

ACT for Peace Programme

**Terminal Evaluation Report**

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List of Acronyms

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **ACT for Peace / A4P** | Action for Conflict Transformation for Peace Programme |
| **ARG** | ARMM Regional Government |
| **ARMM** | Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao |
| **AusAID** | Australian Agency for International Development |
| **BDA** | Bangsamoro Development Agency |
| **BDC** | Barangay Development Council |
| **BDP** | Barangay Development Plan |
| **BDP-PRA** | Barangay Development Plan-Participatory Rural Appraisal |
| **BHW** | Barangay Health Worker |
| **COP** | Culture of Peace |
| **CPP-NPA** | Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army |
| **CSO** | Civil Society Organization |
| **CSPP** | Conflict-Sensitive and Peace-Promoting |
| **DepEd** | Department of Education |
| **DA** | Department of Agriculture |
| **DCC** | Disaster Coordinating Committee |
| **DENR** | Department of Environment and Natural Resources |
| **DILG** | Department of Interior and Local Government |
| **DSWD** | Department of Social Welfare and Development |
| **DTI** | Department of Trade and Industry |
| **EA** | Executing Agency |
| **ELA** | Executive and Legislative Agenda |
| **EO** | Executive Order |
| **ExCom** | Executive Committee |
| **EU** | European Union |
| **FAO** | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| **FGD** | Focus Group Discussion |

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| **FPA** | Final Peace Agreement |
| **GEM Program** | Growth with Equity in Mindanao Program |
| **GOP** | Government of the Philippines |
| **GOP-UNMDP3** | Government of the Philippines-United Nations Multi-Donor Programme Third Phase |
| **GRP-MNLF FPA** | Government of the Republic of the Philippines-Moro National Liberation Front Final Peace Agreement |
| **HDI** | Human Development Index |
| **IA** | Implementing Agency |
| **IDP** | Internally Displaced Person |
| **IP** | Indigenous Peoples |
| **IRA** | Internal Revenue Allotment |
| **KII** | Key Informant Interview |
| **LDC** | Local Development Council |
| **LGU** | Local Government Units |
| **LIA** | Lead Implementing Agency |
| **LSF** | Local Social Formation |
| **MA** | Managing Agent |
| **ManCom** | Management Committee |
| **MDP** | Multi-Donor Programme |
| **MDP3** | Multi-Donor Programme Phase 3 |
| **M&E** | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| **MEDCo** | Mindanao Economic Development Council |
| **MinDA** | Mindanao Development Authority |
| **MILF** | Moro Islamic Liberation Front |
| **MNLF** | Moro National Liberation Front |
| **MTPDP** | Medium Term Philippine Development Plan |
| **MTR** | Mid-Term Review |
| **MWG** | Mindanao Working Group |
| **NEDA** | National Economic Development Authority |
| **NGA** | National Government Agency |
| **NPA** | New People’s Army |
| **NZAID** | New Zealand Agency for International Development |
| **ODA** | Official Development Assistance |
| **OECD** | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |

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| **OIA** | Overall Implementing Agency |
| **OPAPP** | Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process |
| **PCC** | Programme Coordinating Committee |
| **PDA** | Peace and Development Advocate |
| **PDAL** | Peace and Development League |
| **PDC** | Peace and Development Council |
| **PDF** | Philippine Development Forum |
| **PDP** | Philippine Development Plan |
| **PHDR** | Philippine Human Development Report |
| **PMO** | Programme Management Office |
| **PNP** | Philippine National Police |
| **PO** | People’s Organization |
| **SOP** | School of Peace |
| **StRIDE-Mindanao** | Strengthening Response to Internal Displacement in Mindanao |
| **SZOPAD** | Special Zone of Peace and Development |
| **TESDA** | Technical Skills Development Authority |
| **UN** | United Nations |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |

Executive Summary

**Background**

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Terminal Evaluation on the Action for Conflict Transformation for Peace Programme (ACT for Peace Programme) in Southern Philippines. The Programme is the fourth phase of the Government of the Philippines-United Nations Multi-Donor Programme which commenced in 1997 in support of the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (GPH-MNLF).

ACT for Peace capitalized on the successful Peace and Development Community (PDC) model as a vehicle to initiate peace-driven transformation and development at the community level.

The Programme incorporated the “culture of peace” (COP) in the PDC model with the intention of effecting positive change in attitudes and values toward peace and development. ACT for Peace sought to address not only physical and social reconstruction and restoration of areas affected by armed conflict but more importantly to support and sustain stability and peace, and promote human security to enable communities to transition to development.

The Programme commenced in June 2005 and officially ended in June 2010 with a no-cost extension period from July to December 2010. The Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA)[[1]](#footnote-1) acted as the Overall Implementing Agency and the Lead Implementing Agency (LIA) for the non-ARMM areas, while the ARMM Regional Government (ARG) acted as the LIA for the ARMM area.

Total Programme budget for the five-year project period is approximately US$16.2 million (PhP1,091,838,059). Funding was provided by the Governments of Australia, Spain and New Zealand. The European Commission funded the Programme’s humanitarian and rehabilitation component through the Strengthening Response to Internal Displacement-Mindanao (StRIDe-Mindanao) project.

This evaluation assesses the performance of the ACT for Peace Programme over five and a half years of implementation, covering the period 1 June 2005 to 31 December 2010. The evaluation results were intended (a) to inform Programme stakeholders on the effectiveness of peace interventions over its implementation period and (b) to provide information, lessons learned and recommendations for current and future programming for peace and development initiatives of a similar nature.

The summative evaluation of the performance of the ACT for Peace Programme had the objectives of a) assessing Programme implementation and management in the achievement of results ; b) ascertaining achievement of Programme outcomes, including factors affecting them and the benefits to peace and conflict actors; c) determining Programme performance based on OECD-DAC criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities; and d) distilling lessons and recommendations for future programming of similar initiatives.

Quantitative and qualitative data were gathered using review of documents, perception survey, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Variance analysis and descriptive-correlational analyses were used on the perception survey results. The results of the KIIs and FGDs were subjected to content analysis, a form of typological analysis. The assessment was further guided by two general frameworks for evaluation: UNDP’s Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators and the OECD criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities[[2]](#footnote-2).

The Terminal Evaluation Report will not concentrate on inputs, throughputs, and outputs achievement. It is not the objective of the evaluation to provide a cost-benefit based analysis of Programme initiatives and results although cost-effectiveness was considered. It will also not exhaustively look into the achievement of the Programme Goal and the planned Impact level results. These could be the subject of future and more focused evaluation.

**Key Evaluation Findings**

**Programme Context**

1. The Programme operated within a complex environment characterized by an unstable peace and security situation, imbalanced development and overall low human security conditions. Amid many peace and development initiatives and government actions to pursue peaceful negotiations, violent conflicts recurred due to intermittent conflict with the MILF and political dynasties with heavily armed civilian forces. These spawned repetitive cycles of community displacements setting back efforts to bring about stability and development in the region. Displacements have become the most visible effects of the armed conflicts which deflated inroads and initial progress made by the ACT for Peace and other programmes.
2. ACT for Peace adjusted operational priorities and adopted appropriate contingency measures to do humanitarian work even as it continued to pursue development and transformation of other post-conflict communities through the PDC approach. There were many evidences of the Programme effectively confronting uncertainties, and pursuing coordination while managing operational risks and stakeholders’ expectations to continue to be responsive to the context. Thus ACT for Peace was able to maintain relevance in light of the shifting environment. A risk management strategy and the infusion of fresh funds from donor agencies for humanitarian and early recovery enabled ACT for Peace to be responsive and adaptable.

**Implementation and Achievement of Results**

1. The ACT for Peace Programme substantially attained its planned outputs results through its strategies and initiatives, as well as implementation and management arrangements.
2. Most significant about the ACT for Peace Programme is its substantial contribution to the transformation of 278 conflict-affected communities --which exceeded by 6% the original target of 263 -- to peace and development areas as a result of peace-oriented change at the personal, relational, structural and cultural levels. Many of these communities (245) are already at advanced stages of development (4 to 6) which indicated stronger know-how in peacebuilding and culture of peace, and capacities in initiating and managing peace and development initiatives. Only 33 PDCs (12% of the 278) still remain in the early stages of transformation. One hundred forty-one (141) new communities underwent initial transformation following the PDC approach; the target of 126 was exceeded by 12%. Fifty-four (54) early recovery sites still need assistance in transitioning towards recovery and development. Based on the study, PDCs need at least two-years of support to grow by one-point in the Stages of Development and Transformation.
3. Shifts in mindsets and stronger capacities relevant to peacebuilding and conflict transformation were manifest in the 389 peoples’ organizations, 612 local social formations, 674 peace and development advocates (PDAs) and 17 inter-PDC alliances involving 59 PDCs. Specific governance processes such as local planning and representation in local bodies were strengthened in the barangays; these will facilitate future peace and development initiatives. Among the different actors at the community level, there was manifest and growing commitment to shared responsibility in the achievement of peacebuilding objectives.
4. The Programme provided support that enhanced access to social and economic services and addressed key aspects of human security of conflict-affected communities. Through 341 barangay health and sanitation facilities more than 160,000 men, women and children from vulnerable groups have benefited. Another 74,000 affected families were supported with food, medicines and temporary shelter; around 461 shelter units were provided. A total of 438 community economic projects were implemented in 238 PDCs benefiting 23,149 PO members, 45% of whom were women. Employment opportunities were afforded to about 1,230 individuals. Community level service providers (22 midwives and 72 CED para-technicians) can potentially support sustainability and future expansion of services.
5. The MNLF, Peace and Development Advocates Leagues (PDALs), and LGUs had been involved in previous phases of multi-donor assistance to peace after the GRP-MNLF FPA. However, it was only in ACT for Peace where they took on prominent roles and were deliberately targeted as recipients of capacity building assistance with the intention of enhancing the enabling environment for peace and development. All 15 MNLF State Committees implemented projects in the PDCs such as community enterprises and peace advocacy initiatives like regional-level conflict mediation and inter-faith dialogues. All 21 PDALs and alliances evolved from being project beneficiaries to implementing partners and active civil society organizations and peace movements engaged in peace advocacy and community development work. PDALs and other alliances were also represented in Local Development Councils (LDCs) and other local social bodies like the Peace and Order Councils (POCs) and Peace and Development Councils or Technical Working Groups (PDCs or TWGs) at the province level. Thirty-six (36) PDCs integrated Islamic Leadership and Governance in their local governance processes.
6. The Programme demonstrated effectiveness in engaging and capacitating LGUs. Eleven (11) provincial and two city LGUs replicated the PDC approach in 141 barangays; 87 of the 144 MLGUs (60%) were already allocating resources and providing technical and financial support to PDCs; all 19 PLGUs and 95 MLGUs installed relevant mechanisms; and 273 CED projects were provided LGU support. These indicate the LGUs had stronger commitments to pursue and sustain peace and development. The lessons from working with LGUs are vital for future initiatives.
7. ACT for Peace enhanced local capacities for peace, developed partnerships for the promotion of the culture of peace; and advocated it in more mainstream venues thus widening networks for peace. Around 488 LSFs integrated COP, human security, peacebuilding and conflict transformation principles and processes in their local peace and development initiatives. All PDCs developed and strengthened their conflict management skills to promote social healing and harmony through local, cultural and indigenous practices. Four (4) CSOs were actively engaged in inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogues, community development, capacity building and collaboration efforts for COP promotion. Mainstreaming the human security approach to peace education in the military and the police was a positive contribution to enhance security sector perspectives on tolerance and diversity resulting to improved perception of and relations with the community people. Twelve (12) regional and 29 provincial partnerships were forged and operationalized and six (6) regional and 19 provincial policy support for peacebuilding were enlisted. Sixty (60) Schools of Peace (SOPs) were established and capacitated. The 22 Provincial Peace Resource Centers could serve as mechanisms to sustain COP promotion and building capacities of a wider audience in peace-based community organizing, conflict-sensitive and peace-promotive planning and investment programming, and peace education.
8. Key peacebuilding initiatives were institutionalized at the national and regional levels through the strategic integration of peace and human security perspective in frameworks, policies and plans of government agencies. A key example is the issuance of Executive Order No. 570, “Institutionalizing Peace Education and Teacher Education” leading to the release of the implementing DepEd Memorandum Order 469 which was facilitated by partnership of key peace groups, government and donor agencies.
9. The indicators signaled the full achievement of Outcomes 1 and 3 and significant progress towards Outcome 2.
10. The Programme indicators have been achieved signaling attainment of Outcome 1 (Transformation of PDCs, and other conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas is sustained; and community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace and human security are harnessed): a) 245 PDCs have enhanced abilities to plan, implement, institutionalize and replicate initiatives that promote peace and address threats to human security. This is 108% of the original target of 227 PDCs; b) 141 communities are undergoing conflict transformation processes; this is 112% of the target communities.

Evidence from both quantitative and qualitative evaluation showed that ACT for Peace initiatives enabled target communities to plan, implement, institutionalize and replicate initiatives that promote peace and address threats to human security, and a new set of communities to undergo conflict transformation processes. These changes were demonstrations of Programme efforts to strengthen social capital and promote human security in support of peacebuilding and conflict management.

1. Progress has been made in the attainment of the Outcome 2 (Peacebuilding and conflict transformation [prevention, management and resolution] capacities of actors and institutions are strengthened and institutionalized): a) all of the target 19 PLGUs and 144 MLGUs that were actually involved had enhanced capacities in peace building and conflict transformation (total of 163); an estimated two-thirds of the total LGUs involved reached the higher stages of development; b) all of the target PDALs and alliances are in various phases of transformation implementing peacebuilding projects

ACT for Peace improved capacities of different actors in peacebuilding and conflict transformation who are in the position to assist conflict-affected communities and also pursue and enhance their own policy, processes, mechanisms and initiatives to contribute to sustainable peace.

1. Outcome 3 (Critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development are strengthened) has been attained based on the Programme indicators: a) PLGU-level partnerships (19) and regional level (6) partnerships on peacebuilding; b) 60 Schools of Peace modeling the integration of the Culture of Peace and Peace Education

There are evidences that ACT for Peace initiatives were successful in introducing and promoting Culture of Peace principles and practices at different levels and in strengthening critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development.

Eighty-eight (88) communities as vulnerable to violence; 23 of these were directly affected by the 2008 armed conflict and experienced short-term displacement. While the evaluation was not able to study why and how the other 65 PDCs remained unaffected by violence over a five-year period, whether this stability is of a durable nature, and whether it was largely due to Programme support, nevertheless this “result” needs to be cited as the kind of desirable downstream effect that initiatives like the ACT for Peace should be contributing towards, and about which there should be continued efforts to increase knowledge and understanding. It should be noted that KII and FGD respondents consistently reported the reduction of violence in their areas, the absence of new outbreaks, or the prevention of new conflicts. Resilience and ability to promote human security were also demonstrated by the 26 PDCs that served as evacuation camps or resettlement areas.

The achievement of these outcome indicators could be ascribed to the Programme implementation and management arrangements and the output results. The status of these outcomes is plausible in light of the factors that facilitated or hindered their achievement and the context in which the Programme operated.

**Contributions to the Larger Peace Outcomes**

1. ACT for Peace interventions and results were aligned with and contributed towards the Mindanao Peace Outcomes, which are statements that represent the achievement of higher-level changes that would address violent conflicts and usher long-term peace in Southern Philippines, and the country’s peace goals. These attest to the relevance of the Programme whose objectives are consistent with Government peace and development priorities. The Programme is also impacting favorably on the larger peace situation by building positive connections between groups and promoting social cohesion.
2. *Mindanao Peace Outcome 1: Peaceful and inclusive negotiated settlement of armed conflicts between GPH and all rebel groups in Mindanao achieved and successfully implemented.* The Programme is a major support to the implementation of the GRP-MNLF FPA through its assistance to MNLF communities transformed as PDCs and by enhancing the capacities of the MNLF in peacebuilding. It likewise influenced government strategy for the reintegration of rebel returnees through capacity building support to OPAPP’s Social Integration Program.
3. *Mindanao Peace Outcome 2: Human security in Mindanao conflict-affected and vulnerable communities enhanced.* The Programme contributed substantively to enhancing human security in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities by promoting and increasing people’s awareness of human rights and good governance, improving access to basic services especially to vulnerable groups like women and children, increasing appreciation of and access to economic development initiatives through collective undertakings, and establishing greater social cohesion among members of the community of varying faiths and cultural descents. The early recovery strategies employed by the Programme in its efforts to assist IDPs focused on the restoration of human dignity based on the human security framework.
4. *Mindanao Peace Outcome 3: Mindanao peace constituency broadened and citizens’ participation in the peace process strengthened.* The Programme significantly contributed to the strengthening of a Mindanao peace constituency through the formation and strengthening of POs, CSOs, PDALs/Alliances and other LSFs that actively engaged government (both local and national levels) in service delivery to its constituents. In addition, these constituents participated in local development planning, investment programming and project management, other peace-based initiatives for greater social cohesion and cooperation, and sought representation in local peacebuilding and development structures, mechanisms and processes. It likewise contributed to mainstreaming peace education among culture bearers particularly in the academic sector, expanded the peace constituency to the security sector through the participation of the AFP and PNP in COP capacity building, and contributed to policy development for peacebuilding at the national and regional levels.
5. *Mindanao Peace Outcome 4: Policy environment for sustained peace, development and human security in Mindanao enhanced.* The Programme has to a large extent contributed to enhancing the policy environment in Mindanao for sustained peace, development and human security through the introduction and implementation of innovative policies, issuances and enabling structures for sustained peace, development and human security.
6. *Mindanao Peace Outcome 5: The Programme strengthened and institutionalized peacebuilding and conflict transformation capacities among key actors and institutions.* Peace-based platforms and infrastructures were effectively introduced; capacities of officers and functionaries of LGUs and regional level agencies were strengthened. Nevertheless, efforts need further improvement to see the intended outcomes of capacity development through.
7. Mindanao Peace Outcome 6: Social cohesion and harmonious relationships strengthened within and among communities and sectors. The Programme was successful in building social cohesion and strengthening of vertical and horizontal relationships between and among communities, key actors and stakeholders. These were accomplished principally through rigorous peace education and the promotion of COP at the grassroots. Communities were empowered and capacitated to manage conflicts using traditional or indigenous means of conflict resolution (inter-faith, inter-barangayor inter-PDC activities like consultations, dialogues, and celebrations). This strategy has been proven effective in preventing the eruption or escalation of violent conflicts.

**OECD Criteria**

1. Overall perception of the Programme is very positive. This is attributed to the tangible benefits of Programme interventions in the provision of basic services and promotion of community economic activities. The Programme was viewed as desirable -- a reflection of the beneficiaries’ appreciation of the positive changes brought about in the four dimensions of transformation at the personal, relational, structural and cultural levels. There was positive perception of the Programme across all regions. Respondents from Western Mindanao consistently posted the highest positive rating, with ARMM posting the lowest positive rating.
2. Of the eight OECD criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, ACT for Peace was rated “very high” in four (Relevance/Appropriateness, Effectiveness, Coverage and Coherence) and “good” in the remaining four (Sustainability, Efficiency, Impact and Linkages). These very favorable ratings attest to the performance of ACT for Peace Programme as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiative.

**Theories of Change**

1. The ACT for Peace experience confirms that conflict-prone areas require complementing support to sustain their transformation into peaceful, resilient and developing communities. However, not just any kind, and degree of support, delivered at any time, is needed.
2. Evidence from the ACT for Peace Programme showed that there is strong interaction between capacity for social cohesion on the one hand, and capacity for peacebuilding and human rights protection on the other. Further, the level of capacity of the beneficiaries in social cohesion has been analyzed to be a strong predictor of peacebuilding and human rights protection. As the level of capacity for social cohesion increases so does the level of capacity for peacebuilding and human rights protection. This suggests that initiatives and investments on social cohesion would also have favorable effects on peacebuilding and human rights protection. Among social cohesion, human security, community economic development and governance, it is social cohesion that has the most significant relationship to, and is the strongest predictor of peacebuilding and human rights protection. These make social cohesion a very vital aspect of peace work.
3. Improving the capacity the beneficiaries in terms of their access to and utilization of basic social services correlates to an improvement in their capacity for peacebuilding and human right protection. Capacity to access and utilize basic social services was also found to be a significant predictor of peacebuilding and human rights protection.
4. The level of capacity of beneficiaries in social cohesion is a determinant of the level of capacity performance in conflict management. The level of access to and utilization of basic social services also significantly predicts the capacity for conflict management. An increase in the level of access to and utilization of basic social services can lead to an increase in the level of conflict management capacity. Conflict-sensitive governance can also significantly predict performance capacity in conflict management. Future initiatives on strengthening conflict management should thus consider including strengthening social cohesion, promoting human security through the provision of basic social services, and strengthening governance. Although all three have highly significant relationships with and are strong predictors of conflict management capacity, governance stands out.
5. Relationship between social cohesion, human security, and conflict-sensitive governance with community economic development was not significant. Moreover, CED was also not a significant determinant of increased capacities in conflict management. Other than specific observations such as that stronger social cohesion can be a by-product of economic development activities as more members of the community interact, collaborate and share both responsibilities and benefits, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions regarding CED and peacebuilding, human rights promotion and conflict transformation from the lens of the ACT for Peace experience. It is possible that the weak levels of significance are due to the reality that more vigorous implementation of CED initiatives in ACT for Peace only occurred in the higher staged PDC; and thus was not widely provided and did not have as significant implementation time compared to social cohesion, human security and good governance services. Also, the nature of enterprise and economic development is such that basic underlying conditions and considerations apply regardless of the conflict levels and stability of the community in which they are occurring.
6. The ACT for Peace experience validated the importance of working with a larger base of local actors to strengthen responsiveness of duty bearers and civil society to the aspirations of conflict-affected communities; and strengthen local capacities for conflict transformation and peacebuilding.
7. Enhancing the conflict management and good governance capacities of LGUs and other local stakeholders would promote effectiveness of conflict transformation and peacebuilding initiatives; responsiveness to concerns of post-conflict or conflict-affected/vulnerable communities; and effectively inform macro policy and institutional response.
8. Conflict-sensitive governance is the most significant predictor of the performance capacity in conflict management. This means that an increase in the level of good governance capacity in a conflict setting corresponds to an increase in the level of performance capacity in conflict management.
9. The Programme made a strategic decision to focus on capacitating with PDALs as a civil society organization and the MNLF. There were advantages to this decision in light of resource constraints and the need to sustain the involvement of PDALs. ACT for Peace also engaged NGOs as service providers and invited them to partnership activities. However, they were not targeted as direct recipients of assistance. Hence, while the Programme has engaged both rights duty holders and claims-makers, the effects and implications of providing support to a wider base of actors outside of the PDC, PDALs, LGUs, agencies, MNLF and schools, cannot be fully ascertained.
10. The experience of ACT for Peace confirmed the importance of working with key institutions, particularly the “culture bearers”, to broaden peace constituency and nurture the environment of peace. The decision to focus on the academe as a “culture bearer” was predicated on Programme financial and management considerations and to a certain extent, learnings from other initiatives that targeted cultural institutions such as media and churches. Compared to focusing on individuals involved in media work, the Schools of Peace approach had a more institutional nature and facilitated faster mainstreaming of peace education and the culture of peace. However, the downstream and strategic impact of this approach can only be verified in the future.

**Programme Management and Financial Performance**

1. The management policies and structure used in implementation afforded the Programme flexibility to be responsive to the changing context of its operating environment. The levels of authority provided to the PMO enabled it to decide on immediate short-term concerns and to deliver services but not without challenges in meeting deadlines and technical requirements. Organizational changes and compulsory administrative and regulations to ensure aid effectiveness caused delays in completing undertakings. Delays in the release of project funds resulted in snags in the implementation of planned activities and achievement of targets, which did not augur well in a Programme with a stringent timeframe. At the policy level, Programme success rested on the implementing agencies; and better coordination among the agencies concerned such as OPAPP, DILG and NEDA and with donors was recommended.
2. Convergence and coordination with other programs were best pursued at the level of MinDA and ARMM Regional Government where mechanisms are already existing to facilitate interaction and sharing of learning. A PMO convergence group was initiated by MinDA where the Programme was active; it also participated in other forums and inter-agency collaboration. Future peacebuilding programs would do well in terms of facilitating convergence by learning from the experience of the ACT for Peace Programme.
3. Strengthening inter-agency relationships is an area where continued improvement is warranted. The involvement of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) in future peace undertakings will also have to be improved building on the experience of agency involvement in ACT for Peace. Future programming in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) areas will have to recognize the full and effective exercise of authority and direct accountability of the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG) and the peculiarities of the region in the implementation of any peace and development initiatives.
4. The ACT for Peace Programme received Php1,091,838,059 for its five-year implementation spread over six components including fund augmentation from the government of New Zealand for the expanded operations in CARAGA region; and, from the European Union (EU) for the implementation of the StRIDe-Mindanao Project from March 2009 until November 2010. ACT for Peace delivery rate as of 31 December 2010 vis-à-vis 5-year budget was placed at 98.19%. Combined ACT for Peace and StRIDe Programme delivery rate reached 97.72% of the total downloaded funds.
5. Funds were generally utilized within budget and consistent with the implementation framework of the Programme except for Direct Services which accounted for 50.87% of investments exceeding programmed allocation (45%). Support for developing the capacity of key actors for peacebuilding, accounted for 42% of resources disbursed to technical assistance spread across the components. Total investments for components 1, 2 and 3 were directly proportionate to outcome 1 results.
6. The Programme provided an average of PhP500,000 per PDC over the five-year period across the first outcome’s three components. This investment includes value adding derived from interventions under Components 4 and 5. Actual investments per PDC over the five year period of implementation varies from as low as PhP100,000 to as high as PhP10,000,000.
7. In the areas of crosscutting themes, the Programme promoted gender equality through initiatives that enabled remarkable changes in women’s participation and leadership in peacebuilding efforts and community economic development projects. An environmental concern was addressed involving watershed management of some 250 hectares and was an unintended outcome when a partnership was forged between PDC Chua and regional government agencies.

**Relevant Factors**

1. The comprehensive and rigorously-designed concept and plan of the Programme captured, consolidated and enhanced the lessons from the past three phases of the UNMDP. Clear identification of drivers of conflict allowed for strategic interventions in each of the Programme’s five components.
2. Key aspects of the foundation for social capital and peace infrastructure-building such as the peace advocates and alliances were established in some communities at the beginning of the Programme’s life.
3. Communities have their own peculiarities which will have to be taken into consideration along with their capacities, interests, and drivers. More effort will have to be exerted to better understand the abilities, priorities and motivators of ARMM communities. This improved comprehension could then guide the delivery of future assistance so that ARMM communities are better supported in their efforts to become more self-directing, fully reap the benefits of the transformation processes, and become more self-reliant.
4. Peace-oriented civil society organizations and institutions have remained steadfast and unrelenting in their quest for a just and lasting peace, with or without big peace and development projects. Strong partnerships among civil society organizations facilitated accomplishments in the areas of peace education, consensus building for peace and implementation of peace-oriented projects. Conversely, weak CSO - government engagement will also impact on initiatives to strengthen governance and exact performance and accountability from duty bearers. This seemed to be the experience in ARMM.
5. Continuing support of various donor organizations for peace and development in Mindanao and the election of reform-minded leaders in LGUs help make the environment more enabling for peace and development. On the other hand, a political climate where newly-elected officials at the local level can reject or undermine already installed peace-based structures, processes and mechanisms obviously had negative effects.
6. Partnerships at different levels facilitated the success of many Programme initiatives. Collaboration and coordination between and among national/regional government agencies and LGUs resulted in the conflict-sensitive and peace promoting policies and programs. Also, stronger collaboration and convergence between and among PDCs through alliances boosted development gains.
7. Inconclusive peace settlements with rebel groups often lead to eruptions of armed hostilities which impact on Programme operations and negatively affect participating communities and other actors. The outbreak of violence in 2007 and 2008-2009 were external events beyond the control of the Programme that affected planned and budgeted activities.

**Lessons Learned**

1. The Peace and Development Community (PDC) concept and approach remained the most vital contribution of the Programme to peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The abilities to negotiate and manage their own peaceful environments, mobilize resources to support their peace and development plans, and share their peacebuilding skills with neighboring communities are vital capacities that will enable communities to transition from unstable to more stable conditions under an enabling environment, resist provocations to further violence, and respond to any future experiences of instability. These community abilities need to be purposively developed and cannot be exercised or delivered by alternative arrangements.
2. The transformation of former combatants needs to be systematically pursued. PDCs and its effects on strengthening social cohesion can systematize the transformation of conflict actors, particularly in the context of the implementation of peace agreements. Working with groups inside a larger community provides former combatants with the support systems that would enable them to transition to new roles. At the same time, the natural connection to a larger community will facilitate “reintegration” and reduce the risks of former combatants from becoming isolated and being perceived by the rest as a privileged group. Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) are also a key means of sustaining PDCs and expanding the peace constituency to other areas.
3. The sustainability of the transformation of conflict-affected communities towards peace and development hinges on a truly enabling environment which is primarily characterized by support and commitment of local government units and government agencies primarily, and of the donor community to a certain extent. Thus, convergence, collaboration and linkaging between and among national and regional agencies, between higher-level and lower-level government entities, between government entities and the donor community remain a critical component in the pursuit of a just and lasting peace, and sustainable development in Mindanao.
4. Genuine transformation takes time and rigor and requires sustained commitment from all stakeholders. In the context of public organizations, while change management concepts, principles and practices are finding their way into the system, sustaining reforms remains a major effort particularly at the LGU level where traditional, patron-based values and mindsets in politics and governance are deeply entrenched. Hence, institutional and policy reforms in favor of good governance that is conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting must be further pursued and strengthened.
5. LGUs are the natural frontline institutions that would take over providing some aspects of the support that the ACT for Peace used to provide to the conflict-affected communities. However, they have a wide constituency in different levels of stability and development, and they have to deal with competing priorities and limited resources. Among the key challenges that LGUs have to address that have significant impact on communities, whether conflict-affected or otherwise, are meeting the Millennium Development Goals targets, being prepared for, as well as reducing and managing disaster risks particularly in light of climate change.
6. The complex and precarious conflict situation in Mindanao necessitates multi-dimensional programmatic interventions to bring about the desired changes. Moreover, interventions must be context-specific, flexible and time-sensitive. The engagement of multiple stakeholder groups is also essential for peacebuilding efforts to succeed in transforming conflict-affected and vulnerable communities along the path of peace and development. Implementation and management arrangements of future initiatives have to be appropriate to meet these requirements. In particular, a mechanism that has the relevant mandate and adequate convening and coordinative capacity will be needed to lead such initiatives.
7. The evaluation showed that the accomplishment of planned Outputs could be directly attributed to Programme implementation strategies and management arrangements. The achievement of target Outcomes 1 and 3 and progress in Outcome 2 were verified by indicators which were structured to be traceable to the efforts of ACT for Peace and by benefits which similarly could be linked to the Programme. Moreover, the status of these higher oriented results was deemed plausible in light of the factors that affected ACT for Peace implementation and results. However, the complex context and comprehensive and partnership-oriented nature of ACT for Peace make exclusive attribution of results challenging. Typical evaluations which emphasize quantitative models would be inadequate in this situation. While scarce aid funding and the demand for accountability exact attribution, trends in evaluation have emphasized a shift from “measuring and proving” to “understanding and improving”. The problematic nature of attribution has triggered a shift in the understanding of causation – focusing on reducing uncertainty about how things relate and change, instead of fixating on proving relationships between variables. A model that could be considered in future evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict transformation initiatives in the Philippines is causal contribution analysis, a theory-driven performance measurement system that enables, over time, a better understanding of how a program is working, and can be used to improve future performance and report on past performance.

**Recommendations**

**General Recommendations**

1. Under the administration of President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, the peace agenda (Chapter IX) in the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) for 2011-2016 underscores the achievement of stable national security environment as a major sectoral outcome. The PDP calls for reforms and initiatives that effectively address the causes of all armed conflicts and other issues that affect the peace process as well as the satisfactory conclusion of ongoing and past negotiated political settlements with rebel groups. Priority attention shall be given to the development and security needs of areas affected or have remained vulnerable to armed conflict. The approaches and lessons from ACT for Peace Programme are relevant to the Government’s peace and development priorities. The Programme offers a model for an effective peace-driven development intervention drawing strength from responsive and accountable local governance and the communities’ own aspirations and indigenous capacities for self-sufficiency and resiliency.
2. Contribute good practices and lessons learned to enhance the implementation of the strategies under the complementary track, in particular the implementation of PAMANA. Pillar 2 of PAMANA refers to microlevel interventions focused on households and communities which include delivery of basic services at the community level through conditional cash transfer approaches, community driven reconstruction and development and community livelihood. In particular, these are as follows:
   1. Strengthening social cohesion in aid of transformation and peacebuilding, which is a very vital aspect of peace work, needs to be deliberately pursued and nurtured in conflict–affected communities and former combatants, and cannot be left to chance. Services to strengthen social cohesion might be better delivered by other providers, such as non-government organizations, the academe and peace networks, rather than by government personnel. While local governments are set up to deliver mandated social, economic, environmental and development administration services, it cannot be expected of them to automatically introduce peacebuilding and conflict transformation services without themselves going through a process of change.
   2. The delivery of social services is among the ways of promoting human security in conflict-affected/vulnerable communities and achieving Millennium Development Goals across communities. In conflict-affect/vulnerable communities, the services have to be delivered in a manner that highlights that the support is a manifestation of respect for human rights, and government’s concern and inclusivity, to be able to optimize effects on peacebuilding.
3. Contribute lessons learned in community economic development (CED) to Pillar 3 of PAMANA, which refers to mesolevel interventions that address local development challenges, including constraints to local economic development, economic integration of poor areas with more prosperous areas and physical and economic connectivity improvements.
4. The peace-based CED framework of the ACT for Peace Programme is appropriate to the context of conflict-affected/vulnerable and post-conflict communities. However, there are operational approaches that could be enhanced to be more effective in dealing with the demands of economic and enterprise development.
5. CED initiatives should be based on economic advantage. This would involve, among others identifying the various crops (or industry) and comparative advantage, and defining the role of the community and other economic stakeholders in value adding using the value chain.
6. Local government units have roles in promoting community economic development. However LGUs need not be the economic actors themselves but only play facilitating and enabling roles. Government support to CED can also be linked to citizenship. As government provides facilities and marshals other resources to improve productivity and income, organizations and household-beneficiaries must reciprocate through the payment of fees and taxes.
7. LGUs can mobilize the support of agencies that have economic mandates and services and facilitate their delivery of assistance to the communities, as well as tap the private sector. An agency such as DILG will have to play the role of convenor of the agencies.
8. Unpredictability in funding can compromise local initiatives in human security/MDGs and community economic development. Block funds providing grant support innovative initiatives in these areas can motivate LGUs and augment local resources. These can also be packaged as performance incentives to be consistent with the move towards performance-based grants.
9. Continue to improve the institutional capacities of LGUs on disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM), achievement of Millennium Development Goals, entrepreneurial/ corporate governance, and conflict-sensitive and peace-promotive (CSPP) processes.
10. Target local planning, programming and policy formulation processes; in particular ensure that these are informed by use of Culture of Peace, conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and peace-promoting tools, and peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA).
11. Activate mechanisms for peace and development at different levels (provincial, municipal/city and barangay) these could mean creating sub-units and attaching these to mandated mechanisms (e.g., local special bodies). These can facilitate the participation of peace and development advocates, be the point of first contact, or the coordinating body of peace and development initiatives.
12. Continue to Practice Convergence in Support of Aid Effectiveness. Donor convergence is optimized when local government units and higher-level government institutions take their lead role in managing peace and development programs in the coverage areas. Donor program harmonization, complementation and effectiveness are assured when properly coordinated by mandated agencies and authorities (e.g. MinDA). Moreover, convergence with other programmes and institutions promote effective and judicious delivery of services while maximizing impacts on the beneficiaries.

**Recommendations for Mindanao Conflict-Affected Communities**

1. These recommendations build on the general recommendations above and recognize that the support for conflict-affected/vulnerable communities in Mindanao will have to be differentiated. The following premises apply:
2. There are different “types” of conflict-affected/vulnerable communities based on their exposure to violence, the level of assistance provided to them, and their capacities
3. Based on the analysis of relationship to and predictors of peacebuilding, human rights promotion and conflict management, social cohesion, human security/MDGs, good governance and community economic development continue to be effective areas of assistance. These are also consistent with government’s PAMANA framework. However, enhancements will have to be done in conceptualizing and delivering specific support.
4. LGUs are the frontline response unit of government. However, LGU support will have to be augmented to address capacity issues.

Table 1 Summary of Proposed Assistance to Conflict-Affected Communities

| **Strand** | **Type of Community** | **Indicative Areas** | **Indicative Assistance** | **Main Service Provider** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Strand 1 | PDCs | ARMM, SCM, WM | * Governance * MDG/Human Security * Enterprise Development (comparative advantage) * Infrastructure Development * Continuing Strengthening of LGU Capacities in DRRM and CSPP | * LGUs * Assistance from government agencies for Enterprise Development and Infrastructure Development * Other services providers for LGU Capacity Development * Performance-based grant funds (advanced) |
| Strand 2 | Early Recovery Communities | ARMM, SCM | * Social Cohesion * MDG/Human Security * Community Economic Development (livelihood) * Governance (emphasis on order, stability, government visibility and people’s participation) * Strengthening LGU Capacities in DRRM and CSPP | * LGUs for MDG/Human Security * Other services providers for Social Cohesion & LGU Capacity Development * Performance-based grant funds (foundational) |
| Strand 3 | Other Conflict-Affected Areas | Caraga, WM, SCM, ARMM island provinces | * Emergency Assistance * Social Cohesion * MDG/Human Security * Governance (emphasis on order, stability, government visibility and people’s participation) * Strengthening LGU Capacities in DRRM and CSPP | * LGUs for MDG/Human Security * Other services providers for Social Cohesion & LGU Capacity Development * Performance-based grant funds (foundational) |

1. Potentially there could be three strands of assistance for future initiatives in peacebuilding and conflict transformation in Mindanao.
   1. Strand 1. LGUs will be mainly responsible for the PDCs that received assistance from ACT for Peace. LGUs will ensure that governance is strengthened, MDGs/human security attained, infrastructure and enterprise development pursued. LGUs will be assisted through continuing strengthening of LGU capacities in DRRM, CSPP and use of corporate powers, and access to grant funds that serve as performance incentives.
   2. Strand 2. LGUs will similarly be mainly responsible for early recovery communities. The assistance to be provided by LGUs will be similar to the ones for strand 1 except that social cohesion strengthening will have to be pursued and governance will emphasize order, stability, government visibility and people’s participation. LGUs will be assisted through continuing strengthening of LGU capacities in DRRM and CSPP and access to grant funds that serve as performance incentives. The performance incentive will have to be more foundational in comparison to strand 1 which should be more “advanced”. Social cohesion services will have to be sourced from other providers, such as PDALs, other CSOs and peace movements.
   3. Strand 3. LGUs will also be mainly responsible for other conflict-affected/vulnerable communities that are not PDCs or early recovery. The assistance to be provided by LGUs will be similar to the ones for strand 2 except that emergency assistance will have to be included.
2. The delivery of support will have to be orchestrated by a lead mechanism that has relevant mandate and adequate convening and coordinative capacity. This mechanism can provide venues for inter-agency coordination and also enable the participation of organizations representing the target communities (e.g., BDA and civil society organizations). The set-up of the mechanism will need to take into account the roles of the Autonomous Regional Government for areas within the ARMM.

**Introduction and Evaluation Overview**

Section 1

# Section 1 Introduction and Evaluation Overview



## Background

T

he Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace Programme is one of the major donor-supported programs implemented to contribute to government’s peace-building efforts in Mindanao. It is the fourth phase of the GoP-UNMDP, a multi-donor development assistance for recovery and rehabilitation of the MNLF combatants and communities affected by the GRP-MNLF wars. The first two (2) phases of UNMDP focused on providing humanitarian and livelihood assistance to address the needs of returning members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and their families. UNMDP evolved to become a peace building program starting the 3rd phase initiating the promotion of Culture of Peace through various community-based development initiatives.

It aimed to build on the gains of the GoP-UN MDP3 and sought to collaborate and converge with other peace and development initiatives operating in the area. It is managed by UNDP and implemented by the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) and the ARMM Regional Government. The fourth phase was funded by the Governments of Australia, Spain and New Zealand. The European Commission funded the Programme’s humanitarian and rehabilitation component through the Strengthening Response to Internal Displacement-Mindanao (StRIDe-Mindanao) project.

The ACT for Peace Programme is consistent with the national government’s peace agenda as outlined in the 2004-2010 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP). The Plan called for, among others, the rehabilitation and development of conflict-affected areas, complementary measures to minimize the level or violence arising from armed conflicts, catch-up development program for the ARMM and affirmative action agenda for the Muslims, and the conduct of healing and reconciliation programs for former rebels and their communities. The Programme is likewise anchored on Outcome #5 of the United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF) for the Philippines, 2005-2009 which states that, “*By 2009, the level of conflict has been reduced, and human security and the culture of peace have been promoted nationwide.”*

The Programme’s overall implementation strategy is two-pronged: (a) grassroots peacebuilding adopting the Peace and Development Community (PDC) model and (b) enhancing the enabling environment towards a more coherent, participatory and institutionalized agenda for peace and development in Southern Philippines. The design of the Programme, including key frameworks, is described in Annex A.

The Programme sought to strengthen peacebuilding efforts and sustain the gains for peace and development in Southern Philippines. It worked with multiple stakeholder groups in the promotion of change at different levels. Social capital, which is essential to peacebuilding, was strengthened through the consolidation of people’s organizations and other community-based social formations. Through this pursuit, the Programme aimed “to contribute to the promotion of national harmony and a just conclusion of the government’s peace process”.

To support the promotion of human security objectives and a culture of peace, the Programme assisted people affected by and are found to be vulnerable to violent conflicts, provided access to basic services, promoted good governance, articulated people’s common goals while recognizing and strengthening distinct cultural identities, and encouraged strategic alliances for peace work involving civil society organizations, communities, and peace-responsive government agencies. The Programme sought to enhance conflict transformation capacities of individuals, communities, organizations and institutions. Anchored on its Theories of Change (TOC), the Programme aimed to institute changes at four dimensions —personal, relational, structural and cultural. Likewise, it sought to install structures, processes and mechanisms in local governments promoting peace-based governance and to strengthen critical partnerships between and among the various stakeholder organizations and institutions in the building of a peace environment.

By accomplishing its purpose, the Programme expected to achieve the following outcomes:

1. Transformation of peace and development communities (PDCs) and other conflict-affected and conflict vulnerable areas is sustained and community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace and human security are harnessed
2. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) capacities of actors and institutions are strengthened and institutionalized; and
3. Critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development are strengthened.

To achieve the purpose and the planned outcomes, the Programme has five components, the fifth of which cuts across the other four.

* Component 1: Strengthening social capital for peace-building
* Component 2: Promoting human security through improved access to basic services
* Component 3: Promoting human security through community economic development
* Component 4: Building stakeholders’ capacity on conflict transformation
* Component 5: Promoting and advocating a culture of peace towards peacebuilding and conflict transformation

## Purpose of the Evaluation

I

n adherence to aid effectiveness principles, a terminal evaluation was commissioned by the Mindanao Development Authority as the Programme’s overall implementing agency to gauge the Programme’s performance and achievement of results as defined in its Logical Framework of Analysis.

The evaluation results were intended (a) to inform Programme stakeholders on the effectiveness of peace interventions over its implementation period and (b) to provide information, lessons learned and recommendations for current and future programming for peace and development initiatives of a similar nature.

A summative evaluation of the performance of the ACT for Peace Programme over five and a half years of implementation, covering the period 1 June 2005 to 31 December 2010[[3]](#footnote-3) was conducted.

Specifically, the objectives were to:

1. Assess the Programme implementation strategies and processes in the achievement of results
2. Ascertain the achievement of Programme outcomes, including factors affecting them and the benefits to peace and conflict actors
3. Determine Programme performance based on OECD-DAC criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities[[4]](#footnote-4); and
4. Distill lessons for future programming of similar initiatives

The evaluation also sought to examine the contributions made by the ACT for Peace to the larger peace and development milieu in Mindanao. As a five-year Programme informed by three previous phases of similar interventions, the ACT for Peace warranted examination as to how it might have influenced and addressed peace and development conditions and dynamics in the broader society-level peace.

The evaluation approach was both utilization and theory-focused in that it was informed by the imperative of ensuring utility of the evaluation results and of looking into the change process[[5]](#footnote-5) between the initiatives and the results.

## Evaluation Framework

A

s a peacebuilding and conflict transformation intervention, the ACT for Peace Programme was intended to help bring about peace and development change and help influence the environment for change to happen. Specifically, it sought to bring improvement in the human security conditions of 278 peace and development communities (PDCs) as well as generate positive change in the policy environment that would enable and sustain these changes at the community level.

Four elements were examined in the evaluation: a) Programme Implementation (strategies, components and achievement of outputs); b) Programme Management (management structure, processes and systems and financial performance); c) Programme Operating Context; and d) Factors affecting the Outcomes.


The review of Programme implementation and management with an appreciation of factors will support the evaluation of whether the intended outcomes were achieved. Likewise, the evaluation of benefits accruing to target peace and conflict actors and stakeholders were viewed from the lens of Programme implementation, management and context. Finally, attribution was looked into in light of Programme management, context and factors.

The study of these elements and the conclusions on benefits to actors, achievement of Outcomes, and attribution to the Programme is the platform for verifying and validating the Programme’s theories of change. Theories of change are sets of beliefs on how change at the personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions can happen. These theories underpin the Programme’s strategies, approaches and processes.

The evaluation also assessed how ACT for Peace has impacted on or contributed to the larger peace agenda at the national or sub-national levels.

Figure 1provides an illustration of the evaluation framework.

Figure 1 Evaluation Framework



**Outcomes Achievement**

**Attribution to Programme**

**Benefits to Peace & Conflict Actors**

**Theory of Change Verification**

**Contribution to Larger Peace Outcomes**

The above framework was translated into guide questions using UNDP’s guidelines for outcome evaluators and the OECD Criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities (see Table 2).

Table 2 Evaluation Aspects & Key Questions

| **Evaluation Aspects** | **Key Questions** |
| --- | --- |
| **Outcomes Achievement**  **& Factors Affecting Outcomes** | **Outcomes Achievement**   * Positive Change. Were most indicators, if not all or more than the targeted, completely and effectively attained to a level and extent that is effective? What accounted for this? * Negative Change. Was there a reversal to a level below the baseline? What accounted for this? * Unchanged. Was there no movement towards attainment of the intended outcomes? What accounted for this? |
| **Benefits to Peace & Conflict Actor** | **Impact**   * Have there been positive, negative or no noticeable changes in terms of promoting peace and stability? * How has the program built positive connections between groups and promoted social cohesion? * Has the program or could the program inadvertently entrench and further divisions between groups? * Are we confident that the program is ‘Doing No Harm’ and building capacities for peace? |
| **Context** | **Relevance**   * Has the program’s objective in sustaining peace and development in Mindanao been relevant to the Philippine government’s peace and development priorities? * How was the programme able to maintain relevance in the light of shifting peace and conflict environment in Mindanao as well changes in Government peace and development policies? |
| **Programme Strategies & Results** | **Effectiveness**   * How useful have the basic services provided by the program in the PDCs been to the project beneficiaries? * How did provision of these basic services as well as program efforts to promote peace education in 53 Schools of Peace compare with and complement similar programmes in these programme coverage area? * Has the sub-component on emergency response for internally displaced communities contributed to achieving program objectives? * How was effectiveness monitored over the life of the program? |
| **Gender Equality**   * Has the program promoted equal participation and benefits for women, men, boys and girls? * How were gender issues broadly dealt with in programming? |
| **Sustainability**   * Do stakeholders have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the program outcomes following closure of ACT for Peace? * What actions were undertaken to increase the likelihood that program activities will be sustainable? * Are there any areas of the program that are clearly not sustainable? What lessons can be learned from this? |
| **Programme Management** | **Efficiency**   * Has the program suffered from delays in implementation? If so, why and what was done about it? * Has management of the program been responsive to changing needs and circumstances? * How has the program interacted with other peace and development initiatives in Mindanao? * Has a risk management approach been applied to management of the program (including security and anti-corruption)? * What have been the risks to achievement of objectives? Were the risks managed appropriately? |
| **Analysis and Learning**   * How well have learning from implementation and internal assessments been integrated into the program? * How have the recommendations of the 2008 Mid-Term Review been implemented towards improving program performance? |
| **Attribution** | * Is the progress on the Outcome related to specific activities or outputs of the Programme as opposed to other things that are going on at the same time? |

## Scope and Limitations of the Report

S

ection 1 of the report provides information on the evaluation, its objectives, framework, methodology and scope of coverage.

Section 2 is a review of the peace and development context in which the Programme operated. Shifts in the policy and governance environment at the close of the Programme are discussed and their implications for future peacebuilding and conflict transformation explored.

The highlights of the Programme strategies, results and management evaluation are covered in Section 3 and are linked to the evaluation of Programme outcomes in Section 4. Outcomes evaluation is a prominent aspect of this evaluation as Programme direct accountability is up to this layer of results.

Section 5 discusses Programme contribution to larger peace outcomes, as contextualized in the Mindanao situation.

The overall assessment of the Programme using OECD-DAC criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities is tackled in Section 6.

Section 7 caps the report with a discussion of recommendations. General recommendations in support of peacebuilding and conflict transformation are identified, as well as those that are specific to conflict-affected/vulnerable areas in Mindanao.

Recent evaluation studies have slowly shifted its approach from the traditional “project results against project objectives” to outcome-based process that is more oriented to developmental changes. Outcome evaluation goes beyond project evaluation, particularly in its focus, scope and purpose.[[6]](#footnote-6)

On the matter of attribution, causality relationships between observed changes and interventions may be more readily established in immediate results (such as outputs), and even in intermediate results (such as outcomes), they are more difficult in complex systems which are sectors that involve primarily human and social environments, and in programs that involve multiple activities that cut across sectors, themes and/or geographic areas [[7]](#footnote-7) and in programmes where collaboration efforts are strong[[8]](#footnote-8). In the context of peacebuilding and conflict transformation particularly where the public sector is concerned, a new standard in determining the relationship between intervention and effects might have to be used -- measure with the aim of reducing the uncertainty about the contribution made, not just to prove the contribution made."[[9]](#footnote-9) Increasing what is known about what works in an area and thereby reducing uncertainty will translate to greater understanding of “which programs work”, “what parts of which programs work”, “why they worked”, and “in what contexts”.

This Terminal Evaluation Report will not concentrate only on inputs, throughputs, and outputs achievement. It will not provide a cost-benefit based analysis of Programme initiatives and results although cost-effectiveness was considered. It will also not exhaustively look into the achievement of the Programme Goal and the planned Impact level results as detailed in the enhanced Programme logical framework. These could be the subject of future and more focused evaluation.

## Methods Used

T

he terminal evaluation is primarily devoted to understanding why an intervention produces intended and unintended effects, for whom and in which context thus answering the “why it works?” question. While it also looks into whether a given intervention produces the desired effects on some pre-established dimension of interest (thus answering the “does it make a difference?” question), it will not do so using counterfactual methods.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Guided by the Programme’s Logical Framework of Analysis (LFA)[[11]](#footnote-11), both qualitative and quantitative data-gathering methods and analysis were used in the conduct of this evaluation. Mixed methods were adopted to “reduce uncertainty” and arrive at “reasonable confidence” to still address the need for “proof” of attribution.

The qualitative method had two levels of assessment. The first level[[12]](#footnote-12) included a systematic document review on the key project documents provided by the Programme. As well key informant interviews and focus group discussions with respondents from PDCs, LGUs, POs/CBOs were conducted to generate perceptions from those who have directly participated in Programme interventions. The results of the KIIs and FGDs were subjected to content analysis, a form of typological analysis. A perception survey that measured community members’ general perception of the overall impact and results/changes brought about by the Programme specifically in the components of social capital and social cohesion, human security (access to basic social services), human rights protection and security (economic development), conflict management, stakeholders’ capacity, governance and alliance building[[13]](#footnote-13). The second level of assessment was done by metasynthesising the findings of major Programme reports.

The quantitative method[[14]](#footnote-14) of evaluation was employed using the results of the perception survey as a form validating the results of the desk review through the level of community satisfaction of the Programme outcomes. Variance analysis and descriptive-correlational analyses were used to gauge the achievement of Programme target, and investigating the relationships, if there were any, among the variables.

## Sources of Data

F

or the first level of assessment, both primary data (results of KIIs, FGDs and perception survey) and secondary data like Programme reports provided by the PMO and MinDA and the Programme’s knowledge products were used.

A total of 331 respondents (176 males and 155 females) participated in the survey, of which 85% of the respondents are affiliated with a peoples’ organization, cooperative or LGU structure (tanod, lupon or as member of the barangay council). Two (2) provincial LGUs were randomly selected in a given area. Five (5) municipal LGUs per were selected area but for purposes of efficiency, they were part of the administrative area of the selected provinces. Fifteen (15) Schools of Peace (SOP) of varying phases and from different areas were identified.

Based on Table 3 data the average age of respondents indicate that they would have lived through the years of armed conflict in Mindanao, particularly beginning the 70s. Further the average years of living in the community would enable them to compare conditions before and after, as well as with or without, ACT for Peace Programme support.

Table 3 Distribution of Survey Respondents

| **Region** | **Respondents** | | | **Ave. Age** | **Ave. Years Living in Community** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Male** | **Female** | **Total** |
| ARMM | 59 | 32 | 91 | 36.52 | 31.38 |
| South Central Mindanao | 60 | 56 | 116 | 40.99 | 32.47 |
| Western Mindanao | 43 | 38 | 81 | 40.20 | 32.99 |
| CARAGA | 14 | 29 | 42 | 39.21 | 37.26 |
| **Total** | **176** | **155** | **331** | **39.34** | **32.91** |

To ensure representativeness and that varying contexts are considered, the respondents were selected from PDCs from all areas of the Programme (i.e., South Central Mindanao, Western Mindanao, ARMM, and Palawan/Caraga) using the PDCs stages of development as base variable. In this manner, it was guaranteed that not all PDCs came from the higher stages of development. The number of PDCs selected was determined depending on the total number of PDCs per area. (See Table 4)

Table 4 Distribution of Respondents by PDC Growth Stage across Regions

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Growth Stages of PDCs** | **Total Respondents** | **% of Total** | **Percentage of Respondents Per Region** | | | | | | | |
| **ARMM** | | **South Central Mindanao** | | **Western Mindanao** | | **Caraga** | |
| **f** | **%** | **f** | **%** | **f** | **%** | **f** | **%** |
| Stage 3 | 54 | 16 | 10 | 11 | 19 | 16.4 | 11 | 13.4 | 14 | 33.3 |
| Stage 4 | 136 | 41 | 42 | 46.2 | 48 | 41.4 | 41 | 50 | 5 | 11.9 |
| Stage 5 | 122 | 37 | 39 | 42.9 | 38 | 32.8 | 22 | 26.8 | 23 | 54.8 |
| Stage 6 | 19 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 9.5 | 8 | 9.8 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 331 | 100 | 91 | 100 | 116 | 100 | 82 | 100 | 42 | 100 |

The second level of assessment made use of both internal and external evaluation reports[[15]](#footnote-15) provided by PMO and MinDA.

**Peace and Development Context**

Section 2

# Peace and Development Context

This section looks into the peace and conflict context within which the ACT for Peace Programme operated and to which it was expected to respond and bring about peace and development change. Key peacebuilding and conflict transformation issues that the Programme’s three intended outcomes are envisioned to address are examined, as well as the environment for peacebuilding and conflict transformation and the key actors and stakeholders in the overall peace and development efforts for Mindanao. Shifts in the policy environment at the end of the Programme life are acknowledged and implications and opportunities explored.

## Programme Historical Context

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he Mindanao islands and Palawan, areas abundant in land and marine resources, and home to a 22.5 M population[[16]](#footnote-16) frequently referred to as “tri-peoples” made up of Muslims, indigenous peoples and Christian settlers, comprise Southern Philippines. It is also the only island group among the three in the country that has witnessed a long history of the most ferocious and intense armed hostilities between government troops and different insurgent groups. Long-drawn and persistent armed conflicts[[17]](#footnote-17) have hounded this part of the country resulting in higher levels of human insecurity and political instability.

A history marked by exclusion, social injustice and instability has eroded institutional and human capital necessary to accelerate human development. This historical disadvantage, poverty, and the protraction of conflict have reinforced each other so that areas particularly in the ARMM have consistently remained the lowest among the Philippines’ 16 regions in terms of human development outcomes. Similar conditions characterize the Caraga Region, where the CPP-NDF-NPA has waged a protracted conflict, largely based on land issues and the exploitation and inequitable distribution of resources.

The Moro wars in Mindanao were initially led by Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which waged a long-running rebellion against the Philippine Government that lasted for almost three decades. It signed a Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) in 1996, now considered a major international milestone in the history of the peace process.

Soon after the historic signing of the GRP-MNLF FPA, foreign assistance flowed into Mindanao following the call by then-President Fidel Ramos to the international development community for the rebuilding of post-conflict areas within the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD)[[18]](#footnote-18) identified under the GRP-MNLF peace agreement. The United Nations was one of the first to respond by setting up the Government of the Philippines-United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GoP-UN MDP) in 1997 initially as an emergency response and needs assessment project for the MNLF. A second phase expanded the assistance to include livelihood for former rebels and their communities. The third phase was another joint undertaking among the Philippine Government, the MNLF and the UN with support from the countries of Australia, New Zealand and Spain.

The UN-Multi Donor Programme-Phase 3 was implemented from June 2000 to December 2004. Building on the lessons and gains of the two previous phases, the Programme transitioned from being a humanitarian response to become a peacebuilding initiative as it enhanced stakeholdership with the MNLF and strengthened partnerships with local government units (LGUs), national government agencies (NGAs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). While its focus of assistance remained the MNLF communities known as PDCs, it gradually expanded coverage to include other conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities with target populations inclusive of indigenous peoples and Christian settlers.

The persistence of unpeace continued however despite the outpouring of development assistance in the region. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway faction of the MNLF, and the communist insurgents in other parts of Mindanao have become the main protagonists in recurring violent conflicts in the last ten years. Clan feuds (rido) are another source of conflicts as well as politically-motivated armed hostilities which in recent times led to extreme violence like the Maguindanao massacre.

Context assessment conducted at the closure of UNMDP Phase 3 revealed serious concerns on the continued presence of drivers of conflict that impede the attainment of peace. Worsening human security conditions and socio-economic deprivations at the grassroots fuel the insurgency and dampen people’s trust in government. A UNDP background paper for the Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Programme cites the lack of good governance as one of the reasons of the protraction of the peace process. Good governance is the “the social capital needed to set and achieve objectives”. There remains a need for policy reforms to enable the poor to have more equitable access to and control of productive resources; more inclusive mechanisms for the participation of disadvantaged sectors in governance, and effective basic services delivery for marginalized communities in order to address conditions that breed armed conflict and allow it to persist.[[19]](#footnote-19)

The pursuit of peace has constantly been on the development agenda of the national leadership in the past four decades. Political and socio-economic reform measures and peace negotiations with rebel groups have been part of peace plans since the formulation of the “Six Paths to Peace” Framework which emanated from the results of the nationwide consultations conducted by the National Unification Commission (NUC) in 1992 during the Ramos Administration. This was reinforced by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order No. 3 on February 28, 2001 that spelled out the Government’s Peace Process Policy. A National Peace Plan was crafted which was embodied in Chapter 14 of the 2004-2010 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan that identified a two-fold peace strategy of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding as well as Conflict Prevention.

The ACT for Peace Programme was therefore conceptualized and implemented as a comprehensive peacebuilding intervention combining peace and development strategies to effect the transformation of peoples, actors, communities and institutions.

## Programme Operating Context

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indanao’s unique political, social and historical dynamics contribute to a recurring situation of volatility and vulnerability at varying levels across its geographical regions. While some areas experience cyclical episodes of violent conflict, others are relatively stable in terms of security and socio-economic considerations. Insecurities and vulnerabilities are articulated in high poverty incidence, income disparities, poor access to basic services, weak or fragile local governance and institutions, and insecure environments particularly in areas that continue to experience armed conflicts.

Recurring armed conflict exacerbates the already high incidence of poverty in most of the regions of Mindanao. Mindanao remains home to the poorest regions in the country as evidenced from the 2009 Family Income and Expenditure Survey of the National Statistical Coordinating Body (FIES-NSCB) which shows that 11 out of the 20 poorest provinces and six of the 10 poorest provinces are in Mindanao. ARMM provinces, where the core of the Muslim rebellion has been for the past four decades, have consistently been identified as the poorest. In terms of regional data, Caraga Region and ARMM remain the two poorest regions in the country. Furthermore, Mindanao is found with the lowest gross domestic product, lowest literacy rate, and highest in infant and maternal morbidity and mortality rates.

The Programme operated within this complex environment characterized by unstable peace and security situation, imbalanced development and overall low human security conditions. The Programme covered 16 provinces and 14 cities of the former Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in Southern Philippines, and four provinces and three cities in the Caraga Region[[20]](#footnote-20) that are also vulnerable to armed conflict. Its coverage area has varied levels of development necessitating the adoption of context-specific interventions to ensure its relevance and responsiveness.

Moreover, a comparative review of regional statistics shows uneven progress and wide disparities in relation to the achievement of the MDGs. Most of the regions and provinces lagging behind are in Mindanao. Three of the six administrative regions in Mindanao (ARMM, Caraga Region and Zamboanga Peninsula) are highest among the 17 regions in the country which indicate low probability of meeting their regional targets by 2015. The 2009 Philippine Human Development Index (HDI) shows that seven out of the 10 lowest HDI-ranked provinces still remain in Mindanao, which also happens to be conflict-afflicted.

It was deemed necessary therefore to ensure that areas in conflict and crisis situations be assisted such that their vulnerability is reduced and their inherent capacities are restored and developed to improve human security. Towards this end, the ACT for Peace supported development in conflict vulnerable communities employing conflict-sensitive and peace promoting approaches so as not to fuel long-entrenched feelings of discontent and marginalization in these areas. The Programme enlisted the support of government institutions and civil society organizations to address some of the drivers and causes of conflict which are rooted in injustice and exclusion.

Amid these initiatives and government actions to pursue peaceful negotiations, violent conflicts continued to recur and have spawned repetitive periods of community displacements setting back efforts to bring about stability and development in the region.

Compounding the situation of intermittent conflict with the MILF are political dynasties with heavily armed civilian forces, which pose a continuing threat to human and state security in Mindanao. The gruesome November 2009 massacre in Maguindanao allegedly committed by the political dynasty of the Ampatuans is an example of violent occurrences that challenged peace and development initiatives including the ACT for Peace Programme.

Displacements of communities have become the most visible effects of the armed conflicts which deflated inroads and initial progress made by the ACT for Peace and other programmes. The 2005 PHDR report noted a cyclical pattern of displaced populations leaving their communities at the outbreak of an armed conflict to seek refuge in evacuation centers until it is safe to return to their home, only to flee again when armed hostilities erupt once more. The biggest wave of displacement resulted from the 2000 all-out war against the MILF during the Estrada administration. This was followed by the 2003 Buliok military offensive against the MILF and the 2008 to 2009 war resulting from the botched signing of the GRP-MILF interim agreement on ancestral domain that led to another massive displacement which, at its height, affected more than 600,000 IDPs.

Subsequent incidences of violent confrontations between government forces and some MNLF elements such as what happened in Basilan and Zamboanga Sibugay elucidate the fragility of peace in many parts of Mindanao.

As a result, the Programme adjusted operational priorities to do humanitarian work even as it continued to pursue the development and transformation of other post-conflict communities through the PDC approach. While pursuing its development thrusts, the Programme carefully balanced its resources with its set priorities to be able to adequately respond, for instance, to the demands of the burgeoning number of IDPs particularly in 2008[[21]](#footnote-21).

The demand for increased humanitarian services required changes in the Programme’s operational priorities and the adoption of appropriate contingency measures. The Programme’s adaptability was made possible through the infusion of fresh funds from donor agencies for humanitarian and early recovery for the affected PDCs and other communities. From late 2008 to 2010, the Programme embarked on a comprehensive recovery and rehabilitation effort for displaced communities. Following the natural continuum of development in a conflict context, the Programme continued to seek ways of contributing more significantly to stability, peace and economic development in Mindanao.

The on-and-off character of the peace talks and the subsequent erosion of trust and confidence between the two negotiating parties signaled more intensive efforts to find a just and durable solution, in which the Programme and similar donor-supported undertakings actively participated. Coordination of all of these efforts became a priority consideration. There were many evidence of the Programme effectively confronting these uncertainties, and pursuing coordination while managing operational risks and stakeholders’ expectations. A risk management strategy enabled ACT for Peace to be responsive and adaptable. Thus ACT for Peace was able to maintain relevance in light of the shifting environment.

Under the administration of President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, the talks between the government and the MILF have resumed creating a space for continuity in peacebuilding and development efforts in the areas affected. The peace agenda (Chapter IX) in the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) for 2011-2016 underscores the achievement of a stable national security environment as a major sectoral outcome.

In support of such objective, the PDP calls for reforms and initiatives that effectively address the causes of all armed conflicts and other issues that affect the peace process as well as the satisfactory conclusion of ongoing and past negotiated political settlements with rebel groups. Priority attention shall be given to the development and security needs of areas affected or that have remained vulnerable to armed conflict. This strategy underpins the Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan(Peaceful and Progressive Communities) or PAMANA which serves as the current peace and development framework of the government.

Peace-oriented civil society organizations like the Bishop Ulama Conference in Mindanao[[22]](#footnote-22) remain strong, dynamic and continue to evolve, driven by a common agenda for the protection and welfare of conflict-affected communities, the protection of human rights and the peaceful resolution of armed conflicts in their communities. The clamor for wider promotion of peace and a more inclusive approach to development initiatives that address the roots of conflict is widespread among peace advocates and CSOs.

With an overall positive policy environment for peace under the Aquino administration as well as a vibrant and dynamic civil society and peace community that continues to engage government for durable solutions to conflict, the challenges of the peace process in the country can still be overcome. Given this context, the ACT for Peace Programme offers a model for an effective peace-driven development intervention drawing strength from responsive and accountable local governance and the communities’ own aspirations and indigenous capacities for self-sufficiency and resiliency. The Programme’s approaches and lessons are relevant to the Government’s peace and development priorities.



**Programme Implementation and Management**

Section 3

# Section 3 Programme Implementation and Management

This section evaluates the implementation of strategies and management of the Programme towards the achievement of output level results based on the LFA. Actual outputs vis-à-vis intended outputs per component are reviewed and assessed based on data generated from the evaluation. Conclusions are then made on the status of results attainment and strategies implementations, to what extent and at what levels. Programme management arrangements and financial performance are also assessed. Finally, the stakeholders’ reported sense of satisfaction with the Programme is factored in to complete the evaluation of Programme delivery.



## Component 1: Strengthening Social Capital for Peacebuilding

This component has three main outputs with corresponding indicators and targets. (See Table 5)

Table 5 Summary of Output 1 Results Actual Against Targets

| **Outputs** | **Indicators/Targets** | **Summary of Reported Accomplishments (as of Dec 2010)[[23]](#footnote-23)** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Increased number of People’s Organizations (POs) and local social formations (LSFs) able to undertake and participate in peace-based planning process and facilitate equitable access to opportunities and participation | * 263 POs (including women’s groups) and 526 LSFs organized and strengthened in all Programme-assisted PDCs * 263 Programme-assisted PDCs have formulated Barangay Development Plans (BDPs) with peacebuilding7 dimension adopted at the MLGU level * 66 PDCs able to mobilize internal and external resources for their respective BDPs (SCM: 30/102; WM: 15/58; ARMM: 10/78; CARAGA: 10/20; Palawan: 1/5 | * 389 POs organized and strengthened * 612 LSFs actively involved in local peacebuilding initiatives * All 278 PDCs have peace-based BDPs * These POs and LSFs have enhanced skills in conflict management, development planning, implementation and management processes, financial and internal control system and management, organization development, Islamic Leadership and Governance and the COP. |
| 1. Wider support and constituency and more effective inter-PDC/barangay collaboration for the promotion of peacebuilding and human security | * Functional peace and development mechanisms initiating dialogues, inter-PDC collaborative works and peace advocacy * 526 Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) men and women (at least 40% ) trained and mobilized (2 per PDC) * 263 Peace Core Groups formed and mobilized (1 per PDC) * 20 inter-PDC alliance formed and mobilized (1 per province) * 126 new communities adopting PDC approach (ARMM-37; SCM- 49; WM-30; Caraga-10) | * 674 PDAs trained and mobilized for community organizing and local peace initiatives * 17 inter-PDC alliances involving 59 PDCs serving as a mechanism for consolidating peace constituency * 141 new communities adopting PDC approach |
| 1. Improved interface and complementation between local social healing and peacebuilding practices and mainstream peacebuilding endeavors | * 4 local/ indigenous social healing practices interfaced with mainstream peacebuilding practices (ARMM-1; SCM-1; WM-1; Caraga-1) | * Christian fiestas and Muslim religious celebrations become occasions for community sharing among PDC residents. * One mechanism for conflict resolution is the Council of Elders represented by tri-people and the Usrah or Islamic study group under the Islamic Leadership and Governance Initiative in WM. |



### Component 1 Implementation Results

The Programme exceeded almost all of the targets set for each output, except for the targets for resource mobilization and the number of inter-PDC alliance.

* PDCs covered over a five-year period (278) exceeded by 6% the original target of 263.
* PDCs at advanced stages of development and transformation (245 PDCs already at stages 4 to 6) exceeded by 8% the target of 227 as of December 2010.
* New communities undergoing initial transformation following the PDC approach (141) have exceeded by 12 percent the target of 126. Of the total, 80 of these new communities commenced replication of the PDC approach in 2009[[24]](#footnote-24) while 61 new communities began the replication process in 2010.
* Only 33 PDCs out of the 278 or 12% still remain in the early stages of transformation and 54 early recovery sites need some assistance in transitioning towards recovery and development.
* Enhanced capacity of communities in peacebuilding and culture of peace principles, concepts and approaches is evident with 56% of PDCs at stages 4 and 5 in terms of their conflict transformation skills i.e., domestic conflicts are internally resolved and community members are actively involved in peacekeeping activities.

All of these PDCs manifested behaviors and actions consistent with the skills, awareness and capacities established in the PDC Stages of Development and Transformation. Those that already progressed to the higher stages (4 to 6) have enhanced capacity to plan, implement and replicate peacebuilding activities.

Concretely, this means that people’s organizations (POs) possess the capacity and skills to formulate their respective communities’ peace and development agenda, participate in local development planning and integrate them in higher level development plans (barangay, municipal, provincial, regional and national plans) and generate funding for their priorities from LGUs, government agencies, and donor organizations. Further, their participation in local governance was institutionalized through structures, processes and mechanisms within LGUs.

Cross-tabulation of data from identified PDCs in the sampling and the PDC assessment information[[25]](#footnote-25) showed a one-point growth rate over a two year period of a high number of PDCs

(n=17; 42.5%). (See Table 6) This indicates that on the average PDCs require at least two years of assistance and gestation period to be able to grow and progress in accordance with the parameters of the PDC Stages of Development and Transformation.

Table 6 Incidence of Growth of Surveyed PDCs

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Region** | **Number of PDCs per Growth Incidence** | | | | | **Total PDCs** |
| **-1** | **0** | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| ARMM | 2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| SCM | 1 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 13 |
| Western Mindanao | 3 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| Caraga | 1 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| Total | 7 | 14 | 17 | 1 | 1 | 40 |
| % to Total PDCs | 17.50 | 35 | 42.50 | 2.50 | 2.50 | 100 |

Further observations indicate that PDC development was influenced by the environment within which they operated. Those that progressed or maintained their advanced stage of development were more commonly found in areas where partner LGUs were supportive and engaged LSFs and CSOs in undertaking peacebuilding activities.

Conversely, PDCs regressed or remained static where there was an absence of a nurturing and enhancing environment. LGU commitment of support is a PDC selection criterion and vital to the development process of these communities.[[26]](#footnote-26) These results reinforce the reported nature of PDC transformation where peace, conflict and development dynamics affect their transformation process.[[27]](#footnote-27)

The Peace and Development Community (PDC) concept and approach remained the most vital contribution of the Programme to peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The abilities to negotiate and manage their own peaceful environments, mobilize resources to support their peace and development plans, and share their peacebuilding skills with neighboring communities are vital capacities that will enable communities to transition from unstable to more stable conditions under an enabling environment, resist provocations to further violence, and respond to any future experiences of instability. These community abilities need to be purposively developed and cannot be exercised or delivered by alternative arrangements.

There were more positive interactions and cooperative initiatives among peoples and communities that led to development results and the reduction of incidence of local conflicts in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas. More women participated in collective projects; and LSFs actively managed dispute settlement. The absence of conflict and armed hostilities enabled community members to refocus on economic development and pursue livelihood endeavors. A common goal binds members regardless of belief, allowing cooperation and trust to permeate the community. The popularization of the Islamic Leadership and Governance (ILG) module in Western Mindanao is a significant output of increased intra- and inter-faith dialogues. The locally developed ILG was successfully mainstreamed into an Islamic educative tool to influence and spur community elders into actively engaging in conflict mediation and transformation.

The presence of more Peace and Development Advocates (PDA) and other core groups enhanced the communities’ capacities to manage their own peace and development concerns. Many of the PDAs were former combatants who were transformed into peace champions and community leaders.

There are many evidence of improved social cohesion in the communities, which is described in the Programme as the integration of people of diverse cultures, religions and gender into one community, sharing equitably the benefits of resources, social and health services and responsibilities, and undertaking collective decision and actions towards a common goal. Increased trust and confidence have led to improved relationships among Muslims, Christians, Lumads and ethnic groups evidenced by, among others, increased participation in culture of peace education and other community activities[[28]](#footnote-28). Interactions and exchange during inter-faith dialogues, consultations and celebrations facilitated better identification and implementation of projects that address the human security needs of the community. ACT for Peace initiatives have also led to greater intra and inter-PDC cohesiveness.

Empirical evidence pointed to the following manifestations and benefits of social cohesion[[29]](#footnote-29) brought about by Programme support working with groups and networks of local social formations, civil society organizations, PDCs and barangay local government units: trust and solidarity, collective action and cooperation, mutual support, inclusion, empowerment and political action, conflict resolution, participation in decision making, and information and community communication processes. These attributes make participating groups more resilient and not as vulnerable to triggers of conflict.

FGD and KII respondents identified exposure to culture of peace as a key intervention that contributed to improvements in their capacities and situation with respect to peace and social cohesion. In particular, respondents cited that appreciation of the culture of peace changed their views and enhanced their understanding of and respect for other cultures. While other responses to peacebuilding and conflict transformation particularly in the context of post-peace agreement situations include community strengthening, ACT for Peace is distinguished by its strong and systematic promotion of the culture of peace and related peace approaches.

Evaluation respondents also reported changes in their attitude towards government and actual relationships with government. Specifically cited as resolved were sentiments of anger and mistrust towards government and other organizations. These dovetailed with ACT for Peace data that showed marked improvements in community participation in local governance structures and processes that address conflict issues at the barangay level. The tribal Council of Elders in Zamboanga del Sur settled rido (family feuds) among warring Muslim families. Improvements in the representation of Muslim leaders in the barangay LGU which had previously not been receptive were reported in Wao, Lanao del Sur. Communities have a better understanding and appreciation of participatory peace-based, peace-centered planning and development. There are many evidences that Programme activities capacitated these communities and provided them opportunities to actively participate in their own development rather than be passive followers under a feudal set-up of governance.

The belief that peacebuilding and conflict transformation is a shared responsibility of the community with government, CSOs and other agencies/institutions was seen as an emerging trend.

Evidence from both quantitative and qualitative evaluation showed that ACT for Peace initiatives enabled target communities to plan, implement, institutionalize and replicate initiatives that promote peace and address threats to human security, and a new set of communities to undergo conflict transformation processes. These changes were demonstrations of Programme efforts to strengthen social capital by promoting social cohesion and human security in support of peacebuilding and conflict management.

Changes in capacity for and state of social cohesion in the target communities are directly ascribable to the initiatives of the ACT for Peace Programme. However there are difficulties in establishing exclusivity of attribution given the complex nature of the challenges addressed and the comprehensive combination of strategies employed by the Programme, including mobilizing government and non-government institutions to provide other support.

### Level of Satisfaction with Component 1


Perception survey results indicate that the respondents were satisfied with the Programme in the aspect of social cohesion with a mean score of 4.32 (Figure 2).

The analysis showed that improvements in the intra-household, inter-household and inter-barangay relationships are manifestations of the satisfaction of the beneficiaries of the Programme.

In particular, most respondents credit the Programme as having brought changes in the attitudes and skills of community people in terms of formulating development agenda, and implementing and managing barangay affairs. Programme interventions were also seen as a venue for people to work together towards development goals while increasing community access to services.

Respondents’ satisfaction is most pronounced in Western Mindanao, with a mean score of 4.53, and lowest in ARMM, mean score of 4.22 (Figure 3). Along with community economic development and peacebuilding and human rights protection, social cohesion was rated the highest by respondents from Western Mindanao.

Figure 2 Respondents’ Level of Satisfaction with Components



Legend: 4.51 – 5.00 - Highly Satisfied (HS)

3.51 – 4.50 - Satisfied (S)

2.51 – 3.50 - Relatively Satisfied (RS)

1.51 – 2.50 - Unsatisfied (US)

1.00 – 1.50 - Highly Unsatisfied (HU)

Figure 3 Respondents' Level of Satisfaction by Region

Legend: 4.51 – 5.00 - Highly Satisfied (HS)

3.51 – 4.50 - Satisfied (S)

2.51 – 3.50 - Relatively Satisfied (RS)

1.51 – 2.50 - Unsatisfied (US)

* 1. – 1.50 - Highly Unsatisfied (HU)

## Component 2: Promoting Human Security through Improved Access to Basic Services

As can be gleaned from Table 7, more detailed targets were established for each of the two outputs[[30]](#footnote-30), which the accomplishments seemed to have matched. Using some of these as the indicators, plus some of the original indicators written in the enhanced LFA, the achievements exceeded most of the targets, except for the number of health scholars.

Table 7 Summary of Output 2 Actual Against Target

| **Outputs** | **Indicators/Targets** | **Summary of Reported Accomplishments (as of Dec 2010)** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Improved community access to integrated health services that meet community defined needs and promote women’s health and rights[[31]](#footnote-31) | * 21,755 men, women and children availing of health services in the community (representing 90% of vulnerable groups representing 21% of the total population per PDC availing of health services per year) ARMM 6,485; SCM 10,946; WM 2,457; CARAGA 1,379; Palawan * 6,700 families with access to potable water ARMM 2,000; SCM 2,600; WM 1,500; CARAGA 500; Palawan 100) * 25 graduates from Stepladder curriculum for midwifery serving their communities ARMM 5; SCM 8; WM 5; CARAGA 5; Palawan 2 * 1,052 community-based health capability building activities conducted ARMM 312; SCM 408; WM 232 CARAGA 80; Palawan 20   From the Dec. 2010 Terminal Report:   * 75 BHSs constructed * 29,323 men, women and children availing of health services * 126 BnB installed and operational * 30 scholars and graduates from stepladder curriculum for midwifery * 71 potable water system installed * 6,780 families with access to PW supply | * 102 BHS constructed * 143,060 men, women and children representing the vulnerable groups have availed of the health services through the BHS * 128 BnB operating, all directly managed by women’s groups in the PDCs * 22 health scholars completed 2-year course on midwifery in October 2009; 8 of them passed the board exam to date * 111 PWS improved the health and sanitation condition of 25,029 HHs in 95 PDCs |
| 1. Needs of communities affected by armed conflict or natural disaster served in a timely manner | * 13,320 affected families by armed conflict or natural disasters provided with food, medicines and temporary shelter (ARMM 6,660; SCM 3,996; WM 1,332; CARAGA 1,332) * 300 core shelters constructed in selected communities by 2010 * 20 organized disaster preparedness teams capable of responding to emergencies (at least 1 pilot PDC per province)   Dec. 2010 Report:   * No targets cited on organized disaster preparedness teams | * 74,000 affected families provided with food, medicines and temporary shelter * 300 core shelter units constructed in PDC Macuyon, Sirawai, Zambo del Norte and PDC Eleven Islands, Zambo City; 161 units provided in 24 ER sites |

### Component 2 Implementation Results

Programme interventions that enabled communities and improved their access to basic social facilities and services resulted to tangible gains in their health conditions. Reports showed increased availability of water supply and reduced morbidity rates from water-borne diseases such as diarrhea. Pre-natal services have also become available at Barangay Health Stations. Improved health conditions translated to additional disposable income and time to improve quality of life. Women reported that they have more wherewithal to attend to children’s education and participate in community projects.

Competition over scarce natural resources (water, land, etc.) that cause intra/inter-family conflicts have been reduced with the provision of basic facilities that efficiently utilize available resources for wider impact and sustainability.

The Stepladder Curriculum for Health Workers Program in partnership with the University of the Philippines-School for Health Sciences has produced 22 graduates out of 30 scholars. Originally conceptualized as a measure to make available local human resource that would sustain service delivery to communities, this program however requires time and financial commitment to have a significant impact.

Better human security conditions and improved social cohesion bolstered community confidence to assume expanded roles and actively participate in local peace and development efforts. Two notable examples were that some PDCs served as host communities to families displaced by armed conflict and natural calamities; and that one PDC was able to rise as one community after being affected by armed confrontation. The latter occurred in partnership with the barangay government which provided guidance to residents on how to cope with the crisis.

Changes in people’s attitudes towards their leaders, to government as a whole, and towards their neighbors were observed. The improvements in attitude towards neighbors were particularly strengthened by the Programme’s emphasis on shared responsibility for community assets; and the opportunities provided to share learnings to other community members.

### Level of Satisfaction with Component 2

Respondents expressed satisfaction with the Programme component on basic social services with a mean score of 4.27 (see Figure 2).

The analysis showed that this response was triggered by improvements in community access to integrated health services that met community defined needs, promoted women’s health and rights, and served needs in a timely manner of communities affected by armed conflict or natural disasters. In particular the communities showed greater appreciation of the water systems, barangay health stations and the Botika ng Barangay from which they enjoyed direct benefits.

Respondents’ satisfaction with this component is most pronounced in Western Mindanao, with a mean score of 4.4, and lowest in ARMM, mean score of 4.07 (Figure 3). This trend is similar to the respondents’ assessment to the social cohesion component.

Improvements in the state of human security of conflict-affected/vulnerable groups, which are mostly at the periphery of development, have been evident in the participating communities. They were either due to the services directly provided by the Programme or were the results of the groups applying enhanced abilities in resource mobilization and claims-making through governance and development assistance processes.

## Component 3: Promoting Human Security through Community Economic Development

Component 3 has three main outputs with corresponding indicators and targets. Table 8 presents the accomplishments for each output.

Table 8 Summary of Output 3 Actual Against Target

| **Outputs** | **Indicators/Targets** | **Summary of Reported Accomplishments (as of Dec 2010)** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Enhanced stakeholder awareness and appreciation of community economic development principles, concepts and approaches | * 263 economic development initiatives (community enterprises) collectively identified by the community key actors based on environmental, physical, financial and human resources and market opportunities (I per PDC) * At least 40% of PO members or about 5,260 women are involved in the identification and implementation of community economic development initiatives (ARMM 1,560; SCM 2,040; WM 11,160; Caraga 400; Palawan 100) | * 438 community economic projects implemented in 238 PDCs |
| 1. Improved competence among stakeholders to undertake or participate in community economic development processes that focus on self and wage employment skills and agri-based livelihood | * Number of stakeholders (particularly women and MNLF) involved in CED initiatives (enterprise, job creation and agri-fishery productivity) * 13,150 PO members, 40% of whom are women, In 263 PDCs with improved technical, enterprise and agri-fishery productivity skills are involve in CED initiatives (ARMM 3,900; SCM 5,100; WM 2,900; CARAGA 1000; Palawan 250) * Evidence of community initiatives and efforts to establish, strengthen and sustain internal resource generation (capital build-up and repayment) * 126 community economic enterprises have built up capital of P500 per member per year and with 60% repayment rate (ARMM 37; SCM 49; WM 30; Caraga 10)   From Dec. 2010 Report:   * 13,900 PO members involved in CED projects * 5,560 PO women members involved in CED projects * 126 POs with efforts to establish, strengthen and sustain internal resource generation (capital build-up and repayment) | * 352 of 438 (80%) projects are managed by 268 POs. * About 23,149 PO members, 45% of whom are women benefiting from the operations of the CED projects which provided for employment opportunities to about 1,230 individuals * 155 POs have established internal resource generation through capital build up. |
| 1. Environment more responsive to CED initiatives that promote or advance human security and peacebuilding | * Number of linkages (technical, financial, market and policy) facilitated for livelihood farm and non-farm enterprises * At least 126 community enterprise development projects with investments coming from LGU and other stakeholders (ARMM 37; SCM 49; WM 30; Caraga 10) * 6 enterprise projects have formal market and financial linkages (ARMM 1; SCM 2; WM 2; Caraga 1)   From Dec. 2010 Report:   * 126 CED projects with LGU support | * 273 CED projects with LGU support * 72 CED barangay facilitators/para-technicians were trained and deployed to assist in the implementation and sustainability of 16 specialized CED projects in selected 97 PDCs. |

### Component 3 Implementation Results

There was significant movement in community economic development activities with 438 CED projects[[32]](#footnote-32) approved and implemented, improving the economic status of 238 PDCs. The Programme provided capacity building and livelihood assistance projects to all PDCs. Women beneficiaries accounted for 41% of the total beneficiaries. As of December 2009,[[33]](#footnote-33) 354 CED funded projects amounted to almost PhP107 million with counterpart funds from proponents (PhP13 million), LGUs (PhP6.6 million) and other sources (PhP1.3 million).

Improved capacities and competence of community to undertake CED processes was noted. Of the 438 CED projects, 352 are being managed by 268 POs, 155 of which have established internal resource generation through capital build-up. At least 23,149 PO members benefited from the operations of these economic projects. Commodity-based industry development employing value-adding and value-chain strategy was modeled in 25 PDCs that showed strong potential for wider market access within and outside the PDC[[34]](#footnote-34).

Improvements in PDC capacities to engage in productive livelihood, access and mobilize resources, and engage partners in the LGUs, government agencies and the business sector were cited. There was evidence of resources from other providers such as government agencies and donor organizations being accessed and mobilized by a number of POs to sustain CED activities in their communities. As a result, their CED initiatives have been sustained and a limited number of POs have built up their own individual and organizational financial capital. The introduction of modern methods in farming and enterprise development opened the consciousness of small producers in the communities and widened opportunities for business linkaging.

A strategy that enhanced CED prospects of being effectively sustained was securing institutional support from government agencies such as the cocosugar production in South Cotabato where a coalition of PDALs in South Central Mindanao partnered and accessed support from Philippine Coconut Authority, Department of Agriculture, and the Tupi MLGU. Similarly, partnering with and leveraging funds from other donor institutions (e.g., with the World Food Program, Growth and Equity in Mindanao, and Kadtuntaya Foundation in Sultan Kudarat) enhanced CED project success.

This strategy of mobilizing CED support from partners impacted on full attribution of CED results to ACT for Peace. While beneficiary access to CED project support and participation in project activities can be traced to the Programme, it can only be said that along with the other supporting partners the ACT for Peace made causal contribution to the downstream effects of CED such as the overall viability and sustainability of the economic initiatives and the resulting effects on the lives of the participants.

There were issues around the reliability of timely release of support from higher level LGUs (municipal, city and provincial). Local government support and resources committed were mostly from barangay LGUs. There were instances where delays and/or non-completion of projects were experienced due to delays in the release of counterpart funds, a perceived manifestation of weakness in the support of higher level LGUs.

Concern over the sustainability of CEDs supported through joint partnerships/shared costs between LGUs (barangay, municipal or even provincial levels) and the POs/cooperatives was raised. Confronted with the reality of very limited resources of LGUs, convergence and collaboration with more national and/or regional level government agencies, more donor and resource organizations and private sector involvement could have added to the sustainability options of these projects.

Despite significant Programme investments in CED the inadequacy of livelihood inputs and assistance, including those from LGUs, has been lamented by some PDC members. The number of CED beneficiaries was limited and the scale and scope of their economic initiatives constrained. To promote sustainability, the Programme desisted from supporting quick-impact projects and invested in long-term and industry-based economic enterprise.

Among the lessons is that whether a community is conflict-affected/vulnerable or not, the basic underlying conditions that CED interventions need to take into consideration and address are the same;[[35]](#footnote-35) likewise, the basic requisites for successful and sustainable CED project implementation are similar for both types of communities[[36]](#footnote-36). While the Programme’s CED framework is distinguished from the conventional framework by its emphasis on the peace dimension (or what is called the peace dividends) of economic development, further work will have to be done in this area to ensure that the impacts of economic development initiatives are felt by people in the PDCs.[[37]](#footnote-37) The ACT for Peace has significantly invested in CED, but further investments will have to be made. As well the other conditions that enable thoroughgoing economic development[[38]](#footnote-38) will also have to occur; a number of these are beyond the control of peace and development programs.

### Level of Satisfaction with Component 3

Respondents were satisfied with the outcome dimension of community economic development with a mean score of 4.24.

The response was associated with enhanced stakeholder awareness and appreciation of community economic development principles, concepts and approaches; improved competence among stakeholders to undertake or participate in community economic development processes that focus on self and wage employment skills and agri-based livelihood; and created an environment that is more responsive to community economic development initiatives that promote or advance human security and peacebuilding.

In terms of regional response differentiation, satisfaction was most significant in Western Mindanao (4.53) and lowest in ARMM (4.04). Along with social cohesion and peacebuilding and human rights protection, community economic development was rated the highest by respondents from Western Mindanao (Figure 3).

## Component 4: Building Stakeholders’ Capacity for Conflict Transformation

This component has four main outputs with corresponding indicators and targets. Table 9 presents the accomplishments for each output.

Table 9 Summary of Output 4 Actual Against Target

| **Outputs** | **Indicators/Targets** | **Summary of Accomplishments (as of December 2010)** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Enhanced local stakeholder appreciation of human security, peacebuilding and culture of peace principles, concepts and approaches | * Proportion of LGUs and organizations reflecting human security, peacebuilding and COP in their agenda or line of work/plans * 83 LGUs and organizations assisted by the Programme have basic peace-promoting capacities, systems, processes and approaches   From Dec.2010 Report:   * LGUs and organizations (MNLF/PDAL/Alliances) reflecting human security, peacebuilding and COP in their agenda or line of work/plan * 19 PLGU * 60 MGLU * 12 PDAL/Alliances * 12 MNLF-SRC | * Cumulative report on capacities of LGUs and PDALs/PDAAs show 7 PLGUs are at Stage 1; 9 at Stage 2; 4 at Stage 3 and none a Stage 4 * At least 83 (58%) of the 144 MLGUs within the coverage area of the Program were already providing technical and financial support to PDCs indicating the LGUs are already investing in peacebuilding initiatives * On the capacities of the PDALs/alliances., only 3 are still in stage 1, 13 in stage 2, 5 in stage 3 and none in stage 4 |
| 1. Improved competence among local stakeholders, including MNLF, to undertake or participate in community or organizational processes that promote conflict transformation, human security, peacebuilding and COP principles, concepts and approaches | * Evidence of local stakeholders contributing meaningfully and effectively to policy development and planning for conflict transformation, human security, peacebuilding * At least 32% of Programme-assisted LGUs and organizations model practices, systems and structures in conflict transformation and peacebuiding by 2010   From Dec. 2010 Report:   * Local stakeholders contributing meaningfully and effectively to policy development, and planning for conflict transformation, human security and peace building * 19 PLGU * 8 CLGU * 41 MLGU * 3 PDAL/Alliances * 10 MNLF-SRC | * All 19 PLGUs have installed relevant mechanism to pursue and sustain peace and development initiatives. These consist of Provincial Peace and Development Committees or Technical Working Groups (TWGs) working under local mandated bodies like PDCs, PPOCs or PPDCs. These PLGUs have manifested capacities to initiate peacebuilding and conflict transformation policies, plans, programs and projects and activities (like Conflict Analysis, Conflict-sensitive and Peace-Promotive planning and investment programming, Rights-based Approach, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment and the PDC framework). * 95 MLGUs have created their own peacebuilding mechanism through established TWGs * All 15 MNLF State committees are implementing their respective projects in the PDCs and MNLF communities to include community enterprise and peace advocacy initiatives like regional-level conflict mediation and community inter-faith dialogues. * All 21 PDALs and alliances have evolved from project beneficiaries to programme implementing partners and now as active civil society organizations and peace movement engaged in peace advocacy and community development works * PDALs and alliances are also represented in LDCs and local social bodies like the PDC, POC and PDCs/TWGs at the province level |
| 1. Improved responsiveness of LGUs to needs of conflict-affected areas and peace and development concerns | * At least 40% of Programme-assisted LGUs are allocating funds for peacebuilding initiatives by 2010 * LGUS allocating funds for peacebuilding initiatives of PDCs and other conflict affected areas   11PLGU  8 CLGU  43 MLGU | * 11 PLGUs and 2 CLGUs are replicating the PDC approach in 141 barangays * 87 MLGUs covered by the Programme are allocating budget for peacebuilding initiatives and the PDCs * 24 CARAGA Action and Responders (CARE) Teams were organized and trained on land and water search and rescue, first aid |
| 1. Enabling mechanisms supportive of stakeholder initiatives in promoting or advancing human security and peacebuilding | * 20 local knowledge management structures and mechanisms (peace centers) to support peacebuilding initiatives   From Dec. 2010 Report:   * 20 Peace Centers established | * 22 Provincial Peace Resource Centers established serving as peace resource in the areas of peace-based community organizing, conflict-sensitive and peace-promotive planning and investment programming, peace education and COP promotion |

### Component 4 Implementation Results

Reports showed that more than half, or 13 out of the 19 provincial LGUs (65%) and 17 out of the 20 PDALs were in the higher stages of transformation. This meant that “LGU and PDAL structures and mechanisms for conflict transformation and peacebuilding processes and approaches are in place and are functional. Recognizing their role in peacebuilding and conflict transformation, they create or adjust mechanisms, processes and approaches to transform conflicts and build peace based on the demand of conflict-affected and vulnerable communities”.

Evidence from both quantitative and qualitative assessment showed that ACT for Peace initiatives improved capacities in peacebuilding and conflict transformation of different actors who are in the position to assist conflict-affected communities and also pursue and enhance their own policy, processes, mechanisms and initiatives to contribute to sustainable peace. At the close of the Programme peace-based principles, approaches, strategies and mechanisms were being practiced and showing signs of being mainstreamed and institutionalized.

The PDAs congregated as provincial leagues and alliances and brought their advocacy to the sub-national level of governance. They have potential to expand their contribution to community development, transformation and people empowerment in support of peacebuilding beyond the communities from which they originated. They can be mobilized to provide social cohesion strengthening services to other conflict-affected communities. They will be able to foster peer to peer learning which is more consistent with adult learning. Being former combatants or active supporters they can serve as “exemplars” and coaches/mentors to budding peace and development advocates. Given their status and potential, it would be unfortunate if these organizations will be left to their own devices in an environment where resource opportunities are constricting even for more advanced NGOs.

Partner LGUs and government agencies demonstrated improved capacities and enhanced structures, processes and mechanisms for governance that is conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting. Examples include a) integration of community peace and development plans in local development planning, b) strengthening of local special bodies/structures aimed at making governance more peace-based such as the Peace and Order Councils, Local Development Councils, Technical Working Groups, and Peace Units within local executive offices, and c) issuance of local policies and budgetary support for peace-oriented activities, and other local enabling structures.

There were cases where the integration of BDPs into the local development plans had not yet been fully realized. Even in areas where LGUs have been identified to have reached the highest stage so far achieved (Stage 5)[[39]](#footnote-39) increasing locally generated revenues for concerned LGUs and savings mobilization for POs, and institutionalizing PDC development plan integration regardless of who sits as local chief executive in the LGU still need strengthening.

While the seed has been sown in these LGUs follow-through is necessary. Appropriate measures of effectiveness in peacebuilding, human rights promotion and conflict transformation that are linked to performance management systems and public recognition of and incentives for innovative and successful LGU initiatives in peacebuilding and conflict transformation could be among those that should be considered in future programming.

Further, the conceptual design of LGU transformation and development will have to be enhanced to show more effective relationships between initiatives and anticipated results coming out of them. For example in the ACT for Peace Programme Stages of LGU Development model, the movement from the initiating (stage 1) to developing stage (stage 2) assumed that the introduction of peace-based frameworks, approaches and processes would consequently result in functional peace and development LGUs. Reports indicated that while peace-based structures and processes have been installed, individuals who play key roles in realizing these intents need to experience a “personal transformation” and acquire required competencies. Also, these new structures need to play out within existing dynamics and priorities of the respective LGUs and of the larger context. These factors require longer periods of gestation/maturation to facilitate progress to the next level.

Genuine transformation takes time and rigor and requires sustained commitment from all stakeholders. In the context of public organizations, while change management concepts, principles and practices are finding their way into the system, sustaining reforms remains a major effort particularly at the LGU level where traditional, patron-based values and mindsets in politics and governance are deeply entrenched. Hence, institutional and policy reforms in favor of good governance that is conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting must be further pursued and strengthened.

The above factors also explain the need for the involvement of other service providers such as non-government organizations, the academe and peace networks in strengthening the peace abilities of local governments and social cohesion at the community level. While local governments are set up to deliver mandated social, economic, environmental and development administration services, it cannot be expected of them to automatically introduce peacebuilding and conflict transformation services without themselves going through a process of change.

LGUs are the natural frontline institutions that would take over providing some aspects of the support that the ACT for Peace used to provide to the conflict-affected communities. However, they have a wide constituency in different levels of stability and development, and they have to deal with competing priorities and limited resources. Among the key challenges that LGUs have to address that have significant impact on communities, whether conflict-affected or otherwise, are meeting the Millennium Development Goals targets, being prepared for, as well as reducing and managing disaster risks particularly in light of climate change.

### Level of Satisfaction with Component 4

Perception survey results show that the respondents were satisfied with the Programme components on governance with a mean score of 4.19 and conflict management at 4.08 (Figure 2).

Satisfaction with governance was most pronounced in Western Mindanao (4.43) and lowest in ARMM (3.98); the same pattern holds for conflict management – 4.22 in Western Mindanao and 3.97 in ARMM. It is worth noting that of the different components, ARMM respondents scored conflict management and governance the lowest, the former at 3.97, the latter at 3.97 (see Figure 3). ARMM respondents also registered the least regard for the rights of previously in-conflict individuals to participate in governance affairs.

A high number of respondents (92%) claimed improved skills in conflict resolution as a result of the Programme interventions.[[40]](#footnote-40)

While some 10% of respondents believed that conflict still persisted, high visibility of the military, continuing dialog and feedback exchange mechanisms were perceived to be effective in addressing conflict.

## Component 5: Promoting and Advocating a Culture of Peace towards Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation

The areas of assistance focused on: a) enhancing local capacities for peace; b) partnership building for the promotion of the culture of peace; and c) promoting and advocating the culture of peace in more mainstream venues.

The first two areas of assistance in particular supported the first four components of the Programme. Interventions provided partner communities with advanced knowledge, tools and methodologies to integrate the culture of peace, human security and conflict transformation into community level principles, structures and systems.

Table 10 Summary of Output 5 Actual Against Target

| **Outputs** | **Indicators/Targets** | **Summary of Accomplishments (as of December 2010)** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Local capacities to practice and promote peace enhanced and strengthened (in support of components 1,2,3 and 4) | * 452 LSFs applying peacebuilding principles and processes and able to prevent occurrence or recurrence of conflict through application of peacebuilding principles and processes (e.g. dialogues, negotiation and mediation) by 2010 (ARMM 134; SCM 175; WM 100; CARAGA 34; Palawan 9)   From Dec. 2010 Terminal Report:   * 478 conflict prevention initiatives undertaken by the LSFs | * 488 LSFs are integrating COP, human security, peacebuilding and conflict transformation principles and processes in their local peace and development initiatives * All PDCs have developed and strengthened their conflict management skills to promote social healing and harmony through local, cultural and indigenous practices |
| 1. Partnerships with agencies, LGUs and social structures at the provincial and regional levels to improve stakeholder appreciation of and capacity to promote the COP (in support of components 1,2,3 and 4) | * Evidence of collaboration, cooperation and partnership among key institutions and local social structures to promote and mainstream peacebuilding and conflict transformation * 20 provincial level strategic partnerships * 6 regional level strategic partnerships * Evidence of policy support to peacebuilding among GOs, LGUs and other social structures * 20 provincial level policy issuances on peacebuilding * 6 regional level policy issuances on peacebuilding   From Dec. 2010 Terminal Report:   * 6 regional and 19 provincial partnership among key institutions and local social structures to promote and mainstream peacebuilding and conflict transformation * 6 regional and 219 provincial policy support to peacebuilding among GOs, LGUs and other local social structures | * 12 regional and 29 provincial partnerships forged and operationalized across Programme covered areas * 6 regional and 19 provincial policy support for peacebuilding enlisted |
| 1. More venues (mainstream, academic and cultural) to enhance the environment for the promotion and advocacy of the COP | * Evidence of COP mainstreaming in the target key institutions’ processes and policies * 60 SOPs (at least 1 elementary, 1 secondary, 1 tertiary)[[41]](#footnote-41) in the 20 provinces covered by the Programme integrating COP and Peace Education by 2010 (ARMM 18; SCM 15; WM 12; CARAGA 3; Palawan 12) | * 60 SOPs are now in various phases of transformation and capacity development. To date, 40 schools are in the advanced phase of transformation while the other 20 are in their early phase of transformation * 4 CSOs actively engaged in inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogues, community development, capacity building and collaboration efforts or COP advocacy and promotion * 36 PDCs integrating Islamic Leadership and Governance in their local governance processes |

### Component 5 Implementation Results

Evidence from both quantitative and qualitative evaluation showed that ACT for Peace initiatives were successful in introducing and promoting culture of peace principles and practices at different levels and in strengthening critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development.

Strong appreciation for and adherence to COP greatly enhanced the environment for trust-building, conflict reduction, and collaboration among different groups and sectors towards greater social cohesion at the community level. The social capital generated from this which also involved LGUs enabled the pursuit and attainment of concrete development changes in the PDCs that facilitated the entry of assistance coming from other donor programs, NGOs and government agencies. Inter-PDC alliances and regional federations of PDALs as well as PDC-GAs joint economic ventures (e.g., Mindanawon Coco-Sugar Industry) which were well-appreciated by local stakeholders were among the partnerships that came out of Programme endeavors.

Partner barangay LGUs adopted and practiced the culture of peace and conflict-sensitive approaches in barangay governance particularly in conflict resolution and management. More barangay leaders transformed into active peace advocates and mainstreamed peacebuilding in their regular governance functions and development agenda particularly through the formulation of peace-based Barangay Development Plans.

The PDAs grew in competence to manage peace and development initiatives in their communities and link their efforts to wider development arena as members of government mandated and/or special bodies (e.g., Peace and Order Councils, Peace and Development TWGs/Committees, etc.). Some PDAs also entered the political scene as barangay officials and have carried with them the learning and peace-sensitivity into local governance.

The transformation of individual combatants into peace and development advocates and the establishment of peace and development communities is a viable model to support a more transformative and peace-oriented approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This can be a contribution to the conceptualization and delivery of enhanced assistance to support the implementation of peace agreements. In the past, assistance to non-state armed combatants who have chosen to become inactive have mostly been in the forms of cash, counseling and educational and livelihood opportunities. However, the effectiveness of these types of approach in assisting former combatants in their transformation has not been fully established.

Community peacebuilding cannot succeed without the people’s voluntary decision to modify their behaviors—discarding conflict-inducing practices and adopting a culture of peace. Community conflict management and human rights protection are not merely concepts that the community has to imbibe but, more importantly, they are a set of skills that the community has to learn and apply; and mechanisms that have to be institutionalized. Per experience of the ACT for Peace Program, conflict management and human rights protection are two KRAs that seem to be the hardest to implement at the community level.

From experience it would take more than a few years for people to understand and internalize the meaning of conflict transformation and human rights promotion, especially if certain cultural practices that infringe on an individual’s basic human rights are deeply ingrained and are easily rationalized.

A more institutional approach to promoting a culture of peace especially among the young was facilitated by the establishment of the Schools of Peace (SOPs). Although initial credit has been given to the SoPs in the transformation of local peace and development actors and institutions, passage of time will provide a better test for the effectiveness of this strategy.

Periodic conflict analysis by the Programme identified 88 communities as vulnerable to violence; 23 of these were directly affected by the 2008 armed conflict and experienced short-term displacement. [[42]](#footnote-42) While the evaluation was not able to study why and how the other 65 PDCs remained unaffected by violence over a five-year period, whether this stability is of a durable nature, and whether it was largely due to Programme support, nevertheless this “result” needs to be cited as the kind of desirable downstream effect that initiatives like the ACT for Peace should be contributing towards, and about which there should be continued efforts to increase knowledge and understanding. It should be noted that KII and FGD respondents consistently reported the reduction of violence in their areas, the absence of new outbreaks, or the prevention of new conflicts. Resilience and ability to promote human security were also demonstrated by the 26 PDCs that served as evacuation camps or resettlement areas.

### Level of Satisfaction with Component 5

Perception survey results show that the respondents were satisfied with the Programme component on peacebuilding and human rights protection with a mean score of 4.36 (Figure 2). Respondents were most satisfied with component 5 compared to the other satisfied ratings they gave to the other components.

Similar to the other four themes, satisfaction was most pronounced in Western Mindanao (4.53) and least in ARMM (4.16). Along with social cohesion and community economic development, peacebuilding and human rights protection was rated the highest by respondents from Western Mindanao (Figure 3).

Communities felt that their environment had become generally peaceful. There was a sense of peace and the culture of peace permeated the layers of the community. A common belief emerging among all members is that freedom from conflict is everyone’s basic right. The transformation of communities had reached a level of change whereby they felt a strong sense of responsibility to promote and advocate peace within and to the bigger community.

## Crosscutting Themes

### Gender Equality

The Programme’s strategy to address gender sensitivity is two-fold - mainstreaming gender[[43]](#footnote-43) and promoting gender balance. In mainstreaming gender, the Programme aimed to ensure development initiatives addressed roles, needs and participation of both women and men and to some extent possible, encourage a balance in the participation of women and men recognizing likely cultural and religious constraints as well as the differential gender impact of conflict.

The Programme was observed to have an inclusive approach that showed sensitivity to vulnerable sectors as well as to ethnicity and gender. Hence, displaced communities, women, and indigenous peoples were purposively involved.

The Programme’s success in addressing gender equity was also manifest in the changes in women’s participation and in group leadership patterns. Capacity building has strengthened women's abilities to participate in peacebuilding initiatives in a meaningful fashion. Increased stakeholders awareness of women’s rights allowed for women's voices to be heard and their perspectives represented in community structures. Civil society is empowered as women become active participants in partner organizations.

Improved access of community women to basic social services in health and nutrition, water and sanitation and productive resources has addressed the gender equality dimension of human security promotion. Consequently, participation in these projects has instilled a level of confidence and a sense of entitlement among these women.

Specific capacities in entrepreneurship allowed women to manage income-generating projects such as Botika ng Barangay which in turn, provided their communities access to affordable medicines. Participation in improving community health and nutrition through support activities enabled women to manage supplemental feeding and herb gardening programs.

The Programme’s CED approach encouraged the consideration of women’s practical and strategic needs. Many of the more successful community enterprise were run by women.

### Environmental Sustainability

An environmental sustainability concern was addressed by the Programme as an unintended outcome. Efforts to facilitate a partnership between Sultan Kudarat Provincial Social Welfare and Development Office and the World Food Program (WFP) involved the watershed management of 250 hectares of land in PDC Chua in South Central Mindanao.[[44]](#footnote-44) This was done through the food-for-work approach where farmers in the PDC learned soil conservation as part of sustainable agricultural practice.

## Assessment of Management Arrangements

The management policies and structure[[45]](#footnote-45) used in implementation afforded the Programme flexibility to be responsive to the changing context of its operating environment. The levels of authority provided to the PMO enabled it to decide on immediate short-term concerns and to deliver services but not without challenges in meeting deadlines and technical requirements.[[46]](#footnote-46) Organizational changes and compulsory administrative and regulations to ensure aid effectiveness caused delays in completing undertakings. Delays in the release of project funds resulted in snags in the implementation of planned activities and achievement of targets, which did not augur well in a Programme with a stringent timeframe. It should also be noted that glitches in Programme administration prevented a smooth transition from the third phase to the ACT for Peace. The Programme structure was inadequate for 12 months and start-up activities took a year to accomplish. With the consequences that implementation of activities was delayed which reportedly triggered the backsliding of some PDCs.

At the policy level, Programme success rested on the implementing agencies; and better coordination among the agencies concerned such as OPAPP, DILG and NEDA, and with donors is recommended. This was an area raised in the Mid-term Review (MTR) which recommended more constructive efforts to link the Programme with ongoing similar peace and development initiatives (e.g., MTF).[[47]](#footnote-47)

Convergence and coordination with other programs were best pursued at the level of MinDA and ARMM Regional Government where mechanisms are already existing to facilitate interaction and sharing of learning. A PMO convergence group was initiated by MinDA where the Programme was active; it also participated in other forums and inter-agency collaboration like the Mindanao Peace Education Forum which was instrumental in the issuance of the EO 570 IRR that operationalized peace integration in the educational curriculum. Future peacebuilding programs would do well in terms of facilitating convergence by learning from the experience of the ACT for Peace Programme.

Strengthening inter-agency relationships is an area where continued improvement is warranted. The involvement of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) in future peace undertakings will also have to be improved building on the experience of agency involvement in ACT for Peace. Future programming in ARMM areas will have to recognize the full and effective exercise of authority and direct accountability of the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG) in the implementation of any peace and development initiatives.

## Financial Performance

The ACT for Peace Programme received Php1,091,838,059 spread over six Programme components to support five years of implementation. The amount includes fund augmentation from the government of New Zealand for the expanded operations in CARAGA region; and, from the European Union (EU) for the implementation of the StRIDe-Mindanao Project from March 2009 until November 2010.

Total delivery rate as of 31 December 2010 vis-à-vis the 5-year budget was placed at 98.19%.

Programme expenditures are classified according to the following categories: Direct

Services – 51.20%; Technical Assistance – 36.20%; and Programme Management –

12.60%.

For the StRIDe-Mindanao Project, delivery rate at project closing on 30 November

2010 is 95.44%, while expenditures are distributed as follows: Direct Services –66.67%; Technical Assistance – 36.18%; and Programme Management – 6.78%.

Of the total amount received, 8.5% or PhP 92,395,228 went to humanitarian and early recovery assistance. Combined ACT for Peace and StRIDe Programme delivery rate by end of December 2010 reached 97.72% of the total downloaded funds.

The Programme provided an average of PhP 500,000 per PDC[[48]](#footnote-48) over the five-year period across the first outcome’s three components. This investment includes value adding[[49]](#footnote-49) derived from interventions under Components 4 and 5. A study of the actual investment per PDC over the five year period of implementation indicated that it ranged from as low as PhP 100,000 to as high as PhP10,000,000.

Actual spending on Direct Services accounts for a 50.87% investment exceeding programmed allocation (45%) by 5.87%.

The total investment for components 1, 2 and 3 is directly proportionate to outcome 1 results with 88% of the 278 PDCs already in the advanced stages (stages 4 to 6).

It appears that funds have been utilized within budget and consistent with the implementation framework of the Programme. Common to all components is support for developing the capacity of key actors for peacebuilding, as reflected in the 42% of resources disbursed to technical assistance.

Disbursements for direct services included provision for basic services and livelihood assistance intended not solely to address basic needs of the communities, but also to catalyze peacebuilding and promote social cohesion, thus significantly contributing to the attainment of Programme’s outcomes.

**Assessment of Programme Outcomes**

Section 4

# 4. Assessment of Programme Outcomes

T

his section is linked to Section 3 in that it continues to evaluate results-achievement albeit focused on the Outcomes level. The evaluation sought to discuss whether at the end of the ACT for Peace Programme:

* The three intended outcomes have been attained based on the indicators
* Benefits[[50]](#footnote-50) have accrued to peace and conflict actors
* Theories of change have been validated and predictors of key result areas identified
* Factors positively or negatively affected outcome achievement
* Lessons have been identified

## Outcome 1: Transformation of peace and development communities and other conflict-affected and conflict vulnerable areas is sustained and community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace and human security are harnessed

Outcome 1 emphasizes social capital building utilizing grassroots-based community-driven approaches to achieve a just and lasting peace. It provides the sectoral and geographic locus which served as drivers of the two other outcomes. The three components contributing to Outcome 1 received the bulk of the Programme funds, particularly for direct services to the members of the PDCs.

Table 11 presents the indicators for Outcome 1, the components contributing to it, the key areas of intervention as well as the theory of change.

Table 11 Outcome 1: Components, Key Areas of Interventions, Theory of Change

| **Outcomes** | **Target Outcome Indicators** | **Components** | **Key Areas of Interventions** | **Theory of Change** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Transformation of PDCs and other conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas is sustained and community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace are harnessed | * 227 PDCs have enhanced abilities to plan, implement, institutionalize and replicate initiatives that promote peace and address threats to human security * 126 communities undergoing conflict transformation processes | Component 1: Strengthening Social Capital for Peacebuilding | * + Capacity-building and Strengthening People’s Organizations and Local Social Formations (LSFs)   + Expanding peace constituencies and inter-PDC/barangay peace initiatives   + Mainstreaming local social healing and peacebuilding practices in barangay governance | Conflict-prone areas require complementing support to sustain their transformation into peaceful, resilient and developing communities. PDCs are the peace constituents at the grassroots level and can influence other conflict-affected areas and that their experience can be the foundation of peace-oriented policies. |
| Component 2: Promoting Human Security through Improved Access to Basic Services | * + Health and sanitation-promoting projects   + Reproductive health-support facilities   + Potable water supply   + Women’s health and rights promotion   + Emergency relief assistance   + Early recovery of conflict-affected/IDP communities |
| Component 3: Promoting Human Security through Community Economic Development | * + Sustainable agri-based livelihood (farm and related activities)   + Community-based enterprise development (non-farm activities)   + Capacity-building of POs and Cooperatives |

### Outcome 1 Indicators

Based on the following information, the Programme indicators have been achieved signaling attainment of the outcome:

* 245 PDCs have enhanced abilities to plan, implement, institutionalize and replicate initiatives that promote peace and address threats to human security. This is 108% of the original target of 227 PDCs. The 245 PDCs represent 88% of the total number of 278 PDCs that the Programme covered over a five-year period
* 141 communities are undergoing conflict transformation processes; this is 112% of the target communities (126)

The achievement of these outcome indicators could be ascribed to the Programme implementation and management arrangements and the output results. The status of these outcomes is plausible in light of the factors that facilitated and hindered their achievement and the context in which the Programme operated.

### Benefits to Peace and Conflict Actors

A number of benefits to actors were associated with Outcome 1. Among these were:

**Social Cohesion**

* **Organizational Density.** People’s Organizations (PO) possess the capacity to identify their respective communities’ peace and development agenda, to participate in their local development planning, to integrate them in their local development plans (barangay, municipal, provincial, regional and national plans) and to generate funding for these plans, programs and projects by their respective LGUs, NGAs and other donor organizations. Further, their participation in local governance has been institutionalized through structures, processes and mechanisms built within LGUs.[[51]](#footnote-51)
* **Management of Peace and Development Concerns**. More Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) and other core groups enhance the capacities of communities to manage their own development concerns. More women are participating in common collective projects and LSFs are actively managing and settling disputes.
* **Conflict Management Capacities**. Former combatants have transformed to evolve into peace champions and leaders in their communities. Islamic leadership and governance approaches were mainstreamed to influence and spur community elders in Western Mindanao into actively engaging in conflict mediation and transformation. The formation of peace core groups and the practice of dialogues and traditional systems in settling local disputes have been well acknowledged by the PDC members as highly contributory to the prevailing peaceful environment in their communities
* **Trust and Confidence**. Increased trust and confidence within have led to improved relationships among Muslims, Christians and lumads evidenced by increased participation in Culture of Peace education and in building the local constituency for peace. Interactions and exchange during inter-faith dialogues, consultations and celebrations have facilitated better identification and implementation of projects that address the human security needs of the community (health-related and community economic development projects). The improvement of the community’s stature in the eyes of outsiders was cited as an unintended desirable result that also improved the residents’ pride of place.[[52]](#footnote-52)
* **Participation in Local Governance.** There is also a marked improvement in the participation of PDAs and other community members in local governance structures and processes that address conflict and development issues at the barangay level. The absence of conflict and armed hostilities provide opportunities to re-focus on economic development and pursue livelihood endeavors. A common goal binds its members regardless of beliefs, enabling cooperation and trust to permeate the community.

**Basic Social Services**

* **Access and Utilization.** Reports[[53]](#footnote-53) and community validation results show reduced morbidity rates from water-borne diseases such as diarrhea, the availability of pre-natal services at Barangay Health Stations, and the increase in and availability of water supply. Improved health conditions translate to additional disposable income and time to improve quality of life (children’s education and participation in community project).
* **Building Resiliency to Conflict.** Early recovery and humanitarian assistance activities targeted internally displaced families and communities in Maguindanao, Sarangani, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Lanao del Sur and other severely conflict-affected areas in Mindanao. Applying Culture of Peace approaches to early recovery enabled the IDPs to participate actively in the rebuilding process and improve their outlook towards conflict, peace and security. Many of these IDPs managed to return to their places of origin and/or resettled in host communities decreasing the total number of IDPs and allowing the start of rehabilitation work in the communities affected. The returning IDPs and host communities have gradually recovered confidence on themselves and in their government, and developed coping mechanisms to become resilient to crisis or adverse situations.
* **Food Security.** Projects such as the Bio-Intensive Gardening (BIG) and the Food Always in the Home (FAITH) support the government’s poverty alleviation and food security programs particularly in conflict-affected PDCs in the early recovery phase.

**Community Economic Development**

* **Resource Mobilization.** There is evidence that access and mobilization of resources from other sources are being tapped by a number of POs to sustain CED activities in their communities. Thus, livelihood was provided to these communities addressing/augmenting their ability to provide for their basic needs.[[54]](#footnote-54) There is evidence in the field that shows an increasing number of POs across all regions were mobilizing and accessing resources from other government agencies and donor organizations. For instance, FAO provided agricultural inputs and access to appropriate technical resources. As a result, their CED initiatives have been sustained and a limited number of POs have built up their own individual and organizational financial capital.
* **Establishing linkages with NGAs and Development Programs.** CEDs implemented had prospects of being effectively sustained through institutional support from government agencies.[[55]](#footnote-55)
* **Confidence in Local Leaders to Address Community Economic Concerns.** Five (5) PDCs have affirmed capacities of their leaders and citizenry in sustainable utilization of local resources and in the establishment of market links toward environment-friendly and industry-level production. Some CED projects are now generating local employment that contributed to an increase in household income and overall economic growth of the PDCs.[[56]](#footnote-56)
* **Capacities to Engage in CED.** At least five PDCs claimed that they are capable of developing and operating livelihood projects, small enterprise or even macroeconomic projects within the PDCs. They also acknowledged that their respective communities have stored and possessed valuable lessons and better understanding on the progress, limitations, and successes as well as challenges in managing and operating economic activities in their respective PDCs. Around 60% of POs implementing CED projects managed to generate capital build-up for their projects. However, they acknowledged revisiting the subprojects would be a good start in supporting further the PDCs on their economic endeavors.[[57]](#footnote-57)

### Theory of Change Validation

The ACT for Peace experience confirms that conflict-prone areas require complementing support to sustain their transformation into peaceful, resilient and developing communities.

However, not just any kind, and degree of support, delivered at any time, is needed.

**Relationship of Social Cohesion Capacity to Peacebuilding and Human Rights Promotion.** Evidence from the ACT for Peace Programme showed that there is strong interaction (correlation coefficient of about 63.3 percent, see Table 12 between capacity for social cohesion on the one hand, and capacity for peacebuilding and human rights protection on the other hand. Further, the level of capacity of the beneficiaries in social cohesion has been analyzed to be a strong predictor of peacebuilding and human rights protection with coefficient value of .496 (see Table 13). This implies that the level of capacity of the beneficiaries in social cohesion can significantly predict capacity in peacebuilding and human rights protection. As the level of capacity for social cohesion increases so does the level of capacity for peacebuilding and human rights protection.

This suggests that initiatives and investments on social cohesion would also have favorable effects on peacebuilding and human rights protection. Improvements in social cohesion dimensions such as shared identity, sense of belongingness and the ability to act in concert towards common aspirations address drivers of conflict such as isolation, marginalization, victimization, and injustice. Stronger social cohesion is among the conditions that enable durable peace; healing, forgiveness, and acceptance can only occur in a community that is experiencing stronger social cohesion.

Among social cohesion, human security, community economic development and governance, it is social cohesion that has the most significant relationship to, and is the strongest predictor of peacebuilding and human rights protection. These make social cohesion a very vital aspect of peace work.

**Human Security as Instrument for Peacebuilding and Human Rights Protection.** As level of capacity in human security in the context of basic social services increases so does the capacity in peacebuilding and human rights protection. This implies that improving beneficiary access to and utilization of basic social services correlates (a relationship of about 51 percent, see Table 12) to an improvement in their capacity for peacebuilding and human right protection. Capacity to access and utilize basic social services was also found to be a significant predictor of peacebuilding and human rights protection (see Table 13).

Key social services, particularly those that were viewed to be vital support to marginalized communities and sectors (such as barangay health facilities, educational resources/instructional materials, and water systems; and those that supported women’s access to medical services) had a strong connection to peacebuilding and human rights protection.

The delivery of services could likely have been viewed by citizens as manifestations of the observance of the human right to development, particularly of those who are vulnerable and marginalized. The resulting improvement in health and nutrition of women, children and other vulnerable groups will have put them in a better disposition for other productive endeavors, including peacebuilding.

Table 12 Relationship in the Level of Capacity of the Respondents in Social Cohesion and Human Security, with Peacebuilding and Human Rights Protection

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Capacity** | **Pearson Correlation**  **(r-value)** | **P -value** | **Remarks** |
| Social Cohesion | .633\*\* | .000 | Highly Significant |
| Basic Social Services | .510\*\* | .000 | Highly Significant |
| Community Economic Development | .045 | .417 | Not Significant |
| Governance | .519\*\* | .000 | Highly Significant |

*\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)*

Only the level of capacity for community economic development was found not significantly related to peacebuilding and human rights protection.

Table 13 Capacity Predictors of Peacebuilding and Human Rights Protection

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Capacity** | **Unstandardized Coefficients** | | **t statistic** | **P – value** |
| **B** | **Std. Error** |
| Constant | 1.443 | .248 | 5.817 | .000 |
| Social Cohesion | .496 | .070 | 7.102 | .000 |
| Basic Social Services | .106 | .059 | 1.787 | .075 |
| Community Economic Development | .013 | .038 | .348 | .728 |
| Governance | .063 | .064 | .977 | .329 |

R Square = .419 F stat. = 37.815

Adjusted R square = .408 P – value = .000

Standard Error of Estimate = .43623

**Relationship of Capacity for Social Cohesion, Human Security, Governance and Community Economic Development to Conflict Management.** Correlational analysis indicated a high significant relationship between the level of capacity of the beneficiaries in terms of social cohesion, access and utilization of basic social services, governance, and governance with conflict management (p-values are less than 1 percent level of significance, see Table 13). In particular, the correlation coefficients of social cohesion (73.3%), basic social services (64.2%) and governance (75%) indicated a strong relationship in the level of capacity of conflict management.

Based on an analysis of the capacity predictors of conflict management (see Table 14), the level of capacity of the beneficiaries in the areas of social cohesion, access and utilization of basic services, and governance have corresponding increases in the level of capacity in conflict management. In particular:

* The level of capacity of beneficiaries in social cohesion is a determinant of the level of capacity performance in conflict management. In particular the high elasticity between in the level of capacity of social cohesion to conflict management shows that increases in the level of capacity for social cohesion corresponds to an increase in the capacity for conflict management.
* The level of capacity of in human security particularly on the access to and utilization of basic social services also significantly predicts the capacity for conflict management. An increase in the level of access to and utilization of basic social services can lead to an increase in the level of conflict management capacity.
* Conflict-sensitive governance can also significantly predict performance capacity in conflict management. This means that an increase in the level of good governance capacity in a conflict setting corresponds to an increase in the level of performance capacity in conflict management.

Among the possible reasons are that improved access to basic social services could dampen conflicts associated with competition for public goods and services, and that the delivery of social services concretize recognition and support of the “other” (i.e., government and other groups and sectors) of the community and conflict actors. These could pave the way for changes in the perception of community members and conflict actors, address the tendency to compare with other groups that they view to be more favored, and possibly even set off reciprocity.

These findings corroborate the 2011 World Development Report that noted that “Improved service delivery – for all citizens, especially the poor and disadvantaged – can help strengthen civic engagement, rebuild public confidence in government institutions, contribute over the longer term to state legitimacy, and reduce the chances of future conflict by addressing its structural causes.”[[58]](#footnote-58) Further, according to the OECD in 2008 “Efforts to aid fragile and conflict affected areas must address the reciprocal influence between service delivery and fragility.”

Future initiatives on strengthening conflict management should thus consider including strengthening social cohesion, and promoting human security through the provision of basic social services and strengthening governance.

Although all three have highly significant relationships with and are strong predictors of conflict management capacity, governance stands out. It is likely because conflict management requires ability to enforce stability and order, and follow through on agreements, which are dimensions of governance.

Table 14 Relationship in the Level of Capacity in Specific Areas with Conflict Management

| **Capacity** | **Pearson Correlation**  **(R-value)** | **P – value** | **Remarks** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Social Cohesion | .733\*\* | .000 | Highly Significant |
| Basic Social Services | .642\*\* | .000 | Highly Significant |
| Community Economic Development | .023 | .671 | Not Significant |
| Governance | .750\*\* | .000 | Highly Significant |

*\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)*

Capacity for community economic development was not significantly related to conflict management.

Table 15 Capacity Predictors of Conflict Management

| **Determinants** | **Unstandardized Coefficients** | | **t statistic** | **P – value** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **B** | **Std. Error** |
| Constant | .664 | .199 | 3.336 | .001 |
| Social Cohesion | .328 | .056 | 5.849 | .000 |
| Basic Social Services | .136 | .048 | 2.854 | .005 |
| Community Economic Development | .062 | .031 | 2.018 | .044 |
| Governance | .400 | .051 | 7.785 | .000 |

R Square = .640

Adjusted R square = .636

Standard Error of Estimate = .35041

F stat. = 144.918

P – value = .000

**Relationship and Predictive Ability of Community Economic Development to Peacebuilding, Human Rights and Conflict Management.** Multivariate analysis and predictive analysis showed that the relationship between social cohesion, human security, and conflict-sensitive governance with community economic development was not significant (Table 14). Moreover, CED was also not a significant determinant of increased capacities in conflict management (Table 15).

Economic related factors such as poverty, underdevelopment, food insecurity and competition over productive resources are among recognized causes of conflict. Specifically, the FAO has noted that “Lack of food has been the source of many past and recent conflicts. Food insecurity has clearly been a factor behind outbreaks of social unrest or worse, yet conflict also has induced notable instances of food insecurity. Conflict often involves competition over control of the factors of food production, primarily land and water. Having more people to feed, more pressure on land and water, more variable climates, and greater price volatility tends to increase stress; it also raises the risk of civil unrest or worse conflict.”

Other than specific observations such as that stronger social cohesion can be a by-product of economic development activities as more members of the community interact, collaborate and share both responsibilities and benefits, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions regarding CED and peacebuilding, human rights promotion and conflict transformation from the lens of the ACT for Peace experience.

It is possible that the weak levels of significance in the relationship and predictor of peacebuilding, human rights and conflict management are due to the reality that more vigorous implementation of CED initiatives in ACT for Peace only occurred in the higher staged PDC; and thus was not widely provided and did not have as significant implementation time compared to social cohesion, human security and good governance services.

Also, the nature of enterprise and economic development is such that basic underlying conditions and considerations apply regardless of the conflict levels and stability of the community in which they are occurring.

**Working with PDCs.** That PDCs are the peace constituents at the grassroots level; that they can influence other conflict-affected areas and that their experience can be the foundation of peace-oriented policies is a central theory of the ACT for Peace Programme.

The PDC model has proven to be viable for strengthening capacities of grassroots communities to become self-reliant and resilient to violent conflicts. The model enabled the Programme to focus and systematize the delivery of assistance by working with key peace and conflict actors and groups; and at the same time provided a natural mechanism to cascade the assistance and allow access to other stakeholders thus widening the reach of the Programme. Wider Programme reach, one which includes the indigenous peoples and other stakeholders not necessarily aligned with the MNLF, is among the defining characteristics of the ACT for Peace Programme.

The PDC model, which was the Programme’s main strategy for strengthening social cohesion, can systematize the transformation of conflict actors, particularly in the context of the implementation of peace agreements. Working with groups inside a larger community provides former combatants with the support systems that would enable them to transition to new roles. At the same time, the natural connection to a larger community will facilitate “reintegration” and reduce the risks of former combatants from becoming isolated and being perceived by the rest as a privileged group.

In terms of productive resources the PDC concept also provided a base for expanding and scaling up economic activities, particularly those related to farming.

Being part of barangays, which are the basic polity unit in the country, there are governance mechanisms within which the PDCs can be mainstreamed and to which, along with higher level local governments such as municipal LGUs, responsibility for sustaining peace and development gains can be handed over.

National and sub-national appreciation and ownership of this peace-based community development and transformation framework will facilitate replication of its good practices and lessons.

## Outcome 2: Peacebuilding and conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) capacities of actors and institutions are strengthened and institutionalized

Outcome 2 is specifically directed at building capacities of key actors and institutions in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The intended capacities involve: a) mainstreaming peace-based values, approaches and strategies, and b) establishing peace-based initiatives and innovations that institutionalize conflict transformation and peace building through the creation of structures, processes and mechanisms. (See Table 15)

The MNLF, CSOs particularly PDALs, and LGUs had been involved in previous phases of multi-donor assistance to peace after the GRP-MNLF FPA. However, it was only in the fourth phase where they took on prominent roles and were deliberately targeted as recipients of assistance.

Table 16 Outcome 2: Components, Key Areas of Interventions, Theory of Change

| **Outcomes** | **Target Outcome Indicators** | **Components** | **Key Areas of Interventions** | **Theory of Change** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) capacities of actors and institutions are strengthened and institutionalized | * LGUs and organizations model practices, systems and structures in conflict transformation and peacebuilding * LGUs and organizations have basic peace-promoting capacities, systems, processes and approaches * Targets: 19 PLGUs, 60 MLGUs, 12 PDALs/alliances, 12 MNLF-SRC | Component 4: Building Stakeholders’ Capacity for Conflict Transformation | * Improving conflict transformation competencies of institutions * Strengthening peace-responsive government organizations and CSOs * Providing enabling mechanisms to support stakeholders’ initiatives | Working with a larger base of local actors will strengthen responsiveness of duty bearers and civil society to the aspirations of conflict-affected communities; and strengthen local capacities for conflict transformation and peacebuilding. |

### Outcome 2 Indicators

Based on the following information, progress has been made in the attainment of the outcome:

* All of the target 19 PLGUs and 144 MLGUs that were actually involved had enhanced capacities in peace building and conflict transformation (total of 163); an estimated two-thirds of the total LGUs involved reached the higher stages of development [[59]](#footnote-59)
* All of the target PDALs and alliances are in various phases of transformation implementing peacebuilding projects[[60]](#footnote-60)

The achievement of these outcome indicators could be ascribed to the Programme implementation and management arrangements and the output results. The status of these outcomes is plausible in light of the factors that facilitated or hindered their achievement and the context in which the Programme operated.

### Benefits to peace and conflict actors

A number of benefits to actors were associated with Outcome 2. Among these were:

* **Enhanced Competencies on Conflict Transformation.** There are many proof of increased competence at the individual level on key peace and conflict processes such as conflict analysis, rights-based approach and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA).

Peace-based values, principles and practices have to be mainstreamed, integrated and institutionalized into regular governance agenda and processes to be sustained beyond individuals directly assisted by ACT for Peace. Although a few LCEs (Sarangani, Cotabato, Basilan and Davao del Sur) have shown political will and have introduced innovative initiatives (Kalinaw or Peace Unit), a significant number of LGU officials and staff still need strengthening to consistently practice conflict-sensitivity and peace promotion.

* **Mainstreamed Peacebuilding Processes in LGUs and Government Agencies.** Central to the capacity building efforts of the Programme for key peace-responsive government institutions and LGUs is the mainstreaming of peacebuilding principles, concepts, processes and approaches. These include the application of the conflict analysis, PCIA, and conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting (CSPP) development management processes.

All of the 19 PLGU partners are in varying phases of mainstreaming peace-based approaches and processes. NEDA and DILG have ongoing efforts to mainstream CSPP tools in their regional and local planning, monitoring and evaluation system (RPMES) and Rationalized Planning System (RPS).[[61]](#footnote-61) MinDA staff were also trained on CSPP approaches which complemented agency efforts to mainstream the Shared Monitoring and Evaluation of Progress towards Mindanao Peace Outcomes among the key government agencies and the donor programs to effectively assess the impact of peace and development interventions in the achievement of the Mindanao Peace Outcomes.[[62]](#footnote-62)

* **Peace Platforms and Mechanisms Strengthened.** Peace platforms such as structures and mechanisms were strengthened to sustain peacebuilding initiatives. These were evident in the institutionalization of Peace and Development Committees or Technical Working Groups formed at the provincial and municipal levels in some LGUs and mechanisms for emergency response, relief, early recovery and rehabilitation.

These peace platforms were likewise manifest in regional formations such as the PDALs and PDA Alliances.

* **Policy and Institutional Support for Peacebuilding.** Policy support in the form of local development council resolutions and executive orders were issued. At least 87 of the 144 MLGUs covered by the Programme allocated budgets for peacebuilding initiatives and the PDCs. The Peace and Development Committees and Technical Working Groups established at the provincial and municipal levels were instrumental in enlisting technical and financial support for the PDCs.[[63]](#footnote-63)
* **From MNLF Combatants to Peace Champions** The Programme has sustained the transformation of former combatants to peace champions who continually commit to lead and represent vulnerable groups and traditional marginalized sectors in development bodies. These peace champions have become development managers and leaders in the advocacy for peace and building the peace constituency on the ground. They have become better known as Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) organized into leagues (PDALs) and alliances.
* **Strengthening Capacities of the Peace and Development Advocates’ Leagues and Alliances.** The PDA Leagues and Alliances have successfully evolved from project beneficiaries in the first two phases of multi-donor programmes to implementing partners. At the end of the Programme they have become active civil society organizations engaged in peace advocacy and community development work. They are represented in local development councils and other mandated bodies like the Provincial Development Council, Peace and Order Council and Disaster Coordinating Councils through their participation in Peace and Development Committees/TWGs at the province and municipal levels.

As PDALs and as partners of LGUs and NGOs they have been actively involved in mobilizing resources, liaisoning and coordinating with support agencies in the pursuit of their respective PDCs’ peace and development agenda. Some of them have been sitting in local special bodies such as the Local Development Planning Councils, Peace and Order Councils (POCs), Disaster Coordinating Councils (DCCs) as well as in the Peace and Development Committees/Technical Working Groups (TWGs) at the provincial and municipal levels.

* **Strengthening Capacities of the Moro National Liberation Front.** A total of 15 MNLF State Revolutionary Committees were also strengthened in the areas of strategic management and participatory governance through their representation in the Peace and Development TWGs and local special bodies. All the 15 MNLF State Committees implemented their respective projects in the PDCs and other MNLF communities which include community economic enterprise and peace advocacy initiatives like regional-level conflict (such as *rido*) mediation and interfaith dialogues.[[64]](#footnote-64)

**Contributed to the Development of the Mindanao Peace and Development Framework.** The development of the Mindanao Peace and Development Framework (Mindanao 2020) led by the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) was informed by the Programme’s peace-based Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework drawing significant learnings from the Programme’s peacebuilding experiences.[[65]](#footnote-65)

### Theory of Change Validation

The ACT for Peace experience validated the importance of working with a larger base of local actors to strengthen responsiveness of duty bearers and civil society to the aspirations of conflict-affected communities; and strengthen local capacities for conflict transformation and peacebuilding.

Enhancing the conflict management and good governance capacities of LGUs and other local stakeholders would promote effectiveness of conflict transformation and peacebuilding initiatives; responsiveness to concerns of post-conflict or conflict-affected/vulnerable communities; and effectively inform macro policy and institutional response.[[66]](#footnote-66)

**Conflict-Sensitive Governance as Predictor of Conflict Management.** As shown in Table 15 conflict-sensitive governance is the most significant predictor of the performance capacity in conflict management. This means that an increase in the level of good governance capacity in a conflict setting corresponds to an increase in the level of performance capacity in conflict management.

The Programme made a strategic decision to focus on capacitating with PDALs as non-government organizations and the MNLF. There were advantages to this decision in light of resource constraints and the need to sustain the involvement of PDALs. ACT for Peace also engaged NGOs as service providers and invited them to partnership activities. However, they were not targeted as direct recipients of assistance from the Programme.

Hence, while the Programme has engaged both rights duty holders and claims-makers, the effects and implications of providing support to a wider base of actors outside of the PDC, PDALs, LGUs, agencies, MNLF and schools, cannot be fully ascertained.

## Outcome 3: Critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development are strengthened

Outcome 3 focuses on promoting the Culture of Peace by enhancing local capacities for peace; building partnerships for the promotion of the culture of peace; and promoting and advocating the culture of peace in more mainstream venues.

Table 17 Outcome 3 Components, Key Areas of Interventions and Theory of Change

| **Outcomes** | **Outcome Indicator** | **Components** | **Key Areas of Interventions** | **Theory of Change** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development are strengthened | Improved interaction among peace networks, LGUs, government agencies, the security sector, MNLF, media, academe, private and religious sectors in promoting peace and development (26 partnerships) | Component 5: Promotion of the Culture of Peace (COP) towards Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention | * Enhancing local capacities of culture bearers for peace building and development * Establishing vertical and horizontal linkages for the promotion of the Culture of Peace * Promoting and advocating the Culture of Peace in more mainstream venues | Working with key institutions, particularly the “culture bearers”, broaden peace constituency and nurture the environment of peace. |

### Outcome 3 Indicators

Based on the following information, the Programme indicators have been achieved signaling attainment of the outcome:

* PLGU-level partnerships (19) and regional level (6) partnerships on peacebuilding
* 60 Schools of Peace modeling the integration of the Culture of Peace and Peace Education

The achievement of these outcome indicators could be ascribed to the Programme implementation and management arrangements and the output results. The status of these outcomes is plausible in light of the factors that facilitated or hindered their achievement and the context in which the Programme operated.

### Benefits to peace and conflict actors

A number of benefits to actors were associated with outcome 3 which cuts across the five components of ACT for Peace. Among these were:

* **Enhanced Abilities for and Adherence to a Culture of Peace.** A total of 389 Peoples Organizations (POs) and 612 Local Social Formations (LSFs) have enhanced skills on conflict management and the culture of peace. These LSFs now lead local conflict mediation and resolution, among other community development processes.[[67]](#footnote-67)

Fostering a culture of peace appears to have had significant effects among the stakeholders and partners, based on their repeated references to situations that reflect that such culture has been developed in many PDCs. The situations cited range from small, everyday details to major paradigm shifts and policies with a particular bias for peace and peacebuilding. The imperative of further cultivating and radiating the culture of peace to the greater population was a shared sentiment among stakeholders.[[68]](#footnote-68)

* **Mechanisms to Respond to Local Conflicts.** Mechanisms enable the delivery of regular, predictable and impartial services. In the case of conflict management, mechanisms have been established in local government and non-government bodies that benefited the grassroots. The Programme played a major role in the creation of the Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management formed to address rido or clan feud. In particular it was able to address a rido which has spread to at least 10 municipalities in the province. [[69]](#footnote-69)
* **Functional Structures and Mechanisms for Peace and Development.** Successful promotion of COP through partnerships resulted in institutional support. This is evidenced by functioning structures and mechanisms that addressed peace and development concerns, resulting in the adoption of policy and institutional support for peace-based activities and interventions. These included the (a) creation of Peace and Development Committees and Technical Working Groups; and the (b) mainstreaming of partner PDA leagues and alliances and the MNLF in local special bodies. An Executive Order from the Provincial Governor provided the mandate and staff complement for the Sarangani Kalinaw Program which managed all peace-related initiatives and projects of the PLGU.
* **Government Systems and Processes Reflecting Peacebuilding Principles and Concepts.** All 19 provincial LGUs provided technical and financial assistance to PDCs and adjusted their processes to be consistent with COP. One of these is the Kalinaw Sarangani Unit (KSU) of Sarangani Province which coordinates the implementation of peacebuilding programs in the province. The KSU received an award from the “Galing Pook” Foundation[[70]](#footnote-70) under the peacebuilding category for its extensive promotion and support to peacebuilding initiatives in the province.[[71]](#footnote-71)

Other examples of how the culture of peace has affected government processes, a conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting framework was integrated into the ARMM’s Legislative and Executive Agenda, and the SZOPADWare, a database base management system that integrated both peace and development indicators and information, was enhanced in NEDA Regions XI and XII.

The convergence of support for PDCs and conflict-affected areas from national and local agencies, including the programs of peace officers (Armed Forces of the Philippines or AFP and the Philippine National Police or PNP) was facilitated.

* **Multi-Sectoral Partnerships for Peace Constituency Building**. Across the Programme’s four areas of operations, inter-regional and provincial partnerships anchored on the culture of peace were built among various stakeholders. Local peace networks composed of religious leaders (Muslim, Catholic and Protestant Churches) LGUs, AFP and Philippine National Police promoted peace and understanding through intercultural and interfaith dialogues.[[72]](#footnote-72) Regional and local alliances of civil society, government agencies, local government units, the religious, media groups as well as the security sector have been effective peace platforms for the promotion of the culture of peace. An example of this was the strong CSO-GO partnership evident in the Caraga Convergence for Peace and Development (CCPD).[[73]](#footnote-73) Peace-oriented CSOs (faith-based organizations, academe, media, NGOs, and POs) were also involved in peace-promoting collaborative activities. Partnerships among government agencies, non-governmental humanitarian groups and communities were evident during crises situations, specifically in supporting the return, early recovery and rehabilitation of internally displaced communities.
* **Institutionalized Peace Education and Mainstreamed the Culture of Peace.** A total of 60 Schools of Peace (SoPs) modeled peace education and teacher education. Though these schools are now in various phases of transformation, 53 SoPs are integrating COP and practicing peace education at the elementary, secondary and tertiary levels. The Mindanao State University that covers nine campuses in Mindanao, for instance, integrated peace in its curriculum, research and community programs. Peace Exemplars and COP modules are being adopted as effective tools in mainstreaming peace principles, concepts and values in the teaching-learning process of the partner schools. A Peace Education Speakers Bureau consisting of 60 CoP teachers/practitioners coming from these schools was organized and trained, and actively providing technical assistance to replication schools in Cotabato City (7)[[74]](#footnote-74), Bicol Region (1)[[75]](#footnote-75) and Quezon City (1)[[76]](#footnote-76).

The Schools of Peace are being recognized as models for context-specific approach to peace education (e.g. development and application of Enriched Lesson Plans that consider local context and environment of target school/community such as lesson plans for predominantly IP, Moro and mixed communities; peace education project components that are based on the needs and nuances of the partner schools). [[77]](#footnote-77)

### Theory of Change Validation

The initial experience of ACT for Peace confirmed the importance of working with key institutions, particularly the “culture bearers”, to broaden peace constituency and nurture the environment of peace. The decision to focus on the academe as a “culture bearer” was predicated on Programme financial and management considerations and to a certain extent, learnings from other initiatives that targeted cultural institutions such as media and churches. Compared to focusing on individuals involved in media work, the Schools of Peace approach had a more institutional nature and facilitated faster mainstreaming of peace education and the culture of peace. However, the downstream and strategic impact of this approach can only be verified in the future.

## Factors Affecting Outcome Achievement

A key facilitating factor towards the attainment of the outcomes is the quality of the Programme’s overall design. As a successor phase, ACT for Peace enjoyed all the established structures and mechanisms to achieve its intended outcomes. The peace infrastructure composed of the advocates and their alliances, which require a maturation process, have progressively developed over the course of the previous phases of UNMDP implementation.

The comprehensive and meticulous design captured lessons from its three predecessors to enhance ACT for Peace frameworks and strategies. The PDC model traces its roots to UNMDP 2 and has immensely evolved to become a highly effective peace mechanism that articulates progress made towards the peace and conflict transformation agenda for Mindanao. Social capital formation is vital for a genuine and lasting peace to take place. Communities – people -- are the locus for change.

Key aspects of the foundation for social cohesion and peace infrastructure-building such as the peace advocates and alliances were already established in a number of communities at the beginning of the Programme life. Part of the foundation are the inherent or existing “peace abilities” -- the resilience of individuals and communities and their abilities to absorb, accept and adopt peacebuilding concepts and processes – which allowed a level of social cohesiveness that recognized and respected a multicultural environment and facilitated an active constituency.

Communities have their own peculiarities which will have to be taken into consideration along with their capacities, interests, and drivers. More effort will have to be exerted to better understand the abilities, priorities and motivators of ARMM communities. This improved comprehension could then guide the delivery of future assistance so that ARMM communities are better supported in their efforts to become more self-directing, fully reap the benefits of the transformation processes, and become more self-reliant.

Peace-oriented civil society organizations and institutions have remained steadfast and unrelenting in their quest for a just and lasting peace, with or without big peace and development projects. These CSOs became service providers of the Programme in assisting communities and other actors; and even if they were not target participants of the ACT for Peace a number of CSOs were engaged in Programme-supported initiatives. Strong partnerships among civil society organizations facilitated accomplishments in the areas of peace education, consensus building for peace and implementation of peace-oriented projects. The linkages and networks provide a wider coverage and support for peacebuilding activities. Conversely, weak CSO - government engagement will also impact on initiatives to strengthen governance and exact performance and accountability from duty bearers. This seemed to be the experience in ARMM.

Continuing support of various donor organizations for peace and development in Mindanao and the election of reform-minded leaders in LGUs help make the environment more enabling for peace and development. In particular, significant changes took place in communities where LGUs were cooperative and responsive. On the other hand, a political climate where newly-elected officials at the local level can reject or undermine already installed peace-based structures, processes and mechanisms obviously had negative effects. Traditional, patronage-based politics and governance practices still exist in some of the participating LGUs.

Partnerships at different levels facilitated the success of many Programme initiatives. Collaboration and coordination between and among national/regional government agencies and LGUs resulted in the conflict-sensitive and peace promoting policies and programs. Also, stronger collaboration and convergence between and among PDCs through alliances boosted development gains.

Inconclusive peace settlements with rebel groups often lead to eruptions of armed hostilities which impact on Programme operations and negatively affect participating communities and other actors.

## Approach to Atribution

The evaluation showed that the accomplishment of planned Outputs could be directly attributed to Programme implementation strategies and management arrangements. The achievement of target Outcomes 1 and 3 and progress in Outcome 2 were verified by indicators which were structured to be traceable to the efforts of ACT for Peace and by benefits which similarly could be linked to the Programme. Moreover, the status of these higher oriented results was deemed plausible in light of the factors that affected ACT for Peace implementation and results.

However, the context and nature of ACT for Peace will make attribution of results – particularly exclusive attribution -- challenging. ACT for Peace operated in an environment that is regarded as complex. As the fourth phase of a sub-national initiative covering a wide area and supported by official development assistance, it employed strategies that were comprehensive and were more programmatic rather than project-based.[[78]](#footnote-78) It also promoted partnerships and collaboration particularly in community economic development and in the promotion of a culture of peace. Although the confirmation of higher oriented results were linked to specific actions or behaviors of participating communities, LGUs and organizations described in a staged manner (e.g., Stages of PDC Development and Transformation), it can be argued that a number of the manifestations would be best appreciated with the passage of time and hence were better measured further downstream.

Typical evaluations which emphasize quantitative models would be inadequate in the above context. This has prompted evaluation specialists to acknowledge that while scarce aid funding and the demand for accountability exact attribution, “evaluation has undergone a shift from measuring and proving to understanding and improving” and that recognition of the problematic nature of attribution has engendered a shift in the conception of causation away from proving relationships between variables toward reducing uncertainty about how things relate and change.”[[79]](#footnote-79)

One such model that could be considered in future evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict transformation initiatives in the Philippines is causal contribution analysis, a theory-driven performance measurement, where, over time, a better understanding of just how the program is working is developed and used to improve future performance and report on past performance. *[[80]](#footnote-80)*

**Programme Contribution to Peace Writ Large in Mindanao**

Section 5

# Section 5 Programme Contribution to Larger Peace Outcomes

T

he peace and order environment in Southern Philippines has long been characterized by a fragile peace situation and weak human security conditions. A major impediment to the region’s development has been persistent armed conflict in Mindanao leading to disruptions or decline in economic activities exacerbating poverty and producing other forms of social injustices. Government efforts to resolve these armed conflicts have been numerous – from comprehensive peace processes to socio-economic reforms.

The peaceful resolution of the Mindanao armed conflict has been a priority of many of the country’s leaders. During the 2006 Philippine Development Forum, the Mindanao Working Group (MWG) and the donor community in Mindanao recognized the need for greater coordination as then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appealed to intensify reconstruction and development assistance for Mindanao.

The Mindanao Peace Outcomes were formulated as statements that represent the achievement of higher-level changes that would address violent conflicts and usher long-term peace in Southern Philippines. The outcome statements are linked to the goals in the National Peace Plan that is embodied on Chapter 14 of the 2004-2010 MTPDP[[81]](#footnote-81) and are also consistent with international measures such as the Peace Writ Large criteria developed by The Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP).[[82]](#footnote-82) (See Annex B)

The proposed six Mindanao Peace Outcomes are:

1. Peaceful and inclusive negotiated settlement of armed conflicts between GPH and all rebel groups in Mindanao achieved and successfully implemented.
2. Human security in Mindanao conflict-affected and vulnerable communities enhanced.
3. Mindanao peace constituency broadened and citizens’ participation in the peace process strengthened.
4. Policy environment for sustained peace, development and human security in Mindanao enhanced.
5. Structures and institutions for sustained peace, development and human security in Mindanao strengthened.
6. Social cohesion and harmonious relationships strengthened within and among communities and sectors.

In general, ACT for Peace interventions and results were aligned with and contributed towards the Mindanao Peace Outcomes, and the country’s peace goals. These attest to the relevance of the Programme whose objectives are consistent with Government peace and development priorities. The Programme is also impacting favorably on the larger peace situation by building positive connections between groups and promoting social cohesion.

## Mindanao Peace Outcome 1: Peaceful and inclusive negotiated settlement of armed conflicts between GPH and all rebel groups in Mindanao achieved and successfully implemented

The Programme is a major support to the implementation of the GRP-MNLF FPA through its assistance to MNLF communities transformed as PDCs and by enhancing the capacities of the MNLF in peacebuilding. The various leagues of PDAs supported by the Programme increased their capacities in peacebuilding, conflict analysis and M&E. PDALs developed both intrapersonal and interpersonal skills that are more conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting. ACT for Peace likewise influenced government strategy for the reintegration of rebel returnees through capacity building support to OPAPP’s Social Integration Program.

The transformation of community members as individuals and as a group is a significant contribution towards broadening the peace constituency. Programme interventions in the formation of social capital led to the strengthening of individual and institutional capacities to protect and promote basic human rights such as access to basic services, participation and freedom from conflict and violence. Some of the root causes of conflict particularly the marginalization and exclusion of minority groups have been addressed by the Programme through its inclusive approach in PDC development.

Continued cooperation between key government agencies such as MinDA and the OPAPP can genuinely impact on the peacebuilding efforts in Mindanao and achieve a broader peace constituency. Each plays a complementary role and can provide the necessary leadership and support for the resolution of conflicts in political processes such as the peace talks. Significant steps towards this are the sharing of good practices to particularly enhance the implementation of PAMANA, and the use of a shared M&E system to harmonize peacebuilding programs in Mindanao and guide future policy development and programming.

## Mindanao Peace Outcome 2: Human security in Mindanao conflict-affected and vulnerable communities enhanced

The Programme contributed substantively to enhancing human security in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities by promoting and increasing people’s awareness of human rights and good governance, improving access to basic services especially to vulnerable groups like women and children, increasing appreciation of and access to economic development initiatives through collective undertakings, and establishing greater social cohesion among members of the community of varying faiths and cultural descents. This is more evident in the PDCs that have attained Stage 4-6 in their transformation process.

The early recovery strategies employed by the Programme in its efforts to assist IDPs focused on the restoration of human dignity based on the human security framework. Fifty-four (54) communities of IDPs benefited from the early recovery interventions of the Programme in addition to the support from 24 PDCs that directly or indirectly hosted IDPs during the 2008 GRP-MILF armed conflict.

## Mindanao Peace Outcome 3: Mindanao peace constituency broadened and citizen’s participation in the peace process strengthened

The Programme significantly contributed to the strengthening of a Mindanao peace constituency through the formation and strengthening of POs, CSOs, PDALs/Alliances and other LSFs that actively engaged government (both local and national levels) in service delivery to its constituents. In addition, these constituents participated in local development planning, investment programming and project management, other peace-based initiatives for greater social cohesion and cooperation, and sought representation in local peacebuilding and development structures, mechanisms and processes.

It likewise contributed to mainstreaming peace education among culture bearers particularly in the academic sector, expanded the peace constituency to the security sector through the participation of AFP and PNP in COP capacity building, and contributed to policy development for peacebuilding at the national and regional levels. Examples of the latter are the peace legislation agenda at the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly and the adoption of PDCs as recipient communities of development interventions under the PAMANA Program.

PDALs and CSOs collaborated with the Programme to push peace-oriented policy reforms and advocacies aimed at preventing the escalation of conflicts. The successful mass action to contain violence stemming from the kidnapping of Father Bossi in 2007 in Zamboanga Sibugay is an example.

## Mindanao Peace Outcome 4: Policy environment for sustained peace, development and human security in Mindanao enhanced

The Programme has to a large extent contributed to enhancing the policy environment in Mindanao for sustained peace, development and human security through the introduction and implementation of innovative policies, issuances and enabling structures for sustained peace, development and human security. Examples include mainstreaming COP and peace education, conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting development planning and investment programming, inclusion of peace in Executive and Legislative Agenda of LGUs, establishment of special bodies that are peace-directed such as local Peace and Development Committees/TWGs, improved budgetary allocation for peacebuilding initiatives by LGUs, and increased involvement of CSOs/NGOs including PDALs in peace governance.

It has contributed as well in the crafting of the Mindanao 2020 which is the all-encompassing, integrated and holisitic peace and development framework for Mindanao. As part of its mainstreaming efforts, the Programme established working partnerships with key development agencies like the DILG, DepEd, DTI, NEDA, TESDA, CDA, and DA to facilitate and support the delivery of peacebuilding and development projects and services.

## Mindanao Peace Outcome 5: Structures and institutions for sustained peace, development and human security in Mindanao strengthened

The Programme strengthened and institutionalized peacebuilding and conflict transformation capacities among key actors and institutions. Peace-based platforms and infrastructures were effectively introduced; capacities of officers and functionaries of LGUs and regional level agencies were strengthened. Nevertheless, efforts need further improvement to see the intended outcomes of capacity development through. These could be through more results-oriented monitoring of performance, and an incentive system to make peacebuilding initiatives functional and sustained.

## Mindanao Peace Outcome 6: Social cohesion and harmonious relationships strengthened within and among communities and sectors

The Programme was successful in building social cohesion and strengthening of vertical and horizontal relationships between and among communities, key actors and stakeholders. These were accomplished principally through rigorous peace education and the promotion of COP at the grassroots. Communities were empowered and capacitated to manage conflicts using traditional or indigenous means of conflict resolution (inter-faith, inter-barangay or inter-PDC activities like consultations, dialogues, and celebrations). This strategy has been proven effective in preventing the eruption or escalation of violent conflicts.

# Annexes

**Overall Assessment of the ACT for Peace Programme**

Section 6

# Section 6 Overall Assessment of the ACT for Peace Programme

# 6.1 Overall Perception of the Programme

Based on the perception survey, FGD and KII, overall perception of the Programme was very positive. This can be attributed to the respondents’ satisfaction over the contributions made to their communities as a result of Programme interventions.

Programme beneficiaries reported to have experienced some degree of positive change at the different dimensions of transformation. Programme desirability[[83]](#footnote-83) was rated very high in the survey (mean scale score 4.224), indicative of communities’ appreciation of the Programme and its benefits. (See Table 18)

The survey results indicated significant respondents’ perception of heightened awareness on key areas in peace governance such as the causes of conflict and the communities’ capacity and accountability to manage conflict. Enhanced conflict management skills of communities and LGUs as well as increased sectoral participation in barangay councils are two other areas perceived positively by the communities.

A high perception rating of improved and participatory barangay governance was recorded, primarily due to the visibility of concrete projects within these communities and the participative structure and system by which these projects are managed, e.g., the Barangay Water System Association (BAWASA) and the Botika ng Barangay (BnB).

While communities feel that sectoral representation in decision-making bodies such as the Barangay Development Council (BDCs), the Peace and Order Councils (POCs) and other local special bodies (87.1% claim) have become more inclusive of marginalized sectors, only 40% of respondents agreed that concerns of victims of conflict are addressed by the barangay and the municipal LGU. Around 60% felt that political affiliations and party system still prevail and dominate in the identification and prioritization of project beneficiaries.

Many community respondents perceive CED initiatives highly, especially those from PDCs in Stages 4 and 5.

Positive perception of the Programme’s desirability is manifest across all regions regardless of specific regional context. Western Mindanao ranked highest while the ARMM region posted the lowest positive perception. Variations in the level of perception of direct and indirect beneficiaries were found to be insignificant.

Table 18 General Perceptions on Program Desirability

| **Rating Scale** | **Responses** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **f (n = 331)** | **Percent of Responses** | **Percent of Cases** |
| 1 | 193 | 1.7 | 72.0 |
| 2 | 366 | 3.2 | 136.6 |
| 3 | 1,315 | 11.4 | 490.7 |
| 4 | 3,458 | 30.0 | 1,290.3 |
| 5 | 6,192 | 53.7 | 2,310.4 |
| **Total** | **11,524** | **100** | **4,300.0** |

Mean Scale Score = 4.224

The desirability of the Programme was corroborated by results of the content analysis of the KII and FGD which consistently identified aspects of ACT for Peace support in response to the question on what helped in the achievement of results.

In sum the overall high perception rating of the Programme appears to be a translation of the communities’ appreciation and understanding of the transformative process they experienced, reflecting the positive impact of the Programme and the benefits derived from its interventions towards peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

# 6.2 Assessment of Programme Using OECD Criteria

The Programme substantially attained its stipulated outputs and outcomes. All numerical targets were achieved while overall perception of the Programme is very positive attributed to the tangible benefits of Programme interventions. The Programme was perceived to have social desirability in that the beneficiaries highly appreciated the positive changes brought about in the four dimensions[[84]](#footnote-84). There was positive perception of the Programme across all regions; ARMM posted the lowest positive rating.

This section provides the assessment Programme taken as a whole using the OECD-DAC criteria, of which there are eight[[85]](#footnote-85), according to a 1 to 6 rating scale.[[86]](#footnote-86)

Of the eight criteria, ACT for Peace was rated “very high” in four (Relevance/Appropriateness, Effectiveness, Coverage and Coherence) and “good” in the remaining four (Sustainability, Efficiency, Impact and Linkages).

These very favorable ratings attest to the performance of ACT for Peace Programme as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiative.

The overall review also uses the five Peace Writ Large criteria, which ascertain whether an effort:

1. Contributes to stopping a key driving factor of the war or conflict
2. Contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop their own peace initiatives in relation to critical elements of context analysis: what needs to be stopped, reinforcement of areas where people continue to interact in non-war ways, and regional and international dimensions of the conflict
3. Results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances in situations where such grievances do, genuinely, drive the conflict
4. Prompts people to increasingly resist violence and provocations to violence
5. Results in an increase in people’s security and in their sense of security

**6.2.1 Relevance/Appropriateness Rating: 6**

Overall, the Programme fully achieved two of its intended outcomes and made significant progress in one. Appropriate interventions addressed critical areas that trigger conflict. The Programme accomplished and brought about an overall environment relevant and conducive to the growing peacebuilding and conflict transformation vista in the region. Appropriateness of approach, strategies, implementation frameworks and activities was achieved using viable theories of change. The following areas showed significant changes as a result of the Programme:

* Addressed and improved human security needs of communities in conflict-affected areas
* Increased people’s participation in governance
* Strengthened capacities of key stakeholders built on peace governance and on the prevention, resolution and management of conflicts
* Strengthened critical partnerships practicing peace sensitive and peace promoting approaches to development

The overall transformation appears to correspond to the multi-dimensional change that peacebuilding requires. The changes are evident at the personal, relational, structural and cultural levels resulting in the strengthening social capital, or broadening the peace constituency in the program area. The Programme has clearly contributed to the UNDAF Outcome #5 (Reduction of the level of violent conflict and the promotion of human security and COP nationwide).

Interventions focused on capacity development of individuals, communities, institutions and CSOs in peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Increased capacities contribute to the achievement of national priorities and goals for peace.

These added to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop their own peace initiatives. Moreover, there are indications that people’s security and their sense of security are improving. Majority of the respondents (79.33%) reported a general sense of improved quality of life compared to five years ago. KII and FGD results also attested to the difference in the situation “then and now”.

Strong critical partnerships were established between and among key players (peace-oriented CSOs, the military, LGUs, donor organizations and other development organizations) at the national and local levels. The Programme’s rights-based approach to governance and development planning integrated both prevention and management of conflicts; issues on governance, poverty, social inequity were addressed with a long-term perspective.

Peace-sensitive and peace-promoting approaches to development were mainstreamed utilized by Programme stakeholders (communities, the military, the CSOs and LGUs).

There were reforms in governance institutions that handle grievances and enable citizens to seek justice. These mechanisms are important if people are to be supported in their efforts to resist violence and provocations to violence.

The Programme has contributed to the crafting of Mindanao 2020, an all-encompassing, integrated and holistic peace and development plan for Mindanao.

**6.2.2 Effectiveness Rating: 6**

The effectiveness of the Programme can be gauged by how it has caused its partner communities, organizations and institutions to take on and develop their own peacebuilding initiatives and to confront and manage conflict through non-violent means.

The Programme’s community-focused and community-driven approach is highly effective as it reinforces the sense of ownership of the communities and other stakeholders of the peace agenda. The PDC model is recognized by beneficiaries as a very effective approach to engender community participation in peacebuilding. Stronger community capacities in pursuing development in an organized and systematic way are evidence of this. Organized response to peace and development challenges and stronger bonds contribute to the momentum for peace. Community respondents (87.4%) expressed significant improvement in the accessibility of government support to related projects.

The level of social cohesion in the PDCs and their flexibility in addressing emerging issues and concerns including gender sensitivity in a volatile situation without deviating from the desired goals attest to the thorough examination by the Programme of the context within which it operated.

The Programme has been effective in contributing towards building and expanding the constituency for peace in Southern Philippines. It is a comprehensive peacebuilding and conflict prevention programme that supports policy development, peace advocacy, partnership building, capacity-building, as well as socio-economic development.

**6.2.3 Sustainability Rating: 5**

OECD-DAC defines sustainability as the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major assistance has been completed.[[87]](#footnote-87)  It refers to the probability of continued long-term benefits and resilience to risk over time and includes financial, institutional, human resources, management and other elements.”[[88]](#footnote-88) In practical peacebuilding terms, ownership, improved governance institutions and stronger capacities among key actors are required to sustain peace initiatives.

The question of sustainability is the most sensitive and challenging issue for any peacebuilding program because of externalities inherent to an unstable operating environment. Capacities, institutions and conditions need to be strengthened to continue benefits beyond the completion of programme assistance.

The ACT for Peace Programme addressed the issue of sustainability as evidenced by its accomplishment of intended outcomes. Overall, the Programme was able to instill a strong sense of ownership among its partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries over the assets and gains realized in more than five years of intensive peacebuilding work. At the local level, communities are already initiating and managing basic service delivery, capacity development, and confidence-building activities within and with other conflict prone communities.

Community capacities for conflict prevention, resolution and management as well, as for mobilizing and generating resources in the pursuit of peace and development agenda were strengthened by the Programme.

The peace constituency among civil society organizations remained strong, solid and dynamic despite different development climates. Convergence of efforts and increased collaboration can sustain the changes in the living conditions of people that were affected by and remain vulnerable to armed conflicts.

Government’s decentralization policy created opportunities to broaden people’s participation in governance. Complemented by the Programme’s capacity building interventions, communities should be able to sustain their active and meaningful participation in local governance. However, these opportunities are often compromised by partisan, patron-based local politics.

**6.2.4 Efficiency Rating: 5**

Efficiency is measured by achieving results within the designated time and costs. Most of the Programme’s major activities were implemented on time and according to plan. Total delivery rate as of 31 December 2010 vis-à-vis 5-year budget is placed at 98.19%. For StRIDe-Mindanao Project, delivery rate at project closing on 30 November 2010 is 95.44%. Combined ACT for Peace and StRIDe Programme delivery rate by end of December 2010 reached 97.72% of the total downloaded funds.

Specific incidents were cited by the Programme that caused delays in the implementation of some interventions and, in a few isolated cases, hindered the completion of community projects.

The recurrence of violent conflicts in 2007 and 2008-2009 were external events beyond the control of the Programme that affected planned and budgeted activities was cited as among the hindering factors.

**6.2.5 Impact Rating: 5**

As a community based, peace-driven Programme, impact is principally at the community level. Success has also been observed in other areas with other key stakeholders of the Programme. The promotion of the culture of peace and peacebuilding values were evident in many target sectors such as the CSOs, LGUs, security (military and PNP) and culture bearers as schools of peace have been established.

The Programme built a strong peace constituency among participating communities and CSOs that are committed to resist violent means of addressing conflict. These actors have taken the initiative to develop culturally-sensitive or culturally enhancing innovations for peace building and conflict transformation.

It fostered a greater sense of cohesion among the community people and allowed for more inter-faith, inter-barangay dialogues/exchanges and consultation. It strengthened traditional and indigenous forms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and in some identified instances, averted what could have been a serious exchange of hostilities involving families/clans in the community. It resulted to the increase, albeit to a limited extent, of people’s sense of human security.

**6.2.6 Linkages Rating: 5**

Linkages were effectively established between and among the various stakeholders in government and civil society. Complementation of services and interventions towards peacebuilding and conflict transformation was advocated. These linkages created synergies that contributed to the attainment of desired outcomes in the local, regional and national peace agenda. Notable are linkages with government agencies such as the OPAPP, Department of Education, and Trade and Industry and other programmes namely Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM), Habitat for Humanity and World Food Programme (WFP).

However, linkages with national level entities can be further strengthened and engagements pursued in a more sustained manner.

**6.2.7 Coverage Rating: 6**

Coverage refers to whether all those in need of assistance and interventions have access to them.

The Programme covered a broad base of communities in post-conflict, conflict-affected and conflict vulnerable communities in the Southern Philippines. It has addressed a wide range of conflict-based issues and concerns in its services and interventions -- from armed hostilities to natural calamities, even including grievances of indigenous peoples against encroachment of their ancestral domain.

**6.2.8 Coherence Rating: 6**

Evaluating Programme coherence involves assessing activities undertaken by a range of actors (security, development, trade, and military) to ensure that there is consistency and that all take account of humanitarian and human rights consideration. It also means alignment of policies and efforts among key institutions and organizations in both government and civil society.

The Programme steadfastly pursued coherence in frameworks, policies and plans among key institutions and organizations as part of its goal of strengthening critical partnerships in the promotion of a culture of peace and peacebuilding. Strategic plans such as Mindanao 2020, to which ACT for Peace provided input, is an attempt to instill greater coherence among these institutions and organizations in the pursuit of a sustainable peace and development in Mindanao. Teachings of the COP and other rights-based approaches to peace and development in the different sectors of government and CSOs are noteworthy as well.

Moreover, the Programme has to a large extent exerted efforts to promote and be consistent with international conflict prevention and peacebuilding values in its dealings with various stakeholder groups and organizations. As cited in project documents these values and principles include:

1. Rights-based approach to development management and local governance, recognizing the entitlements of citizens of the state and the obligations of the state to fulfill them
2. Non-violent, conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting approaches in all activities and interventions
3. Consensus-building and participatory means, people’s participation in project management, in local governance affairs, in defining and analyzing conflict situations and formulating their actions to addressing them
4. Culture sensitive, recognizing and respecting indigenous, traditional practices and beliefs in conflict resolution and peace-building, and innovating programme strategies and approaches that are sensitive and appropriate to the local culture
5. Gender-responsive, recognizing gender-based inequities and providing for affirmative actions to address them such that community women, traditionally marginalized have broader access to productive resources and participation in governance affairs.

**Recommendations**

Section 7

# 

# Section 7 Recommendations

# 7.1 General Recommendations to Support the Government’s Peace Goal and Objectives

1. Contribute good practices and lessons learned to enhance the implementation of the strategies under the complementary track of the Government’s Peace Goal and Objectives for 2011-2016**[[89]](#footnote-89)**, in particular the implementation of PAMANA.[[90]](#footnote-90) Pillar 2 of PAMANA refers to microlevel interventions focused on households and communities which include delivery of basic services at the community level through conditional cash transfer approaches, community driven reconstruction and development and community livelihood. In particular, these are:
2. Strengthening social cohesion in aid of transformation[[91]](#footnote-91) and peacebuilding, which is a very vital aspect of peace work, needs to be deliberately pursued and nurtured in conflict–affected communities and former combatants, and cannot be left to chance. Services to strengthen social cohesion might be better delivered by other providers, such as non-government organizations, the academe and peace networks, rather than by government personnel. While local governments are set up to deliver mandated social, economic, environmental and development administration services, it cannot be expected of them to automatically introduce peacebuilding and conflict transformation services without themselves going through a process of change.
3. The delivery of social services is among the ways of promoting human security in conflict-affected/vulnerable communities and achieving Millennium Development Goals across communities. In conflict-affect/vulnerable communities, the services have to be delivered in a manner that highlights that the support is a manifestation of respect for human rights, and government’s concern and inclusivity, to be able to optimize effects on peacebuilding.
4. Contribute lessons learned in community economic development (CED) to Pillar 3 of PAMANA, which refers to mesolevel interventions that address local development challenges, including constraints to local economic development, economic integration of poor areas with more prosperous areas and physical and economic connectivity improvements.
5. The peace-based CED framework of the ACT for Peace Programme is appropriate to the context of conflict-affected/vulnerable and post-conflict communities. However, there are operational approaches that could be enhanced to be more effective in dealing with the demands of economic and enterprise development.
6. CED initiatives should be based on economic advantage. This would involve, among others identifying the various crops (or industry) and comparative advantage, and defining the role of the community and other economic stakeholders in value adding using the value chain.
7. Local government units have roles in promoting community economic development. However LGUs need not be the economic actors themselves but only play facilitating and enabling roles. Government support to CED can also be linked to citizenship. As government provides facilities and marshals other resources to improve productivity and income, organizations and household-beneficiaries must reciprocate through the payment of fees and taxes.
8. LGUs can mobilize the support of agencies that have economic mandates and services[[92]](#footnote-92) and facilitate their delivery of assistance to the communities, as well as tap the private sector. An agency such as DILG will have to play the role of convenor of the agencies[[93]](#footnote-93).
9. Unpredictable funding[[94]](#footnote-94) can compromise local initiatives in human security/MDGs and community economic development. Block funds providing grant support innovative initiatives in these areas can motivate LGUs and augment local resources. These can also be packaged as performance incentives to be consistent with the move towards performance-based grants.
10. Continue to improve the institutional capacities of LGUs on disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM), achievement of Millennium Development Goals, entrepreneurial/ corporate governance, and conflict-sensitive and peace-promotive (CSPP) processes.
11. Target local planning, programming and policy formulation processes; in particular ensure that these are informed by use of Culture of Peace, conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and peace-promoting tools, and peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA).
12. Activate mechanisms for peace and development at different levels (provincial, municipal/city and barangay) these could mean creating sub-units and attaching these to mandated mechanisms (e.g., local special bodies). These can facilitate the participation of peace and development advocates, be the point of first contact, or the coordinating body of peace and development initiatives.
13. Continue to Practice Convergence in Support of Aid Effectiveness. Donor convergence is optimized when local government units and higher-level government institutions take their lead role in managing peace and development programs in the coverage areas. Donor program harmonization, complementation and effectiveness are assured when properly coordinated by mandated agencies and authorities (e.g. MinDA). Moreover, convergence with other programmes and institutions promote effective and judicious delivery of services while maximizing impacts on the beneficiaries.

# Recommendations for Mindanao Conflict-Affected Communities

1. These recommendations build on the general recommendations above and recognize that the support for conflict-affected/vulnerable communities in Mindanao will have to be differentiated. The following premises apply:
   1. There are different “types” of conflict-affected/vulnerable communities based on their exposure to violence, the level of assistance provided to them, and their capacities
   2. Based on the analysis of relationship to and predictors of peacebuilding, human rights promotion and conflict management, social cohesion, human security/MDGs, good governance and community economic development continue to be effective areas of assistance. These are also consistent with government’s PAMANA framework. However, enhancements will have to be done in conceptualizing and delivering specific support.
   3. LGUs are the frontline response unit of government. However, LGU support will have to be augmented to address capacity issues.

Table 19 Summary of Proposed Assistance to Conflict-Affected Communities

| **Strand** | **Type of Community** | **Indicative Areas** | **Indicative Assistance** | **Main Service Provider** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Strand 1 | PDCs | ARMM, SCM, WM | * Governance * MDG/Human Security * Enterprise Development (comparative advantage) * Infrastructure Development * Continuing Strengthening of LGU Capacities in DRRM and CSPP | * LGUs * Assistance from government agencies for Enterprise Development and Infrastructure Development * Other services providers for LGU Capacity Development * Performance-based grant funds (advanced) |
| Strand 2 | Early Recovery Communities | ARMM, SCM | * Social Cohesion * MDG/Human Security * Community Economic Development (livelihood) * Governance (emphasis on order, stability, government visibility and people’s participation) * Strengthening LGU Capacities in DRRM and CSPP | * LGUs for MDG/Human Security * Other services providers for Social Cohesion & LGU Capacity Development * Performance-based grant funds (foundational) |
| Strand 3 | Other Conflict-Affected Areas | Caraga, WM, SCM, ARMM island provinces | * Emergency Assistance * Social Cohesion * MDG/Human Security * Governance (emphasis on order, stability, government visibility and people’s participation) * Strengthening LGU Capacities in DRRM and CSPP | * LGUs for MDG/Human Security * Other services providers for Social Cohesion & LGU Capacity Development * Performance-based grant funds (foundational) |

1. Potentially there could be three strands of assistance for future initiatives in peacebuilding and conflict transformation in Mindanao. (see Table 19)
   1. Strand 1. LGUs will be mainly responsible for the PDCs that received assistance from ACT for Peace. LGUs will ensure that governance is strengthened, MDGs/human security attained, and enterprise development pursued. LGUs will be assisted through continuing strengthening of LGU capacities in DRRM and CSPP and access to grant funds that serve as performance incentives.
   2. Strand 2. LGUs will similarly be mainly responsible for early recovery communities. The assistance to be provided by LGUs will be similar to the ones for strand 1 except that social cohesion strengthening will have to be pursued and governance will emphasize order, stability, government visibility and people’s participation. LGUs will be assisted through continuing strengthening of LGU capacities in DRRM and CSPP and access to grant funds that serve as performance incentives. The performance incentive will have to be more foundational in comparison to strand 1 which should be more “advanced”. Social cohesion services will have to be sourced from other providers, such as PDALs , other CSOs and peace movements.
   3. Strand 3. LGUs will also be mainly responsible for other conflict-affected/vulnerable communities that are not PDCs or early recovery. The assistance to be provided by LGUs will be similar to the ones for strand 2 except that emergency assistance will have to be included.
2. The delivery of support will have to be orchestrated by a lead mechanism that has relevant mandate and adequate convening and coordinative capacity. This mechanism can provide venues for inter-agency coordination and also enable the participation of organizations representing the target communities (e.g., BDA and civil society organizations). The set-up of the mechanism will need to take into account the roles of the Autonomous Regional Government for areas within the ARMM.

**Programme Design**

Annex A

# Annex A Programme Design

At the closure of UNMDP 3, stakeholders’ assessment point to issues that needed to be confronted and analyzed to guide the conceptualization of its successor Programme. Among these key issues are the pervasive existence of various forms of conflict and a prevailing poor human security conditions in the Programme’s areas of operation. It was noted that despite efforts of government, NGOs and donor-assisted programs, a situation of unpeace continued to be experienced that hindered the fulfillment of development objectives in these areas. A major consideration then was the need for a unified and comprehensive Peacebuilding response that could help reduce the incidences of violent conflicts and enable the affected communities to become resilient by harnessing their strengths to advance their own aspirations for peace and human security. The active and direct participation of the communities and their LGUs and support institutions was deemed imperative to building capacities and developing ownership of the transformation process.

The ACT for Peace Programme was therefore conceived to be a peacebuilding and conflict transformation program building on and sustaining the gains of the three phases of the GoP-UN Multi-Donor Programmes. Beyond physical and social reconstruction, it sought to respond to the complex situation of conflict in Mindanao ((i.e. ongoing, potential and post-conflict situations) in harmony with and support to government’s national peace framework as articulated in EO #3 and Chapter 14 of the 2004-2010 Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan..

The main objective/purpose of the programme is “to strengthen peacebuilding efforts and sustain the gains for peace and development in Southern Philippines”

The accomplishment of its purpose would be the result of the achievement of three major outcomes:

* Outcome 1: Transformation of PDCs, and other conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas is sustained; and community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace and human security are harnessed;
* Outcome 2: Peacebuilding and conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) capacities of actors and institutions are strengthened and institutionalized; and,
* Outcome 3: Critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development are strengthened.

To achieve the purpose and the planned outcomes, the Programme had five implementation components: Outcome 1 was supported by Components 1 to 3 – strengthening social capital for peacebuilding; promoting human security through improved access to basic services; and promoting human security through community economic development. Component 4 – building stakeholders’ capacity for conflict transformation – was intended to realize Outcome 2; while Outcome 3 would be achieved through Component 5– promoting and advocating a Culture of Peace - that cut across other components.

For each component, the Programme is designed to be able to deliver assistance that were identified and prioritized by stakeholders making it community-driven and local context specific. This is clearly illustrated in its Peace and Development Community (PDC) development framework.



**Scale and Geographic Coverage**

The Programme covered selected areas in Southern Philippines consisting of 15 provinces in mainland Mindanao, the island provinces of Sulu, Basilan and Tawitawi, and the province of Palawan or a total of 19 provinces. It was present in 278 communities known as PDCs and 54 other conflict-affected communities assisted in early recovery and rehabilitation. These communities are distributed in 60 municipalities and the seven (7) administrative regions (Regions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, ARMM and IV-B).

**Programme Principles and Approaches**

Peacebuilding involved the establishment and strengthening of horizontal and vertical relationships in order to strengthen social capital. Consistent with this, Programme implementation was guided by a set of principles.

To build and strengthen horizontal relationships, rights-based approaches to local governance and development management were emphasized. Participatory and demand-driven principles were consciously adhered to in any undertaking, requiring processes that encouraged active and informed participation of stakeholders. Sensitivity to culture, gender and environment also guided the processes for any intervention with enough space for flexibility, taking into consideration current conditions and actual capacities and concerns of stakeholders. To optimize impact, convergence was always encouraged, inviting stakeholders to collaborate in the planning, implementation monitoring and evaluation of developmental interventions and in the management of risks.

In establishing and strengthening vertical relationships, purposeful efforts to bring into the ‘mainstream’ development efforts and changes that might have been undertaken ‘outside of the mainstream or at the periphery’. The Programme also pursued institutionalization by integrating the changes in policy, procedures, processes, roles and behavior of individuals and groups to enhance accountability and to optimize application. Collaboration and complementation among other peacebuilding and development-oriented programs was also deliberately done to avoid duplications and to ensure sustainability, which was seen could by the result of the accumulation of the effects of ‘horizontal and vertical’ relationships and changes brought about by peacebuilding. It also took into account the impact of interventions at the community level as community-based approaches were seen to facilitate changes in the behavior of individuals, households and groups that were essential toward developing and promoting a culture that is oriented for peace.

**A Programme Approach that is Peace-Sensitive and Promotive of Human Security**

* Implementation of the Programme required to spring from shared perspectives among actors and institutions and a common appreciation of peace and development work, its processes and requirements, and what can be reasonably achieved given concrete challenges and existing capacities of stakeholders.
* The incorporation of human security in the ACT for Peace Programme Framework was an advantage. Human security as a framework element is useful for linking violent conflict (or the prevention of it or the responses to it) and human development. It is acknowledged that most of all the elements necessary for peace building already exist in the Philippines but problems hobble successful implementation. A human security policy framework will signal a move beyond the national security approach and will facilitate an integrated and holistic approach to implementing peace work in the country, particularly to peacebuilding in Southern Philippines.

**The PDC Concept**

The Peace and Development Community or PDC was central to the community-based approach of the Programme. The PDC was the basic social unit upon which the whole peace and development framework of the ACT for Peace Programme was founded. Conceptualized as an area where opportunities for development, access to basic services, participation in governance and capability-building for managing and resolving conflicts may take place, the PDC has provided a distinct peacebuilding dimension to the GoP-UN MDP. The PDC model traces its roots to UNMDP 2 and has immensely evolved to become a highly effective mechanism that articulates progress made towards transforming peace and conflict dynamics in violence-vulnerable areas in Mindanao.

A PDC could consist of a barangay, or a barangay and adjacent households marked by a convergence of peace-building and development activities for greater impact. It is a marginalized conflict-affected community which becomes actively engaged in a process of development and transformation with the help of development partners. Social and economic transformation took place in the PDC through strengthening the capacity of its community organizations; rebuilding livelihoods through sustainable agriculture and micro-enterprises; rebuilding community infrastructure, and forging linkages with local service providers, including local government units and NGOs, to secure improved access to basic services.

A PDC is also a key production area, which serves as a “resource center” managed by an active cooperative or community association to ensure the equitable spread and distribution of resources among community members, as they build up over time from self-sustaining efforts and external assistance. Such resources may include: community organizations, trained development leaders, trained para-technicians, education facilities, health centers, household savings pools, enterprise centers, a pool of farm production equipment and farm animals, a cooperative production supply and marketing trading center.

PDCs evolve and generally go through six stages of development and transformation. Designed to be a ladder and a progression, each stage builds on the achievements of the previous one. The PDC Stages of Development and Transformation was formulated by the Programme as a social instrument to measure the progress or lack of progress of a PDC. From Stage 1 - the lowest level, a PDC is expected to mature and fully develop over time to reach Stage 6, the highest level.

During the UN-MDP3 phase, the six (6) stages were named as follows: Stage 1: Confidence Building; Stage 2: Peace and Development Organizing; Stage 3: Peace and Development Planning; Stage 4: PDC Plan Implementation; Stage 5: PDC Strengthening; and Stage 6: PDC Empowerment.

In the latest enhancement of the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) of the ACT for Peace Programme, the nomenclature of stages has been changed to reflect the characteristic of the PDC in every stage and to emphasize the peace changes happening in the PDCs. This “peace changes in the PDCs” is the basic difference of the PDC Framework between the UN-MDP3 and the ACT for Peace Programme, where the previous was more on developmental indicators.

PDC development from one stage to another is cyclical rather than linear, reflecting also the process of change from adapting to normative, and the dynamics of peace and conflict in the PDC. For instance, a higher stage PDC can easily regress dramatically if another cycle of violence will disturb its relative peace. But some degree of resiliency to conflict is also developed as the PDC climbs to higher development. Through capacity-building on the Culture of Peace and employment of conflict-sensitive project planning and management, the PDCs were able to contain and resolve incidences of local conflicts and adopt an inclusive approach in the sharing of benefits from programme services among the community members and stakeholders.

**Key Results Areas**

**The Six-Stage PDC Development and Transformation Process**

**Early Stage**

**Emerging**

**Stage**

**Developing**

**Stage**

**Implementing**

**Stage**

**Adapting**

**Stage**

**Expanding**

**Stage**

**‘Aware’**

**‘Organized’**

**‘Capacitated’**

**‘Functioning’**

**‘Resilient’**

**‘Modeling’**

PDC is conscious of its conflict and human security issues and concerns, and is developing a perspective for peace

PDC is able to organize and practice participatory processes to collectively address its peace and human security needs and concerns.

PDC has built its capacities to plan and act upon its peace and human security requirements.

PDC is able to optimize internal and external resources, and is implementing its priority peace and human security projects and activities.

PDC is able to assert its rights, and adopt systems and practices that promote peace while addressing human security needs.

PDC is recognized for its peacebuilding initiatives, shares its practices with other communities, is involved in wider peacebuilding efforts.

The Programme adopted six (6) KRAs to measure the “peace changes” in the PDCs. The KRAs provided the lenses into which the development in the PDCs might be viewed from different perspectives which approximate the situation of peace required for community life. The six KRAs were guided by the PCIA and also drawn from the experiences of the PDC assessment activity in 2006.

**1. Conflict Management Capacities:** Concern with capacities of the communities to transform and prevent conflicts from getting violent through conflict analysis, mediation and resolution using traditional, religious, legal and other appropriate systems.

**2. Social Cohesion:** Concerns with integration of people of diverse cultures, religions and gender into one community, sharing equitably the benefits of resources, social and health services and responsibilities, and undertaking collective decision and actions towards a common goal.

**3. Human Rights Protection:** Concerns with human rights awareness and protection, assertion of rights, peace constituency building, and the reduction of cases of deaths, injuries and property damages due to violent conflicts.

**4. Good Governance:** Concerns with local leaders having core competencies and values on peacebuilding, community participation in decision-making processes, local resources mobilization, and project implementation and monitoring.

**5. Economic Development:** Concerns with the capacities of community people utilizing their local resources and establishing market-connected industry-level production that generate local employment and positive economic growth.

**6. Social Services:**  Concerns with the community access to basic services namely primary health care and potable water system, and their capacity to manage and sustain these services through their collective efforts to contribute and initiate concrete measures to maintain the facilities and services.

**Programme Implementation**

At the onset of the ACT for Peace Programme, key consideration was how to sustain the gains already achieved from the previous three programs so that the conflict-affected communities would not revert to conditions as was before any interventions were introduced. In this way, the Programme intended to contribute concretely to the ongoing peace process and would be able to deter escalation of conflict in its coverage areas. It was noted that delay of more than a year in the implementation of the successor phase to UNMDP 3 caused unintended deterioration in the socio-economic conditions of some PDCs. The requisite start-up activities of the ACT for Peace Programme further delayed the effort to resume the development process already started in 163 PDCs. The Programme had to undergo catch-up processes including the conduct of rapid assessment of the PDCs and enlistment of NGOs and LGUs in the identification of 100 communities targeted to be assisted as new PDCs.

The PDC had been the nexus of the UNMDP 3 and ACT for Peace Programme’s implementation. It serves as its primary link and platform for local peacebuilding and in strengthening the enabling environment for the promotion of culture of peace and durable recovery and development of conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas.

The Programme adopted a multi-component implementation strategy. Components 1, 2, and 3 directly addressed the needs of PDCs towards their development and transformation (Outcome 1), Component 4 provides the interventions aimed at improving the capacities of key actors and institutions in Peacebuilding and conflict transformation (Outcome 2), while Component 5 crosscuts the other components through the integration of Culture of Peace in pursuit of the objective to strengthen critical partnerships for sustained collaboration, cooperation and convergence for peace (Outcome 3). Each component consisted of a package of assistance directed at achieving a specific Programme outcome with each reinforcing each other to attain a comprehensive development change in the community.

Partnerships were built with government agencies, non-government and civil society organizations, and other donor programs to solicit policy and institutional support for the sustained development of PDCs and other similarly-situated areas. The participation of these actors and institutions concretized programme principle of inclusiveness and convergence. The programme also sought to promote the adoption of peace promoting approaches, processes and tools in these institutions to build and expand the peace constituency from the grassroots up to the top level leadership. Among the peace-promoting tools and processes introduced were Gender Analysis, Conflict Analysis, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), and Participatory Rural Appraisal-Barangay Development Planning (PRA-BDP).



**Programme Two-Pronged Strategy**

The Programme followed a two-pronged strategy[[95]](#footnote-95) (as illustrated below) to rationalize strategies and actions in integrating horizontal and vertical linkages, mechanisms and institutions for peacebuilding.

**Top**

**Level**

**Middle**

**Level**

**Grassroots Level**

**The ACT for Peace Programme’s Two-Pronged Strategy**

Enhancing the Environment

for COP Promotion

and Support

Enhancing the Local

Capacities for Peace

Partnership Building for

Promotion of the COP

* Policy Direction
* Laws/Decision Making
* Negotiations
* Resource Allocation
* Policy Advocacy
* Capacity Building
* Humanitarian Action
* Facilitation
* Community Organizing
* Capacity Building
* Healing and Reconciliation
* Psycho-Social Work

**Key Areas of Interventions**

**Key Areas of Partnerships**

Key Actors

Involved

Key Actors

Involved

Key Actors

Involved

* OP/OPAPP/NEDA
* DBM/CHED/DepEd
* MinDA/ARMM
* Media/Religious

Groups

* Donors
* CSOs
* RLAs/GOs
* PLGUs
* NGOs/MNLF
* MLGUs
* BLGUs
* LSFs
* PDAs
* POs

**Enhancing**

**Enabling**

**Environment**

**PDC**

**Strengthening**

The strategy addressed the concern for PDC strengthening, which focused on both developmental and capacity building interventions, and for enhancing the enabling environment that focused on building the capacities of key actors and institutions at both the middle and top levels.

Assistance to PDCs were directed at building confidence among different groups and at providing venues for residents to interact, overcome differences and promote understanding and tolerance. Development projects served as vehicles to build trust at the same time address development needs. To boost communal trust and confidence, dialogues, peace assemblies and similar activities were conducted. Conscientizing the people at this stage is meant to trigger community awareness and resolve to unite and harness their own potential for development.

Community organizing, a key factor in social preparation, was heightened under the fourth phase with the formation of more People’s Organizations or activating POs if already existing. Local social formations were supported while barangay leaders were capacitated on culture of peace. The community organizers, usually the Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs), led in the activities, making sure that the people were motivated to sustain their involvement in the transformation process.

Participatory Rural Appraisal for Barangay Development Plan (PRA-BDP) was mainly used in community peace and development planning, meant to concretize the people’s desire for change. The exercise covered the identification, prioritization, action-planning and implementation of projects and activities that were meant to spur the PDC development and transformation. The BDP was considered as the Programme’s primary tool for deciding on the right mix of resources and interventions needed to propel the growth of PDCs from one stage to another.

The evaluation has established that this strategy supported by regular community dialogues enabled the programme to navigate effectively in the task of mobilizing and allocating assistance to avoid exacerbating conflicts stemming from competition over limited resources. It should be noted however that feedback from some respondents during the FGDs point to patronage politics still being practiced, in some areas, by community leaders and LGUs that somehow hindered the achievement of desired development results.

As the transformation of the PDCs was taking place, focused interventions were also made to enhance the enabling environment to make it conducive for peacebuilding. Capacity development activities were initiated to enhance knowledge and skills in transforming conflict and building peace of relevant governance institutions such as the municipal and provincial governments, government agencies as well as local peace and development stakeholders (i.e., MNLF, CSOs). Key areas of capacity-building interventions included policy formulation and advocacy, drafting peace-promoting legislation, decision-making, and effective resource mobilization and allocation. The academe, religious groups and other ‘culture bearers’ were also drawn into programme implementation for the widespread promotion of Culture of Peace and in developing critical partnerships for peace.

**Levels of Implementation**

Programme strategies rationalized the key assistance and intervention based on the five contexts or levels of the status of partners and communities. Each level represented a point of focus on which the Programme’s efforts and resources were invested. Each level was built on one another and informed the kind of assistance on which the target participants could progress. The provision of assistance, however, was not rigidly based on the progression of partner-organizations and communities.

The levels were categorized into the following:

**First Level – Awareness:** Refers to efforts to generate consciousness and appreciation among target Programme participants and stakeholders of key concepts and principles in peacebuilding. It also refers to the degree to which participants came to the appreciation of realities (issues, problems and challenges). It was a key level as it triggered interest among participants and stakeholders to be involved in the Programme. Activities during this stage included programme orientation, consultations with LGUs and NGO partners, community resource and capacity-assessment.

**Second Level – Agreement:** Refers to efforts and processes to secure initial commitment among participants and stakeholders. Depending on the nature of the Component, “agreements” involved group formation (i.e., forming an organization or association), collective priorities-setting (i.e., Barangay Development Plan; community economic development projects, etc.), and generating commitment on partners’ roles and responsibilities (LGU support to PDCs, etc.), among others. These agreements provided bases upon which the ACT for Peace have further grounded the assistance it was providing to the program participants. These ensured that Programme support were relevant as it was anchored on the expressed priorities of participants. In turn, this ensured participants’ acceptance, support and predisposition to sustain the Programme interventions.

**Third Level – Access:** Refers to the degree to which participants were afforded access to services, resources and support whether directly provided by the ACT for Peace or acquired through mediation and/or referral by the Programme. ACT for Peace support enabled participants and stakeholders to avail themselves of other forms of assistance from external sources consistent with the community-identified needs and priorities. The specific interventions generally include a) direct services, b) technical assistance, c) Culture of Peace promotion, d) enlisting policy support, and e) linkages and partnerships. At this stage, coordination and complementation with government agencies and LGUs, other donor-supported programs, civil society organizations as well as the private sector was the main strategy adopted.

**Fourth Level – Application:** Refers to the process by which participants applied newly found “capacities” owing to the support that they have accessed during the previous level. ACT for Peace support in this level ensured that new or enhanced capacities were integrated into the partners’ regular activities and practices, thus further reinforcing the learning through “learning by doing” approaches. Successful implementation though on a modest scale and sometimes, pilot or model basis, led to improved confidence on the part of the participants and stakeholders. The initial application also provided a “track record,” which many resource institutions require from groups that obtain assistance from them, and which the participants often lack.

**Fifth Level – Adaptation:** Refers to the process by which participants and stakeholders were able to determine the adjustments that they would make in their household, community, group or enterprise practices in order to sustain the capacities or benefits that they gained from their participation in the Programme. Adaptation also signaled the institutionalization of practices and measures at certain levels or the “mainstreaming” of such in established institutions (government agencies, LGUs, etc.). Among PDCs, this capacity is achieved by those who have reached Stage 5 and 6.

**Gender Mainstreaming**

As a peacebuilding intervention, the ACT for Peace Programme placed significant attention to gender concerns[[96]](#footnote-96) in its implementation. The Programme core strategies on gender mainstreaming were two-fold:

* Promote human security inclusive of women’s rights, in recognition and with special attention to women’s strategic and practical needs, by providing venues for political participation and equal access to basic services and economic opportunities through Components 1-3;
* Enhance the enabling environment for sustained peacebuilding, inclusive of gender and development (GAD) advocacy and gender capacities’ strengthening to address specific needs of women in conflict situations, and subsumed in the promotion of a culture of peace among duty and culture bearers through Components 4 and 5.

Key approaches adopted by the Programme in promoting gender equality through the above strategies are embedded in its major program thrusts. By integrating gender in its processes and interventions, the Programme aimed to ensure development initiatives addressed roles, needs and participation of both women and men and to large extent possible, encourage a balance in the participation of women and men recognizing likely cultural and religious constraints as well as the differential gender impact of conflict.

The Programme’s gains in contributing to gender equity are manifest in the remarkable changes in women’s participation and leadership in the PDCs. Skills training and other capacity development activities have strengthened women’s capacity to participate in Peacebuilding initiatives in a meaningful fashion. Specific capacities in entrepreneurship allowed women to successfully manage income-generating projects such as Botika ng Barangay and small-scale livelihood projects. These projects likewise enabled women to participate in improving community health, nutrition and sanitation particularly in the provision of affordable medicines through the BnBs, supplemental feeding and herb gardening projects that helped enhance the women’s reproductive roles and responsibilities.

Participation in these projects has instilled a high level of confidence and a sense of fulfillment among the women. Consequently, women in PDCs were driven to excel in their undertakings such that many of the more successful and sustaining community economic enterprises were those ran by them. Moreover, increased awareness of various stakeholders and sectors on women’s rights has allowed for women’s voices to be heard and their perspectives represented in different community governance mechanisms. Improved leadership and involvement of women were also observed in some of the NGOs and LGUs that the programme partnered with especially in the areas of humanitarian and recovery services. While not directly attributable to the Programme, women empowerment in these institutions has greatly enhanced the environment for sustained gender mainstreaming efforts.

Nevertheless, it was recognized by the programme stakeholders during an assessment of gender mainstreaming outcomes in November, 2010 that while programme efforts in promoting women’s rights have indeed created the much-needed space for women participation in community decision-making, gender relations still leave a lot to be improved. This was traced to the existence still of sexism in both men and women that encourage stereotyping in allocation of resources and delivery of government services. A more purposive partnership between and among donor programs and government agencies as well as LGUs that focus on improving gender relations without prejudice to addressing women’s strategic and practical needs was considered as a proactive response to the aforesaid situation.

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

As a result of the introduction of results-based management to the programme in 1997[[97]](#footnote-97), a review of the original LFA necessitated a change in the monitoring and evaluation system to adopt more measurable peace and development indicators. This paved the way for the formulation of the Programme’s performance management framework that emphasized the strategic role of M&E in attaining its expected outcomes. Among other considerations, the Framework called upon the Programme to ensure access to timely and accurate information as well as generate regular feedback from partners and stakeholders.

The Programme’s performance management system essentially covered personnel management, office/administrative management, financial management, information management, knowledge management and project management. The latter was the heart of the Programme operations around which the other functional elements of the performance management system revolved.

The Programme’s M&E System consisted of four aspects: a) Implementation monitoring; b) Outcomes monitoring; c) Context monitoring; and d) Programme evaluation. Implementation monitoring was focused on physical and financial performance tracking, delivery of inputs and activities, and production of outputs. Outcomes monitoring examined development benefits and peace outcomes or the extent of behavioral changes in relation to the four dimensions of change brought about by conflict. Context monitoring described changes in the Programme’s operating environment, particularly on the dynamics of peace and conflict that provide opportunities as well as risks that can affect performance. Programme evaluation made periodic assessment of what the Programme had achieved (or not achieved), its significance and contribution to impact in terms of sustaining the gains and changes that are happening.

The system provided a structure and mechanism for efficient data management, analysis and reporting on Programme performance and organizational learning. All operating areas and units, as well as implementing partners of the Programme were involved in monitoring and evaluation at various levels and capacities. Administrative and finance units reported on physical and financial performance of inputs and activities. The technical units reported on outputs. The PMO, OIA (MEDCo, now MinDA) and LIA (ARMM-ARG) shared responsibility in monitoring and reporting of benefits and peace outcomes to donor agencies. At the level of impact, MEDCo and UNDP tracked and reported on the Programme’s contribution to national peace goals and larger peace outcomes.

Tools were provided for each element of monitoring. Implementation monitoring tools included the Annual Work Plan, Project Terms of Reference, Project Progress Report, Participants’ Feedback Sheet among others. Outcomes monitoring tools covered PDC & LGU/CSO Baseline Studies and Annual PDC, LGU/PDAL and School of Peace Assessments. Context monitoring included Risk Analysis and Conflict Analysis while Programme Evaluation included formative and summative evaluations as well as Impact Assessment that would be conducted three or five years after the Programme had been completed.

The Programme’s M&E System was found to be a comprehensive, rigorous and elaborate performance measurement scheme. It is widely recognized as the first peace-based programme monitoring and evaluation system. As such, through the Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCo), now the Mindanao Development Authority, it became a major reference in the formulation of a common M&E Framework in the MWG to monitor and assess the impact of various donor-assisted programs and projects contributing to Mindanao peace and development.

As a pioneering development management system, the Programme’s M&E needed time and technical assistance to fully develop and be useful not only to the Programme’s direct implementers but also to partner organizations and institutions. Efforts to mainstream peace indicators into regular government M&E systems were started in 2009 and continued till programme end albeit wanting in sustainable outcomes. This evaluation found that capacities of partner local organizations on peace promoting and conflict-sensitive M&E vary from area to area and community to community and, in some areas, are assessed to be inadequate. In this sense, the evaluation shows that the Programme has not fully utilized the monitoring tools introduced to partner groups managing community-based projects and activities. Apparent information gaps and variances in completion of project outputs resulted to delays in the provision of assistance and services in some PDCs. A positive intended outcome, however, has been found in the manifest interest of LGUs and partner agencies to learn and find ways to integrate peace indicators in future M&E enhancement undertakings.

**Exit and Sustainability Strategy**

Programme strategies[[98]](#footnote-98) for sustainability of gains and for its eventual phase-out were embodied in its partnership building approaches and implementation priorities. These were reflected in its engagement with key partners, specifically the LGUs, MNLF (including the Peace and Development Advocates [PDAs]), and relevant Government Institutions. The Exit and Sustainability Strategy followed a 3-step process that corresponds to the 5-level Implementation Framework, to wit:

Table 20 Matrix of Exit Strategies and Processes

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Implementation Levels** | **Exit Phases** | **Description** |
| Level 1: Awareness  Level 2: Agreement  Level 3: Access | Phase-In | LGUs, PDALs, government agencies are drawn into and capacitated on peace-building and conflict transformation processes as programme partners |
| Level 4: Application  Level 5: Adaptation | Phase-down | The Programme gradually transfers the responsibility of managing the PDCs to LGUs and PDALs as project holders and implementers. PDC plans are mainstreamed into local development agenda of LGUs and government agencies. |
|  | Phase-out | The Programme exits and hands over completed projects to MinDA, ARMM-RG and LGUs (MLGUs, PLGUs or BLGUs) |

Throughout the different implementation levels, the Programme intensified efforts to mainstream peacebuilding principles, approaches and processes in LGUs and Government Agencies as well as in PDALs as key actors in sustaining initiatives in the PDCs. The CSOs were also tapped to assist in strengthening the capacities of the LGUs to facilitate the process of mainstreaming the Culture of Peace in governance. The LGUs were particularly involved as project implementers and monitors from the very start of project implementation at the community level to prepare the institution towards their eventual assumption as peace and development managers of the PDCs once the programme ends. One of the capacity areas that were focused on was on local financial management to help LGUs and community POs attain competence in resource and income generation as well as effective budgeting and resource mobilization.

A major sustainability strategy likewise of the Programme was improving the peacebuilding capacities of the MinDA and the ARMM Regional Government as coordinating, implementing and monitoring agencies. Through these two institutions and other government partner-agencies, enlisting policy support for peacebuilding principles, processes and approaches was pursued in collaboration with CSOs and partners from the academe, the religious and other sectors.

Another sustainability strategy of the Programme was the integration of the MNLF in local governance by supporting processes to facilitate their active participation as regular members of local special and mandated bodies (e.g., Development Councils, Peace and Order Councils, etc.) at the provincial and municipal levels. This was complemented with the sustained engagement of the MNLF State Revolutionary Committees in project implementation, monitoring and evaluation in the PDCs and in other MNLF communities.

The organizational capacities of Peace and Development Advocates Leagues/Alliances were also further strengthened, particularly in resource mobilization, as the PDAs were among the prime movers and sustainability mechanisms in the PDCs.

The active involvement and practical commitment of these key actors in peacebuilding were seen as major contribution to sustaining the transformation in the PDCs to reach a certain stage of development when the Programme closed. These players were expected to take on the lead to bring those PDCs at the lower rungs to higher stages and to continue enhancing the enabling environment for all PDCs, including those at the higher stages, for the transformation process to be sustained.

**Management Arrangement**

**Policy Level**

A Programme Coordinating Committee (PCC) provided overall policy guidance and strategic directions to the Programme. It was responsible for reviewing and assessing the Programme’s annual consolidated physical accomplishment and financial report, and provided recommendations, as necessary, towards enhancing Programme implementation. The PCC decided on the utilization of additional contributions to the Programme.[[99]](#footnote-99)

The PCC was composed of MinDA chair, ARMM Regional Governor (delegated to RPD), DILG & NEDA focal persons, UNRC, heads of participating UN agencies, representatives of donor partners and the MNLF chair.

The overall responsibility for the achievement of the Programme purpose and outcomes and the proper and judicious use of financial resources in accordance with the guidelines of the government and UNDP, as managing agency, rested on MinDA as overall implementing agency.

**Operations Level (Coordination and Implementation Arrangement)**

**Lead Implementing Agencies**

The OIA was supported by Lead Implementing Agencies (one each for ARMM areas and non-ARMM areas) which assumed direct accountability for Programme management and implementation in their respective areas.

MinDA and ARMM Regional Government each designated an organic officer as Regional Programme Director (RPD) to ensure efficient and effective Programme implementation in their respective areas. Through their respective RPDs, the MinDA and the ARMM Regional Government were responsible for the approval of the Programme’s work and financial plans; ensuring coordination and convergence among stakeholders involved in implementation, effective delivery of Programme, operationalization of PCC policy guidelines and strategic direction, complementation with other programs, and judicious use of government, donor and UN financial resources.

**Management Committees**

The RPDs for ARMM and non-ARMM areas were responsible to the ManCom which served as the management body for the Programme in the two (2) areas. The ManComs reviewed and approved the work and financial plan for the area, reviewed the physical accomplishments and financial reports and recommended measures for enhancement of Programme efficiency, flag Programme policy issues and concerns (elevated same to the PCC through the national programme director), set operations policy for Programme implementation, and monitored risks to the Programme.

**Programme Management Committee**

A Programme Management Office (PMO) provided support to the OIA’s integrative functions and shall serve as the delivery mechanism for services and facilities provided by the Programme. The PMO was responsible for providing support to the OIA by ensuring that the NPD had access to information on overall Programme status and operations and had concurred and/or approved fund requests/releases, contracts, transactions and agreements entered into by the Programme; arranged the coordination among components with and between the ARMM and non-ARMM areas; facilitated work planning of the AMOs for Programme-wide activities; consolidated the annual work and financial plans for the two areas; consolidated the accomplishment and financial reports of the two areas; identified and facilitated ManComs’ actions to address operational issues and concerns; and monitored risks to the Programme.

The PMO initially designated Area Technical Assistants (ATAs) as the Liaison Persons who attended to the needs of the province of Palawan (Region IV-B) and the area of Northeastern Mindanao. However, as Programme presence in these areas increased and the needs of the PDCs evolved, the Programme responded by creating the Programme Coordinating Office (PCO) for the Caraga Region with the seat located in Butuan City. Palawan continued to be supervised by the PMO through the designated ATA until 2010 when the Caraga ACO took over as its supervising unit.

The PMO served as Secretariat of the Non-ARMM ManCom assuming overall technical preparations for and documentation of the ManCom meetings and follow-up of agreements

**Area Management Committees**

Three (3) Area Management Offices (AMOs) and one (1) Area Coordinating Office was set-up to take the lead in the management and execution of approved WFPs for their respective areas as well as undertake coordination activities with other programs implemented in the area. In addition, they were responsible for the preparation and consolidation of periodic work and financial plans that were consistent with intended Programme outcomes; prepared Programme physical accomplishments and financial reports as well as recommended measures to enhance Programme efficiency; recommended strategies and measures to enhance Programme operations at the field level; and provided timely, accurate and relevant information in support of management and stakeholder requirements.

The AMOs also undertook project development and appraisal; implemented and monitored approved contracts that governed delivery of service and assistance; and recommended strategies to LIAs through the RPDs.

**Implementing, Supporting and Collaborating Agencies**

Implementing Partners coming from LGUs, government agencies, NGOs, civil society organizations and the private sector were responsible in providing specific services required by the Programme; delivering assistance to participating groups (beneficiaries); and reporting on the achievement of contracted output level results.

Support agencies, on the other hand, were agencies and institutions tapped by the Programme to handle research and development services to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Programme; documentation and communication support to capture and transmit learning and sound practices; and, hone the conceptual framework of peacebuilding, among others.

Collaborating agencies were not directly involved in implementation but participated through their linkage to the Programme and extended assistance by facilitating the delivery of needed development assistance for the PDCs that are not provided by the Programme; and complementing efforts of the Programme by implementing projects in PDCs based on the barangay development plan (BDP) and conducted in coordination with the LGUs and existing community programme-organized structures.

Annex B

**Mindanao Peace Outcomes**

| **National Peace Plan Goals[[100]](#footnote-100)** | **Mindanao Peace Outcomes** | **Change Hypotheses** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. End of hostilities between Government and rebel groups achieved. | Peaceful and inclusive negotiated settlement of armed conflicts between GPH and all rebel groups in Mindanao achieved andsuccessfully implemented. | If the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants and their representatives are resolved through political processes, the chances of bringing about security and peace will be increased.[[101]](#footnote-101) |
| 1. Enhanced human security in conflict-affected communities. | Human security in Mindanao conflict-affected and vulnerable communities enhanced. | Peace is achieved by addressing the underlying issues of injustice, oppression, exploitation, threats to identity and security and people/s sense of injury/victimization.[[102]](#footnote-102)  There is negative correlation between violent conflict and sustainable development. By demonstrating t people that there are opportunities to “gain” from the social and economic development of Mindanao they will feel more engaged in protecting and engaging in the development process. By developing activities that provide economic benefits to all communities, people will have incentives to resist efforts to incite violence against each other.[[103]](#footnote-103)  While human development is the process that widens the range of people’s choices, human security means that people can make those choices safely and freely. In other words, human security is the external precondition for human development. By pursuing human security, the ability and capacity to exercise development options will be promoted, even under conditions of conflict and vulnerability. |
| 1. Peace constituency broadened and citizens’ participation in the peace process strengthened. | Mindanao peace constituency broadened and citizens’ participation in the peace process strengthened. | Peace comes through transformative change of a critical mass of individuals, in their consciousness, attitudes, behaviors and skills. A transformed constituency will strongly oppose war, address the root causes of the conflict and promote and advocate a culture of peace to achieve meaningful and lasting peace. |
| 1. Enhanced policy environment conducive to peace and human security. | Policy environment for sustained peace, development and human security in Mindanao enhanced. | Policy and political initiatives that change structures and frameworks that cause inequality and injustice, including economic redistribution; and that development processes and systems that promote empowerment, justice, peace, recognition and reconciliation. [[104]](#footnote-104) |
| 1. Strengthened structures and institutions for sustained peace, development and human security in Mindanao. | Structures and institutions for sustained peace, development and human security in Mindanao strengthened. | Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy. Equity, justice and fair allocation of resources.[[105]](#footnote-105)  Local governments and grassroots civil society organizations can serve as the cornerstone to resolve/manage conflict and for building peace. Building the capacity of local institutions and promoting traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve conflict through peaceful means will contribute to peace building in communities.[[106]](#footnote-106) If we can improve transparency in local administration, improve service delivery and establish non-discriminatory policies and practices, this will contribute to a more inclusive Mindanao. People will feel government is representing all community members. |
| 1. Strengthened social cohesion and harmonious relationships within and among communities and sectors. | Social cohesion and harmonious relationships strengthened within and among communities and sectors. | Peace merges out of a process of breaking down isolation, polarization, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups. Strong relationships are a necessary ingredient for peace building and must be nurtured and sustained.  Discrimination or bias against Moro or Lumad communities can fuel conflict in communities, or may be manipulated for political gains. Discrimination linked to horizontal inequalities may be a cause of conflict: social, political, economic inequalities in divided societies. Processes and mechanisms for broad participation in governance and equal access to resources and opportunities are critical to help eliminate discrimination and bias.  If cultural and societal norms, values and behaviors are transformed to reject violence, support dialogue and negotiation and address the causes of conflict, we can develop long-term conditions for peace. Conflict transformation processes are critical for durable peace and sustainable development.  If we provide opportunities for people to work together on practical issues across religious and ethnic lines, it will break down mistrust and negative stereotypes, as well as develop habits of cooperation. |

1. Formerly known as the MEDCo (Mindanao Economic Development Council) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The criteria included relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, linkages, coverage and consistency with conflict prevention and peacebuilding value [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Programme operations concluded in December 2010, although a five-month extension (January to May 2011) was granted by NEDA to allow conduct of terminal activities including conduct of audit and administrative processes and completion of evaluation etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. OECD-DAC criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peace-building activities include: relevance/appropriateness; effectiveness; efficiency; impact; sustainability; linkages/connectedness; coverage; coherence; consistency with conflict prevention and peacebuilding values. See *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities* (OECD 2008), pp 39-46. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Or the theory of change [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Whereas the focus of project evaluation is on inputs and throughputs, outcome evaluation looks at the intended results and analyzes the why and the how. The scope of project evaluation is very specific to inputs, throughputs, and outputs, while outcome evaluation is broader and assesses the extent to which these contributed to the achievement of the Programme’s outcome. And finally, the purpose of project evaluation is to primarily know how to improve implementation (for future endeavors), outcome evaluation improves on the development effectiveness, assists on decision-making and policy-making, and systematizes innovative approaches to social human development. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Evaluation Highlight: Addressing the Question of Attribution in Evaluation, March 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. An issue identified in outcomes theory is called the Attribution/Collaboration Trade-off principle which points to the existence of a trade-off between these two different demands. As pressure mainly from donors for establishing 'what works' is being applied, there is also pressure, sometimes from the same funders, for providers to increase collaboration with other programs seeking similar outcomes. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Mayne, 1999: 16 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evalsed/sourcebooks/method_techniques/counterfactual_impact_evaluation/introduction_to_impact_evaluation/index_en.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Enhanced Logical Framework of Analysis [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Conducted by Orient Management Consultants [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The survey used a 43-item 5-point Likert Scale on the awareness, acceptance, attitude and actual behaviors among randomly selected individuals and among identified partners/beneficiaries of Programme interventions. The scale asked for a graded response for each statement. Response was expressed in the continuum of 5 categories from favorable to unfavorable: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecided (U), disagree (D) and strongly disagree (SD) with code score of 5,4,3,2,1 respectively. Negatively worded statements were reversely scored. The tool was pre-tested in two different sites to establish internal consistency and reliability and determine that items indeed measure the general perception of target groups on the program and its component. Respondents in the perception survey were randomly selected from (a) pool of participants attending the FGD, (b) POs and LGU members directly implementing or benefiting the project or individuals who are involved in several activities and projects of the program like livelihood, health and water services, trainings and the like, and (c) indirect and non-project beneficiaries. There were five to 10 respondents per PDC regardless of PDC’s stage of growth. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. There were two methods of data analysis employed in this evaluation. Qualitative data were analyzed through analytic-comparison method of meta-analysis. This approach employed the following steps: (1) extracting of findings, (2) taxonomic analysis, and (3) abstraction. Quantitative data were analyzed through descriptive statistics for variance analysis of programme achievements and level of community satisfaction of the programme outcomes. Pearson r and Multiple Linear Regression analyses were also computed to describe the relationship of the variables. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The PMO provided the following Programme documents for review: ACT for Peace Project Design Document, 2006 – 2010 End of Year Progress Report, PDC Baseline Study 2006, PDC Assessment Report 2010, Annual Work Plans, 2006 – 2010, Mid-term Review Report, May 2008, Annual Accomplishment Reports, 2005 – 2010, Logical Framework of Analysis – Enhanced, 2007, Framework for Conflict Sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation, Assessment of LGUs and PDALs Capacities and Needs in Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation, Assessment Report, 2010, Capacity Assessment Report of Academic Institutions in Cotabato City and the ARMM to Integrate COP and Peace Education in their curriculum, 2006 – 2007, List of CED Projects as at Dec. 2009, PDC Development and Transformation Framework, Programme Integrative Framework, Results and Peace Significance Analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. A fourth of the total Philippine population, Mindanao is home to the majority of the indigenous peoples (IPs) and Muslims living in the country today. There are 17 IPs groups found in Mindanao, comprising 5 percent of its population while the Muslims comprise around 20 percent of its total population. Philippine Development Forum, Mindanao Peace and Development Imperatives: A Call to Action, March 26-27, 2008, p.1 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2004) cited the conflict in Mindanao is the second longest running conflict in the world, surpassed only by the conflict in North and South Sudan which dates back to the 10th century. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The areas of the former SZOPAD cover: Region IV-B: Palawan, Puerto Princesa City; Region IX: Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, Dapitan City, Dipolog City, Pagadian City, Zamboanga City, Isabela City; Region X: Lanao del Norte, Iligan City; Region XI: Davao del Sur, Digos City; Region XII: South Cotabato, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato, Gen. Santos City, Koronadal City, Tacurong City, Kidapawan City, Cotabato City; ARMM: Maguindanao, Shariff Kabunsuan (newly created province as of December 2006), Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Marawi City. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. UNDP background paper for the Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Programme, June 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The Caraga Region includes the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, and the cities of Butuan, Bislig and Surigao. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. ACT for Peace Programme Annual Accomplishment Report, 2008. p.15 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Per review of project documents, only this group was cited. ACT for Peace Programme Document, May 2005, p.1 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. ACT for Peace Terminal Accomplishment Report, December 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Programme Annual Accomplishment Report, Annex B, December 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. PDC Assessment Reports, November 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. ACT for Peace Programme Document, Annex C: PDC Profile, May 2005 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. ACT for Peace Terminal Report, December 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. From the contextual analysis of the FGD and KII [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. While the presence of people’s organizations (POs) may facilitate social cohesion and can serve as the easily measurable indicator, it is not the only indicator. Per Programme’s experience, presence of many POs does not necessarily mean higher conflict transformation capacities. Other relevant indicators for social cohesion include communication processes, inter-marriages, shared cultural celebrations and social activities, and cultural respect and acceptance. (PDC Assessment 2010) [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Based on the December 2010 Terminal Report [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. With attention to the needs of the widowed and orphaned by the conflict between the MNLF and the government [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. These projects ranged from micro, small and medium sized enterprises [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Programme Accomplishment Report, December 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. ACT for Peace Terminal Report, 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Such as issues of access to and control of resources; availability of and ability to exploit livelihood, employment and other economic opportunities; and access to and bargaining position in markets [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Such as stakeholder/beneficiary participation and sense of ownership/investment; formulation and implementation of effective and applicable policy guidelines and action steps; putting into place of appropriate and functional management/organizational structures and systems; mobilization and maximization of local/ internal resources; accessing of augmenting external resources; development and/or acquisition of technical know-how and skills/expertise; and, identifying and accessing markets and establishing a position therein [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Conceptually, this is manifested in the conscious and inextricable linking of CED interventions to the peace promotion and peace building process being advanced by the Programme. Operationally, this means that CED project development is mainly geared towards addressing the issue of exclusion that is one of the roots of conflict and “unpeace,” with a deliberate effort for developing projects that help build “bridges” among various sectors in the community and that as much as possible promote inter-ethnic and inter-cultural cooperation and understanding. Furthermore, in the actual field implementation of CED interventions in the PDCs, Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) play crucial roles as locally-based peace promoters and technical assistance providers/facilitators (CED Assessment, 2010) [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Such as infrastructure development, a stable peace and order environment, and supportive policies [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Mostly from Saranggani and Cotabato [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. From the Perception Survey [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. May either be public or private school [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. ACT for Peace Programme Terminal Report [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. UNDP defines gender mainstreaming as “Taking account of gender concerns in all policy, programme, administrative and financial activities, and in organizational procedures, thereby contributing to a profound organizational transformation” as quoted in the UNDP publication “Essentials” (July 2003) [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Programme Mid-Year Accomplishment Report, May 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Total staff complement began at 58 people in 2005 augmented by eight recruited for the StRIDe-Mindanao project in 2009. As of end 2010, 40 were left. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. The Programme was confronted with compulsory administrative and bureaucratic regulations and processes to ensure aid effectiveness that are applied without due regard for the realities and dynamics in the operating environment. Delays were experienced in the delivery of assistance to new SOPs and some CED projects. Timeline difficulties for project completion were also encountered due to financial reporting requirements specified by the Programme to meet international standards. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Other MTR findings and recommendations were generally addressed. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. While simply dividing Programme total expenditures by the total number of PDCs would yield a per capita estimate of PhP 2.185 million per community, this would provide an inaccurate picture since the Programme also invested in other communities and not just those that were formally declared PDCs [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Value adding refers to the results of Components 4 and 5 that facilitate support to PDC projects; computed at 20% of the total investment in components 4 & 5 divided by the total number of PDCs. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Benefits are a mix of services provided to the different actors and their subsequent consequences; these include not just social and economic services but also those that are more competence or capability oriented. In this context, they are used to better link the discussion of Outcomes achievement to the results directly achieved by the Programme (outputs) in a manner that benefits peace and conflict actors. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Outcome Evaluation 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Particularly cited by FGD respondents from Brgy. Damalusay, Datu Paglas [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Programme Accomplishment Reports, 2007 – 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Some respondents have indicated the lack of gainful employment or income generating activity before the Programme. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Coco sugar production in South Cotabato where a coalition of PDALs in South Central Mindanao partnered and accessed support from Philippine Coconut Authority, Department of Agriculture, Tupi MLGU), or those that have been used to partner and leverage funds from other donor institutions (partnership of PDC with World Food Programme, Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program, and Kadtundaya Foundation in Sultan Kudarat). Technical support from relevant government agencies and the LGUs through the formation and engagement of the agri-fishery Para-technicians was enlisted. The Para-technicians’ participation in CED project implementation recognized by the LGUs and other institutions like the Regional Agri-Fishery Councils (RAFCs) and other institutions increases the prospects for sustainability. (Terminal Report 2011)**.** Enhanced capacities as a result of Programme training courses empowered members of the South and Central Mindanao (SCM) Coalition of PDALs to coordinate with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to access technical and financial support; the ARMM PDCs sought and gained support from the Department of Agriculture Regional Agri-Fisheries Councils in Regions IX, XI, XII, XIII and the ARMM to sustain initial gains made in community enterprise development projects undertaken through the Programme. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. PDC Assessment, 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Mark Baird, Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, World Development Report 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Of 14 PLGU assessed, four were in stage 3 and nine in stage 2; 83 of the MLGUs were investing in peacebuilding initiatives [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Three of the PDALs and alliances were in stage 1, 13 in stage 2 and five in stage 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Programme Terminal Report, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Extension Phase Accomplishment Report, 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Terminal Report, 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Programme Documents, ACT for Peace Programme, Significance Change, 2005 [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Terminal Report, 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Validation Workshop, 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. 2005 Programme Accomplishment Report [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Gawad Galing Pook is a private awards-giving body that promotes innovation and excellence in local governance. It proactively does a search for and recognizes best local government practices and facilitates their adoption in more communities in the country. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. ACT for Peace Annual Accomplishment Report, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Terminal Report, 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Led by DepEd-Cotabato City Division [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Thru the initiative of OPAPP, DepEd-Region V and ACT for Peace Programme in support to EO No. 570. DepEd Cotabato City Division Order 57 saw the creation of seven more SOPs in the area. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. A partnership between PDC Tuyan SOP in Sarangani Province and the Liwanag ng Kapayapaan Foundation (owned by Mr. Robin Padilla) [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Annual Accomplishment Report, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Sector, program or project level analysis and attributing downstream results were among the evaluation challenges identified in Addressing the Question of Attribution in Evaluation, March 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Addressing Attribution through Contribution Analysis: Using Performance Measures Sensibly, The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation Vol.16 No. 1, 2001 Canadian Evaluation Society [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Annex B contains a matrix that shows how the Mindanao Peace Outcomes are drawn from and alignment with the National Peace Plan goals for 2004-2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. The five criteria of effectiveness were developed by The Reflecting on Peace Practices (RPP) to assess, across a broad range of contexts and programming approaches, where a program is (or is not) having meaningful impact at the level of the “peace writ large.” [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Defined as the expressed desire for the Programme and its services, programs and interventions at the community level [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Four dimensions of change as brought about by social conflicts–personal, relational, structural and cultural (Lederach et. al., 2007) [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. These are Relevance/Appropriateness, Effectiveness, Sustainability, Efficiency, Impact, Linkages, Coverage and Coherence [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. 6 - Very high; 5 – Good; 4 – Adequate; 3 - Less than adequate; 2 – Poor; 1 - Very poor [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Activities: Towards DAC Guidance, OECD Journal on Development, 2007, Volume 8, No. 3. OECD-DAC [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Chapter 9 of the Philippine Development Plan 2011-16 [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Among the strategies are focused development in conflict-affected areas through the PAMANA “Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan” Program which aims to: (a) reduce poverty and vulnerability in conflict-affected areas; (b) improve governance; and (c) empower communities and strengthen their capacity to address issues of conflict and peace through activities that promote social cohesion [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Can cover the change dimensions of personal, relational, structural and cultural transformation [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. These include DA, DAR, DTI, DOT, DPWH, DENR and CDA. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. DILG is championing the creation of Economic Transformation Teams (ETTs) under its LGSP-LED Program [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. IRA and local revenue levels for 2011 and onwards are expected to be affected by disaster-related fluctuations in economic activities and taxation [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. *Expanding Spaces for Change, Peace and Development Communities: A Decade of Building Peace in Mindanao,* Davao City: GoP-UN ACT for Peace Programme, 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. ACT for Peace GAD for Peace Framework [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Managing Performance in Peacebuilding: Framework for Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Programme Sustainability and Exit Strategy Document [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Programme Operations Manual [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Based on the 2004-2010 Peace Plan portion of the MTPDP [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs, [page 14 [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. From the 4th Draft of the Philippines Development forum-Mindanao working Group Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Peacebuilding Southern Philippines (Mindanao). [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Working with conflict, page 9 [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. 4th Draft, PDF-MWG M&E Framework for Peacebuilding Southern Philippines (Mindanao) [↑](#footnote-ref-106)