EVALUATION OF UNDP PARTNERSHIP WITH GLOBAL FUNDS AND PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS

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FOREWORD

The global development cooperation architecture is evolving rapidly, spurred on by a wide range of factors. Mixed fortunes in weathering the global economic and financial crisis of the past few years have led many ‘traditional’ donors to reassess not only the volume of funds they provide in support of development issues, but also the ways in which they provide support. Donors have become increasingly attracted to funding instruments that target more narrowly defined health and environmental issues and are perceived to be of immediate developmental relevance, such as global or vertical funds (e.g. the Global Environment Facility, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the Multilateral Fund for the Montreal Protocol.)

At the same time, the private sector, including individual entrepreneurs, has been playing a more prominent role in providing direct support to, as well as in establishing, philanthropic foundations aimed at addressing developmental concerns. A number of foundations that stand out in this regard include those set up by Bill and Melinda Gates, George Soros and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum.

In providing support to programme countries over the past decade, UNDP has engaged with global funds and philanthropic foundations to varying degrees. UNDP has become a key implementing partner of global funds and has also worked with a range of philanthropic foundations. This evaluation assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP support to achieving development results when activities are carried out in partnership with these global funds and philanthropic foundations.

UNDP remains an important conduit for development funding. This is particularly clear in the case of partnership with global funds, where strategic, corporate-level linkages are cultivated and maintained. Partnership with philanthropic foundations has limited to project-specific initiatives, with minimal corporate-level guidance and follow-up. UNDP has missed opportunities to consistently integrate a human development perspective and foster a more holistic development approach. Moreover, in working with both global funds and philanthropic foundations, there are important issues relating to transparency, bureaucratic efficiency and cost-effectiveness that UNDP needs to resolve.

The evaluation recommends that UNDP should engage more consistently with global funds and philanthropic foundations to develop mutual approaches to development challenges. UNDP should place more explicit emphasis on the central importance of mainstreaming a human development perspective and developing national capacity. UNDP needs stronger central coordination of information and knowledge management functions in order to facilitate a more strategic approach, and should develop a partnership strategy for engaging with philanthropic foundations.

As UNDP prepares to develop a new Strategic Plan against the background of a development cooperation architecture that is in considerable flux, this may be a key moment for decision-making with respect to UNDP partnership initiatives. I hope that this evaluation will be useful for UNDP in strengthening its partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundation in support of programme countries’ efforts to advance human development.

Indran A. Naidoo
Director, UNDP Evaluation Office
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<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Assessment of development results</td>
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<td>GAVI</td>
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the corporate and the programme country level. Varying country contexts have led UNDP to engage in partnerships in which it has variously played the role of principal recipient of funds, implementing agency, interlocutor, coordinator and adviser.

This report seeks to contribute insights on UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations. The principal objectives of the evaluation are to (a) assess the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP support to the achievement of development results when activities are carried out in partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations; (b) clarify the added value to key stakeholders of UNDP partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations and the comparative advantages of working with such funding instruments; and (c) provide actionable recommendations on how UNDP partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations could be further developed.

Covering the period from 2001 to 2010, the evaluation focuses on partnership, and, thus, on a modality rather than a programme or project. It provides a broad perspective on how partnership arrangements between UNDP and a range of funding instruments have evolved in the context of increasing reliance on non-core resources, as well as on the relative importance of the new funding institutions alongside the traditional multilateral development cooperation system.

The evaluation focuses on UNDP partnership with three global funds: the Global Environment Facility (GEF); the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM); the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF); and three philanthropic foundations: the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation (Al Maktoum Foundation); the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
30 percent of official development assistance; the percentage has since remained relatively steady. Since 2000, the share of multilateral aid has fallen somewhat, with a growing portion of bilateral aid being channelled through the United Nations and other multilateral funds in the form of non-core (‘earmarked’) funding. This shift reflects the desire of traditional donors for more control. The past decade saw the growth of additional non-United Nations multilateral funds and the further expansion of existing funds such as GEF and MLF. New private donors entered the aid architecture, with some global funds receiving substantial contributions from private sources (most notably the Gates Foundation). Moreover, the decade saw the emergence of additional official donors, including Brazil, China, India and some of the Arab States.

For UNDP, reliance on non-core funding—including from traditional and non-traditional donors, global funds and philanthropic foundations—grew from 19 percent in 1991 to 80 percent in 2010. By 2010, out of a total of just over $5 billion, core resources amounted to just under $1 billion. Over the past decade, however, core resources have remained relatively stable in absolute terms, increasing until 2007 and decreasing slightly since. In contrast, non-core resources have increased significantly (though more slowly since 2007), which accounts for the changing ratio of core to non-core resources.

GLOBAL FUNDS

Since the early 1970s, global funds have been established primarily in the environment and health fields. Most of these funds have been created outside the United Nations system. In the wake of the signing of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1989, a separate mechanism was established to administer the accompanying Multilateral Fund; it became operational in 1991. Also in 1991, GEF was formally approved during preparations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and...
UNDP and GFATM have been engaged in a partnership since late 2002. UNDP supports programme implementation by serving as the principal recipient in exceptionally challenging contexts, developing the capacities of national actors to assume or strengthen principal recipient responsibility, and improving policy and programme quality. UNDP has been a major partner in terms of receiving GFATM grants. It has assumed the responsibility of principal recipient in 47 countries since 2002, and the value of signed grant agreements totals some $2 billion.

Global Environment Facility

GEF began as a $1 billion pilot programme that expanded into a partnership among three implementing organizations: The World Bank, UNDP and the United Nations Environment Programme. As of 2011, GEF had allocated a total of $9.5 billion, and it is estimated that a further $42 billion in co-financing has been mobilized by donors, recipient countries and the private sector. UNDP has been one of the GEF key implementing organizations since the inception of the Facility, accounting for approximately one third of total GEF funding. UNDP work with GEF encompasses activities in all GEF focal areas: biodiversity, climate change mitigation and adaptation, international waters, land degradation, ozone layer depletion and persistent organic pollutants. The portfolio of work includes projects at the country, regional and global levels.

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

GFATM is a financial instrument that provides performance-based grant funding to country-level recipients to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. As a global partnership among governments, civil society, the private sector and affected communities, GFATM constitutes an innovative approach to international health financing with an original mandate to dramatically scale up global financing. During its almost decade-long existence, GFATM has raised over $20 billion to co-finance prevention, treatment and care programmes in more than 150 countries. UNDP and GFATM have been engaged in a partnership since late 2002. UNDP supports programme implementation by serving as the principal recipient in exceptionally challenging contexts, developing the capacities of national actors to assume or strengthen principal recipient responsibility, and improving policy and programme quality. UNDP has been a major partner in terms of receiving GFATM grants. It has assumed the responsibility of principal recipient in 47 countries since 2002, and the value of signed grant agreements totals some $2 billion.

Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol

The main objective of MLF is to assist developing countries whose annual per capita consumption and production of ozone-depleting substances is less than 0.3 kg to comply with the control measures of the Montreal Protocol. As of 2011, 147 of the 196 parties to the Protocol are eligible for support. As of April 2011, the contributions, from 45 countries, amounted to more than $2.77 billion. After the establishment of MLF, UNDP entered into an agreement with the Executive Committee of the Fund to serve as an implementing agency. As of 2011, UNDP has provided technical and policy backstopping to country offices and governments and has overseen implementation of over 2,000 Multilateral Fund-financed projects in more than 100 countries. A key objective of UNDP work is to develop the capacities of governments to meet their commitments by phasing out the use of ozone-depleting substances in industrial production, refrigeration servicing, mobile air-conditioning, fire protection and agricultural production.

Philanthropic Foundations

Individual philanthropy has led to the creation of foundations that have channelled substantial resources into a range of causes, including development. There are over 75,000 foundations in the United States, some 85,000 in Western Europe, 35,000 in Eastern Europe, 10,000 in Mexico, nearly 2,000 in China and at least 1,000 in Brazil.
Some foundations increasingly see themselves as fully-fledged development partners rather than donors, and expect close involvement in policy discussions, problem analyses and results assessments. Historically, UNDP has had few substantive long-term partnerships with philanthropic foundations. Partnerships with philanthropic foundations have primarily been managed by UNDP country offices.

The Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation

The Al Maktoum Foundation was launched in 2007 with a $10 billion endowment from the Prime Minister and Vice President of the United Arab Emirates and constitutional monarch of Dubai. The Foundation promotes entrepreneurship by supporting innovation and research, improving access to high-quality education and professional development, and supporting the production, acquisition and dissemination of Arab knowledge sources. A memorandum of understanding was signed between UNDP and the Al Maktoum Foundation in 2007. To date, with a $5.83 million contribution, the foundation has supported UNDP in developing the 2009 ‘Arab Knowledge Report’ and the ‘Arab Human Capital Challenge’, two reports that offer a general introduction to the state of the Arab knowledge society and the challenges of fostering employment in Arab states.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

The Gates Foundation, launched in 1994, has grown to be the largest of its kind in the world. The Gates Foundation channels a significant proportion of its assets into development programmes, also contributing to the establishment of other multilateral funds and actively supporting United Nations organizations. The Foundation divides its work into three distinct programme areas: global development, global health, and programmes implemented within the United States. UNDP has worked with the Gates Foundation on several projects since it started its operations in 1994. Activities have been implemented on a project-by-project basis, governed by individual memoranda of understanding. A number of initiatives, with a total value of approximately $50 million, are reviewed in the context of this evaluation.

The Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations

Since 1984, when the Soros Foundation established its first non-United States based foundation in Hungary to support the transition from communism, its support to human rights and democracy has expanded rapidly. UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding with the Soros Foundation in 2001 with a view to supporting international development aimed at strengthening democratic institutions. Activities under the partnership have primarily revolved around several democratic governance and human rights projects in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Between 2004 and 2010 UNDP received $14.8 million in contributions from the Soros Foundation.

FINDINGS

GLOBAL FUNDS

Partnership with global funds is strategically important to UNDP. Not only does it facilitate mobilizing significant volumes of financial support, but it also provides UNDP with opportunities to engage in global policy dialogue, participate in innovative initiatives, and strengthen its own capacity.

Partnership with global funds has become increasingly relevant to UNDP in monetary terms. The UNDP budget derived from such global funds stands at over $657 million per annum, one-sixth of its non-core revenue. Partnership with global funds allows UNDP to engage in global policy dialogue with governments on a range of issues. Such partnerships have enhanced UNDP technical and operational capacities. Global fund monies have enabled UNDP to develop its country-specific technical expertise in specialized areas and have facilitated innovative work that would not easily be possible through the use of core funds.
Partnership with UNDP is strategically important to global funds. There is a shared commitment to international standards, and UNDP adds significant value to the delivery of global fund initiatives. UNDP is a key player in all three global funds under review. It has engaged with these funds since their inception: relationships were forged at a strategic level and based on memoranda of understanding and senior-level contacts. A significant portion of each fund goes to partner countries through or with the support of UNDP, which on an annual basis averages approximately 40 percent of GEF funding, 32 percent of Multilateral Fund financing, and 10 percent of GFATM funds.

Initiatives supported through UNDP-global funds partnerships are generally relevant to national priorities. As governments make choices as to how to prioritize development challenges, the specific allocation of resources within the sectoral focus areas of global funds is not always perceived as requiring the most urgent attention. Global fund projects fit well with national priorities in most of the countries where they operate, according to country case studies and feedback from national stakeholders. While all projects are relevant, questions may sometimes be asked whether the most relevant challenges are being properly prioritized. However, recipient governments are generally assertive about their requirements, particularly as they are often called upon to co-finance projects supported by global funds and endorse them at both the political and the technical level.

UNDP plays an essential role in managing global funds at the national level, and is sometimes the only feasible or available international partner. It may implement directly due to a lack of national capacity arising from political or security reasons, governance issues or a lack of management and administrative expertise. National authorities usually welcome UNDP in global fund implementation, which often builds on long-standing historical relationships. Even governments with evident implementation capacity are seen to be making the pragmatic choice of keeping UNDP as a service provider. In the case of global funds, UNDP specialist knowledge on project design and grant application is a reason for choosing to work through UNDP. There have been a few cases where a government felt that it was able to take responsibility itself, which inevitably created some tensions with UNDP.

National capacity development is highlighted in agreements between UNDP and global funds. While project-based capacity development activities are commonplace, UNDP does not prioritize a longer-term vision and systematized approach aimed at enabling national partners to be self-sufficient. Even in the most challenging contexts, there is a sense among fund managers and within recipient governments that UNDP could do more to prepare for handover to national authorities. While UNDP has generated guidance on effective capacity development, in practice it is often not considered user-friendly or sufficiently comprehensive or adaptable to specific national circumstances. Moreover, there is no mandatory approach to capacity assessment, baseline-setting or exit strategies.

There is a good fit between the objectives of the UNDP-global fund partnerships and current UNDP strategic objectives and international commitments. Challenges remain in cross-linkages with other strategic objectives at the project level. Alignment with the UNDP core mandate is a matter of ongoing debate. At the level of current UNDP strategic objectives and international commitments, partnership with global funds fit well. Project objectives are aligned with country programme objectives and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework which, in turn, feeds into UNDP global objectives. A mixed picture emerges—and there are observable differences between funds—regarding the extent to which cross-linkages are made at the project level between global fund activities and other UNDP strategic objectives (such as poverty reduction and gender equality).
In delivering global fund programmes, UNDP—as the custodian of the resident coordinator function—coordinates initiatives with other concerned development actors. While relations with such development actors have often been mutually beneficial, they have occasionally been competitive or one-sided. United Nations coordination works well at the formal United Nations Development Assistance Framework level, but there is scope for closer cooperation. United Nations country team members expressed the concern that UNDP works on issues outside its area specialization for which it does not consult or involve specialized agencies. The issue of unfair competition from UNDP in relation to different global funds was frequently raised. Relations with civil society tend to be weak; UNDP is often criticized for being too close to governments. However, partnerships with global funds may help UNDP open up to non-governmental organizations and communities.

According to the assessment systems of the global funds under review, UNDP work is considered effective. UNDP generally receives satisfactory to high scores demonstrating its ability to deliver well within the context of the partnerships. Each of the funds under review has systems for measuring the performance of recipient organizations on a regular basis and rating them against each other. According to those external systems of measurement, UNDP work has been found to be effective. Beyond the rating systems, there is ample evidence—based, in particular, on comprehensive evaluations of GEF and GFATM over the past years—that work conducted by the global funds has contributed to the achievement of development results. There are, however, a few less positive outcomes (for example, there were rare cases of corruption infecting individual global fund programmes at the country level).

Efficient support to global funds is provided through the three-tier structure of headquarters units, regional service centres and country offices. In certain instances, the performance of regional service centres in underpinning the work of country offices varies considerably. There is reportedly cross-fertilization between the units responsible for each of the global funds. However, there is no overall coordination function for UNDP work with the funds. From a headquarters perspective, it can be a challenge to ensure a harmonized approach to specific global funds across country offices without line management or at least technical authority over field staff, or to ensure that all country and regional offices have the necessary specialist expertise.

The rigidity of UNDP procedures is both an asset and a concern for global funds and national governments. There is a high level of comfort that UNDP will manage donor resources as intended and in line with strict internal standards. However, procedures are often perceived as excessively bureaucratic and prone to delays. Some staff at GEF and GFATM raised concerns about the rigidity of UNDP procedures. Responses at the field level are mixed. Among some stakeholders there is high praise for UNDP systems relative to the weak administrations in the countries where it operates. But there are also a number of complaints about slow procurement processes; cumbersome and inconsistent accounting, planning and reporting procedures; delayed disbursements; and the inappropriate application of UNDP rules.

From the UNDP perspective, some inefficiencies at the day-to-day working level can be attributed to the global funds themselves. Such issues are part of the ongoing dialogue between organizations that seek to improve efficiency on all sides. Various concerns about global fund inefficiencies have been raised at UNDP headquarters and at the country level. Issues related to GEF include: rules and regulations that are complex and restrictive, a project cycle that is too short for lasting outcomes, and co-financing requirements that put UNDP at a disadvantage compared with development banks that offer loans. With regard to GFATM, there is frustration at the high turnover of GFATM staff in Geneva and the lack
of internal information-sharing; there are doubts about the qualifications of local fund agents; and there is criticism of what is seen as the trialling of new and inefficient procedures. No issues were raised about MLF; the system seems straightforward and well understood.

The overall monitoring and evaluation systems for global funds are found to work well and are often seen as more advanced than general UNDP requirements. There are challenges in monitoring and evaluating for broader development results and in tracking human development-related indicators. UNDP faces some challenges in integrating the monitoring and evaluation requirements of global funds with its own systems. The project results of global funds are not fully integrated into evaluation planning at the country and bureau levels, and many evaluations covering GEF, GFATM and Multilateral Fund projects are not included in evaluation plans. All funds have rigorous monitoring and verification processes that track results using a range of quality criteria. However, longer-term impacts are not necessarily tracked. Overall, the monitoring and evaluation systems of the global funds are more advanced than those used by UNDP, but UNDP has adapted well and has shown a willingness to improve and learn.

While UNDP overheads are agreed upon in the context of partnership documents, the staff of global funds frequently do not consider the level of UNDP charges to be justified. The rationale for overhead charges is not communicated adequately, which has soured relations at times. UNDP cost recovery has been an issue for global funds, and GEF and GFATM have questioned the level of overheads. The Multilateral Fund appears to have a more standardized cost structure, and is able to work out mutually agreeable budgets. Some global fund staff consider UNDP charges to be excessive—sometimes due to misinformation or a lack of appreciation of the risks involved. For the most part, governments see value in the fees charged by UNDP and take the pragmatic view that these are the necessary cost of outsourced services. UNDP considers that its cost structure, which is agreed upon in partnership documents, is reasonable.

UNDP and global funds, in particular GEF and GFATM, have different views on financial transparency. This apparent incompatibility of accountability systems has led to some tension, although decision 2011/23 of the UNDP Executive Board seeks to resolve differences. Global funds frequently criticize a perceived lack of UNDP transparency and financial openness. While they perceive UNDP as taking an excessively legalistic approach, UNDP is adamant that it is a sovereign organization with its own governance structure and accountability and oversight systems, and that the demands placed on it are too invasive. One aspect that is evident at both global and national levels is that UNDP seems poor at communicating what it stands for and what it does, which leads to misunderstanding and distrust among stakeholders.

Many factors beyond UNDP control adversely affect efficiency. In assessing UNDP performance working with global funds, the challenge of working in difficult contexts is, at times, not fully recognized. There are many factors beyond UNDP control that hinder project implementation. Despite external challenges, the possibility of using a direct execution modality (rather than a national execution modality) has enabled UNDP to surmount problems. External stakeholders have acknowledged that UNDP works in difficult contexts where no other organizations are available (as principal recipient of last resort under GFATM, for example). However, judging by the criticisms, the depth of these challenges is not sufficiently understood by critics—nor are they sufficiently communicated by UNDP.

The sustainability of initiatives supported by UNDP-global fund partnerships and the results of those initiatives have varied. Sustainability depends on the continued availability of funding and the motivation and capacity of national counterparts to carry initiatives forward. There are both positive and less positive
examples of the sustainability of initiatives and results. Sustainability of impact varies with the fund and project and the targets set in the first place. For example, MLF has finite conclusive impacts in terms of reduced damage to the ozone layer, whereas GEF projects are highly varied and have more indeterminate impacts. Capacity development is central to sustainability, but has not always been strong. Middle-income countries, with a relatively high initial level of capacity and resources, are more easily able to apply lessons learned and to scale up activities.

The sustainability of UNDP sectoral programmes is sometimes at risk when country offices are heavily dependent on particular sources of funding for the continuation of their programmes. Alternative funding sources are often not actively sought or available at the country level. Heavy dependence on particular funding sources is a concern. This is particularly the case with GEF, which is often intrinsic to the delivery of country office energy and environment portfolios. Other global funds do not engender dependency in the same way. The Multilateral Fund has a specific purpose that can only be serviced through that one particular funding source and does not affect the range of UNDP environmental work, while the whole premise of the partnership with GFATM is on an as-needed basis. Reliance on global funds is not necessarily a problem, provided that offices are set up to cope with funding fluctuations.

Partnership between UNDP and global funds is susceptible to a variety of factors. The sustainability of such partnerships is not a given in a dynamic global development context where the priorities of established players are evolving and new actors are emerging. Sustainability of partnerships often depends on factors outside UNDP control. The funds have their own raison d’être and internal ‘drivers’. It is assumed, for example, that as GEF opens up to more implementing organizations, the UNDP role will diminish, and the choice of UNDP as principal recipient of last resort under GFATM usually depends on local needs, capacities and viewpoints. The Multilateral Fund is a more predictable source than others, as no changes to its implementation arrangements are envisaged. Under all funds, much rests on relations with national authorities, which are increasingly having a say in which organizations they choose to work with.

PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS

In general, initiatives supported through partnership between UNDP and philanthropic foundations fit well with national and regional priorities. On some occasions, the alignment of such initiatives with UNDP principles and programmatic objectives is somewhat tenuous. UNDP partnership with philanthropic foundations has focused on issues of relevance to programme country governments, philanthropic foundations, and UNDP. The two regional-level initiatives, as well as other projects supported through partnership with philanthropic foundations, address important human development concerns in the countries in question. However, a number of projects conducted in partnership with philanthropic foundations appear to have taken UNDP to the fringes of programmatic relevance, although relevance to programme countries and philanthropic foundations was never in doubt.

Partnership between UNDP and philanthropic foundations has been of limited strategic importance to all parties involved. Partnerships have tended to be reactive and focused on individual national and regional development challenges. UNDP engagement with various philanthropic foundations over the past decade has evolved in the context of country-specific circumstances, personal contacts and occasional outreach initiatives by both sides. The overall financial importance to either UNDP or the foundations has been relatively limited; many projects and substantive contributions to objective achievement have been small in scope. Over the past decade, sporadic high-level contacts have taken place between UNDP and the three concerned philanthropic foundations.
However, work cultures and expectations have varied considerably; close institutionalized cooperation has gradually evolved into a more ad hoc approach to partnership.

In most cases, it is difficult to associate partnership between UNDP and philanthropic foundations with demonstrable and positive developmental change. In several instances, it is possible to report on the achievement of some development results. The multifunctional platform initiative in West Africa, supported by the Gates Foundation, stands out as having made an important difference in the life of many primary stakeholders, predominantly women. With respect to other partnerships between UNDP and philanthropic foundations, though project outputs have been delivered, it is premature in many cases—or not possible—to determine their contribution to developmental change.

Working relationships with philanthropic foundations are generally good, contributing to the delivery of planned outputs. A range of issues related to administrative arrangements and country office capacity reduce overall efficiency. Most partnerships between UNDP and philanthropic foundations experienced bureaucratic challenges, including delays in reporting, funds allocation, procurement, recruitment and processing by regional service centres. These were due to different factors related varyingly to UNDP, the respective philanthropic foundation or the government. However, such issues are not inevitable, and some projects are implemented with relatively few setbacks.

Adapting to the planning, monitoring and evaluation requirements of the philanthropic foundations has posed some challenges to UNDP country offices. The raising of standards has generally been welcomed and has contributed to increased capacities on the part of UNDP. The quality of planning documents prepared for partnership initiatives with philanthropic funds tends to be relatively high. Monitoring and reporting systems have been based on philanthropic foundation requirements. As a result, UNDP has occasionally had to adapt its own systems and adopt procedures recommended by the foundations. Systems of results-based disbursements on the part of the foundations, based on regular reporting, have enforced some degree of discipline.

UNDP overhead charges are frequently contested by philanthropic foundations and national government counterparts. UNDP has been unable to effectively communicate the rationale for the charges, which gives rise to periodic disagreements among partners and potentially undermines new partnership opportunities. During the planning phases of projects, philanthropic foundations and government partners tend to agree with UNDP on overhead charges (based on standard UNDP procedures). However, the issue of overhead charges often resurfaces and has, in some cases, led to philanthropic foundations reconsidering partnering with UNDP. The issue of overhead charges is not always contentious, however, and there are examples of philanthropic foundations acknowledging the benefits of working with UNDP despite the charges.

UNDP partnerships with philanthropic foundations have tended to be exclusive affairs. There is no evidence of UNDP having facilitated partnership between another United Nations country team member and a philanthropic foundation. Rather, there are examples of competition among United Nations organizations for philanthropic foundation patronage. Overall, there are few instances where an existing partnership between UNDP and a philanthropic foundation has involved, or could have involved, other United Nations partners. In the United Arab Emirates, the Office of the Resident Coordinator appears to have been regularly bypassed by other United Nations organizations exploring partnership opportunities with nationally-based philanthropic foundations, to the point where government authorities have complained about United Nations competition and lack of harmonization.
While the UNDP Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy has a focal point function for philanthropic foundation partnership, it has not established strong relationships with the foundations. Moreover, its support to programme units in terms of lessons-learning, knowledge-sharing and facilitating contacts with philanthropic foundations has been weak. The Bureau has allocated very limited resources to liaison with philanthropic foundations or the conduct of related policy research and analysis. Responsibility for managing specific partnerships rests primarily with regional bureaux, regional service centres or country offices. The Bureau tends not to follow up closely on implementation, and plays only a limited role in tracking progress or collating related monitoring and evaluation reports. Neither does it play an active role in identifying lessons, sharing information or advocating for partnerships with philanthropic foundations.

Overall, there are few indications that the results achieved through partnerships with philanthropic foundations are sustainable. While efforts have been made to ensure sustainability as part of project planning documents, most initiatives are either unlikely to achieve sustainability or will require more time to determine whether they will do so. In the context of the partnerships between UNDP and philanthropic foundations that have contributed to achieving development results, a number of initiatives do show some potential for sustainability. In other initiatives—those related to democratic governance and capacity development, for example—much will depend on continued commitment and opportunities to take initial achievements forward.

Given the ad hoc nature of most partnerships between UNDP and philanthropic foundations, it is likely that instances of partnership in particular country contexts will not be sustained in the long term. However, opportunities for ad hoc partnerships in new country contexts remain; opportunities for broader strategic cooperation with philanthropic foundations may also be possible. A number of partnerships with philanthropic foundations are likely to end in the near future. Though new partnership opportunities will probably emerge, representatives of philanthropic foundations were not completely positive about the desirability of broader strategic partnerships with UNDP. Opportunities for strategic partnerships are not necessarily remote, however, given the recommendations made by foundations with respect to preferred partnership modalities (and presuming UNDP interest, which is not apparent at the moment).

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: Reforms of the international development architecture are likely to continue given the efforts of the donor community to strengthen the performance of existing multilateral arrangements embodied by the United Nations, including through more direct issue-specific support. In this context, the UNDP record in demonstrating its comparative advantage has been stronger with respect to partnership with global funds than with philanthropic foundations. In many areas, and given its near-universal country presence, UNDP still has a competitive advantage; its long experience and established structure means that it remains an indispensable part of the system. However, the future of this advantage is not secure—new actors will emerge, grow and gain confidence and experience; donor preferences will evolve; and global funds and programmes addressing a wide range of ‘niche’ issues will proliferate.

The central question for UNDP is how to secure future funding in order to discharge its mandate, relating to both its programmatic coverage and its strategic role within the United Nations System, as ably as possible. The experience of partnership with global funds, in particular, appears to imply a greater focus on a narrow range of specialized issues and corresponding closer cooperation with a number of specialist agencies (United Nations and otherwise). This may imply give-and-take in terms of UNDP capacity to pursue a more broadly defined human development agenda.
Conclusion 2: In engaging with global funds and philanthropic foundations, UNDP has demonstrated flexibility in adjusting its programmatic focus and operational modalities. Partnership with global funds has led to a concentration on narrowly defined sectoral issues that are also addressed, to a varying extent, by other specialized United Nations funds and programmes. Partnership with philanthropic foundations has resulted in coverage of an eclectic range of development issues. In working with non-core funding instruments within the context of the changing development cooperation architecture, UNDP appears to have been prepared to engage, where opportune, with issues that lie on the fringes of the programmatic focus areas defined in its strategic plan, 2008–2013. This has been more pronounced in the partnership with philanthropic foundations, which has typically been more ad hoc and context-specific. In working with global funds, UNDP has developed highly specialized technical capacities within the programmatic focus areas of the strategic plan that may not previously have been required of UNDP.

In making itself available as a qualified partner of global funds, UNDP has found itself both competing and cooperating more frequently with other specialized United Nations organizations. This has affected inter-agency relations and has raised broader questions of United Nations System coherence, efficiency and development effectiveness.

Conclusion 3: The programmatic objectives of partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations are generally aligned with the broadly framed UNDP strategic plan. UNDP has missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of partnership to consistently integrate a human development perspective and foster a more holistic development approach. In working with global funds and philanthropic foundations, UNDP did not sufficiently ensure relevance to its core priorities by mainstreaming objectives related to human development, national capacity development or coordination within the United Nations system. Though implementation remains uneven, there is a growing awareness of the need for cross-linkages and connections between thematic areas such as poverty reduction, gender equality and environmental sustainability. Capacity development activities are extensive at the project level, but a strategic approach that prioritizes the long-term objective of ‘helping recipient governments help themselves’ is lacking.

All partners have specific mandates that determine the type of activities they finance and the nature of the benefits they seek. This inevitably limits the nature of the projects for which UNDP can seek funding from such funds. Country offices consistently struggle to secure the additional funds needed to achieve core UNDP human development objectives.

Conclusion 4: UNDP remains an important conduit for development funding. This is particularly clear in the case of partnership with global funds, where strategic, corporate-level linkages are cultivated and maintained. Partnership with philanthropic foundations have been more opportunistic, based on country and project-level requirements. Moreover, given the fundamentally different organizational structures, procedures and cultures of philanthropic foundations, UNDP may not always be the most appropriate partner. UNDP is one of a few organizations able to handle the large amounts of funding channelled through the global funds. It is able to cover a range of sectors in the complex environments in which these funds often seek to operate, and has the capacity to do so in accordance with internationally agreed standards. UNDP has demonstrated its ability to perform effectively, to meet the rigorous standards set by funds, and to develop innovative approaches to development and administrative challenges. Global funds are highly relevant strategic partners for UNDP, both in budgetary and substantive terms. The relationship is of mutual importance but tense at times, as large and complex institutions strive to find ways of working together.
Conclusion 6: At the institutional level, UNDP faces challenges in meeting the expectations of current and potential global fund and foundation partners. In particular, if UNDP is to maintain and enhance these partnerships it will need to resolve issues relating to transparency, bureaucratic efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The support frame for international assistance is shifting. There is a wider array of international and national partners for donors to choose from, and recipient governments are increasingly demanding—and have the capacities—to directly implement international projects. UNDP success in this increasingly competitive environment requires greater responsiveness to donor expectations and a continuing effort to streamline institutional procedures so that the value of using UNDP services is clear. Although UNDP management has made progress on transparency issues (with respect to the sharing of audit information with donor partners, for example), such changes are perceived by partners as being made slowly and reluctantly. Concerns have also been raised about UNDP overhead cost structures. While UNDP overhead fees may be equivalent to or less than those of some other international institutions, funders need to be convinced of the additional value that UNDP brings as an intermediate entity between the funders and their beneficiaries.

Recommendation 1: In fostering and strengthening partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations, UNDP should focus strongly on supporting the prioritization of national development concerns. To the extent possible, over-reliance on any particular funding source should be avoided in order to retain flexibility. In working with global funds and philanthropic foundations to support national development, UNDP needs to be sensitive to the risk of influencing national development agendas through the availability of funding in earmarked sectors. Though uncommon, there were instances where a side-effect of global fund involvement was

Conclusion 5: UNDP management of partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations has lacked strategic vision and overall coordination. UNDP could have done more to foster coordination among headquarters-based management units—and between them, the regional bureaux and other policy bureaux and units. Partnership with philanthropic foundations has been neglected, limiting relationships to project-specific initiatives, with minimal corporate-level guidance and follow-up. UNDP institutional-level working relationships with global funds are well established, with regular senior-level exchanges. While the respective central coordination units manage relations with the funds, on the one hand, and the implementing programme units, on the other, there is no overarching management of those relationships in the broader context of UNDP partnership with non-core donors. As a result, little, if any, cross-cutting analysis has been conducted of the programmatic role of the partnerships in the context of the changing development architecture. Over the past decade, UNDP has made few concerted attempts to foster longer-term, strategic-level partnerships with philanthropic foundations. The resulting impression received by philanthropic foundations is that UNDP is not particularly interested in communicating on substantive issues or in exploring strategic alliances.
to draw attention—and counterpart resources—away from the highest national concerns. In such circumstances, UNDP has a vital role as mediator, ensuring that the proposed package of activities meets national interests.

The integrity of UNDP programming in any given thematic area should be safeguarded by avoiding an over-reliance on one particular fund or foundation. Some sectoral programmes are heavily or wholly reliant on specific sources of funding. This makes the programmes vulnerable to closure if the funding stops. It can also focus attention away from areas that may be equally critical but for which funding may be less readily available. While some country offices may have few options, country offices should receive support to identify alternative sources of funding and diversify their funding base.

Recommendation 2: UNDP should engage more explicitly and consistently with global funds and philanthropic foundations in order to establish common ground and develop mutual approaches to development challenges. In its partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, UNDP should place more explicit emphasis on the central importance of mainstreaming a human development perspective and developing national capacities. UNDP needs to continually demonstrate to global funds and philanthropic foundations that it is a relevant partner. In addition to maintaining a country presence and the ability to deliver programmes and projects, relevance is a function of the value that UNDP adds in contributing international expertise, sharing lessons learned around the world, and building synergies with broader efforts. UNDP should make more concerted efforts to ensure that its partnership with philanthropic foundations falls within its programmatic mandate, adheres to human development principles, and represents value for money.

While UNDP has made substantial progress over the past years in advocating stronger linkages with a broader human development perspective and in securing the commitment of its partners to related objectives, it should explicitly require that partners foster cross-linkages that encourage advancing areas such as gender equality, capacity development, environmental sustainability and civil society participation. A more systematized approach to capacity development will be necessary to enable country offices to identify opportunities to better track progress and explain to other stakeholders what it is doing. Capacity development, with clear benchmarks that can be monitored and evaluated, should be a key deliverable in all global fund and philanthropic foundation projects.

Recommendation 3: UNDP should focus on the role that partnership with global funds can play in securing development support to programme countries, particularly in the context of the rapidly changing international development cooperation architecture. UNDP needs stronger central coordination of information and knowledge management functions in order to facilitate a more strategic approach to partnership with global funds. There is no overarching function that oversees all UNDP work with global funds, and there is limited coordination among the respective units—or between them and regional bureaux and other policy bureaux and units. Identifying or developing such a function would place UNDP senior management in a better position to engage with the global funds in a more strategic manner. Considering the importance of partnership to UNDP, particularly from the perspective of resource mobilization, a more integrated and less piecemeal approach is advisable, particularly during a period when donor relations are undergoing rapid change.

A central coordinating function is likely to be able to play a strategic role in engaging with other development actors (particularly United Nations organizations) in connection with the partnerships with global funds. There are internal fault lines within UNDP that constrain the exchange of lessons learned across the organization. UNDP should explore ways to strengthen the management of knowledge emanating from, and pertaining to, different partnerships across the organization.
Recommendation 4: Building on ongoing Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy initiatives, UNDP should develop a partnership strategy to engage with philanthropic foundations. Such a strategy should be built on a clear assessment of potential partners; on their motivations and goals; on potential benefits to UNDP programme countries; on UNDP value-added in engaging with such partners; and the opportunities and risks of doing so. In order to make the most of potential opportunities for constructive engagement with philanthropic foundations, UNDP should undertake a thorough review of existing partnership experiences and potential partnership opportunities. UNDP would be negligent in its responsibilities to its Member States if it did not engage with such foundations in a proactive and sustained manner. UNDP could conceivably make an important contribution as a facilitator between philanthropic foundations and a range of partners in programme countries; moreover, depending upon the nature of partnerships forged in the future, the potential for supporting the mobilization of significant amounts of resources for development should not be discounted.

UNDP should explore different models of collaboration with philanthropic foundations—such as mobilizing the collective support of foundations for particular issues, and engaging in partnerships with foundations in collaboration with United Nations partners involved in similar areas. UNDP should strengthen its information management and reporting system for philanthropic foundations, with a view to improving its understanding of partnership trends with regard to such foundations.

Recommendation 5: UNDP has a particular responsibility to find solutions to operational and procedural bottlenecks, including issues relating to transparency and oversight, that hamper relationships with global funds and philanthropic foundations. In order to minimize discord stemming from differences in bureaucratic cultures and expectations, UNDP should develop a communication strategy that clarifies what it can and cannot do. UNDP should conduct a comprehensive review of its rules, procedures and practices relating to partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations. The review should provide the basis for engaging in comprehensive, cross-cutting dialogues to strengthen partnerships and increase efficiencies. It should also lead to developing a partnership framework for global funds and philanthropic foundations, clearly defining programmatic objectives and the operational environment.

UNDP should continue to review and take forward its processes for financial transparency and auditing in relation to non-core funds, particularly large-scale global funds. Full disclosure should be the norm, whether it refers to information at the country level or to principles upheld by the central organization. UNDP should consider conducting a comprehensive assessment of the financial cost of partnerships with different global funds and philanthropic foundations. The assessment should focus on strengthening the position of UNDP to negotiate overhead charges in the future and to demonstrate its level of counterpart funding. UNDP should engage with its partners in more innovative ways in order to ensure that its work supporting programme country development is better recognized and understood.

Monitoring and evaluation of projects implemented through partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations should receive adequate attention, as partnerships can only mature when there is mutual learning. UNDP should also apply lessons learned from the monitoring and evaluation of partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations to other areas of its work. An additional concern would be to ensure that monitoring and evaluation capture the contributions of the partnerships to achieving broad human development outcomes.
Chapter 1

RATIONALE, SCOPE AND APPROACH

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has sought to adjust to the evolving development cooperation architecture in different ways, and has engaged with a range of partnership and funding mechanisms in carrying out its mandate and support to developing countries. The past two decades have seen the emergence of an increasing number of funding instruments and other types of institutions outside the established framework for development cooperation. UNDP has actively engaged with many of these new actors. Almost 40 years ago, UNDP helped establish the first substantial global fund, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. In addition, UNDP has been a part of many other new approaches to what is considered to be traditional development cooperation, including the promotion of South-South cooperation as a complementary modality for support to developing countries. UNDP facilitates bilateral funding at the country level, which has led to an upsurge of non-core funding. Among United Nations agencies, UNDP has supported and managed the United Nations approach to volunteerism.

In implementing its work programme, the Evaluation Office seeks to acquire a coherent understanding of the UNDP role in the continuously evolving international development cooperation architecture. For example, it completed an evaluation of South-South cooperation in 2007 and plans to undertake another evaluation in 2012. This present report, constituting the first thematic evaluation focusing specifically on UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, aims to contribute insights on an increasingly important dimension of international development cooperation.

The principal objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP support to the achievement of development results when activities are carried out in partnership with global funds or philanthropic foundations;
- Clarify the added value to key stakeholders (including national governments and civil society, UNDP and the funds and foundations) of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, and the UNDP comparative advantage in partnering with such funding instruments; and
- Provide actionable recommendations on how UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations could be further developed.

1.1 BACKGROUND

The diversity of institutions and different types of partnerships has multiplied based largely on increased earmarking of public funding for specific purposes as donors seek to substantiate the use and impact of taxpayer funds, and by private resources being allocated in different ways to support development. Specific development challenges have brought together groups of donors—comprising governments, civil society and the private sector—in establishing ‘global funds’ that channel funding towards specific development objectives, normally at the sub-sectoral level.

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1 The evaluation was approved by the Executive Board in its decision DP/2008/31 on the Programme of work of the Evaluation Office, as contained in UNDP, DP/2009/2, New York, 8 October 2008.
Global funds have been particularly important in funding health, education and environmental programmes. Philanthropic foundations have been set up by individuals and corporations with the objective of mitigating different developmental problems perceived as causing inequity in poor countries.

In many cases, donors’ underlying motivation in making financing available through global funds or philanthropic foundations has been disillusionment with the performance of existing multilateral arrangements embodied by the United Nations and multilateral development banks. A somewhat related motivation was to establish mechanisms to quickly and efficiently provide targeted support to areas where it was most needed.

Global funds, often also referred to as vertical funds, are largely considered to have brought a new dimension to the delivery of multilateral development cooperation. Though the first major global fund, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, was established in the early 1970s, the last decade has seen considerable proliferation of such funds. Funds such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), established in 2002, typically have an explicit sector focus and a more clearly specified results-chain than horizontally oriented multilateral aid channels. Their governing bodies have a more representative balance between donors and recipients on the executive boards and greater civil society organization participation than generally seen in the United Nations system and multilateral development banks. In addition, global funds tend to have close links to private-sector aid delivery, and programmes tend to be time-bound. Global funds generally demonstrate strong commitments to monitoring, evaluation and the idea of allowing performance data to guide subsequent funding decisions.

Having kept abreast of the evolving development cooperation architecture, UNDP has established partnerships with numerous global funds and philanthropic foundations, at both the global and country level. In addition to providing new opportunities to further strengthen support to programme countries on a range of critical issues, developing such partnerships has been important in a context of continued uncertainty over the availability of sustained levels of core resources. In partnering with funds, UNDP has sought to leverage its comparative advantage as the United Nation's global development network that supports programme countries in accessing financial resources and in delivering related programmes and projects. Different partnership dynamics have resulted in a range of institutional arrangements at both the corporate and the programme country level. Varying country contexts have led UNDP to engage in distinctly different partnerships in which it has played the role of principal recipient of funds, implementing agency, interlocutor, coordinator and adviser.

As UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations has matured over the past 10 years, and as new partnerships have emerged, issues relating to the contribution of such partnership to the achievement of development results have begun to gain increasing attention. One cluster of issues relates to the extent to which partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations is aligned with the principles of development effectiveness and human development, addresses national priorities and is coordinated with other development partners. UNDP has often viewed partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations with some trepidation.

Based on a perspective that has been coloured by multilateral development experiences, UNDP has at times perceived global funds’ sectoral focus as too narrow and philanthropic foundation agendas as being largely driven by the interests of wealthy entrepreneurs. Key questions include whether UNDP, by engaging with such organizations, is allowing itself to be distracted from its core mandate; and whether UNDP is doing its member countries and itself a disservice by working on issues that, though resources are available, may not necessarily constitute the highest developmental priorities.
Another cluster of issues relates to the perceived opportunities associated with partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations. Not only does partnership with such organizations facilitate access to additional resources in support of programme country development, it may also enable UNDP to make critical contributions to human development in a number of narrowly defined fields. This may stimulate UNDP to become a more dynamic, innovative and knowledge-based organization, and it may permit UNDP to position itself as the partner of choice in an increasingly crowded field.

In addressing some of these issues, this evaluation will differentiate between the experiences of partnering with global funds and partnering with philanthropic foundations. The evaluation will also draw distinctions between the widely varying programmatic objectives and organizational setups of entities within each category. In terms of further UNDP engagement with these funds, it will be critical to develop an understanding of how partnership modalities and practices have evolved over the past decade. What type of function and role is appropriate for an organization such as UNDP, which has a country-based approach to development cooperation that cuts across sectors, when partnering with vertically oriented institutions? The partnership modalities that have been developed, coupled with the support structures at headquarters and the country level, provide a wealth of examples of how partnerships can be approached and formalized. How can UNDP best utilize its comparative advantage, and to what extent can it be reinforced through partnering with vertical funds and philanthropic foundations? Moreover, what risks are present when merging the administrative systems of UNDP with vertically oriented institutions?

1.2 SCOPE

The evaluation covers the period from 2001 to 2010 (developments that took place during 2011 are taken into account to the extent possible). The evaluation focuses on partnership as a modality rather than a programme or project. It provides a broad perspective on how partnership arrangements between UNDP and a range of funding instruments have evolved in the context of increasing reliance on non-core resources, as well as on the relative importance of the new funding institutions alongside the traditional multilateral development cooperation system. The report includes an historic review of these trends and discusses the emergence of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations.

Against this background, the evaluation focuses on UNDP partnership with three global funds and three philanthropic foundations:

- The Global Environment Facility (GEF);
- The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM);
- The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF);
- The Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation (Al Maktoum Foundation);
- The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates Foundation); and
- The Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations (Soros Foundation).

The three selected global funds account for a large part of UNDP engagement with global funds. Evaluation findings should thus cover the spectrum of experiences across the organization. The selection criteria for philanthropic foundations include: i) the size of activities with UNDP, ii) the size of the foundations’ activities in the total aid architecture and iii) the foundation’s sector and regional focus. During the assessed time period, UNDP has engaged with numerous philanthropic foundations in addition to those selected. However, the selected foundations are arguably the more important current partners in terms of scope and likelihood of further engagement. They also differ from one another in terms of governance structures and sector focus, which makes for a useful comparative analysis.
Table 1. Contributions to UNDP in 2010 (in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total contributions to UNDP in 2010</th>
<th>Contributions to UNDP from core resources</th>
<th>Contributions to UNDP from non-core resources</th>
<th>Contributions to UNDP from selected global funds* (part of non-core)</th>
<th>Contributions to UNDP from selected philanthropic foundationsb (part of non-core)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribution amount</td>
<td>5,013</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>4,046</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total contributions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of contributions from non-core resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 illustrates the relative importance of global funds and philanthropic foundations to non-core contributions to UNDP in 2010. The combined contribution of GEF, GFATM and MLF amounts to $657 million (16.2 percent of non-core resources). The combined contribution of 10 selected philanthropic foundations, including those mentioned above, amounts to $10.1 million (0.3 percent of non-core resources).

In evaluating UNDP partnership, categorizing institutions as global funds or philanthropic foundations provides only a loose organizing framework; institutions within each of these categories vary considerably in terms of scope, strategic intent, mandate, culture and structure. For example, the size and scope of the GEF and GFATM partnerships require a different analytical approach as compared to assessments of the considerably smaller existing philanthropic foundation partnerships. The evaluation treats each partnership on an individual basis and only draws comparisons among and between funds and foundations where appropriate.

1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA

The evaluation uses the following criteria to assess UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations:

- **Relevance:** The evaluation draws conclusions regarding how UNDP has positioned itself vis-à-vis global funds and philanthropic foundations in order to maximize its relevance and leverage in providing support to programme countries. Relevance is reviewed in terms of the importance of partnership in the delivery of outputs and contribution to outcomes, as well as alignment with programmatic priorities of governments, UNDP, funds and foundations.

- **Effectiveness:** The evaluation assesses UNDP contributions to development results at the outcome level through its cooperation with global funds and philanthropic foundations. Issues regarding UNDP outcome-orientation in partnering with such financing instruments will be reviewed, along with potential opportunity costs of such partnerships.

- **Efficiency:** The evaluation assesses partnership modalities, both at the broader corporate level and within the context of specific countries, with a particular focus on timeliness and resource utilization. UNDP internal arrangements in managing partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations are also reviewed.

- **Sustainability:** The sustainability of development results to which UNDP
programmes have contributed is of central importance to the achievement of longer-term impacts. In some cases, the sustainability of particular partnerships between UNDP and global funds and philanthropic foundations is also critical to ensuring continued support to programme countries. The evaluation will assess the extent to which concerns for both dimensions of sustainability have shaped UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations.

The assessment of partnership contributions to achieving development results (effectiveness) will build strongly on existing evaluative material, particularly for the global funds. The primary focus of this evaluation will be on ascertaining the alignment of such partnership with the programmatic priorities of programme countries, UNDP and the respective fund or foundation partners. The evaluation will also examine the importance of partnership to results delivery (relevance), the operational challenges in delivering development services and products through partnerships, the challenges of working together (efficiency), and on the sustainability of not only results, but also of support to programme countries through partnership. The extent to which human development principles, particularly gender equality, are taken into consideration in partnering with global funds and philanthropic foundation have also been a key factor in the overall analysis.

1.4 EVALUATION CHALLENGES

There are numerous factors inherent in development partnerships that challenge effective evaluation. Understanding the mechanisms that affect the results attained through partnership requires careful consideration of the rationale behind the partnerships, the social capital within the partnership, the relative importance of formalization of agreements and external or contextual issues. Though difficult to assess, these factors must be considered in determining the evaluation approach and conducting case studies.

In addition, addressing attribution challenges in terms of how results are achieved poses difficulties in analysing partnership. The fact that partnerships take place in a multi-stakeholder environment further complicates the assessment, as the various stakeholders have multiple logics and objectives.

Other challenges that had to be addressed during evaluation design include the intention to cover a ten-year time-frame while needing to contend with time and budgetary constraints. This limited the scope of data collection and restricted the coverage of case studies. Moreover, case study selection was influenced by factors such as suitability of the proposed timing to country offices and the availability of appropriate counterparts.

During the initial phase of the evaluation, comparative financial data on philanthropic foundation contributions to UNDP were difficult to obtain. This led to challenges in obtaining a sense of the totality of UNDP engagement with philanthropic foundations. In addition, partnership agreements are not systematically collected and registered at headquarters, and country offices are not required to provide such information to the Partnerships Bureau in New York.

1.5 EVALUATION APPROACH

The evaluation team conducted significant background research and interacted with UNDP and partner stakeholders prior to developing the evaluation methodology. Careful consideration was given to the type of partner institutions that would be possible and suitable for inclusion in the assessment and the extent to which financial information and formal agreements between UNDP and partnership institutions existed.

Given the nature of this thematic evaluation, which looks at partnership with a range of different entities, the assessment is not built on a unifying logic model covering all partnerships. The overarching premise is that UNDP, in line with its mandate, seeks to engage with global funds and philanthropic foundations in order
to enhance its support to programme countries. However, the ‘logic’ of each partnership is different, focusing on different sets of results, underlying assumptions, and delivery mechanisms. As such, each partnership is assessed on the basis of specific partnership agreements and results frameworks (to the extent that they exist or can be recreated through document analysis and key stakeholder interviews). The analysis of the selected partnerships takes place within the context of the overarching premise, while taking into account existing UNDP policies and systems defining partnership with a range of partner types, including the private sector.

1.5.1 KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation seeks to address the following key evaluation questions, which are based on the questions outlined in the inception report:

Evaluation questions related to assessing the relevance of the partnership:

- How well are the partnerships aligned with the priorities of national governments, UNDP, the global funds and philanthropic foundations? How did partnership with UNDP affect the global funds and philanthropic foundations? How did partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations affect UNDP?
- How important is the relationship between UNDP and global fund and philanthropic foundations at global, regional and country levels? If the relationship is important, why? If it is not important, why not?
- What is the UNDP strategy towards global funds and philanthropic foundations?

Evaluation questions related to assessing the effectiveness of the partnership:

- What were the partners hoping to achieve through this partnership? Have these results been achieved? If so, what are they? If not, why not? What evidence is there for the achievement of results (or lack thereof)? Have there been any unintended positive or negative consequences?

Evaluation questions related to assessing the efficiency of the partnership:

- What factors influenced whether or not the partnerships achieved what they set out to do? How efficiently have the partnerships operated? What internal factors (on the part of UNDP and the partners) affected efficiency, for example, with respect to management, administration, values, coordination or resources?
- What monitoring and reporting systems are there for activities implemented through the partnerships at the global and country levels? Have these mechanisms been efficient? Are there any gaps?

Evaluation questions related to assessing the sustainability of the partnership:

- How was the issue of sustainability taken into account in the partnerships?
- To what extent is handover to governments preceded by capacity development programmes? What examples are there for the up-scaling of programmes or projects implemented in partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations?

1.5.2 CASE STUDIES

UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations is analysed using a case study approach, which implies that only a limited selection of UNDP partnerships in these two categories will be included. Such an approach was deemed necessary considering the large number of philanthropic foundations with which UNDP has had some engagement. A total of six partnerships were selected as case studies for the evaluation, including partnership with:

- Global funds: GEF, GFATM, MLF
- Philanthropic foundations: Al Maktoum Foundation, Gates Foundation, Soros Foundation

Conclusions drawn regarding UNDP partnership with global funds apply primarily to the
selected partnerships—particularly since there are currently no other partnerships with global funds of comparable magnitude. Conclusions drawn regarding UNDP partnership with philanthropic foundations may be applicable to partnership with philanthropic foundations that are not reviewed in the context of this evaluation—given that relationships are underpinned by the same systemic issues and are similar in scope. The internal validity of the findings is considered to be high, as it is based on a range of complimentary data collection methods.

1.5.3 DATA SOURCES

In order to allow for triangulation of evidence, different types of evaluative data sources were collected and used to assess each partnership. Table 2 provides an overview, broken down by UNDP region, of country-level data sources (see Annex 3 for a detailed listing of countries reviewed). Country-level data were obtained as follows:

- Seven full country case studies with a focus on global funds (countries visited: Angola, Burkina Faso, Honduras, Iran, Lebanon, Tajikistan and Zimbabwe). To the extent that UNDP country offices in these countries engaged in partnership with any of the selected philanthropic foundations, these were also reviewed. These countries were chosen taking into account a combination of criteria (e.g. amount of funding received, relevance over the last five years, coverage of funds and foundations, regional coverage and different levels of human development experiences in different UNDP regions through a mix of country typologies, with a particular focus on Africa). Relevant financial data pertaining to projects conducted in partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations in all UNDP programme countries over the past decade was obtained through a comprehensive portfolio scan conducted at the outset of the evaluation (see Annex 5).

- Six country case studies with a focus on philanthropic foundations (countries visited: Bulgaria, Liberia, Mali, Moldova, Senegal and the United Arab Emirates). These countries were selected based on the same criteria as outlined above.

- Ten supplementary reviews (Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco and Namibia) with a focus on both global funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Overview of countries reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP Region</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$Numbers may not add up horizontally as some countries in which case studies were conducted also had Assessment of Development Results conducted; such countries were counted only once.
and philanthropic foundations. The purpose of including these reviews was primarily to ensure sufficient regional coverage while bearing in mind the overall selection criteria.

- Meta-analysis of evidence pertaining to UNDP partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations in 61 UNDP Evaluation Office Assessment of Development Results reports covering 56 UNDP programme countries.

In addition, data were obtained through the following sources:

- Document review of evaluations and other key documents related to UNDP and partner institution performance;²
- Semi-structured interviews with 60 global-level informants from UNDP and partnering institutions; and
- A survey of UNDP Resident Representatives.³

To the extent possible, the country case studies allowed for meetings with a large number of stakeholders from different types of organizations, which enabled the evaluation team to record different sets of opinions. Qualitative data resulting from interviews at the country level were then added to headquarters-based staff perspectives, findings from document reviews and other evaluations and performance assessments. When deemed necessary, project documents and financial audits were reviewed in order to shed light on findings that required a more detailed review (as opposed to the broader or institutional-type review that is the main focus of this evaluation). Overall, close to 600 persons were consulted. Although the survey’s overall response rate was close to 40 percent, inconsistencies in responses prevented their use for statistical purposes. However, the surveys did provide additional information on specific cases. The Assessment of Development Results meta-review provided some relevant evaluative information on specific cases, but was less useful in providing insights on the partnership dimension of UNDP collaborations with global funds and philanthropic foundations.

1.5.4 FRAMEWORK FOR DATA ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS

In order to ensure consistency and a common approach to qualitative data analysis, relevant tools were developed for the purpose of the evaluation, including an evaluation matrix with key evaluation questions (see Annex 2), a common understanding of key stakeholders and partners, guidelines for approaching them, basic interview protocols, a template for recording and reporting on interviews, standard case study report formats and a comparative table of findings. In order to answer the main questions contained in the evaluation matrix, the evaluation team synthesized data from different sources, including the country case studies, a review of outcome and project evaluations and interviews with staff at headquarters.

1.5.5 ENHANCING CONTENT VALIDITY

Quality assurance of the overall evaluation process has been undertaken by a headquarters-based reference group made up by UNDP peers and an independent advisory panel comprising four senior experts with experience in development cooperation management, evaluation and organizational partnership. The reference group and advisory panel provided comments on the evaluation’s scope, methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations.

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² Key documents include: the Overall Performance Study 4 for the GEF, the 2009 5-year evaluation of the GFATM and the 2011 Report Fiduciary Controls and Oversight Mechanisms in the GFATM.

³ Out of 140 country offices contacted, 50 provided responses, representing a response rate of just under 36 percent (see Annex 3).
1.6 REPORT ORGANIZATION

This report comprises five chapters. Chapters 1 through 3 are descriptive in nature, placing UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations in the context of the evolving development cooperation architecture. In addition to providing an historical review of the UNDP role within this architecture, Chapter 2 furnishes background information on the selected global funds and philanthropic foundations. Chapter 3 outlines how UNDP responded to emerging partnership opportunities resulting from the rise of non-core funding and new multilateral funding instruments over the past decades, and provides an overview of UNDP relationships with the selected funds and foundations with which it has engaged. Chapter 4, the analytical core of the evaluation, presents the findings from all data sources and assesses the performance of the various partnerships according to the evaluation criteria. Global funds are reviewed separately from philanthropic foundations. Chapter 5 provides the evaluation’s overall conclusions and recommendations.
Chapter 2

THE CHANGING GLOBAL CONTEXT

The UNDP relationship with global funds and philanthropic foundations must be set within the changing global context. This chapter describes this context as well as the nature of the specific global funds and philanthropic foundations that are being used as case studies in this evaluation. In its broadest sense, contemporary development cooperation can be characterized in two important ways. The first relates to the recognition of a country’s responsibility for its development. Framed in the concept of national ownership, this represents a common understanding among the major international development partners and it is the foundation of the United Nation’s relationship with its member countries. A range of meetings since 2000 (in Monterrey, Paris, and Accra among others) have emphasized this approach, and while there are still some challenges to putting rhetoric into practice it represents a clear trend in the relationship between international development partners and the countries with which they engage.

The second way in which contemporary development cooperation can be characterized relates to a growing understanding that development cooperation, in the sense of a range of international partnerships aimed at development, goes well beyond ‘aid’. It encompasses a wide range of relationships with different types of organizations—governmental, non-governmental and the private sector. It covers trade, investment and debt, migration and the associated remittances, and the financial flows from traditional bilateral and multilateral donors.

Within the context of this evaluation, examining aid flows will help explain the UNDP funding structures and patterns described in the next chapter. This section will also look at changes in the architecture of development cooperation that forms the basis for an understanding of UNDP partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations. Aid flows are a key determinant of partnership between UNDP and global funds and philanthropic foundations. However, other factors also play a critical role in motivating partnership, including the perceived value-added of the partnerships in contributing to development results at the country level. Tracing the respective historical and evolving perceptions of different stakeholders towards partnership goes beyond the descriptive nature of this chapter. However, in analysing UNDP partnership with the selected global funds and foundations over the past decade—against the background provided in Chapters 2 and 3—Chapter 4 will focus strongly on different stakeholders’ motivations to engage in partnership, including perceptions of value-added and comparative advantage.

2.1 THE CHANGING DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION LANDSCAPE

In the period immediately following World War II, there was considerable reluctance on the part of the United States and other governments to provide the inchoate United Nations development system with grant funding. Attitudes began to change with President Harry Truman’s 1949 Point Four speech. With the earlier inhibitions set aside, the period from 1960 until the early-1990s was one of rapid expansion in all official development assistance (see Figure 1).
Chapter 2. The Changing Global Context

Official development assistance began to grow again at the turn of the millennium. The pattern, however, was different. Four new features were particularly significant.

First, bilateral aid (except for a two-year hiatus in mid-decade), grew more rapidly than multilateral aid. An increasing amount of the bilateral aid was channelled through the United Nations and other multilateral funds in the form of non-core (earmarked) funding, reflecting traditional donors’ desire for more control. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) estimated that in 2008, core multilateral contributions amounted to $35 billion (28 percent of official development assistance, excluding debt relief). When non-core was included, total assistance through the multilateral system was $49 billion (40 percent of official development assistance).

In the 1960s and 1970s, multilateral aid—mainly through the United Nations—increased even faster than bilateral aid, rising from about 10 percent of total official development assistance in 1960 to almost 40 percent in the mid-1970s. The proportion then stabilized, and over the past three decades, multilateral aid has accounted for around 30 percent of total official development assistance (see Figure 2).

From 1992 until the end of the decade, official development assistance stagnated. The ending of the cold war removed aid’s geopolitical motivations. Bilateral donors became more selective about where and for what they provided aid, with governance and human rights considerations growing in significance. And because of the continuing poor performance by some of the most generously-aided countries, there were renewed concerns about aid efficacy.

Figure 1. Official Development Assistance (ODA), 1960-2010 (in millions of US dollars)

Source: OECD/DAC


12 Chapter 2. The Changing Global Context
Second, the new decade saw the rapid growth of additional non-United Nations multilateral funds. The environment funds—MLF and GEF—created in the early 1990s expanded further. The European Commission emerged as the single largest aid donor. The World Bank’s International Development Association and other regional bank funds grew. There were also several wholly new funds created, in particular the multi-billion dollar Global Alliance for Vaccines and Inoculations (GAVI), founded in 2000, and GFATM, founded in 2002.

Third, new private donors were entering the aid architecture. Already in 1997, the philanthropist Ted Turner made an unprecedented donation of $1 billion to the United Nations. GFATM and GAVI received substantial contributions from private sources, most notably the Gates Foundation.

Fourth, the decade saw the emergence of additional official donors. Some joined the OECD/DAC, including the Republic of Korea and new members of the European Union. Much more significant, however, has been the growth of aid from Brazil, China, India, and some of the Arab States. Some of these countries, such as China and India, have been providing aid for a long time. For the Arab States, the increases were a restoration of assistance that had surged in the 1970s when Kuwait and Saudi Arabia became for a time the world’s largest donor countries. Much of this increase is not captured in the OECD data, which is therefore an underestimate of total aid flows today, now characterized by a more distinct South-South orientation.

The new aid patterns can be seen in Figure 3, which uses OECD/DAC data to show how the composition of multilateral official development assistance, including from the European Union, has evolved since 1970. The United

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8 Administered by the UN Fund for International Partnership in the UN secretariat, New York.
9 See http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRSNEW.
10 Assistance through the EU institutions is not always counted as multilateral, but as a special form of bilateral aid.
Figure 3. Shares of multilateral assistance, 1970-2010

Source: OECD/DAC
Nations data are based on core resources (i.e. funds that donors provide directly to the regular budgets of United Nations entities). They do not include non-core (earmarked) funds, which the OECD/DAC classifies as ‘multi-bilateral’. The first feature that is striking is the importance of the World Bank, which reflects the confidence of the OECD/DAC donors in the institution. In 1970, it accounted for nearly half of the total, and has attracted a higher proportion than the whole of the United Nations system for most years since then. With the establishment and growth of regional development banks—particularly the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank—the share of the World Bank has fallen. Another striking feature is the rise of the European Union and its institutions (principally the European Commission and its European Development Fund), which has grown as a proportion of total multilateral aid in every decade—in 2010 it accounted for more than a third of the total.

The proportion accounted for by the United Nations held steady until 2000, when it was 30 percent of multilateral official development assistance. The last decade, however, has seen significant change. The United Nations proportion fell substantially, while the European Union and the World Bank have gained share. The rise of the ‘other’ category has also been significant; it includes the new global multilateral funds that have matured in recent years and which are the subject of this report.

However, the data sets are based on core funding. If non-core funding is taken into account, then the share of the United Nations in multilateral funding is much higher, as it would include additional contributions from bilateral donors, the European Union and other multilateral funds. In 2009 (the latest year for which full data are available), estimated total contributions to the United Nations for development (excluding humanitarian) purposes was $14.2 billion, which is equivalent to 39 percent of total OECD/DAC multilateral assistance in that year (and nearly 12 percent of total OECD/DAC official development assistance). The share of UNDP in the United Nations development total was 38 percent; its share of total multilateral official development assistance was 15 percent. Using these data, its share of total official development assistance has been between 3 and 5 percent over the last two decades.11 The last 10 years, therefore, have reflected a significant change in the ratio of contributions to the United Nations development system—and to UNDP in particular—with a clear donor preference to make additional funding available through non-core channels.

2.2 GLOBAL FUNDS

OECD/DAC defines global funds as “large multi-country funds that contain a significant element of earmarked funding for specific objectives with thematic, sectoral or sub-sectoral coverage.”12 Within this definition, global funds can be seen to have a number of other core characteristics, such as:13

- A clearly specified results-chain;
- More representative governance, with a balance between donors and recipients on the executive boards and with participation from civil society organizations;
- Stronger private-sector participation in the delivery of fund programmes, with explicit private-sector windows in some cases;

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11 There is some ambiguity in these ratios since the funding figures for the United Nations and UNDP include non-OECD/DAC sources and are compared with the OECD/DAC total of ODA. If United Nations funding from OECD/DAC sources alone is counted, then the proportions are lower.
A strong commitment to transparency, evaluation and learning;

A framework where recipient countries compete for resources via the quality of their funding requests;

Time-bound programmes, in some cases, to instil a sense of urgency; and

A clear approach to global public goods.

The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, founded in 1971, was co-sponsored by UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the World Bank. UNDP was never a beneficiary of the Consultative Group and is no longer a co-funder. More recently, global funds have been established in the fields of the environment and health, and they have mostly been created outside the United Nations system.

Following the signing of the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, a separate mechanism to administer the accompanying MLF was established in Montreal (the MLF became operational at the beginning of 1992).14 A second, much larger multilateral fund for environmental management came into being at almost the same time. GEF was formally approved at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Summit).

In the last decade, major new multilateral funds have emerged in the health sector. It is estimated that as of 2011 there are as many as 90 such funds, if research and advocacy organizations are included.15 These funds have manifested a growing 'privatization' of aid (which can no longer be referred to as official development assistance). In 2000, GAVI was launched. It is committed to increasing access to immunization in the poorest countries, saving children’s lives and protecting health. The GAVI Alliance, as it is now known, has since expanded to include governments, the private sector (companies and philanthropists) and non-governmental organizations. The largest new fund is GFATM, which began operations in January 2002. Similar to GAVI, it benefited from seed money from the Gates Foundation. By the end of 2010, it had disbursed over $21 billion on more than 600 health programmes in 150 countries.

The April 2010 launch of the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program is an indication of continued donor interest in the global fund mechanism to address urgent development needs. The Program was established to address the underfunding of country and regional agriculture and food security strategic investment plans that were being developed by countries in consultation with donors and other stakeholders. This will make aid contributions towards achieving Millennium Development Goal 1 to cut hunger and poverty by half by 2015 more predictable.

New vertical development funds partially explain the decline in the United Nations’ share as a primary source of multilateral assistance. In the environmental field, however, the new funds (notably GEF and MLF) were specifically intended to be channelled through UNDP and other United Nations bodies, as well as the World Bank. They are therefore an example of major sources of targeted non-core funding from traditional donors. The new health funds are somewhat different. They reflect the high priority that the same traditional donors have put on addressing developing countries’ most urgent health needs, but they involve new aid partners and are not to be exclusively implemented by the United Nations system.

When the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS was established in 1996, it

14 It is overseen by an Executive Committee comprising representatives of seven developing and seven developed countries.
2.2.1 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY

GEF was initiated in October 1991 during preparations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Summit), which was held in 1992. Beginning as a $1 billion pilot programme implemented by the World Bank, in 1992 it expanded to a partnership among three Implementing Agencies: The World Bank, UNDP and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). In 2008, the partner agency approach expanded again to 10 implementing agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development from the United Nations system, and four regional development banks. Since 2011, in a bid to promote country ownership and ‘drivenness’, GEF has begun accrediting, on a pilot basis, up to 10 new agencies, giving preference to national institutions, referred to as GEF project agencies.

The remainder of this section will describe the three funds used as case studies in this evaluation.

Table 3. GEF Trust Fund allocation by agency (in millions of US dollars)a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Agency</th>
<th>Pilot</th>
<th>GEF1</th>
<th>GEF2</th>
<th>GEF3</th>
<th>GEF4</th>
<th>All Phases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>2774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>3,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>439</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Projects</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>1,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>1,857</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>1,996</td>
<td>8,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


reflected a lack of confidence the World Health Organization’s ability to address the full range of challenges in conquering the global epidemic. Similarly, the GAVI Alliance—while it involved both the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)—was created with other partners to accelerate immunization campaigns beyond the United Nation’s capacities. In GFATM, an entirely new organization was created outside the United Nations system and is another manifestation of traditional donors’ desire by to address health problems through the use of other partners. In creating these new funds in the health domain, there was a sense among donors that existing organizations were “too bureaucratic and slow, powerful and arrogant, and unwilling to give a seat at the table to” civil society organizations.

The remainder of this section will describe the three funds used as case studies in this evaluation.

GEF conducts its business based on eight basic principles:

1. Provide additional grant and concessional financing of the agreed incremental costs to achieve agreed global environment benefits;
2. Finance activities benefiting the global environment in selected focal areas;
3. Function as the funding mechanism for global environmental conventions if so requested;
4. Ensure the cost-effectiveness of its activities;
5. Fund country-driven projects and programmes;
6. Build on proven institutional structures;
7. Be transparent and accountable to donors and beneficiaries; and
8. Be flexible as a need for modifications arises.

2.2.2 GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA

GFATM is a financial instrument, not an implementing entity. It provides performance-based grant funding to country-level recipients to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. GFATM was established and commenced operations within six months of the UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS in August 2001, at which United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan called for the establishment of a “Global Fund for HIV.” As a global partnership among governments, civil society, the private sector and affected communities, GFATM is intended to be an innovative approach to international health financing with an original mandate to scale up global financing dramatically. During its almost decade-long existence, GFATM has raised over $20 billion to co-finance prevention, treatment and care programmes in more than 150 countries. GFATM was founded on a set of specific principles that guide its work from governance to grant-making.

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20 Including from different trust funds, such as the GEF Trust Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund.


Sub-Recipients and the Local Fund Agent. During the grant period, GFATM applies a performance-based funding approach in which disbursements of tranches of the grant are linked to periodic demonstrations of programme progress (as defined by standardized indicators) and financial accountability.

### 2.2.3 Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol

The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer are dedicated to the protection of the earth’s ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer was adopted in 1987 and became binding international law in 1989. The MLF was established by a decision of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol and began its operation in 1991.

The main objective of the MLF, which is anchored in Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, is to assist developing country parties, whose annual per capita consumption and production of ozone-depleting substances is less than 0.3 kg, comply with the Protocol’s control measures. The MLF is thus a financial mechanism for covering the agreed incremental compliance costs for Article 5 countries. As of 2011, 147 of the 196 parties to the Montreal Protocol meet this definition. As of April 2011, contributions made to MLF by 45 countries amounted to more than $2.77 billion.  

Table 4 provides an overview of the MLF funding allocated to primary implementing agencies.

By its 20th anniversary in September 2007, the Montreal Protocol had succeeded in facilitating the phase-out of over 95 percent of ozone-depleting substances it was designed to control. The Montreal Protocol is largely considered a success story and a model of international cooperation in global environmental management.

---

**Table 4: Share of funding among implementing agencies of the MLF: allocations and provisions, 1991–2011 (in millions of US dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Amount (in millions of US dollars)</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>610.4</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
<td>197.7</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
<td>614.7</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>1,029.8</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified projects</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,453.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**23** Projects to combat ozone-depletion in the transition economies of Eastern Europe are funded by the GEF.

---

Projects financed by GFATM are implemented through a public-private partnership in which the key structures are the Country Coordinating Mechanism, the Principal Recipient, Sub-Recipients and the Local Fund Agent. During the grant period, GFATM applies a performance-based funding approach in which disbursements of tranches of the grant are linked to periodic demonstrations of programme progress (as defined by standardized indicators) and financial accountability.

---

These principles stipulate that GFATM should:

- Operate as a financial instrument, not as an implementation entity;
- Make available and leverage additional financial resources;
- Support programmes that reflect national ownership;
- Operate in a balanced manner in terms of different regions, diseases and interventions;
- Pursue an integrated and balanced approach to prevention and treatment;
- Evaluate proposals through independent review processes;
- Establish a simplified, rapid and innovative grant-making process that operates transparently and with accountability; and
- In making funding decisions, support programmes that adhere to a specific set of criteria, set out in its governing Framework Document.

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By its 20th anniversary in September 2007, the Montreal Protocol had succeeded in facilitating the phase-out of over 95 percent of ozone-depleting substances it was designed to control. The Montreal Protocol is largely considered a success story and a model of international cooperation in global environmental management.

---

23 Projects to combat ozone-depletion in the transition economies of Eastern Europe are funded by the GEF.
in Mexico, nearly 2,000 in China, and at least 1,000 in Brazil. Some of these foundations are development-orientated.

Among such foundations, there has been a growing trend towards substantive engagement, quality management and public accountability. Some foundations have developed complex planning, monitoring and evaluation systems, and place an increasing emphasis on capacity development and contribution to achieving sustainable development results. In engaging with implementing partners, such foundations expect compliance with their own rules and regulations. Overall, foundations increasingly see themselves as full-fledged development partners, rather than donors, and expect close involvement in policy discussions, problem analyses and results assessment.

### 2.3.1 The Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation

The Al Maktoum Foundation was launched in 2007 with an endowment of $10 billion from His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and Ruler of Dubai. The foundation promotes entrepreneurship by supporting innovation and research, enhancing access to quality education and professional development and supporting the production, acquisition and dissemination of Arab knowledge sources.

### 2.3.2 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

In 1994, Bill Gates used his personal fortune to launch the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates Foundation), which has grown to be the largest in the world of its kind. The Gates Foundation channels a significant proportion of its assets into development programmes. Bill Gates has been a prime mover in the creation of other multilateral funds and has been an active supporter of United Nations organizations (primarily the

#### Table 5. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation grants by programme areas (in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Development</td>
<td>677.2</td>
<td>489.8</td>
<td>3,410.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Health</td>
<td>1,826.5</td>
<td>1,485.3</td>
<td>14,742.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>488.8</td>
<td>381.0</td>
<td>6,148.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,992.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,356.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,300.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2010 Annual report of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
World Health Organization, which has received several hundred million dollars in grants). The Gates Foundation divides its work into three distinct programme areas: global development, global health and programmes implemented within the United States. As shown in Table 5, health programmes receive the largest share of resources and have accounted for approximately 60 percent of funds allocated since 1994.

A set of key principles guide the grant making process and shape the work of the foundation. The principles describe a foundation that funds programmes and relies on other entities to implement them. They describe a foundation that is willing to take significant risks and has a strong focus on delivering results. Perhaps most importantly, the principles declare that the Gates Foundation is a family foundation and it is driven by the interests and passions of the Gates family. Though the Gates Foundation does not implement programmes, it is an active funder that does a lot of work in grant preparation and monitors its investments closely. The Gates Foundation’s approach to grantmaking is rooted in a strategy development process during which the Gates Foundation focuses on a particular developmental problem it perceives as causing great inequity. The outcome of a typical strategy is a set of policies or solutions that will result in specific grants that implementing agencies can apply for. The Gates Foundation has a distinct focus on results and emphasizes that results need to be the key factor that determines future funding decisions.

2.3.3 SOROS FOUNDATION

George Soros established his first non-United States based foundation in Hungary in 1984 in support of the country’s transition from communism. Since then, the network of foundations supporting human rights and democracy has expanded rapidly. In 1993, he established the Open Society Institute (renamed in 2011 to the Open Society Foundations), which has extended democracy-building to regions other than Eastern Europe. Based in New York, the Open Society Foundations is a not-for-profit, private operating and grant-making foundation. The Soros Foundation Network is a decentralized association of non-profit organizations that are independent entities with their own boards of directors, staff, programme priorities, application guidelines and grant making procedures.

The Open Society Foundations has spent approximately $8 billion since the early 1980s and has become a major institution with country and regional offices in over 70 countries. The Open Society Foundations has initiatives in a multitude of different focus areas ranging from governance programmes to arts and culture support programmes. The key focus areas to which most funding has been allocated are: i) democratic development projects (primarily in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), ii) human rights protection and iii) education projects. The overarching objectives of the Open Society Foundations’ work are strengthening civil society organizations and encouraging participation in democratic and societal processes.

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This chapter examines evolving UNDP partnerships and funding structures to determine how global funds and philanthropic foundations fit into this pattern. It will also describe the specific partnerships between UNDP and the three global funds and three philanthropic foundations used as case studies in the evaluation. Annex 4 provides an overview of core and non-core contributions to UNDP, identifying a number of global funds, philanthropic foundations and primary bilateral donors.

3.1 THE EVOLVING UNDP ROLE WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

UNDP was created in 1965 as a merger of two United Nations grant funds, one for free-standing technical assistance and the other for pre-investment activities (the Special Fund). UNDP was thus created as the central funding mechanism of the United Nations development system, as well as the manager of a rapidly expanding network of field representatives.

The original UNDP role was to be the principal operational funding entity of the United Nations development system. When it was created in 1965, it was the principal source of United Nations technical assistance funding. But although donor funding rose in the early days, it remained entirely voluntary, a legacy of earlier controversies about giving grant money to the United Nations. Voluntary increases through annual pledging sessions could easily be followed by voluntary decreases, and the uncertainty of funding—and the failure of more substantial UNDP funding to materialize—was one reason why United Nations organizations and agencies, which had depended on UNDP funding for their technical assistance, began to turn increasingly to UNDP donors in order to obtain funds directly.

As United Nations agencies expanded funding options beyond UNDP, UNDP sought its own independence from the agencies, particularly when government (later national) execution became the preferred modality. The separation process accelerated in the 1980s as agencies began opening their own field representations rather than placing advisers within UNDP country offices.28 From the 1980s onward, the United Nations was ‘delivering as many’, with significant consequent increases in total overheads and office costs. Although the United Nations’ traditional donors (which had their own preferences for different parts of the United Nations development system) participated in this fragmentation process, they came to view the United Nations system as a cumbersome, even incoherent, aid mechanism. This reputation is one of the reasons why the new multilateral funding mechanisms that were established over the last two decades have tended to be outside the United Nations system.

28 For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s advisers were called Agricultural Advisers, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s advisers were Senior Industrial Development Field Advisers.
In addition to being the funder and coordinator of the system, UNDP’s chief architect determined in 1969 that it also needed a strong development policy pillar if it was to be the effective core of United Nations development. Related plans never materialized. Instead, UNDP started to take on its own substantive roles, at one time covering a plethora of issues across the entire United Nations system. Beginning in the 1990s, UNDP has sought to narrow its coverage to a limited number of what are now referred to as ‘focus areas’. Under the general theme of human development, these have principally been poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery and environment and energy. Within this area are several other priorities, including HIV/AIDS, gender equality and capacity development. The UNDP strong field tradition also means that it tries to be sensitive to a much wider range of development priorities, country by country, which in itself generates some internal contradictions. The UNDP Evaluation Office (in a report on results-based management) recognized “the current approach of defining and reporting against centrally defined outcomes tends to undermine UNDP’s responsibilities and alignment to nationally defined outcomes and priorities.”

Yet, following several General Assembly resolutions in the 1970s, UNDP is still asked to retain a role as ‘coordinator’ of the United Nations development system at the country level through the UNDP-administered United

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29 Robert Jackson, Study of the Capacity of the UN Development System, United Nations, Geneva, 1969. In this scenario, UNDP would have been headed, not by an Administrator, but by a globally renowned and respected development specialist.


31 Most notably, Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the UN System, UN GA Resolution 77/197, December 1977.
The ‘firewall’ between its dual responsibilities as funds manager and development organization. The establishment of an office to manage these multi-donor trust funds in a separate building from UNDP headquarters was part of that firewall. However, there have been lingering concerns about potential conflicts of interest at the country level, and the United Nations Development Group issued guidelines in 2008 in order to outline how firewalling should work: The Management and Accountability System of the United Nations Development and Resident Coordinator System included the “functional firewall” for the Resident Coordinator System. The fact that a growing proportion of United Nations Resident Coordinators are being recruited from outside UNDP (and the United Nations system) and that more UNDP country directors are being appointed means that the separation of interests is becoming less ambiguous at the country level.

### 3.2 THE CHANGING FUNDING STRUCTURE

The emergence of multi-donor trust funds and joint programmes help explain the substantial rise in the proportion of non-core funding to the United Nations development system as a whole, and to UNDP in particular (see Figure 4). Core funding of the United Nations system’s operational activities, which includes both development and humanitarian programmes, declined

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32 There had already been manifestations of conflict prior to the establishment of these funds. In the late 1990s, UNDP was entrusted with the management of the trust fund of the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Assistance for Least Developed Countries, for which the implementing agencies were the International Monetary Fund, International Trade Centre, the World Bank, UNDP, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization. In some countries, UNDP—which had the most extensive field presence—was criticized by the other agencies for exploiting the advantages of its close ties with government counterparts. This criticism was one of the reasons why management of the newly-replenished fund (the Enhanced Integrated Framework) was removed from UNDP responsibility in 2007.


34 UNDP established a separate multi-donor trust fund office in 2006 in order to administer the growing number of funds, which now number over 40, active in 81 countries and with 66 contributing partners. Each trust fund has an appointed ‘administrative agent’ (usually UNDP), which acts as the principal interface with donors. As of mid-2011, the total amount of funding received by the various trust funds was $5.2 billion.

35 Source: UN DESA.
slightly in real terms between 1991 and 2009, while non-core funding rose four-fold. Proportionally, non-core funding rose from 42 percent to 73 percent of total resources over this period. In 2009, the United Nations development system received a total of $1.8 billion from the European Union and $2.9 billion from other sources. These two sources accounted for over 20 percent of the total for the United Nations in that year (development and humanitarian combined). Of the ‘other’ sources, $1.3 billion came from global funds and private sources.

UNDP dependence on non-core funding has grown even more; from 19 percent in 1991 to 80 percent in 2010 (see Figure 5). Over the past decade alone, the share of core resources fell by nearly 10 percent (see Figure 6). By 2010, out of a total of just over $5 billion, core resources came in just under $1 billion (see Figure 7). In this regard, however, it should be noted that core resources, in absolute terms, have remained relatively stable over the past decade, increasing until 2007, and decreasing slightly since. Non-core resources, on the other hand, have increased

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36 Source: UN DESA.
37 Source: UNDP.
38 Source: UNDP.
available at the country level for different sectors in which donors are interested and organized by the UNDP country offices, sometimes with assistance from UNDP headquarters and regional service centres. Another part of bilateral contributions is channelled through the multi-donor trust funds, with each trust fund targeting a specific cause (e.g. Iraq Trust Fund, or a variety of trust funds for One UN initiatives in a selection of countries). This bilaterally directed aid, whereby donor objectives play a major role, could conflict with UNDP objectives. Donors often have preferences for certain countries or groups of countries, they often favour specific subjects to allocate their funding and their preferences change over time. These factors make it challenging for UNDP to match bilaterally directed aid with country preferences and its own mandate.

There has also been an increase in funding from non-traditional donors. The role of BRICS\(^\text{39}\) countries cannot be ignored, and questions about their influence on funding of UNDP activities are

\(^{39}\) A grouping of countries consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
Global fund—in particular GEF, GFATM and MLF—contributions to UNDP non-core resources have increased from slightly under $250 million in 2004 to close to $700 million in 2010 (see Table 6). During the same period, the share of global fund contributions to non-core resources doubled from approximately 8 percent to 16 percent. Annex 4 provides a more detailed overview of global funds’ contributions to UNDP. All three global fund partnerships are managed through special units of the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy.

3.3.1 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY

The UNDP-GEF partnership dates back to the inception of GEF during preparations for the Rio Summit. Since then, UNDP has remained one of the key implementing agencies accounting for approximately one-third of total GEF funding. As a GEF Implementing Agency, UNDP offers countries highly specialized technical services including eligibility assessment; programme and project formulation; due diligence; mobilization of required co-financing from other vertical funds, UNDP, the private sector, national governments and other partners; project implementation oversight; results management and evaluation; performance-based payments; and knowledge management. GEF Implementing partners are categorized according to their comparative advantages as a means of identifying suitable implementers and ensuring an efficient division of labour. GEF primarily focuses on global issues and on national-level circumstances and initiatives that affect such issues. GEF is not intended to fill funding gaps for other critical local environmental concerns.

UNDP work with GEF encompasses activities in all GEF focal areas: biodiversity, climate change mitigation and adaptation, international waters, land degradation, ozone layer depletion and persistent organic pollutants. The portfolio of work includes projects at the country, regional and global levels. UNDP manages several of the GEF corporate programmes, including the GEF Small Grants Programme and the Global Support Programme for National Capacity Self Assessment.

The UNDP frame of support within GEF revolves around capacity development and technical assistance. As stated in the GEF Instrument: “UNDP will play the primary role in ensuring the development and management of capacity development programmes and technical assistance projects. Through its global network of field offices, UNDP will draw upon its experience in human resources development, institutional strengthening, and non-governmental and community participation to assist countries in promoting, designing and implementing activities consistent with the purpose of GEF and national sustainable development strategies. Also drawing on its inter-country programming experience, UNDP will contribute to the development of regional and global projects within the...
GEF work programme in cooperation with the other Implementing Agencies.41

In accordance with the traditional roles of GEF Implementing Agencies, UNDP has tended to concentrate on demonstration-related activities, including medium- and full-size projects and the Small Grants Programme.42 As a resident development agency, it has often focused on demonstration, capacity development, innovation, market barrier removal, and environmental mainstreaming. By contrast, UNEP, as a non-resident, technical agency, is particularly prominent in environmental monitoring and so-called ‘foundational’ activities, focusing on policy and regulatory frameworks and national priority setting. The most significant difference as to how the agencies perform is that the World Bank (and now the recently added other international financial institutions, such as the regional multilateral development banks), often tends to be involved in projects with high rates of co-funding, catalysing investments or implementing new strategic approaches at the national level.43

The GEF partnership engages UNDP at all levels of the organization: from country offices to five regionally-based support centres to a headquarters-based UNDP-GEF Directorate. The Directorate, which is part of the Environment and Energy Group of the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy, has the overall responsibility for strategic planning, business development, results management and reporting and information management systems. As GEF technical areas are complex and increasingly highly specialized, UNDP work is led by headquarters-based principal technical advisers with the support of regionally-based technical advisers. In addition, UNDP has regional team leaders that provide further support and coordination activities. UNDP Resident Representatives and Country Directors are responsible for ensuring in-country support to the implementation of GEF projects.

In accordance with UNDP cost recovery policies, all non-UNDP core contributions from donors are required to cover indirect costs incurred by UNDP headquarters, regional and country offices. The fee paid by GEF for the provision of project support services is 10 percent of the value of each project. This reflects 9 percent for project cycle management services and 1 percent for the provision of GEF corporate services.44 Table 7 provides an overview of the mobilization of resources for the three primary GEF-related trust funds.

Table 7. Resources mobilized for UNDP-supported GEF-financed projects, as of 2 December 2011 (in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funds</th>
<th>Work Programme</th>
<th>Preparatory Assistance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GEF Trust Fund</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>3,449.4</td>
<td>122.0</td>
<td>3,571.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-financing</td>
<td>9,200.5</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>9,276.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GEF Least Developed Countries Fund</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>107.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>110.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-financing</td>
<td>277.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>280.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GEF Special Climate Change Fund</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-financing</td>
<td>385.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>388.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,605.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>127.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,732.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Co-financing</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,863.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>81.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,944.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP, Bureau for Development Policy.

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41 There is no existing explicit logic model for the UNDP-GEF partnership. However, the GEF instrument, coupled with other key governance documents, does indicate what the purpose of the partnerships is and what the main deliverables of UNDP are. Instead of an overarching logic model, each project is aligned to country strategies, which in turn align to overarching UNDP goals.


43 Ibid.

44 It should be noted that fees paid to GEF agencies are most likely to be reduced in 2012.
3.3.2 GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA

UNDP and GFATM have been engaged in partnership since late 2002. The partnership was first formalized in December 2003 through an exchange of letters between the UNDP Administrator and the GFATM Executive Director. The terms for cooperation between the two institutions were specified by a Standard Grant Agreement, which outlines how activities are to be implemented when UNDP serves as Principal Recipient for GFATM programmes.46

The exchange of letters outlines the basic principles and expectations when UNDP is a GFATM fund recipient. The Exchange of Letters stipulates:

- GFATM may award grants to UNDP as Principal Recipient in countries where complex emergencies or other exceptional circumstances exist and when there is no suitable local entity (lacking sufficient capacity essentially) to serve as Principal Recipient;

- While serving as Principal Recipient, UNDP should work to develop the capacity of national actors so that a national institution can assume the responsibility of the Principal Recipient. Where UNDP is not Principal Recipient it should provide technical advice to the nominated Principal Recipient and sub-Recipients so as to develop national capacity; and

- When UNDP acts as Principal Recipient, the role of Local Fund Agent has been adjusted. The Local Fund Agent which monitors Principal Recipients will not involve an institutional or financial management or fiduciary assessment when assessing UNDP.

The Exchange of Letters specifies agreements on cost recovery, which fall within two categories: (i) general management services (a seven percent flat fee to be applied to all grants), and (ii) implementation support services (costs assumed by UNDP as Principal Recipient should be budgeted as direct costs within each project budget).

Except for matters specifically agreed to in the Grant Agreement or the Exchange of Letters, UNDP uses its normal operating framework for implementing GFATM-funded projects. Article 2(a) of the Grant Agreement recognizes that UNDP will administer the programme in accordance with its regulations, rules and procedures.

When UNDP is the Principal Recipient in a country, GFATM grants are managed directly by the UNDP country office, and the Resident Representative is held accountable by GFATM. After the UNDP-GFATM partnership was formalized in 2002, the first GFATM-dedicated position at headquarters was established in 2004. In subsequent years, the Geneva-based Global Fund Partnership Unit was established, which is part of the HIV/AIDS Group of the Bureau for Development Policy. However, there is no line management from headquarters to the country offices that corresponds to the UNDP decentralized organizational model.

The rationale for partnering with GFATM is in line with what the Letter of Exchange specifies, i.e. to i) support programme implementation by serving as Principal Recipient in exceptionally challenging contexts, ii) develop capacity of national actors to assume or strengthen Principal recipient responsibility, and iii) improve policy and programme quality of GFATM in line with

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46 Grant agreements indicate what the purpose of the partnership is and the main UNDP deliverables. Each project is aligned to country strategies, which in turn align to overarching UNDP goals.

47 In June 2007, the UNDP Executive Board mandated that the recovery rate for general management support for third-party contributions to be increased to from 5 to 7 percent, in order to ensure all programmes managed by UNDP are properly funded.

48 The cost sharing arrangements have been amended since the inception of the GFATM. It currently stands at 7 percent.
Table 8. UNDP-GFATM partnership: facts and figures, as of 1 December 2011 (in millions of US dollars)

| Number of Countries (with UNDP as Principal Recipient of at least one Active grant) | 30 | Angola, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic), Cuba, El Salvador, Haiti, Iran (Islamic Republic), Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Maldives, Montenegro, Nepal, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe |
| Number of Active Grants (Active grants with UNDP as Principal Recipient) | 59 |
| Value of Active Grants (Total Signed Amount in USD equivalent for Active grants) | 1,233 | 11,241 | 11.0 |
| Total Value of Grants (Total Signed Amount in USD equivalent for all grants since 2002) | 2,204 | 18,971 | 11.6 |
| Value of Approved Commitments for Active Grants b (Total Amount of GFATM Board Approved Commitments in USD Equivalent for Active grants) | 1,718 | 22,508 | 7.6 |
| Total Value of Approved Commitments (Total Amount of GFATM Board Approved Commitments in USD Equivalent for all grants since 2002) | 3,222 | 22,508 | 14.3 |
| Disbursed c for Active Grants (Total Amount of Disbursements in USD Equivalent for Active grants since 2002) | 895 | 7,834 | 11.4 |
| Total Disbursed (Total Amount of Disbursements in USD Equivalent for all grants since 2002) | 1,838 | 15,140 | 12.1 |
| Total Disbursed in 2011 (Total Amount of Disbursements in USD Equivalent for all grants in 2011) | 292 | 2,120 | 13.7 |
| Cumulative Expenditure (Enhanced Financial Reporting) 2010 (Total Amount of Expenditure in USD Equivalent reported in GFATM Enhanced Financial Reporting as of the end of the various individual grant reporting periods in 2010) d | 638 | 9,106 | 7.0 e |

a. Active grants are all grants defined by GFATM as “In Progress” at the date of the report. These do not include grants that are undergoing closure, have consolidated, changed Principal Recipient, or terminated.

b. Note that approved commitments are calculated at the programme level, and grants under the same programme are assumed to inherit the same approved commitments amount.

c. All Disbursed figures include refunds to GFATM.

d. Enhanced Financial Reporting (EFR) data is based on information submitted by Principal Recipients and drawn from their own systems. The individual EFR reports are not verified by the Local Fund Agent but are reviewed for the overall reasonableness of the assumptions and high-level accuracy of the figures. EFR was launched in 2008, but since a lot of the reports go back to the start of the grants, some broad assumptions have been used by Principal Recipients to backdate the information prior to 2008. Therefore, the accuracy or reliability of individual grant reports is likely to be affected by how old the grant is, and the capacity of finance staff and systems of the individual grant recipients. In addition, EFR was not required for grants completed before January 2008.

e. These figures are based on the 2010 EFR portfolio results, however it is important to note that the overall percentage of the portfolio allocated to UNDP is likely to be higher than the reality as UNDP grants were 100% compliant with EFR reporting requirements against 95% compliance for the entire portfolio.

### Table 9. 2002-2010 funding by region and type of disease (in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Tuberculosis</th>
<th>HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Malaria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>175.1</td>
<td>867.6</td>
<td>518.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>126.1</td>
<td>179.3</td>
<td>137.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>211.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>389.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>430.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,726.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>702.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GFATM.

### Table 10. MLF-funded UNDP-MLF projects, 2001-2010 (in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Programme Funds Approved</th>
<th>Programme Funds Delivery</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>$38.5</td>
<td>$32.8</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>$170.0</td>
<td>$153.3</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>$3.1</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>$114.9</td>
<td>$90.1</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$326.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>$279.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,165</strong></td>
<td><strong>97</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP.

#### 3.3.3 MULTILATERAL FUND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL

In 1991, in connection with MLF establishment, UNDP initiated its global Montreal Protocol Programme and entered into an agreement with the MLF Executive Committee to serve as an implementing agency. A headquarters-based support function was created in New York to assist in programme development and implementation as well as to provide financial oversight and reporting to its external governing body (the MLF Executive Committee). As of 2011, the UNDP Montreal Protocol Unit (part of the Environment and Energy Group of the Bureau for Development Policy) has provided technical and policy backstopping to country offices and governments and has overseen implementation of over 2,000 MLF-funded projects in more than 100 countries. UNDP is working with a broad range of partners, including governments, the private sector, representative organizations (e.g. technical associations, agricultural institutes, academia and civil society), to help developing countries adopt and implement strategies that target the preservation of the ozone layer and sustainable development. A key objective of UNDP work is to develop governments’ capacities to meet their commitments by phasing out the use of ozone-depleting substances in industrial production, refrigeration servicing and mobile air-conditioning, fire protection and agricultural production.
The programme to date has prevented the annual release of almost 66,000 tonnes of ozone-depleting substances into the atmosphere. Table 10 shows how MLF-funded projects implemented by UNDP have been distributed by region from 2001 to 2010.

### Table 11. Contribution of selected philanthropic foundations to UNDP for 2004–2010 (in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Core resources</th>
<th>Non-core resources</th>
<th>Specific foundations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>842.1</td>
<td>2,943.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>923.4</td>
<td>3,599.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>923.8</td>
<td>3,517.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,119.0</td>
<td>3,564.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,097.1</td>
<td>3,633.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,013.6</td>
<td>3,640.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>967.1</td>
<td>4,045.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation**: 0.6
- **Open Society Institute (NY)**: 0.4
- **Ford Foundation**: 0.4
- **Soros Foundation Network**: 1.0
- **The Rockefeller Foundation**: 0.1
- **Al Maktoum Foundation**: 2.3
- **Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahayan Foundation**: 2.2
- **ZAYED Foundation**: 0.5
- **UN Foundation**: 0.0

**Total contribution**: 3,786.1

- **a.** Figures for total contribution from core resources are based on the 2001–2010 Annual Review of the UNDP financial situation and only include trust funds and cost sharing.
- **b.** Figures for total contribution from non-core resources are based on 2001–2010 Annual Review of the UNDP financial situation and only include trust funds and cost sharing.
- **c.** Figures from 2004 to 2009 are based on the Oracle Business Intelligence Enterprise Edition database (only cost sharing and trust funds). 2010 figures are based on the ‘Fund Balance Report’ (only cost sharing and trust funds).
- **d.** The Zayed Bin Sulthan Al Nahayan, Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation
- **e.** Figures for total contribution from core and non-core resources are based on 2001–2010 Annual Review of the UNDP financial situation and only include trust funds and cost sharing.

Source: UNDP.

There is no existing explicit logic model for the UNDP-MLF partnership. However, the existing policy and procedure documents do indicate what the purpose of the partnerships is and what the main deliverables of UNDP are. Instead of an overarching logic model, each project is aligned to country strategies, which in turn align to overarching UNDP goals.

As of 31 December, 2010, UNDP had received $531,815,854 through net project approvals (excluding support costs). Disbursed funding for the same period amounts to $483,163,726 (excluding all obligations), which corresponds to 91 percent of approved funding. The programme to date has prevented the annual release of almost 66,000 tonnes of ozone-depleting substances into the atmosphere. Table 10 shows how MLF-funded projects implemented by UNDP have been distributed by region from 2001 to 2010.

### 3.4 UNDP PARTNERSHIP WITH PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS

Historically, UNDP has had few long-term substantive partnerships with philanthropic foundations. The main exception is the United Nations Foundation, which was set up in 1999 to manage and disburse the one billion dollar donation from...
Ted Turner in support of various United Nations causes.\textsuperscript{49} To date, the UNDP–the United Nations Foundation partnership has implemented projects worth more than $100 million.\textsuperscript{50}

UNDP engaged with other philanthropic foundations as well. These partnerships have primarily been managed by UNDP country offices and do not necessarily represent partnerships that are anchored in multi-year partnership agreements for UNDP as a whole. Table 11 provides an overview of contributions by selected philanthropic foundations to UNDP in recent years. The Gates Foundation, the Soros Foundation and the Al Maktoum Foundation represent distinctly different philanthropic foundations with which UNDP has had significant engagement between 2001 and 2010, primarily at the project level. Overall, the UNDP Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy\textsuperscript{51} is responsible for corporate-level engagement with philanthropic foundations and has a liaison function vis-à-vis programme units that enter into specific partnerships with philanthropic foundations. Until 2010, the Division for Foundation Affairs managed UNDP’s foundation-specific work programme. Since then, this responsibility has been integrated in the Private Sector Division.

3.4.1 AL MAKTOUM FOUNDATION

UNDP and the Al Maktoum Foundation signed a memorandum of understanding in 2007 with the objective of “enhancing knowledge acquisition, generation and access for the overall purpose of promoting knowledge-based societies and creating an enabling environment for the overall human development in the Arab Region.” The specific activities under the agreement were to prepare the ‘Arab Knowledge Report’ series, which was to be issued annually and address priority challenges in the region. The memorandum of understanding also calls for extending and expanding the UNDP regional project for the enhancement of quality assurance and institutional planning in Arab universities. The memorandum of understanding is due to expire at the end of 2012, when project activities should have been implemented. Nonetheless, new activities within the project are currently being planned through 2014.

The partnership between UNDP and the Al Maktoum Foundation was one of the first major strategic initiatives launched by the Al Maktoum Foundation leadership. As of 2011, the foundation has supported UNDP in developing the ‘2009 Arab Knowledge Report’ and the ‘Arab Human Capital Challenge’, two reports which, following in the tradition of the earlier Arab Human Development Reports, offer a general introduction to the state of the Arab knowledge society and the challenges of fostering employment in Arab states. The entire grant is $9.57 million out of which $5.83 million has been contributed to UNDP.

3.4.2 GATES FOUNDATION

UNDP has worked with the Gates Foundation on several projects since the Gates Foundation began operating in 1994. No broad partnership agreement or memorandum of understanding has been signed between the two institutions; memorandums of understanding are drafted for individual projects. Activities spanning a range of thematic areas and regions have been implemented on a project-by-project basis. Table 12 outlines the projects under the UNDP-Gates Foundation partnership.

The Multifunctional Platform Project revolves around a diesel-run engine mounted on a chassis to which a variety of processing equipment can be attached. The basic idea is to use cost-effective


\textsuperscript{50} Other UN agencies (e.g., the World Health Organization and UNICEF) have also partnered with the United Nations Foundation and received more than $300 million each.

\textsuperscript{51} Prior to November 2011, the Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy was known as the Partnership Bureau.
technology to improve the lives of women in West Africa by freeing up their time and allowing them to sell good quality products at markets. This agricultural project, which has been widely regarded as an innovative initiative, had already been supported by UNDP for some time when the Gates Foundation joined a group of donors and development partners to provide additional backing.

The UNDP-Gates project in Bulgaria is designed to facilitate access to information, knowledge, communication, e-contents and community services through Bulgaria’s public libraries network. The broad objective of the project is to increase library usage throughout the country and help Bulgarian citizens integrate into the global information society within five years.

The UNDP-Gates project in Ethiopia, Enhancing National Capacity for Agricultural Growth and Transformation, is part of the government’s National Agricultural Growth Programme. The overall project objective is to provide support to the Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency in the following areas: up-stream strategy and programmatic support; institutional capacity development and partnership and resource mobilization. The project aims to increase agricultural productivity in Ethiopia by improving agricultural policy, increasing access to knowledge and by facilitating investment to the agricultural sector. The intended output is to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to prepare and implement key agriculture programmes and related investment frameworks. The Food and Agriculture Organization, through its Food Policy Research Institute, has been involved in the Gates Foundation-financed diagnostic studies for eight sub-sectors of Ethiopia’s agricultural sector.

### 3.4.3 Soros Foundation

UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding with the Soros Foundation in 2001 in order to enhance existing cooperation and to help the institutions meet their mutual goals of supporting international development and strengthening democratic institutions. The direct purpose was to move away from the project-by-project relationship and form a more strategic partnership. The principal areas of interest for cooperation were highlighted as: democratic governance, HIV/AIDS, conflict prevention, globalization, information and communications technology, private sector development and gender.

Projects at the Soros Foundation are usually initiated through research undertaken by its economic development team or by George Soros himself. Project initiation is typically triggered

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52 Memorandum of understanding UNDP Open Society Institute, 25 September 2001.
As of 2011, activities under the partnership have primarily revolved around various democratic governance and human rights projects in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Table 13 shows the top five UNDP programme country receiving contributions from the Soros Foundation from 2004 to 2010. In total, UNDP has received $15 million in contributions from the Soros Foundation from 2004 to 2010.

### Table 13. Examples of UNDP/OSI/Soros Foundation projects (in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support Project</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Country Team for Human Rights Promotion and Protection</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chisinau Municipality Development project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achieving European Integration Goals and Commitments project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transitional Capacity Support project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations Development project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>eGovernance in Moldova project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved Capacities for Managing Development project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved social security project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Local Development Programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to 2010 Floods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Increasing Employment Opportunities project</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality and Access to public services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty Reduction - Policy Advice project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Municipal Assessment project</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial Training project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening Capacities project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Support to Governance Reform Programmes</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP
Chapter 4

FINDINGS ON PARTNERSHIP WITH GLOBAL FUNDS AND PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS

This chapter highlights the main findings of the evaluation of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations. The evaluation criteria—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability—are used to assess these partnerships from a strategic and project level. The first part of this chapter deals with UNDP partnerships with global funds; the second part of this chapter deals with UNDP relationships with philanthropic foundations.

Sources referred to are illustrative and the evidence base is always broader, drawing from a wide range of documents and interviews at the global, regional and national levels (most of which are not specifically referenced). The countries or projects cited in the text were selected on the basis of availability and an effort to ensure a balance in geographical coverage. Examples are used to ground the text in order to improve its readability; they are not intended to impart any value judgements or comparisons between cases.

4.1 GLOBAL FUNDS

The findings on global funds are drawn from an analysis of the following sources: studies of 39 cases of GEF, GFATM and MLF partnership in 16 countries developed through field visits or phone interviews; detailed notes from more than sixty global-level interviews; review of background documents including a meta-analysis of UNDP Evaluation Office Assessment of Development Results; and a survey of Resident Representatives.

4.1.1 GLOBAL FUND RELEVANCE

In line with the relevance-related evaluation questions specified in Chapter 1, relevance is presented in terms of two primary dimensions: importance of partnership and its alignment with programmatic priorities.

Importance of partnership

Partnership with global funds is strategically important to UNDP. Not only does it facilitate mobilizing significant volumes of financial support, but it also provides UNDP with opportunities to engage in global policy dialogue, participate in innovative initiatives, and strengthen its own capacity. Partnership with global funds has become increasingly relevant to UNDP in monetary terms. The UNDP budget derived from such global funds has been over $657 million per annum, one-sixth of its non-core revenue. Each fund contributed a sizeable amount to the UNDP budget:

- GEF funding accounts for approximately $260 million per year;
- GFATM has 59 active grants (two to five-year duration), totalling approximately $370 million per year;
- MLF accounts for approximately $25 million per year.

This budgetary significance was reflected at the country level in all programmes under review. Sectoral programmes were heavily reliant on one or more global funds. In Honduras, for example, GEF provided nearly 100 percent of the funding...
for the country programme’s environment and energy programme. Eritrea, among others, derived some 50 percent or more of its resources from such funds. Other offices had a more diverse base with specific global funds accounting for 5 percent or less of overall income.

Partnership with global funds was widely regarded as being of substantive value to UNDP. It provided UNDP with an opportunity to engage in global policy dialogue with governments on a range of issues. In numerous instances, partnership enhanced UNDP capacities and abilities to operate. According to the Resident Representatives’ survey, global fund money enabled UNDP to address environmental issues and provide indispensable support to the control of diseases—activities that would not otherwise have been prioritized due to funding gaps. UNDP has been able to develop its country-specific technical expertise in specialized areas, for example HIV/AIDS in the Maldives through work with GFATM or energy efficiency in Mauritius through GEF.

In Zimbabwe and elsewhere, the funds functioned as a launch pad for mobilizing other donor funding and fulfilling United Nations Development Assistance Framework commitments. Funds also facilitated innovative work that would not have been possible through the use of core funds. GEF was credited for funding cutting-edge work on energy efficiency in Lebanon, and for enabling Belarus to find new avenues for working with communities by integrating environmental protection and income generation support. Cooperation across focus areas fostered by global funds facilitated a better integration of programmes within UNDP itself. The GEF programme in Tajikistan, for example, acquired best practice recognition within UNDP for the quality of its programme portfolios.

**Partnership with UNDP is strategically important to global funds. There is a shared commitment to international standards, and UNDP adds significant value to the delivery of global fund initiatives.** UNDP was a key player in all three funds under review, and played a central role among a small number of recognized implementing agencies; one of ten agencies under GEF; Principal Recipient of Last Resort under GFATM; and one of four organizations under MLF. It has engaged with these funds since the funds’ inceptions. Relationships were forged at a strategic level and based on memorandum of understanding and top-level contacts. Funds were managed through sizeable units at UNDP headquarters. A significant proportion of each fund went to partner countries through or with UNDP support. On an annual basis, UNDP received an average of approximately 40 percent of GEF funding, 32 percent of MLF funds and 11 percent of GFATM funds. At the country level, UNDP was a significant channel for global funds. This is the case for GFATM in particular, and was the premise of its partnership with UNDP—to enable operation in countries where other options are not available (e.g. Zimbabwe).

The partnerships were based on shared common values and commitments to internationally agreed standards. Many of the governments, which sit on the UNDP Executive Board, also supported global funds. Each UNDP project proposal for all funds went through a systematic vetting process that ensured alignment with fund objectives.

UNDP had a number of comparative advantages in terms of implementing global fund programmes. The following factors were most regularly mentioned by interviewees:

- Country presence and a network of offices gave national stakeholders direct access to staff and the confidence that project management was done on-site;
- Administrative and implementation capacity, including human resources capacity in many country offices, and access to development professionals and technical experts through the international network;
- Focus on smaller national projects and grants in enabling activities and capacity development—aspects that were not always of interest to other potential implementing agencies; and
- Neutrality in politically exceptional or unstable contexts (see Box 1).
This is not an exhaustive list of factors. In addition, the UNDP comparative advantage benefited from synergies inherent to multiple factors applying at the same time.

Stakeholders were generally well aware of UNDP added value. Recipient governments in particular had a good sense of the comparative advantages of different agencies and readily cited why they chose one agency over another for a given project. Feedback from government stakeholders in a number of countries indicated that UNDP was best suited for smaller projects that involve capacity development, that the World Bank was relevant for large investment projects involving loans and that UNEP brought a specialization in the legal and political aspects of environmental issues. It was not altogether clear whether these perceptions of comparative advantage were based on broader corporate statements differentiating the roles of various partners involved (which they do mirror), or whether they were based on the immediate observations and experiences of country-level stakeholders. Overall, UNDP administrative capacity and its global network were the main reasons for it being selected as fund manager (as opposed to its specialization in particular subject areas). Historically, this is why UNDP has been able to take on a key implementation role in all the global funds under review.

**Alignment with programmatic priorities**

Initiatives supported through UNDP-global fund partnerships are generally relevant to national priorities. As governments make choices as to how to prioritize development challenges, the specific allocation of resources within the sectoral focus areas of global funds are not always perceived as requiring the most urgent attention. The 2008–2013 UNDP Strategic Plan highlights the importance of ensuring that all programmes, including UNDP-global fund partnerships, are relevant to the national development agenda. Global fund projects fit well with national priorities in most of the countries according to the country case studies and feedback from national stakeholders. Such funding constituted a significant part of national budgets. In Chile, 30 percent of the climate change programme was funded by GEF; in Angola, GFATM supported approximately 40 percent of national initiatives on HIV/AIDS (see Box 2).

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**Box 1. Zimbabwe: playing a critical role but making hard choices**

Most stakeholders agreed that UNDP played an indispensable role in Zimbabwe in terms of leadership among United Nations agencies, coordination and networking. Throughout the turmoil of the past decade, while donor commitment was on hold even beyond the establishment of the “Inclusive Government” in 2009, UNDP was one of the few international agencies that continued to work directly with the government, thus supporting the state at a time of acute financial and monetary crisis. In addition, it was one of the few organizations at the time that the government trusted and viewed as a neutral player.

Following the Reserve Bank’s diversion of millions of dollars from a GFATM Round 5 grant in 2008, continued GFATM involvement in Zimbabwe was called into question. However, GFATM support was critical in combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. In response to this incident, and after putting in place additional safeguards, GFATM continued to channel funds through UNDP. As the only credible partner agency, UNDP had a pivotal role to play in keeping lines of communication open among key stakeholders and in helping mobilize substantial resources not only from GFATM, but also from other donors to support humanitarian efforts. Without UNDP involvement, Zimbabwe may have lost up to half a billion dollars from various funding sources.

However, the UNDP role was not uncontroversial. Several donors and other organizations criticized UNDP for what they saw as its passive role in the face of ostensible human rights violations and its failure to stand up for its own human development values. The UNDP position was that its neutral stance helped keep the door open for dialogue with the government, which would not have been possible had it taken a more combative stance. This helped preserve relations during a difficult period and served the country’s developmental needs.
Maldives was the only country under review where questions arose as to whether UNDP-GEF projects were truly relevant to inherent national priorities. According to a recent UNDP country programme evaluation, only two out of five environmental priorities for the Maldives were of interest to GEF, and then only insofar as global benefits were involved. The UNDP environment portfolio appeared to be skewed towards those areas in which GEF funding was available (e.g. reducing carbon emissions), and paid less attention to issues of climate change which, for the Maldives, is a matter of survival. The UNDP environment portfolio has since been adjusted and now focuses significant attention on developing strategies and plans to cope with climate change-related environmental problems. Situations like this highlight the importance of ensuring that UNDP engages with global funds to address national priority issues, and that governments should look to international financing institutions and bilateral donors to support the types of initiatives that are not covered by global funds (e.g. infrastructure for drinking water, sanitation, waste management). In many places, UNDP had an important role as mediator to

The significance of global funds to national priorities was also shown by the potential impacts of such funding. In a number of countries, the large scale of GEF funding contributed to systemic change (e.g. Belarus and Tajikistan). GFATM funding in Iran provided opportunities for innovative programming in support of human development principles. Although funding is earmarked to specific projects, there was inevitably some crossover in terms of advisory work. Project staff often sat in ministries, which also enhanced wider government programmes.

While all projects were relevant, questions can be asked whether the most relevant challenges were being addressed first. For example, a recent thematic evaluation of UNDP contributions to environment and energy suggested that climate mitigation activities supported through UNDP-GEF initiatives were “often marginally relevant to the mainstream development agendas of countries, especially [least developed countries] and small island developing countries, and have distracted attention from the importance of providing affordable energy services to the poor.”

53 UNDP Evaluation Office, Evaluation of Role and Contribution of UNDP in Environment and Energy, New York, August 2008, p. x. It should be noted that the GEF programmatic focus on issues that have broader global environmental implications does not preclude governments, in partnership with UNDP, from seeking funding through other donors for issues that are of more immediate local relevance.

ensure that country needs were matched with available funding.

There was some debate about whether global funds diverted international funding from other causes. However, the issue was how such funds were used and applied nationally, and whether the availability of global fund support encouraged poor countries to divert scarce national resources and capacities into securing and managing related initiatives. Occasionally, the concern was expressed that funds were imposed on countries or that UNDP pressured governments into such projects. However, no evidence was found to support such allegations. To the contrary, recipient governments were found to be assertive about their requirements, particularly as they often needed to co-finance global fund-supported projects and endorse them at political and technical levels. The majority of governments were appreciative of the sort of activities and expertise generated by such funding sources.

Global fund and UNDP relevance may have been affected by government policies towards international aid or its ability to access international funds. For example, when Chile chose to reduce its reliance on loans, development banks’ roles decreased and UNDP importance correspondingly increased. A preference for more flexible, quick-impact funds may lessen the recourse to global funds and possibly UNDP.

UNDP also had a legitimate role in shaping national agendas, which entailed highlighting and advocating matters that were not listed as national priorities. UNDP was credited with putting environmental issues such as persistent organic pollutants or energy efficiency on the table in a number of countries, including Chile, Honduras, Morocco and Zimbabwe.

UNDP plays an essential role in managing global funds at the national level, and is sometimes the only feasible or available international partner. It may implement directly due to a lack of national capacity arising from political or security reasons, governance issues or a lack of management and administrative expertise. UNDP often filled essential roles in managing global funds at the national level and in mobilizing resources from international donors. For example, when bilateral donors pulled out of Zimbabwe, UNDP became the sole channel of international assistance to the country (approximately $500 million) by galvanizing support for basket funds and using global funds.

**Box 3. Tajikistan: obstacles to handing programme control to national authorities**

The donor community in Tajikistan has been concerned with governance issues, as reflected in numerous reports, rankings and surveys. GFATM, sharing these concerns, has repeatedly decided not to transfer Principal Recipient responsibilities from UNDP to national authorities. However, addressing governance issues has not been an explicit agenda item in the context of the UNDP-GFATM partnership. For example, GFATM did not share with UNDP its assessment reports that covered governance issues. UNDP capacity development assessments were not applied to the government agencies involved in the GFATM programmes.

Parallel to governance issues, Tajikistan lacks technical and managerial capacity. In acknowledging its national agencies’ lack of capacity, the government and other stakeholders suggested that UNDP could have done more to provide systematic training to relevant government institutions.

UNDP (in partnership with the World Health Organization) is planning to undertake a comprehensive assessment of national government capacities with a view towards providing the systematic training. However, governance issues, in particular the question of governmental agencies’ ability to manage financial flows in accordance with GFATM requirements, are still being sidelined. A more explicit capacity development strategy, providing a shared understanding of the multitude of criteria that need to be satisfied to achieve this goal, could contribute to minimizing misunderstandings and to establishing a clear plan of action.
UNDP implements directly where there is a lack of national capacity due to political or security reasons, governance issues or inadequate management and administrative expertise. A variety of practical factors can impede national implementation (see Box 3), such as a lack of efficient procedures for financial approval, funds being lost in national budget cycles and requiring parliamentary approval before they can be used, or all expenditures—even for a few dollars—requiring a minister’s personal signature. Other factors include the absence of legislation allowing governments to subcontract non-governmental organizations or the fragmentation or absence of functioning government structures. In stable middle-income countries, such as Malaysia and Namibia, UNDP provides support to national implementation, playing the role of service provider and adviser on project design, grant application and monitoring.

In some contexts, UNDP collaborated with other organizations. In GFATM initiatives, UNDP was the main recipient of funds within a complex implementation structure. In Belarus, for example, UNDP was the Principal Recipient of GFATM funding and worked with the main implementing partner, the Ministry of Health, along with 23 other government structures and 50 non-governmental organizations. In some contexts, the UNDP role was limited to financial conduit. There was often no alternative to UNDP: all global funds restrict entry to a limited number of recipient agencies, and these were not always present in country, interested in the projects concerned or had the capability to deliver on them. In some cases, alternative partners were available, but UNDP was seen as the best option, having a good track record for implementation.

National authorities usually welcomed UNDP in global fund implementation, which often built on a long-standing historical relationship. Even governments with evident implementation capacity were seen to be making the pragmatic choice of keeping UNDP as a service provider. In the case of global funds, UNDP specialist knowledge on project design and grant application was a reason for choosing to work through UNDP. This was in keeping with broader global trends that show that UNDP relationships with governments evolve as a country develops. For example, a number of high-capacity countries (e.g. Brazil, China and India), have asked UNDP to help them export their knowledge and expertise to other countries.

In some cases, governments that were able to take on financial responsibilities disputed UNDP involvement. These situations tended to be GFATM projects where the donor had assigned the role of Principal Recipient to UNDP on the basis of national authorities’ limited capacities. These included cases where national authorities had previously failed in the role of Principal Recipient due to fund diversion or poor performance. There were also localized instances of poor relations between UNDP and government officials, partially caused by weak communication on the part of UNDP, but also due to governments’ stance on international aid.

National capacity development is highlighted in agreements between UNDP and global funds. While project-based capacity development activities are commonplace, UNDP does not prioritize a longer-term vision and a systematized approach aimed at enabling national partners to be self-sufficient. Capacity development in order to enable national authorities “to develop the ability of national partners to do things for themselves or do things better without the United Nations having to play the same role again” is central to United Nations commitments. The UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2011 places a strong emphasis on capacity assessment, development and monitoring.

national capacity development from the outset and made this part of their agreements with UNDP.

At GFATM and GEF headquarters, interviewees expressed the concern that UNDP offices appeared to stall over capacity development simply to retain funds. However, aside from isolated cases where this may be a problem, there was no evidence to suggest this was a widespread practice.

Another reason some UNDP offices gave the impression of being slow to hand over authority is that they entered agreements with government counterparts under difficult circumstances in which capacity development appears to be a distant likelihood or not properly defined. While UNDP has developed guidance on effective capacity development, in practice it is often not considered user-friendly or sufficiently comprehensive and adaptable to specific national circumstances. Further, there is no mandatory approach to capacity assessment, baseline setting or exit strategies. Each country office proceeded

Even in the most challenging contexts, there was a sense among fund managers and within recipient governments that UNDP could do more to prepare for handover to national authorities. This is despite national stakeholders’ recognition that handover is very likely remote due to a variety of factors beyond UNDP control, such as the need for institutional government reform. Handover will also depend on a donor assessment of national authorities’ competence. In one case where the government is pressing for control, GFATM has specified 100 issues that need to be resolved before it can transmit funds directly to government agencies. Risk is also a key consideration for UNDP since, as the custodian of funds, it remains accountable for them even if other players are given additional responsibilities.

Nevertheless, there are expectations that UNDP should do more. The matter came to a head within the context of the UNDP-GFATM partnership when the GFATM executive board raised the issue with UNDP. Both GFATM and GEF prioritized

Box 4. Lebanon: making cross-linkages between MLF and GEF-supported projects and UNDP strategic objectives

In Lebanon, the linkages between the UNDP-MLF partnership and wider UNDP development objectives are limited. MLF only requires reporting on the reduction of ozone depleting substances, and UNDP does not capture other effects in its own reporting. The country office is aware that there are some development effects in terms of job creation, education and training. For example, the MLF programme trained many individual, low-skilled freelance mechanics and distributed new technologies to public schools. One study on the economic after-effects of MLF showed that private factory production costs decreased by 20 percent, but did not measure impacts on employment opportunities and standards of living. Distribution of free machinery to the private sector was not accompanied by any activities to assess other social impacts or to promote UNDP values. While this may not have been feasible in practice, is a missed opportunity to develop such links.

Linkages were more visible under GEF projects. Alignment with UNDP development objectives are usually reviewed during project design, and GEF projects may include practical components such as the conservation of biodiversity in medicinal plants and reforestation, which incorporate working with communities. These elements frequently include livelihood components. The GEF Small Grants Programme integrates issues such as poverty reduction and gender equality as assessment criteria. Linkages were evident in policy-level work, but were not always present in mainstream projects. The climate change project, for example, has not yet considered gender issues even though these are well-debated internationally. Some project staff confirmed that they did not habitually take wider development results into account, nor did the UNDP country offices ask them to do so.

Whether linkages are formally made or not, GEF environmental projects may have important development outcomes in terms of job creation and new markets. The solar water heater project, for example, opened up $8 to $10 million in new markets in Lebanon; though progress reports, newsletters, and the country office Web site routinely highlighted this fact, the longer-term impacts on jobs and livelihoods have not been tracked. In the conservation of biodiversity project, participating farmers were already achieving a higher price for their produce as compared to pre-project sales. However, the project is still in its early stage and full impacts on livelihoods have yet to be measured.
There has been varying emphasis on developing technical capacities rather than project management capacities. In one location where UNDP support was highly valued, government officials said that they need capacity development on administration and procurement, as this was the main impediment to the government taking control—not merely technical capacity. In this context, the World Bank plans to step in to support the missing elements. In another country, following claims from the government that UNDP was not doing enough capacity development, a capacity assessment and development plan has been initiated.

It should be noted that some country offices (e.g. Jordan) already take a more systematic approach to capacity assessment and development using whatever limited tools are currently available, such as the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers; government counterparts have praised this approach. Even in places where UNDP has been criticized for being slow to hand over, such as Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe, there was still an acknowledgement that national authorities have been successfully supported to take increased ownership.

The UNDP GFATM unit is leading the way on capacity development, following GFATM differently, depending on the direction of UNDP management and receptivity of the national counterpart. Some country offices undertook rigorous capacity assessments, while others based their approach on intuition or light assessments.

UNDP has only recently begun to design capacity development quality assurance functions with the full support of senior UNDP management. This will enable a more comprehensive approach in the future. In the absence of such an approach, UNDP country offices have often overlooked opportunities to develop capacity (however small), been unable to objectively track progress towards national ownership and have been unable to explain what they are doing on these matters.

Nonetheless, UNDP does undertake some capacity development activities. This evaluation would concur with the findings of a recent evaluation of UNDP contributions to strengthening national capacities. Project-specific support is commonplace and seen as relevant and effective by national partners. However, there remains a frequent lack of a long-term perspective aimed at building national partners to such an extent that they are able to successfully take over activities without UNDP support.56

56 Ibid, pp. xiii.

a. Institutional Strengthening and Coherence for Integrated Natural Resources Management (MENARID)—A global project in the GEF International Waters portfolio, focusing on the Middle East and North Africa.
criticisms. The unit is making a concerted effort to design capacity development plans for all countries where UNDP is the Principal Recipient. Through the GEF programme, UNDP has focused significant attention on capacity development, supporting the conduct of detailed assessments in most programme countries on capacities to implement actions based on international environmental conventions.\(^{57}\)

**There is a good fit between the objectives of the UNDP-global fund partnerships and current UNDP strategic objectives and international commitments. Challenges remain in cross-linkages with other strategic objectives at the project level. Alignment with the UNDP core mandate is a matter of ongoing debate.** The coherence between the UNDP mandate and partnership with global funds can be viewed from different perspectives: the fit between the current UNDP strategy and global funds’ objectives; practical cross-linkages at the project level between different organizational objectives and priorities; and the adherence to UNDP core purposes and mandate.

At the level of current UNDP strategic objectives and international commitments, partnership with global funds fit well. Project objectives were generally aligned with country programme objectives and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which in turn fed into global UNDP objectives. This happens as a matter of course with each project through the UNDP project management system.

Current UNDP strategic goals and objectives are broadly framed and encompass a wide variety of development activities. The core goals UNDP set in its 2002 second multi-year funding framework include managing energy and environment for sustainable development and responding to HIV/AIDS. The Strategic Plan 2008–2011 focus areas include poverty reduction and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. These provide ample scope for the activities currently being carried out with existing global fund partners; GEF and MLF are linked to objectives on the environment, whereas GFATM comes under objectives on HIV/AIDS or the Millennium Development Goals. However, evaluations of the UNDP results-based management system have critiqued the lack of precision in corporate goal-setting and observed that country offices can easily manipulate programmes to fit loose overarching objectives.\(^{58}\)

The evaluation team examined cross-linkages at the project level between global fund activities and other UNDP strategic objectives (e.g., poverty reduction and gender equality). A mixed picture has emerged. In terms of environmental projects, some country offices attempted to anchor these in a broader agenda by integrating human development perspectives into discussions on national environmental policy. Programme techniques, such as cross-sectoral team meetings or checklists, were used to ensure that global fund projects integrated with other UNDP objectives. In some country offices, staff admitted that these connections were not habitually made, some struggled with turning theory into practice and others encountered resistance from colleagues and saw the need for a shift in mindset.

There was a general lack of effort to integrate environmental issues into non-environmental projects, thus missing opportunities for an integrated approach to sustainable development. A recent UNDP thematic evaluation on the poverty-environment nexus suggested “UNDP’s focus area structure promotes a ‘silo effect’ that makes cooperation across sectors difficult” and highlighted the lack of coordination between the environment and poverty focus areas in many countries.\(^{59}\) This evaluation reinforces those

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findings; only one office reported that it took environmental considerations into account when preparing development projects that do not have an explicit environmental focus.

There are observable differences between funds. In MLF, for example, there appeared to be missed opportunities to integrate dialogue on wider development concerns with the private sector as UNDP was providing technical and financial assistance, or to capture unintended positive economic and social effects that arose through those programmes (see Box 4). GEF projects would have benefited from more efforts to integrate wider UNDP priorities. Although headquarters provided guidance on ensuring integration of environmental projects with socio-economic and gender concerns, feedback from country offices suggested that implementing this nexus remains a challenge in practice. Previous evaluations of the UNDP-GEF partnership have been concerned that the preponderance of GEF financing used within the UNDP environment and energy programme ran the risk of diverting UNDP from its core focus on addressing priority national concerns. This risk was not, per se, a function of partnership with GEF, but reflected conscious choices by UNDP country office management to concentrate on GEF-funded initiatives instead of other environmental issues that would have required funding from other sources.

These concerns have noticeably abated in recent years, as the GEF strategic programme has expanded its attention to key development issues such as land degradation and sustainable development (see Boxes 4 and 5). There is also an opportunity for reporting on broader development impacts in the GEF monitoring and evaluation framework. In addition, the funding base for the UNDP Environment and Energy Programme has expanded to the point where the GEF trust fund now provides less than 50 percent of external UNDP funding support. The result is that in some places, such as Iran, UNDP is achieving success in implementing projects that integrate GEF-funded initiatives into wider human development-oriented programmes that are co-financed by other donors or programme country governments.

The GFATM partnership was considered a good fit with the overall UNDP strategic priorities, particularly where projects focused on national capacity development. There were a number of examples where the partnership has benefited the UNDP approach to human development, for example projects that enabled country offices to better understand and address highly relevant development challenges related to sex workers, drug users and prison populations; projects that supported gender equality; and projects that entered new programme areas (e.g. work with religious groups).

The question of how the work with global funds fits with the UNDP mandate is an ongoing discussion. The core UNDP purpose is to promote human development, but the concept is subject to variable interpretations, and UNDP’s core mandate is not enshrined in statute as with some other United Nations agencies. Some take the view that the UNDP mandate is being interpreted too broadly, resulting in strategic plans that are too all-encompassing. There have been differing views over the course of UNDP history as to whether specific sectors such as environment, health, and education should be within the organization’s purview at all. For the purpose of this evaluation, it is only possible to observe that the partnerships with the global funds under review fall within the UNDP mandate as it is currently interpreted through the Strategic Plan 2008–2011.

In delivering global fund programmes, UNDP—as the custodian of the Resident Coordinator function—has a role in coordinating initiatives with other concerned development actors. While relations with such development actors have often been mutually

beneficial, they have also, occasionally, been competitive or one-sided. Coordination with other development actors, particularly United Nations members of the country team, is intrinsic to the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2011 and its role as manager of the Resident Coordinator system. United Nations coordination works well at a formal United Nations Development Assistance Framework level, but there is scope for closer cooperation. In relation to GFATM, some countries praised UNDP for its role in galvanizing other players and for mobilizing technical assistance and utilizing networks to the competitive advantage of other United Nations agencies.

UNDP also acts as administrator for United Nations agencies that wish to implement projects but do not have an in-country presence. In this context, agreement on administration costs can be an issue and United Nations agencies may choose other administrators. With respect to procurement under GFATM, UNDP partners frequently include the United Nations Population Fund and UNICEF.

In cases where coordination with other United Nations partners did not work well, interviewees lamented the lack of ongoing coordination and joint initiatives in relation to global funds. United Nations country team members expressed concerns that UNDP worked on issues that are not its specialization (e.g. land tenure or agriculture) and did not consult or involve specialized agencies. For example, UNDP did not actively seek specialized agencies’ participation in project management boards or involve them in an advisory capacity.

External stakeholders, including United Nations agencies, raised the issue of unfair competition from UNDP in relation to different global funds. UNDP staff agreed that there can be a sense of competition at the country and institutional levels. The lack of standardized procedures among United Nations agencies also causes problems and led to questions from national authorities on why different United Nations rules apply, for example, to the use of money from global funds to pay civil servants’ salaries.

However, some global funds took the view that competition is constructive and helps drive efficiency; it can also work to the benefit of recipient governments. In one case, both the government and some United Nations agencies suggested that a certain level of competition between agencies is beneficial, as it enables governments to secure better deals.

Relations with civil society tended to be weak, with UNDP often being criticized for being too close to governments. In one example, UNDP remained engaged with a government that was heavily criticized internationally for its human rights record; UNDP was accused of ignoring human rights violations. However, its continued presence left open at least one channel for dialogue and development aid. The findings also suggested that partnership with global funds may help UNDP open up to non-governmental organizations and communities, e.g. through the GEF small grants programme or GFATM Country Coordinating Mechanisms.

4.1.2 GLOBAL FUND EFFECTIVENESS

According to the assessment systems of the global funds under review, UNDP work is considered effective. UNDP generally receives satisfactory to high scores demonstrating its ability to deliver well within the context of such partnerships. The advent of global funds has brought an increased emphasis on results-based management. Each of the funds under review has systems for regularly measuring recipient agencies’ performance and in rating them against each other. These external measurement systems have found UNDP work to be effective. UNDP work generally receives satisfactory to high scores, demonstrating its ability to deliver well within the context of such partnerships. Recent scores61

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61 As of April 2011.
from each of the funds that illustrate satisfactory performance include:

- GEF’s fourth overall performance study (2004–2009) gives an outcome rating of 78 percent for projects achieving moderately satisfactory or higher targets; UNDP is second place behind the World Bank and ahead of UNEP. GEF also gives a rating for agency performance in terms of overall quality of supervision provided; UNDP received the highest score of 92 percent.

- GFATM rates 92 percent of UNDP-managed grants as A or B1, which is higher than the average of 82 percent for all GFATM grants in all countries where the recipient agency is likely to be a national authority.

- MLF’s average weighted assessment of implementing agency performance in the years 2006 to 2010 awards 80 out of 100 points to UNDP; UNEP was awarded an average of 83 points, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 92 points and the World Bank 79 points.

The comparison with other recipients is not necessarily informative. Ratings vary year to year and the results themselves, positive or not, cannot be solely attributed to UNDP. Because UNDP often operates within a complex network of sub-recipients, various contextual factors affect performance reviews. UNDP often works in particularly difficult country contexts, as Principal Recipient of last resort under GFATM for example, a factor that is not weighted in the performance assessment. Moreover, although each of the funds seeks to harmonize approaches across agencies in order to find comparable results, there remain differences between recipient organizations in terms of target setting and monitoring progress. This renders comparisons between agencies unreliable to some degree.

Beyond internal rating systems that focus on implementing agency performance, there is ample evidence (based on comprehensive evaluations of GFATM and GEF) that work conducted by these global funds contributed to the achievement of development results. The ‘Five-Year Evaluation’ of the GFATM, which was completed in 2009, showed that GFATM contributed to results by having an effect on the disease burden in the countries in which it operates. Independent evidence suggests that MLF significantly contributed to the successful phase-out of CFCs worldwide, which not only benefited the ozone layer but also contributed considerably to climate-change mitigation.

The ‘Five-Year Evaluation’ concluded, “the GFATM had contributed to the rapid expansion of programming addressing HIV/AIDS, [tuberculosis], and malaria and helped mobilize existing capacities in the most affected countries.”

Similarly, the 2010 GEF ‘Fourth Overall Performance Study’ concluded, “GEF grants are relevant to national environmental and sustainable development priorities as well as to international and regional processes.”

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62 In the last GEF Evaluation Office periodic review (‘Fourth Overall Performance Study of the GEF’, GEF Evaluation Office, 2010) UNDP was singled out as providing excellent project support and adaptive management. Initial UNDP project documents may not be as strong and well-documented as those of other partners, but the organization does well in undertaking mid-course corrections so the projects end up meeting or exceeding expectations.

63 Ratings fluctuate from year to year. Performance indicators are set by each agency in the context of annual work plans, and often relate to specific portfolios and activities. Ratings of different agencies are thus not strictly comparable since they reflect different contexts and standards.


Box 6. Tajikistan: making tangible inroads into the elimination of malaria

Tajikistan's malaria epidemic peaked in the mid-1990s, when up to 30,000 cases were being detected annually. The upsurge in the epidemic was largely due to the civil war and the interruption of malaria control measures. In 1999, however, the annual number of malaria cases fell to about 13,400 and continued to decrease drastically into the 2000s, as malaria control measures were reintroduced. With the support of the UNDP-GFATM partnership, these measures, which are considered to have contributed significantly to the success of the malaria control programme, included implementing a comprehensive training programme, strengthening institutional capacities, procuring necessary supplies, performing wide-scale vector-control activities and extending social mobilization measures. Malaria has now been virtually eliminated in Tajikistan; only a few cases are registered annually. Key development results achieved through the GFATM programme of over a period of eight years include:

- Considerable decrease of malaria incidence and elimination of the most severe strain of malaria (plasmodium falciparum) in Tajikistan;
- Shift in paradigm from control to elimination of malaria in Tajikistan to make Millennium Development Goal 6 achievable, with the formulation of a national programme for malaria elimination by 2015; and
- 100 percent coverage of vulnerable households in malaria-prone districts with indoor residual spraying.

The GFATM malaria grant created a unique opportunity to scale up malaria control activities and consolidate achievements. At this stage, it is very important to continue implementation of antimalarial activities. The disease remains endemic in the south-western parts of the country. Any relaxation of health services and weakening of pressure may undermine results achieved thus far. Sustainability challenges include heavy reliance on external funding to maintain and scale up the programmes, poor health care infrastructure, lack of joint regional malaria control interventions with neighbouring countries, poor motivation of health workers and corresponding health care worker migration and weak multi-sectoral coordination.

Notion that countries have used GEF funding to facilitate improved environmental policies and legislation and, as such, that GEF has contributed to solving global environmental problems. The ‘Performance Study’ further concludes that UNDP, as the manager of the Small Grants Programme, has been successful in addressing local populations’ livelihood needs, with specific focus on reaching the poor.67 By implication, given extensive UNDP involvement in the work of these global funds, it may be assumed that UNDP has made an important contribution to achieving these results.

Moreover, agencies added value in ways that were not part of the formal assessment process. UNDP was credited with driving forward an innovative follow-on programme on the phase-out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons after MLF initial objectives regarding chlorofluorocarbons had been achieved. Several interviewees commended UNDP support in helping GFATM develop a policy on human rights-based approaches.

In countries such as Iran, project management and monitoring and evaluation performance indicators did not capture effectiveness in terms of capacity development. Moreover, the compound effects of using different funds may only be captured when there is a broader country office evaluation.

Research at the country level echoes these findings on effectiveness. Not all funds give a composite rating of national programmes; GFATM and MLF give ratings by country, but GEF is implemented through a sequence of individual projects—an overall picture only emerges when and if the country office itself does a programme or outcome evaluation. There are certainly notable achievements under each of the funds. These include the award-winning methyl bromide work under MLF in Lebanon; dramatic

health impacts under GFATM, such as the virtual elimination of malaria in Tajikistan (see Box 6), and systemic changes to health care approaches to tuberculosis in Belarus, recognized as best practice leaders in their region. GEF funded well-recognized, cutting-edge energy efficiency initiatives in a number of places, including Lebanon and Mauritius.

Some outcomes were not as positive. For example, projects that were delayed for years sometimes lead to funding being withheld. In one case, a project that eventually proved highly effective was marred by serious delays in the early years and put on probation—UNDP project management and design was blamed for these problems. However, the donor fund was new and suffering from problems related to start up, and government counterparts failed to meet their obligations. There were also rare cases of corruption infecting individual global fund programmes at the country level. For example, as manager of a significant volume of GFATM funds, UNDP came under close scrutiny when allegations of corruption were highlighted in the press in early 2011. UNDP responded by announcing its commitment to enhanced financial safeguards.68

Project effectiveness was due to several factors, including comparative advantages, UNDP management systems, the calibre of its staff in country offices, regional service centres and headquarters and good support from external stakeholders. Where problems occurred, they were likewise a combination of internal weaknesses and external constraints.

4.1.3 GLOBAL FUND EFFICIENCY

Efficient support to global funds is provided through the three-tier structure of headquarters units, regional service centres and country offices. In specific instances, the performance of regional service centres in underpinning country offices’ work varies considerably.

External stakeholders suggested that global funds were well supported by UNDP’s three-tier structure—headquarters units, regional service centres and country programmes. The headquarters units, which vary considerably in size from fund to fund, are housed in the Bureau for Development Policy. There was reportedly cross-fertilization between the units responsible for each of the funds, but there was no clear evidence of this. Some regional bureaux staff lamented the absence of an overall coordination function for UNDP work with global funds. For example, UNICEF has a position dealing with programme partnerships precisely to cover this dimension.

Coordination between the headquarters, regional and country level worked well on the whole. UNDP offices engaged in implementing specific funds had opportunities to attend global workshops or receive peer support and welcomed these measures as good practices. Country offices mainly attended regional service centres, which exist to provide technical support and have little contact with headquarters. A number of country offices expressed satisfaction with the support received from the regional service centres.

Overall, also taking into account the results of a range of GEF evaluations conducted across the world, strong support from regional service centres can be credited for UNDP successes in expanding its share of GEF projects. However, some country offices and national stakeholders suggested that there was insufficient help. This lack of support, particularly in GEF project preparation, occasionally (sometimes in the name of replicating successful project designs) led to ‘cookie-cutter’ projects unsuited to national contexts. Lack of support also led to insufficient communication and/or knowledge about GEF requirements.

Stakeholders expressed concerns about delays caused by regional offices. UNDP staff, in one case, attributed part of the blame for failing to

Responses at the field level were mixed. In some quarters, there was high praise for UNDP systems relative to the complicated country context in which it operated. There was acknowledgement that UNDP procedures were stringent but justifiably and necessarily so given the local contexts; systems were perceived as probably no more stringent than other international agencies—and far less than national agencies. One case study reported that UNDP disbursements were fast as compared to other United Nations agencies.

However, there were also a significant number of complaints about slow procurement processes; cumbersome and inconsistent accounting, planning and reporting procedures; and delayed disbursements. Further complaints focused on the inappropriate application of UNDP rules, for example, in remote areas unable to meet UNDP requirements or prioritizing cost over quality in procurement decisions. In some countries, sub-recipients said they did not receive grants until the implementation period was nearly over, which meant that they did not have the money to pay contractors or that all activities had to be compressed into a shorter time-frame.

Increased sharing of information on procedural rules was called for. In two countries where project management processes were closely examined, the evaluation team found various factors such as weaknesses in coordination between projects, follow-up, situation analysis, and technical quality impeded effectiveness.

The decentralized UNDP structure is seen as an advantage from the field level, as it enabled in-depth knowledge of context and independent action by country offices. However, headquarters staff said it was a challenge to ensure a harmonized approach to specific global funds across country offices without line management or at least technical authority over field staff. It was also difficult to ensure all country and/or regional offices had the necessary specialist expertise.

The rigidity of UNDP procedures is both an asset and a concern for global funds and national governments. There is a high level of comfort that UNDP will manage donor resources as intended and in line with strict internal standards. However, procedures are often perceived as overly bureaucratic and prone to delays. Some staff at GFATM and GEF raised concerns about the rigidity of UNDP procedures. The same complaints were not raised by MLF, possibly because the UNEP-administered fund is governed by similar procedures to UNDP. By contrast, GEF uses systems that are closer to World Bank modalities.

development banks. The application process was said to require inside knowledge of GEF intricacies rather than knowledge of environmental issues—leading to the emergence of a small group of highly sought-after consultants known for writing successful proposals. Using English as the official language was an impediment for some francophone countries, particularly in completing project implementation reviews. A common complaint was that the GEF approval process is too long, affecting both the relevance of the projects and cost efficiency (e.g. through loss of co-financers, prices going up or currencies depreciating).

There were some opposing views on these points. Some countries appreciated the detailed planning process, despite the time it takes, because it gives them better tools for implementation and follow-up. Also, GEF processes have reportedly been amended, which has eased the process. GEF flexibility and openness to adapting proposals at the inception stage was appreciated and helped offset the relevance problem, if not the cost. There was also praise for UNDP-GEF principal technical advisers.

From the UNDP perspective, some inefficiencies at the day-to-day working level can be attributed to the global funds themselves. Such issues are part of the ongoing dialogue between organizations, with the aim of improving efficiency on all sides. Interviewees at UNDP headquarters and country offices raised concerns about global fund inefficiencies (see Box 8). Issues related to GEF included: rules and regulations being complex and restrictive, the project cycle being too short for lasting outcomes and co-financing requirements that are regarded as putting UNDP at a disadvantage as compared to loan-offering

**Box 7. Lebanon: UNDP administration: pluses and minuses**

Government officials working with UNDP in the context of its partnerships with GEF and MLF considered administrative principles and procedures to have been explained to them well, and compared UNDP bureaucracy favourably with national administrative processes. Most commended UNDP on its financial transparency suggesting that UNDP was correct, easy to deal with administratively and one of the most transparent donors in Lebanon.

However, some UNDP staff questioned the appropriateness of corporate procurement process, since it did not always appear practical when applied to small-scale grass-roots implementation activities (including some GEF projects). For example, UNDP recently changed its individual contracts modality from a recruitment process of short-term consultants to a procurement process where candidates were required to submit bids with financial offers. This may have implications even for grass-roots projects involving local builders constructing low-cost (a few hundred dollars) medical waste storage units, or involving farmers planting seeds under biodiversity projects. It is not feasible to expect written bids from possibly illiterate community members. While UNDP headquarters did inform staff in country offices about changes to procurement rules, there is a sense that new rules were not properly piloted before being implemented.

UNDP offices. Some staff found ways of dealing with UNDP constraints by factoring in time for administrative delays.

A clear positive on the administrative side was the very encouraging feedback regarding UNDP staff in country offices and regional service centres. Government representatives described UNDP as a model donor for its consultative and inclusive approach. There were some complaints about the human resources management system, and several government officials pointed to high staff turnover and time-consuming recruitment procedures. In response, headquarters noted challenges to retaining skilled staff in the face of unpredictable funding from global funds.

From the UNDP perspective, some inefficiencies at the day-to-day working level can be attributed to the global funds themselves. Such issues are part of the ongoing dialogue between organizations, with the aim of improving efficiency on all sides. Interviewees at UNDP headquarters and country offices raised concerns about global fund inefficiencies (see Box 8). Issues related to GEF included: rules and regulations being complex and restrictive, the project cycle being too short for lasting outcomes and co-financing requirements that are regarded as putting UNDP at a disadvantage as compared to loan-offering
person comes on board. There were doubts about the qualifications of some staff; for example, complaints that Local Fund Agents lacked basic accounting skills. These staffing issues may have been the cause of what is perceived as a lack of understanding of UNDP’s role and the contexts in which it works. Stakeholders also criticized complex requirements and what was seen as the trialling of new and inefficient procedures. The long negotiation process delayed disbursements to UNDP and consequently to sub-recipients. Criticisms also included the non-sharing of information, such as GFATM capacity assessments of government structures. No issues were raised about MLF. Though it received less coverage in this evaluation, the system seems straightforward and well-understood.

A general observation was that some of these issues reflected UNDP staff discomfort at the organization being treated as a contractor by the global funds rather than a partner on an equal footing. This highlights a new dynamic at play when UNDP works with non-core funders, including global funds like GEF, which allocate funding on a competitive basis. In such situations the ability to bring in funds is seen as a measure of staff performance, which incentivizes maximizing the UNDP market share of GEF grants.

While this incentive structure promotes efficient, competent, innovative and quality work, it can also lead to a sense among staff that the organization is becoming donor-led and suffering a loss of status and direction.

Issues arising between UNDP and global funds appeared to be taken up to some extent. The establishment of a UNDP coordination unit working with GFATM in Geneva has helped to smooth relations. There is robust dialogue by UNDP headquarters with both GEF and GFATM, but UNDP has so far been in a defensive position on costs, transparency, national capacity development and in safeguarding its position. There is scope for a more evidence-based and constructive dialogue with these global funds, some of which are relatively young as institutions, in order to help them streamline their processes. UNDP has its own administrative challenges, but there are areas where it can draw on its experience, particularly in collaboration with other fund recipients in order to share knowledge and lessons learned and avoid repetition of past mistakes.

The overall monitoring and evaluation systems for global funds are found to work well and are often seen as more advanced than general UNDP requirements. There are challenges in

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**Box 8. Honduras: challenges for UNDP in operating under GFATM procedures**

Honduras was one of the first countries in which GFATM grants were issued, and as a result, the UNDP country office faced many problems related to a new organization’s learning process. For example, during implementation, GFATM required that many adjustments and procedural changes be made, such as the use of different report formats. In addition, it was not initially clear how many persons could be contracted to support administrative tasks; as a result the UNDP staff was overloaded with work.

At the outset, the roles and functions of the different stakeholders (e.g. the Principal Recipient, the government and the members of non-governmental organizations) was also not clear, which resulted in tensions and complaints. From the UNDP point of view, it felt very much like an experimental process while GFATM refined its approach and procedures.

Although it effectively became a learning experience for all involved, there were serious consequences in so far as the project was put on probation by GFATM, causing delays and tensions. The fact that this was a new experience was not properly communicated to different stakeholders, with the result that UNDP was blamed for project implementation inefficiencies. Eventually, however, the project became an important capacity-building experience for all parties—GFATM, UNDP and national authorities. Procedural bottlenecks were addressed and solutions found, leading to the successful delivery of planned outputs. Eventually, the Principal Recipient function was handed over to the government.
Overall, the monitoring and evaluation systems of the global funds—particularly as they are related to projects—are more advanced than those used by UNDP. UNDP has adapted well and shown a willingness to improve and learn. Of all the vertical funds implemented by UNDP, GEF provides the most specific guidance and expectations concerning monitoring and evaluation. The GEF guidance also differs from UNDP general evaluation policy by requiring that a specific rating system be used for gauging project performance, sustainability and results. Otherwise, the evaluation expectations between UNDP and GEF are in harmony as both follow United Nations Evaluation Group norms and standards. The UNDP Evaluation Office provides quality assurance on UNDP-GEF evaluations.

UNDP staff largely acknowledged the added value of global fund monitoring and evaluation procedures to UNDP operations. The Namibia office, for example, said that GEF monitoring and evaluation had been useful beyond GEF projects—it had facilitated the UNDP broader results agenda and made the organization more conscientious about reporting and quality assurance. Other countries appreciated GFATM compliance indicators. Independent evaluation reports of country programmes in Maldives and Malaysia noted the positive effects of global funds, concluding that the reporting and monitoring under those was better than under other UNDP projects.

While the monitoring and evaluation system worked well for the purposes of these funds, it was less clear whether the system sufficiently served UNDP and its own priorities (e.g. whether it captured unintended development effects). Staff noted that the UNDP system could have been more analytical and that it was too focused on process rather than outcomes or lessons learned. Project evaluations often identified problems in design, the absence of clear outcome indicators or poor baseline information and the lack of an
UNDP considers its cost structure to be reasonable and agreed to in partnership documents. Overhead charges range from 7 to 12 percent depending on the scope of agreed support and technical services UNDP is expected to provide. A Joint Inspection Unit report suggests that UNDP overhead charges are actually lower than those of its main United Nations partners. On average, United Nations agencies charge lower overheads than other implementers, including international non-governmental organizations. Critics, however, suggest that recipient governments do not collect any overhead at all and that local civil society organizations receive a lesser percentage under certain funds.

UNDP staff claimed it was more costly and demanding to implement global fund projects and suggested that the organization was actually subsidizing the global funds by working with them. Staff also noted that senior management time at country, regional and headquarters levels was not properly accounted for in determining UNDP’s contributions. However, to date no study has been carried out to ascertain the real costs of supporting the partnership and how that compares with the overhead resources generated.

Costs were apportioned between country, regional and headquarters offices according to standard formulas. Some field staff suggested that UNDP could have increased its competitiveness by being more flexible regarding overheads; headquarters saw this as unworkable and advised against a race to the bottom in terms of pricing. There were some aspects that would have benefited from further UNDP attention, such as ensuring that the differences in administrative fees charged to global funds has a rational basis, enabling cost redistribution between country offices based on the amount of work required to implement projects, or better explaining its cost structure to external stakeholders.

While UNDP overheads are agreed upon in the context of partnership documents, global funds’ staff often do not consider the level of UNDP charges to be justified. The rationale for overhead charges is not communicated adequately which has, at times, soured relations. UNDP cost recovery policies have been an issue for global funds: GEF and GFATM have questioned the level of overheads (MLF appears to have a more standardized cost structure and is able to work out mutually agreeable budgets). Some global fund staff perceived UNDP charges as excessive—sometimes due to misinformation about how much UNDP retained after paying suppliers, or a lack of appreciation of the risks involved in medical procurement. However, other global fund staff perceived costs as reasonable.

Though not a significant issue at the country level, some national partners commented that overheads were too high. For the most part, governments saw value for money in the fees charged by UNDP, and took the pragmatic view that these were reasonable and necessary costs of outsourced services. There were concerns about supply chain costs if multiple United Nations sub-recipients were involved, with each collecting their own fees. However, these concerns are often offset by the specialist experience accompanying their involvement.

UNDP and global funds, in particular GEF and GFATM have different views on financial transparency. This apparent incompatibility of accountability systems has led to some tensions, although a recent decision by the UNDP Executive Board aims to resolve differences. Overhead costs were connected to complaints from global funds about UNDP’s lack of transparency and financial openness. The matter came to a fore with GFATM when UNDP resisted calls to open its books by citing the United Nations single audit principle. While UNDP was perceived to have taken an overly legalistic approach, UNDP was adamant that it is a sovereign organization with its own governance structure and accountability and oversight systems, and that the demands placed on it are too invasive. Some UNDP country offices tried to resolve the situation by informally sharing information with local fund agents, but headquarters stopped this practice.

The relationships between country offices and local fund agents have been further clarified in the context of recent agreements between UNDP and GFATM.\textsuperscript{73} The dispute over transparency has undermined relations between the two agencies, with each side complaining about the conduct and approach of the other. Efforts to resolve these disagreements were taking place during the evaluation period. A June 2011 UNDP Executive Board decision\textsuperscript{74} to share audit reports with some global funds increased transparency—although respondents interviewed expressed doubts that this would resolve the situation. Since then, further high-level meetings and discussions have resulted in the December 2011 signing of two important agreements: a protocol for the disclosure of internal audit reports by UNDP, and an agreement between both organizations on cooperation in investigations. The lesson from this experience is that non-core funding will likely come with at least equal, if not, higher expectations in terms of transparency and accountability as compared to core funds, highlighting the need for UNDP to adapt to this changing context.

While GEF had similar concerns to GFATM, MLF did not share concerns over transparency, partly because it took a results-based approach and used standardized costs. Moreover, as a system administered under UNEP structures, there was more commonality with UNDP.

By comparison, there were relatively few complaints about UNDP’s lack of transparency at the country level, although the issue was raised in the context of three GFATM partnerships where the role of Principal Recipient was contested. More commonly, UNDP systems were praised for their transparency and clarity relative to those of national authorities or other donors. UNDP managers responsible for these funds took the view that the organization should become more transparent, provided that increased access did not become intrusive, burdensome or undermine UNDP operations and its competitive position.

An aspect that was evident at both global and national levels was that UNDP seemed poor at communicating what it stood for and what it did, leading to considerable misunderstanding and distrust among stakeholders.

Many factors beyond UNDP control adversely affect efficiency. In assessing UNDP performance in working with global funds, the challenge of working in difficult contexts is, at times, not fully recognized. Many factors beyond UNDP control hindered project implementation. These included political instability and fragmentation, insecurity and conflict, weak national administration and management capacities, weak in-country human resource capacity, lack of internal


coordination within government, lack of government will or ambivalence over certain policy areas, natural disasters and governance and corruption issues. Despite external challenges, the ability to use a direct execution modality (rather than a national execution modality), has enabled UNDP to ride out problems. For example a coup d’état in Honduras forced some other donor projects to close, but UNDP maintained its presence.

Country contexts with no extraneous impediments tended to be stable middle-income countries. External stakeholders acknowledged that UNDP works in difficult contexts where no other organizations are available, for example, as Principal Recipient of last resort under GFATM. However, given the nature of some criticisms of UNDP, critics did not sufficiently understand the depth of these challenges, nor were they sufficiently communicated by UNDP.

4.1.4 GLOBAL FUND SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability of initiatives supported by UNDP-global fund partnerships and the results of those initiatives has varied. Sustainability depends on the continued availability of funding and the motivation and capacity of national counterparts to carry initiatives forward. There were positive examples of sustainability, but also limitations. Success stories included the use of GEF funding to set up a sustainable land management initiative in Namibia and an energy efficiency programme in Lebanon—both now hosted by government departments and funded by independent mechanisms. In Iran, successful initiatives piloted under both GEF (relating, for example, to the involvement of local communities in biodiversity conservation) and GFATM (relating, for example, to the provision of support to vulnerable groups) are now being implemented with government resources in many additional locations. Feedback from the Resident Representatives’ survey suggested a high level of confidence in the sustainability of results achieved under these partnerships, with examples of lasting impacts on human resource capacity in Barbados, the creation of institutional structures in Albania and the development of new laws and policies in Mongolia.

Project impacts seem likely to be sustainable, although there was little evidence to support this point. Impact indicators were not always included in projects. Moreover, the sustainability of impacts varied with the fund, the project and the targets set. For example, MLF has finite conclusive impacts in terms of reduced damage to the ozone layer, whereas GEF projects are highly varied with more indeterminate impacts.

Sustainability rests on a variety of factors. Capacity development is central to continuation, but has not always been strong. National stakeholders expressed praise for positive efforts in this regard. For example, in Belarus UNDP built the capacities of both government and civil society through a series of trainings, guidelines, policy and legislative changes, which helped bring about dramatic changes in tuberculosis treatment.

Placing technical advisers within government departments (as opposed to within the UNDP management unit) appeared to make a difference to capacity development initiatives’ success. Moreover, middle-income countries such as Iran, with a relatively high level of capacity and resources, seemed to respond particularly well to capacity development and were able to apply lessons more easily to upscale activities.

Project design affected sustainability and appeared well-considered in some countries. For example, in one country, investments made to train doctors and nurses using GFATM funding were unsustainable as they were not integrated into the public health care system (including in terms of salary scales) and remained unemployed after the project ended (see Box 9). Government interest is always critical. Even where this exists, funding is necessary, for example, to pay civil servants to continue the work done by UNDP or to purchase medication to continue health services.

The sustainability of UNDP sectoral programmes is sometimes at risk where country
offices are heavily dependent on particular sources of funding for the continuation of their programmes. Alternative funding sources are often not actively sought or available at the country level. Heavy dependency on particular sources of funding is a concern. This is particularly the case with GEF, which is often intrinsic to the delivery of country office energy and environment portfolios. The evaluation team frequently encountered uncertainty and anxiety among staff on this point. Country offices were aware of the need to diversify, but few have successfully done so. UNDP Lebanon managed to reduce the reliance of its environment programme on GEF funding from 50 percent five years ago to 11 percent as of 2011.

Other global funds do not engender dependency in the same way; MLF has a very specific purpose that can only be serviced through that one particular funding source and does not affect the range of UNDP environmental work. The whole premise of the partnership with GFATM is on an as-needed basis.

Reliance on global funds is not necessarily a problem, provided that offices are set up to cope with funding fluctuations, for example with programme implementation units set up as an adjunct to the core business of the office. Risk assessments at the outset of a partnership would have been useful but were rarely, if ever, carried out. Awareness of an unhealthy dependence on particular funding sources gradually seems to grow with time. There were many calls from the field for more information-sharing and guidance from headquarters on sources of funding. However, in most middle-income countries there were few other sources of funding.

Partnership between UNDP and global funds is susceptible to a variety of factors. The sustainability of such partnership is not a given in a dynamic global development context in which the priorities of established players are evolving and new actors are emerging. Sustainability of partnerships often depends on factors outside of UNDP control. The funds have their own raison d’être and internal drivers. For example, the GEF Secretariat had been seeking a more expanded implementation role that would have impacted on UNDP and other implementing agencies had it gone through. It is assumed that as GEF opens up to more implementing organizations, the UNDP role will diminish.

The choice of UNDP as Principal Recipient of last resort under GFATM usually depends on local needs, capacities and viewpoints. MLF is a more predictable source than other funds as no changes to implementation arrangements are envisaged. Under all funds, much rests on relations with

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**Box 9. Honduras: failing to pay sufficient attention to sustainable capacity development**

In the context of the UNDP-GFATM partnership, UNDP was acting as Principal Recipient in Honduras. The project focused on training doctors and nurses to identify and treat HIV patients. However, the sustainability of this capacity development activity was not adequately considered in project planning and implementation. When the project was ready for handover, arrangements for the employment of medical staff that had been trained under the project were not in place. Government authorities were not in a position to take on the trained staff, as their salaries were considered too high compared to average national rates. The government’s subsequent recruitment process resulted in the selection of only four of the twelve doctors trained under the project. Moreover, some professionals’ working hours were reduced, affecting the overall delivery of the unit, and some nursing staff who had been trained under the GFATM project were transferred to other non-related technical areas.

A similar situation transpired in the context of the malaria programme under which many community volunteers were trained to conduct quick diagnoses and treatment of infected patients in isolated areas. Although the volunteers did not receive a salary during project implementation, they did receive some financial compensation that stopped when the project came to a close, leading to their departure. Paying greater attention to handover mechanisms and project-specific exit strategies would have significantly strengthened these projects’ sustainability.
national authorities that are increasingly participating in decisions regarding which agencies to work with. Moreover, recipient countries themselves may outgrow eligibility criteria. The graduation to middle-income country status means that some countries (e.g. the Maldives) will find it harder to acquire GFATM funds. In European Union accession countries, UNDP’s role changes as they cease to be recipient countries.

Overall, the quality of partnership between UNDP and global funds was subject to vicissitudes in international development cooperation. Its position has at times seemed precarious as donor funds and implementing agencies manoeuvred for position, and relations have become fraught as UNDP tried to find ways of adjusting to other organizations that are equally large and complex. In the context of such a fluid donor landscape, the sustainability of UNDP partnership with global funds cannot be taken for granted. There is a significant risk that UNDP will not be able to enjoy similar funding levels from global funds unless it can be agile and adaptable in the face of changing requirements (see Boxes 10 and 11).

4.2 PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS

The findings on philanthropic foundations are drawn from an analysis of the following sources: case studies of the Gates Foundation, Soros Foundation and Al Maktoum Foundation partnerships in eight countries and two regions developed through field visits or phone interviews; detailed notes from many global level interviews; review of background documents including a meta-analysis of UNDP Evaluation Office Assessment of Development Results; and a survey of Resident Representatives. In addition, some findings are based on interviews with United Arab Emirates-based stakeholders of a number of philanthropic foundations, including the Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation (Zayed Foundation), and the Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation (Khalifa Foundation) with which UNDP has engaged in the past.

4.2.1 PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATION RELEVANCE

In general, initiatives supported through partnership between UNDP and philanthropic foundations fit well with national and regional priorities. On some occasions, the alignment of such initiatives with UNDP principles and programmatic objectives is somewhat tenuous. UNDP partnership with philanthropic foundations has focused on issues that have been relevant to programme country governments, philanthropic foundations and UNDP. The

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**Box 10. Iran: ensuring the sustainability of results and partnership**

There were strong indications that many of the results achieved through the UNDP-GEF partnership can be sustained. Where UNDP-GEF projects have yielded interesting models, the government has demonstrated a pronounced willingness to build on lessons learned and to apply approaches to other sites across the country. Based on the Wetlands project, a national system of wetlands management is now under development. This management system will be adaptable to the context of other ecosystems. Based on the Carbon Sequestration project, the government has developed an integrated approach to sustainable rural development that has been included in Iran’s Fifth Five-Year Plan. The Asiatic Cheetah initiative, piloted through a UNDP-GEF project, is also being taken forward by the government. Finally, a significant number of spin-offs, including the replication of models, have resulted from initiatives piloted through the GEF Small Grants Programme.

The UNDP-GEF partnership is of critical importance to the Government of Iran, providing opportunities to not only obtain external financial contributions—which, by Iranian standards, are relatively modest—but, more importantly, to gain exposure to international practices and gain access to international expertise. As long as UNDP can deliver on this expectation, the sustainability of the partnership with GEF can be considered relatively high. However, given significant challenges in the day-to-day implementation of GEF co-funded projects, the government is actively looking for other partners—a diversification that would also mesh with GEF corporate efforts to reduce its reliance on UNDP.
Box 11. Burkina Faso: demonstrating relevance in a changing environment

UNDP-GEF projects have yielded demonstrable results in Burkina Faso, including improved capacity of the Permanent Secretariat of the National Council for Environment and Sustainable Development, as well as in a number of biodiversity protection and climate change initiatives with strong community development components. These positive results were tempered by some efficiency concerns. UNDP is using a direct execution modality in Burkina Faso, including a dedicated management unit for GEF projects. Some government counterparts considered this to be expensive compared to using other potential partners that can rely more readily on existing government administrative capacities. Some national counterparts have also indicated they are unhappy with UNDP reporting requirements through ATLAS, procurement delays, cumbersome procedures, high turnover of UNDP staff and weak country office capacity. The government is interested in identifying alternative implementing agencies, including other United Nations agencies.

The country office is aware that it is working in a more competitive atmosphere now that the GEF partnering agencies have expanded. This increased pressure is cited as a factor that contributes towards significant improvements in UNDP support over the past year, as reported by other national counterparts, who also highlighted their appreciation of UNDP’s role in facilitating access to GEF support, and in implementing GEF-funded initiatives.

GEF, in the context of global-level policy changes, will be moving in the future to allow accrediting of new nationally based project agencies in some countries. There is keen interest in Burkina Faso to utilize this option when available. UNDP’s continued position as a preferred GEF implementing agency in Burkina Faso will depend on a range of factors, including its ability to demonstrate its comparative advantage in delivering quality products and services in a timely manner.

two regional-level research initiatives, relating to food security in Africa (Gates Foundation) and knowledge codification, management and constraints in the Arab region (Al Maktoum), are relevant to UNDP in programmatic terms, particularly in light of the ongoing famine in Africa and the Arab Spring.

Box 12. Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal: harnessing partners to scale up multifunctional platforms

As part of their national poverty reduction strategies, multifunctional platforms—based on a model pioneered in India—have been introduced in five West African countries over the past two decades, with close UNDP involvement in Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal. Multifunctional platforms provide poor communities (women in particular), with basic time and labour-saving technology that is typically run by a small diesel engine. The multifunctional platforms can also be used for a range of income-generating initiatives. UNDP support to the multifunctional platform initiative began in Senegal in 1995, in Burkina Faso in 2000 and in Senegal in 2002. Over the years, contributions were received from bilateral donors, such as Denmark, Luxemburg, Norway and Switzerland, multilateral donors such as the African Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank, and philanthropic foundations such as the Shell Foundation and the Gates Foundation. Linkages with the European Union and the Economic Community of Western African States have also been fostered.

Activities have focused on establishing an increasing number of units across the countries, and providing accompanying capacity development support on a range of issues relating to activities, such as entrepreneurship development, agro-food processing and community organization. Though evidence relating to the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the multifunctional platform initiative is mixed (calling into question a range of implementation and partnership modalities), its relevance to the national priorities of programme countries and to the programmatic priorities of UNDP and many of its partners, including the Gates Foundation, is very clear.

Other initiatives supported through partnership with philanthropic foundations also addressed important development concerns. In Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal, the multifunctional platform initiative is a prime example of an initiative aimed at reducing poverty and addressing a wide range of human development concerns. The
initiative received strong support by programme country governments (which have moved to upscale the programme), and significant backing by the Gates Foundation on a subregional basis (see Box 12).

Similarly, the portfolio of democratic governance-related projects in Moldova, implemented with UNDP and Soros Foundation assistance, built on all parties’ shared values and programmatic priorities; it was closely aligned with the reformist agenda of the government. In Bulgaria, the interests of the government and the Gates Foundation and, to a lesser extent, UNDP, are brought under one umbrella in the context of an initiative aimed at addressing human development concerns by providing online access (through 960 libraries) to national and global knowledge resources.

A number of projects, conducted in partnership with philanthropic foundations, appear to have taken UNDP to the fringes of its programmatic relevance (though the projects were of high relevance to programme countries and philanthropic foundations). For example, projects in which UNDP recruited political appointees on behalf of a government (Liberia/Soros Foundation), or constructed a knowledge management system around the availability of free software (Bulgaria/Gates Foundation), could be construed as undercutting UNDP operational principles. Moreover, a newly-approved project in Ethiopia, supported by the Gates Foundation, takes UNDP back into agricultural terrain, an area not covered by the UNDP programme framework.

Partnership between UNDP and philanthropic foundations has been of limited strategic importance to all parties involved. Partnerships have tended to be opportunistic and focused on particular national and regional development challenges. UNDP engagement with philanthropic foundations over the past decade has evolved in the context of country-specific circumstances, personal contacts and occasional initiatives on both sides to reach out. The overall financial importance to either UNDP or the foundations has been relatively limited, with many projects typically being quite small in scope, as has the substantive contribution to the achievement of their respective programme objectives. In some cases, partnership has developed in very particular national situations where the choice of partners, from the perspective of the philanthropic foundations, was restricted. In Liberia, UNDP was requested to play a very narrow supporting role following direct personal contacts between the country’s President and George Soros. In Bulgaria, following an extensive search for alternative partners, the Gates Foundation turned to UNDP as the partner of last resort. In Ethiopia, UNDP recruitment capability and the possibility to channel funding through a multi-partner trust fund played a major role in reaching a partnership agreement with the Gates Foundation.

Personal contacts and outreach by regional bureaux have led to partnership around research projects, such as the work on food security in Africa (Gates Foundation) and the Arab Knowledge Report (Al Maktoum Foundation). In both cases, the philanthropic foundations acknowledged UNDP’s value added in publishing high-profile reports, in particular the global and regional Human Development Reports, and appreciated their association with UNDP at that level. For the multifunctional platform initiative in West Africa, the Regional Bureau for Africa succeeded in securing the interest and commitment of the Gates Foundation through an international competition for development project proposals. However, while both parties considered the initiative to be extremely relevant, neither was completely convinced—given challenges in the relationship—of the relevance of the UNDP-Gates Foundation partnership in taking the initiative forward. Although UNDP would welcome continued support by the philanthropic foundation, both parties are pursuing alternative options.

Over the past decade, sporadic high-level contacts have taken place between UNDP and the three philanthropic foundations. For a period, there were closer contacts between UNDP and the
Soros Foundation aimed at developing a more strategic relationship focused on post-conflict and/or reform-oriented programme countries. The Soros Foundation and UNDP’s common commitment to human rights and democratic governance promised to provide opportunities for closer collaboration. However, considerable differences in work cultures and expectations meant that closer institutionalized cooperation gradually evolved into an ad hoc approach to partnership.

Based on interviews with philanthropic foundation managers, UNDP appears to have missed opportunities for closer, strategic-level cooperation. In all three foundations considered, the managers highlighted the importance of sustained engagement at the highest level, focusing on the achievement of development results rather than fundraising. The Gates Foundation made it clear that, under current circumstances and based on recent experiences, there was relatively little interest in a strategic-level relationship. The Soros Foundation suggested that lack of coordination amongst UNDP bureaux—and between bureaux and country offices—weakened UNDP’s ability to develop coherent and committed corporate-level partnership. The Al Maktoum Foundation suggested that, as the “guardian of [the Millennium Development Goals],” UNDP enjoyed a good reputation, which could conceivably have been leveraged through partnership with the foundation with a view to mobilizing developmental support for programme countries.

Overall, UNDP has not demonstrated a significant commitment to fostering strategic partnership with the philanthropic foundations included in this evaluation. Interviews with UNDP staff at all levels suggested that misgivings about cooperation with philanthropic foundations related to whether priorities and approaches can be reconciled and whether the potential financial resources available through partnership are worth the effort of securing them (given the differences in priorities and approaches).

Discussions with stakeholders of United Arab Emirates-based foundations demonstrate that

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**Box 13. United Arab Emirates: dropping the ball for want of a clear approach**

UNDP has entered into partnerships with a number of philanthropic foundations based in the United Arab Emirates. For example, the Regional Bureau for Arab States has worked with the Al Makhtoum Foundation on the Arab Knowledge Report, and several UNDP country offices in Africa and Asia have received funding through the Zayed and Khalifa Foundations. While the partnerships were, to differing degrees, initiated with the support of the Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy, the Regional Bureau for Arab States and the UNDP United Arab Emirates country office, follow-up by these units has been inconsistent and sporadic. Daily partnership arrangements were left to project staff, either in the Regional Bureau or the implementing country offices. All foundations lamented the apparent lack of senior UNDP-level commitment, and the Zayed and Khalifa Foundations, in particular, were disappointed by the lack of substantive engagement with UNDP after financial commitments had been made.

The absence of high-level UNDP staff during the launch of the ‘Arab Knowledge Report’ was interpreted as UNDP management disinterest. Similarly, the lack of sustained involvement by the UNDP United Arab Emirates country office, which is—by virtue of its presence in the country—viewed as the face of UNDP corporate interests, was met with puzzlement. The UNDP position, that the country office had no mandate or resources to follow up on, let alone foster, corporate-level partnership arrangements, may be factually correct; however, from a corporate perspective, this narrow use of the country office presence clearly constituted a missed opportunity. United Arab Emirates philanthropic foundations are left with the impression that UNDP has partnered with them primarily to obtain cash for various ad hoc initiatives, and—particularly in the case of the Zayed and Khalifa Foundations—UNDP was not generally considered to have delivered very well.

This lack of engagement tarnished UNDP’s reputation as a relevant and effective partner of United Arab Emirates philanthropic foundations. Given the investments that other United Nations organizations have made in fostering substantive partnerships with United Arab Emirates philanthropic foundations, there is clearly significant potential for engagement. However, this will only be possible if UNDP not only signals, but also delivers, high-level and sustained commitment.
unlike other United Nations organizations (such as UNICEF, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), UNDP has not made concerted efforts to pursue partnership opportunities with foundations (see Box 13). However, UNDP has recently embarked on the formulation of a partnership strategy for philanthropic foundations, which may change the UNDP approach.

4.2.2 PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATION EFFECTIVENESS

In most cases, it is difficult to associate partnership between UNDP and philanthropic foundations with demonstrable and positive developmental change. In several instances, it is possible to report on the achievement of some development results. The multifunctional platform initiative in West Africa stands out as having made an important difference in the lives of many primary stakeholders, predominantly women. The involvement of the Gates Foundation in this long-standing initiative helped broaden its reach and contributed to mobilizing governments’ budgetary commitments. At this stage, the multifunctional platform programmes in all three West African countries are on track and ready to be scaled up. However, the programme’s pace and performance level differ from country to country.

In Liberia, the UNDP-Soros Foundation partnership has contributed to the recruitment of high-level government officials from the diaspora, with some stakeholders claiming credit for “reversing the brain drain.” This has clearly had a positive impact on the government’s ability to design and implement policies and programmes and to efficiently run the day-to-day business of ministries and institutions. However, in the absence of indicators, there was little evidence that the officials’ involvement has supported the sustainable development of the ministries’ capacities. Moreover, UNDP involvement in the political recruitment process of a government has incited criticisms and potentially weakened its role as a neutral development partner.

In other partnerships between UNDP and philanthropic foundations, there were indications that contributions to some outcomes had been

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**Box 14. Moldova: increased cooperation opportunities in support of a promising reformist democratic governance agenda**

UNDP and the Soros Foundations worked together in Moldova prior to 2009, particularly on a number of local governance initiatives; this cooperation intensified after the change in government. Since the new reformist government came to power in 2009, UNDP and the Soros Foundation have shared concerns about human rights, local governance and rule of law. This has translated into a series of co-funded projects. Though it is too early to ascertain the contribution of the UNDP-Soros Foundation partnership to development outcomes, there are indications that a number of initiatives are yielding results.

For example, support provided to the government helped formulate a new decentralization strategy that integrates a gender perspective and a human rights-based approach. Important achievements were visible at Chisinau municipality in terms of transparency of operations, an e-governance project that supports increased administrative efficiency and transparency, and a project to attract local talent to work in the public sector has had some success.

However, there were concerns about sustainability and capacity substitution. Overall, improved capacities have yet to be translated into tangible improvements in public services either at the central or the local government level. An important insight from the UNDP-Soros Foundation partnership is that both agencies’ flexible approach has made close cooperation easier.

Changes in the Soros Foundation’s priorities at the global level have impacted projects on the ground: the Local Government Initiative—through which the Soros Foundation supported decentralization reform in Moldova—has now been closed.
achieved, for example, in integrating a human rights-based approach into the strategy on decentralization, in strengthening civil society organization-related legislation or in attracting local talent into government positions (see Box 14). In this context, while project outputs have been delivered, ascertaining the contribution to developmental change was not possible or would have been premature.

Similarly, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the Arab Knowledge Report project. There were some indications that the first report stimulated discussion among policy makers in the Arab region. The contributions of future reports may be ascertained more easily as the project now places more emphasis on knowledge dissemination, capacity development and advocacy, as well as on tracking the use of the knowledge products by readers.

**4.2.3 PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATION EFFICIENCY**

Working relationships with philanthropic foundations are generally good, contributing to the delivery of planned outputs. A range of issues related to administrative arrangements and adequate country office capacity reduce overall efficiency. Most partnerships between UNDP and philanthropic foundations experienced bureaucratic challenges, including delays in reporting, funds allocation, procurement, recruitment and processing by regional service centres. These were due to different factors related varyingly to UNDP, the respective philanthropic foundation or governments. Delays in procurement were particularly notable in one partnership, resulting in the scaling down of expectations and raising questions about the adequacy of planning and UNDP’s capacity to deliver—although in-country political circumstances contributed to these delays (see Box 15). Delays in recruitment also had a negative effect on the relationship between UNDP and the foundation, and affected project development (multifunctional platforms—Gates Foundation). However, such issues are not inevitable, and some projects were implemented with relatively few problems (Moldova—Soros Foundation).

With respect to the Gates Foundation’s involvement in the multifunctional platform initiative, UNDP’s administrative arrangements covering the Regional Bureau, the regional service centre in Dakar and three country offices have not worked well. UNDP’s multi-layered decision-making process has resulted in, at times, tense

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**Box 15. Bulgaria: implementation challenges in a rapidly changing environment**

Since 2008, UNDP and the Gates Foundation have worked together on a project to strengthen the national network of libraries with a view to, among other things, provide free access to the Internet in order to support the integration of Bulgarian citizens into the global knowledge society. All partners (including the Government of Bulgaria) subscribed to the broader programmatic context: strengthening democratic governance with a focus on local governance capacity development.

While the project is on track and delivering planned outputs, its implementation was initially hampered by a range of issues, including uncertainty about the continued operation of the UNDP Bulgaria country office. Under the circumstances in which the UNDP office was being drawn down, capacity to support the project was weakened, leading to delays in implementation (including procurement). With no clear alternative project implementation arrangements in place, the Gates Foundation indicated a strong preference to continue implementation through UNDP, contributing to a government decision to continue to maintain the UNDP office.

Overall, better contingency planning by all partners, given the changing environment, would have contributed to more stable and consistent project management. There is little indication that UNDP headquarters or the regional service centre provided support or direction in resolving the challenges or provided guidance on how to support an initiative that was important not only in terms of funding, but also in terms of credibility with national partners and the Gates Foundation.
relations between the three levels, weakened its ability to deliver optimal support services and adversely affected its standing in the eyes of the Gates Foundation and government partners.

In working with philanthropic foundations, UNDP has, on occasion, been insensitive to the requirement of its partners to adequately acknowledge their contribution. However, UNDP has also, at times, struggled to ensure that its own contributions have been appropriately recognized.

Adapting to philanthropic foundations’ planning, monitoring and evaluation requirements has posed some challenges to UNDP country offices. Heightened standards have generally been welcomed and have contributed to increased capacities on the part of UNDP. The quality of planning documents prepared for partnership initiatives with philanthropic funds tended to be relatively high. The planning documents were based on the respective philanthropic foundation’s requirements and often involved a thorough problem analysis. Similarly, monitoring and reporting systems have been based on philanthropic foundation expectations. This has required UNDP to adapt its own systems and, at times, adopt procedures recommended by the foundations. In general, philanthropic foundations were highly results-oriented and did not proceed with new disbursements until they were satisfied with the previous phase’s performance.

UNDP has occasionally struggled with monitoring requirements that appeared tantamount to micro-management on the part of philanthropic foundations. However, UNDP has appreciated the opportunity to apply monitoring tools, for example in the context of the multifunctional platforms that have facilitated meaningful monitoring of social and economic development indicators.

Philanthropic foundations and national government counterparts frequently contest UNDP overhead charges. UNDP has been unable to properly communicate the rationale for such charges, which gives rise to periodic disagreements among partners and potentially undermines new partnership opportunities. During project planning phases, philanthropic foundations and government partners tended to agree with UNDP on overhead charges (based on standard UNDP procedures). However, the issue of overhead charges often resurfaced, particularly as one project phase ended and another began, with UNDP being requested to waive the charges or contribute core funding (Liberia-Soros Foundation; Burkina Faso-Gates Foundation). In some cases, this has led to philanthropic foundations reconsidering partnering with UNDP and actively exploring alternative partners.

However, the issue of overhead charges was not always contentious and there were examples of philanthropic foundations acknowledging the benefits of working with UNDP, notwithstanding such charges (Moldova-Soros Foundation). However, a possibly unjustified reputation of high UNDP overhead charges—based on the experience of supporting UNDP initiatives in different programme countries in Africa and Asia—has resulted in reluctance on the part of some United Arab Emirates-based philanthropic foundations to engage with UNDP.

UNDP partnerships with philanthropic foundations have tended to be exclusive affairs. There is no evidence of UNDP having facilitated partnership between another United Nations country team member and a philanthropic foundation. Rather, there are examples of competition among United Nations organizations for philanthropic foundation patronage. Overall, there were few instances where an existing partnership between UNDP and a philanthropic foundation has involved, or could have involved, other United Nations partners. In Ethiopia, the Food and Agriculture Organization—with what may appear to be better technical credentials—was involved in the diagnostic stage of project development, but the government and the Gates Foundation preferred that UNDP execute the project. In the United Arab Emirates, the Office of the Resident Coordinator appears to have been regularly bypassed by other United Nations
organizations exploring partnership opportunities with nationally-based philanthropic foundations, to the point where United Arab Emirates authorities complained of United Nations competition and the lack of harmonization.

While the UNDP Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy has a focal point function for philanthropic foundation partnership, it has not established strong relationships with the foundations. Moreover, its support to programme units in terms of lessons learning, knowledge sharing and facilitating contacts with philanthropic foundations has been weak. The Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy has allocated very limited resources to liaising with philanthropic foundations, expanding existing partnerships, developing new partnerships or conducting related policy research and analysis. While a number of junior- to mid-level staff have made commendable efforts to keep records of existing partnerships, data is inconsistent and incomplete.

Following limited involvement in the establishment of some partnerships, responsibility for partnership management rests with regional bureaux, regional service centres and country offices involved in particular projects. The Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy tended not to follow up closely on implementation and played a limited role in tracking progress or collating related monitoring and evaluation reports. Moreover, it did not play an active role in identifying lessons, sharing information on possible philanthropic foundation partners with programme units or advocating for partnership with philanthropic foundations in support of programme country developmental efforts. In interviewing philanthropic foundations, respondents generally indicated that, if they were interested in working with UNDP they would prefer contacts with UNDP at the country level to contacts at the headquarters level.

### 4.2.4 Philanthropic Foundation Sustainability

Overall, there are few indications that results achieved through partnership with philanthropic foundations are sustainable. While efforts have been made to ensure sustainability as part of project planning documents, most initiatives are either unlikely to achieve sustainability or will require more time to determine whether they will do so. In the context of partnership between UNDP and philanthropic foundations that have contributed to the achievement of development results, a number of initiatives show potential for sustainability. The multifunctional platforms have received considerable support from national governments, non-governmental organizations and other donors. This degree of support indicates that it is likely that the initiatives will be taken forward and expanded and that fundamental issues of sustainability (e.g. relating to the machinery’s substantial acquisition costs) can be resolved.

In other initiatives, relating, for example to democratic governance and capacity development, sustainability will depend on governments’ continued commitment to take forward initial achievements (Liberia-Soros Foundation; Moldova-Soros Foundation). Other projects will need to run their course before it will be possible to ascertain whether sustainable results can be achieved (Bulgaria-Gates Foundation); here, too, longer-term government commitment will be key to ensuring the initiative’s success.

Achieving sustainability of results of publications is inevitably challenging (Arab Knowledge Report-Al Maktoum Foundation; Human Development Report-Gates Foundation). However, an increased emphasis on dissemination, capacity development and advocacy will support a longer-term contribution to development, and the question can be asked whether partnership with philanthropic foundations will allow UNDP to reach that goal.
Given the *ad hoc* nature of most partnerships between UNDP and philanthropic foundations, it is likely that instances of partnership in particular country contexts will not be sustained in the long term. However, opportunities for *ad hoc* partnerships in new country contexts remain; opportunities for broader strategic cooperation with philanthropic foundations may also be possible. A number of ongoing partnerships with philanthropic foundations are likely to end in the near future. The Liberia project ended in 2011 (see Box 16). Indications are that the Gates Foundation will not continue its support to the multi-functional platform initiative. The series of Arab Knowledge Reports is expected to come to an end in 2015. However, new partnership opportunities, such as the new project with the Gates Foundation in Ethiopia aimed to enhance national capacities for agricultural development, are likely to emerge.

Representatives of philanthropic foundations interviewed in the context of the evaluation were not necessarily positive about the desirability or possibility, of broader strategic partnership with UNDP. Some were more dismissive than others. However, given some of their recommendations with respect to preferred partnership modalities (including strong substantive engagement and the importance of building trust), and presuming UNDP interest (which is currently ambiguous), opportunities for strategic partnership are not necessarily remote. In this regard, the current initiative of the Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy to formulate a partnership strategy for philanthropic foundations may generate opportunities. The initiative’s success will depend, to a large extent, on the amount of resources UNDP allocates to the strategy’s execution.

**Box 16. Liberia: addressing immediate post-conflict needs, but neglecting sustainability**

Initial high-level contacts in 2005 between the Government of Liberia and the Soros Foundation after the end of the Second Liberian Civil War led to the establishment of an initiative (implemented through UNDP), to recruit senior-level staff from the Liberian diaspora at the ministerial or head-of-agency level. The project, conceived as an emergency intervention, aimed to address an acute deficit in government leadership capacity in the post-conflict situation.

The project objectives addressed key programmatic priorities of both UNDP and the Soros Foundation, including strengthening the fragile democratic governance. Five years into the project, having been extended once, the project ended in 2011. The project yielded some concrete results in recruiting senior-level government staff who had led ministries and agencies over the past years. There is no evidence as to whether institutional capacity has been sustainably strengthened, or whether the same calibre staff can be retained beyond the end of the project.

There are no concrete plans to expand the UNDP-Soros Foundation partnership to other areas. Opportunities to plan a more effective exit strategy were missed, as were opportunities to foster longer-term partnership between UNDP and the Soros Foundation in Liberia. Corporate-level lessons on partnership between UNDP and the Soros Foundation in similar developmental circumstances could be explored, but do not appear to have been taken up thus far.
The conclusions and recommendations provided below are based on the findings described in Chapter 4, while taking into account the UNDP role in the broader architecture of development cooperation, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. The conclusions should be seen as mutually reinforcing, conveying an overall sense of UNDP strengths and challenges in partnering with global funds and philanthropic foundations.

Changes in the international development system over the past two decades have seen aid being channelled through an increasing number of routes. While this study has considered the dynamics and partnership implications of two types of funding mechanisms, global funds and philanthropic foundations, there are many other developments—such as the growth in bilateral aid, volunteerism, South-South cooperation and the increasing engagement of non-state actors (including the private sector), all of which play a significant role in shaping the international development cooperation architecture. These developments represent a fundamental shift in the relationships between different stakeholders operating in the arena of international aid. UNDP, as part of the multilateral system, now faces a new reality, one where it cannot take its favoured position with donors for granted.

Over the past decade, UNDP, like most other United Nations entities, has seen its core resources form Member State contributions remain stable or decline, while its non-core resources have increased significantly in absolute and relative terms. Fresh ideas for the provision of international aid abound, new actors are becoming involved and many donors are signalling a greater interest in experimentation. Most importantly, there is a reorientation of relations between donors and the multilateral system.

UNDP has grappled with these challenges, reacting to changes as they have emerged. Some parts of the organization have embraced these developments; the units dealing with global funds, for example, have responded with innovation and flexibility. Other parts of the organization feel discomfort at the perceived decline in status—suggesting that UNDP is treated as a contractor, one of many agencies, and not as an equal partner—and remain attached to traditional ways of working.

In conceptualizing the evaluation, partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations were to be reviewed together as a means of examining how UNDP has adjusted to evolving partnership opportunities in the context of the changing development cooperation architecture. While distinctions between partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations were clear from the outset, the evaluation has further highlighted fundamental differences in approaches and cooperation modalities. The conclusions and recommendations seek to clarify these differences, pointing to variable assessments of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The evaluation aims to provide actionable recommendations with a view towards highlighting how UNDP partnership with such global funds and philanthropic foundations, including access to resources, could be further developed. The recommendations also suggest how UNDP could strengthen its contribution to programme country development in partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations. However, the report also encourages wider
are tightening aid conditionality and looking for greater returns on investment within shorter time-frames. UNDP will need to demonstrate that it can satisfy immediate sectoral concerns (e.g. by supporting visible successes related to health and environmental issues) while developing sustainable capacities to foster democratic governance and a longer-term human development perspective.

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: Reforms of the international development architecture are likely to continue given the efforts of the donor to strengthen the performance of existing multilateral arrangements embodied by the United Nations, including through more direct issue-specific support. In this context, the UNDP record in demonstrating its comparative advantage has been stronger with respect to partnership with global funds than with philanthropic foundations. In many areas, and given its ubiquitous country presence, UNDP still has a competitive advantage; its long experience and established structure means that it remains an indispensable part of the system. However, the future of this advantage is not secure—new actors will emerge, grow and gain confidence and experience; donor preferences will evolve; and global funds and programmes addressing a wide range of niche issues will proliferate. As more countries progress in development terms, the UNDP role in relation to them shifts from one of implementer to service provider or to total withdrawal.

The central question for UNDP is how to secure future funding in order to discharge its mandate, relating to both its programmatic coverage as well as its strategic role with the United Nations System, as ably as possible. The experience of partnership with global funds, in particular, appears to imply a greater focus on a narrow range of specialized issues and corresponding closer cooperation with a range of specialist agencies (United Nations and otherwise). This may imply trade-offs in terms of UNDP capacity to pursue a more broadly defined human development agenda.

As a result of financial crises, large budget deficits and public pressure in many donor countries to diversify platforms for aid delivery, many donors are tightening aid conditionality and looking for greater returns on investment within shorter time-frames. UNDP will need to demonstrate that it can satisfy immediate sectoral concerns (e.g. by supporting visible successes related to health and environmental issues) while developing sustainable capacities to foster democratic governance and a longer-term human development perspective.

Conclusion 2: In engaging with global funds and philanthropic foundations, UNDP has demonstrated flexibility in adjusting its programmatic focus and operational modalities. Partnership with global funds has led to a concentration on narrowly defined sectoral issues that are also addressed, to a varying extent, by other specialized United Nations funds and programmes. Partnering with philanthropic foundations has resulted in coverage of an eclectic range of development issues. In working with non-core funding instruments, within the context of the changing development cooperation architecture, UNDP appears to have been prepared to engage, where opportune, with issues that lie on the fringes of the programmatic focus areas defined in its Strategic Plan, 2008-2013. This has been more pronounced in partnership with philanthropic foundations, which has typically been more ad hoc and context specific. In working with global funds, UNDP has developed highly specialized technical capacities within the programmatic focus areas of the Strategic Plan that may not previously have been required of UNDP.

In making itself available as a qualified partner of global funds, UNDP has also found itself both competing and cooperating more frequently with other specialized United Nations organizations. This has affected inter-agency relations and has raised broader questions of United Nations System coherence, efficiency and development effectiveness.

Coordination within the United Nations system needs strengthening, and UNDP, as a pillar of the Resident Coordinator system, has a pivotal responsibility to foster inter-agency collaboration
and to give other agencies the space to draw on their own specialisms. Reports of competition and rivalry between agencies over non-core funds suggest that this does not always happen.

Conclusion 3: The programmatic objectives of partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations are generally aligned with the broadly framed UNDP Strategic Plan. UNDP has missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of partnership to consistently integrate a human development perspective and foster a more holistic development approach. In working with global funds and philanthropic foundations, UNDP did not sufficiently ensure relevance to its core priorities by mainstreaming objectives related to human development, national capacity development or coordination within the United Nations system. Though implementation remains uneven, there is a growing awareness of the need for cross-linkages and connections between thematic areas such as poverty reduction, gender equality and environmental sustainability. Capacity development activities are extensive at the project level, but a strategic approach that prioritizes the long-term objective of ‘helping recipient governments help themselves’ is lacking.

It is unclear whether such cross-linkages occur less in initiatives supported by global funds and philanthropic foundations as opposed to other types of non-core funding. However, it is clear that the use of earmarked funding, which brings its own restrictions, can limit the UNDP ability to integrate a human development perspective. Though this was observed most clearly in projects funded by global funds, it also applies to philanthropic foundation projects.

All partners have specific mandates that determine the type of activities they finance and the nature of the benefits they seek. This inevitably limits the nature of the projects UNDP can seek funding for from such funds. Country offices consistently struggle to secure the additional funds needed to achieve core UNDP human development objectives, both global and otherwise.

Conclusion 4: UNDP remains an important conduit for development funding. This is particularly clear in the case of partnership with global funds, where strategic, corporate-level linkages are cultivated and maintained. Partnership with philanthropic foundations has been more opportunistic, based on country and project-level requirements. Moreover, given the fundamentally different organizational structures, procedures and cultures of philanthropic foundations, UNDP may not always be the most appropriate partner. UNDP contributes an added and sometimes unique value through its established network of offices. Its role is particularly relevant to global funds; UNDP is one of a few organizations able to handle the large amounts of funding. It is able to cover a range of sectors in the complex environments in which these funds often seek to operate, and has the capacity to do so in accordance with internationally agreed standards. Historically, UNDP acquired a role as a key implementing agency in all of the reviewed funds because of its administrative capacity and global presence, rather than its specialist knowledge of specific subject areas.

Notwithstanding many ongoing challenges, UNDP has also demonstrated its ability to perform effectively, to meet the rigorous standards set by funds, and to develop innovative approaches to development and administrative challenges. Global funds are also highly relevant strategic partners for UNDP both in budgetary and substantive terms. The relationship is of mutual importance but tense at times, as large and complex institutions try to find ways of working together.

UNDP is less essential to philanthropic foundations; they often deal with smaller scale projects and thus have a wider choice of implementing organizations. Relations with philanthropic foundations are at a fledgling state and have not progressed much beyond ad hoc project-based partnerships. Some UNDP advantages—its size, structure and capacity to manage large scale funding—are a disadvantage for smaller donors,
where these strengths can become encumbrances. Whether UNDP would be able to meet smaller donor requirements (and to do so in a way that is cost-effective for its own purposes) raises questions as to its suitability as a partner.

A significant operational risk to partnership with global funds in particular, but also with philanthropic foundations, relates to the at times weak capacities of UNDP country offices and inadequate regional service centre support. While administrative capacity is more readily available, technical capacities are frequently lacking. To the extent that UNDP is unable to establish such capacity, global funds and philanthropic foundations have looked to alternative partners for support. As a result, opportunities are lost, in particular, to integrate a human development dimension into the initiatives to be implemented.

**Conclusion 5:** UNDP management of partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations has lacked strategic vision and overall coordination. UNDP could have done more to foster coordination among headquarters-based management units—and between them, the regional bureaux and other policy bureaux and units. Partnership with philanthropic foundations has been neglected, limiting relationships to project-specific initiatives, with minimal corporate-level guidance and follow-up. Corporate-level UNDP working relationships with global funds are well established, with regular senior-level exchanges. While the respective central coordination units manage relations with the funds, on the one hand, and implementing programme units, on the other, there is no overarching management of these relationships in the broader context of UNDP partnership with non-core donors. As a result, minimal cross-cutting analysis has been conducted of the partnerships’ programmatic role in the context of the changing development architecture, and there is no central, strategic guidance on how partnership should evolve. Within UNDP, relationships between the global fund coordination units and other bureaux vary in quality and intensity. Exchanges of knowledge and experiences among coordination units and UNDP are very limited. While the different coordination units maintain ad hoc relationships with policy bureaux units, the lack of formal integration with cross-cutting concerns, such as gender equality or capacity development, leads to a silo mentality and weakens the ability to mainstream a human development perspective.

UNDP senior-level engagement with philanthropic foundations has been fairly weak, and few concerted attempts have been made over the past decade to foster longer-term, strategic-level partnerships. Rather than the result of an explicit decision to limit partnership to ad hoc project-specific initiatives, this neglect stemmed from the absence of a strategy to engage with philanthropic foundations. The resulting impression, on the part of philanthropic foundations, is that UNDP has little desire to communicate on issues of substance let alone to explore strategic alliances. A corresponding lack of investment in headquarters-based research and analysis, as well as any concerted follow-up or monitoring and evaluation of existing initiatives, has deprived UNDP of a solid understanding of existing partnership experiences and potential partnership opportunities with philanthropic foundations.

**Conclusion 6:** At the institutional level, UNDP faces challenges in meeting the expectations of current and potential global fund and foundation partners. In particular, if UNDP is to maintain and enhance these partnerships it will need to resolve issues relating to transparency, bureaucratic efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The support frame for international assistance is shifting. There is a wider array of international and national partners for donors to choose from, and recipient governments are increasingly demanding—and have the capacities—to directly implement international projects. UNDP success in this increasingly competitive environment requires greater responsiveness to donor expectations and a continuing effort to streamline institutional procedures so that the value of using UNDP services is clear. Although UNDP management
has made progress on transparency issues (with respect to the sharing of audit information with donor partners, for example), such changes are perceived by partners as being made slowly and reluctantly. Concerns have also been raised about UNDP overhead cost structures. While UNDP overhead fees may be equivalent to or less than those of some other international institutions, funders need to be convinced of the additional value that UNDP brings as an intermediate entity between the funders and their beneficiaries.

**5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Recommendation 1: In fostering and strengthening partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations, UNDP should focus strongly on supporting the prioritization of national development priorities. To the extent possible, over-reliance on any particular funding source should be avoided in order to retain flexibility. In working with global funds and philanthropic foundations to support national development, UNDP needs to be sensitive to the risk of influencing national development agendas through the availability of funding in earmarked sectors. Though uncommon, there were instances where a side effect of global fund involvement was to draw attention—and counterpart resources—away from the highest national concerns. In such circumstances, UNDP has a vital role as mediator, ensuring that the proposed package of activities meets national interests.

The integrity of UNDP programming in any given thematic area should be safeguarded by avoiding an over-reliance on one particular fund or foundation. Some sectoral programmes are heavily or wholly reliant on specific sources of funding. This makes the programmes vulnerable to closure if the funding stops. It can also focus attention away from areas that may be equally critical but for which funding may be less readily available. While some country offices may have few options, country offices should receive support to identify alternative sources of funding and diversify their funding base.

Recommendation 2: UNDP should engage more explicitly and consistently with global funds and philanthropic foundations in order to establish common ground and develop mutual approaches to development challenges. In its partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, UNDP should place more explicit emphasis on the central importance of mainstreaming a human development perspective and developing national capacities. UNDP needs to continually demonstrate to global funds and philanthropic foundations that it is a relevant partner. In addition to maintaining a country presence and the ability to deliver programmes and projects, relevance is a function of the value that UNDP adds in contributing international expertise, sharing lessons learned from across the world and building synergies with broader efforts.

This is important to both global funds and philanthropic foundations, particularly as the latter are sensitive about being treated by UNDP as equal partners in development. The philanthropic foundations thus stress the importance of building long-term relationships of trust that are motivated by mutual principles and common objectives, rather than the regular transfer of resources from the foundations to UNDP.

UNDP should also make more concerted efforts to ensure that its partnership with philanthropic foundations falls within its programmatic mandate, adheres to human development principles and represents value for money.

As specified in its Strategic Plan, the UNDP human development agenda requires a multi-dimensional and inclusive approach to development. The programmatic focus of partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations has often been more one-dimensional, in line with the narrow sector- or issue-specific objectives of particular partners. While UNDP has made progress in advocating stronger linkages with a broader human development perspective—particularly in working with global funds on health and environment-related issues—and in securing its partners’ commitment to related objectives,
UNDP should be explicit in its requirement to foster cross-linkages that encourage the inclusion of gender equality, capacity development, environmental sustainability and civil society participation, etc. In order to facilitate such cross-linkages, it may be necessary for UNDP to provide a level of counterpart funding that will strengthen its internal capacity to advocate and contribute expertise on related issues.

Capacity development is focused on project-level activities. However, an overarching approach aimed at enabling national partner independence in line with United Nations commitments needs to be prioritized in partnership arrangements. A more systematized approach is necessary as it will enable offices to identify opportunities for capacity development, to better track progress, and to better explain to other stakeholders what it is doing. Capacity development should be a key deliverable in all global fund and philanthropic foundation projects with clear benchmarks that can be monitored and evaluated.

Recommendation 3: UNDP should focus on the role that partnership with global funds can play in securing development support to programme countries, particularly in the context of the rapidly changing international development cooperation architecture. UNDP needs stronger central coordination of information and knowledge management functions in order to facilitate a more strategic approach to partnership with global funds. Although each global fund reviewed has a corresponding support unit within the Bureau for Development Policy, there is no overarching function that oversees all UNDP work with global funds, and there is limited coordination among the respective units—or between them and regional bureaux and other policy bureaux and units. Identifying or developing such a function would place senior UNDP management in a better position to engage with the global funds in a more strategic manner. Considering the importance of the partnerships to UNDP, particularly from the perspective of resource mobilization, a more integrated and less piecemeal approach is advisable, particularly during a period when donor relations are undergoing rapid change.

A central coordinating function is likely to enable a more strategic role in engaging with other development actors (particularly United Nations organizations) in connection with the partnership with global funds. At the country level, some relationships have been plagued by competition between United Nations agencies, although rules of engagement are often defined more clearly at headquarters level and respective responsibilities are delineated more readily. However, there is an overarching role to be played in coordinating corporate-level cooperation with United Nations agencies across different partnerships with global funds in particular—a role that goes beyond the responsibilities of the partnership-specific coordination units at headquarters.

While UNDP’s three-tier structure has proven relatively effective in delivering services to programme countries in line with the expectations of global funds, there are internal fault lines that constrain the exchange of lessons learned across the UNDP system. The quality of information is mixed and some regional offices offer better support than others. It is clear there are resource challenges at the regional level, but there are also difficulties in transferring lessons learned across regions and between UNDP units working with different partners. UNDP should explore ways in which to strengthen the management of knowledge emanating from, and pertaining to, different partnerships across the organization.

Recommendation 4: Building on ongoing Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy initiatives, UNDP should develop a partnership strategy to engage with philanthropic foundations. Such a strategy should be built on a clear assessment of potential partners; on their motivations and goals; on potential benefits to UNDP programme countries; on UNDP value-added in engaging with such partners; and the opportunities and risks of doing so. The philanthropic sector, an integral
UNDP should also strengthen its information management and reporting system for philanthropic foundations, with a view to improving its understanding of partnership trends with regard to such foundations.

Currently, obtaining consistent and comparable data on partnership with such entities is difficult. Existing accounting and data collection systems do not facilitate easy access to and analysis of related data. No central monitoring and evaluation systems are in place to track existing partnerships. This weakens UNDP’s ability to fully understand partnership trends with regard to philanthropic foundations or make evidence-based adjustments to its policies.

Recommendation 5: UNDP has a particular responsibility to find solutions to operational and procedural bottlenecks, including issues relating to transparency and oversight, that hamper relationships with global funds and philanthropic foundations. In order to minimize discord stemming from differences in bureaucratic cultures and expectations, UNDP should develop a communication strategy that clarifies what it can and cannot do. UNDP administrative capacity is both a strength and weakness. Its global administrative capacity is often the reason why it is chosen to take on the role of implementing agency, as UNDP capacity assures donors that funds will be properly handled. It can also be a liability: donors, implementing partners and even UNDP staff, complain about the impacts on operations caused by bureaucratic hindrances. UNDP needs to address these complaints and find ways of drawing on best practices.

UNDP should conduct a comprehensive review of its rules, procedures and practices relating to partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations. The review should provide the basis for engaging in comprehensive, cross-cutting dialogues to strengthen partnerships and increasing efficiencies. Though UNDP faces its own administrative challenges, there are areas where it can draw on its experience, particularly
in collaboration with other fund recipients, in order to avoid repeating past mistakes. It should also lead to developing a partnership framework for global funds and philanthropic foundations, clearly defining programmatic objectives and the operational environment.

Following the 2011 UNDP Executive Board decision to share audit reports with some global funds,75 UNDP should continue to review and take forward its processes for financial transparency and auditing in relation to non-core funds, large scale global funds in particular. Full disclosure should be the norm, whether it refers to information at the country level or principles upheld by the central organization.

UNDP overhead charges should be better explained and justified. There are some aspects that would benefit from further attention by UNDP, including ensuring that the differences in administrative fees charged to the various global funds have a rational basis, enabling a redistribution of costs between country offices depending on the level of work required and needing to better explain its cost structure to external stakeholders.

In some cases, there is a strong sense by UNDP that overhead charges are insufficient to cover the actual costs of services rendered. UNDP should consider conducting a comprehensive assessment of the financial cost of partnerships with different global funds and philanthropic foundations. The assessment should focus on strengthening the UNDP position to negotiate overhead charges in the future and to demonstrate its level of counter-part funding. UNDP should also engage with its partners in more innovative ways in order to ensure that its work supporting programme country development is better recognized and understood.

Monitoring and evaluation of projects implemented through partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations should receive adequate attention, as partnerships can only mature when there is mutual learning. UNDP should also apply lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation of partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations to other areas of its work. Engaging with global funds in particular has strengthened UNDP monitoring and evaluation capacities in related programme areas. UNDP should consider how these systems can be applied across the organization. An additional concern, however, is to ensure that monitoring and evaluation systems geared towards analysing project results can also capture contributions to achieving broader human development outcomes.

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In partnering with such global funds and foundations, UNDP has sought to leverage its comparative advantage in supporting programme countries in accessing financial resources and in delivering related programmes and projects. Different partnership dynamics have resulted in a range of institutional arrangements at the corporate level. At the same time, UNDP has sought to adapt its partnerships to different country contexts where it has varyingly played the role of principal recipient, implementing agency, interlocutor, facilitator and adviser.

This evaluation exercise was approved as part of the programme of work of the UNDP Evaluation Office at the September 2008 session of the Executive Board.76

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**PURPOSE**

The purpose of the evaluation is to facilitate the Executive Board’s review of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations over the past decade, and to provide strategic inputs into its deliberations on partnership with such funds and foundations in support of UNDP’s work programme.

The evaluation will also provide UNDP management with conclusions and recommendations that are expected to assist in identifying strategies and operational approaches pertaining to UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, in coordination with other development partners.

**OBJECTIVES**

The primary objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP support to the achievement of development results in partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations;
- Clarify the added value of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, and its comparative advantage in partnering with such funding instruments;
- Provide actionable recommendations with respect to UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations.

**SCOPE AND PRELIMINARY EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

The evaluation will cover the period from 2001 to 2010. It will provide a broad perspective on how partnership between UNDP and a range of funding instruments, including global funds and philanthropic foundations, but also mult-donor trust funds, thematic trust funds and other possible instruments, has evolved. Against this background, the evaluation will focus on UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations.

A number of partnerships will be selected and reviewed in some detail—including cooperation at the policy and operational levels, at headquarters and in programme countries. A total of five or six partnerships will be selected as case studies, two or three from each of the two types of funding instruments (e.g. partnership with GFATM and the MLF would be reviewed more closely in the global fund category; and partnership with the Gates Foundation, Open Society Foundations and Al Maktoum Foundation would be analyzed in more detail in the philanthropic foundation category).

The evaluation will also assess how, from the perspective of selected programme countries, UNDP has partnered with a range of available funding instruments, and the particular roles it has played. Up to eight illustrative country case studies will be conducted in programme countries that will be selected to ensure broad coverage of all case studies on specific partnerships (see above), but also to reflect different levels of human development and experiences in different UNDP regions, with a particular focus on Africa.

The final selection of case studies will be specified in the Inception Report. The selection criteria will take into account the scope of UNDP cooperation with different partners, relevance to UNDP’s work programme and the extent to which particular partnerships have already been evaluated by the Evaluation Office. For example, several recent evaluations on the subject of environment have also looked at UNDP partnership with GEF. As such, GEF is less likely to be included as a case study.

The evaluation will also assess UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations based on the following criteria:

- Relevance and strategic positioning: The evaluation will seek to draw conclusions as
to how UNDP has positioned itself vis-à-vis
global funds and philanthropic foundations
to maximize its relevance and leverage in
providing support to programme countries;

- Effectiveness: The evaluation will assess
UNDP’s contribution to development results
at the outcome level through its cooperation
with global funds and philanthropic
foundations. Issues regarding UNDP’s
outcome-orientation in partnering with such
financing instruments will be reviewed, along
with potential opportunity costs of such
partnerships;

- Efficiency: The evaluation will assess
partnership modalities, both at the broader
corporate level, as well as in the context
of specific countries, with a particular
focus on timeless and resource utilization.
UNDP internal arrangements in managing
partnerships with global funds and
philanthropic foundations will also be
reviewed; and

- Sustainability: The sustainability of UNDP
programmes is of central importance to the
achievement of development outcomes and
longer-term impacts. The evaluation will assess
the extent to which concerns for sustainability
have shaped UNDP partnership with global
funds and philanthropic foundations.

In addition, the evaluation will assess the extent
to which UNDP partnership with global funds
and philanthropic foundations has promoted
human development principles, and in particular
gender equality.

The evaluation of UNDP partnership with global
funds and philanthropic foundations will be
guided by the following preliminary evaluation
questions:

- How relevant and strategic has UNDP
partnership been with global funds and
philanthropic foundations at the global,
regional and country levels?

- To what extent has UNDP partnership with
global funds and philanthropic foundations
affected their policy and programmatic
orientation and/or delivery modalities?

- To what extent has UNDP partnership with
global funds and philanthropic foundations
affected its own programmatic orientation
and delivery modalities at the country level,
as well as broader corporate-level policy and
programme priorities, especially with respect
to relevant sectors and thematic areas?

- To what extent does UNDP partnership with
global funds and philanthropic foundations
at the country level provide additionality in
terms of activities, resources and innovative
or effective approaches, both in cases where
UNDP already had a related track record as
well as in cases where the partnership opened
up an entirely new business area for UNDP?

- What comparative advantages does UNDP
have in partnering with global funds and
philanthropic foundations? To what extent
to specific partnerships in fact build on such
comparative advantages?

- How effective has UNDP been in supporting
the achievement of sustainable development
results in partnership with global funds and
philanthropic foundations?

- How does UNDP’s horizontal structure lend
itself to the delivery of vertically-oriented
(i.e. theme or sector-oriented) funds and
foundations? How efficient has UNDP been
in implementing programmes and projects in
partnership with such funds and foundations?

- How do the governance structures of
global funds and philanthropic foundations
affect partnership with UNDP, and what
are the implications for transparency and
accountability?

- How efficient has UNDP’s programmatic
management and oversight been of
its partnership with global funds and
philanthropic foundations?
As part of the evaluation, an historical review will be conducted of UNDP partnership with different funding instruments, including a range of global funds and philanthropic foundations. It will also look at UNDP partnership with bilateral donors in, for example, establishing thematic trust funds and multi-donor trust funds, as well as related cooperation with United Nations and other multilateral partners. This review will be primarily desk-based and draw on existing literature, evaluations and interviews with key individuals.

**APPRAOCH**

The evaluation will seek to obtain data from a range of sources, including through desk reviews and document analyses, surveys and questionnaires, as well as stakeholder consultations, interviews and focus groups at UNDP headquarters and in a range of programme countries, and other relevant institutions or locations. The rationale for using a range of data sources (data, perceptions, evidence) is to triangulate findings in a situation where much of the data, due to the very nature of UNDP partnerships, is qualitative, and its interpretation is thus critically dependent on the evaluators’ judgment. Triangulation provides an important tool in shoring up evidence by using different data sources to inform the analysis of specific issues.

Where possible and appropriate, the evaluation should seek to obtain evidence as to what may or may not have occurred in the absence of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations. Some programme countries may not have benefited from UNDP partnership with such funding instruments for a range of reasons. They may thus serve to provide insights into the relative value added of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations.

**PORTFOLIO SCAN AND HISTORICAL REVIEW**

In launching the evaluation, an important, initial exercise will be to conduct a scan of the universe of partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations. This scan will assist in (i) determining the availability of data on which to base the evaluation, (ii) obtaining a better understanding of the overall profile of different partnerships, as well as trends over the past decade, (iii) developing operational categories for the evaluation, and (iv) defining a sampling methodology for case studies. This scan will be supplemented by a meta-analysis of all Evaluation Office Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) and, where appropriate, outcome evaluations.

As part of the evaluation, an historical review will be conducted of UNDP partnership with different funding instruments, including a range of global funds and philanthropic foundations. It will also look at UNDP partnership with bilateral donors in, for example, establishing thematic trust funds and multi-donor trust funds, as well as related cooperation with United Nations and other multilateral partners. This review will be primarily desk-based and draw on existing literature, evaluations and interviews with key individuals.

**CASE STUDY APPROACH**

The scope of the evaluation will not permit the selection of a sufficiently large number of case studies that could be considered a representative sample of partnerships. Therefore, based on the portfolio scan (see above), a number of working hypotheses will be developed pertaining to the nature of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, taking into account a range of country scenarios or types, including, e.g. least developed countries, middle-income countries, conflict or disaster-affected countries. Based on these working hypotheses and coverage of country types, criteria will be developed to select two sets of case studies:

- Up to six partnership case studies will be conducted, whereby two to three partnerships will be looked at in more detail under each of the two types of funding instruments (e.g. GFATM and the MLF would be reviewed more closely in the global fund category; partnership with the Gates Foundation, Open Society Foundations and Al Makhtoum Foundation would be analyzed more thoroughly in the philanthropic foundation category).
- Up to eight illustrative country case studies will be conducted in programme countries to assess how UNDP has partnered with global funds, philanthropic foundations and other non-core funding instruments, as appropriate. Countries will be selected to
ensure broad coverage of all case studies on specific partnerships (see above), but also to reflect different levels of human development and experiences in different UNDP regions, with a particular focus on Africa.

The case study approach will comprise the following elements:

- **Stakeholder analysis.** An important initial exercise will be the conduct of stakeholder analyses in order to identify, inter alia, the institutional entities and individuals involved in planning, management and implementation of partnerships and related activities at the global, regional and country levels; and the primary target groups of different partnerships.

- **Documentation reviews.** Due to the range and scope of UNDP partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations, a large number of documents and reports (published and unpublished) may be collected. Some may be the subject of only a general review while others will be subjected to detailed review. Some of the key sources of information will comprise (i) programme and project documents and results frameworks, monitoring and financial reports, evaluations, as well as key project outputs, (ii) policy or strategy documents relating to specific partnerships, and (iii) documentation relating to the nature of selected funding instruments’ partnership with other organizations—multilateral, bilateral, academic, non-governmental organizations, etc.

- **Consultations and interviews.** The main source of information will be through structured or semi-structured interviews and consultations at UNDP, global fund and philanthropic foundation headquarters and UNDP country offices. The results of these consultations and interviews are to be documented, for internal team analysis. In some cases, focus group discussions may be held to capture the dynamic of information sharing and debate, and to enrich the findings. In other cases, interviews will be carried out by telephone or tele/video conference.

- **Targeted surveys.** Surveys can play an important role in validating information. As the ‘stakeholder community’ of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations is large and widespread, a series of surveys may be administered in order to collect additional information and perceptions.

### STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION

Stakeholders will be consulted during different phases of the evaluation in order to (i) ensure an adequate understanding of the nature of UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, as well as in different countries and circumstances; (ii) validate the overall evaluation approach; (iii) ensure that the evaluation report is factually correct and contains no errors of interpretation; and (iv) facilitate the formulation of conclusions and recommendations that are relevant and utilization-focused.

### EVALUABILITY

The evaluation builds heavily on the conduct of background research to provide the lay of the land. This poses challenges because: (i) the funds and foundations are very different in nature and scope, and some are very large and others very small; and (ii) availability of up-front evaluative data is mixed in so far as some funds and foundations have large amounts of relevant data available while others have very little.

With five to six partnership-based case studies, suitable illustrative coverage through up to eight country case studies could be problematic, with a risk that the final product will lack sufficient evaluative rigour, affecting both internal and external validity. In developing the evaluation methodology, measures should be taken to minimize this risk, and should be specifically addressed in the Inception Report.
EXPECTED OUTPUTS AND TIME-FRAME

PRELIMINARY OUTPUTS

- A background scan of relevant partnerships, incorporating data from various sources, including ADRs;
- An Inception Report for the overall evaluation;
- An historical review of UNDP partnership with funding instruments, to be included as a chapter in the evaluation report;
- A case study report for each selected partnership and programme country, based on an agreed format;
- A comprehensive, thematic evaluation report covering the principle issues outlined in these terms of reference and further elaborated in the Inception Report, including an executive summary that highlights findings, recommendations and lessons learned. The format and presentation of the report will be based on prior Evaluation Office practice and should adhere to relevant Evaluation Office and UNDP editorial guidelines;
- PowerPoint presentations for senior managers, the Executive Board and other stakeholders to be used during stakeholder feedback sessions as necessary;
- A methodology brief to facilitate the learning of lessons from the evaluation process.

MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

In keeping with its basic mandate, the Evaluation Office will have overall responsibility for the content and production of the evaluation report and its presentation to the Executive Board. The Evaluation Office will manage the evaluation process, put in place a quality assurance system, provide administrative and substantive backstopping support, and ensure the coordination and liaison with concerned agencies at headquarters as well as the country level. It will also ensure that evaluations are conducted in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System, as approved by the members of the United Nations Evaluation Group on 19 July 2007.

OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

A Task Manager will be designated by the Evaluation Office to provide administrative and substantive technical support to the evaluation team and will work closely with the evaluation Team Leader throughout. The Task Manager may also get involved in specific evaluative tasks. An Evaluation Office Programme Associate will be assigned to provide logistical support, including in the handling contracts and facilitating travel.

A substantive focal point will be nominated in each UNDP programme unit responsible for liaising with selected global funds and philanthropic foundations, and in each UNDP country office where a case study will be conducted. That person will, in close collaboration with the Task Manager, coordinate and organize meetings and all activities of the evaluation within the country. Where appropriate, other relevant UNDP bureaux will nominate a focal point who will provide support in coordinating queries and facilitating the collection of information.

QUALITY ASSURANCE

An external Advisory Panel, comprising at least three senior experts with experience in aid management, evaluation and organizational partnership, will be established to advise the Director of the Evaluation Office on the evaluation's scope, methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations.

A reference group of headquarters-based peers from UNDP and other entities will be constituted to provide periodic comments on the evaluation's scope, methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations.

In addition to the Evaluation Office Director and Deputy Director, who will provide oversight and
guidance in the design and conduct of the evaluation, two Evaluation Office evaluators will be appointed to provide quality support.

THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team will consist of externally recruited, independent consultants with extensive experience in their fields. The evaluation team will comprise a Team Leader, several evaluation specialists, one to two regional or national consultants per country case study, and a research consultant.

- The Team Leader will play a lead role during all phases of the evaluation and coordinate the work of all other team members. S/he will ensure the quality of the evaluation process, outputs, methodology and timely delivery of all products. The Team Leader, in close collaboration with the other evaluation team members, leads the inception workshop including the conceptualization and design of the evaluation, has primary responsibility for the case studies on specific global funds and philanthropic foundations, and has primary responsibility for shaping the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the report.

- A senior expert with extensive knowledge of UNDP partnership with global funds, philanthropic foundations and other funding instruments will conduct an historical review of such partnerships, to be included as a chapter in the main evaluation report. S/he will also advise and support the Team Leader in the conduct of partnership case studies and in drafting the overall evaluation report.

- One or two evaluation specialists with relevant background and expertise will participate in the inception workshop (to the extent possible), contribute to designing the evaluation, and will provide inputs into the inception report. They will lead one or more country case studies and be responsible for the preparation of country case study reports, based on a standardized approach and format. They may also support the conduct of one or more partnership case studies. Each evaluation specialist will, under the overall supervision of the Team Leader, contribute to the preparation of the final report as necessary.

- One to two regional or national consultants will be recruited per case study country and, working closely with the country office focal point in consultation with the Task Manager and Team Leader, be responsible for the collection of all relevant data and preparation of the case study mission. The national consultant will contribute substantively to the work of the evaluation specialist, providing substantive advice and context in the preparation of the county case studies. Under the supervision of the evaluation specialist, the national consultant will participate in the preparation of the country case study report.

- A research consultant will be recruited to work in the Evaluation Office to support the Task Manager and Team Leader with background research and analysis as necessary to support the work of the evaluation team.
### Annex 2

**EVALUATION MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Evaluation Questions</th>
<th>Indicative Sub-Questions</th>
<th>Data / information Sources and Evaluation Instruments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1. How relevant/important is the relationship between UNDP and global fund/philanthropic foundation (GF/PF) at global, regional and country levels? If the relationship is relevant, why? If it is not relevant, why not?</td>
<td>What is the scale of funding? What proportion does this constitute of UNDP’s budget? What proportion of GF/PF budget goes to UNDP?</td>
<td>- Document review (partnership agreements, country program documents, national development plans), meta-evaluation and analysis</td>
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<td>Are there shared values and objectives? For instance, gender equality, human development principles, national ownership, accountability, transparency etc.</td>
<td>Are there shared values and objectives? For instance, gender equality, human development principles, national ownership, accountability, transparency etc.</td>
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<td>Does the partnership serve the priorities of both partners? To what extent do partnership agreements between UNDP global funds and philanthropic foundations reflect priorities in the UNDP Strategic Plan?</td>
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<td>To what extent do partnership agreements reflect national development priorities as articulated in national development plans?</td>
<td>To what extent do partnership agreements reflect national development priorities as articulated in national development plans?</td>
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<td>Does UNDP have any comparative advantages when partnering with GF/PF? If so, what are these? If not, what comparative advantages do other organizations (multilaterals, NGOs, private companies etc.) have and why?</td>
<td>Does UNDP have any comparative advantages when partnering with GF/PF? If so, what are these? If not, what comparative advantages do other organizations (multilaterals, NGOs, private companies etc.) have and why?</td>
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<td>- How does UNDP’s horizontal structure lend itself to the delivery of vertically-oriented (i.e. theme or sector-oriented) funds and foundations?</td>
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<td>- In designing programs with global funds and philanthropic foundations how are the comparative advantages of UNDP observed and used, e.g. in designing programs?</td>
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<td>- To what extent have global funds or philanthropic foundations sought to utilize UNDP’s comparative advantage?</td>
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<td>- To what extent do global funds and philanthropic foundations deliberately target UNDP by virtue of its presence at the county level?</td>
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<td>- How important is UNDP’s emphasis on human development and gender equality in terms the global funds and philanthropic foundations’ perception of UNDP’s comparative advantages?</td>
<td>- How important is UNDP’s emphasis on human development and gender equality in terms the global funds and philanthropic foundations’ perception of UNDP’s comparative advantages?</td>
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<td>• Are there any ways in which the organizations are not compatible?</td>
<td>• Are there any ways in which the organizations are not compatible?</td>
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<td>• To what extent has risk analysis informed the initiation of partnerships? What are the key risks for UNDP in partnering with a) global funds, and b) philanthropic foundations?</td>
<td>• To what extent has risk analysis informed the initiation of partnerships? What are the key risks for UNDP in partnering with a) global funds, and b) philanthropic foundations?</td>
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<td>• To what extent do partnership strategies exist between UNDP and global funds and philanthropic foundations?</td>
<td>• To what extent do partnership strategies exist between UNDP and global funds and philanthropic foundations?</td>
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<td>• Where partnership strategies exist, how have they strengthened the relevance of UNDP’s work?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Evaluation Questions</td>
<td>Indicative Sub-Questions</td>
<td>Data / information Sources and Evaluation Instruments</td>
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| 1.1. How relevant/important is the relationship between UNDP and global fund/philanthropic foundation (GF/PF) at global, regional and country levels? If the relationship is relevant, why? If it is not relevant, why not? | • To what extent were partnerships more global in nature or more orientated towards specific (country-level) initiatives?  
• Which partnerships can be identified as examples, possibly to be replicated, of how a specific strategy assisted UNDP in improving its delivery mechanism?  
• Which partnerships can be identified as examples, possibly to be replicated, of how a specific strategy assisted UNDP in improving its delivery mechanism? How are the experiences and partnership modalities different between global funds and philanthropic foundations?  
• To what extent has the decentralized organizational model of UNDP been successful in promoting strategic and relevant partnerships at the global, regional and country levels? |  
| 1.2. What is UNDP’s strategy towards global funds and philanthropic foundations? | • How has UNDP positioned itself vis-à-vis other close or regular partners of specific global funds and philanthropic foundations? How has UNDP sought to differentiate itself as a partner of choice?  
• Has UNDP done anything to make itself relevant? Did it change its administrative or management procedures to facilitate the partnership?  
• Has UNDP decided to take a different kind of approach instead, one which seeks to facilitate partnerships between GF/PF and other players where they are more relevant and experienced? How does it work with other development actors e.g. other UN agencies, does it take a cooperative or competitive approach?  
• How has UNDP facilitated partnership between funds and foundations and UN country teams, or specific country team members, in line with its mandate to support the coordination of the United Nations system at the country level?  
• How does UNDP see its role in the evolving aid architecture? How could it or should it adapt to changes in international development i.e. increasing fragmentation, new players and donors, and aid being delivered through multiple mechanisms rather than traditional multilateral routes?  
• What does the process of initiating a partnership look like? How does UNDP identify potential partners and based on what need/demand?  
• How does UNDP identify suitable projects for partnerships that are in line with UNDP programming objectives as well as national development priorities?  
• What strategies has UNDP applied in fund raising efforts towards global funds and philanthropic foundations?  
• How flexible has UNDP been in terms of adapting its programmatic or administrative approaches to partners in the selected case study countries? | • Document review (partnership agreements, country program documents, national development plans), meta-evaluation, Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (PAPPs) and analysis  
• Targeted survey RCs/RRs  
• Semi-structured interviews with key informants, including:  
  - Senior executives in the Funds and Foundations  
  - UNDP stakeholders at global and regional levels |
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<th>Key Evaluation Questions</th>
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| 1.3. How has the part-ner-ship affected or added value to each partner? How has the partnership with UNDP affected GF/PF? How has the partnership with GF/PF affected UNDP? | • Consider for example, activities, resources, innovative and effective approaches, opening up of new business areas, policy and program orientation, delivery modalities, promotion of UN values, lessons learned, policy development etc.  
• To what extent do global funds and philanthropic foundations consider UNDP to have been a change agent?  
• To what extent are global funds and philanthropic foundations able to identify lessons learned in cooperating with UNDP that could be replicated?  
• To what extent did the modalities and objectives of any of the global funds and philanthropic foundations change as a result of collaborating with UNDP?  
• What lessons has UNDP learned from working with global funds and philanthropic foundations?  
• How have these lessons been identified and disseminated? What have been some of the consequences of lessons learned?  
• To what extent did UNDP adapt or even significantly change its programmatic orientation and implementation modalities, particularly at the country level, as a result of working with global funds and philanthropic foundations?  
• How did changes brought about in UNDP through cooperation with global funds and philanthropic foundations affect the relevance of UNDP program and projects?  
• Have partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations enabled UNDP to explore programming in sectors and thematic areas that have been considered difficult to get access to?  
• What evidence is there that partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations helped UNDP in achieving its objectives by opening or broadening new avenues?  
• To what extent has partnership with global funds or philanthropic foundations constrained UNDP’s programmatic orientation or ability to respond to government requests?  
• Have the partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations supported UNDP’s ability to promote human development principles including gender equality? | • Document review (partnership agreements, country program documents), meta-evaluation and analysis  
• Targeted survey RCs/RRs  
• Semi-structured interviews with key informants, including:  
  - stakeholders at regional and country level (incl. Policy Advisers, selected RCs/RRs of country case studies, development partner representatives)  
  - Senior executives in the Funds and Foundations  
  - UNDP stakeholders at global level (incl. UNDP executives and management of BERA, BDP, Policy Advisers and practice network managers) |
## Key Evaluation Questions

### Effectiveness

2.1. What were the partners hoping to achieve through this partnership? Have these hoped for results (outcomes) been achieved? If so, what are they? What evidence is there of these results?

- Consider effectiveness both from strategic and project level. Ask interviewees for their overall impression as well as documented evidence of lower level results.
- To what extent has UNDP, through its partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, contributed to the achievement of development results, in line with programmatic objectives at the country level?
- Are these results in line with the organizational strategy of each partner?
- What has been the contribution of other partners and organizations to these results?
- How does UNDP’s horizontal structure affect the delivery of vertically-oriented (i.e. theme or sector-oriented) funds and foundations?
- What positive effects have the outputs delivered under the UNDP partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations had on the achievement of outcomes?
- What has been the contribution of other partners and organizations to the outcomes?
- What were the positive, intended or unintended, developmental changes brought about by UNDP’s partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations?
- Compared with other, mainstream delivery mechanisms, what added value does UNDP partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations have in contributing towards the achievement of outcomes?
- To what extent did outcomes achieved through partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations benefit women and men equally?
- To what extent has UNDP’s partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations contributed towards creating conditions in which people’s choices in determining their human development were enlarged, and their human capabilities and freedoms were enhanced?

### Data / Information Sources and Evaluation Instruments

- Document review (partnership agreements, project documents, country program documents, national development plans), meta-evaluation and financial analysis
- Targeted survey RCs/RRs
- Semi-structured interviews with key informants, including:
  - Senior executives in the Funds and Foundations
  - Key donors and multilateral partners
  - UNDP stakeholders at global level (incl. UNDP executives and management of BERA, BDP, Policy Advisers and practice network managers)
  - Implementing partners, civil society
  - Stakeholders at regional and country level (incl. Policy Advisers, selected RCs/RRs of country case studies, development partner representatives)

2.2. What has not worked so well? Have these partnerships failed to deliver anticipated results? If so, what are they? What evidence is there of this lack of results? Have there been any unintended negative consequences?

- What negative effects have the outputs delivered under the UNDP partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations had on the achievement of outcomes?
- What were the negative unintended, developmental changes brought about by UNDP’s partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations?
### Efficiency

#### 3.1. What factors have influenced whether or not the partnerships have achieved what they set out to do? How efficiently have the partnerships operated?

Consider internal factors on both sides e.g. management, administration, values, coordination, resources etc.

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<tr>
<th>Key Evaluation Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>• How efficient is UNDP’s corporate level management, oversight and coordination of these partnerships? How appropriate are current arrangements for the management and coordination of global funds and philanthropic foundations within UNDP? Links between HQ/regional/country levels?</td>
<td>• Document review (partnership agreements, project documents, country program documents, national development plans), meta-evaluation and financial analysis</td>
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<td>• What are the main transaction costs associated with managing the partnership with UNDP?</td>
<td>• Targeted survey RCs/RRs</td>
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<td>• What amount and type of resources have been dedicated to manage partnerships with global funds and philanthropic foundations? Have the resource levels increased/decreased over the course of the past decade?</td>
<td>• Semi-structured interviews with key informants, including:</td>
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<td>• How are risks managed by both partners?</td>
<td>- Senior executives in the Funds and Foundations</td>
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<td>• How do the governance structures of GF/PF affect partnerships with UNDP, and what are the implications for transparency and accountability? To what extent are the governance structures of global funds and philanthropic foundations compatible with those of UNDP? To what extent do conflicts of interest exist, and how have they been resolved?</td>
<td>- Key donors and multilateral partners</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• How do the governance structures of UNDP affect partnerships with GF/PF, and what are the implications for transparency and accountability?</td>
<td>- UNDP stakeholders at global level (incl. UNDP executives and management of BERA, BDP, Policy Advisers and practice network managers)</td>
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<td>• In their partnership with UNDP, to what extent do global funds and philanthropic foundations acknowledge that they produce public goods that need to be audited evaluated independently on a periodic basis?</td>
<td>- Implementing partners, civil society</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• In their partnership with UNDP, to what extend do global funds and philanthropic foundations acknowledge the importance of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (and other relevant international aid effectiveness declarations)?</td>
<td>- stakeholders at regional and country level (incl. Policy Advisers, selected RCs/RRs of country case studies, development partner representatives)</td>
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<td>• What type of governance structures in global funds and philanthropic foundations has been particularly successful in facilitating the delivery of aid programs? In any particular sector?</td>
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<td>• How timely and cost-effectiveness have these partnerships been in terms of delivering high quality outputs?</td>
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<td>• To what extent did the activities implemented under the partnership agreements with global funds and philanthropic foundations result in the timely and cost-effective delivery of high-quality outputs?</td>
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<td>• To what extent were partnership modalities conducive to the efficient delivery of outputs?</td>
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<td>• To what extent is UNDP viewed as an efficient delivery mechanism in a particular country context?</td>
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<td>• To what extent are partnership processes and results monitored as part of the management of the partnerships?</td>
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### Key Evaluation Questions

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<tr>
<th>Indicative Sub-Questions</th>
<th>Data / information Sources and Evaluation Instruments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1. What factors have influenced whether or not the partnerships have achieved what they set out to do? How efficiently have the partnerships operated? Consider internal factors on both sides e.g. management, administration, values, coordination, resources etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What incentives are put in place to reward successful partnership modalities?</td>
<td>• Document review (partnership agreements, project documents, country program documents, national development plans), meta-evaluation and financial analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What is the main transaction costs associated with managing these partnerships and how do they compare to managing funds from more traditional donors?</td>
<td>• Targeted survey RCS/RRs</td>
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<td>• How does UNDP manage risk associated with these partnerships?</td>
<td>• Semi-structured interviews with key informants, including:</td>
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<td>• To what extent do UNDP activities and outputs promote human development concerns, including gender equality?</td>
<td>• Senior executives in the Funds and Foundations</td>
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<td>3.2. What monitoring and reporting systems are there for activities implemented through the partnerships both at global and country levels? Were these mechanisms efficient? Were there any gaps?</td>
<td>• Key donors and multilateral partners</td>
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<td>• To what extent have monitoring and reporting systems been established at the global and country levels to track UNDP’s partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations, in particular the achievement of outputs and the progress made in contributing towards the achievement of results?</td>
<td>• UNDP stakeholders at global level (incl. UNDP executives and management of BERA, BDP, Policy advisers and practice network managers)</td>
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<td>• Have efforts been made to establish joint monitoring and reporting systems?</td>
<td>• Implementing partners, civil society stakeholders at regional and country level (incl. Policy Advisers, selected RCS/RRs of country case studies, development partner representatives)</td>
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<td>• To what extent have governmental counterparts been involved in the establishment of monitoring systems, especially at the outcome level?</td>
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<td>• To what extent are adequate criteria being formulated to allow for meaningful monitoring and evaluation of partnerships between UNDP and global funds and philanthropic foundations?</td>
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<td>• To what extent have M&amp;E been allowed to play a significant role in terms of how these partnerships are managed and their strategic direction?</td>
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### Sustainability

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<tr>
<td>4.1. How is the issue of sustainability taken into account in the partnerships between UNDP and GF/PF?</td>
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<td>• Is sustainability of the partnership itself a relevant concern and an end in itself?</td>
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<td>• How is sustainability factored into programs and activities?</td>
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<td>• How is sustainability addressed in the context of ongoing partnerships?</td>
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<td>• Have mechanisms been established to ensure a sustainable focus on human development concerns, including gender equality?</td>
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<td>Key Evaluation Questions</td>
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</table>
| 4.1. How is the issue of sustainability taken into account in the partnerships between UNDP and GF/PF? | • What exit strategies have UNDP developed in cooperation with global funds and philanthropic foundations?  
• To what extent do global funds and philanthropic foundations explicitly promote sustainability in their cooperation with UNDP, and what have the experiences been in this regard?  
• To what extent is hand-over to governments preceded by capacity development programs? What examples are there for the up-scaling of programs or projects implemented in partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations? | • Document review (partnership agreements, project documents, country program documents, national development plans), meta-evaluation and financial analysis  
• Targeted survey RCs/RRs  
• Semi-structured interviews with key informants, including:  
  - Senior executives in the Funds and Foundations  
  - Key donors and multilateral partners  
  - UNDP stakeholders at global level (incl. UNDP executives and management of BERA, BDP, Policy Advisers and practice network managers)  
  - Implementing partners, civil society  
  - stakeholders at regional and country level (incl. Policy Advisers, selected RCs/RRs of country case studies, development partner representatives) |
## COUNTRIES REVIEWED

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<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>ADR Review</th>
<th>Country Case Study</th>
<th>Supplementary Review</th>
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<td><strong>Regional Bureau for Africa</strong></td>
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<td>88   Venezuela</td>
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### Annex 4

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNDP 2004-2010**

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<td><strong>4,654.2</strong></td>
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Source: UNDP

- a. Figures are based on the 2001-2010 Annual Review of the Financial Situation and only include Trust Funds and Cost Sharing.
- b. Figures are based on the 2004-2010 Financial Highlights of the Annual Review of the Financial Situation and include Trust Funds, Cost Sharing, MSA and JPO.
- c. GFATM 2004-2010 figures are based on the General Ledger (GL). The Trust Fund for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and MLF for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol figures are based on the 2004-2010 Schedule 5: Trust Funds Established by UNDP.
- d. Figures from 2004 to 2009 are based on the OBIEE database (only Cost Sharing and Trust Funds). 2010 Figures are based on the Fund Balance Report (only Cost Sharing and Trust Funds).
- e. The Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahayan, Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation.

* Top five Bilateral Donors (countries) and the mentioned Foundations are ranked on the basis of 2010 Other (Non-core) Resources contributions.
## Annex 5

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNDP COUNTRY OFFICES**

**FROM GLOBAL FUNDS AND PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 2001-2010 (IN US DOLLARS)**

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Annex 6

PEOPLE CONSULTED

HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER CENTRAL OFFICES: UNDP AND PARTNERS

NEW YORK

**Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery**
Venancio, Moises, Policy Adviser, Strategic Planning

**Bureau for Development Policy**
Bennet, Nancy, Results Management Adviser, Global Environment Facility Directorate
Burton, Tracey, Senior Programme Adviser, GFATM Unit
Carvalho, Suely, Principal Technical Adviser and Chief, Montreal Protocol Unit
Cauvin, Linda, Deputy Chief, Montreal Protocol Unit
Dallo, Jose, Programme Specialist
Friederichs, Laura, Programme Specialist, GFATM Unit
Gardner, Douglas, Deputy Assistant Administrator
Glemarec, Yannick, Executive Director, Global Environment Facility Directorate
Hough, John, (Former) Deputy Executive Director, Global Environment Facility Directorate
Janjua, Harinder, Consultant, GFATM Unit
Nganga, Loise, Finance Specialist, Montreal Protocol Unit
O’Malley, Jeffrey, Director, HIV/AIDS Group
Reimov, Ajiniyaz, Programme and Research Analyst, Montreal Protocol Unit

Seyedi, Bahareh, Sustainable Energy and Programme Analyst, Montreal Protocol Unit
Takada, Minoru, Head, Sustainable Energy Programme
Tyrkkü, Klaus, Programme Specialist, Montreal Protocol Unit
Van Engel, Jacques, Programme Adviser, Montreal Protocol Unit
Vandeweerd, Veerle, Director, Environment and Energy Group

**Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy**
Bouadze, Levan, Chief, Management Support Unit
Jackelen, Henry, Director, Private Sector Division
Kaag, Sigrid, Assistant Administrator and Director Partnership Bureau
Muttukumaru, Romesh, Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director
Mzyk, Karolina, Programme Specialist, Private Sector Division
Reyes, Madelaine, Finance Associate, Division of UN Foundation Affairs
Sinha, Lena, former Director, Division of United Nations Foundation Affairs

**Bureau of Management**
Aklilu, Birsat, Executive Coordinator, Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office
Fernandez, Lina, Management Adviser
Hurez, Sylvie, Consultant
Inaba, Mitsuhiko, Finance Analysis Adviser
Keijzers, Henriette, Deputy Director, Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office
Machoka, Penina, Legal Adviser, Legal Support Office
Ng, Jonathan, Quality Assurance and Audit Adviser, Office of Assistant Administrator
Olivier, Gael, Legal Specialist, Legal Support Office
Orr, Simon, Chief, Accounts Division
Shah, Darshak, Deputy Director and Chief Finance Officer
Shemirani, Farnaz, Database Expert/Programme Associate, Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office
Singh, Vikram, Policy Specialist

Office of Audit and Investigations
Ikiara, Zachary, Audit Specialist
Khoury, Antoine, Deputy Director
Ogino, Yuichiro, Chief, Headquarters Audit Section

Regional Bureau for Africa
Baffour, Violet, Special Assistant to the Director
Cisse, Babacar, Deputy Director
Coulibaly, Siaka, Policy and Strategy Division, Policy Specialist
Fuentes, Ricardo, Economics Adviser (Human Development)
Gajraj, Priya, Adviser, Office of Director
Nanthikesan, Suppiramaniam, Evaluation Adviser, Policy and Strategy Division
Sissoko, Mariam, Adviser

Regional Bureau for Arab States
Abdellatif, Adel, Chief of RBAS Regional Programme
Al-Khatib, Dima, Regional Programme Adviser
Siao, Susanne K., Partnerships and Resource Mobilization Adviser

Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
Gjuzi, Albana, Programme Specialist, Office of Assistant Administrator
Harfst, Jan, Chief, Country Cluster
Kazana, Joanna, Chief, Office of Assistant Administrator
Tursaliev, Sanjar, Programme Specialist, Office of Assistant Administrator
Xu, Haoliang, Deputy Assistant Administrator

Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
Bauza, Soledad, Programme Specialist, Oversight and Support
Benitez, Carlos, Programme Specialist, Oversight and Support

Procurement Unit, Copenhagen
Pontré, Jacqueline, Procurement Adviser
Kavaliova, Sviatlana, Procurement Specialist

Other
Krishnan, Venkatachalam, Chief of Operations, United Nations Office for Partnerships
Petersen, Soren, Senior Officer, United Nations Global Compact
Rich, Roland, Officer-in-Charge, United Nations Office for Partnerships
Calvin, Kathy, Chief Executive Officer, United Nations Foundation
Grady, Heather, Vice President, Foundation Initiatives, Rockefeller Foundation
Macpherson, Nancy, Managing Director, Evaluation, Rockefeller Foundation
Myers, Susan, Vice President, UN Foundation
Richter, Anthony, Associate Director of Open Society Foundation, Open Society Institute
Vickers, George, Director of International Operations, Open Society Institute
**UNDP**

Björkman, Håkan, Manager,
  UNDP-GFATM Unit, Bureau for Development Policy

Fuleihan, Nadia, Policy Specialist
  HIV/AIDS, UNDP-GFATM Unit,
  Bureau for Development Policy

**GFATM Secretariat**

Ananaba, Alozie, Fund Portfolio Manager

Benn, Christoph, Cluster Director, External Relations and Partnerships

Eli Eltom, Akram, Unit Director, Partnerships
  Lwin, Sandii, Manager, Bilateral and Multilateral Partnerships

Creac’h, Philippe, Fund Portfolio Manager

Lansang, Mary Ann, Unit Director, Knowledge Management and M&E Unit (a. i.)
  Puvimanasinghe, John, Manager, M&E Team Asia

Pedrosa, Lilian, Programme Officer

Weber, Urban, Unit Director, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean

**Other**

Banda, Mazuwa Andrew, HIV/AIDS Department, World Health Organization

Kakkattil, Pradeep, Chief, Aid Effectiveness and Country Capacity Division, UNAIDS

Nitzsche-Bell, Anja, Team Leader, Global Financing Mechanisms and Impact Unit, UNAIDS

Villeneuve, Pascal, Associate Director (Programme Partnerships), Division of Programmes, United Nations Children’s Fund

**PANAMA**

**UNDP Regional Service Centre,**
**Latin America and the Caribbean**

Coles de Negret, Helen, Senior Technical Adviser, Biodiversity and Ecosystems and Regional Technical Adviser for the Southern Cone Sub-Region of Latin America and the Caribbean, Environment and Energy Practice

Justiniano, Freddy, Director a.i.

Mattila, Inka, Evaluation Specialist

Ruiz Villafranca, David, HIV/AIDS Policy Specialist, HIV/AIDS Practice

**WASHINGTON D.C.**

**Global Environment Facility**

Carugi, Carlo, Senior Evaluation Officer, Office of Evaluation

Laperriere, Andre, Deputy CEO, Front Office

Negi, Neeraj Kumar, Evaluation Officer, Office of Evaluation

Ramankutty, Ramesh, Head of Operations and Business Strategy, Operation and Business Strategy Division

Toure, Sekou, Conflict Resolution Commissioner, Front Office

Van den Berg, Rob, Director of Evaluation, Office of Evaluation, Global Evaluation Fund

Van Dyke, Brennan, CEO Senior Adviser, Front Office

**Open Society Institute**

Amosum, Akwe, Director of Africa Advocacy

**The World Bank Group**

Aghumian, Anna, Country Corporate and Global Evaluations, Independent Evaluation Group
Annex 6. People Consulted

Mitchell, Arlene, Interim Deputy Director, Global Development/Agricultural Development, Seattle

Nelson, Jodi, Director, Impact Planning and Improvement, Gates Foundation, Seattle

Oswald, Siri, Programme Officer, Global Development/Global Libraries, Seattle

Steiner, Roy, Deputy Director for Agriculture, Seattle

Suzman, Mark, Director, Global Development Policy and Advocacy, Washington D.C.

Wilkinson, Brady, Associate Programme Officer, Seattle

MLF Secretariat, Montreal

Ganem, Eduardo, Deputy Chief Officer

Nolan, Maria, Chief Officer

Reed, Andrew, Senior Economic Affairs Officer

United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Vienna

Ahmed, Si, Director, MLF Project Department

Anestis, Georgios, Head of Environmental Projects

COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

ANGOLA

UNDP

Carvalho, Kamia, Head of Poverty Desk

Cooper, Mario, HIV/AIDS Specialist

Harbour, Samuel, Country Director

Maquina, Roberto, GFATM Focal Point

Nascimento, Gabriela Do, GEF Focal Point

Ribeiro, Maria Do Valle, Resident Representative

Goverment

Belchior da Silva, Jose, National Director of Health Services, Angolan Armed Forces

Other

Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal

Ravi Sharma, Principle Officer, Implementation and Technical Support

Gates Foundation

Bertozzi, Stef, Director for HIV and Tuberculosis, Seattle
Coelho, Antonio, Executive Secretary, ANASO
National Network of NGOs

Conesta, Natalia, Country Director, CUAMM

Frimpong, Nana, Country Director, PSI Angola

Gomes da Silva, Filomena, Ministry of Health,
General Director

Matias, Antonio, GEF/OFP political and MLF
Focal Point, Ministry of Environment

Ribeiro, Antonia, Administrator, National
Malaria Control, Ministry of Health

Romero, Jorge, Ministry of Health, GFATM
Technical Unit, Adviser to the Technical
Unity of GFATM

Salvador, Aurora dos Santos, HIV and AIDS
focal point, Ministry of Education

Samuel, Pedro, Deputy National Director,
Ministry of Environment

Serrano, Ducelin, Manager, National Institute to
Fight AIDS, Ministry of Health

Serrano, Ducelina, Director, National Institute
to fight AIDS, Ministry of Health

Suzana, Elsa, Malaria and HIV Focal Point,
Ministry of Social Reintegration

Waya, Evaristo, Member, ANASO National
Network of NGOs

Other

Vanormelingen, Koen, Resident
Representative, UNICEF

BELARUS

UNDP

Choulba, Igor, GEF Programme Manager

Garakhanyov, Farid, Deputy Resident
Representative

Kuzmianok, Olga, Head of Business Unit,
GFATM Grants Implementation Unit

Government

Rachevski, Alexander, Head of International
Relations Unit, Ministry of Natural
Resources, and Environmental Protection of
the Republic of Belarus

Other

Fenchuk, Victor, Executive Director,
Environmental NGO

Ruzanov, Dmitriy, Head of TB and
Pulmonology Chair, Gomel State Medical
University

Subtselnij, Dmitriy, Director of Belarussian
Association of UNESCO Clubs

BURKINA FASO

UNDP

Bounkoungou, Victor, Tuberculosis Programme
Officer, Programme d’Appui au Monde
Associatif et Communautaire

Coulibaly, Clarisse, Programme Officer,
Environment

Cyimana, Ingrid, Country Director

Kabré, Saidou, Coordinator, GFATM
Finance Unit

Karorero, Pascal, Resident Representative

Kere Sosthène, Programme Officer, Programme
d’Appui au Monde Associatif et
Communautaire

Kologo, Boureima, Operation Director,
Programme d’Appui au Monde Associatif et
Communautaire

Lougué, Marcel, Coordinator, a. i.,
Programme d’Appui au Monde Associatif et
Communautaire

Mamadou, Dao, Programme Officer, Prevention,
Programme d’Appui au Monde Associatif et
Communautaire

Ouattara, Anne Marie, Programme Officer,
Programme d’Appui au Monde Associatif et
Communautaire
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Annex 7

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All Country Studies

Assessment of Development Results

Common Country Assessment
Country Cooperation Framework
Country Programme Action Plan
Country Programme Document
MDG Reports
National development plans and relevant policy documents
National Human Development Reports
Outcome evaluations.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

Project documents and reports relating to partnership with global funds and philanthropic foundations

Programme budget for all focus areas (2001-2010)

Resident Coordinator Annual Reports

Results-Oriented Annual Reports

United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks