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# **EVALUATION OF THE LAW AND ORDER TRUST FUND FOR AFGHANISTAN (LOTFA) PHASE V: REPORT**

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANAP	Afghan National Auxiliary Police
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ANP	Afghan National Police
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command
DIAG	Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups
FRU	Family Response Unit
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GMU	Gender Monitoring Unit
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOI	Ministry of Interior
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PRR	Priority Reform and Restructuring
RC	Regional Command
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

# 1 Executive Summary

## 1.1 Purpose of this report

- 1.1.1 This report (the “Report”) presents an evaluation (the “Evaluation”) of the performance of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Phase V, (the “Fund” or “LOTFA-V”) which ran from September 2008 to December 2010 inclusive.
- 1.1.2 LOTFA has acted as a key intervention into the Afghan security sector that seeks to cover “all reasonable costs associated with the start-up and operational needs of the police force” in Afghanistan<sup>1</sup>. By remunerating the Afghan National Police and reimbursing and funding police related activities it has aimed to aid in the return of law and order across the country.
- 1.1.3 The Fund is an initiative jointly funded by several of Afghanistan’s development partners and administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). LOTFA was established in May 2002, and has been delivered through a series of sequential phases. In general and throughout its phases, the Fund has sought to cover the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIROA’s) police related costs, particularly in relation to recurrent costs. In addition, LOTFA aims to strengthen the broader capabilities of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) through a range of project based interventions. The key beneficiary institutions of LOTFA are MOI and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), which it administers. LOTFA-V had a projected total budget of approximately \$454.5 million although, due to the expansion of the ANP during the period, actual expenditure was approximately \$864 million. Fourteen donors contributed to the Fund over this Phase.
- 1.1.4 Atos Consulting was engaged by UNDP to undertake this review, and this Report presents our assessment of performance to date, as well as recommendations for the future of the Fund. We note that particularly given the span of time that has passed since the formal end of LOTFA-V, the subsequent Phase VI, commencing January 2011, has already begun to address concerns identified by the LOTFA Steering Committee in the previous phase. In addition, we point out that Atos was engaged to undertake the review of Phase IV. As such, our analysis takes into account progress made against previous recommendations to improve the performance of the Fund.

## 1.2 Key findings

- 1.2.1 Overall, and measured against established targets, LOTFA has had some notable successes in ensuring an effective mechanism is in place for the reliable payment of salaries. The initiation of LOTFA-V has also seen a further increase in the Fund’s levels of support to a broader range of activities as compared to previous Phases.
- 1.2.2 Phase V saw a number of notable achievements by the Fund. Key among these are:
  - ▶ Its work in rolling out the already established Electronic Payroll System (EPS) and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) to uniformed personnel in the Central Prisons Department. By December 2010, 50 per cent of eligible personnel were covered under both EPS and EFT.
  - ▶ Continued success in advancing penetration of both the EPS and EFT mechanisms for ANP personnel. By the end of December 2010, the Fund attained 99.4 per cent coverage of police numbers, with EFT penetration reaching 80 per cent.
- 1.2.3 This continued progress is significant in demonstrating a level of maturity in the establishment of payroll mechanisms, and particularly so in the context of a sharply expanded force size. This grew from the envisaged 82,000 projected for the end of 2010 to the mandated 1389 *tashkeel* strength of 122,000 by its end. LOTFA’s positive work in this issue remains at risk of being undermined by more strategic concerns over the lack of sustainability of the increased *tashkeel* and ongoing concerns over verification of *tashkeel* numbers.
- 1.2.4 Specifically, we question whether GIROA’s repeated requests to increase the *tashkeel* are also symptomatic of a systemic lack of effective capacity within the MOI and ANP to efficiently manage existing personnel and physical assets rather than just a question of a growing

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<sup>1</sup>Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) Terms of Reference (TOR), 2002.

operational need. Indeed, during the course of our review, there was significant evidence that this may be the case<sup>2</sup>.

- 1.2.5 This progress and the positive results of LOTFA's efforts extend beyond its primary goals in the area of police remuneration to providing benefits that include improved morale, facilitating the inclusion of women through enhancing recruitment processes and promoting awareness of gender in policing, and the perceptions that are formed of the ANP's credibility.
- 1.2.6 These successes notwithstanding, there are a number of persistent challenges that constrain LOTFA from improving its impact. As in the past, the inability to attain a multi-year planning framework due to the short term funding horizon of donors, the limited interventions in institutional capacity building outside of payroll related functions, and the constraints faced in addressing financial risk (particularly in relation to sustainability) are critical drawbacks. It is disappointing to note although these concerns were highlighted in our previous review, their resolution during Phase V was limited. Nonetheless, on a more positive note, LOTFA-VI recognises some of these issues and goes some way in addressing them. We continue to caution that a failure to address these problems will undermine any efforts in attaining fiscal sustainability and administrative capability within the MOI.
- 1.2.7 The causes of these constraints are multiple and reflect factors both within and outside of the influence of LOTFA's management. Included among them are issues of longer standing concern including the reliability and predictability of cash flows from donors, as well as, as inconsistent levels of commitment by the MOI to broaden the scope of LOTFA's capacity development efforts. Furthermore, the broad array of bilateral support activities in this sector and a lack of consensus on the strategic aspects of policing and police management and administration limit opportunities to deliver major reforms. This in turn affects the ability of LOTFA to focus on a consistent set of responsibilities in supporting MOI and the ANP in planning and addressing their development priorities. The ongoing focus by donors on bilateral measures at the expense of multilateral initiatives fundamentally undermines not only the Fund but also broader principles of donor harmonisation and increases -burdens on government instead of reducing them. That donors continue to rely so noticeably on bilateral mechanisms is perhaps an indication of preferences to maintain greater control of security related interventions, given the wider political context of meeting the demands of their own domestic constituencies regarding their interventions in Afghanistan.
- 1.2.8 These just mentioned challenges aside, our review also points to a degree of internal constraint in the capacity of LOTFA. As discussed in our evaluation of LOTFA IV, chief among these is the dissonance between the relatively narrow scope for UNDP's role as fund administrator outlined in the Fund's TOR, as compared to that suggested by other management documents. In addition to the considerable and urgent challenges still faced by the MOI and ANP in attaining institutional sustainability and improved performance, the ongoing transition process suggests a wider role for LOTFA is perhaps warranted to address broader concerns regarding institutional sustainability and other issues. With the shift and reduction in the overall foreign presence in Afghanistan, the need for a coherent vision for LOTFA and its role in a post-transition environment as well as differing views on the progress attained and attainable in terms of MOI reform need to be examined and discussed. Indeed, our interviews with stakeholders have indicated that some of them feel that LOTFA does not adequately address their expectations despite overall satisfaction with LOTFA's remuneration activities. A further more explicitly operational constraint continues to be felt in terms of the availability of skilled resources, particularly to fill key vacancies in the Management Support Unit (MSU), though this appears to have lessened somewhat as compared to Phase IV.
- 1.2.9 Overall, the review concludes on qualified, though essentially positive, note. The success of LOTFA in meeting its primary goal of remuneration speaks to its success in addressing an important component of security sector reform. On the other hand, issues regarding the desire to maximise the potential utility of LOTFA in developing the full range of essential governmental capacity extending beyond payroll-related functions in MOI remain unaddressed and an area of potentially increasing salience as the withdrawal of foreign troops progresses. Regardless of the consensus ultimately reached on this issue, the need for close and active

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<sup>2</sup>Moreover, our view is also corroborated by United States Department of Defense, which, during the period of LOTFA-V rated the MOI's logistics, acquisition and procurement functions within the Department of Administration and Support against its Capability Milestones (CMs) as CM-3: Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance (see the *Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress, November 2010, pp.34-35).

management of an initiative such as LOTFA which operates in both challenging and sensitive contexts should not be underestimated.

## 1.3 Recommendations

1.3.1 Several recommendations to carry forward into LOTFA-VI follow from our analyses:

- ▶ **Given the launch of the formal transition, there is a need for more focused efforts to develop a clearly articulated strategy for each of the Fund's priorities with specified targets.** The limited support for non-salary related initiatives needs to be addressed. Current Phase VI efforts to begin the transfer of relatively well-developed payroll-related activities to Afghan hands are significant in this regard. While priorities and outputs are defined in the Project Document for LOTFA-V at a high level, they require expression in the form of a detailed multi-year strategy, including targets for each priority, around which subsequent funding commitments can be built and outcome performance monitored. It would be important to begin planning in a way that considers a longer term vision of LOTFA's potential contribution to broader security sector reform, as well as, consideration of broader systemic administrative capacity and the series of changes needed to attain it. This ultimately falls outside of LOTFA's control and must be derived from a consensus view of Steering Committee members.
- ▶ **The role for LOTFA in relation to institutional development needs to be clarified and approached in a more consistent fashion.** It is clear there are divergent expectations about the role that LOTFA plays in relation to institutional development issues. The advancing of institutional development to Priority 2 in Phase V has been followed by a reversion to the requirement for earmarked contributions in the second Pillar in the current Phase, suggesting an inconsistency in both perspectives and approaches among stakeholders. While the current transition process has increased the importance of both fiscal and systemic sustainability issues for many stakeholders, this has yet to be met with a unified vision for LOTFA's role in institutional development beyond the relatively narrow remit of capacity tied to payroll-related activities. Current efforts have done little to address the thus far neglected gap in developing efficient resource management systems thereby increasing the operational effectiveness and long-term sustainability of MOI.
- ▶ **Establishment of a competency framework to increase the impact of capacity building efforts.** Further to the previous point, the relative lack of detail in some programme documents suggests there is a need to ensure a more effective use of performance targets to evaluate progress in achieving programme goals. Consequently, institutional development indicators and targets should focus on measuring competencies as opposed to the current practice of quantifying programming events. Institutional development indicators and targets based on a thoughtful competency framework would allow for measuring competencies which better reflect and measure progress towards the Fund's expressed and desired outcomes and the attainment of sustainability.
- ▶ **Boost the robustness of monitoring activities:** In the highly challenging context in which monitoring activities in Afghanistan take place, the importance of both robust and creative monitoring strategies should not be underestimated. Approaches that take into account successful approaches in other "fragile" state contexts, allow for innovative practice, and provide opportunities for the triangulation of data will maximise both the utility of data generated and improve stakeholder confidence. In particular, a monitoring methodology that maximises community participation in collecting and reporting data would be a useful starting point and basis for increasing the robustness of monitoring activities more broadly.
- ▶ **Increase networking efforts and level of communication about LOTFA's role:** As recommended in the evaluation of LOTFA-IV, the large number of international partners in the security and law enforcement arena poses additional demands on LOTFA in terms of avoiding duplication, exploiting synergies, and leveraging collective forces. There are benefits to be had by LOTFA continuing to expand efforts to increase the visibility of its work. Although there has been definite progress on this front, such as the representation of LOTFA and the IPCB in their respective bodies and the granting of observer status to EUPOL, there remains a need for continuous communications and outreach efforts. Given the current state of flux regarding the future international presence in Afghanistan,

communications need to be increased if buy-in and support from external stakeholders is to be retained or increased, especially where expectations among stakeholders of LOTFA's role and performance can easily diverge.

- ▶ **Examine opportunities to leverage LOTFA's strengths through further activities with the CPD:** LOTFA's current activities extend well beyond its payroll function reflecting the desire of a number of donors to develop the Fund as a tool to facilitate broader security sector reform. A key step in this direction was the addition of the remuneration of uniformed Central Prison Department (CPD) personnel to Phase V. The expansion of LOTFA's other activity areas to the CPD, though clearly contingent on donor support, presents an opportunity to leverage LOTFA's utility and impact.
- ▶ **Build on the positive results of FRUs to address issues regarding retention of female personnel.** Increasing the role of women in the Afghan police force is contingent on the availability of positions. Given the positive feedback regarding the operation of FRUs, setting realistic targets for the establishment of FRUs in all 34 Afghan provinces would provide a means of expanding the number of positions available to female personnel. Ideally, this would be accompanied by a strategy plan to increase the number of complaints processed and successfully prosecuted by FRU investigators.
- ▶ **Implement structured transfer of payroll-related functions to GIRoA.** Over many years LOTFA has dedicated to building up payroll related capacity. Given the level of proficiency gained in payroll functions, plans to begin the transfer of this role into Afghan hands during Phase-V would have been appropriate. The introduction of a target date for this transfer in Phase VI is thus welcomed, though the inclusion of a monitoring plan to oversee and ensure an effective transfer would be also desirable.
- ▶ **Donors should consider extending (and committing funds) for Phase VI to cover the transition period.** The current transition period presents a significant development for the security sector and the broader situation for Afghanistan. As an important and long-standing element of international security sector efforts, LOTFA's efforts to continue contributing to police and broader Ministry of Interior development would be better served by adopting a phase length responsive to the timelines accompanying transition. As an extension of this, and in line with the recommendations contained in the Phase IV evaluation, the provision of multi-year donor funding remains a key step in maximizing the Fund's potential.

## 1.4 Preconditions for success

1.4.1 We have identified the following preconditions for success which centre mainly on action by Governmental and international partners and, as such, lie largely outside the direct responsibility of the LOTFA team. These are:

- ▶ **Formulation of a coherent strategy regarding the Fund's non-payroll dimensions:** LOTFA donors as well as the Government of Afghanistan and the Ministry of Interior must reach a consensus regarding the weight to be attached to non-payroll activities and prerogatives of the Fund as expressed in its Terms of Reference. There is a fundamental, and, as yet, unaddressed need to address these priorities, most notably capacity building, that remains central to the institutional and ministerial development aims that LOTFA has articulated as a key goal for its efforts. As such, a coherent strategy and commitment to the attendant resourcing of LOTFA's non-payroll activities is sorely needed.
- ▶ **Development of a vision for a post-transition LOTFA:** As payroll functions reach maturity and are transferred to Afghan control, the potential utility of LOTFA in addressing other important and already identified areas of concern requires examination and discussion if LOTFA's full potential to contribute to the MOI's development and security sector reform is to be realised. Discussion of the role of LOTFA post-transition will allow for greater clarity with respect to the ways in which the Fund can serve to address donors' concerns regarding sustainability and security needs into the medium-term and longer terms.

1.4.2 In conclusion, our Evaluation suggests that the time is right for LOTFA to consolidate its successes and now perform in broader ways to address key issues related to MOI capacity and broader security sector reform. Given the ongoing, and indeed increasing, need for such efforts this untapped potential is worthy of closer examination. In light of this, we recommend

that the Steering Committee resolves to transform the delivery of the Fund along the lines above, and does so quickly as a means to derive the full benefit of resources committed, efforts undertaken, and progress achieved since LOTFA's inception.



## 2 Introduction

### 2.1 Background to the Report

- 2.1.1 The Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) is an initiative jointly funded by several of Afghanistan's development partners and administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). LOTFA was established in May 2002, and has been delivered through a series of sequential phases. In general, throughout its phases, the Fund has sought to cover the Government of Afghanistan's (GIROA's) police related costs, particularly in relation to recurrent costs. In addition, LOTFA aims to strengthen the capability of the MOI through a range of project based interventions. The key beneficiary institutions are the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), which it administers. LOTFA Phase V (the "Fund" or "LOTFA-V") was designed to build on previous successive phases that have been implemented since 2002.
- 2.1.2 Budgeted at \$227 million per annum, expenditures by the end of Phase V ultimately totalled \$864 million<sup>3</sup>. This Phase was funded primarily by the United States, Japan, the European Commission, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom and Norway, Italy, Denmark, and Finland. Implementation of LOTFA-V commenced in September 2008 and was expected to run for 2 years to the end of August 2010 (the Afghan years 1387 - 1389), although a four month extension was ultimately made. This review thus considers work undertaken until the end of December 2010 (1389).
- 2.1.3 Atos Consulting was engaged by UNDP to undertake this evaluation (the "Evaluation") of LOTFA-V, and this Report presents our assessment of performance to date, as well as, recommendations for the future of the Fund. It is duly noted that particularly given the span of time that has passed since the formal end of LOTFA V, LOTFA-VI, commencing January 2011 (1389), has already begun to address concerns identified by the LOTFA Steering Committee in the previous phase.

### 2.2 Evaluation objectives

- 2.2.1 UNDP's project management framework requires an evaluation of the Fund to be conducted at the end of each phase, and as with other end-of-phase reviews, the Evaluation of Phase-V aims to assess the effectiveness and impact of LOTFA in meeting its stated objectives.
- 2.2.2 A second purpose of the Evaluation is to identify lessons learnt and provide recommendations that can help improve the effectiveness of Phase VI of LOTFA. As well as being valuable for UNDP in providing ongoing improvements to Phase VI, it provides a basis for engagement with the international community to continue support for the LOTFA mechanism.
- 2.2.3 The Terms of Reference (TOR) require an assessment various dimensions of LOTFA-V, covering its:
- ▶ Effectiveness;
  - ▶ Impact;
  - ▶ Sustainability;
  - ▶ National Ownership; and
  - ▶ Monitoring and Evaluation performance.

The full TOR for the Evaluation can be found in Appendix A.

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<sup>3</sup>Estimated budget as forecast for September 2008 - August 2009 and September 2009 - August 2010 in the Project Document. The actual out-turn is reported in section 4.1.

- 2.2.4 Whether the Fund generates significant impact is ultimately as much a function of the quality of the management and control systems and processes as it is of the design of its interventions. Our appraisal thus aims to provide a complete overview of performance, in terms of Fund inputs, outputs and likely outcomes, as well as, overall efficiency.

## **2.3 Qualifications to the review**

- 2.3.1 As with our previous Evaluation we do highlight a number of caveats given the brevity of the study and the considerable security and logistical challenges of undertaking such a review in Afghanistan.
- 2.3.2 In particular, the field visit programme was undertaken in a short period of time. This necessarily meant that the review of each aspect of LOTFA-V was brief, and limited the amount of information and feedback that could be gathered. Our analysis therefore focuses only on key issues and is limited by the quality and quantity of information that could be gathered in the time available.
- 2.3.3 Our caveats are provided in greater depth in Appendix B, where we also provide more detail on our approach to undertaking this review.

## **2.4 Structure of Report**

- 2.4.1 This report (the "Report") presents the results of our Evaluation and review efforts. The document is a draft which provides a basis for discussion regarding potential ways forward and will need subsequent finalisation upon comment.
- 2.4.2 The following chapter, Chapter 3, sets the scene for LOTFA-V, by outlining its objectives, activities and structure. Chapter 4 examines the output performance generated through the Fund's operations over the course of Phase V. Chapter 5 represents the core of our analysis of the Fund's performance. The chapter examines operational performance and puts it in the context of its future prospects and in terms of how it is managed and delivered. The Report concludes with Chapter 6, which sets out our conclusions and draft recommendations, for discussion. Finally, a number of appendices, which offer further information and supporting documentation to the main body of text, are also provided.

## 3 LOTFA-V Design, Approach and Objectives

### 3.1 Objectives

- 3.1.1 LOTFA was established by UNDP in 2002 as an open multi-donor trust fund to cover “all reasonable costs associated with the start-up and operational needs of the police force”<sup>4</sup>. This goal was to be achieved by remunerating the Afghan National Police and reimbursing and funding police related activities that served to support the return of law and order across the country. LOTFA-V was one of a series of successive renewals of the Fund, running from September 2008 (1387) to December 2010 (1389).
- 3.1.2 It is important to note, that while LOTFA has extended over several phases, it was originally envisioned to be a finite mechanism: the Afghanistan Compact, co-chaired by the UN in 2006, envisaged the transformation of the Afghan National and Border Police forces into a fully constituted, professional, functional, ethnically balanced and increasingly fiscally sustainable force by 2010. As it stands the ANP and other policing services residing under the umbrella of the MOI continue to face important and significant challenges, which, by general consensus it will take several years to overcome and which are being pursued without the benefits of a clear and unified target date. As such, there is reason to question whether LOTFA’s activities in pursuit of its still clearly relevant objectives are occurring in a substantively different context which undermines the attainment of programming momentum and maximizing donor cohesion.
- 3.1.3 The intended **outcome** of LOTFA-V articulated in the Project Document was “a better trained and appropriately resourced Afghan National Police contributing to the return of law and order across the country, in turn promoting national, regional and global security”<sup>5</sup>. In turn, LOTFA-V had a range of priorities, against which a range of **outputs** have also been defined. These are illustrated in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: LOTFA priorities and outputs

Priority	Output
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Priority 1:</b> Payment of the police force remuneration.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Output 1:</b> Police force is supported to perform their job effectively and efficiently.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Priority 2:</b> Institutional development.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Output 2:</b> Financial and project management capacity built within MOI.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Priority 3:</b> Procurement, maintenance and operations of non-lethal police equipment and supplies.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Output 3:</b> Police force is equipped with required equipment for improvement of their mobility and response.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Priority 4:</b> Rehabilitation, maintenance and operations of police facilities.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Output 4:</b> Improved working and living conditions of police contributing to better efficiency and morale.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Priority 5:</b> Gender Orientation (Selection, recruitment and training of police).</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Output 5:</b> Number of women recruited and trained; number of gender awareness sessions conducted; number of family response units provided with required logistic support.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Priority 6:</b> Payment of remuneration of uniformed personnel employed by the Central Prisons Department through specially earmarked contributions.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Output 6:</b> Uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department are paid on time and transparently.</li></ul>

Source: LOTFA Phase V Project Document

<sup>4</sup>Project Document: *Support to Law and Order in Afghanistan – Phase V*, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and United Nations Development Programme, p.6.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. p. 11.

- 3.1.4 In addition to the requirements laid out in the Project Document, LOTFA is also governed by TOR drafted in 2002, and subsequently amended in 2008 for Phase V.
- 3.1.5 As with earlier phases, payment of salaries was the key priority for Phase V and un-earmarked contributions to LOTFA were to be applied to the reimbursement of ANP remunerations via the national budget until annual costs were covered. Remaining contributions were then to be applied to the subsequent priority areas as determined by the MOI and as incorporated in the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) and reflected in the National Budget.
- 3.1.6 While generally an open fund, LOTFA also allows earmarked bilateral contributions by donors to the extent that such funding is in accordance within the requirements of the National Budget and the six priority areas, and provided it is agreed to in conjunction with the MOI and MOF.
- 3.1.7 An indicative budget of approximately \$227 million was estimated for the first year of Phase V with the UNDP recognising that achieving the Fund's aims would be highly dependent on the extent of financial support from Afghanistan's international cooperation partners. Given the substantively larger final budget numbers, there is reason to question whether current funding patterns and organisational arrangements allow for the required levels of budget realism and planning. Budgetary requirements and planning have been substantively influenced by decisions related to the growth of ANP forces. To the degree that Fund activities are also intended to achieve non-payroll related aims, stock needs to be taken of whether the range of stated objectives are likely to be achieved at the existing levels of financial commitment.

## 3.2 Targets and measuring performance

- 3.2.1 There is a series of **output indicators**, which aim to illustrate progress towards the outcome for LOTFA-V defined above. These indicators are illustrated in Table 3-2 below.

**Table 3-2: LOTFA outputs and output indicators**

Output	Output indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Output 1:</b> Police force is supported to perform their job effectively and efficiently.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police in all 34 provinces are paid on time and transparently; Computerisation of the payroll system for the police is completed by June 2008 for all provinces; By September 2008 a minimum of 60%, and by March 2009 a minimum of 80% of serving police personnel will benefit from individualised payment; the Afghan government has to deliver the necessary documentation (including each individual recruit's <i>tazkira</i>) which is required for identification card production.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Output 2:</b> Financial and project management capacity built within MOI.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of training sessions organised; number of provinces receiving trainings; number of provinces receiving technical support in EPS; number of central departments of the MOI employees trained in EPS, personnel management techniques including staff lists; Comprehensive list of every police personnel with identity, grade, unit and deployment is available by March 2009.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Output 3:</b> Police force is equipped with required equipment for improvement of their mobility and response.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of items procured.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Output 4:</b> Improved working and living conditions of police contributing to better efficiency and morale.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of police facilities constructed and/or rehabilitated.</li> </ul>

Output	Output indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Output 5:</b> Improved capacity in police force with enhanced gender balance.</li> <li>• <b>Output 6:</b> Prison Guards are supported to perform their job effectively and efficiently.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of women recruited and trained; number of gender awareness sessions conducted; number of family response units provided with required logistic support.</li> <li>• Uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department are paid on time and transparently</li> </ul>

Source: LOTFA Phase V Project Document

- 3.2.2 As we noted with the LOTFA-IV Project Document, despite providing a framework of indicators, the LOTFA-V Project Document provides very limited targets against which to assess performance. Further, as noted previously, this is potentially problematic given the effective expiration of the target date for reform associated with the Compact goal<sup>6</sup>.

### 3.3 The delivery management and oversight framework

- 3.3.1 Rebuilding the national civilian police force for national security and recovery represents one of the primary priorities for the Afghan state, and consequently LOTFA requires considerable visibility at the highest levels of government. Given its potentially broad impact on state-building, fiscal stability and security, it also requires considerable inter-ministerial coordination. As activities under LOTFA are delivered under a National Implementation (NIM) modality, GIRoA retains overall responsibility, a state of affairs reflected in the mechanism's governance arrangements and management responsibilities.

- 3.3.2 As designed, LOTFA-V operated on the basis of the following structural features:

- ▶ A **Steering Committee**, which provides overall leadership to the Programme. The Steering Committee engages the executive stakeholders in the Fund and provides a quarterly review and management oversight mechanism;
- ▶ The **Implementing Agency** is the MOI supported by a **Management Support Unit (MSU)**, reporting to the Steering Committee, with responsibility for implementation of LOTFA's components. In itself, the MSU comprises professional non-state resources who undertake tasks that cannot be handled by the existing Government mechanisms with a view to strengthening GIRoA capacity, and transferring skills to the relevant Government counterparts;
- ▶ As well as acting as the **Fund manager** responsible for managing the flow of funds from UN accounts to the MOF via the MSU, UNDP's role in LOTFA is primarily focused on the coordination and liaison of stakeholders, reviewing work plans and reports and monitoring of expenditures. UNDP also provides the support services delivered by the MSU; and
- ▶ Addressing cross-cutting issues is also reflected at the operational level. The Implementing Agency is responsible for coordinating with other government and donor interventions and drawing in other **Implementing Partners**. Chief among these is the MOF for the purpose of the reimbursement of National Budget expenditures and individualised payment to police personnel.

<sup>6</sup> Indeed, future Project Document targets should reflect new targets given the Compact is now outdated.

### 3.4 Design risks

3.4.1 A series of risks underlying the LOTFA-V design were identified in the Phase V Project Document.

3.4.2 These include:

- ▶ A funding shortage during project implementation which would immediately impact on the ability of the project to produce the required outputs;
- ▶ A lack of confidence among donors in accountability and transparency of the LOTFA mechanisms leading to withdrawal or reduction of contributions;
- ▶ Security constraints hindering monitoring activities and EPS coordination at provincial level;
- ▶ Insufficient ownership by the designated institution resulting in a lack of sustainability of results of EPS implementation; and
- ▶ Project staff leaving MOI and institutional capacity/memory remaining weak.

3.4.3 In addition to risks identified during design, additional risks were included in a risks log (including mitigation measures) in the Phase V Final Report as well as 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports. These risks comprised the security of classified EPS data, difficulties in executing an exit strategy for the payment of food allowance, and challenges to attaining progress in EFT implementation.

## 4 Output performance

### 4.1 Summary allocation of resources

#### *Funding commitments and disbursements*

- 4.1.1 Table 4-1 shows the financial resources mobilised for LOTFA-V by donors. Fifteen donors have contributed to the Fund over this Phase, providing approximately \$870 million<sup>7</sup>. This represents a substantive increase in funding compared to previous phases of LOTFA<sup>8</sup>.

**Table 4-1: Donor resources for LOTFA-V, 1 September 2008 – 31 December 2010 (1387-1389)**

Donor	Contributions (\$) by		Expended by 31 December 2010 (\$)	Balance at 31 December 2010 (\$)
	Committed	Received		
Japan	309,963,293	309,963,293	309,267,883	695,409
US	273,474,524	273,474,524	270,556,137	2,918,387
EU	105,470,798	105,470,798	105,003,327	467,471
Germany	54,401,118	54,401,118	53,786,466	614,652
Netherlands	38,681,708	38,681,708	38,681,607	0
Canada	33,554,737	33,554,737	33,554,737	0
UK	24,931,439	24,931,439	24,933,554	0
Norway	14,871,919	14,871,919	14,867,384	0
Italy	3,645,527	3,645,527	2,420,513	1,225,014
Denmark	3,359,189	3,359,189	3,359,189	0
Finland	2,456,442	2,456,442	2,463,886	0
Australia	1,919,382	1,919,382	1,919,382	0
Switzerland	1,335,903	1,335,903	1,047,985	0
Czech Rep.	150,602	150,602	150,602	0
UNDP	526,605	526,605	526,605	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>868,743,186</b>	<b>868,743,186</b>	<b>862,539,257</b>	<b>5,920,933</b>

Source: *Final Project Report, Phase V*. Contribution data from Table 1: Funding Overview LOTFA Phase V (01 Sep 2008 – 31 Dec 2010); Expenditure and balance data from Table 3: Expenditure Status (by Donor) (01 Sep 2008 – 31 Dec 2010).

- 4.1.2 The contributions from international partner countries varied substantially during Phase V, with the seven largest contributors providing more than 97 per cent of the funding. Members of this group, which includes the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, are also key partners for security support in Afghanistan providing military and law enforcement resources. Other key stakeholders, such as Germany and the European Union, have a broader remit to support police reform in Afghanistan through bilateral and multilateral police assistance teams respectively.

<sup>7</sup> There is a difference between total receipts and expenditure totals presented in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, which is likely due to the cash and expenditure receipts recorded within period and carried forward from LOTFA-IV. In our previous review of LOTFA-IV we commented that systematic differences in values occur when cash based accounting methods are used. UNDP is presently moving to an accruals based accounting system, which should address these discrepancies going forward.

<sup>8</sup> LOTFA-IV had fifteen donors and received \$306 million during 1385 through 1387 (April 2006-August 2008).

- 4.1.3 While generally having allowed for a flexible use of resources committed, several donors earmarked the funds they provided. This includes funds given by Canada for the CPD; the European Union for the CPD and construction; Finland for construction; Germany for institutional development, construction and project staff and support; Italy for construction; Japan for construction, institutional development, procurement – including that related to the Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) Cell; Norway for institutional development, procurement and construction; Switzerland for gender; the United Kingdom for the CPD; and the United States for CPD, gender and project staff and support. As section 5.1.2 below shows, the Fund has been used mainly to finance the Operating Budget of the GIRoA (particularly in relation to the payment of police salaries and allowance), with some minimal contributions to the Development Budget. Salaries and allowances are reimbursed in arrears against MOF payment requests and expenditure reports. UNDP applied a 5 per cent General Management Support (GMS) fee to cover administration of the Fund, which is also reflected in the table in the next section.

#### *Activity-related budgets, expenditures and cash flows*

- 4.1.4 Table 4-2 overleaf provides a breakdown of LOTFA V budget and expenditures by activity. Activities 1 – 6 correspond to the priority and output requirements specified in the Project Document (and as illustrated in Table 3-1 above). The data illustrates that over 90 per cent of the resources committed have been applied to the MOF for disbursement in the form of police salaries and allowances.
- 4.1.5 We note feedback indicating that, to at least some degree, funding became more reliable during Phase V compared with previous phases. Nevertheless, the lack of a multi-year funding framework contributes to making funding a systemic issue whose impact is also reflected in the annual planning process and the reporting of budget execution performance.
- 4.1.6 In this regard, there are variations between the resources estimated in annual Work Plans prepared for the Fund and those presented in the annual reports; e.g. the initial draft of the Work Plan for 2010 estimated a requirement of around \$213 million whereas Table 4-2 indicates an ultimate budget of approximately \$537 million for this period. This set of circumstances leads to annual budgets which do not reflect actual project requirements for the year presented and which differ according to the date on which they are produced.
- 4.1.7 Thus, although we have used Table 4-2 to present a consolidation of the periodic budgets for LOTFA-IV, it appears budgets were regularly revised in light of the resources that were actually made available by donors in each relevant time period. As such, the budget numbers include not only the annual requirement but also any cash balances. The table is misleading in that there is an implicit ex-post rationalisation which gives the appearance of a high rate of budget execution.
- 4.1.8 In such circumstances it is not possible to accurately gauge budget execution (particularly for development budget needs) in relation to the investment needs of ANP and MOI for this Phase. A factor that needs to be taken into account is the low absorptive capacity of the MOI. Studies of public financial management performance consistently point to the low utilisation of development budget in GIRoA in general, and also in MOI in particular<sup>9</sup>. Nonetheless, no doubt due to the context of improved predictability in donor financial flows, anecdotal feedback generally suggests that development budget execution in LOTFA-V improved compared to Phase IV, and remuneration of police salaries continued to remain reliable.
- 4.1.9 Going forward, we recommend that LOTFA prepares a baseline annual budget, with the inclusion of any additional intra-year funds acknowledged through periodically updated forecasts. This approach would allow for the more effective identification, benchmarking and analysis of variances and better engagement with donors on planning.

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<sup>9</sup>See *Working Paper 4 for Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010, Second Generation of Public Expenditure Reforms: Security Sector*. World Bank and DFID, 2010, p.8.



**Table 4-2: LOTFA-V Budget and expenditures for September 2008 (1387) –December 2010 (1389), by activity (US\$)**

Activity	Budget	2008 Expenditure	2009 Expenditure	2010 Expenditure	Expenditure Status 2011	Total Expenditure	Balance	Delivery
Activity 1: Police Remuneration (% of total)	787,502,257	63,949,049	240,458,499	480,327,699	-5,547	784,729,790	2,772,468	99.65%
Activity 2: Institutional Development	1,831,358	30,392	815,227	984,939	800	1,831,358	-	100.00%
Activity 3: Procurement of non-lethal equipment	9,824,772	-	1,877,799	6,909,472	376,863	9,164,134	660,639	93.28%
Activity 4: Construction of Police Facilities	10,297,036	-	1,295,797	6,540,920	268,549	8,105,256	2,191,780	78.71%
Activity 5: Gender Mainstreaming	1,060,709	-	436,924	623,784	-	1,060,709	-	100.00%
Activity 6: Remuneration of CPD	14,927,062	-	576,371	14,345,494	5,197	14,927,062	-	100.00%
Activity 7: Project Staff and Support	2,163,212	48,625	825,297	1,289,452	-162	2,163,212	-	100.00%
GMS at 5%	42,580,389	3,366,892	12,902,352	26,370,749	-355,651	42,284,342	296,047	99.30%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>870,186,795</b>	<b>67,394,958</b>	<b>259,188,266</b>	<b>537,392,498</b>	<b>290,139</b>	<b>864,265,862</b>	<b>5,920,933</b>	<b>99.32%</b>

Source: Final Project Report Phase V, Table 2. Expenditure Status (by outputs), 01 September 2008 – 31 December 2010.



- 4.1.10 We note that the current earmarked status for salary remuneration of uniformed CPD personnel poses challenges. Phase V has seen recurrent shortfalls and delays in the provision of the funds required for salary transfers under this Priority. While this problem has largely been an outcome of issues centred within the GIRoA, there is an inherent contradiction in seeking to stabilise and ensure the effective payment of CPD staff wages through the use of a mechanism without some level of assured resources. Much as is the case with the provision of salaries to the ANP, the designation of un-earmarked status to the CPD remuneration priority would allow it to maximise its effectiveness.
- 4.1.11 As indicated in our evaluation of LOTFA-IV, the situation regarding cash flows and the use of cash-based accounting methods has resulted in, and inevitably continues to result in, some level of discrepancy in data reported in quarterly reports vis-à-vis annual reports<sup>10</sup>. The problems in this regard result in variances being reported depending on when reports are produced, and the source of data. Given this, the UNDP's current move to an accrual basis for accounting is helpful in this regard and should allow for a greater consistency and convergence of figures in the future.
- 4.1.12 Finally in summary, cash based budgeting and reporting, as well as, decisions on *tashkeel* size and reforms substantially impact on financing requirements, make it difficult to quantitatively assess the financial planning efficacy of LOTFA, though it should be noted that LOTFA honoured pay-related commitments to the MOF on behalf of the MOI. Additionally, and as in the past, the inability of donors to offer predictable cash transfers and long term commitments impacts adversely on planning Fund activities.

## 4.2 Activities undertaken in Phase V

- 4.2.1 Table 4-4 presents a summary of the progress of LOTFA-V relative to the objectives outlined in the Project Document. It focuses on reporting against the attainment of outputs within each of the priority areas and draws upon a detailed exposition of progress given in various LOTFA-V annual and quarterly progress reports. While performance targets are largely absent in the Project Document, a number have been defined in annual Work Plans, and we therefore include them here as appropriate.

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<sup>10</sup> Such figures are stated to be provisional – until finalisation of UNDP official Combined Delivery Report (CDR)

**Table 4-4: Progress against outputs and priorities**

Priority/Output	Output Indicators/Target	Progress
<p><b>Priority 1:</b> Remuneration costs and payment of the police force.</p> <p><b>Output 1:</b> Police force is supported to perform their job effectively and efficiently.</p>	<p><b>Indicators:</b> Police in all 34 provinces are paid on time and transparently; Computerisation of the payroll system for the police is completed by June 2008 for all provinces; By September 2008 a minimum of 60%, and by March 2009 a minimum of 80% of serving police personnel will benefit from individualised payment; the Afghan government has to deliver the necessary documentation (including each individual recruit's <i>tazkira</i>) which is required for identification card production.</p> <p><b>Target:</b>(a) Payment of ANP salaries in 34 provinces transparently; (b) Coverage of all police forces under EPS; (c) Coverage of 90-95% of police force under EFT; (d) Coverage of 34 provinces by MA for monitoring and verification;</p>	<p>This priority comprises remuneration of salaries and eligible allowances as made by the Ministry of Finance to the police forces of Afghanistan. Over the course of 2009 and the first half of 2010 a cash-versus in kind food allowance was piloted, though this was subsequently discontinued on the grounds of its affecting operational efficiency and discipline. Other important issues relating to salary-related payments were resolved during the course of the Phase, notably in relation to increased salaries for the ANP, professional pay for the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP); progressive MOF responsibility for ANP remunerations, pay parity for uniformed CPD personnel with ANP, hazard pay for select ANP, the removal of martyrs from the <i>tashkeel</i> and special incentives for female recruits. All salary payments are processed through the established government payroll system and distributed through provincial cashiers of Da Afghanistan Bank (the central bank), or electronically to individual bank accounts of staff through the commercial banking system. LOTFA has assisted in enhancing this payment process by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial and technical support for the introduction and maintenance of an Electronic Payroll System (EPS), which contains personnel data for verified police personnel who have been issued with registered ID cards; and</li> <li>Providing coordination, information and analysis of personnel and payroll data for an Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) system. The EFT facilitates remittance of salaries to individual bank accounts of police personnel who are recorded on the EPS.</li> </ul> <p>With respect to the main project activity of disbursement of police remunerations, during 2010, LOTFA paid remunerations in all 34 provinces. The headcount at the start of Phase V as recorded by the HR department of MOI was 78,249 reflecting the significant challenges a rapidly growing <i>tashkeel</i> has presented to the Fund. The veracity of headcount data also continues to be disputed by many commentators, acting as a source of fiduciary risk. Efforts to generate a comprehensive list of all police using ID cards are being facilitated by DynCorp though they have encountered at least some level of operational delay.</p> <p>During the Phase V portion of 1387 (2008-2009), LOTFA transferred a total of USD 173.2 million to the MOF. A total of \$240.4 million was transferred to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to cover the expenditure of police remunerations for 2009 with over \$493 million transferred for 2010<sup>11</sup>.</p> <p>The rollout of EPS proceeded apace building on past progress in this area. By the end of 1387(2008-2009), EPS implementation was completed in all 34 provinces, including 65 client payroll stations in Kabul zone and MOI central departments, and covered 80,403 police personnel,</p>

<sup>11</sup>The switchover in LOTFA reporting from Afghan solar years to the Gregorian calendar means that the 1387 portion of Phase V double counts the months of January – March 2009.

Priority/Output	Output Indicators/Target	Progress
		<p>constituting 98 per cent of the total existing police force. During 2010, EPS coverage grew to around 115,948 police personnel representing 99.4 per cent coverage. Despite these clear successes, the regularity of EPS reports from a number of provinces proved problematic.</p> <p>Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) which allows for the payment of police salaries through individual bank accounts was, as of 2008, made functional in 22 provinces. The number of uniformed police personnel receiving salaries by EFT reached 53,344 constituting 65 per cent of the total police force by end of the year; 2009 saw coverage expand to 80 per cent. While the coverage rated for EFT in 2010 remained constant (80 per cent), the number of provinces reached 31, while the number of uniformed police personnel who received salaries by EFT reached 93,274 (22,815 new police), reflecting growing <i>tashkeel</i> size.</p> <p>An important obstacle to further expansion was identified in the incomplete coverage of provinces by commercial bank branches. The EPS team had initiated discussion to encourage the expansion of bank branches to cover more districts, though the instability at the Kabul Bank situation impeded this process.</p> <p>Efforts to address gaps in bank branch coverage have also included the development of complementary and alternative technology in the form of a mobile phone-based M-paisa system to allow for salary payments in otherwise inaccessible districts. A pilot launch in one district in Wardak province was subsequently expanded to 1 district in Wardak and 2 in Khost province.</p> <p>Monitoring performance of this payment framework is a key role for the LOTFA management team. Consequently, monitoring teams, comprising staff from UNDP, the LOTFA and MOI, conducted 10 to 11 monitoring visits in each of 1387, 1388 and 1389 to various provinces to assess:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Whether salaries were paid on a timely basis and police personnel received the full amount for which they were eligible; and</li> <li>▪ The performance of the EPS and compliance with Afghan Government procedures, including assessing reconciliation of financial records between the Police Finance Department (PFD) and the <i>Mustafiats</i>.</li> </ul> <p>Generally such missions provided positive reviews, although it is evident that both analytical rigour and the coverage of provinces were constrained by time and security issues among others. Indeed, Phase V saw the introduction of an external monitoring agent to ensure that monitoring levels were sufficient in relation to the potential fiduciary risks in the Project<sup>12</sup>.</p>
<b>Priority 2:</b> Institutional development.	<b>Indicators:</b> Number of training sessions organised; number of provinces receiving trainings; number	The LOTFA Phase V Project Document envisaged institutional development activities including institutional reform, the strengthening of financial and project management capacity, and the strengthening of specialised units. Institution building activities were to be coordinated with IPCB.

<sup>12</sup>This Evaluation has also included random interviews conducted with policemen of different ranks with personal files of police also checked on a random basis. Further to this, finance and logistic departments were visited with their records reviewed on a sample basis. Discussions of the results of field visits are included at different points later in the report.

Priority/Output	Output Indicators/Target	Progress
<b>Output 2:</b> Financial and project management capacity built within MOI.	<p>of provinces receiving technical support in EPS; number of central departments of the MOI employees trained in EPS, personnel management techniques including staff lists; Comprehensive list of every police personnel with identity, grade, unit and deployment is available by March 2009.</p> <p><b>Targets:</b> (a) 110 people trained in TOTs; (b) 250 additional finance/IT/EPS/admin/HR officers trained through basic/advanced on-the-job training; (c) Provision of high-level technical support; (d) 60 per cent on job EPS/EFT tasks transferred to MOI;</p>	<p>Activities conducted under this priority focused on training sessions addressing computer/financial/management, personal data entry and administrative training centred on finance officers and EPS operators to aid in the generation of accurate electronic payroll reports, and use of internet for systematic reporting. Many trainings adopted a TOT (training-of-trainers) format.</p> <p>Training sessions have often taken the form of refresher courses involving second or even third repetitions by past participants; this strategy has been intended to address the often highly limited capacity of participants, but also renders indicators and targets tracking the number of training sessions conducted, or participants attending significantly less effective</p> <p>It has not been possible to assess the quality of training in this Evaluation. It is not clear whether an evaluation framework exists for this training that considers training needs analysis or post-training feedback to assess effectiveness and continuity of trained personnel in their roles – anecdotal and published evidence suggests some operators have been transferred into other administrative functions once trained.</p> <p>An additional and significant shortcoming is the lack of competency frameworks which would provide the context and means to evaluate this Priority's activities in terms of their ability to address the desired outputs and outcomes for institutional development.</p> <p>As in earlier phases, there is a distinct need to address weaknesses in the area of financial planning.</p>
<p><b>Priority 3:</b> Procurement, maintenance and operations of non-lethal police equipment and supplies.</p> <p><b>Output 3:</b> Police force is equipped with required equipment for improvement of their mobility and response.</p>	<p><b>Indicators:</b> Number of items procured.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> (a) 100 per cent procurement for MOI traffic and health departments; (b) 100 per cent procurement for DIAG cells in centre and provinces;</p>	<p>Procurement of equipment for MOI is dependent on MOI request as well as availability of funding after meeting higher prioritised activities.</p> <p>Phase V procurement activities included contracts awarded for equipment for MOI traffic, fire-brigade and health departments, and contracts awarded for major equipment for DIAG cell.</p> <p>According to the Phase V Final Report, this priority saw full procurement of MOI health department with 81 per cent procurement achieved at the traffic department and the DIAG cell seeing 64 per cent procurement levels. It is not clear, however, how these targets and any progress related to them should be understood as they do not specify whether the percentages relate to numbers of items procured or the value of procurements.</p>
<p><b>Priority 4:</b> Rehabilitation,</p>	<p><b>Indicators:</b> Number of police facilities constructed and/or</p>	<p>To date, most police infrastructure assets that have been built in Afghanistan have been done so by other means – bilaterally by donors through PRTs and other projects, with CSTC-A being the</p>

Priority/Output	Output Indicators/Target	Progress
<p>maintenance and operations of police facilities.</p> <p><b>Output 4:</b> Improved working and living conditions of police contributing to better efficiency and morale.</p>	<p>rehabilitated.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> (a) 100 per cent construction of gym; (b) 100 per cent construction of traffic, fire brigade and health departments; (c) new projects identified at MOI/provincial level;</p>	<p>largest contributor.</p> <p>Projects included during Phase V under Priority 4 include the completed construction of a gymnasium completed; 10 completed construction projects covering traffic, fire brigade, health and border police departments.</p> <p>Although efforts overlap onto Phase VI, Phase V saw the identification of a number of new police infrastructure projects for 2010-11 intended to enhance police mobility and responsiveness, and contribute to police efficiency and morale. These included construction of a Police Training Centre in Ghor, up-grading of a MOI Drug Rehabilitation Centre in Kabul, construction of housing for families of ANP martyrs, as well as, the supply of equipment for Police Training Centres in Ghor, Herat, Adraskan and Kabul.</p>
<p><b>Priority 5:</b> Gender Orientation (Selection, recruitment and training of police).</p> <p><b>Output 5:</b> Number of women recruited and trained; number of gender awareness sessions conducted; number of family response units provided with required logistic support.</p>	<p><b>Indicators:</b> Number of women recruited and trained; number of gender awareness sessions conducted; number of family response units provided with required logistic support.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> (a1) 900 women in police (209 new recruits; (a2) 8 recruitment campaigns missions; (b) 10 FRUs in provinces; (c) 25 GMU staff provided further trainings; (d) 310 TOTs (10 additional);</p>	<p>482 new female recruits were identified during Phase V. Given a baseline figure of 691 female police which rose to an end of 2010 total of 1001, this suggests a still worrisome attrition figure of 172 lost over the same period.</p> <p>While positive, gains in recruits have largely been among <i>satanman</i> (non-commissioned officer) and <i>sarbaz / satonki</i> (soldier/patrolman) ranks whereas the number of women in saran (officer) ranks has remained stagnant over the 1389-1390 period.</p> <p>Phase V also saw the formation of the Afghan National Police Women's Association with a Gender Mainstreaming Unit facilitated through international assistance.</p> <p>Training efforts were conducted with GMU staff and training incentives were provided to female police personnel<sup>13</sup>. This was complemented with gender awareness and mainstreaming programmes, towards gender enhancement in MOI.</p> <p>Recruitment campaigns were undertaken in 7 provinces with media used as a central tool. Campaigns included the production of media spots, promotional films, documentaries and promotional "give-away" materials/merchandise.</p> <p>Based on the Phase V Final Report, the target of establishing 10 FRUs was not attained with MOI efforts directed instead towards the development of a strategy for FRUs.</p>
<p><b>Priority 6:</b> Payment of remuneration of uniformed personnel employed by the</p>	<p><b>Indicators:</b> Uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department are paid on time and transparently.</p>	<p>After agreement of MOF / MOJ on <i>Tashkeel</i> size and approval of Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) documents by the Office of the Afghan President, payments for CPD personnel scheduled to commence in September were delayed due to non-approval of the Mid-term Review (MTR) budget by Parliament<sup>14</sup>.</p>

<sup>13</sup> Training incentives were provided for patrolwomen at \$40 per month; sergeants at \$50 per month; and commissars at \$70 per month. ( LOTFA Annual Report 2010, p.18) An amount of Afs 947,909 was also disbursed to the new recruits in 1387, as training incentives. (LOTFA Annual Report 2008, p.12).

<sup>14</sup> LOTFA Annual Report 2009, p. 28.

Priority/Output	Output Indicators/Target	Progress
<p>Central Prisons Department through specially earmarked contributions.</p> <p><b>Output 6:</b> Prison Guards are supported to perform their job effectively and efficiently.</p>	<p><b>Target:</b> (a) Payment of CPD salaries in 34 provinces transparently; (b) Coverage of all CPD uniformed staff under EPS; (c) Coverage of 95 per cent CPD uniformed staff under EFT</p>	<p>Ultimately, LOTFA made salary payments to 5,055 uniformed personnel (as per <i>tashkeel</i> strength) of the Central Prisons Department (CPD) of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) through specially earmarked contributions in all 34 provinces. Alongside this and to promote greater accountability in the disbursement process, finance and HR officers from Kabul and the provinces were trained in financial management, HR, EPS and computerisation systems. TOTs were also organized to build capacity for the conduct of independent trainings.</p> <p>Approximately 50 per cent of CPD staff were reached by the EPS mechanism with approximately 50 per cent covered under EFT.</p>

Source: Final Project Report Phase V. Undated.



## 4.3 Key changes being implemented in Phase VI

4.3.1 The introduction of LOTFA Phase VI in January 2011 has brought with it a number of changes reflecting shifts in donors' intentions for the Fund and desires to address perceived operational weaknesses as well as changes in the operational context for LOTFA.


4.3.2 The key changes are:

- ▶ The introduction of a pillar structure encapsulating components into 3 consolidated pillars: Pillar 1: Support to the police remunerations and police infrastructure, with this pillar also including remuneration of uniformed CPD personnel, procurement and construction; Pillar 2: Consolidated capacity development and institutional reform, with gender mainstreaming also included; Pillar 3: Community Policing and the building of effective police-community partnerships under the *police-e mardumi* project; The latter pillar represents a new initiative for LOTFA which will focus on areas deemed to be either at low risk or "swing" areas at risk of insurgent infiltration, and thematic areas of crime prevention and peace consolidation;
- ▶ A more explicit recognition of the need to partner with government and international actors. The IPCB has been identified as meriting enhanced partnership building activities alongside efforts to increase synergies with other bodies including EUPOL, NTM-A/CSTC-A, UNAMA and the ARTF;
- ▶ Although the payment of police salaries and incentive benefits will continue to receive un-earmarked contributions on a priority basis, Phase VI sees changes in the prioritisation of expenditure. Remaining un-earmarked funds will be allocated to procurement and construction with some discretion for donors wishing to earmark funds for these areas. Both capacity building and gender mainstreaming will now be funded through specially earmarked contributions. The community policing pillar is similarly to be funded through designated funds. CPD remuneration will continue to be based on specially earmarked funding<sup>15</sup>;
- ▶ The project document includes moves to transfer LOTFA related activities to Afghan responsibility. During Phase VI, MOF has formally committed to taking over progressively larger food allowances for ANP. It has also resolved to take over larger shares of base salary costs (3 per cent in 1390 and 7.5 per cent in 1391), as well as, a benchmarked hand-over of all payroll systems and LOTFA functions under the MOI. Additionally, a GfRoa-donor working group and the LOTFA Steering Committee (SC) have undertaken to explore time frames for an exit strategy.

4.3.3 The estimated funding requirement for LOTFA-VI, as indicated in the relevant Project Document, is \$1.4 billion. The pattern of budgetary allocations is reflected in Figure 4-1 overleaf.

4.3.4 As with LOTFA-V, the initial commitments are overwhelmingly for salary reimbursement via the National Budget. As noted elsewhere in this Report, subsequent increases in salaries agreed by the Steering Committee and other changes will result in changes in the total funding and relative shares of the activities during delivery of the Phase.

Figure 4-1: Allocation of LOTFA VI budget by output/task



*Source: Analysis of LOTFA-VI Project Document budget*

## 5 Performance appraisal

### 5.1 Introduction

- 5.1.1 Chapter 4 illustrated the dynamics at work during LOTFA-V and the progress made towards its stated objectives, as well as, providing an overview of changes made with the introduction of Phase VI. In this chapter, we document implementation performance during Phase V with an assessment based on site visit research, interviews and an examination of the various control systems, processes and documentation that support the interventions initiated through the Fund.
- 5.1.2 As indicated earlier, while it is unrealistic to attempt to assess the impact of Phase V in isolation, or indeed the broader impact of the LOTFA mechanism given the number of other interventions directed at police development, it is possible to consider whether Phase V's deliverables and likely outcomes are relevant and are viewed positively by recipients and other stakeholders.
- 5.1.3 It is worth noting from the outset, that stakeholders have, by and large, expressed a high level of satisfaction with a number of areas, but most especially in terms of payroll reimbursement activity, and there is a notable level of satisfaction with the LOTFA team's work in this regard. Outside of this main priority, our consultations suggest that stakeholders continue to hold diverging views regarding future directions for the Fund, and with perhaps somewhat greater emphasis, given the onset of the current transition period. At least some stakeholders would like to see developments enabling the Fund to more actively engage in capacity building and activities fostering reform in line with longer term sustainability and institutional development objectives. Some stakeholders have also expressed concern regarding the ongoing fiduciary risk posed by unreliable provincial headcount data, as well as, the longer term role to be played by the Fund. In this section, we set out our assessment of these issues; we have looked to common or consensus views and, together with the observations of the reviewing team, these form the basis for our conclusions.
- 5.1.4 More generally, this chapter will also examine factors that have impacted on the performance of LOTFA-V, both in terms of its own management resources and wider contextual issues. Namely, it will look at LOTFA and whether its interventions are in line with security, institutional development and community requirements, particularly in relation to other policy and project interventions. It will also identify key drivers and constraints, (political, institutional and otherwise) that impact on LOTFA's performance at field level. As a final point, we remind readers that our inferences are formulated in the context of the caveats outlined in section 2.3 and Appendix B.

### 5.2 Achieving priorities

- 5.2.1 LOTFA's activities and stakeholders' perceptions of them are impacted by a range of tensions that impact on the Fund's efforts to achieve its stated priorities.
- 5.2.2 A critical factor is the inherent contradiction between efforts to assist police forces in attaining immediate operational effectiveness and longer term development goals and the achievement of fiscal sustainability envisioned in the Afghan Compact for the police and at the heart of the MYFF.
- 5.2.3 Persisting high levels of insecurity in Afghanistan have resulted in high operational demands on a police force which saw relatively limited levels of attention and resources in the initial years of intervention. While force development through skills training, asset provision and logistical support has been heavily supported by the GIRoA's bilateral and multilateral police-sector partners through a number of interventions, the application of the rule of law in Afghanistan still faces substantive challenges.
- 5.2.4 Related to this tension between operational and developmental imperatives is the approach to non-payroll-related priorities which have expanded over the different phases of LOTFA but have continued to receive a limited share of resources. The attention paid to these priorities, most notably institutional development, which has seen its relative importance both rise and fall, has reflected a divergence of views regarding the aims of LOTFA and the extent to which the existing TOR for the Fund should be fully pursued.

5.2.5 The operational challenges in overcoming these constraints and others are substantial and have been documented and discussed comprehensively in many other reviews. Indeed several are identified in our review of LOTFA-IV, and these remained significant during the period of Phase V. These are:

- ▶ A range of **institutional and organisational weaknesses** in the MOI and the ANP that relate to poor governance, strategic management and policy capacity as well as, ongoing challenges in securing and retaining experienced and skilled personnel;
- ▶ **A reduced but continuing lack of clarity on human resource availability:** Efforts in LOTFA-V to develop the Web-EPS as a means of addressing the personnel management issues of the ANP are welcomed in terms of the attention they commit to a long-standing issue facing the ANP, given the number of different, and widely considered irreconcilable, personnel databases currently in use. The challenge this presents is exacerbated by continued high attrition rates for ANP and marked levels of absenteeism, especially in high threat and medium threat environments; and
- ▶ **Persisting challenges with respect to professionalism and national legitimacy** compounded by complex networks of alternative loyalties reflecting a range of ethnic, tribal, family, religious and political affinities and that reinforce patronage and undermine force cohesion. As an extension of this, the ANP is viewed as unrepresentative of gender and minority rights given existing gender and ethnic imbalances.

5.2.6 In the face of these concerns – particularly in relation to the perceived shortage of manpower – the JCMB has regularly sanctioned the MOI to strengthen the *tashkeel* of the ANP. Given the lead time required to stand up forces, this dynamic has resulted in support for the introduction of ancillary forces<sup>16</sup>. It has also been reflected in decisions to increase the *tashkeel* from 82,180 as a result of a decision made in JCMB-VIII (held 10<sup>th</sup> September 2008) to 109,000 by October 2010 and 134,000 by October 2011. Implicit in these decisions is the assumption of and need for continued bilateral and political support from international partners for funding this growth<sup>17</sup>.

### 5.3 Funding police salaries

5.3.1 As concluded in our last evaluation, the continued relevance of LOTFA is premised on its ability to offer a proven mechanism for remunerating the ANP and thereby improving recruitment and retention in the context of a high risk and fragile security environment. More specifically, LOTFA has thus far provided:

- ▶ A means of ensuring that pay is channelled to ANP personnel – especially with the development and introduction of EPS and EFT mechanisms to assure reliable and full payment of salaries; and
- ▶ A forum for discussion bringing together stakeholders to examine and address pay-related issues in the context of efforts to balance security and development related support.

5.3.2 Accordingly, in November 2008 the LOTFA Steering Committee considered and approved a pay raise as an incentive for recruitment and retention and to encourage national relocation of ANP personnel from northern to southern areas of the country, where counter-insurgency (COIN) operations have been most extensive. The raise consists of \$20 per month pay for all ANP personnel and seeks to facilitate pay parity with ANA servicemen. Incentive pay for relocation of staff to medium and high threat districts was also approved. The March 2009 Steering Committee meeting included the approval of incentive pay for professional personnel (Medical, Explosive Ordinance Disposal and Chief Sergeant Major staffs) of MOI to bring the relevant pay scales into parity with ANA professional pay, while the March 2010 meeting saw a monthly professional pay ruling for ANCOP similarly approved.

5.3.3 In light of the clear primacy of efforts to deliver ANP pay the yardsticks for performance in this area of the Fund stand as central measures with which to judge it. Table 4-4 suggests that both the EPS and EFT have successfully built on past accomplishments and enjoyed increased levels of penetration in meeting remuneration needs for ANP personnel. This, however, has

<sup>16</sup> In recent years this includes for the now defunct Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), and the present Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).

<sup>17</sup> It is worth noting that intra-Phase increments have typically only been funded by a few major donors, with others' commitments remaining constant.

been accompanied by delays due to and factors including infrastructure and the non-institutionalization of EPS operator positions and residual problems of non-compliance in reporting in some areas and, due to a mix of security and logistical issues, a lack of reliable data in others. Field visits conducted over the course of the Evaluation indicate that delays in accessing salaries continue to be an issue in at least some areas, as discussed further in 5.8.2.

- 5.3.4 Despite defining a performance indicator for Priority one, the LOTFA-V project document specified limited specific targets in this regard with additional targets included in Work Plan documentation. Nonetheless progress towards these Work Plan targets has been significant as shown in 4-4.
- 5.3.5 The rollout of EPS during LOTFA-V proceeded apace, building on past progress in this area. By the end of 1387, EPS implementation was completed in all 34 provinces, including 65 client payroll stations in Kabul zone and MOI central departments, and covered 115, 948 police personnel, constituting 99.4 per cent of the total existing police force.
- 5.3.6 Against the project document target of 80 per cent coverage by the end of March 2009, implementation of individualised salary payment via Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) reached 63 per cent. The shortfall was largely on account of external factors, namely, a lack of commercial banks in the relevant provinces and exacerbated by the increase in ANP *tashkeel* size. Despite this, EFT which allows for the payment of police salaries through individual bank accounts was made functional in 22 provinces by end 2008. The coverage rate for EFT in 2010 remained unchanged from the 2009 level of 80 per cent of the payroll, although the number of uniformed police personnel who received salaries by EFT grew to 93,274 reflecting the growing *tashkeel* size.
- 5.3.7 The achievement of this level of penetration reflects both a successful effort on the part of the LOTFA management team and the Steering Committee in pushing for EFT adoption by MOI, as well as, moves to encourage expansion of the banking network. Efforts to address gaps in bank branch coverage have also included the development of complementary and alternative technology in the form of a mobile phone-based M-paisa system to allow for salary payments in otherwise inaccessible districts<sup>18</sup>. A pilot launch in one district in Wardak province was subsequently expanded to one district in Wardak and to two in Khost province. The end of Phase V saw yet another expansion to 25 new districts not covered by commercial bank coverage and providing access for around 4,700 police personnel<sup>19</sup>.
- 5.3.8 Further to this, the LOTFA team have directed efforts towards finding a way forward on the development of a centralised web-based payroll system, which consolidates the processing which is currently undertaken at a provincial level. The stated objective of the web-based EPS system is to harmonise MOI data sources and the link the MOI EPS database with other existing personnel databases, including the DynCorp ID card database, the Personal Asset Inventory (PAI) and current MOI HR database to provide a harmonised set of full and transparent records for personnel boosting system and payment accountability. During Phase V, the online payroll system was implemented in Parwan, Panjsher, Kapisa, Kabul Police HQ, MOI Training and Education Department, the Herat Police Headquarters.
- 5.3.9 With respect to police remuneration, during 2010, LOTFA paid salaries to an estimated 116,524 ANP personnel, (the December 2010 force strength) in all 34 provinces. The headcount at the start of Phase V as recorded by MOI HR Department as 78,249, reflecting a rapidly growing *tashkeel*. The veracity of headcount data continues, however, to be disputed by commentators, acting as a source of fiduciary risk as MOI faces challenges in establishing a comprehensive list of all police personnel with ID cards. The ID card project facilitated by DynCorp (CSTC-A) has encountered some operational delays; the system was subsequently fast-tracked and complemented with Personnel Asset inventory (PAI) initiatives as part of efforts to provide accurate and verifiable data regarding ANP human resources. This represents a potentially useful development though one whose potential remains complicated by the multiplicity of systems in place and concerns regarding reconciliation.
- 5.3.10 Finally, field visits would suggest that technical obstacles to fully effective implementation of payroll activities would seem to be most strongly driven by limitations vis-à-vis equipment, computerisation, availability of a reliable source of electricity and access to banking services,

<sup>18</sup> The M-paisa scheme is premised on cash payments to ANP staff made by local agents of the cellular phone company Roshan against a pin number supplied by SMS to police officers' phones.

<sup>19</sup> As per Steering Committee minutes for 11 November 2010.

as opposed to other factors. The moving target presented by increasing *tashkeel* numbers presents additional challenges.

## 5.4 Institutional development

- 5.4.1 Of the non-salary components in LOTFA-V, institutional development, mainly in financial and project management and accountancy, was given the next highest priority in the phase design laid out in the Project Document. As we noted with approval in our review of the previous phase, this was done in recognition of importance of ongoing institutional and organisational concerns over force composition, structure, policing strategy and operational doctrine.
- 5.4.2 Despite the relative importance ostensibly attached to institutional development as central to addressing sustainability issues, its ranking does not appear to have been fully reflected in the funding subsequently allocated. Neither is there much emphasis evident in the level of preparation and planning dedicated to advancing it as a Fund priority. In addition, the scope of work in this priority during Phase V as outlined in the Project Document has stayed unchanged from the last phase, and continued to focus on training of MOI staff in the use of EPS and fulfilling payroll processing functions. However, we do recognise this remains critical to ensuring a reliable payments system given the ongoing importance of ensuring salaries are reliably paid.
- 5.4.3 Phase V offered the opportunity to build on our recommendations from the review of Phase IV and contribute more widely to the development of institutional and administrative capacity<sup>20</sup>. Unfortunately, there continues to be no will (or funding from donors) to do so, as reflected in a reversion to the requirement for earmarked funds for this activity with Phase VI. Regardless, it is perhaps still reasonable to ask why after 10 years of LOTFA intervention, the institutional capacity development component of the Fund remains focused on doing the same training tasks over successive phases.
- 5.4.4 The wider problems to be addressed in relation to institutional capacity in the MOI are well documented – and have been known for many years. While some of the issues are strategic (for example civilianisation of the MOI) many relate to weaknesses in core administrative functions. These functions, (aside from management of payroll), include: policy development (including strategy); personnel management and HR; financial management; asset and facilities management and procurement. Though Phase VI has undertaken activities to address some of these issues important concerns and limitations remain not only with respect to the development of core capacities but also in light of the highly limited percentage of Fund resources dedicated and the paucity in many instances of meaningful targets and measures for progress.
- 5.4.5 At a tactical level across many of these categories there is considerable support given by Afghanistan's development partners which LOTFA has engaged with in many instances – for example, among others the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) provides substantial training support, CSTC-A is providing a mentoring programme and has recently provided logistical support to improve sustainment. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has engaged in policy support through its Strategic Support to the Ministry of Interior (SSMI) Programme<sup>21</sup>.
- 5.4.6 Despite the range of existing interventions, significant gaps in organisational capacity at MOI persist. This is accentuated by the *ad hoc* quality of mentor advising which has been highly limited in its ability to foster systemic organisational change and capacity transformation. For example, despite the continued logistics and procurement support of US military logistics battalions in acquiring and delivering assets to the MOI, our discussions with CSTC-A highlight ongoing weaknesses in MOI's internal control systems in releasing assets for operational requirements. Elsewhere, a DFID and World Bank public expenditure review point to constraints in budget formulation capacity<sup>22</sup>. More generally, US Government assessments consistently highlight the poor capacity in MOI in core administrative and management

<sup>20</sup> Output 2 envisages institutional development as (a) institutional reform, (b) building financial and project management capacity at MOI; and (c) supporting the establishment or strengthening of specialised units (LOTFA-V Project Document, p.12). In this respect the scope of institutional reform leaves room for interpretation. The LOTFA MSU has taken a specific view focused on financial and management aspects, which is stressed in the Project Document, and in the emphasis given by the Steering Committee. The MSU has also aligned itself with the Fund TOR.

<sup>21</sup> LOTFA has engaged extensively with these programmes in Phase VI under Pillar 2. We do not have sufficient information to comment on the efficacy of these programmes.

<sup>22</sup> *Working Paper 4 for Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010*, op.cit., p.17.

functions. Its periodic assessments of MOI performance against a Capability Milestone (CM) framework have scored the majority of the functions of the Department of Administration and Support as being unable to perform without external assistance<sup>23</sup>.

- 5.4.7 As part of Phase V efforts under Priority 2, the formulation of capacity building plans by LOTFA for 1388 (2009–2010) and 1389 (2010–2011) is a welcome step. The plans would benefit, however, with the addition of a greater level of detail. Central in this regard is the inclusion of appropriate targets and timetables for capacity building activities and transfer of LOTFA functions, as well as the articulation of a monitoring plan for tracking progress in the critical area of transferring EPS functions to MOI authority<sup>24</sup>. A greater focus on building capacity at the systems level through the inclusion of initiatives building organisational capacity in areas such as procurement, asset management and accountability and transparency would also be highly desirable.
- 5.4.8 We also question whether the indicators used to evaluate progress in nurturing institutional development are the best and most suitable option given the sustainability issues underlying the increasing attention paid to strengthening institutions: a focus on evaluating progress in competencies and the development of a competency framework, along the lines used by the US Department of Defense (although there are many alternatives, such as those of the Australian and UK Governments among others) may better serve the aims of LOTFA and its stakeholders.
- 5.4.9 As a consequence of the various challenges outlined above, there are stakeholders who, while viewing pay-related activity positively, indicated they would like to see LOTFA addressing the wider issues of building institutional capacity accountability and governance of the ANP by strengthening core functional capabilities in the MOI. This was a feature of the feedback from donors in our review of LOTFA-IV also. As before, in the face of such desires, it is difficult to fully commend LOTFA-V in relation to its institutional development and capacity building role. However, we re-iterate our previous conclusion that *“it is not the fault of the trust fund or its administration per se, but rather caused by a systemic failure of multiple stakeholders to develop a coherent and coordinated approach to institutional development and commit funding to it through LOTFA”*<sup>25</sup>.
- 5.4.10 Despite the positive steps taken in promoting institutional development within the priorities for LOTFA-V and the introduction of a new Policing Plan, a strategic vision remains lacking. As a result, donors have continued to work bilaterally for much of the period of LOTFA-V, with the LOTFA team, perhaps as a consequence and under guidance from its Steering Committee, continuing to align itself with a narrow interpretation of the Fund’s TOR. However, we note that the level of coordination between donors has increased with the greater activity of the IPCB, and stakeholders comment favourably on LOTFA’s presence and contribution in consultative fora.
- 5.4.11 Finally, we reiterate the continuing limited ownership by the MOI of LOTFA interventions highlighted briefly in section 5.2.1, despite some aspects of work being handed over to GIRoA. Identified as a risk in the Project Documents for Phase V, this is a concern of longer-standing and one which has curtailed the ability of the LOTFA team to expand its capacity building support.

## 5.5 Procurement and construction priorities

- 5.5.1 Procurement and construction activities, with the stated aims of procuring, maintaining and operating non-lethal equipment and supplies, and rehabilitating, maintaining and operating police facilities are Phase V’s third and fourth priorities respectively.
- 5.5.2 While budget utilisation for construction activities appears to have noticeably improved over Phase IV, a number of the observations made in the previous evaluation remain relevant.
- 5.5.3 Central to these observations is the somewhat *ad hoc* and reactive approach taken to advancing these two priorities. The reasons underlying this are multiple. Indeed, a major and

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<sup>23</sup>See the *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*. Report to Congress. November 2011, pp.34-35, and also *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces*. Report to Congress, April 2011, p.17. Most functions are categorised as CM-3: Cannot accomplish [its] mission without significant coalition assistance.

<sup>24</sup> A time log was prepared but lacks appropriate detail.

<sup>25</sup>*Evaluation of LOTFA Phase IV, Final Report*, 22 February 2009, p.39.



continuing factor in this regard is the ongoing and large scale parallel construction and procurement activity being undertaken by donors outside of the command and procurement structures of the MOI. The presence of significant parallel activity in these areas undermines both the relevance of these priorities for LOTFA, and the development of the capacity needed to effectively coordinate and monitor asset needs at MOI. The *ad hoc*-ism of construction and procurement support is reflected in the transactional nature of evaluating these activities, which focuses on quantifying efforts and which, in the case of procurement, acts in response to specific MOI requests. Although this conforms to the Project Document requirements for Phase V, such an approach detracts from the development of a coherent procurement or construction-related capability within the MOI.

- 5.5.4 Indeed, despite the National Implementation Modality (NIM) approach underlying Phase V efforts, there remain capacity constraints in MOI in these areas. As is the case with efforts in institutional capacity building, the exclusive reliance on indicators quantifying transactions occurs at the expense of a lack of attention paid to the development of relevant competencies. As suggested in our evaluation of LOTFA-IV, the development of procurement capacity, in particular, needs to be considered holistically and along with other aspects of supply chain management as well as asset and facilities management. Efforts should thus go hand in hand with a broader focus on addressing the post-procurement process and issues of resource planning and management. This includes coordination and monitoring of asset requirements and asset management in the MOI and the accurate evaluation of the full life-cycle costs and replenishment strategies against proposed purchases. Procurement strategy and forward planning capabilities also remain areas requiring attention. As such, it is worth noting that there are adverse consequences of not addressing procurement and planning activities most notably associated with the risks and opportunity costs of not improving accountability within the MOI and ANP. Given this, any progress achieved in Phase VI or any subsequent phases on reform of procurement systems would represent an important step.
- 5.5.5 Our field visit observations illustrate such consequences. We noted striking and rectifiable gaps in the management of non-lethal assets, including a complete lack of documentation or controls, including basic metering, of fuel supplies and its usage in ANP vehicles. The lack of controls or planning in asset usage was also seen in both the lack and misallocation of police vehicles. In one instance, the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) staff of one district were compelled to operate outside of basic criminal investigations procedure and to expose themselves to heightened personal risk by using marked ANP trucks due to a lack of unmarked vehicles. The provincial capital, a short distance away, was in possession of “60-70” unmarked vehicles that were being reserved for the use of the Provincial Governor when making visits to districts outside the provincial capital.
- 5.5.6 We stress, as before, procurement capability in the MOI needs to be built as part of a wider and more robust engagement in institutional development. As suggested in section 5.4 above, this engagement would seek to assess and develop procurement capacity at a systemic level, addressing the competencies and procedural frameworks that maximise efficiency and accountability and reduce fiduciary risk across procurement related activities. We also re-emphasise this task should also include benchmarks and targets for the progressive use of national procurement by donors rather than current methods which detract from building internal MOI capacity.

## 5.6 Gender-related activities

- 5.6.1 Gender-related initiatives by LOTFA are in effect two-pronged. The Fund has advanced efforts to both increase the representation of women within the police services and to strengthen the overall ability of the police to deal effectively with gender issues. Included in the latter component of the gender priority is an acknowledgement of the importance of ensuring protection of and respect for the human rights of women and girls, including as they relate to the police. The recruitment of women into the police not only provides a mechanism for the reintroduction of women into the public sphere, but also a critical point of access for women to the wider justice system. These activities represent important interventions by LOTFA, albeit ones to which relatively few resources have been devoted. Indeed, performance in these areas has been positive though there are both numerous obstacles to further gains as well as efforts, as outlined below, which could reasonably be undertaken to assist in pushing forward this priority.
- 5.6.2 The successes of LOTFA in contributing to progress on gender-related issues include efforts in



advancing a recruitment strategy and the initiation of incentive pay for female recruitments. Organisationally, this has been accompanied by the establishment of the Gender Mainstreaming Unit (GMU) at the MOI, which has furthermore succeeded in gaining recognition within the MOI *tashkeel*. Further organisational development has been seen in the formation of the Afghan National Police Women's Association (ANPWA) with regional chapters also founded in Herat and Nangarhar.

5.6.3 There are, however, various aspects to gender related intervention which should be considered if the benefits achieved by LOTFA to date are to be expanded on and sustained going forward:

- ▶ Efforts to track data regarding promotions and rank of female staff are a positive, if overdue, development. The next step would be for the monitoring of this data to be met with its use in further analysis of gender aspects of policing policy and operational management, as well as, recruitment and retention;
- ▶ While efforts in recruitment are central to boosting women's participation, they would benefit from complementary initiatives to monitor and analyse attrition and retention of female personnel, issues which continue to pose a significant challenge to the establishment of a core and foundational female presence within the police services; and
- ▶ Discussions with police commanders suggest that the limited availability of positions for women may pose an as yet inadequately recognised obstacle to building a more gender-representative police force. Given that the recruitment and retention of female police staff lie at the core of LOTFA's activities in this priority, the nature and availability of positions for prospective female recruits needs to be considered in future planning and efforts under this priority;

5.6.4 The continued efforts with respect to the establishment and provision of support for Family Response Units (FRUs) represent an important initiative for LOTFA and, indeed, these Units have been identified as successfully accomplishing twin goals of providing positions particularly well-suited to female police personnel and aiding in broader goals of providing women with access to broader and formal police services<sup>26</sup>.

5.6.5 The final report for Phase V indicates that the stated target of the establishment of 10 FRUs was not met, with efforts being channelled instead into the formulation of a FRU strategy by MOI. Information available from LOTFA regarding the number of cases reported to and processed by FRU investigators suggests that closer examination of FRU case handling may be helpful. Specifically, data regarding investigation numbers points to a static caseload that stands at odds with the expanding nature of the FRU initiative, suggesting that a review to examine complaint reporting and handling may be in order.

5.6.6 Finally, despite progress made in ongoing recruitment efforts, we question the usefulness of the aspirational target of 5,000 female officers for 2014 announced by MOI, given the high and likely unrealistic target it represents for LOTFA and other stakeholders<sup>27</sup>.

## 5.7 Remuneration of Central Prisons Department

5.7.1 LOTFA Phase V saw the introduction of a sixth priority, namely the remuneration of uniformed Central Prisons Department (CPD) personnel. The desired output under this priority was to support efficient and effective job performance by prison guards with targets focused on the transparent and timely payment of CPD salaries in all 34 provinces and with all uniformed staff covered by EPS and 95 per cent of them paid by EFT.

5.7.2 After an initial delay in payments due to non-approval of the Mid-term Review (MTR) budget by Parliament, LOTFA ultimately made salary payments to all 5,055 uniformed personnel in accordance with *tashkeel* figures through specially earmarked contributions. Training in financial management, HR, EPS and computers was also provided to finance and HR officers to aid in the disbursement process and promote its greater accountability; training sessions utilised a training-of-trainers (ToT) format to build capacity for the future conduct of independent trainings.

<sup>26</sup>A recent OHCHR/UNAMA report pointed to positive results from the establishment of FRUs in terms of their ability to encourage victims of domestic violence to come forward to the policing system and lodge complaints. *A Long Way to Go – Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan*. UNAMA/OHCHR. November 2011.

<sup>27</sup> The recruitment goal was announced at the 14 June 2009 Steering Committee meeting.

- 5.7.3 Although Phase V was not able to achieve the ambitious targets of 100 per cent EPS and 95 per cent EFT coverage, it achieved approximately 50 per cent penetration with both mechanisms. The relative success of reaching half of the relevant staff despite delays in funding, including regular salary funding shortfalls, represents an accomplishment reflecting the expertise that LOTFA has built up through its experience with the ANP. The static nature of CPD personnel usage has no doubt contributed to this and will facilitate expansion in the current Phase VI, though the repeated difficulties encountered in ensuring adequate funding remain an issue of notable concern.
- 5.7.4 Although the outputs tied to bringing CPD under the LOTFA umbrella have been limited to establishing the basis for distributing salaries and efficient remuneration, the experience of Phase V demonstrates the capacity for LOTFA to build on successes in the policing realm and expand them to additional areas of the security sector. Indeed, given the relative neglect of the prison sector up to this time and its fundamental, if often overlooked, impact in strengthening the rule of law, justice sector, and bolstering state legitimacy, the exploration of further select areas of engagement might be recommended. In particular, and drawing on the results of our field visits, the limited basic equipment and facilities that characterise the overwhelming majority of prisons in Afghanistan suggests a potentially important role for LOTFA in areas of procurement of basic non-lethal equipment to be brought to donors' attention and for their fuller consideration. Areas of special relevance include equipment which aid in basic operations and which strengthen basic security standards at facilities.
- 5.7.5 Given the potentially broad mandate of LOTFA and its existing involvement in areas beyond salaries, there is considerable potential to assist across a range of development needs in the CPD.

## 5.8 Impact of Phase V

### *ANP and MOI perspectives*

- 5.8.1 Despite the range of political, strategic, policy and institutional challenges faced, feedback from stakeholders on LOTFA's contribution to facilitating salary payments was noticeably positive. In keeping with our previous findings during the evaluation of Phase IV, the different provincial headquarters and district police stations visited over the course of our evaluation also produced consistently positive among police personnel regarding remunerations.
- 5.8.2 However, anecdotal evidence from field visits in different areas of the country continues to point to potential difficulties in ensuring payment to affected staff:
- ▶ The limited presence of banks in many provinces means that ANP in relatively remote areas continue to need to travel several days to draw their salaries.
  - ▶ Staffing and vehicle shortages have also meant that staff in some districts have to "schedule" the collection of their salary and collect funds in groups, often resulted in salaries being received weeks late.
- 5.8.3 The extent and frequency of such challenges to efficient disbursement of salaries is difficult to quantify, though they are not out of line with potential obstacles cited in other studies, which have noted more serious problems<sup>28</sup>.

### *Institutional perspectives*

- 5.8.4 LOTFA effectively serves to bring together relevant ministries of the Afghan, most particularly MOI, donor states from the international community, and various other coordination and public stakeholders. As such it provides a forum for discussion and the formulation of joint approaches and strategies, as well as, an opportunity to foster local ownership.
- 5.8.5 As documented in the LOTFA IV Evaluation, senior MOI officials continue to value the access and forum provided by the Fund in engaging with the donor community. Donors' perspectives,

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<sup>28</sup> These include attempts by police commanders to take the bank cards of men under their command and subsequently withhold a portion of each person's pay, and even an attempt to collect SIM cards of personnel participating in the m-paisa scheme and use them to appropriate salary funds. See *Working Paper 4 for Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010, op.cit.*, p. 22 and *Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces report*. Checchia, January 2012, p.5.

on the other hand, were more varied, as is perhaps to be expected given the number and range of parties involved.

- 5.8.6 In addition to the previously mentioned divergence in views regarding policing approaches with respect to community-based efforts or counter-insurgency focused activity, donors have adopted differing levels of urgency towards the issue of the transferral of LOTFA responsibilities. Given the relative maturity and success that LOTFA has attained in remuneration of the ANP, some donors felt that planning for the transferral of these functions should have already been initiated in earlier Phases. As suggested earlier, other donors were more preoccupied with ensuring a foundation for long-term development of ministerial capacity or were content to see the Fund stay within narrow interpretations of its mandate<sup>29</sup>.
- 5.8.7 This range of perspectives, particularly to the degree that they are motivated by views on LOTFA's role in the context of transition, point to the need for LOTFA to both expand its communications efforts and to clarify further with its Steering Committee and donors what its role in the context of decreasing levels of foreign engagement is expected to be. This dynamic is in addition to the already critical need to use effective communications to manage expectations in the face of a lack of continuity among donors' staff, which can contribute to the negative perceptions arising.
- 5.8.8 Related to this, coordination with international community (IC) bodies continues to pose challenges, though efforts have been made to bolster working relations with the IPCB, as well as, EUPOL and NTM-A. While this issue is driven to an important degree by the short rotations of relevant staff, and is thus, ultimately outside of LOTFA's control, it underlines the importance of strengthening communications efforts.
- 5.8.9 Despite these concerns, the advent of LOTFA-V also resulted in increased funding expectations, as well as a broader scope of work. The continuing expansion of funding is perhaps a positive indicator of the value donors perceive that LOTFA can bring as a means of funding interventions. This is tempered however by the strong and continued interest in undertaking parallel interventions bilaterally (e.g. procurement) with the resulting effect of undermining the impact on donor harmonisation and limiting policy coherence among them.

### *Public perceptions of police performance*

- 5.8.10 Assessing the impact of LOTFA's efforts on public perceptions of the ANP remains challenging in light of the multitude of efforts focused on policing, endemic corruption challenges, and local power dynamics particularly in the context of weak governance environments. These challenges notwithstanding, the Evaluation sought to examine whether the public perceptions of the police changed over time (see Appendix D).
- 5.8.11 Our limited anecdotal evidence from non-state civil society was confined to areas permissive to civil policing. Overall feedback was positive expressing confidence in the police and pointing to a lack of equipment in the form of weapons and vehicles, as well as, low pay as impediments to further progress. This being said, the rather forced phrasing of large portions of the feedback leads us to only a cautiously positive conclusion, at best, in light of the sensitivity citizens often feel when asked questions relating to security forces<sup>30</sup>. Of more significance was the assertion of one CDC that the operation of "personal checkpoints" had ceased in the community and been replaced with an expanded police presence.
- 5.8.12 An important effort in terms of evaluating public perception of the ANP is LOTFA and the UNDP's requisitioning of surveys in 2009 and 2010. Survey results over the two years thus far available would appear to reflect some level of improvement in public perceptions from the low levels of confidence seen in earlier studies.
- 5.8.13 The surveys themselves illustrate limited or at least mixed success in various dimensions of building public confidence in the ANP<sup>31</sup>. With regards to the basic question of whether or on

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<sup>29</sup> As indicated earlier in the description of planned Phase VI initiatives, LOTFA has moved towards the transferral of LOTFA related activities to Afghan responsibility. Measures involved include a increased role for MOF in covering food allowances for the ANP, an increased share of base salary costs, as well as, a benchmarked hand-over of payroll systems and other functions.

<sup>30</sup> As well as the limited range of civil society met, as indicated in Appendix A, we also draw upon interviewee perspectives from our other, previous evaluation work in the security sector.

<sup>31</sup> The 2009 Police Perception Survey (p.20) cites 27% of respondents indicating they had been asked to pay a bribe in the last 2 years. This is roughly in line with UNODC's 2010 finding that approximately 25% of respondents had

the ANP is viewed favourably, more positive responses in Kabul and the Hazarajat are matched by more negative ones in the west and south-west, leaving the overall perceptions regarding the police unchanged. Other measures in the survey have been seen as indicating a measure of progress in improving public confidence in the police services.

- 5.8.14 Finally, the Evaluation notes that LOTFA also engaged in broader community outreach over the course of Phase V. In addition to the designing of new publicity brochures and pamphlets, including calendars, newsletters and painting booklets, the Fund organised a Photo and Painting Exhibition and allied events which included the participation of Afghan street children.

## 5.9 Fiscal sustainability and fiduciary risk

- 5.9.1 The financial pressures LOTFA is susceptible to have expanded. This has been tied to the range of pay increases for different categories of personnel outlined earlier, increases in *tashkeel* size, and, perhaps more dramatically, with the onset of the current transition phase. Though CSTC-A has made significant one-year financial commitments to facilitate in the payment of the salary increases incurred in Phase V, longer term concerns regarding sustainability will clearly also need to be addressed.
- 5.9.2 During 2009, the combined expenditure for police salaries and food allowance totalled \$181.7 million (a 29 per cent increase over the previous year). During 2010, the combined expenditure for police salaries and food allowance increased even more dramatically totalling \$493.4 million (a 105.4 per cent increase over 2009). In 1389 (2010-2011), GIRA funding for the ANP via the National Budget was only able to cover a modest amount (just over 9 per cent) of the total expenditures required. Given the steep expansion of combined security force numbers, expenditure on the combined security sector (both ANA and ANP) as of 1388 accounted for 51 per cent of total operating expenditures and is expected to reach 61 per cent by 1393 (2014-2015)<sup>32</sup>.
- 5.9.3 According to a World Bank analysis of the impacts of transition, there is a strong likelihood that ANP salaries will still require external support into the medium term, even if force size and the overall numbers of combined Afghan security forces are not increased further; this will also be case even assuming that the bullish goals for growth in domestic revenue (an increase in domestic revenue from 10 per cent to 17 per cent of GDP over the next decade) are met<sup>33</sup>. Indeed, pointing to a projected fiscal gap of between 21 and 25 per cent of GDP by 2021/2022, the World Bank report anticipates that operations and management spending combined with the wage bill for security will account for 17.5 per cent of GDP by 2021. Along parallel lines, a 2009 report by RUSI points out that, "sustaining an 82,000 strong ANP alone is estimated at \$1 billion annually for the next five years according to the Defence Department. Such a figure is larger than the country's entire domestic revenue which currently hovers around the US\$700 million per annum range"<sup>34</sup>. The current *tashkeel* has, of course, surpassed this figure<sup>35</sup>.
- 5.9.4 The risks associated with shortfalls in spending for the security sector have been discussed and debated widely, though the projected fiscal gap also points to risks in neglecting essential civilian spending, especially should the size of combined Afghan security forces increase even further.
- 5.9.5 A number of mitigating measures are available to address these problems and many have been anticipated by LOTFA and slated for implementation though these have in some cases met with mixed results.
- 5.9.6 A case in point is the decision for the Afghan government to begin assuming responsibility for the cost of ANP food allowances. A resolution for MOF to take over the full food allowance from its own funds by 1389 (2010-2011) was declared unworkable by the Ministry due to

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been asked for a bribe in the preceding 12 months; this data also represents the highest level of attempted corruption among civil servant groupings examined in the UNODC study (see Checchia, p.5)

<sup>32</sup>National Budget 1389, Government of Afghanistan, p.31.

<sup>33</sup>Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014. Executive Summary. World Bank, 2011.18 November 2011, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup>Reforming the Afghan National Police. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), September 2009. p. 87.

<sup>35</sup>The October 2009 LOTFA Steering Committee meeting saw MOF present a medium-term fiscal sustainability framework for the years 1388-93. MOF projected total ANP costs of 25% as a percentage of domestic revenues by 1393. It argued that its fiscal sustainability target might not be attained in the upcoming five years and that the security sector would continue to require external assistance on a long-term basis.

decisions to increase the size of ANP forces relatively soon afterwards. A compromise was approved in which MOF would take over the food allowance payment for 41,000 ANP personnel in 1389 and a minimum of 82,000 ANP in 1390 (2011-2012), with the remainder handled by LOTFA<sup>36</sup>.

- 5.9.7 A further and more substantive issue has been the position of LOTFA with regards to the transferring of functions to Afghan responsibility. In line with another portion of this report regarding donor perspectives, LOTFA donor Ambassadors strongly recommended that MOF take over 5 per cent of ANP base salaries in 1390 and 10 per cent in 1391 (2012-2013) towards the end of Phase VI. This step towards a more substantive financial contribution from MOF was seen as a move towards a more sustainable development approach. MOF responded with a noticeably more modest proposal to take over approximately 1.7 per cent of base-salaries for 1391 and 1392 (2013-2014)<sup>37</sup>. Strategic agreements reached during 2010 committed GIRoA to taking over 3 per cent of police salary budget and the food allowance of 82,000 ANP in 1391 and 7.5 per cent of salary budget and food allowance of 98,239 ANP in the following year<sup>38</sup>. These moves are intended to provide critical first steps towards the fiscal sustainability of LOTFA expenditures.
- 5.9.8 The year 2010 also saw efforts to increase MOI ownership through the phased handover of selected day-to-day functions. Despite this, the final year of Phase V saw LOTFA continue to perform routine functions which have been deemed within the capacity of MOI officials, including the verification of transactions and financial data and correspondence with MoI, MoF, and commercial banks. The relative reluctance of MOI senior management to take over core functions has required intervention to promote greater ministry acceptance and thereby foster skills transfer, and MOI institutional capacity and memory.
- 5.9.9 On a broader level there remains a need to verify existing police resources through coherent and carefully monitored efforts to reconcile the multiple systems currently in place. This will keep donor confidence robust and also allow LOTFA to take needed measures to mitigate system leakage and maximise the resources it accesses in light of a security sector whose size is increasingly seen as unsustainable.
- 5.9.10 In response to concerns that were outlined in the evaluation of Phase IV, LOTFA-V introduced both an internal monitoring post, as well as, outsourcing monitoring functions to an external Monitoring Agent (MA). The latter has been tasked with verification of ANP personnel numbers, as well as, assuring proper salary expenditures.
- 5.9.11 The earlier evaluation of LOTFA-IV outlined a series of criteria needed for effective monitoring including:
  - ▶ The use of risk-based analysis in a Pareto analytical framework to assist MOI in improving its EPS and HR reporting performance in Phase V. This would ultimately allow for a phased approach to rolling out capacity building work while reducing the associated risk tolerances;
  - ▶ A need to foster improved coordination with other monitoring and verification efforts e.g. those currently undertaken by CSTC-A and those proposed to be undertaken by the IPCB and EUPOL.
- 5.9.12 The current Evaluation maintains that all but one of these points are still relevant and worthy of deeper consideration.
- 5.9.13 As suggested in the evaluation of the previous Phase of LOTFA, the processes and methodologies adopted for monitoring purposes are crucial to both their reliability and their broader role in providing assurance for stakeholders. This point is of special import in a context such as that found in Afghanistan where persistent insecurity and restrictive geography, among other factors, result in a demanding environment for monitoring efforts as seen in the challenges facing the different efforts to establish an accurate ANP headcount<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> LOTFA Steering Committee minutes 23 March 2010.

<sup>37</sup> LOTFA Steering Committee minutes 11 November 2010.

<sup>38</sup> LOTFA 2010 Annual Report, p.10.

<sup>39</sup> The RUSI report details a range of challenges faced in establishing an adequate picture of MOI and ANP human resources including difficulties in confirming ranks of officers, determining the eligibility of personnel for police identification cards and past, inadequate measure to document personnel given Afghan naming traditions (see pages 112, 113, and 119 among others in *Reforming the Afghan National Police*, Royal United Services Institute and Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2009).



These challenges are compounded by the as yet unresolved deficiencies in the human resources systems and multiple databases of varying quality and accuracy in use to track personnel though, as noted above, efforts in this direction are being undertaken <sup>40</sup>.

- 5.9.14 Given these factors, we recommend a review of the approach and methodology adopted by the independent monitoring agent. Of central interest in this regard are approaches to physical verification and methodologies for assuring quality control of documents related to this process. In addition to the methodological issues raised above, there should be a concerted effort to identify ways in which the MA can adopt innovative practice to triangulate data and improve its robustness and reliability.
- 5.9.15 Finally, there has been at least some interest voiced during Phase V Steering Committee meetings for an expanded role for the MA in monitoring MOI procurement contracts<sup>41</sup>. Given the importance and value of ensuring a robust procurement capacity in MOI, as discussed earlier, we recommend that this idea is accorded some consideration<sup>42</sup>. Related to this, the number of stakeholders involved in procurement related capacity building suggests that greater clarity regarding the procurement activities falling under LOTFA's mandate would allow for improved assessment of Fund efforts.

## 5.10 Management of the Fund

- 5.10.1 As the Report has indicated, many donors have expressed an overall confidence in and satisfaction with the management of the Fund, most notably with respect to payroll related initiatives, a notable improvement over Phase IV. Despite this, and as implied in other areas of the Report, there are important management concerns that require attention.
- 5.10.2 As seen during Phase IV, ensuring the deployment of qualified staff remains a perennial issue, with difficulties in filling key vacancies, including those of full-time national counterparts to the Management Support Unit (MSU) in areas including procurement, construction, reporting and communications. While there has been some success in dealing with vacancy issues as a result of persistent efforts on the part of LOTFA management, the expansion of scale and complexity entailed in Phase VI has led to donor requests for more international positions<sup>43</sup>. The issue of insufficient full-time national counterparts to work in cooperation with the MSU was partially addressed with the deployment of national advisors on procurement and construction with Phase VI.
- 5.10.3 As suggested, there are key areas of project planning, execution and monitoring in which the Fund's management could be called on to provide more creative and exacting leadership. These include an approach to targets and indicators that expresses a more direct relationship to broader priority and project outcomes. The aforementioned need to focus on competencies in activities intended to strengthen ministry capacity is of central importance in this regard. While Phase V targets focused on quantifying discrete programming outputs, such as numbers of trainings conducted, remain legitimate, they are limited in their ability to address the broader institutional and systemic needs of the MOI. While the sometimes erratic nature of donor funding poses distinct challenges, they do not preclude a shift in approach that would more directly link outputs to outcomes, a principle which a programming outputs-driven approach to target setting does not achieve. While the Phase VI project document pays notably more attention to issues of competencies, a number of considerations remain outstanding. These include the need to ensure that (i) programming-related planning and evaluations include measurements of progress against competency frameworks; (ii) the need to evaluate

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As another example, CSTC-A currently continues to deploy mobile verification teams focused on attaining a reliable ANP headcount through the application of ID cards and biometric data capture of personnel. These teams face considerable challenges in attaining verified numbers at the district level and progress even with the significant level of resources available.

<sup>40</sup> The SIGAR report points out that as of September 2010 approximately 27 per cent of the ANP remain without identification cards [p.7]; It also notes, among other issues, that although a PAI conducted by MOI reported a registration rate of 99 per cent, this reflected a significant variance in registration rates across the 34 provinces ranging from 58 per cent in Farah to 181 per cent in Balkh; the latter was deemed due to the inclusion of ANP who were no longer under assignment along with their replacements. Data captured in the PAI was also deemed to have not accounted for the total number of recruits or for attrition. *Despite Improvements in MOI's Personnel Systems, Additional Actions Are Needed to Completely Verify ANP Payroll Costs and Workforce Strength*, SIGAR Audit 11-10 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 25 April 2011, pp. 8-9.

<sup>41</sup> Steering Committee minutes for 14 October 2009 and 10 February 2010.

<sup>42</sup> We note that expanding monitoring was minuted as being difficult to achieve. However, there is no reason why compliance checks on procurement processes cannot be attained.

<sup>43</sup> Steering Committee minutes for 11 November 2010.

personnel in accordance with articulated competencies relevant to their operational roles; and (iii) efforts to focus on policy development that aligns with desired functional and institutional competencies. As noted above, broader concerns remain regarding the continuing low proportion of resources allocated to institutional development and the return of the need for earmarked funds with the commencement of Phase VI.

- 5.10.4 Finally, the management structures and TOR for the Project Manager outlined in the Phase V Project Document point to a narrower mandate for the Project Manager as compared that of Phase IV. While there is a valid argument to be made for limiting the role of Project Manager to a more technically-focused position, there are also potential risks associated with the adoption of such a management arrangement. Given the large number of stakeholders with varying degrees of engagement in the LOTFA mechanism, limiting the Project Manager's responsibility to a technical and implementation oriented one risks losing a central leadership figure. This is particularly significant given the somewhat reactive role that the Steering Committee has often adopted. Given the complicated context in which LOTFA operates and the challenges the current transition period is likely to pose, the need for responsive, active and focused leadership at LOTFA is perhaps even greater than in the past.

## 6 Conclusions and Draft Recommendations

### 6.1 Introduction

- 6.1.1 This Chapter summarises the findings of the Evaluation and consequent recommendations, identifying the preconditions for ensuring success. These conclusions are set out for consideration and approval by UNDP.

### 6.2 Key findings

- 6.2.1 There is little doubt that the rebuilding of the security forces, including those of the Afghan National Police, stands as a central priority both for the GIRoA and the IC and that issues surrounding security forces will continue to dominate as the transition process continues. LOTFA has played an important role in furthering security sector reform not only through its “technical” capacity to process salaries but also by providing a vehicle to address concerns regarding the rule of law and provision of security for all citizens, factors with important implications for governance and state legitimacy.
- 6.2.2 Overall, and measured against established targets, LOTFA has had some notable successes in ensuring an effective mechanism is in place for the reliable payment of salaries. The initiation of LOTFA-V has also seen a further increase in the Fund’s levels of support to a broader range of activities as compared to previous Phases.
- 6.2.3 This progress and the positive results of LOTFA’s efforts extend beyond its primary goals in the area of police remuneration to providing benefits that include improved morale, facilitating the inclusion of women through enhancing recruitment processes and promoting awareness of gender in policing, and the perceptions that are formed of the ANP’s credibility.
- 6.2.4 This continued progress is significant in demonstrating a level of maturity in the establishment of payroll mechanisms, and particularly so in the context of a sharply expanded force size. This grew from the envisaged 82,000 projected for the end of 2010 to the mandated 1389 *tashkeel* strength of 122,000 by its end. LOTFA’s positive work in this issue is, however, underscored by concerns over the sustainability of increased *tashkeel* sizes. Our evaluation however also questions whether the continuing requests by GIRoA to increase resources are symptomatic of its broader institutional and management deficiencies, particularly at the systems level, given the highly challenging situation regarding resource management capacity, including residual concerns over *tashkeel* number verification,
- 6.2.5 These successes notwithstanding, there are a number of significant challenges that constrain LOTFA from improving its impact. As in the past, the inability to attain a multi-year planning framework due to the short term funding horizon of donors, the limited interventions in institutional capacity building outside of payroll related functions, and the constraints faced in addressing financial risk are critical drawbacks. LOTFA-VI recognises some of these issues and goes some way in addressing them.
- 6.2.6 The causes of these constraints are multiple and reflect factors both within and outside of the influence of LOTFA’s management. Included among them are issues of longer standing concern including the reliability and predictability of cash flows from donors (although these concerns have lessened over time), as well as, a limited level of commitment by the MOI to broaden the scope of LOTFA’s capacity development efforts. A further and significant factor, as noted earlier, is the long-standing tendency on the part of donors to persist with bilateral projects that could be otherwise potentially accommodated under the remit of multilateral initiatives such as LOTFA.
- 6.2.7 Furthermore, a continuing lack of consensus on the strategic aspects of policing and police management and administration limit opportunities to deliver major reforms. This in turn affects the ability of LOTFA to focus on a consistent set of responsibilities in supporting MOI and the ANP in planning and addressing their development priorities.
- 6.2.8 The ongoing focus by donors on bilateral measures at the expense of multilateral initiatives not only fundamentally undermines the Fund but also the broader principles of donor harmonisation and increased the burdens on government. That donors continue to do so is perhaps an indication of preferences to maintain greater control of security related interventions, given the wider political context of meeting the demands of their own domestic constituencies regarding their interventions in Afghanistan. Indeed, domestic political and



economic considerations also form a backdrop for the current transition and also stand as a factor for international partners. LOTFA thus needs to prepare itself for the possibility of the re-emergence of increased volatility in its funding

- 6.2.9 In addition, the changing dynamics of international engagement in Afghanistan point to the need for LOTFA to focus on better use of existing resources rather than growing resources. That being said, the tendency for short-term funding horizons and general uncertainty regarding funding inevitably limits LOTFA's capacity to engage in effective efforts. This is most notable with regards to non-salary priorities which have seen relatively limited resources and attention. This situation restricts the capacity of LOTFA to address the "back office" needs required for the deployment of an effective police force and is a prerequisite for broader LOTFA outcomes regardless of the policing doctrine espoused by donors and stakeholders.
- 6.2.10 These just mentioned challenges aside, our review also points to a degree of internal constraint in the capacity of LOTFA. As discussed in our evaluation of LOTFA IV, chief among these is the dissonance between the relatively narrow scope for UNDP's role as fund administrator outlined in the Fund's TOR, as compared to that suggested by other management documents. In addition to the considerable and urgent challenges still faced by the MOI and ANP in attaining institutional sustainability and improved performance, the ongoing transition process suggests a wider role for LOTFA is perhaps warranted to address broader concerns regarding institutional sustainability and other issues. It is to be hoped that moves in this direction in LOTFA VI and any subsequent phases are strengthened to maximise the Fund's potential utility in this regard. With the shift and reduction in the overall foreign presence in Afghanistan, the need for a coherent vision for LOTFA and its role in a post-transition environment as well as differing views on the progress attained and attainable in terms of MOI reform need to be examined and discussed. Indeed, our interviews with stakeholders have indicated that some of them feel that LOTFA does not adequately address their expectations despite overall satisfaction with LOTFA's remuneration activities. A further more explicitly operational constraint continues to be felt in terms of the availability of skilled resources, particularly to fill key vacancies in the Management Support Unit (MSU), though this appears to have lessened somewhat as compared to Phase IV.
- 6.2.11 Overall, the review concludes on a qualified, though essentially positive, note. The continued performance of LOTFA in meeting its primary goal of remuneration speaks to its success in addressing an important component of security sector reform. On the other hand, developing essential governmental capacity in MOI remains limited and is an area of potentially increasing salience as the withdrawal of foreign troops progresses. Regardless of the consensus ultimately reached on this issue, the need for close and active management of an initiative such as LOTFA which operates in both challenging and sensitive contexts should not be underestimated.

## 6.3 Recommendations

- 6.3.1 Several recommendations to carry forward into LOTFA-VI follow from our analyses.
- ▶ **Given the launch of the formal transition, there is a need for more focused efforts to develop a clearly articulated strategy for each of the Fund's priorities with specified targets.** The persistently limited support carried forward from LOTFA-IV into Phase V for non-salary related initiatives needs to be addressed. Current Phase VI efforts to begin the transfer of relatively well-developed payroll-related activities to Afghan hands are significant in this regard. While priorities and outputs are defined in the Project Document for LOTFA-V at a high level, they require expression in the form of a detailed multi-year strategy, including targets for each priority, around which subsequent funding commitments can be built and outcome performance monitored. It would be important to begin planning in a way that considers a longer term vision of LOTFA's potential contribution to broader security sector reform, as well as, consideration of broader systemic administrative capacity and the series of changes needed to attain it. This ultimately falls outside of LOTFA's control and must be derived from a consensus view of Steering Committee members.
  - ▶ **The role for LOTFA in relation to institutional development needs to be clarified and approached in a more consistent fashion.** It is clear there are divergent expectations about the role that LOTFA plays in relation to institutional development issues. The advancing of institutional development to Priority 2 in Phase V has been followed by a reversion to a need for earmarked contributions in the second Pillar in the current Phase suggesting an inconsistency in both perspectives and approaches among stakeholders.

While the current transition process has increased the importance of both fiscal and systemic sustainability issues for many stakeholders, this has yet to be met with a unified vision for LOTFA's role in institutional development beyond the relatively narrow remit of capacity tied to payroll-related activities.<sup>44</sup> Though the Fund has seen notable accomplishments in remuneration activities over its ten years of operation, it has failed to move beyond a narrow technical payroll focus, with the overwhelming bulk of resources continuing to flow to this area. Moves to transfer responsibilities to MOI has occurred only recently, and there are indications of limited planning and follow-up monitoring. Current efforts have done little to address the thus far neglected gap in developing efficient resource management systems thereby increasing the operational effectiveness and long-term sustainability of MOI.

- ▶ **Establishment of a competency framework to increase the impact of capacity building efforts.** Further to the previous point, the relative lack of detail in some programme documents suggests there is a need to ensure a more effective use of performance targets to evaluate progress in achieving programme goals. Consequently, and as discussed more expansively earlier, institutional development indicators and targets should focus on measuring competencies as opposed to the current practice of quantifying programming events. Institutional development indicators and targets based on a thoughtful competency framework would allow for measuring competencies which better reflect and measure progress towards the Fund's expressed and desired outcomes and the attainment of sustainability. Moreover, a more detailed and coherent timetable for a full and monitored time-bound transfer of skills to the MOI against these competencies needs to be drawn up<sup>45</sup>. LOTFA has been running for 10 years, and an exit strategy premised on sustainable management of administrative functions by MOI should be defined.
- ▶ **Boost the robustness of monitoring activities:** In the highly challenging context in which monitoring activities in Afghanistan take place, the importance of both robust and creative monitoring strategies should not be underestimated, and indeed the current approach to monitoring suggests improvements could be made. We therefore recommend a more substantive review of the approach and methodology adopted by the MA. Of central interest in this regard are approaches to physical verification and methodologies for assuring quality control of documents related to this process. In addition, there should be a concerted effort to identify ways in which the MA can adopt innovative practice to triangulate data and improve its robustness and reliability. Approaches that take into account successful approaches in other "fragile" state contexts, allow for innovative practice, and provide opportunities for the triangulation of data will maximise both the utility of data generated and improve stakeholder confidence.
- ▶ **Increase networking efforts and level of communication about LOTFA's role:** As recommended in the evaluation of LOTFA-IV, the large number of international partners in the security and law enforcement arena poses additional demands on LOTFA in terms of avoiding duplication, exploiting synergies, and leveraging collective forces. There are benefits to be had by LOTFA continuing to expand efforts to increase the visibility of its work. Although there has been definite progress on this front, such as the representation of LOTFA and the IPCB in their respective bodies and the granting of observer status to EUPOL there remains a need for continuous communications and outreach efforts. Given the current state of flux regarding the future international presence in Afghanistan, communications need to be increased if buy-in and support from external stakeholders is to be retained or increased, especially where expectations among stakeholders of LOTFA's role and performance can easily diverge.
- ▶ **Examine opportunities to leverage LOTFA's strengths through further activities with the CPD:** LOTFA's current activities extend well beyond its payroll function reflecting the desire of a number of donors to develop the Fund as a tool to facilitate broader security sector reform. A key step in this direction was the addition of the remuneration of uniformed Central Prison Department (CPD) personnel to Phase V. The expansion of LOTFA's other activity areas to the CPD presents an opportunity to leverage LOTFA's

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<sup>44</sup>We note the assertion and recommendation made in the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report on the ANP: *"An adequately resourced multi-donor trust fund for ANP reform, along similar lines to LOTFA is recommended. It is essential [donors] realise that a well resourced reform effort is cheaper than leaving the ANP underequipped and poorly resourced thereby contributing to a repeat of Afghanistan's state collapse in the 1990s followed by possible and costly intervention from scratch"*, *Reforming the Afghan National Police*. op.cit.,p.87.

<sup>45</sup> There is a capacity development assessment and strategy being prepared at present. It would be important for this strategy to reflect these characteristics.

utility and impact, though one which is clearly predicated on donor support. Indeed, limited basic equipment, particularly in CPD, suggests that the limited resources dedicated to procurement and construction may represent a missed opportunity in terms of maximising LOTFA's impact in supporting security sector reform.

- ▶ **Build on the positive results of FRUs to address issues regarding retention of female personnel.** Increasing the role of women in the Afghan police force is contingent on the availability of positions. Given the positive feedback regarding the operation of FRUs setting realistic targets for the establishment of FRUs in all 34 Afghan provinces would provide a means of expanding the number of positions available to female personnel. Ideally, this would be accompanied by a strategy plan to increase the number of complaints processed and successfully prosecuted by FRU investigators.
- ▶ **Implement structured transfer of payroll-related functions to GIRoA.** Over many years LOTFA has dedicated efforts to building up payroll related capacity. Given the level of proficiency gained in payroll functions, plans to begin the transfer of this role into Afghan hands during Phase-V would be appropriate. The introduction of a target date for this transfer in Phase VI is thus welcomed, though the inclusion of a monitoring plan to oversee and ensure an effective transfer would be also desirable.
- ▶ **Donors should consider extending (and committing funds) for Phase VI to cover the transition period.** The current transition period presents a significant development for the security sector and the broader situation for Afghanistan. As an important and long-standing element of international security sector efforts, LOTFA's efforts to continue contributing to police and broader Ministry of Interior development would be better served by adopting a phase length responsive to the timelines accompanying transition. As an extension of this, and in line with the recommendations contained in the Phase IV evaluation, the provision of multi-year donor funding remains a key step in maximising the Fund's potential.

## 6.4 Preconditions for success

6.4.1 We have identified the following preconditions for success which centre mainly on action by Governmental and international partners and, as such, lie largely outside the direct responsibility of the LOTFA team. These are:

- ▶ **Formulation of a coherent strategy regarding the Fund's non-payroll dimensions:** LOTFA donors as well as the Government of Afghanistan and the Ministry of Interior must reach a consensus regarding the weight to be attached to non-payroll activities and prerogatives of the Fund as expressed in its Terms of Reference. There is a fundamental, and, as yet, unaddressed need to address these priorities, most notably capacity building, that remains central to the institutional and ministerial development aims that LOTFA has articulated as a key goal for its efforts. As such, a coherent strategy and commitment to the attendant resourcing of LOTFA's non-payroll activities is sorely needed.
- ▶ **Development of a vision for a post-transition LOTFA:** As payroll functions reach maturity and are transferred to Afghan control, the potential utility of LOTFA in addressing other important and already identified areas of concern requires examination and discussion if LOTFA's full potential to contribute to the MOI's development and security sector reform is to be realised. Discussion of the role of LOTFA post-transition will allow for greater clarity with respect to the ways in which the Fund can serve to address donors' concerns regarding sustainability and security needs into the medium-term and longer terms.

6.4.2 In conclusion, our Evaluation suggests that the time is right for LOTFA to consolidate its successes and now perform in broader ways to address key issues related to MOI capacity and broader security sector reform, as discussed in detail earlier. Given the ongoing, and indeed increasing, need for such efforts, this untapped potential in worthy of closer examination. In light of this, we recommend that the Steering Committee resolves to transform the delivery of the Fund along the lines above, and does so quickly as a means to derive the full benefit of resources committed, efforts undertaken, and progress achieved since LOTFA's inception.



## Appendix A: Evaluation Terms of Reference

### 1. Background

Rebuilding the national civilian police force for national security and recovery represents one of the Government's highest priorities. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) envisions a professional, disciplined and reinvigorated police force that is responsible and loyal to the Ministry of Interior (MOI), widely visible to and respected by the public, and capable of protecting rights, insurgency and drug trafficking.

International community support for rebuilding the Afghan police force started from the beginning of the establishment of the Afghan Interim Government in 2002, as stipulated by the Bonn Agreement. In May 2002, at the request of the Government and UNAMA, UNDP established a Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to enable the police to return to operation throughout the country.

LOTFA is envisaged to cover the Government's police-related costs and undertake project activities in conjunction with the MOI in the following order of priorities:

- Payment of the police force remuneration;
- Institutional development;
- Procurement, maintenance and operations of non-lethal police equipment and supplies;
- Rehabilitation, maintenance and operations of police facilities;
- Gender Orientation (Selection, recruitment and training of police); and
- Payment of remuneration of uniformed personnel employed by the Central Prisons Department through specially earmarked contributions.

The first four phases of the project have been completed and the project is currently in phase V (August 2008 – December 2010). The United States, Japan, European Union, Canada, Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Italy are the major contributors to LOTFA. The institutional oversight mechanisms for LOTFA include a Steering Committee comprised of all donors, an independent Monitoring Agent and regular audits besides project and UNDP Country Office periodic monitoring. UNDP is the administrator of the fund and provides technical assistance for the implementation of fund priorities.

While LOTFA is a mechanism for receipt and administration of the funds, there are a number of policy and institutional factors which have a bearing on the performance of LOTFA. Although some progress has been made towards reforming MOI and its police force through the pay and rank reform, introduction of Electronic Payroll System, Electronic Fund Transfer, promulgation of new policies, procedures and regulations, and improvement of the gender balance, many challenges remain to be overcome. For instance, the Government of Afghanistan does not currently have the ability to cover core remuneration costs for the ANP from its own revenue sources; raising concerns about the sustainability of MOI reforms and the viability of the LOTFA exit strategy - although some vital steps have been taken towards this in phase-V and proposed for phase-VI.

### 2. Purpose of the Evaluation

As per the UNDP project management cycle, a final evaluation of the project is to be conducted at the end of each project. Therefore, after the completion of the phase V of the project, it should be evaluated. The main purpose of the Evaluation would be to assess the effectiveness and impact of LOTFA in meeting its stated objectives during the two year and four months' period.

The Evaluation should also provide lessons learnt and recommendations that can help improve the effectiveness of the Phase VI of LOTFA. These will be extremely valuable for UNDP as it works to improve the planning, design and management of the LOTFA Phase VI and for the international community to continue support to LOTFA.

### 3. Scope and Focus

The Evaluation will cover all priorities of LOTFA-V and results achieved in each priority area. The Evaluation team will analyze the implementation, outcome, outputs, impact, and sustainability dimensions of LOTFA. In

looking at the sustainability dimensions of LOTFA, the Evaluation team should identify the gaps between the medium and long-term needs of MOI and LOTFA support. For example, when looking at gender mainstreaming, the team should look not only at the recruitment of women, but whether those women have remained with the police force; and if not, what are the areas LOTFA could engage with to ensure retention of female police officers.

Each of these aspects will be assessed as follows:

- i. **Effectiveness:** Provide a comprehensive analysis of effectiveness of LOTFA in phase V vis-à-vis its pre-stated outputs. The Evaluation should review all outputs of LOTFA and respond to the below questions:
  - a. Did timely payment of police and Central Prisons Department remuneration ensure effectiveness and efficiency in performance? How effective has been increments in police salaries?
  - b. Has the Electronic Payroll System (EPS) and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) contributed towards accountability and transparency in police salary payment?
  - c. How effective have the capacity development initiatives undertaken by LOTFA been? Have the initiatives been adequate and resulted in sustainable capacity in the target MOI departments at the central, provincial and regional offices?
  - d. Has contribution towards gender mainstreaming in MOI been cost effective and adequate leading to greater gender balance and awareness? Have capacity development initiatives towards gender mainstreaming in MOI been effective and efficient? Have these initiatives led to greater recruitment and retention of female police officers?
  - e. To what extent have construction and procurement activities added to improvement in police mobility and responsiveness and living conditions? Have the initiatives undertaken under phase V contributed towards overall improvement in police service delivery?
- ii. **Impact:** Take stock of overall LOTFA impact and respond to the questions below:
  - a. To what extent has LOTFA impacted the wider objective of re-building the ANP? In particular, what changes, both positive and negative, both intended and unintended, can be attributed to the interventions?
  - b. What is the estimated impact of the LOTFA funding level on the police reform and overall security in the country?
- iii. **Sustainability:** The Evaluation should have an in depth review of LOTFA sustainability and provide recommendations for future improvements in terms of sustainability, both financially and substantively:
  - a. To what extent will LOTFA benefits and results be maintained after its exit?
  - b. To what extent have the funding requirements for the LOTFA been met and how have shortfalls been managed? How predictably and regularly have resources been supplied to LOTFA? What can be done to improve the predictability and sustainability/efficiency of fund raising?
  - c. To what extent are LOTFA's capacity building initiatives/trainings sustainable?
  - d. To what extent is the GfR taking measures for the fiscal sustainability of the ANP.
- iv. **National Ownership:** UNDP weighs national ownership as the highest priority and it is no different in LOTFA. All fund activities are nationally led and owned for sustainable result delivery. Hence, the Evaluation should give this aspect specific consideration and respond to the questions below:
  - a. How effective has LOTFA been in garnering national ownership of the activities? What have been the best practices? Where has the project not been able to deliver on enhancing national ownership?
  - b. How much support has the Government provided to LOTFA's efforts to garner national ownership?
  - c. Provide a comprehensive analysis of the overall national ownership building effort and set out the strengths and weaknesses; in addition, provide a baseline for future efforts.
- v. **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):** LOTFA has recruited an independent Monitoring Agent (MA) in addition to a full time M&E officer. The review should also take stock of the performance and effectiveness of M&E efforts:
  - a. The Evaluation should review the overall performance, effectiveness and efficiency of the MA and identify strengths and weaknesses of the team.

- b. Review the system of MA findings implementation and find strengths and weaknesses of the process.

#### **4. Recommendations**

Based on the Evaluation, the team will provide:

- Provide recommendations for improving effectiveness of LOTFA efforts;
- Provide recommendations for improvement in sustainability aspect of funded activities;
- Provide recommendations for improvement of national ownership;
- Provide recommendations on improving the M& E of LOTFA.

#### **5. Review Process and Methods**

A team of experts/institution will be hired to engage in a consultative process with the relevant GIRA institutions, International Community, LOTFA Steering Committee members, LOTFA Trust Fund Administrator, and to assess the challenges and processes and provide recommendations for the future. An initial meeting could be conducted jointly with the Steering Committee members to provide a common direction to the Evaluation, identify the major focus areas and agree upon key results.

The Review Team will be requested to prepare and submit to the UNDP Country Office an inception report with an outline of the methodology that will be followed for the Evaluation.

The inception report will contain, but will not be limited to the following information:

- List of all key documents and resource people for the review exercise. The review mission will be provided with the available written documentation (Terms of Reference for LOTFA, programme documents, previous evaluation report, monitoring reports (including that of MA), project quarterly progress and annual financial reports, minutes of the Steering Committee, etc).
- Work programme for the Evaluation exercise.
- Draft of detailed programme for regional visits and consultation meetings.
- First cut of criteria and indicators for assessing the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of LOTFA operations.
- List of specific questions and concerns relating to the review to which LOTFA Steering Committee would respond.

Upon arrival of the Evaluation mission in Kabul, a meeting will take place among all concerned parties to review and finalize the proposed work plan and methodology. The mission will meet with UNDP, LOTFA project management, National Director for the project, MOI and MOF staff, MA team members and donors to receive answers to possible particular questions that the mission would like to look into prior to field visits.

Following these initial meetings the mission will have meetings in Kabul and the provinces (visiting provincial MOI departments) and hold discussions mainly with the police personnel, national project staff, local authorities, members of the public, donors and implementing partners, if necessary. The mission members would look into systems and processes adopted at different levels.

A participatory approach will be used throughout the review.

#### **6. Deliverables**

The consultancy will produce the following deliverables:

*Inception Report*  
(as indicated earlier)

*Preliminary conclusions*

The Review team/institution will draft the preliminary conclusions one week prior to the end of the mission to be shared in meetings with all concerned, for obtaining reactions to these observations and conclusions. A particular effort will be made to obtain the views of the Government implementing agency (MOI), the LOTFA project management team, donors and UNDP staff during these meetings. Prior to its departure from Kabul, the Team Leader will submit the draft report.

### *Review Report*

Within three weeks after receipt of the comments and observations on the draft report, the Review Team will submit a final report.

- The language of the report should be English
- 5 hard and soft copies should be delivered
- The soft copy should be compatible with MS Office Word and Acrobat Reader
- A five page long stand-alone executive summary should be submitted

### *Presentation of the Report*

Once the report is finalized between UNDP and Evaluation team, one of the team members will present the report to the LOTFA SC (Government and donor counterparts).

## **7. Team Composition**

The Evaluation team could consist of about three members (from an institution or individuals). The team leader (an international consultant) will take the overall responsibility for reviewing documents, undertaking field visits, conducting interviews and preparing draft and final reports.

National specialist will also be part of the team who may be separately hired by the institution to support the team leader in reviewing documents, undertaking field visits and conducting interviews as well as doing interpretation as required.

### *Minimum Qualification and Experience required for the Team members:*

- Advance degree in law, public affairs or international developments studies;
- At least 15 years of experience in the area of democratic governance, security sector or police reform, of which at least five years should be experience of working for, or closely partnering with, international organizations working in a developing country context;
- Experience in evaluation of law enforcement and capacity building projects;
- Extensive experience in conflict countries, institution and state building initiatives; Knowledge of Afghanistan country context and the state's institutional framework;
- Experience in undertaking evaluation reviews/studies and impact assessments of development projects; Knowledge of management and implementation of Trust Funds;
- Ability to present information in transparent and comprehensive manner;
- Written and spoken fluency in English, knowledge of local languages is an asset

### *Minimum Qualification and Experience required for the National Specialist:*

- University degree
- At least five years of experience in the area of democratic governance, law or judicial
- This expertise may have been gained in the private sector, NGO, international organizations or public sector
- Should have full command of Dari, Pashto and English languages

## **8. Timeline**

*The mission will be for a period of fifty five days.*

- Briefing, review of documentation – 4 days
- Inception Report – 4 days
- Consultations, field missions – 2 weeks
- Preliminary Conclusions – 1 week
- Draft Report – 1 week
- Receipt of comments and final report – 7 days

## **9. Procedures and Logistics**

UNDP-LOTFA will be responsible for organizing and facilitating the Evaluation. UNDP-LOTFA will provide all related documents and logistical support, arrange meetings and facilitate the field visits.



Throughout the mission the Evaluation team will be supported by the following staff: *UNDP and LOTFA Project Staff*

## **10. Funding**

The review will be supported by the Trust Fund.

## Appendix B: Approach, Methodology and Stakeholders consulted

### B1. Our approach and methodology

The appraisal in this Report is designed to provide an overview of LOTFA-V's performance, in terms of its inputs, outputs and likely outcomes.

We acknowledge that the interventions supported by LOTFA have a long term focus and that an impact evaluation that has a short term appraisal horizon is therefore perhaps unrealistic. This is particularly so given the broader context of Afghanistan's capacity where institutions generally are still nascent and weak. The appraisal process therefore seeks to assess potential outcomes in this context. It focuses on the robustness of the delivery systems and management capacity as much as on its impact on its beneficiary stakeholders. It also gauges the continued relevance of LOTFA-V in a fast changing institutional and political context whose complexity has increased with the onset of a transition phase involving the withdrawal of foreign forces. Therefore, whilst we cannot provide an opinion on whether LOTFA generates conclusively significant positive impacts, we can offer a view on the likelihood of its probable success in the longer term.

To arrive at these opinions, our findings are premised on the following investigative approach:

- ▶ **Desk research:** comprising a literature review of LOTFA-V related design documents, progress reports and other external materials that relate to policing performance in Afghanistan. This research also included summary assessment of other programmes and organisations that either interact, or have the potential to, with the activities of LOTFA-V. (The documents reviewed are listed in Appendix C). In particular, the police are only part of the wider Rule of Law (ROL) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) framework. This broader framework needs to be effective also, if the police are to be seen as a credible mechanism for providing security and law enforcement.
- ▶ Detailed **interviews** with key Fund personnel, comprising implementing consultants from the LOTFA delivery management team in the Management Support Unit and relevant members of UNDP; and
- ▶ **Stakeholder consultation** with key management and administrative officials in the beneficiary institutions of the Government of Afghanistan; with other selected stakeholders amongst Afghanistan's international partners; and with civil society representatives. This stakeholder input was considered critical both as a means of gathering evidence and of building ownership of the findings and recommendations of the review (see the list of stakeholders at Appendix B). This consultation process also included provincial and district visits to enable us to gain a better understanding of implementation issues and performance of LOTFA-V in areas outside Kabul. Visits were selected to give a broad sample, based on location-specific factors. Central to this was the aim to cover stakeholders in at least 2 police RCs as well as additional district stakeholders to assess the impact of LOTFA on funding policing, morale and community engagement, rule of law impact, etc. in both larger and smaller, more remote centres. However, security and logistical considerations for the review team were of overriding importance, which consequently curtailed the scope of sites visited.<sup>46</sup>
- ▶ **Assessment of comparative evidence** drawn from current and best practice, nationally and internationally in the use of development-oriented trust fund mechanisms and in police development elsewhere. These benchmark comparators or reference points are noted throughout this Report.

### B2. Qualifications to the Review

Our recommendations and conclusions in this report are subject to a number of assumptions and constraints:

- ▶ The field visit programme for the Evaluation was of necessity limited in relation to the complexity of issues to be assessed and the scope of work defined in the TOR. Within the available time it was not possible to spend extended periods in interviews or consultations: on occasion, this may result in a high-level view although we have endeavoured to cover all key issues.
- ▶ The preceding point is exacerbated by security considerations and associated logistical constraints, which limited the opportunity to assess the impact of LOTFA-V in the field.

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<sup>46</sup>Logistical and security difficulties limited the scope of visits to districts in Panjsher, Parwan and Herat provinces. We have therefore relied on second-hand views from international and local security and law enforcement specialists regarding broader national issues in our analysis.

- ▶ Many of the personnel among Afghanistan's international cooperation partners are relatively new to their roles and thus unfamiliar with many of the particulars of LOTFA and its operations. As a consequence, some interviewees could only offer a limited opinion of the Fund and its achievements.
- ▶ The review was critically dependent on the quality and timeliness of documentation and information made available to us by MOI, LOTFA and other organisations' staff. We have also relied upon the integrity of responses provided through interview. We cannot vouch for the veracity of this information, although we have attempted to cross-reference it where possible to improve its reliability. Much of the statistical data provided have varied by source.
- ▶ Inevitably, as the delivery of LOTFA is an ongoing, multi-phased initiative, it will be difficult to attribute outcomes directly to the efforts included in LOTFA-V alone.
- ▶ In many instances, stakeholders and commentators provided strong and often contradictory opinions on the performance of LOTFA. This situation made the task of corroborating evidence more time consuming, as well as more critical, for ensuring the overall integrity of the report's findings.

### *B3. Scope of interviews and field visits*

The Evaluation was premised on desk research complemented by consultations with stakeholders in LOTFA to provide greater insight, comment and detail to that which can be garnered from desk work alone. We considered two main categories of stakeholders for this consultation process:

- ▶ **Executive stakeholders**, comprising the MOI and police, MOF, financial contributors from the international community, as well as UNDP and the LOTFA management team; and
- ▶ **Non-executive stakeholders**, such as those delivering other related interventions supporting the police, as undertaken bilaterally and multilaterally, as well as their sponsors. Meetings in this category also include discussions with those directly impacted by LOTFA outcomes, but who do not influence it (e.g community representatives and relevant civil government, especially at provincial and district levels, and the media).

In relation to Afghan stakeholders we aimed to engage with them at both a central level in Kabul, and where possible at a police Regional Command (RC), provincial and district level. In particular, we recognise that the logistical challenges to support the police in and around Kabul are not as extensive as perhaps those for other areas. It was important to attain a balance of views as a consequence. However, in practice, as described in the report our interviews were constrained by security and logistical considerations

### *B4. Interviewees consulted*

#### **UNDP and LOTFA**

Sandeep Kumar	Project Manager, LOTFA
Ubaidullah Sahibzada	Deputy Project Manager, LOTFA
Salim Shah Mushfiq	Senior Finance Officer, LOTFA
Popal Habibi	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, LOTFA
Ahmad Khalid Ashgari	EPS Manager, LOTFA
Manoj Basnyat	Country Director, UNDP
Jan-Jilles van der Hoeven	Senior Deputy Country Director-Programme, UNDP

#### **Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan**

Gen. Ghulam Ali Wahdat	Deputy Minister, Administration, Ministry of Interior
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General Baryalai	Chief of Budget and Finance, Ministry of Interior
General Ekramuddin	Chief of Tashkeel, Ministry of Interior
General Abdul Razaq Amiri	Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups, Ministry of Interior
Brigadier General Noor Agha Noori	Chief of Procurement, Ministry of Interior
Lieutenant General Jamshid	General President of Prisons and Detention, Ministry of Interior
Colonel Saboor	Deputy Director of Gender, Human Rights and Children's Rights, Ministry of Interior
Colonel Zakia	Gender Unit (Family Response Unit), Ministry of Interior
General Khan Mohammad Khan	Pul-e-Charki Prison Commander, Ministry of Interior
Colonel Amir Mohammad Samunwal Amwajpoor	BadamBagh Prison Commander, Ministry of Interior
General Sayed Agha Saqueeb	Chief of Police Herat, Ministry of Interior
Major Azizullah	Head of Finance Herat Police, Ministry of Interior
Colonel Ghulam Hazrat	Recruitment Department (for soldiers), Herat Police
Colonel Nasir Ahmed	Recruitment Department (for officers), Herat Police
Colonel Daud Mohammed	Recruitment Department (for officers), Herat Police
Brigadier General Abdul Majid Sadeqi	Herat Prison Commander, Ministry of Interior
Captain Jalaludin	Panjsher Prison Commander, Ministry of Interior
General Ahmad Wali Saboori	(Deputy) Chief of Police, Panjsher Province
Commander Amin Agha Azizullah	Bazarak District Police Commander, Ministry of Interior
Yaseen Kosha	M-paisa Focal Point Financial Advisor, Ministry of Interior
Ahmad Khalid Ashghari	EPS Manager, LOTFA
<b>international Partners</b>	
Alexandra Lamont	First Secretary (Policing), Canadian Embassy
Gillian Preece	First Secretary (Policing) British Embassy
Kevin Rooke	Second Secretary (Policing) British Embassy
Martin Farquhar	First Secretary Prisons, British Embassy
Anila Khan	Department for International Development, British Embassy
Helena Merks	Counsellor, Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Rule of Law, German Embassy
Jacco Bos	First Secretary political Affairs, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Paul Tholen	Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of the

	Kingdom of the Netherlands
Nobuyuki Ishihara	First Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Kenta Aoki	Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Shinobu Yamaguchi	First Secretary Political Affairs, Embassy of Japan
Jim Crow	Police Programme Manager, INL, United States Embassy
Kim D' Auria-Vazira	INL Management Officer, United States Embassy
Dr Kristian Orsini	Head of Social and Economic Development Section, European Union
Christell Liermann	Project Management Officer, European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
Enver Ferhatovic	Political Advisor, European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
Patrick de Vries	Head of IPCB Secretariat, International Police Coordination Board
Colonel Douglas Boot	Deputy Head, Senior Liaison, International Police Coordination Board
Janis Platais	Chief of Party (Deloitte), Afghanistan Financial Reform Project, Ministry of Finance
Niaz Ali Khan	Fiscal Policy Officer, Ministry of Finance
Colonel John Wiggins	CSTC-A
Lt Colonel John A. Cano-Suero	CJ8, CSTC-A
Alex Chowdhury	DynCorp Liaison Officer CSTC-A, Ministry of Finance
Alex Martin	Project Director, SSMI Programme
<b>Others</b>	
Khalid Momand	Director, Joshi and Bhandary Cnerg
Pradeep Arjnepal	Joshi and Bhandary, Monitoring Agent, LOTFA and ARTF
Dilip Mandal	Joshi and Bhandary, Monitoring Agent, LOTFA and ARTF
Fatima Popal	Senior Manager, M-Paisa Business Development, Roshan/ Telecom Development Company Afghanistan Ltd
Community Development Councils (CDCs)	Two districts in Parwan province (un-named)

## Appendix C: Key References

The following lists key references examined over the course of the Evaluation:

*Afghan National Police Strategy*. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior, Department of Strategy, *January 2010*.

*A Long Way to Go – Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan*. UNAMA/ OHCHR. November 2011.

*Annual Reports, Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Phase V*. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan, 1387 (April 2008-March 2009), 2009, 2010.

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*Brookings Institute Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan*. I.S. Livingston, H.L. Messera, and M. O'Hanlon. 31 December 2010

*Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces report*. Mark Checcia, Civil-Military Fusion Centre, January 2012.

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*Evaluation of LOTFA-IV: Version: 2.0 Final Report*, 22 February 2009.

*The Family Response Unit (FRU) Power Point presentation*, compiled by DynCorp, May 2011.

*Final Project Report, Phase V*. United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

*Gender Unit document containing Tashkeel for Female Officers 1388 and 1389*. Afghan Nation Police.

*LOTFA-V Project Document: Support to Law and Order in Afghanistan*. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and United Nations Development Programme, 31st August 2008. September 2008 – August 2010.

*LOTFA Final Project Report Phase V*. Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). Undated.

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*LOTFA Institutional Capacity Development Plans*. Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). 1388, and 1389.

*LOTFA, Institutional Capacity Development Plan 1388*. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan, (April 01, 2009 to March 31, 2010).

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*LOTFA Phase-VI, Steering Committee Meeting Agenda*, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan, 24<sup>th</sup> January 2012.

*LOTFA Briefing*, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), 5 October 2011.

*The LOTFA Independent Monitoring Agent, Nationwide Monitoring Plan and Methodology document* Joshi and Bhandary.

*The LOTFA Independent Monitoring Agent, Mission Reports, Monthly, Quarterly and Final Reports for years 2009 and 2010*. Joshi and Bhandary.

*Monitoring Mission Reports*, covering missions to Herat, Kabul, Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar. Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), various dates.

*National Budget*. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, (undated). 1387, 1388, 1389.

*Police Perception Survey – 2010: The Afghan Perspective*. Prepared by Afghan Centre for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2010.

*Police Perception Survey – 2010*, Afghan Centre for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan, 2010.

*Project Document: Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) – Phase VI*. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and United Nations Development Programme (undated). 01 January 2011 - 31 March 2013).

*Proposal for Afghan National Police Pay Raise to Steering Committee*, CSTC-A PowerPoint presentation to LOTFA Steering Committee, 18<sup>th</sup> November 2008.

*Quarterly Project Reports, Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Phase*. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan, various dates from September 2008 – September 2010.

*Quarterly statements and payment requests sent to LOTFA*. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, various dates for the period Q2 1387-Q3 1389.

*Reforming the Afghan National Police*. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), September 2009.

*Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan*. Report to [United States] Congress. November 2010.

*Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan*. Report to [United States] Congress. April 2011.

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*Strategic Plan for UNDP Support to MOI and the Police (2010-2012) Capacity Development Plan (Annex II)*. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan.

*Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014. Executive Summary*. World Bank, 2011. 18 November 2011.

*Working Paper 4 for Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010, Second Generation of Public Expenditure Reforms: Security Sector*. World Bank and DFID, 2010.

## Appendix D: Field Visit Questionnaire

### Questions for MSU, MOI, UNDP

1. Are there figures available for the number of police receiving salaries?
2. Are they up-to-date? How are the figures collected? How accurate are they?
3. Are these figures improving? If not why not?
4. What are the possible inaccuracies?
5. Are there figures as to whether salaries are received on time?
6. Are they up-to-date? How are the figures collected? How accurate are they?
7. Are these figures improving? If not why not?
8. What are the possible inaccuracies?
9. How have these figures changed since the 2008 evaluation? Are the statistics collected any differently?
10. What is the impact of the payments? How is this measured? (*reduced crimes , perception of police etc.*)
11. What are the oversight and transparency mechanisms for payments at each level?
12. How much communication equipment has been distributed? Does it work? Is it still present in the police stations? What effect has this equipment had on the operational effectiveness of the police? (*Ask for examples*).
13. What rehabilitation works have taken place or are in progress? (*need to know how many are still left unrehabilitated*)
14. What has been the effect of these works?
15. Are there facts and figures on the numbers/ranks given police training / HR/Legal issues training/ gender awareness training?
16. Ask for a copy of the curriculum and details of how the training is conducted and whether any refresher training is given?
17. How do you communicate with the provinces- ask about reports, work plans, policy, regulations codes of conduct?

### Questions for local community leaders (*obviously some of these might not be relevant depending on how much knowledge they have of the police payments/ their role in the community*)

1. How important are the police to the community? (need to find out what role they play – are they ignored/sidelined by the community because seen as ineffective– does someone else actually do the “Policing” are they feared by the community or a section of the community)
2. Who uses the police? Do women go to the police? Do children/ Poor people/ ethnic minorities go use the police?
3. Do the police ever consult the community? If yes how? And with whom?
4. How have things changed with regards to the police in the past 5 years? Are they getting better and how? (request examples of better performance)
5. What is lacking? What do the police need to do better in the future?
6. Do you trust the police? If not – why not – ask for examples of behaviour?
7. Do you feel that improving the police salaries and living conditions has had an effect on their performance? If so how? (if corruption and taking bribes is a problem, need to explore if the population know that this is not acceptable, who could the victim of corruption complain to? Would the police take it seriously?)
8. How often do you see the police? Do they move around or stay in their stations? Do they police the correct areas – markets, patrols? (*this will depend upon where the local population consider the problem areas to be*)



9. How have the police changed their activities in the past 5 years?

### Questions for the Police

1. Do you get paid the correct amount on time every month? *(if the answer is no ask questions about how often it does not work, whether this is getting more or less frequent).*
2. Do you know how much you should be paid every month? *(Transparency of pay is very important)*
3. What procedure do you go through if you do not get paid the correct amount or it is late? Is the process successful?
4. How do you survive (meals, housing family expenses) when you are not paid on time? *(Depending on the answer as this is obviously going to be sensitive – ask whether witnessed any corruption in fellow officers?)*
5. What are your working conditions like? Have any improvements been made?
6. How many vehicles do you have? Are they sufficient? What are the improvements in your vehicles over the past 5 years?
7. What methods of communication do you use? How effective is this? What have been the improvements in communication over the past 5 years?
8. What are the outstanding issues facing the police?
9. What are the problems for policing in the region?
10. How do you tackle these problems?
11. Do you keep records of crimes reported to you and/or incidences which occur?
12. How does the record system work?
13. How important are the police to the community? *(need to find out what role they play – are they ignored/sidelined by the community because seen as ineffective– does someone else actually do the “Policing” are they feared by the community or a section of the community)*
14. Who uses the police? Do women go to the police? Do children/ Poor people/ ethnic minorities go use the police?
15. Do you ever consult the community? If yes how? And with whom?
16. How have things changed with regards to the police in the past 5 years? Are they getting better and how? *(request examples of better performance)*
17. What is lacking? What do the police need to do better in the future?
18. Do you have a good relationship with the community? If not – why not?–
19. Do you feel that improving the police salaries and living conditions has had an effect on their performance? If so how – ask for examples?
20. How often do the police patrol areas such as markets etc
21. How have the police changed their activities in the past 5 years?
22. How many of your police have been given police training / HR/Legal issues training/ gender awareness training?
23. Ask for a copy of the curriculum and details of how the training is conducted and whether any refresher training is given?
24. What impact has this had on the police activities? *(ask for examples)*
25. What is the composition of the police- women, ethnic minorities? *(need to look at it in rank terms as well)*
26. What is the relationship with the MOI, do you communicate with them regularly? What information do you get from them?
27. Do the MOI deal with any issues you might have? Is it timely?



# Appendix E: Changing Status of EPS and EFT roll out during LOTFA-V



## د افغانستان اسلامي جمهوریت Islamic Republic of Afghanistan د کورنیو چارو وزارت Ministry of Interior



Report As of: 05-Oct-08		14-07-1387		تاریخ راپور:		
Province ولایت	Tash kil تشکیل	HR Update احصایه پېژندنه	Month برج	No. Police in Payroll (EPS) احصایه پرسونل در سیستم کمپیوتر یمعاشات	Month برج	Total Number Police in EFT احصایه کهاز سیستم بانکیمعاشه میگیرند
Kabul Zone زون کابل	7343	10156	04-1387	6804	6-1387	6804
Central Departments+Battations ایر اتوقطعات مرکزی	6276	8808	04-1387	6750	6-1387	6750
ANCOP نظمعامه	5365	1789	04-1387	1620	6-1387	1620
<b>Sub total For Kabul Region</b>	18984	20753		15174		15174
RC Center HQs قرارگاه زون مرکز	561	325	04-1387	306	6-1387	306
Nangarhar (ننگرهار)	2786	2215	04-1387	2287	4-1387	2287
Parwan (پروان)	977	1370	04-1387	987	4-1387	873
Kapisa (کاپیسا)	858	961	04-1387	963	5-1387	0
Pangsher (پنجشیر)	513	401	04-1387	499	7-1387	0
Nuristan (نورستان)	735	616	04-1387	1170	5-1387	0
Kunar (کنړه)	1359	1500	04-1387	1231	4-1387	1025
Laghman (لغمان)	613	677	04-1387	699	3-1387	699
Logar (لوگر)	630	702	04-1387	801	5-1387	0
Wardak (وردک)	803	922	04-1387	753	4-1387	0
Bamyan (بامیان)	736	574	04-1387	598	6-1387	313
<b>Sub Total For Cenral Region</b>	10571	10263		10294		5503
RC Paktia HQs قرارگاه زون پکتیا	291	219	04-1387	215	6-1387	0
Paktiya (پکتیا)	1433	1049	04-1387	1016	6-1387	0
Ghazni (غزنی)	2433	1710	04-1387	1762	5-1387	395
Paktika (پکتیکا)	1681	583	04-1387	1249	5-1387	0
Khost (خوست)	1418	1462	04-1387	1195	5-1387	818
<b>Sub Total for Gardiz Region</b>	7256	5023		5437		1213
RC North HQs قرارگاه زون شمال	317	271	04-1387	279	6-1387	279
Balkh (بلخ)	1826	1635	04-1387	1682	5-1387	1682
Kunduz (کنډز)	1161	1600	04-1387	1064	4-1387	695
Badakhshan (بدخشان)	1800	1897	04-1387	2033	6-1387	664
Takhar (تخار)	1258	1501	04-1387	1270	5-1387	651

Jawzjan (جوزجان)	815	861	04-1387	889	6-1387	380
Faryab (فاریاب)	1306	1296	04-1387	1278	5-1387	1025
Baghlan (بغلان)	1218	1677	04-1387	1403	6-1387	1403
Samangan (سمنگان)	678	818	04-1387	822	5-1387	0
Saripul (سرپل)	703	486	04-1387	516	6-1387	0
<b>Sub Total for North Region</b>	11082	12042		11236		6779
RC Hirat HQs زونېر اتر اړگاه	315	201	04-1387	194	6-1387	172
Herat (هرات)	2476	3166	04-1387	2651	5-1386	2611
Farah (فراه)	1274	1778	04-1387	1873	5-1387	0
Badghis (بادغیس)	856	1100	04-1387	0		0
Ghor (غور)	974	1149	04-1387	903	5-1387	0
<b>Sub Total for Hirat Region</b>	5895	7394		5621		2783
RC Kandahar HQs قرارگاه وونکندهار	365	253	04-1387	220	4-1387	78
Kandahar (کندهار)	2969	3774	04-1387	3889	5-1387	535
Helmand (هلمند)	2188	1765	04-1387	0		0
Uruzgan (ارزگان)	1319	1797	04-1387	0		0
Nimroz (نیمروز)	862	726	04-1387	809	2-1387	0
Zabul (زابل)	1372	1352	04-1387	1448	2-1387	0
Dikondy (دایکندی)	818	637	04-1387	519	6-1387	0
<b>Sub Total for Kandahr Region</b>	9893	10304		6885		613
Kabul Border Police (سرحدیکابل)	1159	751	04-1387	728	6-1387	728
Brigade 1 سرحدینگرهار 1 لوی	3078	2338	04-1387	2181	12-1386	762
Brigade 2 سرحدیخوست 2 لوی	3490	1720	04-1387	1740	6-1387	784
Brigade 4 سرحدیکندهار 4 لوی	4651	3121	04-1387	0		0
Brigade 6 سرحدیهرات 6 لوی	2454	1926	04-1387	1896	3-1387	380
Brigade 7 سرحدیلخ 7 لوی	3235	2704	04-1387	2294	7-1387	650
<b>Sub Total for Border Police</b>	18067	12560		8839		3304
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82,000</b>	<b>78,339</b>		<b>63,486</b>		<b>35,369</b>

EPS has been implemented to all 115 payroll stations of MoI Nation Wide, but still we are not receiving regular reports from four stations (provinces of Helmand, Uruzgan, Badghiz and Border Police Brigade 4) where the EPS figures have been reflected as zero



د افغانستان اسلامي جمهوریت  
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
د کورنیو چارو وزارت  
Ministry of Interior



Report As of: 05-Aug-10

14-05-1389

تاریخ  
رپور:

Province ولایت	Tashkil تشکيل	Mol HR Update احصایه پېژنتون	Monitoring Agent Verification from Payroll تيمبر سيکنند	Month برچ	No. Police in Payroll (EPS) احصایه پېژ سونډ در سیستم کې و تریمعاشات	Month برچ	Total Number Police in EFT احصایه کې ز سیستم کې پیماشمېګیر ټنډ
101 Asmayi Zone آسماني 101 زون	13346	12607	11685	04-1389	11685	04-1389	11685
Central Departments+Battations+Customs Section اپراتو قطعات مرکزی	12811	8214	10395	04-1389	10395	04-1389	10395
ANCOP نظم معامه	11288	5298	6568	04-1389	6568	04-1389	6568
<b>Sub total For 101 Asmayi Region</b>	<b>37445</b>	<b>26119</b>	<b>28648</b>		<b>28648</b>		<b>28648</b>
202 Shumshad HQs شمشاد 202 قرارگاهزون	354	322	321	04-1389	321	04-1389	321
Nangarhar (ننگرهار)	2923	2935	2909	04-1389	2909	04-1389	2909
Parwan (پروان)	1070	1111	1125	04-1389	1125	04-1389	1125
Kapisa (کاپیسا)	925	982	956	04-1389	956	04-1389	956
Panjsher (پنجشیر)	706	651	747	04-1389	747	04-1389	720
Nuristan (نورستان)	1460	2664	2712	04-1389	2710	04-1389	0
Kunar (کنړه)	1371	1376	1855	04-1389	1855	04-1389	1855
Laghman (لغمان)	849	743	740	04-1389	740	04-1389	740
Logar (لوگر)	806	793	979	04-1389	979	04-1389	840
Wardak (وردک)	1201	826	1675	04-1389	1675	04-1389	1473
Bamyan (بامیان)	819	703	687	04-1389	687	04-1389	687
<b>Sub Total For 202 Shumshad Region</b>	<b>12484</b>	<b>13106</b>	<b>14706</b>		<b>14704</b>		<b>11626</b>
303 Pamir HQs پامیر 303 قرارگاهزون	407	403	894	04-1389	894	04-1389	894
Balkh (بلخ)	1986	2063	1997	04-1389	1997	04-1389	1997
Kunduz (کنډز)	1920	1715	1736	04-1389	1736	04-1389	1736
Badakhshan (بدخشان)	1867	1883	2012	04-1389	2301	04-1389	1740
Takhar (تخار)	1405	1364	1385	04-1389	1385	04-1389	1385
Jawzjan (جوزجان)	964	837	803	04-1389	803	04-1389	690
Faryab (فاریاب)	1373	1412	1733	04-1389	1859	04-1389	1774
Baghlan (بغلان)	1752	2346	2146	04-1389	2192	04-1389	2192
Samangan (سمنگان)	804	802	755	04-1389	744	04-1389	744
Saripul (سرپل)	829	685	612	04-1389	612	04-1389	612
<b>Sub Total for 303 Pamir Region</b>	<b>13307</b>	<b>13510</b>	<b>14073</b>		<b>14523</b>		<b>13764</b>
404 Maiwand HQs میوند 404 قرارگاهزون	407	345	348	04-1389	344	04-1389	340
Kandahar (کندهار)	8478	6394	6184	04-1389	6184	04-1389	4430
Uruzgan (ارزگان)	2327	3070	3985	04-1389	2896	03-1389	0
Zabul (زابل)	1982	1591	1594	04-1389	1591	04-1389	1120
Dikondy (دایکندی)	897	682	796	04-1389	796	04-1389	796


<b>Sub Total for 404 Maiwand Region</b>	14091	12082	12907		11811		6686
505 AspienGhar HQs سپينغر 505 قرارگاهزون	407	360	330	04-1389	320	04-1389	320
Paktiya (پکتيا)	1724	1625	1630	04-1389	1712	04-1389	1712
Ghazni (غزنی)	2659	2596	2599	04-1389	2599	04-1389	2210
Paktika (پکتیکا)	2507	2350	2267	04-1389	2267	04-1389	1280
Khost (خوست)	1958	1895	1733	04-1389	1871	04-1389	850
<b>Sub Total for 505 AspienGhar Region</b>	9255	8826	8559		8769		6372
606 Ansar HQs انصار 606 قرارگاهزون	407	388	906	04-1389	906	04-1389	870
Herat (هرات)	2665	2630	2763	04-1389	2763	04-1389	2763
Farah (فراه)	1948	1936	1857	04-1389	1857	04-1389	1060
Badghis (بادغیس)	1551	1347	1282	04-1389	1286	04-1389	1141
Ghor (غور)	1096	1230	1234	04-1389	1188	04-1389	960
<b>Sub Total for 606 Ansar Region</b>	7667	7531	8042		8000		6794
707 Lashkarga HQs لشکرگاه 707 قرارگاهزون	251	0	0		0		0
Helmand (هلمند)	4896	3985	3985	04-1389	3985	04-1389	1870
Nimroz (نیمروز)	1305	1734	1733	04-1389	1733	04-1389	1604
<b>Sub Total for 707 Lashkarga Region</b>	6452	5719	5718		5718		3474
Kabul Border Police (سرحدیکابل)	1120	1052	968	04-1389	968	04-1389	968
Brigade 1 سرحدینگرهار 1 لوای	3880	3533	3409	04-1389	3398	04-1389	2174
Brigade 2 سرحدیگردیز 2 لوای	3809	2712	2522	04-1389	2739	04-1389	450
Brigade 3 سرحدیکندهار 3 لوای	3124	2308	4158	04-1389	4158	04-1389	470
Brigade 4 سرحدیپهرات 4 لوای	2769	2301	2097	04-1389	2097	04-1389	1960
Brigade 5 سرحدیبلخ 5 لوای	3758	3281	3169	04-1389	3169	04-1389	1340
Brigade 6 سرحدیپهلند 6 لوای	2224	1487	0	04-1389	0	04-1389	0
<b>Sub Total for Border Police</b>	21299	17275	16323		16529		7362
<b>Other Mol Entities Paid from LOTFA Fund</b>		5013		04-1389			
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>122,000</b>	<b>109,181</b>	<b>108,976</b>		<b>108,702</b>		<b>84,726</b>

1 - EPS is implemented in all 115 payroll stations of Mol nationwide. Total EPS coverage is around 99.7% (of Mol HR figure) and EFT around 78%, (around same as last month).

2 - There has been difficulty in receiving updated figures from Uruzgan, so the previous month figures have been used.

3 - Under the tashkil, there is a new 707Lashkarga HQ and Helmand Border Police Brigade 6.

## Appendix F: LOTFA Organisational Structure



~End~