
Strengthening the Philippines' Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change (MDG-F 1656)

Final Evaluation
Revised Report

By Joel Beasca, Independent Consultant

May 23, 2012


**The Evaluation Reference Group
The MDG-F Secretariat**

Colleagues in Development Work:

I am privileged to submit this Revised Version of the Final Evaluation Report on the MDG-F Joint Programme entitled *Strengthening the Philippines' Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change (MDG-F 1656)*. This evaluation report was revised mainly in accordance with the factual corrections and comments made on the draft version. I have also made additional changes based on my further review of the text.

In my opinion, this report fairly represents the performance of the programme with reference to the agreed-upon areas of inquiry. The key lessons drawn from the joint programme experience have also been included in this report. I am affirming that the independence of the evaluation process has been upheld, and I further acknowledge that the final wordings and opinionated statements in this report are mine.

I would also like to state that the final evaluation process has been successful, due to the cooperation of the Focal Persons from the UN Agencies and the National Institutions, as well as the support provided by the Final Evaluation Assistant (Mr. Jonas Almendrala) and the NEDA Agriculture Staff. May this report contribute to the achievement of the MDGs in the Philippines and a greater understanding of joint programming in the UN System.



**Joel Beasca
Independent Consultant**

New York City

List of Acronyms

| | | |
|---------|---|--|
| ACCBio | - | Adaptation to Climate Change and Conservation of Biodiversity |
| ADB | - | Asian Development Bank |
| AECID | - | <i>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para Desarrollo</i> |
| AFMP | - | Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Plan |
| AWS | - | Automatic Weather Station |
| BASE | - | <i>Barangay Alerto sa Sakit at Epidemya</i> |
| CAR | - | Cordillera Administrative Region |
| CCA | - | Climate Change Adaptation |
| CCC | - | Climate Change Commission |
| CIRCA | - | Center for Initiatives and Research on Climate Adaptation |
| CLUP | - | Comprehensive Land Use Plan |
| DA | - | Department of Agriculture |
| DENR | - | Department of Environment and Natural Resource |
| DepEd | - | Department of Education |
| DIPECHO | - | Disaster Preparedness Programme of the European Commission Humanitarian Office |
| DOH | - | Department of Health |
| DOLE | - | Department of Labor and Employment |
| DOST | - | Department of Science and Technology |
| DRM | - | Disaster Risk Management |
| DRR | - | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| DTI | - | Department of Trade and Industry |
| EIA | - | Environmental Impact Assessment |
| EMB | - | Environmental Management Board |
| ENR | - | Environment and Natural Resources |
| ERG | - | Evaluation Reference Group |
| ESRC | - | Event-Based Surveillance and Response System for Communities |
| EWS | - | Early Warning System |
| FAO | - | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| GDP | - | Gross Domestic Product |
| GEF | - | Global Environment Facility |
| GPH | - | Government of the Philippines |
| GVA | - | Gross Value Added |
| HEIs | - | Higher Educational Institutions |
| HUDCC | - | Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council |
| IEC | - | Information, Education and Communication |
| ILO | - | International Labour Organization |
| JP | - | Joint Programme |
| LGU | - | Local Government Unit |
| M & E | - | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MDGs | - | Millennium Development Goals |
| MDG-F | - | MDG Achievement Fund |
| MDTF | - | Multi-Donor Trust Fund |
| NEDA | - | National Economic and Development Authority |
| NGA | - | National Government Agency |
| NGO | - | Non-Government Organization |
| NSC | - | National Steering Committee |
| NSO | - | National Statistics Office |
| NWRB | - | National Water Resources Board |
| PAGASA | - | Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration |

| | | |
|----------|---|--|
| PATLEPAM | - | Philippine Association of Tertiary Level Education Institutions in Environmental Protection and Management |
| PC | - | Programme Coordinator |
| PCIC | - | Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation |
| PGA | - | Provincial Government of Albay |
| PhilCCAP | - | Philippine Climate Change Adaptation Project |
| PM | - | Programme Manager |
| PMC | - | Programme Management Committee |
| PMS | - | Project Management Staff |
| PMU | - | Programme Management Unit |
| RBM | - | Results-Based Management |
| RDCS | - | Regional Development Coordination Staff |
| REINA | - | Real, Infanta and Nakar |
| TOR | - | Terms of Reference |
| UN | - | United Nations |
| UNCO | - | UN Coordination Office |
| UNCT | - | UN Country Team |
| UNDAF | - | UN Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | - | UN Development Programme |
| UNEP | - | UN Environment Programme |
| UNRC | - | UN Resident Coordinator |
| V&A | - | Vulnerability and Adaptation |
| WHO | - | World Health Organization |
| WIBI | - | Weather Index-Based Insurance |

Table of Contents

| | Page |
|---|-----------|
| <i>Executive Summary</i> | i |
| I. Context of the Evaluation | 1 |
| A. Development Context | 1 |
| B. Description of the Joint Programme | 4 |
| C. Description of the Evaluation | 8 |
| II. Main Achievements of the Joint Programme | 11 |
| A. Description of Interventions | 11 |
| B. Outputs Delivered and Immediate Effects | 12 |
| C. Outputs in Progress | 18 |
| D. Issues in the Determination of Outcomes and Output 2.2 | 19 |
| III. Assessment of Programme Design, Processes and Results | 20 |
| A. Relevance of the Programme Design | 20 |
| B. Efficiency of Programme Processes | 22 |
| C. Ownership in the Process | 26 |
| D. Effectiveness of the Intervention | 28 |
| E. Sustainability of Results | 33 |
| IV. Conclusions and Lessons Learned | 35 |
| V. Recommendations | 38 |
| Annexes | |
| A. List of References | 40 |
| B. Itinerary of the Country Mission | 42 |
| C. List of Persons Consulted | 43 |
| D. List of Implementing Partners | 44 |

Executive Summary

In more recent times, the Philippines experienced a number of natural disasters which has placed it among the list of countries that have become most vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change. Latest empirical studies have also indicated climate changes in the country in terms of temperature increases and occurrences of extreme heat and rainfall. The total cost of extreme events related to climate change is believed to be high, at around 2.7% of the country's GDP. Climate change has also been associated with the difficulties in the country's achievement of the MDGs.

In response to this situation, the Philippines adopted the *Climate Change Law* in 2009 and the *Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Law* in 2010 as its main policy responses. A *National Framework Strategy on Climate Change* and a *National Climate Change Action Plan* were also put in place. The development community also implemented several initiatives on DRR/DRM starting in 2005.

From 2008 until 2011, the Joint Programme (JP) entitled *Strengthening the Philippines' Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change (MDG-F 1656)* was implemented. This was a JP implemented by 6 UN Agencies (i.e. FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNEP, UN Habitat, and WHO) in partnership with 9 National Institutions (i.e. DA, DENR, DOH, DOLE, DTI, HUDCC, NEDA, PAGASA, and PGA). The MDG-F funded the intervention at a cost of US\$ 8 million.

By January 2012, formal preparations began for the conduct of a Final Evaluation. After submission of an Inception Report, a Country Mission to the Philippines was carried out in March-April 2012. The mission involved interviews and group discussions with various informants from the implementing agencies, and beneficiary groups and institutions. Afterwards, a draft evaluation report was prepared. Corrections and comments on the draft report served as bases in finalizing this revised version of the report.

The evaluation determined that significant outputs were achieved by the JP, and that there were immediate effects from these outputs. *Climate Change Vulnerability and Assessment Tools* for the Health, Water Resources, Coastal Resources, and Agriculture/Forestry/Biodiversity Sectors were completed. These were confirmed by the end-users to have been helpful in their re-planning processes and in their capacity-building activities. Five *Mainstreaming Guidelines* were also made, and *Capacity Assessments* were carried out among 13 NGAs and 10 Provincial LGUs. Several *IEC Materials* were produced, and documentations were completed. An underreported output (i.e. the *Climate Projections for 2020/2050*) was also found by the evaluation, which showed potentials of impact. These were under Outcomes 1 and 2 of the JP, which were a responsibility of UNDP and UNEP, in partnership with NEDA and DENR.

In the five demonstration sites covered by the JP, the evaluation also found most output commitments to have already been delivered. Aside from these, positive immediate effects were reported by beneficiaries. The *Innovative Financing Scheme* in Agusan del Norte was launched and it had shown impressive results. Around 837 farmers have benefitted from the financing scheme which was coursed through a local co-operative, a rural bank, and Municipal Governments. The interviewed beneficiaries of the scheme reported income increments from their initial harvests, while rationalizing their activities with the issue of climate change. A *Weather Index-Based Insurance (WIBI)* System was also piloted in the area, which already paid out indemnities to 327 farmers. The sample of these farmers who were interviewed by the evaluation were likewise appreciative of the system and verified that it had indeed been useful to them in view of the problems brought to them by climate change. Women were active participants in the financing and insurance schemes. There were also other and additional outputs which were completed by ILO and its partners (the DTI and DOLE, among them) in Agusan del Norte.

In Albay, 84 *Modified Barangay Contingency Plans* have been finished and a *Climate Change Academy* was created. The modified plans featured an integration of CCA with their former focus on DRR/DRM. On the other hand, the Climate Change Academy is envisioned to be a learning center on climate change adaptation by government and private sector personnel. Aside from these, *Modified Lesson Plans* with climate change contents are already being used by public school teachers in 15 towns in the province. UNDP is implementing the project in Albay, in cooperation with the PGA.

In Benguet and Ifugao, FAO took the lead in introducing 25 *Climate Change Adaptation Options* for upland farming in 97 sites. Most of the participating farmers reported positive effects from their production of alternative cash crops and in their investments in small-scale infrastructure. Women also formed a significant portion of the set of beneficiaries in these areas, and were likewise vocal about the issue of climate change as it affects them and their communities. Other outputs were also delivered by FAO in these areas, in partnership with the DA Regional Office.

As part of CCA in the Health Sector which is being piloted in Metro Manila and Albay, an *Operations Manual* and *Web Manual* for the Early Warning System (EWS) called BASE/ESRC were developed. Strategic studies were also completed, particularly the *Study on the Use of Climate Change Variables to Predict Dengue Cases* and the *Assessment of Vulnerability and Adaptability of Albay and Metro Manila on the Impact of Climate Change on Health*. The project also trained health workers through modules for the *Training Course for Public Health Workers on Mitigating the Health Effects of Climate Change*. A key output in the Health Sector was the adoption of the *Administrative Order on Mainstreaming Climate Change in Health Programs* by the DOH. These were the products of the collaboration between DOH and WHO. There were also other outputs delivered for this sector.

In Sorsogon City, the project showcased the processes and elements of a climate change-resilient human settlement. A *Vulnerability Assessment Report* with focus on human settlement areas was done. This led to the crafting of a draft *City Shelter Plan* which has climate change parameters. The *Design Parameters of a Climate-Resilient Coastal Settlement/Community* was also completed. A related output was the *Retrofitting of 30 Houses* in 5 sites and the development of a *Prototype of a Climate-Resilient Housing Structure*. *Alternative Livelihood Training Courses* were also conducted to allow greater income options for the coastal settlers. Most of the participants in these courses noted that they have been able to apply their learnings in food processing and in masonry. Among other outputs, additional support was also provided by UN Habitat to the Sorsogon City Government in the improvement of its planning system through the production of maps and interface with an Automated Weather Station (AWS).

Aside from these finished outputs, the evaluation also reported that several other outputs are still in progress because of complexities in the JP's Results Structure, the manner of its delivery, the type of the output itself, and governance processes that have to be followed. However, the evaluation determined that these remaining outputs will be accomplished within the immediate period.

At the same time, it was pointed out that the JP could have problems in reporting the three Programme Outcomes and Output 2.2 because of redundancy issues and the lack of baseline data.

In assessing the relevance of the programme design, the evaluation found that the JP indeed contributed in solving the needs and problems indicated in the programme document through its various interventions in capacity-building, re-planning, and demonstration of CCA Options. The implementing partners (i. e. UN Agencies and National Institutions) were also relevant in the intervention because they added value in the delivery of their

various expertise. National alignment of the JP was evident. The JP was also relevant to the global objectives set by the MDG-F Secretariat.

In terms of efficiency, the JP abided by the standard 7% Administrative Cost ceiling and the least cost-high quality norm in procurements. However, there were obstacles faced by the intervention in terms of high start-up and learning costs, lack of efficiency targets and benchmarks, a need to balance operational efficiency with national ownership, trade-offs between cost efficiencies and operational deadlines, late hiring and staff turnovers, and the lack of a functional M&E System.

The evaluation cited evidence of the rootedness of national ownership in the JP through the amounts of local resources that were raised by the national counterpart institutions, their active participation in the affairs of the programme, and their continuation of project activities despite the closure of the programme last December 2011.

The effectiveness of the JP was assessed on the bases of its output achievements, its contribution to the attainment of the MDGs and the MDG-F Goals on the *Environment and Climate Change* Theme, and its adherence to the principles and standards in *Delivering As One* and *Aid Effectiveness*. In all these criteria, MDG-F 1656 turned out to be a success.

The evaluation also noted some indications of sustainability of the intervention, although in general, it concluded that it was too early to determine if the JP results had indeed become sustainable.

In the end, the exercise led to the following conclusions:

- MDG-F 1656 was implemented at the right time, when present-day needs were brought about by the adoption of the *Climate Change Law* and when there was growing recognition that climate change is tied up to the MDGs. The JP successfully responded to these needs.
- The JP was also successful in delivering most of the outputs expected from the intervention, and some of these outputs could have a strategic impact on climate change adaptation in the Philippines.
- There was also success in demonstrating the application of the *Delivering as One* Concept in the UN System, while abiding by the norms on national ownership set in the *Paris Declaration* and the *Accra Agenda for Action*.
- Except for a weakness in operationalizing an M&E System, MDG-F 1656 complied with the global implementation guidelines set by the MDG-F Secretariat and contributed to the attainment of the MDG-F Goals on *Environment and Climate Change*.
- Planning and management constraints were faced by the JP due to the newness of the joint programming modality applied for the intervention, and gaps in applying RBM approaches and techniques within the framework of this modality.
- The pacing of programme activities had been difficult due to an initial delay in the completion and delivery of key predecessor activities and outputs.

- There were weaknesses in the programme, in terms of delayed staff hiring, later procurements and fund transfers, non-functioning of the M&E System, and the lack of a gender strategy.
- The strong features of the JP were the strong participation of women in the project areas, its ability to leverage the programme funds, its flexibility in adapting the management system, its adeptness in working with NGOs and other private sector groups, and its keenness to the creation of national ownership.
- On the whole, MDG-F 1656 performed well in the aspects of Relevance, Ownership, and Effectiveness. Its performance on Efficiency is also within expectations. The Sustainability of the intervention will have to be determined later, although sustainability measures were put in place and there were indications that these were working.
- The achievements of MDG-F 1656 will contribute towards the reduction of negative climate change effects to the attainment of the MDGs in the Philippines. However, further steps need to be done.

The following recommendations were forwarded in this report:

- The CCA Options and Schemes, particularly in the agricultural sector, should be aggressively promoted and targeted for replication at a larger scale.
- The testing period and measurement process in the project areas in Agusan del Norte, Benguet, and Ifugao should be completed, and ex-post monitoring in these priority areas will have to be conducted.
- The existing initiatives by the project implementers (e.g. ILO) to replicate the CCA Options and Schemes in other areas through successor projects should be endorsed.
- Ex-post monitoring of the programme results in Albay, Sorsogon City, and Metro Manila should also be done.
- The baseline institutional assessments under Outcomes 1 and 2 should be replicated to other priority NGAs and Provincial LGUs.
- With specific reference to the implementation of the current (2012-2018) UNDAF in the Philippines, a Common RBM Training Course among the participating UN Agencies should be held, efficiency benchmarks should be set and efficiency targets should be included among the performance indicators of the JP, a systematic methodology should be used in designing a JP, and a Gender Equality Strategy should be integrated in future JPs.
- For similar future initiatives to be done by the MDG-F Secretariat, technical assistance in RBM should be provided to the programme proponents together with guidance on the conduct of the Programme Inception, clarification should be made if the three-year time frames include the start-up and exit phases, the full three-year plan of activities should be disclosed in the Joint Programme Document and/or a Programme Implementation Plan, efficiency benchmarks should be set in the JP Guidelines, and efficiency targets should be included in the Programme Proposals and the Signed Joint Programme Document.

I. Context of the Evaluation

A. Development Context

a. Climate Change Situation

Extreme weather-based events have lately highlighted the vulnerability of the Philippines to the negative effects of climate change. In 2011, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction reported the country to have had the most number of natural disasters, surpassing similar events in China, the United States, and India. The Philippines was also among the top countries which suffered the most number of deaths due to natural disasters last year. Typhoons and floods are estimated to account for around three-quarters of disaster events in the country.¹

Recent studies have also shown indications of climate changes in the country over time. Temperature increases from baselines in the 1960s and 1970s have been posited in various researches, while changes in the amount of rainfall and the timing of the rainy season per year are commonly acknowledged in similar assessments and reports. Latest data presented by experts from the country's official weather agency PAGASA (Hilario, Cinco & de Guzman, 2011) imply an overall increase in the country's temperature by around 0.5°C from 1981 until 2010, while generally concluding an increase in the intensity of rainfall over the past years. This trend is expected to continue in the future, as the PAGASA projections estimated a further increase in temperature in the range of 1.7°C to 2°C by 2050, with greater frequencies of extreme heat and rainfall.

The costs of climate change-related events in the Philippines are believed to be high. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) quoted a study which estimated the damages associated with the occurrences of *El Niño* in 1997-1998 and in 1992-1993 at around US\$ 450 million each (DENR, 2010). On the whole, the Government of the Philippines (GPH) placed the cost of damages due to disaster events at up to 2.7% of the country's GDP (National Economic and Development Authority [NEDA], 2011).

A large part of these costs could be due to typhoons and floods. Some 20 typhoons pass through the archipelago every year, which are largely (70%) comprised by coastal areas. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) reported that the frequency of typhoons entering the Philippines has increased by four times in 1990 to 2003 (ADB, 2009). Data from PAGASA (Hilario et al., 2011) also show that the top 3 typhoons causing the most number of damages have occurred in the past 6 years [Table 1].

¹ A total of 33 natural disasters were reported to have occurred in the Philippines in 2011, compared to 21 in China, 19 in the United States, and 11 in India. It was also estimated that around 1,400 persons perished due to Tropical Storm *Sendong* that hit the country in December 2011, next to the roughly 20,000 people who died during the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Secondary data from the Asian Development Bank (2009) show that 79% of disaster events in the Philippines from 1905 to 2006 were brought about by typhoons and floods.

Table 1. Estimated Damages due to Typhoons²

| Year | Typhoon Name | Estimated Damage (US\$ million) | Total (US\$ million) |
|------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| 2009 | Typhoon <i>Pepeng</i> | 650 | 912 |
| | Typhoon <i>Ondoy</i> | 262 | |
| 2008 | Typhoon Frank | 321 | 433 |
| | Typhoon <i>Cosme</i> | 112 | |
| 2006 | Typhoon <i>Milenyo</i> | 157 | 388 |
| | Typhoon <i>Reming</i> | 129 | |
| | Typhoon <i>Caloy</i> | 102 | |
| 1998 | Typhoon <i>Loleng</i> | 162 | 291 |
| | Typhoon <i>Iliang</i> | 129 | |
| 2010 | Typhoon <i>Juan</i> | 274 | 274 |
| 1995 | Typhoon <i>Rosing</i> | 257 | 257 |
| 1990 | Typhoon <i>Ruping</i> | 257 | 257 |
| 1993 | Typhoon <i>Kadiang</i> | 210 | 210 |

Source: Consultant's Estimates based on data quoted by Hilario et al. (2011) from the Office of Civil Defense

The Philippine Government has adopted important policy measures and strategies to address the challenges brought about by climate change. The *Climate Change Law*, enacted in October 2009, is the main policy response of the GPH. It mandated the creation of an inter-agency body [i.e. the Climate Change Commission (CCC)] to primarily mainstream climate change concerns into government plans and actions and serve as a coordinating mechanism among the various government agencies on climate change activities. The law further directed the development of a *National Framework Strategy on Climate Change* and a *National Climate Change Action Plan*, which were subsequently approved by the GPH in April 2010 and November 2011, respectively.



A Filipino family copes with the floods brought by Typhoon *Pepeng* in 2009

A related policy measure is the *Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Law* which was passed in May 2010. This law mandated the creation of mechanisms for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) (i.e. DRR/DRM offices and committees) at the national and local levels of the government, and set aside funds for this purpose.

Previous development interventions have also earlier on sought to address the problems and needs arising from extreme climate events. In 2005 to 2007, UNDP Philippines implemented a DRR/DRM Project entitled *Strengthening the Disaster Preparedness Capacities of REINA Municipalities to Geologic and Meteorological Hazards*. Funded by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the New Zealand Government, the project facilitated the development of hazard maps and the establishment of community-based disaster management systems in the towns of Real, Infanta and Nakar (REINA) in Quezon Province in response to a

² The data shown in this Table are limited to typhoons which have estimated damages of at least PHP 1 Billion or US\$ 24 Million over the time series.

disaster which hit the area in 2004. This REINA Project also built the capacities of rural health personnel in responding to calamities, and introduced alternative livelihood options to economically-displaced farmers.

Subsequently, UNDP implemented the *Hazard Mapping and Assessment for Effective Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (READY) Project* from 2006 until 2011. This was an initial effort to strengthen the capacities of key government institutions in disaster risk management through the development of multi-hazard maps and the strengthening of their coordination processes. It also aimed to introduce the concept of DRR into local development plans. The READY Project was also funded by AusAID.

Within the same period, UNDP moved on from the methodology of hazard mapping to risk assessment through its participation in the *Disaster Preparedness Programme of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (DIPECHO)*. In 2006 to 2008, UNDP continued with its earlier effort to integrate DRR into socio-economic and development plans at various levels of governance. UNDP also started to work with NEDA along this line through the *Mainstreaming DRR in Development Plans Project* in 2007 to 2008.

From 2008 until 2011, DENR completed the *Adaptation to Climate Change and Conservation of Biodiversity in the Philippines (ACCBio) Project* which primarily led to the institutional strengthening of the DENR in climate change and bio-diversity conservation, and the development of a national strategy for climate change adaptation. The ACCBio Project was funded by the German Government.

Currently, the DENR, in partnership with the Department of Agriculture (DA) and PAGASA, is involved in the conduct of activities under the *Philippines Climate Change Adaptation Project (PhilCCAP)* which is running from 2011 until 2015. This project features the testing of climate change adaptation strategies in the provinces of Cagayan, Iloilo and Surigao del Norte. The PhilCCAP Project is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) administered by the World Bank.

UNDP and NEDA are also currently working together in a project called *Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in Local Development Planning and Decision-Making Processes Project*. This project is designed to address the capacity gaps of institutions in their need to mainstream DRR and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) in development planning and in related regulatory processes. Funded by AusAID, this project is being implemented until mid-2012.

b. Status of MDG Achievement

In 2010, the Government of the Philippines (GPH) came out with its Fourth Progress Report on the MDGs. The report shows difficulties in Goal 1 (i.e. the elimination of extreme poverty and hunger), which was rated with a lower probability of achievement compared to the previous (2007) reporting period. The backslide in the poverty situation in the measurement period of 2009 was attributed by the GPH to price increases in food and fuel, the global financial crisis, and climate change-related events, particularly the two typhoons that hit the country in 2009 [Table 1] and the occurrence of *El Niño* within that period. The probability of achieving two other Goals (2 and 5) remained low. The country is nevertheless continuously strong in the achievement of Goals 3, 4, 6, and 7 [Table 2].

Table 2. Overall Probability of MDG Achievement, 2007 and 2010

| | 2007 | 2010 |
|---|-------|--------|
| Goal 1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger | High | Medium |
| Goal 2. Achieve Universal Primary Education | Low | Low |
| Goal 3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women | n. a. | High |
| Goal 4. Reduce Child Mortality | High | High |
| Goal 5. Improve Maternal Health | Low | Low |
| Goal 6. Combat HIV and AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases | High | High |
| Goal 7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability | High | High |

Sources: Consultant's Estimates based on data from the 2007 and 2010 MDG Progress Reports

Compared to overseas remittances and the local service and industry sectors, agriculture has a diminishing role in the country's economy. In 2006 and 2009, the agricultural sector contributed only around 10% of the Philippines' GDP. However, agriculture (including fishing) still employs a sizable portion of the workforce. Earlier estimates further show that the agricultural sector is the biggest contributor to income poverty: agricultural poverty could have made up 61% of total poverty in 2000 (Balisacan, 2003). In 2006, the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) also reported the fishermen and farmers sectors to be the top 2 poorest basic sectors in the Philippines, with poverty incidences of 50% and 44%, respectively (Castro, 2006).³

Climate change is believed to have affected agricultural production in the country, which in turn has impacted on Philippine poverty. Extreme weather events, particularly excessive rainfall brought about by typhoons and droughts due to *El Niño*, plus changed weather patterns, have altered agricultural output. Statistical (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics) data for instance show that the Gross Value Added (GVA) of agriculture dropped by around 2% in 2009 compared to 2008, which coincided with the passage of Typhoon *Pepeng* [Table 1] and the reported occurrence of *El Niño* in that year.

B. Description of the Joint Programme

a. Basic Features

The programme entitled *Strengthening the Philippines' Institutional Capacity to Climate Change (MDG-F 1656)* is a Joint Programme (JP) implemented in the Philippines and funded by the MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F). In conformity with the JP Concept, a common Results Framework and Budget was adopted for the programme, aside from a signed JP Document. The MDG-F Guidelines also applied a combined commitment rate system for the second and third fund releases for the programme. Under a national implementation modality, 6 UN Agencies executed the programme in partnership with 9 National Institutions (Table 3).⁴

³ As of January 2012, the National Statistics Office (NSO) reported that around one-third of the total workforce in the Philippines is employed in the agricultural sector.

⁴ The adoption of a Common Results Framework and Budget, as well as the presence of a Signed Joint Programme Document, are norms in joint programming set in the Guidance Note of the UN Development Group (2003). The combined commitment rate system is a particular add-on for MDG-F JPs. It required all the participating UN Agencies to commit at least 70% of the previous funds received for the second and third fund releases. The system implied a collective pace of implementation, which is a logical feature of joint programmes.

Table 3. Participating Agencies and Fund Transfer Modalities

| | UN Agencies | National Institutions | Fund Transfer Modality |
|------------------|-------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Outcomes 1 and 2 | UNDP | NEDA, PAGASA | Cash Advance, Direct Payment |
| | UNEP | DENR | Cash Advance |
| Outcome 3 | FAO | DA | Direct Payment |
| | ILO | DTI, DOLE | Direct Payment |
| | UNDP | PGA | Cash Advance |
| | UN Habitat | HUDCC | Direct Payment |
| | WHO | DOH | Direct Payment |

b. Results Expected from the Intervention

There are 3 Outcomes and 10 Outputs expected from MDG-F 1656. Outcome 1 is basically aimed at integrating the element of climate change in development plans, while Outcome 2 is the result associated with the capacity-building of the target institutions on the aspect of climate change. These outcomes are to be delivered by UNDP and UNEP and their national partners [Table 3], and their outputs are inter-linked. There are 9 outputs under Outcomes 1 and 2.⁵

Outcome 3 represents the result of the demonstration of climate change adaptation options done by FAO, ILO, UNDP, UN Habitat, and WHO and their national partners [Table 3]. There is one output and 21 “sub-outputs” in Outcome 3 [Table 4]. These are to be delivered in 5 demonstration sites: in Agusan del Norte (c/o ILO), Albay (c/o UNDP), Benguet and Ifugao (c/o FAO), Metro Manila and Albay (c/o WHO), and Sorsogon City (c/o UN Habitat).

In terms of their types, eight outputs are *products and services* (e.g. scenarios, options, guidelines, and assessments), while two outputs (i.e. Outputs 2.2 and 2.3) are *changes in development conditions* (i.e. these seeks changes in awareness and capacities). The 21 “sub-outputs” under Output 3.1 are basically also the *products and services* delivered in the demonstration sites. Among the outcomes, Outcomes 2 and 3 are *changes in development conditions* (i.e. these aim to change capacities) and Outcome 1 appear to be a combined *product* of its six component outputs [Table 4].

By design, Outputs 1.1, 1.2 and 3.1 appear to be critical outputs because these are predecessors to 7 other outputs. Output 1.1 is most critical because it was planned to be a basic predecessor output (i.e. it is a predecessor output to Output 1.2) [Table 4].⁶

⁵ This is why the presentation in this report integrates Outcome 1 with Outcome 2.

⁶ It will be disclosed later in this report that the relationships of outputs were not perfectly followed in the actual implementation of the programme because of time and other constraints.

Table 4. Summary of the Results Structure of MDG-F 1656

| Results | | Predecessor Outputs |
|--|--|--------------------------|
| Outcome 1. Climate risk reduction (CRR) mainstreamed into key national and selected local development plans and processes | | |
| | Output 1.1 Baseline risk scenario, incl. vulnerability maps for 43 provinces and CRR/adaptation monitoring system developed for priority sectors | None |
| | Output 1.2 Adaptation options for key sectors assessed, valued and prioritized, including “no regrets” options | Output 1.1 |
| | Output 1.3 Entry points for CRR in key national plans/planning and regulatory (e.g. EIA) processes identified and CRR compendium of adaptation best practices recommended for integration | Outputs 1.1, 1.2 and 3.1 |
| | Output 1.4 CRR mainstreaming guidelines adopted by key national government agencies and selected local governments | Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 |
| | Output 1.5 Selected local development/comprehensive land use plans reflect CRR measures | Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 |
| | Output 1.6 Web-based screening tool and portal for project developers/designers | Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 |
| Outcome2. Enhanced national and local capacity to develop, manage and administer projects addressing climate change risks | | |
| | Output 2.1 Existing capacities and gaps of key NGA, selected LGUs and local HEIs for CRR work assessed | None |
| | Output 2.2 Awareness raised for key national and local stakeholders on climate change | Outputs 1.1, 1.2 and 3.1 |
| | Output 2.3 CRR planning and implementation competencies of key stakeholders (NGAs, LGU planners, Academe) enhanced/increased | Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 |
| Outcome 3. Coping mechanisms improved through pilot adaptation projects | | |
| | Output 3.1 Enhanced capacities to ensure sustainability through demonstration projects showcasing innovative practices to improve local coping mechanisms, including alternative livelihoods | Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 |
| | <i>Number of Sub-Outputs: 21</i> | |

c. Financial Design

The budget for the joint programme is US\$ 8 million, all of which were transferred to the executing UN Agencies within the implementation time frame. Around 60% of the budget was allotted for Outcomes 1 and 2, with 4 agencies involved in Outcome 3 allotted with less than 15% of the budget [Table 5]. As noted earlier, a combined commitment rate system was applied for this joint programme and all other JPs under the MDG-F.⁷

⁷ Based on data from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office, the amounts of US\$2.5 million, US\$3.2 million, and US\$2.3 million were transferred to the 6 Executing UN Agencies in 2008, May 2010, and April 2011, respectively (excluding the amount of US\$ 20,000 in 2007).

Table 5. Financial Data on MDG-F 1656

| | Budget Share |
|------------------|--------------|
| Outcomes 1 and 2 | 60% |
| Outcome 3 | 40% |
| UNDP | 52% |
| UNEP | 15% |
| FAO | 12% |
| ILO | 8% |
| UN Habitat | 7% |
| WHO | 6% |

Source: Consultant's Estimates Based on Financial Data


d. Management System

In conformity with the global implementation guidelines set by the MDG-F Secretariat, a National Steering Committee (NSC) was organized, which served as the highest approval-making body for the programme. This committee was made up by 3 persons: the UN Resident Coordinator for the Philippines; a representative from NEDA; and a representative from the *Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID)* Office in Manila.

Inter-agency coordination of MDG-F 1656 activities, progress, and operational concerns was coursed through a Programme Management Committee (PMC). The PMC was composed by Focal Persons from the Executing UN Agencies and their counterpart National Institutions. Staff support and programme counterparts were provided by the national partners involved in the implementation of the programme. The Programme Management Unit (PMU) was comprised by a Programme Coordinator, a Programme Manager, Outcome Managers for Outcomes 1 and 2, and administrative staff. These personnel were either hired or seconded by the National Participants for the programme.

The links between the NSC, PMC and PMU are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Management Structure of MDG-F 1656



Source: TOR Document for the Final Evaluation

e. Implementation Time Frame

MDG-F 1656 was implemented from December 2008 until December 2011 (i.e. 37 months). While the MDG-F Secretariat approved a no-cost extension of 6 months until June 2011, the extended period mainly covered this final evaluation and the activities that were already committed by December 2011.⁸

C. Description of the Evaluation

a. Background and Approach

The conduct of a Final Evaluation is included in the global MDG-F Guidelines [2011]. It is part of the fund's Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Strategy to track and measure the overall impact on the MDGs and in multilateralism. A Mid-Term Evaluation was also previously done for MDG-F 1656 in August 2010.

⁸ It was clarified that the inception phase covered the period of August 2008 until the start of programme implementation in December 2008.

The Final Evaluation followed a summative approach. It is focused at the main achievements and lessons learned from the programme, taken from the whole period of its implementation. However, the final exercise also took off from the findings and directions set in the mid-term evaluation process.

b. Objectives of the Evaluation

The Final Evaluation was guided by the following generic objectives indicated in the TOR:

- To measure to what extent the JP has contributed to solve the needs and problems identified in the design phase;
- To measure the JP's degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised;
- To measure to what extent the JP on climate change adaptation has attained development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries, participants whether individuals, communities, institutions, etc.;
- To measure the JP's contribution to the objectives set in their respective specific thematic windows as well as the overall MDG fund objectives at local and national level (e.g. MDGs, Paris Declaration and Accra Principles and UN reform); and
- To identify and document substantive lessons learned and good practices on the specific topics of the thematic window, MDGs, Paris Declaration, Accra Principles and UN reform with the aim of supporting the sustainability of the JP or some of its components.

c. Methodologies Applied

An initial desk review of the documents that were sent to the Consultant was first conducted. The data from these documents served as bases in preparing an Inception Report. After the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) submitted its comments, a revised version of the Inception Report was made. The Inception Report included a description of the work to be done, including a Country Mission to the Philippines.

The Country Mission was carried out from February 21 to March 30, 2012. The mission included field visits to the 5 sites covered in Outcome 3. Group discussions and informant interviews were held with the joint programme implementers and beneficiaries. Similar activities were also done among the programme staff, and members of the PMC and NSC [Annex B].

In the course of the mission to the Philippines, additional documents and data were collected. These were likewise reviewed in the preparation of this report [Annex A].

Factual correction and comments on the draft version of this evaluation report were forwarded by the ERG and the MDG-F Secretariat to the Consultant, after which this revised version was prepared.

d. Constraints and Limitations

The Final Evaluation was bounded by the following constraints and limitations:

- *The lack of supporting documents pertaining to the design and inception of the joint programme* – The minutes of meetings and the proceedings of the activities during the design phase and inception of the programme

were not available. The information on this report which pertain to these are simply based on the memory of the informants who were present during the design and inception of the programme.

- *The non-availability of updated financial data* – The latest financial data obtained by the evaluation were as of November 2011. Current data are still not available, as some activities were still on-going during the evaluation period.
- *The quality of the results framework adopted by the programme* – The Results Framework referred to in this report was taken on an “as-is” basis. Despite some flaws found by the evaluation on the said framework, the work still made use of the outcome and output definitions and their logical relationships, as well as the indicators stated therein.
- *The lack of monitoring reports* – For reasons that will be discussed later in this report, the programme-level monitoring reports were not done and could not be referred to in this evaluation.
- *A random sampling of beneficiaries was not applicable* – The attendance of beneficiaries during the field consultations was based on practical factors (i.e. their information on the scheduled meetings, their availability during the time of the site visits, and the accessibility of their farms). However, this limitation did not affect the objectivity of the information derived from the beneficiaries and the site visits.

II. Main Achievements of the Joint Programme

A. Description of Interventions

a. Types of Inputs Provided

Through MDG-F 1656, technical assistance and financial support were provided by the Executing UN Agencies to their national counterparts. In Outcomes 1 and 2, UNDP and UNEP provided technical guidance to NEDA and DENR in the overall planning of activities, in the identification of local consultants and institutions that were eventually contracted for the sectoral and institutional assessments and the training activities for capacity-building, in developing the IEC Materials for the programme, and in documenting the lessons learned from the experience (in Outcome 3). Guidance was also provided by UNDP to PAGASA in the preparation and dissemination of the *2020/2050 Climate Projections*. UNDP drew on the experiences of their national environmental staff from their previous DRR/DRM projects implemented in the Philippines, as well as their knowledge of similar interventions in other countries, in providing the technical guidance to their partner-agencies. UNEP also brought in technical guidance to the national institutions through the expertise and knowledge of its regional staff in Bangkok. The technical guidance provided by the UNDP and UNEP staff were rendered through institutional coaching and participation in the PMC. Depending on the fund transfer modalities agreed upon by UNDP and UNEP with their respective partner-agencies [Table 3], the financial inputs needed for the programme activities were either transferred to the accounts of the national institutions for eventual disbursement or directly paid for by the UN Agencies.

Under Outcome 3, the 5 involved UN Agencies (i.e. FAO, ILO, UNDP, UN Habitat, and WHO) delivered technical assistance to the GPH counterparts through their national staff and international experts who were also brought in to help in specific tasks, particularly the development of the Weather Index-Based Insurance (WIBI) System by ILO which was piloted in Agusan del Norte, and the identification of adaptation options for upland crops by FAO which was done in Benguet and Ifugao. The national staff of UN Habitat, WHO, FAO and ILO banked on their expertise in their respective fields of work in delivering technical assistance to the national programme implementers. Their guidance were also rendered through coaching and their participation in the local management mechanisms that were set up for the programme, aside from their involvement in the activities of the PMC. UNDP also worked in Outcome 3 (with the Provincial Government of Albay) in the same way as it did in Outcomes 1 and 2. The financial inputs under Outcome 3 were delivered in a similar manner as it was in Outcomes 1 and 2, depending on the modalities of fund transfer applied by each agency.

b. Manner of Service Delivery

The programme worked with a number of academe-based persons and institutions that were tasked for the sectoral and institutional assessments, the tools developed for such purposes, and the documentation of lessons learned under Outcomes 1 and 2 of the joint programme. Most of them are known experts in their respective fields (e.g. agriculturists, geologists, and marine scientists). The programme also coursed through some NGOs and private organizations the provision of services for the IEC Activities and the training of target government agencies.

In Outcome 3, programme activities were implemented by local partners in the demonstration sites. These were the local government units or the local (regional or provincial) offices of national government agencies, NGOs, a rural bank, and a government corporation with operational presence in the project site. Informal inter-agency or inter-office mechanisms, such as the *Issue Working Group* in Sorsogon City under the UN Habitat component, the

DOH Technical Working Group under the WHO component, the *Project Steering Committee* in Agusan del Norte under the ILO component, and the community-based *Local Working Groups* in Benguet and Ifugao under the FAO component also served as coordinating bodies for service delivery.

The programme also entered into an agreement with the NEDA Regional Development Coordination Staff (RDSCS) for cost-sharing on the delivery of Output 1.5 (Enhancement of Local Development Plans). This was done to complement the NEDA RDSCS on the same output under its *Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in Local Development Planning and Decision-Making Processes Project* which is being implemented also in partnership with UNDP until mid-2012.

B. Outputs Delivered and Immediate Effects

a. Outputs and Immediate Effects under Outcomes 1 and 2


The Climate Change *Vulnerability and Assessment (V & A) Tools* for 4 key sectors (i.e. Health Sector, Water Resources Sector, Coastal Resources Sector, and Agriculture/Forestry/Biodiversity Sector) were completed by the UP National Institute for Geological Sciences, UP National Institute for Health, and UP Marine Science Institute. These were predecessor outputs to the actual assessments done for the concerned sectors and institutions, as well as the sectoral adaptation guidelines and the provincial plans [Table 4]. The National Government Agencies (NGAs) which benefited from these outputs confirmed that the tools and the overall programme support have been useful in facilitating their climate change planning processes, and in building up their capacities on climate change, as mandated by the Climate Change Law.⁹

A successor output to the V & A Tools were the 5 *Mainstreaming Guidelines* on Climate Change which were subsequently adopted by the concerned government agencies to update their plans and operating procedures (i.e. the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Plan (AFMP) of the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Environment and Natural Resources (ENR) Framework Plan of the DENR, the Water Regulations being set by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) being done by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), and the updating of the Philippine Development Plan by NEDA) based on the climate projections and the foreseen impacts on the sectors. The actual updating of plans and operating procedures were reported to be at varied stages of progress because of bureaucratic and inclusive processes that have to be followed in the government agencies. In the advanced stage is the EMB which has already issued a memorandum on the integration of DRR/CCA in the EIAs. Still in the works are the DA, DENR, and NWRB which are in the stage of having their plans and guidelines approved by their management committees or board of directors.

⁹ The Technical Working Group of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) reported that the Water Resources Sector Study has been useful to them in updating their technology for water allocation planning, while the Planning Service Division of the Department of Agriculture (DA) Central Office noted that the V & A Tool and Study for the Agricultural Sector has enabled them to facilitate their re-planning processes in view of the realities brought about by climate change.

An underreported output in Outcome 1 were the *Climate Projections* in 2020 and 2050 for 69 Provinces in the Philippines (and the National Capital Region) which were done by PAGASA. These are projected data on temperature, rainfall and extreme events in 2020 and 2050 that can be used for long-term climate change adaptation planning. It turned out to be a key and strategic output because it served as a predecessor to most of the other outputs under Outcomes 1 and 2, and also in Outcome 3. PAGASA also reported that the climate projections have been used for several other development planning purposes over those targeted in the programme: around 100 presentations of the climate projections were reported to have been rendered by PAGASA to various government and private sector agencies since the data were completed in December 2010. It is believed that the projections have been used for the planning purposes of these beneficiary agencies.¹⁰

Capacity Assessments were also completed for 12 NGAs, the CCC and the Provincial Governments of Agusan del Norte, Antique, Biliran, Bohol, Bukidnon, Cavite, Ifugao, Pangasinan, Sorsogon, and Surigao del Norte. The results of the most recent assessments show the current capacities of the CCC and the 10 Provincial Governments to be at basic levels [Table 6]. Nevertheless, these data serve as objective baselines for the measurement of capacity improvements of these institutions in the future period. The tool and the methodology applied for this output can also be replicated in other national and local government agencies. A related *Report on Capacity Assessment for Universities and Colleges* was also done by the Philippine Association of Tertiary Level Educational Institutions in Environmental Protection and Management (PATLEPAM) which covered 332 educators (142 females and 190 males) from 13 regions for the assessment. PATLEPAM also enhanced the contents of several academic courses and documented 7 good practices on these. The mainstreaming of CCA/DRR in the curricular program of higher education institutions is being endorsed by PATLEPAM to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The *Documentation of the LGU Summit on Mainstreaming Climate Change Adaptation for Provinces, Cities and Municipalities* was finished and is being reproduced for public dissemination.



The Climate Projections done through the programme turned out to be an underreported, yet strategic output

Several *IEC Materials on Climate Change Adaptation* were produced by the programme and were disseminated to various government agencies and private sector groups in various forums. A *Second Draft of the Publication of Lessons Learned on Climate Change Adaptation* in the Outcome 3 sites has also been finished at the time of this evaluation.

¹⁰ The preparation of the climate projections was part of the activities under Output 1.1 (i.e. the Climate Projections were apparently not considered as an output by itself).

Table 6. Summary of Phase II Capacity Assessment Results

| | Mean Score | Implied Level of Capacity ¹¹ |
|---------------------------|------------|---|
| Climate Change Commission | 2.7 | Low |
| Provincial Government of: | | |
| Agusan del Norte | 1.7 | Very Low |
| Antique | 2.1 | Low |
| Biliran | 2.0 | Low |
| Bohol | 2.0 | Low |
| Bukidnon | 2.4 | Low |
| Cavite | 2.6 | Low |
| Ifugao | 1.9 | Very Low |
| Pangasinan | 2.2 | Low |
| Sorsogon | 2.0 | Low |
| Surigao del Norte | 2.0 | Low |

Source: Consultant's Estimates based on data from the Capacity Assessment Report

b. Outputs and Immediate Effects under Outcome 3

Climate Change Adaptation Options and Schemes applicable in the agricultural, health, human settlements and local governance and education sectors have been piloted in 5 demonstration sites.

In the Province of Agusan del Norte, an *Innovative Financing Scheme* was introduced, covering a total of 837 farmer-beneficiaries. It is a climate change lending program being piloted through a local farmers' co-operative, a rural bank, and selected Municipal Governments. As of December 2011, around US\$ 360,000 have been loaned out for the production of rice and corn varieties that are locally-known to be resilient to climate change effects. Alternative livelihood projects were also financed as a strategy to diversify the risks in farming brought about by changing climates.

A related scheme introduced in the area is the *Weather Index-Based Insurance (WIBI) System* which has so far covered 327 farmer-beneficiaries in two production cycles. This is the first known initiative to adapt crop insurance to climate change effects, by linking the risks and pay-outs with climate projections and actual occurrences of extreme climate events (i.e. low and excess rainfall). Some 102 farmers have so far benefited from the pay-outs under the scheme.

¹¹ These are the Consultant's rating on the capacities of the institutions based on the mean scores computed in the assessment report, although using an integer approach (e.g. a mean score of 2.7 for CCC is recognized herein as a "2"). The qualitative ratings are the same as the ones used in the assessment (i.e. 1=Very Low, 2=Low, 3=Medium, and 4=High).

Several farmers who benefited from the lending programs reported positive effects in terms of increased incomes from their main crops and the additional produce (e.g. vegetables) brought about by the programme. They attributed their additional incomes to lower costs of financing (offered by the program) and good prices during harvest time. The income increments derived by the beneficiaries from the intervention were assessed by them to be significant for their needs (i.e. around US\$ 200 – US\$ 300 per hectare). Aside from their monetary gains from the pay-outs, beneficiaries of the insurance scheme also positively noted the simplicity and promptness of the pay-out system. Women were visibly present in these schemes: around 60% of the beneficiaries in the financing and insurance systems were women.



Income increments were reported by women-beneficiaries of the *Innovative Financing Scheme* in Agusan del Norte

The discussions with the beneficiaries further show their awareness on the concept of climate change, how it affects their communities, and how the lending and insurance programs are linked to the issue. The project partners also reported positive effects from their participation in the project. The local co-operative and the rural bank which are implementing the financing schemes noted that they have likewise benefitted from the project in terms of increased memberships and outreach, and their increased ability to perform their missions and plans. The Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), ILO's implementing partner in the WIBI Scheme, further noted that the pioneering experience has been beneficial to them in expanding the same concept to other areas under the on-going PhilCCAP Project.

Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessments were done for each of the 4 towns in which the project operated. A *Value Chain Analysis* and *Market Research* were also completed in line with the preparations for the test runs of the financing and insurance schemes.

Additional project outputs which are related to the main achievements reported earlier were also delivered by the programme. *Automatic Weather Stations (AWS)* were built through the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) Regional Office and PAGASA in 3 towns where the financing scheme is being implemented. Eleven *Water Level Gauges* and 16 *Manual Rain Gauges* were also supplied in the project area. *Capacity-building and IEC activities on the early warning systems were also reported. Caselets and IEC Materials* on the lending and insurance systems were produced.

In the Province of Albay, *Modified Barangay Contingency Plans* were made in 84 barangays (communities). Using a participatory and bottom-up approach involving the community council officers and members, the apparent aim was to integrate the concepts of CCA and DRR in these plans. Community leaders who took part in the re-planning process appreciated the process by which their contingency plans were upgraded. The project implementer Center for Initiatives on Research and Climate Adaptation (CIRCA) also explained that the barangay-level plans will lead towards the development of municipal and provincial land use plans.



Community Officials participated in the modification of their *Barangay Contingency Plan*

The creation of the *Climate Change Academy* was also reported as a project output. The Climate Change Academy is envisioned by the

Provincial Government of Albay to become a formal learning institution on climate change and disaster risk management by government personnel and other interested sectors. It will offer regular modules on CCA and DRM, and will link up with universities for accreditation of degree and certificate programs. This initiative was apparently inspired by a perceived growing public interest on the DRM/CCA activities and accomplishments of the provincial government, based on the number of local and foreign groups who visit the area for learning and site exposure. The Provincial Government of Albay is known to be a pioneer of local government mechanisms on disaster risk reduction and climate change.¹²

Modified Lesson Plans which integrate climate change concepts have been developed from the *Lesson Exemplars* (i.e. sample lesson plans) that were previously introduced and promoted for use in the public school system of the province. CIRCA staff and officials from the local offices of the Department of Education (DepEd) reported that the lesson plans are currently being applied in major subjects at the grade school and high school levels in 15 towns.

In the Provinces of Benguet and Ifugao, *Climate Change Adaptation Options* for mostly upland farms have been introduced and are being tested. These 25 farming technology options were set up in 97 sites classified into their elevation and cropping seasons. These are options on crop production, agro-forestry and forest enrichment, livestock raising, soil and water management, and small-scale agricultural infrastructure. The promotion of CCA options in the uplands is more challenging because of its sloping terrain, limited size of plots, and vulnerability to extreme climate events (e.g. frosting). Nevertheless, the project was built up from the indigenous adaptation practices that were already being applied by the farmers in the area.

Several participating farmers already reported positive effects from their production of alternative cash crops and in their investments in small-scale infrastructure. Additional incomes were reported by farmers who benefited from the vegetables dispersed through the programme. The level of these incomes varied according to the market prices of their produce which prevailed during harvest time: those who noted good market prices during the time of sale reported incomes as high as US\$ 240, while those who had problems with prices during harvest time only reported break-even levels.

On the other end, farmers who benefited from the small water impounding and rehabilitated irrigation systems noted steady access to water supply, particularly in the context of changed rainfall patterns, as the primary beneficial effect of the project to their households and communities. Women-farmers also turned out to be active participants in the project in Benguet and Ifugao: around 245 out of the 519 farmers (47%) who participated in the testing of the CCA Options were women, who were likewise vocal about the concept of climate change and its specific effects on their communities.



Women-farmers actively participated in the testing of the CCA Options in Benguet and Ifugao

A *Vulnerability Assessment Tool* and *Vulnerability Assessment Studies for Benguet and Ifugao* were completed by the contracted academic institutions. At the time of the evaluation, these were reported to be in the stage of being presented to the municipal governments for use in their CCA planning processes. An additional output was the establishment of *Automatic Weather Stations (AWS)* in 3 towns in the Province of Benguet. The documentation of the implementation process, M&E report, good practices, overall report, and policy proposals were still on-going as of the evaluation period.

¹² Among the notable achievements of the Provincial Government was the creation of CIRCA in 2007.

Under the Health Sector Component of Outcome 3 being implemented in Metro Manila and Albay, the *Operations Manual* and *Web Manual* for the Early Warning System (EWS) called *Barangay Alerto sa Sakit at Epidemya (BASE)/Event-Based Surveillance and Response System for Communities (ESRC)* were developed. BASE is a community-based EWS for the immediate detection of epidemic-prone diseases and other public health threats which usually occur during extreme climate-based events. On the other hand, ESRC is a rapid reporting system that immediately alerts health authorities on public health events that require timely response. The development of the manuals are ultimately expected to contribute to the enhancement of the EWS nationwide.

A *Study on the Use of Climate Change Variables to Predict Dengue Cases* was also completed. This study determined the relationships of humidity, temperature and water levels to the spread of dengue fever. A larger study on the *Assessment of Vulnerability and Adaptability of Albay and Metro Manila on the Impact of Climate Change on Health* was also done. This research output served as reference for the eventual adoption of the *Administrative Order on Mainstreaming Climate Change in Health Programs* which was issued recently by the Department of Health (DOH) in 2012.

Training Modules for the *Training Course for Public Health Workers on Mitigating the Health Effects of Climate Change* were developed. Four batches of health workers from selected health clinics and hospitals in Metro Manila have so far completed the course. Several *IEC Materials* were also produced under the Health Component. Flyers, posters, calendars and flip charts on climate change-related diseases like cholera, dengue, leptospirosis, and measles were developed and disseminated. Information sheets on *Climate Change and Its Health Effects*, the *Climate Change Law*, and the *Relevance of Disasters to Illnesses* were made. Similar Advocacy Kits for Health Workers and Local Government Executives were also developed.



A Public Health Worker who attended the training program being interviewed during the evaluation

In Sorsogon City, several outputs were produced to showcase the processes and elements of a climate change-resilient human settlement. A *Vulnerability Assessment Report* with emphasis on human settlement areas was completed. This key output was developed through a participatory approach, and was documented for possible sharing in other areas. According to the project implementer, the process is already being replicated by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) in other parts of the country.

As an effect of the Vulnerability Assessment Report, a draft *City Shelter Plan* with climate change elements and parameters was subsequently developed. This is in the process of being approved by the City Council. The *Design Parameters of a Climate-Resilient Coastal Settlement/ Community* were also adopted. These included minimum housing and siting standards, a design for a model housing structure, and the promotion of alternative (i.e. non-climate sensitive) livelihoods.

The actual demonstration of these design parameters have so far resulted in the *Assessment of 43 Housing Structures* in 5 pilot communities and the actual *Retrofitting of 30 Houses* in these sites. *Community Action Plans* were also developed, and a *Prototype of a Climate-Resilient Housing Structure* is in the works and expected to be completed by May 2012. *Alternative livelihood training courses* which covered around 100 participants were also conducted. Several beneficiaries of these livelihood courses reported to the evaluation that they have been able to apply their learnings in practice (e.g. food processing and masonry). An *LED Lighting System* was also promoted in 5 barangays.

Additional outputs from the project included the *Production of Several (Zoning, Hazard, and Land Use) Maps* and its interface with an *Automatic Weather Station (AWS)* which was also set up through the project. This intervention included training of personnel from the City Planning Office who reported an increase in level of professional confidence as an immediate positive effect from the project. *Manual Rain Gauges* were also installed in selected barangays. *IEC Materials* were produced and distributed in 64 barangays, and *Radio and TV Broadcasts* on climate change themes were likewise supported. Selected *Public Schools* were *retrofitted* to become more effective evacuation centers during times of emergencies, and a *Roof Painting Technology* was tested.



An immediate effect of the project in Sorsogon City was the increased confidence of this planning personnel in his task

C. Outputs in Progress

The evaluation determined that there are no outputs in the Results Framework which could not be delivered by the joint programme. However, there are outputs which are still in the process of being completed because of complexities in the results structure and the manner of delivery, the type of the output, and governance processes that have to be followed.

As earlier disclosed, the *Enhanced Provincial Plans for 43 Provinces* expected in Output 1.5 is a co-shared output with the *Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in Local Development Planning and Decision-Making Processes Project* which will still run until mid-2012. This output (and all other outputs under the other project) also required the completion of Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 as predecessor outputs [Table 4]. For reasons that will be elaborated later in this report, Output 1.1 was itself delayed which led to the delay of the successor outputs.

The completion of Output 1.6 (Web-based screening tool and portal for project developers/ designers) was also reported by NEDA to be delayed and will be completed by the middle of the year because it is also a successor output to Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 [Table 4].

Unlike most of the other outputs in Outcomes 1 and 2, Output 2.3 [*CRR planning and implementation competencies of key stakeholders (NGAs, LGU planners, Academe) enhanced/ increased*] requires a change in a development condition (i.e. capacities) that usually takes more time to achieve [Table 4]. As it is, the joint programme has completed the assessment of the current capacities of selected government agencies [Table 6]. According to NEDA, capacity increases will be measured after one year, using the same assessment tool and (self-assessment) methodology. Training courses under the Integrated Competency Development Program (ICDP) of the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) are also on-going. These courses are aimed at developing climate change adaptation strategies and competencies of government agencies. It was reported that 3 training batches have been completed and the ICDP Training Modules are being finalized.

Outputs related to policy support under Outcome 2 were also reported to be on-going. A proposed law (i.e. People's Survival Fund) was being worked on by the CCC with support from the programme. This was at the stage of approval at the level of the Senate and the House Committee.

Although a second draft has already been completed, the *Compendium of Best Practices* under Output 1.3 was delayed because it is a successor output to Outputs 1.1, 1.2, and 3.1 [Table 4].

Under Outcome 3, the *Capacity Assessment of the Provincial Government of Albay* and the *Enhanced Provincial Development Plan* are still on-going because of the similar situation with Output 1.5. The *Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP)* is also still in progress because of the bottom-up process adopted by the project implementer.

In Benguet and Ifugao, the *project outputs related to documentation* (i.e. documentation of the implementation process, M&E report, good practices, overall report, and policy proposals) are still on-going as of the evaluation period because these are successors to all other outputs.

The *City Shelter Plan for Sorsogon City* is in the process of being approved by the City Council. Also, the *Prototype Housing Structure* under this project is scheduled to be completed within the year.

D. Issues in the Determination of Outcomes and Output 2.2

There could be problems in the determination of the joint programme outcomes. While Outcome 1 is a product that can be readily measured, it appears that it is redundant to Outputs 1.3 and 1.4. On the other hand, Outcome 2 could also be redundant with reference to Output 2.3. In Outcome 3, there is only one programme-level output which will obviously be redundant to it (i.e. the outcome is the output itself) [Table 4].¹³

The determination of Output 2.2 (i.e. a change in awareness) can also be difficult for the programme because the baseline level of the targets have not been established. The methodology for measuring the change is also unclear [Table 4].¹⁴

¹³ In the Results Framework of MDG-F 1656, there are 2 indicators specified for Outcome 1 (Climate risk reduction (CRR) integrated into key national and selected local development plans and processes). These are: (a) 8 Guidelines available for integration into next cycle national plans; and (b) 100% of target local land use/development plans with qualitative and quantitative CRR measures. These are the same indicators in Output 1.3 (i.e. No. of CRR Guidelines for development plan integration) and Output 1.4 (i.e. No. of local development/comprehensive land use plans). Having the same indicators for the outcome and the outputs is not possible in the concept of a logical framework and the concept of a results chain in RBM.

¹⁴ The indicator set for Output 2.2 (Awareness of key national and local stakeholders raised on climate change issues) is 30% increase over baseline level of awareness of target clientele. However, this baseline level of awareness was not established, so it would not possible to measure the increase (or the change, in other words, the "result"). The methodology of measuring the change was not also specified (i.e. how will the increase be measured, possibly through panel research or random sampling?).

III. Assessment of Programme Design, Processes and Results

A. Relevance of the Programme Design

Drawing from its previous experiences on DRR/DRM Projects, UNDP Philippines took the lead role in the design and development of this joint programme on climate change. After receiving the MDG-F Guidelines and Call for Proposals, UNDP's Environment Team developed the *Concept Note* for MDG-F 1656 in 2007 and convened an interim inter-agency group originally composed by 8 UN Agencies. After approval of the *Concept Note* by the MDG-F Secretariat, the *Programme Proposal* involving the final set of 6 UN Agencies and their counterpart national institutions was drafted by UNDP.

The needs and problems on climate change adaptation that were identified in the design phase were drawn from the knowledge of UNDP in its implementation of the *REINA Project* in 2005 to 2007, the *READY Project* which started in 2006, and the *DIPECHO Project* which also started in 2006. These needs and problems were: (a) the weak capacities of national agencies, local authorities and vulnerable communities to effectively develop coping mechanisms and strategies on climate change; (b) the lack of tools and systems to enable appropriate planning and implementation of climate change adaptation; and (c) a general lack of information on technological adaptation and sustainable development options to address the impacts of climate change at the local level.

To the fullest extent, the joint programme contributed in solving the needs and problems identified in the design phase, as certain elements specifically addressed these. Outcome 2 matches the needs and problems in the aspect of institutional capacities, which were addressed through the development of assessment and planning tools, and the actual conduct of capacity-building activities. Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 correspond to the needs and problems associated with the lack of tools and systems that were actual components of Outcome 2. Outcome 3 meets the needs and problems related to the lack of information on climate change adaptation options. These are the CCA options shown in the 5 demonstration sites.

The implementing partners clearly added value in solving the development challenges stated in the programme document. On the side of the UN Agencies, each UN Agency delivered its expertise and specialized services to deliver the programme outputs. UNDP Philippines banked on its related expertise on DRR/DRM which were built up through those project engagements that were previously mentioned. UNEP contributed its regional knowledge of environmental management practices that were applicable to the programme. FAO's specialization on agricultural production technologies was certainly visible in the demonstration sites. ILO also clearly built on its mastery of social protection schemes that were adjusted to the climate change adaptation framework. UN Habitat likewise brought in its concept of human settlements into the programme demonstration component, while WHO's role in the health sector component was clearly linked to its agency competence.

On the side of the national partners, NEDA is known to be the principal GPH agency on development planning, and this was its main contribution to the programme. Prior to the creation of the CCC, DENR was the lead government technical agency on climate change, and hence was instrumental in overseeing and mainstreaming the programme activities. PAGASA also had a specific role in developing the climate projections that were crucial for the implementation of the programme. The DA certainly performed its role in the agricultural concerns of the programme. The DTI and DOLE in the Caraga Region not only worked for the programme in terms of aligning the project activities with their institutional plans, but also in contributing financial resources for certain project components. The Provincial Government of Albay, through CIRCA, definitely also did its task of implementing the project activities in its area through its local governance mechanisms. The DOH was also a critical partner in the

implementation of the health component of the programme, and has an important role in expanding the impact of the JP to the national level.

It is believed that the joint programming option was the best option to address the needs and problems stated in the programme document. The needs and problems earlier mentioned were broad, and these demanded several competencies which were present among the participating UN Agencies and their national counterparts. The UN Agencies and the National Institutions also implemented the programme in line with other related interventions on climate change which were concurrent with the JP's time frame.

In relation to the earlier point, the planners of the joint programme could also have opted to split the JP into 2 smaller JPs (i.e. one combining Outcomes 1 and 2, and other representing Outcome 3). However, it was explained that this could not have been possible because the programme was designed to follow a scientific approach in climate change adaptation. This meant that even Outcome 3 was supposed to be based on the basic assessments and tools which were developed under Outcome 1.

In broad terms, the joint programme was aligned with the previous 2003-2009 *UNDAF* and the 2004-2010 *Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan* which generally called for environmentally sustainable growth. The concept of climate change had not yet been elaborated in the Philippines during the time of programme development (i.e. 2007-2008). It was not until 2009 when the Climate Change Law was enacted in the country, which made climate change adaptation a national priority. It was also only in the current (2012-2018) *UNDAF* where the climate change issue and the need for adaptation were made explicit. In this sense, it can be stated that MDG-F 1656 was aligned with the national priorities and with the *UNDAF* even before these priorities and plans related to climate change came into being.

The Joint Programme Document included a Programme Monitoring Framework which spelled out the indicators for each outcome and output, its means of verification, the agencies responsible for the monitoring of each element, and the risks and assumptions associated with the expected results. However, there was no discussion in the text about how the programme M&E will be carried out. The MDG-F Guidelines nonetheless included a section on programme-level M&E and a template for the monitoring reports.

Eventually, the Project Monitoring Staff (PMS) of NEDA was tasked to develop the M&E Strategy for MDG-F 1656 and to perform the monitoring work required for the programme. There were clear efforts made to develop the strategy (including revising the Results Framework) and to implement the programme monitoring system. However, these efforts did not lead to a functional monitoring of development results. According to the report of the NEDA PMS, this was because: (a) the revised Results Framework was not finalized; and (b) the implementing agencies did not submit the basic progress reports that were needed for the preparation of the programme-level monitoring reports.

At the project level however, the evaluation noted some disparate efforts done on M&E. Evaluations have also been carried out, although because these were obviously required by the MDG-F Secretariat. The weakness in programme-level monitoring will negatively affect the determination of outcomes later on as already mentioned in the preceding section of this report.

There have been no major revisions on the programme design. As stated earlier, there was an attempt to update the Results Framework but this did not succeed because there was no final agreement among the implementing agencies on the new set of indicators and monitoring system that will be applied for the programme. The effort to

revise the Results Framework was done in response to the recommendations set by the mid-term evaluation. The mid-term evaluation report also suggested to integrate a gender framework in CCA and specifically recommended for the programme to undertake a gender study. Although this point was reportedly discussed in the PMC Meetings, it was apparently not also finalized, and it remained as a missing element in the programme design.

An *Inception Workshop* for MDG-F 1656 was done early in September 2008 but it did not also lead to a revision of the programme design and plan. This turned out to be a major weakness in the management of the JP because it could have served as an opportunity to review the Results Framework at the onset and reach an agreement among the implementing partners on the M&E System that will be adopted for the programme. The MDG-F Guidelines did not include guidance on the conduct of inception workshops for MDG-F JPs.

While the programme has indeed been able to address the basic needs and problems identified during the design phase, there has been a weakness in the programme logic due to flaws in the structure of results. There are redundancy issues in the Results Framework as earlier reported. This could be due to the lack of a methodology in constructing the logical framework of the programme. The MDG-F Guidelines did not also specify a methodology for the identification of problems and solutions, and in constructing the logical framework.¹⁵

MDG-F 1656 incorporated specific IEC outputs that are related to the communication and advocacy of climate change adaptation concerns. This led to the production of several printed and audio-visual materials, and the adoption of the *Adapt Tayo* slogan.

To the best extent possible, project-level IEC materials were developed. As part of the Focus Country Initiative, the Philippines was also granted with additional resources by the MDG-F Secretariat to promote the MDG-F initiatives, although these are not necessarily limited to MDG-F 1656. However, one reported weakness on the communication and advocacy plan of MDG-F 1656 is that the activities were conducted late into the programme time line. This was explained to be due to the delay in the completion of predecessor Outputs 1.1 and 1.2.



An MDG-F 1656 Billboard located along the highway in Benguet

B. Efficiency of Programme Processes

Except for the standard 7% Administrative Cost and the 70% Combined Commitment Rate rules, there were no quantitative efficiency norms and targets set in the MDG-F Guidelines, and agreed-upon in the financial and operations management of MDG-F 1656 (e.g. target disbursement and expenditure rates, ratio of head office costs to field costs, ratio of programme management costs to total costs, maximum number of days for procurement, and just-in-time systems for activity implementation and decision-making). Still, the cost efficiency of the programme is embedded into the financial administration systems followed by the disbursing UN Agencies and National Institutions, which apply quality and cost-based standards.

It did nonetheless appear from the financial data that MDG-F 1656 had been at the bottom half of the MDG-F JPs in terms of the pace of fund disbursements as of their mid-term points [Table 7]. This could be attributed to the

¹⁵ According to UNDP, there was no methodology (e.g. Logical Framework Approach) applied in constructing the programme's Results Framework.

fact that MDG-F 1656 was the largest JP among the other JPs, and it incurred higher learning curves being the first JP to be implemented in the Philippines among the current set of JPs.¹⁶

Due to the size of MDG-F 1656 plus the inclusive and participatory approach followed in programme management, the cost of managing the JP was high. The minutes of meetings indicate that there were 12 PMC Meetings held from August 2008 to December 2011. The mean number of participants in these meetings was around 40 persons, including alternate PMC Members and Guests. Starting in April 2010, PMC Meetings were also held in the project sites (under Outcome 3) as an innovative approach in better understanding the progress of the CCA demonstration projects.¹⁷

Table 7. Comparative Mid-Term Disbursement Rates of MDG-F JPs

| | Title of JP | Disbursement Rate |
|------------|--|-------------------|
| MDG-F 1942 | Youth, Employment and Migration | 64% |
| MDG-F 1919 | Enhancing Access to Water | 51% |
| MDG-F 1656 | Strengthening the Philippines' Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change | 41% |
| MDG-F 2030 | Ensuring Food Security for Children | 30% |

Source: Mid-Term Evaluation Reports

Most informants from the PMC nevertheless believe that the management costs incurred from the processes are commensurate to the benefits derived from the process, in terms of their collective information on the progress of the programme, the development of national ownership, and the interpersonal relationships among the staff of the implementing agencies that were reported to have strengthened and were noted to have been helpful in moving the JP forward. The evaluation also observed most PMC Members to be more focused on the effectiveness of the management process and less inclined on its efficiency aspect.¹⁸

Several PMC Members appreciated the PMC Meetings in terms of its being a venue for information-sharing than decision-making. Presentations of the progress of the programme by the participating agencies were noted to have taken a large part of the proceedings. A higher-level informant however pointed out that in at least one instance, the Heads of UN Agencies held an executive session (i.e. among themselves) in a PMC Meeting to frankly talk about the main problem on the delay of programme activities. It appeared that there are differing expectations about the role of the PMC in decision-making, if it can indeed make decisions on the spot, or if the real decisions would have to be made somewhere else in view of sensitivities to agency autonomies and respect for each other's decision-making processes.

¹⁶ Data from the UN Coordination Office (UNCO) nevertheless show that as of 31 December 2011, the delivery rate of MDG-F 1656 was 97% compared to 99% in MDG-F 1942, 83% in MDG-F 2030, and 78% for MDG-F 1919. However, the delivery rate formula used in these UNCO data was both disbursements and commitments, which may not be a fair approximation of efficient fund use. Also, the other MDG-F JPs had budgets of from US\$ 3.5 million to US\$ 6 million, and were implemented by 2 to 5 UN Agencies each.

¹⁷ The 12 meetings included the joint PMC-NSC meetings which were held in August 2008 and July 2011. The mean number of participants in the PMC meetings covers only 10 meetings from January 2010 until December 2011.

¹⁸ Only one among the 14 PMC Members interviewed for the evaluation approached the discussion on the subject matter from a benefit-cost perspective.

There was also an opinion that MDG-F 1656 had to go through some “birth pains” and learning curves, since it was the first JP among the current set of JPs. Only two of the 13 UN Agency personnel who were interviewed for this evaluation said that they had previous involvement in a JP.

Late procurement issues were raised by some informants in the course of the evaluation, but it remained unclear if these were due to weaknesses in the procurement systems itself, or if these were a consequence of the late submission of the required documents and reports. These were also reported to have been discussed in the PMC Meetings, although it could not be established from the minutes of meetings if the issues have actually been tracked and resolved.

It has been reported since the mid-term evaluation that the transaction costs in running a JP like MDG-F 1656 are high, because of the scale of institutional participation (i.e. 6 UN Agencies plus 9 National Institutions) and the need to develop ownership, plus the costs associated with first-time learning. From a purview of pure “costs”, it would hence be incomparable to cross any intervention done through a JP modality with an initiative done by a single agency.

The element of “benefits” would also be incomparable in this case, because MDG-F 1656 appeared to have delivered intangible benefits that would have otherwise been absent from a single agency or per agency intervention. One of these is the sense of ownership that has apparently been developed into the national institutions that participated in the programme. This value has led to the sustained implementation of programme activities by the national partners even if the JP has already ended last year. It was also a factor in the leveraging of the programme funds by local resources which were brought into the programme. A second invisible benefit would be the learnings in joint programming that were gained particularly by the participating UN Agencies in the process. A common view expressed by informants from the UN Agencies is that MDG-F 1656 contributed to a greater understanding of how joint programming is to be done in the Philippines. It was also cited as a positive factor in developing the current (2012-2018) UNDAF.

The financial performance of the JP was discussed regularly in the meetings of the PMC and NSC. There were more details discussed in the PMC Meetings, because the NSC Meetings covered all the 4 MDG-F JPs in one session. As earlier noted, while there could be higher immediate costs incurred in the PMC system adopted for MDG-F 1656, the long-term returns in terms of national ownership (on the part of the national institutions involved in the PMC) and in learning to work together as one (on the side of the participating UN Agencies) could likewise be significant.

These governance structures were effective in terms of developing ownership and learning, as well as in identifying bottlenecks and possible solutions for these. Actual action-taking and decision-making may have been difficult to expect in the PMC Meetings itself because of reasons that were already cited in this report. The timeliness of decision-making was also limited by lags and weaknesses in the submission of reports. Systematic tracking of the programme through indicators set in the Results Framework of MDG-F 1656 did not happen because of an overall weakness in implementing the M&E System. However, the programme outputs were regularly reported on in the PMC presentations on an “as-is” basis.

As stated earlier, the programme design phase was basically led by UNDP being the main proponent of the JP. Within the UN System, a working group was formed to level off on the Concept Note which was developed by UNDP Philippines. This was a large group composed by 8 UN Agencies which was eventually reduced to the 6 agencies that actually participated in the programme. Participation from the national institutions was done mainly through informal consultations, up until the full development of the Programme Proposal and signed Programme

Document. According to UNDP, this was the best approach that could be undertaken in designing the programme because of time constraints in meeting the deadlines for the submission of the concept note and the programme proposal.

Joint monitoring and evaluation did not happen because the M&E System for the programme did not function. While there were efforts to develop and install the M&E System especially after the mid-term evaluation, it turned out that systematic programme-level monitoring did not take off because of reasons previously cited.

The main work methodology applied in MDG-F 1656 which was aimed at increasing efficiency in applying the *Delivering As One Concept* was the pooling of knowledge and expertise on climate change adaptation by the six UN Agencies in delivering the outputs and outcomes expected from the intervention. The design was for UNDP and UNEP to work together in delivering Outcomes 1 and 2 (and its component outputs), while FAO, ILO, UN Habitat, and WHO were supposed to work together in delivering Outcome 3 (and Output 3.1). In theory, there would also greater values derived from the Results Structure in which some outputs would serve as “inputs” (or predecessors) to successor outputs [Table 3].

In the latter part of programme implementation, UNDP was assigned as the Lead Technical Agency for the programme. This arrangement would have facilitated the flow of technical decisions that ought to be made for the programme. However, it is felt that this decision had come late in the programme time frame.

There was also an internal arrangement done by two UN Agencies for the use by one agency of the other’s procurement system for the programme instead of setting up its own. There were however issues encountered in the timeliness of the procurements and some additional costs incurred.

All the UN Agencies also abided by the fixed 7% allocations for Administrative Costs, and the Combined Commitment Rate System. There are nonetheless issues arising from the cost efficiency of programme administration, because the costs of programme management were actually separately incurred by the programme. It also appeared that while the combined commitment rate system is linked to the consistency of the joint programme concept, it may not necessarily contribute to greater efficiencies in joint programming. In general, follow-up studies may be needed to measure the efficiencies in the operationalization of the *Delivering As One Concept*.

MDG-F 1656 encountered the following obstacles which affected its efficiency:

- Being a first-time experience in joint programming and joint programme implementation, there was no previous model to work on, and high start-up costs were incurred. This eventually led to a delay in the implementation of the programme activities. The learning costs were also high.
- The aspect of programme efficiency was not really considered in the programme design and in the implementation plan. There were no efficiency norms and targets that guided the programme, aside from the standard 7% Administrative Cost and the 70% Combined Commitment Rate set in the MDG-F Guidelines.
- There was a need to balance operational efficiency (e.g. timeliness and costs of decision-making) with the development of national ownership and adherence to the concept of *Delivering As One*. MDG-F 1656 was a large programme, and the costs of participation were high. There was a need to follow inclusive processes

between 6 UN Agencies, 9 National Institutions, and several other implementing partners. The JP modality was also a first-time experience for most of the persons who were involved in the programme.

- There were trade-offs in meeting cost efficiencies while aiming for timely implementation of the programme activities. Procurement delays presumably due to compliance with standard least cost considerations, on the other end led to delays in the implementation of activities.
- Late Hiring and Staff Turnovers affected the pace of the programme. The recruitment of some Project Managers was delayed and there were turnovers in 4 out of 5 positions in the PMU.
- The programme-level M&E System did not become functional. It was not possible for the PMC and the NSC to make informed and timely decisions because of the absence of monitoring data.

Based on accounts, there were also some imperfections in selected agency systems which led to inefficiencies, particularly the late delivery of goods and services, in the joint programme. However, this was not reported as a general trend that significantly affected the operations of the programme as a whole.¹⁹

The conduct of the mid-term evaluation had a positive impact on the JP. A *Catch-Up Plan* was made and a *Management Response* was formally done by the PMC. The management response addressed the recommendations set forth in the evaluation. Among these is the suggestion to upgrade the PMC and NSC to become more oriented on problem identification and solving. Based on the discussions, there have been improvements since the mid-term review about this matter, although there are known constraints on how far the PMC and NSC can go on this point.

Another recommendation addressed in the management response is the improvement of the M&E System. As already discussed, clear steps were taken by the programme to make the necessary adjustments. But these did not work out, and the lack of an M&E System turned out to be a key weakness of the programme.

Another weakness is the lack of a gender perspective in MDG-F 1656. The mid-term report clearly recommended the conduct of a gender study in order to integrate a gender dimension into the climate change adaptation framework. Although this recommendation was reportedly discussed in the subsequent PMC Meetings, it was missed out in the programme's *Improvement Plan* and there were no final actions taken for it.

C. Ownership in the Process

The National Institutions which are part of the PMC and NSC took an active role in its meetings and in the other activities (e.g. conferences, IEC activities, mid-term and final evaluations) related to the programme. The overall approach applied in programme management has been inclusive, and this approach has helped in developing the interest of the national participants and in encouraging them to actively contribute in programme management. There were also a host of several other national implementing partners which took part in the JP [Annex D], and the linkages and networks with these are believed to have facilitated the conduct of programme activities, while expanding the operational reach of the main national participants.

¹⁹ One comment received by the evaluation is that the actual delivery of expertise by a UN Agency came late in the programme. Another informant noted that in most cases, the transfer of funds from their Head Office in Manila to the regional project office was delayed, and these have negatively affected project operations.

One indicator of national ownership over the programme is the extent by which local counterpart resources were raised to add on to the programme funds. In Agusan del Norte for example, ILO reported that around US\$ 195,000 were put up by the local rural bank, co-operative, LGUs and NGAs for the test run of the *Innovative Financing Scheme* in the area [Table 8].

Table 8. Counterpart Data for the Test Run of the Innovative Financing Scheme

| Programme Budget (US\$) | Local Counterpart (US\$) | Counterparting Institution |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| 18,273 | 136,364 | People's Bank of Caraga |
| 14,894 | 1,595 | Baug CARP Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative |
| 19,772 | 2,613 | Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)-Caraga |
| 18,409 | 10,057 | Provincial Government of Agusan del Norte/Municipal Government of Las Nieves |
| 17,199 | 10,454 | Provincial Government of Agusan del Norte/Municipal Government of Jabonga |
| 19,908 | 24,159 | Provincial Government of Agusan del Norte/Municipal Government of Remedios Romualdez |
| 17,199 | 10,454 | Provincial Government of Agusan del Norte/Municipal Government of Buenavista |
| | | |
| 125,654 | 195,696 | |

Source: ILO Data

The DOH Budget for 2012 likewise shows that some US\$ 114,000 has been allocated for the continuation of climate change activities started by the project. In Benguet and Ifugao, the DA Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office allocated an amount of roughly US\$ 7,000 from its regular budget for the field monitoring of the CCA Options established through MDG-F 1656.

Another indicator is the continuation of project activities by certain national and local agencies. The evaluation noted that post-programme activities were being carried out by national partners in the demonstration sites. Test runs of the *Innovative Financing Scheme* were continuing in Agusan del Norte, DepEd Officials were monitoring the application of the *Modified Lesson Plans* in Albay, the *Multi-Hazard Maps* were being improved in Sorsogon City, the *Implementing Rules for the DOH Administrative Order* were being followed up, and a plan has been made for the *Field Monitoring of the CCA Options* in Benguet and Ifugao.



Project-level versions of the PMC were organized in the demonstration sites, and these could have been positive factors in building a sense of ownership at those levels. These mechanisms carried different names (i.e. *Issue Working Group* in Sorsogon City, *Technical Working Group* at the DOH, *Project Steering Committee* in Agusan del Norte, and *Local Working Groups* in Benguet and Ifugao) but all these may have served the purpose of continuing the project accomplishments.

Other mechanisms, such as this Local Working Group in Benguet, helped develop community ownership over the programme

It is evident from the above-mentioned examples that national ownership has affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP. Greater cost efficiencies were created by the local fund counterparts put up by the various groups in Agusan del Norte. If the data in Table 8 are correct, these imply that the counterpart arrangements have leveraged the corresponding programme funds by about 1.5 times. The effectiveness of the intervention has also been enhanced, with particular reference to its sustainability, since the local partners are by themselves continuing the project activities.

While the evaluation found that several JP Outputs are being utilized by the national institutions, it is still too early to conclude that these have indeed been integrated into their regular processes. The outputs under Outcomes 1 and 2 are indeed being treated as reference materials by the NGAs in their re-planning activities for CCA. But it could be that these are part of the on-going activities that were committed to them when the programme ended.

As reported earlier, there were other mechanisms aside from the PMC which were set up to allow national institutions to meaningfully participate in the projects/programme. It is apparent that the UN Agencies adopted this common approach. Alignment of project activities with the partner plans was also seen in some cases (e.g. in Sorsogon City where the project activities and budget were aligned with the city plan and budget, and in the DOH where the post-project activities and budget were aligned with the department's annual work plan and budget for 2012). At the same time, discussions with informants from the national institutions on the matter of ownership did not go up to a point where they felt that they were the ones who were steering or driving the programme. At the most, the discussions showed that they were informed on the progress of the projects/programme and that they participated in the major decisions involving their agencies. In a few cases, some contrary experiences were raised but these seem to be caused by personality differences more than anything else.²⁰

D. Effectiveness of the Intervention

The outputs described in the earlier section in this report that have so far been achieved and in progress could be attributed significantly to the intervention. Although several outputs in Outcomes 1 and 2 made use of the assessment and planning tools that were developed earlier in the previous DRR/DRM Projects of UNDP, MDG-F 1656 was believed to have a distinct value-added in terms of the *2020/2050 Climate Projections* that were done through the programme and were integrated into the successor outputs. In Outcome 3, most of the outputs were created through the intervention, except for a few (i.e. the barangay contingency plans that were modified, and the alternative livelihood projects that appeared to have been tested previously in the REINA Project). It can also be stated that the expected outcome of increased capacities of the covered institutions will be largely due to the programme, although there have also been other interventions (e.g. the READY Project and the ACCBio Project) that were noted to have done the same. The informant from PAGASA for instance emphasized their improved competency on climate modeling as the distinct value added by MDG-F 1656 to them, in terms of the training of their personnel and the acquisition of equipment to downscale the climate scenarios. The programme will only be partly contributing to the outcome related to the enhanced local development plans because it is co-shared with another project (i.e. The *Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in Local Development Planning and Decision-Making Processes Project*).

²⁰ An informant from an NGA felt bypassed by a foreign expert who was sent by a UN Agency to help in the project, while another informant from a demonstration site had issues with the recruitment of a local expert done by a UN Agency.

The programme outputs and outcomes are expected to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs in the Philippines, although there are specific outputs that are apparently directly linked to the operational achievement of the MDGs. In the long-run, the capacity-building of institutions and the adaptation of development plans will definitely enable the duty-bearers to mitigate the negative effects of climate change in the country, including those that are related to the MDGs. Still, in view of the overall status of MDG achievement in the country that was discussed earlier, it is turning out that MDG-F 1656 has potential to contribute significantly to the achievement of Goal 1 (i.e. the eradication of poverty and hunger), with particular reference to the outputs and outcomes that pertain to capacity-building in the agricultural sector and reduction of economic losses in farm production, and the creation of additional income options to farmers. In order to do these however, the capacity-building and re-planning processes in the agricultural sector will have to be fast-tracked in order to meet the MDG time frame in 2015. The CCA Options on agricultural technologies and financing will have to be promoted and replicated to a larger scale.

Aside from contributing to the achievement of the MDGs, the results from the intervention will also be a factor in sustaining the MDG achievements beyond 2015, in terms of reducing the negative effects of future climate changes on agricultural productivity and incomes, on health and well-being, and on the sustainability of the physical environment.

Use of the JP Outputs would also directly contribute to the achievement of the MDG-F Goals for the theme of Environment and Climate Change, primarily the goal of *Enhancing Capacities to Adapt to Climate Change*, and also the goal of *Improving Environmental Management and Service Delivery*. Designed mainly as a capacity-building intervention, MDG-F 1656 is clearly aligned with the first MDG-F Goal. Also, the improvement of environmental management and service delivery will arise from the programme interventions, specifically those that are related to the upgrade of environmental impact assessments, environment and natural resource use plans, and water allocation management.

To the best possible extent, the participating UN Agencies adhered to the implementation of the principles and commitments set in the *Paris Declaration* and the *Accra Agenda for Action*. National ownership of the programme was evident, in terms of the active participation of national and local institutions in programme management. Non-state institutions were also involved in the programme, recognizing their respective specializations and mandates in activities that are related to climate change adaptation. The programme was designed for eventual alignment with the priorities set by the Climate Change Law, and there were no reported overlaps with existing government plans. The concept of aid effectiveness was respected through applicable cost-sharing arrangements with related projects and local budgets. A results-based management framework was applied in the programme, although its operationalization had been weak.

The JP also contributed significantly to the application of the concept of *Delivering As One* in the Philippines. Clarity on the concept among the participating UN Agencies has increased because of their experience in MDG-F 1656. It is commonly acknowledged by the Focal Persons in the UN Agencies that their participation in the programme served as reference in developing the joint interventions planned for in the current (2012-2018) UNDAF. This was noted to be an unplanned positive effect of the MDG-F JP. The MDG-F JP had particularly elaborated the basic elements of joint planning (through the adoption of a Common Results Framework), joint fund accountability (through the combined commitment rate system), and joint programme management (through the Programme Management Committee) in the concept of *Delivering As One*. It can also be stated that the JP has introduced the element of joint evaluation (through the conduct of this final evaluation and the previous mid-term evaluation) in the concept. The joint monitoring of results has however been a weakness in MDG-F 1656, together with the

different fund transfer systems across the UN Agencies. There was also a perceived functional overlap between two UN Agencies which were involved in the agricultural component of the JP, although it was also reported that there were efforts to rationalize these efforts in terms of defining the specific roles of each in the agricultural sector.

A second unplanned immediate effect was the expansion of the test run of the WIBI Scheme by PCIC in a second area under the PhilCCAP Project. Additional outcomes can also be expected from the use of the 2020/2050 Climate Projections by other government agencies and private sector organizations.

The JP was designed to contribute to the advancement of the processes and outcomes related to national and local development planning. The climate change adaptation content of the current (2011-2016) Philippine Development Plan was attributed to MDG-F 1656. The enhancement of local development plans for climate change adaptation in 43 provinces is also an on-going effort. The programme also reported current work with the Climate Change Commission for policy adoption by the national government on a public fund for climate change adaptation (i.e. the People's Survival Fund) and the formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plans.

As designed, synergistic effects were expected from the structure of the programme results. The predecessor outputs would have added value to the successor outputs. In Outcomes 1 and 2, this relationship operationally meant that the assessment tools and sectoral assessments were meant to be used in the enhancement of the national and local development plans for their climate change adaptation purposes. In Outcome 3, the plan was to also use the assessment tools and sectoral assessments in the provincial-level vulnerability and adaptation assessments. It was also implied that the 2020/2050 Climate Projections delivered as part of Outcome 1 would serve as bases in developing the CCA Options in Outcome 3.

It however turned out that these synergies were only partly created because the main predecessor outputs (i.e. the 2020/2050 Climate Projections, Assessment Tools, and Sectoral Assessments) were delayed, and the succeeding activities and outputs (in most of Outcome 3) went ahead without waiting for the sequence. Still, Outcomes 1 and 2 managed to conform to the original concept, and can hence demonstrate some synergistic properties. Operationally, there were also linkages between the three outcomes through the conduct of cross-visits and the participation of the Outcome 3 sites in the ICDP Trainings under Outcome 2.²¹

As earlier reported, immediate effects on the beneficiaries have been observed from the field visits. Farmers who participated in the testing of the CCA Options in Benguet and Ifugao, and in the Innovative Financing Scheme and WIBI in Agusan del Norte, reported additional incomes from their harvests and savings in production costs, while rationalizing these effects and their activities to the concept of climate change. Beneficiaries of the retrofitted houses in Sorsogon City noted greater security for their homes, while some of those who participated in the alternative livelihood training courses reported that they have also derived additional incomes from their application of the livelihood technologies taught to them. Increased work confidence and understanding of the systems introduced by the programme were also evident among other beneficiaries in Sorsogon City, Albay, and Marikina City.

²¹ This is most probably because there was greater programme control in Outcomes 1 and 2 being managed by the same implementing agencies (i.e. UNDP, UNEP, NEDA and DENR), whereas Outcome 3 was being managed independently by the other agencies.

Several lessons and good practices from the implementation of the programme (in Outcome 3) have been documented and will be published as part of Output 1.3. The key features noted by this evaluation from the draft write-up are as follows:

- In the demonstration of CCA Options for the agricultural sector, indigenous practices on climate change adaptation were already being applied by the farmers. The project primarily built up on these practices to develop the set of agricultural production options that will be promoted in similar situations, instead of just introducing new and untested alternatives.
- In the testing of the Innovative Financing Scheme, the project worked with existing financial intermediaries (i.e. a co-operative and a rural bank) to introduce a new loan product which is tied up to the issue of climate change. Adopting this scheme increased the chances for self-sustainability of the system, and may also impact on the sectors involved (i.e. the co-operative and rural bank sectors).²²
- In demonstrating CCA Options in human settlements, security of land tenure among poor households was a key factor to consider. It was realized that the poor have less incentives to retrofit their homes in consideration of their possible displacements.
- In developing early warning systems for the health sector, it was learned that the effectiveness of community-based systems ultimately depended on the capacities of barangay health workers who may be pre-occupied with several other health-related tasks. First responders may also be inclined towards disaster management than climate change adaptation.
- In the local governance sector, the creation of more permanent mechanisms such as CIRCA and the Climate Change Academy was a good strategy to sustain climate change adaptation initiatives, in consideration of possible turnovers among local government executives.

In addition to these, the evaluation also noted the following good management practices in MDG-F 1656: (a) *The presence of a Programme Coordinator (PC), aside from a Programme Manager (PM)* – According to the PMU, the PC took on the task of coordinating the programme activities with the various NGAs involved in Outcomes 1 and 2. The PC was a director-level staff of NEDA, and this was believed to have been a positive factor in facilitating the pace of project activities with the NGAs. On the other end, the PM was responsible for the overall tasks undertaken by the PMU. The appointment of a PC aside from a PM showed the flexibility of the programme to adapt to the needs of the intervention;²³ (b) *The holding of PMC Meetings in the demonstration sites* – All PMC Members believe that the strategy to have the PMC Meetings in the demonstration sites worked well for them in better understanding the projects that were being undertaken by the other agencies; (c) *The organization of local ownership mechanisms in the demonstration sites* – As already reported, there were other local inter-agency and beneficiary groups that were organized in the demonstration sites which complemented the PMC in creating national and local ownership over the programme; and (d) *Leveraging of the programme resources in some project*

²² Working with these private sector groups was a unique feature of the project in Agusan del Norte, and if successful could lead to wider adoption by other interested participants in the co-operative and rural banking sectors.

²³ The MDG-F Guidelines specify a PC/PM Position, which means that either a PM or a PC can be hired for the programmes.

sites – Some UN Agencies noted difficulties in the project budgets allotted for the demonstration sites [Table 5]. Additional funds were raised by these agencies from other sources.²⁴

The report had earlier pointed out the significant role of women in the programme, particularly in Outcome 3 where women-farmers participated in the piloting of the CCA Options in Benguet and Ifugao, and in the test runs of the Innovative Financing Scheme and WIBI in Agusan del Norte. In Sorsogon City, women were also key participants in the retrofitting scheme and in the conduct of the alternative livelihood training courses. In general however, the strong participation by women in the programme happened by chance and not by any proactive strategy adopted by the programme on gender equality. When asked why they were the ones who were participating in the projects and not their spouses, the women simply said that it was because they were the ones who had the time to attend the project meetings and other activities. Still, it appeared from the discussions with the women-beneficiaries that farming decisions over climate change-related issues (e.g. which varieties to plant in view of changed weather patterns) is a shared responsibility between women and men. The women also said that they explained the concept of climate change adaptation to their spouses after attending the project trainings.



While unplanned, women participated significantly in the project activities in Sorsogon City and in most other areas

MDG-F 1656 contributed distinctly to increased stakeholder engagement on the issue of climate change in the Philippines through the more scientific details about climate change projections and scenarios that it created. While there have been other interventions that sought to promote public awareness on climate change, the programme appeared to have stood out technically because its advocacies were linked to data and studies that were made by experts and academics. To a large extent, the intervention was able to shift the level of public engagement on climate change to a more professional level.

At least three factors that affected the effectiveness of the programme were identified. The first factor was the *Limited Time Frame* for the intervention. A common realization among the Focal Persons is that three years was not enough for the programme, especially considering that it was a first time JP. It also turned out that more time was needed to validate the initial effects in the demonstration sites. On this matter, FAO pointed out that the norm in the agricultural sector is for the results to pass through at least 3 cropping cycles, while PCIC noted that the testing period in the crop insurance industry require at least 4 testing cycles. In the Province of Albay, it was also pointed out that there was a need to emphasize on the training process of local government personnel for the formulation of CLUPs. The evaluation would also like to add that the complexity of the results structure designed for this programme (in terms of the succession of activities and outputs) may not really work out in a three-year time frame.²⁵

A second factor was the *Initial Delay of the Programme* due to the late completion of the basic predecessor outputs, particularly the *2020/2050 Climate Change Projections* and the subsequent *Assessment Tools* and *Sectoral*

²⁴ ILO reported that a total of roughly US\$ 316,000 were raised mainly from the participating NGAs, LGUs, and private sector groups that participated in the project in Agusan del Norte. In Sorsogon City, UN Habitat also drew in some funds from its *Cities and Climate Change Initiative Project*, aside from the counterpart funds of the City Government.

²⁵ Up until the programme ended in December 2011, there have only been one or two cropping cycles in the project areas.

Assessments. The production time for the climate change projections was grossly underestimated in the design (i.e. it was finished only in late-2010) because it was highly technical and it was also a first-time for PAGASA. Informants believed that while a catch-up plan was devised after the mid-term evaluation, most activities were crammed at the latter part of the time frame. The integrity of the original concept, in terms of the sequence of outputs and use of common reference data, was also not fully followed.

A third factor was the *Limited Supply of Technical Expertise* that were needed to deliver the basic outputs. The programme worked mainly with a limited number of known academics who were also preoccupied with other tasks, and whose capacities on climate change also had to be upgraded. Some trade-offs were made in terms of operational delays, output quality, and utility of their final products.

E. Sustainability of Results

By the last year of programme implementation, sustainability plans were in place and actual hand-over activities were done in December 2011. Agreements were made with the national partners to assume some key activities and the outputs that have been completed as of that date. These partners are the national and local institutions present in the PMC, and which are mainly the traditional counterpart agencies of the UN Agencies. Efforts were also made to include the Climate Change Commission (CCC) in post-programme activities, although its limitations are acknowledged due to its newness as an agency and its currently limited capacity [Table 6].

The site visits have shown that the project partners have kept up to their commitments in terms of continued financial and technical support to the on-going activities of the JP. For instance and as earlier reported, the DA CAR allocated around US\$ 7,000 from its regular budget to monitor the CCA Options in Benguet and Ifugao. In Sorsogon City, the Issue Working Group is continuing the work related to the adoption of the City Shelter Plan and the development of the Prototype Housing Structure. On its part, the DOH has allotted some US\$ 114,000 for the continuation of activities related to climate change adaptation. In Albay, the concerned provincial government units (i.e. CIRCA and APSEMO) are proceeding with the establishment of the Climate Change Academy and the expansion of the Modified Barangay Contingency Plans to other barangays. In Agusan del Norte, the test runs of the Innovative Financing Scheme are continuing and additional resources have been committed by the regional offices of DTI and DOLE, and the Provincial Government, for the expansion of the scheme. The Insurance Scheme is also being developed into a project under the GEF for potential upscaling. In Outcomes 1 and 2, the interviewed NGAs are also moving forward with the next steps in adapting their plans and operating procedures. In general however, the measurement of sustainability will need to be done later on because some of the on-going activities were apparently still coming-off from the commitments made near programme end.²⁶

It is also too early to conclude that the capacities of the national partners on climate change have indeed been enhanced. It will probably take one more year to undertake these measurements, considering that the programme had only so far been able to approximate the baseline capacities. However, it did appear that their financial capacities are adequate to sustain their use of the programme outputs.

There are plans and opportunities to replicate and scale up the programme outputs. In the demonstration sites, there have already been commitments for such, particularly in Agusan del Norte and in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). In Sorsogon City, the project was designed for self-expansion, as the funds used in

²⁶ The combined commitment rate for the programme was reported at 90% as of the end of November 2011, compared to a disbursement rate of 63% as of that date.

the retrofitting of the pilot houses were treated as a revolving loan fund by the City Government. Initial efforts have also been made on a possible replication of the Innovative Financing Scheme in other areas. Still, the challenge is on how these initiatives and possibilities can be done in the framework of the whole programme, and on how all these could lead up to the achievement of the MDGs, whose deadline is fast approaching in 2015.

IV. Conclusions and Lessons Learned

A. Conclusions

The JP has been successful in responding to the current problems and needs on climate change adaptation in the Philippines. These current problems and needs arose from contemporary occurrences of extreme climate events, as well as estimations of its damages to the economy and on the achievement of the MDGs. Modern-day demands for the strengthening of Philippine state institutions on the aspect of climate change adaptation were also brought about by the country's recent adoption of its Climate Change Law. MDG-F 1656 was implemented at the right time, when the overall need to strengthen state institutions in view of climate change realities was formally acknowledged.

The JP has also been successful in delivering most of the outputs expected from the intervention. At the time of this evaluation, around 7 of 8 *measurable* outputs in its Results Framework have been completed or will most likely be completed in the immediate period. Among these are three key outputs which could strategically contribute to the long-term goal of climate change adaptation and capacity-building in the Philippines. The project-level outputs from the demonstration sites also carry strategic implications for climate change adaptation in the agricultural, health, human settlements, and local governance sectors.²⁷

MDG-F 1656 was also successful in demonstrating the application of the *Delivering As One* Concept in the UN System, while abiding by the norms on national ownership set in the *Paris Declaration* and the *Accra Agenda for Action*. In partnership with their national counterpart institutions, the six participating UN Agencies in the JP (i.e. FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNEP, UN Habitat, and WHO) collectively added value in addressing the problems and needs identified in the programme document, while respecting and nurturing national ownership processes and mechanisms.

Except for the adoption and operationalization of an M&E System, MDG-F 1656 complied with the global implementation guidelines set by the MDG-F Secretariat. The JP also successfully contributed to the attainment of the MDG-F Goals on Environment and Climate Change, and has potential to substantially contribute to the achievement of the country's MDGs, and the sustainability of these achievements.

At the same time, there were planning and management constraints in the JP due to the newness of the joint programming modality applied for the intervention, and gaps in applying Results-Based Management (RBM) approaches and techniques within the framework of this modality. The planning and implementation of MDG-F 1656 did not have the benefit of drawing from previous lessons on joint programming and joint programme operations. In addition, the concept of RBM was still incipient at the time of programme planning, and guidance on such was not readily available at the time of programme implementation. The consequences of these constraints were weaknesses in the logic of the Results Framework, and an inability to comprehensively and objectively measure results from this framework.

There was also a difficulty in the pacing of programme activities, most of which were rendered in the latter half of the programme time line, due to an initial delay in the completion and delivery of key predecessor activities and outputs.

²⁷ The three key outputs mentioned here would be the *2020/2050 Climate Projections*, the *Sectoral Assessments*, and the *Institutional Capacity Assessment Tools*.

There were also weaknesses in the programme. Personnel hiring was delayed, some procurements and fund transfers came late, the programme-level M&E System was not finalized and did not work, and the mid-term evaluation recommendation to include and elaborate a gender dimension on the programme was not clearly addressed.

In reality however, women were active participants in MDG-F 1656 and this was one of its strong features. The other strong features shown by the JP were its ability to leverage the programme allotments with local resources, its flexibility in adapting the management system to the task requirements and for collective learning, its adeptness in working with NGOs and other private sector groups, and its keenness to the creation of national ownership.

On the whole, MDG-F 1656 performed well in the aspects of Relevance, Ownership, and Effectiveness. Its performance on Efficiency is also within expectations, but may need to be reviewed later. While standard cost efficiency measures and processes were followed, the actual financial and operational efficiency level of this JP could not really be determined as yet because of the lack of applicable efficiency benchmarks and targets. People were also generally less inclined to think about the efficiency of the programme, than its effectiveness. It was also too early to establish the Sustainability of the intervention, although sustainability measures were put in place and there were indications that these were working.

There is growing perception that climate change adaptation will have a key role in the achievement of the MDGs in the Philippines. The achievements of MDG-F 1656 will definitely lead towards this end. However, further steps need to be taken in order to reach this goal.

B. Lessons Learned

There are start-up and learning costs associated with first-time joint programme implementation, in terms of a lag time between the approval of the joint programme document and the actual implementation of programme activities, and also a lag time between the occurrence and identification of problems with the actual problem-solving. In a three-year time frame, these costs could be significant and should be factored in the joint programme plan. At the same time, there are learning and ownership benefits from the processes, although these benefits may or may not accrue with the costs.

The quality of the Results Framework in a JP is important because it eventually serves as reference in implementation planning (i.e. in terms of activity and output sequencing), in testing the relevance of the intervention (i.e. in determining how the design corresponds to the needs and problems identified in the programme document), and in formulating the M&E System. Quality assurance of the Results Framework prior to the approval of programme proposals is therefore a crucial activity among donors. Review and possible revision of the Results Framework prior to actual implementation (usually as a result of an inception process) is also a critical activity among programme implementers.

Being a crucial activity, the guidelines for the inception of the JP should be included in the implementation guidelines set by the MDG-F.

In view of the importance of M&E in the measurement and reporting of development results, the operational plan for the development and implementation of the M&E System for the JP should be clearly spelled out in the programme proposal and in the signed joint programme document.

There could be trade-offs between the efficiency of the JP and its adherence to the other norms in the *Delivering As One* Concept, and in the other principles and commitments embodied in the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* and the *Accra Agenda for Action*, specifically on the element of national ownership.

There are limitations in the problem-solving capacities of the PMC and NSC, in consideration of a parallel need to respect the internal decision-making processes of the participating agencies and their institutional mandates. This factor contributes to the lag time in decision-making in a JP.

In the case of MDG-F 1656, the task of joint programme management involved more coordination (among agencies) and facilitation (of agency implementation) than actual staff execution. At the same time, technical programme planning and operations management skills are needed to deliver the committed outputs and outcomes within the time frame.

A Catch-Up Plan may work in meeting the deadline for programme implementation, but it may not leave enough time for the natural gestation and measurement of the development results.

The combined commitment rate system is a good practice in a JP because it encourages the participating agencies to work at a common pace of implementation. It also serves as a tool for joint accountability.²⁸

²⁸ Only one among the 8 Focal Persons from the UN Agencies surveyed by the evaluation responded negatively to the combined commitment rate system applied in MDG-F 1656.

V. Recommendations

Further steps will have to be taken to link up the JP accomplishments with the achievement of the MDGs in the Philippines, particularly on MDG 1 where there is most difficulty. Along this line, the CCA Options and Schemes, particularly in the agricultural sector, will have to be aggressively promoted and targeted for replication at a larger scale. The MDG-F funds for communication and advocacy that are with UNCO may be used for this purpose. If these have already been committed and could no longer be used, other donor funds may be considered and applied for, including additional funds that may be at the disposal of the MDG-F Secretariat.

Prior to the actual promotion of the Agricultural CCA Options and Schemes however, it will be necessary to complete the testing period and measurement process in the project areas in Agusan del Norte, Benguet, and Ifugao to determine the viability of the options and schemes, and also the limitations of these. Ex-post monitoring of the programme in these priority areas will have to be conducted.

Existing initiatives by the project implementers (e.g. ILO) to replicate the CCA Options and Schemes in other areas through successor projects should be endorsed.

Ex-post monitoring of the programme results in Albay, Sorsogon City, and Metro Manila will also have to be done. The funds needed to do these may be sourced together with those associated with the first two recommendations, or separately.

For Outcomes 1 and 2, the baseline institutional assessments should be replicated to other priority NGAs and Provincial LGUs, in partnership with the CCC. An agreement should be made between MDG-F 1656 and CCC for this purpose. The plan by NEDA to measure the progress in institutional capacities through the conduct of follow-through assessments should be supported.

In relation to the future JPs lined up in the current (2012-2018) UNDAF in the Philippines, the following recommendations are being forwarded:

- A Common RBM Training Course among the participating UN Agencies should be programmed, in order to come up with a single understanding of RBM concepts, tools, and methodologies
- Efficiency benchmarks in the context of a JP should be set, and efficiency targets based on these benchmarks should be included among the performance indicators of the JP
- The design of a JP should make use of a systematic methodology (such as the Logical Framework Approach) that will enable stakeholder participation right from the design phase, while at the same time leading towards the development of a sound Results Framework for the intervention
- A Gender Equality Strategy should be clearly integrated in the JP

For similar future initiatives to be done by the MDG-F Secretariat, the following improvements are being recommended:

- Technical assistance in RBM, specifically to improve the Results Frameworks developed for the programme applications, may also be provided to the programme proponents, possibly through the fund advanced to them or through the deployment of experts
- Guidance on the conduct of the Inception of the Programme should be provided
- Future JP Guidelines should clarify if the three-year time frames include the start-up and exit phases, and if so, how much of the time within the three-year horizons are allowed for these
- The full three-year plan of activities should be disclosed in the Joint Programme Document and/or a Programme Implementation Plan should be required after completion of the programme inception phase
- Efficiency benchmarks should be set in the JP Guidelines, and efficiency targets should be included in the Programme Proposals and the Signed Joint Programme Document

Annex A. List of References

Documents

- Asian Development Bank. (2009). *The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review*. Retrieved from <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/economics-climate-change-se-asia.pdf>
- Balisacan, A. (2003). *Poverty and Inequality. The Philippine Economy - Development, Policies and Challenges*. Ateneo De Manila University Press.
- Beasca, J. (2010). *Mid-Term Evaluation of the MDG-F Joint Programme in the Philippines entitled Strengthening the Philippines' Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change [MDG-F 1656-E-PHL] Revised Evaluation Report*. Mid-Term Evaluation Report of MDG-F 1656.
- Chiwara, R. (2011). *Final Draft Report Mid-Term Evaluation "Enhancing Access To and Provision of Water Services With the Active Participation of the Poor."* Mid-Term Evaluation Report of MDG-F 1919.
- Chiwara, R. (2011). *Mid-Term Evaluation Final Report (1 December 2011)*. Mid-Term Evaluation Report of MDG-F 2030.
- Damiani, O. (2011). *Alternatives to Migration: Decent Jobs for Filipino Youth Mid-Term Evaluation*. Mid-Term Evaluation Report of MDG-F 1942.
- MDG Achievement Fund Secretariat. (2011). *Implementation Guidelines for MDG Achievement Fund Joint Programmes*. Updated on February 2011.
- National Economic and Development Authority. (2011). *Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016*. Pasig City. Retrieved from <http://www.neda.gov.ph/PDP/2011-2016/default.asp>
- National Economic and Development Authority, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and UNDP Philippines. (2011). *Capacity Development for Climate Change Adaptation: Capacity Assessment Report of the Capacity Assessment Phase 2*.
- Punla sa Tao Foundation. (2011). *ILO Climate Resilient Farming Communities in Agusan del Norte Through Innovative Risk Transfer Mechanisms Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report*.
- Republic of the Philippines, United Nations System in the Philippines, New Zealand Aid Programme, and Australian Agency for International Development. (2010). *Philippines 2010 Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals*.
- Republic of the Philippines and United Nations System in the Philippines. (2007). *Philippines Midterm Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals*.
- United Nations Development Group. (2003). *Guidance Note on Joint Programming*.

UNDP-Spain MDG Achievement Fund. *Terms of Reference for Thematic Window on Environment and Climate Change*.

Presentation Slides

Castro, L. (2009). *2006 Poverty Statistics for the Basic Sectors*. Presentation Slides on the Users' Forum on the 2006 Poverty Statistics for the Basic Sectors and the 2006 Child Development Index held on June 25, 2009.

Hilario, F., Cinco, T., & de Guzman, R. (2011). *Climate Trends/Projections in the Philippines*. Presentation Slides on the Trainors' Training on Climate Variability/Change Concepts for PAGASA Forecasters held on December 12, 2011.

Various Other Presentation Slides used during the site briefings

Websites

Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. *Country Stat Philippines*. Retrieved April 9, 2012 from <http://countrystat.bas.gov.ph/selection.asp>

Lee-Brago, P. (2012, January 31). *Phl tops 2011 disaster league table*. Retrieved April 18, 2012 from <http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=772945&publicationSubCategoryId=63>

Annex B. Itinerary of the Country Mission

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| February 21 | Preliminary Meeting at NEDA |
| February 22 | Meeting with UNDP Focal Persons |
| February 23 | Meeting with UNCO Focal Person Skype Interview with UNEP Focal Person Meeting with PC |
| February 24 | Meeting with ILO Focal Person Meeting with FAO Focal Person and Staff |
| February 27 to 28 | Field Visit to Albay |
| February 29 to March 2 | Field Visit to Sorsogon City |
| March 5 | Meeting with DENR Focal Persons |
| March 6 | Meeting with UNRC/NSC Meeting with CCC Assistant Secretary |
| March 7 to 13 | Field Visit to Benguet and Ifugao |
| March 15 | Meeting with PMU and NEDA Focal Person Meeting with DA Focal Person Meeting with DA Planning and Policy Director |
| March 16 | Meeting with WHO Focal Person Meeting with DOH Focal Person Meeting in Marikina City |
| March 19 to 23 | Field Visit to Agusan del Norte |
| March 26 | Meeting with UNDP Focal Persons Meeting with UNDP Country Director |
| March 27 | Meeting with NWRB Group Meeting with PAGASA Focal Person |
| March 28 | Meeting with DENR Focal Person |
| March 30 | Debriefing with ERG |

Annex C. List of Persons Consulted

NSC/PMC Member

1. Dr. Jacqui Badcock - UN Resident Coordinator

PMC Members

1. Undersecretary Analiza Teh - Focal Person, DENR
2. Mr. Renaud Meyer - Country Director, UNDP
3. Ms. Amelia Supetran - Focal Person, UNDP
4. Ms. Sheila Marie Encabo - Focal Person, NEDA/Programme Coordinator
5. Ms. Imee Manal - Programme Analyst, UNDP
6. Mr. Aristeo Portugal - Focal Person, FAO
7. Ms. Lorraine Villacorta - Focal Person, ILO
8. Ms. Adelaida Mamonong - Project Manager, UN-Habitat
9. Ms. Cynthia Arce - MDG-F Joint Programme Coordinator
10. Ms. Bess Lim - Chief, Management Information Division, DA
11. Ms. Brenda Corvera - Focal Person, DTI-Caraga
12. Ms. Cristina Regunay - Chief, Multilateral Investment Program Division, DENR Foreign-Assisted and Special Projects Office
13. Ms. Eda Soriano - Desk Officer, DENR
14. Ms. Luisa Jolongbayan - OIC Assistant Director, NEDA
15. Dr. Cecile Magturo - Focal Person, DOH
16. Ms. Rosalina De Guzman - Chief, Climate Data Section, PAGASA
17. Engr. Bonifacio Magtibay - Technical Officer, WHO
18. Mr. Jonathan Gilman - Focal Person, UNEP
19. Ms. Ma. Concepcion Sardaña - Focal Person, ILO
20. Dr. Cedric Daep - Focal Person, PGA
21. Ms. Brenda Sacquing - Focal Person, FAO

Programme Management Unit

1. Ms. Katherine Firmeza - Programme Manager
2. Ms. Mai Alagcan - Outcome 1 Manager
3. Ms. Gina Aljecera - Outcome 1 Manager

Others

1. Mr. Robert Sandoval - CCA Specialist, FAO
2. Mr. Genaro Castro - Programme Staff, FAO
3. Ms. Monette De Ocampo - Programme Staff, CIRCA
4. Director Agnes Miranda - Director, DA Planning and Policy Unit

Site Informants

Various Partners and Beneficiaries in Albay

Various Partners and Beneficiaries in CAR

Various Partners and Beneficiaries in Agusan del Norte

Various Partners and Beneficiaries in Sorsogon City

Annex D. List of Implementing Partners

Outcomes 1 and 2

1. UP National Institute for Geological Sciences
2. UP National Institute for Health
3. UP Marine Science Institute
4. DENR - Environment Management Bureau
5. DENR- Planning and Policy Studies Office
6. DA-Planning Service
7. National Water Resources Board
8. DOH - Climate Change Unit
9. NEDA - Agriculture Staff
10. NEDA - Regional Development Coordination Staff
11. Climate Change Commission
12. PATLEPAM
13. Development Academy of the Philippines
14. UP PLANADES
15. DOST – PAGASA
16. La Liga Policy Institute
17. Dr. Corazon Claudio

Outcome 3

Benguet and Ifugao:

1. Provincial Government of Benguet
2. Provincial Government of Ifugao
3. Municipal LGU of Atok, Benguet
4. Municipal LGU of Buguias, Benguet
5. Municipal LGU of Sablan, Benguet
6. Municipal LGU of Tuba, Benguet
7. Municipal LGU of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao
8. Municipal LGU of Banaue, Ifugao
9. Municipal LGU of Kiangnan, Ifugao
10. Municipal LGU of Mayoyao, Ifugao
11. Barangay LGU of Paoay, Atok
12. Barangay LGU of Loo, Buguias
13. Barangay LGU of Bayabas, Sablan
14. Barangay LGU of Taloy Sur, Tuba
15. Barangay LGU of Namnama, Alfonso Lista
16. Barangay LGU of Viewpoint, Banaue
17. Barangay LGU of Nagacadan, Kiangnan
18. Mayoyao Women's Organization, Mayoyao, Ifugao
19. Ifugao State University
20. Benguet State University
21. UPLB Foundation, Inc.

22. Isabela State University
23. PhilRice, San Mateo, Isabela
24. Bureau of Plant Industry, Baguio City
25. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, CAR
26. Bureau of Soils and Water Management
27. Agricultural Training Institute, CAR
28. Northern Rootcrops Research Center, Benguet State University
29. DENR-CAR
30. Cooperatives for Rural Development (NGO), Cordon, Isabela

NCR and Albay (Health Component):

1. Department of Health
 - National Center for Disease Prevention and Control (NCDPC) - Climate Change Unit
 - Health Human Resource Development Bureau
 - Bureau of International Health Cooperation
 - Bureau of Local Health Development
 - Health Policy Development and Planning Bureau
 - Health Emergency Management Staff
 - National Epidemiology Center
 - National Center for Health Promotion
 - Environmental and Occupational Health
 - Center for Health Development – National Capital Region
 - Center for Health Development – Albay
 - Technical Working Group of the DOH and the major offices
2. WHO - Western Pacific Region - Emergency and Humanitarian Action (EHA)
3. NEDA
4. PLGU of Albay
5. City of Legazpi
6. City of Marikina
7. UP- College of Public Health
8. UP- National Institute of Health
9. MMLDC Foundation, Inc.
10. Development Academy of the Philippines
11. UP National Institutes for Health
12. PAGASA

Sorsogon City:

1. Sorsogon City LGU
2. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
3. PAGASA
4. Philippine Institute of Environmental Planners (PIEP)

Agusan del Norte:

1. Province of Agusan del Norte
2. Municipality of Buenavista
3. Municipality of Jabonga
4. Municipality of Las Nieves
5. Municipality of Remedios T. Romualdez
6. Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
7. DOST- PAGASA
8. Office of Civil Defense (OCD)
9. Department of Agriculture (DA)
10. Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC)
11. Agriculture Credit and Policy Council (ACPC)
12. National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
13. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
14. Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
15. Baug CARP Beneficiaries Multipurpose Cooperative
16. Peoples Bank of Caraga (PBC)
17. Punla sa Tao Foundation, Inc.
18. Caraga Learning Service Provider Network (LSPN)
19. Propegemus Foundation, Inc.
20. UPLB Foundation, Inc.
21. SUCCEED, Inc.

Albay:

1. National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
2. Department of Education (DepEd) Albay Division
3. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
 - Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
 - Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB)
4. Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
 - Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS)
 - Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA)
5. Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
6. Philippine National Police Albay Provincial Office (PNP-Albay)
7. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
8. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
9. Energy Development Corporation (EDC)
10. Local Government Units in the Province of Albay
11. Bicol University (BU)
12. University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB)
13. AMA Computer College