Management Programme (2005-10, extended to the end of 2011) that focused on the three components and sub-components listed below:

*Component 1. Improving access to information on disaster risk and risk management*; Establish a national disaster risk management Information Portal (IP); Establish national disaster database/inventory, DesInventar; Prepare an Iran Disaster Risk Report;

*Component 2. Strengthening capacities at the city and community levels for effective urban earthquake risk management(UERM);* Implemented in two provinces, Kerman and Gorgan, in six areas of work: School safety and preparedness; Safe hospitals; Neighbourhood safety; City earthquake scenarios; Preparedness and response plans; Education and public awareness raising campaign; Re-enforcing building permit process;

*Components 3.Facilitating knowledge networking for disaster risk management at sub-regional level*.

The evaluation team, comprising of one international expert and one national consultant, spent a total of ten working days in Iran to interview the key stakeholders and observe sample activities in Kerman and Gorgan. The mixed methodological approach as per UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation guidelines was adopted, which primarily included desk research of secondary resources, interviews and consultations, field visits and observations.

The programme implementation modality was National Execution (NEX). It was cost-shared with a total estimated budget of US $ 6 million, out of which UNDP contributed US$ 1.5 million, while the government provided US$3.2 million. Close to half of UNDP funds were spent on Component 1, IP and DesInventar, while the GoI funds contributed largely to Component 2, the UERM. Majority of the programme staff and national consultants were covered out of the GoI budget, while UNDP paid for the international consultants and the staff of the Programme Office in Tehran.

Technical Affairs Deputy of the Management and Planning Organisation (MPO) that later became the Office of the Deputy President for Strategic Planning and Control (SPAC), was assigned by the former-Vice President as the Executing Agency of the Programme. By the end of 2009, the executive agency function had shifted from SPAC to NDMO. UNDP provided technical support, quality assurance and co-shared the finances.

Much of the implementation in all three components occurred from late 2006 to mid-2009. For the last year, there has been fewer activities and limited transfer of funds, mainly by UNDP, to the various components of the programme. While UNDP allocated its funding timely, there were initial delays with the GoI funding. This was largely due to the different calendar years between UNDP and the GoI that resulted in lack of harmonization of financial management and integrated management of the programme.

**Findings**

**Appropriateness:** The UERM at the provincial level and the DRM capacity building objectives are appropriate in addressing some of the gaps in Iran. Successful urban risk management requires an interrelated set of measures to act in tandem, from public awareness to improved construction practices. These are correctly identified in the UERM component of the programme but are not sufficiently articulated in terms of time frame, capacities, and resources, as well as policy commitment and management structures required for any meaningful results. Improving information management of risks and sharing of information across the relevant organisations is an ongoing need in Iran. While the need is well identified, the institutional set up to manage and maintain the database and the instruments selected, IP and DesInventar, are not well suited for the context in Iran. Data management did not appear to be a priority, particularly at the provincial level where DesInventar was expected to be used for decision-making.

**Effectiveness:** The overall achievement of the programme has been higher at the product level in terms of numbers of training programmes delivered and consultations made; IP and DesInventar tools completed; number of public awareness material –posters, films, booklets- distributed; and earthquake drills conducted, etc. However, the capacity-building objective of the programme has been achieved in a limited way both at central and provincial levels. Some activities under the UERM could not be fully achieved. There is also room to improve content and communication quality of the training material and manuals that are now under way.

**Efficiency:** In a five-year programme, active implementation time was reduced to two years. The activities of the first two years were mostly in relation to negotiating the programme, establishing its management structure and initiation of a pilot school project. During the last year, there was no new programme funding for the provincial level implementation and only a limited number of activities were carried out from the provincial government budgets. High staff turnover from partner organisations and project management staff in Tehran and the field also interrupted continuity and learning. Cost-efficiency of the approach adopted could not fully be determined, as a complete breakdown of the programme budget was not available. Close to half of the UNDP funding went into component 1 that so far has achieved limited sustainable results. High number of external consultants -national and international- and project staff resulted in spending sizable part of the funds for management and technical support.

**Impact:** Significant institutional learning happened at SPAC. Programme management procedures and standards established by UNDP were complicated and time consuming, but they set new standards within SPAC for future international cooperation in DRM. Programme impact on improved teamwork and inter-sectoral coordination was good at the provincial level and less effective at the national level. Impact from Components 1 and 3 remain negligible, while Component 2 (UERM) stands out as the most influential part of the programme. Nevertheless, progress with the more technical areas of UERM has been demanding for the local authorities. Public impact from the various awareness raising and safety programmes could only be assessed indirectly. There was no impact measurement of the communication material and strategies except for the TV broadcasting component in Gorgan that probably created the most sustainable impact due to its active messaging and continuity. Safe schools activity achieved a better coverage than the safe hospitals.

**Sustainability:** There are useful achievements and valuable experiences from the current project that can inform the next steps. At the same time, the specific activities and outcomes from this programme can be sustained or scaled up only if serious organisational and financial investment is made, and policy and strategic decisions to continue with the programme are taken by the GoI. Experiences built and increased awareness of DRM within SPAC will positively influence sustainability of DRM and can support its mainstreaming into relevant sectors, such as education and health. A policy and dedicated institutional base for information and data sharing are essential for any continuity with the IP and database. As they stand, both activities need a major input and a new institutional commitment and engagement to become sustainable. A comprehensive approach to UERM with six distinctive areas of work is proven to be beyond the technical, institutional and financial capacities of the provincial authorities. There is sufficient momentum to continue with select components of the UERM, mainly with school and hospital safety and TV public broadcasting.

**Conclusions**

Results from the consultations and desk review revealed that the programme increased awareness of DRM among the stakeholders; fostered better coordination particularly among the various local organisations in the two provinces; delivered several of the intended outputs such as an information portal, a database and piloted a number of demonstration projects at the field level. Progress at the provincial level was more evident in response preparedness aspects of DRM. Programme was weaker at the outcome level as policy changes for scaling up the good practices are yet to be advanced; institutional structures and relationships for a more comprehensive approach to DRM are to be established.

* The most significant overall development achievement by UNDP out of this programme was the leveraging of funding from the GoI and from the local government budgets for DRM.
* International partnership is highly valued by the programme partners and UNDP is perceived as the window to the outside world, expected to facilitate international opportunities for the programme partners.
* Programme introduced training based, ‘low cost’ and ‘soft’ approaches to DRM that are appreciated by the provincial authorities. However, the institutional structure for the more participatory approaches such as the community based DRM (mahalle projects) is weak in Iran. Therefore, results pertaining to this part of the programme were not significant.

**Recommendations: Current Programme**

1. **UNDP needs to facilitate a dialogue for an ‘exit’ or a ‘transition’ strategy as soon as possible**. For this purpose, it needs to coordinate with the MoFA, NDMO and SPAC.
2. **The original objective of the Programme to pilot a range of DRM activities with a view to scale up the effective components should be maintained**. Providing continuity to the successful examples will motivate the stakeholders and promote the programme objectives wider.
3. **Safe schools initiative could be considered for scaling up as an effective and efficient component of the programme**. A dialogue needs to be established between the MoE and the relevant stakeholders such as the IIEES, IRCS, SPAC, etc to develop a strategy to scale up.
4. **A dialogue needs to be established with the relevant sectors for policy and strategy attention and handover** **of the** **outputs and outcomes of the programme**, particularly in the areas of safe hospitals and public awareness.
5. **Dissemination of the ongoing documentation of the UERM experiences and material should be supported.** UNDP can provide support to ensure quality of communication and technical accuracy of the information.
6. **UNDP support to database and knowledge networking should be demand driven channelled by the MoI/NDMO**. UNDP should provide technical exchange and examples upon request.
7. **Support/facilitate the use of relevant existing programmes for enhanced DRM impact.** For example, to learn from the Tehran Disaster Management and Mitigation Office (TDMMO) Programme on earthquake loss estimation for other high-risk municipalities in Iran.
8. **UNDP should also consider technical support on information management for the *Asia and Pacific (regional) Center for Development of Disaster Information Management* (APDIM)** to be established in Tehran with funding from the GoI.

**Recommendations: Working Modalities for Future Engagements**

Bearing in mind the provisions of the UNDAF as well as the findings above, a number of recommendations are made regarding the future working modalities and strategic issues.

* **Future programme support to Iran must be situated in the country’s risk profile, socio-political and administrative context** and avoid replicating other country experiences and products without adjustment to needs.
* **Based on the experience of the current programme, a long-term, comprehensive conceptual DRM framework should be maintained, with an incremental approach to implementation** thatcan enhance learning by doing and better serve the capacity building ambitions of the DRM.
* **Despite the apparent difficulties, UNDP should maintain its principle role of ‘filling gaps’ ‘making connections’ in DRM and introducing innovative approaches and partnerships.** UNDP’s role in supporting well functioning institutions should focus on linking their activities and capacities innovatively where they are needed –nationally and internationally.
* **Based on the current programme experience, any new piloting or testing should be planned with an ‘institutional home’ and a strategy for their scaling up.** Experience from the pilots of the current programme points to the need to have greater clarity on the institutional responsibilities, policy framework and the resources required to scale up any approach before embarking upon more pilots.
* **In future, co-financing modality and procedures need to be clarified fully** for the benefit of MoFA, Mo Economic Affairs and its Senior Monitoring Accountant of the executing and implementing partners.
* **Reflecting from the SPAC experience, an effective management structure has to be developed from the start** that keeps management and implementation separate.
* **Steps should be taken to involve the MoI, MoFA, NDMO and SPAC from the start to define the programme management and implementation modalities**, as well as decision-making mechanism with the implementing partners.
* **Place additional advisory and other capacities required within the organisations, such as in NDMO for increased capacity in coordination and management**. Experience indicates that parallel structures reduced ownership and sustainability within the institutions.

# Introduction

Iran is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world. Earthquakes, floods, droughts and sandstorms are the main hazards and more recently typhoons have affected parts of the country. A large part of the country is also prone to droughts, which creates severe stress in the rural areas. This high susceptibility to multiple disaster risks experienced across the country is well documented. Iran’s main concern however remains to be the seismic risks. Due to its position in the Alpine-Himalayan mountain system, Iran is highly vulnerable to frequent and often severe earthquakes. Therefore, most scientific and technical efforts are directed towards earthquake risk management.

Iran and the UNDP had developed a fruitful cooperation in the field of disaster management after the Manjil earthquake of 1990 in the area of hazard and risk mapping. Over the years, their cooperation has gradually expanded through the implementation of several programmes for strengthening national capacities in disaster risk reduction and preparedness. With support from the UNDP, an Integrated National Disaster Management Plan (INDMP) was developed and approved by the Cabinet in April 2003. The INDMP provides a framework for emergency management at the national, provincial and local levels during preparedness, mitigation and recovery phases. UNDP has also provided critical support for recovery efforts in the aftermath of Bam and Lorestan earthquakes.

Iran has significant experience and capacity in relief and emergency response as well as in some technical areas of disaster risk management, such as hazard and risk mapping, earthquake engineering and reconstruction planning. It has strong technical institutions and institutional arrangements for disaster management at the national level. However, the capacities at the local level remain relatively weak and the ‘soft’ approaches to disaster risk management such as community based risk reduction are relatively new concepts.

In recognition of the high disaster risk status of Iran and the renewed commitment of the GoI and the UN in reducing future disaster risks after the Bam earthquake, the UNDAF Iran 2005-9/10 prioritized disaster risk management (DRM) as a key programming area. Consequently, in pursuit of common objectives as listed in CPAP, UNDP Iran and GOI developed a Joint National Five-Year Disaster Risk Management Programme (2005-10, extended to the end of 2011) that focused on the three components and sub-components listed below:

1. Improving access to information on disaster risk and risk management;

* Establish a national Disaster risk management Information Portal (IP).
* Establish national disaster database/inventory, DesInventar
* Prepare an Iran Disaster Risk Report

1. **Strengthening capacities at the city and community levels for effective urban earthquake risk management(UERM);** Implemented in two locations, Kerman and Gorgan in 6 areas of work: School safety and preparedness; Safe hospitals; Neighbourhood safety; City earthquake scenarios; Preparedness and response plans; Education and public awareness raising campaign; Re-enforcing building permit process.
2. **Facilitating knowledge networking for DRM at sub-regional level**. The current programme will be finalised by the end of 2011; however, the new UNDAF will continue to focus on DRM as one of its core areas.

## 2.1. Methodology

The evaluation team, comprising of one international expert and one National consultant, spent ten working days in Iran to interview key stakeholders and observe sample activities in Kerman and Gorgan. The programme staff for Component 1, Mr Shamseddini had organized all the meetings and accompanied the team during the interviews and field visits.

The mixed methodological approach as per UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation guidelines was adopted, which primarily included desk research of secondary resources, interviews and consultations, field visits and observations.

The evaluation team undertook extensive desk review of secondary documents (annex 1), including programme documents, reports, minutes of technical and steering group meetings, UNDP ATLAS reports and risk logs, M&E reports, technical expert and consultant reports, training documents and samples of training materials and guidelines from the field. Few of the documents were available in English while the rest were documented in Farsi only. Given the time constraints only a summary of the key reports in Farsi were translated into English.

Documentation was limited for the period after mid-2009. Detailed risk financial logs and audits were available from the UNDP. The team could not access the breakdown of the financial support provided by the GoI. There was no up to date consolidated documentation of the programme outputs and figures. Risk logs were kept up to date and quarterly reports were available. The programme had not been externally evaluated before so that a formal baseline for the current evaluation had not been formed. A number of internal stocktaking exercises and one Joint Government of Iran /UNDP Review for the purpose of stocktaking, documentation of knowledge and lessons learned were under taken in early 2009 that provided some basis for this evaluation.

The team had consultations with individuals that have been involved in the management and implementation of the various activities. The number of programme staff and partner organisation personnel engaged in the programme was significant (annex 2) and their turnover had been high. It was therefore not possible to consult every responsible person in the given time frame. Nevertheless, the team made best efforts to contact the critical respondents either by telephone or by sending a set of questions with mixed success. Unfortunately, it was not possible to interview anyone from the NDMO due to the prior commitments and travel of staff. Only a few of the technical consultants were available and it was not possible to contact the international consultants due to the time limitations.

The team visited Kerman and Gorgan provinces and met with the POs, public officials and other partners to get first-hand account of programme achievements in the area of Urban Earthquake Disaster Risk Management. In Kerman, extensive group and separate individual discussions with the Working Group (WG) leads were held, while in Gorgan only a joint WG discussion was organized. In both provinces, the team visited a number of project sites such as the participating schools and hospitals that were pre-selected by the provincial authorities. Extensive discussions with the responsible staff of the schools and hospitals were held, non-structural mitigation measures inspected and in Kerman school safety demonstrations were observed. In Gorgan, schools were closed therefore no safety demonstration could be observed. In both provinces, no Neighbourhood Safety Project (Mahalle Project) site visits were organized and information was not available regarding their continuity. In Gorgan, it was not possible to meet the NGO that was responsible for the Neighbourhood Safety Project. In Kerman, the consultants that were in charge of the Building Standards Project were not available for an interview. In both provinces, provincial Programme Officers (POs) accompanied the team and provided useful information.

Programme was largely run by consultants and hired staff. High turnover of both the programme and government personnel rendered it difficult to capture all details of the process. Evaluation team balanced these constraints with extensive document review and focused on the results in terms of Programme achievements, impact and key lessons learned.

## 2.2 Programme objectives

UNDP Iran and GOI Joint National Five-Year Disaster Risk Management Programme (2005-10) aimed for the broad objective of “strengthened disaster risk management capacity, including enhanced community awareness and participation and enhanced coordination mechanisms among all stakeholders at local and national levels”.

Putting this broad objective into practice, the Programme focuses on the three following strategic directions: i) Improving access to information on disaster risk and risk management; ii)Strengthening capacities at the city and community levels for effective earthquake risk management; iii) Facilitating knowledge networking for disaster risk management at the sub-regional level in Central and South West Asia.

While droughts and floods are among the hazards that also threaten Iran, the programme focuses on reducing risks associated only with one hazard, earthquakes.

## 2.3. Programme Management and Implementation Modality

The programme implementation modality was National Execution (NEX). It was cost-shared with a total estimated budget of US $ 6 million, out of which UNDP contributed US$ 1.5 million, while the government provided US$3.2 million. UNDP funds covered mostly Component 1and 3 and the GoI funds contributed largely to Component 2. Majority of the programme staff and national consultants were covered out of the GoI budget, while UNDP paid for the international consultants and the staff of Tehran Programme Office.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table: Budget Breakdown US$ 000[[1]](#footnote-1)** | | | |  |  |  |  |
|  | **UNDP TRAC I** | **UNDP TRAC III addendum 07** | **Total UNDP** | **UNDP %** | **Gov** | **Grand Total** | **%** |
| **Comp 1** | 700 | 15 | 715 | 100 | 0 | 715 | 23 |
| **Comp 2** | 300 | 350 | 650 | 29 | 1,600 | 2,250 | 73 |
| **Comp 3** | 0 | 135 | 135 | 100 | 0 | 135 | 4 |
| **Total** | 1,000 | 500 | 1,500 | 48 | 1,600 | 3,100 |  |

Comp1, UNDP TRAC I: Portal 150, DesInventar 250, GAR and NDR 300 TRAC III: NDR Workshop with BCPR-GRIP 15

Comp2, UNDP TRAC III: School Safety Project from Zarand EQ 50, Gender Mainstreaming 50, Animation 100, ICT Tools for public awareness 100, EOCs 100 Comp3, UNDP TRAC III: Linking NDR to Regional Reports with UNDP BCPR-GRIP Team+BRC 35, KN Fair in the sub-region with UNDP BCPR and BRC 100

UNDP provided technical support, quality assurance and co-shared the finances while a comprehensive structure was established to manage and implement the programme.

In line with the prevailing rules and regulations observed by UNDP country office the Technical Affairs Deputy of the Management and Planning Organisation (MPO), which later became the Office of the Deputy President for Strategic Planning and Control (SPAC), was assigned by the former Vice President as the Executing Agency of the Programme. That is because of SPAC’s central coordinating/technical role in developing national development plans, including for disaster reduction and national standards for DRM. SPAC maintained the overall accountability and management role for the Programme until the end of 2009 when the programme shifted to the National Disaster Management Organisation (NDMO).

National Disaster Task Force (NDTF) of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which later became the National Disaster Management Organisation (NDMO) through enactment of a law in 2008, is the national coordinating body regarding all activities related to DRM and implemented by any line ministry and agency. Provincial Governor Offices in Gorgan and Kerman lead the provincial and district branches of the Disaster Task Forces (later on NDMO). They coordinated the initiatives of all other line organisations at the provincial level such as MoH, MoE, Iran Red Crescent Society etc. In Gorgan, coordination of the Programme was through the existing Working Groups (WG) of the Disaster Task Forces. In Kerman, new WGs were established for this purpose as required by the Programme.

In accordance with its appointment as the Programme’s executing agency, the SPAC reported quarterly on the developments in the Programme to the High Task Force. A high level Steering Committee for strategic decisions and reviewing progress was established as part of the executive board with members from key implementing partners, presided by the Deputy of Technical Affairs of SPAC. A Technical Coordination Committee made up of staff with coordinating authority at senior level, such as from High Task Force, MFA, SPAC, UNDP and the line ministries as relevant, was set up as the technical arm of the Steering Committee to provide technical integration and synergies between the three components of the programme.

DRM Programme was designed to be implemented through collaboration of these partners:

* Management and Planning Organisation (MPO), later becoming the Strategic Planning and Control (SPAC),
* High Task Force in the First Vice President Office,
* Ministry of Interior (MOI)/National Disaster Task Force (NDTF), later becoming the NDMO
* Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution (IHF),
* Ministry of Housing and Urban Development,
* Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS),
* Association of Engineers,
* Building and Housing Research Centre (BHRC),
* International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology (IIEES),
* National NGOs and Associations.

Throughout the implementation of the programme, organisational mandates and roles have changed and by the end of 2009, the executive agency function had shifted from SPAC to NDMO. Level of participation and the role of partner organisations have also changed in this period and some, such as IIEES and BHRC, became less active partners. The Steering Committee that played a strong role in directing and reviewing the programme lost some momentum over time. Much of the technical support came from international and national consultants and consultancy firms. Some technical support was also provided by UNDP regional office and the BCPR in Geneva, particularly in developing the initial framework and information management component of the Programme.

Three National Programme Directors (NPDs) were appointed in Tehran, Kerman and Gorgan to provide overall management. Significant numbers of additional staff and consultants have been engaged with this initiative as none of the executive organisations had sufficient existing capacities to manage this programme. As for the programme management staff, UNDP provided two International UN Volunteers (DRM and ICT experts) and a DesInventar consultant for a period of 24 months in 2006 and 2007. Tehran Programme Office hired eight staff and four national volunteers and the provinces hired seven staff in each. Extra office space and equipment were provided from the Programme to facilitate the functioning of the new staff.

The Programme start up was delayed for several months as nomination process for NPDs in Tehran and provinces was initially time consuming. Transfer of funds also took time due to difference in financial calendars applied by the UN and the GoI. While some activities started earlier, full implementation started in 2006. UNDP provided support at programme start up especially with the establishment of a Programme Secretariat (PS); supported the early recruitments of national staff, consultants and the United Nations Volunteers (UNV’s). The technical trainings were outsourced to Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) and National Society for Earthquake Technology – Nepal (NSET). UNDP also supported the PS in development of M&E Plan by outsourcing the work to a national consultant and M&E staff in Kerman and Gorgan.

# Programme description and Outputs

Programme maintained the original framework comprised of three key components and their sub-components throughout despite different levels of achievement in their implementation and delivery. Component 2, implemented in the two provinces, advanced the most while Component 3 could not make any significant progress.

Two more activities, a ‘needs assessment’ training in Kerman and Gorgan and a ‘gender assessment’ training, were later added to the programme. One gender mainstreaming ToT workshop at national level and two additional ones in the pilot cities were organized in 2008 and 2009 along with two workshops for Sisters Theology Schools in Tehran in 2010 with UNDP facilitation.

**Component 1. Improving access to information on disaster risk and risk management.**

lran has significant scientific and technical capacities on different aspects of disaster risk management. The country hosts a number of institutions with international reputation that compile and have access to a range of relevant data and information. Sophisticated hazard and risk mapping are also advanced, including the JICA supported project within the Tehran Disaster Mitigation and Management and Organisation (TDMMO).

**Sub-component 1.1: National Disaster Risk Management Information Portal (IP).**

Main objective of this sub-component is to collect and consolidate existing information on disaster risks in Iran from a range of institutions through developing an information hub. In addition to being a resource repository, the Portal is expected to provide an interactive forum on sector specific community of practice networks for exchange of information and knowledge. A national consultant conducted a Needs Assessment with over 30 partner agencies. The GIS interface for the portal was designed by a private IT company and housed by SPAC IT Department for testing, and subsequently transferred to NDMO. Initial procurement problems due to sanctions and technical problems in developing the software resulted in delays in making the Portal operational. Much time and money went into developing the software and ultimately a standard one was procured and adapted. The original plan that disasters would be managed through communication of all relevant departments via the Portal has not yet been materialised.

Over 40 Information and Communication Technology focal points of the NDMO Thematic Working Groups were trained on using/maintaining the IP and DesInventar systems. Knowledge networking consultants also trained and informed the staff in key institutions on knowledge networking.

Current Status:

* IP functions more as a website than a national portal with very few interactive information and limited active uploading from the partner and user organisations.
* Confidentiality issues regarding public access to information that is deemed sensitive were raised as a possible challenge regarding the consolidation of information for IP resource repository.
* Limited awareness of public agencies, technical bodies and public at large around usage of IP might have influenced the membership and subscription rates for community of practice platforms.
* Use of IP platforms for information sharing is not part of the work culture; incentives for systematically sharing knowledge are not yet in place.
* Institutionalisation, ownership and sustainability of IP within NDMO are yet to be established and supported.

**Sub-component 1.2: National Disaster Database/Inventory, DesInventar**

Iran has a good inventory of data on multiple hazards and disaster losses. However, disparate data has not been consolidated in a geo-referenced format, particularly at provincial level, in order to facilitate informed decision making for risk reduction. Iran DesInventar database has been established to serve this purpose through provincial level data collected by university volunteers, who were trained by a UNDP consultant on data collection and entry. Data collected at the field level had to be screened and validated at the national level by the Government. Partner institutions and potential users were trained. DesInventar technical and user Guidelines were translated into Farsi and distributed. In collaboration with UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok, in December 2007, complementary trainings for the experts of the NDMO and the Programme were conducted. As a follow up to the change of responsibility from SPAC to NDMO, an action plan to institutionalise the database was developed jointly with UNDP and NDMO.

Current Status:

* Database is finalised and is available online covering 25 different hazards from 1979 (with scant additional data since 1955) to 2010. However, despite extensive training courses delivered, as was the case with the IP, awareness and use of the database were not evident at any levels of decision-making, including in Kerman and Gorgan that also took part in the trainings.
* The most concrete output from DesInventar so far has been the contribution of Iran to the ISDR Global Risk Assessment Report of 2009 and 2011.
* There have been institutional concerns over the quality and sustainability of data collection at the local level and its sustainability over time. Compatibility of data on various hazards and the shortness of 30 year time frame to reflect earthquake risk are also among the expressed concerns.
* Similar to the IP, confidentiality issues regarding public access to information that is deemed sensitive is an issue that affects wider sharing of data.
* Institutionalisation and sustainability of DesInventar for its maintenance and updating are yet to be materialised.

**Sub-component 1.3: Iran Disaster Risk Report**

The Iran Disaster Risk Report was planned to be produced based on the outputs of the risk information sub-components 1.1 and 1.2 with a view to map the existing and emerging spatial and temporal patterns of disaster risks in the country. The main purpose of the Report was to support advocacy efforts for the greater integration of disaster risk management in development processes and to provide baseline information on disaster risks in Iran.

Current Status:

A number of attempts were made and consultants contracted, but the Report could not be advanced fully. Differences of opinion among the institutions involved and sensitivities around the public dissemination of risk information contributed to the slow process of producing the Report.

**Component 2: Urban Earthquake Disaster Risk Management Programme (UERM) with a focus on local and intermediate levels**

The UERM is piloted in two medium size cities in high seismic risk zones. The two cities, Kerman and Gorgan, were selected as the pilot cities through a rigorous process based on the priorities of the GoI and a set of criteria agreed upon by UNDP. Partnership for learning and replication between the two pilot cities and others was envisaged in the original programme, but it did not progress.

The two cities adopted different structural approaches to management of the activities. Kerman had set up a parallel operational arrangement to the existing NDMO (former NDTF) structure by establishing WGs to match the programme components as was expected by SPAC and UNDP. Gorgan, opted for working within the existing provincial NDMO structures, hence kept the existing Task Force structure to function as WGs.

In both cities, six different sets of Working Groups worked in the following areas:

1. School safety and preparedness;
2. Safe hospitals;
3. Community-based disaster risk management (neighbourhood safety);
4. City earthquake scenario, preparedness and response plans;
5. Education and public awareness raising campaign;
6. Re-enforcing building permit process;

The main capacity building input of the Programme was in the form of training by international companies and support by national consultants. Seven thematic workshops on various aspects of disaster risk management were conducted in Tehran, Gorgan and Kerman by the ADPC and NSET-Nepal. Over 700 managers and experts at national, intermediate and city levels were trained through these courses. A Study Tour to Nepal exposed 35 key government officials in Disaster Risk Management field from Tehran, Gorgan and Kerman to community-based earthquake risk reduction activities. The “School Earthquake Safety” and “Neighbourhood Safety” Programmes are being implemented in 60 schools and 10 neighbourhoods in Gorgan and Kerman.

More than 35 different types of training were conducted between 2005-2010 in Tehran and in the provinces on different components of the Programme. A full list of training is provided in Annex 3.

**Sub-component 2.1: School Safety and Preparedness**

The School Safety and Preparedness led by the Working Group in Kerman covered 40 pilot schools, where with the help of IRCS and the Fire Department 4-day trainings were organised by the Ministry of Education. In these schools, teacher and student committees were formed and staff and students were trained in fire fighting, first aid and protection from earthquakes. School committees are linked up with local IRCS branches for added support. Each school has a room equipped with the tools and goods that would be useful in the aftermath of an earthquake. A number of schools have also undertaken non-structural mitigation interventions that safely secure the glass on the windows, and prevent furniture and equipment from falling in the event of an earthquake.

Similarly, in Gorgan the school safety and preparedness Working Group led by the Ministry of Education developed partnerships with the local IRCS, Fire Fighting Department and others to run trainings and support schools with relevant training. Participating schools were expected to come up with a preparedness plan; however, the team could not verify their existence.

**Sub-component 2.2: Safe Hospitals**

There were marked differences in the way the Hospital Safety programme has advanced between the two cities. In Kerman, as in other components, there was already extensive experience with hospital safety. Members of the WG had access to international standards and knowledge and in fact, some worked as national trainers on the subject. The existing Health Task Force of the provincial DMTF (NDMO) had conducted some DM training before the Safe Hospitals project was introduced. Similarly, Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) and Incident Command System (ICS) were practiced; structural safety and non-structural safety in hospitals were well known, where a joint programme with the World Bank focused on retrofitting.

UNDP funding was used mainly for the non-structural mitigation of the hospitals. WG prepared its own checklist from various international sources. Assessment of two city government hospitals revealed that a full non-structural mitigation would cost around $300,000 per hospital, while only $25,000 was available from UNDP. With the funding available, non-structural mitigation measures, such as adding stoppable wheels to beds, securing equipment and furniture were implemented only in the emergency wing of one hospital to a good standard. Having conducted a thorough assessment, the WG was frustrated by the availability of only a small amount of funding and recognised that this component of the project cannot be advanced significantly unless further financial resources become available from the government.

In Gorgan, the approach was to hire a consultancy company that conducted the assessment in the selected hospitals and developed the measures for non-structural mitigation. Implementation of non-structural measures observed in one hospital was very basic and poor in quality compared to the work carried out in Kerman. There was limited understanding demonstrated by the hospital management on the process followed. A hospital disaster management plan was considered, but was not yet in place.

The main product shared with the evaluation team appeared to be a thick catalogue of pictures of the various equipment and furniture secured and anchored to the walls, prepared by the consultancy firm. The cost of this work could not be obtained. There were no HICS, ICS, or trainings carried out. There was no evidence of the activity reported in UNDP documentations that the WG had designed an IT based system to share the lessons learned on non-structural mitigation, or had launched a community of practice website.

**Sub-component 2.3: Safe Neighbourhoods (Mahalle programme)**

In Kerman, the Safe Neighbourhood WG was jointly coordinated by Kerman DMC and IRCS. Safe neighbourhoods programme (mahalle programme) was not new in Kerman. It was introduced by JICA and Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) after Bam earthquake. Some officers also participated in SDC training on a similar project in Turkey. The current programme was broadly based on the same components of the SDC programme that included community led risk identification, training in risk mitigation and preparedness planning, provision of tools and equipment for community level rescue and relief, first aid and the formation of multiple response teams in each community.

Response focussed components of the programme were possible to implement in the neighbourhoods namely fire fighting, first aid, search and rescue, safety drills and the provision of tools and equipment for the neighbourhoods. From the discussions with the authorities, the team could not trace any significant examples of community led risk identification and risk mitigation. IRCS and the Fire Department were the key implementing agencies, which are using their own curriculum for this kind of training in Kerman. Both IRCS and the Fire Department have been providing this type of training already before this programme, but the programme helped them to take it to the people rather than the public approaching them to be trained e.g. in first aid. The programme also helped the IRCS to further disseminate some training materials.

Gorgan had adopted a similar content for their Safe Neighbourhood programme. However, the key implementing partner for CBDRM component was a local NGO. M&E consultant reported work with this NGO to train their staff on participatory appraisal methods. However, it was not possible to measure the impact from this imput. The team could not meet with the implementing NGO, or visit the neighbourhoods that had participated in the programme.

In both provinces, the authorities could not organise visits to the communities where the Safe Neighbourhood programme were implemented.

**Sub-component 2.4: City earthquake scenario and preparedness plans**

The working arrangements in the two cities were different. In Kerman, the process was led by the DMC Kerman that had significant experience and received support after Bam earthquake for city level preparedness plans. A software based earthquake scenario was prepared with the involvement of all relevant provincial Government departments. Development of a disaster response plan was completed with the support from IRCS. In Gorgan, the initial work on the earthquake scenario was supported by the BHRC; IRCS led the preparation of the response plan. However, in both cities there was no evidence that the scenarios had been practiced regularly.

Preparation of urban earthquake scenarios and the corresponding response plans were technically too complex and time consuming exercises for the WGs to develop and maintain by themselves. In both cities, the authorities have been in their positions for some time, know their cities well and have significant experience to feel comfortable to respond to disasters from practical knowledge. During our visit to Gorgan, a real time field exercise that lasted a whole day was underway with the participation of all relevant organisations. This seemed to be a regular activity to test preparedness for response.

**Sub-component 2.5: Public Education and Awareness**

In both provinces the Public Education and Awareness WG has been quite active and interacted well with all other WGs. IRIB (the National Broadcasting Organisation) led the WG in both provinces. In Kerman, since the programme moved from SPAC to NDMO more resources have been made available for this sub-component and wider coverage has been achieved.

In Gorgan, public information and awareness was led by IRCS with the participation of all Disaster Management TF members. Work implemented by the media came under the purview of the provincial Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organisation. Coverage in Gorgan was extensive, targeting all 360,000 households of the province with printed material on safety measures. According to the members of the WG, examples of similar awareness materials from other countries could have been made available to guide and speed up the process of preparing their own awareness material. If this was done, money and time could have been saved and quality could have been better.

Authorities in Gorgan also felt that the programme did not make a good judgment of the potential cost of public information dissemination at a provincial scale and a threshold was not established. Coverage of all the provincial households was a costly exercise at US$400,000, funded by the Government. Unless regular funding is to be made available in the future, it will not be easy to replicate the same level of information dissemination.

TV and media work (radio and press) in Gorgan is impressively comprehensive, including 20 minutes TV slots repeated twice a week and a popular ‘safe house’ competition. The cost could be reduced due to mostly free provincial TV time and discounts received on the production cost. Viewing of the TV broadcast was polled three times a year that averaged 62-64 % with a satisfaction and usefulness level of over 90% rated by the viewers. Attempts to disseminate the films on the National TV were made, but the airtime turned out to be very expensive.

**Sub-component 2.6: Reinforcing building permit process**

The Gorgan specialist group comprising of municipal officials have adopted a research approach and have undertaken consultations with engineers, architects, and public in general. They also visited construction sites to gather ideas on streamlining the approval and enforcement processes. The group has come up with recommendations around training of engineers and construction workers, introducing design level improvements and random checks, smoother approval processes and introducing mechanisms for registration of private construction companies, and quality based certification processes. The process was valuable in bringing together the various stakeholders. Any implementation of the findings required significant funding. The WG was therefore only able to produce a report.

In Kerman, it was not possible to interview the private company that undertook this work. However, based on discussions with the other WG members it was concluded that there was no evidence of further ongoing work in this subject.

**Output 3.1. Knowledge networking for disaster risk management in Central and South West Asia**

This component required a great deal of coordination both nationally and regionally that did not receive adequate attention and financial commitment. Delays with the development of the Information Portal, which would have acted as the necessary infrastructure for the functioning of the regional knowledge network, also affected the outputs from this component. Consequently, objectives of this component could not be achieved.

The Steering Committee of the programme decided that instead of developing a regional website, other projects that could eventually help regional interaction should be developed. Some of these activities that were undertaken in 2007 were the inauguration of regional ECO in Mashhad; First meeting of the heads of meteorological organisations of ECO member countries; Workshop on Drought DRM (monitoring and early warning); in 2008: A regional workshop of ISDR on Global Assessment Report(GAR); Technical and policy making meeting held by UNDP with participation of representatives of key organisations such as NDMO, MoI, SPAC, UNDP, ISDR, and regional UNDP; and in 2009 presentation of Iran study in 2009 in GAR.

# Findings

## 4.1. Appropriateness

**Appropriateness of programme focus:** Of the three Programme components, Urban Earthquake Risk Management (UERM) was the most appropriate component in addressing the gaps in DRM. Iran is highly prone to earthquakes. It has significant emergency response capacity and world-class expertise, particularly in technical aspects of risk management, and a declared commitment to risk reduction (UNDAF). As revealed by the earthquake in Bam, provincial and lower administrative levels are effective at response but need further strengthening in DRM. While rural disasters occur, high rate of urbanisation puts cities more and more at risk. Community based approach to risk reduction is relatively new and what exists mainly focus on preparedness to respond. The UERM at provincial level and the capacity building objectives of the programme are therefore appropriate in addressing some of these gaps in the DM system in Iran.

Successful urban risk management requires an interrelated set of measures to act together from public awareness to improved construction practices. These are correctly identified in the UERM component of the programme but are not sufficiently articulated in terms of time frame, capacities, and resources, as well as policy commitment and management structures required for any meaningful results. Programme’s expectation that the provinces could work on all six components simultaneously and make measurable progress with limited funds available per component was not well judged. Nevertheless, both provinces put a lot of effort and some resources into making progress and delivering results.

Amongst the components of the UERM, Safe Schools is an important aspect of DRM. A similar but simpler programme was developed by the IIEES in partnership with the MoE nearly ten years ago and implemented nationwide. A partnership agreement with the IIEES at the inception of the programme could have helped to learn and expand from that earlier programme instead of another ‘piloting’. At a later stage the IIEES was approached, however a meaningful partnership was not possible to establish. [[2]](#footnote-2)

Safe Hospitals programme, which was already implemented in Kerman to some extent prior to this programme, can be considered as a relatively new area of DRM in Iran. Non-structural Safety at schools and hospitals is also a relatively new approach hence appropriate for piloting.

Neighbourhood Safety Programme was introduced to Iran by the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) and others after the Bam earthquake. Organisations like the IRCS and the Fire Department are well equipped to train the public on fire fighting, first aid, search and rescue. All these initiatives have been more focussed on response preparedness. A more participatory and mitigation focussed CBDRM is still a weak area in Iran that deserves some attention. Strengthening this requires parallel investment into developing the NGO sector and methods of community participation.

Amongst the public information programmes, Education and Public Awareness raising campaigns through the media have been the most appropriate and successful at the provincial level. While similar material and programmes exist from the IIEES and others, engagement of the provincial level TV broadcasting provided the most value at a lower cost than the national TV broadcasting. Provincial TV broadcastings have a dedicated following and reaches out to a wide audience. Innovative TV programmes such as the ‘safe house competition’ in Gorgan and the weekly TV shows on safety can easily be introduced to other provinces. In 2010, some steps were taken to disseminate both Kerman and Gorgan TV programmes to other cities nationwide. However, this coincided with a management change at the NDMO and thus is still a pending item. [[3]](#footnote-3)

Earthquake Scenarios and Response Plans are very important instruments in understanding the risks and mitigating their impacts in a planned way. Yet effective urban earthquake scenarios require reliable hazard, risk and loss data at sub provincial level, dedicated funding and technical staff to develop and maintain. The example of a similar work implemented by the Tehran DMMO and supported by JICA is a successful example and highlights the complexity of scenario development. Without a significant investment, it would have been difficult to replicate such high quality work in the two provinces.

The project on Reinforcing Building Permit Process was useful in highlighting the gaps and inconsistencies in the system and bringing together the various stakeholders. Yet, it required significant technical and financial investment for any meaningful outcomes and such investment was beyond the scope of the programme and means of the provincial authorities.

The idea of piloting the UERM in the two selected provinces, then sharing with others and scaling up was a good idea. Regular visits between the provinces of Gorgan and Kerman were in the original plan of the programme but could not be arranged. Training and information sharing is achieved, but one time training is not adequate in influencing decision makers and urban administrators to replicate these activities in their provinces.

Improving information management of risks and sharing of information across the relevant organisations is an ongoing need in Iran. Hazard information is located in different organisations and data is not systematically collected, or collected to different standards. While the need is well identified, the institutional set up to manage and maintain the project and the instruments selected, IP and DesInventar, are not very suitable for the context in Iran. Data security is important in Iran, as is the case in other countries, such as in India, Nepal and Pakistan where for example rainfall and water related data are critical. Partnering with international organisations on data sharing projects and open source online access to such data are always nationally sensitive issues that have to be agreed upon with MoUs and clear protocols from inception. Use of a secure intranet could have been a more appropriate platform. Both the IP and DesInventar component of the project while useful in their objectives did not appear to be a priority, particularly at the provincial level.

Knowledge networking with other countries was stated as a very high priority practically by everyone interviewed. This is partly due to the limited interaction with other countries, but also due to the desire to measure their own accomplishments from this programme against others. However, as a country with good technical institutions and significant practical experience in disaster response, Iran compares itself with peers from developed countries and values networking with countries like Japan, USA and Turkey. The Programme had not yet advanced adequately to comment on what would be the appropriate modalities of this networking. However, it is evident from the national experience that an IP based knowledge networking has not become part of the work culture.

**Appropriateness of UNDP support:** UNDP’s support helped to get the attention of the national and provincial authorities on DRM and leveraged funding from the government. Programme also facilitated linkages with external knowledge and expertise. UNDP provided technical support to prepare the initial programme framework and the programme document formulation; identified and recruited the international consultants and UNVs to assist the development of the various components. Without this help, the programme could not have advanced, as capacities in NPO to develop complex programme documents up to international standards were initially limited. UNDP also provided monitoring and maintained standards that helped to improve the quality of the programme management.

While the role of UNDP in facilitating links with international expertise was highly appreciated, the appropriateness and the quality of some of this assistance were questioned, particularly at the provincial level. More consultations and detailed assessment of needs and preferences could have been made at the onset and the provincial level could then have participated more closely in developing the programme. For example, it is claimed that results from the training needs assessment was not used and technical capacities within the Iranian institutions were not adequately utilised. Instead, ‘off the shelf’ training or products were introduced without sufficient scrutiny to their appropriateness to the context in Iran.

Some partners felt that UNDP at times ‘micro-managed’ and had pre-conceived opinion on everything. As expressed by one interviewee, ‘even the title of reports became an issue of dispute’ and at times Steering Committee decisions were vetoed. Administration of the programme and timely delivery of the products appeared to be the overriding concern for UNDP that helped the programme to maintain its momentum under difficult circumstances. The delivery concerns and the technical focus of the programme could have been better balanced with a more systematic and planned approach to capacity building and institutional support that were achieved partially.

## 4.2 Effectiveness

The long-term development results expected from this work were stated in the Programme document “Strengthened disaster risk management capacity including enhanced community awareness and participation and enhanced coordination mechanisms among all stakeholders at local and national levels” as well as “Development and application of early warning systems and hazard mapping for effective disaster risk management at all levels.”

**Programme effectiveness:** The overall achievement of the programme results has been more significant at the product level in terms of numbers of training programmes delivered and consultations made; IP and DesInventar tools completed; number of public awareness material –posters, films, booklets- distributed; and earthquake drills conducted, etc. However, the capacity-building objective has been achieved in a limited way, both at central and provincial levels. Coordination has improved at the provincial level as the WGs met regularly and worked harmoniously. Development of early warning was dropped when the programme focused on earthquakes only. Producing hazard maps from DesInventar is possible, but this is not yet implemented.

Information Portal and DesInventar have been delivered at the product level. Despite technical training and dissemination of information on these tools, awareness among government agencies and technical bodies around their usage is relatively low. Community of practice platforms are not yet fully functional, and information is not yet uploaded to the Portal actively and regularly.

In addition to the security of information, high turnover of government staff and frequent institutional changes are among the stated reasons for the lack of DesInventar’s use. Benefits from a platform such as an IP may not immediately be evident to staff. There is generally not a great deal of conviction in sharing information amongst the national partners. However, fostering a culture of active data and information sharing needs more than developing tools and guidelines and informing the potential users of their application. An institutional structure, clear responsibly and protocols for data generation and use, as well as dedicated resources are necessary to make progress in this area of work. Ownership is low due to unclear institutional arrangements, but also because the work was largely externally driven and there are no dedicated national institutional commitments established from the start. Reliability of data and sources and standards for data collection were also questioned by the technical organisations. Thus far, the only DesInventar products have been Iran’s contribution to the ISDR Global Assessment Report 2009 and 2011.

Contrary to component 1, UERM programme in the two provinces brought together the key provincial stakeholders and managed to forge some partnerships and coordination around the delivery of products. This is partly because the WGs exist under the provincial DM Task Force and meet regularly. In Kerman, creation of a parallel structure for the UERM is claimed to have negatively affected the functioning of the existing structure. This was eventually restored when the programme management shifted to the provincial NDMO. In Gorgan, the authorities kept the original DMTF WGs and coordination worked well. Some activities under the UERM could not fully be achieved and there is room to improve content and communication quality of training and awareness raising material and manuals. Nevertheless, several provincial level staff in Gorgan stated that engagement in the UERM raised awareness on the ‘low-cost ‘and ‘soft approaches’ to DRM.

It was not possible to investigate the level of community awareness raised by the programme other than the figures given by the TV broadcasting company in Gorgan that present a very impressive outreach. Similarly, the number of posters, booklets and CDs distributed to the public is high but the level of learning that has occurred from these products could not be objectively measured.

**Effectiveness of UNDP M&E:** Capacity-building objective could only partially be achieved and perhaps remained limited to increased awareness among the stakeholders on the importance of disaster risk reduction, urban risk management and community based approach. Capacity building was expected to be achieved through training and stakeholder meetings. Yet, the high turnover of government and programme staff, and low level of participation by some organisations reduced the institutional effectiveness of training. At the provincial level, projects were an additional workload to many other daily responsibilities of the stakeholders and at times were not regarded as a priority, for example vis-à-vis emergency response. Moreover, UERM programme was very demanding in terms of both the number and diversity of its sub-components and paper work.

These issues were frequently reported back by the provincial authorities through the M&E process, but no alternative capacity building strategies were explored. Furthermore, the level and substance of training was not always appropriate for the level of participants. Much complaint is expressed on ADPC training in both Gorgan and Kerman. It was considered to be too generic and not tailored to their level and needs; examples and the training team did not match the aspirations of the participants to learn from developed countries.

At the provincial level the M&E, though started late, seems to have served as a substitute for capacity building. This was largely due to the personal interests and capacities of the National M&E Officer, who had a good understanding of participatory approaches and institutional development. However, this input prematurely ended by mid-2008 when the M&E Officer discontinued at a stage when perhaps a capacity building approach was the most critical. His inputs, alongside the international UNV’s advice on management and training, were much appreciated by the local organisations. Both the M&E Officer and the UNV worked in a more direct and regular support role with the provincial staff on developing programme management skills, a model that served well for capacity building. For Gorgan, it was their first programme management experience and this guidance was essential and regarded as very useful. At the same time local officials felt that their feedback on the programme through this monitoring were not acted upon sufficiently by SPAC or UNDP. Responsibility for acting upon the feedback was not so clear between the UNDP responsible for quality control and SPAC for execution of the Programme.

As the examples illustrate, each component and sub-component of the Programme was a major project in its own right and required significant capacities, time, funds and technical inputs for any meaningful outcome. Much of the funding and energy was spent on creating and managing a large external structure -consultants, companies and programme staff- administering heavy paperwork and tackling obstacles, as well as ensuring that the products were delivered timely. An approach that would have revolved around capacity building could have focused on fewer components and progressed incrementally, and invested more on strengthening institutions.

UNDP provided technical support at all levels as required but did not have the capacity to provide regular technical quality assurance on the substance of the programme. Quality assurance was partly expected to come from the Steering Committee and the technical partners. However, this system did not function effectively and partners could not be expected to provide regular support to the programme without a clear operational role. UNDP has to assess carefully its own capacity when it engages in programmes that are both technically and institutionally very diverse and require institutional capacity building as well as delivery of technical products. Implementation can be NEX, but the final accountability for quality assurance rests with the UNDP and this goes beyond measuring delivery rate.

## 4.3 Efficiency

Programme Document was developed in 2004 with a view to start implementation in 2005. UNDP led Programme Document formulation and addendum development in 2004-2005 and 2007. In early 2010, the addendum for handover of the programme from SPAC to NDMO was again prepared by UNDP.

Much of the implementation occurred from late 2006 to mid-2009. For the last year, there has been few activities and limited transfer of funds, mostly by the UNDP, to the various components of the programme.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Consultant Co.** | **Project Title** | **Expense (Rial)** |
| 1 | Civil Research Centre | National Disaster Risk Report | 290,000,000 |
| 2 | Ab Andishan Azar Co. | Training Needs Assessment | 200,000,000 |
| 3 | Rahbord Peymayesh Co. | Women Needs Assessment | 120,000,000 |
| 4 | Nasle Andisheh Sabz Co. | Safety Animation | 60,000,000 |
| 5 | Ardeshir Sayyah | Component 2 (Urban Earthquake Risk Management) Documentation | 940,000,000 |
| 6 | Paydaran Parsa Co. | Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) for Gorgan | 180,000,000 |
| 7 | International Consultant |  | 150,000,000 |
| 8 | Miscellaneous |  | 51,610,000 |
| 9 | Project Staffs |  | 210,000,000 |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | **Total** |  | **2,201,610,000** |

Table 1. Financial commitments by UNDP in 2011

While UNDP allocated its funding in a timely manner, there were initial delays with the allocation and disbursement of GoI funding. This was largely due to the different calendar years between UNDP and the GoI and legal problems regarding the absence of ratification from the parliament and legal procedure to transfer Government funds to an international organisation. These resulted in lack of harmonisation of financial management and integrated management of the programme. These in turn delayed the transfer of funds, caused loss of some momentum and impaired the efficient implementation of the programme.

**Efficiency of management and management structure:** Opinions varied on the efficiency of the management structure established. MoI and its NDTF had been identified during the initial consultations as the executive agency. This later changed to MPO/SPAC. NDTF/NDMO is largely operational and some interviewees believe that it would have the authority but not the time (from attending to disasters) to manage what is fundamentally a community and institutional capacity development programme. SPAC, on the other hand, has experience of programme administration and project documentation but it is not substantive. It has limited authority to make decisions and lead the implementing partners. SPAC’s role as the executive agency resulted in some disputes over participation in the programme, strongly manifested in Kerman, but improved after the programme had shifted to NDMO.

Institutional changes from MPO/ SPAC to NDMO consumed management time and contributed to delayed implementation. Despite its limitations some interviewees expressed that management should not have shifted from SPAC to NDMO at this late stage as it interrupted the programme. Others believed that NDMO should have been in charge from the outset, due to its operational role at the provincial level.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Staff of SPAC and the partner organisations had many other responsibilities. Dedicated additional staff for DRM was rarely appointed. Frequent change of project management staff in Tehran and the field was also an important factor that interrupted continuity and learning. These project staff were mostly externally hired consultants rather than staff appointed by the partner organisations, which at times created issues of authority. Staff participation from the partner organisations in the Steering Committee and NDTF changed frequently that required repeated clarification of objectives and activities. A smaller core group for regular steering and a less frequent meeting of all stakeholders could have been more appropriate.

There were delays with the appointment of programme staff at all levels. For example, the NPDs for the two cities were appointed late in 2006 (Gorgan in June and Kerman in September), therefore, the members of the Project Management Committee (PMC) in both cities were identified and briefed about the project around September-October 2006. Hence, many of the planned activities at the provincial level could not be implemented in a timely manner. During the first two years most of the activities undertaken were in relation to negotiating the programme with the relevant authorities, establishing the secretariat, Project Management Committee and their working groups, initiation of a pilot school project, preparatory tasks for acquiring international consultancy inputs such as the International UNV and the training by the ADPC.

**Efficiency of technical support:** Best placed technical organisations such as BHRC, IIEES, NDRII were initially engaged with the programme and could have provided high quality expertise and examples in many areas of work throughout the project. In fact, three of the earlier public information posters were prepared by the BHRC at a cost of printing only. However, the technical support shifted to external consultants –both national and international-, some of whom had limited relevant DRM experience. Once again, the high fees demanded by these technical institutions and some delivery problems were mentioned as reasons for choosing consultants over technical institutions. As the institutes could not be interviewed, we were not able to elicit their point of view. Bridging the high level technical knowledge with practical needs of the provincial organisations is important and could have been an explicit objective of the programme and planned from the start.

Public training material on certain aspects of earthquake safety was readily available from IIEES and IRCS. International examples were also easily accessible on school and hospital safety as well as on non-structural mitigation. Project manager in Gorgan stated that if there were examples from other places, they could have avoided redeveloping the same guidelines and work could have progressed faster. There was no doubt about the benefits of learning from developing these materials jointly within the working groups, but too much time and money were spent on this. As the material and the guidelines produced are not standardised and vary greatly in quality, NDMO has recently commissioned a new package that will codify some of the process and outputs from the provincial work that can help to replicate it nationwide. This package funded by the UNDP includes: 5 Guidelines, 11 manuals,7 reports, 8 Training packages, 5 pattern reports, 4 executive plans, 22 brochures, 15 presentation slides, 3 checklists, 3 agreements, 4 multimedia outputs, 5 data banks. This is a good approach and a step towards scaling up from this programme. Provincial officials were not aware of this initiative during our visit and would have liked to be consulted on their experiences.

**Cost-efficiency:** Cost efficiency of the approach adopted could not fully be determined. A breakdown of the complete programme budget, including the contributions by the GoI and the local governments was not available. Close to half of the UNDP funding went into component 1 for the establishment of the IP, the DesInventar and the National Report as well as GRIP. The development of these products so far has achieved limited sustainable results.

Recruitment of a high number of external consultants, both national and international, and project staff resulted in spending sizable part of the funds for managing the programme and technical support, while the funds available for the actual implementation in schools and hospitals were inadequate. There were too few pilots, repeat drills could not be funded, and hospital structural measures had to be implemented in a very limited way. In Gorgan, coverage of all the households with public information material consumed a significant portion of the funds. There was additional funding made available from the provincial budgets for the public awareness material and free or reduced cost airtime was offered by the local TV broadcasting company. Gorgan province did not receive any funding from the Government for the last two years and used their own budget that can be interpreted as a sign of commitment. IRCS also stated that they will continue to train the public with their own funds and will incorporate some of the learning from the gender training into their needs assessment.

## 4.4 Impact

Despite institutional and programmatic difficulties, there is no doubt about the increase in awareness on DRM and learning from the various activities implemented since 2005. Ms. Pourseyed, the National NPD, stated these key achievements and the lessons learned from the SPAC’s point of view as “ more focus on prevention; team-work and inter-sectoral coordination in spite of the wide range of programme activities; increased institutional capacities for young personnel; strengthened capacities for documenting the extracted standards from the programme”. [[5]](#footnote-5)

**Institutional impact:** Significant institutional learning happened at SPAC. First, pogramme management procedures and standards established by UNDP were complicated and time consuming, but they set new standards within SPAC for future international cooperation. Secondly, SPAC is the organisation that approves budgetary allocations. Through this programme, SPAC has been sensitised to the importance of disaster risk management and consequently more interested in allocating funds for this area of work than has been the case in the past. This is a significant gain in terms of potential integration of DRM into development work of the various sectors.

Programme impact on improved teamwork and inter-sectoral coordination was good at the provincial level. WGs enjoyed coming together on specific projects. Delivering as a team was easier on simpler components such as the school safety and public awareness rather than the more technical components of risk scenario development or building practices. At the national level, unclear institutional roles resulted in creating some tensions. Although UNDP tried its best to facilitate partnership building through meetings and consultations, there was a strong tendency among the partners to work on their own rather than under the framework of the Programme. This was partly attributed by some Programme staff to the need to clarify for the stakeholders from the onset the operational and implementation details of the project and their specific role in it. Dependency on external consultants and consulting companies also created a sense of detachment from the responsibility for delivery that runs against the spirit of capacity building. Placing staff within the organisations instead of a parallel programme structure could have been an option to increase institutional capacities. This happened gradually at the provincial level. In Gorgan, the Programme Officers are now offered jobs by the NDMO to continue.

**Impact on public:** Public impact of the various awareness raising and safety programmes could only be assessed indirectly. There was no impact measurement of the various communication material and strategies except for the TV broadcasting component in Gorgan that probably created the most sustainable impact due to its active messaging and continuity throughout the year. Impact from one time brochures and posters is known to be more limited from other similar experiences. Active learning calls for more participatory approaches. This requires a stronger community based organisations that are active in the DRM field of work.

Too many different communication strategies and materials have been used for public awareness and safety with limited attention to their quality, cultural and practical appropriateness. The need to invest in an effective communication strategy across different groups and medium was identified as early as 2007 but this was never carried out systematically. Programme could have provided more support to the provinces on this subject.

Safe schools activity achieved a better coverage than the safe hospitals. According to the teachers, students take the messages back home; hence, the messages are disseminated widely. For any meaningful impact schools safety programme needs to be regularly repeated to train the new students and the staff. This needs policy decisions and regular funding at the national level. Hospital safety is expensive and as it stands could not achieve adequate traction to influence a culture of change in the hospitals. Low level of funding for these two components limited their impact.

## 4.5 Sustainability

Disaster Risk Management remains an area of interest for the GoI and UNDP is committed to continue with its support through the next UNDAF. There are useful achievements and valuable experiences from the current project that can inform the next steps. At the same time, the specific activities and outcomes from this programme can be sustained or scaled up only if serious organisational and financial investment is made and policy and strategic decisions are taken by the GoI to continue. During the last year, there was no new programme funding available for the provincial authorities. Only a limited number of activities could be carried out from the provincial government budgets, such as developing and disseminating the public awareness materials in Gorgan. Experience gained out of this programme is expected to help the provincial authorities in negotiating funding for DRM in the future. SPAC has already reported some requests in this direction.

It is expected that SPAC will continue to have some role in overseeing the budgetary allocations for DRM. Experiences built and increased awareness of DRM within SPAC will positively influence sustainability of some focus on DRM and hopefully will support its mainstreaming into relevant sectors such as education and health.

A policy and dedicated institutional base for information and data sharing are essential for any continuity with the IP and DesInventar. Usefulness of IP and knowledge management needs to be further promoted with the government staff; dedicated staff time and incentives can increase sustainability among the relevant organisations. As they stand, both activities need a major input and a new institutional commitment and engagement to become sustainable.

**Sustainability at the provincial level:** A comprehensive approach to UERM is proven to be beyond the technical, institutional and financial capacities of the provincial authorities. Yet, there is sufficient momentum at the provincial level to continue with select components of the UERM, but lack of funding is an obstacle. Of all the components, School Safety programme has achieved the most traction and has the potential to be scaled up nationwide. Hospital safety and non-structural mitigation are technically and institutionally more complicated and are costly to be mainstreamed into health sector. At minimum, the component of HICs and hospital preparedness plans have the most potential to be institutionalised in high risk provinces.

The ‘people –centred’ and ‘soft’ approach is appreciated by the provincial authorities as a new and different way of working. Media engagement is very important and has proven to be effective in promoting this approach in Kerman and Gorgan that can easily be replicated in other provinces and sustained with the support of provincial broadcasting. Neighbourhood safety and community based, participatory approaches in general require strengthening of the NGO sector and building trust for the NGOs. IRCS has the trust of the public and capacity to reach out at a scale on response preparedness such as first aid and search and response. However, IRCS may have been less equipped for mitigation aspects of DRM that requires a developmental approach.

The scaling up and longer-term sustainability of these few areas are possible only with relevant policy and strategic decisions, as well as resources made available by the government.

# Conclusions and Recommendations

Results from the consultations and desk review revealed that the programme increased awareness of DRM among the stakeholders; fostered better coordination particularly among the various local organisations in the two provinces; delivered several of the intended outputs such as an information portal, a database and piloted a number of demonstration projects at the field level. Progress at the provincial level was more evident in response preparedness aspects of DRM, partly due to the focus of the implementing organisations. Programme was weaker at the outcome level as policy changes for scaling up the good practices are yet to be advanced and institutional structures and relationships for a more comprehensive approach to DRM are to be established. The review identified the following key conclusions and recommendations that can be useful for future programme partnerships on DRM.

## 5.1. Conclusions

* The most significant overall development achievement by the UNDP out of this programme was the leveraging of funding from the GoI as well as the local government budgets for DRM. As one provincial official stated: ‘it is like UNDP sending the invitation for the party and the government paying for it’. The funding that was available might have been small for the scale of the programme envisaged, but the allocation of funds from the national budget for DRM is a key indicator of GoI mainstreaming disaster reduction into national development.
* International partnership is highly valued by the programme partners and UNDP is perceived as the window to the outside world. This ‘connectedness’ is expected to be facilitated by providing opportunities for the programme implementers to present their work and compare their achievements internationally with others. International expert support and visits were an integral part of the programme and were appreciated. However, the perception among the stakeholders is that the quality and choice of international support could have been more appropriate with regard the cultural context in Iran and more in line with the level of experiences and expertise of the partner organisations.
* Programme introduced ‘low cost’ and ‘soft’ approaches to DRM that are appreciated by the provincial authorities as complementary to the more prevalent technical and engineering approaches in Iran. However, the institutional structure for the more participatory CBDRM is weak in Iran and the results from the programme in this area of work were not significant. UNDP could have transferred its experiences in working with the civil society from its other programme areas in Iran such as environment.
* Choice of SPAC as the programme implementer created institutional tensions and the dual role of management and implementation of very diverse technical components burdened the organisation. However, it also had a positive impact on SPAC in terms of enhanced awareness of DRM and learning the rules and standards for international programme management. This experience can help the future allocation of resources for DRM and its mainstreaming into the relevant sectors.
* Programme implementers at the provincial level, particularly in Gorgan where there was no previous exposure to international cooperation, expressed a great deal of learning from the programme. Provincial level would like to be involved in development of the framework and the programme substance. They would also appreciate more flexibility where expected outputs could be better aligned to the capacities and needs. A capacity assessment at the onset would have clarified the organisational structures and relationships, human and financial resources, and the time frame required to deliver the outcomes.
* Programme was ‘introduced’ through a series of consultations and workshops. Missing skills and capacities were provided in the form of training or consultants. Much of the training provision appears to be weakly linked to the action-oriented practice of the organisations, at least in part because the kinds of ‘hands-on’ learning approaches preferred by many humanitarian personnel – coaching, on-the-job training, etc- were under-utilised.
* A comprehensive and integrated UERM programme was conceptually right. Yet, it was not easy to manage and implement the many disparate components and progress them simultaneously. Consequently, the more complex and technical components such as provincial risk mapping and response plans made inadequate progress.
* Institutional relationship between NDMO and SPAC, SPAC and UNDP, SPAC and Gorgan authorities, between the technical/government organisations and SPAC/UNDP, consultants/programme officers and the Government organisations were stressed at different stages of the programme. This had seriously hampered participation and harmonious cooperation. Roles and responsibilities, expectations and resourcing should have been cleared and officially agreed upon from the start.
* Programme should not have been run largely by external/internal consultants and POs and in a parallel structure to the existing ones. Many of the consultants were committed but inexperienced in the ‘soft’ and ‘integrated’ DRM approach adopted and in programme management. They also lacked authority over the implementing organisations. As a result, they were not always able to find solutions to technical and management issues as these surfaced.
* There were delays and tensions over NDMO taking over the responsibility for the Programme. NDMO structure works well at the field level particularly for response. An outlook and a strategic direction to progress with the DRM agenda are yet to be provided by the NDMO in Tehran. Frequent change of staff was one factor that limited progress.

## 5.2 Recommendations

There was significant learning from this project for the GoI and the UNDP, some of which was documented in the programme reports and joint stock-taking exercises. Interviews with a large number of stakeholders, implementers, consultants and programme officers provided valuable lessons that can guide future programme partnerships on DRM in Iran.

### Recommendations: Current Programme

1. **UNDP needs to facilitate a dialogue for an ‘exit’ or a ‘transition’ strategy as soon as possible**. For this purpose, it needs to coordinate with the MoFA, NDMO and SPAC to determine how to align the outputs and outcomes from the various activities of this programme with the broader policy, mainstreaming and institutional engagement objectives, and determine how UNDP can support this process.
2. **The original objective of the Programme to pilot a range of DRM activities with a view to scale up the effective components should be maintained**. Providing continuity to the successful examples will motivate the stakeholders and implementers engaged in this Programme and promote its objectives wider. It will give the right message that the significant energy, time and resources that have been spent in the last five years are not wasted and hence would protect the reputation of future DRM partnerships with UNDP.
3. **A dialogue needs to be established with the relevant sectors for policy and strategy attention and handover** **of the** **effective** **outputs and outcomes of the Programme** **for scaling up.** A dialogue needs to be established between the MoE and the relevant stakeholders such as the IIEES, IRCS, SPAC to develop a strategy to scale up the Safe Schools initiative. Safe Hospitals with the Mo Health, and Public Awareness –particularly the TV campaigns with the local broadcasting companies also have a potential to be scaled up.
4. **Dissemination of the ongoing documentation of the UERM experiences from Gorgan and Kerman should be technically supported.** UNDP should provide support to ensure quality of communication and technical accuracy of the information from international best practices as required for the ongoing documentation process from this Programme, coordinated by the NDMO and financed by the UNDP.
5. **UNDP support to database and knowledge networking should be demand driven channelled by the MoI/NDMO**. A sustainable approach to database development would require development of comprehensive systems, ensuring that data is compatible between the various systems, and competent and motivated human and financial resources to manage the systems. UNDP should provide technical exchange and examples upon request and not drive the agenda.
6. **Support/facilitate the use of relevant existing programmes for enhanced DRM impact.** For example, the TDMMO programme on earthquake loss estimation for Tehran is a well-resourced and advanced programme. UNDP can consider support the replication of/learning from this work for other high-risk municipalities in Iran.
7. **UNDP should consider technical support for the establishment of *Asia and Pacific (regional) Center for Development of Disaster Information Management* (APDIM)** in Tehran from its regional offices in Bangkok and Delhi, as well as the UNDP Country Offices in the region.[[6]](#footnote-6)

### 5.2.2 Recommendations: Working modalities for future engagements

Bearing in mind the provisions of the UNDAF and CPD programming as well as the findings above, a number of recommendations are made regarding the working modalities and strategic issues for the future.

1. **Future programme support to Iran must be situated in the country’s risk profile, socio-political and administrative context** and avoid replicating other country experiences and products without adjustment to needs. Programme planning must take more of a holistic view of work practices, institutional complexities, bureaucratic culture, inter-organisational coordination, human resources and their capacities etc while defining the programme. Risk profile of Iran would deserve a careful look at the gaps regarding hazards other than earthquakes that could also be considered in future partnerships.
2. **Based on the experience of the current programme, a long-term, comprehensive conceptual DRM framework should be maintained, with an incremental approach to implementation.**Simultaneous management of several technically and institutionally diverse activities for any meaningful outcomes proved to be demanding. Such an approach was not easily accommodated in the work culture of the key governmental institutions. Capacity building in DRM should be viewed as a development programme with a minimum of ten-year perspective. An incremental approach that adds activities, components and institutions as progress is made can enhance learning by doing and serve better the capacity building ambitions of the DRM.
3. **Despite the apparent difficulties, UNDP should maintain its principle role of ‘filling gaps’ ‘making connections’ in DRM and introducing innovative approaches and partnerships.** UNDP’s role in supporting well functioning institutions should focus on linking their activities and capacities innovatively where they are needed –nationally and internationally. Many well-established organisations such as IRCS, IIEES, and BHRC are providers of expert services and in their respective areas. UNDP needs to carefully define where it can add value and consider linking this expertise where it is needed in Iran and internationally. Based on the current programme experience, financial expectations of such organisations that receive a core budget for their mandated activities from the government have to be clarified from the onset of a partnerhip.
4. **Based on the current programme experience, any new piloting should be planned with an ‘institutional home’ and a strategy for their scaling up.** Experience from the pilots of the current programme points to the need to have greater clarity on the institutional responsibilities, policy framework and the resources required to scale up any approach before embarking upon more pilots. All stakeholder institutions that are essential for the scaling up have to be involved in formulating the plan for piloting at the inception stage.
5. **In the future, co-financing modality and procedures need to be clarified fully** for the benefit of MoFA, Mo Economic Affairs and its Senior Monitoring Accountant of the executing and implementing partners.
6. **Reflecting from the SPAC experience, an effective management structure has to be developed from the start** that keeps management and implementation separate, thus avoiding the placement of these functions under one umbrella organisation that can overburden it’s capacities. UNDP should judge its own capacity needs for monitoring to match the chosen management model.
7. **Steps should be taken to involve MoI, MoFA, NDMO and SPAC from the start to define the programme management and implementation modalities**, as well as decision making mechanism with the implementing partners.
8. **Place additional advisory and other capacities required within the organisations, such as in NDMO for increased capacity in coordination and management**. Experience indicates that parallel structure reduced ownership and sustainability within the institutions.

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# Annex 2: List of interviewed

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Name** | **Position** | **Organisation** | **Duration** |
| 1 | Mr. Akbar Hashemi | First NPD | MPO/SPAC | 20 Months |
| 2 | Mr. Ali Tabar | NPM | MPO/SPAC | 24 Months |
| 3 | Mrs. Farzaneh Agharamezanali | NPM Deputy | MPO/SPAC | 27 Months |
| 4 | Mr.Mehdi Kamyab | Team Leader, Energy, Environment and Disaster Management Programmeme Cluster, UNDP CO | UNDP | Since September  2010 |
| 5 | Mrs. Yasemin Shahrbabaki | M&E | Project Staff | 18 Months |
| 6 | Mr. Amin Shamsoddini | Project Expert | Project Staff | 5 Years |
| 7 | Mr. Mohsen Soleymani | M&E | Project Staff | 37 Months |
| 8 | Mr. Ardeshir Sayyah | DRM Expert | Project Staff | 41 Months |
| 9 | Mr. Rasoul Hesam | Gorgan Project Man. | NDMO- Gorgan | 3 years |
| 10 | Mr. Mohammad Ali Heravi | Member WG- Gorgan | IRCS | 3years |
| 11 | Dr. Saeed Golfirouzi | Member Hospital Safety WG- Gorgan | Medical Science University |  |
| 12 | Mr. Hosein Ayat | Member School Safety WG- Gorgan | Ministry of Education |  |
| 13 | Mr. Parviz Sandzayee | Member School Safety working group- Gorgan | Ministry of Education | 4 Years |
| 14 | Mr. Arash Javadi | Member WG- Gorgan | Engineering Ass. Organisation- Gorgan | 3 Years |
| 15 | Mr. Asghar Heidarian far | Member WG- Gorgan | Ministry of Housing and Urban Devl. | 4 Years |
| 16 | Mr. Abdolhosein Rahimi | Member WG- Gorgan | IRCS | 5 Years |
| 17 | Mr. Hamid Reza Zargarani | Member WG-Gorgan | TV and Radio Broadcasting Org. | 4 Years |
| 18 | Mr. Hadi Dashtizadeh | M&E | NDMO- Gorgan | 5 Years |
| 19 | Mr. Ahmad Paypandan | DRM Expert- Gorgan | NDMO- Gorgan | 5 Years |
| 20 | Ms. Zohresadat Sharif Mousavi | Head teacher Alzahra vocational high school | Ministry of Education | 3 Years |
| 21 | Ms. Ozra Gorzin | D. Head teacher Alzahra vocational high school | Ministry of Education | 3 Years |
| 22 | Mr. Dadipour | Member School Safety WG- Gorgan | Ministry of Education | 2 Years |
| 23 | Dr. Giti Reza Hoseinpour | Manager of Dezyani Hospital- Gorgan | Medical Sience University | 3 years |
| 24 | Mr. Abdolreza Dadboud | Gorgan Project Director | Civil deputy Gorgan Governor Office | 15 Months |
| 25 | Mr. Mohsen Salehi | Kerman Project Man. | NDMO- Kerman | 5 Years |
| 26 | Mr. Kamyab | Kerman Project Director | Civil deputy of Kerman Governor Office |  |
| 27 | Mr. Alavi | Member,Urban Earth.Scenario/Neighborhood WG- Kerman | Kerman Municipality Dis.Management Organisation |  |
| 28 | Ms. Mirhoseini | Member, Public Awareness WGKerman | TV &Radio Broadcast Organisation- Kerman |  |
| 29 | Dr. Majid Ashraf Ganjavi | Member, School Safety WG- Kerman | Ministry of Education |  |
| 30 | Mr. Karimzadeh | Member of School Safety working group- Kerman | Ministry of Education |  |
| 31 | Mr. Mehran Karimi | Project Expert- Kerman | Project Staff- NDMO | 3 years |
| 32 | Ms. Rogheye Sadr | Project Expert- Kerman | Project expert | 5 Years |
| 33 | Dr. Amin Saberinia | Member of Hospital Safety WG- Kerman | Medical Sience University | 2 Years |
| 34 | Dr. Masoud Moghadari | Head of Bahonar Hospital- Kerman | Medical Sience University | 4 Years |
| 35 | Ms. Dorsadaf Yaseri | Member of School Safety WG- Kerman | IRCS |  |
| 36 | Head Teacher and D Head Teacher of Razi Vocational Schools - Kerman | School Safety Programme |  |  |
|  | **Phone Interviews** | | | |
| 37 | Mr. Mostafa Mohaghegh | Advisor to RR | UNDP | Short skype |
| 38 | Mr. Krishna Vasta | Regional DRR advisor | UNDP |  |
| 39 | Dr. Victoria Kianpour | Programmeme Analyst, DRM, UNDP CO | UNDP | 5 Years |
| 40 | Dr. Ghafouri Ashtiani | National Report cons. | IIEES |  |
|  | **TDMMO** | | | |
| 41 | Ms. Saleh | Deputy for Training and Education | TDMMO |  |
| 42 | Ms. Shabou Vazirpour | International Affairs Officer | TDMMO |  |
| 43 | Mr. Radniab | Public Relations Manager | TDMMO |  |
| 44 | Mr. Norouzi | DRM Expert | TDMMO |  |
| 45 | Mr. Karimi | DRM Expert | TDMMO |  |

# Annex 3: List of Workshops (2005-2007)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Workshop Title** | | **No. of events** | **No. of participants** | **No. of Days** | **Participants- Days** | **Participants-Hours** |
| 1 | Nepal Trip | | 1 | 33 | 6 | 198 | 1548 |
| 2 | Training workshops with cooperation of ADPC , NSET , UNDP | Facilitating | 1 | 40 | 1 | 40 | 320 |
| 3 | Urban Risks - Gorgan | 1 | 40 | 5 | 200 | 1600 |
| 4 | Urban Risks - Kerman | 1 | 40 | 5 | 200 | 1600 |
| 5 | Safe Hospital | 1 | 35 | 5 | 175 | 1400 |
| 6 | Building Permits | 1 | 40 | 5 | 200 | 1600 |
| 7 | Labor Trainings | 1 | 25 | 3 | 75 | 600 |
| 8 | Response Plan - Kerman | 1 | 40 | 5 | 200 | 1600 |
| 9 | Response Plan - Gorgan | 1 | 40 | 5 | 200 | 1600 |
| 10 | Neighborhood Communities- Kerman | 1 | 35 | 5 | 175 | 1400 |
| 11 | Neighborhood Communities- Gorgan | 1 | 35 | 5 | 175 | 1400 |
|  | Prince II | 1 | 35 | 2 | 70 | 560 |
| 12 | Held by or through Cooperation with other Organisations | Kerman School Preparedness 1 | 1 | 30 | 1 | 30 | 240 |
| 14 | Gorgan School Preparedness 1 | 1 | 30 | 1 | 30 | 240 |
| 15 | Kerman School Preparedness 2 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 60 | 480 |
| 16 | Gorgan School Preparedness 2 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 60 | 480 |
| 17 | Kerman Alavi Neighborhood 1 | 1 | 20 | 2 | 40 | 320 |
| 18 | Kerman Alavi Neighborhood 2 | 1 | 20 | 2 | 40 | 320 |
| 19 | Isfahan Hospitals | 1 | 40 | 2 | 80 | 640 |
| 20 | Beit ALLAHI Scenario | 1 | 30 | 1 | 30 | 240 |
| 21 | School Guidelines | 1 | 10 | 1 | 10 | 80 |
| **Total** | | | 21 | 678 | 66 | 2288 | 18268 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Workshops 2008-2010** | | | | |
| **No.** | **Workshop Title** | **Number of events** | **Number of participants** | **Number of Days** |
| 22 | DesInventar Training- 2008 Kerman | 1 | 19 |  |
| 23 | DesInventar Training- 2008 Gorgan | 1 | 23 | 1 |
| 24 | ToT for School Safety programme 2008 | 1 | 25 | 1 |
| 25 | School Preparedness Training for 30 Schools in Gorgan and Kerman- 2008 | 36 |  |  |
| 26 | Neighborhood Sensitizing- Gorgan- 2009 | 3 | 90 |  |
| 27 | Sensitizing School Teachers and Heads- Gorgan 2009 | 2 | 50 |  |
| 28 | DM Workshops for Teachers 2009 | 6 | 240 |  |
| 29 | Non-structural Mitigation Experience Sharing for Hospitals-Gorgan 2009 | 1 | 50 | 1 |
| 30 | DM Training with participants from 5 Hospitals- Kerman 2009 | 1 |  | 3 |
| 31 | CBDRM Training for Neighborhoods - Gorgan 2009 | 2 |  | 1 |
| 32 | Workshop for Gender Needs in DRM- Kerman 2009 | 1 |  | 2 |
| 33 | Workshop for Gender Needs in DRM- Gorgan 2009 | 1 |  | 2 |
| 34 | Portal Management for Information Sharing in DRM 2010 | 1 |  | 1 |
| 35 | DesInventar Training and Forum for Heads of DM offices 2010 | 1 | 11 | 1 |

1. From Hand Over Note Victoria Kianpour, Programme Analyst, Reconstruction and DRM UNDP Iran,

   Period: January 2004 - July 15 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Programme staff stated that they approached the IIES and proposed an implementing role in the two pilot cities. Eventually however the fee demanded by IIES and their proposed approach resulted in abandonment of this proposed partnership. IIEES position on this specific point could not be established.. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Written comment by the coordinator of the UERM programme, Mr Sayah, the DRM Expert. This plan was not known to the authorities in Gorgan and Kerman. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The MPO Bureau directly involved with project implementation was initially the Bureau for Formulation of Standards for Mitigation of Earthquake Risks- a highly relevant part of MPO with substantial funding allocation powers. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. . From the Stock –taking exercise meeting notes, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. * Establishment of the Center, was adopted at the 67th session of ACPR of ESCAP in 2011. It will receive US$ 50 million from the GoI for the next five years to serve the region.

   [↑](#footnote-ref-6)