ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS
EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Evaluation Office, May 2012
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ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION – DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

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The Evaluation Office would like to thank all those who contributed to this exercise. The evaluation team, led by Carrol Faubert, consisted of Jups Kluyskens (governance), Didier Mumengi (poverty and development) and Olivier Cossée (from the Evaluation Office, covering the community recovery sector in the mission), and was assisted by Anna Parini, research assistant. The assessment was prepared and carried out with the invaluable assistance of UNDP staff in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), especially Nick René Hartmann, Country Director a.i., Fumie Nakamura, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist and focal point for this assessment, and Mimi Nlongo Kiala, Assistant. We also thank the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, the Government of the DRC, the United Nations Country Team and representatives of civil society, non-government organizations, donor countries and international funding institutions, for their support to this assessment. Victor Angelo and Roberto della Rovere usefully commented on earlier drafts of the report. Thanks are finally due to Thuy Hang To and Caroline Monyi, Evaluation Office, for their administrative support, as well as to Danielle Fabre, Marina Blinova, Anish Pradhan and Sanjay Upadhya who edited and formatted the text for publication.
The present Assessment of Development Results (ADR), conducted between May and November 2011, examines the support provided by UNDP to the reconstruction of a most deprived country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The period covered by the evaluation (2003-2012) follows a series of conflicts that wrecked the country and the subregion from 1994 to 2002. In 2003, the Congolese nation embarked on a reconstruction of its institutions, infrastructure and economy.

The ADR concludes that UNDP contributed in a singular manner to this reconstruction process, assuming, for example, a leading role in the demobilization of ex-combatants, sometimes in extremely difficult conditions, and supporting the registration of more than 25 million voters, the referendum on the constitution and the presidential and legislative elections that followed in 2005-2006, an endeavour that many observers at the time felt doomed to fail. While it would be impossible to list here all of UNDP’s contributions, one should mention its support to aid coordination and policy formulation; the important role played in the management of the humanitarian pooled fund in terms of mentoring and building the capacity of NGOs accessing the fund; the role of principal recipient for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, which provides medical care to people living with these diseases in many localities; and the efforts deployed to fight poverty and promote economic development in a context where most of the available external resources are directed to humanitarian aid.

As part of its mandate, UNDP has also contributed to developing the capacity of institutions playing a key role in the transition. However, on this issue the ADR concludes that, with very few exceptions, such support to governmental capabilities did not build upon a diagnosis of the initial situation, did not seek to complement the support provided by other partners, and most importantly, focused too narrowly on the training of a few individuals without consideration to the operational constraints of the institutions employing them. For example, in the absence of a credible and secure salary payment system, policemen and judges will at times feel tempted to monetize their services, and thus strengthening their capacity with respect to criminal procedures may have a limited effect. The same remark applies to virtually all public services. In this context, it is extremely difficult to apply the principles of the Paris Declaration. As noted in the report, most development partners in the DRC prefer to entrust their funds to civil society organizations, NGOs or international organizations.

UNDP has benefited from this trend by earning itself the reputation of a good fund manager, and over the years came to manage all kinds of trust funds in the DRC. The evaluation stressed that the management of these funds sometimes came at a variance with the mandate of the organization, in particular when UNDP is placed in a conflict of interest between, on the one hand, the need to manage these resources to the best of its abilities, and on the other hand, the requirement to build the capacity of national institutions that should ultimately manage these same resources. The Global Fund is a case in point, as was apparently the ex-combatants demobilization programme.

According to the last Human Development Report, the DRC is the poorest country in the world. This situation is worsened by continued violence committed by armed groups whose aims have progressively become more economic than political. The task is far from finished and yet, the evaluation concludes that UNDP’s commitment
to the DRC was stronger during the immediate post-conflict period than it has been since then. The spirit of enthusiasm, creativity and risk-taking which dominated during the first few years gave way since 2008 to a sense of frustration and discouragement in front of massive, deep-rooted challenges. The UNDP team in the DRC must regain the energy and creativity that characterized it a few years back, in order to reassert its leadership in the development field, promote open debates on topics that are key to the future of the nation, and revisit the issue of aid effectiveness based on mutual accountability and the restoration of trust between citizens, the State and its development partners. Indeed, trust forms the basis for any modern society and is necessary to any cooperation effort.

I hope the conclusions and recommendations of this report will contribute to the revitalization of UNDP in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so that the organization can support good governance, develop national capacities and help reconstruct the country’s economy with renewed vigour.

Juha I. Uitto
Deputy Director, Evaluation Office
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>2BEK</td>
<td>Project to support farmers’ organizations in the Bandundu, Bas Congo and Kinshasa provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Assessment of Development Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>AIT</td>
<td>Project to support transition institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Support to the election process in the Congo <em>(Appui au processus électoral au Congo)</em></td>
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<td>APNURC</td>
<td>National Emergency and Capacity Building Support Programme <em>(Appui au programme national d’urgence en renforcement des capacités)</em></td>
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<td>ARV</td>
<td>Antiretroviral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCC</td>
<td>Central Bank of Congo <em>(Banque centrale du Congo)</em></td>
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<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of UNDP</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Country Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Country Coordinating Mechanisms of GFATM</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CDMT</td>
<td>Medium-Term Expenditure Framework <em>(Cadres de dépenses à moyen terme)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CELC</td>
<td>Commission for Ethics and the Struggle Against Corruption <em>(Commission de l’éthique et de la lutte contre la corruption)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CEI</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission <em>(Commission électorale indépendante)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CENI</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission <em>(Commission nationale électorale indépendante)</em></td>
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<td>CEPI</td>
<td>Community Empowerment and Peace Building in Ituri</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>Chlorofluorocarbons</td>
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<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defence of the People <em>(Congrès national pour la défense du peuple,</em> a rebel group in eastern Congo)</td>
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<td>COMDEV</td>
<td>Integrated community development project <em>(Projet intégré de développement communautaire)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>COMREC</td>
<td>Community reconstruction development project, reintegration of ex-combatants and reduction of small arms <em>(Projet de reconstruction communautaire, réintégration des ex-combattants et réduction des armes légères)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CONADER</td>
<td>National Commission for disarming, demobilization and reintegration <em>(Commission nationale de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion)</em></td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Country Programme Document</td>
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<td>CTAD</td>
<td>Technical Support Unit for Decentralization <em>(Cellule technique d’appui à la décentralisation)</em></td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development of the United Kingdom</td>
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<td>DIM</td>
<td>Direct Implementation Modality</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>DSCR</td>
<td>Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper <em>(Document de stratégie de croissance et de réduction de la pauvreté)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Drug Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECGLC</td>
<td>Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENA</td>
<td>National School of Administration <em>(Ecole nationale d’administration)</em></td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo <em>(Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo)</em></td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda <em>(Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda)</em></td>
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<td>FPM</td>
<td>Microfinance Promotion Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFATM</td>
<td>Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria</td>
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<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC-I</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>National Statistics Institute <em>(Institut national des statistiques)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSSSS or 14S</td>
<td>International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy in the East of the DRC</td>
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<td>KFW</td>
<td><em>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</em> <em>(German Development Bank)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Decentralization and Regional Planning <em>(Ministère de la Décentralisation et de l’Aménagement du Territoire)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilization and Re-integration Programme</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFI</td>
<td>Microfinance Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRR</td>
<td>Rapid Response Mechanism <em>(Mécanisme de réponse rapide)</em></td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Implementation Modality</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD/DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development/Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHADA</td>
<td>Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa <em>(Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Project to Support Electoral Capacity <em>(Projet d’appui au cycle électoral)</em> <em>(successor of APEC)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PACTE</td>
<td>Joint support project for transformation in Equateur <em>(Projet d’appui conjoint pour la transformation en Equateur)</em></td>
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<td>PADC</td>
<td>Community Development Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PADDL</td>
<td>Decentralization and Local Development Programme <em>(Programme d’appui à la décentralisation et au développement local)</em></td>
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<td>PANA</td>
<td>National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change <em>(Programme d’action national d’adaptation aux changements climatiques)</em></td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Priority Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASMIF</td>
<td>Microfinance Sector Support Programme (Programme d’appui au secteur de la microfinance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peace Building Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Peace Consolidation Programme (Programme de consolidation de la paix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Pooled Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGAI</td>
<td>Aid and Investment Management Platform (Plateforme de gestion de l’aide et des investissements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Public Investment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNLT</td>
<td>National Programme Against Tuberculosis (Programme national de lutte contre la tuberculose)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNMLLS</td>
<td>National Multisectoral Programme Against AIDS (Programme national multisectoriel de lutte contre le SIDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSAR</td>
<td>Project for Security, Empowerment and Reintegration of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Resident Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SENAREC</td>
<td>National Office for Capacity Development (Secrétariat national pour le renforcement des capacités)</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<td>SMT</td>
<td>Security Management Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPEC</td>
<td>Electoral Process Security in Congo (Sécurisation du processus électoral au Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRFF</td>
<td>Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility in Eastern DRC</td>
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<td>SRPI</td>
<td>Support to Recovery and Peace Building</td>
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<td>SRSF</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAREC</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction plan for areas emerging from armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UADPL</td>
<td>Provincial and Local Development Support Unit (Unités d’appui au développement provincial et local)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE-PNDDR</td>
<td>Executive Unit of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-REDD</td>
<td>United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Staff Safety and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>United Nations System</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTFHS</td>
<td>UN Trust Fund for Human Security</td>
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<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between May and November 2011, the UNDP Evaluation Office carried out an Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This report presents the result of this assessment and covers interventions implemented between 2003 and 2011, i.e., during two programming cycles (2003-2007 and 2008-2012).

DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES

After Mobutu’s long dictatorship and two wars which devastated the country in the 1990s, the DRC engaged in 2003 on a transition which led to the organization in 2006 of the first democratic elections since 1960, and to the installation of a government, a national legislature and provincial assemblies resulting from the ballot.

Despite the progress registered against some macro-economic indicators, the Congolese continue to experience massive poverty. According to UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) 2011, the DRC is the poorest country in the world. This situation is worsened, particularly in the east of the country, by continued violence committed by armed groups whose aims have progressively become more economic than political. The main underlying causes of conflict are endemic poverty, competition for natural resources, land tenure issues and widespread lawlessness and impunity. These factors are present all over the country, which raises the threat of new explosions of violence including in provinces considered ‘stabilized’.

In light of these challenges, the main strategic documents dealing with the reconstruction and development of the country, in particular, the two successive Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (DSCR, for Document de stratégie de croissance et de réduction de la pauvreté), define the following priorities: a) promote good democratic governance, public finance reform and decentralization; b) consolidate peace and security via a national reconciliation process, demobilization of fighting groups, reform of the security sector and the fight against sexual violence; c) restore the transport infrastructure, improve the business climate and taxation environment, and diversify the economy; d) improve access to basic social services; e) fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; f) protect the environment and help fight climate change.

After a period of disengagement by the main donors in the 1990’s, the international community returned to the DRC, first to support the transition, and then to help the country in its endeavours to restore a state of law. In 2009, international aid represented close to USD 2.4 billion in total. International aid is characterized by a high priority given to humanitarian actions, macroeconomic stability, political and electoral governance, and security sector reforms. Because of this overall focus on humanitarian programmes, international assistance is majoritarily invested in the east of the country.

UNDP’S PROGRAMMES

The 2003–2007 crisis recovery period was marked by considerable increase in the volume of operations, rising from USD 27 million in 2004 to USD 212 million in 2005. Based on its good relations with the transitional government, UNDP was able to facilitate the return and renewed commitment of many financial partners. It assumed a leading role in the demobilization of ex-combatants, sometimes in extremely difficult conditions, thus making a significant contribution to peace and stability in the country. It also supported the transitional parliament in drafting the new constitution and election laws, and then
helped the Independent Electoral Commission and MONUC to register over 25 million voters and organize three elections within a year (referendum on the constitution, presidential and parliamentary elections). In a country as vast as the DRC, with a dearth of means of communication and transport and in areas often still affected by violence, organizing these three elections appeared a towering challenge. International observers agreed that the elections were democratic, despite isolated violent incidents.

In this operation, UNDP got praise for its management of two ‘basket funds’ created to support and secure the electoral process. Other basket funds followed, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), for which UNDP was selected as the principal recipient for the DRC in 2003, and the Humanitarian Pooled Fund (PF) created in 2005 to meet the humanitarian needs of the DRC, where UNDP manages NGO financing.

During this period, UNDP has been able to take risks and proved creative and flexible. Among the innovations introduced during that cycle, one can mention:

- The support for the whole electoral cycle (election law, registration of voters, support to the Independent Electoral Commission, logistics and security for the ballot, training of the newly elected officials), rather than just supporting a specific electoral event;

- The creation and management of multi-donor basket funds that contributed to improved coordination and rationalization of external support;

- The adoption of community-based approaches in areas such as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR);

- The deployment of a field presence using offices outside of Kinshasa, allowing UNDP to become more operational and closer to local authorities and beneficiaries;

- The extensive use of United Nations Volunteers to implement activities that required a rapid and flexible deployment of human resources; and

- The support to the preparation of a Country Assistance Framework (CAF), bringing together 17 international partners in 2006 to share their analysis of the situation and craft a common aid strategy.

The foundations underlying future interventions were also laid during this period. The CAF was a major source of inspiration for the UNDAF and UNDP programming for 2008-2012. The effective support in drafting the first DSCR, based on very broad participation by civil society, laid the foundations for national development strategies. A number of community rehabilitation and development projects started during this cycle and carried on after 2008. Finally, the National Forum on Decentralization held at the end of 2007, with strong support by UNDP, defined the conceptual approach in this field for the years to come.

The 2008-2012 cycle was marked by continuity and the necessity of a certain administrative ‘normalization’. UNDP opted for a ‘programme approach’ rather than a ‘project approach’, both with a view to rationalization and also under pressure from donors seeking greater consistency, in particular in the good governance area. Activities were grouped under two major programmes and their respective programme management units, i.e., the Governance Unit and the Poverty Unit. Activities previously managed by the Post-Conflict Unit were incorporated for the most part into the poverty programme, and the Post-Conflict Unit thereafter abolished. During this period marked by greater stability and signs of economic recovery, UNDP tended to rely on the successes and the main areas of intervention of the previous cycle, but continued to innovate successfully in a few domains, such as:

- Its support to the country’s negotiations at international conferences on climate
change and the ensuing access by the DRC to programmes to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD);

- Support to the Stabilization and Reconstruction plan (STAREC) for the eastern regions of the DRC and the design of a new Peace Consolidation Programme (PCP) for those provinces not covered by STAREC; and

- The effective support provided by UNDP to NGOs to help them access resources from the Pooled Fund and GFATM.

The 2008-2012 programme was very ambitious. During its formulation, some time after the elections in 2008, donors were displaying a willingness to phase out short-term emergency interventions and switch to long-term development assistance. UNDP formulated a programme to fight poverty and promote the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which totaled USD 311 million. However, funding hopes never materialized and at the end of 2010, only USD 58.2 million had been spent, i.e. less than 20 percent of the budget two years from the end of the cycle. The reasons for this gap are (i) overly optimistic planning; (ii) the relative lack of interest on the part of UNDP’s main donors in ambitious development actions in a context that is still seen as too precarious; (iii) a 25 percent reduction in UNDP’s own resources halfway through the cycle; and (iv) the effects of the global financial crisis on international aid. The governance programme was also cut, in part for the same reasons as the ones cited for poverty but also because of disagreements between UNDP and DFID, the main donor of the governance programme.

Over recent years, activities related to the management of the two major basket funds, i.e., the GFATM and the Humanitarian Pooled Fund, have come to represent 61 percent of total outlays, a percentage that raises the issue of the primary role of UNDP: service provider or sustainable development agent? Beside, the management of these basket funds, in which UNDP controls neither the planning nor the choice of partners and which pertain to domains that are at best ancillary to the organization’s mandate\(^1\), creates serious risks for UNDP’s image.

**RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS**

Some activities implemented by UNDP were particularly relevant and effective. In the area of support to good governance, one should mention: i) support to electoral cycles, as well as to the parliament and provincial assemblies; ii) support to the Court of Audit (Cour des Comptes) and control over public expenditures; iii) support to the PGAI (Plateforme de Gestion de l’Aide et des Investissements - a database of aid projects) and aid coordination; and iv) training of police and access to justice, including for victims of sexual violence.

With regard to the fight against poverty and support for the MDGs, UNDP worked on the most appropriate subjects or achieved the best results for: i) DDR and community recovery activities, which were generally successful; ii) the drafting of strategies, policies and national pro-poor documents, such as the DSCRPs, reports on the MDGs and national reports on human development, although the issue of how identified priorities translate into action remains a major challenge; iii) microfinance, an area where much remains to be done to improve sector regulations and allow access by the poor to savings and credit services; and iv) support in the field of climate change, an area that is still very recent but promising.

During the first cycle, the United Nations Country Team in the DRC had a very active gender thematic group and UNDP itself integrated this issue into many of its programmes.

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\(^1\) One could make the case that certain dimensions of the fight against AIDS are within the UNDP mandate, but this does not apply to the fight against malaria and tuberculosis.
For example, UNDP promoted the participation of women as voters or candidates, helped the Noyaux Pacifistes des Mamans en Ituri (women’s pacifist groups in Ituri) to promote peace in this district, and supported the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. However, gender does not seem to have been handled with as much energy during the second cycle. The recent outcome evaluation that covers the 2008-2011 period indicates ‘small areas of progress’, such as access to justice for victims of sexual violence, but also many missed opportunities and highlights a significant imbalance between sexes as well as an unequal consideration of male and female staff within the UNDP offices in the DRC.

There are also areas in which UNDP has achieved few concrete results, such as the Decentralization and Local Development Programme (PADDL), or support to the media and civil society under the governance programme. In theory, a more effective support to decentralization and strengthening local authorities and civil society organizations could have accelerated democratization and peace building. However, challenges blocking the decentralization process are of a political nature and, therefore, have to be sorted out by the Government.

With regard to the Pooled Fund, the country office did a remarkable job in strengthening the management skills of humanitarian NGOs. However, the three hundred or so humanitarian projects, often not exceeding six months, that UNDP oversees (but does not plan or implement) are considered as UNDP projects from an administrative point of view. The limited procedural flexibility granted so far by headquarters remains insufficient.

Under the GFATM, the role of UNDP is more substantive and its contribution to results more visible than in the PF. However, UNDP has recently seen its Round 8 HIV/AIDS programme performance downgraded to ‘C’, the lowest rate issued by the Fund, indicating ‘unacceptable’ performance. This downgrade, which seems to reflect a real degradation in UNDP’s performance as principal recipient, results from a number of factors: poor monitoring of subrecipients by UNDP’s Fund Management Unit which slows information flows; complex and changing operational structures in which national programmes were treated as ‘main subrecipients’ and where several principal recipients co-existed in the same round; and GFATM and UNDP procedures that do not adequately take into account the operational realities in the DRC (e.g., a uniform rate of reimbursement for transport costs irrespective of the actual distance from the medicine delivery point to the intervention site, leading to a lack of incentives to work far away from cities). Furthermore, the government institutions that should eventually take over the function of principal recipient from UNDP complained about what they perceive as a lack of interest from UNDP in preparing them effectively for their future role, resulting from what they see as a conflict of interest between, on the one hand, the need to prepare such a handover of GFATM management role to national institutions, and on the other hand, the desire to preserve the financial advantages inherent in managing these funds. This perception of a conflict of interest deeply eroded the trust that the concerned institutions placed in UNDP. The UNDP country office points to a clear build-up in the capacities of these institutions as evidence that some assistance was provided.

CAPACITY BUILDING AND NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

Capacity building is crucial in any post-conflict environment. It accounts for a significant portion of the organization’s expenditure. With the exception of support to NGOs and the Court of

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Audit, the ADR team noted that: these capacity building interventions only rarely resulted from a comprehensive diagnosis established jointly with the relevant units; they focused too narrowly on the training of a few individuals without looking at the operational constraints of the institutions employing them; they were often not coordinated with each other or with other players; they were not sustained long enough to have a lasting impact; and, too often, they were perceived by beneficiaries as opportunities for supplemental income. Furthermore, UNDP did not equip itself with the means to assess the results of its capacity building efforts.

The ADR team felt that the degree of national ownership for results – and therefore their sustainability – was rather limited for governmental units but better for community projects. Benefiting communities are most often contributing financially or providing labour to each intervention that concerns them, while the State repeatedly failed to allocate a budget and assign the personnel required to take over and operate a rehabilitated service. However, the support to the electoral process forms a significant exception, as the Government is expected to contribute more than 66 percent of its financing during the 2011 cycle.

**EFFICIENCY OF INTERVENTIONS**

The sudden increase in resources available in 2005 and 2006 required a rapid adaptation of the country office, with massive hiring, intensive use of United Nations Volunteers (UNV) and the creation of many ad hoc structures and units: a service centre, management units for the PF and GFATM, the NIM/DIM support unit, and an audit and management control unit. The organization was not quick enough to see the need for a ‘normalization’ of this situation and it was only in 2011, for example, that the service centre was fully integrated into the office structure.

In 2006, UNDP created seven field offices that were granted partial authority in order to allow the organization to be more operational and closer to local authorities and the end beneficiaries of interventions. These structures significantly contributed to sustaining UNDP’s credibility but they were expensive to operate. In February 2011, UNDP decided to significantly reduce this local presence. This decision was communicated to UNDP partners in September 2011 only. At the time of our visits in July 2011, provincial authorities had only heard rumours.

Despite the programme approach adopted for the 2008-2012 cycle, there is still a lack of coherence within the respective governance and poverty programmes and between these two areas of intervention. This is in part due to significant reductions in budgets, and, therefore, certain interventions which formed part of an overall coherent strategy had to be abandoned. Another factor was the country office institutional culture, which does not systematically promote coordination or a search for synergies among teams and between activities.

The successive programmes favoured a direct implementation modality (DIM) in light of the operational weakness of most national partners. In general, government partners complained about UNDP’s lack of transparency in managing funds and believed that the costs of expatriate staff and UNDP’s operating costs were not well known but probably excessive.

UNDP is seen in the DRC as a bureaucratic organization. The main problem at this level pertains to disbursements delays to implementing partners. Partnership and contractual issues should be taken very seriously because the programme involves numerous operational partners. Nevertheless, UNDP has built a good reputation for its management of trust funds and is considered by a number of donors as ‘inescapable’ when appointing a body to manage such funds.

The country office is well endowed in monitoring and evaluation personnel, but this potential is not always used judiciously. The evaluation function requires greater independence and should therefore not be placed under programme units.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: In planning for the next cycle, and considering a probable reduction in resources, UNDP must strive to reduce the number of sectors and subsectors of intervention, build upon the strongest elements of its former programmes to address the country’s most urgent needs and avoid redundancy with other stakeholders’ interventions. Its future interventions must be based on diagnoses jointly conducted with the authorities and all other stakeholders, and on a precise roadmap showing the complementary nature of their respective actions. Furthermore, these operations must be carefully contextualized to fit the political and operational environment of the country rather than based on standard, one-size-fits-all institutional arrangements, principles and approaches.

In concrete terms, and not precluding future developments and opportunities that could arise, the evaluation team suggests that:

a) In decentralization, the programme should be refocused on advocacy, stressing the absolute need for effective decentralization in a large and diverse country as the DRC and the need to rethink the modalities of decentralization in more pragmatic terms. Within this framework, UNDP can provide tools for analysis, assist in assessing the current situation, provide a space for dialogue between local, national and international stakeholders, and support the local elections, long postponed and currently planned for 2013. As for the PADDL, its staff and ambitions should be scaled down to account for the lack of local development funds. In the short term, the approach tested in Beni-Mbau, combining reconstruction and development planning by local authorities and implementation through UN agencies or NGOs, seems the most realistic to support local development.

b) In other components of good governance, the main focus should be placed on the following areas: (i) reinforcement of the Independent Election Commission and parliamentary institutions; (ii) support for the Court of Audit, including the provincial courts currently planned, (iii) support to aid coordination by strengthening the PGAI as well as the different thematic groups and other agreement forums where UNDP has a central role, such as the Joint Committee on Justice (Commission Mixte de la Justice); and (iv) training of police forces and improved access to justice, in priority for victims of sexual violence.

c) For the fight against poverty, the focus should be on the following areas: (i) support to STAREC and to the swift formulation of the future Peace Consolidation Programme (Programme de Consolidation de la Paix or PCP); (ii) support for the drafting of essential development policy and strategy documents, including the DSCR and MDGs progress monitoring, while ensuring that these policies and strategies are followed up and implemented; (iii) community development; (iv) the development of microfinance in deprived areas and for the most vulnerable populations, by linking up microfinance interventions with community development activities; and (v) climate change, where the challenge will be to implement effective field programmes that are environmentally friendly and socially responsible.

d) Anticipating a gradual drawdown of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), and in consultation with the United Nations Country Team and with the Government, preparations should be made to take over some of the functions currently under the responsibility of the MONUSCO, particularly in the areas of peace building and human security.

Recommendation 2: Building on its comparative advantages as government partner, leading UN agency and CAF member, UNDP must reposition itself as a facilitator of change by developing strong advocacy and national debates on complex issues crucial to the country’s
development. For example, and although there are many potential themes, the evaluation team suggests the following areas for reflection:

a) The role of land and land tenure in conflicts and development;

b) Pro-poor and eco-friendly economic growth;

c) Decentralization (refer to Recommendation 1a); and

d) Means to improve basic social services with the participation of citizens.

Recommendation 3: The next programme must identify clear, quantifiable objectives to move forward towards compliance with the principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, building upon the principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations, and keeping in mind that national ownership without national co-funding remains rather theoretical. Since immediately adopting a full national implementation of programmes would be impossible, interim solutions must be sought and a roadmap established, with milestones accepted by all parties. The following areas are suggested for reflection:

a) Sharing with the national counterpart body of all information on the use of resources, including personnel costs, operating costs for implementation units and to support UNDP, and administrative overhead fees paid to the organization out of the donors' contributions;

b) Establishing and progressively reinforcing a co-management approach intermediate between NIM and DIM, including for financial aspects;

c) For some of the projects, establishing a test phase for management by the Government, under close supervision by UNDP;

d) UNDP must acquire the means to evaluate more effectively the impact of its capacity building activities.

Recommendation 4: UNDP must redefine its approach to capacity building of national institutions on the basis of internationally recognized good practices and in close coordination with other international partners active in this field. The following areas are suggested for reflection:

a) UNDP must focus its capacity building efforts on a small number of key institutions wherein it can inject sufficient resources and commit over time in order to reach a lasting impact;

b) It must base its interventions on capacity assessments that take into account institutional dimensions (mandates, rules, budgets, etc.) as well as human resource aspects (payroll, individual skills, motivation, etc.), conducted jointly with the authorities and other stakeholders in order to ensure that its contribution is complementary to other interventions;

c) It must ensure that the relevant institutions participate financially in these improvement efforts or that the training participants are volunteers and solely motivated by an opportunity to learn and improve the performance of their institution;

Recommendation 5: The country office should implement its gender strategy and correct the imbalance between men and women among professional staff. It must, moreover, take concrete steps to mainstream gender in its programmes and identify specific projects with gender as an entry point. The following examples may be suggested:

a) The role of women in conflict resolution and mitigation, in microfinance and entrepreneurship, as well as in healthcare and the prevention of major pandemics;

b) The role and participation of women in elections and politics;
c) Interventions that promote access to justice by victims of sexual violence must also be strengthened while ensuring that the accused are judged within reasonable timeframes;

d) A national human development report on the roles of men and women in the Congolese society could be of use to clarify the gender issue in the DRC and identify areas of intervention by the State and its partners.

Recommendation 6: While recognizing that a reduction in field office staff is inevitable, the ADR team believes that this kind of decision cannot solely answer to immediate financial considerations, but must also take into account UNDP’s positioning as a privileged interlocutor for local authorities, its proximity to the poor it must serve in priority, as well as future financing opportunities, for example, those that should ultimately result from the REDD+ or PCP process. UNDP should try to keep the strongest possible field presence in order to protect one of the main assets inherited from prior phases. In particular:

a) To avoid sacrificing too much of its local presence, UNDP could make its Kinshasa office bear a greater part of the required budget cuts;

b) As currently envisaged, it is imperative to delegate true authority and broader powers to the Goma office to allow it to support the other offices in the eastern region;

c) UNDP must assume a leading role in planning for and implementing the future joint United Nations offices, and ensure a significant presence of its personnel in those offices once established;

Recommendation 7: The country office must strengthen its partnerships and improve its efficiency by working on its institutional culture, which is too bureaucratic and fragmented. In particular, management must focus on:

a) Continuing to promote joint interventions with other UN agencies and strengthen cooperation with agencies working on the field.

b) Promoting synergies within and between UNDP programmes, in particular on topics shared by the two programmes (for example, environment, sexual violence);

c) Continuing to promote access by national NGOs to ODA, through flexible and proactive support rather than through an approach essentially based on compliance with rules;

d) Defining coherent procedures, in particular to manage contracts with partners, and communicating these procedures clearly and transparently within the country office in Kinshasa and to field offices and partners;

e) Setting precise targets for the time UNDP takes to review reports and effect payments to implementing partners;

f) Promoting more regular and transparent communication between partners, joint reflection events with partners on the strengths and weaknesses of the interventions and, to the greatest extent possible, a collegial decision-making method involving all partners instead of leaving major decisions to the discretion of a donor or UNDP.

Recommendations 8: At both the headquarters and country level, UNDP must improve its basket fund management skills and, to this end, reconsider some of the issues related to the management of these funds:

a) With regard to the Pooled Fund, UNDP must decide whether it wants to keep this humanitarian window open, in which case it must make greater efforts to lighten its bureaucratic requirements so as to strengthen its ability to support emergency projects. This consideration relates in particular to the rate it charges for administrative overhead fees, which must remain as low as possible;
b) With regard to GFATM programmes, the UNDP Global Fund Unit must immediately increase its efforts to monitor sub-recipients and attempt to solve occasional inventory shortages. In parallel, headquarters must initiate negotiations with the Fund to simplify the operational set-up and adjust certain fiduciary, operational and bureaucratic requirements that do not fit the specific context of the DRC. Furthermore, UNDP must extricate itself from the conflict of interest related to its responsibility in preparing national bodies for their role of principal recipient, by proposing that a 'neutral' agency take on this role. If it fails to achieve these objectives, UNDP should announce its withdrawal from the role of principal recipient for the GFATM at the latest by the end of 2013, as other organizations seem to be interested in taking on this role.

Recommendation 9: The UNDP country office must reorganize its monitoring and evaluation (M&E) resources to provide for better synergy among M&E staff and greater independence of the evaluation function. In concrete terms, the evaluation team proposes that programme managers be held accountable for monitoring their programmes, and that a strong M&E Unit be created that reports to management and whose role would be: (i) to propose and implement an evaluation plan; (ii) to mandate and manage project and programme evaluations; (iii) to define and supervise the implementation of norms and standards for the monitoring function; and (iv) to centralize and summarize information from monitoring and evaluation and make them regularly available to management.
1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Following the approval of its 2010-2011 work plan by the UNDP Executive Board (decision 2010/15), the Evaluation Office conducted an Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The ADR has two objectives: (i) contribute to UNDP accountability to its Board and partners as well as institutional learning; and (ii) provide recommendations to the country office for the development of its future interventions.

The ADR was carried out between May and November 2011 and covered the period from 2003 to 2011, including the first years of the current cycle (2008-2012) and all of the previous cycle. Because of the greater availability of information and as a result of high staff turnover at both UNDP and its partner organizations, the ADR has prioritized existing programmes, while retaining some of the projects from the previous cycle that ended recently or are directly linked to ongoing interventions. Reliable financial information is only available starting in 2004, the year the Atlas management system was introduced.

The assessment analyses two fundamental dimensions: (i) the contribution of the programme to national development based on the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability; and (ii) UNDP strategic positioning and partnerships. The team did not restrict itself to examining results of project activities. It also looked at crosscutting areas such as gender as well as non-programmatic interventions such as advocacy, advisory support, communication and information. It only addressed internal management issues to the extent in which they may have affected the achievement of results.

The ADR analysed in detail the main activities of UNDP in the DRC to provide the most complete picture of the results achieved, but was not intended to provide specific recommendations to each intervention. In an informal manner, the team sometimes called the attention of the country office on technical or operational difficulties that seemed to deserve timely corrective action.

The ADR was carried out in parallel with an ‘outcome evaluation’ undertaken by the country office. This outcome evaluation only concerned the 2008-2012 cycle, and reviewed the totality of the outcomes identified in the country programme document. The two teams cooperated closely, sharing databases, documentation and meetings with partners in Kinshasa in May 2011. In addition, the governance expert participated in both assessments, highlighting the synergy between the two exercises. The ADR work was therefore facilitated by the outcome evaluation team’s draft report, which was available at the time when the ADR began its own fieldwork.

1.2 THE EVALUATION PROCESS

In December 2010, the Evaluation Office carried out a one-week mission to evaluate the feasibility of an ADR. In May 2011, the ADR team leader conducted a scoping mission to establish an initial inventory of UNDP activities in the DRC,

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3 See ADR terms of reference in Annex 1.
4 ADRs in other countries have often been hampered by the near total absence of results assessments.
a work methodology and programme. The team was formed in May and June and was composed of three independent consultants: Jups Kluyskens (governance), Didier Mumengi (poverty and development) and Carrol Faubert (team leader). Olivier Cossée of the Evaluation Office joined the team as an expert in community recovery. The main mission took place from 3 to 30 July 2011. A presentation of preliminary findings and recommendations to key government partners and donors was given on 28 July and was presented alongside the draft report on the outcome evaluation. On 14 November, a workshop was held in Kinshasa with the main programme stakeholders to collect further comments and remarks on the ADR report.

The draft report was submitted to the Evaluation Office and to an external reviewer, then to the country office and the UNDP Regional Office for Africa, and finally to the Government. This process assisted in correcting a number of factual errors. The independent team carefully examined each comment and either corrected the text or noted the most significant divergences of interpretation, citing the source.

1.3 METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Two documents guided the work of the assessment team: the ADR guidelines and the ADR methods manual. The contribution of UNDP was analysed against the expected outcomes listed in the country programme documents, the documents of the United Nations system and the national strategy documents, such as the two Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

In preparation for the main mission, the ADR team developed an analytical framework (Annex 2) that establishes criteria or indicators for the main assessment areas. This framework has served as a guide for research, interviews and field visits.

The methodology adopted for this evaluation is primarily based on a triangulation approach. The elements of this triangulation are:

- An analysis of the UNDP projects and programmes portfolio as well as strategy documents and previous assessments. A significant contribution was the report of the outcome evaluation team, which was available in draft form at the outset of the ADR’s main mission. The main documents consulted are listed in Annex 4.

- Semi-structured individual and group interviews with government partners at the central, provincial and local levels, donors, NGOs and other members of civil society in the DRC. The team also met with independent observers who are unrelated to UNDP. The team leader was also able to meet with UN and UNDP officials and with the Permanent Mission to the DRC in New York from 6 to 8 June 2011. A list of people consulted appears in Annex 3.

- Field visits that enabled direct observation of several achievements and interviews with beneficiaries. The team visited sample UNDP implementations near Bunia, Goma and Kisangani in the east of the country, in Lubumbashi in the south and Mbandaka in the west, thus covering four provinces and one district outside of Kinshasa. Given the large concentration of assistance activities in the east of the country, the team spent more time in the province of North Kivu and in the district of Ituri (10 days) than in the other localities visited (6 days).

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5 M. Victor Angelo, former Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone, Chad and the Central African Republic.
7 Evaluation Office document still in draft form.
As in all exercises of this nature, it was sometimes difficult to establish the cause-and-effect relationship between one UNDP intervention and the expected and observed results. Despite a considerable UNDP effort to identify the outcome indicators, the monitoring of these indicators remains low, and progress reports are most often based on the quantification of projects’ products, to the detriment of an impact analysis. The large number of actors in some areas and the absence of common monitoring and evaluation mechanisms make the task of attributing success or failure even more difficult.

Other factors have contributed to the difficulty of this assessment:

- The extraordinary size of the programme, with USD 1.2 billion in expenditures from 2004 to 2010, as well as its diversity and complexity, have complicated the evaluation team’s task of absorbing and providing an in-depth analysis of the mass of available information and documentation.

- Staff turnover often prevented the team from having direct access to certain important actors. However, it was possible to consult the main managers having worked in the UNDP country office, whether face-to-face, via phone or e-mail.

- In addition, statistics are often unreliable. Such is the case, for example, for poverty data, most of which is based on a “123” survey dating from 2004-2005.

- The allotted time did not allow desired coverage of certain aspects of the mandate, particularly the organizational aspects tied to the support received for headquarters and the UNDP Regional Bureau in Johannesburg.

- Logistical difficulties related to the country’s size, the challenges of internal travel and the security situation restricted the team’s access to some areas of the country. This gap was partially filled through interviews with many NGOs and civil society representatives who work in unsafe areas.

Finally, in comparing the two programming cycles, it is important to note that the interventions started in the first cycle had time to overcome their implementation problems and produce visible results, while those initiated in the second cycle are in the process of implementation. It follows that the first cycle interventions are better suited to an analysis of their effectiveness, that is to say, their capacity to contribute to development results, whereas the second cycle interventions are better suited to an analysis of efficiency, that is to say, the quality of implementation.

1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

This report is organized into six chapters. After this introductory chapter, the second chapter explores the major development challenges in the DRC and strategies to address them. A third chapter analyses UNDP responses and strategies to meet these challenges and a fourth addresses the specific UNDP contribution to development results. Chapter 5 analyses the strategic positioning of UNDP and Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of the evaluation team and formulates recommendations.
Chapter 2

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES

2.1 NATIONAL CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

Independent since 30 June 1960, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is located in Central Africa. It stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Lakes region and corresponds to most of the Congo River basin. One of the largest rainforests in the world lies in the north of the country. To the east is a mountainous area bordering the large East African rift. The south and centre of the country, areas of wooded savanna, form a mineral-rich plateau. The country extends over 2,345,000 square kilometres and has a population of approximately 66 million. Approximately 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas.

Despite its vast natural resources, the DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world. This is the direct result of the collapse of the State and the armed conflicts of the 1990s. These conflicts, which involved nine African states and thirty armed groups, led to millions of deaths and almost completely destroyed the national economy.

The country began to stabilize in 1999 with the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, followed by a peace agreement with Rwanda in 2002. On the political front, the Global and Inclusive Agreement of December 2002 provided for a transitional government that was established on 30 June 2003. The transitional government was headed by the President of the Republic and four vice-presidents, and was tasked to reconcile the nation and reunify the country, reinstate the authority of the State, integrate and restructure the army and organize democratic elections. These were held in 2006. In 2007, the first ballot-selected legislature, provincial assemblies and government were appointed. Another round of presidential and parliamentary elections was conducted in November 2011.

Some progress has been recorded at the macroeconomic level. Growth resumed in 2010 (6.1 percent compared to 2.8 percent in 2009) and inflationary pressures eased (9.62 percent at the end of the year compared to 54.3 percent at the end of 2009). In July 2010, the DRC reached the ‘completion point’ of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC-I), thus cancelling 90 percent of its external debt, estimated at approximately USD 13.8 billion. Several factors contributed to this achievement, including the completion of a new three-year IMF programme in December 2009, the implementation of some structural reforms and the preservation of macroeconomic stability during the first half of 2010.

Positive developments on macroeconomic indicators have not yet impacted on the well being of

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8 Hence its nickname, ‘government 1+4’. The leaders were Joseph Kabila, President of the Republic (PPRD); Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Vice President (PPRD); Azarias Ruberwa, Vice President (RCD); Jean-Pierre Bemba, Vice President (MLC); Arthur Z’ahidi Ngoma, civil society representative.

the vast majority of the population. As indicated in Table 1, per capita income decreased from USD 323 per year in 1960 to less than USD 100 in 2008, mainly due to the collapse of the mining and agricultural sectors following the Zaïrianization and the looting of 1991 and 1993. The current situation is characterized by a broken production system, in which the agricultural sector, consisting mainly of small peasant farms, and the various branches of the informal urban sector account for over 80 percent of total employment. In this context, transfers from the Congolese diaspora have contributed significantly to poverty alleviation, and Congolese households are growing increasingly dependent on these transfers. It is difficult to estimate total annual transfers, but it is reported that over 80 percent of households in major cities such as Kinshasa and Lubumbashi are largely living on such remittances.

The main indicators of human development (health, food, education, housing, drinking water, power, justice, etc.) remain well below the required minimum. Seventy-one percent of all Congolese live below the poverty line. Almost 73 percent of the population does not reach the minimum calorie requirements, when the sub-Saharan African average is only 33 percent (FAO, 2003). A third of all children under five suffered from chronic malnutrition in 2007. One in ten children under five was acutely malnourished, and one in five dies before reaching age five. The mortality rate for the general population is 2.2 per 1,000 people per month. This rate is 57 percent higher than the average for all sub-Saharan countries. The country’s human development index reflects this mass poverty. In 2010, it was 0.239, and the DRC ranked 168 of 169 countries listed.

The collapse of the health and school systems adds to the tragic character of such mass poverty. According to UNESCO statistics from 2010, the primary enrollment rate was 48.2 percent. Low household income drives the population to spend less on health while nearly 85 percent of income is spent on food. Therefore, 61 percent of households prefer to use traditional healers and self-medication rather than attend modern health facilities. The weakness of health coverage is a direct consequence of the disengagement of the Government vis-à-vis the health sector in the 1990s, the aging infrastructure and much of its destruction during the armed conflict. Health

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Table 1. Evolution of GDP Per Inhabitant, 1960-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP/inhabitant ($ constants year 2000)</th>
<th>Change since 1960 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


11 Throughout the course of 1974, ‘zaïrianization’ was one of the most destructive events to the Congolese economic fabric, namely through the expropriation of national or foreign-owned commercial property and land and subsequent free distribution to members of the MPR party-state. If this measure was officially intended as a nationalist impulse for economic independence to redistribute wealth acquired during colonization, it was in reality a plunder that benefited the political class.

12 According the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (draft PRSP dated May 2011), close to eight out of ten rural households live below the national poverty line, while less than seven in ten urban households are in this same situation. It must be noted, however, that this data is extrapolated from a 2004-2005 study that should be updated in 2012.


14 Compared to an average of 0.389 for all sub-Saharan Africa.

15 In the 2011 report, the Democratic Republic of the Congo ranked last according to the Human Development Index. The DRC is, therefore, currently considered the poorest country in the world.
district evaluations showed that only 26 percent of the population lives within five kilometres or less than an hour’s walk from an operational health centre.16

The chances of the DRC meeting the key MDGs by the 2015 target date are generally perceived as weak. The estimate in Table 2, drawn from the 2010 National MDG Progress Report, is even considered optimistic by some observers.

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index published by the NGO Transparency International, the DRC ranks 164th of 178 listed

16  Thematic note on health established in March 2011 during the preparations for the formulation of the second PRSP.
countries based on the perceived level of corruption. It is almost impossible to reduce poverty in an environment where corruption leads to structurally deficient governance, paralyses the State's ability to provide social services, affects private investment and accelerates the depletion of resources that could be used for development. Faced with this situation, many international aid actors rely on their own aid management and monitoring channels and favour private implementing agents, including national and international NGOs.

The human rights situation in the DRC remains a concern. Both the reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council and those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights describe repeated violations committed by rebel groups and national security forces alike. The High Commissioner for Human Rights notes that “the key challenges to be met in the area of human rights are as follows: arbitrary and illegal arrests and detentions; prison conditions, torture and ill-treatment in detention; sexual violence; violations of economic and social rights and exploitation of natural resources; the situation of journalists, human rights defenders, victims and witnesses; the administration of justice; and ending the impunity of Congolese security forces.”

In this context of widespread human insecurity, it is not surprising that unacceptable levels of violence persist. The combination of poverty, land conflicts and unregulated competition for natural resources increases inter-ethnic and inter-community tensions.

Since 2003, significant progress has been achieved, and there has been an increase in secure areas, such as Ituri. But significant needs persist in the East and in areas emerging from conflict, and the security situation remains fragile. The year 2010 was marked by violent inter-community conflicts, particularly in the Equateur Province. The conflict, which has since stabilized, broke out in October 2009, following an argument between the Monzaya and Enyele communities over access to fish ponds. It displaced close to 200,000 people outside the country’s borders. In the north of the country, 123 LRA attacks were recorded from March to September 2010. As a result of the LRA activities alone, 284,000 Congolese remain displaced within the country, and more than 23,500 others have found refuge in Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic. At the end of September 2010, the number of IDPs was estimated at more than 1.7 million throughout the country.

To the east of the country, from the Province Orientale to North Katanga, within a context of diluted state authority, rebellions are becoming less and less political and are now veritable private armies that pillage, massacre, rape and burn villages to chase populations from mining zones in order to exploit them. According to the UN, more than 200,000 women have been victims of sexual violence in DRC since 1998, and their attackers went unpunished.

This culture of violence and impunity hinders any development effort, but one does not need to
travel to the far end of the country to find areas of lawlessness. In Kinshasa itself, there are pockets of acute deprivation and insecurity.\textsuperscript{21} As soon as night falls, frightened and helpless neighbourhoods experience the extreme violence of armed banditry called the ‘Kuluna phenomenon’. This ‘phenomenon’ includes fierce clashes between rival gangs, residential burglaries, car thefts, physical and sexual violence against women, attacks on the street and drug abuse. Faced with these violent crimes, many Kinois have organized themselves into self-defence groups, and private security companies have proliferated.

### 2.2 THE DRC AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS

The size of the country, its geo-political situation on the African continent and its natural wealth, make the DRC a key actor on the regional scene. Beginning in 2004, President Kabila and his Government were able to rebuild a relationship with the former perpetrators of the war that ravaged the country in 1988 and 1999. The DRC restored full diplomatic relations with Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda in 2009.

The DRC is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and of the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC). The DRC is also the most vast and populated country in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The country is active in the environmental field and has been designated as president of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change for the 2009 Copenhagen and 2010 Cancun summits. In addition, the DRC is currently a member of the UNDP Executive Board.

### 2.3 ROLE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN AID

After the disengagement of the main donors during the final years of Mobutu’s regime and the two wars that ravaged the country until 1999, the international community re-engaged with the DRC, first to support the transition, and then to help the country restore the rule of law. Table 3 shows the financial size of this international contribution.

More than 40 percent of the state budget comes from external sources. Technical and financial partners fund much of the investment in priority sectors such as health, education and infrastructure. National and provincial planning activities are generally funded by foreign aid, contributing to the perception of weak national ownership of both the process and the documents produced. Greater diversification of the economy, improved administrative and economic governance, maximization of tax revenues and better control over planning and monitoring processes would help ensure an increasing national share of the investment budget, greater independence from foreign aid and a more sustainable development.

According to the Aid and Investment Management Platform (PGAI) of the Ministry of Planning, the principal donors in 2010 were the European Union, the World Bank Group, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, the African Development Bank, the United States, France and Germany. The country also maintains economic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,881</td>
<td>2,197</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>1,769</td>
<td>2,354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD-DCA

\textsuperscript{21} In 2010, some neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the capital were declared eligible for assistance from the Common Humanitarian Fund.
and commercial relations with a number of important partners including China, which has played an important role in recent years.\(^{22}\)

Aid is not distributed equally among the provinces, and responds more readily to conflict situations than to poverty, even when it is acute. A large part of international aid is dedicated to humanitarian needs and investment that prioritize post-conflict areas in the east of the country. For instance, the 2011 Humanitarian Action Plan\(^{23}\) requires more than USD 719 million to respond to urgent relief needs and promote access to basic social services by 7.5 million people. Nevertheless, the weight of humanitarian aid within international assistance is also a matter of perspective, as many of the Pooled Fund projects could be described as aiming for reconstruction or development.

2.4 **THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

Mass poverty, as described above, stems from the extreme weakness of the national economy. The collapse of the private sector began with the Zairianization and looting of 1991 and 1993. In 2010, the country was ranked 178th out of 183 for its business environment in the World Bank’s *Doing Business* report\(^{24}\), while neighbouring countries Rwanda and Zambia were tied at the 58th place. This position in the ranking is due to a complex and unstable administrative and regulatory framework, strong legal uncertainty, and a myriad of both formal and informal fees and charges levied on the private sector. Most private investors prefer trade to industry, seek short-term profits, maximize financial and land speculation and intensify capital flight. There are, however, several examples, especially in the mining sector in Katanga, that provide hope for greater private sector participation in social development efforts. The Government of the DRC has also shown interest in improving its business environment since 2008 with its application to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and by joining the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA).

The weakness of the Congolese private sector contrasts sharply with the development of the national civil society. The dynamism of civil society has its source in the paralysis of the State’s public services and the breakdown of international structural cooperation in 1991. Since then, civil society’s activities have been strengthened, diversified and go well beyond humanitarian efforts to include social and economic management of Congolese society: parent committees that bear the costs of schools in their community, production and processing cooperatives for agricultural produce, sewing workshops, human rights advocacy groups, support for people living with HIV/AIDS, etc. In this context, the number and size of Congolese NGOs is growing considerably, and their activities often substitute for the absence of the State. According to the PGAI\(^{25}\), international and local NGOs and churches executed more than 75 percent of all aid outlays in 2007 and 2008. For UNDP, as for many UN agencies, NGOs are key implementing partners.

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22 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Democratic Republic of the Congo*, March 2011, notes that China has played a more and more important and noticeable role in the economy of the DRC. Almost 50 percent of DRC exports are directed to China, and it is estimated that 80 percent of its mineral treatment facilities in Katanga are owned by Chinese companies.


24 The 2012 ranking shows slight improvement, as the DRC ranked 175th.

25 PGAI: Aid and Investment Management Platform (Ministry of Planning).
2.5 THE ROLE AND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE DRC

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has around 19,000 soldiers, 3,800 civilian staff and more than 600 United Nations Volunteers (UNV). It is currently the largest UN mission in the world. The UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) represent the most visible UN effort in the DRC. Relations between MONUC and the Government were particularly strained prior to the Security Council meeting in June 2010 in which the renewal of the mission’s mandate was discussed. In March 2010, the Congolese Government had actually asked for the complete withdrawal of MONUC by the end of 2011. In July 2010, MONUC began to evolve into MONUSCO with a more limited mandate. An agreement was reached that established a joint assessment of progress towards certain common goals to periodically evaluate the need for the continuation of the mission.

The MONUSCO mandate, recently renewed through June 2012 on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter26, focuses on the protection of civilian populations, as well as that of UN staff and facilities and humanitarian personnel. The mission also continues to play an important role in the field of human rights, strengthening the Government’s security capacity and technical and logistical support for the next elections.

Humanitarian action continues to account for the largest part of the United Nations system, around 70 percent of the total volume of activity according to various sources. Therefore, UN agencies are mostly concentrated in the east of the country, although efforts are being made to correct this geographical imbalance.

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Chapter 3

UNDP RESPONSE AND STRATEGIES

3.1 PROGRAMMING CYCLE AND FINANCIAL PROFILE

3.1.1 REVIEW OF STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS UNDERPINNING THE PROGRAMME

Programming instruments specific to UNDP, described later in this chapter, are based on a series of documents that seek to ‘frame’ all partner programmes that subscribe to three successive versions of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, a Country Assistance Framework (CAF) combined with United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and finally two local strategic documents: the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy in eastern DRC (ISSSS or I4S) and the Peace Consolidation Programme (PCP) under development.

National strategic documents

The Government and the World Bank prepared an initial, provisional PRSP relatively quickly in 2003, following their renewed cooperation. The first Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (known by its French acronym DSCRP I, for Document de stratégie de croissance et de réduction de la pauvreté I) was finalized in 2005 and covered the period 2006-2008. It was later extended to 2010 by way of two annual Priority Action Plans (PAP). The strategy was based on five pillars: (i) promoting good governance and consolidating peace through institution building; (ii) consolidating macroeconomic stability and growth; (iii) improving access to social services and reducing vulnerability; (iv) combating HIV/AIDS; and (v) supporting community-level dynamics.

The second DSCRP was developed in 2010-2011 for the period 2011-2015. When approved, it seeks to consolidate the achievements of the first and is based on the following pillars: (i) strengthening governance and peace and continuing the reform of public finances and the decentralization process; (ii) diversifying the economy, accelerating growth and promoting employment; (iii) improving access to basic social services and strengthening human capital; and (iv) protecting the environment and combating climate change. Therefore, the document includes for the first time a mention of the fight against climate change as a lever for poverty reduction, anticipating significant financial flows from ‘carbon credits’. The DSCRP II also integrates the conclusions of the 2008 Advocacy and Resource Mobilization for the MDGs document, confirming the inability of the DRC to meet MDG targets in 2015 and postponing the deadline until 2020.

The CAF and UNDAF

The development of the CAF marked an important turning point in coordinating international assistance to the DRC. This document, developed in 2006 and based on the DSCRP I and the initiative of the World Bank and the United Nations system, was a “deliberate effort of international partners to develop a new approach to support the transition in the DRC from conflict to peace and sustainable development”.

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For the first time, 17 international partners\textsuperscript{29} met to establish a common diagnosis, identify priorities for international assistance, harmonize approaches and adopt a framework of shared outcomes for the period 2007-2010.

The initial CAF process gave birth to the UNDAF 2008-2012. The CAF and UNDAF are based on the priorities of the DSCRP I, providing a detailed analysis of these challenges and priority intervention areas for each.

Initially, the United Nations System (UNS) in the DRC appears to have considered a UNDAF to be unnecessary and redundant to the CAF, in which the UNS was a stakeholder. The idea of the CAF was to create a single document that combined both strategic planning papers of the World Bank (Country Assistance Strategy or CAS) and of the United Nations system (UNDAF). It was finally decided, apparently at the insistence of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in New York, to develop an amended version of the CAF, including an attached series of results matrices specific to the UNS. This version of the CAF is called the CAF/UNDAF.

**Major national programmes**

During his inaugural speech following the 2006 presidential election, the President of the Republic Joseph Kabila announced five priority areas for his administration: infrastructure (roads, rails, bridges); job creation; education (reconstruction of schools and universities); water and electricity; and health. These projects are intended to be clear and concrete commitments to improving the daily lives of the Congolese. Without coming into conflict with the strategic documents described above, the ‘five projects’ (‘cinq chantiers’) do not explicitly refer to the CAF or the PRSP and include none of the political objectives of the DSCRP (good governance, decentralization, reconciliation, public finance reform, etc.). However, in February 2007, the National Assembly adopted a Government Programme and a Governance Contract for the period 2007-2011 which envisage: (i) security sector reforms; (ii) improving the business climate; (iii) strengthening public revenue collection; (iv) the transparent management of mineral resources; (v) public administration reforms; and (vi) prudent macroeconomic management.

In 2009, with the support of the international community, the Government launched the stabilization and reconstruction plan in areas emerging from armed conflict (STAREC) that seeks to promote a reconstruction and development approach in conjunction with the humanitarian approach and in consultation with provincial authorities. STAREC concerns the areas of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Tanganyika, Bas-Uélé, Haut-Uélé and Ituri. Parts of Equateur were also recently added. It incorporates older initiatives such as the Amani Programme, which only concerned the two Kivu. In parallel, the international community has defined a strategy to support STAREC, known as the ISSSS or I4S\textsuperscript{30}. The I4S provides a strategic framework with essentially the same players as the CAF plus MONUSCO. It also includes a multi-donor fund called SRFF\textsuperscript{31}, managed by the UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) office in New York that finances projects implemented by UN agencies in the five sectors of security, political dialogue, the restoration of state authority, the return, reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees and communities, and the fight against sexual violence.

Finally, to rebalance the geographic distribution of aid, the Government and its development

\textsuperscript{29} Participants included the World Bank, the United Nations system, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, as well bilateral cooperation agencies representing Germany, Belgium, Canada, China, Spain, the United States, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden.

\textsuperscript{30} International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy.

\textsuperscript{31} Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility in Eastern DRC.
partners, including UNDP, are working to develop a ‘Peace Consolidation Programme’ (PCP) as a counterpart to STAREC for the rest of the country. The effective role of the MONUSCO office in piloting the I4S and PCP initiatives, as well as UNDP support for the coordination efforts, should be noted.

### 3.1.2 UNDP PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORKS

The legal framework that establishes the basis for relations between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and UNDP is the Basic Agreement signed by both parties on 27 May 1976. Two basic documents approved by the UNDP Board cover two cycles pertinent to the ADR, a Country Cooperation Framework for 2003 to 2007 and a Country Programme Document for 2008 to 2012, accompanied for the latter by the Country Programme Action Plan signed between UNDP and the Government.


Reached by the Government and UNDP at the outset of the transition period, the CCF 2003-2005 defined three areas of intervention: (i) good governance, (ii) the fight against poverty, and (iii) crisis prevention and recovery. The programme framework, as originally formulated, is summarized in Table 4. However, total expenditures have greatly exceeded the initial budget projections, particularly in 2005, when UNDP was assigned two funds totaling approximately USD 340 million to support the electoral process.

This programme, originally planned for 2003-2005, was extended for another two years (2006 and 2007) and was adjusted a number of times. In particular, the support planned for the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises (SME), the development of an observatory for monitoring DSCRIP indicators and the strengthening of national crisis and disaster prevention capacity do not appear to have been implemented.

Some areas and activities were added, apparently to reflect new opportunities for action and funding, for example, the sustainable management of natural resources (biodiversity conservation, implementation of international conventions) with funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), or the fight against HIV/AIDS and other pandemics through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). During this cycle, UNDP has also begun to act as administrative agent for the Common Humanitarian Fund (‘Pooled Fund’ or PF).

In general, UNDP opted during this cycle for flexibility in its strategic programme orientation and application of implementation modalities, mainly done through discrete projects, almost always in direct implementation (DIM) or implemented by other UN agencies. The resources mobilized far surpassed the initial target: approximately USD 480 million compared to the anticipated USD 61.9 million, mainly due to the broad support programme for elections and trust funds.

**Country Programme Document (CPD) and Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2008-2012**

The UNDP vision established in the CPD 2008-2012 is to remain an active and dependable development partner for the Government and other stakeholders, working towards building peace and security through two priority intervention areas: the strengthening of good governance and poverty reduction. The CPD and the CPAP were developed from the CAF/UNDAF and the DSCRIP I, and seek the following eight major outcomes:

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**Table 4. Programmes 2003-2007:**
Programmes/Main Areas of Intervention and Expenditures, 2004-2007 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good governance support programmes</th>
<th>Expenditures (in thousands USD) **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main areas of intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gender mainstreaming and promotion of the Congolese women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development and strengthening of the transitional parliament and other transitional institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support for the electoral process and its security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support to public administration, planning and national management capacities</td>
<td>5,703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes against poverty</th>
<th>Expenditures (in thousands USD) **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main areas of intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community recovery (strengthening community dynamics, access to basic social services, promotion of income generating activities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sustainable management of environmental resources (biodiversity conservation, implementation of international conventions ratified by the DRC, access to clean energy in rural areas)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support for the multisectoral fight against HIV/AIDS and other pandemics</td>
<td>2,591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes for conflict prevention, peace building and post-conflict recovery</th>
<th>Expenditures (in thousands USD) **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main areas of intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community recovery and rehabilitation of people affected by war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Security sector reforms (DDR, reducing the circulation of small arms, integrating the army)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Peace building and conflict prevention</td>
<td>14,006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria</th>
<th>Expenditures (in thousands USD) **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management as principal recipient</td>
<td>4,546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common humanitarian funds (Pooled Fund)</th>
<th>Expenditures (in thousands USD) **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrator and Fund Manager</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Atlas management system was only introduced in 2004, data for 2003 are not available
** Excludes certain non-attributable expenditures and operating costs
Source: Country Office/Atlas, July 2011

**GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME**

1. Significantly reduce armed violence and assure effective protection of all citizens and their property by the State;
2. Increase citizen participation in the political process and the exercise of power;
3. Orient local public institutions, actions towards meeting the people’s needs; and
4. Make public administration more efficient and reliable to increase the efficiency, equality and transparency of public services.
Poverty Programme

5. Strengthen capacity for policy formulation for the MDGs;

6. Harmonize the response to HIV/AIDS and strengthen the national capacity for programme management;

7. Pacify communities and boost local economies; and

8. Strengthen national institutional capacity for environmental management and access to energy, especially for the poor.

The 2008-2012 CPD, written after the 2006 elections, accounted for the Government’s desire to reduce the last period’s focus on conflict prevention and find an end to the crisis. The Government took the view that it was no longer time for crisis management but for development, since the security situation was more or less stabilized. The 2008-2012 programme, therefore, has only two areas of intervention: governance and poverty. Activities funded under conflict and crisis prevention in the previous programme were divided between the two other areas, most of which falling within the new poverty programme.

The use of the programme approach was the other big difference with the previous programme. It was meant to ensure both synergies within the two programmes and consistency between them. However, most activities continued to follow a direct implementation modality (DIM) during this period, with very few managed according to a national implementation modality (NIM).

Largely supported by donors, the UNDP country programme in the DRC is the most important UNDP programme in Africa and the fourth globally. The total programme country budget for 2008-2012 is estimated at USD 635.5 million. During the second programming cycle, the trust fund management role grew until it reached 61 percent of expenditures for the Pooled Fund and Global Fund alone. Table 5 provides a glance of the main activities since 2008 and of the total expenditures for each of the main programme areas.

3.1.3 Programme Financing

During the first cycle (2003-2007), the UNDP programme in the DRC received USD 67 million from UNDP’s own regular funds, to which over USD 750 million was added from donors. For the second cycle, the CPAP expects resources to decline slightly, as detailed in Table 6.

Unfortunately, budgets have had to be revised downward twice, as UNDP cut 25 percent of its own resources mid-way through the programming cycle. Entire sections of the programme were affected by this reduction in regular resources, but

<p>| Table 5. Annual Expenditure by Programme, 2008-2010 (in thousands USD) |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Good Governance Support Programme</td>
<td>45,632</td>
<td>51,257</td>
<td>40,507</td>
<td>137,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Programme Against Poverty in Support of the MDGs</td>
<td>17,951</td>
<td>17,358</td>
<td>22,940</td>
<td>58,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Common Humanitarian Funds (Pooled Fund)</td>
<td>50,517</td>
<td>51,147</td>
<td>51,522</td>
<td>153,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Office Operations</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>3,170</td>
<td>3,470</td>
<td>7,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Costs*</td>
<td>6,678</td>
<td>14,599</td>
<td>2,814</td>
<td>24,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total year/period</td>
<td>188,713</td>
<td>186,454</td>
<td>165,918</td>
<td>541,085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes costs tied to programme management, crosscutting activities as well as other non-attributable costs
Source: Country Office/Atlas, July 2011
also by the withdrawal of some funding opportunities, most notably for governance.

As shown in Table 7, UNDP still has a large donor base, dominated by the United Kingdom (DFID) and trust funds managed by the organization. The table shows the contribution of the DRC Government to UNDP programmes. The table also illustrates the very significant reduction of resources in 2009 and 2010, a trend that may continue for years to come.

**Table 6. Resources Required by Practice Area (in USD millions), 2008-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice Area</th>
<th>Regular resources¹</th>
<th>Other resources²</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty reduction and MDGs</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic governance</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>333.2</td>
<td>358.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis prevention and recovery</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>123.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>539.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>635.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 TRAC resources 1, 2 & 3
2 Includes cost sharing, trust funds, GEF, UNAIDS and other resources.

**Table 7. Main Financial Partners, 2005-2010 (classified by value of total contribution, expressed in thousands USD)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>28,562</td>
<td>68,688</td>
<td>65,054</td>
<td>86,976</td>
<td>38,724</td>
<td>17,301</td>
<td>305,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFATM</td>
<td>38,766</td>
<td>25,762</td>
<td>29,875</td>
<td>69,055</td>
<td>53,738</td>
<td>48,572</td>
<td>265,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>116,687</td>
<td>92,020</td>
<td>3,284</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>215,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled Fund</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16,036</td>
<td>8,899</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>51,281</td>
<td>53,374</td>
<td>131,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>6,468</td>
<td>19,827</td>
<td>50,915</td>
<td>34,949</td>
<td>8,293</td>
<td>1,743</td>
<td>122,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,231</td>
<td>21,928</td>
<td>15,723</td>
<td>20,009</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>62,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9,702</td>
<td>7,629</td>
<td>2,601</td>
<td>2,616</td>
<td>3,946</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>26,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,349</td>
<td>6,359</td>
<td>4,503</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,118</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9,831</td>
<td>10,987</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>7,247</td>
<td>3,971</td>
<td>6,640</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>20,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7,765</td>
<td>7,318</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>2,219</td>
<td>17,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2,788</td>
<td>11,164</td>
<td>2,48</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>14,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12,458</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>13,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>1,603</td>
<td>1,624</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(others)</td>
<td>10,154</td>
<td>9,775</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td>18,589</td>
<td>10,644</td>
<td>16,472</td>
<td>75,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>243,567</strong></td>
<td><strong>295,589</strong></td>
<td><strong>205,589</strong></td>
<td><strong>256,713</strong></td>
<td><strong>174,232</strong></td>
<td><strong>144,373</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,320,062</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are slight differences in the totals due to the rounding of figures in thousands.
Two main factors explain this decline. The first relates to the international financial crisis and to severe budget cuts imposed by the government. The second is related to the country office’s poor management of its relations with its financial partners between 2008 and 2010. The general opinion is that these relations have improved recently, but an entire period was marked by a significant communication failure, a lack of transparency and by the poor quality of UNDP reports. The office has now adopted a more open communication strategy and proceeded to further diversify its donor base.

3.2 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF UNDP FIELD OFFICES

The management of UNDP programmes is now focused on two main ‘pillars’ corresponding to governance support and the fight against poverty. In addition, two large specialized units manage the large trust funds. The first is a GFATM programme unit and the second, a joint OCHA/UNDP unit, manages activities covered by the Pooled Fund.

In 2005, a number of specialized support units were created to manage the massive expansion in delivery. A ‘service centre’ was set up for the management of human resources and procurement, thus duplicating the existing units of the Operation Group in the country office traditional structure. Central units were also created for the Pooled Fund and the Global Funds, as well as a NIM/DIM unit33 whose essential functions were to ensure the certification of financial reports, to conduct internal audits and, when needed, to strengthen the capacity of the numerous programme partners and funds.

Headquarters commissioned several missions to review and streamline the management of parallel units that maintained a large expatriate staff and were, therefore, very expensive.34 This process was very slow, and it was not until mid-2011 that the last outstanding structures were abolished and the functions reintegrated into the traditional office structure.

The creation of seven field offices outside of Kinshasa was one of the important innovative measures35 instituted by UNDP for the period 2003-2007. During 2007 and the first half of 2008, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) assumed the running cost of these decentralized presences. Starting in mid-2008, five offices (North Kivu, South Kivu, Eastern Kasai, Equateur and Ituri) have been jointly funded by the governance and poverty units. The poverty programme covered the operating costs of the other two offices in the Katanga and Province Orientale.

While UNDP is often perceived as an organization primarily – if not exclusively – present in capital cities to provide support to centralized processes, these field offices have amply contributed to creating an image of UNDP in the DRC as a decentralized and operational organization engaged side by side with communities and with the new decentralized governments. Thanks to these offices, UNDP was able to adapt its activities to local realities and priorities. Some offices could provide support services to government and non-government partners with personnel seconded by the Pooled Fund, Global Funds and NIM/DIM central units. A delegation of authority for any transaction not exceeding USD 30,000 enabled these offices to respond quickly to the specific needs of the authorities and other partners. It should be noted, however, that this delegation of

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33 Refers to the national implementation modality (NIM) and direct implementation modality (DIM) of UNDP.
35 The model developed in the DRC has been replicated in several other countries and contributed to the development of a UNDP directive in 2009: “Guidance Note: Establishing a UNDP presence outside the Country Office”, October 2009.
authority remained limited, since any expenditure still required prior approval from the programme units in Kinshasa.

These benefits of field offices may be if not lost, at least weakened. In November 2010, following analyses showing that funding the field offices was becoming more and more difficult, the country office decided to change the status of the field offices by converting all but the one in Goma to simple ‘project offices’ or ‘outposts’, noticeably changing the profile and authority of the offices and significantly reducing staff. The proposed architecture is:

- A single field office in Goma with relatively high level of authority delegated to it;
- Project offices (in Mbandaka, Mbuji Mayi, Bunia, Kindu and Bukavu) where specific projects are implemented, with a representation role vis-à-vis local authorities;
- ‘Policy dialogue’ offices in Kisangani and Lubumbashi where significant programmes do not exist but where a modest UNDP presence is desirable;
- Support for the installation of area coordinators in Matadi, Mbandaka and Kananga, as part of a team effort to establish joint UN offices in certain provinces to prepare for the withdrawal of the MONUSCO and to move towards a ‘One UN’ approach.

The new system strengthens the Goma office, which becomes a real subdelegation, with its own budgets and a delegation of authority that the evaluation team hopes to see established at USD 100,000, and assumes the role of supporting other offices in the area. Unfortunately, this will exacerbate the imbalance in favour of the east of the country.

Where these field offices operated, UNDP served as a support unit to the governorates or line ministries on topics such as the transition from emergency to development, provincial participation in planning exercises (DSCRPs, Five-Year Plans, Priority Action Plans, etc.) or the strengthening of the Provincial Assemblies. This reorganization will reduce the visibility of UNDP in the field.

The considerations that led to UNDP’s modified role in the field are perceived differently by various actors. UNDP staff in these offices consider the decision to be based on a purely financial analysis, i.e., a simple comparison between the operational cost of the office and the volume of its programme activities, without considering other aspects related to the perception and image of UNDP and its ability to provide support and advice to the newly decentralized authorities and to engage in advocacy for development. UNDP management in Kinshasa asserts that all aspects have been taken into consideration, but recognizes that financial aspects weighed heavily in the decision.

The country office has managed its communication with partners and even with its own staff rather poorly on this important subject. It was slow to define and communicate its decisions on the new field office set-up, which allowed rumours to spread. It was not until September 2011 that UNDP officially informed its partners of a decision taken in February 2011, the end of a process that began in November 2010.

3.3 COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN UNDP AND THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Starting from 2005, the UN mission became an integrated mission, and the UNDP Resident Representative (RR) is now one of the two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), thus combining the functions of UNDP Resident Representative, UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, in addition to those of Deputy SRSG for MONUC. An integrated office was created to support these multiple functions, including the coordination of the development of stabilization strategies, peace
building and development, and harmonization with humanitarian action, as well as the monitoring of the key strategic documents.

As a result of the gradual reduction of MONUSCO’s presence in the country, UNDP will probably be called upon to play an important role in many areas under the responsibility of the current UN mission. As currently envisaged, this process focuses mainly on the establishment of joint United Nations offices with a pilot phase scheduled for three provinces.

As noted above, the UNDP RR has several functions, each of which demands a great deal of time and energy. In this context, the role of the UNDP Country Director becomes essential to the proper internal management of the organization and a large portion of relations with partner, within the overarching strategic directions defined under the responsibility of the RR.

The country team and MONUSCO continue to work to strengthen collaboration and integration at both the central and provincial level. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General attends country team meetings when the agenda is of common interest to the agencies and MONUSCO. On the programmatic level, several joint initiatives are planned for the country team and MONUSCO, namely for the implementation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction plan (STAREC), the formulation of the Peace Consolidation Programme (PCP), the implementation of the joint strategy to protect civilians, the extension of state authority and capacity building in civil society, reform of the justice sector, support for demobilization, reintegration of former combatants and support for the organization of elections.36

UN agencies and UNDP meet in the following key coordination structures:

- The meetings of the UN System Country Team, chaired by the Resident Coordinator, bring together 20 UN agencies and organizations. The country team provides leadership and oversight in the preparation and monitoring of common strategy frameworks such as the UNDAF. The same group is also responsible for the analysis of security issues and for making recommendations thereon to the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). The Country Director represents UNDP at these meetings. UNDP provides significant support for this coordination by managing UNDSS staff and in deploying staff to the Integrated Office of MONUSCO, as well as providing other common services.
- Fifteen thematic groups bring together donors, the United Nations, civil society and the Government to strengthen dialogue around national development priorities. While some thematic groups are at an advanced stage of discussion, others are inoperative.
- On the humanitarian side, coordination is essentially based on a cluster37 and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) approach. The HCT is the central forum for coordination. It operates under the authority of the Humanitarian Coordinator and is composed of representatives from humanitarian agencies including UNDP, representatives of international NGOs and funding partners. At the provincial level, inter-agency provincial committees and provincial clusters bring together stakeholders present in the field. Permanent consultation frameworks allow for the regular exchange of humanitarian, security and development information between the highest provincial authorities and the humanitarian and development organizations that work in a given province. OCHA38 leads these different structures on behalf of the Humanitarian Coordinator, supervises

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36 Letter from the Resident Coordinator to the Secretary-General – Annual Report 2010, 31 January 2011.
37 This term is used to designate a thematic or sectoral group.
38 UNOCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
the preparation of annual humanitarian programmes and assures monitoring activities. A common humanitarian fund was established in 2006, managed by UNDP (see section 4.3 of this report).

- A Security Management Team (SMT) facilitates information exchange about the security of UN staff and operations. This team is supported by a UNDSS unit.

In addition, UNDP carries out joint projects with several UN funds and programmes (see sections 4.2 and 5.5 of this report). UNDP also provides administrative support to joint UN system activities to ensure the management of several common services like security services and the Joint Medical Service. The UNDP offices also house the staff of several organizations, including the coordination of the United Nations Volunteers, OCHA offices and HABITAT, UNEP and UN Women projects.
Chapter 4

UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

To better adhere to the reality of the programme, the analysis in this chapter follows the current thematic framework of UNDP in the DRC: (i) support for good governance; (ii) fight against poverty and promotion of the MDGs; and (iii) basket fund management activities. This chapter also reviews UNDP activities in the context of joint United Nations projects. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency of interventions and programme management.

4.1 SUPPORT TO GOOD GOVERNANCE

Support to good governance occupies a central place in the two successive UNDP programmes between 2003 and 2012. During the first programming cycle, the governance programme dominated the portfolio: between 2004 and 2007, UNDP disbursed a total of USD 310,336,000 through its good governance projects, representing approximately 60 percent of total expenditures over the period. UNDP also used to lead international partners in most of the thematic groups on governance.

One can distinguish two periods in the good governance support programme. The first corresponds to the country’s transition between 2003 and late 2006 when the presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections were held, and the second period, to the installation of the new republic’s elected officials. UNDP provided support to the transitional institutions during the first period, while interventions focused more on strengthening the State in the second period.

During the transition and until 2007, UNDP focused on supporting the five citizen commissions for democracy emanating from the Global and Inclusive Agreement of December 2002 and provided assistance to the transitional parliament, especially in formulating the new constitution and electoral law. UNDP has played a central role, with MONUC, in organizing the various elections of the electoral cycle, its security and the strengthening of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI). It also contributed to the strengthening of the Supreme Court of Justice in addressing electoral disputes and provided support to the International Committee of Wise Men, a structure that significantly helped in calming the political situation through the establishment and maintenance of dialogue between the main political actors in office. The UNDP support helped to facilitate the first voter registration, the organization of a constitutional referendum as well as presidential, legislative and provincial elections in July and October 2006. In addition, UNDP has contributed to the development of a programme framework for the reform of public administration and the finalization of the General Civil Service Regulations.

During the programming cycle beginning in 2008, UNDP focused its efforts on five main components shown in Table 8. Many of the current activities of these components are a continuation of interventions started during the previous cycle. For the first three years of this new cycle, governance programme spending reached USD 137.4 million, approximately 25 percent of the total budgeted for the period. Proportionately, the volume of support for the good governance

39 The 2003 figures are not available; the Atlas information management system was introduced in 2004.
40 Comité International des Sages.
programme is less than during the 2003-2007 cycle, mainly because of the reduced need for support during the second electoral cycle since the Government assumed the logistical costs for the 2011 election. Two components accounted for approximately 76 percent of total expenditures between 2008 and 2010: judicial and security governance and political governance, the latter becoming even more significant in 2011 with the reactivation of the basket fund for the second electoral cycle and to support the new CENI.

While the good governance support programme received contributions from a large number of
donors during the 2003-2007 cycle, the second cycle saw a reduction of this broad base and the emergence of one key donor: the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID). UNDP earned a good reputation for basket fund management during the first electoral cycle. Based on this proven ability, the organization’s neutrality and its good relations with the Government, DFID decided to entrust UNDP with significant contributions to extend the good governance support programme in the DRC.

Nevertheless, many expectations of the good governance programme proved too optimistic: the decentralization and administrative reform process proved complex, difficult and slow, and projects with a significant portion of capacity building have produced few results. In certain areas, the risks were underestimated. This was the case, for example, with the local development funds initially planned through the project to support decentralization and local development (PADDL). Consequently, DFID suspended or redirected a portion of the expected contribution, seriously handicapping the entire programme and its internal coherence. UNDP has now undertaken the important task of diversifying its donor base for the good governance programme.

The following paragraphs review the main components of the 2008-2012 programme, also referring to corresponding activities from the previous cycle. Although managed by the governance unit of the country office, the interventions related to the ‘post-brassage’ project are discussed in the next section because of their natural link with DDR programmes.

4.1.1 ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE

Under this component, UNDP provides support for inter-ministerial cooperation, especially by promoting the development of a communication strategy for the Prime Minister, supporting his leadership role on the Steering Committee of the governance programme and strengthening the capacity of an inter-ministerial committee in charge of coordination. A second component supports public sector reform by identifying agents of the State, preparing a legal framework for the retirement of civil servants, supporting the establishment and operation of a National School of Administration (ENA) and the development and promotion of a code of conduct that promotes ethical and professional values in public administration. The third component addresses the fight against corruption, which has become a crosscutting theme for all interventions in the field of good governance. Many of these activities continue the work started under the Support for the National Emergency Capacity Building Programme (known by its French acronym, APNURC, 2001-2007), whose final evaluation indicated a significant discrepancy between the project objectives and tangible results of its activities.41

In terms of results, the preparation of a legal framework for public sector reforms is at an advanced stage, but many laws and regulations remain ineffective, including those relating to social security and pensions. The ENA has been created but still has little impact on the creation of a more efficient public service, given the weakness of the institution itself. UNDP is contributing to the creation of a capacity building plan to address these deficiencies. In 2008, when DFID was revising its programme cooperation with UNDP, the emphasis was placed on the fight against corruption, with support for the Court of Audits as a central element.

Support to the Court of Audits is particularly well targeted and seems to have yielded positive results (Box 1). This project provides a good example of complementary approaches between partners that carried out a joint analysis of needs and responses. The European Union and UNDP

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have partnered with the national counterpart to develop a common assessment and a training plan over the medium term. To date, UNDP has completed targeted training of 60 judges, reviewers and auditors from the current Court of Audits staff, while the European Union supported recruitment of 60 new magistrates to address the institution’s insufficient and aging staff. UNDP’s specific expertise is, therefore, used wisely and complements other interventions. However, the Court of Audits is handicapped by a lack of government funding, even for simple inputs such as fuel to power a generator that would allow officials and judges to work more efficiently.

Many interventions in the area of administrative governance have produced immediate results by instituting guidelines, procedures and systems that will eventually improve public services. Unfortunately, the Government is slow to adopt the necessary legislative framework and public offices remain weak and underpaid. These factors limit the real impact of interventions focused on legal and regulatory frameworks.

4.1.2 ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

The economic governance component that originated with the APNURC project during the first programming cycle is an important support mechanism, particularly for the Ministry of Planning through a National Secretariat for Capacity Building (know by its French acronym,}

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**Box 1. Court of Audits: A Model for Future UNDP Interventions in Capacity Building**

The mandate of the Court of Audits is based on the ordinance of 6 February 1987. Its mission is to review the general treasury and public accounts, to oversee and verify the management of accounts of public institutions and monitor reimbursements due to the State with respect to loans and loan guarantees. It submits reports to Parliament, which is responsible for ensuring follow-up.

Thus, the Court of Audits is the guarantor or ‘watchdog’ par excellence of good governance by the State. Its mandate provides it with general control over all State finances.42

Through its project to support transitional institutions (known by its French acronym, AIT) and Parliament (2004-2005), UNDP has provided limited support to the Commission for Ethics and the Fight Against Corruption (French Acronym: CELC). As early as 2005, a study43 noted the important role played by the Court of Audits in the management and monitoring of public finances. Starting in 2008, UNDP and DFID launched a project to promote ethical values and the fight against corruption (2008-2012), which included a component for support to the modernization and capacity building of key links in the accountability chain, with the Court of Audits at its core.

Following intensive consultations, the Government and active partners in public finance reform (including UNDP, DFID and the European Union) proceeded with a joint diagnosis and developed a strategic plan for finance reform in 2010 that now serves as a common framework for actors working in the field. Interventions are now based on this strategy.

Although the support programme for the Court of Audits experienced delays, the Court was able to publish all required reports in 2010. The Court of Audits reports are published in the Official Gazette and entered in the debate agenda of the National Assembly. These reports, therefore, feed the debates in Parliament, improving to a certain extent the capacity of elected official on issues of public finance management and reinforcing their ability to oversee the Government. Unfortunately, the Congolese justice system does not pursue cases highlighted in the Court of Audits’ reports to prosecute those who do not respect administrative and financial rules. In addition, many of these reports are not shared with members of Parliament for months after their publication, which undermines the role of the Court of Audits.

However, this example of intervention demonstrates that a well-targeted approach, based on national demand and built on a joint diagnosis and strategy by all partners, can be beneficial and should be replicated on a wider scale in other capacity development interventions.

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SENAREC). Capacity building focused primarily on the creation of economic and social strategies, the State’s budgets and the database on foreign aid.

An evaluation of the APNURC project notes that “of all the development partners, UNDP was alone in this initiative and deserved all of the credit, not only for paving the way for other partners but also for addressing sectors that are generally not included in its areas of activity, such as preparing the State budget [or] macro-economic policies.”

During the second cycle (2008-2012), UNDP has based its economic governance programme on these assets. The National Statistics Institute (NSI), for example, has continued to receive support for the development of its Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) database that must centralize the results of all socio-economic surveys from the past 10 years. Nevertheless, there is much to do to rebuild a national capacity to produce reliable statistics. In the Ministry of Planning, UNDP contributed to the establishment of a Public Investment Programme (PIP) that facilitates development and budgeting of multi-year plans by the national and provincial authorities. Support for the Aid and Investment Management Platform (PGAI) began in 2006 and is ongoing.

The PGAI seeks to improve the planning, monitoring and evaluation of foreign aid and its integration into the national budgeting process. However, the system is not yet fully operational, its data entry methods are laborious, reports are not available online and the data remain incomplete given the large number of aid agencies and the resistance of some of them to provide information. The PGAI also provides information to assist in the monitoring activities of the thematic groups. The PGAI is expected to develop at the provincial level and mobilize support from both MONUSCO and the private sector. Despite its weaknesses, some donors have begun to use the PGAI, and its services have also proved useful to the Government in the preparation of the 2010 and 2011 budgets. The coordination of aid, however, remains a chronic problem, which goes far beyond the PGAI (see section 5.5).

Although this activity was not included in the CPD 2008-2012, a support mechanism to improve the business environment was incorporated into the CPAP. The mid-term evaluation of the governance programme claimed that this component was a late addition, unrelated to other aspects of the economic governance component or to the rest of the governance programme and did not respond to national demand. Independently from the UNDP project, a National Steering Committee was created in 2009 by prime ministerial decree to improve the business climate and seemed to yield positive results. In the absence of specific funding and considering the relevant role assumed by the World Bank and the EU delegation on the issue of business environment, UNDP terminated the activity, a decision that seems appropriate.

UNDP interventions in the field of economic governance have had mixed results. Support for the development of the PIP was particularly useful, and the PGAI has the potential to be a very effective tool for coordinating external assistance. However, it should be noted that in spite of the DRC’s adhering to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (2009), as well as to the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (OECD-2007),

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45 The PGAI received funding from France, the European Community, Belgium, the ADB and the World Bank in addition to UNDP funds.


the Government has not shown much leadership so far in coordinating and effectively managing external aid.

During the transition period, UNDP played a leading role in the area of economic governance. Many other external actors – also equipped with the necessary expertise but with more financial resources – are now involved, and the added value of UNDP in this area is becoming less and less obvious.

### 4.1.3 POLITICAL GOVERNANCE AND ELECTIONS

The most important contribution of UNDP to the development of the DRC remains its support for electoral cycles, in close cooperation with MONUC and then MONUSCO. This role was particularly important during the first election cycle in 2005 and 2006, which the international community had to support at arm's length and many observers saw as doomed to fail. In a country four times larger than France and nearly a quarter of the size of the United States or China, with a near total absence of road infrastructure and in often highly insecure areas, the integrated unit formed by the nascent Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), UNDP and MONUC was able to achieve a feat that proved to be one of the most significant contributions to the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in the DRC. The joint MONUC and UNDP support has focused on organizing voter registration, support for three successive elections, securing the electoral process and strengthening the CEI.

In 2005, more than 25 million voters were registered out of an estimated total of 28 million eligible people. The voting card served as a temporary identity card and for most Congolese, became the only identification they had. In December of that year, the Constitutional referendum was organized, with the participation of 62 percent of registered voters. The elections of July 2006 focused on the first presidential and legislative rounds, with 71 percent participation. In October of that year, the second round of presidential elections was held with 65 percent participation. Despite some problems during those elections, observers from the Southern African Development Community and the European Parliament agreed that the process was democratic, except for isolated acts of violence.

Financial support for the electoral process came from two large basket funds managed by UNDP, the common electoral fund that financed support for the election itself (APEC) and the common fund for securing the electoral process (SPEC project). The basket funds were indispensable tools for the implementation of such vast and complex projects. They contributed to ensuring the mobilization of significant resources (USD 277 million for APEC and USD 58.6 million for SPEC) while assuring good coordination and coherence of multi-donor interventions. The Government itself contributed to these basket funds with up to 10 percent of the total for APEC and 6 percent for SPEC. UNDP, despite being criticized for its administrative delays and red tape, proved to be an efficient manager of these large basket funds. The country office was able to gain a reputation for competence, neutrality and good rapport with the authorities, which has raised UNDP appeal among donors seeking to designate managers for shared resources.

A 2007 evaluation summarized the merits of the APEC project: “The institutional arrangements set up by APEC involved several bilateral and multilateral partners in a common search for solutions and financial resources. This collegial management succeeded due to a common vision and high-level exchanges between the actors. It enabled the CEI to benefit, under the circumstances, from the best levels of harmonization, efficiency and coherence in the interventions.”

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The SPEC project, meanwhile, sought to enable police officers with special training to ensure both orderly voter registration and elections and to secure the CEI agents and voters. The project was able to train approximately 54,000 police officers with technical support from MONUC, South Africa, France and Angola. However, a 2007 evaluation notes a number of weaknesses, particularly in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the timely payment of police bonuses.49

The Project to Support the Electoral Cycle (PACE) succeeded APEC in 2007. It was revisited and updated in 2011 to respond to demands in the preparation and implementation of the second electoral cycle in a different political context, while taking into account both the postponement of the local elections originally scheduled during the first election cycle, changes made to the presidential ballot and the decision to proceed with a second complete registration of voters. The main objective of the PACE project is no longer only to support the organization of elections but to contribute to capacity building in the CENI50 so that it may conduct future elections with the least amount of international assistance. UNDP management of a new basket fund, which was essential to the success of APEC, remains an element of the PACE project.

The Government contributed up to 66 percent of the necessary resources for the project, emphasizing its determination to achieve ownership. International support provided for PACE is, therefore, more limited than during the first electoral cycle, and the CENI’s role as a true project manager increased.

The project, however, has faced a number of challenges: the introduction of a new database created logistical problems and delays, and staff recruitment was slower than anticipated. Particularly important to note was the tragic MONUSCO airplane accident of 4 April 2011 in which several staff members from CENI, the electoral division of MONUSCO and UNDP lost their lives.

Donors frequently mention management issues in the PACE project, and one even demanded reimbursement, citing UNDP tardiness in requesting an extension to the statutory implementation period.

Beyond the elections, UNDP also provided efficient and notable support to both the transitional Parliament and the one issued from legislative elections in 2006, as well as to certain provincial assemblies. This support consisted of strengthening the capacities of elected officials and administrative staff through training, the provision of computer equipment and furniture, the facilitation of exchanges with other parliaments, study tours and various training, as well as support to the Parliament’s standing commissions and the study offices of the provincial assemblies for the review of laws and edicts. Resources were inadequate to respond to the many expectations of elected officials and members of the various commissions supported by UNDP. Nevertheless, it is generally recognized that Parliament has become more efficient, as it has adapted more and more laws and increasingly assuming its oversight role vis-à-vis the Government.

UNDP has demonstrated better results for support provided to the National Assembly in the formulation of several essential laws on nationality, referendums and elections, as well as legislative work on decentralization and edicts adopted by the provincial assemblies.

UNDP launched a support programme during the first cycle to assist the efforts of political parties to adopt internal democratic principles and practices. More than 400 political parties are registered with the Ministry of the Interior and Security, many of which represent very small

50 The CENI or Independent National Electoral Commission succeeded the CEI in 2010.
constituencies and have no visibility outside of elections. In agreement with the Ministry of the Interior, UNDP has chosen to focus its main efforts on 15 or so parties that have representation in the National Assembly, as well a few extra-parliamentary parties that have a strong popular base. In 2009, UNDP estimated that it had strengthened the capacity of more than 18,000 political party activists in the programme’s six intervention provinces (Kinshasa, Equateur, North Kivu, Katanga, Bas Congo, Bandundu). In its second phase, the project focused its efforts on decentralization and on the roles and capacities of leaders and activists. According to available evaluation reports51, the project helped to popularize the ‘code of conduct for political parties’52 and has positively affected the attitude of trained candidates participating in the 2006 elections in terms of allowing opposition, accepting results and/or challenging them through the appropriate mechanisms for electoral disputes. It also contributed to the production of annual financial reports based on a framework developed with the Ministry of the Interior and Security. Since then, the programme has been greatly reduced due to lack of funding. To the extent that there are others who have been or are interested in supporting political parties, such as the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, which resumed its activities in 2011, the Electoral Institute for Southern Africa and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, UNDP’s role in supporting political parties has become more marginal.

One aspect of political governance involved the promotion of citizen, civil society and media participation. Activities in this area have remained very modest despite the efforts of the country office to develop an ambitious programme (Box 2).

Overall, however, the interventions under the political governance component have been relevant, within a strategy of stability and reconciliation through the organization of democratic and secure elections. Support for transitional institutions produced particularly fruitful results during a period in which the new authorities had very little means. Of particular note is the aid provided to the establishment and operation of Parliament and certain Provincial Assemblies and to the CEI. However, the strength of UNDP’s engagement declined during the first years of the PACE project, partially due to the political uncertainties surrounding the rules for the next election cycle, the cancellation of local elections in 2009, the transition of the CEI to the CENI and the delayed approval of the new electoral law. Efforts to strengthen the capacity of CENI should be increased and structured to enable the commission to assume a fuller role in future elections cycles.

National and international actors perceived the 2006 DRC elections as a crisis-exit strategy, a step towards normalization of the political, security and humanitarian situation that was to return peace and install a functioning government that could finally address the country’s numerous problems. The results in all of these areas were significant but did not meet expectations. Peace still has to return to all areas of the country, even if there has been progress. A legitimate state has been restored, demonstrating a greater capacity for action than the ‘Government 1+4’ and decreased dependency on the international community. Development programmes have been defined and are beginning to be implemented. The Parliament has sometimes stepped in to oversee the Government, for example, in the review of mining contracts and the bilateral cooperation agreement with China. Nevertheless,


52 Text developed by political parties with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the Electoral Institute for Southern Africa (EISA).
many Congolese political observers believe that the democratic space shrank during the preparations for the 2011 elections, with threats to freedom of the press, for example, and the decreased involvement of civil society in the 2011 elections. The facts that local elections planned for around 2008 could not be held and that decentralization has been completed stalled ever since (see next section) do not inspire optimism. Whether out of realism or resignation, the 2011 elections seem to raise fewer expectations than those held in 2006.

4.1.4 DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Within the framework of a unitary State, the Constitution of the Third Republic, adopted by referendum in December 2005 and entered into force in February 2006, opted for a high level of decentralization, perceived by many as a sine qua non for deepening democracy in a country as vast as the DRC. In reality, however, concrete decentralization measures are slow to materialize. The introduction of 26 new autonomous provinces under the constitution instead of the 11 provinces currently existing constitutes a particularly difficult and controversial aspect of this process, as well as the questions related to fiscal decentralization.

During the 2003–2007 period, UNDP had already provided support to decentralized structures such as the Provincial Assemblies and had encouraged the formation of local project management committees through its community development interventions like the community recovery (COMREC) project.

UNDP contributed significant support to National Forum on Decentralization held from 3 to 5 October 2007. The forum stressed the need for early adoption of a legislative framework, firm political will, transparent and viable funding and a greater effort to strengthen the capacities of local officials. The forum identified concrete priority actions that the Government should take and noted the commitments of development partners.

UNDP has also placed eight UNV within selected MONUSCO field offices (Bandundu, Bas Congo, ...

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53 Apparently, it would be too costly to have 26 provinces as originally planned, and the equalization formula provided in the Constitution for the distribution of tax revenues among provinces is not viable for some provinces. See World Bank, European Commission, Belgian Cooperation and UNDP, "Study on Province Delimitation," Report No. S067S-ZR, May 2010.
Kindu, Dungu, Gemena, Bandaka, Kalemie) to popularize the existing texts on decentralization.

In 2008, DFID, UNDP and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) combined efforts to launch a support programme for decentralization and community development (PADDL), covering the 2008-2012 period. The concept of the project was based on the ‘local development fund’ model developed by UNCDF, which essentially consists of technical and budgetary support for local authorities to help them plan and deliver social services and infrastructure; and thus pilot a decentralization experiment in order to inform the development of national decentralization policies. The project was centred on two components:

- At the central level, support concerns the Ministry of Decentralization and Land Use Planning (MDAT), particularly through a Technical Support Unit for Decentralization (known by its French acronym, CTAD), the Parliamentary Commissions responsible for analysing laws on decentralization and selected technical ministries (Planning, Public Administration, Budget);
- At the provincial level (North Kivu, Eastern Kasai and Equateur), Support Units for Local and Provincial Development (know by their French acronym, UADPL) have been set up. These UADPL, which also have branches in some territories, execute their field missions in collaboration with the decentralized and deconcentrated administrations at the local and provincial levels, as well as with civil society and the private sector.

The original PADDL budget was USD 88 million, and pledges totaled USD 71.8 million (USD 62.1 million from DFID, USD 7.7 million from UNDP/TRAC and USD 2 million from the UNCDF). Of this, a USD 45 million Local Development Fund (LDF) was to finance infrastructure and other concrete projects planned by the local authorities in the above-mentioned project locales.

But as most observers recognized, including within the Government, the decentralization process has now broken down, notably due to the delayed adoption of a legislative framework and to the transfer of resources from the central Government to the provinces being currently blocked. In addition, the project initially underestimated the operational and fiduciary risks of a direct transfer of resources towards local administrations that are still underprepared and ill-equipped to ensure proper management. This issue has raised the concern of DFID, the main project donor. A 2009 study on the topic concluded that the fiduciary risk was significant54. UNDP, UNCDF and DFID were not successful in agreeing upon the modus operandi and the size of the project, which consequently experienced significant delays and drastic budget cuts. DFID reduced its planned contribution to USD 24 million and UNDP to USD 750,000. UNDP and UNCDF developed a new project document for the 2011-2014 period for a total budget of USD 25 million that included several modifications to the functioning of the LDF. This new formulation of the project was not approved, since the main donor had decided to withdraw funding from the LDF.

Meanwhile, for the 2008-2010 period, the project reported expenditures totaling USD 13.3 million, primarily related to the costs of establishing the national unit to support decentralization and support teams at the provincial level, the development of a legal framework (six laws enacted of 14 expected), and support for the development of local planning tools and documents. A small number of concrete realizations were financed through a priority investment programme and are currently executed through direct implementation. The project set out to build public financial management capacity of the

provincial governments, territories and chiefdoms concerned. However, the development plans and local development committees that were created remain more often than not without financing, feeding the beneficiaries’ frustration.

Mistakes were made by all sides. The lack of a strong political will to promote true decentralization severely hampered the project. UNCDF sought to promote in the DRC a model developed for more stable countries with less fiduciary risk (even if they are equally poor). The UNDP governance unit should not have built such a heavy structure to manage a project whose main element, the LDF, was still in limbo. The donor could have also expressed its doubts about the LDF more clearly and sooner.

In the absence of funding for the LDF, the evaluation team believes that an approach that combines a) reconstruction and development planning by local authorities, and b) a non-governmental implementation process through United Nations agencies or NGOs, is now the most realistic means of financing local development, at least in the short term. This approach, not unlike that of STAREC but with a more assertive role for local authorities, has already been used by the PADDL project in the Béni-Mbau Sector and the Bwisha Chiefdom (North Kivu) as well as in the Elanga territory (Equateur) in 2010: round tables brought together several ‘donors’ (mainly NGOs) around development plans prepared by local authorities. The attending NGOs expressed interest in the possibility of selecting micro-projects validated by local authorities and recorded in their development plans. The minutes of the Beni-Mbau round table mentions pledges for over a million dollars, and about USD 350,000 were pledged at the Bishwa round table. These promising results stress the need to mobilize resources more flexibly than through the LDF alone.

4.1.5 JUDICIAL AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE

At the end of 2003, seven donors decided to conduct an audit of the justice sector, followed by the development of a joint programme for sector reform and established a joint commission with the authorities. UNDP supported this effort by establishing a National Technical Secretariat to assist the commission. In addition, a Joint Monitoring Committee was established under the joint chairmanship of the Ministry of Justice and the European Union. The UNDP programme for the reform of the justice sector included interventions to strengthen the capacities of legal and paralegal personnel, combat corruption and impunity and ensure the protection of human rights.

Between 2006 and 2008, UNDP extended support to rule of law, in an endeavour linked to a number of other international initiatives, particularly those of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), France and the NGO Lawyers Without Borders. According to an evaluation, however, “little progress has been made during the transition in the fight against impunity. Sexual violence and forced labour persist throughout the DRC, especially in the areas underserved by the legal authorities.”55 It is particularly difficult if not impossible to investigate mass rapes committed in areas that are unstable or where rebel groups operate.

The human and financial resources allocated to the judicial system remain small. In 2004, for example, only 4 percent of the national budget was allocated to the justice sector.56 In this context, it is not surprising to note that there is only an average of one judge per 25,000 inhabitants in the country, even though this average must be viewed in light of a significant imbalance that favours the large urban centres. In the second programming cycle, UNDP, therefore, focused on

training new judges. This training was completed, but it remains difficult to attract judges towards rural zones and many are drawn to the private sector due to the low and often unpaid wages in the public service.

A joint project of the National Police, MONUSCO, UNDP and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) supported refresher training for 2,100 police officers deployed in four provinces in the east of the country, and training for more than 600 recruits from armed groups. The project supports two training centres, one in North Kivu and the other in the Province Orientale. In addition to the functions of law enforcement, the training covers human rights, gender and protection of minors as well as HIV/AIDS prevention. It is expected that these police officers will be able to effectively secure the next elections. Besides, a pilot project in community policing in the cities of Kinshasa, Bunia and Goma was recently developed and received BCPR funding. Its implementation will enable the creation of Local Security Councils that will bring together the National Police, political-administrative authorities and civil society to develop and implement local security plans.

A strategy to combat sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) was adopted in the DRC and is accompanied by an action plan to prevent such violence, to end impunity and provide assistance to victims. These interventions focus especially on the eastern zone of the country, where the most flagrant and publicized abuses occur. UNDP plays a key role in fighting impunity through its Access to Justice programme. This programme is promising because of its comprehensive approach, covering both the capacities of the police and criminal justice systems, the strengthening of local NGOs involved in SGBV programmes, monitoring of the criminal process and the development of documentation on the procedures to access justice for the victims.

These efforts should nevertheless be intensified, particularly the monitoring of cases brought to justice. In certain areas, many people accused of rape were charged and incarcerated but have not yet been tried in court, which has led to serious overcrowding in the prison system. As long as a verdict is not issued in a case, the plaintiff cannot receive any financial compensation. Consequently, according to a number of observers, delays in the processing of cases lead many plaintiffs and their families to become disillusioned with the judicial system and consequently prefer to seek compensation through amicable agreement.

In 2003, UNDP launched a programme to control small arms and light weapons (SALW), but a 2005 evaluation concluded that although relevant, the intervention demonstrated weaknesses in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency, and its results were mixed.57 UNDP continued its SALW programme. It remains challenging but has led to progress, especially with regard to the adoption of a legal framework in Parliament, the distribution of a code of conduct to armed forces personnel (FARDC) and the approval of a national action plan to monitor and manage SALW. In four communities of Ituri, civilians officially initiated a SALW collection and destruction operation. However, several other areas are not yet secured. Often, civilians feel reluctant to part with weapons that they consider essential for their own safety.

In general, the judicial and security governance support component proved relevant even if the expected results in increased stability and citizen security have not yet been achieved. UNDP interventions to support justice also appear scattered, and many other actors are present in this area. UNDP has, however, been able to develop comparative advantages in the areas of access to justice and police training. A greater effort is necessary to properly coordinate the interventions of the various actors, especially within the Joint Justice Commission, which according to

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the Ministry and some donors does not function well. In addition, capacity development activities for the judicial staff are often ineffective when the Government does not pay the salaries of judges, who might therefore be tempted to monetize their services.

### 4.2 Poverty Reduction and Promotion of MDGs

For the 2008-2010 period, the programmes implemented within the framework of the fight against poverty and promotion of the MDGs represent slightly less than 11 percent of total UNDP spending, or approximately 25 percent if one excludes Pooled Fund and Global Fund expenditures.\(^58\) During the previous period, this percentage was only 6.2 percent.\(^59\) These figures illustrate the international community and donor prioritization of humanitarian activities, macro-economic stabilization, political and electoral governance and the reform of the security sector. In this context, UNDP has not been able to mobilize the resources identified as necessary for the implementation of its plans.

Table 9 shows the various components of the poverty programme and their expenditures between 2008 and 2010. The current programme has carried on the main activities implemented during the 2003-2007 cycle, and integrated most of the activities for which the now-defunct Post-Conflict Unit was responsible.

During the first programming cycle (2003-2007), the interventions in the poverty programme included mainly:

- Community recovery projects providing better access to basic social services and supporting income-generating activities, such as the project to support farmer organizations in Bandundu, Bas Congo and Kinshasa called ‘2BEK’, the Integrated Community Development and Local Governance Project (known by its French acronym, COMDEV) that aimed to consolidate peace in the Orientale, North and South Kivu Provinces, or the Community Development Support Programme (known by its French acronym, PADC) in the provinces of Katanga and Maniema. These projects were all implemented by UNOPS except for the FAO-implemented PADC.

- The rehabilitation of the Kisangani-Ubundu road, implemented by UNOPS.

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58 The rationale for excluding GF and PF expenditures from this ratio is that they are considered extraneous to traditional UNDP activities.

59 However, it should be considered that some 15 to 20 percent of the activities implemented by the Post-Conflict Unit were transferred to the Poverty Unit during the 2008-2012 cycle.
Projects for the sustainable management of environmental resources (rehabilitation of protected areas, implementation of international conventions ratified by the DRC, phasing out of CFCs, etc.) funded by the GEF and the Montreal Protocol, as well as a study of risks posed by the Nyiragongo volcano located near Goma.

Support to the formulation of the National Multisectoral Programme for the Fight Against HIV/AIDS.

The first cycle also included a programme for conflict prevention, peace building and post-conflict recovery that was later divided up between the governance and poverty programmes. The main areas of intervention included:

- DDR, the reduction in light weapons trafficking and the reintegration of war-affected populations, such as the projects to manage transit sites, the Rapid Response Mechanism (MRR) that funded the main DDR and ‘post-brassage’ activities (cantonment of the FARDC) of UNDP during the period, as well as the Community Reconstruction, Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Reduction of Light Weapons Project (COMREC) implemented in Ituri, North and South Kivu.

- Projects for peace building, conflict prevention and reintegration of displaced persons, such as the project entitled ‘Community Recovery and Conflict Prevention’

During the second cycle (2008-2012), the programme is structured in five components: (i) the promotion of MDGs; (ii) community recovery; (iii) microfinance promotion; (iv) the fight against HIV/AIDS and other pandemics; and (v) environment and climate change. The Country Programme Document covering the 2008-2012 period estimates funding needs at USD 311 million. When this document was being developed in 2008, just after the elections that led to a legitimate government, major donors showed a willingness to move from short-term to long-term interventions. The resources to be mobilized from donors for the fight against poverty were estimated based on this premise. However, the expected level of donors’ support did not materialize, and at the end of 2010, only USD 58 million had been raised, i.e., less than 20 percent of budgets two years before the end of the programming cycle. The reasons of this discrepancy are: (i) over-optimistic planning; (ii) a relative lack of interest among the main UNDP donors for ambitious development plans in a context still seen as too precarious; (iii) a 25 percent reduction of UNDP’s own resources midway through the cycle; and (iv) the effects of the global financial crisis on international aid. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the objectives and activities planned can be achieved.

### 4.2.1 PROMOTION OF MDGs AND DSCR MONITORING

The first DSCR (2006) was developed through a highly participatory process in consultation with some 35,000 Congolese. The document echoes and details the concerns of a great number of poor people. It led to the CAF, which itself inspired the UNDAF. It is, therefore, possible to conclude that the process has resulted in the increased coordination and coherence of international aid. Planning capacities were also strengthened at the central and provincial level. However, the impact on policies and public expenditures remains more hypothetical since no Medium Term Expenditure Framework has been adopted yet. It is being planned following upon the DSCR II, but even so, such documents do not always guarantee that the planned budgets will be approved. In addition, the budgets approved by

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60 Known in the DRC by their French acronym (CDMT for Cadre de dépenses à moyen terme), Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks are a standard budget implementation tool for poverty reduction strategy papers.

In this context, any national strategic planning document is likely to go unheeded. The issue is openly discussed in the new DSCRPP and presented itself in almost identical terms for the 

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63 “The majority of political and administrative authorities and managers have not paid [the PRSP I] particular attention. They programmed, budgeted, executed and controlled public interventions without taking it into account.”
CAF, which did not detail the costs of its proposed interventions and did not include specific commitments on behalf of the partners who subscribed to it. The same problem eventually arose with the provincial Priority Action Programmes (PAPs) as well, due to the limited fiscal resources availed to the provinces. The majority of the projects described in these provincial PAPs will not likely see the light of day in the near future. There is, therefore, a proliferation of strategic frameworks whose stated goal is to inspire action by development partners and the Government, but which remain largely theoretical.

Nevertheless, one of the interests of the DSCRP is to overcome short-term visions and help the country and its development partners look into the future and strategize. During a retreat held in late May 2011, development partners noted that the first DSCRP was more of a long list of needs than a true strategic management tool, and they expressed their intention to help the Government make the second DSCRP a better strategic tool. And to this end, UNDP planned to continue its support for the improvement of planning capacity at the central and provincial levels.

The DSCRP II was prepared as a matter of some urgency. The aim was apparently to fill a strategic void since the DSCRP I had already been extended twice through annual PAPs in 2009 and 2010. Initiated in 2010, the DSCRP II was being finalized during the evaluation mission. The poverty programme called on a large number of international consultants in order to guarantee its rapid preparation, and the process was less participatory than that of the first DSCRP. In any case, UNDP lacked the financial resources required for the kind of extensive consultation process undertaken a few years earlier. Some development partners expressed doubts about the methods adopted, in particular the lack of up-to-date poverty and household data. It appears that many international partners have not participated in the review meetings for the DSCRP II. Insufficient participation by donors and ministries other than the Ministry of Planning in the production of the second DSCRP, as well as the possibility of a change in government after the next elections, raises concerns that these various actors will not, in the case of the second DSCRP, share the same sense of ownership as they did for the first. In addition, the same risk of formalism that has limited the impact of the first threatens the second DSCRP. To avoid this risk, UNDP and the Government should pay more attention to budget issues and the formulation and implementation of policies that are simple, credible, realistic and conducive to growth. It would be advantageous given the quality of the document, which is based on a candid analysis of the challenges that the country faces and logically leads to a realistic and well-designed strategy.

Finally, UNDP has helped produce two national reports on human development (2008 and 2010), two reports on the progress towards the MDGs in the DRC (2004 and 2010), and studies on the costs necessary to achieve the MDGs. The human development reports are rather well written but their audience is hard to gauge. The studies on the costs of the MDGs were relevant in principle, although in practice they did not focus sufficiently on the most basic needs. Their methodology seems to be based on the need for a complete rehabilitation of all national infrastructure and social services, which leads to costs that lay well beyond the resources available nationally or internationally. This error in the MDG cost studies has been corrected in the second DSCRP, in which the analysis of resources needed to achieve the MDGs is appropriately refocused on the most basic needs.

4.2.2 DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)

DDR operations were very important, especially during the first programming cycle (2003-2007). Since 2002, UNDP and MONUC collaborated...
to implement demobilization programmes for Congolese armed groups\(^6\) with funding from a regional demobilization and reintegration programme, the MDRP\(^6\). The main UNDP interventions under the programme involved the community recovery programme (COMREC) and the rapid response mechanism (MRR) until 2008. The MRR, created in 2003, while supporting the creation and strengthening of the capacities of the national service in charge of DDR (CONADER, which would later become the UE-PNDDR\(^8\)), filled an operational void, assuming a temporary role in substitution to the Government. The successful implementation of the large-scale Operational Programme for Disarmament and Community Reintegration (PODRC), in partnership with the Government, MONUC and other UN bodies in Ituri in September 2004, led to the disarmament of 15,941 militant signatories of the peace accords and earned UNDP a good reputation for operational capacity in areas with difficult security and physical access. CONADER then requested the MRR to support the first phase of implementation of the National DDR Programme in the east of the country, and subsequently to assist in of the resolution of the Mayi Mayi issue in Katanga. During the second cycle, the DDR programme was mainly composed of the Community Reintegration and Recovery Programme (CRRP), which targets unarmed ex-combatants and members of other vulnerable groups as beneficiaries.

During the two cycles, UNDP directly carried out or supported the biometric registration of 50,000 ex-combatants (one third of whom were children and adolescents and 3 percent women), their regrouping in 14 transit sites including seven in Ituri in 2004-2005, their employment in a few labour-intensive projects, and their vocational training and economic reintegration, including by other actors than UNDP for the last two points.

UNDP directly reintegrated around 10,000 people, about one fifth of the number of people it demobilized. CONADER/UE-PNDDR and its partners were able to reintegrate many people previously demobilized by UNDP, but certainly many of the demobilized combatants were not reintegrated. For example, the military authorities which the mission met with in Ituri mention approximately 4,000 non-reintegrated ex-combatants, out of a total of 16,000 demobilized combatants. At the national level, the MDRP evaluation report confirms that only 54 percent of the 102,000 ex-combatants demobilized in DRC have received reintegration assistance\(^9\).

At the individual level, vocational training for the demobilized remains concentrated in a few areas (tailoring-sewing, fishing, farming, livestock, agricultural processing, small trade, hairdressing, brick work, etc.) and rarely build on their previous skills. The very short duration of contracts with NGO implementing partners limits the choice of vocations, orienting them towards the simplest trades that can be taught quickly. Many ex-combatants encountered by the mission have changed work, selling their initial kit to settle in areas such as the butcher trade, mobile phone services, shoemaking, etc. Most of them ‘scrape by’ economically. According to military sources closely associated with the UNDP DDR projects in Ituri, approximately 60 percent are effectively reintegrated professionally. The remaining 40 percent would have sold their kits and found themselves unemployed, tempted into criminal

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\(^{6}\) A parallel DDR programme was implemented for combatants of foreign origin, also including repatriation and reintegration components.


\(^{8}\) CONADER: National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; UE-PNDDR: Implementation Unit of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.

activities since they have experience in handling weapons70. According to numerous sources, very few would have returned to the militias.

At the community level, UNDP has favoured the formation of reintegration groups, similar to mini-cooperatives that often include members of host communities. This approach has worked well when the groups benefited from solid leadership. Military group leaders sometimes became good managers of economic groupings. Despite these isolated cases, many groups have shrunk, divided or dispersed, each member taking his/her share of the kit. This should not be perceived as a problem but as a solution to an implementation problem. The demobilized ex-combatants continue to have neighbourly, commercial and social relations with host communities, and some forms of economic association persist between ex-combatants and host communities, generally involving two or three people who appreciate one another.

The UNDP DDR interventions have primarily been effective in achieving peace in Ituri, which was the main focus of the programme71 but also a district where the environment was more amenable to success, since the ethnic groups in conflict since 2003 have effectively reconciled. Beyond DDR projects, a number of other UNDP projects helped this reconciliation in Ituri: building of community infrastructure in locations carefully chosen to facilitate the meeting of communities, community reconciliation committees, etc. The fact that conflicts persist in other parts of the east of the country, for example in Maniema, North Kivu and South Kivu, cannot be interpreted as a failure of DDR activities, but rather as a result of the absence of reconciliation between the belligerents.

It should be noted, however, that the final MDRP evaluation report72 was rather critical of UNDP performance in the two large projects co-financed by this fund, COMREC and the MRR. In the case of COMREC, the report stresses the small geographic coverage and the weakness of results in terms of the economic reintegration of former combatants. To UNDP’s credit, the report notes the project’s generally positive contribution to establishing the foundation for peace consolation in the east of DRC. The report judges the MRR as ‘moderately satisfactory’, reproaching it for not having completed the key objective of preparing a national programme73.

DDR activities are now almost completed. Following the Goma accords, the Government has expressed its will to stop DDR programmes for fear of adverse effects. Indeed, the risk is real of paving the way for an endless cycle of negotiations with new armed groups, as they appear on a regular basis.

Once UNDP completed the activities co-financed by MDRP, it engaged in a post-brasage programme with the support of DFID and the Netherlands to improve the human security situation by strengthening army brigades that had integrated former combatants of armed groups. The programme included the provision of temporary and permanent housing, the establishment of water supply, the acquisition and distribution of starter kits, supporting greater

70 According to a survey conducted in 2007 and cited in the MDRP evaluation report, 68 percent of DDR project beneficiaries have reached a level of economic subsistence, but the survey’s methodology is criticized in this same report. See Scanteam, op. cit.

71 The MRR and a number of other UNDP DDR projects concentrated on the Ituri district.

72 Scanteam, op. cit.

73 On this subject, it is interesting to note that the same report describes a conflict of interest between the direct implementation of DDR projects by UNDP on the one hand, and the support and advisory role for national counterparts on the other hand, a remark that recalls the ADR team’s own observations related to the management of Global Fund programmes. Therefore, UNDP may have faced the same dilemma for DDR as it is now facing with the GFATM programmes: directly implementing DRR operations in substitution for the Government, while at the same time being responsible for preparing the Government to take over future operations.
autonomy for families and better security for the populations through army training. Temporary shelters in the form of tents were provided to three ‘integrated’ brigades. In one of the two camps visited by the ADR team (South Kivu, with funding from the Netherlands), these temporary shelters were replaced by permanent structures. The project also supported income-generating activities for military families, provided basic training in military justice procedures, trained judicial and penitentiary system personnel, rehabilitated the military prison and strengthened community services in the surrounding communities (water, health, education, roads, etc.). There was none of this in the other camp visited (Ituri, with DFID funding) due to lack of resources: military families are still lodged in simple tents worn-out by time and weather, and they complain of the lack of income-generating activities. Furthermore, this project has suffered a number of implementation delays.

4.2.3 COMMUNITY RECOVERY

Community recovery interventions have clearly dominated the poverty programme. They are responsible for two-thirds of spending during the 2008–2010 period. Around 75 percent of activities focused on the provinces of North and South Kivu and the Ituri District. These interventions mainly include:

- An important community recovery programme funded largely by UNDP but also Italy and the Peace Building Fund (PBF) in the provinces of Bandundu, Bas Congo, Equateur, Katanga, Maniema, Province Orientale, North and South Kivu, and Kinshasa (with a budget of USD 16 million at the end of 2010). The programme builds or rehabilitates social infrastructure (police stations, schools, health centres) and economic structures (markets, vocational training centres), supports community radio stations and has set up village development and conflict management committees in the two Kivu, Katanga and Ituri.

- Four projects implemented jointly with other UN agencies in support of provincial governments: one for the province of Equateur (know by its French acronym, PACTE, with bilateral Spanish funding), which seeks to improve governance and the delivery of basic social services and contribute to economic recovery in the context of a possible redeployment of MONUSCO outside that province; the second for South Kivu (rehabilitation of basic social services and recovery of displaced communities in return areas in South Kivu, with funding from the Netherlands), developed as part of ISSSS and aiming to provide an integrated assistance package to displaced persons; the third in the district of Ituri (CEPI, funded by Japan through the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security) to promote a culture of peaceful coexistence between communities, restore livelihoods and improve access to basic social services; and the fourth in the region of Beni in North Kivu (Support for Stabilization and Conflict Prevention in North Kivu, funded by the Spanish MDGs Achievement Fund) that seeks to stabilize communities and contribute to human security through a set of integrated actions on food security, nutrition, hygiene and communities’ capacity building in three municipalities.

- A project to support recovery and peace building (SRPI), funded by BCPR and seeking to strengthen the capacities of local governments and other stakeholders to foster participatory local development and achieve the MDGs in Equateur, Eastern Kasai, Province Orientale, Ituri, Katanga and North Kivu.

- Several projects in DDR, disarmament and community security (Community Reintegration and Recovery Project with funding from PBF, Community Security in Ituri with funding from BCPR, Stability Plan for Eastern DRC with funding from the Netherlands, PSAR for the reintegration of
women victims of violence in the two Kivu with funding from BCPR).

Funding from the MONUSCO support unit for the STAREC structures as well as participation in the formulation of ISSSS and more recently the Peace Consolidation Programme led by the integrated office.

It is difficult to pass a judgement on the overall effectiveness of all the initiatives funded at the local and community level. The following picture emerges based on available evaluation reports and the evaluation mission’s own field visits, which were necessarily limited.

The first cycle projects funded the reconstruction or rehabilitation of numerous infrastructures (schools, health centres and hospitals, roads, markets, water systems, agricultural and irrigation projects) and a even more significant number of income-generating activities. These projects used good practices, for example, the establishment of local committees for the approval of projects, bringing together project managers, local authorities and civil society or even mobilizing in kind and cash contributions by beneficiaries and local authorities. Although some of the projects proved successful (the schools, for instance, as they answer to a high demand), other micro-projects visited by the mission were sometimes under-utilized (Box 4). Some health centres are not or barely operational because of underpaid medical personnel, who sometimes leave the centre taking with them its medical equipment.

The same applies to the Kisangani-Ubundu road which, according to impact study reports, is only used by a dozen trucks and as many vans a day. This said, it seems to generate visible economic impacts. After Ubundu, the Congo River is navigable until Kindu in Maniema province. Therefore, the road provides Kindu with a supply route to and from Kisangani, and from there to Ituri and on to Uganda since the rehabilitation of the RN 4. The main negative environmental impacts are related to the over-exploitation of the forest along the road and the use of the road to transport bush meat hunted in the region, including some protected species.

During the second cycle, the funded micro-projects were often more business-oriented in nature, dominated by markets and especially vocational training centres. Most of these micro-projects are under construction, and a number of them have suffered from administrative delays and budget cuts. Some of the completed projects appear to be working reasonably well, while others face supply problems. It is important to support these centres in a flexible manner, at least in the medium term (two or three years) after installation until they are able to reach their cruising speed.

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Box 4. Rehabilitation of the Kisangani Slaughterhouse

The Kisangani slaughterhouse was built in 1959 in order to improve food safety. It stopped operating in the 1980s. UNDP set out to rehabilitate this facility. The COMDEV project, implemented by UNOPS, rehabilitated the slaughterhouse building, built the fence and restored the cold room. The current slaughterhouse capacity is 100 animals per day, but the actual activity is around five slaughtered animals per day, mostly cattle.

Most often, as recognized by the head of the slaughterhouse, slaughtering is done in public markets or privately. There are many reasons for uncontrolled slaughtering: to evade taxes, avoid distances or additional cost of transporting the animals from the breeding ground to the slaughterhouse, escape public health inspections, or slaughter stolen animals.

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UNDP (BCPR) has helped to energize the start-up of STAREC/ISSS with staff support. The beginnings of STAREC are promising, although late. The east of the country certainly needs a source of dependable and flexible funding for its recovery and stabilization effort and a consensual programming framework involving local authorities. The mobilized funds (USD 20 million from the PBF, USD 20 million in the SRFF in July 2011) remain modest but could grow if the SRFF makes proper and timely disbursements to visible projects. Meanwhile, many interviewees expressed a concern about the complexity of the project preparation and approval process, which involves many provincial, national and international actors. The involvement of local authorities is real, even if some believe it remains superficial in nature. Donors vary in their degree of interest in the STAREC mechanism. Some demand that their projects, planned entirely outside of the STAREC framework, still be ‘aligned’ a posteriori, i.e., registered as STAREC projects so as to benefit from a greater visibility.

The effectiveness of STAREC, a governmental programme supported by the international community through the ISSS, obviously remains to be seen. The population has expressed some frustration. For example, inhabitants in the east of the country often hear radio announcements of approved STAREC funding or projects but complain that the achievements do not match the advertisements. Even when STAREC effectively finances a number of concrete projects, its effectiveness will still depend on a political and/or military resolution of the multiple conflicts that continue to plague the east of the country.

The idea of focusing on a limited number of communication axes to favour progressive stabilization is good but can only work if the newly opened zones are effectively and permanently secured by the FARDC and/or the MONUSCO. Yet, none of them seems ready to do so. Of the six ‘priority stabilization axes’ selected in the east of the country, two display a clear deterioration of security, there is no change for two others, and an improvement in the remaining two.

Most observers agree that interventions in the area of community recovery are generally positive. UNDP has solid experience and clear comparative advantages in this area. These interventions have brought visibility to UNDP and initiated a transition from humanitarian to development work. Unfortunately, these interventions risk being considerably reduced for the rest of the second cycle. An internal country office note dated November 2010 concludes that the persistent weakness of available funding, from both donors and the organization’s own resources, and the reduction of the role of field offices requires the reorientation of a programme that was initially built around community recovery. The paper proposes to refocus around the four remaining components.  

4.2.4 MICROFINANCE PROMOTION

Less than three percent of expenditures under the poverty programme between 2008 and 2010 were allocated to microfinance. Despite UNDP and UNCDF efforts in the context of the microfinance support project (known by its French acronym, PASMIF) to support microfinance institutions and reach non-covered areas, access to credit remains strongly limited by the lack of capital, default risks, and a weak domestic banking system.

PASMIF supported the development of the new microfinance law that was approved by the Government, debated in Parliament in early 2011 and submitted to the Senate. The World Bank is working on drafting application decrees for this law with the Central Bank of Congo (BCC).

During its first phase, PASMIF emphasized methodological supports and training to Microfinance

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75 ‘Critical Review of the Foundations and Implementation Methods of the Poverty Programme’, Internal memorandum of the Fight Against Poverty Unit, November 2010.
Institutions (MFIs), a work for which the Microfinance Promotion Fund (FPM after its French acronym), a component of PASMIF, has received a prize from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). The mission encountered MFIs with seemingly efficient management systems and group lending products, but they are still missing the financial means to respond to demand. They appreciate the quality of PASMIF technical assistance and small grants but want additional loans and capital grants to enable them to expand their operations more rapidly.

There was a one-year break between the first and second phase of PASMIF. The FPM was restructured to receive contributions from the KFW and the World Bank, and it is now managed by a new partner organization. While continuing to provide technical assistance, the second phase of PASMIF must focus more on capital assistance to MFIs by guaranteeing commercial bank loans for MFIs. There is still much to be done to better regulate the sector, enable the poor’s access to savings and credit services and build bridges to other UNDP projects, for example, for demobilized ex-combatants and the people trained in vocational centres. At the national level, the ICA 2010 survey considers the lack of credit as the biggest obstacle to growth, affecting 40 percent of Congolese companies. The bank rates are extremely high due to the lack of credit (effective rates of 25 percent to 45 percent), which has the advantage of attracting new operators but excludes the modest borrower. Ultimately, it is hoped that competition will lead to reduced rates.

4.2.5 FIGHT AGAINST HIV/AIDS AND OTHER PANDEMICS

The bulk of activities related to major pandemics is managed by UNDP in its capacity of primary recipient for a large part of Global Fund resources. These activities are analysed in section 4.3 of this chapter. Interventions of the HIV/AIDS component of the fight against poverty programme regroups the UNDP-mandated poverty programme, notably (i) support for the system of coordination and the integration of HIV in national development programmes; (ii) mainstreaming of gender issues in the fight against HIV; and (iii) defending victims’ rights. In these three areas, UNDP played an important role, mainly by supporting the formulation of a national strategy, the formulation of a ‘gender and HIV/AIDS’ methodological document and the recent start-up of pilot activities in communities on integration of HIV/AIDS in the development programmes of the South Kivu and Bas-Congo Provinces.

UNDP invested approximately USD 358,000 between 2008 and 2010 in these activities, or 6 percent of all disbursements on poverty during the period. This low disbursement rate is explained by the fact that most of the originally allocated funds were re-allocated to other components after the 2008 approval of specific budget lines in the second phase of round 3 Malaria and HIV for the strengthening of the national health system.

In 2009, UNDP contributed to the formulation of a National Strategic Plan to Fight AIDS (2010–2014) and provided expertise to the National Multisectoral Programme to Fight AIDS (PNMLS). The capacity building efforts, however, focused more on improving management by 90 Global Fund subrecipients from civil society than on enabling governmental services to take over as primary recipients of funds. However, UNDP has produced capacity building plans, but the Ministry of Health has not yet endorsed them. The national members of the Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) consulted by

76 End of programme evaluation, PASMIF, P. Larocque, I.Y. Dambaye and E. Balemba, December 2009.
77 KFW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) is a German banking group which supports inter alia microfinance for development.
the ADR mission complained about the lack of support they received, particularly for purchases of office equipment and computer softwares, to prepare them to assume the role of primary recipient. Meanwhile, UNDP submitted a devolution plan and roadmap, but, according to UNDP officials, the Government became disinterested in the subject when discussions with the Global Fund began about designating the National Programme to Fight Tuberculosis (known by its French acronym, PNLT) as the primary recipient for this component. These different views of the situation highlight the existing tensions between UNDP and the Government over the management of Global Fund resources.

UNDP’s decision to reallocate the USD 5 million originally allocated to the 2008-2012 capacity building programme to other activities was not opportune. The ADR team’s analysis of the Global Fund in the DRC (see further in section 4.3) shows that it is not the best tool for funding national capacity development. The types of expenditures authorized by the Fund are severely restricted, limited to aiding in the implementation of the Fund’s own operations, without taking into account the broader needs of the national health system to prepare it to assume the role of primary recipient. In addition, obtaining funding for successive ‘rounds’ from the Global Fund is unpredictable, and the funding is often disbursed late, while a capacity building programme needs to be predictable and sustained.

4.2.6 ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

The second largest recipient of disbursements in the poverty programme is the environment component, with 14 percent of total expenditure for the 2008-2010 period. Since 2008, this component consists mainly of UN-REDD (Reduction of Emissions and Deforestation and Forest Degradation) preparedness, with funding from Japan and Norway. The activities support the Government in negotiations on climate change, the development of a REDD+ strategy, estimates of the ‘reference scenario’ for deforestation and forest degradation and building Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) capacities. The component also includes funding for small projects by the GEF, including PANA (National Action Programme for Adaptation to climate change – agricultural sector).

The UN-REDD preparatory phase is promising. The programme supported DRC negotiators at the Copenhagen Conference and the elaboration, public consultation and validation of the DRC REDD Preparedness Plan, opening the way for the approval of nearly USD 75 million in new funding in 2010 by the UN-REDD programme, the World Band and the World Bank FIP. In addition, the Congo Basin Forest Fund is expected to contribute USD 22 million for the development of a traceability system. In the longer term, there is discussion of another multi-donor fund for REDD+.

The project’s positive results are evidenced by the selection of the DRC as one of the nine countries chosen for the REDD ‘quick start’ phase80. The process of preparing for REDD+ seems to be properly coordinated with the Ministry of the Environment, Conservation of Nature and Tourism, the implementing partners including FAO and UNEP and the main donors including the World Bank. However, the ministry expressed the desire for increased government involvement in the management of the programme and its budgets. Besides, provincial authorities were not systematically involved in the programme’s

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79 REDD funding aims to establish a financial value for the carbon stored in forests by offering incentives to developing countries in order to reduce deforestation and forest degradation and invest in sustainable development strategies, low in ‘carbon costs’. Beyond the control of deforestation and forest degradation, ‘REDD+’ also includes building forest carbon stocks through sustainable forest management.

80 In addition to the DRC, it includes Bolivia, Indonesia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia.
multiple thematic coordination groups that brought together close to 400 people from the administration and civil society in Kinshasa, although UN-REDD has organized consultations in some provinces.

Properly used, the funds channeled by the REDD+ process, can induce the country to better protect its forests and generate welcome investment in the area of sustainable development. The challenge will be to formulate and implement projects that are interesting, efficient and ecologically sound, and reduce poverty. The proposals developed for FIP funding (tree planting, improved stoves, better land management) are interesting but took time to formulate and must still be implemented.

The small PANA project is not well designed: the support provided to the six agricultural research stations for some varietal tests pales in comparison with the reconstruction needs of an agricultural research and extension system capable of providing farmers with minimum services. In this context, it would be surprising if the project’s varietal trials were technically and scientifically good enough to contribute significantly to the adaptation of the country’s agriculture to climate change. No trial has yet begun. The project has been stalled for nine months following an audit of three previous environmental projects before PANA, also implemented by the ministry.

The impact of some first phase environmental projects, including the rehabilitation of protected areas, the implementation of international conventions ratified by the DRC, a risk study of the Nyiragongo volcano, the elimination of CFCs and access to renewable energy in rural areas, has not been evaluated by the mission.

4.2.7 SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS ON THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY AND THE PROMOTION OF MDGs

The results achieved by UNDP interventions in the fight against poverty and promotion of the MDGs have generally been satisfactory in an environment where implementation is affected by numerous problems related to security, difficulty of travel in the country and the weak capacity of some national institutions. The programme has shown itself to be innovative, especially during the transition period when UNDP promoted responses adapted to the local context, mostly for DDR and community recovery. Support for the Government in the development of reports and national strategies during the two cycles resulted in background documents that contributed to a greater coherence of external aid.

UNDP’s current portfolio includes some strategic interventions that address key issues for the future of the DRC. These include PASMIP that could operate on a larger scale; the REDD programme, which has a significant potential but must be managed wisely; STAREC that is beginning to fund projects in the East; and finally the PCP whose implementation in the rest of the country still requires multi-donor funds and a simple and participatory allocation and planning mechanism.

Despite its slow implementation, STAREC tried to move forward pragmatically on the issue of national and local authorities’ involvement in planning the reconstruction and development of the country. It is important to highlight that STAREC was developed as a governmental programme and enjoys a higher level of national ownership than other interventions evaluated in the poverty programme.

81 Greenpeace recently aired its opinion on a series of reports prepared by McKinsey including one on the DRC (unrelated to UNDP), that proposed 14 programmes that the NGO considers unfavourable to small farmers and favourable to large commercial companies. See Greenpeace, ‘Bad Influence – How McKinsey-inspired plans lead to rainforest destruction’, April 2011.
4.3 MANAGEMENT OF BASKET FUNDS

There are six basket funds, some of which are managed by the UNDP country office and others by UNDP services in New York, but benefiting the DRC. Table 10 provides an overview of these funds.

This section of the report looks specifically into UNDP’s role in the management of the two large funds that are not strictly within the organization’s traditional mandate. This is to say the role of UNDP as primary recipient of a large part of the Global Fund resources to fight tuberculosis, AIDS and malaria, and UNDP’s role in managing the Common Humanitarian Fund (or Pooled Fund82).

For the 2008–2010 period, 61 percent of all UNDP expenditures were related to the management of these two funds. The exceptional importance of these activities in the UNDP portfolio demonstrates the confidence of donors and authorities in the organization’s management capacity, but it also raises the issue of UNDP’s role as a development agent or as a service provider.

In each of these two funds, it is difficult to evaluate UNDP’s contribution to the results achieved. It seems that UNDP’s role is very concrete and engaged in the case of Global Fund programme management, while it is more marginal and ‘administrative’ for the Pooled Fund. In both cases, however, UNDP’s role is contested, and there are significant risks for the organization.

4.3.1 THE GLOBAL FUND

The Global Fund launched its programmes in the DRC in 2003, and by the end of 2010 it had approved a total of USD 654 million in funding for total disbursements of USD 386 million.

By mutual agreement between the Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) and the Global Fund, UNDP was designated as primary recipient83 for all programmes in 2003, after extended discussion84. Since Round 8, this role is shared with NGOs. Round 10 (tuberculosis) intends to designate the Ministry of Health as primary recipient.

According to members of the CCM, UNDP was a rather obvious choice as primary recipient, given the organization’s good reputation for management, its procurement competency and the quality of its relations with the Government. For UNDP, this designation added a significant component to its activities and an importance resource due to an administrative overhead of 7 percent included in the contribution. For the Government, which had realistically assessed its own management capacity, it was a question of ensuring that resources be available for the country.

The malaria component was for the most part entrusted to NGOs (Population Service International and Church of Christ in Congo) several years back. In mid-2011, UNDP was still the primary recipient for the medical part of the AIDS component and for the entire tuberculosis component.

In the case of HIV/AIDS, the division of responsibilities between two NGOs (CORDAID and the Church of Christ in Congo) charged with the community component of programmes and UNDP charged with the medical component created some confusion for subrecipients, who must sign agreements with multiple stakeholders for programmes that are closely related. There is

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82 This informal term being the one used by most stakeholders in the DRC, it is also used in this report.

83 A governmental institution is the primary recipient in most countries in which the Global Fund operates. In 2010, UNDP was a substitute primary recipient in 26 countries, including the DRC, where particular circumstances prevent management by government departments. UNDP’s role as primary recipient is, therefore, to manage programmes funded by the Global Fund, most often by subcontracting subrecipients.

84 The GTZ also wanted to be primary recipient. However, it had been heavily involved in the drafting of the Round 3 proposal and this was seen as a possible conflict of interest. See Béjanin, F., Milleliri, J.M., Kuvula, J., and Manzengo, C., ‘Report on the Round 3 Evaluation Mission of the Global Fund, HIV/AIDS Component’, World Health Organization, 2011.
very little coordination between UNDP and the two NGOs, and the CCM does not take initiatives in this area, which according to several sub-recipients reduces the effectiveness of the interventions.

In 2008, the GF and UNDP decided to introduce a new intermediate management level by selecting relevant governmental entities as sole sub-recipients, and making all other operational actors ‘sub-sub-recipients’ in order to increase the national role and to strengthen the coordination and supervision capacity of health sector actors. The procedure proved cumbersome and slow, and UNDP considers that it generates delays in reporting to the GF and, therefore, postpones subsequent payments. This complex ‘cascading’ arrangement may create further tensions.

The Ministry of Health is now expected to become the primary recipient for the tuberculosis component for Round 10, starting September 2011. However, this schedule may be affected by the current ‘freeze’85 of GF programmes in the DRC.

In terms of results, the successive programmes provided antiretroviral treatments (ARV) to 34,000 people living with HIV, detected and treated tuberculosis in 250,000 patients, and distributed 710,000 mosquito nets. The number of patients receiving ARV prior to the start of Round 3 was only 4,300. Round 3 surpassed its objectives in terms of the number of people living with the virus that received ARV treatment. Eight out of 10 people receiving ARV treatment in the DRC do so thanks to the Global Fund. These results, however, should not obscure the fact that needs are considerably higher, with the number of patients eligible for ARV treatment estimated at 280,00086. If this data is accurate, current recipients of ARV represent approximately 12 percent of those in need of treatment87.

The programme also provides specific support for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Other programmes contribute to the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the DRC, but those of the Global Fund are by far the most significant.

It is apparently difficult for the three programmes to reach rural areas, home to about 70 percent of the population. Even in the cities, services are rare, and geographic coverage was affected in 2010 by the departure of some sub-recipients, for example in Province Orientale (departure of GTZ) and in Maniema (departure of Merlin). Stock-outs of detection and biological monitoring tests were reported locally88, but thankfully not for ARVs. According to contacted sub-recipients and audit reports, the logistical and contractual arrangements with the company responsible for the product shortages are of particular concern89. There are also very few personnel trained to detect the viral load and prescribe ARVs90.

Consequently, people currently being treated represent ‘the tip of the iceberg’.

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85 Following the identification of management issues among some sub-recipients, the Global Fund decided to open an investigation and ‘freeze’ activities in the meantime, while ensuring that essential drugs remained available.

86 NACP 2009, projections based on sentinel surveillance data, 2008.


88 In response to a questionnaire that the ADR team sent by mail, four sub-recipients reported recent stockouts for these products. Three other sub-recipients in the field relayed the same message to the mission in person. A provincial official of the National AIDS Coordination Programme reported frequent stock-outs and irregular supply that affected sub-recipients in one eastern province. According to UNDP, these stock-outs would be due to four instances of equipment theft that occurred in 2010 and 2011 at Ndjili airport.

89 See audit report of December 2010 on this point.

90 UNDP/GF Unit Annual Report 2009.
However, to what extent can we attribute the successes and failures to UNDP? Contrary to what occurs with its own programmes, UNDP is not involved in the planning process or selection of partners and sub-recipients. Like a service provider in a sense, UNDP is responsible for implementing a programme that has already been planned and budgeted with designated sub-recipients. There are cases in which UNDP had to re-open discussions with the GF because of under-estimated budgets. In addition, the Global Fund has operated on the principle of multiple primary recipients since 2008, which increases the difficulty of attributing all the results to one partner on a national scale. However, UNDP has important responsibilities through the activities that it manages directly. This mainly concerns purchases made via the Copenhagen centre and

**Table 10. Basket Funds Administered by UNDP in the DRC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Nature of fund</th>
<th>Role of UNDP</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pooled Fund</td>
<td>Established in 2006, this common fund ensures management of a portion of the annual contributions received for the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP).</td>
<td>The activities are humanitarian, but the country office is involved in project management via the Joint OCHA-UNDP Unit. UNDP supports mainly concerns the assessment of NGO funding capacity, capacity building needs, financial tracking, and monitoring and certification of reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Global Fund</td>
<td>UNDP was designated as primary recipient in 2003. Since Round 8, this role is shared with other institutions. Round 10 (Tuberculosis) plans to designate a government agency as one of the two primary recipients.</td>
<td>UNDP’s role is that of an implementing agent for the programmes developed under the Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) and approved by the Global Fund. UNDP is responsible for managing the funds, including procurement, and reporting to the GF to which it is fully accountable. As the primary recipient, UNDP also assumes responsibility to prepare national institutions to take on this role as soon as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. STAREC</td>
<td>The STAREC programme is funded in part by direct bilateral contributions but also by a ‘pass-through’ common fund (simple transfers) managed by UNDP, called the SRRF (Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility in Eastern DRC).</td>
<td>The MDTF (Multi-Donor Trust Fund office of UNDP in New York) has delegated management of these fund transfers to the country office. Under the ‘pass-through’ formula, UNDP’s role is limited to funds transfers to agencies responsible for implementations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Common Electoral Fund + Election Security Fund in 2005-2006</td>
<td>Established in 2005, these funds have financed the activities of APEC, SPEC and now PACE.</td>
<td>UNDP is both electoral fund manager and responsible for implementation, jointly with MONUSCO and CENI. The Congolese National Police, several bilateral actors, MONUC and UNDP have been involved in the implementation of activities funded by the Election Security Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Common Fund for Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>Covers activities in support of the army, police and justice</td>
<td>The fund is managed by UNDP and the implementation of programmes is executed through UNOPS, MONUSCO, IOM and UNDP. A Steering Committee chaired by the Ministry of Defense determines assignments. The Netherlands is the only contributor to date (USD 10.4 million).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Peace Building Fund</td>
<td>Funding of peace building activities (these funds now integrated into the SRFF of STAREC)</td>
<td>A special UNDP unit in New York without the intervention of the country office manages the fund. UNDP-DRC is, however, one of the fund recipients for its work to restore state authority and to reintegrate displaced persons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
represents about 60 percent of the total sums involved. UNDP is also responsible for funding and ensuring the monitoring and evaluation of subrecipients, who receive about 30 percent of all resources. Of the remaining 10 percent, seven cover UNDP’s administrative overhead, and the rest covers operational costs and personnel of the Global Fund Programme Management Unit in the country office.

Therefore UNDP’s role is crucial in supplying all drug and test reagents. To better manage supply and ensure that there are no stock-outs, the country office established a Drug Information System (DIS) that should in theory provide the precise monthly status of all stock in the DRC, including subrecipient stock. In reality, the system does not work because it depends on the provision of timely information from a variety of organizations that do not always provide it. Thus, according to the UNDP office Programme Management Unit, there are no stockouts. It appears that there is a difference between DIS information and the reality perceived in the field.

The monitoring and evaluation of GFATM-funded programme remain weak, due to a lack of resources for such a vast country where transport and communication are difficult. In total, there are only 10 people available to ensure this function: UNDP itself has three focal points (in Lubumbashi, Goma and Bukavu), complemented by seven governmental focal points who receive UNDP top-ups for their involvement in this effort.

As the primary recipient, UNDP agrees to be liable to the GF for the management of the entrusted funds and for programme results, although it does not have control of the entire product. During a meeting in New York on 19 January 2011, the UNDP team overseeing partnerships with the Global Fund ranked the DRC in the highest category (severe risk) for the risk entailed by managing the programme. Stakeholders in the country agree that the Global Fund procedures (or the way in which they are applied in the DRC) are excessively heavy and not adapted to the context. For example, the cost of drug transport is paid on a standard and uniform scale regardless of the location of programme sites. In a country as vast and difficult to access as the DRC, this approach does not encourage subrecipients to work far away from cities, where transportation costs can rise very fast.

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**Box 5. Christian Massaba Awesse, President of the Congolese Union of Organizations of People Living With HIV/AIDS (UCOP+) for the Province Orientale**

Christian learned that he was HIV-positive in 2004. His wife told him a few days before dying at the Kisangani hospital. The medical staff knew they were both infected but had said nothing. AIDS was still highly stigmatized and shameful at the time. The epidemic was largely ignored, and there was no treatment available. However, Christian believes that psychological counseling and advice about transmission would have been extremely useful, even in the absence of medical treatment.

After several weeks of reflection, he decided to tell his friends and family about his illness. Such ‘coming out’ was a small revolution in Kisangani. He was the second person living with HIV in his city to announce his illness. “Keeping the information to yourself eats at you from within. You don’t sleep at night and weaken as a result,” Christian says.

Christian remarried in 2008 to a person living with the virus. Thanks to a treatment to avoid mother-to-child transmission, they were able to have a girl who is HIV-negative. “It is important for me: before I thought I would pass through this world like this, pfft,” Christian says with a hand gesture resembling a leaf blown in the wind.

But Christian and his wife are aware that they are privileged, with less than 12 percent coverage for mother-to-child transmission prevention in the province. The policy is to systematically screen pregnant women, but there are no tests available in Kisangani since the GTZ withdrew in early 2011. There are no more reagents for biological monitoring either. Even at the time of the GTZ, there were treatments and tests in urban areas only.
The same stakeholders are unanimous in their critiques of UNDP’s slowness and cumbersome nature. UNDP disbursement delays are generally estimated to be at least double those of NGOs acting as primary recipients. There is thus a combination of two bureaucratic approaches, which led to the downgrade of UNDP’s performance to ‘C’, the lowest rating, mainly because certain sub-recipients were unable to provide reports according to the prescribed norms. Consequently, UNDP could not respond adequately to the Global Fund’s reporting demands.

In addition to the fiduciary risks faced by UNDP, this management role creates serious tensions with the Government, which seeks full control over these resources and believes that UNDP failed in preparing national institutions to take over as primary recipients. Representatives from national institutions felt that UNDP did not want to lose the resources tied to the management of these important funds. Although UNDP can claim to have contributed to a definite improvement of national programme capacity since 2003, this opinion of some national representatives is shared by certain sub-recipients and donors interviewed. In the circumstances, it is legitimate to ask whether the national capacity building role should not be given to another organization.

4.3.2 COMMON HUMANITARIAN FUND (POOLED FUND)

In 2006, OCHA and several donors decided to create a common fund in order to increase flexibility in the allocation of annual resources for the DRC Humanitarian Action Plan. It was then decided that UNDP should manage the Pooled Fund for NGO-executed projects91. Several options were considered and UNDP emerged as the only viable choice. A Joint OCHA-UNDP management unit was created within the UNDP country office, initially with an international official and a part-time national assistant. The unit now has 28 staff, of which about 75 percent are UNDP staff.

Contrary to what is the case under the Global Fund, UNDP is not involved in the design and implementation of interventions financed by the Pooled Fund. Its project management responsibility is limited to monitoring and evaluating activities implemented by beneficiaries of Pooled Fund allocations. The UNDP country office does not participate in project design and budgeting, or in the designation of beneficiaries, except to evaluate their implementation capacity. UNDP is involved in the initial evaluation of national NGOs capacity to implement programmes and in strengthening their capacities, if necessary.

In addition, UNDP has contributed to improving the quality of project planning and design by proposing results-based project templates with indicators. It also introduced the notion of cross-cutting themes in project formulation. It has, therefore, indirectly contributed to achieving better results. Reportedly, a donor evaluation comparing programmes implemented by NGOs under the PF and under programmes directly managed by another UN agency concluded that NGOs working under the PF were better managed and produced better results92. Capacity evaluations produced by the joint unit also serve other agencies and donors who rely on the quality of these evaluations for their own programming decisions.

Complaints about the cumbersome nature of UNDP procedures and slow disbursements remain justified despite commendable UNDP efforts to improve these procedures. An inter-departmental UNDP meeting was held in New York in 2006 to resolve operational problems that NGOs encountered with UNDP, in situations where the organization manages humanitarian funds93. UNDP made the following concessions:

91 Unlike NGOs, UN agencies have direct access to the Pooled Fund.
92 Interview with official from the Joint Pooled Fund Unit.
93 This was the case notably in Sudan and the DRC. Since then, the Central African Republic was added to the list.
The government agreement for implementation by non-governmental agents may be fulfilled by a single exchange of letters rather than on a case-by-case basis;

OCHA accepted the result-based projects submission templates, combining OCHA and UNDP procedures;

The removal of mandatory monthly reports from the implementation agreements, but the adoption of a log frame and of the UNDP project submission template;

The requirement for quarterly financial reports remain in force but advances are allowed for up to 100 percent of the budget for projects of less than six months, at the discretion of the country office; and

The possibility of allowing an NGO to retain ownership of equipment purchased by the project for multi-year activities in the context of Humanitarian Action Plans.

These adaptations and capacity building activities contributed to making UNDP a valued partner of many stakeholders in the PF, although it is still criticized for its administrative red tape, incompatible with humanitarian action. For example, UNDP has not been able to administratively close any of the PF projects due to the equipment issue. In a classic UNDP project, durable equipment must be returned either to the Government or to UNDP at the end of the project; NGOs cannot keep the equipment unless an exception is made. However, in the case of projects funded by the Pooled Fund, NGOs can and actually do keep the equipment, since such projects are not really UNDP projects, even if treated as such administratively.

Headquarters does not seem to understand the issue of humanitarian programmes that include a number of small short-term projects undertaken in emergency situations that seek to save lives rather than promote sustainable development in a stabilized situation. Headquarters must reflect on this subject or run the risk of being marginalized in this management function, which, because of the large sums involved, represents significant revenue for the organization.

At the insistence of headquarters, a debate is ongoing about the management fee charged to the PF, which is statutorily fixed at 7 percent but was exceptionally decreased to 5 percent during initial discussions with donors in 2006. The donors, as well as OCHA, are opposed to any additional charge, arguing that the management costs are added to the 1 percent cost for UNDP-MDTF in New York, 0.9 percent banking charges, and operating costs for UNDP participation in the Joint Unit estimated at around USD 4 million per year.

Despite the few administrative compromises described above, this issue illustrates the inability of headquarters to adjust rules and procedures to enable the organization to operate in non-conventional activities and areas such as humanitarian aid. Country office management accepted the 5 percent rate during the initial negotiations with OCHA and the donors in 2006, and asking for a 7 percent rate does not seem justified since UNDP is barely involved in the formulation and implementation of PF projects.

OCHA representatives from the UN Secretariat in New York reported their frustration with UNDP regarding the management of common humanitarian funds. The OCHA staff met in Kinshasa was more positive. An independent evaluation commissioned by OCHA in the three countries where UNDP manages common humanitarian funds concluded that the DRC Pooled Fund is well managed overall, but recommended that OCHA find alternatives to UNDP for the management of such funds.

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94 It should be noted that the statutory 7 percent is divided into 3 percent for UNDP headquarters and 4 percent for the country office. The concession made in 2006 only affects the country office share, reducing it to 2 percent.

The country office, in this context, suffers from two major issues resulting from the inability of the organization to adapt to the humanitarian world:

- The management of the PF often generates negative management ratings for the country office because the performance and management of the country office are evaluated by headquarters against procedures and management results typical of development programmes in a 'normal' environment;
- UNDP as an institution risks being excluded from the humanitarian area, which attracts many donors and provides desirable visibility.

### 4.3.3 SUMMARY OF THE OBSERVATIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF BASKET FUNDS

UNDP acquired a solid reputation as a common fund manager in the DRC, mainly due to its exceptional performance during the first election cycle. It has since become ‘inescapable’, according to several donor and the authority representatives. There is, however, a significant risk of compliance and immoderate search for funding and new areas of activity. The UNDP’s institutional culture places a high value on the ability of senior management and country offices to mobilize new funds, often at the expense of the logic of the organization’s mandate.

UNDP has positively contributed to strengthening the management of Pooled Fund projects and stakeholders and was thus able to promote a greater role for NGOs and national associations. It is, however, strongly criticized for its weaknesses in building government capacity under the Global Fund.

Despite a number of positive results in the management of these funds, there are still doubts about the relevance of UNDP’s continued role in the concerned technical areas. A large number of observers interviewed by the ADR team believe that the responsibilities which UNDP has accepted – and in fact sought out – for the management of Global Fund and Pooled Fund programmes represent an institutional risk that requires immediate attention. Some members of the UNDP country office management team are even of the opinion that UNDP could and should withdraw from these activities to concentrate on sustainable development activities, its primary mission.

### 4.4 CROSSCUTTING AREAS

#### 4.4.1 GENDER

During the transition phase, the UN Country Team could rely on a very active gender thematic group, and UNDP integrated this issue into many of its programmes. For example:

- The governance programme made a significant effort to promote women’s participation as voters or candidates. Unfortunately, there was no notable effect on national representation since only 52 of 500 deputies elected in 2006, or a little over 10 percent, were women.\(^96\)
- The training of police officers and the facilitation of access to justice for victims of sexual violence has increased the number of lawsuits.
- UNDP supported the effort of the Noyaux pacifistes des mamans dans l’Ituri\(^97\) to promote the restoration of peace in the district;
- The community recovery programme has built and equipped a number of maternity wards adjacent to, or included in the health centres that it has built;
- The support to the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, even if service coverage is limited to major cities.

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96 There were as many as 60 women deputies in the transitional Assembly. The average for the lower houses for countries in sub-Saharan Africa is 19 percent. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union website.

97 Mothers’ Pacifist Groups in Ituri.
It appears that these efforts have tapered down and that UNDP did not invest as much energy in this area after 2006. The recent outcome evaluation\(^\text{98}\) for the 2008-2011 period finds that progress on gender equality and the empowerment of women is partial or non-existent, and judges the few economic initiatives supported by the PSAR project in North and South Kivu as very limited compared to the needs of victims of sexual violence for socio-economic reintegration. However, the outcome evaluation report notes ‘islands of progress’, particularly in support of the development and popularization of the national gender policy and national strategy against gender-based violence, in community recovery and HIV/AIDS, and in support for decentralization and judicial and security governance. The report attributes the slow progress to:

- Weak implementation of UNDP gender strategy and weak mainstreaming of gender analyses and strategies in the project design phase;
- A lack of high-level technical expertise to anchor the mainstreaming of gender equality and of women empowerment in key UNDP projects and programmes;
- A strong gender imbalance in UNDP’s own staff and serious inequality in the consideration given to its female staff; and
- The low interest of heads of unit, components and projects in taking the gender perspective into account in the development of programme documents and their implementation.

Regarding this last point, the 2010 country office annual report notes that the percentage of women among professional staff has declined in recent years, from 31 percent in 2007 to 23 percent in 2008 and only 17 percent in 2009, recovering slightly in 2010 to 23.1 percent.

It is essential to achieve progress in this area since UNDP should be a model of what it tries to achieve through its programmes in terms of gender equality. The ADR team was able to observe a new impetus given by the country office management team on this issue starting in late 2010. In general, however, UNDP has not contributed to the formulation of national mechanisms and public policies that would positively influence the promotion of human rights and especially gender equity in the DRC.

### 4.4.2 HIV/AIDS

UNDP in the DRC addresses the HIV/AIDS issue through a component of the Poverty and MDG Promotion Programme. Apart from UNDP’s role as primary recipient for some Global Fund programmes to fight AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis – activities managed by a distinct unit within the country office structure – the activities implemented with UNDP’s own funds are very limited, and the budgets have even been reduced recently (see section 4.2.5 of this chapter).

The HIV/AIDS issue must also be seen as a cross-cutting area that should be of interest to all other UNDP programme interventions. Thus, UNDP has promoted the inclusion of the fight against HIV/AIDS as one of the main pillars of the first DSCRPs. For the second, however, UNDP preferred to promote the inclusion of an environment and climate change pillar while ensuring that the AIDS theme was mainstreamed in all sectors. UNDP ensured that the HIV/AIDS theme was taken into account in other interventions as well. This is particularly true for DDR activities, the training of police officers and the support to provincial planning. These efforts, however, remain relatively weak, and there is no focal point in the country office responsible for the systematic promotion of the theme in the formulation of programmes and projects.

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4.4.3 SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

The governance programme has made intensive use of regional expertise in its implementation. This is particularly true for the support to the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies through study tours abroad or training provided in the DRC involving regional experts. During the first cycle, in the context of the election security project, neighbouring countries contributed to police training in the DRC. To support the development of strategy documents such as the DSCR, the country office called upon a large number of international consultants from West Africa. Some Government stakeholders complained that this expertise was overly used at the expense of employing nationals.

4.4.4 CONFLICT PREVENTION

In the context of the DRC, all interventions must take causes of conflict into account, including endemic poverty, acute disparities, access to natural resources, land tenure issues, and impunity. Before proceeding with planning for the 2008-2011 cycle, the country office requested the help of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) to carry out a thorough analysis of the causes of conflict. It did the same in preparation for the next cycle, whose formulation should start at the end of 2011. In October 2011, a joint mission was under way to support the UN Country Team’s capacity to conduct conflict analysis. The country office’s policy and strategy unit is the focal point facilitating this discussion, but this unit has until recently shown weaknesses and should be strengthened.

4.5 GENERAL REMARKS ON EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY AND NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

4.5.1 EFFECTIVENESS

When considering the efficiency of UNDP interventions, i.e., its capacity to contribute to development results, it is important to keep in mind that some interventions lend themselves more easily to this exercise than others. The interventions begun during the first cycle are finished and have had the time to produce visible results, while those initiated during the second cycle are mostly still under way and should be judged on their potential to produce results. Thus, the efficiency can be analysed under three main headings:

- Interventions where effects are visible and demonstrable: these are, in general, programmes and projects that are already completed with final reports and independent evaluations. For example: the support to the first election cycle, to parliamentary institutions and to the Court of Audits, some community recovery and development programmes, DDR projects, programmes related to gender-based sexual violence and the improvement of implementing partners’ performance under the Pooled Fund.

- Interventions where the results remain hypothetical, mainly including ongoing projects for which results cannot be measured yet, such as the support for REDD+ preparedness. Projects that have delivered the expected products but have not yet generated the anticipated results can also be included in this category. The ADR team thinks here especially of UNDP’s work to develop strategies, policy, action plans and development plans that the authorities have not yet implemented either for a lack of political will, a shift in priorities or a lack of funding. Decentralization, support for provincial and local development plans, or even the first DSCR are examples of finished products that largely remained fruitless so far.

- Finally, some interventions yielded limited or no results. This is the case with the component to support media and civil society for which UNDP was unable to meet donor expectations, with PADDL that was never able to implement its local development fund, and with the support to national authorities for the transfer of responsibilities under the Global Fund programmes.
Almost all UNDP interventions, as much for governance as for poverty, include important capacity-building activities. This is a key area in a country under reconstruction. These activities do not lend themselves easily to evaluation, and annual reports typically quantify the amount of training, the number of people trained and the organization of seminars and workshops, without any in-depth analysis of the impact of these activities on improved performance of a government department or the quality of the documents produced. These training activities are often undertaken without a precise diagnosis of the initial capacity situation and without looking for complementarity with other UNDP projects or the support provided by other bilateral or multilateral agencies. They are also too narrowly focused on training of a few individuals, whose selection may or may not be relevant, without addressing the deeper issues of the mandate, values, budgets and operational constraints of the institutions that employ them. In addition, UNDP has not provided the necessary financial and human resources for an effective monitoring and evaluation of capacity-building activities.

4.5.2 EFFICIENCY IN IMPLEMENTATION

Throughout the first cycle, UNDP was able to create a strong dynamic due to generally well-targeted and directly implemented interventions, through a set of distinct projects. These projects suffered numerous delays but nevertheless came to term. During this period, the creation of ad hoc management units (service centre; NIM/ DIM, Pooled Fund and GFATM units), as well as field offices, greatly contributed to UNDP’s efficiency and credibility in the DRC. The reconfiguration of the field offices may be detrimental to the organization’s image and may significantly reduce its operational capacity. However, it is important to note that, to the credit of the country office, it intends to make of its Goma office a real sub-office, managing its own resources and programmes and providing support to other project or satellite offices. This implies an increased delegation of authority to the field but will have the disadvantage of further accentuating the imbalance in favour of the eastern provinces and weakening the capacity of UNDP to intervene in many provinces as efficiently as it has in the past.

Some first-cycle interventions were too compartmentalized and did not create the kind of synergies necessary to enrich the national experience, for example, for the four community recovery projects of the first cycle (PADC, COMDEV, 2BEK and COMREC). While the first cycle was characterized by a ‘project approach’, UNDP chose a ‘programme approach’ for the 2008-2012 cycle, both as a streamlining effort and under pressure from donors who sought more coherence, particularly in the good governance area. However, both governance and poverty programmes today lack coherence, and collaboration between these two intervention areas is rare. In part, this was due to the sometimes artificial regrouping of activities previously managed by the post-conflict unit and somewhat arbitrarily divided up between governance and poverty programmes, but the main factors were the significant budget cuts and, therefore, the abandonment of interventions that were part of an overall logic, as well as an institutional culture that does not promote systematic coordination, the search for linkages between activities and greater synergy between teams.

The evaluation team heard a number of complaints about delays in disbursements to partners in all intervention areas. These delays are related to a lack of real decentralization towards the field offices, bottlenecks in Kinshasa, an overly bureaucratic administrative culture and the absence of clear rules and procedures known to all. These delays represent the most serious efficiency issue.
which the country office must address. They generate blockages, frustrations and additional and non-reimbursable costs for partners, who must retain staff longer than set out in partnership agreements.

For its role in managing the common funds for the elections (APEC) and for the security of the electoral process (SPEC), UNDP built its reputation as an effective manager in 2005 and 2006. This status has enabled the organization to be entrusted with a number of other common funds. UNDP continues to suffer from its image as an administratively cumbersome and slow organization, and several observers consider that its procedures are not adapted to humanitarian funds such as the Pooled Fund. The NGOs generally consider that UNDP does not communicate sufficiently and treats them more as subcontractors than as true partners.

From a programme management point of view, the ratio between international and national staff is more imbalanced in favour of expatriates than other UNDP programmes typically are100, a situation which considerably augments implementation costs. Although UNDP needed a quick and massive injection of skills when programmes multiplied ten-fold between 2004 and 2005, the necessary adjustments came too late after that. The same applies to the special units created in 2005, functioning in parallel with the existing country office units. It was essentially a ‘service centre’ including one unit for procurements and another for human resources, and it was not until mid-2011 that these parallel services were completely integrated in the regular structure.

The ADR team noted that a number of activities were executed through ‘cascading’ implementation arrangements, in other words, implemented by a series of intermediaries, which resulted in increased management costs and reduced benefits to the beneficiaries (Figure 1).

This is the case, for example, when projects implemented by international NGOs are subcontracted to national NGOs, or for UNDP projects executed by another UN agency. Some UNDP programmes deliberately adopted a formula for execution by international NGOs that were then required to subcontract national NGOs. UNDP considered the increase in overhead justified by the effort to improve national NGOs’ capacities.

In recent years, UNDP’s institutional culture in Kinshasa did not sufficiently promote the creation of synergies between projects and programmes. This is the case, for example, with community recovery interventions that could benefit from ‘bridges’ to the microfinance sector, or for capacity building activities that could be implemented jointly. However, it should be noted that the UN Country Team did attempt to promote joint projects that capitalize on the respective abilities of agencies and are attractive to donors.

Significant human resources are available in the country office for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), but here again, cooperation between those responsible for M&E remains weak. In the current context, those M&E officers work under the authority of programme managers, something which is appropriate for monitoring, which falls under the responsibility of programme managers, but more problematic for the evaluation function, which should be more independent.

Finally, the mission notes that most of the progress reports consulted present a generally positive image of interventions, focus on products rather than outcomes, and lack a critical analysis of the challenges that arise during implementation and of the means to overcome them.

The monitoring function is especially important since it feeds into the necessary dialogue with partners, beneficiaries and donors. Quality dialogue with donors is essential in a country

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100 In stable situations, the proportion of international staff in UNDP country offices is often less than 10 percent. However, a high ratio of international staff is frequent in crisis or immediate post-conflict situations. For example, the national UNDP staff in Iraq is only 61.9 percent of the total, whereas it represents 88.5 percent in Angola.
where most of the resources come from extra-budgetary contributions. Diligent and transparent reporting along with relevant analysis are essential to maintaining the office’s reputation as a good manager of basket funds. A positive example here is the quality of Pooled Fund project monitoring.

### 4.5.3 NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS

UNDP, like all foreign aid actors, often substitutes for the role of the Government. In a context of post-crisis and reconstruction of the State such as that in the DRC, this substitution role was unavoidable. True national ownership inevitably takes time. Some progress has been achieved, e.g., the active role played by the Prime Minister in the overall coordination of the governance programme.

However, the level of national ownership and the prospect for sustainable results remain generally limited. The situation is better at the community level than at the government level. UNDP projects frequently require their benefiting communities to contribute financially or in labour, a useful practice for the sustainability of results. The schools and health centres visited by the ADR

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**Table 11. Evolution of UNDP Staff, 2006-2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Année</th>
<th>Effectifs Staff</th>
<th>International Personnel</th>
<th>National Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP Country Office, Kinshasa, August 2011

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**Figure 1. The ‘Cascading’ Nature of Some Aid Channels in the DRC**

- Arrows represent financial flows.
- This diagram illustrates some specific cases and does not imply that all basket funds operate in cascades.
mission were all self-financed, with teachers and
nurses demanding a contribution from benefici-
aries in the absence of state support. In the same
vein, maintenance of the Kisangani-Ubundu road
has long been carried out by logging companies
rather than by the government department that
levied the right of way along the road. It is as if
the Government had transferred the responsi-

bility for entire swathes of social services to the
‘international community’ and to civil society.

With the notable exception of the Government’s
participation in the electoral fund and two
instances of financial contributions by the
Katanga provincial authorities, the Government’s
financial participation in projects is very limited.
In addition, the staff required to run the structures
rehabilitated or built by UNDP projects are often
availed very late, and salaries and operational
costs rarely paid. In these conditions, it is difficult
to envisage sustainable results. As explained, the
situation is better for interventions targeting
communities, small groups or individuals at the
grassroots because some form of financial or
labour contribution is usually required in those
cases. This requirement promotes ownership by
the beneficiaries and increases the likelihood of
sustainable results.

101 Although since January 2011, maintenance has reportedly been provided by the Office of Roads, with funding
from FONER.
5.1 STRATEGIC RELEVANCE

In general, the relevance of the interventions funded by UNDP and its partners is widely recognized. In terms of documentation, UNDP programming frameworks (CPD, CPAP) are almost perfectly consistent with the various strategic planning documents of the Government (DSCRCP), donors (CAF) and the United Nations (UNDAF), which is not surprising given that UNDP has been instrumental in developing these strategic documents. In terms of meeting the population’s needs, the programme has also been quite relevant in that it addressed key themes for the country’s future and to improve the welfare of the population. The programme is also aligned with UNDP global and regional strategies and responds to the priorities and values of the United Nations.

At the strategic level, it is important to underline that many UNDP interventions are national in scope (election support, DDR and community recovery, Global Fund, etc.). Rare are the countries in which UNDP has been able to work on such a wide geographical expanse or could claim such a high visibility. Therefore, the balance between upstream and downstream interventions is especially good. Activities in areas such as community recovery, DDR, support for provincial assemblies and administrations, training of the police force and access to justice have given UNDP an image of operational capability and proximity to beneficiaries, an image that the organization lacks in many countries. However, the programme continues to suffer from several imbalances:

- Management of the large basket funds such as the Pooled Fund and the Global Fund is an important responsibility of the country office and accounts for 61 percent of the total volume of operations. The considerable weight of this service activity raises the important issue of the external perception of UNDP, evolving from that of an organization providing visible leadership for development and strong pro-poor advocacy, to that of a service provider or implementing agent in domains that are not always central to its mandate;

- Programmes for the fight against poverty and the promotion of MDGs only represent about 11 percent\(^\text{102}\) of total spending over the last three years. As a comparison, in 2010 and in all its programmes around the world, UNDP dedicated more than 28 percent of its global resources to this thematic area;

- Geographically, UNDP devotes more resources in the east of the country than in other areas, despite more acute poverty conditions in certain of these other zones. This geographical imbalance is not confined to UNDP and affects many other multilateral and bilateral actors. In many cases, the choice of interventions and zones of action are defined by the donors, and UNDP attempts to diversify these intervention zones have systematically been underfinanced; and

- The donor base participating in the good governance support programme was imbalanced, favouring one donor until just recently.

The targeting of interventions is generally judicious even though programmes often appear too ambitious in comparison to the organization’s resources, or are based on excessive expectations.

\(^{102}\) This percentage increases to 25 percent if non-traditional activities under the Pooled Fund and the Global Fund are excluded from the calculation.
of contributions, as was the case with the poverty programme. The wide diversity of interventions combined with a reduction of resources has highlighted a sense of dispersion and thinly spread resources in UNDP programmes. Donors have played a key role in both choosing the intervention areas and in the reduction of resources, even if management weaknesses at times also caused some funding to be withdrawn.

### 5.2 RESPONSIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY

During the period covered by the ADR, the UNDP country office had to implement a very broad and multidimensional programme in a very complex national context. UNDP successfully managed the first phase corresponding to the transitional period and to the 2003-2007 programing cycle. However, it has not sufficiently anticipated the changes that followed the first elections and the installation of the first elected government since 2007.

The context of the first period can be summarized by emphasizing the following characteristics. First, the country remained in an emergency phase, emerging from a period of conflict and entering into a transition stemming from an agreement to share power and governmental responsibilities at all levels. Despite the persistence of violence and serious conflicts, particularly in the East, some signs of stabilization and a timid economic recovery appeared. The strategy of the international community was focused on humanitarian assistance and on stabilization, especially on reforming the security sector and supporting the electoral cycles. Resources were significant, available operational actors were scarce, and UNDP benefited from a significant level of trust from the authorities.

During this period, UNDP was able to react with great agility, often testing the limits imposed by administrative regulations, and responded promptly to immediate demands. According to a former country director, the DRC was a ‘laboratory of innovations’ during this period. A number of innovations were, in fact, introduced in the rather particular context of the DRC at the time. These include the intensive use of common funds, making UNDP more operational through field offices, a community-based approach to DDR, support to the electoral cycle and intensive use of UNV during implementation. The DRC has also been a place for experimenting with new formulas for managing integrated UN missions through joint implementation units and by creating an integrated office at MONUC to support the role of the SRSG in charge of coordinating the United Nations system and humanitarian affairs.

The 2008-2012 programming cycle covers a more complex period, during which the Government considers that the country is no longer in a situation of emergency, despite the ongoing violence and instability in some regions. This is the time to rebuild the administration of the State, respond to the root causes of conflict and consolidate peace, and to address endemic poverty and long-term priorities such as the environment. But national capacities and governance remain weak, while donors are now more demanding, both in terms of results and management.

UNDP could have adapted more quickly to this changing context. It should have reformed the ad hoc units created previously, and prioritized the core purpose of the organization – sustainable development and national capacity building. This period also required a return to administrative practices consistent with the regulatory framework. A period of ‘normalization’ should have followed this emergency period, but UNDP was slow in making the necessary adjustments.

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103 The Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition of December 2002 was in fact more of a formula for the sharing of power and governmental responsibilities between former combatants, the political opposition and civil society than a new vision of the future accompanied by a reconstruction and governance programme. This often resulted in the near paralysis of several administrations due to the underlying political tensions.
In the second cycle, UNDP was much less innovative. However, one should note among the most recent innovations the efforts to support a transition from humanitarian to development, such as the STAREC, the attempt to geographically rebalance aid through the Peace Consolidation Programme, and the preparation to REDD+.

Meanwhile, according to the majority of observers, UNDP remained attentive to the Government and continues to have a good ability to analyse the national context and priorities. Some note, however, a decrease in that analytical ability in recent years.

UNDP has made efforts to adapt to MONUSCO’s changing mandate and contributed to UN Country Team initiatives to facilitate the phasing out of MONUSCO presence in some areas of the country. Thus, UNDP launched the PACTE project for transition in the Equateur Province, developed plans for the creation of three joint United Nations offices and participated in joint projects with other UN system agencies.

In addition, the programme was affected by a 25 percent decrease in the organization’s own resources, a reduction that was implemented midway through the last programming cycle and destabilized a number of activities, particularly those in which UNDP had to compensate for the reluctance of donors, such as in the poverty programme. These reductions were not always properly explained to partners and were slow to translate into a formal review of budgets and agreements.

### 5.3 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

Relations between UNDP and the Government remain good. They are based on the trust developed in an organization that stayed by the authorities in the darkest hour, and facilitated the return of multilateral and bilateral institutions that, at one time, were still hesitant to become involved. Formally, UNDP’s main partner is the Ministry of International Cooperation but in practice, working relations are more intense with the Ministry of Planning. For example, the Ministry of Planning coordinates the thematic groups, bringing together government services and external partners under the responsibility of one technical ministry and with the support of one ‘lead’ international partner. Coordination, however, remains weak between ministries and within governmental services. UNDP has also developed relationships with the Prime Minister, mainly in order to ensure better coordination of governance programmes.

Relations between UNDP and donors deteriorated between 2008 and 2010, particularly for the governance programme. UNDP was criticized for reporting delays and, more generally, for a lack of transparency and poor communications. UNDP has now developed a communication and partnership strategy that promotes openness and dialogue. At the same time, it is in the process of diversifying its donor base to strike a better balance in some programmes.

Relations between the World Bank and UNDP also deteriorated during the preparation of the second DSCRP because of disagreements about whether to start writing this document prior to the formation of the newly elected government, in addition to methodological problems. UNDP was seen as attempting to impose its formulas and methods at the time.

UNDP works extensively with civil society and NGOs in the DRC. The preparation of the first DSCRP and the Forum on Decentralization remain examples of good practices in the area of civil society consultation. Unfortunately, the preparation of the second DSCR did not benefit from such extensive consultation.

In its downstream interventions, especially the community recovery and development programmes, UNDP cooperates with a large number of local NGOs and community groups. In addition, UNDP works extensively with numerous civil society associations and organizations through its management work for the
Global Fund and in the context of the Pooled Fund. UNDP’s role in strengthening the capacities of these groups significantly contributed to promoting the role of national NGOs. UNDP still lacks the ability to provide its support to the NGOs flexibly enough, and to treat them as partners rather than subcontractors.

The support provided by UNDP central and regional structures to the country office could not be exhaustively analysed. However, it appears that BCPR in New York provided the most effective support through both funding and technical assistance. BCPR provided significant support to the UNDP’s post-conflict unit in Kinshasa during the first programming cycle, contributed to the creation and initial funding of the network of field offices, and supported programme planning by providing expertise in the analysis of the sources of conflict.

5.4 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF UNDP IN THE DRC

Clear comparative advantages emerge from the ADR team’s analysis of UNDP in the DRC since 2003:

- UNDP enjoys a significant level of trust among national authorities and authorities in the provinces in which it operates. The organization is perceived as neutral and capable of simultaneously representing the views of the governmental authorities and the international partners and, therefore, able to play a facilitating role in some discussions;
- UNDP has developed a pro-poor sensitivity through community approaches and its support for the promotion of the MDGs. It has, therefore, developed a greater advocacy capacity;
- It demonstrated a good ability to analyse and comprehend the causes of conflict and did not restrict this analysis to geographic areas that recently experienced active conflicts. Here too, its capacity for advocacy is important;
- In the DRC, UNDP showed a great ability for innovation and a greater flexibility than in many other programmes. It succeeded in projecting an image of a highly operational organization, with a presence in the field and in proximity to the beneficiaries; and
- It has developed a recognized and appreciated capacity as a basket fund manager.

In the area of good governance support, there is no doubt that UNDP was able to develop significant comparative advantages, particularly for the elections, parliamentary assemblies, the Court of Audits, police training and access to justice, including support for victims of sexual violence. Community development and recovery activities remain a strong point in the fight against poverty, as is the capacity of UNDP to support the formulation of national policy and strategy documents. Activities undertaken more recently in the context of REDD for the environment and climate change have positioned UNDP as a major player in this field. Finally, UNDP has effectively supported national NGOs and development of their project management capacity.

5.5 UNDP SUPPORT TO THE COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL AID

The country receives substantial international financial aid, which makes proper coordination of this aid more important but also more difficult.

With the notable exception of the International Committee to Support Transition (CIAT),

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104 The Comité international d’accompagnement de la transition (CIAT) was composed of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, South Africa, Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, Zambia, the African Union, the European Union and the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC). It originated in Annex IV (‘International Guarantee’) of the Global and Inclusive Agreement signed by the participants and entities of the inter-Congolese dialogue on 16 December 2002 in Pretoria.
established to support the democratic transition in the DRC and closely follow preparations for the 2006 elections, the 2003-2006 period was characterized by generally weak coordination among donors, and between the United Nations and the rest of the international community. The State’s role in coordination is very weak.

However, the first DSCRP was developed based on broad national consultations and formal approval of this document by the transitional parliament in 2006 marks the beginning of some national ownership.

UNDP participated in the development of the Country Assistance Framework (CAF) that marked an important turning point in the coordination of international aid to the DRC. The CAF still exists today but became a high-level forum for international partners rather than a reference document. The United Nations, through the Resident Coordinator, and the World Bank co-chair the CAF that brings together the heads of bilateral and multilateral agencies in the DRC.

The Ministry of Planning and UNDP have also established 15 thematic groups to ensure better sectoral coordination. A government official chairs these groups with the support of a lead donor. In general, the effectiveness of the thematic groups varies widely and depends mostly on the capacity of different presidents and the energy of the leaders. Some of these groups have not met for over a year, such as the subgroup on decentralization led by UNDP.

Partners also expressed their appreciation for the ‘Mardis du Développement’105, a country office initiative to bring together all interested partners once a month around a specific developmental theme.

Agencies and NGOs involved in humanitarian work and benefiting from the Pooled Fund also participate in the humanitarian cluster meetings at the national and provincial levels. UNDP plays a marginal role in this structure, which is quite normal in view of its mandate more focused on development than humanitarian work. It is the cluster leader for the small ‘return, reintegration and early recovery’ cluster, which receives very little PF funding106 and whose specificity and mission remains rather ill-defined compared to cluster pertaining to sectors such as food security or education. In the DRC, the early recovery cluster appears to have worked only in the Province Orientale, Ituri, North and South Kivu, and even then, the lack of funding and unclear positioning of the cluster progressively discouraged NGO members to attend the provincial clusters.

At a retreat organized at the end of May 2011, partners observed a number of weaknesses in coordination. It was found that coordination had become more of an information-sharing mechanism than a vehicle for concerted action, and that the architecture for strategic management of aid in the DRC had all but broken down.

An important issue at this level is that of the relationship between the Government and donors. The latter became heavily involved in the transition and retained their outspoken habits, which at times upset the Government. Another constraint is the weakness of the coordination between ministers and governmental services. A World Bank mission in 2010 observed that “the coordination of external resources within the Government is characterized by a plethora of structures whose missions frequently overlap”107. Too many ministries are competing for coordination and control of aid, a situation that the Government does not seem to want to rectify. UNDP and other

105 ‘Development Tuesdays’.
106 This cluster only received USD 1.2 million of the USD 122 million received through the PF in 2010 (UNOCHA, Humanitarian Action Plan 2011).
partners are currently working on a proposal for a coordinating structure that would bring together all key ministries and include a platform for high-level political dialogue involving these ministries and donors, chaired by the Prime Minister. This proposal emanates from a high-level national forum organized by the Government in 2009 on the effectiveness of aid.

Chapter 4 examined four projects jointly implemented with other United Nations agencies: (i) CEPI in the Ituri District; (ii) PACTE in the Equateur Province; (iii) the rehabilitation of basic social services and the recovery of displaced communities in the areas of return of South Kivu; (iv) support for conflict stabilization and prevention in the Beni territory in North Kivu. This type of inter-agency collaboration likely goes deeper in the DRC than in many other countries. The relevant agencies include UNICEF, FAO, UNDP and sometimes the UNHCR. These agencies describe the benefits of joint projects as follows:

- Joint projects strengthen inter-agency collaboration;
- They benefit from a high credibility, visibility and attractiveness for local authorities and donors; and
- Interventions are more complete, useful and synergetic, at least when implemented by agencies in a concerted and simultaneous manner.

They also have disadvantages. During the initial phase of this effort to develop joint interventions, the formulation of institutional arrangements and resource sharing between agencies took more time than for a simpler project. Agencies have different implementation rhythms, which limits synergies between them. UNICEF, for example, is often faster and more flexible in its relations with NGOs than are UNDP and FAO. Finally, they were promoted at first mostly to mobilize resources. The agencies involved have only gradually recognized the importance of not only common planning but also concerted implementation. From this point of view, the most recently implemented projects in the two Kivu appear to be better integrated than the older CEPI project, in which the agencies intervened largely in parallel, despite a couple concrete examples of synergies. The most recent joint projects have benefited from lessons learned from the CEPI experience thanks to an exchange workshop on joint projects held in Goma in January 2010.

5.6 IMAGE AND COMMUNICATION

UNDP is relatively well known to the general public, mainly thanks to its support to the electoral process. The country office now produces quality public information materials that avoid UN jargon and transmit simple and accessible messages. The website is good but could be improved with more frequent updates about projects and operations. For example, there is no mention of the problems encountered by the decentralization support project, in spite of it being at a near standstill.

In the domain of communication with partners, several parties have expressed their frustration at not receiving answers or feedback when they submit a report, present a fund-raising project or point out operational problems. An example was given of a provincial governor who wrote to UNDP in Kinshasa in April 2011 and had not yet received even an acknowledgement of receipt by July. According to several donors, and despite recent improvements, UNDP communicates less, and less efficiently, than it used to do until 2006.
6.1 CONCLUSIONS

The previous chapters examined the environment in which UNDP operates, analysed the main axes of its contribution to development in the DRC, and assessed its strategic positioning. The following conclusions seek to highlight the essential strategic lessons from the evaluation.

Conclusion 1. Having reviewed UNDP interventions during the two programming cycles, the ADR team concludes that the quality and visibility of UNDP’s engagement in the DRC were better from 2003 to 2007 than they have been since 2008.

The first cycle corresponds to the post-conflict period and the beginning of state stabilization and reconstruction. Humanitarian aid and the security sector are given priority, resulting in a stabilization that remains quite partial. The donors have recently returned to the DRC and their interest level is high. They are ready to invest significant resources and are looking for well-established implementing agencies. The national capacities remain very weak in a context in which the management of ministries is often paralysed by the tensions resulting from the adoption of the 1+4 formula during the transition. This has led the international community to adopt many substitution models in response to the weaknesses of the State, for example, through technical support teams lodged within the civil service or through implementation via international organizations and NGOs. For the UNDP office, this was a period dominated by enthusiasm, creativity and risk-taking.

The context changed for the 2008-2012 programming cycle: the country is no longer in a situation of extreme emergency, despite the violence and instability that persist in some regions. This is a time to reconstruct state administration, respond to the root causes of conflict and instability, consolidate peace and confront endemic poverty and long-term issues, such as the environment, all in a continued context of weak national policies, norms and institutions. Donors, however, want to go beyond emergency and they become more demanding than in the previous period. For UNDP, this period presents an opportunity for ‘normalization’, i.e. to bring administrative practices back into the regulatory framework, reform the ad hoc units created previously, and refocus the programmes on the core mandate of the organization, i.e., development policy and capacity building. Nevertheless, these changes were driven by a team whose management was challenged by some major donors. UNDP was slow to adapt to this new situation. Within the team, enthusiasm gave way to routine, or even frustration and discouragement, given the magnitude of the challenges.

Conclusion 2. When planning for a new cycle (2013-2017), UNDP can count a large number of significant comparative advantages in the DRC, but there are still many pending questions about the future, and planning will have to show a great deal of flexibility.

UNDP has been able to develop a number of strong points in its interventions. Its competence is recognized in several areas of good governance, in supporting the development of policy and strategy documents, in a community-based approach to development and more recently in the quality of its support for programmes related to climate change. It has also developed a good understanding of the root causes of instability and conflict in the country and extended its reflection to often-neglected areas such as poverty outside of zones of active conflict, or land tenure issues. UNDP has built an increasingly solid reputation...
as a basket fund manager and remains a respected partner of the Government, provincial authorities, donors and other UN agencies, with which it implements several joint projects.

Yet the future remains uncertain, and many questions can affect the strategic options for the next programme. These include uncertainty about government priorities following the elections planned for late November 2011; the sharp decline in funding over the last two years, which will undoubtedly continue to suffer from the international financial crisis; the future of MONUSCO, which is subject to annual renewals of its mandate; a national post-election context in which the Government will no doubt want to assert its sovereignty more vigorously; and a national environment in which solutions have yet to be found for the root causes of tension between communities, be it in the east or west of the country.

Should there then be a cautious fall back on activities that are core to the UNDP mandate and away from peripheral undertakings? Above all, it is important to remain prudent, choose areas of intervention based on opportunities that arise, and maintain room for manoeuvre.

It is clear that certain activities, for example, the support to decentralization, have not yielded positive results and should be deeply revisited. In other areas, UNDP has assumed a secondary role and could withdraw, for example, from most activities in the sectors of administrative and economic governance, except for the Court of Audits and support for aid coordination.

Conclusion 3. UNDP has demonstrated its ability to initiate major national debates and often be at the forefront of national strategy development. It has practiced effective advocacy in several domains and is, therefore, in a position to build on this experience and credibility to reassert leadership in matters of development.

Sound, targeted and opportune initiatives have enabled UNDP to develop its role as an agent of innovation and advocacy, for example, in organizing the National Forum on Decentralization in 2007 or its action in the area of climate change to support country negotiators in major international conferences and the DRC’s access to REDD+. It is necessary to reaffirm this innovation capacity and leadership role more forcefully in the coming years.

Conclusion 4. There remain significant imbalances in the UNDP programmes that affect the organization’s ability to fully develop pro-poor approaches and ensure the vitality of its development mandate. These imbalances can be corrected.

The first of these imbalances is geographical and affects UNDP as well as most multilateral or bilateral actors. UNDP has started to play an important role in the East and in Equateur in the transition from humanitarian work to development assistance. It did so by supporting STAREC, as well as with its own community recovery and community development programmes. With its United Nations partners and at the Government’s request, it has now engaged in the development of a Peace Consolidation Programme which will complement the STAREC in the West and South. This rebalancing effort is based on a simple concern: acute poverty is at the root of many tensions that lead to destabilization and conflict, and is as common in the west of the country as it is in the east. The formulation of the PCP has been time-consuming and deserves to be accelerated.

The second imbalance lies in the very composition of the UNDP programme that dedicates only 25 percent of total 2008-2010 expenditures to the fight against poverty (excluding Pooled Fund and Global Fund-related expenditures). While community recovery was conceived as the centrepiece of the poverty programme, it is now likely to be abandoned due to UNDP budget cuts and

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108 The Civil Affairs Section of MONUSCO records in a database the conflicts it is informed of. The database indicates that there are twice as many conflicts outside of STAREC zones than inside them (around 800 conflicts per year compared to 400). According to this database, land was at the root of 40 percent of all conflicts.
to lack of interest by donors, who prioritize the humanitarian, security, infrastructure and macroeconomic sectors. The recent UNDP decision to review field office operations and to sensibly reduce its presence outside of Kinshasa and Goma will further reduce the organization’s opportunity to operationalize downstream community interventions. This was, however, one of UNDP’s strong points and the area where effectiveness and ownership of results were most significant.

The third major imbalance concerns the growing importance that UNDP has placed on the management of large basket funds. Expenditures related to the Pooled Fund and Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria account for nearly two-thirds (61 percent) of total country office disbursements for the 2008-2010 period. UNDP is thus often perceived more as a manager and a service provider than as an agent of sustainable development. In the case of the Global Fund programmes, UNDP is held fully accountable for the results and for the proper use of funds, in programmes for which it controls neither planning nor the designation of implementing partners. For the Pooled Fund, the few efforts made to adapt its procedures to the management of humanitarian programmes contributed to UNDP being perceived positively, as facilitating NGO access to PF funding. Humanitarian actors, however, still perceive UNDP as too bureaucratic. Headquarters must make additional efforts if the organization wants to remain a good manager of humanitarian funds.

For Global Fund programmes, monitoring weaknesses and UNDP administrative delays are compounded by the slowness and rigidity of the Fund management itself. In addition, governmental entities have accused UNDP of being placed in a conflict of interest and not sufficiently favouring the strengthening of capacities of future primary recipients.

Conclusion 5. The particular circumstances in which programmes are implemented and the recognized weaknesses of national authorities in project and fund management have led to an approach that favoured the direct implementation of programmes by UNDP, an unusual situation which requires an explicit waiver from the organization’s senior management. In parallel, national ownership and sustainability of results have been limited.

Many of the international aid actors in the DRC have preferred to entrust programme implementation to NGOs, civil society organizations or international organizations that manage their funds directly. This is symptomatic of the lack of trust in the Congolese administration, its poor management of national budgets and particularly the lack of a credible and secure payment chain.

The DRC is indeed a country that absolutely needs to reconstruct a state presence, but it also seems to have lost, along the ordeals it has suffered, any shared notion of good citizenship and social contract. This results in a very low level of trust towards institutions and between individuals, as well as in high rates of insecurity and corruption. This phenomenon constitutes a challenge for international cooperation agencies that seek to strengthen the capacity of the State, while the State itself seems to attach little importance to the provision of social services such as health or education, as well as to such essential and regalian functions as justice. In this context, the principles of the Paris Declaration remain difficult to apply.

As a consequence, many international cooperation efforts ‘substitute’ for national actors, in the sense that a non-state actor provides a service where national efforts and resources should prevail. The objectives of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Action Plan should be pursued, albeit without illusions or precipitation, in order to further the goal of the DRC becoming the architect of its own development. As such, UNDP can still play a pioneering role in inventing intermediate formulas for joint resource and programme management, and in establishing a roadmap with clear milestones for a gradual transfer of responsibilities, while reassuring donors by enforcing the sort of rigour required to properly manage funds and achieve outcomes.
Conclusion 6. UNDP continues to be perceived as a bureaucratic organization. The institutional culture is so focused on prudent management of funds and on the importance of securing funding that the ‘client’ – i.e. the institutional and individual beneficiaries of the interventions – is sometimes overlooked.

Delays in disbursements to partners, related to an absence of true decentralization to the field offices, bottlenecks in Kinshasa, an overly bureaucratic administrative culture and the lack of clear rules known to all, represent the most serious efficiency problems that the office must face. They generate blockages, frustrations and additional costs for partners, and seriously damage the reputation of UNDP in the country.

UNDP seems to want to position itself in areas such as community recovery, humanitarian work and emergency operations that require a highly flexible management as well as a capacity for rapid response and a strong presence in the field. These characteristics are not those of a traditional UNDP that tends to operate in capital cities, in stable situations and environments and mainly in support of national policies and strategies. With a programme as ambitious as that of UNDP in the DRC, focused on crisis and rehabilitation issues, implemented over such a vast geographical expanse, and partnering in almost all of its components with such diverse operational partners, it is absolutely essential to take operational and contractual issues very seriously.

The evaluation team has noted that UNDP does not communicate with its partners sufficiently, whether donors, authorities or NGOs. Moreover, many observers consider that UNDP finds it difficult to clearly position itself between, on the one hand, its role as a donor subcontracting implementation of projects to partners, and, on the other hand, its own resource mobilization efforts as an implementing agent for other donors. Some interlocutors noted that the performance assessment system for UNDP country office management placed too strong an emphasis on fund-raising.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on its observations and analyses, the evaluation team proposes the following recommendations, on general and strategic themes as well as on specific thematic and operational issues.

Recommendation 1: In planning for the next cycle, and considering a probable reduction in resources, UNDP must strive to reduce the number of sectors and subsectors of intervention, build upon the strongest elements of its former programmes to address the country’s most urgent needs and avoid redundancy with other stakeholders’ interventions. Its future interventions must be based on diagnoses jointly conducted with the authorities and all other stakeholders, and on a precise roadmap showing the complementary nature of their respective actions. Furthermore, these operations must be carefully contextualized to fit the political and operational environment of the country rather than based on standard, one-size-fits-all institutional arrangements, principles and approaches.

In concrete terms, and not precluding future developments and opportunities that could arise, the evaluation team suggests that:

a) In decentralization, the programme should be refocused on advocacy, stressing the absolute need for effective decentralization in a large and diverse country as the DRC and the need to rethink the modalities of decentralization in more pragmatic terms. Within this framework, UNDP can provide tools for analysis, assist in assessing the current situation, provide a space for dialogue between local, national and international stakeholders, and support the local elections, long postponed and currently planned for 2013. As for the PADDL, its staff and ambitions should be scaled down to account for the lack of local development funds. In the short term, the approach tested in Beni-Mbau, combining reconstruction and development planning by local authorities and implementation through UN agencies or
NGOs, seems the most realistic to support local development.

b) In other components of good governance, the main focus should be placed on the following areas: (i) reinforcement of the Independent Election Commission and parliamentary institutions; (ii) support for the Court of Audit, including the provincial courts currently planned; (iii) support to aid coordination by strengthening the PGAI as well as the different thematic groups and other agreement forums where UNDP has a central role, such as the Joint Committee on Justice (Commission Mixte de la Justice); and (iv) training of police forces and improved access to justice, in priority for victims of sexual violence.

c) For the fight against poverty, the focus should be on the following areas: (i) support to STAREC and to the swift formulation of the future Peace Consolidation Programme (Programme de Consolidation de la Paix or PCP); (ii) support for the drafting of essential development policy and strategy documents, including the DSCRP and MDGs progress monitoring, while ensuring that these policies and strategies are followed up and implemented; (iii) community development; (iv) the development of microfinance in deprived areas and for the most vulnerable populations, by linking up microfinance interventions with community development activities; and (v) climate change, where the challenge will be to implement effective field programmes that are environmentally friendly and socially responsible.

d) Anticipating a gradual drawdown of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), and in consultation with the United Nations Country Team and with the Government, preparations should be made to take over some of the functions currently under the responsibility of the MONUSCO, particularly in the areas of peace building and human security.

Recommendation 2: Building on its comparative advantages as government partner, leading UN agency and CAF member, UNDP must reposition itself as a facilitator of change by developing strong advocacy and national debates on complex issues crucial to the country’s development. For example, and although there are many potential themes, the evaluation team suggests the following areas for reflection:

a) The role of land and land tenure in conflicts and development;

b) Pro-poor and eco-friendly economic growth;

c) Decentralization (refer to Recommendation 1a); and

d) Means to improve basic social services with the participation of citizens.

Recommendation 3: The next programme must identify clear, quantifiable objectives to move forward towards compliance with the principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, building upon the principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations, and keeping in mind that national ownership without national co-funding remains rather theoretical. Since immediately adopting a full national implementation of programmes would be impossible, interim solutions must be sought and a roadmap established, with milestones accepted by all parties. The following areas are suggested for reflection:

a) Sharing with the national counterpart body of all information on the use of resources, including personnel costs, operating costs for implementation units and to support UNDP, and administrative overhead fees paid to the organization out of the donors’ contributions;

b) Establishing and progressively reinforcing a co-management approach intermediate between NIM and DIM, including for financial aspects;

c) For some of the projects, establishing a test phase for management by the Government, under close supervision by UNDP;
d) Measures b) and c) above should be applied first to interventions that have received a significant financial contribution from the Government in order to promote real national ownership.

Recommendation 4: UNDP must redefine its approach to capacity building of national institutions on the basis of internationally recognized good practices and in close coordination with other international partners active in this field. The following areas are suggested for reflection:

a) UNDP must focus its capacity building efforts on a small number of key institutions wherein it can inject sufficient resources and commit over time in order to reach a lasting impact;

b) It must base its interventions on capacity assessments that take into account institutional dimensions (mandates, rules, budgets, etc.) as well as human resource aspects (payroll, individual skills, motivation, etc.), conducted jointly with the authorities and other stakeholders in order to ensure that its contribution is complementary to other interventions;

c) It must ensure that the relevant institutions participate financially in these improvement efforts or that the training participants are volunteers and solely motivated by an opportunity to learn and improve the performance of their institution;

d) UNDP must acquire the means to evaluate more effectively the impact of its capacity building activities.

Recommendation 5: The country office should implement its gender strategy and correct the imbalance between men and women among professional staff. It must, moreover, take concrete steps to mainstream gender in its programmes and identify specific projects with gender as an entry point. The following examples may be suggested:

a) The role of women in conflict resolution and mitigation, in microfinance and entrepreneurship, as well as in healthcare and the prevention of major pandemics;

b) The role and participation of women in elections and politics;

c) Interventions that promote access to justice by victims of sexual violence must also be strengthened while ensuring that the accused are judged within reasonable time-frames;

d) A national human development report on the roles of men and women in the Congolese society could be of use to clarify the gender issue in the DRC and identify areas of intervention by the State and its partners.

Recommendation 6: While recognizing that a reduction in field office staff is inevitable, the ADR team believes that this kind of decision cannot solely answer to immediate financial considerations, but must also take into account UNDP’s positioning as a privileged interlocutor for local authorities, its proximity to the poor it must serve as priority, as well as future financing opportunities, for example, those that should ultimately result from the REDD+ or PCP process. UNDP should try to keep the strongest possible field presence in order to protect one of the main assets inherited from prior phases. In particular:

a) To avoid sacrificing too much of its local presence, UNDP could make its Kinshasa office bear a greater part of the required budget cuts;

b) As currently envisaged, it is imperative to delegate true authority and broader powers to the Goma office to allow it to support the other offices in the eastern region;

c) UNDP must assume a leading role in planning for and implementing the future joint United Nations offices, and ensure a significant presence of its personnel in those offices once established;
Recommendation 7: The country office must strengthen its partnerships and improve its efficiency by working on its institutional culture, which is too bureaucratic and fragmented. In particular, management must focus on:

a) Continuing to promote joint interventions with other UN agencies and strengthen cooperation with agencies working on the field.

b) Promoting synergies within and between UNDP programmes, in particular on topics shared by the two programmes (for example, environment, sexual violence);

c) Continuing to promote access by national NGOs to ODA, through flexible and proactive support rather than through an approach essentially based on compliance with rules;

d) Defining coherent procedures, in particular to manage contracts with partners, and communicating these procedures clearly and transparently within the country office in Kinshasa and to field offices and partners;

e) Setting precise targets for the time UNDP takes to review reports and effect payments to implementing partners;

f) Promoting more regular and transparent communication between partners, joint reflection events with partners on the strengths and weaknesses of the interventions and, to the greatest extent possible, a collegial decision-making method involving all partners instead of leaving major decisions to the discretion of a donor or UNDP.

Recommendations 8: At both the headquarters and country level, UNDP must improve its basket fund management skills and, to this end, reconsider some of the issues related to the management of these funds:

a) With regard to the Pooled Fund, UNDP must decide whether it wants to keep this humanitarian window open, in which case it must make greater efforts to lighten its bureaucratic requirements so as to strengthen its ability to support emergency projects. This consideration relates in particular to the rate it charges for administrative overhead fees, which must remain as low as possible;

b) With regard to GFATM programmes, the UNDP Global Fund Unit must immediately increase its efforts to monitor subrecipients and attempt to solve occasional inventory shortages. In parallel, headquarters must initiate negotiations with the Fund to simplify the operational set-up and adjust certain fiduciary, operational and bureaucratic requirements that do not fit the specific context of the DRC. Furthermore, UNDP must extricate itself from the conflict of interest related to its responsibility in preparing national bodies for their role of principal recipient, by proposing that a ‘neutral’ agency take on this role. If it fails to achieve these objectives, UNDP should announce its withdrawal from the role of principal recipient for the GFATM at the latest by the end of 2013, as other organizations seem to be interested in taking on this role.

Recommendation 9: The UNDP country office must reorganize its monitoring and evaluation (M&E) resources to provide for better synergy among M&E staff and greater independence of the evaluation function. In concrete terms, the evaluation team proposes that programme managers be held accountable for monitoring their programmes, and that a strong M&E Unit be created that reports to management and whose role would be: (i) to propose and implement an evaluation plan; (ii) to mandate and manage project and programme evaluations; (iii) to define and supervise the implementation of norms and standards for the monitoring function; and (iv) to centralize and summarize information from monitoring and evaluation and make them regularly available to management.
Annex 1

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION
The Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts periodic country evaluations called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs), in order to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP’s contributions to development results at the country level. They are carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.109

The EO plans to conduct an ADR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) during 2011. This ADR will contribute to a new country programme, which will be prepared by the concerned country office (CO) and national stakeholders.

2. NATIONAL CONTEXT AND UNDP PROGRAMME
The DRC is located in Central Africa. It stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Lakes region and corresponds to most of the Congo River basin. One of the largest rainforests in the world is in the north of the country. To the east, an area of mountains and hills borders the large East African rift. The south and centre, an area of wooded savanna, forms the mineral-rich high plain. The country extends over this vast surface of 2,345,000 km² and has a population of approximately 60 million inhabitants. Around 70 percent of this population lives in rural areas. The country shares borders with nine countries (Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia).

Despite its vast natural resources, the DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world. The national report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper revealed indicators of massive poverty: in 2007, 71 percent of the population was living under the poverty line and 31 percent of children under 5 suffered from chronic malnutrition. This is the direct result of the collapse of the State and armed conflict in the 1990s and early 2000s, conflicts that have implicated nine African countries and 30 armed groups, led to nearly 5 million deaths and almost completely destroyed the national economy.

Despite these recent improvements, the country continues to experience conditions of massive poverty: 71 percent of the population lives under the poverty line and three quarters suffer from malnutrition. This situation is worsened in several zones, particularly in the east of the country, by continued violence from armed groups whose aims are now more economic than political. The main underlying causes of conflict are endemic poverty, competition for natural resources, land-tenure issues and widespread lawlessness and impunity. These factors are present in the east but also in many other parts of the country considered ‘stabilized’, which raises the threat of new outbursts of violence, as was the case in 2009 and 2010 in the Equateur province.

Stabilization began in 2001 with the Lusaka Agreement, which theoretically put an end to all foreign military intervention in the DRC. On the political front, the Global and Inclusive Agreement of April 2003 assigned the transitional

109 <www.undp.org/oe/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf> UNDP evaluation policy is currently under review but this should not affect the general methodology of the ADR.
institutions with the missions of reconciling the nation and reuniting the country, to reinstate the authority of the State, to integrate and restructure the army and organize democratic elections at all levels. Free presidential and legislative elections, the first in 40 years, were held in 2006. The National Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Programme, the National Strategy for the integration of the armed forces and the Congolese National Police Reform Programme are the pillars of the reform. However, the restructuring of the army within a context of command crisis, logistical dysfunction and administrative failures, in addition to the presence of foreign armed groups and uncontrolled light weapons circulation, have contributed to the persistence of insecurity in Ituri, North and South Kivu and northern Katanga. In this context, the restoration of state authority throughout the territory remains particularly difficult.

Good progress has been achieved at the macroeconomic level. Growth resumed in 2010 (6.1 percent compared to 2.8 percent in 2009) and inflationary pressures eased (9.62 percent at the end of the year compared to 54.3 percent at the end of 2009). In July 2010, the DRC completed the Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC-I), resulting in the elimination of nearly 90 percent of its external debt, estimated at about USD 13.8 billion. Several factors contributed to this achievement, including the conclusion of a new three-year programme with the IMF in December 2009, the implementation of certain structural reforms and the maintenance of macroeconomic stability in the first half of 2010.

With the resumption of cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions and the international community, the Government reached the decision point on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC-I) in July 2003 and, therefore, benefited from external debt relief service by bilateral and multilateral donors. The implementation of stabilization and reconstruction programmes has led to positive GDP growth rates since 2003, after two decades of decline. The inflation rate dropped from 510 percent in 2000 to 4.4 percent in 2004. Despite these results, the mismanagement of public finances did not allow for a rapid evolution of the MDG indicators. Poor economic governance and unsatisfactory implementation of reforms led to the suspension, in March 2006, of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), financed by the IMF.

UNDP played a key role during the transition and in the post-election and post-conflict stabilization phase, and expects to continue this role during the development phase. The organization’s vision, enshrined to the Country Programme Document (CPD) for 2008-2012110, is to remain an active and reliable development partner for the Government and other stakeholders in working to consolidate peace and security through two priority intervention areas: strengthening good governance and poverty reduction.

The approach is based on two principles:

- A strategic position that combines policy support/advice and implementation of field projects to produce visible results and begin a transition towards development activities in the medium- and long-term;
- The orchestration of strategies developed for each component (governance and poverty) and for the crosscutting issues (gender, capacity building, human rights, etc.) within a programmatic approach that ensures synergies within each pillar of the programme and consistency between the different pillars (sharing of resources, focus on outcomes, etc.).

The CPD was developed from the Country Assistance Framework (CAF111), a comprehensive strategic framework that brings together the United Nations system and 19 donors. The CPD

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110 <www.undp.org/execbrd/word/DPDCPCOD1.doc>
111 The CAF was itself developed based on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).
seeks eight major outcomes that support the objectives of the CAF, namely:

- Significantly reduce armed violence and guarantee effective state services to ensure the protection of citizens and their property;
- Increase citizen participation in the political process and the exercise of power;
- Guide the actions of local public institutions to meet the needs of the population;
- Make public administration more efficient and reliable to increase the efficiency, equality and transparency of public services;
- Strengthen capacity for policy formulation for the MDGs;
- Harmonize the response to HIV/AIDS and strengthen national capacity for programme management;
- Pacify communities and boost local economies;
- Strengthen national institutional capacity for environmental management and access to energy, especially for the poor.

UNDP also acts as a management office for the NGOs that access the ‘common donor funds’, an important humanitarian funding mechanism for strengthening coordination and better distribution of funds for humanitarian needs. The country receives substantial international financial assistance, which makes proper coordination of such assistance indispensable.

The total country programme budget for 2008-2012 is estimated at USD 635.5 million. Largely supported by donors, the UNDP country programme in the DRC is the most important UNDP programme in Africa (fourth globally).

### Table A1. Disbursements During the 2008 Fiscal Year by Component (in USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes/Components</th>
<th>2008 Budget</th>
<th>2008 Expenditures</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Disbursement rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Justice and security</td>
<td>23,531,083.75</td>
<td>13,527,426.87</td>
<td>10,003,656.88</td>
<td>57.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Political governance</td>
<td>41,100,115.24</td>
<td>25,891,893.00</td>
<td>15,208,222.24</td>
<td>63.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Local governance</td>
<td>2,091,319.84</td>
<td>2,049,481.68</td>
<td>41,838.16</td>
<td>98.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Administrative and economic governance</td>
<td>9,937,350.50</td>
<td>8,088,971.81</td>
<td>1,848,378.69</td>
<td>81.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance subtotal</strong></td>
<td>76,659,869.33</td>
<td>49,557,773.36</td>
<td>27,102,095.97</td>
<td>64.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Fight against poverty</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 DSCR support</td>
<td>2,593,597.52</td>
<td>1,164,277.00</td>
<td>1,429,320.52</td>
<td>44.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 HIV/AIDS and other pandemics</td>
<td>72,539,062.25</td>
<td>69,655,980.55</td>
<td>2,883,081.70</td>
<td>96.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Community recovery donor common fund</td>
<td>113,646,925.71</td>
<td>68,724,496.83</td>
<td>44,922,428.88</td>
<td>60.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Environment and climate change</td>
<td>4,384,446.62</td>
<td>3,521,253.77</td>
<td>863,192.85</td>
<td>80.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty subtotal</strong></td>
<td>193,164,032.10</td>
<td>143,066,008.15</td>
<td>50,098,023.95</td>
<td>74.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>269,823,901.43</strong></td>
<td><strong>192,623,781.51</strong></td>
<td><strong>77,200,119.92</strong></td>
<td><strong>71.39%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A note prepared for the country visit of the UNDP Administrator in June 2009 estimated spending at over USD 192 million in 2008 alone (see Table A1). The fight against HIV/AIDS, community recovery and governance were the three main areas of expenditure.

3. OBJECTIVES

The overall goals of an ADR are to:

- Provide substantive support to the Administrator’s accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board;
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country;
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level;
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

The specific goals of the ADR in the DRC are to:

- Provide an independent assessment of the progress or lack of, towards the expected outcomes envisaged in UNDP programming documents;
- Analyse the value added of UNDP in response to national needs and changes in the national development context;
- Present key findings, draw key lessons and provide a series of recommendations to the management team for the preparation of the next country programme strategy.

4. COMPONENTS

The ADR must be able to qualify, with a reasonable degree of plausibility, UNDP contribution to development and country recovery in a post-crisis situation. It will cover the current and previous country programmes (2007-2011 and 2002-2006). It will, however, place a greater emphasis on the most recent interventions, largely due to the increased availability of data.

The evaluation will examine UNDP’s strategic position, all of its programmes and ‘non-programmatic activities’ (activities carried out by UNDP personnel without funding from specific programmes, like advocacy, coordination of knowledge management) at the national level, and several regional activities in which UNDP participated in the DRC. The ADR will evaluate the main results of these activities – positive and negative, planned or not. It will include UNDP support financed by ordinary resources (called ‘core’) and resources mobilized from partners.

The evaluation has two main components: a) the analysis of development outcomes and b) the positioning of UNDP.

A) DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

The assessment of the development outcomes will entail a comprehensive review of the UNDP programme portfolio of the previous and ongoing programme cycles. This review will account for:

- Results achieved by the non-programmatic programmes and activities during the period;
- Development results and UNDP contribution to key interventions;
- The factors influencing these results (positioning, capacities, partners, etc.);
- Analysing the crosscutting linkages and their relationship to MDGs and UNDAF.

The ADR will use four essential criteria related to the design, management, implementation and usefulness of the interventions:

- **Thematic relevance**: Is the formulation of interventions relevant, given the national strategies, development issues and UNDP’s mandate? Are intervention approaches inspired by nationally and internationally recognized practices? Are the resources proportional to the expected results?
- **Effectiveness**: Did the UNDP programme accomplish its intended objectives and
planned results? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the programme? What are the unexpected results it yielded? Should it continue on the same course or should its main tenets be reviewed for the new cycle?

- **Efficiency**: How well did UNDP use its human and financial resources in achieving its contribution? Was the management of the programme adequate in terms of: (i) office structure, staffing; (ii) project quality control systems; (iii) monitoring and evaluation; (iv) knowledge management; (v) communication; and (vi) synergy with the Regional Office in Johannesburg? Is it possible to ensure more efficient use of resources in the specific context of the country or subregion?

- **Sustainability**: Are the development results achieved through UNDP contribution sustainable? Do national stakeholders assume ownership of the benefits derived from the interventions once the intervention is completed?

B) **UNDP STRATEGIC POSITIONING**

The ADR will evaluate the strategic positioning of UNDP both from the perspective of the organization and the development priorities in the country, notably the credibility of the organization, its coordination role within the United Nations system, its place in the ‘development space’ and the policy context in the DRC, as well as the strategies used by the country office to strengthen the position of UNDP in the country.

The criteria for the analysis of the strategic positioning of UNDP are:

- **Strategic relevance and responsiveness**: Did the UNDP programme address the main development concerns of the country, for example, by leveraging its role to mobilize support for the national policy and development strategies, while achieving balance between the interventions at the macro level (central government) and micro level (community, local institutions), adapting its entry points and strategies to the evolution of the national context without losing focus on its long-term goals?

- **Using UNDP strengths**: To what extent did UNDP, in seeking out the most useful positioning, use its reputation for neutrality, its global network to provide advice on governance issues, capacity building, community recovery, etc., as well as the specific strengths of UNDP in the DRC: organic link with MONUSCO due to the integrated mission, reputation in governance, role in the management of the Pooled Fund and Global Fund, network of provincial offices, long-term relationship with key ministries, etc.?

- **Partners**: To what extent did UNDP benefit from the experience and the characteristics of its current and potential partners (in terms of resources, technical skills, etc.) within the institutional arrangements to make the best use of the comparative advantage of each? Has UNDP helped the government to take advantage of South-South cooperation?

- **Promoting UN values from a humanitarian development perspective**: What is the role of UNDP in facilitating policy dialogue on sensitive issues, for example human development, human rights or gender equality\textsuperscript{112}, and in the implementation of socio-economic equality and the focus of its actions on the poor and excluded groups?

Regarding UNDP networks and partnerships in the DRC, the ADR should not limit itself to partnerships with government institutions and donors. It should also include civil society and the private sector in this analysis.

\textsuperscript{112} The Millennium Declaration highlights six fundamental values for human development: equality, solidarity, freedom, shared responsibility, tolerance and respect for nature; UNDP is committed to supporting the implementation of these values in the world.
UNDP’s coordination role will be considered from the viewpoint of coordination within the UN system (joint curriculum development, synergies, efforts to avoid redundancy, geographically concentrated experiences) and also in the context of broader international cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral donors and non-traditional partners (for example, China, Brazil and India) and NGOs, very active in the area of first-response and community recovery in the DRC.

Based on the analysis of the criteria mentioned above and a review of the major future challenges, the ADR must develop conclusions and provide recommendations to UNDP113, including all necessary assistance and complementary activities and the strategies to follow in future interventions of 2013-2017 programming cycle.

5. METHODOLOGY

The methodology will follow the ADR guidelines and the methodological guidelines of the CO, an iterative process that involves the following steps:

- Desk review of project and programme portfolio;
- Preparatory mission by the evaluation task manager to present the assessment to the UNDP country office, the Government and key partners; plan the successive phases, and consider the role of the national authorities and the composition of the evaluation team in terms of expertise (carried out from 22 November to 1 December 2010);
- Scoping mission by the evaluation team leader to identify and collect further documentation, validate the mapping of the country programmes, define the appropriate set of data collection and analysis methods, and address logistical issues related to the main mission (a phase usually launched by a short inception report);
- Main ADR mission by a team of independent consultants focused on data collection and validation. It concludes with an entry workshop where the ADR preliminary conclusions and recommendations are presented to the CO, the Government and eventually other stakeholders;
- Drafting of the preliminary report, collection of comments and finalization of the report;
- Feedback workshop for key partners and stakeholders in the country.

A) COORDINATION WITH THE OUTCOME EVALUATION

Regardless, this methodology will have to be adapted to the specific case of the DRC. Indeed, the country office had originally intended to carry out an ‘outcome evaluation’ for seven of its eight outcomes in 2010. The search for consultants for this purpose was interrupted following the announcement of the ADR planned for 2011. The CO later chose to replace these seven outcome evaluations by one mid-term outcome evaluation of its programme.

The CO, RBA and EO agreed on the need to coordinate this evaluation managed by the CO and the ADR in order to reduce the transaction cost for partners and UNDP and to avoid a situation in which UNDP would project a disjointed and disorganized image to its partners.

It was agreed that the best option for coordinating both of these evaluations would be to maintain the independence of the administration and the content of the two processes. The goal was to avoid compromising the independence of the EO and the ADR while ensuring that they be well coordinated in practice to reduce the ‘evaluative burdens’ for the CO and the stakeholders. The two teams (ADR and outcome evaluation) will remain de jure separated with distinct TOR and reports, as well as different budgets and

113 Recommendations can also be proposed to the Government, donors or other stakeholders.
administrative processes. Nevertheless, the two teams will have coordinated and simultaneous missions in the DRC to be able to participate in a common process in the field. In particular, the two teams will conduct most high-level stakeholder interviews together (political level within the Government, donors, head of UN agencies), particularly in Kinshasa, at the beginning of work but also at the end, when presenting the results of both evaluations to the same high-level stakeholders (see Figure A1).

As shown by Figure A1, one of the changes to the classic ADR methodology is to modify the scoping mission by the evaluation team leader so that it is also the beginning of information collection. The scoping mission, therefore, becomes an inception mission for the evaluation. The majority of interviews with high-level stakeholders in Kinshasa must be conducted in conjunction with the outcome evaluation team during this mission.\(^\text{114}\) The methodological aspect of this mission cannot be neglected. Care should be taken to maintain shared work hours to harmonize the methodological approaches.

The ADR inception mission will be governed by a report that details the methodology to follow and will evaluate data availability, reliability and its link to expected programme outcomes, as usual, but that will also include an aide mémoire for the interviews conducted to date.

Moreover, the quality of the outcome evaluation is crucial to the ADR because it will assess its effectiveness to a degree. This quality must be controlled and strengthened by the ADR team, which will have access to the results of the outcome evaluation (inception report and final report, even in draft form) to improve the uniformity and quality of the two final reports. The team leader will also be invited to comment on the terms of reference, the selection of team members and the draft outcome evaluation reports. Informal exchanges are also planned between the two teams as the work progresses.

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114 The ADR team or its members can obviously revisit some of these high-level stakeholders at a later time, if necessary, for example, to confirm information, explore a question in depth or refine a recommendation.
Sources
A number of assessments and reviews have been carried out recently in the DRC:

- The two ‘Kinlock missions’ of 2009 and 2010 analysing the way in which the UNDP CO is structured to meet the current challenges;115
- The two PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) reports on the same subject;116
- The review of the change management process117 that followed the PwC studies;
- The mid-term evaluation of the governance programme;118 and
- The review of UNDAF.119

Upon examining the reports mentioned above, it appears that the questions about how the CO is structured and administered have been evaluated in depth, mainly at the request of the principal donor of the governance programme, DFID, which sought assurance that its financial support was properly used. Therefore, the ADR must try to synthesize this information rather than collect it again. An important preparatory task for the ADR will be to produce an annotated bibliography with abstracts of all of these evaluations in order to facilitate the work of the consultants.

Data collection
The evaluation team will first conduct a desk review of available documentation (secondary data). It will also collect primary data through workshops, group or individual interviews and field visits.

Field visits are especially important to the extent that although the country is vast, UNDP has a strong presence at the provincial level, and the EO seems to lack data on the results of its interventions at the local and community level. In addition, the outcome evaluation will not impact operations that are not directly linked to the CPD, such as the management of common donor funds or the Global Fund. These UNDP roles should, therefore, only be judged by the ADR on the basis of an analysis of the added value of UNDP and the quality of the services provided to its partners. This will require the continued presence of the ADR team in the field, notably in the east of the country, with the highest concentration of humanitarian and reconstruction activities financed by the common donor funds.

Given the size of the portfolio, the team will most likely be called upon to define a sample of projects for further evaluation. This sample will be developed in consultation with the UNDP country office during the inception mission. It should consider: (i) a mix of institutional support projects and field projects; (ii) national implementation and direct implementation modality; (iii) projects with and without assessments.

6. TIME-FRAME

Based on the EO guidelines concerning the ADR and discussions with the CO and RBA for coordination with the outcome evaluation, the ADR process can be divided into three phases, each with several stages.

PHASE 1. PREPARATION

- Preparatory mission by the evaluation task manager to present the assessment to UNDP country office, the Government and key sources.

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partners, to discuss coordination between the ADR and the outcome evaluation, to plan the successive stages, consider the role of national authorities and the needs of the evaluation team in terms of expertise (carried out from 22 November to 1 December 2010).

- **Desk review** initially carried out (February 2011) by an EO research assistant, and includes an analysis of the portfolio and main UNDP partners in the DRC, the collection of the relevant documentation and an annotated bibliography of key evaluation reports; the documentation review will of course be pursued by the evaluation team for the duration of the ADR.

- **Inception meetings** at UNDP headquarters with the EO team leader, the Regional Bureau (country context and programme) and other relevant bureaux, such as the Bureau for Development Policy, the Bureau for Crisis and Recovery, as well as the DRC mission to the United Nations.

- **Scoping mission** by the team leader and the evaluation task manager (two weeks at the end of April) to define the data collection and analysis methodology (including the project/programme sample to be evaluated in detail); establish shared tasks with the outcome evaluation team; participate in meetings with high-level stakeholders; validate the portfolio analysis; and address logistical issues related to the main mission, mainly the time-frame and the provinces visited.

- **Inception report** by the team leader detailing the context of the ADR, key evaluation questions, methodology (existing information sources, samples, data collection instruments) and an aide mémoire of key information and perceptions gathered during partner interviews (15 May 2011).

### PHASE 2. CONDUCTING THE ADR

- **Main ADR Mission** – A complete evaluation team headed by the team leader conducts this mission of approximately one month (June to July 2011) and will focus on 1) debriefing the outcome evaluation team to obtain a precise vision of their results, even before they produce their report; 2) collection and validation of additional data, notably the review of a sample of significant interventions in the field, identified during the scoping mission; 3) the development of conclusions and recommendations; and 4) presentation during a review meeting with the country office and the Government, for validation and comments. The outcome evaluation team could also participate in this presentation of key conclusions and recommendations.

- **Analysis and reporting** – The evaluation team will analyse the information collected in the ADR draft report within three weeks after the team’s departure from the country.

- **Report review** – The draft report will be subject to a rigorous quality control process, by submitting it to key clients (including the UNDP country office, the Regional Bureau and the Government) in addition to an external and independent reviewer with experience in the countries affected by the conflicts and the integrated United Nations missions in order to ensure that all final product is high quality, realistic in its recommendations and as useful as possible to the teams in the field. The team leader, in close cooperation with the EO task manager, shall finalize the ADR report based on comments received.

- **Stakeholder meeting** – A meeting with the key stakeholders will be organized in fall 2011 in Kinshasa to present the results of the evaluation, facilitate greater buy-in by national stakeholders in order for them to profit from the lessons and recommendations in the report, and examine means to favour their ownership in future UNDP programming in the DRC.

### PHASE 3. FOLLOW-UP

- **Management response** – The UNDP Associate Administrator will request relevant units (generally the concerned country office and regional office) to prepare a management
response to the ADR. The regional office will be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of follow-up actions through the Evaluation Resource Centre (ERC) online120.

* Communication* – The ADR report and management response will be published in both printed and electronic versions, made available to the UNDP Executive Board at the time of its decision to approve a new Country Programme Document, and widely distributed in the DRC and at UNDP headquarters. Furthermore, the report and management response will be published on the UNDP Evaluation Office website and will be available to the public121. Its availability will be announced by UNDP and external networks.

7. **MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS**

A) **THE EVALUATION TEAM**

The *evaluation team* will be constituted of four members:

- A team leader will be responsible for guiding the team to coordinate its activities with those of the outcome evaluation and coordinate the draft and final report. The team leader must have a demonstrated background in assessment and team management;
- A governance specialist with experience in peacekeeping operations, conflict resolution and fragile states;
- A specialist in the fight against poverty, rural development and community recovery;
- A gender specialist, preferably with experience in gender-based violence and capable of addressing aspects of equity.

The UNDP programme in the DRC also includes environmental and forestry interventions and well as medical (role of ‘principal officer’ in the Global Fund). These are not as large as interventions in governance and the fight against poverty but could eventually require timely specialized assistance.

The team members must be independent, that is, they must not be directly involved in the formulation or implementation of UNDP programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A2. Time-Frame (Tentative)</th>
<th>Estimated date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory mission</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of reference shared with UNDP-Kinshasa, RBA and Government</td>
<td>February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk review</td>
<td>February-March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoping mission</td>
<td>End of April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoping mission report</td>
<td>May 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main mission</td>
<td>June-July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First draft report submitted to the Evaluation Office</td>
<td>Beginning of August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report sent to UNDP-Kinshasa and RBA</td>
<td>Beginning of September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments from UNDP-Kinshasa and RBA</td>
<td>End of September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report reviewed and sent to Government</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments from Government</td>
<td>End of October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final workshop in Kinshasa</td>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

120 <www.erc.undp.org>
121 <www.undp.org/eo>
in the DRC. They can be either national or international.

The evaluation team will follow the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and will adhere to the ethical Code of Conduct.122

B) THE ROLE OF THE EVALUATION OFFICE

The EO will contract the evaluation team consultants and a research assistant to facilitate desk review. It will provide the team with a programme assistant to support logistical and administrative matters. The EO will meet all costs directly related to conducting the ADR. These will include costs related to participation of the team leader and consultants, as well as the preliminary research, logistics within the country (transport, workshops) and the issuance of the final ADR report.

The evaluation task manager of the EO will manage the substantive aspects of the evaluation and oversee the administrative aspects to assure coordination with the Regional Bureau, the other relevant units at headquarters and the CO management team; and participate in the inception and main missions, at least in the review meeting.

C) THE ROLE OF THE COUNTRY OFFICE

The CO will support the evaluation team in liaising with the key partners. It will provide the team with all necessary information regarding UNDP activities in the country and contribute to the organization of a stakeholder meeting by the end of the evaluation process. The office will also be requested to provide additional logistical support to the evaluation team, for example, arranging meetings of assisting site visits. The country office will contribute support in kind by providing office space for the evaluation team. The CO and the EO will agree ahead of time on the budgeting and financing local transportation costs.

D) THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

Since 2010, the UNDP Evaluation Office has aimed to strengthen the involvement of national authorities in the ADR while ensuring an independent assessment process and results. In the DRC, national authorities could, however, be invited to play an expanded role in the governance of the evaluation by forming a ‘reference group’, whose duties would be to:

- Provide comments and suggestions on the ADR terms of reference;
- Participate in an introductory meeting during the scoping mission to explain their priorities and interests to the ADR team;
- Participate in the debriefing upon completion of the main mission;
- Provide written comments on the draft assessment report; and
- Participate in the final stakeholder workshop.

During the preparatory mission, people consulted at the Ministry of Planning suggested using an existing committee, the ‘technical advisory committee’, established in the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in June 2009. This committee would consist of Prime Ministry, Planning Ministry, International Cooperation Ministry representatives, select donors, and representatives from civil society and United Nations agencies.

8. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The expected outputs from the evaluation team are:

- An inception report (maximum 15 pages, plus annexes);

- A comprehensive final report on the ADR in the DRC (maximum 50 pages, plus annexes);
- A two-page evaluation brief;
- A presentation for the stakeholder workshop.

All ADR products are written and published in French. The final report will be published in French and English.
### Annex 2

**EVALUATION FRAMEWORK**

#### Evaluation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Main evaluation questions</th>
<th>Information and data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Evaluation by programme or theme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1 RELEVANCE</td>
<td>Is the formulation of the UNDP interventions relevant, given the national strategies, country needs and UNDP mandate? Has UNDP applied a strategy that is well suited to the political, social, economic and security contexts, as well as to the specific human security conditions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1a Relevance to objectives</td>
<td>Is the programme aligned with the strategic documents of the Government, the United Nations Country Team and the development strategies in coordination with technical and financial partners? Does the programme adequately account for the country’s human security needs? What are the reasons for the apparent proliferation of planning frameworks (PSRP, CAF, UNDAF, ISF, ISSSS, PCP, etc.), and is it a problem?</td>
<td>Group interviews: Key partners from government authorities, international organizations, donors, members of civil society and independent observers Document analysis: DSCR, CAF, UNDAF, CPD, CPAP, results frameworks and annual work plans Financial data supplied by the country office and the Atlas system Evaluations (particularly the UNDAF) and programme reports 2003-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1b Relevance of approaches</td>
<td>Does the allocation of resources to the different thematic areas and regions of the country correspond to the expressed need and desired outcomes? Have the lessons learned from the previous programming cycle been considered in the development of the 2008-2012 programme? Has the scattering of resources been avoided? Has a programme approach been favoured rather than a project approach? Do the approaches, resources and results frameworks effectively contribute to the achievement of desired outcomes and are these inspired from national and international ‘best practices’? What are the causes and consequences of an approach that is almost exclusively based on direct implementation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.2 EFFECTIVENESS</td>
<td>Did the UNDP programme accomplish its intended objectives and planned results? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the programme? What unexpected results were yielded? Should the programme continue in the same direction or should its main intervention priorities and areas be reviewed for the new cycle?</td>
<td>Evaluations of past programmes and projects including assessments made by donors Draft report by the outcome evaluation team through discussion with members of this team Analysis of available ROAR, the results database and work plans integrated into the ERBM platform, annual reports of the DRC Project documents Mappings of the interventions Interviews with project coordinators and programme managers Analysis of results frameworks for the programmes and progress reports Field visits and interviews with beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Evaluation Matrix

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<tr>
<td><strong>A.3 EFFICIENCY</strong></td>
<td>How well did UNDP use its resources (human and financial)? What could be done to ensure a more efficient use of resources in the specific country/subregional context?</td>
<td>Reports related to « Change Management », including the HR report of March 2011 Audit Reports ERBM platform and « balanced scorecard » Discussions with the country office management team and basket fund management teams Interviews with partners Meetings with UNDP field office teams Interviews with key government partners, donors and civil society Successive ROAR and periodic reports from the administrative units responsible for programmes Outcome evaluation team draft report through discussions with members of this team UNDP and donor evaluation reports Visits to field projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.3a Management efficiency</strong></td>
<td>Is the management of the programme adequate in terms of: (i) office structure and (ii) quality control systems of the projects? Is M&amp;E planned, structured and implemented to ensure that the country office and steering committees have access to sufficient information to make the necessary adjustments and corrections and to provide lessons learned and recommendations to guide future interventions? Did the establishment of field offices allow UNDP to improve its performance? Will these expected structural and operational changes have consequences (positive or negative) on this performance? Has UNDP managed to make the necessary adjustments to the current programmes in the response to delays or changes to external factors affecting the validity or original plans or implementation? What is UNDP’s performance and added value in the management of the Global Fund and Pooled Fund? Can and should UNDP remain the principal Global Fund recipient? What improvements should be made to this management? Are there indications that the current process of change and structural adjustments to the office have improved UNDP performance and how it is perceived by its partners?</td>
<td>Group interviews with NGOs and other PF and GF recipients Steering Committee reports Identification of activities that have been significantly underfunded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.3b Programme efficiency</strong></td>
<td>Did the programmes meet deadlines and respect the planned budgets? Is it possible to ensure more efficient use of resources? How? Did UNDP develop synergies between programmes to reduce costs or better reach desired outcomes? Quality and usefulness of central office support (BCPR, CO) and regional (Johannesburg)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.4 SUSTAINABILITY</strong></td>
<td>Does UNDP aim to promote national ownership and the suitability of results achieved by its programmes?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.4a Sustainability planning</strong></td>
<td>Are programmes designed to ensure sustainability of results, taking into account identifiable risks and is there an exit strategy? Has UNDP been able to ensure that its interventions were supported by adequate national ownership? Do national institutions assume the costs and human resources necessary to pursue an activity or service beyond the UNDP intervention?</td>
<td>Individual interviews or group meetings with government partners, donors, international organizations, members of civil society and independent observers Current outcome evaluation draft report and discussion with members of this team Draft documents Available risk analyses Field visits NIM/DIM unit reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.4b Strengthening national capacities</strong></td>
<td>Has UNDP developed a coherent capacity building strategy for its key partners? Has it established the means to measure results of these capacity building efforts?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.4c Replication of pilot projects</strong></td>
<td>Have UNDP pilot projects generated investment from the Government or financial partners?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Evaluation Matrix

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<tr>
<td><strong>B. Evaluation of UNDP Strategic Positioning</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.1 STRATEGIC RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS</strong></td>
<td>Are interventions based on the comparative advantages of UNDP at a global and local level? Are they balanced and do they reflect the national priorities and changes in the course of implementation?</td>
<td>Comparative review of the PSCR (including the future DSCRP), CAF, UNDAF Interviews with key national partners Identification of development projects (e.g., microfinance) Review of the new peace consolidation programme Analysis of project document revisions Analysis of work plan modifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.1a Relevance to DRC challenges and priorities</strong></td>
<td>Has UNDP invested in areas where it can have a value added and make a difference? In a situation in which humanitarian needs and post-conflict activities often have priority, has UNDP managed to preserve a space for development activities? Is the programme well balanced among the diverse regions of the DRC and between upstream and downstream interventions? What are the major challenges ahead for the country and on which could UNDP work in the context of 2013-2017 programming?</td>
<td>Comparative analysis of resources allocated to themes and components of successive CPD Evolution of resources allocated to emergency response and the post-conflict situation in the East compared to spending more focused on development activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.1b Response to changes in the context</strong></td>
<td>Has UNDP adapted to the changes in the national or international context that have affected the current programmes? Are there areas in which UNDP recognized its limitations and disengaged?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.1c Short- and long-term balance between upstream and downstream interventions</strong></td>
<td>Has UNDP integrated unexpected activities in response to government or donor requests? If yes, how has it preserved the coherence of programmes? Is there a clear strategy to link upstream interventions (central, normative) and downstream interventions (field application)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.2 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND NETWORK</strong></td>
<td>What are the comparative advantages of UNDP in DRC? How has UNDP drawn on the support of United Nations system partners and international and national institutions?</td>
<td>Reviews of Multi-Donor Trust Funds, relations with the national portion Review of UNDP global strategies for the period Interviews with key partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.2a Comparative advantages of UNDP in the DRC</strong></td>
<td>What are the comparative advantages of UNDP in the DRC? What are the strengths of UNDP from which the country office has benefited? Has UNDP strategy been developed on the basis of comparative advantage? How significant and effective is UNDP advocacy? Has UNDP played a support-advisory role in relations to national partners and the general public?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.2b Coordination</strong></td>
<td>Has UNDP contributed to the development of common programmes between UN agencies? Did it use its comparative advantages of associated funds? What is UNDP contribution to inter-agency cooperation with donors and the Government? Did UNDP effectively contribute to improving dialogue between donors and the Government, including high-level political dialogue with the government? Are cooperation and coordination with MONUSCO sufficient and effective? How do the joint units operate? How did the multiple functions assigned affect the different roles of the Resident Representative?</td>
<td>Review of common activities developed with FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNV and FENU Review of draft documents and interviews with UN partners Field visits Interviews with UN country team members Interviews with donors Analysis of the coordination structure of the thematic groups on site and their evolution in the DRC High-level interviews with MONUSCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.2c Communication</strong></td>
<td>How is UNDP perceived in the DRC? Is communication efficiently planned, structured, financed and implemented?</td>
<td>Interviews and group meetings with donors and other partners Interviews with NGOs and members of civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria</td>
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<td>Information and data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| B.2d Support to Government for developing partnerships                 | Did UNDP help the government in implementing the Paris Declaration and to benefit from South-South cooperation?  
Quality of relations with the Government?  
Use in the programme of regional expertise  
Analysis of PGAI database                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| B.3 THE VALUES OF THE UNITED NATIONS                                   | Have UNDP activities promoted the principles and values of the United Nations and of UNDP itself?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| B.3a Support for the MDGs                                              | Does UNDP provide the Government with efficient support for the achievement of the MDGs and the monitoring of progress in this area?  
Has UNDP efficiently used reports on the MDGs and human development in its planning activities and as an advocacy instrument?                                                                                                           | Discussions with the Ministry of Planning and UNDP country office management  
Human Development Reports                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| B.3b Gender equality and empowerment of women                          | Has UNDP sufficiently integrated the gender issue in its planning and capacity building activities?  
How effective are UNDP’s own gender-advocacy activities and in collaboration with the UN Country Team?  
Did UNDP use gender-sensitive budgeting or produce reports with gender-sensitive data?                                                                                           | Draft documents  
Analysis of staff training activities  
ROAR and ERBM  
Interviews with members of the gender thematic group  
Current outcome evaluation draft report                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| B.3c Equity issues                                                     | Does the programme successfully account for the needs of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups?  
Did the programme adopt an approach that emphasized human rights?                                                                                                                     | Document analysis: DSCR, CAF, CPD and ROAR  
Field visits                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| B.3d Leadership and credibility                                       | Is UNDP capable of providing leadership on human development issues?  
Does it effectively contribute to dialogue on human development in the country, including politically sensitive issues?  
How effective are UNDP advocacy activities with national partners and the general public?  
Has UNDP played a useful support-advisory role in relation to national institutions?                                                                                               | UNDP partner evaluation reports  
Partner perceptions  
Partner surveys  
Individual interviews and groups meetings with partners: Government, UN, donors, civil society and independent observers                                                                                                                                 |

**ANNEX 2. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK**
PEOPLE CONSULTED

NATIONAL MINISTRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE
Masini, Jean-Claude, Assistant Administrative Adviser
Mbaya, Jean-Paul, Senior Adviser, Economic and Finance
Mukoko Samba, Daniel, Deputy Chief of Staff
Tubula Seshi, Delphin, Administrative Adviser

MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Bokota Likangau, Director, DSG
Katsamingu Kebenga, Director, DC-BN
Kumakinga-Ngwey, Director, Coordination
Koni, Pakabomba B., Chief of Staff
Mondonga-o-Batobandelye, Secretary General
Mpaka Bin Mpaka, Assistant Secretary General
N’Siala Kapesa, Head of Division
Nyemdo, Patrick, General Secretariat
Tshimbinda Bilolo Zach, Director, DESE

MINISTRY OF PLANNING
Kabemba Musange, DFR
Kamene, Théo, DCRE
Kasongo Jean, Head of Division
Likele Batiwelo, Monique, Secretary General
Lubaki Mu Matomina, DPBI
Matondo Ngumbi, COSEP
Mbaki, Mata, Chef, Division unique
Mokute Mopolo, Fidèle, Division Chief, PGAI Administrator
Mombong, Yvon, PGAI Coordinator

Mupa, Romain, Expert, PGAI
Nkusu, Mbala, Director, Secrétariat Général

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS (NIS)
Kankwanda Ebuldang, Grégoire, Head of Mission

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, SECURITY, DECENTRALIZATION AND LAND PLANNING
Kasongo, Baudouin, Director
Okende, Boniface, Secretary General
Zuka Mon’do Ugonda-Lemba, Georges, Vice-Minister

MINISTRY OF DECENTRALIZATION AND REGIONAL PLANNING
Kayembe Léon, Secretary General
Makolo Jinikilay, National CTAD Coordinator
Paluku Charles, Chief of Staff

MINISTRY OF CIVIL SERVICE
Limbaya Maurice, Head of Human Resource Management
Mukenge, Makabu, Director, Secrétariat General
Mulumbu Florent, Chief of Staff
Mwabandali Prof. Saint Augustin, Code of Professional Ethics

MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Kanumbizi, REDD Coordination
Kasulu, Vincent

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Bambi Lessa, Luzolo, Minister
PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS

Byala Sanda Lutala, David,
Secretary General, Senate
Lute Katembo, Raymond, Deputy,
Chairman of the Permanent Defence
and Security Commission
Massika, Martine, Former Secretary
General of the Senate
Modrikpe Patrice, Madjubole, National
Assembly Secretary General a.i.
Mulamba, Bernard, Cooperation and Project
Planning Director, National Assembly
Ngalula Bin-Knade, Joseph III, National
Assembly Commissions Office
Tshisuaka, Constantin, Former Secretary
General of the National Assembly

COURT OF AUDITS

Ghonda Makiadi Ephrem, Ministry of Finance,
COREF, President
Izemengia, Ernest, President a.i.,
Court of Audits
Kitambala N’Gbeze Joseph,
Secretary General Magistrate

SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF MAGISTRATES

Kibala Akidy Fidele, Deputy Magistrate
Nduba Kilima, Head of Career Information,
Planning and Management
Ubulu Pungu Jean, Secretary General

NATIONAL INDEPENDENT
ELECTORAL COMMISSION (CENI)

Baludo, Aimé
Béchir Bungu, Deputy Executive Secretary
Bokombé, Jean, Assistant Director, CNT
Malumalu, Abbé Appolinaire Muholongu,
Former Director of the Independent
Electoral Commission (CEI) and
Head of the STAREC resource
mobilization programme

NATIONAL MULTI-DIMENSIONAL
PROGRAMME TO FIGHT AIDS (PNMLS)

Manwana, Bob, Assistant National Manager for
Monitoring & Evaluation

NATIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISM
(GLOBAL FUND)

Kalambayi, Dr. Hyppolyte, Technical Secretariat
Coordinator
N’Siesi, Dr François-Xavier, Deputy
Coordinator
Oklata, Dr. Jean-Paul, Tuberculosis

PERMANENT DRC MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

Empole Losoko Efambe, Paul, Senior Adviser

EMBASSIES, BILATERAL AGENCIES
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Asakura, Eriko, Programme Director –
Security Sector, Japanese International
Cooperation Agency
Badagard, Helena, Head of Democracy and
Good Governance, Embassy of Sweden
Banaji, Yael, National Programme Officer,
Embassy of Sweden
Banza, Ponce, Programme Officer, DFID
Bayili, Daouda, Governance Expert,
European Union
Bokoko, Dr Marie-Jeanne, Health Adviser,
Canadian Embassy
Cichocka, Anna, Section Chief,
European Union Delegation
Disasi, Claude, Deputy Programme Chief, DFID
Dowd, Vincent, Advisory Minister, Head of
Operations, European Union Delegation
Eijpe, Angelique, Senior Secretary, Embassy of
The Netherlands
Eiro, Yoonezaki, Resident Representative,
Japanese International Cooperation Agency
Escoffier, Carine, Senior Governance Adviser,
Embassy of the United Kingdom, DFID
Evans, Phil, Director, DFID
Gorenflo, René, Programme Manager, European Union
Hirotani, Yuki, Third Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Kazuano Shibata, Deputy Resident Representative, JICA
Lafosse, Philippe, Cooperation Attaché, Governance, French Cooperation
Lemire, Martial, Director, Cooperation Programme Support, Canadian Embassy
Makaya, Vincent, Economic Adviser, Canadian Embassy
Menase, Urbain, Deputy Attaché for Development Cooperation, Embassy of Belgium
Noterman, Dr Jean-Pierre, Attaché, Embassy of Belgium
Piazzardi, Sergio, Infrastructure and Transportation Section Chief, European Union Delegation
Shibata, Kazunao, Deputy Resident Representative, Japanese International Cooperation Agency
Sunnergren, Mette, Deputy Head of Mission – Head of Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden
Taché, Michel, Adviser and Head of Cooperation, Canadian Embassy
Vanderveulen, Harold, Attaché, Embassy of Belgium
Van Loo, Sonia, Cooperation Attaché, Embassy of Belgium
Vaubourg, M, Adviser, Cooperation and Cultural Action, French Cooperation
Veierskov, Lena, Programme Officer, European Union
Yuki Hirotani, Third Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Boukry, Mohammed, Regional Representative, UNHCR
Dackam-Ngatchou, Richard, Resident Representative, UNFPA
Diallo, Amadou Bachir, Economist, World Bank
Donat, Bruno, Stabilization Team Leader, MONUSCO Stabilization Support Unit
Duffour, Diane, Pooled Fund Team, OCHA
Grieco, Richard, UNV
Guepin, Laurent, Senior Civil Affairs Officer, MONUSCO Civil Affairs Section
Gueye, Ndiaga, FAO Representative
Kefi, Sihem, Information Officer, Sexual Violence Unit, MONUSCO
Kristensen, Ulrik, PADDL Programme Officer, UNCDF, South Africa (by phone)
Kouadaogo Ouedraogo, Dr, Deputy Representative, UNFPA
Maloof, Salim, Head of Programme, UNOPS
Mama, Damien, Strategic Planning Consultant, Integrated Office, MONUSCO
Meece, Roger, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MONUSCO
Ouedraogo, Koudeogo, Deputy Representative, UNFPA
Rauchenstein, Franz, Head of Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Ropars, Maud, Civil Affairs Officer, MONUSCO Civil Affairs Section
Snellen, Richard, Chief, Division of Civil Affairs, MONUSCO
Stroux, Daniel, Acting Director, Electoral Division, MONUSCO
Ursino, Steven, Acting Chief of the Integrated Office, MONUSCO

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Bamouni, Dieudonné, Deputy Head of Office, OCHA
Bardoux Chesneau, Pierre, Deputy Team Leader, MONUSCO Stabilization Support Unit
Bassiou Diallo, Amadou, Economist, World Bank

NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Alingwi, Jean de Dieu, Grassroots Coordinator, La Benevolencia
Andrews, Geoff, Director, MEDAIR
Ayera, Flory, Project Coordinator, LWF
Bahati, Charles, Organizer and Facilitator, CARITAS
Bigamiro, Yves, Project Manager, ADRA (Adventist Development Relief Agency)
Bikoro, Stéphane, Head of M&E, CORDAID
Bofoe Lomalisa, Emmanuel, Head of Programmes with UN Agencies, CARITAS
Bonte, Hugues, Office Director, CARITAS Germany
Buravadza, Gilbert, Dean, Pimbo Agricultural Technical Institute
Bwihangani, Lievain, Director of Operations, Hekima (IMF)
Byama, Marc, Assistant Project Manager, CARE International
Chishugi, Louis, Accountant, OXFAM-GB
Cisungu, Gustave, Provincial Coordinator, LIZADEEL (Africa zone league for the defense of children and student rights)
Ekwa, Père Martin, Chairman of the Steering Committee, NRHD (National Report on Human Development)
Ikoyendea, Blandine, Supervisor, Diocesan Office for Medical Works (BDOM-Kinshasa)
Imani Kupuya, Joël, Monitoring Officer, ETN
Kadet, Pierre, Head of Mission West-DRC, Action against Hunger
Kahuka, Hubert, Programme Assistant, APEDE NGO
Kambale Mapilimoga, Grégoire, HIV Programme Officer, MDM France
Kambalu, Joseph, Focal Point, ULPGL Legal Clinic
Kasongo, Antoine, Senior Program Officer, Christian Aid NGO
Kassanani, Jeremy, Deputy Programme Coordinator, Elpis Zoe (NGO for the fight against AIDS)
Katavarwa, Didier, Administrator, ALDI
Kavera, Gogo, President, Collective of Women’s Associations for Development
Kiesse, Pierre, Provincial Coordinator, UEFA
Kimpanga N’Key Indo’le, Théo, Managing Editor, ‘La Référence’ Media Group
Kitumba, Jean-Pierre, Finance Officer, APEDE NGO
Lagrange, Marc-André, Senior Analyst, DRC, International Crisis Group (ICG) (by phone)
Lifta, Seblon, Project Manager, CEO (Centre d’Etude et d’Organisation)
Luheno, Jason, President, Coordination of Congolese Civil Society for Elections and Governance in DRC
Lutula Kitoko, Dominique, National President, DRC Red Cross
Mabo, Florence, Supervisor, Diocesan Office for Medical Works (BDOM-Kinshasa)
Machoozi, Catherine, Finance Officer, ACIAR
Massamba, Blaise, Salvation Army
Matabichi, Marcelin, Director, Hekima
Messina, Agata, Head of Mission, CESVI
Mohimdo, Jean-Claude, Financial Coordinator, OXFAM GB
Muhombo Muhima, Paul, Project Supervisor, ETN
Mukosi, Francine, Administrator, LWF
Mukuma, Ghislain, Acting Office Manager, OXFAM-Quebec
Mupenda, Monique, Director CCP, UEFA (Union for the Emancipation of Congolese Women)
Musaghi, Pacifique, Office Manager, Africa Initiative Programme
Mutambala, Pancrace, Reporting Deputy, ACTED
Natifa, Azama, Deputy Secretary General, CSDFC (Complexe Social Développement de la Femme Congolaise) [Social Development Complex for Congolese Women]
Nku Imbie, David, Medical Director, Salvation Army
N’Tumba Kabeya, Joachim, Sociologist, CSDFC (Complexe Social Développement de la Femme Congolaise) [Social Development Complex for Congolese Women]- Pewa, Bertrand, Assistant aux Projets, CARITAS
Professor Shusa, Secretary General, Red Cross DRC
Ribul Moro, Giovanna, CDM, CESVI
Rosa, Anicet, President, RADHIT
Sorda, Yannick, Coordinator, OXFAM
Sylla, Mamadou, Managing Administrator, CORAID
Thetika Banzodila, Jean-Claude, General Director, Microfinance Promotion Funds (PASMIF)
Vive Lobo, Rose, Supervisor, CARE International

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED DURING FIELD VISITS

BUNIA, ITURI DISTRICT
Adouane, Soroya, Head of CAS, MONUSCO Bunia
Ambwa, Benjamin, Deputy Bureau Chief, FAO Bunia
Baguma Araali, Ruhiwgwa, Rector, University of Bunia
Bondowe Muhindo, Roots, Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, UNICEF Bunia
Bonebana, Janette, Law Clerk, Kasenyi Legal Clinic
Coreke, Jeanne, Programme Officer, UNHCR Bunia
Dhedza, Vladimir, Engineer, FOMI (Mothers Forum of Ituri)
Duku, Xavier, Colonel, Head of Ituri Office, UE-PNDDR
Eka Rustique, Avo, Assistant District Commissioner, Ituri District
Hamani, Papy, Representative, CLPD Bunia Q. Soukisa
Justin Evilago, Christophe, DDR Coordinator, Ministry of the Interior – Ituri
Kassa, Sabiti, Law Clerk, Kasenyi Legal Clinic
Kpadju, Pierre, Director, Djaiba Primary School
Kwabene, Damien, Coordinator, APEC Bunia
Ladjouzi, M’hand, Acting Director, MONUSCO Bunia
Lalo, Jean-Bosco, President, Ituri Civil Society
Liendo Menga Konga, Jean-Louis, Deputy Administrator, Djugu Territory
Londjiringa, Nicolas, Lawyer, Coordinator, Ituri Human Rights Network
M. Sinami, Ituri Land Commission
Mbaya, Marcel, Major, Focal Point Project Post-Brassage, Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs
Ngabe, Michel, Director, Mwita Nzige Primary School
Nobirabo, Charles, Commander, Djugu Station (National Police)
Nodjun, Clémence Marie, Electoral Adviser, MONUSCO Electoral Division (Kisangani)
Rushoke, Abaingi, Traditional Leader, Kasenyi Authority
Songara, Johu, Captain, Djugu Military Camp

GOMA, NORD KIVU
Amuri-bin-Aradjabu, Tom, Consultant in Charge of Economic Affairs and the Portfolio, Provincial Ministry of Finance, Economy, Trade and Portfolio
Balikwisha, Juma, Minister, Provincial Ministry of Planning, Budget, Reconstruction, Information and Media (North-Kivu)
Banyene Manasse, Matata, Coordinator, ETN (Education and Supervision Team for Nyiragongo Trauma Victims)
Baumbila Kisolomi, Jean, Vice President, North-Kivu Provincial Assembly
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Annex 4

MAIN DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

The documents listed below do not include the many project documents, financial statements, briefs or internal documents that were provided to the evaluation by the UNDP country office. The list focuses on the external documents and the materials specific to UNDP that are essential to the programme analysis, such as the strategy documents or evaluations of the period covered by the ADR.


Government of DRC, Court of Audit, Rapport d’audit de la Cour des Comptes sur l’utilisation des ressources pro-pauvres ; observation de la cour des comptes sur le projet portant Arrêt du compte général de la république et règlement définitif du Budget de l’état pour l’exercice 2008 [Audit Report of the Court of Audit on the use of pro-poor resources; Court of Audit observations on the general account of the republic and final settlement of State budget for the Army 2008]


‘Support for the Emergence of Good Governance in DRC – Guidance Note’, anonymous and undated.


