UNDP

Portfolio review for UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Final Report

February 2012

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Table of Contents

Table of Appendices

Acronyms

BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CADRI	Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative
CIS	The Commonwealth of Independent States
CO	Country Office (of UNDP)
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPR	Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CPR TTF	Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CPRU	Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
CRMA	Crisis and Risk Mapping and Analysis Approach
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DOCO	Development Operations Coordination Office
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRRU	Disaster Risk Reduction Unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ER	Early Recovery
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	The Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non-Government Organisation
IOM	International Office for Migration
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MYRF	Multi-year Results Framework
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NIDM	National Institute for Disaster Management
NY	New York
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAPP	Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP)

PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBCPU	Peace Building and Conflict Prevention Unit
PBCRU	Peace Building and Conflict Resolution Unit
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
RBM	Results-Based Management
SC	Security Council (of UN)
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SPF	Strategic Partnership Framework
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRAC	Target for Resource Assignment from the Core
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USD	US Dollars

Executive Summary

In line with the broad objectives laid out in UNDP's Strategic Plan 2008 – 2013, the purpose of this Portfolio Review for UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is to provide an overall picture of the effectiveness of BCPR-supported programming in terms of strengthening UNDP's efforts to reduce the negative impacts of crisis on national development, and more specifically to provide answers and recommendations to the following questions: (i) The relevance and effectiveness of the BCPR support for delivering impact in diverse crisis environments; (ii) How effective the strategic investment so far has been in achieving maximum long-term development results and impact; (iii) The extent to which BCPR-supported programmes have espoused UNDP's capacity building agenda, or addressed the corporate cross-cutting priorities such as gender equality and women's empowerment.

Since BCPR was established in 2001 the bureau has undergone several strategic and organisational change processes, and several reviews have been undertaken recently, notably the BCPR Strategic Review in 2010. This bears witness to the organisation's willingness to constantly analyse and learn from past experience and also to take account of changes in the external environment in countries affected by disasters and conflict. The current strategic transition process aims at positioning BCPR at the heart of UNDP's Agenda for Change and ensuring adequate responses to the world's current challenges in crisis prevention and recovery. It is expected to reach completion at the beginning of 2012 and the findings and recommendations of this portfolio review will feed into the final stage of this process.

The general picture emerging from this portfolio review is an illustration of the vast and diverse engagement of BCPR as an integral part of UNDP working through the Country Offices. The review team has spent time in the BCPR head office in New York, interviewed staff of the Geneva liaison office, visited nine UNDP Country Offices, meeting with many of the highly committed and excellent managers and staff members of the organisation as well as partners and other stakeholders in the countries. A substantial amount of relevant and effective work is being done to prevent, and contribute to recovery after, disaster and conflict. The portfolio review has also pointed to a number of areas

where the work would benefit from a stronger and more systematic approach, building on good practices already existing and utilising the great potential of BCPR even better.

1   Relevance and effectiveness of BCPR's support to UNDP Country Offices for achieving impact in crisis environments

Even though a number of tools and guidelines exist in BCPR meant to support programme staff in their work, it seems that they are seldom brought to the field. Changes in conflict context and emerging windows of opportunity have rarely led to programmatic changes and adaptation. Focus in disaster prone countries has until recently been more on reactive assistance than on long term disaster risk reduction (this is however being addressed through increasingly shifting the focus from disaster response to prevention and mitigation, together with preparedness). Apart from very general outcomes all emphasis in the programme documentation is on deliverables in terms of outputs and efficient project implementationBaseline studies are not systematically carried out and much staff and management seem to not emphasise the strategic emphasis on positive change.

When that is said the review has identified many good practices in programme design and management during the country visits, and there is clearly a wealth of expertise and experience to build upon, when tools and guidelines are to be revised, improved and brought to use.

The portfolio focus for BCPR has been on provision of seed money for many projects of one or two year's duration, but the seed funding from BCPR has rarely been used to fund a pilot project that following a proper evaluation was replicated in other areas. The impact of the multitude of small projects on peace or conflict has been limited and only recently BCPR and the COs seem to have moved in the direction of larger flexible programmes that, through a holistic approach, deal with root causes and current dynamics of conflicts, or, in the case of disasters, build the local capacity to deal with risk reduction and preparedness. Many country offices request larger and long term programmatic funding instead of short term project support.

2   The recommendations following from the above relate to (1.1) Substitution of small scale seed funding with long term funding of comprehensive programmes; (1.2) Develop new criteria for selection of priority countries; (1.3) Develop a special monitoring and evaluation system for crisis affected countries; (1.4) Evaluation of pilot projects and replication of the successful ones; (1.5) In collaboration with country offices establishment of procedures for solid contextual analyses;,(1.6) Provide guidance to COs and other actors and take leadership in securing relevant and timely application of the right methods and tools in programme planning and implementation and (1.7) Assistance to country offices in developing more pro-active partnerships with donors. **To what extent strategic investments have achieved maximum development impact**

The most urgent requirements of the COs are a strong involvement and delivery of expertise from BCPR into the strategic approaches to conflicts and other crises. Often BCPR technical assistance has been used for design of projects for presentations to donors but in far too few cases the BCPR assistance has been used to do proper conflict analyses or help the COs with particularly complex methodological challenges and long term guidance. The Strategic Partnership Frameworks designed and agreed between BCPR and several Country Offices are generally perceived positively because a SPF provides a 3-4 years horizon for which the CO has clear indications of the agreed activities, technical assistance and the amount of funding that can be expected. While the uncertainty of funding weakens the SPF-model a future framework should focus on the context analysis, strategic perspective and joint strategies for resource mobilisation. Till now the SPFs have been of varying quality, some only listing on-going and planned projects and others being based on comprehensive context analysis and a strategic perspective. Methodological guidance and stronger involvement of BCPR in monitoring and evaluation processes is a stated need in several COs.

The **recommendations** presented in this context relate to (2.1) Investing in in-depth analyses of conflicts and crises, funding of senior peace and policy experts at COs, and active advice and guidance, (2.2) Bolstering and strengthening regular field level monitoring and reviews of projects, (2.3) Establishment of some sort of strategic frameworks for all BCPR priority countries including comprehensive context analyses with clearly defined and coherent CPR strategies; (2.4) Mainstream CPR within CO support strategies and programmes, thus formally including BCPR in all stages of country programme formulation; and (2.5) Invest in development of an effective approach to partnerships with governments and CSO.

3 To what extent BCPR supported programmes have espoused UNDP's capacity building agenda or addressed corporate cross-cutting issues including gender equality

UNDP's capacity building agenda has been addressed in several CO projects and programmes dealing particularly with conflict prevention as well as risk reduction and disaster preparedness. There are however also a number of cases in which this aspect should be strengthened. While the capacity building agenda has been on the minds of UNDP and BCPR staff for their field operations it is surprisingly not receiving much attention and focus internally between BCPR, the COs and the regional bureaus

There is a very significant need for BCPR to strengthen its knowledge management. As a self-perceived centre of excellence in crisis prevention and recovery BCPR HQ could be much stronger in provision of clear models, methodologies and approaches to the entire system of UNDP country offices and external agencies and stakeholders. There is a lack of clear definitions and a lack strategic approaches and methodologies offered to CPR work in Country Offices. Often there has been inadequate or delayed assistance from BCPR

when COs asked for guidance in particularly complicated situations. BCPR should be able to rapidly answer requests of this type.

There is a wish and a need for staff development in the COs in order to be more confident on methodologies and in many cases too much depends on the capacity of individuals rather than joint capacity built up among staff in COs. Similarly, the relations between BCPR and the Country Offices should to a larger extent rely on established procedures and less on individual engagement.

Finally, with regards to cross-cutting priorities such as gender equality and women's empowerment the mission has noted a few cases in which women's roles in families and local communities have led to special involvement of women in mediation and conflict resolution. In several other cases, however, the gender perspective has been of a very traditional character that did not relate or empower women in conflict and disaster related processes. This should be looked at by BCPR, and a firmer framework for mainstreaming cross-cutting issues would be needed.

The **recommendations** in this area relate to: (3.1) Engaging COs with politicians to build their capacity for peace building, conflict resolution, mediation and reconciliation, along with an active civil society(3.2) Integration of women into reconciliation, mediation and conflict resolution processes with a focus on skills development ; (3.3) Offering valid strategies for creating an enabling environment for peace in the absence of a peace treaty; (3.4) Using Early Recovery to target windows of opportunities before, during and after violent conflicts; (3.5) Revise the CWGER Guidance Note and UNDP's ER policy to reflect current realities; (3.6) Developing a methodology for the local CPR teams' engagement with governments and conflicting partners at policy level while building on BCPR's long term and trusted relationship; (3.7) Maintain the integrated HQ/CO structure set up in the emergency response (3-month) phase in the post-emergency phase to succeed the SURGE when it withdraws; (3.8) Using experienced staff in HQ and COs to clarify models and methodologies to be used by BCPR in UNDP's CPR work; (3.9) Promoting concepts, models and methodologies to all CO staff through various of communication methods; (3.10) Additional opportunities for staff development and sharing of best practices and lessons learned through mutual secondments and other means,;(3.11) Maintaining the system of country contact persons at HQ but ensuring access to relevant thematic experts; and (3.12) Clarifying lines of communications within the BCPR structure between NY HQ, the Regional Service Centres and the Country Offices.

1   Introduction and background

This report is the second output from the team of consultants undertaking the Portfolio Review for UNDP's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). Following an Inception Report reflecting explorative interviews with BCPR and other UNDP entities, this report is based on further review of documents and five-day visits to the nine countries selected during the inception phase: Indonesia, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Georgia and Colombia. Desk studies of Nepal, Benin and Haiti also provided input to the report.

As part of its broader mission to enable sustainable social and economic development, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) received a clear mandate from the United Nations General Assembly to operate in "special development situations", where disasters and violent conflicts have undermined the human, social, physical, and institutional capital that sustains development. The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) was established in 2001 and charged with helping UNDP fulfill this mandate by supporting efforts to reduce the impact of natural disasters, prevent armed conflicts, and assist in recovery from crises when they occur. Specifically, the Bureau's role is to consolidate UNDP's crisis prevention and recovery knowledge and experience; provide a bridge between humanitarian response and the development work of UNDP; and advocate for crisis sensitivity in the context of development policy.[1]

In line with the broad objectives laid out in UNDP's Strategic Plan 2008 – 2013, the purpose of this review is to provide an overall picture of the effectiveness of BCPR-supported programming in terms of strengthening UNDP's efforts to reduce the negative impacts of crisis on national development, and more specifically to provide answers and recommendations to the following questions:

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[1] Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Population Fund Documents: DP/2000/18, 20 March 2000; DP/2001/4, 27 November 2000. (Here quoted from the BCPR Strategy 2007-2011)

- The relevance and effectiveness of BCPR support for delivering impact in diverse crisis environments;

- How effective the strategic investment has been thus far in achieving maximum long-term development results and impact;

- The extent to which BCPR-supported programmes have espoused UNDP's capacity building agenda, or addressed the corporate cross-cutting priorities such as gender equality and women's empowerment.[2]

The proposed methodology anticipated a desk phase ahead of interviews with BCPR to identify key issues from selected countries, but due to later contracting and selection of countries for review the first step in this review ended up being the interviews in HQ. In the process leading up to the inception report, the team discussed the focus and scope of the review with BCPR in order to secure the highest relevance of the review in relation to a range of other reviews and evaluations that BCPR has either gone through recently or is running more or less in parallel. These include a BCPR Strategic Review undertaken in 2010.

The Strategic Review found BCPR's work to be highly relevant and important to the achievement of UNDP's overall mission, adding significant value to UNDP's field operations. The review also found significant opportunities for improvement in critical areas such as the analytical and strategic parts of the work, leadership cohesion and management processes, effectiveness of teams and processes, capacity to assess outcomes and demonstrate impact in countries receiving BCPR support, and measurement and evaluation capacities in HQ and in COs.

The findings and recommendations of the portfolio review will complement the results of the Strategic Review and provide lessons that will feed into the organizational restructuring to ensure that the new BCPR set-up helps it meet UNDP's most critical Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) programming challenges. This process has led the review team to primarily focus on the following tasks:

- Assess the types and modalities of support provided to UNDP Country Offices (COs) – capacity, technical and financial support - in relation to relevance and needs in the country context and appropriateness in terms of specialised expertise;

- Explore possible links between BCPR support provided to COs and the results achieved at country programme level in terms of outputs, outcomes and probability of impact;

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[2] For more details on these questions please refer to the Terms of Reference for the Portfolio Review.

- Explore working relations between BCPR, the UNDP Regional Bureaux and the COs to see whether the division of responsibilities and the modes of collaboration could be improved upon in order to optimally support the work on the ground.

The team would like to thank BCPR for its valuable guidance and support and the UNDP Country Offices in the nine countries visited by the team between September and November 2011 for their support, openness and excellent input to this review.

The main findings from country visits are presented in the twelve brief country notes attached as a separate volume to the report. They include only part of the input the team received during the visits, while the substantial input to assessments, ideas for change and specific recommendations are reflected in the main report.

Limitations

Due to the short duration of country visits (5 working days) the team was not able to conduct project visits and beneficiary interviews in all the nine countries. This is a limitation but it is justified by the fact that this is not a project evaluation but a portfolio review with focus on modalities, systems and working relations. The team appreciated the field visits that were arranged in some of the countries as they provided valuable illustrations and perspectives to supplement the findings from stakeholder interviews in and around the UNDP country offices.

BCPR has recently undergone a major internal reorganisation and the new organisational structures as well as revised strategies for country priorities, and systems for monitoring and evaluation are still falling into place. Therefore, some of the strategic documents and internal systems that were available to the review team have not been completely updated. The team has mitigated this through adding information received in the round of interviews in New York and Geneva during the first phase of the review. However, visits to the selected countries or at least reading of the related projects would have added further dimensions to the interviews in BCPR.

The role of the Regional Bureaux in the design, implementation and documentation of results at country level has not been highlighted in much detail in this review. This is not a reflection of lack of importance but rather reflects that the bureaux as well as the regional service centres are perceived as playing a role in relation to management and as receivers of reporting rather than being expected to deliver direct input to the CPR programme cycle management.

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2 Approach and methodology

2.1 Scope and objectives

This review:

1 Provides an overview of the effectiveness of BCPR programmatic support (financial support and technical assistance through programmes and projects) and its ability to assist UNDP in addressing CPR challenges at country level either through direct interventions or catalytic support.

2 Identifies the conditions that have allowed for positive long term change and those that have led to less positive results in each of the five regions in which BCPR supports CO CPR programming.

As described in the TOR, the objectives of the review have been to assess, on the basis of existing BCPR programmes:

• Under what conditions and in what settings (geographical, political, socio-economic) BCPR supported programming has contributed, or is likely to contribute to positive national/local development gains through the prevention, mitigation, or recovery from the development challenges associated with crisis (disaster and conflict) – looking at capacity, technical and financial support;

• Under what conditions and in what settings BCPR supported programming has failed to contribute to such positive development;

• The underlying causes of successful or failed programming;

• What practical changes BCPR can make in its structure/delivery of programmes (content and medium of delivery) to ensure more consistent positive support;

- To what extent BCPR assistance has strengthened the ability and capacity of UNDP COs and their portfolio to address CPR challenges in a holistic manner;

- The extent to which there is shared knowledge within BCPR on the methodologies and processes of programming and implementation for CPR capacity development.

The primary audience for the BCPR portfolio review is senior management and staff, as an input towards strategic results based planning, and to guide the prioritization process for the use of limited resources going forward. Other audiences include senior management in selected UNDP country offices and their counterparts in CPR country governments – vis-à-vis providing a statement of accountability and donors – vis-à-vis accountability for funds spent to date. The findings and recommendations will also inform implementation of the UNDP Agenda for Organizational Change with regard to ensuring more effective programming across the Organization to contribute to meaningful change on the ground.

2.2   Approach

The Review Team has emphasised the inclusion of relevant stakeholders within UNDP and in the concerned countries to ensure and test different perspectives and views on all aspects of the reviewed portfolio. The Review Team has reviewed provided UNDP programme evaluations, progress reports and other relevant documentation, and has based its review on the DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. Please see the enclosed evaluation table in Annex D for an overview of the more specific evaluation questions used. During field visits the team also met with key UNDP partners - such as Government, Civil Society, Donors, other Multilateral Organisations and key NGOs of relevance. The team has reviewed a diverse portfolio covering BCPR support to programmes and projects targeting both natural disasters and violent conflicts. It has assessed BCPR's technical assistance and financial contributions to build the CPR capacity of UNDP and the long term impact of UNDP's CO programmes on CPR.

2.3   Data collection methods

A range of methods and tools for data collection and analysis have been applied in this review, the major ones being:

Initial consultations and explorative interviews

Initial consultations and interviews with key personnel in BCPR and UNDP Headquarters (HQ) and other UN agencies were conducted during the inception phase with the aim of providing initial direction to the subsequent document review and mapping, the selection of case studies and identification of issues that required deeper exploration.

Document review

The first step of the document review was to study existing documentation in order to establish, as comprehensively as possible, a mapping of the scope of BCPR's portfolio. The documents reviewed included recent reviews and evaluations, policies and other regulatory documents, Strategic Partnership Framework, annual reports of BCPR and its teams, technical tools as well as other relevant analyses and studies carried out within BCPR, and country level information on baseline studies, CPR programme documents, monitoring/progress reports, and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

2.4   Country studies

This review has a strong focus on assessing the relevance and the effectiveness of BCPR's assistance at country level. Hence, a large part of the data collection is based on field visits to a sample of countries where the Bureau has conducted activities. Nine case countries were selected among the countries that are recipients of support from BCPR.

The countries were selected by BCPR in consultation with the review team based on consideration of the following criteria:

•   Representation of the five regions covered by BCPR i.e. Latin America and Caribbean, Europe and CIS, Africa, Arab states and Asia Pacific.

•   Balance between interventions that are overall perceived as successful and less successful by BCPR: this provides a basis for examining factors which are likely to affect project implementation and results positively or negatively.

•   Balance between conflict and disaster contexts as well as both prevention and recovery interventions: these dimensions constitute the core of BCPR's mandate and are therefore all being taken into account in the review.

•   Representation of different thematic sub-categories (i.e. rule of law, livelihoods, etc.): this ensures a representative overview of BCPR's overall portfolio.

•   Different levels of political stability and of economic development in order to explore some of the potential factors that drive or inhibit achievement of outcomes at country level.

•   Extent to which the COs are able to receive the review team: this means that an overload of visits from various review and evaluation teams within a short period of time has been avoided to the extent possible.

•   Security situation: security risks have been taken into consideration in the overall selection of countries. As part of the security planning mechanism put in place, a specific updated assessment of the security situation was

carried out by COWI in close dialogue with BCPR, prior to each of the field visits.

In addition to the country visits, the review team has conducted three desk studies of BCPR country interventions. The list of countries studied is presented in the table below:

Table 2.1 Overview of country studies

Type ⟋ Region	Country visit	Desk study
Africa	DRC, Kenya, Uganda	Benin
Arab States	Sudan, Somalia	
Asia Pacific	Indonesia, Pakistan	Nepal
Europe & CIS	Georgia	
Latin America& Caribbean	Colombia	Haiti

Each of the nine field visits were conducted mainly as a round of face-to-face interviews. These interviews have in some cases been supported by a number of additional e-mail interviews with stakeholders that could not be reached during field visits. For each country visit the following categories of experts were interviewed:

Table 2.2 Categories of interviewees for the country studies

Category	
UNDP	Resident representative and/or Country Director, Personnel involved in CPR programming
Other UN agencies	UN Resident Coordinator (if different than UNDP Res Rep), representatives of relevant UN agencies
National counterparts/government authorities	Relevant national and local authorities
Other international or regional organisations and funding agencies	EU, bilateral donors, international NGO's depending on specific country interventions
Other stakeholders	National civil society organisations & other relevant resource persons

In most of the visited countries[3], the core team members were assisted by a national consultant recruited by COWI. The BCPR country support team at HQ and UNDP offices in the selected countries facilitated the preparation of the country visits, organised meetings and provided relevant documents, information about relevant stakeholders for interviews, and information about the security situation, etc.

2.5 Analytical framework

The overall effectiveness of BCPR programmatic support has been assessed against the context and needs in the countries of implementation and in relation to the mandate and strategic goals of BCPR.

The assessment against the country context and needs has addressed the following questions:

1. **OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS**: Where projects were judged to be successful – in terms of having positive development impacts – what was the relative influence on this positive success of good design, effective delivery, contingent factors.

2. **RELEVANCE**: How relevant has BCPR assistance proved in addressing CPR country challenges? How well did project designers base their programs and projects on assessments (conflict, capacity, gender, situational assessments)? How relevant were programmes to the national and UNDP capacities to deliver?

3. **DESIGN:** What determined effective project design in crisis settings, and to what extent were design considerations responsible for the success or failure of BCPR-funded projects? Has BCPR assistance been integrated into UNDP Country Office programming and portfolios or led to separate, parallel additional projects?

4. **IMPLEMENTATION:** How have programming and procurement modalities within UNDP influenced the successful outcome of the projects/programmes assessed? What were the other main influences on successful implementation? How important to success was alignment of BCPR supported programmes with other agency/donor programmes?

5. **MONITORING AND EVALUATION**: How well have projects defined, monitored and evaluated results and what have been the key challenges to BCPR carrying out its M&E and quality control functions for BCPR-funded projects? The team has also considered evidence for a correlation between strong M&E and developmental success.

6. **IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY:** What was the impact of absorptive capacity in country, and how well did BCPR exit strategy issues take

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[3] The only exception is Somalia because the country study was conducted from Kenya.

absorptive capacity into account in project design, implementation, and partnerships?

7. **PARTNERSHIPS:** How well were partnerships and dialogue initiated and developed throughout all stages of the project design and implementation with (a) national authorities and stakeholders; (b) other national and international actors; and what role did partnerships play in the extent to which projects reached or failed to reach their goals?

3   Overview of BCPR core activities, strategies and capacities

Since its establishment in 2001, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has been leading UNDP's work in the area of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) comprising conflict prevention (CP), disaster risk reduction (DRR), and post-crisis (PC) recovery in these two areas. The Bureau has provided technical and operational support to UNDP country offices in these specialised CPR areas. BCPR describes its business model as "one that twins technical resources with seed-funding in situations that require immediate crisis response as well as medium and longer term initiatives".[4] The primary funding instruments for CPR support are core resources provided through allocations from TRAC 1.1.3, and non-core resources mobilized through the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF).

3.1   Purpose and areas of engagement

The core purpose of BCPR as defined in the BCPR Strategy 2007 – 2011 is to advance peace and development by strengthening capacities to prevent and recover from crisis. This purpose is pursued through the goal of becoming a global centre of excellence and practice leader on crisis prevention and recovery. As such, at the policy level BCPR interventions include the development of knowledge products aiming at the improvement of BCPR's own practice through sharing of lessons learned and tools within UNDP and beyond, and developing policy positions and advocating on crisis issues. At the operational level, support is provided through technical and programmatic support as well as through interagency collaboration on CPR issues with the wider UN system.   BCPR's primary focus areas are prevention and recovery in relation to natural disaster and conflict.

The key thematic areas are Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery, Early Recovery, Conflict Prevention and Recovery, and Gender Equality in Crisis

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[4] "UNDP's Work in Crisis Prevention and Recovery", BCPR June 2011

Prevention and Recovery.[5] In 2010 Early Recovery received 28% and Gender Equality 4% of the total expenditure of the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention And Recovery.[6] The BCPR engagement in *Conflict Prevention and Recovery* received more than half (54%) of the total expenditure for these four areas in 2010 and comprised support to conflict prevention; rule of law; justice and security; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; armed violence, small arms and mine action; and crisis governance. *Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery* receiving 13% of the total expenditure for these four areas in 2010 included strengthening capacity for DRR, Prevention and Recovery at country level within the priorities set out in the Hyogo Framework for Action. *Early Recovery* is a collaborative effort seeking to close the gap between humanitarian relief and longer-term development,[7] and UNDP is the lead UN agency for early recovery within the UN system. This area of work received 28% of the total expenditure to the four areas in 2010 and included activities in livelihoods and economic opportunities; restoring community infrastructure including socio-economic community infrastructure; and sustainable solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees or ex-combatants. The special budget line for *Gender Equality* was used in 2010 for supporting women's civic engagement, participation and leadership in peace-building; local and national capacity to respond to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); gender-responsive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; gender-responsive DRR programming; and gender-responsive economic recovery and reintegration. The support in the area of gender equality received 4% of the total expenditure of the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention And Recovery for the four areas in 2010.

BCPR has recently embarked on a strategic review and transition process in order to strengthen the ability to meet demands of country offices and taking account of recent changes in the external environment.[8] The aim is to position BCPR centrally in UNDP's Agenda for Change, and the main areas of BCPR's future engagement are in June 2011 presented as (1) Immediate Crisis Response, (2) Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Risk Management, (3) Livelihoods and Economic Recovery, and (4) Conflict Prevention and Recovery.

3.2   BCPR support to the country level

The core services that BCPR is committed to deliver to Country Offices in support of their prevention and recovery activities are comprised of the following:

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[5] Source: BCPR Annual Report 2010

[6] Ibid.

[7] This definition of early recovery is taken from BCPR Annual Report 2010

[8] UNDP's Work in Crisis Prevention and Recovery, BCPR June 2011

Assessment and analysis of risks and recovery needs;

Development of post-conflict and post-disaster strategic frameworks and policies;

Design of plans and programmes in accordance with these strategies;

Incorporation of conflict sensitivity into country programmes;

Mainstreaming disaster preparedness into country programming as part of an integrated package with climate change adaptation support;

Incorporation of gender considerations into CPR programmes;

Technical support for programme implementation;

Knowledge codification and policy development;

Capacity development for Country Offices and national partners;

Support to national authorities in the coordination of UN and international partners;

Resource mobilization including the establishment and management of trust funds.[9]

BCPR provides support to a total of some 100 country offices, but with a special focus on 30+ countries affected by crisis. Table 3.1 below presents an overview of the ten largest recipients of support from BCPR in 2010 through the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF) in the different areas of work.[10]

BCPR is not an implementing agency and the modality of support is providing assistance to the country level by partnering with actors present on the ground. Working closely with UNDP Regional Bureaux and Country Offices, BCPR provides technical expertise and financial resources in support of prevention and recovery activities. According to BCPR's internal documents, the volume and intensity of support depends on the magnitude and complexity of crises occurring in a given country, and it also depends on the capacity of country offices.

BCPR often plays an important role in the preparation of needs assessments and action plans through rapid deployment of experts, and providing financial support through the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR TTF) or from UNDP TRAC 1.1.3 core funds. In all its activities, BCPR functions as an integral part of UNDP.[11] Another important role that BCPR plays, as leader of the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery practice, is serving as a repository for UNDP CPR policies, tools, methods, and experience, and a centre for crisis policy and best practice for partner agencies and governments. Through this function BCPR is expected to provide leadership on crisis prevention and recovery issues and on advocating for crisis sensitivity in long-term development policies andprogrammes.[12]

A specific crisis response project in BCPR is the SURGE intended to "enhance UNDPs capacities to respond quickly and effectively to the recovery demands

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[9] BUREAU FOR CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY (BCPR), BUREAU STRATEGY 2007-2011, January 2007

[10] Based in information from BCPR Annual Report 2010

[11] BCPR Strategy 2007-2011 and own observations

[12] BCPR Website and BCPR Strategy 2007 - 2011

immediately following a crisis be it a conflict or a disaster".[13] SURGE was created in 2007 to develop tools and systems to facilitate immediate crisis response that would be fully mainstreamed throughout UNDP, with a particular emphasis on having a facility of rapid disbursement of funds and rapid deployment of experts to the crisis area.

*Table 3.1 Overview of main recipients of BCPR support through CPR TTF in 2010 (Source: BCPR Annual Report 2010) Countries in **bold** are covered by this review.*

BCPR SUPPORT 2010	LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF SUPPORT (IN FINANCIAL TERMS)	AMOUNT RECEIVED IN 2010 (USD)	% of TOTAL
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RECOVERY **USD 71,741,903** **(54.5%)**	1. **DRC**	8,465,222	**11.8**
	2. PAPP	4,681,154	6.5
	3. **Sudan**	2,618,739	**3.7**
	4. **Haiti**	2,453,783	**3.4**
	5. Liberia	2,183,538	3.0
	6. **Colombia**	1,887,094	**2.6**
	7. Sri Lanka	1,813,051	2.5
	8. Sierra Leone	1,597,765	2.2
	9. Kosovo	1,520,170	2.1
	10. **Nepal**	1,431,602	**2.0**
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY **USD 17,137,590** **(13.0%)**	1. **Pakistan**	3,016,368	**17.6**
	2. Sri Lanka	875,320	5.1
	3. Myanmar	660,954	3.9
	4. Ethiopia	529,532	3.1
	5. **Indonesia**	512,887	**3.0**
	6. Kyrgyzstan	490,964	2.9
	7. India	419,626	2.4
	8. Bhutan	384,014	2.2
	9. **Haiti**	346,997	**2.0**
	10. Bangladesh	312,747	1.8
EARLY RECOVERY **USD 37,413,115** **(28.4%)**	1. **Haiti**	13,015,347	**34.8**
	2. Sri Lanka	3,733,836	10.0
	3. Liberia	3,610,938	9.7
	4. **Nepal**	2,971,983	**7.9**
	5. **Sudan**	2,016,855	**5.4**
	6. Tajikistan	2,011,784	5.4
	7. Honduras	1,825,239	4.9
	8. Chad	1,483,910	4.0
	9. **Uganda**	1,234,686	**3.3**
	10. Yemen	1,095,175	2.9
GENDER	1. Timor-Leste	413,314	7.7
	2. **Nepal**	402,518	**7.5**

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[13] Presentation on BCPR by UNDP, Dr Mohamed Abchir, May 2010, and own observations

BCPR SUPPORT 2010	LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF SUPPORT (IN FINANCIAL TERMS)	AMOUNT RECEIVED IN 2010 (USD)	% of TOTAL
EQUALITY **USD 5,356,923** **(4.1%)**	3. Liberia	357,121	6.7
	4. Kosovo	295,207	5.5
	5. Iraq	293,017	5.5
	6. Papua New Guinea	287,218	5.4
	7. Sierra Leone	276,875	5.2
	8. Sudan	**214,837**	**4.0**
	9. Indonesia	**142,007**	**2.7**
	10. PAPP	124,764	2.3

## 3.3 Organisational structure, capacities and systems

BCPR has undergone several organisational change processes since its establishment in 2001, in order to prepare the bureau to best meet its specific purposes as an integral part of UNDP. The most recent change process – which will be finalised in in early 2012 – has taken account of the findings and recommendations of the strategic review of BCPR completed in early 2010, pointing to the need for better integration of CPR within UNDP and the UN more broadly, a strengthened strategic and results-oriented approach, and stronger analytical and technical assistance capacities.[14]

As part of this reorganisation, most of the functions hitherto located in the Geneva BCPR office have been transferred to New York, and the internal structure of BCPR has been transformed. BCPR now consists of a directorate, three divisions - the Advisory and Programme Support Division, the Strategic Re- source Management Division, and the Policy and Planning Division – and the Geneva Liaison Office. Under the Advisory and Programme Support Division are are three Technical Support Teams, namely, the Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Team, the Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team, and the Country Support Management Team which also houses the SURGE. Please refer to the organogram below for further details.

Responding to findings in the strategic review, a Multi-year Results Framework has been introduced in BCPR, and this is supported by comprehensive agency-wide monitoring and evaluation of activities. This will be followed up by a new monitoring and evaluation strategy with "special emphasis on improving financial performance, expanding and deepening (…) partnerships, and further upgrading (…) information and knowledge management. Each of these will be boosted by additional support for senior management and leadership training".[15]

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[14] BCPR Strategic Review 2010

[15] Statement by the BCPR Director, BCPR's website

BCPR Functional Structure

3.4 Inter-agency coordination and UN partnerships

As the face of UNDP within the wider UN system on CPR issues, BCPR is a central player in a number of networks and partnerships within UN (in relation to peacebuilding and humanitarian this includes partnerships with PBC, PBSO, PBF, OCHA, DPKO, DPA, and DOCO). In addition to this, BCPR also plays a role in relation to the World Bank and the European Commission with a focus on broadening engagement and creating synergies in disaster and conflict countries, and is, on behalf of UNDP, co-chair of the OECD/DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility, and member of the Steering Committee for International Dialogue on State building and Peace building.

Finally BCPR leads several inter-agency processes on crisis issues, such as e.g. the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, and hosts several inter-agency mechanisms, such as CADRI, a global platform for disaster risk reduction (an inter-agency initiative between UNDP, OCHA, and UNISDR), the UN Inter-agency Framework Team for Preventive Action, and the Secretariat of the inter-agency task force on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.[16]

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[16] UNDP's Work in Crisis Prevention and Recovery, BCPR June 2011

4 Assessment of BCPR support to the country level

This section presents an overview of the effectiveness of BCPR programmatic support (financial support and technical assistance through programmes and projects) and its ability to lead UNDP's efforts to address CPR challenges at country level, either through direct interventions or catalytic support. The assessment is primarily based on the visits to UNDP Country Offices in Indonesia, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia and Colombia, and the desk studies of UNDP programmes in Haiti, Nepal and Benin. This is supplemented by overall information on BCPR and UNDP systems, capacities and approaches. Further details on the 12 countries are found in the country notes attached to this report.

4.1 Overall effectiveness

Understanding effectiveness in the context of this review as a measure of the extent to which CPR related programmes attain their objectives,[17] the following questions have been considered:

- To what extent were the objectives achieved / likely to be achieved considering the systems and approaches applied by the CO in cooperation with BCPR and the Regional Bureaux?[18]

- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

In assessing overall effectiveness, the review has identified factors that can be said to have led to successful interventions, meeting the set objectives and with a likely positive development impact. The relative importance of factors like good design, effective delivery and contingent factors has been assessed to the

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[17] Based on the OECD DAC Evaluation Guidelines, www.oecd.org.

[18] Since the present review is not an evaluation of programmes and projects, the actual achievement of objectives has not been evaluated at programme/project level as the evidence base for this has not been established.

extent possible based on available evaluations/reviews, progress reports and interviews with stakeholders in the nine countries visited and review of documents for the three desk study countries.

To the extent realistic and possible the field missions included an outcome review perspective as outlined in the Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators from UNDP's Evaluation Office.[19]

The overall finding on the relation between good **design** and successful implementation is that this is one of the key factors that should be given high attention by BCPR. The relevance of a project or programme interlinks with the quality of its design and implementation with direct impact on results achieved, as well as the ability to document the results. Furthermore, all the 'binding' elements of a programme are established during the design phase such as objectives, indicators, methodologies, and resource allocations. Examples of participatory CSO and government involvement in the design phase such as in Kenya, involvement of other UN agencies such as in DRC, and requirements from donors to be regarded as partners in both design and implementation phases illustrate that a thorough participatory process in the early phase helps to secure lasting ownership and success in the implementation phase.

This review is not deep enough to firmly establish a link between quality of design and successful CPR programmes in all cases, as good design is not a sufficient condition for effective implementation. Some interesting examples are however worth noticing. One of them is from Kenya, where a design strengthening structures for CSO conflict mediation following post-election violence proved successful after a later referendum. As can be seen in UNDP's own outcome evaluation method, several factors might have played a role in the programme's success, but many people recognized this programme as influential in the mitigation of further conflict. Another example is the Rule of Law project in Pakistan where it is clear that due to a strong analytical base, including a thorough baseline survey, the programme management has a much firmer grip on progress and results compared to programmes without this level of analysis. The programme document presents a thorough situational analysis addressing key institutions and processes related to Rule of Law, clearly based on careful research on the ground. The programme approach embraces formal as well as informal justice domains and reflects the key issues raised in the situation analysis. The programme includes a partnership strategy and an exit strategy, and a comprehensive programme organisation has been established including high-level managerial backing from the UNDP Country Office as well as an advisory group providing regular technical input throughout implementation.[20] Programme design is discussed in more detail in section 4.3.

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[19] The review of outcomes was primarily based on existing evaluation and monitoring reports since the review team had insufficient time to conduct an in depth analysis of each project and only met a limited number of stakeholders.
[20] For more details, please refer to the programme document "Strengthening Rule of Law, Peace & Stabilization in Malakand", UNDP Pakistan 2010.

Effective delivery has considerable influence on project success not least in conflict situations and natural disasters where population groups have been displaced or deprived and immediate needs must rapidly be met. In the countries visited during this review, UNDP is generally known as an organisation with a practical orientation capable of supporting partners in delivering services as well as longer term capacity development in a timely and effective manner. This was for example emphasised by UNDP partners in Pakistan and Indonesia, where the UNDP CO has skillfully responded to earthquakes, floods, as well as conflicts leading to forced displacements and large groups of internally displaced people (IDPs). A programme that in its design lacked the requisite conflict sensitivity – a livelihood programme following post-election violence in Kenya – was delayed for one year in spite of its early recovery funding, but due to an overburdened CO and newly hired staff, managed over the next two years to catch up with the missing outputs. In the process, it also managed to incorporate a solid conflict perspective and in the next phase ended up as one programme integrated between the two units dealing with natural disasters and conflicts. A new larger programme is foreseen to focus on the prevention of disasters through disaster risk reduction.

The opinions of representatives from government and civil society partners interviewed during the review regarding UNDP's strength in procurement and delivery varied. From Sudan, DRC and Kenya donors claim that UNDP COs are not very cost effective. Their judgment is that UNDP deliver in a timely manner but at great financial cost.   Experiences in DRC and Haiti where large projects have been implemented are not very positive. In this regard it might be worth mentioning that effective delivery depends on CO capacity but also on other more structural factors (procedures etc.). In the Haiti case, an internal assessment 3 months after the quake highlights "Somehow slow procedures to allocate funding from BCPR", and a "CO slow in approving project documents". In relation to interagency cooperation, an OCHA evaluation was also very critical of the role played by UNDP, stating that its administrative support is "almost dysfunctional in emergencies". There is positive feedback from Georgia, especially the rapid funding mechanism which is straight from BCPR, though there were some issues regarding regular UNDP procurement. In Uganda the picture is mixed   with some procurement issues resulting in delays.

The review has explored internal factors relating to the structures, systems and capacities within the UNDP CO and BCPR, as well as external factors related to the country context of the programmes and projects.

Internal factors within UNDP and BCPR which would have influence on the degree of success in CPR interventions include systems and guidelines, staff capacities, approach to partnerships and relations between BCPR and the Country Offices. These are assessed below:

Systems and guidelines. The UNDP generic Resources and Results Framework is used in planning and design of UNDP programmes including CPR programmes. This framework provides an overview of intended outputs, output targets, indicative activities, responsible parties and inputs and is considered useful for maintaining an overview of the crucial elements of a project or programme, and is therefore relevant for managing and monitoring as well. The limitations of this framework in relation to capturing results beyond the level of activities and outputs were evident in all country programmes reviewed. The review team's assessment is that not only the documentation of results, but also the likelihood of achieving results is affected negatively when the framework does not focus on outcomes and impact in relation to fulfillment of objectives.

Systematic baseline surveys are not mandatory in the programmes, but general programme documents include some kind of contextual information on the pre-programme situation and the problems needing attention in the context. The lack of guidelines for analytical work and needs assessment has resulted in descriptive rather than analytical contextual information with limited value in terms of guiding programme priorities, modalities etc.

As an example, most staff working with conflicts in Sudan mentioned in interviews root causes and triggers or dynamic factors, but the programme and project documents presented to the mission do not contain systematic baseline analyses based on models for understanding conflicts. BCPR should agree on

using in practice a shared model for analysing and understanding conflicts, probably based on theories like Michael E. Brown (pre-disposing and proximate causes or triggers)[21] or Michael Lund (structural and dynamic factors).[22]

The analyses in documents dealing with conflict prevention tend to describe the conflicts very briefly in terms of political positions, battlefield positions, and conflict history but with pretty limited descriptions of the root causes or political and other dynamic triggers of violent conflict. Some of the paragraphs in the analyses of the conflicts are copied from one programme or project to the next one, representing missed opportunities to refine the analysis and the tools of the new project. Comprehensive and systematic analysis of a conflict will obviously encourage the development of projects that use and design their tools to address the dynamics and root causes of conflicts, and should lead to more effective impact.

In some country programmes extensive needs assessments and good quality analyses are carried out – e.g. in Nepal UNDAF and SPF, in Colombia with its UNDAF listing existing analysis and reports, and the fact that the CO has analysts on its staff, or as in Kenya where the Peace Building and Conflict Prevention Unit (PBCPU) since being established in 2008 has worked at the programme rather than the project level. Particularly the latest programme (2010-13) delivers a very convincing analysis of the situation and a multifaceted answer to the identified needs. It convincingly targets political and civil society levels nationally and locally across various economic and social sectors.

High quality analyses are most often a result of qualified individuals in the Country Offices or specialised support from BCPR (such as the Sudan mapping programme, the Nepal UNDAF and SPF, carried out with BCPR POSC Asia Pacific Regional Team as responsible; and the Pakistan Rule of Law Project).

Back in 2003 a model for analysing conflict situations – *Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA)* was developed by BCPR and staff were trained in using it. However, according to our interviews and observations, the model is not used systematically and has not been updated.

There is good learning and inspiration to be drawn from some of the initiatives mentioned above, but in order to uphold a high level of quality in programme design it would be advisable for BCPR and all COs to apply a systematic approach to analysis of conflict addressing both root causes and dynamic factors at the same time; to analysis of natural disasters in accordance with current humanitarian principles and approaches; and to baseline surveys and needs assessments of a high standard.

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[21] BROWN, Michael E. 1996 The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT Press

[22] LUND, Michael 1996 Preventing Violent Conflicts, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace.

With regard to disaster recovery responses, experiences from Haiti show that there can be a tendency to reduce demands for a thorough and soundly based needs assessment due to the focus on immediate relief. However, UNDP's role should rather be to ensure that early recovery and disaster risk reduction activities are well planned and incorporated in the humanitarian response and that a long-term approach is adopted. In this regard, various evaluations and lessons learned exercises have shown that it is important to base the interventions in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis on a comprehensive situation analysis which also includes a capacity assessment and constraints analysis.

Staff capacities. The review team met managers and staff of the UNDP country offices visited, including the CPR units who had a great deal of experience from other countries affected by natural disasters or conflicts, or who had previously worked at field level in the programmes. There is no doubt that such experience and capacities with key staff have a positive impact on programme effectiveness, provided that knowledge is updated to take account of the prevailing context and of recent developments in methodologies and tools. Impact also depends on the particular country context. The team also met managers and staff members with shorter experience who had excellent capacity and energy, and who were results-oriented. In some COs, staff members had previously worked in BCPR and had a good understanding of the head office that they could utilise in accessing services and using their personal contacts in BCPR. In other cases the mission sensed a lack of solid theoretical understanding of BCPR's areas of work among CO staff of BCPR's work areas, and among some individuals, a limited dynamic and proactive engagement in the local context. As stated in BCPR's 2007-2011 Bureau Strategy, some COs face unanticipated or complex crisis and lack the necessary staffing and resources to tackles these challenges. In these cases, the need for BCPR assistance and advice will be stronger and will constitute a critical factor for the successful implementation of project or programme activities.

The maintenance and further development of a high level of staff expertise in countries affected by natural and/or man-made disasters is of course crucial. The review team did not systematically study the training and educational opportunities provided by UNDP or by BCPR to CO st,aff but came across a number of staff members centrally placed in CPR programmes that had not had the opportunity of going for training. In view of the high work pressure in relation to this kind of work and considering all the challenges related to working in areas of instability, the team suggests that regular update of competencies should be given high priority.

Crisis-sensitive programming framework. Surprisingly BCPR has not developed any specific programming framework for UNDP's engagement in crisis areas. As one government partner expressed it, "UNDP has a very practical approach and does not come with all the theoretical stuff that others such as the World Bank and some of the bilaterals do".[23] While the comment is intended in a complimentary way, indicating UNDP's practical approach, it

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[23] Interviewee in Pakistan

indicates a lack of a crisis-sensitive programming framework that would be most beneficial to BCPR's effectiveness and success. A number of tools and guidelines have in fact been developed by BCPR over the years, but have not been applied systematically at CO level.

BCPR aims to be a global leader in dealing with prevention of conflicts and natural disasters as well as recovery. While many other organisations deal with humanitarian assistance after disasters, few deal with risk reduction and disaster preparedness as a means to prevent crises. Some international organisations deal with conflicts on the fringe of governance work but UNDP BCPR is – apart from the UN Peace Building Office - the only agency focusing on conflicts, their civilian prevention and peace building processes. This demands that BCPR becomes a lead partner in developing and implementing frameworks for risk reduction and preparedness for natural disasters as well as in its conflict preventing and peace building strategies.

If BCPR aspires to be the global leader in this arena of work – which it probably is in quantitative terms – it is necessary to be ahead of other international organisations engaged in the field– or preferably develop a specific "UNDP/BCPR approach" building on the unique role and global coverage of the organisation In relation to natural disasters, it is also important that BCPR and COs in their coordination and supportive roles ensure that current humanitarian principles and standards are applied, such as Do No Harm, Sphere Standards etc. Early recovery is supposed to begin in the emergency intervention phase and be integrated into humanitarian mechanisms.[24] UNDP is designated the cluster lead for Early Recovery (ER) at global level, but also at country level UNDP has the responsibility to lead a coordinated approach to ER planning together with key partners as OCHA coordinating the Humanitarian response. At the same time UNDP in its own programmatic approach to ER has often resorted to use its traditional development approach only at an earlier point. The perceived conflict of interest between coordinating the ER planning and benefiting from humanitarian funding in its programmatic activities seems sometimes to lead to unnecessary interagency tensions. This was mentioned in Kenya, and in Haiti there seemed to be an unclear division of tasks among agencies and conflicting approaches on the ground.

Some of the CO staff met by the review team expressed that they would appreciate guidance or best practices/lessons learned from BCPR regarding other UN experiences working in countries affected by crisis. Staff at BCPR HQ confirm that there is generally more focus on providing specific assistance to countries than developing generic tools. On the other hand, interviews during country visits also indicate that tools and concepts are not sufficiently promoted and made available within UNDP. Hence, staff report that external consultants recruited by BCPR to formulate projects and even people employed in long term position as advisors in COs or other agencies (e.g. in DRC) are frequently unfamiliar with the BCPR approach.

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[24] See guidance note

Early Recovery

As part of a multi-country early recovery programming review a country review of DRC from 2010 concluded that

"The DRC situation underscores that the current Early Recovery concept has quite a few shortcomings that need to be addressed, in part at the conceptual level (so that it is clear to both host governments and donors what we seek to achieve) and in part at the practical level (so that we can re-engineer our operational mechanisms to make it happen on the ground).

Based partly on the DRC field mission's findings, the Early Recovery Programming Review reached the conclusion that "*concepts such as stabilization, peace-building, and state building have entered the UN System in a major way during the past five years and have enriched the UN debate about and approach to post-crisis interventions*" (ref. para 42). As a result, UNDP will need urgently to reassess its Early Recovery concept and approach and place it within that wider context. The Overseas Development Institute's Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI/HPG) studies reached a similar conclusion."

The *Darfur Early Recovery Impact Assessment Mision* from June 2009 seems to confirm the CO information that humanitarian organisations in 2007 for more than a year fought UNDP ER involvement in Darfur with the argument that it was still in a humanitarian phase. The Assessment Mission suggests that Early Recovery initiatives should comprise measures to tackle the root causes of any particular conflict – whether political, ethnic, economic or natural resource-based – so as to strengthen a given country's conflict-resolution mechanisms and reducing the risk of renewed conflict.

The existing official definitions from UNDP and IASC are from February and April 2008. In the guidance note on Early Recovery from April 2008 (CWGER) and in the UNDP Policy on Early Recovery the approach to conflict settings is indeed very modest with the latter stating that:

As a minimum, early recovery interventions will be designed and implemented in a way that does not reinforce or further exacerbate conflict dynamics but also emphasises the need to develop *early recovery plans and priorities that take into account critical drivers of conflict, the ethnic or social diversity of societies, and that ensure sufficient inclusion and participation of key groups such as women, youth and minorities.*

The review does not suggest to open an interinstitutional discussion about the definition of Early Recovery or about UNDP's coordinating role. However, in the implementation of UNDP's two main functions – coordination of the early recovery cluster globally and locally, and not least in designing its early recovery programming – there are things to learn from the review.

We have noted that the balance of coordinating or leading is important to strike right. While UNDP i.e. coordinates the planning of ER it does not coordinate

the humanitarian assistance as OCHA is supposed to do, and UNDP does not have ownership to the ER cluster.

Conceptually, UNDP's Early Recovery programming could in conflict settings be significantly smarter than we have seen in several countries. The Early Recovery is not supposed to be merely an early beginning of ordinary recovery or development programmes but should also include important mechanisms seeking instantly to influence the conflict dynamics, creating basis for renewed relations across conflicting communities and setting a basis for civil, economic, and institutional cooperation or building media systems for information about safety, assistance and ways out of the conflict. With an emphasis on building social and national coherence through reconciliation, confidence building measures, and reintegration of those involved in conflict as well as strengthening governance across communities. UNDP can provide important inputs to ER that will shape the conditions for successful livelihood, reintegration of IDPs and development of basic rights, but also will create a context that helps the other agencies to succeed. This falls perfectly within the mandates of UNDP but has only rarely been found in the projects examined. The Early Recovery should also be utilised by UNDP to develop strategies for building mechanisms for long term conflict prevention and development targeting the root causes of conflict.

Strategic Partnership Frameworks. The concept of Strategic Partnership Frameworks (SPF) was introduced by UNDP/BCPR towards the CO's CPR programmes as a step towards improving effectiveness and predictability of support to country programmes. It is intended as a comprehensive framework also including a range of other development partners/donors and hence a step in the right direction towards harmonisation and aid effectiveness. The review team received very positive assessments from CO staff that had experience with these.[25] In fact, many of the countries not having the benefit of a SPF were experiencing a non-strategic and ad-hoc way of working with BCPR, which they felt was not optimal in relation to programme effectiveness and quality. Furthermore, the criteria applied for the countries chosen for SPFs have not been transparent – or at least not communicated to all country offices. The first two SPFs – for Sudan and Somalia - were approved in 2007, and subsequently countries in other regions have been included as shown in the table below.

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[25] This finding is in line with the Strategic Review of BCPR, March 2010

Table: Status of existing Strategic Partnership Frameworks

Region	Country	SPF Status	Amount	Duration	Expenditures
Africa	Uganda	Final Stages	$9.5 M	2010 -2012	N/A
	DRC	Approved August 09	$ 24 M	2009 -2012	$6.6 M
	Sierra Leone	Final Stages	$20 M	2010 -2012	N/A
Arab States	Sudan	Approved, June 07	$ 17 M	2007-2009	$ 9.8 M
	Sudan (Phase II)	Final Stages	*TBD*	2010-2011	N/A
	Somalia	Approved, June 07	$ 8.6	2007-2009	$5.1 M
	Somalia (Phase II)	Under development	*TBD*	2010-2011	N/A
	PAPP	Approved Sep. 09	$ 9 M	2009-2012	$1.9M
Asia	Nepal	Approved, Oct. 2009	$ 14.7 M	2009-2012	$ 400k
	Sri Lanka	Approved, July 2008	$ 20 M	2008-2010	$2.3 M
	PNG	Approved, Dec. 2008	$ 5 M	2008-2012	$0.5 M
LAC	Colombia	Approved Sep. 09	$ 7.8 M	2009-2012	$ 140 k
	Haiti	Final Stages	*TBD*	2010-2012	N/A
ECIS	Tajikistan	Final Stages	$ 5 M	2009-2012	$ 300k

Source: Strategic Review of BCPR, Final Report, March 2010.

The evaluation of the SPF in Somalia conducted in 2009[26] found that transaction costs had been reduced and predictability increased, and that 'efficiency' had thus increased, while there was no evidence to show that 'effectiveness' had improved. It also found that the framework was not sufficiently strategic in the way it was used.

In the view of the Sudan CO, the SPF had been of benefit, ensuring predictability and initially also quicker access to funding from BCPR. However, the first generation of SPFs did not pay much attention to sound conflict analysis and did not have much strategic direction.

The CO Strategic Partnership Framework (SPF) for DRC defines 10 areas of BCPR support.[27] Given the huge needs, none of these areas can, per se, be considered irrelevant but they do not seem to be based on an overall strategic analysis prioritizing the areas of particular relevance in the specific context, when considering the dynamics of conflict, removal of its root causes, available capacity and complementarity with other stakeholders. These reflections are not stated in the SPF which mainly consists of a description of already on-going and planned additional activities.

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[26] Evaluation of the Strategic Partnership for Somalia, Adam Smith International, 11 June 2009

[27] Justice Sector and National Police Reform; Capacities for Democratic Control and Civilian Oversight of the Security Sector; National programme on Small arms and light Weapons ; Women empowerment and Sexual Gender Based Violence; Community security and social cohesion in key conflict-affected provinces ; DDR and Community based Reintegration of non-eligible ex-combatant in Eastern Provinces; Livelihoods restored for conflict-affected population; UNDP Support to the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy; Applying Conflict Development analysis planning process and Conflict Prevention; Capacity for Disaster Risk Reduction

The Strategic Partnership Framework in Nepal was found to be comparatively well designed with a solid needs analysis and a strategy for the partnership though not necessarily for the programming priorities. The CPR strategic outcomes seem however more based on supply than demand in its sub-activities and the activities are fragmented into several smaller projects.

Moving away from small projects towards coherent and flexible programmes would strengthen the impact of BCPR's work.

This review covered 7 out of the 12 countries having had the strategic framework (5 visited, 2 covered by desk review) and received mainly positive feedback, primarily in relation to predictability of funding and other support (in fact the perception in BCPR is that the interest in financial contributions overshadowed the need for BCPR technical support[28]). This was, however, in several countries accompanied by a certain degree of frustration over recent reductions in the BCPR budget and hence quite a drastic cut in allocations to country offices. Meanwhile the BCPR is abandoning the Strategic Partnership Framework in favour of alternative cooperation mechanisms, partly due to the uncertainty of funding that made long term commitments impossible. The review team concludes that a concept like the SPF or similar agreements is useful, but would benefit from being developed into a more strategic tool (in accordance with recommendations from the evaluation of the Somalia SPF), building an analytical framework for future CPR priorities in a country, clear and accessible mechanisms for using BCPR's technical assistance and a joint plan for resource mobilisation with description of the roles for CO and for BCPR.

Clarity of roles: BCPR – Country Offices. Feedback from many country offices visited reveals a certain degree of uncertainty regarding the role of the BCPR and the expectations of when and for what it can be called upon for support. Situations were observed where BCPR had been very proactive in following up on programmes (for example the Rule of Law project in Pakistan), while the situation in other places revealed a much more reactive role of BCPR and much more sporadic support (for example in Somalia and Indonesia). In Sudan however, the CPR staff praised BCPR for reacting quickly in comparison to the regional bureau. A finding in the case of Somalia was that the support and communication was much more frequent and sizeable until 2-3 years ago when the decrease in funding was felt and the quality of technical support started to become very uneven.

The review found that the criteria for which countries get more attention and support than others are not transparent. A country hit by multiple crises like Pakistan receives considerable attention, while Somalia, a country currently going through probably the most complex conflict scenario and worst humanitarian crisis in the world, claims to receive less support and communication than, for example, Kenya. BCPR seems not to have given focused technical support to UNDP DRC despite the great needs in that country and the high level of funding provided. After multi-party elections were held in

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[28] Comment to draft report by SN, January 2012

DRC in 2006, the new Congolese government emphasised that the country was no longer in a conflict situation and this approach was taken on by the new UNDP management in DRC that closed down the CPR Unit which had been extremely dynamic and successful from 2003. [29] From 2007 onward the CO has suffered from a lack of staff dedicated to manage CPR activities and this has not been compensated with additional technical support to the CO from BCPR despite substantial financial support for project activities. Technical support was provided through funding of staff for field offices which has contributed to strengthening the implementation of some of the BCPR funded projects, but it has not contributed to ensuring that the CO could overall appear as a proactive, visible and efficient player in CPR. A similar development was seen in Uganda. The government declared that the humanitarian crisis had ended, and that the country was now in "development" mode, and accordingly UNDP reorganized its units and CPR now has one regular HQ staff, and one project manager. In the case of Georgia, the experience with BCPR is very positive, particularly immediately post crisis (2008 conflict) when within 5 days, BCPR sent an early recovery specialist to conduct a joint needs assessment and work with staff on devising strategy and programme/projects to meet immediate needs, followed up by a visit 2 months later. It seems that when the COs do not appear as very interested and active counterparts, BCPR also reduces its active involvement. Because BCPR support apparently, except in immediate response, is considered as 'demand-driven', which is surprising given the implications of CPR for UNDP's entire development mandate, and its 'resilience' agenda.

The review team has been informed that a concept note has recently been developed and agreed between BCPR and the Regional Bureaux as the basis for prioritization of CPR countries for support. This was used in 2010 to draw up a list of priority countries for 2011. But it was never consulted with COs, partly because it was felt that direct discussions on the subject with COs seen by HQ as non-priority in terms of CPR support needs would (as history had shown) be too subjective and inconclusive, with many more COs wanting to be on the list. It should also be noted that allocations are not prioritized based only on the scope and intensity of crises, but also on the availability of other sources of funding for the crisis (e.g. US in Iraq and Afghanistan, Arab oil-producing countries in Somalia, etc.) It is also determined by the potential strategic impact that BCPR's seed funding would have on the overall response picture.

Findings from a number of country offices question the technical capacity of BCPR to provide support of adequate quality in relation to the crisis context

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[29] In the view of BCPR, one significant downside to creating CPR units in COs was the fact that they tended to operate as stand-alone units, better staffed and better equipped by BCPR in a way that drew the envy of other frustrated understaffed units. As such they did little to mainstream CPR across a programme that was essentially CPR across the board, and lacked exit strategies which would have allowed for them to include the training of local CO staff as part of their functions. The BCPR perspective on this is that in the long run, the solution lies not in CPR units but in mainstreaming of CPR and in the training of CO staff to serve as frontline respondents, knowing when and how to call on which BCPR experts for more specialized support. (SN comment to draft report, January 2012)

(Somalia, Pakistan, Indonesia). The difficulties have been evidenced by an often very long processing time for a request, uneven quality of consultants provided through the roster (ExpRes), and inadequate technical input to programming processes and documents as well as in the implementation phase. The roster of experts maintained by BCPR is viewed by some as sub-standard, and the knowledge management by BCPR is seen by many as inefficient (Indonesia, Sudan, Kenya, DRC). This picture emerging from country visits is of course in stark contrast to BCPR's own perception and ambition of being a leading agency in crisis prevention and recovery. It should be noted that the review team also heard of very capable experts who had contributed significantly to the quality of programmes, but the picture is very uneven.

External factors

When it comes to the external factors leading to successful or less successful programmes and projects, the review has identified the following as the most important: **instability** in the contexts posing challenges to UNDP's programming approach, specific challenges related to countries in **transition**, **capacity of the government partners**, and of **civil society partners** not only in relation to programmatic capacity but also in bridging relationships with government, and the often **high risk and insecurity** in the areas of operation.

In recurring and protracted conflicts the projects that have been designed in a traditional UNDP manner with linear thinking are characterised by a lack of flexibility to answer the constantly changing situation. The problem is that conflicts are not just a disturbance to normality and peace but in itself have underlying pre-conditions, often based on unequal access to resources or ethnic divisions. When e.g. the UNDP CO in Sudan designs and implements a traditional DDR project in a region in which armed conflict again erupts, then the DDR efforts can almost be said to be wasted. However, it might not have been the case had the DDR project been combined with development of different structures for mediation, conflict resolution and with an attempt to remove some of the root causes.

Seen from a BCPR perspective, a major strategic gap continues to be the absence of effective and realistic successor arrangements to the SURGE crisis response beyond the immediate post-crisis and emergency response phase of UNDP support. Organisation-wide support to COs through the current SURGE mechanism usually lasts 3 months or, exceptionally up to 6 months. Beyond this phase, the SURGE mechanism is dismantled, and UNDP immediately reverts to traditional CO support, providing programmatic support to post-crisis countries as simply another CO-led and POPP/ATLAS supported function. This swift post-SURGE draw down ignores the fact that the risk factors that characterize programme implementation in the emergency response phase of any crisis improve only marginally during the 2-3 years that follow the end of the crisis, especially in post-conflict settings. These risks and challenges extend well beyond the emergency phase and persist for years, sometimes contributing in many ways to relapse or to long drawn-out and ineffective transition and recovery processes. While the SURGE mechanism, in its current form recognizes that the full range of management resources and assets of

UNDP are needed to help COs cope with immediate crisis response needs from a management perspective, there is no mechanism on the programmatic front that recognizes the overwhelming challenges that COs in post-crisis situations face for years following a crisis. As is the case with immediate crisis response, the full range of these substantive programmatic challenges cannot be fully met by any single Bureau, or by resorting to programming guidelines intended for use in normal development settings. Beyond the 3-month immediate response management SURGE, a longer-term programmatic SURGE (2-3 years) is needed for each priority country if real progress is to be made.[30]

When taking into consideration the external factors from changing conflict dynamics the best way to deal with it is through multifaceted, flexible programmes. The focus for the COs should move away from efficient delivery to effective changes of structural, political or other dynamic factors. The on-going PBCPU programme in Kenya could be an example of the attempt to do this.

Effectiveness and strategic positioning of BCPR

In Haiti, there have been some steps towards building up the resilience towards future disasters. However, when it comes to ensuring a smooth transition from emergency to recovery in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, UNDP has had limited success in taking on a lead position in finding sustainable responses as could have been expected. The technical responses related to the after earthquake recovery seem to a large extent to have dominated the agenda while governance issues have been given less attention although it remains clear that the country will remain highly vulnerable to both natural disasters and conflict if the root causes of the past political turmoil are not addressed. BCPR clearly has the potential to play a key role in proposing approaches that can capture this kind of complexity, but in practice the bureau like many other organisations appears to have been mostly caught up in finding responses to immediate needs. BCPR should invest itself in defining more innovative approaches dealing with challenges related to the interface between disaster and conflict based on a more thorough analysis of successes and failures of prior interventions in Haiti.

An evaluation of UNDP-**Benin** dating from 2008 concluded that involvement in too many pilot projects constituted a serious sustainability challenge for UNDP-Benin. This evaluation further recommended that the CO concentrate its efforts in areas where its expertise is recognised. The projects funded by BCPR in Benin do not seem to live up to either of these recommendations as they were smaller interventions that were rather disconnected from the CO's other interventions and requiring expertise from external consultants and with limited prospects of being followed up by the CO. UNDP- Benin is recognized for its ability to play a coordinating role in areas which are considered politically sensitive, but the CO also has very limited resources compared to other international agencies in the country. Given the relatively low scale of severity of the crisis and emergencies that are likely to occur in Benin on short to

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[30] BCPR, January 2012

medium term, it would appear more appropriate to work with CPR by mainstreaming some elements into the CO's main programme intervention areas, instead of implementing separate projects with limited anchorage in the CO's core activities. In this way UNDP can still stay alert and play a key role in avoiding the deterioration of critical emergency situations, but with much more emphasis on long-lasting prevention efforts.

In **DRC**, without any clear strategy of its own and with weak government institutions, the CO seems to a large degree to have oriented its activities towards donor priorities, covering a large number of different intervention areas and projects which have not been designed coherently and synergitically. BCPR's programme funding modalities, provided mostly as seed funding with a duration of 18-24 months, seem to have reinforced this tendency that contributes to reducing the CO's positive impact even further. This 'silo thinking' does not allow for the flexible and holistic approach which is needed to deal with the short term dynamics of DRC's conflicts as well as the long term structural causes of conflict in the country-specific context. The CO has had difficulties in positioning itself during the last programme phase during which it has undergone considerable restructuring and budgetary cuts and the CO has not always been able to live up to the expectations of its partners However, UNDP-DRC also has considerable comparative advantages. Its presence in the field has allowed for a more operational approach responding to local needs and its perceived neutrality and long history in DRC puts the CO in a position where it can potentially engage more closely with the government on conflict and development policies and play a greater role in political dialogue and mediation. While Monusco's mandate is due to expire soon, it is of outmost importance that UNDP-DRC manages to develop effective and convincing strategies for peace building to donors as most of its CPR projects are about to expire.

4.2   Relevance

The questions guiding the review in the assessment of relevance of the CPR programme portfolio and the support provided by BCPR to country programmes were:

> * How relevant has BCPR assistance proved in addressing CPR country challenges? How well did project designers base their programme and projects on assessments?
>
> * How relevant are programmes to the national and UNDP CO capacities to deliver?

The review has addressed this issue at two levels: (1) How have needs been assessed and the relevance of CPR interventions, including BCPR support, ensured? (2) To what extent have CPR interventions including BCPR support actually been relevant as viewed by in-country stakeholders? In analysing relevance, the review team has focused on approaches and mechanisms applied

in CPR programmes in order to capture best practices and to point to areas that could be strengthened in the future.

4.2.1 Relevance to CPR country challenges

The nine country visits and the three country desk studies show that the intensity and volume of BCPR support varies considerably between country offices. In Indonesia's CO, UNDP has extensive experience and expertise in conflict prevention and management as well as disaster risk reduction and response. The support provided by BCPR over the years has been limited to financial and technical support in relation to earthquakes and other disasters. The CO has been very **precise in formulating its needs** to BCPR and that has ensured high relevance of the services offered. It appears that the CO has been able to manage most programming exercises through its own resources or consultants, and there is not a perception that BCPR would be able to offer expertise of a higher quality.

The visit to UNDP Indonesia underlined the importance of looking beyond the one-sided support from BCPR to COs and to acknowledge the value of more **reciprocal relations** with mutual exchange of experience and innovative ideas, lessons learnt and best practice. CO Indonesia has for example developed an innovative to approach to Post Conflict Needs Assessment in close cooperation with the Government of Indonesia (Bureau for Disaster Risk Reduction). A delegation from Indonesia with UNDP as well as government representatives presented this approach to BCPR at a meeting and this resulted in useful exchange of ideas and experiences. Another example is the Crisis and Risk Mapping and Analysis Approach (CRMA) developed by UNDP in Sudan that if independently validated could become valuable in BCPR's strategy to address the root causes of conflicts and probably also for early warning and prevention of conflicts. The CRMA was developed in cooperation between UNDP CO and IOM and funded mainly through additional bilateral funds.

It is very important that BCPR disseminate best practices, and be responsive to the need for information sharing across and within regions, wherever the experience of other COs may prove to be valuable in setting precedent for success.

Another means of maximising relevance to local needs is to work in close cooperation with **authorities and national/local CSOs**, and this is clearly a very strong point in many UNDP-CPR country programmes. All COs visited displayed a high emphasis on working in tandem with national and local partners with local knowledge and often specialised expertise to supplement UNDP's own capacity. In Indonesia, the DRR project is for example well integrated into local structures, and work related to peace and conflict is undertaken in close cooperation with national NGOs with high experience and expertise. The same is the case in Pakistan where there is almost organisational symbiosis between UNDP and the National Disaster Management Authority. In a country like Somalia, it is a challenge to uphold very close cooperation with authorities following the relocation of the CO to Nairobi, but cooperation is

going on with regional governments in Somaliland and Puntland. South Central Somalia is a special challenge due to instability and poor security. It should however be noted that in practice it can be a challenge to ensure a high level of involvement of national partners in contexts where government institutions are weak and unstable. This is for instance the case in DRC and Haiti. In these situations, the country studies show that there can be a tendency to focus more on project implementation and delivering the planned outputs than on ensuring that national partners are involved in all phases of the interventions.

In Uganda the situation is more nuanced as local government is weak and varies greatly from place to place, while the national government is a strong partner. Apart from working in tandem with local partners, **UNDP/CPR Unit presence at field level** is also important to ensure relevance of activities. This is especially the case in the response phase to floods or other natural disasters, where UNDP is known for its operational approach when supporting partners in responding to local needs. In DRC, the strengthening of decentralised field offices has also contributed to the establishment of good relations with authorities at provincial, territorial and local levels as an important element for ensuring effective implementation of activities on the ground. In some conflict affected countries like Somalia and Pakistan, COs face limitations of movement and local presence due to the security situation, and in the case of Somalia there is likely to be a risk of lower relevance due to remote management from Nairobi (which the CO is making a strong effort to mitigate through frequent visits of staff between Nairobi and the field offices in Somalia).

While UNDP COs work without SC mandates and normally will not be involved in military or diplomacy track I conflict resolutions it is important to make use of the organisation's usually high standing through its long presence and neutrality in a country to get directly involved with politicians at governmental and opposition level. The engagement with politicians can partly add to efficiency of mediation tools, partly to implementation of peace building initiatives through existing state structures.

In Sudan the collaboration with politicians takes place successfully at local level, while there are almost no political links at federal, national level. In DRC all political contacts seem to have been left to the UN stabilization mission MONUSCO, while the Senior Peace and Development advisor in Kenya funded by BCPR seems to have managed to act as an efficient interface to the political level between not only UNDP CO and also other UN agencies.

The review has revealed that the **analytical work** is not systematically integrated in all CPR programmes, and the analytical capacity in COs varies from country to country. The lack of systematic guidance in this area has led some COs to develop their own assessments and analyses. One of the consequences of the lack of a generic system for analyses to be conducted during the early stages of programming is that baseline surveys are not carried out in all programmes, even though good examples of comprehensive baseline surveys do exist resulting from CO initiatives (*Somalia* Community Security and Armed Violence Reduction, *Pakistan* Rule of Law, *Georgia* post-2008 crisis in South Ossetia). In *Haiti*, a government led PDNA process was

supported by UNDP, world bank and EU and was supposed to provide baseline information for the design of new post-earthquake interventions. However, as the process turned out to be quite lengthy, interventions were initiated before the PDNA was actually finalised. The PDNA was also criticised for not being inclusive enough and for not being gender sensitive. In *DRC*, so far Monusco has been gathering various data and conducting analysis on which UNDP could draw information when designing new interventions, but the CO does not have a tradition for using specific baseline studies in the project planning process. However, the CO has recently launched a conflict analysis study covering the entire country based on data collected in most provinces which is expected to provide the basis for future BCPR support. The team has notes that this is a very commendable step towards developing a more coherent and strategic approach. A smaller conflict prevention project was carried out in *Benin* prior to the 2011 elections without any thorough analysis of the dynamics of conflict, although Benin is not a country that has been prone to violent conflict in recent time.

The absence of comprehensive conflict analysis and other kinds of socio-economic analysis/profiling, gender and diversity analysis, analysis of fragility causes/trends/patterns – that could provide guidance to programmatic priorities and approaches – is a serious weakness leaving UNDP's CPR programmes vulnerable in terms of relevance to local acute and longer term needs. CPR work takes place in high-risk and complex environments, and if the drivers of conflict and the power dynamics are not understood in some depth, there is not only a risk of missing relevant needs but a **risk of 'doing harm'** and a risk of unanticipated negative impacts in relation to specific population groups.

The four examples below highlight different practices in different COs.

Below: good analysis, good contextual design

The UNDP/IOM Joint Conflict Reduction Programme in Sudan (2011-12 with anticipated prolongation) aims to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the Protocol Areas. Based on a number of existing documents as well as the comprehensive CRMA conflict risk mapping this programme puts together a decent analysis of the conflict in the Protocol areas and develops a flexible and integrated programme with possibility for rapid actions and maintenance of a long term peacebuilding and conflict prevention perspective builds the capacity of public and CSO mechanisms for conflict resolution. This reflects very well the fluent situation on the ground with cycles of peace and conflict.

Below: limited analysis, bad design, lack of implementing capacity, bad implementation

A DDR in Darfur project 2009-2010 aimed to strengthen capacity of national, sub-national, state and local institutions and communities to manage the environment and natural disasters to reduce conflict over natural resources and to restore post–conflict socio-economic infrastructure, revive economy and generate employment. With field assessments described as successful but with

only limited systematic conflict analyses the project was in a later review31 strongly criticized for weak design, lack of strategy, lack of time for preparation and lack of implementing capacity.

Below: lack of contextual analysis and design

The evaluation *Evaluation de la contribution du PNUD aux résultats de développement en République Démocratique du Congo (2003-2011)*, produced by UNDP's Evaluation Office is strongly critical towards the UNDP programming as it had been implemented in the last part of the period. The report recommends that the UNDP's interventions shall be based on common assessments between authorities and all stakeholders external and precise mapping of complementarities in their respective actions. Moreover, it must be ensured that these operations are carefully tailored to the political and operational context in the country rather than formula-based, standardized principles and institutional rules.

Below: High ambitions, no analysis, deemed to fail.

In other cases like in the important and also ambitious UNDP Nepal Conflict Prevention Programme from September 2010 the conflict analysis is indeed reduced to an analysis of different stakeholders' interest and to an overview of potential threats to peace. Besides aiming to build sustained capacities for collaboration, dialogue and conflict management the programme also aims to ensure that development programmes are designed , implemented and monitored though conflict sensitive approaches and in an integrated way reforms the way the UN provides its development assistance. Such ambitions would indeed need to make use of a comprehensive conflict analysis in order to succeed.

What do we expect from an analysis ahead of UNDP's involvement?

Few violent conflicts are sustainably settled through a peace agreement and in most countries tensions are waving up and down with apparent risks of a recurring openly violent conflict. The UNDP must in its methodology be prepared to work with a long term strategy for peacebuilding and prevention of recurrent conflicts through reducing the root causes. Equally UNDP must be prepared in a short and midterm perspective to get rapidly and directly involved in the conflict dynamics as well as strengthening the local society's conflict resolution capacity to prevent immediate outbreaks of violence e.g. by strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms.

In other words UNDP must be prepared and plan for mid and long term development programmes with an added conflict sensitivity and simultaneously strengthen its capacity to play a strong and important role in the dynamics that at any time might trigger new conflicts.

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[31] Preparatory Support Project to DDR Darfur, Programme Review and Lessons Learned, June 2011 - UNDPBCPR

To be able both to respond to the dynamic and structural causes of conflict the demands to the conflict analysis and its reflection in the strategy on the ground are indeed high. In our view a successful conflict analysis for UNDP should work with three areas:

• The root causes of conflict and what could theoretically reduce them.

• The objective interests of the very actors – at the level of political and military leaders within the striding population groups; at the level of public authorities, institutions and civil society organisations; as well as at the level of communities.

• The perceptions among the actors involved in conflict at higher and middle levels, but definitely also among the citizens directly touched by or involved in the conflict.

The key and most challenging work for UNDP's strategy for preventing the conflicts and building sustainable development is to transfer the conflict analyses into coherent and comprehensive strategies targeting all sides of the conflict and designed for timely actions in short, mid and long term perspectives.

The scenario based analyses that have been carried out for e.g. Darfur, Tunisia and currently Jordan have received positive comments among staff and evaluation reports and very well illustrate the complexity and fluidity of conflicts.

In order to make full use of its analytical capacity the BCPR could develop further the joint analyses with other agencies, but definitely also with large donors as the European Union that is in the beginning of strengthening its external service and is weak on coherent analysis of conflicts. Shared ownership to conflict analyses is not only a way to reduce costs but also a way to give BCPR analyses a leading place in the market.

Analytical work in natural disaster related programmes. The team has reviewed natural disaster related programmes in Indonesia and Pakistan though country visits and Benin and Haiti through desk studies.

In Indonesia, an example of a thorough problem analysis is found in the programme document for the Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction (SCDRR),32 presented in a table as a "best practice disaster management system" The design process for DRR programmes is generally assessed by stakeholders as good and characterised by a high degree of involvement of authorities at central and local level, good analytical work and learning from lessons from previous projects.

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[32] Safer Communities Through Disaster Risk Reduction (SCDRR) in Development, United Nations Development Programme & National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), Government of Indonesia, 2009.

In the response provided by UNDP Pakistan to the country's worst ever floods in August-September 2010 affecting more than 20 million people, the early recovery programme was based on a thorough need assessment made by the implementing partners and supported by UNDP, The baselines and identification of benchmarks at the inception stage were in Pakistan found to be beneficial to determine the impact of interventions. This work could be strengthened by incorporating support for needs assessment as part of the overall implementation strategy. The CPR Unit in the Pakistan CO has been very active in developing guidelines for systematising the analytical work, through e.g. producing Guidelines for Early Recovery Assessment in Pakistan.

4.2.2   Gender equality elements

There are a number of examples of interventions that have women as a specific target group with a focus on e.g. women's social and economic conditions through credit and employment schemes (Benin, Haiti, DRC). However, it is unclear whether these projects have made a difference in terms of changing the underlying inequalities in the relations between men and women in the communities. There is little evidence that gender is mainstreamed into BCPR interventions in a systematic manner. Gender analysis providing more in depth knowledge of relations between men and women does not appear to be conducted and/or applied. Consequently the promotion of women's rights are dealt with in a rather traditional way which does not promote real change in relations between men and women. The limited level of gender expertise and ability to develop strategies that take into account gender equality in a crisis prevention and recovery at the CO level is probably the main factor that can account for this lack of gender mainstreaming. There are, however, a few examples of more successful gender intervention. The Access to Justice Project for Victims of Sexual Violence in DRC is in fact considered one of the most successful CPR interventions in UNDP-DRC due to its integrated approach. Hence, by contributing to substantial improvements of the penal chain for victims of sexual violence, the project has had a positive impact on the security and justice system as a whole. Interviews have also indicated that BCPR has provided the most consistent support and follow up of this specific project both during and after the project design phase which was stressed as one of the key factors contributing to its success.

The cross-cutting gender issue is still mainly considered a separate issue targeting women in many UNDP programmes, as e.g. seen in DRC. The advantages of encouraging the participation of women in post conflict settings and in formal and informal mediation processes do not seem to have been explored thoroughly. Sexual and gender based violence is often rampant in crisis situations and in many cases used as a deliberate war tactic. In DRC this issue is a strong concern and it has been supported with substantial financial resources from BCPR. However, BCPR's support in this area has been somewhat ambiguous with regard to enhancing the CO's role and expertise in this area. Hence the fact that BCPR funded a senior advisor responsible for the implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence anchored in the UN stabilization mission MONUSCO, while more or less

simultaneously an expert was recruited within the CO to develop a proposal for Multi-sector Sexual Gender Based violence, created a lot of confusion The CO's proposal was eventually dropped and UNDP has not been actively involved in any of the 5 pillars of intervention of the Comprehensive UN Strategy. In Haiti, although it is recognised that women find themselves in particularly vulnerable position after the 2010 earthquake, few concrete actions seem to have been initiated to address the question of Gender Based Violence. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and conflict (as well as related resolutions) addresses the issue of gender based violence as well as other central elements in adopting a gender perspective in peace processes and conflict resolution and would be logical to use as a key document in the country based CPR work. Experience shows that if the gender issue is not integrated in the programme during the design phase there is a serious risk that it will remain an add-on rather than a mainstream issue during programme implementation. UNDP/BCPR has developed the so-called "Eight Point Agenda: Practical, positive outcomes for girls and women in crisis" addressing important aspects of women's role in peace building, disaster risk reduction, gender-responsive recovery. The review team has observed that even though gender perspectives are incorporated in many country programmes, there is no overall rigorous follow-up on this from BCPR and supported interventions do not contribute significantly to changing the dynamics causing violations of women's rights and inequalities between men and women. Gender activities are still mainly considered a separate issue targeting women and few efforts seem to have been invested into strengthening the participation of women in post conflict settings and in formal and informal mediation processes (DRC).

4.2.3   Relevance to national and UNDP capacities to deliver

This review has found **no direct connection** between low capacities of a given government or a CO to deliver on the one hand and the intensity and volume of support from BCPR on the other. The obvious assumption would be that a relatively weak CO in a crisis country would receive relatively more support from BCPR, but the reverse rather seems to be the case (Benin, Uganda not receiving much support, while strong COs in Pakistan, Georgia and Colombia receiving considerable support). It is in this connection very important to distinguish between financial and technical support. DRC has for example received a high level of funding but not much technical support. A strong CO like UNDP Indonesia has almost reached a stage where support from BCPR is rarely asked for, as BCPR technical capacities are not seen as the most relevant ones, and experts from the region are seen to add better value to the programmes. There are examples of very relevant support from BCPR such as a very successful training course in "How to work in conflict affected areas" for the Somalia CO, that according to staff members was highly relevant in relation to enhancing the capacity at CO and field office level. Perhaps reflecting a symptom of the lack of systematic and strategic approaches, this course was however never **followed up** by refresher training or other activities from BCPR but remained a one-off activity. On the other hand the support from BCPR to assist the CO in a programming process did not **match the CO's own capacity**

as the competencies of the external consultant provided were not adequate for the task at hand.

An example of a potentially negative effect of BCPR support on relevance is the support provided to DRC. Without any clear CPR strategy of its own and with weak government institutions, the CO seems to a large degree to have prioritised a large number of small scale activities instead of comprehensive, holistic and flexible programming adjustable to the context development. The scattered project portfolio is an undesired consequence of a lack of strategic approach in the CO and a lack of support from BCPR in assisting the CO in identifying interventions that are most likely to have a long lasting impact. BCPR programme **funding modalities**, provided mostly as seed funding with a duration of 18-24 months have also contributed to this lack of coherence in DRC's project portfolio. Another undesired consequence of this modality is that 80 % of all project funding to the CO runs out in 2012. In DRC, large budget allocations have also been made to fund staff in the UN stabilization mission MONUSCO. The reason why this kind of support has been provided seems to be related to the fact that MONUSCO has in practice been leading most CPR interventions while the UNDP-DRC has had limited capacity to take on a leading role in this field. Experience show, however, that this can in create misunderstandings

4.3   Project design

This review's overall finding is that thorough design including the necessary analytical work is of high importance to achieving good results, and that some UNDP programmes in the CPR area are strong in this area, but there is no consistent practice on analyses and baseline surveys with the result that many projects and programmes do not include the required level of analysis in the design.

4.3.1   Effective project design in crisis settings

Practically all project descriptions and consequently also review and evaluation reports in their methodologies tend to **focus on outputs** and give much less attention to outcomes and impact. Project design does not include measures or indicators related to impact. The generic UNDP Resources and Results Framework does have a focus on outcomes, but indicators of the framework reflect the output level rather than the outcome level.

The design formats and processes applied by UNDP at country level in relation to BCPR intervention are generally **not adapted to a crisis setting** characterised by high risk and volatility. They do not refer to any frameworks or principles for programming in conflict affected areas etc., such as the OECD DAC Principles for Effective Engagement in Fragile States, nor do they refer to any special BCPR approach to working in crisis affected areas. The lack of crisis-sensitive programming tools also means that the practice regarding analytical work and needs assessments is not uniform across countries with CPR engagement, and the review team has seen cases where the relevant

analyses had not been conducted at all (Indonesia). In the view of the review team, this lack of a specialised and consistent approach to working in crisis areas will potentially affect performance and results negatively as it leaves project success dependent on committed and experienced individuals rather than on systemic procedures and safeguards.

Another design related aspect is that several COs have mainly focussed on setting up individual projects which have not been designed coherently to create synergy. This appears to be the case in DRC with its many individual projects but is also met in other. This 'silo thinking' does not allow for the **flexible and holistic approach** which is needed to deal with the short term dynamics of conflicts as well as the long term structural causes of conflict in the country-specific context. The CO in Somalia has moved away from the individual project approach to a comprehensive programme approach in order to enhance coherence and synergies.

During emergencies, immediate delivery is often prioritised over **medium to long term planning** – which is contrary to current international approaches to crisis programming that are moving away from the 'phased approach' to more comprehensive approaches not necessarily bound to a timeline. Particularly in sudden disaster situations, the project design process is often rushed with a focus on mobilising inputs without thinking through how the intervention will contribute to achieving longer term outcomes and impact. This is, for example, one of the lessons learnt after the Haiti earthquake.

Ideally, **effective design in crisis settings** should include elements like those listed below which, combined together in a comprehensive crisis sensitive programming framework, can be adjusted to the given context and character of crisis (e.g. natural disaster or conflict related). Inspiration can be drawn from frameworks developed by OECD-DAC, the World Bank, INGOs, humanitarian organisations, bilateral donors and others.

- Comprehensive analysis of given crisis such as conflict analysis, state fragility, humanitarian situation, drivers of conflict etc.
- Informed programme priority choices based on analytical work.
- Regular monitoring of crisis context (conflict, natural disasters, fragility, political instability, human rights, gender …)
- Flexibility built into programme to allow a shift of focus between stable and non-stable areas without bureaucratic procedures.
- Risk management system.
- Crisis specific indicators.
- Explicit theories of change: identifying causal link from inputs to outcomes and impact.
- A framework for capturing gender and diversity elements in crisis, e.g. using UNSC Resolution 1325 as a point of departure.

4.3.2 Implications of BCPR modalities of support

The review team find that the nature and scale of BCPR involvement **varies a great deal** between countries. There are indications that countries with strategic partnership agreements (SPF) get more assistance from BCPR. Colombia, DRC and Haiti are examples of countries with SPF and that are big recipients of BCPR support in terms of seed funding and other financial support. At the other end of the spectrum, we find Benin to which very low scale assistance is provided. It is fair to ask whether it is worthwhile for BCPR to have low-scale recipients on their list of priority countries since the impact of such interventions cannot be expected to be very high. It is also fair to ask what determines funding and technical assistance allocations. The review team has not managed to get precise information on the **criteria** by which countries are eligible for what kind and magnitude of BCPR funding , as the country priority list is under revision and will probably be reduced to a fewer number of countries than the 30+ on the current list. The only set of criteria that the review team has come across is contained in BCPR's Bureau Strategy 2007-2011 that has a section on Criteria for Engagement.[33] Overall the strategy stresses that BCPR will strive to allocate its resources where they are most likely to have a positive impact and it further indicates a number of factors that will determine engagement[34]:

- Does the situation meet the crisis criteria?

- Does BCPR currently have the necessary capacity (staff, financial resources)?

- Is there demand from national counterparts for UNDP's participation?

- Does UNDP have a comparative advantage relative to other UN actors?

- In chronic situations, is engagement reasonably expected to have meaningful results?

- In conflict prevention situations, is there an entry point for engagement given the politically sensitive nature of the work?

However, it is unclear whether these criteria are still considered as the ones that should guide the selection of priority countries. At least, based on the review team's interviews in HQ and COs, it can be concluded that the criteria for BCPR engagement do not seem to be well known within BCPR or COs or to be used in a systematic way. Based on the above criteria, and although they are not very specific, it could certainly be questioned whether Benin is relevant for BCPR to have on its list of priority countries if one considers the severity of the crisis, the comparative advantage of UNDP and the results that can be expected from the support provided.

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[33] The review has subsequently been informed of the existence of a prioritisation concept note from 2011

[34] UNDP/BCPR. Bureau Strategy 2007-2011, January 2007, p. 11..

The team also find that BCPR assistance is **integrated** in the country office portfolios to different degrees in different countries. Examples of BCPR assistance integrated in CO portfolios are found in Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia, in the sense that the CPR interventions are projects under 'mainstream programmes' within the country programme. In Benin, the CPR work is part of the country portfolio as a specific area of intervention, but is not integrated in the main country programmes on poverty reduction, governance etc. This has capacity implications in the sense that it is difficult to transfer knowledge if the CPR work is not mainstreamed into areas where human resources are available. In DRC, the CO no longer has a CPR Unit and the CPR interventions are split into the two overall programmes of the CO (governance and poverty reduction). The CPR focal point (who is the only staff member with specific responsibilities within CPR) is part of the poverty reduction unit and has limited capacity to follow interventions that fall under the governance unit. Consequently it is difficult to ensure the required coherence between the different CPR interventions. In countries such as Sudan and Kenya the conflicts and for the latter also disasters have separate outcome areas from CPRU, DRRU and PBCRU, while at the same time being mainstreamed into the CPAP and UNDAF. In countries dominated by conflicts or disasters the double approach seems correct having both separate CPR units and mainstreamed CPR in development programming. With countries of little crisis intensity the mainstream approach might be sufficiently conditioned that there still is capable CPR staff. In Colombia there is good communication between management and portfolio managers (called area coordinators) and the CPR portfolio is well integrated with the rest of the country programme. In Georgia, BCPR principles are well integrated into the regular CO portfolio, also including other CO areas like governance and poverty reduction, livelihoods, etc.

The use of **seed funding** as BCPR's main financial support modality without systematic up scaling and the lack of agreed strategy has (among other factors) resulted in a lack of coherence and reduced the medium to long term consistency of interventions. BCPR seed funding has been effective in helping the CO initiate new projects for which the office has, in some cases, managed to mobilise additional funding. However, strategies on how to evaluate and upscale the interventions are not integrated into the design phase so projects frequently close when there is no more funding. In Sudan, BCPR has played a key role in assisting the CO with development and seed funding of CPR projects and is perceived as responsive, efficient and has a culture of urgency that could be used by the rest of UNDP. In DRC, BCPR has also provided funding to organisations other than UNDP (i.e. the UN stabilization mission MONUSCO) and in practice this has tended to contribute to a lack of clear ownership of the support and to undermine UNDP CO's position.

The two different ways of channelling BCPR support to the country level have **implications** in various areas. Integrated support in e.g. programming processes fosters local ownership and sustainability. Additional or parallel support in e.g. sudden crisis situations enhances the ability to respond but COs must maintain a basic capacity to continue with early recovery when additional staff and financing is pulled.

4.4   Implementation, monitoring and evaluation

The questions guiding the review in the assessment of the effectiveness and quality of programme implementation, monitoring and evaluation were:

> - How have programming and procurement modalities within UNDP influenced the successful outcome of projects/programmes assessed?
>
> - What are the other main influences on successful implementation?
>
> - How important is alignment of BCPR supported programmes with other agency/donor programmes?
>
> - How well do projects define, monitor and evaluate results and what determines how well M&E is integrated into the project planning and implementation stages?

The definitions of output, outcome and impact used as guidance for the review team are the ones found in UNDP's Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results (UNDP 2009):

> **OUTPUTS -** The products, capital goods and services that result from development interventions.
> **OUTCOMES -** The short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs; change in development conditions.
> **IMPACT -** Actual or intended changes in human development as measured by people's well-being; improvements in people's lives.

4.4.1   Role of programming and procurement modalities in successful implementation

Being part of UNDP, BCPR benefits from the organisation's immense experience in implementation in all parts of the world. A **solid framework for programming** has been developed over the years and modalities for procurement are in place. It is precisely in the practical implementation on the ground and the ability to mobilise resources that the UNDP has its main strengths. This was confirmed through the country visits undertaken under review, and from the many well managed projects and programmes and positive feedback from partners and other stakeholders. There is no doubt that UNDP's programming framework and procedures and procurement modalities play a decisive role in successful implementation of programmes at the level of **delivery and outputs.** The **decentralisation** and de facto delegation of power to UNDP offices in the field is also stressed as one of the main strengths of UNDP interventions in recent years and has allowed for a more operational approach responding to local needs.

BCPR could do more to **tailor the programming framework to crisis situations**. There are two reasons for this: 1) the generic framework does not go beyond the level of output, and 2) crisis situations are much more challenging in terms of volatility, risks and security. As part of the PME

Handbook of UNDP from 2009, BCPR has developed a framework for CPR programmes, but this is not very detailed and the COs have largely been left to rely on good practices developed by individual staff members with experience from crisis situations.

It should be noted that given the complexity and volatility of crisis situations even in the post-emergency period, the integrated HQ/CO structure that is usually set up in the emergency response (3-month) phase should be mirrored more or less in the post-emergency phase to succeed the SURGE when it withdraws. This is because all the management, technical and financial resources of the organisation should come together to provide the timeliness, responsiveness, urgency, and flexibility needed to implement recovery programmes. This integrated oversight and support mechanism would be required no matter the programming framework adopted, given the very strong roles that BCPR, Regional Bureaux and COs have to play in their various areas of authority to make things work. Such a mechanism would go a long way towards cutting back on the bureaucracy. Indeed, the authority that lies with each of these key actors is enough to stop things from happening. The review has included a recommendation to this effect.[35]

The backside of being a large worldwide organisation is the risk of becoming bureaucratic. There is evidence in this review that UNDP procedures are seen as **overly bureaucratic** by partners and that this has slowed down the process in crisis settings. BCPR funding may be dispatched quickly but there are often delays at CO level, which has for example been the case in DRC and Haiti. Some improvements have however been made in speeding up procurement in crisis affected countries through new fast-track modalities.

Part of programming is also allocation of resources, and there is a need to **prioritise resources** in order to set the agenda and deliver effectively in critical areas. In Haiti, the capacity to coordinate the early recovery cluster was, for example, found to be insufficient. Strong UNDP/BCPR leadership would have helped speed up the reconstruction process that had been stalled by diverging approaches among agencies and donors.

The length of the funding cycle and programme period is an issue, although the findings are slightly different from country to country. In Colombia the programmes are relatively long (3-5 years) allowing for in-depth work and change to occur, and making sustainable impact more likely. The Uganda CO – as well as most other COs with a CPR engagement - had a different experience and finds short term funding frequently inappropriate, as it 'takes 6-8 months to consult and plan, include local community, etc.; then another couple of months to mobilize funds; and then you have to rush to spend the money before the 12-18 month funding period ends,' so things end up being done hurriedly without adequate time and attention at the end. The general feedback from COs is that BCPR should make **longer term commitments** and urge other donors to do the same.

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[35] Please refer to Chapter 6 for details.

4.4.2   Other main influences on successful implementation

Other factors found to have important influence on successful implementation include:

Strong alignment and cooperation with authorities. Indonesia and Georgia are good examples of COs having a strong relationship with authorities, which is crucial in crisis situations. Methodologically it is an advantage that the programmes and projects have been implemented in close collaboration with ministries and other public authorities because it emphasizes national ownership and sustainability. However, in a conflict context this may in some cases pose problems if the government is a part in the conflict, while other political parties, civil society and other stakeholders may represent other sides of it. This has to be handled professionally e.g. through ensuring inclusion of all sides as partners, an approach which the Kenya CO has applied.

The **security situation** and the ability to tackle it. The finding from Somalia is that UNDP is doing this well, and in countries like Colombia and Georgia has gained access to crisis affected areas not accessible by government.

Prioritizing **risk management.** A good example of what can be done is the new joint UN-donor risk management project in Nairobi which also includes training of UN staff and partners. In other countries such as Uganda, the feedback is that this area has not received sufficient attention.

Strong on-the-ground presence. The general finding is that UNDP is particularly strong on this in emergency situations, where COs in Pakistan and Indonesia are very strong examples. The feedback in the case of the Somalia CO points to the importance of posting staff with decision making authority at field offices in order to facilitate smooth implementation.

The **involvement of local partners and working bottom-up.** UNDP are often characterised as a top-down organisation 'rolling out' its preconceived programmes without much involvement of local resources. While this is probably true in some cases (Haiti, Benin), this review found very good examples of participatory approaches with a strong local involvement (Colombia, Georgia, Pakistan, Indonesia).

UNDP's strong **focus on long term capacity development,** which is the core mandate of UNDP. Most countries may state it as a priority but in practice one of the major difficulties of BCPR has been to ensure that long lasting effects are in fact dealt with - often because analysis in the design phase is insufficient. DRR does not always have the intended effect on building resilience and preventing future disasters, which has been seen in Haiti. And conflict prevention has not in all cases been effective in addressing the root causes of conflict, of which DRC is an illustration. In countries with strong governments such as Pakistan and Indonesia there are clear indications of successful capacity development such as UNDP support to the establishment of specialised government agencies for disaster risk management.

Timely and relevant BCPR involvement. The feedback tells us how important it is to tailor the support to the situation and be very precise on exact needs in terms of quality and timing, in order to match capacities and processes at CO level (Somalia, Pakistan, Colombia, Georgia).

4.4.3 Importance of alignment with other agency/donor programmes

BCPR is not an implementing organisation and always works in partnership with others through the UNDP Country Offices. Therefore alignment and harmonisation with other programmes and other actors in a given country will always be crucial for achieving good programme results.

The review saw many examples of good **coordination between UNDP/CPRU and other UN agencies** (for example Georgia, Colombia, Indonesia, Somalia), but observed frictions between UNDP and OCHA (Pakistan, Haiti and vaguely in Kenya) due to unclear boundaries between their respective roles. UNDP's leading role in coordinating early recovery interventions appears to interfere with OCHA's role as coordinator of humanitarian interventions, and in some countries this challenge has been difficult to reconcile. One example of this is the Pakistan CO where considerable effort has been put into clarifying the respective roles pof UNDP and UNOCHA in different stages of the crisis/post-crisis situation.

Cooperating with other actors is conducive for succeeding **with holistic approaches** to address the needs of specific communities, which is, for example, done well in Colombia. It also reduces the risk of overlap and providing redundant services to same beneficiaries.

UNDP HQ appears to be very conscious of whether there is a **need** for the organisation to play a role in a given crisis situation, or if other actors are already well placed to provide assistance. It was, for example, mentioned by staff in the Sudan CO that BCPR pulled out after other donors became involved in a programme support. This is fine if it is part of a coordinated plan, but in other cases the methodological inputs and advice are requested by the COs.

Another advantage of alignment is that **programmes complement each other** as, for example, the Community Security and Small Arms Project and the Joint programme for Local Governance in Somalia. Another example, as in Uganda, is different agencies providing psycho-social support to ex-combatants in a DDR programme or to women who were sex-slaves who are now in a livelihoods programme and also require HIV/AIDs education or treatment, and conflict management training. The situation with respect to programmes complementing each other varies considerably between countries, though. In Benin, there was no evidence that complementarity with other donor interventions has been taken into account. Haiti has experienced flag raising among agencies wanting to highlight their contribution which appears to have had a counterproductive effect on alignment. DRC previously experienced a lot of rivalry and competition among agencies but there has been recent

collaboration with FAO, UNHABITAT and UNESCO on joint projects. Initially the collaboration was established to raise funds, but the agencies have gradually come to realize the added value in adopting a complementary approach, and several new joint projects are in the pipeline.

It appears to be difficult for UNDP to position itself in countries where there is a large SC-mandated **UN peacekeeping mission** such as DRC and Haiti. Evidence from these two countries indicates that UNDP' s peace building and post- conflict recovery interventions are not always well articulated with the work of the UN missions. This may to a certain extent be related to the fact that UNDP is more oriented towards long term development, and that in some ways, its approaches therefore differ from that of a peacekeeping mission, although there are also a number of overlaps.[36]At the same time, the UN missions have much larger amounts of resources available. It is thus crucial for UNDP to focus on specific areas of its competence where it can provide an added value in order to influence the agenda UN stabilization and reconstruction work.

4.4.4 Planning for and capturing results

In the guidelines for Results-Based Management (RBM) guidelines in UNDP's Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results,[37] results are described as the totality of output, outcome and impact. At country level, the Resources and Results Framework is the most commonly used framework for keeping track of results in projects and programmes.

Results at country level are measured through the UNDP RBM system which, at project level, is focused on **outputs** and includes outcome at the country level. It is clear from a sample of reports from the Governance Programme and the ROLS programme in Somalia that the focus is very much on outputs such as trainings delivered, equipment provided, seminars held, etc. This is the case in the other country programmes reviewed, as all COs use the generic UNDP framework.

Some of the strong COs have started **developing the system further** to better capture the results. UNDP Somalia has recently developed new formats for their project and programme reporting to better respond directly to objectives and intensifying the reporting from six-annual to quarterly progress reports. The Indonesia CO has a very strong M&E Unit that does regard BCPR as a centre of expertise but prefer to develop their own formats as well. In Indonesia and Pakistan booklets on **best practices** have been produced in order to strengthen exchange of experience and lessons learnt from implementation.

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[36] While DPKO tends to be very focused on strengthening security management, UNDP/BCPR's emphasizes the need to balance this with rule of law and access to justice interventions. Another example concerns DDR, where UNDP has a more collective approach that involves communities and not only ex-combatants.

[37] Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results United Nations Development Programme 2009

Documentation on **broader results** is scarce. Some programme reports do however reflect on lessons learnt from earlier project or phases, necessary changes resulting from those, and identification of best practices.

It is clear that **weak design** influences the quality of monitoring and evaluation. In most programme and project documents reviewed, there were **no specific indicators or benchmarks** related to work in crisis environments and no consistent practice regarding baseline surveys that could have provide a good basis for monitoring and evaluation. As part of the UNDP PME Handbook from 2009, a (brief) compendium on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Prevention and Recovery Settings outlines some basic principles for conflict-sensitive programming and other important elements, but this seems not to be used at country level.[38]

4.4.5   Key challenges in monitoring of projects and programmes

The monitoring and evaluation of BCPR and UNDP projects poses significant difficulties because of the lack of baseline studies, the lack of definition of outcomes and impact, as well as the lack of systematic procedures and /or capacity with BCPR, COs and partners.

Some of the key challenges in the monitoring of projects and programmes are:

The limitations in the systems and formats result in a strong focus on output of projects and programmes and less focus on outcome.

The limited use of existing guidelines for conflict sensitive programming in BCPR means that not all CPR programmes are planned and implemented according to key principles.

BCPR is not part of line management towards the COs but the fact that most projects or programmes are started with funding from BCPR, and often are (co-)designed by experts offered from BCPR should ensure that BCPR's approach would be used in CPR work if BCPR consistently presents its tools and guidelines. BCPR, however, does not seem to offer a coherent monitoring or evaluation mechanism to the COs.

As mentioned earlier, the lack of a successor mechanism for enhanced recovery programming support remains a major problem as well. Some recent steps may contribute to more coherent approaches and decision-making, such as an "Executive Team" chaired by the Associate Administrator to make sure that high-level decisions with important policy and political implications are made jointly and in a timely manner. The "SURGE" ensures that enhanced management support capacities are provided in a timely manner to enable COs

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[38] Compendium #1 – Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Prevention and Recovery Settings, BCPR, 2009

cope with the first 3 months of a crisis. The recently introduced "fast-track procedures" ensure that procurement/recruitment can now be done in a more timely manner. The gap appears to be, however, that there is no such mechanism when it comes to recovery programming post-SURGE, despite the continued volatility and complexity of the setting for programme/project implementation. This is recognized by BCPR as a major challenge. Another challenge related to the paucity of analysis is the lack of a shared analytical baseline of information between BCPR, the Regional Bureaux and Cos posing an obstacle to joint and coherent monitoring.[39]

CPR projects and programmes are integral parts of UNDP country programmes and are not monitored separately.

•   In some places there is insufficient staff capacity to actively monitor projects on a frequent basis. There is also a need to train local partners in M&E in some countries such as Uganda. In Georgia the COBREM programme works with more than 50 local partners/projects and provides M&E support to them so that they know how to conduct M&E and file reports.

The different levels of M&E defined at CO level do not seem a sufficient guarantee for documentation on how projects have contributed to outcomes in their specific context. This is a crucial weakness and will become even more so with increased demands and more restricted donor funding.

4.5   Impact and sustainability

> •   Where projects were judged to be successful - vis-a-vis having positive development impacts - what is the relative influence of this positive success of: good design, effective delivery, contingent factors?
>
> •   What was the impact of absorptive capacity in country, and how well were absorptive capacity issues taken into account in project design, implementation and partnership?

The definition of impact used as guidance for the review team is the one found in UNDP's Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results (UNDP 2009):

> **IMPACT -** Actual or intended changes in human development as measured by people's well-being; improvements in people's lives

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[39] BCPR, January 2012

4.5.1 Documentation of impact

Given the focus of this review, which is not an impact assessment as such, information has been gathered on *indications of likely impact* in the countries covered. In most countries the review found that the impact of programmes and projects has been mixed.

In Sudan it was found **difficult to assess the impact of programmes and projects as formulated in the present documents** – and it would be fair to say that this is the situation in most countries due to the way reporting is being done. It is not possible to assess impact by whether stable peace has been achieved or conflicts have been prevented because a number of factors exert influence on conflict situations. However, a number of benchmarks or milestones could be developed for all programmes and projects defining what the expected outcome will be. Depending on the specific project indicators, as, for example, increased trade, traffic and communication between former enemies or less bias of media content about the other side, could be first steps of measurable progress and more ambitious indicators could be formulated for later phases. More or less the same situation is found in relation to the Somalia CO, where there is a **very limited focus on programme impact**, as the UNDP guiding frameworks do not go beyond output. This area will need to be strengthened to document and understand the broader impact better – including unintended negative impact. A more systematic application of Do No Harm principles might facilitate this process but it also needs firm management steps and formalised systems. A lot of UNDP's engagement in capacity development with government at various levels in Somalia is focussed on reaching sustainable improvements; for example, the work with the police under the Governance Programme. A more direct reflection in progress reporting on the degree of success in building sustainable capacity would produce clearer evidence of UNDP's achievements in this area.

Among the interventions likely to have achieved a **positive impact** is the engagement in Ituri in DRC, where UNDP is considered to have contributed significantly to the promotion of social cohesion by addressing inter-ethnic and intra-community tensions. Projects in the field of access to justice and rule of law are assessed to have had a positive impact in DRC, Somalia and Pakistan due to (among other things) the adoption of comprehensive approaches. The engagement in community security and armed violence reduction in Somalia is another example which has had a documented positive impact on community security. In Colombia, UNDP technical support to national government ministries and institutions has shown positive results in assisting to develop national policies on a number of issues. In Kenya, the multifaceted programming carried out by PBCPU in close cooperation with the government and politicians seems to have established structures and facilitated processes preventing political violence during the recent referendum. And the livelihood programme in Kenya seems helpful for the involved communities because of its emphasis on the development of alternative types of livelihood and cross-conflict dialogue, but it does not target the reduction of risks related to natural disasters per se and therefore has limited sustainability. In Nepal, the Livelihoods Outcome Evaluation has registered important impacts from the

programme itself. It stresses that UNDP CO has been able to adjust from an entire conflict situation to and through the transitional situation towards development.

In Uganda, the UNDP capacity building projects at the national government level have shown good results in assisting the government and its various ministries to develop national policies, such as the National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management. There are indications of intended and achieved impact of UNDP DRR and the peace building programmes in Indonesia, in particular in the area of strengthening policies, legislation and governmental capacity in the fields of Disaster Risk Reduction and Peace Building/Conflict Prevention and Management. This is one of the important results of a long-standing partnership with central and local government in Indonesia which regards UNDP as a trusted partner ready to assist when a crisis strikes and also in long-term support to strengthening governmental capacity in managing natural disasters as well as conflict related crises. Along similar lines, the creation of provincial disaster management institutes in Pakistan can be attributed to the success of support provided by UNDP to NIDM. These institutes will continue to exist and work once the funding from UNDP comes to an end. In Georgia too, UNDP is working with the government at national and municipal levels to build capacity, and has been particularly effective in working with a number of ministries concerned with DRR. In Georgia and Uganda, programmes focused on provision of infrastructure and goods are found to have immediate impact, with long-term sustainability always a risk as local communities and municipalities must adhere to their commitments for upkeep and maintenance.

Examples of projects and programmes **less likely to have achieved much** in terms of impact are UNDP's engagement in relation to the conflict fuelled by access to minerals in the Kivus, where there is no clear indication of long term impact in terms of economic recovery and resolution of the underlying causes of conflict. In Benin, pilot interventions with a more narrow scope such as economic recovery targeting a specific group (women) or conflict management training for the establishment of local peace committees have had difficulty in achieving real impact.

Haiti is another example of doubt about the impact. Although UNDP's engagement in emergency and recovery operations in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake have without doubt contributed to preventing an aggravation of the crisis, it is still too soon to determine to what extent the support has increased the resilience of the Haitian government and people to overcome future shocks and threats . There are clearly needs that remain insufficiently addressed, especially when it comes to the more long-term needs that are crucial for the reconstruction process such as the resettlement of earth quake survivors.

4.5.2 Steps to enhance sustainability

In view of its core mandate being capacity development, UNDP should be well placed to reach good results in terms of sustainability. UNDP often finds itself

in a quite unique position vis-à-vis the government because of its **long term commitment and neutrality**. However, in some countries (e.g. DRC) the CO does not appear to have used this position proactively to initiate a dialogue with the government on key reform issues.

In some countries like Uganda, project design in **recovery programmes** failed, by and large, to take into account the long-term sustainability of implemented actions. Quick Impact Projects, in particular, suffered from this, and addressed immediate needs with middling success in the longer term.

The extent to which COs work systematically with **exit strategies** varies from country to country. In Uganda, exit strategies do not seem to have been part of the planning in the last phase of interventions. In Colombia, the CPR exit strategy for programme components targeting governance is that the Colombian government's capacity will strengthen to the point where support is no longer required. A recent BCPR mission to Colombia surprisingly recommended that exit strategies not be considered at this time. This is contrary to common knowledge and experience, that exit strategies must be considered even at the project design stage in order to be realistic and transparent in relation to the implementing partners.

Even though documentation of results is weak, it should fairly be mentioned that in most countries the BCPR supported projects and technical assistance have not only aimed at micro level interventions, but had an **ambition to strengthen sustainable mechanisms.** Although the exact role played by UNDP is difficult to assess in all situations, its interventions have no doubt contributed to the development of sustainable structures, policies and plans. Examples are UNDP's contribution to the strengthening of the justice sector in DRC and Haiti, or the adoption of the first national contingency plan for management of crisis and natural disasters in Benin.

A good example of a comprehensive UNDP effort with a **strong focus on longer term impact and sustainability** is the integrated strategy of three related projects in Indonesia, designed to consolidate peace, reduce the impact of future natural disasters, and build the foundations for a sustainable economic recovery that benefits all citizens in Aceh. Similarly, in Pakistan under the peace and development program, UNDP provided necessary seed money for the salaries of specialist staff needed at the national agency PaRSSA. There is now indication from the government of its intention to take over, in incremental phases, salary costs of staff, supported by UNDP. In Georgia and Colombia too, design and implementation take into account various aspects of impact and sustainability, with local ownership (municipal government or local community) frequently addressed in content and by partnership.

An example of a programme with inadequate focus on sustainability is the early recovery intervention in Haiti, where the slow pace of reconstruction means that the situation remains very volatile which indicates that the country suffers from a **lack of clear transition strategy** from emergency to recovery and sustainable development. This is an area where UNDP/ BCPR should have a

comparative advantage, but does not seem to have manifested itself in an actual role of leadership in making the process smoother.

In view of the many other factors influencing sustainability of interventions, it is not possible to single out UNDP's contribution as the one crucial factor. Fragile and volatile environments often add to this **attribution problem**. In Colombia's complicated and volatile conflict environment with repeated crises and large numbers of affected population, for example, UNDP's long-term impact is difficult to discern, even though indications are positive with CSO's attributing much of their impact on government policy to UNDP's support.

4.6   Partnerships

- How well were partnerships and dialogue initiated and developed throughout all stages of project design and implementation with (a) national authorities and stakeholders, (b) other international actors?

- What role did partnerships play in the extent to which projects had impact?

Partnerships with government and non-governmental organisations and other stakeholders at country level are crucial to UNDP/BCPR as a non-implementing organisation. The approach to partnership is taken very seriously by COs as they depend to a great extent on their partners in achieving the intended programme results.

The review team met with government partners and NGOs in the nine countries visited and found a mostly positive and diverse pattern in the way COs related to partners, and also a number of challenges and opportunities to pursue for improvement.

4.6.1   Partnerships with governments

The feedback from government stakeholders was positive on the partnership with UNDP in the majority of countries visited (Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, Georgia), while there were mixed experiences in Haiti and DRC.[40]

In Indonesia, stakeholders in and around the SC-DRR and PTD programmes confirmed the good cooperation with UNDP on CPR programme, in particular the planning department BAPPENAS which is the main partner. In addition to **capacity development**, the partnership entails **regular dialogue** between BAPPENAS and CPRU on issues related to implementation of the programme. Through the partnership approach, CPRU/UNDP is by stakeholders seen as giving leverage to the importance of the programme and lending its convening power to the stakeholders. In Pakistan the government partners have generally been appreciative of UNDP for understanding their needs and also **recognising**

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[40] The review team did not meet with government partners in Somalia

the significance of existing government structures as a means of service delivery. These relationships are developed around the concept of shared vision but also driven by the provision of resources from UNDP. There is need for development of clear guidelines for partnership. This may be in the form of a "Partnership Development Policy or Framework" so that expectations are clear from the start of the project.

UNDP Georgia has proven adept at working with the government, and has been useful to it in building capacity on a number of fronts. In the CPR portfolio, assistance to the Law and Justice sector stands out as a place where BCPR support played a critical role in building local capacity. In Colombia, government agencies consulted were **complimentary** of UNDP's interventions and capacity-building support, citing that UNDP works in regions where government and other organizations are not or cannot be active; that UNDP is a good bridge, bringing the national strategy to a territorial level; and that UNDP brings other international actors and stakeholders to the table.

In Uganda the effectiveness thus far of UNDP CPR implementing programmes in partnership with other organizations and institutions, including the Ugandan government and both local and international organizations, is mixed. Varying **capacities of implementing partners** have been a factor playing into UNDP success, with some implementing projects effectively and others having been less successful.

4.6.2   Partnerships with civil society organisations

The feedback from civil society organisations (CSOs) was positive in countries like Kenya, Somalia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Colombia. What was particularly emphasized was the involvement of CSOs in programme formulation, the trust shown by UNDP in respecting the organisations' values and modalities of work, the element of strengthening civil society at the local and national level, and the networking and dialogue work done by UNDP. There was however also criticism of UNDP's bureaucratic procedures (Kenya, Pakistan), and of the lack of involvement of CSOs in crucial programme processes (DRC and Haiti).

UNDP Somalia has a sharp focus on partnership development and has generally a good reputation as a responsible partner among government and NGO stakeholders in Somaliland and Puntland. NGO and private sector partners are selected based on careful assessment of their abilities taking into account relevant existing networks and initiatives with which to partner. This modality is already widely used in south-central Somalia and its use in Puntland and Somaliland will increase. In Pakistan, BCPR has developed a strong linkage with NGOs for early recovery, but the majority of such organizations are either international or national. The team from UNDP provides an overall framework of working but leaves the decisions about execution to the implementing partners. In Colombia, local partners highlighted the value of UNDP's networking and dialogue work, strengthening civil society organizations at the local and national levels, and providing local people, particularly IDPs and victims groups, with access to decision makers in government.

In DRC, some interviewees stressed that local stakeholders were not always sufficiently taken into account in the design phase and that intervention were therefore not sufficiently adapted to the local context. At the same time UNDP had good relations with government which were not used in a strategic way to enter into a political dialogue with the government on sensitive issues.

In Haiti, the lack of inclusiveness in needs assessment and project planning has been emphasised. There is also a tendency only to involve CSOs as service providers rather than partners in a broader and deeper sense (DRC and Haiti).

5   Overall assessment of conditions for positive results and long term change

Based on the findings presented in the previous chapter, this chapter presents the review's overall assessment of the key conditions for achieving positive results and long term impact, as well as the assessment of BCPR's strengths and weaknesses in relation to these conditions.

1   Good design with a strong analytical base, and tailored to crisis affected environments.

UNDP/BCPR is strong in programme planning and design with a focus on activity planning and identification of outputs. It would however be useful to strengthen BCPR's approach through working with more explicit theories of change: how will the planned activities provide positive results? There is a need to provide more specific analysis in the design phase on how inter-group and/or systemic change can be promoted to ensure long lasting results and to develop indicators reaching beyond activities and output. More explicit mapping of diagnosed problems and proposed solutions could help revising and refining a programme strategy in an environment that is changing rapidly. The special nature of CPR work requires more systematic analytical work such as conflict analysis with identification of root causes, conflicting identities and interest of actors playing into the dynamics of the conflict, rapid assessments in disaster situations, the link between disaster risk reduction and long term prevention of disaster prone crises, socio-economic analysis including gender aspects, analysis of fragility and instability. In the Conflict-related Development Analysis from 2003 the BCPR offers a pretty straight forward model for analysing conflicts and to some degree also designing a response to these. However, most analyses we have seen do not follow these guidelines and there is clearly a need for updating and disseminating a new version across the system.

Furthermore, the design needs to take into account that CPR programmes need to apply more flexible and crisis sensitive approaches that non-CPR programmes. The team has in some countries observed strong design informed by post-conflict needs assessment and various kinds of studies, and would only

add that there may be a need to more directly address institutional weaknesses and capacity needs which are crucial in fragile contexts. . In relation to conflict it is necessary both to make designs dealing with long term pre-disposing causes and the current or constantly changing dynamic causes. In situations of immediate crisis such as sudden disasters, there is a particular challenge in following a thorough methodological approach, and programmes are often designed while they are rolled out. New programme interventions have in several cases been designed in a rush, and there is a risk of quality demands being set aside because of a need to respond to immediate needs.

In this kind of disaster, proven approaches developed by the humanitarian organisations are often used, and the systematic combination of these and longer term approaches could potentially be one of the key strengths of BCPR and the CO CPR units in disaster risk reduction work. Adapting the overall programming approach to crisis affected settings by building on these good practices and drawing inspiration from other international organisations should be a key task of BCPR in cooperation with its CPR counterparts in COs. In relation to conflict, BCPR is the only international UN agency specialising in conflict prevention and working mainly at track II-level, and should thus take the lead in developing and adjusting approaches and modalities

2   Effective delivery in accordance with short term and long term needs

One of BCPR's strengths has been to seed fund the initial phase of projects and programmes carried out by UNDP CO. And UNDP CO has been good at mobilising additional sources with the help of BCPR in approaching donors. The relevance and impact would however be strengthened if detailed needs assessments were a systemic feature of all CPR programmes as this would ensure that long term needs are better addressed. UNDP-BCPR has conducted a number of comprehensive needs assessments at country level in cooperation with national and international partners, and specialists from BCPR have played a key role in developing approaches to Post-Disaster Needs-Assessments and Post-Conflict Needs Assessments. BCPR has a key role in ensuring that these kinds of comprehensive and joint assessments are conducted in all programmes with substantial BCPR guidance and participation, as part of a unique 'BCPR Approach' to enhance effective and needs-based delivery in natural disasters as well as conflict situations. The focus should be on providing sustainable responses which can minimise risks related to recurring disasters and conflicts.

3   Competent and experienced managers and staff of Country Offices

It is crucial for achieving good programme results that the CO senior staff is competent, experienced and thus adept at manoeuvring with flexibility in a volatile, changeable, sensitive environment, and develops and adapts programmes to suit the specific needs of not only the country but also the specific needs of different regions. All this requires analysis to inform, but also experience to judge, react and act effectively in a politically charged environment. It also requires field staff that is attuned to the same factors.

Overall, the CO senior level managers met during the country visits were impressive with extensive experience from working in crisis affected environments, and possessed a deep knowledge of UNDP as an organisation. The staff of the CPR Units, programme managers and field managers met during the visits were of a high calibre, too, and there is no doubt that this factor impacts positively on the programme results. Some of these COs with strong capacities to work with CPR issues may in fact not need much technical assistance from BCPR. On the other hand, there are also countries that face unanticipated or very complex crisis which the COs are not geared to tackle and where substantial technical support from BCPR is an absolute requirement to ensure effective CPR interventions. Disaster prone countries that are at the same time characterised by severe governance problems and latent conflicts are often particularly vulnerable because the COs are working in an environment not conducive to effective crisis management.

4   Systems and guidelines to ensure consistent programming practices throughout the organisation

Being a large worldwide organisation with long-standing experience and operating large programmes in all continents, there is a risk of inertia and limited flexibility in the ways UNDP works. The creation of BCPR in 2001 was an innovative step responding to the special challenges that UNDP had met in countries affected by conflict and disasters. Specialised capacity has been built up in this field not least because of BCPR, which now has the potential to become the global leader in crisis prevention in relation to natural disasters and conflict, and combinations of the two. In the field of early recovery during natural disasters, BCPR cannot be seen as the natural global leader, as it does not have the same rapid response capacity as the humanitarian organisations, whereas BCPR would often be better placed than others in rapid response to conflict, as well as crisis prevention through assisting governments putting policy and structures in place to mitigate against natural disasters in a preventive way. This review has shown that the specialised expertise has often been of great benefit through technical assistance to COs, funding of CPR staff in COs, as well as through seed funding of projects and programmes. However, it has not led to a very visible specialised and consistent approach to programming and implementation in crisis affected countries. It is considered a weakness that no special CPR approach to crisis countries has been detected during this review. To the extent that tools and methodologies have been developed by BCPR experts, they do not seem to be "internalised" by staff, mainstreamed into CO programming or promoted beyond UNDP. A systematised knowledge in terms of methodologies, tools, and models seems not to exist and the exchange of knowledge or the easy contact to BCPR for advice has not been put in place. Not to mention that organisations like the World Bank seem to move ahead of BCPR with inspiring analyses and models for dealing with conflicts. The review found however a number of good practices but only little consistency between programmes.

**5   Crisis sensitive implementation and M&E frameworks which go beyond
      output and capture effect and impact**

Related to the previous is the total reliance on the generic UNDP frameworks
for programming and monitoring & evaluation, which are not developed for
crisis affected areas and which are focussed on activities and outputs. The
donors interviewed have often insisted that the COs in their CPR work must
move from focusing on outputs to measurable outcomes and impact indicators.
Crisis sensitive implementation also implies addressing and monitoring
triggers/dynamic causes of conflict at the current, on-going level and on root
causes or pre-disposing structural causes at the longer term level. It also implies
capturing and addressing dynamics of natural disasters including when and how
to bridge short term response by building resilience and addressing longer term
needs. In addition, it is crucial to work with gender sensitive indicators to
capture – and respond to – the different needs and capacities of women and
men in a crisis. The actual application of M&E frameworks is another area
calling for attention, in particular in relation to accountability and follow-up
after frameworks have been filled out and reports submitted.

6   Clarity of roles between BCPR, Regional Bureaux and Country Offices

The review found that there is some confusion at CO level regarding what can
be expected from BCPR, and the priority of one country over another for BCPR
support is not understood. The contact with and benefit from BCPR seems
sometimes to rely on personal relations rather than on clear needs based
criteria. The relations with BCPR is in some countries seen as closer than with
the Regional Bureaux and the Regional Service Centres situated in the regions,
which by some COs were seen as unresponsive compared to BCPR and were
viewed as very supportive by others. Others mentioned that the regional
Bureaux were responsible for the performance evaluation of the CO
management and consequently were not criticised. Another factor may be that
the Regional Bureaux are seen by COs more as part of the line management
rather than a source of funding and technical expertise. It might be considered
in relation to the division of roles between BCPR, RBs and COs to find a way
that could ensure a better use of regional bureaux, as they, for example, have
the advantage of proximity to the CO and therefore potentially a better
knowledge of the specific context in the region. The team received very
positive response in cases where a BCPR expert had been seconded to a
Regional Support Centre as this added a specific technical expertise to the
bureau. This could be a good practice to be applied more intensely.

**7   Long term, transparent and predictable commitments in terms of
      funding and technical assistance including follow-up, as well as
      including transparent criteria for selection of BCPR priority countries**

Alignment of expectations between the COs and BCPR and predictability of
support and cooperation came out as areas where the COs are very interested in
a higher level of clarity. Two issues are important in this respect: (a) BCPR

criteria for choice of priority countries, and (b) the experience from the countries where the Strategic Partnership Framework has been applied.

(a) BCPR is currently going through a process of focussing its efforts on fewer countries and this has not yet reached a final decision. The BCPR Strategy 2007 - 2011 presented a set of criteria for engagement to be used as a basis for decision-making on specific engagements. The criteria relate to the type of crisis, whether there is a demand from national counterparts for UNDP participation, availability of the necessary capacity within BCPR, whether UNDP has a comparative advantage, whether meaningful results are realistic, and if entry points for engagement exist.[41] These criteria should be used in conjunction with a country analysis before a decision was taken for engagement in a country. As part of the on-going geographic concentration process, a new set of criteria are expected, and as a response to the interest from many COs in knowing more about strategic priorities on the side of BCPR, it is important that these are clearly communicated to COs, and CO perspectives on the criteria are taken into consideration.

(b) This review covered 7 out of the 12 countries with a Strategic Partnership Framework (SPF) (Uganda, DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Colombia visited, and Nepal, Haiti covered by desk review) and received mainly positive feedback, primarily in relation to predictability of funding and technical support. The review team concludes that the SPF concept is useful, but would benefit from being developed into a more strategic tool. In some (but not all – with e.g. Pakistan and Kenya as exceptions) of the COs not covered by the Strategic Partnership Framework (SPF), the contact with BCPR is considered to be ad hoc and not so predictable. Many expressed interest in a more strategic approach on the part of BCPR, which would also facilitate more systematic follow-up after visits, etc. The feedback from COs shows that the SPF provides opportunities for more strategic and predictable working relations between BCPR and COs. The funding terms vary between short term response and longer term engagements, but a longer term perspective would be preferred in more cases Disasters often develop into protracted humanitarian crises.. Essentially UNDP's role in the Early Recovery cluster has very efficiently managed to tap into the donor funding provided during and around humanitarian emergencies, whether they were a result of conflicts or natural disasters. Conceptually, however, it does not work for conflict settings in its present form and should be redefined in a process led by BCPR and involving representatives from the CO CPR Units. A few principles should be considered for a rapidly deployed funding mechanism to substitute Early Recovery in conflicts: It should be possible to engage rapidly immediately before, during and after eruption of violent conflicts to change the dynamics of conflicts and to take the first steps towards a long term conflict sensitive development programming that targets the structural causes of conflict.

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[41] BCPR Strategy 2007 – 2011, p.11

8   Timely, relevant and quality support provided from BCPR to Country Offices

Even though the support provided by BCPR is generally highly acknowledged by COs and there are fine examples of excellent specialists contributing positively to programming processes over the years, the quality of the support is very uneven and some COs say it has lost intensity during the past 2-3 years. One reason given is the time consuming internal reorganisation of BCPR; another is decline in funding. The review received feedback from several COs regarding delays in funding or technical assistance committed, and also concerns over the technical quality of experts provided. Others, however, praised the expert roster as very useful and important. The findings show that strong COs able to define their needs in precise terms have more success with getting relevant support than COs with less capacity. There is also an impression with some COs of BCPR not having the right expertise in relevant areas, and some have started seeking support elsewhere after a few negative experiences with consultants supplied by BCPR through the roster (ExpRes). This feedback points to a need for BCPR to update the roster, to improve the procedures for providing expertise and ad hoc advice from BCPR to COs, and to strengthen the quality assurance of the experts provided. BCPR is regarded within UNDP as the 'practice leader for crisis prevention and recovery' and sees itself as a 'repository for tools, methods and experience'.[42] Given its vast experience and specialised staff, BCPR has great potential for fulfilling this role and also be a trendsetter outside UNDP due to its unique role in dealing with both natural disasters and conflict, with short term as well as long term interventions. Core to the BCPR business model is also to be a catalyst and for COs and other actors with a firm focus on capacity development and support in terms of methods and tools. It would be useful for BCPR to explore why the perception at COs is not in all cases positive, and to find ways of strengthening the work in cooperation with the COs.

9   Close partnerships with government and civil society actors at national and local levels

Interviews and observations during field visits show that UNDP COs in general are very strong in establishing partnerships with government ministries and departments. In conflict settings it is however also important that the UNDP COs make use of their often very strong reputation as neutral aid partner to engage with government and opposition politicians whenever this can facilitate progress in the conflict prevention work. It is also apparent that the partnerships with governments vary according to ministries and personalities involved – and between national and local level, and that they are fragile and may change after elections or in cases of transfer or new appointments of government staff. While traditionally UNDP has prioritised close links with government, civil society organisations have often been used more as service providers than partners. In a number of the countries visited, the partnerships with specialised NGOs in, for example, peace building and disaster risk reduction appeared to

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[42] BCPR Strategy 2007-2011

have developed to a quite mature state and were well functioning. In Kenya, BCPR was especially helpful in establishing relationship with CSOs. Apart from some complaints regarding delays, bureaucratic procedures and lack of economic transparency, partners in general regard UNDP COs as good partners providing relevant capacity development support and refraining from trying to micro-manage the partners, but allowing local partners to shape and guide the programme design and content, thereby addressing real needs and building capacity. The close cooperation between UNDP CO and government departments is very important for creating local ownership, developing government policy to address specific issues, and to strengthen prospects for sustainability.

10   Participatory implementation involving national and local resources

Contrary to the image of a bureaucratic top-down organisation, the review found a number of good practices where UNDP COs worked in a very participatory manner involving local actors and building on local capacities. It is a healthy sign that UNDP COs can perform in a bottom-up manner and be flexible at the country level, which may be related to the decentralisation and delegation of authority to the country level. While conflict prevention and peace building demand a holistic approach that includes a bottom-up strategy, engagement with the political levels in a bottom-down approach is also needed. COs such as Colombia have proven quite successful with both approaches. BCPR has been helpful in suggesting both approaches to COs which had only emphasised one of the strategies.

11   Coordination and harmonisation with other UN entities, other international organisations and donors

In all countries visited, UNDP is an important actor in coordination foras with the country government and donor partners. However, while donors tend to praise the CO's CPR implementation they insist in Sudan, Kenya and DRC to become much more involved as partners in the development of programmes and to focus on outcomes and stronger cost benefits. The feedback on coordination from donor partners was very positive in Georgia and Colombia. Joint exercises between UNDP COs, BCPR and other development partners have taken place in a number of countries, such as needs assessments, programming processes and joint projects on e.g. risk management. Much of the architecture created at country level as part of the aid effectiveness agenda has facilitated these coordination mechanisms.

With few exceptions, the coordination with other UN agencies at country level is found to be good, with each part respecting its own and others' mandates. There is an in-built potential conflict in relation to disaster situations, however, resulting from UNDP taking on the lead role for the early recovery cluster, as this touches closely on the coordinating role of UN OCHA. The review observed in Pakistan how this can lead to difficulties in cooperation and division of labour. In Colombia, on the other hand, there seemed to be no problem at all in the agency coordination mechanism, with each relevant

organisation taking on their leadership roles. Furthermore, in Georgia, there was great appreciation for the lead role of UNDP in early recovery, particularly working in Abkhazia where, without UNDP, other agencies asserted they'd be unable to work, or work with extreme difficulty. When it comes to conflict situations, the role of UNDP in countries with and without a peace keeping mission has to be made clear where the involvement of the peace keeping mission ends and UNDP's role begins to avoid confusion, as the experience from DRC clearly shows.

12 Improved knowledge management between HQ and COs, and towards external partners

This review has shown that the specialised expertise of BCPR has often been of great benefit through technical assistance to COs, funding of CPR staff in COs, as well as through seed funding of projects and programmes. However, it has not led to a very visible specialised and consistent approach to programming and implementation in crisis affected countries. It is considered a weakness that no special CPR approach to crisis countries has been detected during this review. To the extent that tools and methodologies have been developed by BCPR experts, they do not seem to be "internalised" by staff, mainstreamed into CO programming or promoted beyond UNDP. A systematised knowledge in terms of methodologies, tools, and models seems not to exist and the exchange of knowledge or the easy contact to BCPR for advice has not been put in place. Not to mention that organisations like the World Bank seem to move ahead of BCPR with inspiring analyses and models for dealing with conflicts. This should lead to significant changes in BCPR's strategy and actions towards a better management of its specialised knowledge at HQ and country level.

The review team finds that the BCPR must develop a comprehensive strategy and an action plan that internally targets country offices, regional bureaus and regional service centres, and externally targets relevant partners at country and international level.

• In COs and at regional level there is a need to have a uniform knowledge of BCPR's tools, models and guidelines in order to succeed but also in order to build a clearer profile of BCPR and UNDP. This also implies that external experts sent to help COs with technical assistance must be trained in using BCPR's methodologies in order not to make the profile even more blurred.

• The procedures for collecting useful experience form COs as answers to particular crises could be systematised through synoptic overviews and be offered smoothly to the COs or others requesting advise on implementation issues for a particular programme or project.

• Most COs still favoured a person in BCPR HQ with contact responsibility for one or more countries but suggested that the internal HQ

communication should be strengthened to allow the COs easy access to responses from a variety of expertise through telephone or email.

• At country level the team has already suggested that BCPR crises analyses should be made and shared with other international and local partners on the ground. It is important to involve also donors in the development of strategies as response to the analyses. UNDP's facilitation of stakeholders meetings among local and international partners will further strengthen the profile of the organisation.

• At international level BCPR should decide on strategic priorities for how to engage more in the external UN international debates about approaches to national and regional conflicts and disasters. Umbrellas with think tanks, professional organisations, donors and other partners could strengthen the BCPR's capacity to lead in the area of conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction.

6 Overall conclusions and recommendations

1 Relevance and effectiveness of the present programming mix and programming modalities for delivering impact in the diverse crisis environments in which the Bureau supports UNDP COs

In most mission countries there have only been very weak analyses of root causes and dynamic factors with a risk of fuelling conflict. BCPR capacity seems frequently underutilized in the field, with information regarding the conflict context and the existence of relevant windows of opportunity seldom leading to programmatic changes and adaptation. The focus in disaster prone countries has often been more on reactive assistance than on long term disaster risk reduction.

In view of the multitude of actors operating in crisis affected countries and not least the great variety of approaches, methodologies and tools existing 'on the market', BCPR could potentially play an important role in securing relevant and timely application of the right methods and tools in programme planning and implementation. Given the expertise developed over the years in BCPR, this could be an appropriate *niche* for the organisation to fill. It also relates to coordination between actors in what kind of analytical work is carried out in the early stages of the programme cycle, the indicators to be developed in a particular crisis situation, and ensuring a solid framework for monitoring and evaluation directly linked to the analytical work and the indicators.

The insufficient focus on short and long term impact in conflicts and disasters is reflected in almost all project documents, reviews and evaluations that the mission team has encountered. Apart from very general outcomes, all emphasis is on deliverables in terms of outputs and efficient project implementation.

Very few baseline studies have been carried out and a majority of staff and management seem to neglect the strategic emphasis on positive change.

BCPR has responsibility for this. The portfolio focus for BCPR has been on provision of seed money for many projects of one or two year's duration.

Success seems to have been judged by the number of additional contributions from national and multinational donors boosting the budgets or prolonging the projects. Seed programme funding from BCPR has seldom been used to fund a pilot project that, following a proper evaluation, was replicated in other areas. This is a strategic error pointed to by several COs that would aim for such replication (Uganda, Colombia).

The impact of a multitude of small projects on peace or conflict has been limited, and only recently BCPR and the COs seem to have moved in direction of larger flexible programmes that holistically deal with root causes and current dynamics of conflicts, or in the case of disasters, build the local capacity to deal with risk reduction and preparedness. Many country offices request larger and longer term programmatic funding instead of short term project support.

It is recommended that BCPR:

1.1   Substitute seed funding of smaller projects with a long term programmatic approach to funding, providing guidance to holistic, multifaceted and contextually based programmes with clearly defined milestones and outcomes for improving the situation. This does not exclude seed funding, which has often been successful in getting other donors on board, but it would be seen in a larger strategic context. If the current financial situation poses challenges to this, the number of priority countries could be reduced (based on clear criteria – see below).

1.2   Develop new criteria for selection of priority countries based on a) The seriousness of crisis in the country, b) Whether the country is affected by sudden disasters or protracted crises, c) The capacity and needs of the CO and the government in the country, and d) The support provided by other actors.

1.3   Develop a special monitoring and evaluation system for crisis affected countries that includes crisis-sensitive indicators, frequent context analyses, and more frequent monitoring visits and reporting than in countries not affected by crisis.

1.4   When funding pilot projects, evaluate and consider up scaling successful projects across larger geographical, thematic or recipients' areas.

1.5   In collaboration with the country offices, establish procedures for solid contextual analyses informing and ensuring that projects and programmes are defined with realistic outcomes, milestones and benchmarks that can be used to monitor, review, evaluate and adjust the implementation accordingly.

1.6   Provide guidance to COs and other actors and take leadership in securing relevant and timely application of the right methods and tools in programme planning and implementation, starting from the analytical work needed in a given crisis and stretching all the way through the

programme cycle, thus ensuring that the complexity of crisis is captured in the way programmes are identified, planned and implemented.

1.7 Help the country offices develop their relationship with donors into a more pro-active partnership involving the donors before, during and as a follow up to programme implementation.

2 The strategic investment made thus far in terms of achieving maximum development impact

Strong involvement and provision of expertise to support programming processes from BCPR are the COs' most urgent requirements of BCPR in terms of the strategic approaches to conflicts and crises. BCPR technical assistance has often been used for design of projects for presentations to donors, but in far too few cases the BCPR assistance has been used to do proper conflict analyses or help the CO with particularly complex methodological challenges and long term guidance. In natural disaster related programmes, there are several examples of good analytical work, which could be used as strategic inspiration for other programmes.

The Strategic Partnership Frameworks designed and agreed between BCPR and several Country Offices are generally perceived positively because a SPF provides a 3-4 years horizon for which the CO has clear indications of the amount of funding and the types of activities for which it can expect BCPR funding. However, the SPFs are of varying quality. Some seem just to register on-going and planned projects as targets for funding for the next 3-4 years, while others have a comprehensive context analysis and a strategic perspective on outcome areas, providing guidance for the priorities of the CO. As a tool for achieving maximum development impact, the importance of the Strategic Partnership Framework cannot be overestimated. Methodologically, guidance and perhaps even involvement of BCPR in monitoring and evaluation processes has been requested by several staff members.

It is recommended that BCPR

2.1 Invest in depth analyses of conflicts and crises, funding of senior peace and policy experts employed by the country offices such as Peace and Development Advisors (PDA), and in active advice and guidance on particularly complex challenges.

2.2 Bolster regular field level monitoring and reviews of projects to ensure meeting of benchmarks, timeliness and quality of implementation.

2.3 Some sort of strategic frameworks should be established for all BCPR priority countries and should include a comprehensive context analysis with a clearly defined and coherent CPR strategy with priority areas, technical assistance and plans for joint resource mobilisation towards an estimated overall budget across 3-4 years.

2.4   Mainstream CPR within CO support strategies and programmes, thus formally including BCPR in all stages of country programme formulation.

2.5   Invest in development of an effective approach to partnerships with governments and CSO ensuring equitable partnership models with a significant focus on building on and strengthening local resources and including a sustainability and exit strategy.

3   The extent to which BCPR supported programmes have really espoused UNDP's capacity building agenda or addressed the corporate cross-cutting priorities such as gender equality and women's empowerment.

UNDP's capacity building agenda has been addressed in several CO projects and also in programmes dealing particularly with conflict prevention, but also risk reduction and disaster preparedness. As illustrated in previous chapters, there are, however, also a number of cases in which this aspect should be strengthened. While the capacity building agenda has been on the minds of UNDP and BCPR staff for their field operations, it is not given much attention internally between BCPR, the COs and the regional bureaus.

There is a very significant need for BCPR to strengthen its knowledge management. As a self-perceived centre of excellence in crisis prevention and recovery, BCPR HQ should be much stronger in provision of clear models, methodologies and approaches to be reflected all way through the entire system of UNDP country offices and towards external agencies and stakeholders. There is a lack of clear definitions – causes of conflicts, recovery and early recovery, conflict resolution, transformation and prevention etc. – and a lack strategic approaches and methodologies offered to the CPR work in the Country Offices.

Many times, the mission has learned that there was very little help, if any, or much delayed assistance from BCPR when COs asked for guidance in particularly complicated situations. The BCPR should rapidly be able to answer requests of the type – i.e. "I face a particular problem in a (DD) R process – please give me three examples of what others did in a similar situation."

There is a wish and a need for staff development in the COs in order to be more confident on methodologies and in many cases too much depends on the capacity of individuals rather than joint capacity built up among staff in COs. Similarly, the relations between BCPR and the Country Offices should to a larger extent rely on established procedures and less on individual engagement. The relationship between BCPR and the Country Offices should rely on established procedures and less on individual connections.

Finally, with regards to cross-cutting priorities such as gender equality and women's empowerment the mission has noted a few cases in which women's roles in families and local communities have led to special involvement of women in mediation and conflict resolution. In several other cases, however,

the gender perspective has been of a very traditional character that did not relate or empower women in conflict and disaster related processes. This should be looked at by BCPR, and a firmer framework for mainstreaming cross-cutting issues would be needed.

It is recommended that BCPR

3.1 Help the COs to engage actively with politicians at national and local levels to build their capacity for peace building structures and to take a prominent role in conflict resolution, mediation and reconciliation, along with an active civil society.

3.2 Examine the potential and advise accordingly on the integration of women into reconciliation, mediation and conflict resolution processes at local and national level, e.g. prioritizing skills development for women in these important fields.

3.3 Offer valid strategies, based on experience and analysis, for creating an enabling environment for peace in the absence of a peace treaty.

3.4 In collaboration with CPR experts from country offices, BCPR should use Early Recovery to target windows of opportunities before, during and after violent conflicts, and act as a source of funding, a resource of pro-active methodologies and rapidly deployed experts.

3.5 Urgently revise the CWGER Guidance Note and UNDP's ER policy in order to reflect the way ER within the humanitarian response has involved from where it was in 2006-2008 to where it is now.

3.6 Develop a methodology for the CO CPR team's engagement with governments and conflicting partners at a policy level while building on BCPR's experience and expertise.

3.7 Maintain the integrated HQ/CO structure set up in the emergency response (3-month) phase in the post-emergency phase to succeed the SURGE when it withdraws. This would secure an integrated oversight and support mechanism, given the very strong roles that BCPR, Regional Bureaux and COs have to play in their various areas of authority to make things work.

3.8 Use its highly experienced staff of practitioners in HQ and COs to agree upon and disseminate scholarly models and methodologies used by BCPR in UNDP's CPR work.

3.9 Establish clear procedures ensuring that BCPR concepts, models and methodologies are promoted and available to all CO staff through video conferencing, respond to project documents, allocate experts as well as contextually based advice concerning the implementation process.

3.10 Provide additional opportunities for staff development and sharing of best practices and lessons learned through secondments and other means beyond "communities of practice".

3.11 Maintain the system of country contact persons at HQ, but ensure that personal contact to relevant thematic experts is provided through the contact person.

3.12 Clarify lines of communications within the BCPR structure between NY HQ, the Regional Service Centres and the Country Offices.

Appendix A   List of persons consulted

UN New York and Geneva	

Aseem Andrews	Knowledge Management Specialist Central Strategy and Policy Cluster, BCPR, New York
Jonathan Andrews	Chief of Staff, BCPR, New York
Serdar Bayriyev	Programme Specialist, Europe and the CIS Programme and Operations Support Cluster, BCPR New York
Giuseppe Belsito	Senior Programme Adviser Country Operations Division, Regional Bureau for Arab States, New York
Jon Bennett	Oxford Development Consultants
Roma Bhattacharjea	Senior Gender Adviser Central Strategy and Policy Cluster, BCPR, New York
Kristofer Carlin	Europe Division Department of Political Affairs, United Nations, New York
Patrice Chiwota	Senior Advisor/UN Peacebuilding Fund UN Peacebuilding Support Office, New York
Maxx Dilley	Partnerships Advisor Disaster Risk Reduction Team, BCPR Geneva
Alan Fox	Evaluation Adviser, Evaluation Office, New York
Juliette Hage	Chief, Country Operations Division Regional Bureau for Arab States, New York
Jan Harfst	Division Chief, Central Asia and Azerbaijan, Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS, UNDP New York
Arnaud Huannou	Focal Point on Uganda Department of Political Affairs, United Nations, New York
Joanna Kazana	Chief, Division II Western CIS and Caucasus UNDP, Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS
George Y. Khoury	Team Leader Rapid Response Support Uniy,BCPR, New York
Taija Kontinen-Sharp	Programme Specialist Country Support Management Team, BCPR, New York
Chetan Kumar	Senior Conflict Prevention Adviser Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team, BCPR, New York
Willemijn Van Lelyveld	Associate Programme Officer

	UN Peacebuilding Support Office, New York
Luc Lafrenière	DDR Advisor Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group, BCPR Geneva
Sebastien Lapierre	Mediation Support Unit Department of Political Affairs, United Nations, New York
Bruno Lemarquis	Coordinator Country Support Management Team/Crisis Management Team,BCPR,New York
Christian Lotz	Peacebuilding specialist BCPR, New York
Michael Helmer Lund	Policy specialist Central Strategy and Policy Cluster, BCPR New York
Astghik Martirosyan	Results Based Management and Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist Central Strategy and Policy Cluster, BCPR, New York
Francesca Moledda	Chargée de Programme Fonds d'Equipement des Nations Unies, Mauritanie
Kyo Naka	Deputy Chief, North East Asia and Mekong Division, Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, UNDP New York
Stan Nkwain	Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, New York
Devanand Ramiah	Regional Conflict Prevention and Recovery Specialist Asia and the Pacific Regional Team, BCPR, New York
Alejandro Rausch	International Consultant, New York
Natasha van-Rijn	Country Specialist for Crisis and Post-Crisis Countries, Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP New York
Marta Ruedas	Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, New York
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Appendix C Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference (TOR)
Portfolio Review

BACKGROUND:

The overarching goal of the support provided by UNDP's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is to provide substantive leadership for UNDP's work in assisting national authorities to achieve sustainable, effective, efficient development change through the prevention, reduction, and mitigation of the effects of conflict and disaster. BCPR has recently embarked on a strategic reorganization of the Bureau to deliver on this mandate better. An organizational review has identified constraints and opportunities for focusing BCPR assistance with the aim of improving the Bureau's support for development impact through more effective delivery of appropriate support for national results. At the same time, BCPR is working with Regional Bureaux to strengthen the focus and effectiveness of its role, and with the Capacity Development Group of the Bureau for Development Policy to refine corporate tools to enable routine baseline capacity assessments to become an integral part of all CPR programming.

In line with UNDP corporate practice, BCPR has developed a multi-year results framework (MYRF) which will frame the delivery of its assistance and measurable results between 2010 - 2012. One constraint BCPR continues to face however is the lack of sufficient clarity in the strategic thrust of its existing project portfolio. The **urgent issues** that need to be addressed include: **i)** the **relevance and effectiveness of the present programming mix and programming modalities for** delivering **impact in the diverse crisis environments** in which the bureau supports UNDP COs; **ii) how strategic investment** made so far have been **in terms of achieving maximum development impact**; and **iii)   the extent** to which **BCPR supported programmes have** really **espoused UNDP's capacity building agenda**, or **addressed the corporate cross-cutting priorities such as gender** equality and women's empowerment.

Purpose of the review

The portfolio review is being conducted to provide an **overall picture** of how effective BCPR-supported programming has been in terms of strengthening UNDP efforts to reduce the negative impacts of crisis on national development gains and to provide specific answers to the questions above. The findings and recommendations of the portfolio review will **complement the results of the BCPR Strategic Review** and provide lessons that will feed into the organizational restructuring to ensure that the new BCPR set-up helps it meet UNDP's most critical CPR programming challenges.

Scope:

The review will:

1. Provide an **overview of the effectiveness of BCPR programmatic support** (financial support and technical assistance through programmes and projects) and its ability to assist UNDP in addressing CPR challenges at country level, either through direct interventions or catalytic support.

2. Identify the conditions that have allowed for positive long term change and those that led to less positive results **in each of the five regions in which BCPR supports** CO CPR programming.

Specifically, the **objectives** are to assess, on the basis of existing BCPR programmes:

- **Under what conditions** and in what settings (**geographical, political, socio-economic**) **BCPR** supported programming has contributed or is likely to **contribute to positive** national/local development **gains through the prevention, mitigation, or recovery from the development challenges associated with crisis** (disaster and conflict);
- **Under what conditions** and in what settings BCPR supported **programming has failed** to contribute to such positive development;
- The **underlying causes** of successful or failed programming;
- What **practical changes BCPR can make in its structure/delivery of programmes** (content and medium of delivery) to ensure more consistent positive support;
- To what extent **has BCPR assistance strengthened** the ability and **capacity of UNDP COs** and their portfolio **to address CPR challenges** in a **holistic** manner?
- The extent to which there is **shared knowledge within BCPR** on the methodologies and processes of programming and implementation for CPR capacity development.

The primary audience for the BCPR review is senior management and staff, as an input towards strategic results based planning, and to guide the prioritization process for the use of limited resources going forward. Secondary audiences will include CPR country governments – vis-à-vis providing a statement of accountability and donors – vis-à-vis accountability for funds spend to date.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The following analytical questions will guide the review team in its work: tidligere udgave: "The review will seek to answer the following key questions"

8. **<u>OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS</u>**: Where projects were judged to be successful – vis a vis having positive development impacts – what is the relative influence on this positive success of

   o Good design

   o Effective delivery

   o Contingent factors

9. **<u>RELEVANCE</u>**: How relevant has BCPR assistance proved in addressing CPR country challenges? How well did project designers base their programs and projects on assessments (conflict, capacity, gender, situational assessments)? How relevant are programmes to the national and UNDP capacities to deliver?

10. **DESIGN:** What determines effective project design in crisis settings, and to what extent are design considerations responsible for the success or failure of BCPR-funded projects? Has BCPR assistance been integrated into UNDP Country Office programming and portfolios or led to separate parallel additional projects?

11. **IMPLEMENTATION:** How have programming and procurement modalities within UNDP influenced the successful outcome of the projects/programmes assessed? Which are the other main influences on successful implementation? How important to success is alignment of BCPR supported programmes with other agency/donor programmes?

12. **MONITORING AND EVALUATION**: How well do projects define, monitor and evaluate results and what have been the key challenges in the way of BCPR carrying out its M&E and quality control functions for BCPR-funded projects? Gledet ud: "What is the correlation of strong M&E and developmental success?"

13. **IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILTY:** What was the impact of absorptive capacity in country, and how well were absorptive capacity BCPR exit strategy issues taken into account in project design, implementation, and partnerships?

14. **PARTNERSHIPS:** How well were partnerships and dialogue initiated and developed throughout all stages of the project design and implementation with (a) national authorities and stakeholders (b) other national and international actors and what role did partnerships play in the extent to which projects reached or failed to reach their goals?

METHODOLOGY AND KEY TASKS:

15. The review will be informed by **documentary, interview and field data**.

Desk Review

16. To understand better the context within which the projects were formulated, the team will first conduct a desk review of relevant <u>project documents</u> and related documentation such as <u>routine monitoring reports, BPAC reports, project progress reports, relevant review</u> and evaluation reports, other analytical studies and ongoing project review processes within BCPR (specifically, the <u>corporate and BCPR disaster risk reduction evaluation</u>, and initial reports from <u>ongoing conflict prevention evaluation</u>).

17. The desk review will enable the team to: **<u>i) examine the quality of results baselines</u>** and **indicators** established for the projects; **<u>ii) assess the adequacy of the response strategies</u>** as reflected in the results framework; iii) **<u>review the quality of project baselines and indicators</u>** as well as **<u>existing monitoring mechanisms</u>** and resources (financial and human), and iv) conduct an **<u>initial assessment of progress</u>** towards results and/or impact as reflected in available progress reports.

18. To inform the desk review, the review team will draw on **<u>existing matrices</u>** developed by the Early Recovery and Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery and Rule of Law (Conflict) Teams to demonstrate their respective portfolios. Some BCPR Country Focal Points have also developed matrices to track progress on BCPR supported projects in the countries for which they are responsible (including the Arab States team). The BPAC Data System which is currently under development also aims to incorporate information on all BPAC approved projects including financial allocations, project objectives, progress against objectives etc. This will also be a useful source of information once it is launched.

HQ Interviews

19. The Review Team will **interview key informants at HQ**, both within **BCPR** and key **HQ partners** for the **selected projects** – in other parts of UNDP, key partner agencies and programme government officials as well as donors.

Selection of countries for case studies

20. Following its initial desk review, and as part of the process of preparing its inception report, the **review team will select a number of representative countries and projects** on which to focus to obtain valid and credible conclusions and answers to the above questions.

21. The Review Team will **conduct field visits to validate the documentary data** against project level progress on the ground. The focus will be to triangulate information from documents and interviews by gathering both **objective and perception data** on what are the key contributions to

project success, and what are the key contributions to lack of progress and / or impact and to compare these factors across the different CPC settings where BCPR works, and to **generate recommendations for the priorities and nature of future BCPR engagement.**

22. The case study visits will include **interviews** with the **CO, project staff and beneficiaries**, national counterparts, and other stakeholders of the projects concerned. The country visits will help determine the **levels of shared understanding** of CPR related issues, the national and local socio-political environment within which the projects were formulated and are being implemented, constraints encountered (external and internal to UNDP), and likelihood of eventually achieving sustainable CPR results (in the case of newer projects) and to document the development impact already achieved (in the case of mature projects)

23. **Lessons learned and good practice** in all areas – project design, implementation, results monitoring and evaluation, partnerships, should be collected to guide future programs. At the end of country visits, the team will be expected to present initial findings to the CO concerned for factual validation.

DELIVERABLES:

1. An **inception report** developed following the documentary review and HQ interviews to finalize the methodological/analytical framework, initial findings, and ensure that the team is on track with the process. This initial feedback will also inform the selection of countries for field visits.

2. At the end of the exercise, the review team will produce **one overall descriptive report** on the development impact of the BCPR portfolio and the factors accounting for success or failure. The report will be expected to **synthesize across the diversity and specificity of different projects** to present a general **stocktake of projects**, and a **typology of factors** for success or failure as far as possible

3. This descriptive report will be accompanied by **2-3 page overviews in annexes for each of the projects reviewed**. The overviews will identify **project objectives** and the overall **development impact**, highlighting key **reasons for success or failure**, **best practices** to be shared, and **recommendations on immediate actions** required **to set the project on the path** to measurable and sustainable CPR results, as well as the **relevance of the project level findings** for the portfolio as a whole.

4. As part of disseminating the report findings, the Review Team will **share the findings and recommendations with senior BCPR management**, programme and policy staff, selected UNDP Country Directors and/or DRR/Ps, and national stakeholders on "Programming for high impact CPR results in CPC Settings". **The project review findings will serve as resource material** for the **workshop** whose outcome will inform the

formulation of a transformative action plan for BCPR's portfolio. A detailed **management review** will be prepared by BCPR Senior Management to the recommendations **of the Review/evaluation to detail how BCPR will address each recommendation.** This MR will be uploaded on the public Evaluation Resource Centre website.

Management of the review exercise.

The review will be managed by a **BCPR-led Support Group** that will include BCPR technical and programme units, representatives of the Regional Bureaux, BDP, and the Evaluation Office. These various units will comment on the TOR, hold meetings to listen to, and guide the review team on process- and methodology-related issues, and read and comment on the draft report. Tidligere udgave: "The review will be managed by BCPR/CSPC who will engage the BCPR technical and programme teams and Regional Bureaux CPR counterparts. The Evaluation Office (EO) will be invited to comment on the TOR and the draft report".

STATEMENT OF WORK
Review Time frame

Task	Duration
Desk review of project related documentation and engagement with BCPR and other HQ Units (with CDG facilitation)	4 Weeks
Missions to programme countries for project visits and consultations/interviews with stakeholders (UNDP COs, national counterparts, UN System and donor partners; etc..)	8 Weeks
First draft synthesis report + 9 cases	4 weeks
Initial feedback to BCPR TASC and POSC teams	1 day + travel
Finalization of report incorporating comments	2 weeks (including time to incorporate BCPR comments)
Participation in CPR/CD workshop to present and discuss report	2 days + travel

Appendix D   Evaluation Matrix

Key issues	Generic review questions	Questions for country studies	Indicators
Cross-cutting: Cooperation, coordination and division of labour between BCPR, Country Offices and Regional Bureaux			
Design			
What determines effective project design in crisis settings, and to what extent are design considerations responsible for project success or failure?	• What sources are used to inform design processes? • To what extent are baseline analysis conducted and what type of content do they have? • What is the quality of baseline analysis and to what extent do BCPR interventions build on them? • How do issues such as political prioritisation, public attention, demand for speed and visibility influenced programme planning and implementation?	• Was a risk analysis/conflict analysis prepared? • Was strategic planning / log frame methodology used? • What, in your estimation, could be improved upon in the programme design process and in the programme design itself? • Was local capacity to carry out the project taken into consideration?	• Programme preparation process • Structures of planning and implementation within UNDP/BCPR
To what extent has BCPR assistance been integrated into CO programming and portfolios or led to separate additional projects?	• How are BCPR activities initiated and by whom – e.g. CO, RB, BCPR or? Are programmes designed with due consideration of CO priorities? • How effective is the coordination with COs and regional bureaus? • Do long term considerations shape options for interventions and are steps taken to strengthen/develop long term processes? • Are CPR strategies and analysis	• How was the programme design process structured? • Who participated from UNDP (BCPR and other UNDP) and who were the in country partners? • How much input did in country partners have into design? • How is relevance ensured? • How is monitoring and evaluation incorporated into the overall programme design?	• Evidence of needs assessments • Appropriateness of targeting and choice

Key issues	Generic review questions	Questions for country studies	Indicators
Cross-cutting: Cooperation, coordination and division of labour between BCPR, Country Offices and Regional Bureaux			
	mainstreamed into CO programming? What are the main obstacles and conducive factors to an integrated approach?	• Have exit strategies been planned?	
Relevance			
How relevant has BCPR assistance proved in addressing CPR country challenges? How well did project designers base their programme and projects on assessments?	• Is BCPR support responsive to key challenges identified in the various regions and countries? • How are BCPR interventions generated/initiated? • Are there any mechanisms to ensure that baseline analysis is used in design of interventions? • • What is the comparative advantage of BCPR?	• Are baseline analyses reflected in programme documents? • What was the analysis of pre-disposing and dynamic causes behind the crisis? • What is the programme intended to address and achieve? • Was the analysis ahead of the programme start correct?	• Decision making mechanisms regarding different types of support modalities • Procedures to identify and analyse evolution in needs • Procedures for monitoring and capitalizing on lessons learned
How relevant are programmes to the national and UNDP capacities to deliver?	• Do national partners and COs have sufficient capacity to ensure timely delivery of planned programmes? • What kind of capacity building is provided to COs and national partners? • To what extent are interventions coordinated with priorities of regional bureaus? • How well do programming mix and support modalities match the needs	• Do you get feedback, formal or informal, from in country partners or programme beneficiaries? If yes, how is it used? • Do you believe the programme is addressing a real need? • Can you provide evidence of the capacity building support provided by BCPR? • What are your recommendations for increasing the relevance of the	• Evidence of factors influencing programme planning and implementation • Inclusion of long term development considerations in the context of planning of programme activities

Key issues	Generic review questions	Questions for country studies	Indicators
Cross-cutting: Cooperation, coordination and division of labour between BCPR, Country Offices and Regional Bureaux			
	of COs and national partners?	programme? • (For beneficiaries): What is the purpose of this programme? Do you find it useful/effective? What have you learned? What has changed as a result? Do you believe the programme is addressing a real need? What are your recommendations for increasing the relevance of the programme?	

Key issues	Generic review questions	Questions for country studies	Indicators
Cross-cutting: Cooperation, coordination and division of labour between BCPR, Country Offices and Regional Bureaux			
Implementation			
How have programming and procurement modalities within UNDP influenced the successful outcome of projects/programmes assessed?	• What major factors are contributing to achievement or non achievement of objectives? • How have institutional management and administrative efficiency including resource mobilisation issues affected implementation and results?	• What are the measurable results of the programme? How have they been measured? • Are there any internal (i.e. procurement) challenges to implementation? • What measures have been taken during the planning and implementation to ensure that timely interventions and efficient administration of resources? • Are there any negative impacts or unintended consequences of the programme?	• Strengths/weaknesses of the BCPR implementation modalities
Which are the other main influences on successful implementation?	• What are the underlying assumptions for successful implementation? • Which channels and sources of funding are applied for the various programmes /activities and which constraints are encountered?	• Are there qualitative results that are hard to measure that lead you to perceive the programme a success? Please explain. • What changes have you seen since the programme began that you can attribute to the programme? • What were the obstacles to	• Strengths/weaknesses of the BCPR approach • Main channels and sources of funding and provision of assistance

Key issues	Generic review questions	Questions for country studies	Indicators
Cross-cutting: Cooperation, coordination and division of labour between BCPR, Country Offices and Regional Bureaux			
		• successful implementation (i.e. government, security, spoilers) and how did BCPR overcome them? • Are there any other issues in implementation that are important to address?	
How important is alignment of BCPR supported programmes with other agency/donor programmes?	• What is the added value of BCPR interventions compared to other agencies and organisations? • Are synergies and overlaps occurring between BCPR interventions and other agencies? If so, how are they addressed and capitalised on?	• Is there coordination between BCPR and other UNDP departments and other agencies active in country? • If yes, how does this coordination impact programme success? • If there is little or no coordination, does it impact programme success?	• Procedures for assessment of aid effectiveness
Monitoring and evaluation			
How well do projects define, monitor and evaluate results and what determines how well M&E is integrated into the project planning and implementation stages?	• Do clear M&E mechanisms exist to assess the "quality" of the intervention/ support and are they applied? • What are the main challenges in measuring results?	• Were the programme objectives clear and how were they translated into activities? • What is the M&E plan for the programme? • What is being measured, how often, and how?	• Regularity and quality of monitoring and evaluation • Quality of output, outcome and impact indicators
What is the correlation between strong M&E and development success?	• What are the main challenges in achieving tangible results and how are these addressed?	• How are M&E results incorporated into the programme? • Is there flexibility for adjustments built into the programme? Have	• Procedures to identify and analyse evolution in needs

Key issues	Generic review questions	Questions for country studies	Indicators
Cross-cutting: Cooperation, coordination and division of labour between BCPR, Country Offices and Regional Bureaux			
	• Are assessments regularly updated? • Are activities adjusted in response to changes in context?	there been changes to a pro-gramme as a result of M&E? • Who is the M&E reports made available to?	
Impact and environment			
Where projects were judged to be successful - vis-a-vis having positive development impacts - what is the relative influence of this positive success of: good design, effective delivery, contingent factors?	• Which internal and external factors determine the planning, management and results of the programme? • What are the key lessons learned with regard to successful intervention in the different intervention areas?	• Have there been any unanticipated consequences, positive or negative, of the programme?	• Evidence of analysis of long term development in the implementation of support interventions
What was the impact of absorptive capacity in country, and how well were absorptive capacity issues taken into account in project design, implementation and partnership?	• Are capacity assessments conducted and what kind of assistance is provided to COs and national partners to address weaknesses? • To what extent have recurrent CPR concerns been tackled by CO and national partners?	• Have recipient governments built in CPR dimensions in their national strategies and budgets? Is there in country capacity to continue the programme without BCPR support? (Is there such a need?) • Is there need to build this capacity? • If yes, is this taken into account in the programme design?	• Evidence of improved capacity in COs and national institutions in dealing with CPR concerns after support ceased
Partnerships			
How well were partnerships and dialogue initiated and developed	• Are the various actors willing and able to engage actively in partnerships?	• Were you or your organization partners in the programme? If yes,	• Involvement in coordination activities with other

Key issues	Generic review questions	Questions for country studies	Indicators
Cross-cutting: Cooperation, coordination and division of labour between BCPR, Country Offices and Regional Bureaux			
throughout all stages of project design and implementation with (a) national authorities and stakeholders, (b) other international actors?	• What tools are seen as the most effective in terms of promoting increased coordination? • To what extent are local stakeholders involved in planning, decision-making and implementation of BCPR support in the various phases?	how did this partnership manifest itself throughout the life of the programme? • Were there any plans to conduct joint reviews/evaluations of programmes with other partners? • Was there a formal or informal system for your voice to be heard regarding programme design, implementation and results? • Who was your main point of contact at BCPR? Was it sufficient?	programmes, agencies and national partners