

**Evaluation of UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)  
Programme  
Final Report**

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UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CSF	Citizen Security Forum
CoM	Council of Ministers
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CB	Coordination Board for SALW Control in BiH
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Forces
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EWG	Expert Working Group
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina
MOFTER	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OBOD	Open Burning and Open Detonation
RS	Republika Srpska
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SEESAC	Southeastern European Small Arms Clearinghouse
TA	Technical Assistance
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

## ***Executive Summary***

This Evaluation of the UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme (SALW) is based on an assessment of the intended Outcome:

- BiH Coordination Board reinforced, coordinating SALW policies and initiatives in line with National SALW strategy
- Bosnian capacities for ammunition destruction and demilitarization developed
- Risk posed by unsafe ammunition decreased through elimination of stocks from military possession.

This project has achieved the intended outcomes, and more, through a

variety of efforts to build capacity at the state, entity and municipal levels. In support of the destruction of surplus weapons, the UNDP focused on technical advice, material input, facilitation, training, and coordination. It also sponsored pilot projects with municipal fora to address local security concerns, and provided technical assistance and training to set up a central registry for cross-border security issues.

#### *SALW Coordination Board*

Part of the UNDP assistance to the destruction of hazardous ammunition consists of hosting the SALW Coordination Board, on which it participates as a Technical Advisor. The UNDP also has provided capacity-building training, equipped destruction sites, and provided technical advice for methods of ammunition destruction.

The Coordination Board guides SALW policy and programmes according to a Strategy and Action Plan, and appreciates the facilitation and coordination role played by the UNDP. Indeed, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman both stated the Board would have collapsed without the support of the UNDP. This underscores the fragility of the process, something which the UNDP should try to address with other coordination measures. Moreover, not much practical information was given as to what the Board achieved in terms of monitoring and reporting. There is a natural division between operational issues and political influence in meetings, and questions were voiced as to whether the Minutes of meetings reach top decision makers.

#### *Destruction of Surplus Weapons and Ammunition*

The UNDP offered a range of technical assistance to the commercial destruction facilities of Pretis in Vogosca, Vitezit in Vitez, and Binas in Bugojno that helped to increase the level of destruction of surplus weapons to 1800 tonnes this year. There is also the Ministry of Defence facility of TROM Doboje, a disposal range at Glamoc and a demolition area at Manjaca. There are at least two other facilities that were considered for development as destruction sites, but that did not progress.

The financial viability of the Pretis and Vitezit sites is in doubt, and an assessment should be made to review their operational needs.<sup>1</sup> The destruction process was meant to create jobs for 3700 demobilized soldiers, but the current level of employment at the sites is erratic. There are still technical problems with the equipment provided by the UNDP that limited destruction capacity. A technical capacity analysis of the machines at the sites and staffing issues is sought by the primary donor.

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<sup>1</sup> The EU donor asked the UNDP for assurances that in case of bankruptcy the equipment would be transferred to the Ministry of Defence.

### *Situation Analysis*

Old, unstable ammunition is thought to pose the greatest threat to public safety and lowering surplus stockpiles is a precondition for both EC accession and membership in NATO. Although there are an estimated 20,000 tonnes of surplus military ammunition, only the most unstable 4600 tonnes are currently slated for destruction. Some of the remainder could be sold or donated, although a market is not assured.<sup>2</sup>

The value of raw materials, unstable ammunition and weapons for sale is a matter of contention slowing the destruction process. It was estimated that the cost to destroy a tonne of ammunition was \$570/tonne and that the raw material value recovered from that would be 10-13%, or at most \$70 per tonne. However, some of the 20,000 tonnes of surplus ammunition is more costly to destroy than others. An assessment should be made to ascertain whether buying some ammunition for its scrap value might be faster and less expensive than the dismantling and destruction process.<sup>3</sup>

Current projections indicate that BiH has the technical capacity to reach its goal of destruction of surplus stockpiles within two to ten years, depending on political consensus over what should be destroyed. Some controversy exists over the disposal of raw materials, as they have value of interest to the entities as well as the agency carrying out the destruction process.

### *Illegal Weapons*

The control and elimination of small arms and light weapons does not just relate to weapons held by the military but also to those in the possession of private citizens. The number of illegal weapons is estimated at 1,224,142, with 90% of it in the hands of civilians. This includes those weapons classified as illegal in private hands as well as those that could be legally held but require a permit. According to information presented in meetings arranged by the SACBiH office, some areas, such as RS and Brcko, have strong laws and onerous conditions that limit private possession of guns. In the Federation, cantons regulate weapon ownership in their jurisdiction and the law proposed has not been passed.

According to information given in interviews arranged by the SACBiH office, the amnesty on illegal weapons expired several years ago and it is difficult to envision how a new one could offer enough incentive to be successful. More productive might be an assessment of why citizens feel

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<sup>2</sup> In open bidding, only one company, in Montenegro indicated an interest in buying raw materials, but the price they proposed was rejected as too low.

<sup>3</sup> Some question has been raised as to whether all materials slated for destruction were actually destroyed.

insecure. A study on perceptions was already done and should be analyzed in order to link community policing with other security initiatives.

Some think that illegal weapons are mostly held by criminals and used in criminal activities, but undoubtedly a large number of otherwise law-abiding citizens keep weapons as an added security measure. Illegal weapons range from handguns to rocket launchers, and more research is needed to distinguish level of risk and formulate targeted campaigns.

#### *Community Security Forum*

The UNDP also worked with the Community Security Forum in a pilot Safer Communities project in five municipalities of Zenica, Prijedor, Visegrad, Sanski Most, and Bratunac, to help them develop strategies and action plans to deal with municipal concerns relating to public security. Each Forum is composed of various concerned professionals who are appointed to consider strategies for addressing local public safety issues.<sup>4</sup> Among the issues addressed were establishing animal shelters to help contain the stray dog population and surveillance cameras to monitor areas of municipal concern. The UNDP offered financial resources and helped to share solutions with the groups. The degree of public consultation and participation should be increased in the next phase, and coordination should be made with the UNDP Community Policing initiative.

#### *Joint Center for Risk Analysis*

The UNDP helped to capacitate this multi-agency effort to monitor border issues and to establish a computerized registry for coordination of efforts. Technical support and training was given and the project is due to start early next year.

#### *Central Registry for Weapons and Military Equipment Movement Control*

The UNDP interim report states how it assisted the Central Registry with software and equipment, but the evaluation team did not speak with anyone about this aspect of the programme, or discover how well the system is functioning. Comments on the draft report suggested the Registry should be functional in February 2012. If this registry is the one discussed in the interview with the head of the JCRA, that was not clear.

#### *Future Needs*

At this stage, most of the UNDP areas of intervention in SALW have some positive results and a demonstrated need for continuation or expansion. However, there are still some problem areas which need a fresh assessment and analysis in order to generate possible remedies. This

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<sup>4</sup> These include school officials, NGO heads, and social workers.

includes the need for an accurate inventory of ammunition and weapons stockpiles, and an accurate profile of the destruction facilities, the state of their equipment, their capacity, their production activities, and their destruction rate this year.

UNDP coordination and technical assistance are requested throughout the destruction phase of ammunition, or for at least the next three years. By then, the sustainability of the capacitated oversight and coordination bodies should be reviewed. The UNDP needs to coordinate with its donors on future priorities, taking into account the presence of other groups dealing with destruction, such as the US Embassy in ammunition destruction, and a consortium of Swiss, Swedish and Austrian technical advisors developing the skills of the armed forces in weapons and ammunition transport and destruction. They expect to expand their activities once the training phase is complete. The UNDP role may change, to focus on analysis and coordination, if other agencies prove a better record in coordinating the destruction process.

In addition, the Safer Communities project seems quite weak in both the utility of its activities and the interest of local groups to participate and sustain the initiative

## **1. Background and Rationale**

The UNDP began its support for the elimination of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in 2003 with the aim of attaining several key socio-economic, development and security results. The most important of these are increasing human security for communities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and releasing government resources used for stockpile management for investment in other priority public sectors.

One of the major challenges facing BiH was the legacy of the 1992-1995 war and the resulting wide presence of SALW and ammunition.<sup>5</sup> Independent studies commissioned by the UNDP in 2003 and 2004 indicated that the high level of SALW in civilian and military possession and BiH's large stock of surplus ammunition posed a significant threat to human security.

Since 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made progress in resolving the SALW and ammunition issues. A total of 125,000 SALW and over 8,000 tonnes of ammunition were destroyed, with the assistance of the UNDP

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<sup>5</sup> BiH was also a major producer of weapons under the former Yugoslavia, and some of those facilities now assist with the destruction process.

Small Arms Control Programme (SACBiH). However, 20,000 tonnes of surplus ammunition still remain for disposal or destruction.

According to the Expert Working Group (EWG) <sup>6</sup>, there are 3275 tonnes of heavy armaments, 89,625 SALW, and 29,246 tonnes of ammunition. When the needs of the Armed Forces of BiH are deducted, that leaves a surplus of 2879 heavy arms, 6588 SALW and 21,746 of ammunition for sale or destruction. Of the ammunition, 4500 tonnes has been recognized as unsafe and slated for destruction.<sup>7</sup>The Presidency approves destruction quantities proposed by the Ministry of Defence.

The European Union began funding the activities of the UNDP SACBiH Programme in 2008. With those funds more than 5,000 tonnes of ammunition have been destroyed and ammunition disposal capacities and the capabilities of the BiH Armed Forces were doubled.

Phase II of the Project was launched on 1 January 2010 and aimed to continue the UNDP's support activities contributing to the reduction and mitigation of risks and threats posed by large quantities of unstable and inadequately unguarded remnants of war in BiH. Military stockpiles were then estimated at 21,000 tonnes at more than 20 storage sites around the country.

As downsizing occurs in the Armed Forces, it is not clear if fewer officers are engaged to guard the storage sites. An estimated 700 officers out of a force of 8500 are required for guarding weapons facilities. Significant sums from the state defence budget are dedicated to storage<sup>8</sup>, funds which could be allocated to defence reform or other critical development issues.

Meanwhile, unstable ammunition further deteriorates, posing somewhat of a public safety risk. The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) identified BiH as facing "a potentially significant threat to human life due to storage conditions and the physical condition of their ammunition stockpile."

Phase II extended over 24 months from 2010-2011 and focused on the completion of ammunition destruction and strengthening of BiH government capacities for SALW and ammunition control. Its intended impact was:

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<sup>6</sup> Composed of EUFOR, OSCE, UNDP, and NATO.

<sup>7</sup> In fact, 78% of the ammunition is thought to be unsafe.

<sup>8</sup> Estimated at 10,000 euro a month.



- Continued reduction of security and development risks through the destruction of up to 3,000 tonnes of surplus, unstable ammunition.
- Continued support to improved industrial productivity to increase job creation at demilitarization facilities.
- Completion of all requirements created by the restructuring process of the AFBiH in line with NATO standards.
- Enhanced BiH government capacity to exercise improved SALW control.
- Increase the awareness and understanding of citizens as to the dangers posed by ammunition and SALW.

Under the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), SACBiH has continued Phase II in its work coordinating the destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition by the military, and the destruction of illegal weapons by the police.

Destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition not only will protect the population from aging and unstable weapons and ammunition. It will also help BiH to comply with the standards for EU accession and for membership in NATO. This year, with the help of the UNDP project, BiH fulfilled its obligations under Article III of the Conventions of the Ban of Cluster Munitions and the UN Programme of Action for the Prevention and Combating of the Illicit Proliferation of Weapons.

The ammunition and weapons destruction component of the SALW programme has been slower than the purported optimal technical capacity would suggest, destroying 1000-1800 tonnes per year. The remaining surplus is 20,000 tonnes of ammunition, of which 4600 tonnes of the most unstable has been slated for destruction.<sup>9</sup> The destruction rate is affected by political will and disagreement over the possibility of the sale or donation of stocks versus their destruction. In addition, the dismantling and destruction process leaves a stock of raw materials whose sale cannot be agreed. This may be an issue the UNDP can help to mediate.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The UNDP just finished assisting in the destruction of the most dangerous cluster and air-fuse weapons.

<sup>10</sup> The dispute is over both the real market value of the materials and how the income from sales should be divided between entities/cantons and the State.

The value of raw materials and of old unstable ammunitions and weapons for sale is a matter of contention slowing the destruction process. It was estimated that the cost to destroy a ton of ammunition was \$570/ton and that the raw material value recovered from that would be 10-13%, or at most \$70 per ton. Buying some of the ammunition for its scrap value might be faster and less expensive than the dismantling and destruction process.<sup>11</sup>

One aim of the programme was to offer employment opportunities linked to the destruction of weapons, but the slow and erratic destruction rate seems not to have generated much regular employment. We were given no data, and only in discussion with the main donor did we discover the inactivity of some facilities. Donors seek assurance from the UNDP that the equipment that they provided to the commercial facilities at risk of bankruptcy will be handed over to the Ministry of Defence for continued use in ammunition destruction.

The amnesty to collect illegal weapons expired in 2007 and incentives vary between regions as to how actively illegal weapons are being sought by the police. Recent estimates indicate 1,224,142 SALW, of which 1,098,762 are in the hands of civilians. Most are handguns and rifles, but 749,366 of them are held without proper authorization.

The Safer Communities Project worked with the Citizen Security Forum in five pilot municipalities: Zenica, Prijedor, Visegrad, Sanski Most, and Bratunac<sup>12</sup>. The Fora are composed of citizens representing key institutions relating to security and social welfare, including police, teachers, clergy and social workers. The UNDP facilitated the process by helping the established municipal fora develop three-year strategies and annual work plans. They also gave funds to help to finance identified projects, such as the posting of surveillance cameras at selected sites or the construction of animal shelters to help to contain the stray dog population. Forum members are volunteers but try to meet once a month and discuss issues of concern to the community. The general public is invited to participate in some instances, but citizen participation is limited and may indicate a low level of interest in the Project.<sup>13</sup> It may be that Fora members elected by the community would be more representative.

It was difficult to see how this Project related to priority matters of national or local urgency, given that stray dogs were the only concern

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<sup>11</sup> Some question has been raised as to whether all materials slated for destruction were actually destroyed.

<sup>12</sup> Municipalities were chosen according to specific criteria, including presence of returnees, multi-ethnic communities, and how the Forum had been established (NGO, municipal order, etc.)

<sup>13</sup> Public approval of the posting of CCTV cameras will fulfill EU requirements on citizens' privacy rights.

raised in the four municipalities visited. The security cameras were not placed to monitor any public security problems, as none were mentioned.<sup>14</sup>

The assistance offered, of helping to build a shelter will not address the issue of stray dog overpopulation or responsible pet ownership. Officials said that there are already laws regulating dog owners that need to be enforced, and that would help to distinguish strays from pets running loose. Animal control is usually a police matter, involving capture and spay/neutering. Introducing such practices could suit a BiH NGO supported by international animal welfare groups. Perhaps the UNDP could encourage such a programme. Community Policing is also an activity of the UNDP but was not mentioned by any Fora members as being integrated into the Safer Communities project.

The Joint Center for Risk Analysis is a joint project of five security agencies to coordinate data and analysis of cross-border risk. The database was set up through technical support from the UNDP and analysts have been trained on how to maximize collaborative analysis and identify risks. By the end of February 2012 the team will have prepared an annual risk analysis, probably focusing on trafficking of goods. They will also examine risks requiring immediate action and will respond to requests for analyses by other agencies.<sup>15</sup>

### 1.1. Assumptions

#### *Ammunition and Weapons destruction*

The technical capacity for destruction is somewhat unrelated to the rate of destruction since not every decision-maker is equally committed to the process of destruction of surplus SALW and ammunition. There may be other reasons why some officials want to retain weapons and ammunition, and there are indications that some munitions and explosives have been taken from storage facilities. Few interviewees wanted to discuss these aspects of the destruction process.

Thus far, the concern has been with illegal export and criminality. However, in a country with a recent history of armed conflict, access to weapons stockpiles poses broader security risks. Divisions amongst politicians, a dysfunctional political system, weak international support, and the presence of private military contractors all contribute elements of instability that make access to stockpiles of weapons a threat to security.

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<sup>14</sup> At most, they helped to verify information given in a traffic accident.

<sup>15</sup> The Central Registry for Weapons and Military Equipment Movement Control is a different programme which we did not assess.

### *Safer Communities Initiative*

Limited involvement may also indicate a lack of interest in the issues raised or in the appointed members of the Fora. <sup>16</sup>Sharing successful methods of community intervention may inspire and motivate these groups to become self-sustaining. A lack of community confidence in the police was mentioned in this context, as well as with the illegal possession of weapons by civilians. More coordination between UNDP and other agencies working on police reform might help to link the now disjointed aims of community security, community policing and community ownership.<sup>17</sup>

### 1.2. Coordination

This programme is founded on the UNDP facilitating the coordination of key parties in the security sector, some of whom are at odds over aims and methods. Regulation of SALW is a highly complex process, reflecting the political structure of the country, vested interests, lack of functional structures, and some insecurities and mistrust of motives by involved parties. Not only does the UNDP SACBiH team display great technical knowledge and competence, their role as facilitator and coordinator is invaluable in the current setting.

However, there are other key parties with whom the UNDP SACBiH team appears not to be sufficiently coordinating. The OSCE heads the International Community Forum, attended by NATO, EUFOR, EUSR, the UNDP and the EU at the highest levels in order to address issues of national ownership and the speed of the process. They play an important advocacy role for building the government's will and capacity to assume control to sustain the process.

The US Embassy has its own programme, operating through Sterling International,<sup>18</sup> to destroy surplus ammunition through a different methodology—and perhaps a faster one—than that of the UNDP. <sup>19</sup>Most recently, the Austrian, Swedish and Swiss have combined efforts to train officers from the Ministry of Defence on the movement and destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition, although they are not in this phase undertaking an actual destruction process.

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<sup>16</sup> This seemed the case with the Safer Communities programme, where issues pertaining to returnees and minority relations, youth violence and crime were not mentioned, only stray dogs.

<sup>17</sup> UNODC did a report on issues relating to police reform.

<sup>18</sup> They may soon work on a larger scale in coordination with the International Trust Fund on Mine Action and MVA.

<sup>19</sup> As we only heard of this involvement on the last day of the evaluation, we did not learn details of the plans. However, it seems they are planning to work with a major international agency specializing in mine action and weapons destruction, in order to speed the process.

We met none of these parties to the process and cannot gauge how their role will affect the destruction capacity or rate. In meetings with the main SACBiH donors, the EU and DfID, both of them complained about inadequate communications and the lack of timely reporting. The EU representatives said that during Phase I, "trust was broken" with the SACBiH programme, when it failed to fulfill its promises. Thus, the team in Phase II needed to be more diligent in meeting donor requirements or in explaining delays.

The DfID programme has modified its plans and financing in light of changes at headquarters. The SACBiH team insisted they had an agreement with the former programme director, not grasping that the situation has changed and they risk losing their DfID funds.

According to the EU, the main Programme donor, the UNDP needs to conduct a fresh assessment of partners, institutions and destruction facilities to establish an accurate profile of current capacities, initiatives and trends. There is no assurance the UNDP will be their chosen partner for Phase III.

### 1.3 UNDAF and CPAP

The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) helps to present a unified overview of UN agency country involvement for the government, and the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) of the UNDP helps to outline the aims of the UNDP office. A programme evaluation deals with specifics that do not refer primarily to CPAP and UNDAF, but should reveal the programme achievements in terms of how they fulfilled the needs in the sector, met agreements with donors, and proved to be effective, efficient and sustainable.

As the evaluators do not assess to what degree the CPAP was based on valid assumptions and priorities, but only how the programme met its potential, it is up to the UNDP to conclude from the evaluation whether the programme achieved all it could, its weaknesses and failings and then determine how it ranks within the overall country plan and UNDAF. This evaluation did not focus on UNDAF activities, as that would have entailed a different methodology, focusing on the UNDP staff as opposed to the overall impact of the SACBiH programme on SALW destruction.

### *UNDAF*

According to the UNDAF for 2010-14, the work of SACBiH is listed under UNDAF Outcome 4 Human Security, as item 4.2:

"State Entity and municipal governments in cooperation with local communities improve management of small arms and light weapons, mine action and armed violence prevention.

The UN will also support government at local levels to develop models and action plans, including communication strategies for community based responses for small arms, armed violence, mine action and child safety”.<sup>20</sup>

There was no report that municipal government and communities had addressed the issue of management of small arms. Amnesties were no longer deemed effective. There is no real discernment between individuals in remote areas holding a weapon for their personal safety due to a lack of confidence in the police, old weapons long ago buried and no longer operational, and weapons that are of a type and caliber that exclude them from personal security.

**Output 4.2.1.** BiH Council of Ministers adopts and relevant ministries implement mine action, small arms strategies and armed violence prevention programmes. (UNDP, UNICEF).

The evaluation team did not deal with mine action or encounter any mention of action against armed violence. Nor did we encounter mention of strategies to deal with small arms. Most of the focus was on destruction of weapons and ammunition slated by the Ministry of Defence.

**Output 4.2.2.** Government at all levels develop models and implement plans, including communication strategies, for community and municipality based responses for small arms, armed violence prevention, mine risk reduction, and child safety (UNDP, UNICEF).

The evaluation team did not see examples of any such communication strategies, but entity government officials think that such messages against small arms might work instead of an amnesty.

**Output 4.2.3.** Government at State and Entity levels develop and implement regulatory frameworks and systems for small arms and light weapons and ammunition stockpile management (UNDP).

The focus of the SACBiH programme was on SALW and ammunition stockpile management and destruction. The evaluators did not see what role the SACBiH team played in developing regulatory frameworks at the entity levels. Laws on weapons possession are strict in RS and Brcko and some of the arms control measures in Brcko may serve as examples for the cantons. However, the evaluation did not include Brcko.

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<sup>20</sup> UNDAF 2010-14, p24.

The international partners for the programme included in the UNDAF plan were the OHR, OSCE, EUPM, and EUFOR. The Evaluation team did not meet the OSCE or EUFOR, although they had been included on our original evaluation schedule. We met the EU office representatives at the end of the mission.

The Output indicators listed in the UNDAF matrix can be assessed during an UNDAF review, and deemed appropriate or not. The evaluation team had seven days to meet with implementing partners, peer agencies, donors and other key informants. To assess the UNDAF indicators would have required focusing instead on the SACBiH staff, and seeking documentation for the activities linked to the indicators. We were not given monitoring or progress reports, or even the annual reports of the Ministry of Defence, but relied on key informants from the Ministry in order to gain the most recent information.

This evaluation focuses on the critical points of whether this programme addressed a national priority, what it achieved, the problems it faced, and how it can improve its performance in the next round of funding. It is this analysis that will enable the UNDP to assure its relevance, mend relations with donors, and provide increasingly higher levels of professional assistance, adjusted to meet changing needs and resources.

#### *CPAP*

Under the Country Programme Action Plan, the SACBiH is not presented as a coherent whole but is mentioned under various items. Under 4.14 Small Arms Control is included with other Security and Justice issues. "The planned initiatives will include technical assistance for reduction of small arms and light weapons SALW, ammunition destruction and capacity development for demining."

Under item 4.16, page 15, which is a long narrative of varied initiatives including disaster response, disease control, and crime prevention, there is reference to aims in the security sector, including management of SALW and integrated border management. An incredibly muddled paragraph then states the UNDP will support the development and implementation of relevant state and entity laws and regulatory frameworks on arms reduction.

"The specific activities will include, *inter alia*, assistance to lobbying activities, policy development...and a weapons collection campaign. Capacity development activities will include a provision of technical support, policy advocacy, equipment, and training activities". A later section in the paragraph also mentions capacity development for integrated state borders management, including needs assessment, policy advocacy and technical assistance.

The SACBiH fulfilled these programme intentions, as this report indicates under headings for each project area.

## **2. Programme Objectives and Achievements**

The main Programme achievements according to interlocutors were the ongoing meetings of the SALW Coordination Board; the destruction of large quantities of SALW and ammunition, including all the cluster ammunition; support to five Citizens Security Forums, including implementation of local Safer Communities projects and the creation of strategies and action plans.

The UNDP SACBiH office serves as Technical Advisor to the Coordination Board, which initiates, approves and coordinates SALW initiatives in BiH in accordance with the National Strategy and Action Plan for SALW Control.

The National Coordination Board (CB) consists of representatives from:  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Security including State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA)

State Border Service (SBS)

Office for Coordination with Interpol

State Civil Protection Agency, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations

Ministry of Defence BiH

Entity ministries of internal affairs (RS and FMoI)

Indirect Taxation Administration

The Coordination Board should provide the major policy and oversight role in coordinating the destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition from military stockpiles. It also should deal with the seizure and destruction of illegal weapons held by citizens. However, it is unclear how their reports to the Council of Ministers facilitate implementation of the National Strategy.

The destruction of surplus weapons included the most unstable and hazardous ammunition, which required special technical contractors. Amongst the 1800 tonnes destroyed this year were 39,119 pieces of cluster munitions KB 1, 321 pieces of BL 755,<sup>21</sup> 152 pieces of Orcan rockets, 131,722 pieces of hand grenades, 59,043 pieces of rifle grenade fuses, 43,044 pieces of artillery fuses, 29,580 pieces of anti-armour munitions and 45 tonnes of rocket propellant.

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<sup>21</sup> Making BiH a cluster munitions-free country.



As part of a Safer Communities project, the UNDP aimed to help the Fora to build their capacity through trainings on strategic planning, so that they have a three year Strategic Plan and annual Action Plans. The SACBiH office spoke of a Community Security Management model relating to the project, but this was not mentioned by the active members of the Fora whom we met. Capacity development through training is not adequate and must be reinforced by active involvement. The UNDP also provided funding for certain projects, but none are linked to critical security issues.<sup>22</sup>

### 2.1. Relevance

The weapons and ammunition programme aims and achievements are highly relevant and address requirements for EU accession and NATO membership. However, the Citizens Security groups are based on appointed representatives identifying needs of concern to the community, and there is little citizen participation. This project could have more relevance if real areas of need are identified, perhaps in other towns.<sup>23</sup>

### 2.2. Effectiveness

The BiH Coordination Board on SALW reinforces and coordinates SALW policies and initiatives in line with the National Strategy for SALW and ammunition control in BiH. BiH institutional and industrial capacities have been upgraded for the dismantling and destruction of unstable and surplus ammunition, most notably this year, the highly dangerous cluster and aerosol munitions and rocket propellant. Public safety risks posed by unsafe ammunition decreased through elimination of SALW and ammunition stocks in military possession.

The Central Registry was set up for coordinating analysis of cross-border risk and the Joint Center for Risk Analysis staff were given technical training. The Citizens Fora in five municipalities were assisted with drafting strategic plans, which are necessary if the Fora will function independently.<sup>24</sup>

### 2.3. Efficiency

The UNDP stated that its aim in these projects is to build capacity and functionality not to serve as a donor organization. Therefore its financial investments have been reasoned and it seeks cost-sharing with government agencies. It recruited specialized companies with expertise in

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<sup>22</sup> Stray dogs that are really pets, are not linked to a significant number of attacks or rabies outbreaks are not really a security threat. Criminality was not mentioned by any officials interviewed.

<sup>23</sup> The Evaluation team was not shown Council of Ministers plans. The text, of course, reflects the information given to evaluators and the conclusions we drew.

<sup>24</sup> Including CCTV cameras to monitor key sites and animal shelters to contain the stray dog population.

the types of weapons to be destroyed, thus assuring the most effective and efficient methods were used.<sup>25</sup>

It helped to upgrade ammunition disposal facilities, simplifying the disposal process and increasing security standards. This should ensure a more efficient transfer of knowledge to the Ministry of Defence staff. Better classification of types of ammunition will assure that the more complex and hazardous systems are destroyed with UNDP assistance, leaving simpler types to the Ministry of Defence to destroy with its own new machinery.

We were given no baselines and did not visit these facilities to collect data or verify the different versions we were told of the destruction process. Costs can vary widely depending on the type of weapons and method of destruction.

#### 2.4. Sustainability

The UNDP may well remain engaged in the SALW control process until it reaches its target of ammunition destruction. It has been focusing its assistance to the Ministry of Defence towards the most hazardous munitions which the Ministry could not dispose of by itself. During the disposal process, the UNDP assured that the relevant staff of the armed forces were present to gain new knowledge about disposal methods applied. Moreover, the UNDP arranged training sessions to increase the capacity and capability of the Armed Forces of BiH to assume those activities in the future. Other agencies are now involved in the same tasks, so a new assessment needs to be done as to the current parties involved in the sector, their resources and performance, in order to map out the best coordination for donor resources.

In the meantime, the UNDP continues to host or support the voluntary management bodies of the Coordination Board and the Citizens Security Fora. According to interviews with members of the Coordination Board, it is doubtful that the Board would meet without the UNDP playing the role of convener and secretary. The evaluators cannot assess whether there is another possible host, or if different Board members would agree to fulfill those vital roles. A sustainability plan needs to be drafted, in consultation with the Board.

The Safer Communities project Fora seem too disjointed to function reliably or sustain themselves. We did not meet enough members and often the person who presented the Fora was vague and confused, as though the meetings and activities are limited in capacity and activity. It was not evident that the training given by the UNDP helped with

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<sup>25</sup> Such as Sterling and UXB Balkans for cluster and air-fuse ammunition.

management, planning, sustainability, nor that the groups were following any strategic or action plans.

### 2.5. Impact

The potential for impact is greatest in the case of quantities of destroyed weapons and ammunition, as they diminish public risk. This will have to be assessed over time. Although the numbers of destroyed ammunition given to the evaluators were varied, it is the only quantifiable goal. That the destruction of certain quantities of weapons was set as a desirable outcome should mean that someone anticipated favorable impact on society. Repeated references were made to the risk to the public of the presence of unstable ammunition, although there are few instances to report of stockpiles exploding and causing injury.

The Safer Communities project idea seemed to have potential, but needs to be redesigned to address municipalities that have demonstrated need. There results from the monitors seem trivial given the cost of the material inputs. The animal shelters were not linked to police enforcement of existing animal control regulations and a sterilization process, so their impact will be minimal, if the Fora even implement their part of the plan.

The Registry set up by the Joint Center for Risk Analysis should have tracked results relating to integrated border management within its first year of operations.

## **3. Programme Management**

### 3.1. Accountability

The destruction of military surplus is conducted according to levels recommended by the Ministry of Defence and approved by the Presidency. The entities where the destruction facilities are located also can affect the pace of destruction. The greatest hindrance stems from who will profit from the disposal of surplus weapons and ammunition and the moveable property of the military. Agreement on how to divide the proceeds of sales of ammunition, weapons and raw materials leftover from the disposal process has been a factor impeding the pace of destruction. This has been mitigated by the recognition that some ammunition is so unstable that it must be destroyed as soon as possible.

### 3.2. Implementing Partners

The implementing partners in this programme are government agencies responsible for defense and security, such as the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Interior, municipal police forces and the border police, as well as some civil society and community bodies. The UNDP has focused on capacity building and coordination, and

facilitates the meetings of the SALW Coordination Board. This process seems based on a true partnership with clear functionality added by the technical support of the UNDP team. The UNDP team may well be the mortar that holds together these diverse stakeholders with their occasionally divergent positions.

### 3.3. Capacity Issues

Of some concern is how the process would continue without the assistance of the UNDP. The Coordination Board holds its meetings in the UNDP conference room and relies on the office for secretarial and other support. While individual members of the Board may have expertise and professional competence, they did not indicate the Board would meet without the UNDP. The Citizens Security Fora existed before the involvement of the UNDP but had limited activity due to resource constraints and apathy. Were the issues they faced more pressing, they could probably activate the community enough to scrape together the resources necessary to solve the problem.

The Registry to be set up by the Joint Center for Risk Analysis depends on technical skills that may need to be refined, with UNDP assistance. As the Registry was not yet functioning, these capacity issues appeared to be the prime issues to be address to assure the Center can be sustainable.

Capacity issues linked to the destruction process also need to be reassessed in a baseline study of current stockpiles and destruction facilities. What is the capacity of each destruction facility, which types of ammunition and weapons can they destroy, what staff and technical capacity do they have for dismantling and destruction, what issues impede their destruction rate? We had no data on how the commercial or government facilities were used, except that two of the commercial facilities had destroyed nothing this year. It is not clear whether this was due to mechanical problems, financial or staffing constraints, or a lack of agreement as to who profits from waste materials.

## **4. Findings and Recommendations**

1. All interlocutors expressed satisfaction and gratitude in their participation in the UNDP SACBiH programme.
2. The SACBiH programme team were praised for their professional competency.
3. The Programme has helped to develop the capacities of local partners at all levels.

4. The SALW Coordination Board would not be sustainable without further UNDP support.
5. The process of destruction of SALW has been slowed down by insufficient political will to overcome disputes over the remaining raw materials after destruction.
6. There was no proper monitoring system in place over the SAC BiH programme by the UNDP to provide data on the process for evaluators.
7. There is a lack of current data on the capacity of the destruction facilities and their level of activity.
8. No progress was made on using the destruction process to create stable employment for demobilized soldiers.
9. Most of the activities of this programme relating to amnesty, weapons in the hands of citizens, etc. are under the jurisdiction of the cantons and not the FBiH, making implementation of certain laws or consensus on procedures more difficult to obtain.

**Recommendations:**

1. The UNDP needs to conduct a fresh assessment of partner agencies, institutions and destruction facilities involved in SALW to establish an accurate profile of current capacities, achievements, initiatives and trends, including the destruction facilities and their functionality and destruction rate.
2. The UNDP can continue to work in this sector for at least three years, until the target reduction of surplus ammunition is reached.
3. The UNDP together with other international partners should set up a framework for a mediation process of negotiations and agreement among local stakeholders and decision makers over the disputes such as state property issues, SALW raw materials disposal, etc. that is more effective than existing bodies.
4. Some effort should be made to increase livelihoods and employment through the destruction of SALW or alternative investment.
5. The UNDP could also open a debate to present alternative strategies for the reduction of illegal weapons in private hands and

for legislation on illegal weapons at the cantonal level, that distinguish weapons held by citizens for self-defense.

6. More attention should be paid to the land ownership and environmental issues surrounding SALW destruction.
7. Strategic interventions should be devised to address the enactment and enforcement of legislation and ordinances relating to arms and public security issues, and harmonization of laws at the cantonal level.<sup>26</sup>
8. Some analysis should be made as to the reasons why individuals want to hold private weapons.<sup>27</sup> The cost and difficulty of gaining a legal permit may assure people hold onto an unregistered firearm.
9. Public awareness campaigns on security issues should be continued, encouraging civic engagement in assuring their own security through responsible action.
10. The UNDP Community Policing initiative can be tied into efforts to contain illegal weapons possession and the Citizens Forum, in order to assure an increase in police accountability and public perceptions of security.
11. Other municipalities can be identified for participation in the Citizens Security Fora and the most successful municipalities can help to build the capacity of other areas in a support network based on what they have learned.<sup>28</sup>
12. In the next phase, more attention could be paid to Disaster Risk Management and work with Civil Protection organizations within the Community Fora, to give them something productive to do. .
13. Further support will be needed for building the capacity of the Joint Risk Analysis Center through specialized training of the analysts.

## **5. Lessons Learned**

1. Instead of trying to initiate new community projects, the UNDP may be able to animate and activate an existing group with coordination, capacity building and group facilitation.

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<sup>26</sup> Such as animal licensing, vaccination and leash laws.

<sup>27</sup> Some reasons were given in a survey of public perceptions of security.

<sup>28</sup> <sup>28</sup> Brčko District offers a good example of effective policing due to their successful fight against all criminal and security related activities.

2. The UNDP offers concrete assistance in its role as Technical Advisor and impartial facilitator that makes it a credible partner.
3. Two conditions must be fulfilled in order to fight security problems: political commitment to a common strategy and financial resources. Technical issues are easier to address.
4. Public awareness campaigns need to be based on strategic analysis to produce results.
5. Networking and experience/information exchange can lead to structural improvements in local communities.
6. Inter-Ministerial bodies in divided societies may need the mediation of international agencies in order to be more functional.

## **6. Conclusion**

The UNDP SACBiH programme was repeatedly commended for its successful partnership with three levels of government and security agencies, as well as with civil society. The management team was praised for their technical competence, and their role as facilitators. This sort of praise is to be expected when an agency offers resources to fund a vital activity. However, there were complaints by both donors over a lack of responsiveness to their expressed concerns about programme implementation. This puts at risk ongoing funding. Donor requirements change and the SACBiH failed to adapt to meet those needs. Both the EU and DfID complained about waiting for reports that were overdue.

There also should be clarity over what exactly the UNDP process is achieving in terms of destruction capacity and outcome and what obstacles remain. Then the issues affecting the destruction of surplus can be properly addressed. We were told of ongoing technical problems with some machines, a slower pace of destruction due to low pay of workers, the unwillingness of the government to hand over ammunition already slated for destruction, and even pending bankruptcy for the commercial destruction facilities. None of these issues was disclosed by the SACBiH office.

UNDP financing helped to launch projects that otherwise lacked the funding to be enacted. These concrete results are rare for a development agency. All the areas of UNDP involvement in SALW should continue, with refinements and more sectoral coordination, in order to build on past success and become sustained by local systems and structures.

The Safer Communities project now lacks much pertinence, but the selection criteria for the municipalities may have been ill-conceived. If there are no areas of BiH that have problems worse than stray dogs, that is quite a tribute to the state of security. Just observing and monitoring what the establish Fora achieve on their own over the next year could offer insight as to whether this initiative is worthwhile.

The SACBiH team has experience and skill that might transfer to broader application in addressing some of the political issues that destabilize the country. However, that would require a new programme plan beyond SALW.

## **7. Appendices**

### **A. Evaluation Methodology**

The Evaluation team began with a document review of the project document, the Country Programme Action Plan, the UNDAF for 2007-2011, and the EU project document. We then met with the Programme team and identified the key stakeholders and partners for interviews.

We also met with donors and key informants in the security sector, including civil society NGOs, including:

- The Ministry of Defense
- The Ministry of Security
- The Ministry of Interior of the RS
- The Ministry of Interior of the FBiH
- Municipality of Prijedor
- Municipality of Sanski Most
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- State Border Police
- SALW Coordination Board
- The Ministry of Interior of ZE-DO Canton
- NATO
- EU
- DfID

We only discovered at the end of our mission that the OSCE was coordinating an important International Group and we should have met with them. We also should have met with EUFOR, the US Embassy, and the Austrian/Swiss/Swedish project to assist the Ministry of Defence with destruction capacity. To do this, we would have needed an extra day or two added to our evaluation contract.



The UNDP office later suggested we could have done these meetings by email or Skype, however, even the SACBiH office did not respond our email requests (for the comments). An unnamed official at the OSCE, EUFOR, or an Embassy will not respond to a list of questions by email—or Skype-- from a person who did not bother to arrange an interview while in the country. Perhaps we could have obtained follow-up information with people we did interview, were that necessary, although many were leaving for the Christmas holiday and were out of the office for a few weeks. We were not given the names or contact details for any of the officials we failed to meet during our mission. The evaluation needed another week to make visits to destruction facilities and to conduct meetings with other groups involved in the destruction process.

Field visits to Zenica, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Banja Luka and Visegrad were arranged in order to learn about the Citizens Security Forum, local security concerns and efforts to address illegal weapons. To maximize the value of these trips, we should have visited some of the destruction facilities in order to learn about the issues they face. We also should have met with ordinary citizens to ask them about their security perceptions and their interest in a Community Security process.

Photos and film were made available to the consultants so that they could observe the actual ammunition storage conditions and the lengthy field preparation and destruction process.

The evaluation team split up in order to reach enough stakeholders and informants to triangulate information and confirm field activities. During the evaluation mission, there was a conference organized by the Ministry of Defence to resolve outstanding issues affecting the ammunition destruction process, which also gave access the evaluation team access to a wide variety of concerned parties and decision-makers.

The focused nature of the intervention and the concrete link between activities and outcomes made it easier to evaluate than many other projects. However, there are diverging accounts of what hinders the destruction facilities from maximizing their role which only direct investigations of their facilities and functionality would reveal.

## **B. Interviews**

### UNDP

Armin Sirco, Assistant Resident Representative  
Amna Berbic, Coordinator, Justice and Security Cluster  
Jasmin Porobic, Project Manager, SACBiH  
Majda Zeherovic, Project Associate, SACBiH  
Denis Siljegovic, Community-Based Policing Officer

Tarik Ucanbarlic, Ammunition Technical Officer

Government of BiH

Momir Brajic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chairman SALW Coord. Board

Verica Trbic, Min. of Security- INTERPOL, Dep. Chair of SALW CB

Vedran Mulabdic, Ministry of Security, Coordination Board

Denis Hadzovic, Secretary General, Center for Security Studies

Admir Gazic, MUP-ZUK, Citizens Security Forum, Zenica

Besim Sekic, President, Citizens Security Forum, Sanski Most

Drasko Djenadija, Citizens Security Forum, Prijedor

Darko Maricic, Inspector for Prevention in Board of Police, MUP RS,  
Banja Luka

Perica Stanic, Min. of Internal Affairs, Rep. on Coord. Board for SALW,  
Banja Luka

Brigadier Dalibor Peric, Ministry of Defence

Nikica Curak, Federal Directorate for Defence Industry

Col. D. Marjanovic, Min. of Defence Verification Process

Fahrudin Selimovic, BD Police

Ekrem Suljevic, MUP, FBiH

Zoran Uscumlic, Citizens Security Forum, Visegrad

Stjepan Skoko, Chief, Joint Risk Analysis Center, BiH Min. of Security  
Border Police

Lt. Col. Lawrence Carpenter, Equipment and Logistics Advisor, NATO

Donor Agencies

Lt. Col. Rob Tomlinson, Defense Attache, UK Embassy

Natalia Dianiskova, Head of Section, Social Dev., Civil Society, Cross  
Border Cooperation in BiH, European Union

Sanja Tica, Programme Manager, European Union

**Missed meetings**

Yuri Padun, OSCE

EUFOR

**C. Documents**

Azinovic, Vlado, Kurt Bassuener, Bodo Weber. Assessing the Potential for  
Renewed Ethnic Violence in BiH: A Security Risk Analysis. Atlantic  
Initiative Democratization Policy Council. October 2011.  
98p.

Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers. Strategy and Action Plan  
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Bosnia and  
Herzegovina for the Period 2008-2011. Sarajevo: Nov.2008. 24p.

Center for Security Studies and UNDP. Study on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010. 101p.

Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Small Arms Control Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SACBiH Phase II) Grant Application Form. 32p.

UNDP. Country Programme Action Plan 2010-2014. 22p.

UNDP. Small Arms Control Programme in BiH (SACBiH) ProDoc. 39p.

UNDP. Small Arms Control and Reduction Programme. The Interim Report 1 January 2010 to 20 September 2011. 22p

UNDP. Small Arms Control and Reduction Annual Work Plan 2010.

UNDP. Small Arms Control and Reduction Annual Work Plan 2011.

## **E. Terms of Reference**

### **Terms of Reference**

**Title:** Monitoring and Evaluation Expert (National)  
**Project:** Small Arms Control and Reduction  
**Cluster:** Human Security and Reduction  
**Reporting to:** HS&J Cluster Coordinator  
**Duty Station:** Sarajevo  
**Contract Type:** Special Service Agreement (SSA)  
**Duration:** 10 working days

### **Background**

- **General Overview:** In 2005 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) expanded its Small Arms Control Project (SACBiH) to assist the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in reducing the immediate threat posed to human life by Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and remnants of war. Within the framework of the programme the UNDP assisted the SALW Coordination Board to develop and implement the National Strategy and Action Plan for SALW Control in BiH, the Ministry of Defense in disposing SALW and ammunition surpluses and the Ministry of Security, entity ministries of interior and Brcko District Police in expanding its capacities to control SALW. Among others, it focuses on issues pertaining to streamlining SALW legislation, registration, storage, SALW acquisition and SALW trade and trafficking as well as arms and ammunition reduction. The programme seeks to attain several important goals: (i) Enhanced Institutional

Capacity for SALW Control; (ii) SALW and Associated Weapons Systems Disposal; and (iv) Ammunition Disposal and Demilitarization.

- **Purpose:** The purpose of the External Evaluation is to assess the overall Small Arms Control and Reduction (SACBiH) relevance, quality performance as well as effectiveness of SACBiH endeavors towards achievement of objectives. The evaluation will be performed by the team that will be consisted of External Evaluation Consultant (Team leader) and one Monitoring and Evaluation Expert. Monitoring and Evaluation Expert (MEE) will assist External Evaluation Consultant - Team leader in a review process and recommendations towards the implementation of planned activities along with the identification of key lessons learned and future project ideas. He/she will address overall project performance as well as to what extent are the project's objectives and outputs achieved.

Evaluation will aim to answer questions and provide recommendations that will assist in maximizing SACBiH performance and further improve its efficiency and effectiveness. The consultant will take a broad overview of the project area by gathering gender sensitive perceptions, aspirations, feedback and data from relevant partners and stakeholders, in order to make objective analysis.

- **Objective:** The main objective of the External evaluation is to provide UNDP and EU Delegation with an objective analysis of the prospective success of the SACBiH Project. Where appropriate, adjustments will be made to ongoing programme activities to re-focus on objectives.

## **Description of Responsibilities**

### **a. Scope of work**

Under the direct guidance and supervision of the Cluster Coordinator the MEE is going to provide technical services ensuring high quality, accuracy and consistency of work. The consultant promotes a client-oriented approach consistent with UNDP's rules and regulations. He/she will work in close collaboration with the SACBiH project staff and stakeholders to exchange information and assess development priorities.

It is important to emphasise that appropriate approaches are chosen by consultant. The parameters outlined in ToR should therefore be taken as indicative. It is expected that elaboration of the detailed approach to be taken, methods to be utilised will precede to adoption of a final evaluation schedule.

1.

D

#### desk review

Assisting in a review process will include review of the UNDP/SACBIH Project Document and Inception report, SACBIH annual and quarterly progress reports, key project deliverables and other relevant project documentation. The briefing kit will be prepared by the UNDP/SACBIH. Together with the MTE team leader, Monitoring and Evaluation Expert will meet with the key Country Office (CO) staff for initial briefing as well as at the end of the assignment to provide debriefing and discuss findings.

Monitoring and Evaluation expert will assist the Team Leader in creation of a work plan that will summarise key findings from desk review; list project stakeholders to be interviewed and present a schedule for these interviews; and, most importantly, set out in detail the methods and approaches to be utilised in evaluating SACBIH. It is expected that elaboration of the detailed approach to be taken, methods to be utilised, and schedule to be followed as per the schedule given below.

Note: Sufficient copies, both print and electronic, will be made available by UNDP.

#### 2. Field phase

The SACBIH Monitoring and Evaluation Expert will, in close collaboration and guidance provided by the Team leader, interview relevant UNDP personnel, stakeholders and the SACBIH Project team, both female and male, to reflect on their experiences and practices in the day-to-day implementation of the project.

Most importantly through field visits, the Monitoring and Evaluation Expert should meet with the representatives of various UNDP/SACBIH stakeholders in order to assess the project performance as well as its approach and modalities. These should include, if possible: the BiH Ministry of Defense, the representatives of the Delegation of the European Union to BiH, at least 10 representatives from other partner institutions/communities as follows but not limited to:

- The Ministry of Defense;
- The Ministry of Security;
- The Ministry of Interior of the RS;
- The Ministry of Interior of the FBiH;
- Municipality of Prijedor;
- Municipality of Sanski Most;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- State Border Police;

- SALW Coordination Board;
- The Ministry of Interior of ZE-DO Canton.

The SACBiH team will provide transport for the MTE team.

### 3. Monitoring and Evaluation Expert (MEE) final report write-up

The main output of the MEE will be a comprehensive report, of sufficient detail and quality, with annexes and working papers as required, covering a detailed review of the SACBiH in line with the UNDP standards and requirements. The MEE report will be included into **Final External Evaluation Report** and **Lessons Learned Report** that is to be prepared by the team leader at the end of the process.

The MEE report will include findings relevant to the final report and results of the analyses conducted through comprehensive interview process of relevant stakeholders in close collaboration with the MTE Team leader. Furthermore, the MEE will encompass detailed information related to gender mainstreaming.

The MEE report will capture key findings and conclusions against the core areas of project External Evaluation based on inputs given by the Team Leader, and serve as substantive part of the The Final External Evaluation Report.

The Monitoring and Evaluation Expert Report will be based on the inputs and instructions provided by the Team Leader which could include but not limited to:

- executive summary;
- introduction to the mid-term review;
- description of the intervention;
- review scope and objectives;
- evaluation approach and methods;
- finding and conclusions (including on the project relevance and quality of project performance);
- recommendations for the formulation of the remaining activities and beyond the project life (including assessment review and recommendations for adjustment of project's results and resource framework);

A contextual analysis of the environment in which SACBiH is working and its relevance in fulfilling a role in that environment should also be

included. Similarly, the report should include the data, inputs and analysis, as well as success indicators used, and an overview of the effectiveness of the project from the perspective of various stakeholders.

The consultant will perform the required activities within a period of up to 10 days in the period of November-December 2011. Duty station is Sarajevo (possible field trips to partner institutions, maximum 3 overnight stays).

**b. Deliverables and timelines**

The consultant is responsible for the following deliverables:

<b>Deliverables (outputs)</b>	<b>Deadline</b>
Assisting team leader in submission of a final work plan and revision of the assignment's Terms of Reference including definition of methodology based on coordination of all required activities and results of a desk review.	20 November 2011
Field visits performed, interviews conducted.	01 December 2011
Submission of MEE report. This report will encompass all information and findings planned in cooperation with MTE Team Leader. MEE report will be basis for the final report that will compile and finalise the mid-term project evaluation results. Findings from the report will be presented to UNDP senior management.	15 December 2011

**Competencies**

**Corporate Competencies:**

- ☐ Demonstrates commitment to UNDP's mission, vision and values;
- ☐ Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability.

**Functional Competencies**

Knowledge Management and Learning

- ☐ Shares knowledge and experience.

Development and Operational Effectiveness

- ☐ Provides helpful feedback and advice;
- ☐ Conceptualizes and analyzes problems to identify key issues, underlying problems, and how they relate;
- ☐ Contributes creative, practical ideas and approaches to deal with challenging situations;
- ☐ Plans and produces quality results to meet established goals;
- ☐ Demonstrates substantive and technical knowledge to meet responsibilities and post requirements with excellence;
- ☐ Ability to identify beneficiaries' needs, and to match them with appropriate solutions;

- ❑ Ability to produce accurate and well documented records conforming to the required standard;
- ❑ Good knowledge of administrative rules and regulations in civil society sector;
- ❑ Plans and produces quality results to meet established goals executing day-to-day tasks systematically and efficiently;
- ❑ Proven excellence in report writing;
- ❑ Responds positively to critical feedback and differing points of view;
- ❑ Ability to handle a large volume of work possibly under time constraints;
- ❑ Demonstrates strong oral and communication skills;
- ❑ Responds positively to critical feedback and differing points of view;
- ❑ Strong IT skills.

#### Leadership and Self-Management

- ❑ Focuses on result for the client and responds positively to feedback;
- ❑ Consistently approaches work with energy and a positive, constructive attitude;
- ❑ Remains calm, in control and good humored even under pressure.

#### **Qualifications**

- University degree (master degree is an asset) in political science, social science, public administration or related disciplines;
- At least 7 years of extensive project/programme evaluation experience; evaluation of UN/EU donor-funded interventions is considered to be an asset;
- Solid knowledge and at least 3 years of experience in the area of design and development of programmes within security sector;
- Experience in gender mainstreaming is an asset;
- Experience in the usage of computers and office software packages (MS Word, Excel, etc);
- Experience in comparable evaluations;
- Fluency in spoken and written English and familiarity with the United Nations System.

<b>Signatures</b>	
Incumbent <i>(if applicable)</i>	
Name	Signature
Date	
Supervisor	



Amna Berbic Cluster Coordinator Date	Signature
Peter Van Ruysseveldt Deputy Resident Representative Name / Title Date	Signature