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Evaluation Report

Integrated Resettlement

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Program

Travnik and Vitez

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I Background

1.1. Introduction

The Integrated Resettlement Program (IRP) for the Central Bosnian Canton of Travnik provided assistance to internally displaced persons in the Travnik and Vitez Municipalities, to refugees from the Municipalities residing in Western Europe and to residents who remained in war affected communities. The first phase of the project (IRP I) was

implemented between April 1997 and October 1998, while the second phase (IRP II) started in November 1999 and will be completed by May 2000. In IRP I the European Union and UNDP collaborated in this effort in which the EU supported physical reconstruction tied to resettlement while the UNDP supported the economic and social initiatives. In IRP II, the EU expanded its support to include the full scope of the integrated program.

The Project was conceived as an *integrated program* divided into two components for strategic reasons and implementation purposes:

- A physical reconstruction program aimed at the reconstruction of houses for refugee and displaced returnees, and the rehabilitation of infrastructure supporting the return process. Reconstruction was targeted on the displacement "axis" of Travnik (in IRP II and I) and Vitez (in IRP II) Municipalities.
- An economic and social development program to facilitate and support the returns process whilst benefiting the resident community in Central Bosnia Canton as a whole. Support for civil society organizations and a Legal Advice and Information Center (in IRP II and I) and an economic micro-grant program (IRP II only) were developed as part of this component.

L2 Purpose of Evaluation

Now when phase II of IRP is coming to a close, an examination of the performance of the program and its implications in a wider context is critical, not only for the review of the particular project, but also to enhance future programming in the Central Bosnian Canton and in general.

The evaluation covers (*detailed TOR see in Annex 1*):

- Program Performance
- The IRP Travnik and Vitez in the Wider Context
- Lessons for Future UNDP programming in BiH

The independent evaluation team was composed of Ms. Sam Barnes (Team Leader), Ms. Elena Krylova (Consultant specialized in community development) and Ms. Natasa Goronja (Consultant specialized economic development) and Mr. Amer Basiic (Representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons of FBiH).

The team worked from 14 February to 2 March 2000. Meetings were held in Sarajevo with UNDP staff, the European Union and IBHI. The team spent close to two weeks in Travnik and Vitez meeting with IRP staff, municipal and cantonal authorities, sub-contractors, international organizations, NGOs and beneficiaries (*see Annex II for program and Annex III for the list of participants*).

L.3 Program Context

Travnik Municipality in 1991 had a total population of 70,747 comprised of 45% Bosniacs

(31,813), 37% Croats (26,118), 11 % Serbs (7,777) and 7% (5,039) other groups. During the war there was a large migration of population, which altered its ethnic composition. In 1998, there were 59,000 inhabitants in Travnik with 79% were Bosniacs, 18% Croats, 1.5 % Serb and 1.5% other ethnicity.

Vitez Municipality before the war was also ethnically mixed with 45% Croats, 41% Bosniacs, 6% Serbs and 8% other ethnicity out of a total population of 28,859. During the war there was also significant migration in which the total population of 24,700 in 1998 was 65% Croats, 32 % Bosniacs, 2% Serbs and 1 % other ethnicity.

When the project began in 1997, Travnik was under dual administration (Bosniac and Croat). During 1998 the Travnik municipality was combined and by October of the same year Travnik was named an "Open City" by UNHCR demonstrating that minority rights were protected and return was safe. When IRP II started up in late 1998, Vitez had an ethnically divided administration, and only in mid-1999 did the two administrations merge. However, with the strong position of OHR in closing the loopholes in property legislation that were used by some municipalities to block minority return and in the removal of abstracting mayors, both Vitez and Travnik municipalities have demonstrated support for return. They are issuing more evictions so that refugees and IDPs can return to their pre-war homes.

L4 Objectives of the program

Development Objective

The IRP development objective is to contribute to the process of peace building in Central Bosnia Canton through the return and reintegration of refugees and ethnic minorities into their communities of origin, and through economic and social development benefiting the population as a whole.

The approach to peace-building of the IRP was an integrated approach which combined the necessary physical reconstruction with support for the evolving civil society organizations; an enhanced municipal capacity to select beneficiaries, determine priorities, organize transparent bidding processes and monitor projects; and support for rural and urban economic livelihoods.

Immediate Objectives

Under Physical Reconstruction the immediate objectives are:

- *The reconstruction of 520 houses (IRP I) within Travnik Municipality and 400 Houses in Travnik or Vitez (IRP II) belonging to refugee returnees or internally displaced;*
- *Undertake the repair and rehabilitation of social infrastructure to improve the conditions of the returning population and the wider community;*

- *Build municipal and cantonal capacity for selecting beneficiaries and program monitoring.*

Under Economic and Social Development:

- *Contribute to economic development through micro-grants (IRP II);*
- *Support the growth of civil society organizations through a Civil Society Development* *nnar17M -*
- *Provide information, advice and legal services through the establishment of an Advice and Information Center (AIC).*

I. S IRP Partners

The project envisaged close collaboration with the local government counterparts. It was also sub-contracting local organizations and public and private firms for key parts of its implementation.

Municipal and Cantonal Authorities

The local government (municipalities of Travnik and Vitez and Cantonal Ministry of Refugees and Social welfare) are direct counterparts of the IRP. Cooperation with them was crucial for the program implementation.

IBHI

The Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI) was sub-contacted by UNDP to provide technical assistance and capacity building to municipalities in the process of identification and contracting of IRP beneficiaries.

UMCOR

United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) was hired to provide technical assistance to the agricultural projects benefiting from IRP economic micro-grants scheme.

CCC

Center for Civic Co-operation, a local NGO, was sub-contracted by UNDP to provide legal services in a UNDP Advice and Information Center, addressing issues in the area of property rights, employment, social care, humanitarian aid, health, pensions, displaced status and utilities. In addition to the services provided to clients, the CCC provided legal services for IRP in its reconstruction component.

Private and Public firms

The materials and labor for the reconstruction of the houses was sub-contracted to local firms through an open bidding process according to UNDP/EU procedures. The rehabilitation of social infrastructure was also subject to a tendering process run by the municipalities with technical assistance provided by the project.

L 6 Crosscutting Issues to Assess Program Impact

The project had specific outputs defined in the two project documents but no performance

indicators. This should normally be done in the early stages of a project so that there are clear benchmarks for each component and for the program as a whole. Five cross-cutting issues were identified by the evaluation team as important in assessing the overall impact of the program. Each component's output was assessed in terms of its impact in relation to the following:

- Durability of return,
- Local institutional capacity building,
- Inter-ethnic reconciliation,
- Strengthening civil society and community participation,
- Economic livelihoods: region and individual,
- Economic and social empowerment of women.

II Return and Resettlement of Refugee Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) through the reconstruction of 920 war damaged houses and the clearance of occupied housing in Travnik and Vitez Municipalities (Objective 1, Output 1.1).

II.1. Beneficiary Selection

Beneficiary selection process in the program was driven by the need to provide durable accommodation solutions for returning refugees from EU member states to Central Bosnian Canton (CBC). In IRP it was initially envisaged that this objective would be achieved through:

1. Direct reconstruction assistance for returnees refugees from EU countries (anticipated 25% of project construction activities);
2. Reconstruction assistance for IDPs currently occupying dwelling of refugees (65% of project reconstruction);
3. Reconstruction assistance to resident population who is registered in the municipal authorities as social needy category (10%, introduced in IRP II).

This approach in IRP prioritized reconstruction of the homes of displaced people from villages of Travnik and Vitez municipalities who resided in the pre-war apartments of refugees from urban areas, thus allowing the program re-establish two families in their original homes for the cost of rebuilding one house. Before 1997, municipalities provided to requesting international organizations simply the list of IDPs whose houses were destroyed and who were willing to return. The approach of chaining beneficiaries in the selection process introduced by the IRP was new for all the partners.

In the immediate post-war period, a major problem in housing reconstruction projects was a lack of a comprehensive monitoring and weak municipal partners unable to ensure appropriate beneficiaries selection process. To address this problem, cantonal and municipal institutional capacity building was initially envisaged as a crucial element of IRP.

In 1997, IRP sub-contracted IBHI to provide capacity building to the municipality of Travnik (with Vitez joint later) in the identification and contracting of beneficiaries. Services of IBHI included:

- provision of information to the refugees outside;
- liaison between targeted and other international agencies;
- technical assistance, monitoring and management skills to cantonal and municipal level authorities within the project scope and partners responsibilities.

To support these tasks, a team was established and run by IBHI with the intention to further integrate into municipal structures. The integration did not take place for two reasons: (1) previous formal arrangements for the integration had not been made; (2) the municipal budget was substantively cut in the end of 1997 and the municipality of Travnik could not add more staff in the local administration to support additional tasks. Besides, in 1999 the Municipal Return Offices (MRO) were introduced into the local administration. These Offices had a centralized database approach supported by the UNHCR which was inappropriate for IRP. These factors resulted in IBHI's continuing its functions separate but in coordination with the municipalities. Later, in IRP II, to upstream potential capacity building and to improve coordination and information exchange, a Cantonal Reconstruction and Return Unit (CRRU) was launched by IBHI. The Unit has an attached Mobile Team and project workers assigned to each of the beneficiary municipalities (*Schematic program tasknetwork see in Annex If*). Thus, IBHI served as an important bridge for developing neutrality and continuity in the relationship between UNDP and municipalities, especially at the initial

stage when the program dealt with divided municipalities. IRP program staff stated that IBHI involvement allowed them to minimize risk factors at that stage and to keep the situation under control.

The initial list of potential beneficiaries was compiled by municipal authorities based on the following "non-technical criteria" (chain of beneficiary categories). This data was collected by municipalities in different ways: either beneficiaries, assisted by Community Councils, directly applied to municipalities after they had heard about the program; or the authorities had already some data previously accumulated. The data was turned over by municipalities to IBHI, and then verified by IBHI workers and the mobile team to ensure that the potential beneficiaries fit the IRP criteria and that the selection process was fair. According to the Major of Travnik, UNDP was one of the first international organizations in his experience who listened to the opinion of local authorities.

The IBHI Cantonal Unit manager forwarded the list to IRP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (M&E), where the information accuracy was verified through visits carried out to all potential beneficiaries. Once cleared by M&E unit, the inspection of the houses of potential beneficiaries and cost estimate was carried out with participation of municipal representatives based on the "technical criteria" - house destruction not more than 80 %, balanced by average cost of 13,700 DEM per house. Where the price of the house was more than average anticipated, the beneficiaries had either to buy materials themselves or UN Volunteers (UNVs) were involved in reconstruction.

After this screening the final decision was made by the Beneficiary Selection Committee (composed from various IRP units) and certified by the Program Manager signature. The

UNDP M&E unit assumed the role of overseeing initial beneficiary selection process, and made final review of the data compiled by IBHI, assessing whether the process set up by UNDP had been followed and pointing out cases where additional documentation was required. This, including the field visits of IRP M&E staff, was brought together for the final selection.

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Category	IRP I	IRP II	Total
Direct Beneficiaries	520	400	920
<i>EU Returnees</i>	138	98	236
<i>IDPs</i>	382	262	644
<i>Social Cases</i>	--	40	40
Indirect beneficiaries	340	242	583
<i>EU returnees</i>	340	242	583
<i>IDPs</i>	--	--	-
Total	860	642	1 503

As a result of the program 819 families have returned from European countries, including:

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Holland

120
1
2
6
5
632
10

*Italy 11 Sweden 28
Switzerland
4*

The returnees learned about the IRP assistance through advertisements, media coverage, as well as from relatives and friends living at the place of their previous residence. In order to qualify a returnee had to present a set of documents (refugee visas, property rights certification, etc.).

The program resulted into:

- 40 social cases resolved in IRP II
- 143 *female headed households* assisted with housing in IRP I and IRP II. According to the IRP staff, there was only one case where the widow at the time of application was not considered as an owner of the house, but it this was solved.

Each case of such nature was approached individually. For instance, in the case of invalid-headed household with 8 family members whose house was 100% destroyed during the

war, unapproachable for him and distanced from health and social utilities. The man applied for construction assistance, and the program staff in cooperation with municipal authorities managed to find a way to satisfy *his application*. A new house was build with appropriate wheelchair access and facilities close to the medical center.

11.2 Reconstruction of Houses

The municipalities signed contracts with the beneficiaries for the house reconstruction. The local authorities also actively participated in the organization of labor bidding for the house reconstruction component, while the UNDP Country Office (Sarajevo) ran the bidding process for the procurement of all building materials. There is still a debate in regards to whether the procurement of materials and construction work should be under the same sub-contract. The argument of UNDP to separate these two components was to ensure good quality of materials with less technical staff involved in field monitoring.

Most of the companies winning the bids were from CB Canton. This resulted in 12,000,000 DEM insertion of capital in CB Canton for both labor and materials components. At the same time, the municipalities were introduced to transparent tender procedures through their active involvement in the preparation of the tendering process and in the evaluation of bids.

Out of 40 companies that applied for the labor tenders, 10 were rejected as they were more expensive due to employment of labor from other cantons. 30 companies then took part in final bidding and provided their price for 1 normative labor hour for 5th category worker. On the basis of a pre-set UNDP norm (6 DEM/ normative labor hour), 21 companies were selected whose proposals were in the 5% vicinity of the UNDP price. To secure quality and speed of the houses construction delivery, each company got a contract (based on the pre-set basis price) for a certain initial number of houses. Those companies with verified quality and time compliance got further contracts.

Thus, in IRP I, 20 companies within the CB Canton (14 from Travnik) won contracts for a total of 1,564,002 DEM to provide 332,505 hours of labor for housing reconstruction. In IRP II, 27 companies in the CB Canton (24 from Travnik or Vitez) won contracts for a total of 1,678,226 DEM to provide 296,654 working hours of labor for housing reconstruction (34 houses which are still under completion are not included)

At the very program beginning the first 50 contracts included a self-participation component in the house reconstruction (as envisaged in IRP I Project Document). This experiment turned out to be time and human resources consuming. All 50 self-reconstructed houses, due to delays and lack of effective participation of house owners, ended up being "half selfreconstructed" with later involvement of UNVs. In subsequent contracts the self-participation clause was dropped.

As a result of the program:

- 48 villages in Travnik municipality directly benefited from IRP I while 73 villages in Travnik and Vitez directly benefited from IRP II.

- Average final cost per house was 11,341 DEM in IRP I and 13,264 DEM in IRP II with the difference between estimated and final cost being 4.77 % (estimated more than final) and average number of 65 reconstruction days per house.
- 40 national UNVs, returnees from Western Europe, worked in reconstruction of houses. In IRP II average labor hours of UNV per house was 35,9.

IL3 Monitoring of Beneficiary Resettlement and Occupancy Rate

Throughout the program, M&E unit of IRP continued to play a key role in the resettlement process through on-going field visits, establishing reporting procedures, final checks and participatory evaluation exercises. Also, contracting and resettlement processes were heavily supported by the IRP Legal Advice Center. The role of IBHI was to work with the municipalities to secure that their obligations were met, the necessary actions were taken to ensure the occupancy of the finished houses and to verify that vacant property was returned to the legal owners (in-direct beneficiaries).

According to the contracts signed with the direct beneficiaries, they were expected to move within 30 days since the house was technically accepted. There were some cases when a "grace period" was extended, as people are not inclined to move during winter months.

The program was rebuilding the beneficiary houses, according to the IMG reconstruction criteria and up to the pre-war standards. Though the program was using locally available materials, the standards were improved for many families (with new materials, ceramics, new carpentry and good insulation).

Occupancy rate in IRP I was very high (96 % for direct and 58% for indirect beneficiaries). In IRP II at least the same figure is anticipated for Travnik. It is still difficult to assess projections for Vitez, through given improved security situation and the recent eviction dynamics in this municipality, there is optimism that a high occupancy rate will be achieved.

A comprehensive electronic database related to the house reconstruction and beneficiaries was developed within IRP IT unit with strong focus on monitoring (*a sample print out see in Annex P*). It is periodically up-dated and used as a mapping tool to support management, as well as information dissemination to municipal authorities, cantonal ministries and other organizations. The issue of the database transfer and continuity is being discussed in the program.

II.4 Outcomes and Impact

The approach used by the IRP supported the lowering of social tensions arising from urban/rural differences. It facilitated return of villagers to rural areas and refugees from urban areas, who have more cosmopolitan experience, back to their towns, thus, recreating urban multi-ethnic character. Chain of return, as introduced by IRP I, through supporting IDPs to move back to rural villages and opening up urban flats for return is becoming a practice of other international organizations and local municipalities.

Though the program monitored ethnic balance in beneficiaries distribution, it was mainly driven by the servicing refugee returnees regardless their ethnicity.

The IRP Beneficiaries Ethnic Profile

<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>IRP I, households direct+ indirect</i>	<i>IRP II, households direct+ indirect</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bosniac	304+74	197+50	625
Croat	200+253	185+172	810
Serbian	2+13	3 + 19	37
Roma	0	14+1	15
Others	14+0	1+0	15
Total	860	642	1,502

Although sub-contracting process was driven by cost effective criteria, it entailed a big insertion of capital into CB Canton: total 3,242,228 DEM through labor sub-contracts and most of 8,539,486 DEM through materials procurement. Further impact from investments re-enforcing the relevant municipal budgets, assuming that 9% of total paid in taxes by companies to the Canton returned back to the municipal budgets. Cost and efficiency in the bidding process was an effective tool to promote locally market economy. A significant number of jobs for construction labor in the Canton were generated through the program.

Strictness and transparency of shared criteria in beneficiary selection process provides little space for manipulations (*"Because of the strict criteria there was hardly any chance to make a mistake"*). Also, in future criteria might leave some opportunities for those whose houses are more than 80% destroyed, as they are the least covered by existing housing assistance programs. Self-construction component failed and should not be used in large programs aiming at quick results delivery and wide geographic areas.

Monitoring of resettlement and occupancy proved to be a critical element for the program success and made a comparative advantage of IRP vis-a-vis other similar local interventions.

In order to maximize further the occupancy rate, in future interventions the possibility should be considered to introduce and include into beneficiaries' contract some repayment measures activated if the beneficiaries do not return into the reconstructed houses.

Involvement of IBHI in the program minimized risk factors in beneficiary selection process. It has also facilitated UNDP linkage with municipalities, though its role was technical, political and strategic rather than important from capacity building point of view. In IRP II the roles of IBHI, municipalities and M&E unit (along with beneficiaries selection, monitoring and evaluation functions) could have been reviewed and altered to be more efficient and cost-effective. For instance, according to some insiders' estimates, 70% of beneficiaries for IRP II had already been screened and selected in IRP I.

Municipal participation in beneficiary selection increased the responsibility of some authorities to the return process and returnees. Municipal representatives in Vitez reported that they implement minimum one eviction per day, and only within the last month 100 evictions took place from Bosniac houses).

Linkage of municipalities to the Canton level in the program was important for the authorities to start looking at some possibilities for replication of program elements and facilitated intermunicipal cooperation. 15% of the program in-direct beneficiaries in IRP are returnees from other municipalities (Zenica, Bugojno, Donji Vakuf).

III Rehabilitation of utilities and social infrastructures in Travnik and Vitez to support the return process (Objective 1, Output 1.2)

Extensive destruction of infrastructure during the war remains an obstacle to return in many communities. So as to avoid the pitfalls of return programs which have the narrow vision that housing reconstruction is sufficient to secure a durable return process, support for the rebuilding of social infrastructure was included in both IRP I and IRP II. Investment in public and social infrastructure benefits the entire community also reducing potential tensions between the returnees and the "remainees".

Therefore, the program included the rebuilding of water systems, electrical supply lines, schools, health centers and roads. IRP I, \$346,590 (6.8% of total budget) was spent for infrastructure projects. IRP II, recognizing the importance of social infrastructure rehabilitation in an *integrated approach*, increased the amount to \$954,805 for infrastructure projects or 15.7% of the project budget.

III] Identification of Infrastructure projects

The program worked with municipal authorities and village leadership (Mestna Zajednica - MZ) to identify potential infrastructure projects. Meetings were held in communities with the municipal authorities to determine priority needs, discuss the contribution of the community to the project (labor, materials, etc). The Cantonal authorities stated that all projects had been consistent with the Cantonal Development Plans for Reconstruction.

IRP I

IRP I repaired four health facilities between August and September 1998; ambulances in Mehurci and Guca Gora, a lung hospital in Travnik and the Cantonal Hospital. Nine roads were repaired in the project period.

IRP II

In IRP II, infrastructure repair was undertaken to electrical supply lines, water supply systems and schools.

Electrical Supply

There are two different utility companies in the Central Bosnian Canton (one Croat and one Bosniac.) This complicated the process of prioritization of the villages for project support. An agreement was reached by the IRP with the municipalities of Vitez and Travnik,

ElectroPrivreda and Elektroprivreda Hrvatske Zajednice Herceg-Bosne, to support the repair of low voltage power lines supplying 10 villages. Elektroprivreda Travnik undertook all electrical work. Nine of the ten villages were also beneficiaries of UNDP housing reconstruction. Four were Bosniac villages, 5 were Croat villages and one was a mixed village.

Water Supply

IRP implemented seven water supply projects: 5 in the municipality of Travnik and 2 in Vitez. Five different local firms were contracted in an open bidding process. Six of the seven projects supplied water to communities that also benefited from IRP housing reconstruction. A total of 23 villages benefited from the projects (some 130-140 DEM per beneficiary).

Schools

Three schools were reconstructed, all in communities that also benefited from the IRP housing reconstruction. Three different local firms were contracted for this work. UNHCR agreed to provide the necessary school equipment for one of the schools, which had to be completely rebuilt. Savings from the electricity sector were applied to the schools sector, after a budget revision submitted to the EU.

Reconstruction of Infrastructure in IRP 2

<i>Type of Infrastructure</i>	<i>Total Value-DM</i>	<i>No of villages</i>	<i>Beneficiaries</i>
Electricity	458,456	10	4000+
Water Supply	1,059,418	23	7,700+
<i>Schools</i>	307,225	3	Will be available after enrollment for 200/2001 school year

11.2 Bidding Process, Technical Supervision and Hand-over

The IRP assisted the municipalities in preparing the technical specification for the tendering process for the projects. The municipalities were in charge of the tendering process, and the tenders were issued according to UNDP/EU rules and the IRP/UNDP provided technical assistance throughout the process.

One Electrical Contract was signed in December 1998, while seven others were signed in September 1999. One project has been completed and accepted; four have been completed but not yet accepted technically and three have not yet been completed. All other contracts were signed between June and October 1999. Six water supply projects have been completed and technically handed over, two are completed but not yet accepted and one is not yet completed. One school is completed and handed over, one is completed and not yet handed over while one is not yet completed.

Municipal authorities were asked about the guarantee of maintenance and operating costs for the social infrastructure in the future, and whether this could have been contemplated in the municipal or cantonal budgets. It was unclear to the mission, whether the maintenance costs had actually been introduced into the local budgets.

III.3 Outcomes and impact

Rehabilitation of social infrastructure benefits community at large, thereby lowering tensions between those who stayed in their communities during the war and those who left.

Rehabilitation of essential services- electricity and water- is a precondition and an incentive for continuing return.

In future interventions rebuilding schools for a single ethnic group, while curriculum issues have not yet been dealt with, should be re-examined by UNDP as a policy issue.

IRP assisted the municipalities in preparing the technical specifications for the bidding process and they were issued according to UNDP/EU procedures.

IV Contribute to economic livelihoods of returnees, IDPs and socially vulnerable residents through the provision of economic micro-grants (Objective 2, Output 2.1)

IV] Formulation of the micro grant project

The economic development component was added to the IRP during phase II of the program implementation. The aim of this component was to facilitate *economic development, a necessary pre-condition of sustainable return and* resettlement through provision of microgrants. The objective of the small grants approved for beneficiaries in Travnik and Vitez and the surrounding areas was to facilitate the returns process through the re-establishment of *minimum sustainable livelihoods* for socially vulnerable returning displaced families, refugees and resident community members.

The long-term objective of the project was to promote durable return to the villages in the Travnik and Vitez municipalities. It was envisaged that the micro-grants would aid in *decreasing of social tensions* between returnees and remainees thereby contributing the durability of return.

The immediate objective of the project was to provide basic income *generation and job creation opportunities* to socially vulnerable people living in the villages of Travnik and Vitez. The micro-grant component was also to coordinate with other similar programs implemented in the area by local and international organizations.

The specific target population were 200 - 230 families without any or with limited income. In this way, the grant program would improve their economic situation by having *a quick and positive impact on their living conditions*. The program design included repayment to "indirect beneficiaries": the direct beneficiaries who received a micro-grant were to repay in kind 25% of the value of the donation received to another socially vulnerable person/groups in need. The introduction of this aspect not only supported the livelihood of the indirect beneficiary, but it was a tool to promote reconciliation in targeted communities.

IV.2 Selection and approval process

In order to qualify to receive a micro - grant a potential beneficiary submitted a pre-selection form. The clients within the targeted areas were assessed for eligibility according to a number of criteria:

- limitation of income,
- basic pre-conditions to engage in the proposed income-generating activity,
- lack of pre-existing businesses,
- lack of benefits from other micro-grant or credit programs.

A field visit was conducted by one of the team members to verify that the applicant satisfied the pre-selection criteria. During the field visit, information from the initial form was checked by the program officers in addition to an assessment of the planned income generating activity (section C on the Field Visit Report)¹.

After the program officer expressed his/her opinion on whether the grant should be extended, the selection committee reviewed the case and decided whether or not to support the incomegenerating activity.

¹ Please refer to the forms included in the annex: Pre-selection, Field Visit, Selection, and Monitoring
The Economic Micro-grant Unit reported that the rejection rate for the program has been 50%. It is also important to note that only one out of three clients visited in the field passed on to the next step - the approval by the selection committee. The main reason for such high rate of rejection was the lack of business viability, hence the inability of the proposed business to reach the break-even point after a certain period of time. In order to be approved, businesses were expected to prove that they'd be earning a monthly profit of at least 400 DEM. In the case of agricultural businesses and especially low-income beneficiaries, the ceiling was dropped at times, down to 200 DEM.

IV.3 Monitoring

Field visits were conducted every 30 days to follow up with the beneficiaries and assess their progress, as well as their needs for additional support and technical assistance that could be provided through another organization.

IV.4 Outside technical assistance for the agricultural projects

A sub-agreement was made with UMCOR to provide technical expertise for the agricultural activities through its local specialist staff. UMCOR provided the Project Consultant with advice regarding the agricultural projects and participated in the selection and approval process. UMCOR also assisted the Economic Micro-grant Unit with specific advice regarding procurement of livestock appropriate for the area.

IV.5 Integration with other components of the IRP Travník

Though the IRP II started in November 1998, the micro-grant component only began in June 1999. The first activity undertaken was an informal feasibility study conducted by the IRP micro-grant consultant. The consultant engaged in discussions with other

organizations engaging in similar activities (USAID, UMCOR, ICMC, CeBeda, SFOR, Solidarite, Action Contre La Faime/Faim, UNHCR, etc.), as well as potential beneficiaries. It was decided to extend grants to the socially vulnerable for whom it was difficult to participate in other micro, medium and large credit programs, since this category of person did not satisfy other programs' criteria. During the follow - up visits to the micro-entrepreneurs, a fact sheet was developed and handed out containing information on lenders in the region, for those who wanted to expand as well as for those who did not qualify for the micro-grants.

A repayment component was also built into the grant scheme. However, because of the particular profile of the beneficiaries and their businesses, it was decided that it would be more suitable for them to make barter or in - kind repayments. Their small businesses are more subsistence oriented, and there would be little cash flowing through their entrepreneurial undertakings. As some grants were given to plumbers, carpenters, and electricians, in these cases the repayment was organized through their participation as skilled laborers teams working under the management of the UNDP IRP Engineers on reconstruction of direct beneficiaries' homes (*see Annex VI*).

A similar linkage was made with the civil society component. The non-governmental organizations helped the IRP disseminate information on the Micro-grant scheme. At the same time, many of the associations were indirect beneficiaries of the Micro-grant project. For example, the tailor repaid 25% value of the grant to the war veteran association, a hairdresser provided services to the persons wounded in the war, and a car repair shop fixed cars free of charge for the members of the association of families of the fallen soldiers. In

another case a person making lawn and garden cement ornamental objects repaid by working together with the Environmentalist Association in his town by making a fence and a waterfall in a new park. A complete list of all of the cases where indirect beneficiaries are not private households is provided in *Annex VII*.

The project worked in the communities through the existing government structures, the Village Councils - MZs. Along with the NGOs, MZs disseminated information on the program. Sometimes, when additional information was needed on certain beneficiaries, the MZ leaders were consulted. In the cases where cows and sheep were distributed in the villages, the MZ was used to distribute the draft contracts to the direct and indirect beneficiaries, as well as to contact and locate beneficiaries without telephones.

On the grassroots level, the beneficiaries were very satisfied with the transparency of the selection process by the IRP Economic Development Unit. The evaluation team interviewed 11 grant recipients and all had praise for the Unit. The beneficiaries met the criteria of socially vulnerable cases that would have not been able to start their income (generating or self - subsistence activities) had they not received the initial capital support through the IRP. Interviewed citizens who submitted applications, but were rejected by the project, also understood why they did not satisfy the eligibility criteria.

Most often reconciliation happens on an individual level. It is important to note that many

direct beneficiaries chose as indirect beneficiaries persons from ethnic groups, different from their own. The multi-ethnic composition of the Unit staff, all of whom worked very well with all of the beneficiaries, was also important in the context of promoting reconciliation.

IV.6 Analysis of the beneficiaries,

projects IV 6.1 Outreach

As of February 2000, 205 micro-grants for income - generating activities were approved for low-income households. The IRP Micro-grant team has already delivered 176 of those, 16 are in the process of delivery, and an additional 13 will be delivered in the spring. The average grant size was 3,116 DEM in Travnik and 3, 775 DEM in Vitez.

A large portion (cca 65%) of these beneficiaries invested the grants into agriculture, specifically - dairy production, and the program purchased livestock (111 cows + 18 bulls) for the grant beneficiaries. UNDP office in Sarajevo purchased the livestock, while the IRP Micro-grant Unit undertook all other procurement. The grants were distributed in a wide geographical area, covering 84 villages. The micro-grant team approved grants for beneficiaries from the Western-most point of Cosici, in the Travnik municipality, to Ahmici on the East, in the Vitez municipality (*see the attached map for the detailed information on the geographical distribution of the micro-grant scheme*). In each of these villages there are up to ten beneficiaries of the micro grant project.

Of the 205 beneficiaries of the Economic Development Project, 17% of them also had their house reconstructed by the UNDP IRP.² In terms of gender, 40 of 205 (19.5%) approved grants were issued to women. This is very low considered that women form the majority of the population, though they are still not active in initiating entrepreneurial activities.

Breakdown of IRP Micro grant Schemes Beneficiaries by Gender


² Information taken from the EU Statistic Report Economic Development Programme, UNDP Travnik

Gender	Travnik	Vitez	Total
Female	29	11	40
Male	118	47	165
Total	147	58	205

Travnik & Vitez

- Female
- Male


80%



This low percentage of female recipients may not be as much of a problem as it seems because the activities undertaken by the beneficiaries were done as a typical micro-businesses, on a household level enterprise. The grant may have been in the name of the husband, or a male member of the household, while the female members of the household engage in the productive activity and in sharing of the profits, as it is often the case in other programs in BiH. However, a more significant effort to reach out to women micro-entrepreneurs could have been made by the IRP Micro-grant team.

IRP Grants Broken Down by the Type of Business³

Category	Travnik	Vitez	Total
Agriculture	2	1	3
Livestock	103	27	130
Production	17	18	35
Services	25	11	36
Trade	0	1	1
Total	147	58	205



17%
/Agriculture

Livestock 64%
Production 17%
Services 18%
Trade 0%

As it has been mentioned earlier and can be seen from the table 64.9% of the approved businesses were approved for agricultural or livestock activities. This is in direct correlation with the project's choice to work directly in the rural areas. The range of realizable business ideas in the rural communities is smaller - mainly of the agricultural type. Since agriculture is also one of the less profitable business activities, the strategy of giving grants for traditional activities in the rural areas without encouraging capacity building of the local agro-processing factories, encouraged self-subsistence activities.

IV. 6.2 Impact of the grant program

s Information taken from the table "Types of projects" provided by UNDP Travnik, prepared for the EU Report, February 17th, 2000

The program has been very successful in achieving its' objectives as per the project document. The demand for micro-grants in Travnik and Vitez was very high. The Micro-grant Unit reported that 2,284 visitors came to the office to request information on the scheme. The high level of unemployment in the Canton - 64%⁴, caused all of the various groups of people who live in the area to look for sources of self-employment. The micro - grant program was attractive to all of the citizens - regardless whether they were IDPs, returnees or domicile population.

The micro grants were approved in the amounts 3000-5000 DEM to socially vulnerable categories of population. For the purposes of this project, socially vulnerable were considered all applicants coming from households where monthly income was below the value of consumer basket price for a family of four.⁵ Although the ceiling was set, and it is an acceptable one, it is impossible to check the income levels with formal authorities as most persons in BiH work in the gray economy. Due to high taxes, most businesses are not registered, and even if they are registered, most of their employees are not. Although having this criterion was important, it had no practical meaning because it could not be enforced.

The additional assessment method developed by the team - evaluation by observation during the pre-selection field visit, in this case, was a more objective way to get a sense of the level of poverty of the potential beneficiary. The knowledge of the local conditions by the staff in the unit played a critical role here, especially their ability to assess the level of poverty of a particular household was the only way to determine the eligibility of a certain potential beneficiary.

IV.6.3 Needs in the field, time constraints and application of the UNDP procedures

During the selection process itself, the applications were mainly rejected on the basis of the applicant not having "pre-existing conditions" for engaging in the planned activity or for not having a good projected cash flow (as per section C on the application form). It must be noted that most of the persons who applied for grants did not know how to fill out the section C and often overstated, or understated the income or expenditures. That required a lot of additional work with the potential beneficiaries. Some of this work may have been avoided had there been an additional component of business training for the beneficiaries. Plans were made to make this an integral part of the micro-grant process, however it actually never took place.

But during the evaluation mission's visit in the week of 21 February 2000, the Unit was in the process of organizing training for the beneficiaries who received funding for agricultural activities. The response of the potential participants was excellent - 30% of the beneficiaries have already signed up during the first two weeks of registration for the course. Work is also being done to research the possibilities of doing a business planning and marketing training for all of the beneficiaries. This training is of crucial importance for many beneficiaries who do not have experience in running a business under free-market

economy conditions.

IV. 6.4 Staffing and the issue of the local capacity building

This work of the Micro-grant Unit was complicated by the fact that the project was understaffed during the beginning of its operations. When it started in June '99, it had two employees for the months June and July and an international consultant working on a part-time basis (two days/week). This problem was later corrected and the number of staff grew to

⁴ According to the official reports it is likely that the real number is even higher due to many persons "on waiting lists" being considered as employed
s CBP defined in Federation of BiH as 450 DEM for a family of four, monthly basis
four. However, the international consultant remained a part-time employee. That meant that there was not enough management of the project on day-to-day basis.

The level of IRP staff training to assess the business plans was very limited. Some of the staff had been previously employed in the IRP and had extensive field, beneficiary selection and experience with the target villages. Each staff member received three one-day sessions on cash - flow projections and on-the-job training during the field visits. Since the person who was received the most training from the international consultant is not a native Bosnian, the issue of staff training and increasing the local capacity remains a priority, as there is still some funding to be disbursed.

IV 6.5 Issues with Procurement

Per Activity 2.1.2 of the Output 2.1, it was envisioned in the initial project document that an outside local NGO would be subcontracted to undertake the micro-grant process. This proved unfeasible later due to a low overhead planned by the budget (less than 8% of the overall amount). Hiring UMCOR to provide technical assistance for agricultural projects rectified the problem.

Also, the program staff faced a pressure to disburse a relatively large amount of money, 677 040 DEM during the period June - November 1999. The funding was actually not received in the UNDP IRP account until August 15 1999.

The UNDP procurement procedures and their implementation by the staff somewhat added to the delays in the project. Due to the fact that there were many grants in the form of livestock, it was decided by UNDP Country Office that it would be more efficient to buy more livestock at the same time. The attempt somewhat undermined the good impression from the work of the field staff. The disbursements ended up not working in synchronicity with seasonal needs as the last two deliveries of livestock were delayed until November.

IV..7Impacts and Outcomes:

Grant vs. loan. Rural vs. urban. Agriculture vs. Craft Businesses

The micro-grant program by the means of disbursing some 700,000 DEM provided individuals with start-up capital for self - subsistence, and in some cases viable income -

generating activities. Economic development is a crucial component in a society with a high unemployment level for both, the increase of quality of the economic livelihoods of the local community residents, and the ease of tensions that surface as a result of the lack of financial means.

Whether the grants were the best means to achieve some of these goals is a question of debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is a relatively high degree of consensus among the economic development analysts who say that in the post-conflict societies grants are the first step on the ladder of further development. While most agree that credit is not suitable in the immediate post-conflict environment, there is little consensus on when exactly should grants as a way to help alleviate poverty be transformed into credit.

In case of Travnik and UNDP IRP's Micro-grant Unit, we could compare the project with other projects provided in the area - the UMCOR and ICMC micro-credit programs. The ICMC lends to the population in the same area. While the UNDP IRP's grants ranged from 3000-5000 DEM, sometimes going up to 10,000 (for joint activities). ICMC average loan size is 1,200 DEM, and clients are required to repay 100% of the amount (in cash) with

interest. In IRP case, to issue grants as opposed to credits, was among EU initial requirements.

ICMC program in Travnik has 100% repayment, and its' clients are not only repaying the monthly installments on the basis of viable business activities, but they are also earning more income than the necessary monthly repayment installment which is enabling them to increase their monthly income.

It can be argued that the IRP supported micro-business start-ups only, while ICMC may also be supporting business expansion. This is a legitimate argument, but the role of IRP then becomes even more important - if we see its' micro-grant component as the first step in creation of new businesses in Travnik and Vitez areas. That first step has to be undertaken seriously and with a high degree of competent business planning. This again points to the need of providing the beneficiaries with adequate training for their business endeavor, with a focus on business planning and marketing, most importantly.

A third approach has been employed by UMCOR. UMCOR also disburses grants for businesses. A business specialist who has trained the program staff in business analysis as well manages the program. The eligibility criteria are different from those of the IRP; there is a bit less focus on the poverty of the beneficiary and a higher priority is given to the viability of the business idea and projections. Business training is provided for potential beneficiaries, but they attend it on a voluntary basis - if they feel they need it. There is also a built-in in-kind repayment component, but it varies depending on the profitability of the business, up to 60%. In terms of quantitative analysis, the UMCOR grant program has disbursed 392,619 DEM⁶. As a result new 226 jobs have been created.

The IRP micro-grants are definitely a necessary step in the process of return and resettlement in a country with destroyed houses, devastated infrastructure, and non-existence of employment opportunities. The money invested served the purpose of enabling

all of the beneficiaries to reach a level of self-subsistence in their households. In some cases beneficiaries even started income generating activities, either by implementing new business ideas, or through re-opening their pre-war shops. This is the first and unavoidable step of post - conflict transitional economic development. The Economic Micro-grant Unit worked well, and as a team, to achieve all of the outputs as per the Objective 2.1. The project can be evaluated as having been very successful within the parameters outlined per in the Project Document.

IV.8 Specific Recommendations

Projects supporting agricultural micro-businesses should support the organization of cooperatives and provide assistance in making agreements with local agro-processing factories as well as include a training component on modernization of agricultural technologies and marketing.

There is a need to incorporate business training into the economic development scheme, on the level of the staff, as well as for the beneficiaries. It would be ideal if one staff member within the program could be trained to become a trainer in this field. This would greatly increase the impact of the financial investment by the UNDP into the micro-businesses, as well as increase the local capacity. Along with disbursing grants, either for income - generating activities or only self-subsistence, simple financial tools must be used to increase

⁶ Source: Interview with Karri Goeldner, UMCOR Income Generation Program Director
efficiency of the investment. The training needs to be appropriate for the beneficiaries; both culturally sensitive and sensitive to the particular needs of the micro-entrepreneurs who often feel threatened by academic type training. The programs also need to consider the transaction and opportunity costs for the interested beneficiaries.

For programs providing assistance for agricultural activities, it is absolutely crucial to plan work cycles in harmony with the potential beneficiaries' needs varying with seasonal demand fluctuation and natural productive cycles. This would greatly increase the efficiency of the program.

While it may have been important to direct grants into activities in the rural part of the region for the most part, there is a growing need to assist individuals in the small urban zones. This would help diversify the portfolio of activities the agency is funding thereby more efficiently supporting the development of the local economy and the chances of a particular business to achieve success.

A more appropriate outreach needs to be made to increase the number of female beneficiaries of the program.

It is advisable to take an approach that would have more sustainable economic impact. This may seem to be in contrast with the social objectives of the program, however, helping a household to become sustainable and increase its' monthly income in the long term has much stronger social impact than one-time only grant with very little sound business

planning involved in the process.

V Provision of legal assistance to beneficiaries of project and area residents through the establishment of a Legal Advice and Information Center (Objective 3, Outputs 3.1,3.2)

V.1 Establishment of AIC

The dissemination of information, the provision of legal advice and the promotion of human rights is an integral part of the resettlement process. Whether it is information regarding property matters, the availability of public services, support programs of NGOs and international organizations, or assistance in employment issues; the IRP recognized an important link could be made to the resettling community through the early establishment of an Advice and Information Center (AIC). UNDP contracted a local NGO, the Centre for Civic Co-operation (CCC)⁷, to provide legal services in a UNDP AIC starting in August 1997. According to the contract, the CCC legal work would address issues in the area of property rights, employment, and social care. Humanitarian aid, health, pensions, displaced status and utilities.

A team of multi ethnic lawyers of the CCC was available for consultation and support to clients. The UNDP AIC was envisioned as a "safe space" within a divided community for residents, returnees and IDPs to receive advice, to discuss and share.

A participatory evaluation carried out after the first six months of the project, confirmed the usefulness and importance of the AIC in linking the IRP to the community: "*Empowering and informing the community were the reasons for opening the AIC ... The unit has been struck again and again at the importance of continuing to give space for people to come and complain, to cry a little, to tell their story, to question, and to learn. Without this space the project would lose much of its connection with the community.*"⁸ This evaluation recommended separating the AIC more from the UNDP project so as to enhance the local organization and to provide a closer link to the community. The AIC did move into a separate IRP office but continued as closely linked to UNDP IRP in terms of community space and visibility. The AIC Office also housed the Civil Society component of the IRP and the M&E Unit. The CCC ceased to have a sub-contract with the IRP in February 1999. The two CCC lawyers were then individually contracted; one by IRP and one by PSB, two UNDP projects in Travnik.

In the final months of the IRP project, the CCC will again have a sub-contract with IRP so as to re-launch the provision of legal services and civil society component by a local organization (rather than the project). This contract will cover the period from April until the completion of IRP, to provide legal advice and information to IDPs, refugee returnees and wider municipal community.

The Legal Advice and Information component of the AIC had 2 national lawyers and a receptionist/librarian through the CCC sub-contract. In IRP II, an international adviser was added to assist the legal services component. This was important in that the legal services

component had a dual role of service provision and monitoring/advocacy. Having an

¹ The CCC was established in 1996 as a non-profit, non-political, non-governmental organization with technical and financial support from the International Centre for Civil Society for South Eastern Europe and is registered as an association of Citizens in the Zenica District Court.

² *Listening to the Community: A Participatory Evaluation Report of the EU/UNDP Integrated Resettlement Programme in Travnik* prepared by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, February 1998.

international lawyer on the staff of the project assisting in the liaison work with the international organizations and advocacy with local authorities (municipal or cantonal).

V.2 Services Provided, Beneficiaries and Client Needs

V.2.1 Services Provided

One of the first tasks of the AIC was to prepare five information brochures on issues (property rights, pensions and disability, health services, education, etc.) affecting the resettlement process. These brochures were used as an outreach tool and distributed by the M&E Unit staff when visiting communities and beneficiaries.

The resettlement process and chain of return is inextricably linked to legal services and affirmation of legal rights and procedures. Throughout the life of the project, property claims and issues related to return made up the vast majority of documented cases. However, in addition, information requests regarding access to social services and clarification on governmental procedures and labor issues consumed a large amount of time of the AIC staff.

The lawyers of the CCC addressed the needs of the clients by providing written complaints, requests, claims, charges, objections and other necessary legal documentation. A majority of the clients required assistance at different stages of the process of re-establishing their property or accommodation rights to their pre-war accommodation. The lawyers explained the process, helped with filling out the forms and connecting the clients to the relevant local bodies or international organization. No electronic database was developed for the legal advice project, though information on claims was filed and regular reports provided to the IRP Program manager.

In addition to the services provided to clients, the CCC provided legal services for IRP in its reconstruction component. This was not included within the contract with the CCC. The staff members of CCC that implemented the CCC sub-contract, took on tasks as if they were UNDP staff members rather than employees of a subcontracted organization.

Progress in the cases is often slow, though over the life of the project as both the AIC became more adept, local officials accepted the "right to return", and the political environment changed, the claim processing time was reduced slightly. At the start of the project there was a limited legal framework in terms of property law. During 1999, several important loopholes in the property laws were closed (i.e. double occupancy). The Legal Advice center of the IRP prepared eviction orders based on these new laws, so that the

return chain could function. The changing legal environment in BiH (labor law, privatization of housing, etc) had led to an increase of requests for information on these processes. Most documented cases of the AIC remained tied to property questions. According to OHR, most returns in 1999/2000 are to contested space, making the legal support work of the AIC fundamental to this process. UNDP AIC has been active in the OHR Property Legislation Implementation Plan.

Case Distribution of AIC:
Travnik

Sept. 99/Jan/00

Case Problem
Aug 97/Jan98

No. |

No |

Return to house/flat		73	198	48.6
Return		1		
Social issues		5		
Employment/labor		4	76	13.2
Return of Business		4	10	1.7
Reconstruction		3	30	5,3
Reconstruction		6	25	4.4
Health		3		
Temp. housing		1	50	8.8
Indemnity			15	2.6
			6	1.18
Exchange of flat			88	14.52
Total	148	100	572	100

Source: IRP

IRP II expanded the AIC to Vitez municipality in May 1999. IRP/AIC did not have a permanent presence but rather teams visited twice week. An agreement was made with the Red Cross/CARITAS in the Croat administered part of town and the Red Cross in the Bosniac part of town to use an office one day a week. Similar to Travnik, Vitez most of the cases were property related, though the differences between the Croat and Bosniac cases reflect the differences in their positions before the war. The Bosniacs were predominantly urban residents, owning private houses in the town (68% of claims return of private house) while Croats lived in surrounding rural areas. Therefore Croat cases more on reconstruction (25%), temporary housing (6%), and social issues.

Case Distribution o AIC: mitez Ma to December 1999

	<i>Croat Section</i>		<i>Bosniac Section</i>	
<i>Case Problem</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No.</i>	

Humanitarian Aid	26	10.2	0	0
Indemnity	13	5.10	1	.63
Temp Housing	15	5.88	2	1.25
Pension	23	9.02	1	.63
UNDP Reconstruction	2	.78	4	2.5
Reconstruction	63	24.76	1	.63
Return of Private House	16	6.27	109	68.13
Return of business Premise	1	.39	3	1.88
Return of Apartment	34	13.33	24	15
Return of land	2	.78	0	0
Privatization	5	1.96	0	0
Exchange of Apartment	3	1.18	0	0
Labor	15	5.88	3	1.88
Other	37	14.52	12	7.5
TOTAL	255	100	160	100

*Source:
IRP*

V.2.2 Human Rights Working Group

The Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) was set up by the AIC in October 1998. International and local organizations meet on monthly basis to promote a more coherent and coordinated approach among the organizations working in legal protection and human rights. The IRP AIC legal component (CCC) has been the backbone of this initiative. The key members include OSCE, OHR, IPTF, the Travnik Office of the Ombudsperson, the Human Rights Bureau of the Serb Civic Council and the ARC Information Center.

The HRWG, on several occasions, organized concrete interventions in which joint pressure was put on local authorities to resolve pending legal issues. As obstruction is a favored tactic, this combined local and international pressure proved effective. The OHR in Travnik stated that the UNDP legal assistance project was very important for their process of municipal accountability, and noted that UNDP was in Travnik supporting legal monitoring and advocacy before OHR opened its office in 1998.

The HRWG also promoted dialogue and discussion through their participation in various training and education initiatives including a round table on " Democracy and Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina", TV talk shows, radio programs on property legislation, a seminar on " Co-operation in implementation of housing and property". The CCC/AIC staff also participated in a meeting organized by OSCE Knin in Croatia on return to Bosnian Croats currently living in the Croatian Krajina area.

V 3 Outcomes and Impact

Issue: Durability of Return

The IRP AIC promoted and defended the legal right of the citizens to return.

Issue: Legal Policy

The IRP AIC promoted the issues of Human Rights and Protection in Travnik and Vitez through the establishment of the Human Rights Working Group, assisted OHR, OSCE, Ombudsperson in monitoring legal situation and provided legal information. It has assisted individual returnees, IDPs and local residents to make claims and supported governance through rule of law and accountability of local authorities to the law.

Issue: Strengthening Civil Society and Community participation

The IRP AIC promoted a culture of legal protection and human rights with the community at large, although it failed to promote or strengthen the CCC as a local NGO that could be autonomous and sustainable after the project terminates.

Issue: Reconciliation

Legal services protect and advocate for all ethnic groups the individual rights of each community member, the right to return and the implementation of property legislation serve as a basis for reconciliation.

VI Support for Civil Society Organizations to overcome divisions between ethnic groups, refugee returnees and local residents and urban /rural area (Objective 3, Output 3.3)

VI.1 Formulation of Civil Society Strategy and Program

UNDP considered support to civil society organizations to be a vital contribution to secure durable reintegration of returnees into their communities of origin. Therefore in IRP I, UNDP resources contributed to the civil society component aimed at supporting the development of local groups and associations.

There were a number of lessons derived from the previous experience of international organizations in BiH, which influenced the designers and managers of the IRP civil society component in Travnik:

- Boom and popularity of international community involvement NGOs support resulted in weakening and fragmenting the NGO sector in BiH.
- Most of the NGOs projects fail on the long run trying to substitute public institutions through increased and rather chaotic involvement in the provision of social services.

As a respond to these trends, and based on the successful experience of UNDP in communityled peace-building projects in Gorny Vakuf, IRP I consciously developed a slightly different approach in support of the civil society role in Travnik. It decided to maintain a focus on participation within civil initiatives and rehabilitating the pre-war

social groups with longstanding traditions in the community, rather than supporting new "associations of citizens" (i.e. promoting "horizontal" rather than "vertical" links)⁹. Besides, UNDP was the first organization to provide locally grant opportunities for civil society groups in Travnik.

Lessons learned as a result of participatory evaluation in the first phase of the social grant program (conducted by the program Monitoring and Evaluation Unit¹⁰) led to a re-shaping of the strategy in the IRP II with a shift in focus towards strengthening of the broader NGOs community role. Thus, in the IRP II Project Document the civil society component objectives were formulated as following:


- to reintegrate the returnees into the social life of the community,
- to foster inter-ethnic dialogue and promote mutual respect and tolerance,
- to build the credibility of alternative community leaders.

⁹ *Social Capital and Integrated Development: A Civil Society Grant Program in Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ulla Engberg and Paul Stubbs, September 1998*

¹⁰ *A Participatory Evaluation Report: Listening to the Community, M&E Unit, February 1998*

V7.2 Selection process and responsibilities

The Civil Society program was implemented in the partnership with IBHI and CCC, within the responsibilities division reflected in the scheme below.




Ro_{pot}t

Criteria development Promotion Project proposals collection and preselection

First funds Disbursement

A i

Final - Projects Selection



4

-n

xn -n

A i

A i

- n

xn :n

Following this chain, 16 organizations out of 32 applied were selected to benefit from social grant schemes (with average 9,500 DEM per project) in IRP I and 26 out of 124 applicants in IRP II (with average 5,955 DEM per project).

Under the first scheme grants were provided up to 15,000 DEM for various small projects (e.g., additional Bosnian classes for returnees children, local women groups, support to socially vulnerable groups local sport clubs and hobby associations aiming at reviving their pre-war activities and membership, etc.). For full projects list *see Annex VIII*. The criteria for grants in IRP I evoked different opinions, with some being impressed by UNDP taking the issue so seriously to comments that the criteria was completely wrong for some institutions' 1.

Based on experiences in IRP I and developments introduced by a new strategy led to a change in projects criteria in IRP II (*the list of projects see in Annex M* in a following way:

- *Project duration* was changed from 9 to 3 months "to provide more momentum in implementation, especially since most projects require immediate remittance of funds for equipment or space renovation in order to get their projects off the ground"¹². In past this was conditioned by the fact that there was a short period left before the end of the program, and decision was made to concentrate more on the civil society quickimpact-actions type of projects (e.g., launching a town park).
- *Multi-ethnic membership* was dropped as a criteria, because by many participants it was perceived as "discriminative". There was no reason for IRP I to exclude them from grant competition, unless the interests they promote are discriminatory towards other ethnic groups. It is an absolutely natural thing for a healthy multi-ethnic community to have minorities united in an organization to support their identity. It is also recognized as an important coping strategy and a vehicle for supporting the ethnic group interests and growing confidence, and as a factor that has a role to play

¹¹ A Participatory Evaluation Report: *Listening to the Community*, M&E Unit, February 1998 ¹² *Small Grants Program Evaluation Report*, Gwen Jones and Edib Agic, November 1999

in reconciliation process. Moreover, many of the local pre-war NGOs were predominately mono-ethnic.

- Women groups were not given special preference. This revision was a result of relatively poor performance of women groups in the first round.
- *Civil action projects* were more encouraged in line of reinforcing community role of the civil society.
- *Application forms* were simplified.
- *Public institutions* were made not eligible to apply.
- *Non-registered associations* could apply given their willingness to register if their project was selected.
- *Funding scope* was reduced from 2,000-15,000 DEM to 2,000-8,000 DEM with 10,000 DEM in case of joint NGOs projects to discourage the organizations dependency of one source of funding.
- *Implementation partnership mechanism* was simplified to the following scheme:

Criteria development Promotion Project proposals collection and preselection


Final Project Selection



Funds Disbursement

Monitoring and Projects Reports Review

A
A



Simplification of the mechanism was connected with the fact that CCC has merged with IRP, and in the framework of the second phase there was no further need for IBHI support in the area of civil society development.

VL3 Analysis of Grants Scheme Performance

The revival of prior forms of civil involvement, taken at the approach in the initial phase (e. g. support of such civil initiatives like fishermen and small animals armatures) emphasized rebuilding social trust under reconciliation objective, as opposed to imposing a "western understanding" of what the NGOs should be. 92% of supported civil organizations in the first round and 69% in the second were organizations registered before the war. It was mentioned several times during the interviews that IRP "made working NGOs which before existed only on paper".

In the second phase, the program strategy went further, by providing space for shared

community action and assisting projects involving rehabilitation of social services and assistance to socially vulnerable groups. Five projects, supported in the second phase, demonstrated positive civil-public cooperation (i.e. the construction of accesses for disabled in Travnik-town between the Council of War Invalids and municipal utilities company) in

comparison to three grants issued merely to public institutions in the first phase. r
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There were several trends observed in the course of implementation of the Civil Society Grants component:

1) The groups who applied for the first round of grants were very different by type of activity and role in the wider community. Some were public institutions, like schools, clinics or the Central Bosnian Archive. Among these registered as NGOs were hobby groups (like Association for Letter Carrier Pigeons, or Association of Small Animals with 500 members of all levels and ages) and those which are part of larger networks (like some women organizations). Most of them learned about the program through personal visits of UNDP CCC representatives and did not have any experience in receiving or implementing grants. The lowest applicants success rate was among projects covering public provision, like education and health (33%), and the highest among recreation, environmental and nature projects (75%).

2) The growth of number of applicants among NGOs in the second phase could be attributed not only to the program extension to the municipality of Vitez, but also to good media coverage and well organized public awareness campaign in regards to previously granted projects activities. A clause on mass media coverage was included in each NGO contracts.

3) The increase of the membership of the NGOs involved in the program (44% according to evaluation of 1999) can serve as an indicator of how the implemented projects promoted civil participation. Future monitoring should also look at membership growth in regards to gender groups, ethnic groups and the social inclusion of returnees. More than one third of all supported projects were explicitly aiming at supporting opportunities for youth and children.

4) Most of the NGOs in CB Canton are a "creation of urban middle class" and do not reach rural areas. From the total 365 registered NGOs in the Central Bosnian Canton, few are of the rural origin. There was hardly any assistance through the projects aiming at rural population, although the major number of reconstructed houses through the program are in rural areas. In the second phase applications from groups from rural areas or serving rural communities were encouraged through out-reach projects. However, there was only 1 project of this nature supported (training of volunteer teams to provide health care and household assistance elderly and disabled).

5) Several one-day training sessions were conducted in 1998 by IBHI on project proposal writing, project monitoring, budgeting and reporting and a two-days seminar was

conducted by the Civil Society Development Officer on fundraising (April 1999). The training generally was viewed by the applicants as helpful. For many groups this was the first time when they could exchange with other NGOs. Besides this initial rather technical training, there was no substantive training, limited exchange mechanism are available for groups to share experience. Also, in the evaluations of the first grant schemes, some organizations pointed out that the training was weakened by the fact that the participants had different skill levels.

Generally, grantees perception of LJNDP procedures and support was evaluated by workers of IRP Civil Society Development Program ³ and was summarized as following:

<i>Aspect</i>	<i>Highly positive</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Highly negative</i>
Clarity of criteria and requirements	8	6	2	-	-
Clarity of application form	9	5	2	-	-
Usefulness of training on project formulation and planning	9	6	1	-	-
Usefulness of training on budget preparation	10	4	2	-	-
Interest to learn about other groups' projects	5	9	2	-	-
Clarity of financial and report	10	6	-	-	-
Satisfaction with fund transfer	9	5	2	-	-
Satisfaction with support provided by the program	14	2	-	-	-
Overall efficiency of scheme procedures	9	5	2	-	-

Out of 4 organizations-beneficiaries in both grant schemes, 2 commented on UNDP procedures as "improved" and the other 2 as "greatly improved".

VL4 Outcomes and Impacts

After two years since launching of the IRP Civil Society Support scheme, the experience can provide a range of indicators for measuring success in future similar interventions (*some suggestions are in Annex)Q*. It is recommended that in future, with considerations of specific objectives and particular local contexts, indicators should be developed in the beginning of the project and reviewed in its course together with the potential beneficiaries. This will help to ensure clear visions and provide right focuses for the monitoring od impact.

Similar programs should distinguish between the horizontal trust building (through support to interest groups, rehabilitation of previously existing associations) and strengthening the vertical axis (promoting civil society-government linkages, networking and advocacy). Revival of prior traditions of civil involvement are extremely important in reconciliation context and can serve as *a predictive factor* for promotion of development, but development assistance should not be limited to this revival.

Strict criteria for grants are important. However, the criteria should be designed to be applicable to the project activities rather than to the organizations and procedures. In the case of mixed grant schemes (NGOs and public institutions), there is a need to distinguish between two different sets of criteria applicable to different group.

The increase of the projects involving civil-public cooperation can be interpreted as a growing level of civil society responsibility in provision of social services to the community and as growing chances for cooperation between the civil initiative and the government in the de-centralization process. In IRP II half of the implemented projects were additionally supported by local authorities contributions either through funding (total 12,500 DEM) or in kind. Another indicator of growing civil responsibility can be a number of volunteer

¹³ *Small Grants Program 1999, Evaluation Report, Prepared by Gwen Jones and Edib Agic* contributions mobilized (e.g. in the second phase half of the projects supported involved volunteer contributions).

Similar programs should provide better opportunities and encourage participation of unregistered and rural civil groups (e.g. through developing incentives for other NGOs to implement projects for wider community, through establishing a local implementation agency that could better present to donors the interests of rural civil groups, etc.).

It is too early to assess sustainability chances of the benefited NGOs and to judge to which extent the program contributed to it. However, some indicators, like decreasing dependence of the NGOs on one source of funding, are worthy to mention. Only one third of supported projects in the second round have no additional sources of support, and 4 out of 24 managed to utilize contributions from local private enterprise. Given low key objectives of the Civil Society Support component, success of similar interventions should be measured along reconciliation and social rehabilitation lines.

Initial training and further informal contacts in the course of the program between the NGOs catalyzed the recognition of a need for an NGO Resource Center. This was also one of the recommendations of the M&E unit's participatory report and is still mentioned by many NGOs as an emerging need. Originally, there was a common perception that the CCC, with its initial role and functions in the program could have been developed into a local Resource Center. But since its staff members were incorporated with IRP, they were perceived as "donor employees", and the potential for further organizational development of the NGO was weakened. Nevertheless, in IRP II an attempt was made to find an entry point to bridge from horizontal to a vertical axe in local civil society development through creation of the NGO Forum. Presently, the Travnik NGO Forum is referred to by many as a positive example of local civil society mobilization process. The Forum was established in late 1998 and includes 6 working groups (women issues, environment protection, culture, vulnerable groups, human rights, sport and leisure). It start serving a platform for the NGOs to reflect on their joint role vis-à-vis the broader community.

In similar interventions the question "How do the NGOs reflect upon their collective role in the wider community?" is important to address through the creation of a mechanism where the groups are able to compare, develop, unite and capitalize on their advantages and civil agendas. The role of civil society is a pre-condition for local development rather than its effect. This is especially important for the regions where municipal assemblies are politicized and are not capable of facilitating healthy civil-government dialogue.

Although well networked (both through the Forum and other available mechanisms), many of the local organizations, on one hand, are still lacking skills to influence local public policy and, on the other hand, are still too tired to grants to be creative, innovative and responsive to the needs of the grass-roots work.

The objective to build the credibility of alternative community leaders was not met within the IRP. It is not fair to attribute it to the program failures, as it was never clearly translated in program design and there was no common vision on how it was supposed to be achieved.

It is recommended that, when possible, training opportunities are made available for all local NGOs before submission of applications. This might result in a) a bigger number of genuine grass-roots organizations (who lack presentation skills and/or previous experience with donors) to formulate their ideas, and b) more opportunities for growth of leadership within

the organizations. This type of training could involve more experienced local organizations to share skills with others (also as a tool to promote informal leadership).

It is important that similar civil society support programs include assessment of the participants training needs and develop a comprehensive training program with the focus on substantive issues as well as technical ones.

When aimed at support of NGO projects in the area of social services, such programs could better utilize limited resources through encouraging governmental contribution for projects "hardware" (e.g., school building repairs) combined with grant funds utilized more for "software" (e.g., books, visual aids, teachers training, etc.) The "software" in such cases falls anyway under responsibility of either cantonal or municipal authorities, and this type of arrangements would also stimulate close cooperation between local NGOs, cantonal and authorities and municipalities. Experimenting with such schemes could lead to a re-thinking of public expenditures policy and serve a longer-term purpose of social partnership in decentralization of social services.

VII Participatory mapping and evaluation of project activities and dissemination of information on UNDP and source of funds (Objective 3, Output 3.4)

VII.1 Relations with Local media

The program activities were well covered by local media. Its representatives were also

cooperative at the dissemination of information regarding housing reconstruction and microgrants program. It was acknowledged by some local media members that IRP, in its turn, was one of the most cooperative while giving information out (in comparison to other international organizations operating in the area).

Within the social grant scheme, the IRP awarded three grants as technical assistance to local media organizations. One of them produced a series of programs on return to Central Bosnian Canton.

In evaluation of NGO projects, "media coverage" was one of the indicators to assess success of the projects, and most of the projects were well covered by local media.

VII.2 Production and dissemination of newsletter, reports, leaflets,

M&E unit was made responsible for establishing reporting procedures to facilitate monitoring and evaluation of the program performance and to feed the information into the database. Reports from partners (IBHI, CCC and UMCOR) were received by it monthly.

In the middle term period of the program the M&E unit carried out a substantive participatory evaluation, which documented the need for the number of management and substance changes in different program components.

The IRP Information Support Unit issued two newsletters in 1998 in both Bosnian and English language. In 1999, information strategy of IRP expanded to more intensive relations with media and the development of IRP Internet WebPage. Besides, some specific leaflets were produced by IAC for its clients and for applicants of micro-grants scheme.

To ensure visibility of the program activities and to acknowledge donors contribution, signboards and stickers were placed on each reconstructed house, infrastructure and the place hosting micro-grant projects funded through IRP.

An IRP Calendar 2000, a colored brochure in 1999 and a substantive book (February 2000) were produced to increase the profile and awareness of the IRP. Other public events such as a street ball and a basketball tournament were organized in Travnik and sponsored by IRP.

VII.3 Outcomes and impact

Participatory mapping and evaluation was important for feeding information to the program management, and, finally, critical for the program successes.

Partners reports might have been more useful and less repetitive if they could have included some analysis of obstacles and successes rather than mere description of activities. To improve dynamics of reporting, specific report forms or guidelines should be developed for future partners, allowing better focus and analysis along the pre-established indicators.

To achieve maximum impact visibility should be implemented more by beneficiaries. For instance, it can be added in small amounts on the top of social grants of the NGOs that suggest creative approaches to promote donor's contributions.

VIII Project Management

VIII.1 Organization of the Project Staff

The IRP I had four distinct units reporting to a Program Manager (*see Annex XI*):

- Reconstruction Unit (responsible for the implementation of both housing and infrastructure reconstruction components),
- Advice and Information Center (responsible for the implementation of civil society and legal rights components),
- Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (responsible for beneficiary selection preparation, monitoring and evaluation of occupancy, and overall program monitoring),
- Operations and Support Unit (responsible for administration, information and communication, database, logistical support).

An information manager who reported directly to the program manager and the Economic Micro-grant Unit to implement the micro-grant scheme were added in IRP II.

During part of the program life there was a Deputy Program Manager, who was considered advisable since the Program Manager had to spent large amounts of time liaising with local authorities, coordinating with international organizations, and working on substantive issues related to program implementation. The Deputy then worked more on the day-to-day supervision of unit managers and the sub-programs.

The IRP was unique in the sense that for implementation of the program it had a priority in hiring international staff who knew the Bosnian language as well as was familiar with the local context. The first Program Manager had worked in Western Slavonia (Croatia) and Gornj Vokuf and was involved in the design of the original program. He brought his understanding and familiarity of the area, recruited appropriate international staff that set the IRP program apart from most international organizations. The international staff could develop a quicker working relationship with the national staff, since there were not language problems. This also allowed for the development of effective working relations with the municipal leaders, beneficiaries and community at large.

The fact that there were three different program managers through the total program duration of 30 months (IRP I and IRP II), undermined continuity and working relations with local officials and key stakeholders. There were complaints made to the mission that time was lost in having to develop working relationships three times, while efforts could have been placed on more important implementation issues.

***Break own ——— Bu
et***

<i>Component</i>	<i>Component share, of total budget</i>
Housing	69,2
Infrastructure	15,0

Legal Advice	0,3
Civil Society Dvp	1,6
Economic Micro-Grants	6,0
Staff Costs	0,1
Administrative Costs	3,2
IT Unit	4,6
Total for IRPII	100

VIII.2 Role of UNDP FO and project office in execution (efficiency of division of labor)

All program implementation was delegated to the program manager except for certain procurement contracts that the UNDP Country Office undertook for the program. There were two specific areas. One was the procurement of all building materials for the housing reconstruction and the other was the livestock for the micro-grant component. There was satisfaction with the procurement of building materials, but criticism from some beneficiaries on the purchasing of livestock that was not the best quality and was delivered too late in the year.

The IRP experience demonstrates that generally agricultural tenders should be very specific in terms of what is appropriate for the region so that the most appropriate inputs are purchased, even if the cost is slightly higher.

IX IRP as an integrated program

The IRP was an effective integrated program in which the varying components have addressed in some way the cross-cutting issues identified to assess its impact. The varying components of the IRP, used different entry points and strategies from which to address the multi-faceted needs of the returning populations and area-residents. No indicators were developed in the early stage of the program to measure the success and impact of the components or the program as a whole, although one. has to admit that in the changing political environment it is also difficult, to have set benchmarks and indicators as the socio-political terrain and the institutional environment was changing and evolving throughout the life of the program (July 1997- February 2000).

IX.1 Durability of return

The application of durable return, though difficult to assess in a project of limited duration, can, in the first instance, be seen in the success in ensuring occupancy in the reconstructed houses. Through the frequent contact with beneficiaries made by the monitoring and evaluation staff of IRP, the occupancy rate for IRP I was verified at 96%. In IRP II the process is still ongoing. With the additional support of the recent property legislation and the legal work of the IRP AIC component of the project in cooperation with the local authorities evictions are becoming more common. The changing political climate indicates that some of the "hesitant" returnees and IDPs who maintained double occupancy feel that they must return. The assessment is that in the case of Travnik, the same occupancy should be reached in IRP II. Vitez, which had a divided administration and insecurity until six

months ago, may not reach the IRP occupancy rate.

The impact of the other components can be seen as re-enforcing the durable return by improving the enabling environment, though to a limited degree. The Legal Advice and Information Center helped to create a culture and practice of legal accountability of municipal authorities - an important element in confidence building. The Civil Society component supported the reactivation of the multi-ethnic urban associations, cultural activities, sports and independent media. Rebuilding of social infrastructure; especially roads, utilities and water; are important pull factors to return. The Economic micro-grant program, though limited in scope gave concrete support and hope to socially vulnerable returnees, IDPs and remainees that they may improve their economic livelihoods- the key factor to long term revitalization of the towns and villages in the Travnik and Vitez.

IX.2 Local Institutional Capacity Building

The major obstacle to support local institutional capacity building was the political environment at the start of the program. The dual administrations in the municipal authorities, meant that it was difficult to define which institution should receive the institutional support. The major focus of capacity building was to be in the areas of beneficiary selection, monitoring and evaluation of projects like the IRP. IBHI had been sub-contracted to undertake the capacity-building, with the goal of transferring the task to the local authorities within one year. It did not take place for institutional reasons, and the focus became the upgrading of local human resources, through their association with IBHI or IRP, with the hopes that they would later be integrated within the municipal authorities. The political context had changed somewhat by IRP II, but there was not an adequate review of the

capacity-building strategy to modify it for the changing circumstances. In the future, if the political administration is unified and has legitimacy, a formalized institutional relationship should be established by the project. However, in many post-conflict situations the establishment of formalized relationships with "illegitimate" authorities can severely reduce the effectiveness and impact of the project.

The participation of local authorities in tendering and bidding processes for sub-contracts did have an impact on building their capacity in the application of transparent bidding procedures.

IX.3 Promotion of Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a complex social, cultural and political process that the project addressed in many ways. All components of the project incorporated the principle of reconciliation in their work, as they addressed the material needs of the beneficiaries. There were numerous examples in which support for a minority returnee promoted reconciliation with pre-war neighbors: a micro-grant beneficiary included a member of a different ethnic groups as an indirect beneficiary to receive a calf; a pre-war multi-ethnic association received support to restart activities and promote the multi-ethnic fabric of Travnik town. At the same time,

there are remain many divisions and invisible boundaries which cannot be overcome in the context of a project or in a three year period. Also, the IRP had the principle of multi-ethnic teams working on each component, so as to demonstrate the multi-ethnic character of the Central Bosnian Canton.

IX.4 Strengthening Civil Society and Community Participation

The importance of the approach to civil society of the IRP project is that civil society was defined as the Bosnians themselves define it. Therefore, many diverse associations were supported with small grants, which promoted a revival of pre-war organizations and horizontal participation. The economic micro-grant component linked up with civil society organizations in naming them as secondary beneficiaries of the outputs of the grants, thereby re-enforcing the importance of these groups in their communities. The Legal Advice and Information Center supported the development of civil society organizations and actions in the area legal protection and human rights through the founding of the Human Rights Working Group.

The IRP did not set up any formal structures to promote community participation, but went through the MZs or arranged community meetings when needed, as in the case of infrastructure projects or to introduce the program in 1997/98 to local residents.

IX.5 Support for Economic Livelihoods: Individual and Region

There is broad agreement among community residents and organizations, that *the issue* of prime importance is the need for economic revitalization of the CB Canton to secure economic livelihoods for the residents. The IRP, in its second phase, actually introduced an economic component in its micro-grant program. Given the nature of this program, its shortterm duration, limited training and follow-up, it is difficult to assess the impact in terms of economic sustainability of the sub-projects supported. The majority of them were household level projects in which self-sufficiency, rather than job creation, was the goal.

The reconstruction components of the projects had an important economic impact in Travnik, Vitez and the CB Canton. The materials and labor components were contracted out to local enterprises and close to 15,000,000 DEM flowed into the enterprises. The labor component of the reconstruction created a significant number of jobs in the building of 920 houses and reconstruction of communal utilities and social infrastructure in Travnik and Vitez.

IX.6 The Economic and Social Empowerment of Women

The IRP had no specific strategy or program to focus on woman's particular needs in the return and resettlement process. Some female headed households benefited from the reconstruction program, but no specific support mechanisms were envisaged to respond to their particular needs. The economic - among the beneficiaries of micro-grant project almost 20% were women, but again there was no special outreach or training in economic initiatives for women.

XOutlines: Impact of IRP in Travnik and Vitez and in a Wider

Context *X.1 Program Strengths*

If to summarize the strengths of IRP in terms of its wider community impact, the following is worthy mentioning:

- Integrated approach ensured high occupancy in reconstruction component. *Key elements:* Beneficiary Selection, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, Legal Advice and Information Center necessary for 96% occupancy of direct beneficiaries in IRP I.
- Integrated approach consolidated return process and promoted reconciliation through support for social infrastructure, civil society component and micro-grants that benefited community at large.
- More than 15,000,000 DEM was awarded in contracts to Bosnian enterprises, in the implementation of IRP II and I. This was a major infusion of capital into the post-war CB Canton economy.
- Civil society support for settled urban community association stimulated the restarting multi-ethnic urban life civic actions and activities.
- IBHI involvement of beneficiary selection important as an impartial independent partner to work with municipalities.
- Capacity building focused on human resource development rather than institutional capacities (municipality, CCC).
- Legal component brought together national lawyers with international human rights advocates and monitors to work for legal protection and to implement recent property legislation to secure durable return and resettlement.
- Connection with communities maintained through beneficiary monitoring, legal advice component, civil society grants and micro-economic sub-projects.
- Procurement and technical supervision guaranteed high quality and low cost construction.

X.2 Program Weaknesses

Among weaknesses of the program are the following:

- Capacity building took second place to timetable of primary outputs.
- Projects of short time frame limit planning, training and participation, which weaken and undermine sustainability potential of program.
- IRP II delayed start-up of key components: i.e. economic micro-grants, civil society component, beneficiary selection of housing reconstruction, due to management problems impacted component definition and criteria and resulting impact.
- No strategy for economic or political empowerment of women.
- No strategy or incentive for youth or young families to return.

- Limited cross fertilization between IRP and other UNDP area-based programs.
- Frequent change in management undermined credibility and continuity with local authorities, implementing partners and other stakeholders.

X.3 Recommendations for Future Programming

As a result of IRP evaluation the Mission developed recommendations for future UNDP programming of similar interventions:

- UNDP interventions should continue to be driven by economic and social development needs and impact on affected area, rather than number of "vulnerable" beneficiaries as defined by relief or humanitarian agencies.
- Institutional capacity building as well as human resource development should be built into projects.
- The appropriateness of grants or credit should be determined by a clear economic analysis of the area in question rather than donor specified constraints such as duration of project or implementation ease.
- Economic programs should require economic viability of projects as well as inclusion of low income beneficiaries.
- Business training should be incorporated in the pre-project proposal phase of future economic micro-grant or credit programs.
- Support for Civil Society Organizations should emphasize organizational development, growth and impact.
- Legal advice and assistance is critical as citizenry is just learning to use the law to protect their rights. Application of recent property legislation will facilitate future return programs.
- Reconstruction of social infrastructure; particularly roads, water supply and electrical power lines, are important pull factor for return; and could continue being included in future projects. Rehabilitation of mono-ethnic schools while curriculum issues are still pending should be decided as a policy issue by UNDH BiH, rather than left to projects to decide on a case by case basis.
- Indicators for determining impact of project interventions and project, as a whole should be developed in early stages of project.