Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.
ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS SRI LANKA

EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION
### REPORTS PUBLISHED UNDER THE ADR SERIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Paraguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados and OECS</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: SRI LANKA**

Copyright © UNDP 2012, all rights reserved. Manufactured in the United States of America. Printed on recycled paper.

The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication by UNDP Evaluation Office.

**Copy editing:** Michelle Weston  
**Graphic design:** Laurie Douglas Graphic Design (lauriedouglas.com)  
**Cover photos:** UNDP Sri Lanka
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to offer sincere thanks to the Government of Sri Lanka for their collaboration in successfully conducting this joint evaluation. The engagement was constructive and professional, allowing the evaluation team to take full advantage of the national ownership whilst maintaining independence. The credit goes to the members of the Joint Management Group who represented the Government: Vaidehi Anushyanthan, T.M.J. Bandara and P.D.H. Dabare of the Ministry of Finance and Planning. We are also grateful to P.B. Jayasundera, Secretary to the Treasury of Sri Lanka, who kindly co-chaired the stakeholder workshop with us.

We congratulate with thanks the excellent work done by the evaluation team comprising: Masahiro Igarashi of the Evaluation Office as the evaluation manager; Isha Miranda, who led the national team and was responsible for the areas of poverty reduction, the achievement of the MDGs and gender; Asoka S. Gunawardena, who coordinated drafting of the report and worked on democratic governance; Sonali De Silva for her work on energy and the environment; and Mallika R. Samaranayake for her work in the areas of peace and recovery. Elizabeth Leon de Jones provided research support, and Nina Abeydeera provided in-country coordination support.

Our thanks are also extended to stakeholders and partners of UNDP Sri Lanka, including members of the Government, civil society, international development community, the United Nations family and members of the communities the ADR team consulted during the course of the evaluation.

The cooperation of Subinay Nandy, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, and Douglas Keh, former Country Director, is gratefully acknowledged. We appreciate the cooperation and the extensive support from Razina Bilgrami, Deputy Country Director and Country Director a.i., Frederick Abeyratne and Salma El Hag Yousif who were the focal points for this evaluation, and the staff of UNDP Sri Lanka, including those in the field who provided support to the missions. We would also like to thank the UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific for their cooperation.

It is our hope that this evaluation will help UNDP further leverage its strategic partnership with the Government of Sri Lanka, as UNDP advances to become an ever more relevant and valuable partner to the country.
The Assessment of Development Results (ADR) is an independent evaluation by the Evaluation Office (EO) which systematically assesses progress of key interventions by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in countries receiving its support. The ADR in Sri Lanka is the seventy-fourth assessment conducted by the EO and the twenty-first conducted within the Asia-Pacific region, and the first such evaluation conducted in Sri Lanka.

This ADR was conducted jointly with the Government of Sri Lanka with a view to strengthening the ownership of the evaluation results by national partners, and thereby its credibility and utility. For this purpose, a Joint Management Group (JMG) was set up with participation from both the Government and the EO. The JMG provided oversight to the evaluation which was conducted by an independent national team and guided by a professional evaluation manager from the EO. Through this mechanism, both the Government and the EO ensured that established norms and standards for evaluation, such as independence, impartiality and rigorous methodology, were followed. We believe that this joint approach has helped the evaluation team collect inputs from a broad range of national partners and resulted in a report that is soundly rooted in the national reality making it useful for national partners and UNDP in designing their future engagement with a better sense of UNDP’s strategic direction.

The evaluation found that UNDP had significantly helped the country overcome major challenges that emerged during the last decade. Today, Sri Lanka is looking at a new development path as a middle income country, and UNDP has been seeking to reposition itself to maintain its relevance in the new context. We therefore believe that the evaluation was very timely. Having provided the opportunity to take stock of what worked, and what did not, in the past decade, the evaluation proposes the most useful role UNDP can play in the future.

Indran A. Naidoo
Director, Evaluation Office
UNDP
# CONTENTS

## Acronyms and Abbreviations
- ix

## Executive Summary
- xi

### Chapter 1 Introduction
- 1
  1.1 Objectives
  - 1
  1.2 Scope
  - 1
  1.3 Joint evaluation approach
  - 2
  1.4 Methodology and approach
  - 3
  1.5 Structure of the report
  - 8

### Chapter 2 Development challenges and national strategies
- 9
  2.1 Overview
  - 9
  2.2 Development challenges
  - 10
  2.3 National development strategies
  - 21
  2.4 Non-governmental actors
  - 23
  2.5 International development partners
  - 23

### Chapter 3 UN and UNDP responses
- 25
  3.1 UN strategic framework 2002-2012
  - 25
  3.2 Evolution of UNDP strategies
  - 26
  3.3 UNDP programme response by thematic clusters
  - 27
  3.4 Programme resources
  - 38

### Chapter 4 Assessment of UNDP’s contribution to development results
- 41
  4.1 Poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs
  - 41
  4.2 Fostering democratic governance
  - 46
  4.3 Energy and environment
  - 52
  4.4 Crisis prevention and recovery
  - 62
  4.5 Gender
  - 70

### Chapter 5 UNDP’s strategic positioning
- 73
  5.1 Strategic relevance to country needs and challenges
  - 73
  5.2 Use of UNDP’s strength and comparative advantages
  - 74
  5.3 Promotion of UN values
  - 76

### Chapter 6 Conclusions and recommendations
- 70
  6.1 Main conclusions
  - 79
  6.2 Recommendations
  - 81

## Annexes
- 85
  - Annex 1 Terms of reference
  - Annex 2 List of people consulted
  - Annex 3 List of group interviews and discussions held
  - Annex 4 List of main documents consulted
Boxes

Box 1. Programmes and projects selected for in-depth review
Box 2. Data collection methods for programme contributions
Box 3. Field visits conducted

Figures

Figure 1. Human Development Index of Sri Lanka
Figure 2. Poverty headcount ratio
Figure 3. Expenditure 2004-2010 by focus area

Tables

Table 1. Poverty headcount ratio by region
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADREP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ART GOLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCFII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIABOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoGoPro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG-CSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONG PLACES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Currency rates fluctuated between USD 8.50 and USD 9.30 for Rs.1,000 between 2007–2012.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Sri Lanka is an independent evaluation conducted in 2011, jointly by the Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Sri Lanka. The EO and the Government participated in a Joint Management Group (JMG) which established an independent national team, led by a professional manager from the EO, and oversight to the evaluation process.

The ADR has collected and analysed evaluative evidence of UNDP’s contributions to development results during the 2002-2007 (previous) and 2008-2012 (current) programme cycles. It focuses on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of programme activities in achieving intended programme outcomes, as well as the potential sustainability of the results achieved. The ADR also assessed UNDP’s strategic positioning and approaches, drawing general conclusions and recommendations to improve UNDP’s future strategy and approaches have been made.

The evaluation team adopted a case study approach and selected 31 programmes and projects implemented during the period for in-depth review. These programmes and projects were selected to ensure the evaluation covers all strategically or financially significant interventions and all thematic areas of the country programme. The evaluation team set-up a data collection strategy and conducted:

- Individual and group interviews of nearly 150 stakeholders, including policy makers, programme and project managers, project implementing agencies and partners, representatives of beneficiaries or those representing their views, and other stakeholders such as local government officials and private sector associations.
- Ten group discussions of beneficiaries, particularly of the wide-scale Transition and Recovery Programme (TRP) that was implemented directly by UNDP.
- Desk studies of all relevant documents and studies, including 15 existing evaluation reports on UNDP programmes and projects.
- Visits to 11 out of 25 Districts in Sri Lanka to observe the results achieved by field activities. For every programme or project that involved field activities, at least one location was visited.

KEY FINDINGS

UNDP has supported the Government to incorporate the Millennium Declaration Goals (MDGs) and the Managing for Development Results (MfDR) approach into the national planning framework. Introduction of the MDGs in the early 2000s was highly relevant and there has been a steady but slow progress since then. Application of MfDR has yet to achieve necessary depth and breadth to be effective. Dynamic linkages of MfDR systems between national and sub-national entities, and between the central units and other parts of the Government were still largely missing.

UNDP has undertaken several projects to facilitate poverty-reduction in specific sectors and regions. Generally, these projects had limited impact and the sustainability of any results achieved was questionable.

To promote democratic and inclusive governance, UNDP has aimed to strengthen human rights institutions, decentralization of governance and access to justice by the people. Initiatives such as localisation of the MDGs, the introduction of a Citizen’s Charter, and provisions of
legal documents for internally displaced persons (IDPs), were effective in steering public service provision to the people’s needs. Support to local administrations in their tsunami-related recovery effort had a tangible impact on the lives of beneficiaries. However, capacity development support largely focused on institutional strengthening, and systems to effectively utilise those capacities were generally missing.

UNDP has provided policy support to promoting sustainable development through a number of “enabling” documents, or technical studies, to support policy development and implementation. However, the majority of these documents have not led to any policy implementation on the ground. UNDP also has supported a number of field projects for sustainable development and improved environmental management. Many of these projects had produced tangible results, albeit on a limited scale.

UNDP has significantly contributed to establishing a comprehensive national disaster management system, including the creation of the Disaster Management Centre, local disaster response units and an early warning system. Inter-ministerial coordination and local government involvement in disaster management are issues which still remain. The lack of UNDP’s exit strategy from this programme had put into question the sustainability of results achieved.

The TRP implemented in post-conflict areas majorly impacted the lives of beneficiaries. Its integrated approach, encompassing support for housing, livelihood and social transformation, and the strategy to focus this support in community-based organisations, has made some results sustainable. Direct implementation approach adopted by UNDP has led to greater effectiveness but left gaps in the local government’s capacity to take over operations. Further, there was no common understanding on the future or the exit strategy of this programme.

Support to the mine action project has achieved major results on the ground in terms of demining. However, reliance on foreign funding leaves the future of the project uncertain.

A gender dimension was well mainstreamed into UNDP’s programmes, especially its field operations. The standalone project to increase representation of women in decision-making processes has had some contributions but no real impact as yet.

**MAIN CONCLUSIONS**

**Conclusion 1.** Over the past decade, UNDP’s programme has responded well to evolving government priorities and the needs of the country, particularly in dealing with the effects of the war and the tsunami. UNDP thus remained an important partner to the country and has had a tangible impact. Today, UNDP faces the challenge of repositioning itself within a changing context. With post-conflict regions soon moving from a transitional to a developmental phase, UNDP must set out a clear course for its future in these regions. With the country solidifying its middle-income country status and developing its own capacity, UNDP is expected to strengthen its policy advice, advocacy and partnership building roles while focusing capacity development on supporting national efforts. New social, economic and environmental issues are also emerging, in which UNDP could contribute through policy support.

**Conclusion 2.** UNDP’s approach to poverty reduction was opportunistic. Interventions aimed at poverty reduction were isolated and impact was limited. Most of UNDP’s contributions to reduce poverty occurred where poverty reduction was not a primary objective, such as in post-tsunami and post-conflict recovery, the localisation of the MDGs, and the establishment of local disaster response capacities. These programmes, which mainstreamed not only poverty reduction but also human rights and gender, had a considerable impact on the lives of the poor and the vulnerable.

**Conclusion 3.** National capacity developed with UNDP’s support has not always been fully utilised
 Recommendation 5. In all areas of its programme, UNDP should more systematically consider how partnerships with the private sector could facilitate the achievement of development goals and build those partnerships into the programme design.

 Recommendation 6. UNDP’s capacity development should encompass support to the development of systems and mechanisms that would make use of the capacity developed.

 Recommendation 7. UNDP should ensure that capacity developed in national institutions is sustainable after the completion of the engagement, and an exit strategy should be built into every project design.

 Recommendation 8. In promoting accountable and transparent public service delivery mechanisms, UNDP should systematically involve both decentralized and devolved structures of local governance as well as community-level organizations, take on a policy leadership role in coordinating varied donor initiatives in this area, and take a holistic approach to democratic governance encompassing its work on human rights, access to justice, local public service delivery and RBM at national and local levels.

 Recommendation 9. For post-conflict regions, UNDP should set up an exit strategy for its transition and recovery programme, on which a common understanding with partners should be developed. In this regard, it should consider retaining some capacities at the province level to monitor the socio-economic situation and coordinate the capacity development and recovery support during the transition period.

 Recommendation 10. UNDP should re-examine where it could make a critical contribution to gender equality within the context of UNDAF, and provide focused support therein.

 RECOMMENDATIONS

 Recommendation 1. UNDP must strengthen its focus on the achievement of development results beyond the delivery of outputs.

 Recommendation 2. UNDP should support the national development effort more through coordinating and galvanizing support around national development goals, and engage in deeper programmatic coordination within the UNCT towards common development goals defined in UNDAF.

 Recommendation 3. UNDP should enhance its policy advisory role. To this end, it should engage in building broader partnerships among policy makers, intellectual communities, civil society and the private sector in the country.

 Recommendation 4. UNDP should make an effort to more effectively use its success experiences in downstream projects. It should take initiatives to collate experiences of development partners engaged in similar activities to promote a more coherent approach.

 Conclusion 4. There has been a tendency to focus on the delivery of outputs without paying sufficient attention to the conditions in which these outputs could lead to actual development results. Even beyond UNDP, in the community of development partners as a whole, this tendency to focus on delivery more than results, may have hindered effective coordination of strategies and approaches among partners engaged in similar assistance to achieve similar objectives.

 because there was too much focus on individual and institutional capacities without sufficient attention to the system and mechanisms to use them. Further, in most UNDP initiatives, there have not been proper capacity assessments or exit strategies to prepare national institutions to take over the work and functions, putting into question the sustainability of the capacity developed.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 OBJECTIVES

The Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Sri Lanka is an independent evaluation conducted in 2011, jointly by the Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Sri Lanka.

The purpose of an ADR is to support UNDP’s accountability to its Executive Board, stakeholders, partners in respective countries and the public, as well as contributing to improvements in UNDP’s future strategies and programmes in the countries and its sectoral and global knowledge. The ADR of Sri Lanka will be made available to the Executive Board of UNDP, relevant UNDP offices and a wide range of stakeholders and partners in Sri Lanka. In line with UNDP’s Evaluation Policy, it will also be made publicly accessible.

The objectives of the ADR of Sri Lanka are to:

- Capture evaluative evidence of UNDP’s contributions to development results in Sri Lanka during the previous (2002-2007) and current (2008-2012) programme cycles.
- Draw on these evidences to assess the contribution of UNDP’s programme activities to human development in Sri Lanka and the well-being of its people; focusing on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the programme activities in achieving intended programme outcomes, and the potential sustainability of the results achieved by the activities.
- Further analyse evidences and assess the strategic positioning and approaches that UNDP has taken; focusing on synergies with national development strategies and priorities, values espoused by the United Nations (UN) and the comparative strength of UNDP as an organization.
- Draw general conclusions and make recommendations based on the assessments to improve the programme’s future strategy and approaches.

1.2 SCOPE

From 2001 to 2011, the EO conducted 21 ADRs in the Asia and Pacific region covering 30 out of 36 programme countries in the region. The majority of these ADRs (15) were conducted between 2008 and 2011, in response to the UNDP Executive Board members’ request for increased country coverage.

This was the first evaluation conducted in Sri Lanka by the EO. Following the established practice for ADRs, it covered the country programme for two programme cycles and focused on recent experiences so as to produce lessons relevant to the future of the programme. The country programmes for the two cycles are defined respectively in the:

- Second Country Cooperation Framework (CCFII) 2002-2006 (later extended to 2007)
- Country Programme (CP) 2008-2012

The ADR examined the strategies and approaches taken by the country programme,
as well as contributions to development results made by programme activities implemented through projects. For this purpose, with the assistance of the Sri Lanka country office, the EO identified 113 projects implemented during the two programme cycles. Given budget and time constraints, the evaluation narrowed its scope and focused on a subset of these 113 projects for in-depth review, as detailed in the methodology section below.

The ADR covered programme activities funded from both core and non-core resources, which were implemented before August 2011 when the evaluation was launched.

### 1.3 JOINT EVALUATION APPROACH

This evaluation was conducted as a joint evaluation between the Government of Sri Lanka and the EO. Once the intent of the joint evaluation between the two parties was agreed, a Joint Management Group (JMG) was established. The JMG was composed of representatives from three government offices and three representatives from the EO, including the evaluation Task Manager. The roles and responsibilities of the JMG were to:

... [P]rovide overall management of and technical backstopping to the evaluation. It will set the terms of reference for the evaluation, select the independent evaluation team, receive and review the inception report, provide guidance to the conduct of evaluation, receive the first, second and final drafts of the report and decide on its acceptability, organize a stakeholder meeting to discuss the final draft of the report, and manages the review, follow-up and dissemination processes.

The JMG prepared the terms of reference, and selected an evaluation team with four consultants, each of whom was made responsible for one thematic cluster of work. The EO Task Manager also participated in the team to provide methodological guidance and quality assurance. The JMG launched the evaluation in August 2011.

The evaluation team established a data collection plan which was presented to the JMG for their review and comments. The plan was approved in September 2011. After the data collection and analysis, the evaluation team formulated preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations which were presented to the JMG in December 2011.

The evaluation team then prepared the first draft of the evaluation, which was subjected to the internal quality control process of the EO. The draft was submitted to the JMG for review in May 2011.

The draft was then circulated by the JMG to UNDP’s country office in Sri Lanka and key partners in the Government to ensure factual accuracy. The final draft was presented to a wider range of stakeholders to enhance the validity of its findings and conclusions, and the applicability of its recommendations.

Throughout the process, the JMG ensured the evaluation’s adherence to the principle of independence. The evaluation was therefore conducted in strict compliance to the procedures and guidelines established by the EO to safeguard independence. In its oversight role, the JMG also ensured that the quality control process established by the EO was strictly followed. [The draft was then circulated by JMG to a reference group comprising the country office, key partners in the Government and the professional evaluation association in Sri Lanka for ensuring factual accuracy. The final draft was presented to a wider range of stakeholders to enhance the validity of

---

3 In country programme documents, projects are defined as “outputs”. However, at the stage of programme implementation (i.e. when individual projects are designed), this correspondence between projects and outputs is not always maintained. For example, a project may be designed to cover two outputs, vice versa.

4 Defined in the terms of reference agreed by the two parties (see Annex I).
its findings and conclusions, and the applicability of its recommendations.]

1.4 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The ADR assessed UNDP’s contributions to national efforts at addressing development challenges, encompassing the social, economic and governance spheres. It also examined key intended and unintended outcomes of the UNDP programme.

The ADR followed the structured framework provided in the EO’s *ADR Method Manual 2011* and examined two aspects of programme performance. First, the country programme’s contributions to development results through activities aimed to achieve programme outcomes. Second, the strategic positioning and approaches UNDP has taken during the two programme periods. The ADR used multi-data collection methods and applied evaluation criteria to generate findings and make assessments. It also sought to identify underlying factors that led to the findings, and to answer evaluation questions. Based on this analysis, the main conclusions and recommendations were generated.

The evaluation applied a set of evaluation criteria provided in the *ADR Method Manual 2011* to assess both aspects of programme performance. Standard programme evaluation criteria were used to assess contributions through programme activities, namely:

- **Programmatic relevance**: How relevant have UNDP’s programme activities and outputs been to achieving intended programme outcomes and addressing challenges they aimed to address?
- **Effectiveness**: How effective have UNDP’s programme activities and outputs been in achieving intended programme outcomes and addressing challenges they aimed to address?
- **Efficiency**: Has there been any reasonable way to achieve more results with the same resources, or the same results with fewer resources?
- **Sustainability**: Have the results achieved by the programme been sustainable, or produced in such a way that they are likely to be sustainable?

In this analysis, particular attention was paid to how UNDP used its capacity development approach and partnerships with national and other international actors. In the assessment, the output-outcome structure defined in the programme documents provided the framework for the evaluation.

The assessment of UNDP’s strategic positioning and approaches required a systematic analysis of UNDP’s positioning in Sri Lanka, in terms of development and policy. Strategies used by UNDP to maximize its contribution through adopting relevant strategies and approaches were also analysed. The following criteria were applied as per the standard ADR methodology:

- **Strategic relevance and responsiveness**: How relevant have UNDP’s programme and strategy been to national development challenges and Government priorities, and how responsive has UNDP been in responding to emerging challenges and shifting priorities to keep its programme relevant?
- **Use of UNDP’s strength and comparative advantages**: How has UNDP made use of its strength and comparative advantage such as its strategic position in the country or development knowledge and expertise, to maximise its contribution to development results?
- **Promoting UN values from human development perspective**: How has UNDP incorporated promotion of UN values such as equality and human rights in its approach and programme activities?

EVALUABILITY OF THE PROGRAMME

Overall, the country programme was judged evaluable although an issue relating to the results framework needed to be addressed. One of UNDP’s
main clusters of work in Sri Lanka was in the area of energy, environment and disaster risk reduction. However, unlike other clusters of work, the country programme documents did not treat this area as one of its pillars and outcomes expected from work in this area were not clearly defined. A detailed examination of the results framework revealed that the outputs planned for this area of work were actually defined at the outcome level.

Although these outputs were defined as contributing towards intended outcomes for poverty reduction and attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), mapping of actual programme activities to intended outcomes revealed that logical linkages were missing. The evaluation therefore used these outputs as the de facto (intermediate) intended outcomes to properly assess UNDP’s performance in this area of work.

PROJECT COVERAGE

In order to examine programme contributions with sufficient depth and following the standard ADR methodology applied in large country programmes, this ADR focused on a subset of programme activities for in-depth review. The criteria for the selection of such programme activities were as follows:

- All strategically important programmes and projects must be included.
- All four thematic clusters and all programme outcomes must be covered.
- For a programme comprising a number of projects (e.g. multi-phased programme), all projects in the programme should be covered.

Based on a desk study and interviews of programme managers, 30 programmes and projects were identified for in-depth review. In addition, a self-standing project on gender issues implemented under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2008-2012 was included.

The list of selected programmes and projects is provided in Box 1. The list was reviewed by the country office and the JMG to confirm that it met the above criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1. Programmes and projects selected for in-depth review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty reduction and the achievement of MDGs cluster</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Outcome 1**  
  - Strengthening Plan Implementation Capability, Phase I & II (2006-2011) |
| **Outcome 2**  
  - Green Belt Redevelopment of Tourism Infrastructure along the Sri Lankan Coastal Area (2006-2009)  
  - Capacity Development for the Implementation of the National Plan of Action for the Social Development of the Plantation Community (2009-2010) |
| **Fostering of democratic governance cluster** |
| **Outcome 3**  
  - Support to the Bribery Commission (2006-2009)  
  - Support to Efforts and Action Against Corruption (SEAC) (2009-2011) |

---

5 See section 3.3.3 below for a concrete explanation of this issue. Actual outputs and outcomes are defined in the programme document.

6 Within the country programme, in addition to self-standing projects, there are “programmes” composing a series or a set of projects. For example, the MDG-CSP was implemented by a series of projects (Phase I and II) and the Transition and Recovery Programme (TRP) comprised a number of smaller projects implemented in various locations.
Fostering of democratic governance cluster (continued)

**Outcome 4**
- Articulating Territorial and Thematic Networks for Human Development – Governance of Local Development (ART GOLD), Phase I & Phase II (2004-2010)
- Local Governance Project (LoGoPro) (2008-2012)

**Outcome 5**

Energy and environment cluster

**Outcome 1**
- Sustainable Recovery of Natural Resources of Tsunami (2006-2010)
- Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction through Partnerships (2009-2011)
- Operationalising the Road Map towards a Safer Sri Lanka (2009-2011)

**Outcome 2**
- Conservation of Biodiversity in the Rekava, Ussangoda & Kalamitiya (RUK) Coastal Eco-system (2004-2010)
- Post-Tsunami Sustainable Recovery of Natural Resources (2006-2009)
- Promoting Biomass Energy Production (2009-2011)
- Conservation of Biodiversity in Rainforests of Sinharaja and Kanneliya-Dediyangala-Nakiyadeniya (KDN) through Community Co-management (2009-2010)
- Global Environment Fund (GEF) Small Grants Programmes (implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services [UNOPS])

Crisis prevention and recovery pillar

**Outcome 6**
- Creating Dividends for Peace (2004-2010)

**Outcome 7**
- Support to the National Mine Action Programme (SMAP) (2004-2011)
- Transition Programme (TP) (2004-2006)
- Transition and Recovery Programme (TRP) (2008-2011)

Gender
- Enhanced Women’s Political Representation and Participation (2007-2010)

DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY
Data collection activities were planned with the following strategy.

For the assessment of programme contribution by UNDP, data in each thematic area would be collected by each member of the evaluation team responsible for the area with the following methods and data sources:
During the inception phase, the evaluation team established a data collection plan based on the above data collection strategy. The plan was reviewed by the country office for accuracy, and by the JMG for its approval.

Once approved, the evaluation team initiated the data collection according to the plan, although some adjustments were necessary during the course of the data collection due to the unavailability of interviewees or some logistical reasons. These adjustments were made within the data collection strategy framework and, if necessary, data sources were added so that views were collected from all sides.

Field visits were organized to conduct the above data collection activities which, in principle, covered all projects involving field operations.

For the assessment of UNDP’s strategic positioning, findings from the data collected for each thematic area formed the primary evidence base in the assessment of strategic positioning. Further, the following activities would be conducted collectively by the evaluation team to formulate or validate the assessments:

- Interviews of UNDP Sri Lanka senior management.
- Interviews of key programme government counterparts.
- Interviews of Sri Lanka’s key development partners.
- Group discussions with representatives from the UN and other partner agencies.
- Discussions with prominent national think tanks.

### DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

During the inception phase, the evaluation team established a data collection plan based on the above data collection strategy. The plan was reviewed by the country office for accuracy, and by the JMG for its approval.

Once approved, the evaluation team initiated the data collection according to the plan, although some adjustments were necessary during the course of the data collection due to the unavailability of interviewees or some logistical reasons. These adjustments were made within the data collection strategy framework and, if necessary, data sources were added so that views were collected from all sides.

The lists of actual data collection activities conducted are presented in Annexes II (persons consulted), III (group discussions held) and IV (main documents consulted, excluding the programme and project documents). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with over 140 stakeholders. Fifteen semi-structured group discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 2. Data collection methods for programme contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structured group discussions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Structured group discussions of beneficiaries were planned for the TRP in particular because it is a directly implemented programme with fewer layers of stakeholders whose views should be solicited, and a major field operation that directly impacted a large number of beneficiaries.

Field visits were organized to conduct the above data collection activities which, in principle, covered all projects involving field operations.

For the assessment of UNDP’s strategic positioning, findings from the data collected for each thematic area formed the primary evidence base in the assessment of strategic positioning. Further, the following activities would be conducted collectively by the evaluation team to formulate or validate the assessments:

- Interviews of UNDP Sri Lanka senior management.
- Interviews of key programme government counterparts.
- Interviews of Sri Lanka’s key development partners.
- Group discussions with representatives from the UN and other partner agencies.
- Discussions with prominent national think tanks.
and ten structured beneficiary group discussions were also held.

The team carried out field visits for project site observations, and stakeholder interviews and group discussions in the following 11 out of 25 Districts in the country, covering seven out of nine Provinces\(^7\) (see Box 3).

**DATA ANALYSIS AND VALIDATION PROCESS**

For the assessment of **programme contributions**, each member of the team analysed the data collected in the respective thematic area, and formulated findings and made assessments based on the evaluation criteria provided. These findings and assessments were collectively reviewed and discussed by the team to ensure their robustness. When a finding was considered insufficiently substantiated because of differing views expressed by stakeholders, additional data was collected to ensure the triangulation of the finding, even if this was not envisaged in the original data collection plan.

The evaluation team engaged in three-day sessions to identify, from the data gathered individually and collectively, evidences that would provide the basis for the assessment of the strategic positioning of the country programme. Each member of the team produced findings relevant for the assessment of the strategic positioning for each criterion. These were compared and further analysed to reach a common assessment of the strategic positioning.

The team brainstormed to identify major underlying features of the country programme, its strategy and approach that led to the assessments reached. These were then formulated into general conclusions. The team followed a similar process to make preliminary recommendations to address issues emerging in the assessments and conclusions. An iterative review process ensured there was no contradiction between findings for individual thematic areas and the team’s collective assessments on strategic positioning and general conclusions.

The findings, general conclusions and preliminary recommendations were presented to the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 3. Field visits conducted</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Province</strong></td>
<td><strong>District</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Northern Province | Jaffna District  
| | Vavuniya District |
| Eastern Province | Trincomalee District  
| | Batticaloa District  
| | Ampara District |
| North-Central Province | Anuradhapura District |
| Uva Province | Badulla District  
| | Monaragala, District |
| Southern Province | Galle District  
| | Matara District |
| Sabaragamuwa Province | Ratnapura District |
| North-Western Province | Puttalam District |

\(^7\) In Sri Lanka, the main unit of decentralized local administration is the District. Counterparts or national implementation partners of most field-level projects, including those of UNDP, are in the District Secretariat. UNDP field offices are also based in Districts. Hence, the field research is organized by District, except for a few visits related to specific project activities.
JMG and subsequently to the country office for their feedback and validation. When findings or conclusions were questioned through this process, the team further consulted other data sources to enhance the validity of the findings.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides the context in which UNDP has been working during the past decade and describes challenges it faced. Chapter 3 outlines UN and UNDP’s strategies in responding to these challenges. It also details UNDP’s programmatic response which is itself assessed in Chapter 4. Findings are further analysed from the viewpoint of UNDP’s strategic positioning in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 provides conclusions and main findings of the evaluation, as well as recommendations to contribute to UNDP’s future programmes and their implementation in Sri Lanka.
Chapter 2

DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES

This chapter provides the context in which UNDP has implemented the country programme. After an overview, development challenges of the country and the national strategies of the Government are described, followed by brief descriptions of the non-government sector and development cooperation.

2.1 OVERVIEW

Sri Lanka is an island country in the Indian Ocean with approximately 20 million people living in 65,610 square kilometres, meaning a relatively high population density. Today, it has a relatively low population growth rate estimated to be around 0.7 percent, and is faced with an aging population. Approximately 14 percent of the population live in urban areas. About a third of the labour force is engaged in agriculture and a quarter in industrial sectors. A Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of USD 2,836 in 2011 places the country in the lower bracket of the middle-income countries.

Sri Lanka has consistently remained at the global middle of the Human Development Index, in which it is currently ranked 96th of 187 countries (see Figure 1). Based on a tradition of policies to ensure the spread of social welfare, Sri Lanka has achieved higher levels of health and education services than expected of countries with a similar income level. Led by social indicators (with life expectancy at 74.0 years and literacy at 91.3 percent), Sri Lanka is on track to achieving the targets in respect of most of the MDG indicators.

Such a steady pace of development in national statistics and indices however should not mask the fact that this was a highly eventful decade and the country still has structural problems and faces a number of human development challenges.

The most impactful events that affected the development of the country and the life of its people were those related to the prolonged civil war that had started in the late 1970s. At the beginning of the decade, Sri Lanka was experiencing widespread poverty and a sluggish economy. In May 2009, the Government of Sri Lanka declared victory and the end of the war has created hopes of peace and stability. Another impactful event was the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, which brought the largest natural disaster to the country in its recorded history.

While facing the effect of these events, Sri Lanka has been experiencing rapid economic growth thanks to the market-oriented policy introduced in the late-1970s. Over the past decade, there has been a sharp fall in absolute poverty and the country has gained middle-income status.

---

8 Population density was estimated at 308.5 person per square kilometres in 2009. The general statistical data in this section were drawn from official statistics from the Government of Sri Lanka or UN statistics.

9 A population growth rate of 0.7 percent is estimated for 2010-2015, and the ratio of those over 60 years old in 2010 is estimated to be around 12-13 percent of the total population. (Data source: UN statistics).


The realization of the development dividend however poses many challenges. Sri Lanka must move towards becoming conflict-free and create an inclusive society. Improving standards of living requires building a vibrant economy. Post-conflict regions still face reconstruction and rehabilitation challenges and structural issues still need to be addressed to meet the demands of a rapidly growing and transforming economy.

Against this background, the Government’s development strategy has consistently sought to achieve a reasonable rate of growth and ensure equity in the distribution of benefits. Its Vision for the Future is “to share benefits of growth across all segments of the population and prevent inequities, social exclusion and adverse environmental repercussions that have been witnessed in some of the rapidly growing economies”.

The challenges the country faces will be reviewed below by thematic areas related to UNDP’s work.

2.2 DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

2.2.1 POVERTY AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES

The adoption of market-oriented policies in the late-1970s accelerated economic growth, with consequent changes in the structure of the economy bringing about substantial diversification. The share of agriculture decreased by half whilst shares of services and manufacturing increased. GDP over the last decade also doubled.

Such economic growth has brought about a corresponding reduction in poverty at an accelerated pace during the past decade (see Figure 2). The doubling of GDP from USD 1,062 in 2004 to

---

15 Department of Census and Statistics, Poverty Indicators, Vol. 1, Issue 2, May 2011. Poverty headcount ratio is the number of persons living under the official poverty line. The official poverty line shifts with the consumer price index, and takes account of regional price differentials.
USD 2014 in 2008 was matched by a dramatic decline in the poverty headcount from 22.7 percent in 2002 to 8.9 percent in 2009, and to 7.6 percent in the most recent estimate (2009/10).\footnote{16}

While Sri Lanka has drastically reduced poverty during the past decade, thanks largely to rapid economic gains at the macro-level, it still exists at the micro-level. Also, structural disparities between the sectors and regions still exist.

Since the end of the civil war, Sri Lankans have hoped for peace, harmony and economic prosperity.\footnote{17} The outlook for 2011–2015 is positive. The country will profit from a peace dividend, with GDP estimated to average 6.6–8 percent during this period. The agricultural sector will be supported by increased cultivation in the North and East. Recovery in consumer and business confidence is expected to stimulate economic activity, and growth in private consumption, fuelled by rising incomes among industrial, service and agricultural workers, is set to become the main driver of economic expansion.

Poverty has multiple and interlinked causes and dimensions: economic, human, political, socio-cultural, and security. Pro-poor growth therefore requires a concordance of efforts between macro policies and micro interventions such as community development, private sector development and human resource development. Better coordination between national policies and programmes, and non-governmental actions (including those by the private sector and international assistance) is also required.

‘Mahinda Chintana: Vision for a New Sri Lanka’, which provides the basis of the current national development strategy,\footnote{18} identified the drivers of pro-poor growth as: investment promotion in labour-absorbing technologies; development

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{poverty_headcount_ratio.png}
\caption{Poverty headcount ratio}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & National & Urban & Rural & Estate sector \\
\hline
1991 & 40 & 30 & 20 & 10 \\
1996 & 25 & 20 & 15 & 10 \\
2002 & 10 & 5 & 5 & 0 \\
2007 & 5 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
2009 & 2.5 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{Figure 2. Poverty headcount ratio}
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Poverty Indicators, May 2011}
\end{flushleft}

\footnote{16}{Central Bank of Sri Lanka, \textit{Annual Report} 2010.}


\footnote{18}{\textit{Mahinda Chintana: Vision for a New Sri Lanka} was established when the current Government administration came to power in 2005. It still provides the basis of the national development strategy today.}
of rural and urban informal sectors, as well as small and micro-enterprises; employment and investment opportunities particularly in vulnerable communities; and addressing environment and disaster hazard, and vulnerability to climate change. Some specific challenges to pro-poor growth include:

- **Labour market**: There is a general mismatch of skills required for the growing modern economic sector and those available in the Sri Lankan labour market. To achieve the knowledge-based economy envisaged by the Government, skills need to be developed, especially of those in the poorer segment of the population, and the availability and quality of labour market information improved.\(^{19}\)

- **Aging**: Sri Lanka’s population is rapidly aging, placing a heavy burden on the social welfare system and limiting the human resources required for continued development. With the aging rural population, issues arising from the possible labour shortages in the labour-intensive agricultural sector need to be seriously addressed.\(^{20}\)

- **Entrepreneurship and innovation**: Entrepreneurship and innovation are increasingly recognized as important drivers for economic dynamism and growth. The need to strengthen the capacity for research and innovation is recognized.\(^{21}\) In partnership with the private sector, informal sector communities and academia, policies to support entrepreneurs and to nurture the entrepreneurial culture that encourages them, need to be further developed and enacted.

The private sector of Sri Lanka was remarkably resilient during the period of war. The challenges today are to expand and build new businesses that are globally competitive and to create productive employment, while addressing issues such as food self-sufficiency and an aging population, building infrastructure without being detrimental to the environment, and equating development with quality of life across the country.

Finally, regional disparities have narrowed, although not disappeared, over the years thanks to the drastic decline in the overall poverty incidence. Structural problems that created regional disparities still largely remain, such as the lack of an efficient transportation system, underdeveloped infrastructure, low productivity in agriculture, and the high poverty incidence in sectors such as the estate sector (see Table 1).

The Government places regional disparities high on its policy agenda and is taking measures to address these structural problems. As outlined earlier, this requires a sustained multidimensional effort. For example, improving the infrastructure and providing incentives for investment in under-developed regions may be necessary conditions for development, but will not be sufficient conditions as the human resources in those regions do not yet meet the demands of modern industries.

### 2.2.2 GOVERNANCE

The realization of the development dividend arising from political and economic achievements, as well as building on progress towards the MDGs, posed many challenges. It was necessary to look beyond aggregate numbers and indicators to address fundamental distribution and allocation issues underpinning disparities. Improving standards of living required full economic participation of communities and regions and a necessary pre-condition for social development was the creation of an inclusive society. Politically, it was imperative that Sri Lanka move towards becoming conflict-free, and have in place the necessary framework...


development disparities exist – was underscored by the adoption of the MDGs as a national framework for human development. To promote inclusiveness and to address gaps in public services, the MDG framework needed to be localised through the adoption of region-specific targets that reflect local situations. Disparities also created issues of rights and entitlements to social and economic services.

Table 1. Poverty headcount ratio by region (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Kandy</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matale</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuwara Eliya</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Ampara</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Batticaloa</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trincomalee</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-central</td>
<td>Anuradhapura</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polonnaruwa</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-western</td>
<td>Kurunegala</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Puttalam</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Jaffna</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vavuniya</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabaragamuwa</td>
<td>Kegalle</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratnapura</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hambantota</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matara</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uva</td>
<td>Badulla</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moneragala</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gampaha</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalutara</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Poverty Indicator, May 2011

Institutional systems and structures to engage citizens in the governance of the country. A holistic approach to human development also included paying attention to human rights and promoting rights-based approaches to engage citizens in the development dividend.

While the enduring focus of all development strategies has been to ensure maximum economic participation of the people, especially those in vulnerable communities, the promotion of inclusive growth has emerged as the fundamental governance concern during the decade. A core issue of inclusive governance has been the institutional gap between macro policy, sector and regional programmes and community-level actions. The need to focus upon what was happening at the micro-level – where the poverty and human development disparities exist – was underscored by the adoption of the MDGs as a national framework for human development. To promote inclusiveness and to address gaps in public services, the MDG framework needed to be localised through the adoption of region-specific targets that reflect local situations. Disparities also created issues of rights and entitlements to social and economic services.

Decentralization has been a significant governance issue affecting inclusion and participation. Sri Lanka has long experimented with forms of decentralization to manage development and address issues in the North and South. Decentralization was thus perceived as being driven by different and distinct governance concerns – to improve management of the delivery
of development services and to accommodate demand for regional autonomy in the North and East. Devolution through the Provincial Council in 1988 constituted a radical change in existing systems of government and governance. However, perceptions as to the form of state structures for delivering peace and development differed (devolution being perceived as the solution for regional autonomy but not for development). This has made the transformation to a devolved system of governance incoherent, resulting in dual governance arrangements for managing development.

Disparities raised fundamental issues about rights and entitlements to development services with implications for economic, social and political rights of all citizens. Development issues have tended to be addressed more in terms of reducing poverty to the relative neglect of establishing rights. Rights have been approached more in terms of the denial of individual entitlements rather than the provision of collective guarantees of access. The institutional framework in place for the promotion and protection of human rights has fundamental capacity problems.

There are some specific challenges that inclusive governance continues to entail:

- A national strategy for the provision of services that addresses and responds to the needs of people in the natural, social and economic contexts of their livelihoods.

- A holistic and integrated programme framework for the effective management of the provision of goods and services for addressing disparities in human development, whether at the national or sub-national levels.

- Promoting and safeguarding entitlements in regard to access to social justice on the part of the vulnerable groups in eliminating disparities.

- The design of delivery systems that clearly assign responsibility and accountability for the provision of services as between the different levels of government.

- Clarity in the roles state and non-state actors in the provision of public goods and services.

- Monitoring and evaluation that goes beyond recording of financial and physical disbursement on to assessing performance on development results.

The effective delivery of a macro-strategy for economic growth and inclusive development presupposes the existence of sound governance institutions. Improving governance and public management should then go hand in hand, if not precede the scaling up and targeting of basic economic and social infrastructure.

‘Mahinda Chintana’ is underpinned by the creation of prosperity for the majority of people who cannot rely entirely on market-based solutions. Therefore, the development strategy relies not only on promoting investments in infrastructure based on commercial and economic returns, but also on the creation of equitable access to such infrastructure development to enable people to engage in gainful economic activities.

### 2.2.3 GENDER

Despite being influenced by patriarchal values and social norms, Sri Lanka has achieved a greater degree of gender equality than many other developing countries. Sri Lanka is now ranked sixteenth in the Global Gender Gap Index, ahead of many developed countries. However, challenges still exist on several fronts.

In the 1940s, Sri Lanka established equal and free access to health and education. This was an important factor to achieving gender equality in primary and secondary education. Today, the majority of university students are women, although they continue to face gender-related barriers in both the political arena and labour market. Customs and traditions vary across Sri Lanka’s various regions and religions, affecting women in different ways. Traditional male leadership makes it difficult for women to challenge or change their situation, even in the present day.
A recent survey\(^\text{22}\) revealed that among an economically active population of 8.1 million, 65.0 percent were male and 35.0 percent were female (52.8 percent of the total population is female). Of the economically inactive population, 31.1 percent were male and 68.9 percent were female. Among agricultural workers, roughly one-quarter of women and two-thirds of men engage in self-employed activities (e.g. poultry raising at home). However, twice as many women as men are involved in manufacture of food and beverages.

Poverty and limited local economic opportunities have fuelled two significant gendered migration trends: (i) international migration of large numbers of women to the Middle East and elsewhere for domestic or garment factory employment; and (ii) internal migration of young unmarried women to factories in export promotion zones to engage in work mostly classified as unskilled or semi-skilled. In both cases, women often live and work under oppressive and dangerous conditions and are vulnerable to sexual harassment, exploitation and psychological depression.\(^\text{23}\)

Furthermore, the war has increased the number of displaced households, widows and women-headed households without productive resources and income-earning skills.\(^\text{24}\) The number of widows and women-headed households is estimated to be over 100,000 across all provinces. Women-headed households are often less likely than couple-headed households to gain access to shelter, self-employment tools and job training. Addressing the needs of war victims, direct or indirect, has been put as an urgent priority on the policy agenda and the “the role of women at all levels and in all aspects of rural development, agriculture and food security” needs to be ensured.\(^\text{25}\)

The persistence of gender-based violence is another challenge the country still persistently faces. Sri Lanka has legal instruments to this regard including the 2005 Domestic Violence Act of Sri Lanka which was passed in 2005. Sri Lanka is also a signatory to a number of related international treaties including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Vienna Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) and Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (1979),\(^\text{26}\) among other human rights related treaties and conventions.

The Forum against Gender-based Violence was set up in August 2005 to facilitate greater co-ordination of actions, and sharing of information, resources and multi-sectoral responses to gender-based violence. Membership of the forum is broad-based, and includes local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the UN, donor agencies and government representatives. The Forum found that: at least 60 percent of all women in Sri Lanka have experienced domestic violence; the number of reported incidents had been increasing; and domestic violence and sexual abuse still tended to be under-reported due to various social stigmas.\(^\text{27}\)

In terms of government policies to address gender-related issues, the establishment of the Women’s Bureau in 1978 marked the beginning of government policies for the advancement of women in Sri Lanka. Its mission was to improve living standards and empower Sri

\(^{22}\) See Department of Censor and Statistics, ‘Poverty Indicators’, 2011. Data are from a survey conducted in the first quarter of 2011.


\(^{24}\) ibid.

\(^{25}\) International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Rural Poverty Portal (http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org).

\(^{26}\) UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security, adopted in 2000, also provides the basis for this statement.

\(^{27}\) Often referred to as CEDAW.

Lankan women by providing knowledge, opportunities and resources for them to utilize their full human potential and reap the benefits through ensuring their equal rights in educational, socio economic, political and cultural spheres.

In 1993, the Women’s Charter of Sri Lanka was established by the Government “to ensure justice and equity and the recognition of gender equality in all areas of life in Sri Lanka”. The Charter clarified the related laws, policies and measures, set down new commitments and standards on gender equality, and established the National Committee on Women to examine and monitor the progress made towards the achievement of the Charter’s objectives.

The Charter stipulates women’s rights vis-à-vis:

- Political and civil rights
- Rights within the family
- Rights to education and training
- Rights to economic activity & benefits
- Rights to health care and nutrition
- Right to protect from social discrimination
- Right to protection from gender-based violence

The Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment was established in 2005 and has played a key role in policy and strategy development, and in planning, coordination and implementation of programmes on child development and empowerment of women.

2.2.4 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

Since 2002, successive governments have identified nine key environmental related challenges. These challenges still exist today. The foremost challenge is land degradation which is evident in the loss of soil fertility, decrease in arable land and forest cover, decline in agricultural productivity, and loss of biodiversity. Agricultural regimes which support natural eco-systems and preserve soil fertility have been replaced by plantation agriculture which requires large amounts of pesticides and herbicides. Land degradation further induced loss of irrigation and hydropower generation capacity due to silting of reservoirs and tanks, floods and landslides.

The second challenge is water scarcity and pollution. Sri Lanka receives plenty of rainfall, but there is an acute shortage of water in some parts of the country, particularly in the dry zone. Demand for water is increasing due to expansion in the agriculture and industrial sectors and rapid urbanization. However, deterioration of water quality and pollution has been caused by waste generation; industrial effluents; increased use of agricultural chemicals, fertilizer, and herbicides; and increasing salinity in irrigated paddy lands.

The third challenge relates to the coastline and coastal resources where population pressure is the highest in the country. Coastal areas contain a significant number of critical habitats. These small and critical habitats are highly vulnerable to activities such as coral mining, clearing of coastal vegetation and mangroves, sand-mining in beaches, haphazard construction, and the dumping of waste.

A fourth is the loss of biodiversity. Sri Lanka is listed as one of the top biodiversity hotspots in the world. However, biodiversity has decreased and this trend is expected to continue due to deforestation, filling of wetlands, overexploitation of biological resources such as timber for commercial purposes, destruction of coral reefs, and the pollution of inland and coastal waters.

---

30 For example, 80 percent of fish are harvested through near-shore fishing and some of the richest biodiversity reserves are within the coastal belt.
The fifth is the continuous increase and management of solid waste (including hospital and electronic waste), particularly within urban and industrial areas. The local authorities collect approximately 3,000 tons of waste per day. However, there have not been satisfactory measures to collect and dispose of solid waste in properly engineered landfills, and the facilities for the safe disposal of hazardous and clinical waste are also lacking.

Air pollution is the sixth challenge and is a serious problem in Colombo and other cities due to increasing vehicle emissions. Factors contributing to this problem include the pricing policy between diesel and petrol, an inadequate road network and the concentration of vehicles in the cities.

The seventh are challenges in the mining and minerals sector. Sri Lanka has rich mineral resources and the industry is continuously expanding. Minerals are being exploited at an increasing rate, resulting in numerous environmental impacts such as air and noise pollution, soil erosion, destruction and damage to vegetation cover, and the creation of breeding grounds for vector-borne diseases.

Eighth is climate change, which is affecting all major sectors in the country and economy. Some impacts that have already been experienced include increased variations in temperatures, increased variability in rainfall causing water scarcity, greater vulnerability of the agricultural sector to weather pattern changes and health-related problems such as increases of vector-borne diseases.

The ninth and final challenge is the rapidly increasing demand for electricity. Hydropower generation has associated environmental risks such as flooding of fertile lands and human settlements, and thermal power generation causes atmospheric pollution.

These challenges have arisen from, and are linked to, economic development, population growth and the increasing pressure for natural resources. The continuous need for higher rates of economic growth and poverty reduction, together with factors such as urban expansion and infrastructure development, human settlements, demographic changes, increasing numbers of vehicles on the road and energy generation, have all had negative environmental impacts and/or lead to the over-exploitation of natural resources. Natural disasters and the war have also impacted the environment.

The government strategy in the Action Plan 2008–2012 for sustainable development with regard to four of the above challenges are summarized below:

- **Land resources management:** The main effort in this sector is to establish a system of sustainable land management by the year 2012. Whilst the land is primarily owned by the Government (80 percent), the Forest and Wildlife Departments manage 21 percent and 13 percent of it respectively. The key strategies are: (i) making best practices a rule in hillside areas and those prone to erosion; (ii) moving from chena (slash and burn) cultivation to sustainable farming; (iii) taking measures to conserve sensitive lands at high elevations; (iv) rehabilitating lands which have been mined; and (v) promoting sustainable sand mining.

- **Biodiversity, forests and wildlife:** The main strategies in this sector are based on: (i) the recovery of threatened species; (ii) sustainable use of biodiversity resources outside protected areas; (iii) limited access to genetic resources; (iv) preservation and use of traditional knowledge and practice; (v) sustainable management of forest and wildlife resources and sensitive areas; (vi) developing mechanisms for benefit sharing; (vi) research and education for addressing problems;

---

(vii) nature based tourism; (viii) community participation and livelihood development; (ix) institutional strengthening and setting up the legal framework; and (x) information networking.

- **Climate change mitigation and adaptation:** The path to dealing with climate change impacts in Sri Lanka is covered by three strategies: (i) an energy efficient transport system; (ii) an improved information system for disaster management; and (iii) air quality management through appropriate technologies. Mitigation measures include reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing renewable energy generation, and the adaptation measures include rainwater harvesting, new agricultural practices and use of biogas.

- **Energy:** The vision and way forward in the energy sector comprises many elements including the provision of basic energy needs for the people, energy efficiency and conservation, capacity building for management and energy security. Energy demand was to be met through a number of strategies such as fuel diversity through non-conventional renewable energy, generated by wind, biomass energy and mini-hydro systems.  

### 2.2.5 DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

Sri Lanka is an island with a coastline of 1,340 km. During the monsoons, it receives heavy rainfall in its South-West region from mid-May to September, and in the North and East from October to February. Floods are the primary hazard regularly affecting Sri Lanka in terms of both human and economic losses and landslides associated with heavy rainfall often claim lives and property of those affected. Cyclones normally affect the Northern region of the country but cause relatively few deaths. Droughts occur when the monsoons do not bring sufficient rainfall, and cause economic losses to a large number of people in the South-East, Central-North and North-West regions. A mortality-weighed multi-hazard map shows that Sri Lanka is heavily affected by these natural disasters, and their impact is especially severe in the South-West region.

The Indian Ocean Tsunami that hit on 26 December 2004 devastated a long stretch of Sri Lanka’s coastline. It is estimated that the tsunami killed roughly 40,000 people and left around two million families displaced. Although far from the epicentre, waves as high as 6 meters struck with a huge force, sweeping as far as 5 km inland, taking people and houses from coastal villages along in its wake. It was the worst natural disaster in the modern history of Sri Lanka.

Both the Government and the public subsequently recognised the urgent need to introduce an effective disaster management system. Disaster risk management is defined as the “systematic process of using administrative decisions, organization, operational skills and capacities to implement policies, strategies and coping capacities of the society and communities to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and related environmental and technological disasters. This comprises all forms of activities, including structural and non-structural measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) adverse effects of hazards”.

Prior to the tsunami, disaster response was coordinated mainly by local administrations, while relief and rescue operations were led by civil defence organizations. At the national level, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Social Welfare

---

33 Center for Hazard & Risk Research, Columbia University.
34 The data announced by the Disaster Management Centre soon after the tsunami (March 2005) estimated over 35,000 people dead or missing, and over 1.4 million families displaced. The precise figures are not known but are considered higher due to the difficulties in collecting data in the conflict-affected regions.
prepared a legal framework and action plans to establish a disaster management (DM) system. However, the DM effort was marred by a number of capacity issues such as: inadequate information systems; lack of training and education; limited budget of the responsible departments; inadequate manpower and equipment for search and rescue operations; lack of provisions to assist disaster victims; and delays in relief distribution.

The 2004 tsunami brought to light the urgent need for a systematic approach to DM and the Disaster Management Act of 2005 provided the legal base for such a system. It mandated the formulation and implementation of a national disaster management policy, the preparation of a national disaster plan and an emergency operational plan, and the establishment of a disaster management authority of Sri Lanka. The high-level inter-ministerial National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) was therefore established to oversee all activities in this area. The Ministry of Disaster Management was created as the entity responsible for the implementation of the Disaster Management Act, and the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) as the lead operational agency under the Ministry to implement and coordinate a broad range of DM activities. The Act thus provided for a DM framework in Sri Lanka and addressed DM holistically, leading to a policy shift from response-based mechanisms to a proactive approach.

Another important milestone was the ‘Road Map towards a Safer Sri Lanka’ in 2005, which serves as the basis for planning, resource mobilisation and the phased implementation of disaster risk reduction activities in Sri Lanka. The Road Map covers seven areas of action: policy, institutional mandates and institutional development; hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment; multi-hazard early warning systems; disaster preparedness planning and response; disaster mitigation and its integration into development planning; community-based disaster management; and training, education and public awareness. The Road Map serves as a platform for coordination among a large number of those involved in DM-related actions – government departments and agencies, local governments and administrations, the private sector, NGOs and development partners. The Road Map also recognises that DM considerations need to be incorporated into development plans.

2.2.6 RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION

The long civil war created a serious humanitarian crisis and placed a heavy burden on economic and human resources of the country. More than 800,000 people were internally displaced. The conflict is said to have reduced overall economic growth by two-to-three percentage points per annum\(^{38}\) and cost the country close to two years’ worth of GDP.\(^{39}\)

While development challenges caused by war remained formidable, more complex development challenges followed which were caused by the breakdown of the 2002 ceasefire agreement; the Government’s perceived reliance on the military during the consensus-building exercise under the auspices of the All Party Representative Committee; increased displacements in the months prior to the liberation of the Eastern Province and their immediate recovery needs; and finally, the immense humanitarian and immediate recovery needs following the military’s defeat of the rebels and the end of the war.

The most notable development challenges therefore related to the responses required to meet recovery, rehabilitation and development needs, which were in line with political imperatives and

---

\(^{36}\) In 2006, the Ministry became the Ministry for Disaster Management and Human Rights.

\(^{37}\) The DMC was created under the National Council and later placed under the Ministry as the lead operational agency.


the Government’s long-term post-war development plans. While Sri Lanka fell under the glare of the international spotlight, burdened with an unprecedented post-war humanitarian effort, the development challenge called for international partnerships to provide recovery and rehabilitation support to returnees and host communities.

Development challenges directly related to sustainable peace and reconciliation were not easy to address because the conflict had left society suspicious and insecure, and messages concerning consensus building were inconclusive. The Government was therefore faced with the challenge of responding to immediate recovery and resettlement priorities, with a focus on livelihood support and housing and less so on direct peace-building initiatives. While recovery and resettlement needs were identified through a community-based participatory process, the selection of priorities for resource allocation has been a great challenge.

The sheer magnitude of the effect of the war made these challenges a formidable one. The war severely affected a vast extent of territory and its infrastructure, massive population and their livelihoods, and the identity and the pride of the populace. Rehabilitation required a complex coordination of actions, a large amount of resources and implementation capacity at all levels.

Sri Lanka’s outlook for peace, as articulated in ‘Mahinda Chintana’, speaks about sustainable peace through a negotiated settlement. Although sustainable peace is high on the Government’s agenda, a well-defined national strategy to bring about solutions to problems perceived by the minorities, including effective devolution of power to the provinces, is still in the making. During the conflict, the Government appointed an All Party Representative Committee to build a power-sharing consensus, and accepted its interim recommendations to pursue a greater devolution of power under the Provincial Council system. Since then, however, there has been a lull in progress with the administration giving confusing signals to stakeholders. Discussions between Tamil political parties and the Government have also been inconclusive.

There has, however, been much progress towards re-establishing democratic local government institutions in once strife-torn areas. The Provincial Council in the separated Eastern Province was maintained and is operational. Elections were later held for all local government institutions, such as municipalities and Pradeshiya Sabhas, in both the Eastern and Northern Provinces. The lack of progress is found at the central level because of indecisions regarding sensitive land issues and police powers. While the findings of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee were made public in December 2011, the country waits to ascertain the Government’s plans for implementing the key recommendations that were made in the report.

In the meantime, resettlement, rehabilitation and development efforts started by the Government on its own initiative are progressing. It was recently reported that only 10,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are yet to be resettled from an original figure of 300,000. The resettlement effort was complemented by the rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, airports and livelihood systems such as irrigation. Applying lessons learnt in the Eastern Province, the Government believes that developing infrastructure and opening the area for investment encourages economic activities and is an effective method to gain the support of the population. This lesson has been repeated in the districts of the Northern Province with some degree of success. While recovery and resettlement needs were identified through a community-based participatory process, the selection of priorities for resource allocation has been a great challenge.

The sheer magnitude of the effect of the war made these challenges a formidable one. The war severely affected a vast extent of territory and its infrastructure, massive population and their livelihoods, and the identity and the pride of the populace. Rehabilitation required a complex coordination of actions, a large amount of resources and implementation capacity at all levels.

Sri Lanka’s outlook for peace, as articulated in ‘Mahinda Chintana’, speaks about sustainable peace through a negotiated settlement. Although sustainable peace is high on the Government’s agenda, a well-defined national strategy to bring about solutions to problems perceived by the minorities, including effective devolution of power to the provinces, is still in the making. During the conflict, the Government appointed an All Party Representative Committee to build a power-sharing consensus, and accepted its interim recommendations to pursue a greater devolution of power under the Provincial Council system. Since then, however, there has been a lull in progress with the administration giving confusing signals to stakeholders. Discussions between Tamil political parties and the Government have also been inconclusive.

There has, however, been much progress towards re-establishing democratic local government institutions in once strife-torn areas. The Provincial Council in the separated Eastern Province was maintained and is operational. Elections were later held for all local government institutions, such as municipalities and Pradeshiya Sabhas, in both the Eastern and Northern Provinces. The lack of progress is found at the central level because of indecisions regarding sensitive land issues and police powers. While the findings of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee were made public in December 2011, the country waits to ascertain the Government’s plans for implementing the key recommendations that were made in the report.

In the meantime, resettlement, rehabilitation and development efforts started by the Government on its own initiative are progressing. It was recently reported that only 10,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are yet to be resettled from an original figure of 300,000. The resettlement effort was complemented by the rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, airports and livelihood systems such as irrigation. Applying lessons learnt in the Eastern Province, the Government believes that developing infrastructure and opening the area for investment encourages economic activities and is an effective method to gain the support of the population. This lesson has been repeated in the districts of the Northern Province with some degree of success. While recovery and resettlement needs were identified through a community-based participatory process, the selection of priorities for resource allocation has been a great challenge.

The sheer magnitude of the effect of the war made these challenges a formidable one. The war severely affected a vast extent of territory and its infrastructure, massive population and their livelihoods, and the identity and the pride of the populace. Rehabilitation required a complex coordination of actions, a large amount of resources and implementation capacity at all levels.

Sri Lanka’s outlook for peace, as articulated in ‘Mahinda Chintana’, speaks about sustainable peace through a negotiated settlement. Although sustainable peace is high on the Government’s agenda, a well-defined national strategy to bring about solutions to problems perceived by the minorities, including effective devolution of power to the provinces, is still in the making. During the conflict, the Government appointed an All Party Representative Committee to build a power-sharing consensus, and accepted its interim recommendations to pursue a greater devolution of power under the Provincial Council system. Since then, however, there has been a lull in progress with the administration giving confusing signals to stakeholders. Discussions between Tamil political parties and the Government have also been inconclusive.

There has, however, been much progress towards re-establishing democratic local government institutions in once strife-torn areas. The Provincial Council in the separated Eastern Province was maintained and is operational. Elections were later held for all local government institutions, such as municipalities and Pradeshiya Sabhas, in both the Eastern and Northern Provinces. The lack of progress is found at the central level because of indecisions regarding sensitive land issues and police powers. While the findings of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee were made public in December 2011, the country waits to ascertain the Government’s plans for implementing the key recommendations that were made in the report.

In the meantime, resettlement, rehabilitation and development efforts started by the Government on its own initiative are progressing. It was recently reported that only 10,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are yet to be resettled from an original figure of 300,000. The resettlement effort was complemented by the rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, airports and livelihood systems such as irrigation. Applying lessons learnt in the Eastern Province, the Government believes that developing infrastructure and opening the area for investment encourages economic activities and is an effective method to gain the support of the population. This lesson has been repeated in the districts of the Northern Province with some degree of success. While recovery and resettlement needs were identified through a community-based participatory process, the selection of priorities for resource allocation has been a great challenge.

The sheer magnitude of the effect of the war made these challenges a formidable one. The war severely affected a vast extent of territory and its infrastructure, massive population and their livelihoods, and the identity and the pride of the populace. Rehabilitation required a complex coordination of actions, a large amount of resources and implementation capacity at all levels.

Sri Lanka’s outlook for peace, as articulated in ‘Mahinda Chintana’, speaks about sustainable peace through a negotiated settlement. Although sustainable peace is high on the Government’s agenda, a well-defined national strategy to bring about solutions to problems perceived by the minorities, including effective devolution of power to the provinces, is still in the making. During the conflict, the Government appointed an All Party Representative Committee to build a power-sharing consensus, and accepted its interim recommendations to pursue a greater devolution of power under the Provincial Council system. Since then, however, there has been a lull in progress with the administration giving confusing signals to stakeholders. Discussions between Tamil political parties and the Government have also been inconclusive.

There has, however, been much progress towards re-establishing democratic local government institutions in once strife-torn areas. The Provincial Council in the separated Eastern Province was maintained and is operational. Elections were later held for all local government institutions, such as municipalities and Pradeshiya Sabhas, in both the Eastern and Northern Provinces. The lack of progress is found at the central level because of indecisions regarding sensitive land issues and police powers. While the findings of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee were made public in December 2011, the country waits to ascertain the Government’s plans for implementing the key recommendations that were made in the report.

In the meantime, resettlement, rehabilitation and development efforts started by the Government on its own initiative are progressing. It was recently reported that only 10,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are yet to be resettled from an original figure of 300,000. The resettlement effort was complemented by the rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, airports and livelihood systems such as irrigation. Applying lessons learnt in the Eastern Province, the Government believes that developing infrastructure and opening the area for investment encourages economic activities and is an effective method to gain the support of the population. This lesson has been repeated in the districts of the Northern Province with some degree of success. While recovery and resettlement needs were identified through a community-based participatory process, the selection of priorities for resource allocation has been a great challenge.

Another feature of the overall government approach is the process it currently adopts with regard to individuals who are identified as ex-combatants. The Government has taken upon itself the task of rehabilitating ex-combatants for the purpose of reintegrating them into society.
At regular intervals, groups of ex-combatants are being released to their families after a rehabilitation programme. UNDP, together with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and other agencies, supported the preparation of the National Action Plan and related policy documents on this issue that would deepen the consensus among the Government and other stakeholders on how to deal with the issue.

The Government’s approach to mine action is also characterized by its willingness to develop partnerships with donors that offer packages that support and contribute to the development efforts of the Government. For example, the Government’s continuing partnership with UNDP succeeded in resettling a large number of families.\(^{40}\)

Despite challenges, the end of the conflict produced a positive environment for peace and stability. The economy during the post-conflict period has shown signs of improvement with increased foreign investment and an improvement in growth figures. The removal of security restrictions and the opening up of roads, and consequently markets have also set a positive trend leading to greater normalization of communities, particularly in the North.\(^{41}\) This is evident from the fact that produce from Jaffna are reaching the markets in the South and large numbers of southerners are visiting the Peninsula. However, the lack of a demonstrated commitment to bring about an acceptable political settlement is a matter of concern, which may have some consequences in the long-term.

## 2.3 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

The core of national development strategies have been affected by the rapidly changing political situation, with four changes of government in ten years bringing about volatility in development policy approaches. ‘Vision 2010 – Making It a Reality’ was launched in 2001 and combined a poverty reduction strategy with a dynamic private sector-led growth strategy. In 2004, this gave way to the ‘New Development Strategy: Framework for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction’, which aimed to accelerate economic growth whilst focusing on pro-poor growth strategies.

In 2005, the manifesto of the new Government (‘Mahinda Chintana’) was detailed in its ‘Ten Year Horizon Development Framework 2006 – 2016’.\(^{42}\) The framework emphasised a new approach that “integrates the positive attributes of market economic policies with domestic aspirations, by providing necessary support to domestic enterprises and encouraging foreign investments”. The overall strategy is set in the context of achieving middle-income country status with a per capita income of USD 4,000 by 2016 and “to share benefits of growth across all segments of the population and prevent inequities, social exclusion and adverse environmental repercussions that have been witnessed in some of the rapidly growing economies”.

Successive changes of government during the decade brought about formulations and reformulations of development approaches that sought to bring about the right partnership between the state and the market in steering the development process. The thrusts of core strategic policy issues have evolved as follows:

- **Growth**: Achieving a reasonable rate of growth to support social welfare had been a post-independence policy objective subscribed to by successive governments. The policy was state-led when, with a shift to

---

\(^{40}\) Over 61,950 families were resettled according to UNDP’s internal Results Oriented Annual Report of its Sri Lanka country office for 2009.


\(^{42}\) Department of National Planning, 2010.
outward-looking liberalized development strategies in 1977, the private sector was promoted to take the lead in investment. Then, the thrust of government policy shifted from one of “dynamic private sector-led growth” to “pro-poor growth” strategies. In 2005, however, the new Government set out its agenda in ‘Mahinda Chintana’, which sought to delineate a new approach supporting domestic enterprise and encouraging foreign investment aimed at accelerating growth from an average of five to eight percent per annum.

- **Equity:** Sri Lanka has consistently subscribed to equity policies, moving from universal social welfare through targeted protection to poverty reduction. The phased approach to the implementation of the Janasaviya poverty reduction program was revamped with the Samurdhi program implemented throughout the country except in the North. The poverty reduction program, although loosely defined, provides for a safety net targeting the poor. The poverty safety net is complemented by a large number of sector-based social protection programs. Promotion of rural infrastructure, especially in less-developed areas, has been a consistent element in Sri Lanka’s equity strategy.

- **Role of the public sector:** The public sector, as the provider of basic services across public infrastructure, utilities, human development and economic services, has been at the core of the development strategy. However, the role of the public sector in the provision of public utility services has been under review. The private sector is increasingly engaging in human development services to provide private health care and education, whilst NGOs have been engaged in providing institutionalized care for vulnerable groups. An economic liberalization policy through privatization has given way to a policy of public-private partnership. At the same time, the Government’s role as a regulator is increasingly applied in the public utilities and the financial sectors.

- **Public economic management:** Efficiency of public sector management emerged as a major concern in the post-conflict context. The preparation of development plans gave way to the formulation of public investment programs. However, the need for better fiscal management was underpinned by persistent budget deficits, problems in the balance of payments and the need for proactive debt management. The Fiscal Management Responsibility Act (2003) sought to introduce fiscal discipline by setting medium-term fiscal targets. The Government introduced Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks (2006–2009) which were linked to projected government revenue, foreign aid commitments and pledges, and government borrowing making economic management coherent overall. The Government also moved towards introducing the concept of Managing for Development Results (MfDR) to create greater alignment between capital projects and its development strategy.

- **Decentralization:** The equity policies and the role of the public sector as provider of basic services have been underpinned by a strategy of decentralization. In 1987, the devolution of local governance to provincial councils was introduced to complement the de-concentration system used for the management of local development and public service delivery. This shift was a political response to the demand for greater decentralized autonomy by the Tamil people living in the North and East.

- **Governance oversight:** The Constitution of Sri Lanka provides for governance oversight to promote greater transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs. They in turn constitute a network for safeguarding and protecting the rights and entitlements of citizens. These extend from oversight of public finance to parliamentary oversight bodies comprised of the Committee on Public Accounts and the Committee on Public Enterprise, and to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC).

2.4 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS

The private sector has been an important partner in Sri Lanka’s development from rural to urban even through uncertain times – engaging with Government during colonial times, independence, the civil conflict, financial crises, and now the process of becoming a middle-income country. The private sector has been resilient and remains the engine of economic growth in Sri Lanka.

The role of NGOs in Sri Lanka has varied. NGOs have demonstrated their role in community-driven development, raising awareness, and empowering the poor. This capacity has been widely recognized, especially among development partners. NGOs have also been reasonably effective in supporting decentralized delivery, promoting sustainable practices and strengthening community-based organisations (CBOs). NGOs have demonstrated a high capacity for outreach and for effectively responding to emergency situations as demonstrated during the tsunami and other emergency situations, including humanitarian assistance provided during the conflict period.

2.5 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Donors constitute the third major non-government group involved in development efforts in Sri Lanka. Donor composition and the forms of development financing have changed substantially over the recent years. As Sri Lanka became a middle-income economy, it no longer qualified for concessional external assistance. The Government therefore made an effort to broaden foreign financing options by mobilizing a mix of commercial credit and non-concessional funds with concessional funds to keep the cost of borrowing at an affordable level. During the last five years, annual total foreign financing commitments have increased from USD 1,311 million in 2006 to USD 2,221 million in 2009 and to USD 3,261 million in 2010. Foreign financing has also changed significantly during the last few years with the increase of export credit financings accounting for only two percent in 2005 but 40 percent in 2010. Since 2007, Sri Lanka has also successfully tapped capital market financing by issuing long-term sovereign bonds. The Governments of China and India have emerged as major donors along with Japan, Russia, and multilateral financial institutions including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, who together account for 84 percent of the total commitment in 2010.

Approximately two-thirds of foreign assistance has been regularly invested in infrastructure development in recent years. Among the non-infrastructure areas, in 2010, approximately 10 percent was allocated to livelihood and regional development (mostly for the rehabilitation of conflict-affected regions). Other notable categories of assistance were production, services and environment, human resources development and governance.43

Among traditional donors providing large-scale assistance, aid coordination has generally occurred at the sectoral level. For example, the ADB focused on infrastructure, agriculture, secondary education and energy. The World Bank focused on health, primary education, community development and information technology and Japan on socio-economic infrastructure, rural development, human resources development, poverty reduction and energy.44 With respect to policy coordination of development assistance among the donors and UN agencies, there have not been many visible effects. A case in point is that donors and UN agencies have been taking

their own individual approaches to post-conflict rehabilitation without much coordination among them to identify what works best and what did not, and how they can work together to achieve the maximum results.\textsuperscript{45}

* * *

Against this background, the UN and UNDP’s response to these development challenges, and their evolution, will be explained.

\textsuperscript{45} For example, both UNDP (with support from AusAID) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have been independently implementing large-scale projects for post-conflict rehabilitation but with quite different approaches. This is despite the existence of coordination mechanisms at the district level. The Government of India has started providing housing to IDP communities on a large-scale but has not yet engaged with other partners on community development once construction is complete.
This chapter describes how the UN and UNDP have designed their responses to challenges outlined in Chapter 2. It focuses in particular on how UNDP responded to major events and adapted to evolving situations during the decade. The second part of this chapter details UNDP’s response to provide readers with sufficient background on the programme assessment in the Chapter 4.

3.1 UN STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 2002-2012

The strategy of support to national development efforts by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) is provided in the successive UNDAF documents. In 2000, the UNCT recognized that resolution of conflict was the single most important challenge for the country, and that public accountability and responsiveness of governance, social cohesion and ethnic harmony, reduction in poverty and disparities that were feeding the sense of resentment, were the key elements in halting the cycle of conflicts. The UNCT defined its goals in support of UNDAF 2002-2006 as:

- Providing emergency and humanitarian assistance to conflict affected areas and people, assisting in restoring the economic livelihood of adversely affected persons and providing support for efforts that contribute to the establishment of peace and social harmony;
- Reducing poverty through promoting improved accessibility to basic services and the creation of economic opportunities for the poor; and
- Supporting governance reform aimed towards promoting people-centred development.

Gender, environment and human rights considerations were also to be mainstreamed into all programmes and activities of the UNCT member agencies. UNDAF 2002-2006 also noted that, in light of UN agencies’ limited resources, their primary role would be to provide catalytic and innovative approaches to the social and economic development of the country.

UNDAF 2008-2012, developed against the backdrop of the resumption of war and in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, essentially kept its focus in line with the three objectives of the previous UNDAF, namely:

- Economic growth and social services are pro-poor, equitable, inclusive and sustainable in fulfilment of the MDGs and MDG plus, and focus in particular on the rural areas.

---


47 Detailed diagnosis of the development challenges at the time can be found in Common Country Assessment conducted in 2000 by the UNCT.

48 The Common Country Assessment 2000 paid particular attention to regional disparities.

49 UNDAF 2008-2012 was based on the diagnosis provided in Common Country Assessment conducted in 2006.

50 With a difference in the order of presentation. This may be a result of having MDGs as the overall framework.
Governance mechanisms and practices enable the realization of the principles of the Millennium Declaration and promote and protect human rights of all persons.

An improved environment for a sustainable peace anchored in social justice and reconciliation.

Thus, UNDAF 2002-2006 placed the promotion of peace as its central theme, while poverty reduction and governance reform were defined as underlying structural issues. UNDAF 2008-2012 brought pro-poor, equitable, inclusive and sustainable development to the forefront of the programme’s objective, with supporting governance mechanism as the second theme. This was mainly because of the introduction of MDGs as the overall framework of UN support. This also led to the introduction of the promotion of gender equality as the new and fourth major objective of UN work, whereby:

- Women are further empowered to contribute and benefit equitably and equally in political, economic and social life.

Within the UNCT, UNDP was assigned a major role in the three original pillars of work (referred to as the poverty, governance and peace pillars). In the new gender pillar, UNDP’s role was limited to that of “contributor” within the context of its work in post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation, as well as in promoting democratic representation of women, both closely relating to its other areas of work.

Compared to UNDAF 2002-2006, UNDAF 2008-2012 is more clearly aligned with the national strategy and has integrated the MDGs in its programming. This reflects the establishment of the strategic framework and development plan outlined in the ‘Mahinda Chintana’ ten year development framework. It also reflects the integration of the MDGs into the national planning process thanks in no small part to UNDP’s support during the first half of the decade.

While the overall strategy was thus defined in these two five-year UNDAF documents, the actual UN response has been far from static. During the decade, Sri Lanka has seen rapid economic development and associated emerging challenges on the one hand, the ceasefire, resumption and conclusion of the war, and the 2004 tsunami on the other. These events and developments created a shifting social, economic and political situation to which each UN agency had to respond within its programme implementation. This programme response will be explained in the next section, focusing on UNDP’s strategy.

### 3.2 EVOLUTION OF UNDP STRATEGIES

UNDP, while keeping its broad strategy to address fundamental and structural challenges of the country and its programmes very much aligned to UNDAF objectives, had to respond to the turn of events and evolving social, economic and political situation by adjusting its priorities to where actions were urgently needed.

The CCFII 2002-2007 was developed right before the ceasefire agreement in 2002. Rehabilitation and development of conflict-affected areas was therefore identified as a major pillar of the programme.

Another major pillar of work under the CCFII 2002-2007 related to public sector reform, fiscal devolution and legal drafting capabilities at the provincial level. Support here was provided in line with the policy thinking at the time on the future form of the governance of the country. In addition, UNDP had provided capacity-building support in such areas as aid management,
environment and natural resource management, and gender equality.

The ceasefire only lasted until 2005, and the CP 2008-2012 was drafted after the peace process was aborted in 2005. UNDP therefore made promoting peace in conflict-affected areas and socio-economic recovery of post-conflict areas a major focus of its work. Since the conclusion of the war in 2009, UNDP has been focusing on early recovery and demining work.

In response to the 2004 tsunami disaster, UNDP intensified its support to disaster risk management in response to the increased effort of the Government in 2005-2006 to establish a comprehensive DM system. Increased awareness of the effects of a rapidly growing and modernizing economy on the environment has enabled UNDP to engage more comprehensively in the work on sustainable development under the CP 2008-2012. With regards to poverty reduction, UNDP has concentrated more on supporting the government’s capacity for policy planning and coordination under the CP 2008-2012 than previously.

The presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010 resulted in a stable government. This, and the first two full years of peace since 1983, resulted in a cautious optimism among the population for the future. Many legacies of the war remained, however, among them a still polarized society and a strong focus on security.

In 2010, UNDP initiated a process of change through support to the national, regional and local levels. This involved empowering communities to move from focusing on short-term needs and being dependent on outside support, to becoming self-reliant through supporting stronger communities and more responsive local government. Peacebuilding and social cohesion interventions have been delicately initiated to make development conflict-sensitive, and as a first step towards reconciliation. However, UNDP recognizes that existing political sensitivities on the ground pose a continuing challenge.

3.3 UNDP PROGRAMME RESPONSE BY THEMATIC CLUSTERS

This section first presents UNDP’s overall programme response for each thematic cluster. It then describes how UNDP aimed to achieve the intended programme outcomes through various activities and outputs.

3.3.1 POVERTY REDUCTION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MDGS

Given the country context, UNDP has been paying particular attention to the issue of regional disparities in human development. The first National Human Development Report, published in 1998, detailed the human development situation in Sri Lanka by provinces and districts, and over various socio-economic aspects of human development. Since the Millennium Summit in 2000, one of the main thrusts of UNDP’s work has been to promote the use of the MDGs as the policy framework. Central to this effort in Sri Lanka was to promote the MDG agenda and support MDG monitoring.

MDG data collected confirmed the existence of significant regional disparities. In response, the Government requested support for localizing the MDGs as a policy framework and a project was initiated to support national and local planning processes. The preparation of the second National Human Development Report that follows up the research of the first report is now underway.

Central to UNDP’s poverty reduction work has been the upstream support to planning and coordination of national policies and programmes as well as international aid. This area of work became more comprehensive during the CP 2008-2012 to include support to the

---

53 The CCFII 2002-2007 did not have a clear results framework or programme outcome structure. However, the activities under each cluster clearly continued for the CCFII activities to fit into the CP framework with relative ease.
Government’s initiatives to introduce results-based management (RBM). Support for managing international aid was then integrated into this effort. This area of work was largely funded by UNDP’s internal sources, with financial contributions from the Government of Sri Lanka.

UNDP has taken initiatives to address more specific issues that have significant poverty implications. Support to policy development pertaining to plantation communities and the tourism industry was among them. Downstream support to the economic development of the Uva Wellassa Dry Zone was another. However, most of these initiatives have not achieved their fully intended results. One major reason for this has been the frequent changes in government and consequent changes in policy direction during the past decade. With a stable government in place today, there is a possibility that these types of initiatives could see more success in the future.

One initiative that had some impact at the micro-level was the ART GOLD programme which was implemented under the governance pillar as part of strengthening local governance in the Southern Province after the tsunami, to develop partnership coordination around local authorities. The local authorities took the lead in coordinating and managing assistance, and the programme seemed to have directed the assistance to where it was needed.

In a broader context, the largest poverty impact that UNDP had was through its operations for rehabilitation and recovery in the post-conflict and tsunami-affected area. In programmatic terms, those operations are placed under the crisis prevention and recovery pillar and discussed separately in this report.

Outcome 1: Economic policies, strategies and programmes address geographical and income disparities and aid utilization is more effective and coordinated

UNDP undertook three main streams of activities to achieve this outcome. First is a set of activities for promoting and supporting the use of the MDGs as a national policy framework. For this, UNDP engaged in activities to raise awareness about the MDGs, to support monitoring and reporting of progress made towards MDG achievements, and to support capacity development to collect and analyse MDG data. Through these activities, UNDP has supported the Government in making the MDGs not only a policy benchmark at the national level but, more importantly, a policy framework and a tool for dialogue at the local level that would contribute significantly to inclusive governance and equitable development.

The second stream was a programme to strengthen the capacity for national planning and coordinating the implantation of the plan, in particular to support the Government’s moves to introduce RBM. In addition to providing technical support and training on the use of RBM, UNDP supported the development of the Integrated National Development Information System (INDIS), a database which monitors the progress in the implementation of development projects and their financial status, as well as the performance of ministries through key performance indicators.

The third stream is capacity development support to the management of development aid in line with national planning. It aimed to support the improved use of aid and monitoring, including the effective alignment and harmonization of development funds made available by development partners to national plans and policies. INDIS also serves this purpose as it monitors parameters identified under the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness.

Outcome 2: Service providers ensure equitable access to improved services and economic infrastructure to vulnerable populations in disadvantaged areas

For this outcome, the localization of the MDGs, local governance capacity development programmes such as ART GOLD, and the recovery
and rehabilitation programmes in the post-conflict areas had a direct impact.

In addition, under the poverty reduction pillar, several independent initiatives were undertaken. First was support to develop a National Plan of Action for the social development of the plantation community. In 2006, UNDP supported the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development to develop a ten-year plan to address this long-standing issue. It was intended to be further developed into an implementable Road Map and UNDP was to lead a joint UN programme to support its implementation. However, the Government incorporated the Road Map into the regional development planning process (i.e. it did not identify the estate sector as a separate sector) and the planned initiative of UNDP to develop the Road Map was therefore set aside.

Instead, some possible actions identified in the process of developing the ten-year plan were transformed into individual projects. These include the Uva Wellassa Dry Zone project described below, and similar initiatives implemented in displaced communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Second was capacity development for decentralized poverty reduction in plantation communities in the Uva Wellassa Dry Zone. This region-specific poverty reduction project supported the livelihood needs of over 1,000 households, especially women and vulnerable households, through micro-credit programmes that introduced new technologies, processing techniques and marketing. The programme has been delivered in two districts – Badulla and Moneragala – through direct implementation and in partnership with the national level SANASA programme.54

The third was the Green Belt Re-development of Tourism Infrastructure initiative along Sri Lanka’s coastline, which was a joint response by UNDP, the World Tourism Organisation and Sri Lanka Tourism Board to a request by the Government. In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, the Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority sought to contribute to recovery by ensuring tourism made the best use of environmental and cultural resources, while respecting the socio-cultural traditions of local communities, and proving economic benefits to local communities, businesses and national economy through responsible tourism planning and development. For this purpose, a survey and study was completed. The study not only developed a comprehensive plan to achieve this purpose and contribute to poverty reduction but it also drew attention to issues such as child sex tourism. However, neither the Government nor the national partners put the study into action.

3.3.2 FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Improving governance was considered imperative not only in its own merit but also in promoting inclusive development to maintain peace, reduce poverty and encourage sustainable development. Promotion of equity in terms of inclusive human development has been an enduring development challenge that successive governments have sought to address. It reflects a complex array of governance issues around service delivery, access and oversight. The issues address equity in the creation of development opportunities and ensuring the guarantee of entitlements within the overall context of democratic governance. Thus inclusive human development is underpinned by the capacity of governance to manage two sets of relationships – vertical upstream-downstream relations and horizontal implementation partnerships.

It is in this broad policy context that UNDP’s country programmes have evolved. The CCFII 2002-2006 noted that, despite notable achievements in human development indicators, Sri

---

54 SANASA is a movement of co-operatives for credit and savings.
Lanka is yet to create an enabling environment for sustainable development and poverty reduction. A clear delegation of administrative and fiscal authority at local levels is necessary but not sufficient in creating such an enabling environment that requires citizens to effectively participate in decision-making processes, managing the delivery of public goods and services, and monitoring and evaluation of public sector activities. Recognizing this, the CCFII 2002-2006 moved from public sector reform and sound governance under the preceding programme, to supporting the building of effective governance institutions at national and decentralized levels to reduce economic and social disparities. The strategy targeted capacity development in three governance sectors: national and provincial institutions; key human rights institutions; and environmentally sustainable development at the local level. The CP 2008-2012 continued this three-pronged approach of strengthening oversight mechanisms, strengthening local government capacity to deliver public services, and providing access to justice and human rights which correspond to intended Outcomes three, four and five of the CP.

In reviewing programme response to local governance, its complementarity with work conducted under the poverty reduction pillar at the national level needs to be noted. While work under the governance pillar aimed to strengthen governance mechanisms and practices to enable the realization of the MDGs at the local level, the poverty reduction pillar aimed to do essentially the same at the national level by supporting the planning and coordination of national policies.

Outcome 3: Key oversight institutions and mechanisms are strengthened

The primary outcome focus of both the CCFII and the current CP has been strengthening the capacity of oversight institutions to effectively advocate and implement rights-based approaches. The current programme has a specific focus on enhancing the capacity of legal-institutional frameworks for improved governance mechanisms and respect for human rights through the strengthening of independent oversight bodies. The programmes targeted the HRC and CIABOC. The thrust of support to the HRC brought about increased access to justice among disadvantaged groups whose rights had been violated by state agencies, by developing the Commission into an efficient and effective organization able to fulfil its mandate. Support to CIABOC sought to enable managing corruption through increased efficiency, effectiveness and accountability as a duty-bearer, empowering ordinary citizens to report and follow-up incidents of corruption without fear of reprisal.

Strengthening key oversight institutions and mechanisms (i.e. the intended programme outcome) was to be achieved by building capacities of independent commissions to fulfil their mandates. Specifically, the programme aimed to enhance legal and institutional frameworks of these oversight bodies for improved governance mechanisms and respect for human rights.

The main funding partners of this area of work were the United Kingdom and Switzerland.

Outcome 4: Capacity of local government strengthened

The nature and scope of project engagement for strengthening decentralization demonstrates a shift in approach between the CCFII and the current CP. The CCFII focused on decentralized development management, strengthening institutional capacity of relevant national and provincial institutions, and enhancing institutional linkages at the central and provincial levels for coordinated development management. The current CP focuses more on service delivery at the local level, with the overall outcome of improving performance of regional and local level structures in delivering services in a transparent and accountable manner.

The current programme for strengthening decentralization stems from UNDP’s support to recovery from the 2004 tsunami. This support included capacity development of provincial,
district and local authorities to improve the overall governance of the recovery process (Capacity Development for Recovery Project – CADREP) and support to civil society organisations (CSOs) to engage in a bottom-up recovery process in partnership with development partners (Sustaining Tsunami Recovery by Organizations Networking at the Grass-Roots Level through Promoting Local Accountability and Capacity Enhancement project). A complementary programme was the ART GOLD programme introduced in the Southern Province to coordinate the development of decentralized partnerships around local authorities. The MDG Country Support Programme (MDG-CSP) is a related project with a component to support institutional and capacity development for localization of the MDGs, MDG advocacy and MDG-based planning, budgeting and monitoring.

The Local Governance Project (LoGoPro) was built on these project initiatives. It was designed to serve as an umbrella framework on local governance to ensure coherent approaches and synergies both at the thematic and geographic level, and to set out local governance strategies to address priority needs in a holistic manner. LoGoPro was comprehensive in its focus on decentralization, and addressed both devolved (provincial councils and local government bodies) and de-concentrated arms of sub-national governance (district and divisional secretariats). Notably, LoGoPro incorporated capacity development strategies specific to the East and North. The project also aimed to promote a coordinated, participatory and transparent approach to local development planning by introducing localized but coordinated MDG plans and monitoring mechanisms. In line with the overall UN and UNDP strategy, the project also supported CBOs in advocating community needs as well as transparency and accountability of the service delivery system.

To improve the performance of regional and local administrations in delivering services in a transparent and accountable manner, two sets of activities were implemented. The first activity enhanced the capacity of devolved authorities and decentralized government administration to deliver services in a transparent and accountable manner. The second activity enhanced the capacity of CSOs/CBOs to (a) act as accountable and transparent service providers complementing government functions, and (b) represent public needs and monitor service delivery, so that people and communities are empowered as claim-holders participating in decision-making and accountability.

Norway has been a major funding partner in this area of work. Post-tsunami rehabilitation by local governments was funded through flash appeals supported in large part by Norway and Germany.

**Outcome 5: Greater and more diverse access to and participation in decision-making processes and justice redress mechanisms**

Under the CCFII, access to and participation in decision-making processes were addressed within the human rights outcome. The current CP introduced a separate and distinct outcome to ensure greater and more diverse access to redress mechanisms thereby addressing access to justice. The intervention sought to promote legal empowerment and increased access to justice of the disadvantaged through the application of a human rights-based approach. The project also sought to reduce barriers to the justice system while promoting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms at the community level. Thus overall support to access to justice seeks to promote and protect human rights.

To achieve greater and more diverse access to justice redress mechanisms, the Access to Justice project aimed to enhance the capacity of duty-bearers to deal with the grievances of disadvantaged groups. On the claim-holders’ side, it aimed to increase the knowledge of disadvantaged groups on their rights, and to enhance their access and benefits from legal services. The project also aimed to improve the performance of regional and local level administrations in fulfilling their role as duty-bearers in delivering services in a transparent and accountable manner.
In this regard, improving the performance of the local governance system through capacity building of duty-bearers and claim-holders, constitutes an important input to creating a supportive governance framework for mainstreaming the MDGs.

The MDG-CSP was developed as the core of the Government’s pro-poor policy framework and was central to the President’s vision of a country free from poverty.\(^{55}\) It was structured around four components: national and sub-national enhancement of MDG awareness; operationalizing the MDGs in national policies and sub-national programmes; capacity-building to sustain the national MDG agenda; and monitoring progress on the MDGs. The programme worked with three national level agencies – the National Council for Economic Development, the Department of National Planning and the Department of Census and Statistics. At the sub-national level, a noteworthy initiative was the adoption of the MDGs as a rural development road map for Sri Lanka under LoGoPro, which supported regional and local administration to deliver public services in a transparent and accountable manner.

The main funding partners to this area of work were the Netherlands, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

3.3.3 ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

During the CCFII period, the main objectives of the UNCT (as defined in UNDAF 2002-2006) related to peace and recovery in conflict-affected areas, poverty reduction and improved governance. This was largely in line with the priorities of the Government at the time. Environment, gender and human rights were defined as cross-cutting issues that needed to be mainstreamed into all UN programmes. In line with this programme structure, the three programme objectives of the CCFII 2002-2006 were (a) enhancing the capacity of key government institutions; (b) increasing economic opportunities for the poor; and (c) sustainable recovery of conflict-affected areas.

Under this programme structure, environment issues were to be addressed by strengthening governance institutions to promote environmentally sustainable development which benefits the poor. Three expected results were defined in CCF II as: (i) strengthened national capacity to negotiate, implement and report on global environment commitments; (ii) increased institutional capacity to mobilise additional financial resources and expertise to address global environmental issues through a well-developed strategy; and (iii) water supply, sanitation and waste disposal needs of the poor urban settlements addressed in three municipal councils through integrated approaches and the use of these experiences for policy and strategy development.

Accordingly there were approximately ten environment related programmes or projects implemented through funding by the Global Environment Fund (GEF) and other partners. The main programmes/projects included the conservation of biodiversity; pollution control at a leather complex; implementation of the Montreal Protocol work stream on phasing out of Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS); preparation of enabling documents such as the capacity self-assessment and the first submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and preparatory work for the establishment of a DMC and early warning system. Other interventions concerned the recovery of natural resources after the 2004 tsunami, emergency response to floods in 2006, drafting a sustainable land use policy and developing a project on renewable energy.

---

In UNDAF 2008-2012, the environment remained a cross-cutting issue. It was however not clear in UNDAF how these issues were to be addressed. If there was any element in UNDAF that defined the purpose of work on environment, it was its statement that sound policies and strategies for “sustainable” economic growth must be put in place so that the “present benefits” of development will not “impose a toll on future generations”.

Accordingly, in the CP 2008-2012, UNDP proposed three outputs related to environment, energy as contributions to two intended outcomes:

- **Outcome 1: Economic policies, strategies and programmes address geographical and income disparities and aid utilisation is more effective and coordinated**
  - Output 1.4: Improved policies and strategic interventions ensure sustainable environment management and efficient use of renewable energy sources

- **Outcome 2: Service providers ensure equitable access to improved services and economic infrastructure to vulnerable populations in disadvantaged areas**
  - Output 2.3: Capacity for effective preparedness, mitigation and response to natural and manmade disaster is built at national and subnational levels
  - Output 2.4: Communities adopt and benefit from improved environment and energy best practices, technologies and related investments.

Outputs 1.4 and 2.4 are particularly defined at the outcome level, not at the output level. Hence, in this evaluation, the assessment will be presented as the achievement against these “outputs” which can be seen as the *de facto* intended outcomes in this area.

While this area of work was hence not defined as a major pillar of work in these programme documents, the Government’s decision in 2005 to establish a comprehensive DM system, and heightened environmental awareness caused by rapid economic development, created a condition which allowed UNDP to respond with a full-scale treatment of these issues. The national policy agenda for environment and disaster management was thus strengthened and resulted in the ‘Caring for Environment 2008-2012’ Action Plan of the Ministry of Environment, the ‘National Action Plan for Haritha (Green) Lanka for 2009-2016’, and the ‘Road Map Towards Safer Sri Lanka 2005-2015’. In support of these national strategies, UNDP aimed to provide a more systematic approach to environmental sustainability and disaster risk reduction.

The major partners for the programmes on environment, energy and disaster management were the GEF, Japan, New Zealand, SIDA, France, the Republic of Korea, AusAID, the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), UNHCR, All India Disaster Mitigation Institute, OXFAM GB, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society.

**Outcome 1: Economic policies, strategies and programmes address geographical and income disparities and aid utilisation is more effective and coordinated**

- Output 1.4: Improved policies and strategic interventions ensure sustainable environment management and efficient use of renewable energy sources

The CP interventions on energy and environment primarily provided technical assistance and funds to support natural resources management.

---

56 In UNDAF 2008-2012, gender equality was defined as one of the main programme objectives along with the other three (the peace and recovery, poverty reduction, and governance).

57 Established in 2008.
and capacity-building at national level to prepare strategies and policies. Such support was given through a number of programmes and projects such as the completion of the national capacity self-assessment; policy development on the control of alien invasive species; drafting the second communication to the UNFCCC; continued activities under the Montreal Protocol; preparation of a land use policy; and preparing a proposal for promoting biomass energy and support in preparation of the Caring for Environment 2008-12 Action Plan. Some policy and strategy support fulfilled the requirements of UN conventions ratified by the Government of Sri Lanka (such as UNFCCC communications). Strategic environmental assessments at the provincial level started in the conflict-affected Northern Province and the gathering of information on climate change adaptation efforts in Sri Lanka provided a sound base for ecosystem-based environmental management.

Most recently, in the context of post-conflict development of the Northern Province, UNDP has initiated a new approach to address environment, land use and development issues through a consultative and conflict-resolution mechanism involving 25 government agencies. UNDP hopes that the appreciation expressed by the Government to this approach will lead to its replication in other provinces.

Outcome 2: Service providers ensure equitable access to improved services and economic infrastructure to vulnerable populations in disadvantaged areas

- Output 2.3. Capacity for effective preparedness, mitigation and response to natural and manmade disaster is built at national and subnational levels
- Output 2.4 Communities adopt and benefit from improved environment and energy best practices, technologies and related investments

To support the Government’s initiative to establish a DM system, UNDP assisted with the preparation of a Disaster Information Management System and national hazard profiles for coastal hazards, cyclones, droughts, floods and landslides. This was complemented and enriched with the development of disaster-resilient building designs for schools and hospitals, best practices for disaster risk reduction and strengthening the building approval and land use process of local government agencies. Continuous capacity-building support means the DMC is able to issue timely warnings and provide effective responses to floods, landslides and droughts with minimum external support.

In energy and environment, UNDP has engaged in several projects focused on promoting best practice in local areas. These include projects to conserve bio-diversity through community collaborations, and a biomass energy production project.

Finally, UNDP’s capacity was mobilized to establish and manage drainage and waste at a refugee complex where more than 300,000 IDPs were housed for more than a year after the end of the war.

3.3.4 CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

The CCFII 2002-2006 was formulated against a background of continued conflict between armed rebels and government forces, with low expectations for a negotiated settlement. The conflict had created a serious humanitarian crisis and placed a heavy burden on the country’s economic and human resources. There was limited scope to alleviate poverty. Therefore, the CCFII 2002-2006 identified conflict resolution as the first major development challenge to be addressed, followed by poverty reduction and governance.

In addition to the effects of the war, the CP 2008-2012 was confronted with more complex development challenges including the breakdown of the ceasefire agreement in 2005; increased displacements in the months before the liberation of the Eastern Province and subsequent
immediate recovery needs; and finally, the substantial humanitarian and immediate recovery needs following the military defeat of the rebels and re-establishment of peace. Therefore, in the implementation of the programme both UNDP and its partners had to adjust and respond to the periodically changing situation on the ground.

As the conflict ended during the timeframe of the CP 2008-2012, UNDP’s interventions in crisis prevention and recovery were more weighted towards indirect assistance to peace, including the socio-economic recovery of conflict-affected communities. With the Government regaining control of the Eastern Province in 2006 and the end of the war in 2009, UNDP scaled-up its coordination and quality assurance support to demining as a precursor to the safe resettlement of IDPs in the East, and then the North. Similarly, the end of the war opened up more opportunities for UNDP to undertake socio-economic recovery activities, such as supporting livelihoods, housing and infrastructure needs in the North and East. Over this period, UNDP also initiated work to coordinate early recovery activities in conflict-affected areas, as part of fulfilling its mandate within the UN system.

It is important to note that while a large part of UNDP’s mine action support is aimed at downstream coordination and quality assurance of demining activities, over the past couple of years UNDP has been heavily involved in the establishment and functioning of the country’s National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) which can be considered part of its institutional/policy support for peace. Finally, while UNDP did not engage in macro-level peace-building activities (again due to political sensitivities), it was able to successfully integrate social cohesion activities into its downstream recovery programmes. Exchange programmes such as inter-village exchanges, and sports and cultural activities as part of its socio-economic recovery work, have allowed UNDP to contribute to peace and reconciliation at the local level.

**Outcome 6: Improved performance of public institutions to respond to conflict, promote humanitarian law and build national consensus for peaceful coexistence with active civil society participation**

Although most other output targets were on track at the beginning of the project period, progress in this particular component lagged behind, mainly due to the revocation of the ceasefire agreement in 2008, and the Government’s prerequisite that the military recapture rebel-controlled areas before proceeding with the political dialogue process for peace. It was stated that “this severely limited the opportunities for development actors to support direct peace-building measures.”

Even during 2009, the country situation prevented the launch of peace-building initiatives and the implementation of projects envisaged in Outcome 6. However, UNDP was able to identify several entry points to access peacebuilding stakeholders to provide capacity support.

First, UNDP provided support to the Ministry of Resettlement to formulate a national policy on the return, resettlement, relocation, integration and reintegration of IDPs. At the request of the Government, UNDP prepared the groundwork for the formulation of the policy. However, the project was suspended mid-stream, also at the request of the Government, reflecting the political sensitivities of IDP issues at the time.

Second, at the end of the war, the reintegration of ex-combatants emerged as a major issue. UNDP, in partnership with ILO, provided upstream policy support to the Government in the form of technical assistance for formulating a national action plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

---

58 UNDP’s internal Results Oriented Annual Report of its Sri Lanka country office for 2008.
59 UNDP’s internal Results Oriented Annual Report of its Sri Lanka country office for 2009.
Third, UNDP supported the design of instruments for the conduct of a national youth survey, concerning the issues and aspirations of youth in society, politics, culture and the economy. UNDP was also involved in a project development exercise with the Ministry of National Languages and Social Integration supporting language training efforts of the public sector through the improvement of curricula and training methods.

Overall, the number and scope of projects undertaken for this outcome were much fewer than originally planned, due to the absence of an enabling environment for capacity development for peacebuilding.

### Outcome 7: Increased equity in socio-economic opportunities, and services for conflict-affected communities and IDPs

For this outcome, two agreement-based projects were implemented through separate mechanisms in view of the conflict situation. These projects were in response to the urgent need to provide immediate relief to displaced families on one hand, and to facilitate the demining of large tracts of land for resettlements on the other.

**Transition Programme (TP) and Transition and Recovery Programme (TRP):** The TP 2004-2006 was a major UNDP response to the post-ceasefire situation that supported the economic and social recovery of conflict-affected populations in the North and East. The TP built on an umbrella project that operated in the region from 2001-2004. The TRP 2008-2011 succeeded the TP and, building on experience gained in the TP, it took an integrated approach to social cohesion and livelihoods to effectively support the rehabilitation of crisis-affected and risk-prone communities and IDPs. The TRP implemented activities to provide immediate relief for recovery, resettlement, and recommencement and stabilization of livelihoods.

The programme was implemented through components that focused on six areas:

- **Sustainable livelihood:** The objective was to create livelihood opportunities for crisis-affected communities through community mobilization, training, provision of equipment and start-up capital, community infrastructure improvements, and activities to facilitate inter-community interaction and integration. The target beneficiaries were those who needed support to re-establish or increase their primary source of income.

- **Micro-credit and micro-enterprise:** Support was given to communities and individuals with limited access to credit through micro-finance and skills training for small and medium-size enterprise (SME) development. Micro-finance institutions and CBOs were given training to enhance their operational and fund management capacities.

- **Housing:** Houses were constructed for the most vulnerable families, particularly women-headed households, in crisis-affected communities. A community-based self-help approach was used with a labour-intensive construction method and alternate building technologies.

- **Infrastructure:** Rehabilitation and improvements of basic community infrastructure was provided to crisis-affected communities so as to enable access to socio-economic services and facilities by the residents. Training for social cohesion was also provided to enhance the benefit from those services and facilities.

- **Equitable and inclusive community networks:** With a view to building equitable and inclusive community networks, support was given to targeted communities through youth leadership training, establishment of youth networks, school twinning and exchanges, gender and youth empowerment activities, and the establishment of funds to be used for community activities. With the integrated approach of the TRP, social transformation and conflict sensitivity initiatives were integrated into various sector interventions and projects, for example in a project for communities to learn new livelihood activities and business practices. There
were also stand-alone social transformation initiatives such as pilot projects for social transformation in five communities, and a large number of school exchanges visits of children among various regions of Sri Lanka.

- **Environment management and disaster risk reduction**: To mainstream environment management and disaster risk reduction into the recovery process, the programme introduced to the communities environmentally-friendly livelihood practices and technologies, environmental standards for basic infrastructure, and disaster profile mapping. It also conducted capacity-building of local authorities for sustainable solid waste systems management and for the development of sustainable environment strategies at the community level.

The major partners of the TR programme were AusAID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Denmark, the European Commission (EC), Japan, Norway and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) who implemented several projects related to community rehabilitation, communities for peace, economic recovery and infrastructure, alternative livelihood development, social cohesion and social transformation, and so on.

**Support to Mine Action Project**: Since 2002, UNDP Sri Lanka has been providing key support to the National Steering Committee for Mine Action, headed by the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development. UNDP supported coordination, capacity-development and provision of technical expertise at national and district levels, resource mobilization for demining operators and advocacy of the National Mine Action Programme, the overall aim of which was for Sri Lanka to be mine free by the end of 2008.

This project consisted of two sub-components:

- Support to field operations, in particular, the coordination and management of mine action through UNDP-staffed Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAOs). RMAOs conduct quality management of the clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war, mine risk education, surveys for clearance, issuances of decision to engage in clearance, and maintenance of the mine action database.

- Support to the institutionalization and capacity development of NMAC with a view to gradually handing over mine action coordination and management responsibilities to the Government.

The major partners of this programme were AusAID, the EC and Sweden. While a large part of UNDP’s mine action support has previously been on downstream coordination and quality assurance of demining activities, over the last couple of years it has been more heavily involved in support to NMAC to provide institutional and policy support for peace.

**3.3.5 GENDER**

UNDAF 2008-2012 established a new pillar of work with a focus on gender. UNDP was assigned to contribute, along with other UN agencies, to two outputs:


- UNDAF Output 3.3 Increased representation of women in decision-making processes in private and public life.

UNDP’s contribution to Output 2.2 was mainstreamed within the Crisis Prevention and Recovery cluster of its work and is discussed in that context.

UNDP implemented a project dedicated to increasing the representation of women in decision-making processes (UNDAF Output 3.3). Potential women leaders were trained in negotiation skills, and leadership and electoral processes.

---

60 For Output 2.2, UNEP, UNV and UNESCO; for Output 3.3, ILO and WHO.
in local Districts. Representation of women was further promoted through national dialogue, production of film and radio spots, and circulation of issues notes. Finally, a participatory stocktaking and needs assessment exercise was conducted looking at challenges for women in political representation to provide the basis for building a national plan of action.

3.4 PROGRAMME RESOURCES

From 2004-2010, funds made available to UNDP Sri Lanka averaged around USD 16 million per annum, of which approximately 80 percent came from external funding sources. The availability of funds and expenditure fluctuated considerably due to major events that occurred during the period.

The trends in expenditure by focus area are presented in Figure 3. By far the largest focus area in terms of fund availability and spending has been crisis prevention and recovery. Expenditure in this area peaked in 2005 in the aftermath of the tsunami, and again from 2009 to 2010 with the ending of the war. Rehabilitation and recovery efforts involved large-scale field operations, so naturally involved high financial costs.

Expenditure on democratic governance activities also peaked in 2005 mainly due to the large-scale funding of post-tsunami rehabilitation efforts by local governments.

In the area of poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs, the expenditure peak in 2005-2007 followed the establishment of

---

Figure 3. Expenditure 2004-2010 by focus area

Source: UNDP financial data

---

‘Mahinda Chintana’ in 2005 and the effort to incorporate the MDGs into the national planning process. It also coincided with the peak expenditure period of some downstream activities. Expenditure remained low since 2008 because the work in this area comprised mainly policy and technical advice and support.

Expenditure in the areas of energy, environment and disaster risk management remained low until 2008 because activities were mainly confined to technical studies and support on specific issues. Funding has expanded with efforts to introduce a more comprehensive treatment of environment and disaster management, the establishment of the ‘National Action Plan for Haritha (Green) Lanka’ in 2008, and the operationalization of the ‘Road Map Towards Safer Sri Lanka’ and the DMC.

* * *

The next two chapters provide assessments respectively of: UNDP’s contributions to development results through implementing the programme described above and the strategies and approaches UNDP has taken in response to evolving development challenges and national priorities, while applying its comparative strengths and promoting UN values.
This chapter assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP’s contributions to development results. The assessment follows the structure of the CP 2008-2012 thematic clusters and programme outcomes and covers the CCFII 2002-2006. Although the CCFII 2002-2006 did not have a clear results framework there was clear continuity in activities and the assessment of CCFII activities was incorporated into the CP programme structure.

4.1 POVERTY REDUCTION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MDGs

This thematic cluster aims to encourage economic growth and social services to be pro-poor, equitable, inclusive and sustainable to fulfil the MDGs, with a particular focus on rural areas (UNDAF Outcome 1). Two sets of activities, with distinct approaches, were implemented under this programme cluster. The first set of activities was a group of projects focusing on policy, technical and capacity support at the national level and, in particular, on national planning processes (CP Outcome 1). The second set of activities was a group of independent sector or regional level projects that aimed to reduce poverty through the programme logic of each individual project (CP Outcome 2). The programme is therefore assessed separately for the two outcomes.

4.1.1 COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTCOME 1

- Economic policies, strategies and programmes address geographical and income disparities and aid utilization is more effective and coordinated.

Programmatic relevance

Prior to the Millennium Summit in 2000, the Government together with concerned stakeholders made an extraordinary effort to build a framework for poverty reduction for 1998-2001. This process involved a large number of government entities and stakeholders advocating key criteria for poverty reduction, pro-poor growth, social protection systems, empowerment of the poor and strengthening governance. The challenge however was in finding coherence with traditional structural adjustment promoted under the auspices of international finance institutions that did not address issues critical for poverty alleviation strategies. This has made the introduction of the MDGs timely, having provided an important framework and a motivational force to make progress on poverty reduction and human development. Support provided by the MDG-CSP was therefore extremely relevant and aimed to raise MDG awareness through a campaign, help incorporate the MDGs into policy frameworks both at the national and local levels, and support capacity development for the use of the MDGs and monitor their progress through improved statistical capacities.

Successive capacity development programmes followed the MDG-CSP. In addition to capacity development support in planning and statistics, more recent activities included support to the introduction of RBM and MfDR, and an integrated database to manage the results and

---

62 Projects included the Strengthening Plan Implementation Capability project and the project for Strengthening National Capacities for National and Local Information Collection, Planning, Budgeting and Monitoring for the Attainment of MDGs.
related information, including the development assistance, provided by international partners.

As the Government recognizes the importance and benefits of MfDR for improving development efficiency and effectiveness, promoting transparency and accountability, and making informed decisions, the programme that supports this effort remains relevant for the achievement of the intended outcome.

Nevertheless, several important design issues remain. First, the programme has been largely confined to supporting the central offices of the Government in charge of planning and statistics. The concept of MfDR needs to be understood and fully applied not only at the central offices but also at the sectoral ministries and agencies, and by sub-national government entities. Interviews revealed that, at sub-national levels, MfDR was still seen as a statistical reporting tool and not as a policy instrument to promote inclusive development.63

Second, the sub-national MDG-based policy framework should be dynamically linked to the national framework in the context of MfDR for the whole system to work effectively. The programme has not addressed the development of such a system.

Third, as the evaluation of the programme commissioned by UNDP Sri Lanka in 2009 showed, “the private and non-government sectors, both of which have a role to play in economic development and poverty reduction, ... were notable absentee from the MDG-CSP design (though they were mentioned in the introductory sections). Both have contributed emphatically to poverty reduction in Sri Lanka and there are likely to be benefits in drawing them into an overall national partnership to address the pockets of weakness in the achievement of MDGs. Two important examples of continuing weakness in MDG achievement, in addition to the pockets of poverty in the country, are the environment and gender equality”.

**Effectiveness**

There have been considerable achievements in advocating for the MDGs and their incorporation into budgetary and statistical processes. The projects have helped Sri Lanka and its development partners to take stock and review progress since 2000 using 51 MDG indicators, and identify areas where additional effort is needed to implement the successive national development plans. Today, Sri Lanka is well on track to achieving most of the MDG targets nationally by 2015. The second MDG Country Report for Sri Lanka was released in 2010, and included MDG indicators not only at national but also sector and regional levels, highlighting regional disparities. Importantly, the Government has been assuming the primary responsibility for leading the efforts for the successful achievement of the MDGs.

While overall these projects have been effective in achieving their objectives, there are still some shortcomings. The consistency and reliability of data from the sub-national level still needs to be improved to develop a more accurate picture of the progress made.64 There is still a need to consistently apply standard concepts, definitions and statistical methods for some indicators, the lack of which affected the comparability of data. Finally, the need for dialogue and partnerships involving citizens, the private sector and civil society in the MDG process, needs to be more widely recognized especially at the sector and sub-national levels.

The capacity development support of the central departments for MfDR has built-up the competencies and knowledge base necessary to lead result-based planning and monitoring. However, it was pointed out that the support was often too

63 For example, some officials at the sub-national level attached importance to reporting accurate data but remained sceptical on involving civil society to use the data in policy dialogue.

64 For instance, there is still a shortage of reliable time series data on indicators such as consumption, poverty and child malnutrition at the district level.
focused on teaching theories and more guidance on practical application of those theories would have been desirable.

Another achievement was the pilot application of RBM in five line ministries in 2007. The line ministries set out their key deliverables, operational intentions and performance expectations in their respective Annual Implementation Plans as a basis for reporting progress. The Annual Implementation Plans were aligned with the ‘Ten Year Horizon Development Framework 2006-2016’, and further developed into Agency Results Frameworks and scorecards for the ministries. The next step was to work with these ministries, deepening the use of MfDR at the sub-ministerial level (i.e. in departments and agencies), and in the management of projects. However, the evaluation team could not find strong evidence that the Agency Results Framework was effectively used so far in the planning process, or that the use of MfDR was further deepened or widened based on this particular initiative.

Further, MfDR tools such as independent evaluations have not yet been applied to most public assistance programs and interventions, such as the Samurdhi programme. Stakeholders at the downstream level would still need access to such instruments for performance and value-for-money auditing.

With regard to involvement of civil society and private sector, despite the design issue raised in relation to the relevance criteria, the programme evaluation 2009 noted that the involvement of the National Council for Economic Development in the programme had worked towards bringing together stakeholders from the private and state sectors to develop economic policies and action plans.

**Efficiency**

As discussed above, the key achievements have been the introduction of the MDGs in national planning and the capacity development of key national level entities. However, further widening and deepening of MfDR would be needed to effectively achieve the overall objective. The results information thus collected would allow more informed and focused policy interventions that are pro-poor, equitable, inclusive and sustainable. From the efficiency viewpoint, after ten years of support through successive projects, one could argue that more should have already been achieved. Regular changes within the Government during the past decade seemed to have affected progress in this regard.

The programme evaluation 2009 reported that improper management of programme accounts in the past compromised the efficiency of the programme. This issue seems to have been addressed.

Finally, there is a need to more dynamically link systems at the national and sub-national levels, and build an integrated system for inclusive governance. UNDP defined local governance and national planning under separate programmatic outcomes in its country programme framework. Within UNDP, local governance projects are run by the governance cluster team and the national planning projects by the poverty cluster.

---

65 The pilot ministries were the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition, Ministry of Highways and Road Development, Ministry of Agricultural Development & Agrarian Services and the Ministry of Plan Implementation.

66 In 2012, in its instruction on budget preparation, the Ministry of Finance and Planning incorporated an Agency Results Framework as part of budget proposals from ministries. It is therefore to see how this process will lead to the result-based planning and budgetary process.


68 The evaluation of the MDG-CSP in UNDP Sri Lanka (2009) reported that “efficiency was also compromised when MDG-CSP was gearing up by National Council for Economic Development not following government regulations regarding the keeping of proper books of account and other financial records until the current director was appointed. Some expenditures have been difficult to account for, there were examples of duplicated payments and the national awareness campaign started with insufficient preparatory work with the result that preparation for the campaign had to be started again, resulting in the initial costs being written off".
team. These factors have not been conducive in promoting the integrated treatment of MDG-centred inclusive governance at the national and sub-national levels.

**Sustainability**

Government ownership over the use of the MDGs and MfDR in national planning is clear. Moreover, the Government is integrating planning and budgeting, and incorporating RBM into the budgetary process.⁶⁹ UNDP’s close and continued engagement with key entities within the Government has facilitated this.

To sustain the effective use of MfDR for pro-poor, equitable, inclusive and sustainable development, it is imperative to develop an integrated system that encompasses all the implementing entities throughout the governance system from the national to local levels. This would require broad-based understanding of MfDR concepts, and capacities to apply MfDR at all levels.

### 4.1.2 COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTCOME 2

Service providers ensure equitable access to improved services and economic infrastructure to vulnerable populations in disadvantaged areas.

**Programmatic relevance**

For this outcome area, UNDP has run several sector or region focused projects under the rubric of poverty reduction and the attainment of the MDGs. All of which were relevant to addressing human poverty in the country. However, translating the initiative into actual impact on human poverty on the ground has been a challenge.

The project to support the National Plan of Action for the Social Development of the Plantation Community addressed the long-standing issue relating to the population group lagging behind in development. The plantation community had the highest poverty incidence, with over 30 percent of the population living below the poverty line for most of the decade (see Table 1 above), and social problems in this sector are well recognized. The National Plan of Action approved in 2006 was a comprehensive plan that addressed all dimensions of human poverty in the plantation community. The Government assigned the responsibility to lead and coordinate the implementation of the ten-year plan to the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development. For the attainment of the MDGs, addressing the issue of this sector has been critical and the initiative was thus relevant.

The recently completed Uva Poverty Alleviation project also targeted the region left behind from rapid economic growth of the past decade. Uva is a landlocked province with poor access and infrastructure putting it at disadvantage in terms of economic development. The poverty head-count ratio was over 37 percent in 2002 despite a national average of approximately 23 percent. It remained between 13- to 15 percent in 2009/10 despite the national average dropping drastically to 8.9 percent (see Table 1). The project was thus relevant to UNDP’s programme objective and one of the important challenges remaining in the country.

However, Sri Lanka has had a variety of indigenous public and non-commercial financial cooperatives and credit schemes for a long time, including: rural cooperative banks, village revolving funds, thrift and credit cooperative societies and women’s development cooperatives. There are an estimated 10,000 institutions or schemes in operation, and their contribution to social welfare and poverty reduction is recognized.⁷⁰ Serious questions about the relevance of UNDP’s involvement in this area of work, where it does not have a recognized expertise, have been raised. Stakeholders in the region also have questioned...
the idea that UNDP could develop a viable micro-credit system with a three-year project.

Developing the tourism sector is a high policy priority for Sri Lanka. The Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority aims to ensure that tourist destinations make the best use of their environmental and cultural assets, while providing benefits to communities and local businesses. The Green Belt Re-development of Tourism Infrastructure project was a joint undertaking among the Sri Lanka Tourism Board, the World Tourism Organisation (WTO) and UNDP, aimed to support this effort by conducting a study and recommending actions to be taken. The study was comprehensive and provided an excellent analysis of critical issues. It extensively addressed poverty reduction through tourism, suggested costal development strategies that could benefit local communities and businesses, and explained how a diversified approach through non-traditional market development would reduce income fluctuations caused by seasonal tourism patterns. The study outlined key action points for human resources development, local partnership and livelihood creation. The study was clearly relevant in facilitating inclusive development in Sri Lanka.

It should also be recognized that projects implemented in other clusters of work also made significant contributions to the reduction of human poverty. The largest impact came from the TRP which helped conflict-affected communities. Programmes related to local governance, post-disaster recovery and disaster management also contributed\(^{71}\) to improved services and economic infrastructure for the vulnerable population and those affected by disasters in one way or another.

**Effectiveness**

Despite the high relevance of these projects to reducing poverty (or human poverty), the evaluation did not find strong evidence of their overall effectiveness and impact, and the assessments of stakeholders were mixed.

The Uva Poverty Alleviation project was relatively successful in providing the poor and most vulnerable groups greater access to assets, markets and financial resources, working through 50 CBOs in 25 villages and the private sector. The project established small SME development centres (one stop shops) and supported the livelihood needs of over 1,000 households through micro-credit programmes that introduced new technologies, processing techniques and marketing. Linkage was developed among the producers, the private sector and the market. The 2008 impact evaluation of micro-credit programmes found that over 500 loans worth nearly Rs. 3 million were provided for crop production, animal husbandry and other needs. The programme was also “considered opportunistic for widows and women-headed households” and the “majority of families benefited from the credit programme [were] either poor of live in acute poverty”.\(^{72}\)

However, working through CBOs was a challenge because their work “covers a wide spectrum of areas without a direct focus on credit”. Further, financial management of a credit programme was a task that turned out to be particularly challenging for CBOs. Operational challenges faced by the programmes, including difficulties in maintaining professional expertise, suggest that UNDP may not have been the best-equipped institution to directly support such schemes with a time-bound intervention.

The National Plan of Action for the Social Development of the Plantation Community has not yet been implemented. The study of the Green Belt Redevelopment of Tourism Infrastructure project has been completed, but

\(^{71}\) For instance, the ART GOLD programme under the governance cluster has enabled local administrations to address the poverty reduction needs of local population with the development initiatives in such areas as SMEs, agriculture and animal husbandry.

no further action has been taken by the national stakeholders partly because changes within the Government caused changes in policy direction and strategies. The question as to how committed national partners were before embarking on these initiatives is therefore raised. While each instance has its particular background and a generalized judgment cannot be made, one would hope that similar initiatives would be more securely imbedded in the national strategy and the agreement between UNDP and the Government.

Efficiency and sustainability
On the sustainability of the Uva Poverty Alleviation project, the key question is whether such a micro-finance scheme will remain viable in the future. On the demand side, 88 percent of borrowers surveyed indicated that they intended to borrow money for the same type of activities in the future. On the supply side, stakeholders asked whether CBOs can maintain capacity to operate micro-credit programmes with efficiency and control to make them financially viable.

The 2008 impact evaluation of the micro-credit programme\(^{74}\) noted that beneficiaries were attracted to this programme because of the low interest rates, easy access to credits and no demand for collateral. Since many other public and non-commercial microfinance institutions and schemes are in operation, the question arises as to how the programme can continue to offer such favourable terms and be financially viable without substantial subsidization. The effort to involve local partners and the national level SANASA programme\(^ {75}\) provides elements for sustainability. However, whether these schemes can actually survive is very questionable.

Given the limited results of other projects as described above, it is not possible to provide an informed overall assessment of their efficiency and sustainability.

### 4.2 FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

UNDP’s engagement in the area of democratic governance sought to contribute to capacity development through the promotion of governance mechanisms and practices that would enable the realization of the principles of the Millennium Declaration and protection of human rights of all persons (UNDAF Outcome 2).\(^ {76}\)

UNDAF Outcome 2 provides the overarching goal for activities implemented to achieve three CP outcomes concerning: (i) protection of human rights, (ii) strengthening decentralization, and (iii) safeguarding access to decision-making processes and justice redress mechanisms. This three-pronged approach provided a holistic thematic framework to address governance of multifaceted development challenges that emerged during the decade. Hence, the analysis below is presented for all three CP outcomes, namely:

- **Outcome 3:** Key oversight institutions and mechanisms are strengthened.
- **Outcome 4:** Capacity of local government strengthened.
- **Outcome 5:** Greater and more diverse access to and participation in decision-making processes and justice redress mechanisms.

The realization of the Millennium Declaration principles is contingent on the formulation of policy framework and strategies that address eliminating disparities to make economic growth and social services pro-poor, equitable, inclusive and sustainable (UNDAF Outcome 1). Hence the assessment framework for democratic governance requires a holistic approach.

\(^{73}\) ibid.

\(^{74}\) ibid.

\(^{75}\) SANASA is the network of thrift and credit cooperative societies in Sri Lanka, and covers over 3 million people with over eight thousand primary Societies in all provinces.

\(^{76}\) The assessment is presented using the programme structure of UNDAF 2008-2012 and CP 2002-2006 and 2008-2012 as a framework. However, it also covers successor activities under UNDAF 2002-2006 and CCFII 2002-2006.
governance is also informed by the status of upstream engagement made under the theme of achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty. At the output level, individual projects have addressed specific development issues identified at the time of programme formulation, and their contributions were assessed against the intended outcomes they were designed to address.

**Programmatic relevance**

The assessment found that the design of the thematic response addressed capacity gaps at the entity and individual levels rather than at the system level in meeting the challenges of inclusive governance. The magnitude of displacement and vulnerability resulting from the war and the 2004 tsunami called for urgent operational engagement with affected local communities in providing services required in an accountable and transparent manner. Thus projects worked at the entity or institutional level (new or expanded service deliveries, organizational procedures and practices) or at the individual level (knowledge and awareness creation).

At the entity level, the critical challenge during the decade was to establish and strengthen decentralized governance to bring new or expanded services to vulnerable groups. There were a number of notable initiatives that responded to this challenge:

- The IDPs affected by the tsunami or conflict were often lacking civil documentation and marginalized from delivery of basic services, and could be facing issues that require legal assistance. Under the Support to the HRC and the Access to Justice projects, specific measures were taken to address these needs including mobile documentation clinics, strengthening the local presence of the HRC and promoting a positive orientation among duty bearers to the needs of the IDPs.

- In the South, strengthening the capacity of the local administration (decentralized arm of the central government) under CADREP for effective governance of recovery after the tsunami constituted critical support in managing the recovery of tsunami-affected areas as well as re-building the capacity of local administration to play an effective role in disaster management. The project evaluation of CADREP in 2007 found that the establishment of the District Recovery and Development Unit in the District Secretariat to coordinate the district recovery management, was a very appropriate measure to facilitate rapid recovery, and that this Unit functioned effectively because it properly involved different players in the recovery effort.

- For tsunami recovery, partnerships built by two programmes were complementing each other: the ART GOLD programme worked with local governments (devolved arm of local governance) and the ‘Sustaining Tsunami Recovery by Organizations Networking at the Grassroots-level through Promoting Local Accountability and Capacity Enhancement Systems’ (STRONG PLACES) Project worked with CSOs. They sought to address capacity issues in the Southern Provincial Council and selected local authorities in the province.

- The MDGs became a local framework to guarantee basic services to people which constituted a significant step towards providing a framework for a rights-based approach to social and economic services. The introduction of the concept in selected urban local authorities was carried forward under LoGoPro around districts as a rural development road map for Sri Lanka.

In addressing vulnerabilities arising from horizontal imbalances in service delivery, the programme

---

77 Including District Secretariat, Divisional Secretariat etc.


79 This comprises Provincial Council, District Council, Local Council, Municipal Council and so on.
designed and introduced a framework of governance mechanisms and practices at the local level to target service delivery.

- Under LoGoPro, accountability of local administration was promoted by the introduction of citizen’s charters, and localized MDG plans and monitoring mechanisms. The citizen’s charter was designed as a transparent institutional framework for rights-based service delivery transactions between citizens and government. The MDG localization process was designed to promote a participatory process of integrated district/divisional facilitation to planning, resource mobilization and coordination of local level service deliveries. Together the two initiatives targeted service delivery to meet needs and address vulnerabilities.

- The introduction of a rights-based approach implicitly (as a cross-cutting dimension) and explicitly (as specific initiatives focussing on capacity building of claim holders) addressed issues of marginalization and vulnerability arising from the war and poverty.

- Legal empowerment of the vulnerable was promoted by making claim-holders aware of their rights and entitlements and duty-bearers aware of their claims. This programme enhanced accountability for local service delivery since it developed a set of redress mechanisms around the responsibilities of key frontline local service providers. The initiative under the Access to Justice project has targeted key front-line duty-bearers including, among others, the Grama Niladharis. Since the Grama Niladharis is responsible for a wide range of services at the village level, making them aware of the claims of right-holders was a significant step towards safeguarding access to services for vulnerable. On the claim-holders’ side, the project worked with a wide range of vulnerable groups such as prisoners, victims of domestic abuse, IDPs, refugees without citizenship, and tea plantation workers in addressing their rights and entitlements.

It is noteworthy that the initiative for localizing the MDGs addresses a long-standing local governance issue by putting together the basis for a division-level service delivery networking arrangement. Localized division-level MDG plans bring a wide range of service providers into a service delivery network. Facilitating an access of the vulnerable to redress mechanisms can be an important dimension of this network. The citizen’s charter and the orientation of the village administration as a legal empowerment mechanism complement the networking arrangement from the side of the right holders.

While the projects engaged mostly at the entity and individual levels, no conscious effort was made to build them up to the system level. Under the CCFII, the institutional capacity development of national and provincial institutions was considered in the context of decentralized development. Elements of an integrated approach to governance mechanisms and practices have been piloted at the local level. At the national level, capacity development support was provided to build policies and programmes to address horizontal disparities between regions and communities. However, there does not seem to be a move towards a coherent policy framework that integrates policies and programmes at both the national and local levels, and the supply and demand sides of service delivery.

As already indicated, the absence of an integrating framework for addressing different aspects of democratic governance is an important issue. While individual projects addressed specific needs, there has been a lack of clarity in rationale and direction, and in how contributions of individual projects add up to achieving democratic governance.

80 The Grama Niladharis is an official appointed by the central government to carry out administrative duties at the sub-divisional level, which is basically at the village level.

81 Division is a local administrative unit, one level above villages/communities, and one level below Districts.

82 See also the human rights programme review conducted by Parakrama, Samarasinha & Theis (2004).
In ‘Mahinda Chintana’ policy statements, and government policy and priorities, the central role of the MDG-CSP was relevant. Sri Lanka has made substantial achievements in respect of most MDG targets with its existing service delivery system. Through its support to MDG awareness, the MDG-CSP brought into the national development dialogue the regional disparities in attaining the MDGs. However, the central role assigned to the MDG-CSP in the current CP 2008-2012 “with a strong emphasis on linking upstream policy with capacity development strategies and alternative pro-poor downstream and rights-based development approaches” has not been translated in implementation. It was found that, in practice, the relevance of the MDG-CSP to agencies responsible for its implementation have been low.\(^{83}\)

Thus, in the absence of a national policy to inform strategies and programmes that address disparities between regions and groups, capacity development for fostering democratic governance remains fragmented at the institutional level, and remains to be integrated into a policy strategy for inclusive human development. The regular changes of government during the decade resulted in a lack of policy stability especially with regard to issues of governance and devolution. The shift in approach to fostering democratic governance from the CCFII to the current CP reflects the absence of a focal point for mainstreaming such engagement. Assigning responsibility for implementation of the MDG-CSP between three national-level agencies did not lead to the expected synergies in upstream-downstream programme linkages.

**Effectiveness**

UNDP interventions in this area comprised, on the supply-side, primarily capacity-building activities for public sector entities. The needs identified have largely been in specific operational areas, hence the focus was on tangible institutional mechanisms, procedures and practices, and human resources at the entity level. Such support has been effective in bringing about improvements in institution’s ability to take on expanded service delivery responsibilities. On the demand-side, the initiatives were taken to strengthen CBO capacities, improve outreach to citizens and empower claim-holders.\(^{84}\)

The regional network of the HRC was strengthened so that the HRC can effectively execute their mandate. On the supply-side, capacity was built for streamlining the complaints handling system at the national and regional level. On the demand side, an unofficial network of civil society activists was built around regional offices to create pressures to address human rights issues. The project helped the HRC regain the top status rating for national human rights institutions, and publish and disseminate the Annual Reports since 2008.

Procedural improvements in the complaint system at CIABOC significantly contributed to capacity-building. These include the establishment of a hotline, the introduction of an information sheet for complainants that was made publicly accessible on-line, and the introduction of a computerized case management system. The improvements have resulted in improved quality and quantity of information provided by complainants.

Post-tsunami capacity-building under LoGoPro improved the performance of regional and local level structures as duty-bearers to deliver services in a transparent and accountable manner. The new generation of citizen charters and localizing the MDGs into a rural development road-map were built upon current needs and past experiences. The mechanisms and procedures being piloted measured service delivery results and outcomes.


\(^{84}\) In addition to the HRC project mentioned below, such demand-side initiatives were taken in CADREP, STRONG PLACES, Access to Justice project and LoGoPro.
New mechanisms to bring about greater transparency and accountability were piloted in eight districts. Further, by filling a considerable human resource gap, CADREP greatly accelerated tsunami recovery efforts in affected areas with a limited number of skilled staff.\(^\text{85}\)

Under the Access to Justice project, support was provided to improve the downstream delivery of legal aid. In 2008-2009, for instance, UNDP supported the Legal Aid Commission and the Ministry of Justice to conduct a forward looking review of the legal sector. This has led to several policy changes, such as the introduction of legal aid for criminal cases.

**Efficiency**

With regards to project execution arrangements, the execution of LoGoPro was located at the national level between relevant ministries each with clearly identified delivery responsibilities. This arrangement led to a coherent delivery of technical assistance through changes in the service delivery systems of the respective implementing agencies. The successful piloting of a new generation citizen’s charter in eight districts indicates ownership at the national and district levels. Success could be measured by the level of control of the central ministry over the change process at the district level.

National implementation of the first Equal Access to Justice Project\(^\text{86}\) by the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and National Integration was, on the other hand, found to be inadequate in providing required delivery responsibilities for project implementation. This was especially because the high-level Steering Committee did not meet regularly,\(^\text{87}\) and it failed to assume its functions of providing direction and oversight or establish a dynamic strategic management process to guide project activities. Further, the project management structure was found to be “not realistic; they are not being adhered to; and they do not enable results-based management towards the project outcomes.”\(^\text{88}\)

To execute the ART GOLD programme, project steering arrangements were made at national and provincial levels to bring about national ownership. A Project Steering Committee was established at the Southern Provincial Council where the project was implemented. The Committee was chaired by the Chief Secretary and brought together government, private sector and non-government representatives. However, this arrangement was found to be inadequate in realizing changes in the decision-making arrangements in the provincial service delivery organizations. Subsequently, the project remained a channel for resource inputs with limited impact on institutional capacity of the provincial system.

With regards to project operation, the delivery of project outputs adopted a variety of outreach mechanisms, many of which were based on local level experiences elsewhere in Sri Lanka and were therefore familiar. Such outreach mechanisms helped projects effectively involve different actors to achieve project objectives efficiently.

LoGoPro piloted systems development, in partnership with the project management unit designing the systems at the executing ministry, and the districts and divisions responsible for application and testing of the localized systems. Engagement with the districts and divisions allowed local capacity to be identified and the development of resource persons as master trainers through training of trainer interventions.

In support of the HRC networking, local meetings and dialogues were organised for the delivery of project activities, to disseminate information

\(^{85}\) S. Pathirathna et al. (2007).

\(^{86}\) The first project was implemented under the CCFII.

\(^{87}\) The Steering Committee was supposed to meet quarterly.

and to engage the HRC regional offices with government and non-government stakeholders, as well as civil society, including professionals, trade unions, CBOs and religious leaders.

Under Equal Access to Justice, awareness training of duty-bearers and mobile clinics for claim-holders worked well in tandem to promote access to redress mechanisms.

In the case of multi-agency project interventions, the 2006 evaluation of the Access to Justice project found that while individual project components were well designed and implemented, they were fragmented and not well-coordinated between the various actors representing the different sectors and the intended beneficiaries of the project. It also found that the project tended to be centred in Colombo and other urban centres, necessitating long and expensive travel by the rural poor.\(^8^9\) Based on these findings, the project was reformulated in 2007 and the successor project from 2009 incorporated mechanisms to improve coordination.\(^9^0\)

**Sustainability**

The project interventions identified a variety of measures for promoting ownership of change and capacity development. National ownership is, however, only one aspect in ensuring sustainability. More fundamentally, sustainability of governance interventions requires change to be institutionalised and internalised by mainstreaming improved systems and procedures, or by adopting best practices for policies and services. Therefore, sustainability requires appropriate changes at the system level that enable vertical integration across the macro (national and cross-sector), meso (local and sector) and micro (entity or institution) levels of governance. Capacity development for democratic governance thus requires an approach linking capacity-building at the micro-level and system development at the meso and macro levels.

At the institutional level, sustainability can be examined by looking at whether improvements were mainstreamed into institutional mechanisms, procedures and practices. The improvements of complaint procedures in CIABOC constitute a case in point. In the case of the initiative to strengthen regional offices of the HRC through civil society networking, institutionalization of a reporting system to both civil society networks and the Head Office was needed. In the case of the pilot initiative to improve localized mechanisms for service delivery, a measure of sustainability was achieved by the ownership demonstrated by the districts and divisions in applying citizen charters and localized MDGs. However ownership is yet to be reflected in the respective institutional budgets of the HRC and CIABOC.

Sustainability can also be looked at in terms of the coordination of entity level interventions into sector or local governance frameworks. Project interventions to strengthen local governance structures, whether in terms of service delivery, rights, or access to redress mechanisms, were designed to support institutional mandates, roles and responsibilities. While these interventions have strengthened respective oversight institutions, sustainability requires transparency and accountability of regional and local level structures and access to redress mechanisms being pulled together into a governance framework that supports change in people’s wellbeing.

Finally, sustainability could have been enhanced by linking initiatives to strengthen governance and oversight institutions with an overarching national governance policy and planning process. However, such a national policy framework to

---

\(^8^9\) ibid.

\(^9^0\) Such mechanisms include: the establishment of a Project Board that meets bi-annually; the monthly working group meetings for all project partners; and a formal Memorandum of Understanding with key partners in the justice sector to identify joint activities and monitor progress.
pursue inclusive growth and development is yet to emerge. In this context, the MDG-CSP was not able to address governance issues underpinning disparities in MDG attainments. However the current ‘Ten Year Horizon Development Framework 2006 – 2016’ and the subsequent ‘Vision for the Future: Government Development Policy Framework 2010 – 2016’ could provide the starting point for such a governance policy framework.

In this context, the following findings of project evaluations point to operational gaps at the entity level affecting sustainability, as well as the failure to introduce a system that would have ensured sustainability.

- The 2007 evaluation of CADREP\(^91\) concluded that the programme lacked a strong and clear phasing out plan or exit strategy beyond government procedures. Such an exit strategy would have assured the smooth transformation of resources, concepts, mechanisms, institutions, infrastructure, and especially the services offered and responsibilities.

- The Equal Access to Justice Project sought to address problems of vulnerability and marginalization by supporting policy changes and assisting NGOs to reach the poorest of the poor. The 2006 evaluation of the project\(^92\) pointed out that the project outcome has not been monitored and documented adequately and it was not clear whether and how the project led to policy changes or improved NGO support to the poor.

- The 2007 evaluation of the STRONG PLACES Project\(^93\) found that there was little or no monitoring of project interventions in support of CSOs, especially with regard to how CSOs maintained material and financial assets provided by the project, and transferred knowledge gained from training to other members. The evaluation concluded that the sustainability of the project outcomes would not have been guaranteed without ensuring CSOs undertake these activities.

### 4.3 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

As previously explained, for the purpose of assessment, outputs, as defined in the programme document, should be viewed as *de facto* intended outcomes. The three outputs concern: (i) policy and strategy development at the national level, (ii) promotion of best practices and appropriate technology at the community level, and (iii) establishment of comprehensive disaster management.

#### 4.3.1 COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTPUT 1.4

- Improved policies and strategic interventions to ensure sustainable environment management and efficient use of renewable energy sources

**Programmatic relevance**

UNDP programmes and projects in this area aimed to support policy and strategy development, and hence were directly relevant to government policies and strategies. They have also contributed to fulfilling the Government’s commitments to Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, and other international obligations to which Sri Lanka has committed itself.\(^94\)

The proposal ‘Promoting Sustainable Biomass Energy Production and Modern Bio-Energy Technologies’ is aligned to national energy and

---

94 Sri Lanka has ratified 36 UN conventions concerning the environment.
forest strategies.\textsuperscript{95} Enabling documents that supported Sri Lanka to meet its international obligations include: the National Communications to UNFCCC and National Compliance Action Plan for Phase-out of ODS; the Sustainable Management of Land; and the Marine Turtles Strategy and Action Plan. The National Capacity Self Assessment (NCSA), which detailed capacity-building requirements needed to meet the obligations of UN conventions and environmental management, was also very relevant.

Sri Lanka could use a wealth of information and knowledge provided by these programmes and projects in dealing with key challenges of land and forest degradation, climate change adaptation and mitigation, renewable energy generation and air quality improvement. The project to reduce pollution at the Bata-Atha Leather Complex in the South, although not implemented, was also relevant as it supported the Government’s decision to relocate the high polluting leather industry to one location and provide a centralized sewage treatment facility, which would be environmentally beneficial.\textsuperscript{96} Furthermore, stakeholders have acknowledged the recently completed Integrated Strategic Environmental Assessment (ISEA) in the North as highly relevant to development planning and natural resource management. Several more ISEAs in other parts of the country are on-going. These activities are all relevant to CP Output 1.4.

Recently, UNDP has engaged in some initiatives that aimed to pioneer innovative approaches to climate change adaptation, such as saline resistant paddy, flood resistant paddy, traditional seed bank development, tank rehabilitation and rainwater harvesting. These initiatives are relevant to development of concrete policy and programmes for sustainable development and climate change adaptation objectives.

Effectiveness
Almost all the programmes and projects on policy and strategy in relation to environment and energy over the past decade have been completed and have achieved their immediate project objectives. Only a few projects (Bata-Atha Leather Complex, and Sri Lanka Renewable Energy & Energy Capacity Building) were not fully implemented. However, almost all these initiatives were not very effective to achieving CP Output 1.4, with the exception of the implementation of the Montreal Protocol, which was highly effective.\textsuperscript{97}

Under the Montreal Protocol project, a number of activities were successfully implemented,\textsuperscript{98} a number of tangible outputs were produced,\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{95} The National Energy Policy and Strategies of Sri Lanka (2008) and the National Forest policy (1995) which was revised in 2011.

\textsuperscript{96} The leather industry in Sri Lanka is highly polluting and causes much damage to the natural environment particularly within the surrounding vicinity. At the time, tanneries were dispersed in residential areas, including in Colombo, compounding the environmental issues that had to be addressed. Further, due to the dispersed nature of this industry it was difficult to take mitigating measures. The Government’s decision to address this problem was essential.

\textsuperscript{97} Sri Lanka ratified the convention the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the Ozone Layer in December 1989. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry began activities under this in 1994 with the establishment of the National Ozone Unit, with funding from UNEP. Thereafter, numerous activities have been carried out through multilateral funding, and both UNDP and UNEP have been a part of this process. UNDP have funded around eight to ten projects over the past decade.

\textsuperscript{98} Such as the Refrigeration Management Plan, National Compliance Action Plan for Phase out of ODS, Institutional Strengthening for ODS-Management of the Project and phasing out ODS and phase out of Methyl Bromide in the agricultural sector.

\textsuperscript{99} For example: (i) four of the largest refrigerator, deep freezer and aerosol manufacturing factories were converted to using ozone friendly technology; (ii) a total of 120 recovery and recycling centres were established throughout the country and their performance monitored; (iii) the Environmentally Friendly Refrigeration Association of Sri Lanka was set up for the purpose of reducing ODS from this sector; (iv) twelve Mobile Air Conditioning Centres were established across the country; (v) Government vehicles were fitted with ozone friendly air conditioning systems; (vi) regulations to control ODS substances gazetted and regulations for the HCFC phase-out Management Plan drafted and Methyl Bromide phased out in the agricultural sector.
and the target to reduce chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) consumption was met two years ahead of schedule. Today there is better control of greenhouse gas emissions and ODS. The beneficiaries cut across varied groups such as refrigerant and industrial manufacturers, service providers, sales outlets, technicians, education institutions and the Government.

None of the other programmes or projects have met with the same success. Only selected priority actions have been implemented through government funding. Policies and strategies essential for the country largely remain unrealised and the long-term effort needed to achieve the goals of the Actions Plans is not visible. For example:

- Nothing has been done yet on the NCSA. There has been no follow-up action either by the Government or UNDP. The Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources requested the GEF to take the NCSA to the next level; however, there has been no response so far.

- Only piecemeal action has been taken to implement the Marine Turtle Strategy and Action Plan.\textsuperscript{100}

- The proposed programme on energy is at a stage where funds are still being solicited.

- The second UNFCCC National communication has been completed but not submitted as yet by the Government, although the deadline has passed.\textsuperscript{101}

There are several possible explanations for the lack of effectiveness of these programmes and policies. First, there is no clear mechanism\textsuperscript{102} for conveying the substance of the policy and strategy documents to government’s planning and decision-making bodies at the highest level. Second, producing enabling documents is not enough if enabling conditions for implementation are not met. In contrast, some other development partners have been packaging technical support with implementation support. Last, policies and strategies cannot enhance environmentally sustainable development if they are not consistently applied or implemented. Sri Lanka has not yet met the MDG targets for environmental sustainability, and this is often attributed to the lack of enforcement and implementation of policies and strategies.\textsuperscript{103}

Nevertheless, those interviewed agreed that the programme to develop capacity for future implementation of policies and strategies has been very effective and it has helped transfer much needed technical and subject knowledge to government institutions. For example, training given to extension officers in the Forest Department later helped trainees join the permanent cadre.

**Efficiency**

In terms of efficiency, programmes and projects have had mixed results. There were projects which were operationally efficient, for example, the implementation of the Montreal Protocol where funds were received and activities started off on time, technical support was obtained,

\begin{itemize}
  \item Nothing has been done yet on the NCSA.
  \item Only piecemeal action has been taken to implement the Marine Turtle Strategy and Action Plan.
  \item The proposed programme on energy is at a stage where funds are still being solicited.
  \item The second UNFCCC National communication has been completed but not submitted as yet by the Government, although the deadline has passed.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{100} After drawing up the Marine Turtles Strategy and Action Plan with the assistance of IUCN Sri Lanka, Rekawa was declared a turtle sanctuary with identifiable boundaries by the Government. This was a significant achievement and it was the first reptile sanctuary in Sri Lanka.

\textsuperscript{101} At the time of this evaluation. The second national communication was submitted with delay in March 2012.

\textsuperscript{102} The National Environment Action Plan 1998-2001 and the National Sustainable Development Policy 2002 recognized the need for a government coordinating and monitoring mechanism to achieve strategies for sustainable development. These mechanisms were established within the Committees on Environmental Policy and Management, constituted by representatives from subject ministries, experts, professionals and private sector/other. These Committees were overseen by the Committee on Integrating Environment and Development Policy chaired by the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. The importance of this whole system was that it provided a forum to “all stakeholders including NGOs, professionals, academics, public officials [and] civil society” to participate and “discuss issues related to environment” (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 2002). There were problems in operationalising this process, which has disintegrated over time and not been replaced.

\textsuperscript{103} National Planning Department Report on MDG 7, Ministry of Finance and Planning.

54 **CHAPTER 4. ASSESSMENT OF UNDP’S CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS**
targets were achieved and all submissions to the Convention were made on time. Only the Incentives Programme for the End-User for Industrial Enterprises did not run well due to technical problems\textsuperscript{104} and project funds were later channelled into a project on ODS.

There were projects that were efficient but which could have been better implemented, for example, the preparation of the NCSA. The report was completed and submitted on time, and the study process provided for multiple inputs and mix of expertise from both within and outside government. However, the desired combination of expertise was often lacking in the working groups set-up and coordinated by UNDP and the Ministry of Forestry and Environment. For example, the biodiversity working group could have benefitted from more lawyers, ecologists and those with a good overall knowledge of biodiversity and what is threatened. It would also have been desirable for a representative of the Foreign Office to participate. However, species specialists, whose knowledge was not required for a study of this nature, participated in the group.\textsuperscript{105} Furthermore, there were no guidelines for the consultative process.\textsuperscript{106} These factors slowed down progress and resulted in an inconsistent study process and methods.

Some projects experienced operational problems (for different reasons) and were either closed down and/or did not have the required outcomes. For example, the project to reduce pollution at the Bata–Atha Leather Complex closed because the industries did not relocate and cooperate as expected. The Renewable Energy & Energy Capacity Building project, implemented by the Ministry of Power and Energy for a while, was also discontinued. There were also problems faced in the Incentive Programme for End Users and the transfer of the remaining funds to another project, and there are on-going delays in submitting the second communication to the UNFCCC.

Finally, there were several views with regard to developing and implementing project proposals in the energy sector. It was felt that the process of proposal preparation\textsuperscript{107} and application for funding to UNDP was time-consuming and difficult compared to that of other partners. For example, it took more than five years to develop the proposal on Sustainable Biomass Energy Production and Modern Bio-energy Technologies and apply for funding. There was also a lot of paperwork involved with reporting after the project began which was time-consuming and these factors affected efficiency. However, it was also felt that detailed planning was beneficial because it helped minimize future operational and other problems, and plan for contingencies.

**Sustainability**

The sustainability of the enabling documents is of high concern. Although they have enabled Sri Lanka to comply with global commitments, not enough progress was observed so far in relation to the recommended activities on the ground.

A number of reasons for this situation were suggested: (i) the Government only chose to implement some of the priority actions; (ii) the responsible entity in the Government lacked the capacity to prepare proposals to secure funding for implementation; (iii) the Government did not have real ownership of the project output (for example, the ISEA in the North); (iv) UNDP was too complacent and not pro-active in ensuring their implementation; (v) evaluations to assess

\textsuperscript{104} Such as (i) low incentive margin, (ii) few applicants (iii) complicated application form requiring technical specifications and (v) difficulties in processing applications.

\textsuperscript{105} In Sri Lanka, biodiversity is often equated to species specialisation and species specialists are therefore recruited for projects on biodiversity. This may have led to lack of proper analysis on aspects such as policy issues.

\textsuperscript{106} For instance, one subject area had several workshops with wide stakeholder participation including civil society and private sector whilst the other two subject areas had one large workshop each with some civil society participation. There were UNDP guidelines for outcomes but not on consultative process.

\textsuperscript{107} Such as the proposal on Promoting Sustainable Biomass Energy Production and Modern Bio-Energy Technologies.
the status of Action Plans were not conducted; and (vi) there was no public accountability for implementation.

Again, implementation of the Montreal Protocol is an exception. There have been sustained outcomes under this programme because activities in the national strategy have been implemented either through direct funding or incentives/assistance.

Consultative process
An important feature that stands out in the consultative process followed in UNDP programmes and projects overall is the inadequate or inconsistent attention paid to public participation. The process followed to research and formulate policies and strategies is as important as the end product. Since the final beneficiaries of UNDP support to the country are the people and the policies/strategies formulated impact on them, ultimately the effectiveness and sustainability depends on how well their concerns are addressed and they have the ownership over the concept and the actions.

Attention has been paid (at varying levels) to civil society participation. For example, there has been wide stakeholder participation from among government and civil society in the preparation of the NCSA, particularly in the sub-sector on biodiversity. Stakeholders, primarily from the Government but with a few NGOs in the working groups and workshops, also participated in the second communication to the UNFCCC. The process was commendable and contributed well to the outcome. The ISEA for the North also had some civil society participation. However, there has been no public participation or consultations in any of UNDP’s projects or programmes so far, including the ones mentioned above, although provisions have been made for public participation. For example, the National Policy on Bio-Safety solicited public participation and commenting through newspaper notices. The Coast Conservation Department is soon planning to call for public participation and consultation for its Coastal Zone Management Plan 2013, which is in the process of being drafted.

Social auditing and demand side accountability, and transparency and access to information, can and must be ensured by UNDP. Over the years, beneficiaries have been defined as government agencies, and policy/strategy documents as the end product, but there has been no public accountability on their lack of implementation. As already mentioned, it is implementation and enforcement of policies/strategies that will enable Sri Lanka to attain the MDG goals (particularly MDG 7) and poverty alleviation.

4.3.2 COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTPUT 2.4

- Communities adopt and benefit from improved environment and energy best practices, technologies and related investments

Programme relevance
UNDP project interventions were largely relevant to this Outcome, although only a few have been directly related to the policies and strategies at the national level. Three examples are (i) the Conservation of Biodiversity in the Rainforests of Sinharaja and Kanneliya-Dediyangala-Nakiyadeniya (KDN) through community co-management; (ii) the Conservation of Biodiversity through Integrated Collaborative Management in the Rekawa, Usangoda and Kalametiya (RUK)
Coastal Ecosystems; and (iii) Biomass Energy Production Project in Galle.

The two biodiversity projects were located in sensitive areas, rich in animal and plant life but seriously threatened by a number of destructive practices such as shell mining, over-grazing and forest encroachment. Poverty and population increases added to these problems particularly on the coastal belt. The implementation of projects to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity through a collaborative management system involving local communities, NGOs, and government agencies was therefore relevant.

The Biomass Energy Production Project was highly relevant to the Government’s strategy to move towards alternative and renewable energy. It is also in keeping with the overall UNDAF and CCFII 2002-2006 goals of sustainable human development, poverty reduction, more economic opportunities for the poor, better access to basic services and capacity-building for government institutions.

Effectiveness

The programmes and projects for adopting best practices in environment and energy at the community level have been effective, and met with only a few obstacles. The Biomass Energy Production Project in Galle has been the most successful project in contributing to CP Output 2.4. This project was a component of a larger project on Post Tsunami Recovery of Natural Resources and aimed to develop a replicable model for the production of biomass energy. Under this project, UNDP in partnership with an NGO named HELPO made a major breakthrough in biogas development (after many years of failures) at community and institutional levels and developed a successful model for community participation in biomass energy production. The primary outcome was that it generated an income for the NGO, clients and those employed in it. The project has been replicated in Sri Lanka and South Asia to improve the livelihoods of communities, illustrating its effectiveness. It has also benefitted several groups such as communities, NGOs/CBOs and government institutions.

The Sinharaja-KDN project was also effective at stopping and reducing illegal encroachment in the KDN region and the Sinharaja respectively by supporting communities to find alternative sources of income. Laws were also more strictly enforced. The process was participatory and the people expressed that they benefited from the project. Today, illegal encroachment is found mainly in East Sinharaja where the project was not implemented. There has hence been good progress on protected area management, and the communities.

On the other hand, replication of the Sinharaja-KDN project was not very effective, despite it being a long-term goal, and the opportunity to incorporate best practices and lessons learned...
The change in the emphasis of the project away from NTFP was an example of adaptive management but this change was not incorporated into the project design, or recorded in the Project Steering Committee and Project Implementation Reporting process. This meant that the lessons learnt and successes were not formalised or recorded.

The Lunama-Kalametiya Wildlife Sanctuary established in 2006 had “very limited resources for enforcement”; the RUK Special Area Management Plan was prepared without “proper integration into the wider planning system and without any post-project resources for its implementation”; the “Coastal Education Research and Visitor Centre has been partially built at Kalametiya but is not complete and is yet to function”; the “restocking of Rekawa Lagoon with shrimp larvae failed” (P. Edwards and K. Padmalal, ‘Conservation of RUK Coastal Ecosystem: Final Report of the Terminal Evaluation Mission’, 2007).


Positive outcomes of the Training and Education programmes for CBOs and other stakeholders included the formation of societies, proposals for income generating activities, and campaigns to prevent sand-mining for garnets. The Turtle Conservation Component Project also had some positive outcomes on the ground. People learned the techniques of conserving marine turtles, saw that it generated income, stopped destructive activities in the sanctuary and respected its boundaries, cooperated and worked together through a community-based taskforce taking action against illegal activities in the sanctuary and made police complaints when required. While the activities carried out by the Department of Wildlife Conservation were not successful, those implemented by the NGO, the Turtle Conservation Project, yielded self-sustaining outcomes for those involved with the project.

The project benefitted the community and encouraged conservation through community involvement (although on a small-scale) particularly in the Rekawa area. A few individuals who participated in this project have since ventured into responsible tourism which has provided employment to people in the area.

**Efficiency**

The community-level programmes/projects experienced both positive and negative operational efficiency. For example, the operational efficiency of the Biomass Energy Production Project is illustrated through the success of the replicating projects.

The Sinharaja-KDN project was operationally efficient for a number of reasons. Foremost, the Forest Department took full ownership of the project. A Project Management Unit was housed within the department and the Project Manager was an officer from the department. The department itself had the administrative and managerial capacity required, and external technical expertise was obtained if and when needed. This was complimented well on the ground by a system of community mobilisation, based on successful experiences in an earlier World Bank-GEF project, involving community mobilisers and community conservation societies. Further, the community mobilizers were recruited as Forest Extension Officers after a year. These officers, together with community conservation societies,
provided the link between the department and the communities serving to discuss and solve forestry issues. Additionally, the credit loan system was successful and utilised by communities in innovative ways. Overall, this management and community-mobilization system worked well.\(^{122}\)

In contrast, the RUK project was operationally inefficient and financially mismanaged.\(^ {123}\) The project was implemented and managed by the Coast Conservation Department with several layers of committees, each with different roles and powers. A number of agencies were also involved in implementing various activities.\(^ {124}\) The 2007 evaluation report summarised the problems as follows:

“[A]ppalling implementation with exceptionally long delays at Project start-up resulting in two years lost; unnecessary delays in obtaining a year’s extension resulting in only three months of implementation time available to the Project; egos, personal feuds, political interference, hampering project management and implementation at all levels; inadequate Project oversight; woefully inadequate capacity within the Coast Conservation Department to run the Project; prehistoric accounting system; failure to deliver most Project outputs on the ground or, if delivered, all but one in an unsustainable way”.\(^ {125}\)

The Coast Conservation Department, the National Planning Division, the External Resources Department of the Ministry of Finance and UNDP had a role to play in monitoring and evaluation which did not happen properly.\(^ {125}\) Another example of operational inefficiency is the post-project developments of the “community revolving fund” for conservation and livelihoods at Bata-Atha in Kalamatiya. The fund was established in the Fisheries Cooperative under the supervision of the Provincial Secretary and ran smoothly until the 2004 tsunami. After the tsunami, community members who lost their properties and livelihoods could not repay their loans on time. The Fisheries Cooperative and Provincial Secretary filed court action against them. Many were not able to comply\(^ {126}\) and the relationship between the Fisheries Cooperative and local communities became strained. Questions are being raised about the accountability of the remaining revolving funds (i.e. the amount not paid out as loans). CBO’s and NGOs, who were partners in UNDP projects in the area, have indicated that the objective of the fund is in question and that a reappraisal of the present situation and the process forward needs to be conducted urgently.

**Sustainability**

There have been a number of good examples of sustainable environment and energy best practices at the community level although, at the same time, there are also a number of ones that failed. A good example of a successful model is the Biomass Energy Project that has proved to be self-sustaining because benefits accrue to the communities or clients themselves and has a low investment cost. It is operated by the communities/clients, generates income and provides energy for consumption.\(^ {127}\)

---

\(^{122}\) See also Rodgers & Abayawardana (2007).

\(^{123}\) Irregularities and mismanagement of funds are described in Edwards & Padmalal (2007).

\(^{124}\) For example, the overseeing and coordinating bodies were the National Level Coordinating Committee, the District Level Coordinating Committee, and the Tri-partite Review. The implementing agency was the Coast Conservation Department. IUCN acted as the project facilitation organisation, and agencies such as the Department of Wildlife Conservation, National Aquatic Resources Agency, the Sustainable Development Consultants (Pvt) Ltd and the Industrial Services Bureau in North Western Province carried out activities contracted to them.

\(^{125}\) Edwards & Padmalal (2007).

\(^{126}\) For example, those who had taken a loan of Rs. 20,000 are now being asked to pay Rs. 80,000 or more.

\(^{127}\) In Sri Lanka it has been replicated in more than ten instances such as in the Tangalle, Welikada and Moneragala prisons, Trincomalee and Galle Navy Bases, Panadura, Negombo and Matale government hospitals and the Kohuwela Army Camp. Even today more than four years after the project it is being replicated. For example, many private tea factories are in the process of setting up the same model.
The biodiversity conservation project in the KDN area, where communities have been weaned off destructive activities, is viewed as sustainable. It is viewed as fairly sustainable also in the Sinharaja rainforests. The reasons for this are that community needs have been assessed and alternatives provided. Awareness creation has also contributed to this effort. The 2007 evaluation highlighted several reasons for this success: (i) solid national ownership and internalisation of the project by the Forest Department; (ii) consultations with communities to assess their needs and solutions; (iii) a revised emphasis of the project, to make it relevant to the project site; and (iv) the awareness created on the need for conservation and other issues at hand. However, replication of the model has not been very successful as it has limited applicability in other areas.

However, the sustainability of the biodiversity conservation project in the Rekawa-Kalamatiya area, which was co-managed by the community, has been questioned. This project was well run and sustainable for the first three to four years because it proved to be beneficial both as a conservation measure and for enhancing community livelihoods. However, today (around six years after the project) the community Task Force which was/is central to sustainability is no longer functional for various reasons: (i) it was not effectively integrated within the development planning process; (ii) it had no enforcement powers in relation to illegal activities; (iii) no operational guidelines had been provided, and its role and functions in the post-project period were not clear; and (iv) there was no long-term plan for funding its continued operation. There have been a number of operational issues that needed to be addressed to ensure sustainability. However, there has been no post-project follow up, continued awareness creation or monitoring of the situation to look at the issues and problems arising. The benefit of having a sanctuary in the RUK area is thus dissipating.

4.3.3 COUNTRY PROGRAMME
OUTPUT 2.3

- Capacity for effective preparedness, mitigation and response to natural and manmade disaster is built at national and sub-national levels

Programmatic relevance

Capacity for managing disasters ranges from providing on-going DM services and development of disaster resilient infrastructure, to emergency preparedness and response. After the 2004 tsunami, the Government prioritised establishing a comprehensive DM system to reduce the human cost of disasters and to support further development. UNDP support to the establishment, operationalisation and capacity development of a DMC was hence a vital and timely initiative to enable the country to face this challenge. Further, decentralization of DMC functions and rationalization of a DM system at provincial and district levels have been a significant step towards building an effective DM system in Sri Lanka.

A comprehensive DM system requires coordinating the efforts of various agencies working in different sectors and regions of the country. The Ministry for Disaster Management proposed a framework to identify and coordinate multi-stakeholder efforts in the next ten years in its Road Map towards Safer Sri Lanka with the support of UNDP. The relevance and timeliness of this Road Map has widely been recognized.

The Road Map has been implemented through ‘priority projects’ across different areas for action. According to the 2011 evaluation of this programme, two projects received particularly high scores from stakeholders in terms of their relevance, namely: support to the establishment of the DMC and a tsunami and multi-hazard early warning system. Stakeholders have agreed the importance and relevance of these two projects as the foundations for implementing the Road Map.

---

129 Rodgers & Abayawardana (2007), as well as the findings of this evaluation.
and effective DM in the country. Other initiatives, such as raising awareness and education, capacity development of DMC, and the protection of eco-systems, were all considered very relevant but to differing degrees among stakeholders both in the 2011 and present evaluation.

**Effectiveness**

The primary functions of the DMC include coordinating the implementation of the Road Map, and serving as a repository on disaster-related information. To ensure its function, the existing capacity needed to be greatly strengthened to track, monitor and disseminate disaster and related information. The DMC also needed to strengthen its advisory capacity for the inter-ministerial National Council for Disaster Management.

With the establishment of the DMC and the strengthening of its capacity, the comprehensive DM system in Sri Lanka has much improved. With UNDP assistance, significant achievements or improvements were made in the following areas:

- An emergency operation system has been established;
- Response capacity for disasters has been improved;
- Early warning systems have improved and public rehearsing has been systematically taking place in districts;
- Hazard maps for cyclones, landslides, coastal hazards and drought have been developed;
- Nation-wide awareness regarding disaster risk reduction measures has been created;
- Mainstreaming of DM into development plans, land-use plans, building codes etc. has been promoted and supported;
- DM research has been supported.

There are nevertheless a few shortcomings that require further improvements, such as: lines of responsibility and communication between some ministries, departments and agencies; implementation capacity of local DM centres particularly in rural areas; and integration of disaster-oriented CSOs into the public system.

One of the guiding principles of the DMC is good institutional governance - where it endeavours to consult and communicate with the partner departments and stakeholders. Progress review meetings between main and support divisions have enabled the DMC management to keep track of its activities on a regular basis. However, when it comes to the distribution of responsibilities and communication with other ministries, departments and technical agencies, it was observed that coordination and collaboration among them need to be further improved to make an effective DM system overall.\(^{131}\)

More broadly, for an effective and expeditious response to disasters and risk reduction, local governments and authorities (beyond those who are directly involved in emergency response), as well as the community-level associations and citizen groups, need to be fully involved, as emphasized by the 2011 evaluation.\(^{132}\) There is still much to be done in this regard.

Recently, UNDP has been engaged in a strategic shift from institution building to supporting overall risk reduction. The ISEA and the hazard and vulnerability mapping illustrate this approach. An example of a successful application of this approach is the introduction of building construction standards and requirements for housing in disaster prone areas.

---

\(^{131}\) The point was raised with the recent case of high wind in the Southern Province, which resulted in a number of fishermen missing in the sea. It was pointed out that, because this was not classified as disaster, no effective warning was provided to the fishermen and DMC could not take an effective action in the current set up. The lack of technical capacity to detect the high wind or to promptly issue warning may also have been a factor.

\(^{132}\) ibid.
Finally, although not a planned activity to achieve the capacity development outcome, UNDP’s quick emergency assistance, by taking advantage of its technical and coordination capacity, had a significant impact on the well-being of those affected by the disaster. Emergency assistance rendered during the floods of 2006 in designing and constructing the drainage and waste management system for the Menik farm IDP Complex is a case in point.

**Efficiency**

In response to the 2004 tsunami disaster, there was a surge in funding to disaster response by foreign donors and renewed commitment by the Government to fund DM activities. As large amounts of funds were channelled through UNDP and the DMC within a short period of time for a large number and variety of projects, there may have been a rush to spend money, implement projects and yield visible results. Such an environment is not conducive to ensuring the best use of money or programme efficiency.

The programme therefore, had an impressive record in building institutions and systems, such as the DMC and the early warning system, but had shortcomings in areas where the results were less visible or could be achieved only in the long-run. The aforementioned challenge in inter-departmental and inter-ministerial communication is a case in point. Another example is the lack of involvement of local governments and authorities (as highlighted by the 2011 evaluation). At the district level, for example, there are impressively run emergency operation centres but district authorities are not sufficiently informed about or involved in DM. Similarly, within the DMC itself, projects have been implemented by a unit staffed by UNDP-hired experts independently of the DMCs mainstream of work. This may have been the most effective way to produce short-term results but created a long-term problem of maintaining capacity. Funds could have been spent increasing the capacity of DMC staff, which may have taken a longer time to develop but would have yielded better results in the long-run.

The 2011 evaluation also highlighted managerial inefficiency caused by the implementation of a large number of parallel projects including issues of associating expenditures to project accounts.

**Sustainability**

The establishment of the Road Map and the DMC provided a solid foundation to sustain the results achieved. Furthermore, strengthening national and sub-national level platforms for collaborative risk reduction initiatives and promoting partnerships towards creating safer schools and hospitals has greatly contributed to the nationalization of DM. The engagement of public, private and non-governmental sector stakeholders contributed to mainstreaming DM and created a culture of collaborative actions for risk reduction. Such broad-based awareness and collaboration must be the best guarantor for the sustainability of the DM system UNDP supported to build.

However, the absence of a proper exit strategy of UNDP support to the DMC may hamper the continued effectiveness of the DM system. A large number of UNDP-hired staff is currently deployed to the DMC, almost on a full-time basis, to perform some vital functions and work on various projects rather independently of regular DMC operations. This, combined with the absence of a proper exit strategy, can be a recipe for a major disruption when UNDP withdraws its support at the completion of the project, which could significantly affect the functioning of the overall DM system of the country.

**4.4 CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY**

This programme was delivered by supporting peace and reconciliation efforts (CP Outcome 6) and providing populations in conflict-areas with access to basic services (CP Outcome 7) through two major operational programmes – Transition Recovery Programme (TRP) and the Support to Mine Action Project (SMAP) – which were by far the largest financial and operational components of the country programme, and have a distinct operational approach. The assessments
of the two programmes are therefore presented separately below.

4.4.1 COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTCOME 6

- Outcome 6: Improved performance of public institutions to respond to conflict, promote humanitarian law and build national consensus for peaceful coexistence with active civil society participation

Programmatic relevance

Some of the inevitable outcomes of the ethnic conflict which progressively escalated into an armed combat lasting over three decades, were the rapid erosion of respect for human rights, deterioration of mechanisms for reconciliation, contraction of space for dialogue and coexistence, and the almost non-existent capacity of public institutions to respond to conflicts. In such an environment, public institutions face severe constraints. The expected programme outcome is therefore not only relevant, but also critical to long-term peace and reconciliation. Relevance of the programme was visibly demonstrated in some of the grassroots level projects undertaken under the TRP in which the willingness of people to coexist despite the conflict could be exploited if the relevant institutions had the capacity and political will.

Effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability

As described in Chapter 3, progress in this outcome was slow and inadequate given its importance to long-term peace-building and reconciliation. Progress was constrained mainly due to the absence of an environment conducive for implementing the intended initiatives. Therefore, the failure to produce many outputs means a proper assessment of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability cannot be made.

Nevertheless, one could note that the strategies conceptualized to achieve the outcome, in a hypothetical sense, would have been effective if the climate was enabling. However, the political sensitivities were too overpowering to an extent that the planned outputs remained un-pursued. Hypothetically again, if curricula were developed to impart language training to public officials who were then able to communicate and perform their official functions in both Sinhala and Tamil, and if CSOs were given a larger role in peace-building and reconciliation, the results in the medium-term would have been effective.

4.4.2 COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTCOME 7

- Increased equity in socio-economic opportunities and services for conflict-affected communities and internally displaced persons

□ Output 7.1: Socio-economic rehabilitation of conflict-affected communities and IDPs through housing, small infrastructure and livelihoods

Programmatic relevance

The TP 2004-2006 was built on UNDP’s prior experiences in post-conflict areas and its comparative advantage of an existing network of field offices with proximity to beneficiaries and local government agencies. The overarching objective of the TP was post-resettlement support to IDPs and their reintegration into the larger community, moving progressively and sequentially from relief activities to activities conducive to socio-economic development. An external evaluation conducted in 2005 showed that the programme “was mainly confined to supporting individual communities/CBOs by means of small-scale and narrowly focused activities”. The evaluation recommended two options: (i) while maintaining its field presence in all conflict-affected districts, the project should follow a geographical concentration of activities, creating a critical mass of support of interventions that could subsequently be replicated; and (ii) the interventions could be up-scaled in all conflict-affected districts in order

---

for it to become a truly area-wide reconstruction and development programme. Questions were also asked whether the TP reached those most affected by the long-lasting conflict and “whether the TP can be engineered such that it could help ensure a certain measure of equity among the different categories of IDPs and the various communities most affected”. Further, the evaluation observed that gender should be factored in more explicitly and purposefully.

In the formulation of the TRP 2008-2012, all of the above recommendations and observations regarding equity were taken into consideration. The basic programmatic relevance of the TRP remained that of its predecessor the TP, while intensity and coverage were adjusted to enhance its relevance in terms of area-based development and increased equity.

Data gathered from desk reviews, questionnaire surveys, key informant interviews and focus group discussions suggest a high degree of programmatic relevance in all thematic interventions made under the TRP. UNDP’s efforts to provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for vulnerable communities, including IDPs, were vital to the recovery process of communities who had completely lost their economic opportunities as a result of the war, and as such, were identified by all stakeholders as being of fundamental concern. Further, the long conflict produced diverse and often new sets of vulnerabilities, particularly the increased incidence of women-headed households, which needed to be addressed.

The opportunities provided by UNDP project interventions with regard to improved access to micro-credit and capacity-building in support of micro-enterprise development, were rated as very relevant by stakeholders. It was particularly relevant in areas where access to credit has been difficult due to the lack of credit avenues and collateral required to secure loans. However, the loans disbursed were too small and in many instances were used for consumption rather than invested.

Community-focused housing and livelihood-related social infrastructure have been accepted by stakeholders as extremely relevant interventions in the North and East considering the degree of loss in physical capital. Infrastructure projects complement larger initiatives undertaken by the Government and also serve as a foundation to link communities to vital socio-economic services. Conversely, housing programmes have had very limited reach as the supply did not match the demand for individual housing units. Questions were raised as to whether UNDP should continue with housing assistance as it is not traditionally an area within UNDP’s mandate, and whether UNDP should find a more complementary role to the house-building initiatives taken by other international partners endowed with large-scale funding needed for such projects.

The three-tier planning of UNDP support interventions followed in both the TP and TRP were: understanding between the Government and UNDP; identification of stand-alone donor support packages; and determination of specific community-level activities. Participatory project identification and prioritization process of the TP, which is an integral element of the UNDP’s core intervention determination mechanism, was continued in the TRP. The TRP also faced difficulties in the sub-project planning process that had previously arisen in the TP.

---


136 Once communities have been selected for TP support, a Participatory Needs Assessment is conducted to determine and prioritize the needs identified by the communities concerned. The assessment is usually concluded within one or two days, using a methodology prescribed in the TP field manual.

137 “[G]iven the variety of sectoral and spatial coverage … the TP planning process is tantamount to ‘jigsaw’ programming. As a consequence, the topmost priorities – as expressed by communities – cannot always be met, in particular the need for permanent housing”. P. Matthews, et al. (2005).
“Softer” initiatives, including social transformation activities, were also seen as highly relevant particularly in a post-conflict environment. CBO strengthening, while not articulated as an immediately felt need amongst communities, is relevant not only in terms of building civil society capacity, but also in providing a mechanism for the mobilization of communities and implementation of all other activities.

Environmental interventions continue to be relevant at the policy level as there is consensus that the concept of sustainable development needs to be incorporated into programming as early on as possible. Further wherever projects were attempted, the beneficiaries responded positively appreciating the relevance of environmental conservation for long-term development.

**Effectiveness**

The TRP has been effective in helping communities regain not only their livelihoods and restart their lives, but also regain their sense of dignity, confidence and stability. This is particularly visible with former IDPs who have begun to rebuild not only their own personal lives and that of their families, but also collective community identities. Further, assistance has been particularly effective in targeting women, not only in bringing about greater economic empowerment, but also in strengthening women’s networks and securing increased involvement in community welfare and village development. Assistance has been effective in generating new and additional sources of income, and in creating an environment for parents to concentrate more on the future of their children. In certain villages in the North it was noted that parents had now begun to take a greater interest in their children’s lives and education as day-to-day survival burdens have been somewhat alleviated through the TRP interventions.

Among the individual programme pillars, housing appeared to create the most satisfied beneficiaries. Between 2008 and 2010, a total of 277 houses were constructed or repaired under TRP assistance, benefiting 1,108 persons. Another 448 houses were at various stages of construction at the end of 2010. However, coverage was too limited for the overall programme to be considered effective. The owner-driven and community participatory modality was commended as an effective strategy in securing greater intra-community cohesion as well as a sense of ownership among beneficiaries.

The 2005 TP evaluation observed that “the synergetic effect of concentrating multiple projects holds particularly true for the combination of micro-finance support and skills development (in particular when it related to fisheries agriculture and vocational trades)”. In the design of the TRP, this observation has been given due consideration and a series of initiatives were initiated to effectively deliver micro-finance and micro-enterprise development support to vulnerable communities and individuals.

Livelihood and micro-credit initiatives have helped communities to initiate or restart livelihoods and prevent their situations from worsening. Further it has been effective in diversifying livelihoods and in introducing better management practices in livelihoods. Between 2008 and 2010, a total of 8,927 beneficiaries received direct livelihood-related assistance, of which 3,294 (36.89 percent) were women. The majority (73.52 percent) opted for assistance with livelihoods in the agriculture sector. A total of 582 beneficiaries received training in business planning and micro-enterprise development skills of which 62 percent were women. A total of 659 beneficiaries accessed loan facilities from revolving funds, the majority of whom (62.82 percent) were women. Forty CBOs were provided with seed capital to operate loan schemes, and 351 members of CBOs were provided with fund management training. Beneficiaries also reported increases in household

---

139 Output 2 of the results framework introduced into this programme.
income. Infrastructure projects were rated the highest in terms of effectiveness and were noted to have brought about visible improvement in access to socio-economic services.

Effectiveness of the micro-credit and micro-enterprise support component could have been further increased if, at the implementation level, partner organizations had followed some of the lessons learned from the evaluation of the Investment in Peace Project (2003-2006) that UNDP implemented to mobilise business as a force for peace in Sri Lanka.

The 2005 TP evaluation observed that “any successor to TP should place more emphasis on the medium-term, i.e. support to livelihoods and local economic opportunities than has been in the current TP”. It also recommended that “since the bottom-up approach does not automatically generate projects of this type, proposals from other sources should be solicited, while ensuring that any such proposals are endorsed by the potentially benefiting communities”. This observation, if adopted in the formulation and implementation of the TRP, would have generated more diverse types of projects and up-scale small enterprises to the next level of employment creators and supported the larger goals of area-based development even more.

These interventions to create enabling conditions for livelihoods were complemented by providing basic infrastructure to crisis-affected communities. Between 2008 and 2010, a total of 484 units of livelihood related infrastructure facilities such as rice mills, irrigation channels, tanks, community farms, agricultural wells, storage facilities, roads, marketing centres and processing centres were constructed or renovated mainly in the agricultural and animal husbandry sectors. Furthermore, 28.91 km of roads and 13.78 km of irrigation channels were renovated. Under the same component a total of 158 social infrastructure units were also constructed under the TRP.

Social transformation projects have been effective in increasing interaction between diverse communities and, in some instances have transformed conflicts between groups such as host communities and IDPs, and those from different ethnicities. The programme enabled communities to learn new livelihood activities and business practices through interaction with CBOs and learn from collective action and CBO management processes. The stand-alone social transformation projects implemented under selected TRP projects, including five specific social transformation pilot projects in Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna and Trincomalee Districts in 2010, involved over 800 direct beneficiaries.

A further 320 social transformation initiatives had taken place by the end of 2010 involving a large number of school children in exchange visits from the northern, central-northern, eastern and southern regions. These exchange visits promoted interaction among communities of different ethnicity, culture, religion and location contributing to greater interaction and tolerance (Communities for Peace – C4P Project). The ratio of women attending consultative meetings, such as the Participatory Needs Assessment, was found to be higher in comparison to that of men, which can be considered an entry point for gender empowerment.

Strengthening of CBOs has enhanced local capacity and helped in overall implementation of interventions. Members of 191 CBOs received training in administrative and accountability practices, and out of the CBOs trained as many as 153 (80.10 percent) had adopted

---

140 G. Gunatilleke & R. Subramanium, ‘Invest in Peace Project: Evaluation Report’, paper prepared for UNDP Sri Lanka (2006). The lessons referred here relate to, for example, the benefit of partnering with regional chambers of commerce in terms of SME development and the delivery of credit, and the desirability to expand the coverage of the programme to vocations in small construction industry.

such practices six months after training. Despite these positive trends, questions were raised as to whether CBOs were truly independent enough to be sustainable.

The environment component varied in its effectiveness. Some targeted interventions have been very successful, while other projects less successful. Where implemented, environmental initiatives have helped educate communities on the value of environmental conservation and to create sustained interest in environmental protection. The local authority and communities fully participated in the solid waste management projects in Jaffna and Vavuniya and the reforestation project trained 2,381 beneficiaries.

The 2005 TP evaluation concluded that “a few projects are generating up and down stream linkages, such as rehabilitation of milk schemes and the introduction of sprinkler and drip irrigation”. The programme may have been constrained by the lack of expertise available to ground-level partner organizations. If such projects were given more weight, the effectiveness of the programme interventions could have increased.

**Efficiency**

One concern expressed with regard to programme efficiency was that operational costs continue to be higher than desired. That said, outputs were considered to be satisfactory and in some instances have exceeded inputs. Delivery mechanisms were accepted to be efficient (by beneficiaries, CBOs and government officials) and that in general, delivery was timely, although exceptions were noted with regard to the supply of material, particularly for housing- and infrastructure-related projects. The owner-driven mechanism for housing construction proved to be very efficient for beneficiaries who were able to save on expenses incurred on labour and on numerous occasions, shared construction material when there were delays in supply.

Beneficiaries also indicated that livelihood assistance was timely, but often negatively impacted by middleman exploitation, inadequate market linkages, and unpredictable weather and rainfall patterns. Micro-credit programmes administered through revolving funds were not always efficient, as amounts disbursed were either too small or disbursed to vulnerable communities who were unable to pay back loans. Concerns were also raised over the timing of certain social transformation activities, for example exchange programmes were conducted during the agricultural seasons, consequently, only older people were able to participate.

The efficiency of follow-up processes to the livelihood support, and micro-credit and micro-enterprise development components had some gaps, particularly in the linking of government services and the private sector. The manner in which extension services can be accessed continues to be inadequate, and greater support and involvement of agricultural officers and veterinarians in particular is essential for new projects to reach a degree of sustainability.

One of the issues often discussed in relation to the programme, and covered at length in the 2005 evaluation report, is the use of the “direct implementation” as opposed to “national implementation” modality. In the TRP, the direct implementation modality was used mainly because of the unsettled and changing ground situation and because both UNDP and donor partners were more comfortable with the modality.

The direct implementation modality, whereby UNDP directly operates the programme from seven sub-national offices, is very costly. However, local capacity still needs to be developed before the exit of the programme. Hence, the delivery mechanism could have been more efficient if an appropriate modality – including a hybrid of the two – was sought to suit particular situations on the ground.

142 ibid.
Sustainability
A common observation made in relation to sustain-
able is that lasting peace is essential for economic and social sustainability in the North and East. In the past, there have been short peri-
ods when hostilities were suspended giving hope of stability, and people made attempts to restart economic activities. However, the resumption of hostilities again resulted in abandonment of farmlands, houses, villages and in mass displace-
ment. In the process much has been lost in terms of human, physical, financial, social, natural and institutional capital. Therefore, it was a strongly agreed that stability and peace were the foun-
dations upon which recovery and development could be built.

There are issues that need to be resolved before the results achieved by livelihood, micro-credit and micro-enterprise development interventions become fully sustainable. Currently many of the livelihood initiatives only address subsistence level needs. As a result of inadequate and inter-
mittent extension services, people lack awareness in value addition techniques and market linkages continue to be poor. In some instances, livelihood activities did not match market demands and hence were not sustainable.

The CBO strengthening initiatives have been largely confined to (mostly one-off) training of CBOs to help develop their capacity. However, there is no systematic assessment and follow-up on the capacities of the CBOs and the question remains as to whether CBOs are equipped to function autonomously once external support ceases. Concerns on whether funding may have damaged the voluntary nature of CBOs were also raised. At present CBOs are neither voluntary civil society networks nor professional bodies equipped to perform social mobilisation and advocacy. Projects inadvertently shifted the CBO’s focus from these traditional roles to proj-
ect implementation creating the risk of demobili-
sation once funding decreases.

Although only a few projects were implemented, a positive feature of social transformation initiatives has been that they primarily target children, youth and parents. These groups are seen as the drivers of positive change within their communities and in a majority of instances has proven to be true. In a number of communities where such programmes have been conducted, friendships formed across cultural, ethnic and community barriers, are now being sustained by the communities themselves, particularly by the young participants of exchange programmes and even in the absence of further encouragement from UNDP or any other development agency.

Capacity-building
As important as the physical inputs provided to beneficiaries under the TRP to restart and stabi-
lize lives, the project also envisaged a substantial extent of capacity-building, both for individuals and in organizations. Capacity-building was a key element in both CP Outcomes 6 and 7.

For Outcome 6, the main modality of support was capacity-building. This included: curriculum development; design of language courses for both Sinhalese and Tamil; training of a large number of public officials; and a programme with CSOs and their networks to promote peaceful coexis-
tence. Unfortunately, output targets could not be achieved due to the volatile situation prevailing during the period under review.

Capacity-building was also identified as a key modality of work for Outcome 7. All pillars in the TRP had elements for capacity-building but achievements have been mixed. The liveli-
hood support and the micro-credit and micro-enterprise development components provided capacity-building to 5,633 (training in improved livelihood practices) and 582 individuals (train-
ing in business planning and enterprise develop-
ment) respectively.

In terms of capacity-building of organizations, the TRP provided capacity-building assistance to 37 government departments under the livelihood support component to enhance their abil-
ity to deliver services to beneficiaries. Under the micro-credit and micro-enterprise development
component, 40 CBOs were provided with training in fund management and bookkeeping of credit operations, which were important elements of capacity-building in grass roots organizations. Under the housing component, 44 CBOs received training in construction of infrastructure. The largest capacity-building intervention was carried out under the social transformation component in which 191 CBOs received training in administrative and accountability practices.

Thus the TRP has made a concerted effort to build the capacity of both individuals and organizations to achieve the objectives of the programme. However, the issue is whether adequate capacities have been built to meet long-term community level development needs in a sustainable manner and whether the expertise would be transferred to the next generation of CBO actors by those who were trained in the original programme.

4.4.3 COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTCOME 7

- Increased equity in socio-economic opportunities and services for conflict-affected communities and internally displaced persons
- Output 7.2: Increased opportunities for early recovery of livelihoods through mine action

Programmatic relevance

The first phase of SMAP was initiated in the post-ceasefire environment of 2002 and activities started in 2003. The project was designed as a coordination mechanism to directly support the National Mine Action Programme (under the National Steering Committee for Mine Action) and to set up support in the field for mine clearance. Specifically, it was supposed to provide support for (i) capacity-building, (ii) mine action operations, and (iii) resource mobilization and advocacy. The overall goal was to build the capacity of the Ministry of Nation Building and Development through the National Steering Committee and the NMAC to plan and manage mine action activities and provide standards and controls for doing so. As the project progressed, however, hostilities resumed in 2005 and demining activities were interrupted.
UNDP has spearheaded action to alleviate a very relevant need and has been at the forefront of a coordinated effort to clear mines and resettle communities. The project has provided technical know-how over the years and managed mine action activities in Sri Lanka, amidst limited local capacity. With the need to resettle over 300,000 people in the North and East, demining and the release of land for resettlement and development became an urgent necessity. In the absence of this adequate local experience, the project’s support in fulfilling an urgent need to build local capacity – not only in terms of the mine clearance process but also management of this process – has been a notable contribution.

**Efficiency**

In 2009, the project faced a rapidly growing mine action sector which was needed to support the resettlement process. The presence of RMAOs within the District Secretariat was critical to respond to evolving needs. As such, RMAOs acted as an effective link between the Government and implementing agencies ensuring smooth and speedy implementation. The efficiency at which mine surveys were carried out in large tracts of land (444 square kilometres) was the key contributing factor to the speed at which resettlement plans were implemented.

On the whole the project has responded efficiently in terms of covering areas that required the most urgent attention. Yet certain gaps have been created, particularly in the East, due to all funds being redirected to the North. It must also be noted that while UNDP works closely with the government in ensuring needs are met, overall coverage is determined by government priorities.

**Sustainability**

The primary focus of SMAP is the capacity-building of nationals and the institutionalization of the process. However, despite building national capacity and contributing to the establishment of the institutional framework, including NMAC, government ownership is at an inadequate level. Further, much of the technical capacity that has been built up in local individuals continues to be sustained through foreign funding. Given that funding limitations are inevitable in the future, the question remains as to whether sufficient government commitment can be achieved to lead the process in the future when the project phases out.

**Effectiveness**

SMAP was designed to maximize local capacity-building and in this regard it has succeeded. Despite its overall success, however, the envisaged level of national ownership has not been achieved, as the Government is yet to bear the anticipated level of responsibility.

The project has been highly effective in contributing towards the intended outcome. It supported the National Mine Action Programme which set the foundation for the return and resettlement of an unprecedented number of IDPs in the Vanni region (more than 90 percent have been already resettled) and accomplished, as of December 2010:

- The return of over 61,950 families to their original villages.
- The settlement of over 300,000 IDPs, 50 percent of which are women.
- Demining of 444 square kilometres of land, and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs).

The project has also been effective in advocating mine awareness and in upgrading the technical quality of mine surveys and clearance. It succeeded in bringing forth 13 standards documents for mine action and the institutionalisation of NMAC.

**4.5 GENDER**

Within its mandate and the role assigned to the UNCT, UNDP has taken a three-pronged approach to gender. First, it aimed to mainstream gender in all of its programme activities. Internal training succeeded in mainstreaming
gender dimension particularly in work on local governance, post-conflict recovery and disaster management.

Second, it has paid particular attention to gender issues within crisis prevention and recovery. In activities to promote reconciliation, the role of women in peace and reconciliation process was emphasized. In post-conflict rehabilitation activities, women in vulnerable situations, such as women-headed households, were targets for assistance.

The assessments below focus on the third prong, the Enhanced Women’s Political Representation and Participation in Decision-Making project which was dedicated to gender issues.

Programmatic relevance
The activities implemented under this project were of direct relevance to the UNDAF Outcome 3.3 and its overall goals. The UNCT shares its gender work among the agencies and since UNDP has expertise in governance issues, it was particularly relevant for UNDP to take the lead in enhancing women’s participation in politics and decision-making. This project was also relevant to the national challenge highlighted in the stocktaking report that representation of women in political intuitions in Sri Lanka has been minimal. 145

There was, however, a timing issue. On the one side, the Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment was in the centre of the initiative and fully committed to pushing the agenda forward. On the other, it was implemented during the closing and immediate aftermath of war at which time the Government’s top priority was to address disparities between regions and ethnic groups, not between genders.

Effectiveness
The project has yet to make a discernible national impact in terms of women’s representation in political institutions. The number of women presently participating in parliament has actually fallen to less than 4 percent, attributed partly to the lack of engagement with mainstream political parties, and to real-life challenges women leaders face, such as the lack of financial resources or understanding of family members of their interest to engage in political activities.

Nevertheless, the project has laid the ground for tangible progress in the future. The stocktaking report and needs assessment exercise helped clarify issues and possible actions to take, and led to the formulation of a ‘National Plan of Action for Women’ by the Ministry. Other UNDP projects and NGOs have also used the report’s recommendations in designing their activities.

Efficiency
Given that this was a relatively small self-standing project, resources were generally well allocated to gain maximum leverage by focusing on advocacy, assessment and capacity development support.

Sustainability
The direct contribution of the project, namely the awareness, the assessment and the capacity built in women leaders, were sustainable. The initiative was firmly owned by the Ministry as well as the civil society groups to carry the agenda forward. UNDP’s gender-focused support dissipated after the completion of the project although some successful effort was made in the context of TRP at a local level. Further support is needed to translate the effort of national partners into real impact of political representation.

Chapter 5

UNDP’S STRATEGIC POSITIONING

5.1 STRATEGIC RELEVANCE TO COUNTRY NEEDS AND CHALLENGES

The past decade has been eventful for Sri Lanka and the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that UNDP generally responded well to the urgencies and national policy priorities that changed over time. The analysis also showed that UNDP has been aligning its programme objectives with those of the national development strategies. The 2005 launch of the TP in response to immediate relief needs, as well as the intensification of support by TRP for post-war recovery and IDP resettlements since 2008, exemplify this responsiveness. Similarly, the engagement of UNDP after the 2004 tsunami in immediate recovery efforts and longer-term support in building the national DM system are clear examples of this.

The success of initiatives in these areas, as documented in Chapter 4, is supported by two main factors. One is the strong ownership and priority setting by the Government towards these challenges. The other is the flux of donor support to event-driven initiatives, from which UNDP programmes also benefited, as shown in Chapter 3.

This responsiveness however may have left some gaps in addressing more structural challenges such as poverty and social issues.

UNDP was successful in some of these structural issues, such as integrating the MDGs into national planning and the local public service delivery systems, or in promoting technical knowledge on environment issues. UNDP was less successful in nationally promoting a poverty or gender agenda (beyond those affected by the war or tsunami disaster) as discussed in Chapter 4, as the larger effort was directed towards responding to emerging needs and priorities of the time.

In more recent times, with the post-conflict situation stabilised and new social and economic issues emerging, thought has been given to how UNDP should strategically position itself to remain relevant during the next programme cycle.

One strategic decision to have emerged in UNDP was the consolidation of work under the governance and poverty pillars into one, allowing the national-level MfDR effort to be more organically linked to the local-level MDG integration. Moreover, since Sri Lanka has a stable local governance machinery, promoting more responsive and inclusive local governance would contribute directly to poverty reduction and addressing vulnerability issues.

As Sri Lanka solidifies its middle-income country status, further developing its own capacity to face development challenges while possibly facing a declining funding base in the future, UNDP would also need to further adjust its strategic positioning with more emphasis on several aspects in the programme approach. One aspect is ownership and sustainability in capacity development of national entities such as the NMAC and DMC, and in policies and strategies such as ISEAs.

The second aspect is policy support, as opposed to supporting technical aspects of implementation. At the same time, where policy support had

---

146 Such as the aging population, especially in the rural sector.
not led to much national action, an emphasis needs to be placed on the system level support to encourage implementation of policies.

Finally, more emphasis on partnership building would strengthen the synergies and effectiveness of existing national networks and systems. Possible partnerships that could be supported by UNDP include:

- Partnerships between CBOs and the Government system especially at local and regional levels.
- CBOs’ partnerships with private or public sector in such area as in micro-financing, environmental management, vocational training, or language skills training.
- Public-private sector collaboration and involvement of the research community for policy development and implementation.
- Vertical and horizontal linkage in the Government system for strengthening MfDR and programme management.
- A social protection network for the protection of the vulnerable and groups at risk.
- CBO networks and exchanges for peacebuilding and their capacity development.

5.2 USE OF UNDP’S STRENGTH AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES

The assessment illustrates the use of strengths and comparative advantages of UNDP in responding to the country’s development challenges.

5.2.1 RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GOVERNMENT’S NEEDS

UNDP’s response to evolving challenges demonstrated its unique strengths that complemented those of the Government. UNDP has utilized its policy neutrality in programme development by following a process framework and a participatory and consultative process. By identifying, prioritizing and operationalizing programme responses on the ground, UNDP was able to engage constructively with the Government in areas where it had limitations. The case in point was the progressive reintegration of land and people after the war.

Another area of strength was UNDP’s approach to coordination, and its credibility within the donor community to launch extensive and multi-faceted schemes in a comparatively short period. This was particularly useful where it would not have been possible for the Government on its own to muster external support, as in the case of support for mine action, disaster management and transition and recovery. Thus UNDP was able to co-opt the support by the international donor community to launch an extensive and multi-faceted scheme of rehabilitation and reintegration within a comparatively short period.

5.2.2 COORDINATION AND POLICY ADVICE

Many stakeholders, including government and other development partners, expressed high expectations for UNDP to play a critical role in coordination and policy advice.

In coordination and partnership building, UNDP supported mainstreaming and localization of the MDGs as an overarching programme framework to coordinate economic policies, strategies and programmes to address geographical and income disparities. UNDP, following its integrated approach to development, aimed to support the Government to promote a coherent and integrated approach to national, regional and sectoral policies. However, while the country programme provided potential complementarities between national, regional and sectoral levels through support to the MDG agenda, UNDP’s development cooperation agenda has been rather fragmented in its implementation, both thematically and organizationally. There has been

147 Some examples of policy support not leading to policy implementation were presented in Chapter 4.
a focus of project engagement at the micro-level that often could not raise support to a policy level whether in sectors or regions.

At the same time, in its interventions in the North and East, the establishment of a strong coordination mechanism by UNDP to maintain its strategic position was not very tenable given the prevailing circumstances and changing situations in the region. Thus, coordination rested at two levels: with the District Secretariats and UNDP. This has not always been effective, particularly in working with multi-donor partners. At the same time, it is often highlighted how many development actors, including UNDP, have been focusing on their own project execution in search of visible development results without coordinating sufficiently within the development community, even within the UN system. Many considered UNDP to have been in a good position to have facilitated a more coordinated approach.

Thus, UNDP has not always played to its strength as a coordinator to build partnerships, through which the effectiveness of actions, whether by the Government, civil society, the private sector or development partners, could be enhanced. The potential for this was not fully exploited especially at the policy level to achieve national development goals.

With regard to policy advice, UNDP’s strength as a policy advisor derives from its engagement in sector and downstream activities that can generate critical national-level policy insights. In some areas, such as environment, disaster and the TRP, UNDP was able to use such strengths to provide effective national policy advice. In other cases, such as micro-credit, successes and failures were not assessed effectively to develop coherent policy advice. In yet other cases, the project has not yet reached the stage where experience could be reviewed to provide holistic policy advice, although a range of information useful for policy-making has been generated.

Further, policy advice to be provided (through studies, proposals, action plans) has not always led to actual policies or government programmes. This could be attributed to the lack of strategy to see policy advice through to implementation, and to monitoring and follow-up. Too much focus on project-level implementation and the lack of attention to systems development also may have contributed to this.

There has also been a view that UNDP has focused too much on technical support to implement policies and programmes and could have provided more expert advice.

5.2.3 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

With the exception of the TRP, SMAP and ART GOLD, UNDP implemented its programmes using a national implementation modality with a view to contributing to capacity development. This approach was exemplified in such programmes as LoGoPro, Access to Justice, strengthening planning and implementation capability of foreign funded projects, implementation of the Montreal Protocol and communications on climate change to UNFCCC. Although implemented directly, national and local capacity development undertaken under SMAP has been effective in dealing with urgent capacity gaps in mine action, while NMAC was established with support from UNDP to eventually take over all functions.

At the same time, in some cases, projects were implemented by programme implementing units established by UNDP in parallel to the mainstream work of the government body, such as in the DMC. This approach may be effective in operationalizing the programme and achieving immediate results, but can make it difficult for the government body to absorb capacity developed.

UNDP support was sometimes integrated into the work of the supported body, such as in the ODS project. This allowed the body to develop its own capacity and implement the subsequent phase of work without support from UNDP.
UNDP has supported capacity development of governmental institutions both at the national and local levels. However, as in the case of support to foreign aid monitoring and RBM, a mechanism to utilize the very capacity developed has not always been present or functioning. UNDP often focused on capacity development of individuals and institutional units without paying sufficient attention development of systems and mechanisms to utilize their capacities. Hence these capacity development activities were not fully effective in achieving development goals they aimed to address.

UNDP’s capacity development effort has not systematically involved partnership building. Even when UNDP interventions seem to have met immediate capacity needs, the sustainability of local actors to take over challenges upon UNDP’s exit of the programme remains a serious issue. Building of partnerships to support long-term capacity needs should have been an important component of capacity development.

Finally, capacity assessments have not been consistently conducted leaving in doubt the extent to which interventions have been successful, and making it difficult to identify what needs to be done before the exit of the programme.

**5.3 PROMOTION OF UN VALUES**

**5.3.1 ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF THE POOR AND THE VULNERABLE**

UNDP’s strategic position to address the needs of the poor and vulnerable is visible throughout the country programme. Mainstreaming and localizing the principles of the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs underpin the programme responses of the country programme in all thematic areas, both at upstream and downstream levels. For example:

- The MDG framework was applied in the governance programme to design a rural development roadmap for planning and coordinating service delivery at the local level under LoGoPro.
- The design of governance projects to support accountability and transparency in relations between duty-bearers and claim-holders explicitly addresses equity issues.
- The TRP is pro-poor and designed to address the needs of the vulnerable (IDPs, women-headed households, the poor and the homeless).

UNDP’s support to the collection and use of socio-economic data demonstrated the need to move beyond income poverty, to focus attention on disparities across regions and socio-economic groups in human development attainments, pointing out the need to assess emerging vulnerabilities (environmental, social, employment, health, security, etc.).

**5.3.2 PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY**

The design of the programme emphasizes gender equality in all pillars and in all practical interventions, mirroring the overall strategic mandate of UNDP. It is visible especially in downstream projects such as the TRP, where community-based projects consciously prioritized support for women-headed households or involvement of women in their activities. In the implementation of a DM system at the village level, women villagers were mobilised and assigned specific roles raising the awareness among women villagers to disaster preparedness and responses.

However, it is difficult to assess overall impact or how the outcomes of individual interventions affected gender equality. For instance, how the sensitisation of duty-bearers in the delivery of

---

148 A capacity assessment would examine various dimensions of institutional capacity, including institutional governance and organisational culture, human and financial resources, administrative procedures, financial management and oversight, and monitoring and evaluation.
public services and providing access to justice and redress mechanisms have affected gender equality, would require further assessment that focuses on this aspect.

5.3.3 USING A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH

The entire country programme is based on the important foundation of human rights – the right to live. In that sense, the programme as a whole is in line with the strategic position of human rights advocated by UNDP.

Further, some programme interventions adopted a strong or explicit approach to the promotion of human rights. The entire governance programme, for example, aims to promote governance mechanisms and practices that would enable the realization of the principles of the Millennium Declaration through interventions aimed at: (i) protecting of human rights, (ii) strengthening decentralization for inclusive development and (iii) safeguarding access to justice and redress mechanisms. It is also evident that the TRP contributed directly to the protection of human rights of those severely affected by war.

* * *

The next chapter provides main conclusions drawn from the analysis above and makes recommendations for the future.
6.1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS

1. Over the past decade, UNDP’s programme has responded well to evolving government priorities and the needs of the country, particularly in dealing with the effects of the war and the tsunami. UNDP thus remained an important partner to the country and has made a tangible impact. Today, UNDP faces the challenge of repositioning itself within a changing context. With post-conflict regions soon moving from a transitional to a developmental phase, UNDP must set out a clear course for its future in these regions. With the country solidifying its middle-income country status and developing its own capacity, UNDP is expected to strengthen its policy advice, advocacy and partnership building roles while focusing capacity development on supporting national efforts. New social, economic and environmental issues are also emerging, in which UNDP could contribute through policy support.

The responsiveness of UNDP to national priorities and challenges was exemplified in its support to the recovery needs after the 2004 tsunami and the war. For instance, in response to the tsunami disaster, UNDP supported local governments to implement post-tsunami recovery programmes and helped the national Government set-up an effective DM system. These initiatives produced tangible results. UNDP’s contribution to post-conflict recovery was substantial and visible.

With war concluding in 2009, post-conflict regions currently in the transition phase are expected to move into the development phase within a few years. So far, UNDP has largely worked with CBOs to address the challenges in these regions using a direct implementation modality under its transition and recovery programme. This programme will be gradually phased out and its activities will be absorbed into sectoral programmes with national implementation.

In these regions, there is still a need to develop the capacities of the public administration for both socio-economic development and social transformation. A need was also expressed for an organisation such as UNDP to continue monitoring the socio-economic situation in these regions and to support local authorities coordinate assistance. However, there has not been a clear understanding among UNDP, other development actors or the local authorities on the future role of UNDP or the exit strategy on how this process will be pursued.

In more broad terms, the middle-income country context with possible decline in the external funding and enhanced national capacity, will necessitate repositioning of UNDP’s programme approach to one that emphasizes ownership and sustainability, policy support over technical support, system-level over entity or individual-level support, and partnership building.

High expectations were expressed for UNDP to engage more in policy advice in the future. A good example so far has been research conducted in relation to the national Human Development Reports. Some innovative ideas were put forward such as the greenbelt redevelopment of tourism infrastructure. New issues have also emerged such as the aging population or the threat to environment posed by rapid economic development.
There are policy generation opportunities that are yet to be tapped. The wide range of national intellectual resources has not been fully used. The rich on-the-ground experience gained through various projects has not sufficiently been scaled-up to the policy level, or used by other development partners.

Similarly, a more systematic involvement of concerned civil society actors would improve the effectiveness of policy implementation. The sustainability of capacities developed in CBOs would be more secure if partnerships were built with appropriate national entities to support them. There is further room to explore the potential of partnerships with the private sector, which were experimented in a few projects so far.

2. UNDP’s approach to poverty reduction was opportunistic. Interventions aimed at poverty reduction were isolated and their impact was limited. Most of UNDP’s contributions to reduce poverty occurred where poverty reduction was not a primary objective, such as in post-tsunami and post-conflict recovery, the localization of the MDGs, and the establishment of local disaster response capacities. These programmes, which mainstreamed not only poverty reduction but also human rights and gender, had a considerable impact on the lives of the poor and the vulnerable.

UNDP has not implemented a poverty reduction programme as such beyond a few isolated projects of limited scope. Those projects were sector or region oriented, and their impact was limited. UNDP is recognised as the lead UN agency for poverty reduction by partner agencies in the country, and a more pro-active approach and leadership would have been needed to tackle structural poverty issues and emerging poverty gaps (e.g. rural aging population).

UNDP’s contribution to poverty reduction came from the mainstreaming of poverty into other clusters of work. Major operations in support of post-tsunami and post-conflict recovery had a direct bearing on poverty, and had been successful in reducing the vulnerability of population groups such as IDPs. The localization of the MDGs as a framework for guaranteeing basic services to the people constituted an important step towards addressing inequity and vulnerabilities among the population. Vulnerabilities were also addressed through mainstreaming human rights approaches and gender. In particular, attention paid to woman-headed households in conflict-affected region was a case in point.

3. National capacity developed with UNDP’s support has not always been fully utilised because there was too much focus. Most of UNDP’s contributions to reduce poverty occurred where poverty reduction was not a primary objective on individual and institutional capacities without sufficient attention to the system and mechanisms to use them. Further, in most UNDP initiatives, there have not been proper capacity assessments or exit strategies to prepare national institutions to take over the work and functions, putting into question the sustainability of the capacity developed.

UNDP has provided a wide range of capacity development support in areas such as RBM in public administration. Capacities developed so far have not always been utilized to the fullest. This was partly because, while the capacity needs of individuals and institutions are addressed, attention was not paid sufficiently to the implementing systems and mechanisms. Capacity development was often limited to knowledge and skills training, whereas the system’s capacity to use the knowledge and skills was not addressed, and the knowledge provided was sometimes too general to be applicable in practice.

For many projects, an exit strategy has not been included in the project design to ensure proper handover of work to national partners at the completion of the project. Such an exit strategy would have required regular capacity assessments of the institutions supported, but such assessments were not systematically conducted.
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. UNDP must strengthen its focus on the achievement of development results beyond the delivery of outputs.

UNDP must strengthen its focus on achieving development results. In designing projects and other interventions, it must pay more attention to how and under what conditions, the delivery of outputs would lead to the realization of development results and ensure that such conditions would exist. In national implementation, UNDP must ensure that support provided would lead to actual implementation of policies and actions that produce results.

2. UNDP should support the national development effort more through coordinating and galvanizing support around national development goals, and engage in deeper programmatic coordination within the UNCT towards common development goals defined in UNDAF.

In order to enhance the realization of development results, UNDP should engage more in coordinating and galvanizing support to national efforts for national development goals. Addressing regional disparities and poverty gaps, as well as the needs of vulnerable communities and social groups, should be one goal where UNDP could take a lead role in assisting the Government to map out strategies and action plans, and inciting support around them.

One immediate action that could be taken is to engage in deeper programmatic coordination within the UNCT towards common development goals defined in UNDAF. In this regard, joint approaches should be explored in such areas as poverty reduction, gender empowerment, environment, energy, SME development, human resources development, social service delivery and social transformation.

4. There has been a tendency to focus on the delivery of outputs without paying sufficient attention to the conditions in which these outputs could lead to actual development results. Even beyond UNDP, in the community of development partners as a whole, this tendency to focus on delivery more than results, may have hindered effective coordination of strategies and approaches among partners engaged in similar assistance to achieve similar objectives.

In a number of cases, policy advice or technical support provided by UNDP in the form of strategies, action plans or studies have not been followed up or implemented. Programme outputs were produced but did not contribute to intended outcomes. From the outset, attention should have been paid to the conditions for implementation so that there was a higher probability of the outputs contributing to development results.

Even within the UN system, programmes are coordinated at the UNDAF level but not at the programme and project levels despite many agencies engaging in similar activities. This suggests each agency is more concerned about delivering its own outputs than maximally contributing to the overall UNDAF results together. For example, many UN agencies, NGOs and bilateral donors engage in livelihood-related projects across the country. However, there has not been a coherent or consistent approach among all these activities, or systematised learning from each other. Hence, while the benefits at the individual output level may be visible, it is not clear how and to what extent overall development results were achieved at the national level.

In some cases, because capacity was built as an additional layer to national institutions, it could not be easily absorbed into the institution’s mainstream of work at the conclusion of the project, and hence its sustainability was questionable.
3. **UNDP should enhance its policy advisory role.** To this end, it should engage in building broader partnerships among policymakers, intellectual communities, civil society and the private sector in the country.

As Sri Lanka consolidates its status as a middle-income country and develops its technical capacity, UNDP should shift its support from technical aspects of implementation to policy support. By engaging widely with intellectual communities, civil society and the private sector, it should ensure that policy generation does not critically depend on a few individuals, and that solid national ownership is built-up around policy recommendations.

4. **UNDP should make an effort to more effectively use its success experiences in downstream projects.** It should take initiatives to collate experiences of development partners engaged in similar activities to promote a more coherent approach.

UNDP has a wealth of experience in, for example, livelihood-related support and community-level environmental projects. It should share more proactively such successful experiences so that they can be replicated where applicable.

It should also take initiatives to draw in and gather experiences of other development actors engaged in similar initiatives. This would allow development partners with similar objectives to take a more coherent approach and identify the most effective way to support the national effort.

5. **In all areas of its programme, UNDP should more systematically consider how partnerships with the private sector could facilitate the achievement of development goals and build those partnerships into the programme design.**

UNDP has engaged in an effective private sector partnership in some of its initiatives. There are more potential partnerships in the private sector that should be explored. In all areas of its programme, UNDP should more systematically consider how partnerships with the private sector could facilitate the achievement of development goals and build those partnerships into the programme design. In its work to strengthen the livelihood capacities of communities for example, involvement of the private sector will be essential in improving added value, quality control, market development and supply chain management.

6. **UNDP’s capacity development should encompass support to the development of systems and mechanisms that would make use of the capacity developed.**

Training individuals or providing technical assistance to institutional entities alone should not be viewed as capacity development. It must encompass creating conditions in which the knowledge and skills instilled can then be used in practice. To this end, more attention should be paid to developing systems and mechanisms that would enable the effective use of the capacities developed.

7. **UNDP should ensure that capacity developed in national institutions is sustainable after the completion of the engagement, and an exit strategy should be built into every project design.**

UNDP must ensure that the capacity developed in national institutions by its programme is sustainable after the completion of the engagement. It must build an exit strategy in every project design and where it has not been, build one through proper capacity assessments. UNDP should also more effectively use partnership building as a means to ensuring the sustainability of the capacity build in national partners, such as CBOs.

**PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS**

8. **In promoting accountable and transparent public service delivery mechanisms, UNDP should systematically involve both decentralized and devolved structures of local**
governance as well as community-level organizations, take on a policy leadership role in coordinating varied donor initiatives in this area, and take a holistic approach to democratic governance encompassing its work on human rights, access to justice, local public service delivery and RBM at national and local levels.

UNDP should build upon local governance initiatives, systematically involving both decentralized and devolved structures of local governance as well as community-level organizations. It should thereby ensure that public service delivery mechanisms have both upward and downward accountability, while safeguarding participation of communities as active partners.

Given the central role it has played so far in promoting accountable and transparent public service delivery mechanisms, UNDP is in a position to take on a policy leadership role in coordinating varied donor initiatives in this area. At the same time, it should take a holistic approach to democratic governance by integrating its work on human rights, access to justice, local public service delivery and RBM at national and local levels.

9. For post-conflict regions, UNDP should set up an exit strategy for its transition and recovery programme, on which a common understanding with partners should be developed. In this regard, it should consider retaining some capacities at the province level to monitor the socio-economic situation and coordinate the capacity development and recovery support during the transition period.

Post-conflict regions where TRP has been operating would still require special attention to their socio-economic development and social transformation for several more years. While the programme itself is expected to be gradually integrated into national sectoral programmes, UNDP should consider retaining some capacities in those provinces to monitor the socio-economic situation and coordinate the necessary capacity development support for transition and the remaining recovery effort made by the UNCT and with other aid providers.

10. UNDP should re-examine where it could make a critical contribution to gender equality within the context of UNDAF, and provide focused support therein.

UNDP has mainstreamed gender dimensions in its programmes. It has also taken an initiative on political empowerment of women in the past but this agenda has largely disappeared from its work. UNDP could still make a critical contribution in promoting gender equality, and should re-examine such possibilities within the context of UNDAF.
Annex 1.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

The Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts country evaluations called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP’s contributions to development results at the country level, as well as the effectiveness of UNDP’s strategy in facilitating and leveraging national effort for achieving development results. ADRs are carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.¹⁴⁹

The ADR in Sri Lanka will be conducted in 2011 jointly by the Government of Sri Lanka and EO, towards the end of the current programme cycle of 2008-2012 with a view to substantively contributing to the preparation of the new country programme starting from 2013.

2. BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY SITUATION TODAY

The over thirty year’s long conflict and the resulting war in the North and East, finally came to an end in May 2009. However, it has created significant strains on the living conditions of the people, especially in the North and East of the country, and therefore severely impacting human development in this region. Despite the direct threats posed to human development by the above challenges, the country has remained resilient. It recovered from the massive effect of the tsunami and re-established upward growth in the economy. It also made efforts to regain and extend effective governance structures in the areas that were affected by the war and has initiated several significant infrastructure projects in these areas as well as in many other parts of the country.

The end of the war has undeniably brought about peace dividends. First-time tourist visits to Sri Lanka increased by 60 percent in the second quarter of 2010 compared to the same period in 2009, and the numbers peaked to 654,476 in 2010.¹⁵⁰ The economy expanded at 8 percent in 2010, and inflation has fallen from over 20 percent in 2007 to 5.9 percent. The Colombo stock market was the most active in South Asia over the past year, growing by 95 percent in 2009 and already 125 percent in the year to date. Foreign reserves have reached record levels in 2010, catalysed by a USD2.6 billion IMF loan granted last year.

The recently published MDG report on Sri Lanka highlights the country’s achievements on all MDGs. Because of consistent decades-long investment in education and health, as well as a strong focus on rural economic development, Sri Lanka will achieve most, if not all, of the MDGs before 2015. However, the report indicates that there remain deep inequalities and regional disparities. Being a post-conflict middle-income country emerging from protracted conflict, the decades of conflict have left large parts of the country and the population therein, in dire need of targeted support, posing several development challenges. The ‘Mahinda Chintana’ ten year development framework clearly specifies the Government’s commitment for the achievement of the MDGs for the people of the entire country. The Government is planning to undertake a census of the population in 2011, which will

cover the conflict-affected areas after 30 years. The information from the census would be vital for development planning.

Given the above context, there is a unique window of opportunity for UNDP to make a difference. The humanitarian needs in the country, while still prevalent in particular districts in the North, are winding down, exposing a widespread need for early recovery and livelihood support.

**UNDP’S RESPONSE SINCE THE PREVIOUS CYCLES**

Under the Second Country Cooperation Framework (CCF II) 2002-2006, UNDP focused on poverty alleviation by creating an environment of good governance for poverty reduction and sustainable recovery of conflict-affected areas. In order to support the Government’s efforts in building effective governance institutions to reduce economic and social disparities, UNDP helped strengthen national and provincial institutional capacities needed for decentralized development, as well as capacities of key human rights institutions, and promoted environmentally sustainable development that benefits the poor. It also supported efforts to enhance national mechanisms to build poverty reduction programmes, and to improve access by the poor to assets and economic and social development services through participatory local governance and stronger local communities and institutions. Finally, to support the recovery efforts from the effect of the conflict, UNDP engaged in activities at the community level such as skills training and provision of microfinance, to help create improved livelihood opportunities in the conflict-affected areas.

UNDP’s achievement during the CCF II period included the important contribution it made to the recovery effort from the unexpected tsunami that devastated a part of the island country at the end of 2004. UNDP was able to mobilize and provide about USD40 million in total resources for these efforts, including the tsunami recovery programme. UNDP’s network of field offices has proven to be the strength in this recovery effort as well as in supporting the capacity development and service delivery at the local level. At the end of this programme cycle there was a concern, however, that UNDP might have been spread too thin. Accordingly, for the Country Programme 2008-2012, UNDP in consultation with the Government, decided that in addition to continued peace and recovery efforts, the Programme would focus on its areas of strength, namely, to support the MDG achievement, democratic governance and disaster risk management.

For the Country Programme 2008-2012, UNDP has a resource envelope of around USD70 million. It has organized its programme activities around three pillars, namely: poverty reduction (which subsumes energy, environment and disaster risk reduction), democratic governance & promoting peace, with gender as a cross-cutting theme. Key areas of intervention include:

a. **Support to the Millennium Development Goals:** UNDP has launched the second phase of an MDG support initiative aimed at raising awareness of the MDGs, as well as giving assistance for MDG based planning and budgeting. Also under this initiative, assistance is given to ensure that the Government’s 2011 census captures the development needs of the war-affected communities in the North and East. An important initiative currently underway is the institutionalization of Results-based Management within the Government machinery, and enhancing aid effectiveness.

b. **Socio-economic recovery:** The Transition Recovery Programme serves as UNDP’s primary vehicle for integrated, area-based recovery in the North and East, covering sectors such as community housing, small-scale infrastructure, livelihoods, environmental management and social transformation. Community-based reconciliation has emerged as a central pillar of these initiatives. As the Northern and Eastern districts are gradually evolving from early- to mid-term recovery, the TRP is also exploring
opportunities for collaborative local economic development bringing together local government, private sector and community-based organizations.

c. **Early recovery coordination**: UNDP supports the Government of Sri Lanka to coordinate recovery activities at national and district levels. The capacities of government officials are being strengthened to take over recovery coordination.

d. **Support to mine action**: UNDP continues to provide quality assurance and coordination support for mine clearance in the Northern districts. Following the official endorsement for the establishment of the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) in mid-2010, UNDP is scaling-up its support to the full operationalization of this national institution.

e. **Provision of equal access to justice**: Work has been underway to extend professional legal aid and paralegal services to villages, and develop the capacities of judges, court administration, quasi-courts (administering Sharia law), prisons and mediators, to address the most common grievances faced by vulnerable groups. Legal documentation is being provided to estate sector workers and to the conflict affected groups including IDPs seeking to return to their communities. Countrywide support is being provided to the prison sector through upgrading the standards in prisons, promotion of alternate sentencing, and training and counselling services for prison officials and prison inmates. Addressing gender-based violence is also a key area of support.

f. **Local governance support**: In the East, UNDP is supporting the technical and financial capacity development of elected local government bodies in order to strengthen local governance, improve service delivery, and build trust between local government and communities. In the North, the capacity of both local government and community-based organizations is being strengthened in order to support the recovery process. Technical support is also provided for the recovery process to transform it into a more sustainable development process.

g. **Environment, energy and disaster management**: UNDP has embarked on a major GEF initiative to support biomass energy production jointly with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). In the Northern Province, a consortium of about 20 government entities has been brought together and supported to develop an Integrated Strategic Environment Assessment (ISEA) to facilitate integration of environmental sustainability and disaster risk reduction into development planning. UNDP has helped establish and is providing support to the Disaster Management and Emergency Operation Centres and the National Disaster Management Coordination Committee.

3. **SCOPE AND METHODS OF THE EVALUATION**

**SCOPE**

The ADR will review UNDP experience in Sri Lanka under the previous and current country programmes for 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 respectively, with closer attention paid to the current programme. It will cover UNDP activities funded from both core and non-core resources.

It will assess UNDP’s contribution through its programme activities to the human development of Sri Lanka and the well-being of its people. It will also assess strategic positioning and approaches UNDP has taken to maximize its contribution to this end, and their synergies with the national development strategy, the values that the UN espouse and the comparative strength of UNDP as an organization.

Based on these analyses, strategic and forward looking recommendations should be made, keeping in perspective the changing scenarios in the country in the aftermath of the conflict, which can be directly translated into strategic priorities for the forthcoming programming cycle.
Evaluation questions specific to this ADR will be further developed based on the views of stakeholders presented during the scoping.

**EVALUATION CRITERIA**

The ADR will follow the structured framework provided in the *ADR Method Manual 2011*.151 The evaluators will generate findings within the scope of the evaluation, use the evaluation criteria to make assessments based on the findings, analyse the findings to identify underlying factors that have led to such findings and to answer evaluation questions. Based on this analysis, the evaluators will generate main conclusions and corresponding recommendations.

The evaluation will have two main components: the analysis of UNDP’s contribution to development results through its programme outcomes and of the strategic positioning and approaches it has taken. For each component, the ADR will present its findings and assessment according to the set criteria provided below.

**UNDP’s contribution by thematic/programmatic areas**

Analyses will be made on the contribution of UNDP to development results of Sri Lanka through its programme activities. The analyses will be presented by thematic/programme areas and according to the following criteria:152 programmatic relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

Within the analyses above, wherever applicable, particular attention could be paid to UNDP’s effectiveness in promoting capacity development, in utilizing opportunities for South-South cooperation, and in leveraging its contribution through various partnerships and coordination of its activities with other UN agencies and development partners.

**UNDP’s strategic positioning and approaches**

The strategic positioning and approaches of UNDP are analysed both from the perspective of the organization’s mandate153 and the development needs and priorities in the country. This would entail systematic analyses of UNDP’s place and niche within the development and policy space in the country, as well as strategies used by UNDP to maximize its contribution through adopting relevant strategies and approaches. The following criteria will be applied: strategic relevance and responsiveness to the development needs and national strategies; capitalizing on comparative strengths of the organization; and promoting UN values from human development perspective.

**EVALUATION METHODS AND APPROACHES**

**Principles and guidelines**

The ADR will be conducted in adherence to the Norms and the Standards154 and the ethical Code of Conduct155 established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), as well as the UNDP’s Evaluation Policy. The ADR will be conducted in close consultation and collaboration with the Government so as to enhance the national ownership of its results.

**Data Collection**

In terms of data collection, the evaluation will use a multi-method approach that could include document reviews, workshops, group and individual
interviews, project/field visits and surveys. The set of methods for each evaluation criteria and questions should be defined in the inception report to be prepared by the evaluation team.

Validation
The evaluation team will use a variety of methods to ensure that the data is valid, including triangulation. All the findings must be supported by evidence and validated through consulting multiple sources of information. The evaluation team is required to use an appropriate tool (e.g., an evaluation matrix to present findings from multiple sources) to show that all the findings are validated.

Stakeholder participation
A strong participatory approach, involving a broad range of stakeholders, will be taken. These stakeholders would include government representatives of ministries/agencies/local governments, civil-society organizations, academia, private-sector representatives, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, and importantly, the beneficiaries of the programme. Furthermore, in order to identify development needs of the country, the evaluation team may conduct interviews or consultations beyond those involved directly or indirectly in UNDP country programme, such as from academia, media, religious community and the citizens at large.

4. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

JOINT MANAGEMENT GROUP
The Joint Management Group (JMG) is formed by representatives of the Evaluation Office of UNDP and the Government of Sri Lanka. The JMG will provide overall management of and technical backstopping to the evaluation. It will set the terms of reference for the evaluation, select the independent evaluation team, receive and review the inception report, provide guidance to the conduct of evaluation, receive the first, second and final drafts of the report and decide on its acceptability, organize a stakeholder meeting to discuss the final draft of the report, and manage the review, follow-up and dissemination processes.

THE EVALUATION TEAM
An independent evaluation team will be formed to undertake the evaluation. The evaluation team will be selected in strict compliance with the requirement of the established process of the EO to ensure its independence and expertise in evaluation. Based on the desk study of relevant documentation and the views of stakeholders, the evaluation team will formulate the evaluation plan and submit it in the inception report. The evaluation team will collect and analyse data based on the evaluation plan, draw general conclusions based on the analysis, and hold sessions with main stakeholders to validate findings and conclusions. The evaluation team will prepare the first draft of the evaluation report, submit it to the JMG for review and revise the draft as required. The evaluation team will further revise the report based on the feedback from the joint reference group and other stakeholders, including at the stakeholder workshop, and submit the final report to the JMG for its acceptance.

THE JOINT REFERENCE GROUP
The Joint Reference Group (JRG) will be formed by the JMG, comprising representatives of selected government partner agencies, civil-society actors and development partners, as well as the evaluation society in Sri Lanka. The JRG will review the inception report and the second draft of the report, and provide feedback to the evaluation team.

UNDP COUNTRY OFFICE IN SRI LANKA
UNDP country office in Sri Lanka (CO) will support the evaluation team in liaison with key partners and other stakeholders, brief the evaluation team on its programmes and achievements, make available to the team all necessary information regarding UNDP’s programmes, projects and
activities in the country, and provide factual verifications of the draft report. The CO will provide the evaluation team support in kind (e.g. arranging meetings with government officials, project staff and stakeholders, organise project site visits etc.). To ensure the independence of the views expressed in interviews and meetings with stakeholders, however, the CO may accompany the team to, but not participate in, interviews and meetings with stakeholders.

5. EVALUATION PROCESS

PHASE 1: PREPARATION

The JMG will be set-up to manage the process, and establish the terms of reference, the evaluation team and the JRG. EO in collaboration with the CO will prepare for the information needs of the evaluation team, and provide methodological guidance on the ADR to the evaluation team.

PHASE 2: PRELIMINARY RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PLAN

A scoping exercise will be undertaken with a broad participation of stakeholders to further develop evaluation questions to be addressed specifically in this ADR. This will be in the form of a set of meetings/sessions held by the evaluation team as a part of the preparatory process of the inception report. The evaluation team will conduct a desk study and draw up the evaluation plan, and submit it to the JMG in the inception report. The JMG and JRG will review the inception report and provide feedback to the evaluation team for the revision of the evaluation plan as may be required.

PHASE 3: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Based on the evaluation plan, the evaluation team will collect data, inter alia, by: conducting interviews, organizing focus group meetings, conducting surveys, observing the project activities and results, and collecting further documentary evidences. The evaluation team will analyse the data collected to generate findings, make assessments according to the evaluation criteria, and draw main conclusions. The main conclusions should be formulated with a view to identifying underlying factors that have led to the findings and the assessments, and answering evaluation questions developed further during the scoping exercise. The evaluation team will further validate its findings and conclusions by holding validation sessions with key stakeholders, including the CO and relevant JRG members, at the end of this phase.

PHASE 4: DRAFTING AND REVIEWS

The evaluation team will submit to the JMG the first draft of the report within four weeks of the conclusion of the previous phase. The first draft will be accepted by the JMG, after revisions if necessary, when it is in compliance with the terms of reference and the \textit{ADR Method Manual}, and satisfies basic quality standards in terms of logical coherence, clarity of writing, and sufficient substantiation of its findings and analysis. The draft will also be subject to a quality assurance process through external reviews.

Once the first draft is thus accepted, it becomes the second draft and will be subject to the review by the JRG and factual verification by the CO. The JRG and CO will provide comments in writing, and the evaluation team will revise the draft appropriately to produce the final draft. In doing so, the evaluation team will prepare the audit trail to record its responses to the comments.

The final draft will be presented to a broad range of stakeholders at the stakeholder workshop. The evaluation team will finalize the report taking into account the feedback made at the workshop. EO will further professionally edit, design and format the report in a publication format.

PHASE 5: FOLLOW-UP AND DISSEMINATION

The UNDP CO will prepare the management response to the ADR recommendations under the oversight of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific and in consultation with
relevant government counterparts. The ADR report will be made available to the UNDP Executive Board by the time of approving the new country programme document, and widely distributed in both hard and electronic versions by UNDP and the Government. Both the report and the management response will be made publicly available at UNDP’s Evaluation Resource Centre.\textsuperscript{156}

6. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The main output from this exercise is the report “Assessment of Development Results – Evaluation of UNDP’s contribution in Sri Lanka”.

The expected outputs from the evaluation team in particular are:

- An inception report, providing the plan for evaluation. The evaluation plan should identify for each evaluation criteria and evaluation question, the methods to be used and the sources of information in specific terms. The plan for the field trips should also be included in the evaluation plan.

- The first, second and final drafts of the report (approximately 50 pages for the main text, excluding annexes), and the complete lists of persons and documents consulted to be included as annexes.

- Presentations, debriefings, as required.

The final draft of the report must follow the ADR Method Manual 2011 and UNDP’s publication guidelines, and all drafts will be provided in English.

7. TIMEFRAME

The timeframe and responsibilities for the evaluation process are tentatively as follows. The exact timeframe will be decided in consultation with all involved, and will be adjusted accordingly.

The timeframe below is indicative of the process and deadlines, and does not imply full-time engagement of the evaluation team during the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Estimated timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory mission</td>
<td>EO &amp; CO</td>
<td>7-11 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of the terms of reference</td>
<td>JMG</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of the evaluation team</td>
<td>JMG</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary research and scoping</td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of the inception report</td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td>End August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of the inception report</td>
<td>JMG, JRG</td>
<td>Early September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection &amp; analysis, validation</td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td>September-October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of the first draft</td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td>Mid November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of the first draft</td>
<td>JMG</td>
<td>Second half November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of the second draft</td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td>Mid December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review by JRG and CO</td>
<td>JRG, CO</td>
<td>December-January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of the final draft</td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td>End January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder workshop</td>
<td>JMG, Evaluation team</td>
<td>First quarter 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing, formatting and designing</td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuance of the final report</td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Second quarter 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination</td>
<td>EO, Gov. &amp; CO</td>
<td>Second quarter 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{156} Available at: http://erc.undp.org/.
8. TRAVEL
The evaluation team is expected to undertake a few field trips for interviews and group discussions of beneficiaries and project stakeholders and for project site observations. The team must plan for such field trips in consultation with the CO and relevant government stakeholders, and submit it in the inception report. The team may elect to split travel among its members for different destinations.

The team leader may be requested to travel to UNDP Headquarters in New York, to hold specific interviews, briefings or presentations.

9. THE EVALUATION TEAM
An independent evaluation team will be formed to undertake the ADR. The team will be constituted of three or more members. The roles and responsibilities of each member will be specified in a separate terms of reference. The qualifications for the team members are:

- Have a sound understanding of evaluation methodologies relevant to ADR, and/or a proven expertise of research in social science relevant for the evaluation

- Have a sound knowledge of development issues and challenges in Sri Lanka, as well as the government policies, at least in one subject area relevant to the work of UNDP

To avoid any conflict of interest, the members of the team should not have engaged in the design or implementation of the country programme in question.
Annex 2.

LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Ambawatte, Chithral H., Director General, Ministry of Vocational and Technical Education

Anura, Jayatileke, Director, Global Affairs and Air Resources Management Centre, Ministry of Forestry and Environment

Anushyanthan, Vaidehi, Assistant Director, Department Foreign Aid and Budget Monitoring, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Bandara, Palitha, Assistant Director, Training and Awareness, Disaster Management Centre, Ministry of Disaster Management

Bandara, T.M.J., Deputy Director, Department of National Planning, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Batagoda, B.M.S., Director General, Department of National Planning, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Boghawatte, Sagarika, Deputy Director, Department Foreign Aid and Budget Monitoring, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Brigadier, Rodrigo, B.C.J.A.F., Deputy Commander, Security Forces in Jaffna

Chandradasa, U.W.L., Director, Technology and Mitigation, Disaster Management Centre, Ministry of Disaster Management

Chandrapala, L., Director, Department of Meteorology, Ministry of Disaster Management

Chulananda, R.A., Director, Sri Lanka Women’s Bureau, Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment

Dadallage, Jinasiri, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs

De Saram, Sunil, Director, Department Foreign Aid and Budget Monitoring, Ministry of Finance and Planning

De Silva, Anura, Deputy Conservator of Forests, Department of Forests, Ministry of Forestry and Environment

Dela, Jini, Consultant, Ministry of Forestry and Environment

Gamage, Malanie, Director General, Department of Foreign Aid and Budget Monitoring, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Gamage, Gamini, Director, Biodiversity Unit, Ministry of Forestry and Environment

Gunasekara, Neela, Chairperson, National Child Development and Women Affairs

Gunasekara, Manisha, Director General (Donor Coordination), Ministry of Economic Development

Gunawardana, G.M.J.K., Director, Promotion and Environmental Education and National Ozone Unit, Ministry of Environment

Gunesekara, Alex, Donor Coordinator, Ministry of Economic Development

Ismail, Jeziima, Member of the Commission, Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka

Jayawickrema, Luxmi, Director General, Commission for the Investigation of Allegations of Bribery and Corruption

Kasturiarachchi, Kema, Environment Management Officer, Climate Change Secretariat, Ministry of Forestry and Environment
ANNEX 2. LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

Tissera, W.I., Additional Director General, Department Foreign Aid and Budget Monitoring, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Vidanapathirana, C., Director, National Authority of Vocational Training, Ministry of Youth Affairs

Wickremasinghe, Harsha, Deputy Director General, Operations, Sustainable Energy Authority, Ministry of Power and Energy

Wickremesinghe, Malkanthi, Secretary, Ministry of Social Integration

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Aththanayaka, Susantha, Assistant District Secretary, District Secretariat of Matara

Balasooriya, Saman, Major, District Disaster Management Coordinating Officer, District Secretariat of Matara

Charles, P.S.M., District Secretary, District Secretariat of Vavuniya

De Silva, T.T.R., Major General, District Secretariat of Trincomalee

Dhananjith, Karunarathne, Brigadier, Commander, Engineering Brigade, Sri Lanka Army

Harees, A.S.M., Deputy Director, Mine Action and Recovery, Agricultural Extension, Provincial Department Ampara

Harischandra, B., Additional District Secretary, District Secretariat of Galle

Jayalaxmi, S., District Representative of the Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment, District Secretariat of Vavuniya

Jayasena, P., Grama Niladari, Muduwa East, Ratnapura

Kamalathasans, N., Divisional Secretary, Divisional Secretariat of Vengalachcheddikkulam, Vavuniya

Hettiarachchi, Gamini, Major General, Director General, Disaster Management Centre, Ministry of Disaster Management

Pathirana, M.P.D.U.K. Mapa, Director General, Department of External Resources, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Priyadarshan, Rohitha, Regional Coordinator, Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka in Vavuniya

Rahubaddhe, Sumithra, Secretary, Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Affairs

Ramani, Ellepola, Director General, Central Environmental Authority, Ministry of Forestry and Environment

Ranatunga, Monty, Chief, National Mine Action Centre, Ministry of Economic Development

Ranawaka, A.A.K., Additional Secretary, Ministry of Economic Development

Sathurusinghe, Anura, Conservator of Forests, Research and Education, Department of Forest, Ministry of Forestry and Environment

Senanayake, Chandrika, Assistant Director, Department Foreign Aid and Budget Monitoring, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Seneviratne, M.M.M., Project Coordinating Officer, National Ozone Unit, Ministry of Environment

Silva, Ajith, Director, Policy and Planning, Ministry of Forestry and Environment

Sivagnanasothy, V., Secretary, Ministry of Traditional Industries and Small Enterprises Development

Somaweera, Nihal, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Economic Development

Sumanasinghe, H.D., Director, Department Foreign Aid and Budget Monitoring, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Hettiarachchi, Gamini, Major General, Director General, Disaster Management Centre, Ministry of Disaster Management
ANNEX 2. LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Deshapriya, M.Y.S., Secretary to the Provincial Public Services, and former Programme Coordinator of ART GOLD Sri Lanka, Provincial Council of Southern Province

Piyadasa, U.G., Chairmen, Ruhunu Tourist Bureau, Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority

Santhaseelan, N., Secretary to the Pradeshiya Sabha, Nallur Pradeshiya Sabha, Jaffna

Saravanabavan, M.S., Municipal Commissioner, Municipal Council of Jaffna

Sathyananthy, S., Assistant Commissioner, Local Government, Batticaloa, Provincial Council of Eastern Province

Sivananthan, K., Municipal Commissioner, Municipal Council of Batticaloa

Welaratne, A.U., Ministerial Secretary to Chief Minister, Provincial Council of Southern Province

FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCIES

Atapattu, Nihal, Senior Programme Officer, Canadian International Development Agency

Kantha, Ashok K., H.E., High Commissioner of India to Sri Lanka,

Kawamoto, Hiroyuki, Representative, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Sri Lanka Office

Mackay, Sally, First Secretary, the Australian Agency for International Development

Okawa, Shinsuke, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan

Shimura, Akira, Resident Representative, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Sri Lanka Office

Srivastava, Anurag, First Secretary (Political), Office of High Commissioner of India in Sri Lanka
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

Andaraweera, Sugath Piyasiri, Chairman, Rukdiya Eco-Tourism Project
Chandraratne, Gothami, Programme Officer (Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Preparedness), Sri Lanka Red Cross Society.
De Silva, Chaminda M.S., Programme Manager, Help Age Sri Lanka
Gunasekara B. W., Chairman, National Ethnic Unit Foundation, Jaffna
Kapurusinghe, Thushan, Executive Director, Turtle Conservation Project
Nadarajah, Thavarajakumar., Livelihood Programme Manager, Caritas Jaffna
Ravikumar, N., Livelihood and Market Access Coordinator, OXFAM GB Sri Lanka
Senaratna, Thusitha, Head of Programme Services, OXFAM Sri Lanka
Senthraraja, S., Director, Social Organisation Networking for Development (SOND), Jaffna
Sothi Saravanamuttu, Pakaya, Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives
Thevathas, S., Programme Coordinator, OXFAM GB Jaffna
Velayuthen, K., Chairmen and a member of Plantation Trust, Power Foundation
Vipulananthan, Emil Kanopathipillai, Emergency Support Officer, Christian Aid UK
Weerasakara, Bandula, Program Manager, Former Chamber of Commerce Kegalle, and Youth Development Child Fund Sri Lanka
Yogarajah, M., Head of office, OXFAM Vavuniya

PRIVATE SECTOR

Hansen, Bobby Jordan, Managing Director/Director and Advisor, Columbus Tours
John Keels Hotels and Holdings, Sri Lanka Travel Agents Association Board member, and Sri Lanka Tourism Board member
Nugegoda, Anuja, Office Manager, SAH Swiss Labour Assistance
Seneviratne, Somasiri, Program Manager, SANASA (Micro Credit) and Canadian Corporative Association

UN AND PARTNER AGENCIES

Abeysundara, Sarath, National Project Coordinator, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) Sri Lanka
Evans, Patrick, Country Representative, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Sri Lanka
Gopalan, Sundarajan S., Senior Health, Nutrition and Population Specialist, South Asia Human Development Department, World Bank Sri Lanka
Mohamed, Milhar, Mine Action Officer, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Sri Lanka
Navaratne, T., National Project Coordinator, UN Joint Programme on Human Rights, Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka

UNDP SRI LANKA

Abeyratne, Fredrick, Senior Programme Analyst, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office
Bilgrami, Razina, Deputy Country Director, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office
Buhne, Neil, Former Resident Representative and UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

Fonseka, Dilrukshi, Team Leader, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

Ganesharajah, Rajenndra, Programme Specialist, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

Keh, Douglas, Country Director, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

Keeler, Zoe, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

Mallawathanthri, Ananda, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

Nandy, Subinay, Resident Representative and UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

Rupesinghe, Swariee, Programme Analyst (HIV/AIDS and Gender), UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

Wickramasinghe, Amanthi, Programme Officer, UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office

**UNDP SRI LANKA PROJECT STAFF**

Attanayake, Udayanga, Mentoring and Evaluation Officer, Transition and Recovery Programme

Augustine, Santhiapillai, Area Head, UNDP Mannar office

Chandrasekara, Damith, Programme Officer, Disaster Risk Management Programme, Programme Management Unit, Disaster Management Centre

Dayaratne, Sonali, Deputy Programme Manager, Transition and Recovery Programme

De Silva, Kushani, Programme Development Officer, Disaster Management Centre, UNDP Sri Lanka

Diana, Massimo, Senior Programme Manager and Head of Programme Management Unit, Transition and Recovery Programme, UNDP Sri Lanka

Gertz, Calitz, Technical Advisor, Regional Mine Action Office, Vavuniya

Gnanaganeshan, Chellappha, Head of Field Office, UNDP Jaffna office

Kamalathas, Nagarasa, Area Head, UNDP Vavuniya office

Mohamed, Asan Saleem, Area Head, UNDP Ampara office

Mugunthan A., Senior Operations Assistant, Regional Mine Action Office, Mannar

Murugathas, Varatharasa, Senior Operations Assistant, Regional Mine Action Office, Jaffna

Nagahawatte, Gaya, Reporting Associate, Transition and Recovery Programme, UNDP Sri Lanka

Navaratne, Deepal, Program Coordinator, Formerly UNDP Uva Wellassa Project

Patterson, Refinceyaa, Area Head, UNDP Trincomalee office

Perera, Kapila, Regional Mine Action Officer, Regional Mine Action Office, Vavuniya

Satheesan, S., Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Transition and Recovery Programme, UNDP Jaffna office

Subasinghe, S.P., Field Programme Assistant, UNDP Anuradhapura

Ziyath, M.H.M, Project Officer, Access to Justice Project, Vavuniya

Zulfic, A.R.M, Project Officer, Access to Justice Project, Batticaloa
Annex 3.

LIST OF GROUP INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS HELD

**SEMI-STRUCTURED GROUP INTERVIEWS**

- ART GOLD Project Office in Badulla
- Co-operative Society of Livestock Farmers Federation in Vavuniya
- Disaster Management Centre in Galle
- Disaster Management Centre in Matara
- District Office of the Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment in Jaffna
- District Office of the Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment in Monaragala
- District Office of the Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment in Vavuniya
- Local and international NGOs in Jaffna
- Micro Credit Groups in Badulla
- Micro Credit Groups in Monaragala
- NGO Forum in Vavuniya
- Programme Management Unit for SMAP Colombo
- Provincial Council Office of Southern Province
- SANASA District Officials in Monaragala
- Women’s Bureau in Colombo
- UN agencies in Colombo: FAO, UNICEF, ILO, UNFPA, World Bank, UNOPS, UNHCR

**STRUCTURED FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

- Beneficiaries of TRP in Vavuniya
- Beneficiaries of TRP in Trincomalee
- Beneficiaries of TRP in Mannar
- Beneficiaries of TRP in Ampara
- Beneficiaries of TRP in Jaffna
- CBO partners in Mannar
- CBO partners in Jaffna
- CBO and NGO partners in Trincomalee
- Grant recipients, CBOs and CSOs in Ampara
- Mine Action NGOs in Vavuniya
Annex 4.

LIST OF MAIN DOCUMENTS CONSULTED


