## Consultancy on the Final Evaluation of the UNDP Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion (EPTSI) Project in Guyana

Final Evaluation Report

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#### List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

- 1. AVC Amerindian Village Councils
- 2. AWP Annual Work Plans
- 3. BCPR -Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
- 4. BIT -Board of Industrial Training
- 5. CBOs -Community-based Organisations
- 6. CIDA -Canadian International Development Agency
- 7. CPAP -Country Programme Action Plan
- 8. CSOs Civil Society Organisations
- 9. DFID -Department for International Development
- 10. DIM -Direct Implementation Modality
- 11. DPA -Department of Political Affairs
- 12. DRR -Deputy Resident Representative
- 13. EPTSI -Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion
- 14. EU -European Union
- 15. GoG -Government of Guyana
- 16. IPs Implementing Partners
- 17. LCDS -Low Carbon Development Strategy
- 18. MCYS -Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport
- 19. M&E -Monitoring and Evaluation
- 20. MLGRD Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development
- 21. MLHSSS Ministry of Labour, Human Services and Social Security
- 22. MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs
- 23. MTE -Mid-Term Evaluation
- 24. NDC -Neighbourhood Democratic Councils
- 25. NDS -National Development Strategy
- 26. NGOs -Non-governmental Organisations
- 27. NUNV -National United Nations Volunteer
- 28. PM Project Manager
- 29. PMU Project Management Unit
- 30. PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
- 31. PRF Project Results Framework

- 32. RBLAC -Regional Bureau for Latin American and the Caribbean
- 33. RDC Regional Democratic Councils
- 34. RC Resident Coordinator
- 35. SCP Social Cohesion Programme
- 36. SFCD -St. Francis Community Developers
- 37. TG -Thematic Group
- 38. UN -United Nations
- 39. UNCT United Nations Country Team
- 40. UNDAF -United Nations Development Assistance Framework
- 41. UNDP United Nations Development Programme
- 42. UNDP CO United Nations Development Programme Country Office
- 43. UNEG -United Nations Evaluation Guidelines
- 44. UNFPA CO United Nations Population Fund Country Office
- 45. UNICEF CO United Nations Children's Fund Country Office
- 46. UNV -United Nations Volunteer

## **Executive Summary**

In August 2008 UNDP Guyana launched a 6.95 Mio USD Programme<sup>1</sup>, the Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion Project (EPTSI), to work towards social cohesion and a peaceful transformation in the country. This was a response to the long lasting tensions between the main ethnic groups, the Indo and Afro Guyanese, which culminated in sporadic violent incidents during elections.

The EPTSI Project was implemented in 5 regions of the country namely in region 3,4,5,6 and 10 over a period of three years, from 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2008 until 31<sup>st</sup> December 2011.

The programme comprised the following components:

1. Empowering youth (and particularly women) to participate fully and constructively in governance, and to serve as agents for peaceful change.

This part of the project was multi-dimensional and was sub-divided into two main areas of activities: Firstly vocational trainings and micro-loans for youth at risk and secondly the recruitment and placement of UN Volunteers trained as conflict facilitators to conduct sports and cultural activities for youth, interlinked with NGO's youth programs in the area of peer education, mentoring and recreation.

2. Enhancing local capacity for participation in governance and enhancing community security and safety

This component was covered by the following activities: A baseline survey at community level on community security and youth unemployment; the establishment of community based forums for conflict resolution, security oversight and dialogue; the development of community safety plans and workshops in fragile communities on conflict resolution with a broad participation of local stakeholders.

3. Strengthening the public discourse centred on inclusion and the constructive resolution of conflicts

The focus of this output was twofold: Capacity building with the media and press association to improve independent and unbiased reporting as well as capacity building of local governmental structures on information and education strategies to enhance the communities' access to information on public service delivery.

Although it was a challenge to measure the effects and impacts of a comprehensive programme aiming at a complex socio-political transformation towards peace, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> However, due to the funding gap of almost 2 Mio, the programme's budget was reduced to ca. 5 Mio.

evaluation could gain some insights and indications for strengths and constraints of the programme.

In general it was found, that EPTSI has developed valuable approaches to address the conflicts in Guyana. The major achievements are as follows:

The UNDP EPTSI programmatic response has been judged to be highly relevant as it addresses main factors of the existing conflict: The lack of future perspectives for young people, the ethnic tensions between Afro- and Indo Guyanese and the media as driving factors of conflict, especially during election times.

The EPTSI programme succeeded in introducing mediation as nonviolent mean of negotiating interests into different sectors and levels of the society. Overall an estimated number of 10.000 people have directly participated in these activities.

The concepts, approaches and skills have been incorporated into the revised national Youth and Sports Policy as well as into the national vocational training curricula under the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Labor and Human Services. Apart from the national level, these inputs gained currency also at the medium and local level by partnering NGOs, community centers, sports clubs and community based organizations. As mediation and peaceful dispute resolution training sessions became a regular component within the respective activities and programmes, these results can be regarded as sustainable.

The strategy to use specifically trained personnel, the UNVs, as medium for the delivery of conflict resolution skills and peacebuilding messages, has been instrumental to reach young people and youth at risk in their specific social environments. Several of the UNVs acted as mediators and as such as role models for the constructive resolution of disputes within their respective working areas.

The placement of the UNVs at different hosts such as NGOs, sports clubs and governmental institutions broadened the effects of their engagement and created linkages with different projects and intervention areas. The target to reach 1500 youth was exceeded by far with ca. 8000 participants. Two specific highlights were video clips on peacebuilding among the ethnic groups of Guyana broadcasted on TV and the community centers in Linden integrating young people as members of the board, which was not done before. In addition a remarkable number of the former volunteers are still employed at the NGOs or at other institutions (one is working at the Ministry for Culture Youth and Sports), where they are continuing to use their experiences and skills. Another 594 young people, among them youth at risk, received vocational training under the programme. The curricula included additional life and conflict resolution skills. According to survey and tracking studies out of these ca. 45% are still employed or participation in further education.

The community based approach with the successful establishment of 20 community support groups serving an average of 1200 community members per group, is a sustainable project

strategy, as the majority of the groups will most likely be able to continue with their activities on the long run without any further assistance and funding. Several of them are ethnically mixed, which will promote inter-ethnic cooperation and contribute to establish longer term relations between divided communities of Afro- and Indo Guyanese.

Last but not least the support of the Media Monitoring Unit during the election period contributed to the regulation of the media, which play a vital role within the conflict situation in Guyana encouraging violence and promoting ethnic division by racial messages and biased reporting.

Apart from the these positive results, there were several constraining factors, not at least due to the challenging nature of the program aiming at political changes at the national level on highly political and conflict sensitive topics.

One major weakness is the low efficiency of the programme reflected in several delays and postponements and the management difficulties of funds and personnel throughout the project period.<sup>2</sup> This has affected almost all areas of the project: The timely and coherent implementation of the components 1 and 2, the guidance of the UNVs and the cooperation with the partners and donors.

In view of the management capacities, the project design was too ambitious and complex, covering 5 geographic regions with a broad range of partners on different levels, the high number of additional personnel with the 45 UNVs and with several thematic areas. Subsequently, some targets were not reached: The number of youth placed in new jobs or higher education and the number of youth participating in a micro credit scheme to start their own business.

Furthermore the different components were not implemented synchronically, but one after the other and the geographic operational areas within the 5 regions were more isolated areas of interventions with a high concentration in the cities, than a broader coverage. As a result the programme could not fully use the chances of creating linkages and synergies between the geographic areas and the fields of intervention.

In addition several highly relevant targets to social cohesion and peacebuilding were modified and not implemented as planned mainly due to long and complex negotiations with different governmental institutions.<sup>3</sup>

As the conducted baseline survey did not provide data on the most conflict prone and vulnerable communities as anticipated, the geographic selection was not done systematically according to these conflict relevant criteria and the Ministry of Local Government mainly took over the task of the selection.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See the details in the chapters on efficiency and effectiveness.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See the details in the chapter of effectiveness of component 2.

On the whole the result was that the project did not succeed in using its full potential to address conflict relevant topics and to operate in those geographic areas, which are the most conflict prone. This had affected the relation with the donor community, which was not fully satisfied with the project's results and how their funds have been spent. According to their view, the government's influence on the target modification was too high.

The rights based approach was more implicit than transformed to an explicit project strategy on the rights of children, youth and women. There was no specific approach to strengthen the role of women in peacebuilding and social cohesion according to UN Resolution 1325.

Finally, the funding gap of ca. 2 Mio created a lot of negative effects from project management to project credibility and contact with partners including GoG, donors and CSOs. It was found that there was as well a shortfall in clear communication. Especially in case of the CSOs there was no clarity on the funding modalities of UNDP, causing frustration with a few partners.

# Considering the above described challenges and constrains, recommendations for future programming are made as follows:

- As the design and the areas of implementation of the EPTSI project are still highly relevant to social cohesion and peacebuilding, the thematic areas could and should be addressed by further projects. This is applying for the focus on youth empowerment as well as cross-community approaches and media development. However, due to the critical opinions of the international donors towards the EPTSI project, it is generally advisable to start with new project concepts, not referring to the EPTSI as successor programme, even if the thematic focus might be continued.
- There should be an in-house reflection among UNDP staff to identify the different causes for the delays and to find out feasible mechanism, how management and timely implementation of projects could be strengthened in future.
- In order to enhance proper planning and in view of the limited staff and management capacities at UNDP, it is recommended to select an easier manageable scope, for example by a smaller geographic area according to clear criteria such as of being prone to conflict and crime, (e.g. the coast region between the two rivers, which is known as being one main area of ethnic tensions with high crime rates and vulnerability). In a smaller geographic region it is much easier to do a proper baseline beforehand, to oversee the implementation and to measure the impacts on hard indicators such as unemployment and crime rates (as DFID had requested). Furthermore, with a strong baseline containing objective data, it is easier to assure a balanced flow of resources. This is a basic and important principle of conflict sensitive programme implementation as cross cutting approach.

- As ethnicity and ethnic tensions are a taboo to a certain degree, it is advisable for future programming to find ways of specific areas and more indirect approaches towards the conflict relevant topics. A successful example is the conflict resolution skills within the youth programmes of Output 1, which is accepted by everyone. Another possibility is to incorporate conflict sensitivity strategies throughout all UNDP, UN and partner programmes for example by ethnically balanced service delivery with a system of quota. In addition entry points across all sectors and programmes could be used to integrate systematically cross-community approaches.
- The selection criteria for receiving project benefits are always a crucial and sensitive issue, which can easily promote conflicts itself in every country and social environment. This is even more valid in a highly politically polarized environment as in Guyana. A basic principle of conflict sensitive service delivery is to work with clear and transparent selection criteria throughout project implementation based on objective and independent data. (see above) This is valid for all areas of interventions such as recruitment of personnel, selection of partnering NGOs, geographic regions or community groups.
- Conflict resolution is not an easy topic to implement, if it is intended to become institutionalised on the local level in the form of permanent structures leaving the sphere of the superficial level of awareness rising and basic training. It is necessary to work more intense on this topic, doing research on the local attitudes and necessities, the so-called specific peacebuilding needs, develop specific tailored concepts for setting up mediation committees, equip them with the necessary skills and provide appropriate supervision and monitoring.
- There could be a stronger rights based strategy to empower youth and strengthen their participation for example by thematic youth projects such as youth parliaments.
- A focus on the capacities of women in peacebuilding processes according to the UN Resolution 1325 could be a thematic focus for future programmes.
- The fact that tensions are raising mainly during election periods is showing that politics have a strong influence on social cohesion among the population. Therefore it might be advisable for future programming to work on political party dialogue.
- There should be a strong and systematic focus on exit strategies and longer lasting structures, which are most likely to continue after the program has ended, e.g. in the field of youth empowerment such as youth clubs, small committees at schools and community centers for peer education, counseling and dispute resolution, in which youth can organize themselves and continue on their own. The same should be applied with the cross community approach by setting up cross community boards or committees for specific activities.

- It is recommended to define the targets within the Logframe Matrix less ambitious. It is more advantageous for the reputation of the project, if the targets are moderate and are reached or even exceeded at the end than not achieved. In addition the socio-political environment should be taken into account in an appropriate way.
- Funds not granted by written agreements, should not be taken into consideration for any project planning. Planning should be done solely on the basis of assured finances.
- In order to avoid situations, in which partners are disappointed, communication should be very clear, not raising any expectation, which can eventually not be met afterwards.

## Recommendations to finalize the programme:

- It should be clarified with the MCYS, why the two sports facilities, namely Silver City Secondary School and Bushlot Secondary School, have not been renovated and possibilities should be elaborated to finalize this part of the project.
- The status of the implementation of the 50 micro credits for students of the Kuru Kuru Training Center should be discussed with the MCYS, as during the evaluation there was no evidence that his was implemented.

## Lessons Learned:

With regard to the project management:

- 1. Smaller geographic regions enhance a better in-depth planning, implementation as well as monitoring and final impact measurement on substantial data, such as crime and unemployment rates.
- 2. It is a high risk and can affect the whole project implementation, if funds are taken into account for the project budget, which are not confirmed by written agreements.
- 3. Unclear communication on funds commitments with partners and more specifically raising hopes on incoming funds, which are not assured yet, can cause distrust and negative effects on the relationships with partners as well as the reputation of the respective organization. This is valid on different levels: Between UNDP and partners, NGOs and communities and international donors and recipient organizations.
- 4. A project with a budget of 6.95 Mio USD can not be handled without a project manager.
- 5. Management of personnel requires clear job descriptions not exceeding an appropriate amount of tasks as well as the establishment of supervising and backstopping mechanism.

6. It is a risk to work with high level indicators and ambitious targets within the Logframe Matrix. If the targets are not met at the end of the project period, this can affect the reputation of the organization and the relationship to partners. In view of the political conditions in Guyana, it is important to formulate project targets moderate in those areas, which are known of being highly controversial.

With regard to a conflict environment:

- Geographic planning in a conflict environment requires a prior detailed baseline survey with objective data according to conflict relevant criteria to enhance the development of neutral and independent selection criteria and balanced distribution of project resources.
- The placement of trained UNVs at host organizations has been proved as a successful strategy to incorporate conflict resolution as a new topic to the respective institutions. Furthermore young people were reached in their specific social environments.
- 3. Projects aiming at social changes need a long term orientation: It is necessary to build up longer lasting structures, which are most likely to continue after the program has ended such as small committees, which can officially be handed over at the end of the project period and be continued by the target groups on their own. The same is valid for the cross community approach: Cross community boards or committees for specific activities are important structures, which have the capacity to continue independently after the funding period.
- 4. A project aiming at social cohesion requires a long term systematic cross community approach. If far distances between Indian and Afro communities are an obstacle, other possibilities have to be identified such as intra-community committees.
- 5. Conflicts can be provoked by imbalanced distribution of project resources in every social environment and even more easily in a highly polarized conflict situation as in Guyana. Therefore it is necessary to work with clear and transparent selection criteria based on objective and independent data as conflict sensitive principle. This is valid for all areas of interventions such as recruitment of personnel, selection of partnering NGOs, geographic regions and community groups.
- 6. In conflict environments, in which the conflict themes such as ethnicity and ethnic tensions are a taboo, more indirect approaches towards the conflict relevant topics are appropriate. A successful example is the conflict resolution skills within the youth programmes of Output 1, which is accepted by everyone.
- 7. In a conflict environment it is necessary to incorporate conflict sensitivity strategies throughout all programmes for example by ethnically balanced service delivery with

a system of quota. In addition entry points across all sectors and programmes could be used to integrate systematically cross-community approaches.

8. It is not a simple task to institutionalize permanent conflict resolution mechanism on the local level. This requires a more in-depth approach: Doing research on the local attitudes and characteristics, the so-called specific peacebuilding needs, develop specific tailored concepts to set up mediation committees and last but not least support the selection of respected personalities, who could take over this responsibility, equip them with the necessary skills and provide appropriate supervision and monitoring, until they are able to continue on their own.

## 1. Introduction and Background

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the final evaluation of the Enhanced Public Trust Fund, Security and Inclusion (EPTSI) Project in Guyana, undertaken from 7<sup>th</sup> until 21<sup>th</sup> of May 2012. The report is in three main sections. The introductory part gives an overview of the situational analysis in Guyana, background information on the programme, as well as the evaluation methodology. This section draws upon an inception report prepared prior to the field visit. Section II presents the findings of the evaluation and features assessments of program relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The final part, Section III, treats the main conclusions and the recommendations on the way forward.

## **1.1 Situational Analysis**

Guyana has been affected by tensions between the different ethnic groups since its independence in the year 1966. As a consequence sporadic violence used to take place before and after elections.

The major ethnic groups are the Afro-Guyanese with ca. 32 % (census of 2002) and the people of Indian origin with 43.4 % of the population. A third relevant group with a lower percentage are the indigenous, the 'Amerindians', which make ca. 9.1 %. Another 16.7 % of the population regard themselves as 'mixed'.

The political parties' membership represent broadly particular ethnic groups: The Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) the Indo- Guyanese population and the People's National Congress Reform –One Guyana (PNCR-1G) the Afro-Guyanese.

The background of the ethnic heterogeneity is the colonial history: The Afro-Guyanese are descendants of slaves brought to the country during the British colony in the 19ths century. After the abolishment of slavery in 1834, indentured Indian labourer were hired and settled in Guyana.

## 2.2 Overview of the EPTSI Project in Guyana

In 2003 UNDP responded to the long lasting social-political segregation of Guyana's population and more particularly the post election crises in 2001 by setting up the 'Social Cohesion Program', with the aim was to strengthen social inclusion, dialogue mechanism and democratic governance. In view of the project's positive effects and new rising tensions due to the Lusignan massacre, UNDP decided in August 2008 on a follow-up programme: The Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion Project (EPTSI). The objective was to deepen the impact of the previous Social Cohesion Program towards democratic governance, social inclusion and long term peace in Guyana.

The EPTSI Project is part of the Democratic Governance portfolio of UNDP. It was implemented in 5 regions of the country namely in region 3,4,5,6 and 10 over a period of three years, from 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2008 until 31<sup>st</sup> December 2011.

According to the project documents the specific targets, formulated as outputs, are as follows:

1. Empowering youth (and particularly women) to participate fully and constructively in governance, and to serve as agents for peaceful change.

This part of the project was multi-dimensional and was sub-divided into two main areas of activities: Firstly vocational trainings and micro-loans for youth at risk and secondly the recruitment and placement of UN Volunteers trained as conflict facilitators to conduct sports and cultural activities for youth, interlinked with NGO's youth programs in the area of peer education, mentoring and recreation.

The respective allocated budget was USD 3.082.000

2. Enhancing local capacity for participation in governance and enhancing community security and safety

This component was covered by the following activities: A baseline survey at community level on community security and youth unemployment; the establishment of community based forums for conflict resolution, security oversight and dialogue; the development of community safety plans and workshops in fragile communities on conflict resolution with a broad participation of local stakeholders.

3. The component's budget was USD 1.642,000

Strengthening the public discourse centred on inclusion and the constructive resolution of conflicts

The focus of this output was twofold: Capacity building with the media and press association to improve independent and unbiased reporting as well as capacity building of local governmental structures on information and education strategies to enhance the communities' access to information on public service delivery.

The budget was USD 250.000

The project's total allocated budget was 6,960.000 USD. It was realized with funds from UNDP and UN DPA, the European Union (EU), Canadian (CIDA) and the Department for International Development UK (DFID). A funding gap of approx. 1,960.000 USD remained until the finalization of the project.

The project period was three and a half years.

The administrative structure of the project consisted of a management team at UNDP and two boards, the Outcome Board and the Project Board. The first was co-chaired by the Head of the Presidential Secretariat and the UNDP Resident Representative. The meetings were held half yearly. The board was responsible for all questions concerning the policy and strategy and approved the annual work plans of the project.

The Project Board was chaired by the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative. The meetings were held quarterly and it had a supervising role: Approving the quarterly project plans according to the Annual Work Plans, monitoring the project implementation and giving advice to the Management Team.

The management of the project was done by a Project Implementation Unit comprised of Project Manager, two Project Coordinators, a Communication Analyst, a Capacity Development and Volunteerism Specialist and a Project Associate.

In addition a project Assurance Team was in charge of conducting an independent monitoring function. The team comprised the UNDP's Programme Analyst and the Advisor on Governance of the Government of Guyana (GoG).

The program was designed and aligned under the framework of the CPAP agreement between UNDP and the Government of Guyana in order to contribute to the CPAP outcome 'Social Cohesion and peace building approaches factored into national development frameworks and integrated into programme at the national and local level to reduce real or perceived sentiments of insecurity.'

## **1.2 The Assignment – Terms of Reference and Scope of Work**

The context, purpose and tasks of the evaluation are clearly outlined in the Terms of Reference. The evaluation exercise was conducted by an international consultant.

The objectives of this evaluation are as follows (see TOR page 3):

- To assess the contribution of the Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion Project to the promotion of social cohesion and trust building among individuals and groups in Guyana and more specifically to which extent EPTSI has contributed to CPAP outcome 'Social Cohesion and peace building approaches factored into national development frameworks and integrated into programme at the national and local level to reduce real or perceived sentiments of insecurity.'
- To assess the contribution and effectiveness of the EPTSI project to improved youth livelihoods and empowerment
- To generate strategic information which can be used to guide and develop future interventions in its democratic governance portfolio

In view of these goals the evaluation is containing summative and formative elements at the same time: As final evaluation it seeks to elaborate the extent, how far the objectives have been reached and to draw the lessons learned for future programs.

This evaluation is taking place at a critical point of time, after UNDP Guyana has drafted its new five year country program (CP). The results of the evaluations should support this planning process particularly with regard to the output of the new CPAP on 'National regional and local level Programmes strengthened to support social inclusion and vulnerable groups'.

UNDP Guyana is the primary audience of this evaluation. However, it is planned to share the evaluation report with all stakeholders involved in the program. This way the lessons learned and recommendations will serve as well the partnering organisations.

A mid-term evaluation was conducted in February 2011, covering the project period from January 2009 until November 2010. This final evaluation will cover the final year of the project period, from December 2010 until December 2011. However, as a final assessment, some aspects of the achievements can only be evaluated on the whole, considering the whole time span of the project.

The evaluation seeks to elaborate the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. In addition it assesses, how the program has promoted the application of the rights-based approach and gender mainstreaming throughout the program.

The definition of the evaluation criteria and how they are related to the evaluation questions are outlined in Annex 2.

## 1.3 Conceptual Framework and Methodology

In order to enhance a common understanding among all stakeholders of the central terms and definitions, it is not only necessary to clarify the evaluation criteria but as well the categories of peace, peacebuilding and peacebuilding projects. The following definitions are proposed:

Within the scientific debate as well as in the context of international cooperation there are diverging interpretations of the terms 'peace', 'peacebuilding' and 'peacebuilding projects'. A milestone within the debate was Johann Galtung's concept of peace distinguishing between 'negative peace', the absence of physical violence and a 'positive peace', describing a society without physical, structural and psychological violence based on positive relationships with a common understanding. The latter describes an ideal state, which can be reached only to a certain degree. Due to practical reasons, the evaluator is using the definition of peace describing peace as a state without physical violence.

The United Nations Agenda for Peace of 1992 laid the ground for the increasing use of the term 'peacebuilding', defining it as a 'broad range of activities that are associated with capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation. Peacebuilding activities identify and support structures and systems that intend to strengthen and solidify peace.'

Development agencies sometimes attribute their programs in conflict zones per se as 'peacebuilding work'. Researchers argue that interventions can only be regarded as peacebuilding programs, if they are based on specific peacebuilding and conflict prevention methods. Others are following a broader understanding distinguishing peacebuilding and conflict prevention programs and those of development by their goals and objectives. In this evaluation the author follows the latter definition: 'Peacebuilding or conflict prevention programs or projects are interventions, whose primary purpose is to promote peace and prevent violent conflict.'

## 1.3.1 The Approach and Methodology

The methodology is based on qualitative research tools, mainly semi-structured individual and group interviews, focus group discussion, expert interviews, semi-standardized observation and review of project documents. A description of these research tools is given in Annex 3.

The following table gives an overview on the interview partners and the respective methodology:

INTERVIEW PARTNERS	Methodology Applied
1. UNDP staff in charge of the program (briefing)	Semi-structured interview
2. Direct beneficiaries such as youth groups (vocational training, livelihoods and sports etc.) women and women community leaders, local governments, relevant community members from various backgrounds	Individual semi-structured interview and focus group discussion, semi-standard- observation (sports facilities and community centers), review of project documents
3. Intermediaries such as implementing partners and allies such as Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Local Government, NGOs, UNV Volunteers and Ethnic Relations Commission etc.	Semi-structured interviews and review of project documents
4. External experts/resource persons, who know the program but are not directly involved such as experts form international organizations, relevant governmental institutions, media etc.	Semi-structured interviews, triangulation (crosschecking information and data from external and internal sources)

Through the combination of 'internal' and 'external' interviewees different perspectives of the program were collected and synthesized to a picture as complete as possible.

A detailed list of persons interviewed during the evaluation is given in Annex 5.

## 1.3.2 The List of Questions

From the Terms of Reference, the evaluation criteria and the programme framework a matrix of guiding questions was developed. These questions were used as basis for the semistructured interviews and focus group discussions in a flexible manner and were adapted to the respective context.

A spreadsheet of the detailed questions is given in Annex 4.

## 1.3.3 Approaches in the Field and Sample

Part of the procedure to secure unbiased information was to conduct the interviews without the presence of the project staff.

The timeframe of the evaluation with 5 days in the regions gave space to carry out field visits to all five project regions.

During the field research an estimated sample of 10 % of the programme activities was covered. This has allowed sufficient insight into both, the achievements and the challenges of the program.

Efforts were made also to discuss and reflect the underlying theoretical concepts of the EPTSI Programme such as the definition of the main terms (peace, peacebuilding and peacebuilding projects) and the so called 'theories of change'. This is very important as this is the underlying framework determining all aspects of the project activities. However, the limited timeframe was an obstacle to achieve a profound additional discussion on these broad topics during the field visit.

## **1.4 Constraints and Challenges**

The major challenge of this review was the complexity of the programme on different levels. First of all the programme is made up of the different sub-components conducted by numerous implementing partners such as several Ministries and governmental institutions, NGOs and United Nations Volunteers.

Secondly, the thematic scope of the programme is multi-faceted, containing projects on vocational training and micro finance scheme, sports, youth animation, policy development, capacity building of the media, psychosocial care for victims of violence, community based projects on livelihoods, capacity development of the local governmental institutions and the United Nations Volunteers as an own project.

Thirdly the geographic focus was broad as well, covering five regions in Guyana with the highest density of the populations with far distances between project sites.

As a consequence the evaluator could neither conduct interviews with all implementing partners nor visit beneficiaries of each sub-component. This information gap was covered by reports being aware of the lower degree of knowledge of and insight in these projects.

Hence, the validity of the evaluation results, based on the project visits, is not high in the sense of being representative. They present more examples, which were examined in an explorative way to get insight into the approaches and implementing modalities.

However, the evaluator feels that it was possible to gain an overall impression of strengths and weaknesses of the EPTSI programme, even if not all projects within the framework could be examined in detail.

## 3. Relevance

In 2008, after the violent events of the so-called 'Lusignan and Bartica Massacres', Guyana had to cope with the aftermath of this re-occurrence of violence after a peaceful election in 2006. Although the security has slightly improved during the recent years, there is still a need to strengthen the social cohesion towards a long term peaceful transformation.

According to different analysis and interview statements, the remaining challenging factors are high crime rates, attitudes within the political leadership, high numbers of unemployed youth and issues of marginalization and exclusion on different levels. The latter is in some aspects related with accountability issues of the governmental structures, which are not fully assuring transparent and equal service delivery.<sup>4</sup>

All these factors have to be understood in a broader context of the historic conflict between Afro and Indo-Guyanese on power and access to the resources of the country, in which the political interference of external stakeholders played an important role. During the struggle for independence, and due to the political conditions of the Cold War, especially the USA and Great Britain promoted the ethnic separation in the country by giving one-sided support to the African leader Burnham, acknowledged as political moderate. Through this Burnham's break with the People Progress Party and the political leader Dr. Jagan of Indian origin, regarded as pro-communist, was indirectly promoted.<sup>5</sup> Until today this ethnic separation is a permanent reason of grievance and latent conflict and is regularly contributing to raise violence during election periods. In this environment the media are playing a critical role not fully working according to professional standards with a tendency to biased reporting (see also the chapter on effectiveness of component 3: The results of the Media Monitoring Unit).

The design of the EPTSI project presents an overarching framework of a multi-sector approach to balance the above described risk factors for stability:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Transparency International Corruption Index of Guyana rank 134 of 183 countries, score 2,5 (scale 0 -10/ highly corrupt - very clean), Freedom House Reports from 2003-2011

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> More details see the publication of Raymond T. Smith 'British Guyana', 1962

- Unemployment of young people is addressed by the first component to empower young people, strengthen their participation within the society and provide them future perspectives by vocational training, life and conflict resolution skills and cultural and sportive recreation activities.
- The tensions between Indo and Afro Guyanese are particularly tackled by component 2 focusing on a community based approach with conflict resolution, cross-community activities and small scale development projects.
- In addition, many of these activities in the areas of community development, training, sports and sports are organized as cross-community initiatives to improve social cohesion.
- Component 3 of the project is aiming to improve the professional standards of the media towards independent and neutral reporting and to strengthen their positive contribution to a public dialogue towards peaceful transformation.

Overall it can be stated that the design and strategy of the EPTSI was and is still relevant to the peacebuilding needs in Guyana, because it is addressing crucial risk factors for stability.

## 4. The Planning

The planning of the EPTSI was mainly a long-term follow-up process of the previous Social Cohesion Project, which was implemented from 2003 until 2006. This programme was regarded as success by different stakeholders, having achieved to build the capacities for dialogue and the reduction of inter-ethnic tensions on the national, medium and local level of the society.

Intensive consultations with the government and partners were held over a long period, during 2007 and 2008, to design a programme with the aim of deepening the impact of the previous Social Cohesion Project.

In this context the Government of Guyana (GoG) raised the need of a more community based approach investing in economic livelihoods and training to unemployed and vulnerable youth in order to reduce the risk that these young people become involved in crime and illegal activities. Another concern was to strengthen the local governance institutions and community based groups in the areas of service delivery and conflict resolution.

With the background of the successful Social Cohesion project, donors committed their financial contribution to the upcoming EPTSI, particularly DFID, CIDA and the EU.

Five geographic regions were selected based on the criteria of the highest population density being the predominantly ethnically mixed areas, namely Essequibo Islands-West

Demerara, Demerara-Mahaica, Mahaica-Berbice, East Berbice Corentyne and Upper Demerara-Berbice.

A baseline survey was planned to provide the necessary information for a more detailed planning such as the selection of the communities for implementation, the employment situation particularly of youth and the local perceptions on conflict and security.

However, due to a long lasting tender procedure, the baseline survey was implemented not at the beginning of the project, but with a tremendous delay, in March 2010.

After the completion of the survey, a constraining factor was that it did not provide data per community/village, but per region. As such it could not be used to select the most affected communities in terms of crime/violence/conflict and poverty as anticipated. Furthermore the evaluation found that tensions exist among communities on the distribution of social service delivery:

According to the statements of several interviewees one reason for grievance on the local level is that in some cases implementing partners are trying to guide resources of development projects to communities on the basis of their own interests or for political reasons. For example it was believed among community members, that the selection is made of communities in those areas, where the ruling party has no supporters with the assumption that the intervention will have positive effects on electoral behavior in future.<sup>6</sup> Another example is the specific situation of Region 10, a predominantly Afro Guyanese area, where the regional government is ruled by the opposition: Some RDC representatives complained that the Ministry of Local Government did the selection of the communities for the implementation of component 2 without the full participation of the RDC due to political reasons (see also chapter on effectiveness of component).<sup>7</sup>

The evaluation could not verify and cross-check these statements in order to find out, whether these complains were well-founded. However, they show the level of distrust and political polarization. The selection criteria are crucial to enhance equal and balanced access to project resources and as such are highly relevant to social cohesion and peacebuilding. Consequently in future programming, geographic selection should be done very carefully and according to objective criteria.

## Lessons Learned:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See also the Quarterly Project Reports of the MLGRD for the period of February to April 2011, in which it was documented that 'residents questioned whether the dialogues were politically motivated or related to pending national elections.'

- 1. Geographic planning in a conflict environment requires a prior detailed baseline survey with objective data according to conflict relevant criteria to enhance the development of independent selection criteria and balanced distribution.
- 2. Smaller geographic regions might enhance a better in-depth planning, monitoring of implementation and finally impact measurement on substantial data such as crime and unemployment rates.

#### **Recommendations:**

- In order to address the prior needs of the communities regarding the peacebuilding and social cohesion needs, it is recommended for future programming, to select the least stable and most vulnerable community as operational area, e.g. the East Coast, which is known as main area of conflict between Indo- and Afro Guyanese with high rates of violent incidents.
- In order to enhance a proper and detailed planning it is advisable to select a smaller geographic area: Instead of 5 regions, one or two regions could be selected. This would enhance not only a more detailed planning but as well more efficient implementation and last but not least an improved impact measurement on substantial data such as crime and unemployment rates and the level of perceived segregation between ethnic groups.
- For future programming a mapping of communities according to criteria of vulnerability and prone to conflict should be conducted prior to programme implementation. This way continued imbalance regarding the flow of resources can be avoided. This is one important instrument of conflict sensitive programme implementation as cross cutting approach.

## 5. Coordination and Coherence

The EPTSI Programme was aligned in detail with the different UN strategic frameworks for Guyana: The expected outcomes of the Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP).

The supporting management and supervising structure of the EPTSI, comprising the Outcome and Project Board was assuring further coordination and streamlining of the EPSI with the partner country, the donors and the civil society, as representatives of each of these parties were participating.

## 6. Efficiency

The efficiency criterion can be described as timely and cost effective programme implementation.

There were several delays with regard to the programme implementation:

- Firstly, the recruitment of the project manager took half a year, until March 2009.
- Secondly, the baseline survey, which was planned for the early stage, was done not before March 2010, one year and a half after the start of the programme.
- The contracts for component one with the two Ministries, Labor and Culture, Youth and Sports was signed in Sept/Oct. 2009, with a delay of one year.
- The Ministry of Local Government began implementation with a delay of two years in Oct. 2010 with a remaining project period of one year only.
- Three out of six partnering NGOs started with a delay of ca. one year, at the end of 2009 (Nov/Dec.): St. Francis, Varqua Foundation and Volunteer Youth Corps. The other three NGOs, Youth Challenge, Childlink and Den Amstel, signed the contract another half a year later, in May 2010 with a funding for one year.

According to the mid-term review, the late start was partly reflected in the status of the activity execution and funds disbursement over the project period. However, some delays could be balanced by cumulative action afterwards.

Due to the limited timeframe of this final evaluation, it was not possible to do a budget analysis in order to assess the project's cost efficiency in detail. However, the evaluation found one funds disbursement modality, which had negative effects on the management of the programme: Budget commitments were made to partners without having a written confirmation of the respective donors. The financial contribution of CIDA, which was based on a verbal agreement only and was never released afterwards, caused a funding gap of about 1.5 Mio. Additionally there were expected funds from the UN, which did not materialize. Thereafter, although prior oral commitments had been made to several partners on an extension of funding, funding was terminated. Affected were those partners, mainly Civil Society Organizations, but also the Regional Development Council (RDC) in Region 10, whose written contract covered only the first tranche. However, due to the fact that the verbal communication was not very clear on these circumstances beforehand and afterwards, dissatisfaction and frustrations among partners emerged.

Another challenge for an effective and timely management of project implementation was the high turnover of staff on behalf of UNDP: The project manager had left before the end of his contract, already after ca. 19 months, in November 2010. He has never been replaced due to the above explained shortages of funds, which, at this point of time, had already been allocated to the budget of the government's components.

During the following project period the EPTSI coordinator for component 1 took over additionally the responsibility of the project manager. This was an overburden of tasks and ended up in an ineffective management during the remaining project period.

On the top of this, according to the interview statements, the job descriptions of the two coordinators, whose office's were placed at the two partnering Ministries, for Component 1 at the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports and for component 2 at the Ministry for Local Government, were not very clear. Both parties, the Ministries and the coordinators, had contradictory visions of the coordinator's responsibilities. This resulted in miscommunication and frustrations. (see also chapter on the effectiveness of component 1)

In summing up, considering the different factors such as delays of the start, the management of funds and human resources and time consuming procedures of staff recruitment and contracting partners, the efficiency of the EPTSI Project implementation has to be assessed as low.

## Lessons Leaned

- 1. It is a high risk and can affect the whole project implementation, if funds are taken into account for the project budget, which are not confirmed by written agreements.
- 2. Unclear communication on funds commitments with partners and more specifically raising hopes on incoming funds, which are not assured yet, can cause distrust and negative effects on the relationship with partners and the reputation of the respective organization.
- 3. A project with a budget of 5 Mio USD can not be handled without a project manager.
- 4. Management of personnel requires clear job descriptions not exceeding an appropriate amount of tasks as well as the establishment of a supervising and backstopping mechanism.

## **Recommendations to the International Donor Community:**

• Fund commitments should be handled with care. No promises should be made, before the funds are secured.

## **Recommendations to UNDP:**

• Funds not granted by written agreements, should not be taken into consideration for any project planning. Planning should be done solely on the basis of assured finances.

- In order to have clear communication and coordination structures, all job descriptions have to be outlined in detail. In case of emerging difficulties, mechanism should be put in place to bring about clarification, for example regular meetings with all parties involved etc.
- There should be an in-house reflection among UNDP staff and UNRCO to identify the different causes for the delays and to find out feasible mechanism, how management and timely implementation of projects could be strengthened in future.

## 7. Effectiveness

## 7.1 Component 1: Empowering Youth

This part of the project was multi-dimensional and was sub-divided into two main areas of activities: Firstly vocational trainings and micro-loans for youth at risk and secondly the recruitment and placement of UN Volunteers trained as conflict facilitators to conduct sports and cultural activities for youth, interlinked with NGO's youth programs in the area of peer education, mentoring and recreation.

The overall implementation period was from October 2009 until October 2011. However with the different partners the contracting periods were varying.

The respective Logframe Matrix<sup>8</sup> with the targets and indicators and its achievement status by end of December 2011 is presented on the next page:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The original Logframe Matrix was modified during the project period by the Annual Work Plans (AWPs). The Logframe used in this report is the modified version.

#### **Output 1 Youth Empowerment and Livelihood**

Empowering youth (and particularly women) to participate fully and constructively in governance, and to serve as agents for peaceful change—through expansion of skills training programmes and community participation

	ject modified Indicators (As per IPs):	Project modified Targets (as per AWPs):	Summarized achievement by December 2011
1. 2.	Number of young people who have completed relevant skills training programmes Number of small scale enterprises/self employment created by youth	<ul> <li>900 young people placed in new jobs or begin business or higher education</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>70% achieved; 594 youth received skill trainings (100 KKTC), 267 by MLHSSS, 227 by CSOS)<sup>9</sup></li> <li>Ca. 45 % of those of KKTC and MLHSSS are still employed or receiving further education</li> </ul>
		• At least 1500 people consulted in target regions	- 70% achieved; 1090 persons consulted through the Baseline Survey
		• Consultations held in at least 30 communities	<ul> <li>100% achieved/ exceeded;</li> <li>consultations held in 37 NDCs</li> <li>representing 90 communities</li> </ul>
3.	Number of cross community development projects with youth involvement started / implemented	40 community projects developed	<ul> <li>100% achieved/exceeded;</li> <li>45 community projects developed and implemented by partner NGOs and UNVs</li> </ul>
4. 5.	<ol> <li>Number of cross community cultural and sports programmes initiated</li> <li>Number of community youth facilitators functioning</li> </ol>	• At least 50 youth conversant in community organizing and conflict transformation skills.	- 90% achieved; 45 NUNVs equipped with conflict transformation skills and active as youth facilitators
		<ul> <li>1500 young people participate in peace oriented activities</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>100% achieved/exceeded;</li> <li>ca. 3450 young people received awareness rising in conflict resolution skills</li> <li>-Ca. 2744 youths engaged in sports for peace activities</li> <li>-ca. 2637 youths support by mentors</li> </ul>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Sources for the numbers of trainees are as follows: Reports of Ministry of Labour: 98 trainees in 2010 and 169 trainees in 2011, list of 100 trainees of the Kuru Kuru Training Centre handed over by the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports (this number was as well confirmed by the Kuru Kuru Administrator) and the EPTSI final report 'The EPTSI Project, A Comprehensive Report' by Monica Sharma mentioning another 227 trainees from NGO projects. There is a discrepancy between the total numbers detected by the evaluation of 100 trainees of the KKTC and those of the EPTSI final report, which is calculating a higher number. This could not be cleared up

## A. The Vocational Training

#### Background

Against the background of high employment rates and violent behavior among vulnerable youth, this part of the project's aim was to reduce unemployment and crime rates by education and professional training.

Before the EPTSI project started, the Government of Guyana had made already plans to address this situation by an increase of the number of trainings for young people. Particularly the Ministry of Labor targeted to reach additional 2000 young people per year by training programs with a specific focus on early school leavers and those with an insufficient qualification to get employment or higher education. The objective of the EPTSI project with the focus on youth empowerment fitted very well into these national plans. Through the program the national targets were co-financed und the implementation supported in three areas: **F**irstly the improvement of the training infrastructure and the related governmental institutions, secondly the funding of additional training courses and thirdly the incorporation of new topics into the training curricula such as conflict resolution and life skills.

The contracting periods with the government were as follows: With Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports from October until July 2011 and with the Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security from September 2009 until February 2011. The geographical focus was on all 5 Regions of implementation.

#### Achievements and Results

*Infrastructure:* Under the partnership with the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports (MCYS) the national Kuru Kuru Training Centre received a new resource center, female dormitory enclosure, renovation of the kitchen and refurbished of the training building.

In cooperation with the Ministry of Labor a completely new training center, the Eccles Training Institute was established, furnished and equipped with 16 computers and a kitchen. With the Eccles Training Centre additional 65 training places were created. The Linden Technical Institute got funding for the purchase of heavy duty equipment for specific further education. The institutional bodies, namely the Board of Industrial Training (BIT) and the Central Recruitment and Manpower Agency (CRMA) received computer equipment and supplies. This supported the installment of an interactive webpage for employment seekers, who can apply online.

*Training Courses*: Regularly the Kuru Kuru Training Centre (KKTC) through the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MCYS) is taking ca. 200 students per training course (Number of

during the evaluation. As the number of 100 was confirmed independently by 2 parties, the report is based on this result.

graduates: In 2010, 200 [133 male; 67 female] and in 2011, 234 [162 male; 72 female]). The training cycle is from October to July and is organized as residential programme. The trainees get a full stipend. The application procedures comprise a written application and an entry test. The following professional areas are covered: Business Studies, carpentry, joinery, motor mechanics, masonry, plumbing, garment construction, welding, and electrical installation. Additionally the students are trained in entrepreneurship skills, how to develop a business plan, accounting, life skills and HIV prevention. They do not get micro-credits at the end of the training, but tools and are brought into contact with micro credit institutions and they can apply for a credit.

According to the statement of the administrator of the Kuru Kuru Training Center, the total number of trainees was not increased under the EPTSI, but 100 trainees from disadvantaged communities were sponsored by the project. However, the Ministry plans to increase the numbers each year in 2012/13 up to 275 and in 2014 up to 300. The renovation of the infrastructure financed through EPTSI is supportive to reach this aim.

The Kuru Kuru Training Center could afford to hire seven additional staff due to the project: 2 supervisors of the dormitories, 1 social worker, 2 caterers and 2 lectures. Three of them are still employed and became permanent staff members.

Under the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor through the Board of Industrial Training the main focus is on technical and vocational training incl. computer skills (IT), engineering, construction as well as garment and hospitality industry. The training institutions are among others the Linden Technical Institute, Linden Sewing Institute, the Lezon's Professional Sewing School and the under EPTSI newly established Eccles Training Institute. A total number of 98 young trainees graduated in 2010 and 168 young people in 2011 under the agreement with EPTSI. The fields of expertise were mainly: Computer skill, heavy duty operation, auto-mechanics/incl. air conditioning, electrical, mechanics, garment construction, catering and cosmetology.<sup>10</sup> The application procedure is different from the Kuru Kuru Training Center: A written application and an interview, but no entrance test.

**Tracking studies of Trainees:** A comprehensive tracer study of all trainees with a written questionnaire was not conducted by the MCYS. However, the staff is working with a list of the EPTSI trainees. They have been contacted by phone in February 2012. Results are as follows: Out of the 100 trainees, 45 % did not respond. Out of the remaining 55%, 60 % are employed or participating in further education. This means that at least 30% of the 100 trainees are engaged.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> In 2011, 21 persons completed auto air conditioning training, 9 persons electrical, 10 persons in mechanics, 28 persons in catering ('Grove/Diamond'-Training), 10 persons in Cosmetology, 36 persons IT training and 29 catering (Eccles Training Center), 25 persons completed the garment construction training programme.

The Board of Industrial Training conducted recently a tracking survey on the employment status of the trainees and has set up a database. According to the results an average percentage of 42% are employed. In summing up, the average employment rate of the former trainees is at ca. 36 %.

**Review of training Curricula:** Under the EPTSI additional modules on life skills and particularly on conflict resolution were incorporated into almost all training programs. Lectures were given to the teachers partly by the EPTSI Project Manager, partly by a hired consultant. According the statements of the respective Ministries and the BIT they have revised their curricula and integrated these new topics into the regular training programme.

The interviewed representatives of the governmental institutions are broadly satisfied with the EPTSI programme and feel that it contributed to reach the national targets in the field of youth employment and addressing the needs of vulnerable youth. The new topics of conflict resolution, anger management and self empowerment are appreciated and regarded as supportive and important especially for the youth at risk.

The majority of the beneficiaries interviewed stated as well their satisfaction with the education in terms of content and facilities: Overall they feel well equipped by the respective trainings. Additionally to the vocational skills, they highlighted to have received lectures on the following topics: Communication, HIV prevention, entrepreneurship, how to develop a business plan, mathematics, English and conflict resolution skills. All these topics were perceived as useful.

A few critical remarks were made:

- The cooperation and communication between the Ministries and the UNDP staff, who were placed in offices at the Ministries, were overshadowed by unclear job descriptions and role confusion on responsibilities. This was felt particularly after the EPTSI Project Manager had left (see also chapter on Efficiency).
- The administrator of the Kuru Kuru Training Center stated that the majority of the students are not belonging to the vulnerable group of school leavers or those, who left school without a sufficient qualification to find employment or to start further education. This is due to the fact that the application procedure with the entry test is hindering the vulnerable young people to be successful. Consequently there were very few vulnerable youth at the centre.
- The teachers of KKTC stated that the conflict resolution skills were meant more to support their own morale and to help them in their roles as a teacher and less as a training topic to be delivered to the students.
- Some of the students did not receive the conflict resolution skills at the Kuru Kuru Training Center and at Eccles Training Institute.

 The trainees under the BIT criticized that they were not trained on how to apply for a new job and were not informed on the possibility of the online database of vacancies and how to use it. Furthermore during the training they were not brought into contact with potential employers. They also feel that they need more professional experience than only theoretical training, as most employers ask for experience. One interviewee stated that she has applied as single parents for a loan to set up her own business, which is offered by the MLHSSS for single parents. She has never received a response.

## Conclusions

Overall there are several positive effects of the vocational training component: A total number of 594 youth<sup>11</sup> received vocational training and the majority of those interviewed is satisfied with skills acquired. About 36% (rough estimate) of the trainees have received an employment or started higher education afterwards.<sup>12</sup>

Relevant topics to promote social inclusions were brought into the training curricula on conflict resolution, anger management and life skills.

Several achievements have been made to improve the vocational training infrastructure: By the up-grading of training institutes with equipment, through setting up a data-base for tracking of former trainees and the establishment of a webpage for job seekers.

However, it has to be assessed critically that the Kuru Kuru Training Center has reached very few vulnerable and the total number of trainees has not been increased under the EPTSI. The 100 trainees funded by the project, were part of the regular training programme and not additionally recruited. There was no evidence that the target of providing a micro-credit scheme for the best trainees at Kuru Kuru Training has been implemented.

The quantitative target of a total of 900 youth in new jobs or further education could not be realized. In order o reach the target of 900 young people in new jobs or further education, a much higher number must have been gone through training programs: A rough estimate is that a minimum of at 1500 young people have to be trained to reach the target of 900 youth placed into a new job or higher education. As the program did not work with the target of reaching this amount of trainees, the number of 900 seems to be over ambitious.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Sources for the numbers of trainees are as follows: Reports of Ministry of Labour: 98 trainees in 2010 and 169 trainees in 2011, list of 100 trainees of the Kuru Kuru Training Centre handed over by the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports and the EPTSI final report 'The EPTSI Project, A Comprehensive Report' by Monica Sharma, mentioning another 227 trainees from NGO projects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The breakdown of those, who started higher education and those who are employed was done only by the MCYS tracer study: Ca. 20 % are employed and 10 % are at educational institutions. The numbers can be regarded as rough estimate only. Many did not respond or have changed their address.

Finally, conflict resolution training was not delivered to all students and several trainees assess the trainings insufficient with regard to the support, on how to get employment or set up a start up business afterwards.

## **Recommendation for future programmes:**

It is advisable to do a more detailed research beforehand on the specific proposals submitted by the partners and how far they are appropriate to reach the specific target groups, e.g. vulnerable youth.

Monitoring should be strengthened on the different levels of the program to assess, how far the inputs at the Ministry level e.g. in terms of curricula development and application for loans, is broken down to the students.

If there will be future programs in the field of vocational training, a stronger focus should be on those training topics preparing the students to find an employment afterwards: How to apply for a job, a mentoring phase after the training in which the students get practical support in finding employment, internships at firms to get practical experience, organization of fairs with firms to bring into contact employers and employment seekers and more support to provide micro-credits for start-up businesses.

It is recommended to define the targets within the Logframe Matrix less ambitious. It is more advantageous for the reputation of the project, if the targets are moderate and are reached or even exceeded at the end than not achieved.

## Lessons learned

- If programmes of vocational training for vulnerable youth should be successful, it requires a strong focus on how to find employment afterwards: How to apply for a job; a mentoring phase after the training, in which the students get practical support in finding employment; internships at firms to get practical experience; the organization of fairs to bring into contact employers and employment seekers and more support to provide micro-credits for start-up businesses.
- 2. In order to reach the most vulnerable as a target group, specific strategies are necessary such as to examine critically the entrance conditions of projects and if they can be met by the target group representatives.
- 3. Less ambitious targets within the Logframe Matrix, which will be reached are more advantageous for the project's reputation.

## B. Community Level Youth Empowerment

## Background

The background of this component was the finding that young people and especially those of disadvantaged communities need not only employment, but also psychosocial support and possibilities to participate in recreation and cultural activities. The aim is to offer positive alternatives to destructive behavior such as gang involvement, drugs, violence and crime. As a cross-cutting issue the inclusion of all groups regardless ethnicity, religion and race is promoted.

The implementation strategy for this sub-project was twofold: Firstly by the cooperation with partnering Youth NGOs, which were funded to implement specific youth projects and secondly by the recruitment and placement of National United Nations Volunteers (NUNVs) at these NGOs. In addition a few other selected institutions were supported by NUNVs such as a sports club or a chamber of commerce.

The contracting period of the volunteers was from October 2009 until October 2011.

Due to the placement of the UNVs the activities of the host organizations, mainly NGOs, and the United Nations Volunteers are closely linked.

Institution	Areas of activities	Funded Project Period	Num- ber of NUNVs	Geo- graphic Region
Den Amstel Residence for Change (NGO)	Organizing cross-community workshops and peer education on best practices in parenting for mothers, fathers, and other care givers, including alternatives to physical punishment and other forms of violent behavior	May 10 - May 11	1	3
Every Child Guyana (formerly Childlink Inc.)	Empowering youth at risk from St. Winifride's Secondary, St. Mary's Secondary, Dolphin Secondary, Tutorial High and Houston Community High School with life skills and conflict resolution to create more violence free schools	May 10 - May 11	2	4
Varqa Foundation	Promoting literacy & numeracy, the arts (dance, theatre and music) among youth; training of selected youth as youth leaders in the promotion of literacy and conflict resolution	Dec. 09 - Nov. 10 (ended earlier)	7	4
Volunteer Youth Corps	Empowering at-risk youth from Lodge and Tucville High Schools to serve as agents for peaceful change within their respective communities; providing relevant vocational skills training to unemployed youth and single mothers	Dec. 09 - Nov. 10	3	4
Youth Challenge Guyana (NGO)	Equipping youth with conflict transformation and employability skills; one specific project worked with the production of thematic video clips on social inclusion as competition	May 10 - May 11	3	4
Help & Shelter	Working against all types of violence, especially domestic and sexual violence and child abuse	Not funded	1	4
Red Thread	Bringing together women of African, Indian, and Indigenous descent, across race divide and working on women rights and skills developments	Not funded	2	4
Men Empowerment Network	Mobilizing men of all ethnicities to take up their responsibilities in ending violence, and become change agents and building blocks of society	Not funded	1	4
SASOD – Soc. Against Sexual Orient. Discrimi- nation	Supporting equal rights for all persons and fighting all kinds of discrimination and in particular those based on sexual orientation	Not funded	1	4

The following matrix gives an overview on the project implementation strategy:

Institution	Areas of activities	Funded Project Period	Num- ber of NUNVs	Geo- graphic Region
Den Amstel Residence for Change (NGO)	Organizing cross-community workshops and peer education on best practices in parenting for mothers, fathers, and other care givers, including alternatives to physical punishment and other forms of violent behavior	May 10 - May 11	1	3
Every Child Guyana (formerly Childlink Inc.)	Empowering youth at risk from St. Winifride's Secondary, St. Mary's Secondary, Dolphin Secondary, Tutorial High and Houston Community High School with life skills and conflict resolution to create more violence free schools	May 10 - May 11	2	4
Amerindian Student Hostel – Corriverton	Supporting interior students/indigenous villages for example by providing accommodation for students from remote areas to get education and training.	Not funded	1	6
Corentyne Chamber of Commerce	Promoting charity initiatives, sponsoring of sports tournaments and youth work	Not funded	1	6
Probation Department, (MLHSS) Whim	Offering support to families by counseling in cases of marital conflict, neighbor disputes, domestic violence, providing social services for survivors of abuse and violence	Not funded	2	6
Rose Hall Town Youth-Sports Club	Facilitating sports, youth development and charity community development and anti-drug initiatives	Not funded	1	6
St. Francis Community Developers	Providing community developmental activities, while securing democratic citizen participation in public dialogues for conflict resolution	Dec. 09 - June 10	9	Across Region 6
Regional Democratic Council (RDC)	Facilitating sports for peace initiatives and building cross community relations	June – Oct. 10	7	10, mainly Linden

## **Achievements and Results**

According to the interview statements and reports a total number of 45 so-called 'community projects' were developed and implemented by partner NGOs and UNVs. Numerous had a cross-community scope, including young people from different ethnic backgrounds. The term 'community project' is referring to different kinds of ongoing community activities. The thematic focus of these projects was covering all types of children and youth concerns: From recreation activities such as sports and cultural events to livelihoods, employment skills incl. literacy and numeracy and last but not least psychosocial support, mentoring and counseling for prevalent problems such as aggressive behavior, gang involvement, sexual abuse and drugs. One main emphasis was conflict resolution and alternatives to violent behavior. These topics were incorporated into all activities as cross-cutting issues.

The geographic concentration of this part of the project was, out of the 5 regions, in Region 4, 6 and 10 with one exception: The NGO Den Amstel was operating in Region 3.

As complementary activities two further elements were integrated into the cooperation with the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports: The development of the national policies on youth and sports with a new focus on conflict resolution and social cohesion as well as the renovation of 12 sports facilities.

The results of the above described projects can be summarized as follows:

- ca. 3450 young people received awareness rising in conflict resolution skills
- ca. 2744 youths engaged in sports for peace activities
- ca. 2637 youths received support from mentors in order to cope with problems within families at school or on the job
- 25 Peer educators were trained by a cross-community workshop in Den Amstel including Den Amstel, Blankenburg and Hague, on best practices in parenting skills and particularly on alternatives to physical punishment and other forms of violent behavior. The 25 peer educators delivered counseling and awareness rising on these topics to their respective communities and multiplied the skills.
- Disadvantaged youth from St. Winifride's Secondary, St. Mary's Secondary, Dolphin Secondary, Tutorial High and Houston Community High School in region 4 were supported by youth clubs, mentoring and counseling services through peer educators to create a more violence free school. During the evaluation beneficiaries explained that especially the mentoring and counseling service has helped them to overcome difficult situations, which they had within their families and at school. One girl stated that she was able to stop her aggressive behavior due to the support of the mentors. Afterwards she became a mentor herself for younger children.
- 9 Community projects in region 6 were supported across region 6, comprising livelihoods, child care, cultural and sports activities for peace. Several activities had a cross-community approach and included neighboring communities.
- In Tigerbay, a disadvantaged community within Region 4, dance, theatre and music as well as conflict resolution skills was offered to children and youth at risk. Youth leaders were trained to take care of minors.
- Youth at risk from Lodge and Tucville High Schools were empowered by vocational and conflict resolution skills to serve as agents for peaceful change within their respective communities in region 4.
- A group of 74 youth from Georgetown were trained in life skills, leadership, computer skills, accounting and conflict resolution. The trained youth delivered the skills to their respective communities. In addition two events were realized: A career workshop in Albouystown and a movie night in Agricola. During the latter the film Hotel Ruanda was presented with a follow up panel discussion on ethnic conflicts and options of nonviolent conflict resolution.
- Volunteers attached to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC) of Region 10 worked closely with 5 communities at the respective community centers spreading sports for peace initiatives and building cross community relations. According to the interviews it

could be achieved by the ongoing efforts of the UNVs that for the first time young people were integrated into the boards of the community centers, which was not possible before.

- NUNVs working at the Red Thread organized a summer camp for youths from 3 disadvantaged communities in Georgetown together with youths from Region 10 in a cross-community initiative.
- In cooperation with the University of Guyana, Centre for Communication Studies young people from 5 communities in region 4 were trained in the scripting and production of short videos on social cohesion and peace in Guyana. These videos were launched on YouTube for a video competition and broadcasted on national TV.
- One major achievement was the 'human resource development' with the national UNVs: They were recruited from various regions and backgrounds. The education and the work experience were not the main criteria, but the potential to become a youth leader. Several candidates were selected from disadvantaged communities in order to strengthen their capacities and get them involved as agents for change within their communities. At the University of Guyana all UNVs received a comprehensive training with a strong focus on peacebuilding. In the interviews the majority of them stated that they are satisfied with the training and could use the acquired skills during their engagements as UNVs and also beyond. Some of them said that it was the chance of their life to become a UNV: Due to the work experience they could develop their skills and with the new responsibilities, they felt acknowledged as valuable member of the society.
- Out of the 45 UNVs, some got employments afterwards in good positions: Out of the 9 volunteers working under the umbrella of St. Francis Community Developers, 4 are still employed as outreach or administration officers, one became the Vice President. Another is working at the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports and one is still employed at Childlink. Several are still working at the same host organization, either as volunteers or as employees and others are self-employed.<sup>13</sup> They are building on their experiences and continue to use their conflict resolution skills in their professional and private environments. This is contributing to the capacity building of the human resources of the country will have longer term effects.
- As new and essential topic conflict resolution skills were introduced to the host organizations and to the communities. The interviewees of the host organizations said that they continue to use these approaches within their youth activities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Due to the limited timeframe of the evaluation, it was not possible to assess the exact number of those volunteers, who are employed and in meaningful positions. It would be worth for UNDP to do a tracking survey on this as a follow-up activity.

- The EPTSI project was instrumental to integrate conflict resolution and social cohesion into the drafts of the national Youth and Sports Policies.
- 10 sports facilities have been renovated.

Overall it can be stated that a major strength of the program was the multi-dimension approach to empower youth and youth at risk. Particularly strong inputs were the different counseling services offered to persons in need over a longer period of time in combination with the concepts of setting up mentoring structures through volunteers and peers; the conflict resolution skills, which were brought as a new element to the host organizations and to the communities; the approach of placing personnel, the UNVs, as locally acting driving forces for behavioral change; the sports for peace strategy and last but not least the crosscommunity approach. Furthermore the quantitative targets regarding youth involved in peace activities was exceeded by far: A total of approximately 8000 young people were reached instead of the targeted 1500.

# **Constraints and challenges:**

However, some critical issues were raised during the interviews:

- The communication on the part of UNDP with the NGOs and the Regional Democratic Council was partly unclear. Funds were promised orally and then not delivered according to verbal commitments. This happened in case of the St. Francis Community Developers and the RDC of Region 10. The written contract covered only the first tranche of the verbal agreement. The first tranche was transferred accordingly, but then the cooperation ended without a clear communication on the reasons (see also chapter on efficiency).
- The interviews gave evidence of the fact that there was a gap with the management of the UNVs: The placements at the host organizations were not fully done according to the expectations and wishes of the UNVs and the host organizations and there were un-clarities on the responsibilities, reporting structures and the respective job descriptions. Last but not least the supervision was insufficient, although UNDP had tried to set up a supervising structure for example by employing a regional coordinator at Region 10. Other complaints were referring to the fact that the UNVs did not receive training certificates and to the comparatively high salaries. The latter caused envy among colleagues in some projects. A consequence of the shortfalls in terms of preparation, job description and supervision were conflicts on different levels: Between the host organizations and the volunteers, the host organization and UNDP as well as between the volunteers and UNDP. In some cases the cooperation was terminated before the end of the contract. One of the main reasons for the coordination gaps was the early departure of the Project Manager at the end of 2010 and the fact that he has never been replaced. Another contributing factor was the

selection criteria of the volunteers, who partly had no work experiences, came from difficult social backgrounds themselves and would have needed intensive guidance. Furthermore UNDP had no experiences with the human resources management of such a scope with 45 young people. On the part of the host organizations the role of the UNVs were partly misinterpreted as cheap labor for all kinds of works (see also chapter on efficiency).

- The capacities of the NGOs were very different with regard to their performances. Some did not reach the targets defined in their work plans and the efficiency has to be judged as low.
- The geographic selection for the UNV component is questionable. There is no specific strategy, why out of the 5 regions only 3 were selected for this part of the project. The implementation strategy was not aiming at coherence and inter-linkages between the different sub-projects. There was only one meeting with all partners at the end of 2011 and no regular meetings with the UNVs.
- There was no visible strategy to set up longer term structures and no exit strategy with the aim to hand over the started projects towards the end of funding period. The main focus was one time events, which might have an impact, but on a superficial level. For example a cross-community football tournament is a good way to bring communities together and increase the contacts among the people with different backgrounds, but it will not really make a difference on the long run, if there is no continued effort.
- The project funded an international consultant to support the process of drafting the youth policy. According to the interviews at the Ministry this person had not the expertise to complete the draft according to the expectations of the Ministry<sup>14</sup>. The finalization is still pending on the part of the MCYS.
- There was no strong rights based approach under this component. Although it was an implicit assumption that children and young people have specific rights such as receiving education, growing up in a safe environment and to participate, no explicit strategy was developed to address these topics and use them as instruments to empower young people and youth at risk.
- During the evaluation sports facilities were visited, two of them were not completed, namely Silver City Secondary School and Bushlot Secondary School: The basketball stands and boards are not installed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> It could not be clarified during the evaluation if this occurred due to a lack of expertise of the consultant or if other factors played a role such as miscommunication between the Ministry and the consultant for example.

## **Recommendations for future programmes:**

- Communication lines should be improved with partners. It is very important not to raise any expectations towards partners before the funds from donors are granted. In case of misunderstandings there should be the openness to clarify issues before it ends up in having former partners disappointed and frustrated damaging the reputation of UNDP.
- In view of the limited staff and management capacities at UNDP, the program was too complex in terms of number of UNVs, number of partners and coverage of geographic regions. For future programs it is recommended to select an easier manageable scope, for example by a smaller geographic area according to criteria of vulnerability and crime rates e.g. the coast region between the two rivers, which is known as being a main area of ethnic tensions with high crime rates and vulnerability. In smaller geographic regions it is much easier to control the implementation and to measure the impacts on hard indicators such as unemployment and crime rates, as DFID had requested. Another advantage of a smaller scope is that is easier to do a proper baseline survey. Furthermore, with a strong baseline containing objective data, it is easier to assure a balanced flow of resources. This is a basic and important principle of conflict sensitive programme implementation as cross cutting approach (see also chapters on planning and efficiency).
- There should be a strong and systematic focus on exit strategies and building longer lasting structures, which are most likely to continue after the program has ended such as youth clubs, small committees at schools and community centers for peer education and counseling and dispute resolution, in which youth can organizes themselves and continue with the main activities on their own. The same should be applied with the cross community approach by setting up cross community boards or committees for specific activities so that there are structures in place, which have the capacities to continue independently.
- It should be clarified, why the two sports facilities have not been renovated and possibilities should be elaborated to finalize this part of the project.

## Lesson learned:

Projects aiming at social changes needs a long term orientation: It is necessary to build up longer lasting structures which are most likely to continue after the program has ended and such as small committees at schools and community centers for peer education, counseling

and dispute resolution, which can be continued by the target groups on their own and officially handed over at the end of the project period. The same is valid be for the cross community approach: Cross community boards or committees for specific activities are important structures, which have the capacities to continue independently.

# 7.2 Component 2: Enhancing Community Dialogue and Social Cohesion

# Background

This part of the program comprised a community based approach in order to promote social cohesion and peacebuilding on the local level by the establishment of local structures for conflict resolution. The main implementing partner was the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (MLGRD).

The implementation period was one year, from October 2010 until October 2011.

The prior project plans for this output were changed during the project implementation: Firstly the part of the community baseline survey on communities at risk and local conflicts was shifted to output 1. Secondly the original emphasis on conflict resolution and the development of 'Community Safety Plans' was changed in favour of 'Community Development Plans' (CDPs) due to negotiations with the government. The Ministry for Local Government advocated for a stronger focus on economic aspects of community development as prior need for the community and the strengthening and reactivation of local government structures on the Neighbour Democratic Council (NDC) level and beyond. At the community level so-called Community Development Councils (CDC) are existing, but the majority is not functional and the NDCs have limited capacities. Subsequently, the government had an interest to reinforce the local government institutions by either reactivating the CDCs or creating new structures, which could be responsible for the implementing of local development activities such as EPTSI and take over as well a general monitoring role, as a so-called 'oversights mechanisms'.

The respective modified Logframe Matrix with the targets and indicators and its achievement status by end of December 2011 of is presented below:

Output 2 Enhancing Community Dialogue and Social Cohesion Enhancing local capacity for participation in governance and in the development of initiatives to resolve conflicts and contribute to community security			
Project modified Indicators (As per AWPs):	Project modified Targets (as per AWPs):	Summarized achievement by December 2011	
1. Number of community led forums for dialogue and resolution of differences	25 community development	- 23 community dialogues held in 5 regions with 819 residents participating	

2. Number of community development programmes created and accepted through inter/intra community participation	programmes established in 5 regions (with a focus on gender mainstreaming)	<ul> <li>- 90 % achieved; 23 Community Support Groups (CSGs) established in 5 regions with 82 members contributing to the development of Community Development Plans</li> <li>- 23 community development programmes developed comprising economic projects and social activities</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>3. Number of women who are empowered to play an active role in their communities (e.g. Representation on community councils, gainfully employed, reporting crime).</li> <li>4. Number of persons (male and</li> </ul>	25 community oversight mechanisms established or re established in 5 regions;	<ul> <li>- 90 % achieved. From the 23 Community Support Groups, 27 supervisors were nominated to be responsible for the monitoring of the community development programmes under EPTSI and other governmental projects</li> <li>- 186 were trained under this component with MLGRD on conflict resolution</li> </ul>
female) trained in conflict negotiation and transformation Targets (as per Project document):	3000 persons (1800 female & 1200 male) from 5 regions trained in conflict negotiation and transformation skills.	- 70% achieved; another 2000 persons made aware of the basics in conflict resolution at the community levels through the 35 community dialogues conducted in 2009

## **Achievement and Results**

On the basis of the available data at the two Ministries, MLGRD and MCYS, and several consultations between UNDP and MLGRD the selection criteria were developed as of:

- 1. The population size: Communities must have a minimum of 1000 residents, merged communities should have 1400 and hinterland communities 300 residents.
- 2. Ethnic representation: A balanced ethnic presentation of the two main ethnic groups, Afro and Indo Guyanese, under consideration of the different settlement patterns in the geographic regions
- 3. Prevalence of conflicts and or social issues including domestic violence, unemployment, drug abuse and petty crimes
- 4. Existence of community leaders and volunteers willing to engage
- 5. Communities that demonstrate the need for establishment of safe community space as a prime mean for resolving conflict/social issues and promoting peace at the community level, but also include, community resource centres, grounds, counselling facilities and libraries.
- 6. Where feasible and geographically strategic, communities identified within the communities sampled by the EPSTI Baseline Survey will be selected.
- 7. Communities that have not previously benefitted from considerable developmental support.

According to these criteria the communities were selected across the 5 Project Regions and 23 community dialogues were held with 819 residents participating. During these dialogues it became evident that there were very few locally functioning structures beyond the NDCs, which could be in charge of the EPTSI implementation on the local level. The officially

existing Community Development Councils were not active anymore. Subsequently, Community Support Groups (CSGs) were formed on the basis of nominations and elections. The work of the members is fully done on a voluntary basis. The groups are as follows:

- Uitvlugt, Stewartville, Zeelugt/Tuschen, Bagotville and La Grange in Region 3
- Bee Hive / Clonbrook, Anns Grove / Two Friends, Victoria, Timehri, Soesdyke, Foulis, Paradise and Elizabeth Hall (Melanie Damishama) in Region 4
- Hopetown, Bush Lot and Trafalgar / Union in Region 5
- Alness / Ulverston, Palmyra / No.2 and Sheet Anchor / Cumberl in Region 6
- Canvas City (Half Mile), Wisroc (Block 22), no.58 / Great Falls, Wiruni in Region 10

Together with 99 NDC leaders, 87 group members, a total number of 186 persons, were invited to the MLGLD and received training on conflict resolution, project management, accounting and all matters concerning the formalization of the group such as registration, bank account and constitution.

According to their mandate, the 23 Community Support Groups drafted their Community Development Plans (CDPs) considering the prior needs of the communities, which were identified during the dialogue sessions. The priorities outlined in the plans are mainly small scale economic activities such as pig rearing, poultry and plant nursery, diverse skill training programs and a few sports and cultural activities. The target groups are predominantly youth at risk, single parents and women.

21 groups have been officially registered under the MCYS and these 20 groups have received an official sign that read 'the name of the group...Community Safe Space'. This is indicating the official status and will help to raise the awareness on the activities among the population.

Out of the total number of 23 groups, 20 started successfully to set up the necessary structures, such as providing office space and furnishing the rooms for the respective project purposes. At the end of January 2012, 50% of the 20 remaining groups have completed the renovation and started with the projects, either small scale income generation activities for vulnerable target groups or trainings such as computer classes or catering. The others were still in the process of setting up the facilities.

The results of the project visits during the evaluation gave a similar picture: Out of the seven groups visited, four have successfully started with the activities and three are still in the preparation phase. According to the statements of the interviewees, the majority is satisfied with the development of the group activities, even if some still have to struggle to set up the facilities. The project site visits gave evidence of successful examples: One CSG is organising a childcare from Monday to Friday afternoon for 72 children, another groups has set up ongoing computer classes and a third is regularly organising sport courses. One interviewee stated that for them one of the most important achievements is that they had the chance to build their own capacities in leadership and community development.

Furthermore the reports and interviews gave evidence of the following results:

- The activities of the groups are serving the whole community with an average number of 1200 inhabitants and are accessible for everyone.
- The majority of the group members are women due to the fact that men used to be more reluctant to engage as volunteers (However the exact data on gender balance within the groups were not documented.) During the interviews a few group members complained on the unwillingness of men. The strong participation of women enhanced to build their capacities in leadership and strengthened their role within the communities.
- Out of the CSGs Voluntary Supervisors were identified, trained and given tools for voluntary monitoring and oversight of community projects, also beyond the EPTSI.
- Concerning the target of awareness raising on conflict resolution at the community level, 186 persons were trained under this output and another 3000 residents were reached through the 35 community dialogues conducted in 2009.
- Additionally two regional sports events for peace were organized with 247 players from 20 communities and the official participation of the UNDP Deputy Representative and the Permanent Secretary of the MLGRD. In Region 5 the event was instrumental to support cross community relations, as the Afro Guyanese CSG Hopetown and the Indo Guyanese CSG Bush Lot worked closely together to organize these events.
- A further additional activity was the conducting of 'community fairs' at regional levels with approximately 3000 residents. The UNDP EPTSI and the social services for single parents, youth and elders of MLGRD at the local level were presented (this activity was originally planned under Output 3 and shifted, see also chapter on Component 3).

Overall it can be stated that the modified project targets have been reached to 90 %. The strength of this output is the sustainable approach. The majority of the groups have the capacity to continue on their own after the end of the project funding. Another advantage is that several groups are ethnically mixed and this will most likely support cross-community cooperation on a long run. According to the statements of the interviewees the cooperation with mixed teams is working well and not causing any problems. Furthermore, the fact that the groups can determine the work priorities in consultation with communities on their own has an effect of 'empowerment' and is contributing to a sense of participation in decision making on the local level.

## However, during the interviews a few constraining aspects were raised such as:

• The focus on conflict resolution was only implemented as a training topic to the group members, but is not a subject of the respective community development plans and the project activities. During the interviews the groups were asked, what the title of sign boards ' community safe space' mean to them and the majority stated that it stands for a comfortable and attractive room, where community members can spend their time and children can do their homework. One interviewee explained that it is referring to the fact that the computers are safely stored, because they have a guard.

No one interpreted the sign in the sense of using the room for dispute resolution, counselling and cross-community activities to improve social cohesion, inclusion and security. When they were directly asked on these issues, the majority said that it would be a good idea to work on this as well, but it would not be an easy task. It would need a long term effort to set up a team of respected and capable community members with counselling and mediation skills and there is the need to cooperate with the police and the probation officers of the respective RDCs. One team thinks that the church leaders would be able to take over these responsibilities. It was evident that this aspect was neglected throughout the project implementation, although it was defined under the selection criteria that a pre-condition for the selection of the communities would be the demonstrated need for safe community space as a prime mean for resolving conflict.

- According to the interviews the ethnic conflicts on the community level between Indo and Afro Guyanese are limited. The majority stated that they have good relationships in general and that the problems are more at the political level, as problems are rising mainly during the election periods. However, there is also the tendency not to talk about these sensitive issues.
- The criteria for the selection of the communities were not very clear and not transparent neither for the communities nor for the donors. From the group members interviewed nobody was aware of it. Different opinions were expressed such as randomly selected, those which have not received support before, political reasons such as to get votes from the communities during the upcoming election. This is critically as some interviewees stated that neighbouring communities are wondering, why they don't receive the same support. This can easily lead to local tensions.
- It was not documented in the reports how the above described selection criteria were applied on each community.
- Furthermore especially the highly conflict relevant selection criteria of 'prevalence of conflict' under point 3 comprised many aspects such as domestic violence, unemployment and drug abuse. This way it left many options open for application.
- The criteria targeting ethnic balance of Afro and Indo- Guyanese were applied more flexible in some cases: E.g. Region 10 was included, although the population is predominantly Afro Guyanese and ethnic tensions between the Indo and Afro Guyanese are not existent. Here, two groups of Amerindians were integrated as well.
- Especially in Region 10 it was criticised that the project became politically instrumentalised, as the MLGLD did not fully consult the RDC during project implementation. It was stated that the direct intervention of the Ministry in the community without the involvement of the duly elected bodies of the region is done by the purpose of strengthening the position of the ruling party PPP in Region 10, as the RDC is at the moment ruled by the opposition. In addition it was outlined by one

community group that there is a risk that the groups themselves become politicized and instrumentalised after a while by the Ministry to act on heir behalf on the local level (see also Chapter on planning). The evaluation could not prove the validity of these statements, but these concerns were raised by several interviewees and are showing the level of distrust towards the government and the level of political polarization of the conflict between the two main ethnic groups.

- The international donors criticized the project plan modification: The topics of security and conflict resolution were changed due to the influence of the MLGRD during the one year lasting negotiations on this output 2.
- Although there was a strong participation of women within the CSGs, there were no specific activities or inputs to support the leadership capacities of women and through this to promote an active role of women in social cohesion and peacebuilding according to the UN resolution 1325.
- Some of the CSG seem to need further support, as there is a standstill for five months, since January 2012 (last monitoring report of MLGRD) until May (evaluation visit): There are still the same issues, which are hindering the start of the project activities such as getting electricity (Bagotville, Block 22) and room renovation (Bushlot).

## **Recommendations for future programming:**

- Within programmes with the primary goal to work on social cohesion and reduce ethnic tensions, the cross community approach should by systematically integrated as cross-cutting issue as it was done by the project in Region 6. With regard to those locations, where distances between communities might hinder this approach, other possibilities should be identified such as intra-community committees.
- Conflict resolution is not an easy topic to implement, if it is intended to become institutionalised on the local level in the form of permanent structures leaving the sphere of the superficial level of awareness rising and basic training. It is necessary to work more intense on this topic, doing research on the local attitudes and necessities, the so-called specific peacebuilding needs, develop specific tailored concepts for setting up mediation committees, equip them with the necessary skills and provide appropriate supervision and monitoring.
- The selection criteria for receiving project benefits are always a crucial and sensitive issue, which can easily promote conflicts itself in every country and social environment. This is even more valid in a highly politically polarized environment as in Guyana. A basic principle of conflict sensitive service delivery is to work with clear and transparent selection criteria throughout project implementation based on objective and independent data. (see above) This is valid for all areas of interventions such as

recruitment of personnel, selection of partnering NGOs, geographic regions or community groups. Subsequently, UNDP should apply this principle by applying clear, transparent and ethnically balanced selection criteria based on objective data. Furthermore, as already described, objective data can help to maintain the own course during the negotiation process with partners. This way the risk that project resources are used along other interests creating new conflicts, can be reduced.

- As ethnicity and ethnic tensions are a taboo to a certain degree, it is advisable for future programming to find ways of specific areas and more indirect approaches towards the conflict relevant topics. A successful example is the conflict resolution skills within the youth programmes of Output 1, which is accepted by everyone. Another possibility is to incorporate conflict sensitivity strategies throughout all UNDP and UN programmes for example by ethnically balanced service delivery with a system of quota. In addition entry points across all sectors and programmes could be used to integrate systematically cross-community approaches.
- A focus on the capacities of women in peacebuilding processes according to the UN Resolution 1325 could be a thematic focus for future programmes.
- The fact that tensions are raising mainly during election periods is showing that politics have a strong influence on social cohesion among the population. Therefore it might be advisable for future programming to work on political party dialogue.
- On the part of the MLGRD it is recommended to support those CSG which have difficulties to get their projects started by guidance and technical input if possible.
   Furthermore regular meetings of all CSGs could be organised to inspire each other and share experiences and to keep up the motivation of the volunteers.

## Lessons Learned:

- 1. A project aiming at social cohesion requires a systematic cross community approach if far distances between Indian and Afro communities are an obstacle other possibilities have to be identified such as intra-community committees.
- 2. Conflicts can be provoked by imbalanced distribution of project resources in every social an environment and even more easily in a highly polarized conflict environment as in Guyana. Therefore it is necessary to work with clear and transparent selection criteria based on objective and independent data as conflict sensitive principle. This is valid for all areas of interventions such as recruitment of personnel, selection of partnering NGOs, geographic regions or community groups.
- 3. In conflict environments, in which ethnicity and ethnic tensions are a taboo, more indirect approaches towards the conflict relevant topics are adequate. A successful

example is the conflict resolution skills within the youth programmes of Output 1, which is accepted by everyone.

- 4. In a conflict environment it is necessary to incorporate conflict sensitivity strategies throughout all programmes for example by ethnically balanced service delivery with a system of quota. In addition entry points across all sectors and programmes could be used to integrate systematically cross-community approaches.
- 5. As it is not a simple task to institutionalize permanent conflict resolution mechanism, a more in-depth approach is required: Doing research on the local attitudes and characteristics, the so-called specific peacebuilding needs, develop specific tailored concepts for setting up mediation committees and last but not least support the selection of respected personalities, who could take over this responsibility, equip them with the necessary skills and provide appropriate supervision and monitoring.

# 7.3 Component 3: Strengthening the Public Discourse

Background

In view of the fact that in Guyana the media are contributing to ethnic tensions and outbreaks of violence especially during election times, this part of the project was aiming at the improvement of the professional standards of media. This means in detail to reduce biased reporting, hate speech and an emphasis on scandals and violence in favour of messages with positive and peaceful content.

Originally there was a second sub-project under this output addressing the low level of information within the communities on the government activities such as public tenders, public works and social service delivery by specific information and media strategies. After consultations with the partnering stakeholders this was shifted to OUTPUT 2 and implemented by the MLGRD (see chapter on Output 2).

Similar to the other project components this output was as well modified several times in the course of the project period. At the beginning it was planned to set up a general media code of conduct, but several media houses questioned the usefulness of such regulations and refused to cooperate. Subsequently, the activities ended at the drafting stage.

The remaining activities in order to strengthen a constructive public discourse consisted of awareness raising workshops with the media during 2009/2010 on issues of conflict sensitive reporting and the support of the Media Monitoring Unit (MMU) under the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) during the election period from August to December 2011.

The Matrix below gives an overview on the respective Logframe and the achievements:

of conflicts		
Project modified Indicators (As per AWPs):	Project modified Targets (as per AWPs):	Summarized achievement by December 2011
<ul> <li>Project modified Indicators (As per AWPs):</li> <li>1. Number of media houses including in their programming positive conflict resolution content and good media practices</li> <li>2. Independent media code of conduct developed</li> <li>3. Number of community awareness programs developed</li> </ul>	Project modified Targets (As per AWPs): 30% improvement in the perception of good media content Independent media code of conduct accepted by 80% of media houses Public awareness campaigns & Conflict sensitive newsworthy platforms	10 % achieved (based on reports of Media Monitoring Unit) Not achieved. However, an election code of conduct was adopted by all media houses Target 3 and 4 were related to indicator 3 and Shifted to Output 2
	Further modified Project targets (as per MOU with GECOM): 50% - 75% reduction in the documentation of serious violations of the signed Media Code of Conduct (MCC)	100% achieved; 10 documented violations of the MCC for the 2011 elections period as compared to 40 during the 2006 period.

# Output 3 Strengthening the public discourse centred on inclusion and the constructive resolution of conflicts

# Achievements

The main result under this component is the professional and independent media monitoring during the election period at the end of 2011. The organization observed all relevant press and broadcasting media during the four months and delivered monthly reports. The reports were based on quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media products and their positive, negative or neutral coverage of the main political parties and the government. Additionally, media practices in terms of ethical standards and professionalism were critically assessed, with specific emphasis on violations of the election media code of conduct, which was approved in 2010 by all media houses (with support of another UNDP program).

According to the statements of interviewees, the activities of the Media Monitoring Unit were instrumental to put pressure on the media and the reporting style. The very positive result is that

• Firstly the violations have reduced to 10 form 40 committed during the election in 2006

• Secondly the violation of the of Section of the Media Code of Conduct that relates to the publication of racially insensitive information (racially inciting/divisive/ discriminative) has reduced from 17 cases in 2006 to two cases in 2011

However, several critical aspects were raised during the evaluation:

• In general the interviewees stated that they do not feel that there is a visible change within the media reporting. However, due to the limited number of interviews this result can not be regarded as representative.

The MMU media reports are stating as well an increase of opinionated news reporting particularly by radio and television and a general trend of a higher level of imbalanced reporting compared to the election period in 2006.

The fact that a part of the media are still unwilling to cooperate on a general media code of conduct is showing that the environment is still political sensitive.

The originally planned activities to strengthen positive media products on the community level were shifted to component 2. Although there had been inputs in this area (see chapter on component 2), there is still a need to improve the media situation on the local level, especially with positive content.

**Conclusion:** The remaining part of this component has reached its target and there is a slight improvement towards less racial reporting at least during the election period. However, with regard to the original ambitious project target to develop and put in place a general media code of conduct, this has not been achieved.

**Recommendation for future programming:** The political conditions should be considered very carefully during project planning. The project targets should be defined less ambitious and more realistic taking into account political and conflict sensitive issues in an appropriate way.

# Lesson Learned

In view of the political conditions in Guyana, it is important to formulate project targets moderate in those areas, which are known of being highly controversial.

# 8. Impact and Sustainability

In this evaluation the term impact is understood as the relationship between the project's objectives and overall goal, that is the extent to which the benefits received by the target groups had a wider overall effect on larger numbers of people in the sector or region or in the country as a whole.

In view of the EPTSI Programme's overall goal to contribute to social cohesion and a peaceful transformation of conflicts in Guyana, it can be summarized that the following influences of

the programme can be regarded as impacts towards a peaceful transformation in the whole country:

Firstly the concepts, skills and knowledge on conflict resolution, which were brought in as a new topic on the political agenda on the various levels of the society in Guyana are most likely to have broader effects on a long run. The partnering agencies have adopted and incorporated these inputs into their programmes and strategies as follows:

- The Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports within the Sports and Youth Policy.
- The Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security within their vocational training curricula for teachers and students.
- The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development equipped the NDC and community leaders of the Community Support Groups (CSG) with these skills.
- The 10 partnering NGOs integrated these topics into their youth and social projects.
- The 45 UNVs received an in-depth training and are partly still using these skills in their private and professional environments.

Secondly the revised election Media Code of Conduct, which was approved by all media houses with the support of UNDP, had a regulatory impact on the media landscape in the whole country. Although this is not attributed to the EPTSI programme, it is closely interlinked with the support of the Media Monitoring Unit under EPTSI. The MMU's activity was based on the Media Code of Conduct and contributed to raise the awareness on the importance of conflict sensitive media reporting, the media's responsibilities and finally the control of the media during the election period. This is highly relevant to the specific conflict setting in Guyana.

The conflict resolution skills, which became regular components within the programmes of the different institutions and organizations are most likely sustainable as well.

Furthermore the interviews held during the evaluation gave evidence of further aspects of the program, which are sustainable to a certain degree:

- At the very first place this is valid for the 20 Community Support Groups. The majority of them will continue with their programmes at the community level without any further assistance and funding.
- The young people, who have acquired skills during the vocational training programmes will benefit of the education on the long run. In case of vulnerable youth, it is most likely that the training supported them to develop future perspectives and reduces the risks of crime, gangs and drugs involvement.

- Similar are the effects of the psychosocial support components with peer education and counseling, which helped youth at risk to reorient themselves.
- The young people, who are elected as board members within the community centers in Region 10, will continue to bring up the concerns of youth into the board meetings and represent the interests of young people.
- The young people participating in the sports for peace activities have gained new experiences and got to know alternatives to destructive behavior.
- Within the Community Support Groups several groups are ethnically mixed, which will most likely have longer term effects of deepening the cooperation and relation between communities of different ethnic backgrounds.

# 9. Conclusions and Recommendations

From 2008 to 2011, UNDP designed and implemented an ambitious programme to respond to the historic ethnic conflict in Guyana. The interventions were implemented over a wide geographic area, covering 5 regions of the country.

In view of the conflict scenario in Guyana, the UNDP EPTSI programmatic response has been judged to be highly relevant in terms of the design of the program as well as the areas selected for implementation, as it addresses main factors of the existing conflict: The lack of future perspectives for young people, the ethnic tensions between Afro- and Indo Guyanese and the media as driving factors of conflict, especially during election times.

Overall, numerous beneficial impacts have been realized from the interventions. During the programme period from 2008 until 2011 the EPTSI programme succeeded in introducing conflict resolution as nonviolent mean of negotiating interests into different sectors and levels of the society. Overall an estimated number of 10.000 people have directly participated in these activities.

The concepts, approaches and skills have been incorporated into the revised national Youth and Sports Policy as well as into the national vocational training curricula under the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security. Apart from the national level, these inputs gained currency also at the medium and local level by partnering NGOs, community centers, sports clubs and community based organizations. As conflict resolution became a regular component within the respective activities and programmes, these results can be regarded as sustainable.

The strategy to use specifically trained personnel, the UNVs, as medium for the delivery of conflict resolution skills and peacebuilding messages, has been instrumental to reach young people and youth at risk in their specific social environments. Several of the UNVs acted as

mediators and as such as role models for the constructive resolution of disputes within their respective working areas.

The placement of the UNVs at different hosts such as NGOs, sports clubs and governmental institutions broadened the effects of their engagement and created linkages with different projects and intervention areas. The target to reach 1500 youth was exceeded by far with ca. 8000 participants. Two specific highlights were video clips on peacebuilding among the ethnic groups of Guyana broadcasted on TV and the community centers in Linden integrating young people as members of the board, which was not done before. In addition a remarkable number of the former volunteers are still employed at the NGOs or at other institutions (one is working at the Ministry for Culture, Youth and Sports), where they are continuing to use their experiences and skills. Another 594 young people, among them youth at risk, received vocational training under the programme. The curricula included additional life and conflict resolution skills. According to survey and tracking studies out of these ca. 45% are still employed or participation in further education.

The community based approach with the successful establishment of 20 community support groups serving an average of 1200 community members per group, is a sustainable project strategy, as the majority of the groups will most likely be able to continue with their activities on the long run without any further assistance and funding. Several of them are ethnically mixed, which will promote inter-ethnic cooperation and contribute to establish longer term relations between divided communities of Afro- and Indo Guyanese.

Last but not least the support of the Media Monitoring Unit during the election period contributed to the regulation of the media, which play a vital role within the conflict situation in Guyana encouraging violence and promoting ethnic division by racial messages and biased reporting.

In summing up, apart from the these positive results, there were several constraining factors, not at least due to the challenging nature of the program aiming at political changes at the national level on highly political and conflict sensitive topics.

One major weakness is the low efficiency of the programme reflected in several delays and postponements and the management difficulties of funds and personnel throughout the project period. This has affected almost all areas of the project: The timely and coherent implementation of all three components, the guidance of the UNVs and the cooperation with the partners and donors.

In view of the management capacities, the project design was too ambitious and complex, covering 5 geographic regions with a broad range of partners on different levels, the high number of additional personnel with the 45 UNVs and with several thematic areas. Subsequently, some targets were not reached: The number of youth placed in new jobs or higher education and the number of youth participating in a micro credit scheme to start their own business.

Furthermore the different components were not implemented synchronically, but one after the other and the geographic operational areas within the 5 regions were more isolated areas of interventions with a high concentration in the cities, than a broader coverage. As a result the programme could not fully use the chances of creating linkages and synergies between the geographic areas and the fields of intervention.

In addition several highly relevant targets to social cohesion and peacebuilding were modified and not implemented as planned due to different circumstance.

As the conducted baseline survey did not provide data on the most conflict prone and vulnerable communities as anticipated, the geographic selection was not done systematically according to these conflict relevant criteria and the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development mainly took over the task of the selection.

On the whole the result was that the project did not succeed in using its full potential to address conflict relevant topics and to operate in those geographic areas, which are the most conflict prone. This had affected the relation with the donor community, which was not fully satisfied with the project's results and how their funds have been spent. According to their view, the government's influence on the target modification was too high.

The rights based approach was more implicit than transformed to an explicit project strategy on the rights of children, youth and women. There was no specific approach to strengthen the role of women in peacebuilding and social cohesion according to UN Resolution 1325.

Finally, regarding the contact with partners it was found that there was a gap in clear communication between UNDP and donors, GoG and partners. The latter was mainly concerning the funding modalities of UNDP, causing frustration with a few partners.

# Considering the above described challenges and constrains, recommendations for future programming are made as follows:

- As the design and the areas of implementation of the EPTSI project are still highly relevant to social cohesion and peacebuilding, the thematic areas could and should be addressed by further projects. This is applying for the focus on youth empowerment as well as cross-community approaches and media development. However, due to the critical opinions of the international donors towards the EPTSI project, it is generally advisable to start with new project concepts, not referring to the EPTSI as successor programme, even if the thematic focus might be continued.
- There should be an in-house reflection among UNDP staff to identify the different causes for the delays and to find out feasible mechanism, how management and timely implementation of projects could be strengthened in future.
- In order to enhance proper planning and in view of the limited staff and management capacities at UNDP, it is recommended to select an easier manageable scope, for

example by a smaller geographic area according to clear criteria such as of being prone to conflict and crime, (e.g. the coast region between the two rivers, which is known as being one main area of ethnic tensions with high crime rates and vulnerability). In a smaller geographic region it is much easier to do a proper baseline beforehand, to oversee the implementation and to measure the impacts on hard indicators such as unemployment and crime rates (as DFID had requested). Furthermore, with a strong baseline containing objective data, it is easier to assure a balanced flow of resources. This is a basic and important principle of conflict sensitive programme implementation as cross cutting approach.

- As ethnicity and ethnic tensions are a taboo to a certain degree, it is advisable for future programming to find ways of specific areas and more indirect approaches towards the conflict relevant topics. A successful example is the conflict resolution skills within the youth programmes of Output 1, which is accepted by everyone. Another possibility is to incorporate conflict sensitivity strategies throughout all UNDP, UN and partner programmes for example by ethnically balanced service delivery with a system of quota. In addition entry points across all sectors and programmes could be used to integrate systematically cross-community approaches.
- The selection criteria for receiving project benefits are always a crucial and sensitive issue, which can easily promote conflicts itself in every country and social environment. This is even more valid in a highly politically polarized environment as in Guyana. A basic principle of conflict sensitive service delivery is to work with clear and transparent selection criteria throughout project implementation based on objective and independent data. (see above) This is valid for all areas of interventions such as recruitment of personnel, selection of partnering NGOs, geographic regions or community groups.
- Conflict resolution is not an easy topic to implement, if it is intended to become institutionalised on the local level in the form of permanent structures leaving the sphere of the superficial level of awareness rising and basic training. It is necessary to work more intense on this topic, doing research on the local attitudes and necessities, the so-called specific peacebuilding needs, develop specific tailored concepts for setting up mediation committees, equip them with the necessary skills and provide appropriate supervision and monitoring.
- There could be a stronger rights based strategy to empower youth and strengthen their participation for example by thematic youth projects such as youth parliaments.
- A focus on the capacities of women in peacebuilding processes according to the UN Resolution 1325 could be a thematic focus for future programmes.

- The fact that tensions are raising mainly during election periods is showing that politics have a strong influence on social cohesion among the population. Therefore it might be advisable for future programming to work on political party dialogue.
- There should be a strong and systematic focus on exit strategies and longer lasting structures, which are most likely to continue after the program has ended, e.g. in the field of youth empowerment such as youth clubs, small committees at schools and community centers for peer education, counseling and dispute resolution, in which youth can organize themselves and continue on their own. The same should be applied with the cross community approach by setting up cross community boards or committees for specific activities.
- It is recommended to define the targets within the Logframe Matrix less ambitious. It is more advantageous for the reputation of the project, if the targets are moderate and are reached or even exceeded at the end than not achieved. In addition the socio-political environment should be taken into account in an appropriate way.
- Funds not granted by written agreements, should not be taken into consideration for any project planning. Planning should be done solely on the basis of assured finances.
- In order to avoid situations, in which partners are disappointed, communication should be very clear, not raising any expectation, which can eventually not be met afterwards.

# Recommendations to finalize the programme:

- It should be clarified with the MCYS, why the two sports facilities have not been renovated and possibilities should be elaborated to finalize this part of the project.
- The status of the implementation of the 50 micro credits for students of the Kuru Kuru Training Center should be discussed with the MCYS, as during the evaluation there was no evidence that this was implemented.

## Lessons Learned:

With regard to the project management:

- 1. Smaller geographic regions enhance a better in-depth planning and implementation as well as monitoring and final impact measurement on substantial data such as crime and unemployment rates.
- 2. It is a high risk and can affect the whole project implementation, if funds are taken into account for the project budget, which are not confirmed by written agreements.
- 3. Unclear communication on funds commitments with partners and more specifically raising hopes on incoming funds, which are not assured yet, can cause distrust and negative effects on the relationships with partners as well as the reputation of the

respective organization. This is valid on different levels: Between UNDP and partners, NGOs and communities and international donors and recipient organizations.

- 4. A project with a budget of 5 Mio USD can not be handled without a project manager.
- 5. Management of personnel requires clear job descriptions not exceeding an appropriate amount of tasks as well as the establishment of supervising and backstopping mechanism.
- 6. It is a risk to work with high level indicators and ambitious targets within the Logframe Matrix. If the targets are not met at the end of the project period, this can affect the reputation of the organization and the relationship to partners. In view of the political conditions in Guyana, it is important to formulate project targets moderate in those areas, which are known of being highly controversial.

With regard to a conflict environment:

- Geographic planning in a conflict environment requires a prior detailed baseline survey with objective data according to conflict relevant criteria to enhance the development of neutral and independent selection criteria and balanced distribution of project resources.
- The placement of trained UNVs at host organizations has been proved as a successful strategy to incorporate conflict resolution as a new topic to the respective institutions. Furthermore young people were reached in their specific social environments.
- 3. Projects aiming at social changes need a long term orientation: It is necessary to build up longer lasting structures, which are most likely to continue after the program has ended such as small committees, which can officially be handed over at the end of the project period and be continued by the target groups on their own. The same is valid for the cross community approach: Cross community boards or committees for specific activities are important structures, which have the capacity to continue independently after the funding period.
- 4. A project aiming at social cohesion requires a long term systematic cross community approach. If far distances between Indian and Afro communities are an obstacle, other possibilities have to be identified such as intra-community committees.
- 5. Conflicts can be provoked by imbalanced distribution of project resources in every social environment and even more easily in a highly polarized conflict situation as in Guyana. Therefore it is necessary to work with clear and transparent selection criteria based on objective and independent data as conflict sensitive principle. This is valid for all areas of interventions such as recruitment of personnel, selection of partnering NGOs, geographic regions and community groups.

- 6. In conflict environments, in which the conflict themes such as ethnicity and ethnic tensions are a taboo, more indirect approaches towards the conflict relevant topics are adequate. A successful example is the conflict resolution skills within the youth programmes of Output 1, which is accepted by everyone.
- 7. In a conflict environment it is necessary to incorporate conflict sensitivity strategies throughout all programmes for example by ethnically balanced service delivery with a system of quota. In addition entry points across all sectors and programmes could be used to integrate systematically cross-community approaches.
- 8. It is not a simple task to institutionalize permanent conflict resolution mechanism on the local level. This requires a more in-depth approach: Doing research on the local attitudes and characteristics, the so-called specific peacebuilding needs, develop specific tailored concepts to set up mediation committees and last but not least support the selection of respected personalities, who could take over this responsibility, equip them with the necessary skills and provide appropriate supervision and monitoring, until they are able to continue on their own.

# Annexes

# **Annex 1: Terms of Reference**

## Terms of Reference Final Evaluation Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion (EPTSI) Project

## 1. Background and context

In recent years, Guyana has made significant strides in consolidating democratic governance, social peace, and development by opening up both its polity and economy. Key steps included reaching agreement on, and continuing the implementation of, comprehensive constitutional reforms, and efforts by all stakeholders to promote greater dialogue and inclusion among the country's different groups in order to advance the socio-economic development of Guyana. In particular, political dialogue and peaceful competition that ushered in violence-free elections in August 2006 were followed by a climate of general stability that saw Guyana successfully host the Rio Group Summit as well as Cricket World Cup West Indies 2007. Between 2003 and 2006, the Social Cohesion Programme, implemented by Guyana with UN assistance, saw the building of national and local capacities for dialogue and for the reduction of inter-ethnic tension. An independent evaluation of the programme in October 2006 determined that the programme had made a contribution to the violence-free election in 2006, and to an increase in the levels of public trust and confidence in the country. The evaluation also recommended that these initial gains needed to be consolidated through a deepening of social cohesion, and trust-building activities, at the community level. The most recent elections of November 2011, can be regarded as another major milestone in consolidating peace and securing violence-free elections.

Notwithstanding, efforts towards greater inclusion and constructive conversation among different stakeholders remain fragile, and in need of continued nurturing and consolidation. In addition, there is a critical need to match many of the reforms which have taken place in the democratic framework of the state with the constant advancement in the economy and reduction of poverty. The country faces many complex challenges such as achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and reducing poverty whilst constructively managing the country's ethnic and social diversity. Guyana's movement from a low income country to a low middle income country is expected to contribute to a more stable environment, in the long term.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signed with the Government of Guyana in August of 2008 a successor project to the Social Cohesion Project of 2003 called the **Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion (EPTSI) Project**. This project was meant to build on the success of the Social Cohesion Programme and recognised that there needs to be sustained interventions to strengthen efforts towards deepening democratic practice and sustainable peace in Guyana. Some sections of the project were designed to be community driven. The project was implemented in Regions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 over a three years period (August 1, 2008 – December 31, 2011). In particular, the project specific aims were to:

- 1. Empower youth (and particularly women) to participate fully and constructively in governance, and to serve as agents for peaceful change
- 2. Enhance local capacity for participation in governance and enhance community security and safety
- *3.* Strengthen the public discourse centered on inclusion and the constructive resolution of conflicts.

The EPTSI Project posited the following Theories of Change in its implementation:

Output 1: - Youth Empowerment and Livelihoods

..involving and preparing youth to be engaged in positive productive activities through hard and soft capacity building reduces susceptibility to crime and violence, and contributes to social cohesion.

Output 2: - Enhanced Community Dialogue and Social Cohesion

..building on and strengthening interventions in promoting inter-ethnic harmony and social cohesion increase trust and securities at the local level.

Output 3: - Reduced Risks

..enhancing communication and information-sharing at the community levels, focusing on inclusion and the constructive resolution of conflicts to convey positive experience and messages, promotes trust and social cohesion.

Since its commencement, the EPTSI Project has executed numerous activities that were implemented by both Government and non-governmental partners. To mention a few highlights, the Project:

- 1) Utilized the National UNV Volunteer Programme to embed volunteers into governmental and non-governmental organizations as peace agents to build institutional capacity of these institutions and to work with communities on youth empowerment and social cohesion.
- 2) Partnered with Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and the Ministry of Labour to reach unemployed, vulnerable youth with employable vocational skills, develop local initiatives aimed at encouraging social cohesion and improved the policy environment for youth and sports activities.
- 3) Partnered with the Ethnic Relations Commission and several local NGOs to undertake community awareness dialogue on peace, conflict resolution and empowerment activities targeting youth, women, community leaders and other local stakeholders.
- Partnered with the Ministry of Local Government to develop and implement Community Development Plans(CDP);

Over the three-year life of the project, UNDP along with DFID, Canadian International Development Agency and the European Union, invested almost US\$5,000,000 to promote social cohesion, improve community perception on safety and security and improve capacity of youth to be meaningfully engaged through livelihood and other empowerment activities.

A project implementation unit at UNDP provided project management expertise with a multidisciplinary core team of 6 persons when at its fullest.

# 2. Evaluation purpose

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the effectiveness and contribution of the EPTSI project in addressing issues of social cohesion in Guyana. This evaluation is also expected to pronounce of the extent to which the EPTSI Project has contributed to the UNDP CPAP Outcome – "Social Cohesion and peace building approaches factored into national development frameworks and integrated into programmes at the national and local level to reduce real or perceived sentiments of insecurity. Due regard paid to gender, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law."

This evaluation will take place at a critical juncture, when UNDP Guyana is operationalising its new five year country programme. A key output of this new country programme is "**National, Regional and Local level Programmes strengthened to support social cohesion and vulnerable groups**". As a result, UNDP intends to use the findings of this evaluation to inform future projects that have similar objectives. In this regard, this evaluation is expected to record and evaluate how UNDP interventions under the EPTSI project have made a difference to individuals, their organizations, and communities. UNDP will continue to support the efforts of Guyana to promote lasting peace and social cohesion and will use and share the findings of this evaluation with all relevant stakeholders to improve the design of future interventions in this area.

## 3. Evaluation scope and objectives

This is a final evaluation of the EPTSI project. A mid-term evaluation was done in February 2011 and the report finalized in September 2011. Since then, several community level activities have been implemented. The project formally came to an end in December 2011. The geographic scope of this effort will be the 5 regions served by the project. Those are administrative regions: 3,4,5,6, and 10.

The evaluation will examine all three outputs of the EPTSI project over the life of the project and will examine all sub-projects and the contribution of these activities to the achievement of the three primary outputs as described in the project document.

The objectives of this evaluation are:

- (1) To assess the contribution of the Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion Project to the promotion of social cohesion and trust building among individuals and groups in Guyana;
- (2) To assess the contribution and effectiveness of the EPTSI project to improved youth livelihoods and empowerment

When finalized, this evaluation is expected to identify those strategies used that were most effective in bringing people and communities together to address real and perceived issues of intolerance and discord, understand the level of effectiveness that was achieved in improving livelihood opportunities for youth, and the extent to which the community development plans contributed to improving the capacity of communities to address issues that can result in social discord and tension. Further, the role of the national UNV volunteers who were embedded as community change agents should be reviewed to identify the significance of their contribution to the overall project results. In conducting this final evaluation, UNDP expects the evaluator to rigorously and clearly apply the UNDP evaluation criteria. These are the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Project's interventions and institutions supported. In addition, UNDP evaluations must address how the intervention sought to strengthen the application of the rights-based approach and mainstream gender in development efforts.

# 4. Evaluation questions

UNDP expects to generate strategic information which can be used to guide and develop future interventions in its democratic governance portfolio. Among the questions to be answered by this evaluation are:

- Were stated project outputs achieved?
- What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended outputs and project outcome?
- To what extent has EPTSI outputs and soft assistance contributed to UNDP Guyana CP 2006-2011 outcomes "Social Cohesion and peace building approaches factored into national development frameworks and integrated into programmes at the national and local level to reduce real or perceived sentiments of insecurity. Due regard paid to gender, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law?"
- Has the EPTSI partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
- What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the EPTSI interventions?
- Which interventions or strategies hold the most promise for UNDP future work in the area of social cohesion, trust building among individuals and communities, youth participation and community capacity development in area of conflict mitigation?
- Were the theories of change correct?

## 5. Methodology

The EPTSI project worked with a wide range of government and non-governmental partners on a gamut of issues that are linked to the three key outputs under the project Results and Resources Framework. Given the dynamic nature of this work, the methodology to be used should capture both the tangible project activities that are or have been implemented but also the effect of the project on the institutions, communities and individuals including National United Nations Volunteers. In this regard, UNDP expects the Evaluator to employ a participatory methodology which consists of the following key elements:

- Documentation review (desk study);
- Interviews;
- Field visits;
- Questionnaires;

- Participatory techniques and other approaches for the gathering and analysis of data;
- Participation of stakeholders and/or partners.

Final decisions about the specific design and methods for the evaluation would emerge from consultations among the programme unit, the evaluator, and key stakeholders about what is appropriate and feasible to meet the evaluation purpose and objectives and answer the evaluation questions, given limitations of budget, time and extant data. This finalized methodology will be detailed in the Evaluator's Inception Report.

## 6. Evaluation products (deliverables)

The key evaluation products the evaluator will be accountable for producing are as follow:

- Evaluation inception report—An inception report should be prepared by the evaluator before going into the full fledged evaluation exercise. It should detail the evaluators' understanding of what is being evaluated and why, showing how <u>each</u> evaluation question will be answered by way of: proposed methods; proposed sources of data; and data collection procedures in the form of an evaluation matrix. The inception report should include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, designating a team member (if relevant) with the lead responsibility for each task or product. The inception report provides the programme unit and the evaluators with an opportunity to verify that they share the same understanding about the evaluation and clarify any misunderstanding at the outset.
- Draft evaluation report
- Final evaluation report.
- Evaluation brief and other knowledge products

## 7. Evaluator Qualifications and required competencies

The evaluator for this assignment must meet the following minimum qualifications, experience and knowledge:

- Masters Degree or PhD in social sciences, conflict prevention, sociology, international relations or relevant discipline
- 7-10 years project evaluation experience in the field of peace and development, conflict management or mediation, conflict prevention, community security issues and/or youth empowerment and livelihood development projects.
- Experience in conducting programmatic (outcome level) or project level evaluation is essential. Prior exposure to terminal project evaluations or summative evaluations. Excellent proven ability to assess, evaluate, analyze and plan strategically. Evidence of previous evaluation work (evaluation reports) will be required.
- Capacity to work closely with multiple stakeholders in a participatory manner; be a good listener with aptitude for details.

- Ability to develop and present electronically generated, useable and user-friendly analytical reports.
- Knowledge of the democratic governance and development challenges of Guyana as evidenced from previous work.

UNDP expects Evaluator to be independent and impartial. Evaluators should be independent from any organization that has been involved in the design, execution, or advising on any aspect of the intervention.

## 8. Evaluation ethics

All evaluations in UNDP must be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) "Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation."

The Evaluator is expected to clearly demonstrate that all necessary steps have been taken to ensure a rigorous evaluation process that confirms with UNEG Evaluation Standards.

Critically, evaluators must ensure that procedures to safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, for example: provisions to store and maintain security of collected information; and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.

## 9. Implementation arrangements

The table below summarises key internal stakeholders in the evaluation process, and their roles and responsibilities:

Stakeholder	Roles and Responsibilities
UNDP Country Office	
1. Kenroy Roach,	Main Role: Ensures the evaluation quality and approves
Monitoring and	evaluation report
Evaluation	i) Prepares ToR
Analyst	ii) Review and take lead in
	approving Inception Report
	iii) Reviews draft and final evaluation
	report and coordinates CO
	feedback to Consultant
	iv) Gives technical no-objection to
	final report from an
	evaluation perspective
2. Vanessa Morris,	Main Role: Contract Management and Support to evaluation
Programme	preparation.
Associate	
3. Trevor Benn,	Main Role: Ensures that evaluation plan and report reflects the
Programme	context and scope of the EPTSI project
Analyst,	i) Reviews ToR and adjusts to
Democratic	reflect the key issues to be
Governance	evaluated
	ii) Provides material guidance to
	evaluator on the technical
	scope of project and provides
	background to project

	management arrangements.
	iii) Inception briefing for Evaluator
	on Project
	iv) Reviews inception report to
	ensure that substantive
	issues are taken adequately
	into account
	v) Advises on stakeholder
	engagement and manage
	stakeholder input into the
	evaluation process
	vi) Provides data necessary for
	thorough evaluation that is
	available at UNDP
	vii) Reviews draft and final reports
	and comment on the
	technical soundness of the
	substantive elements of the
	evaluation.
4. Chisa Mikami	i) Meet evaluator for inception and
and Khadija	final briefing
Musa	ii) Final approval of evaluation
	report

A list of key external stakeholders is provided in the attached Annex B.

## 10. Time-frame for the evaluation process

The total level of effort for this evaluation consultancy is 15 working days over a month as reflected in table below.

Task		Duration	Indicative Date
•	Desk review	2 days (home-country)	April 12 – 13
٠	Briefings of evaluators	½ day (included in in-country mission)	April 19
•	Finalizing the evaluation design and methods and preparing the detailed inception report. The inception report <u>must</u> contain evaluation matrix. See Annex D for template).	2 days (in-country mission)	April 19 – 20
•	In-country evaluation mission (visits to the field, interviews, questionnaires and CO debrief)	6 days (in-country mission)	April 19 – 26
•	Preparing the draft report	3 days (home-country)	April 30
•	Stakeholder meeting and review of the draft report (for quality assurance)	5 days (not compensated), UNDP to circulate report for comments	May 2 – 8
•	Incorporating comments and	2 days (home – country)	May 15

finalizing the evaluation	
report	

In addition, the evaluators may be expected to support UNDP efforts in knowledge sharing and dissemination. Required formats for the inception reports, evaluation reports and other deliverables are included in the annexes of this ToR.

## **11. ToR annexes (will be provided after contract signature)**

- A. EPTSI Results Framework and Theory of Change
- **B. Key stakeholders and partners**—A list of key stakeholders and other individuals who should be consulted, together with an indication of their affiliation and relevance for the evaluation and their contact information. This annex can also suggest sites to be visited.
- C. Documents to be consulted—:
  - Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2011 2015
  - Guyana MDG Progress Report 2011
  - UNDP Guyana Country Programme Documents (2006 2011, 2012 2016)
  - UNDP Guyana Country Programme Action Plans (2006 2011, 2012 2016)
  - o Enhanced Public Trust, Security and Inclusion Project Document
  - o EPTSI Annual Work Plans (2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011)
  - EPTSI Quarterly and Annual Progress Reports (2008 2011)
  - o EPTSI DFID Project Reports
  - Partnership arrangements –Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR), Department for Political Affairs (DPA), DFID, CIDA, and EU, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Local Government, Youth Challenge Guyana, Volunteer Youth Corps, St.Francis Xavier Community Developers
  - EPTSI Monitoring Report
  - EPTSI Capacity Development Assessment of Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports and St. Francis Community Developers
  - o EPTSI Mid-Term Evaluation Final Report
  - Reports on the End-of-Project Partner Review Forums, including the one for NUNVs
  - o UNDP evaluation policy, and UNEG norms and standards
  - Required format for the inception report
- **D. Evaluation matrix** The evaluation matrix is a tool that evaluators create as map and reference in planning and conducting an evaluation. It also serves as a useful tool for summarizing and visually presenting the evaluation design and methodology for discussions with stakeholders. It details evaluation questions that the evaluation will answer, data sources, data collection, analysis tools or methods appropriate for each data source, and the standard or measure by which each question will be evaluated.

## Table A. Sample evaluation matrix

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub- Questions	Data Sources	Data collection Methods / Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis

- **E. Required format for the evaluation report and quality criteria**—the final report must include, but not necessarily be limited to, the elements outlined in the quality criteria for evaluation reports.
- F. Code of conduct.

# **Annex 2: Definition of the Evaluation Criteria**

#### Relevance

Relevance concerns the appropriateness of the programme to the problem to be solved and to the respective prior requirements of the target groups. At the same time it covers the programme's congruence with the respective policies of donor/s. It is tackling as well the planning process and the adequate adaption of the programme to changes in the environment. Key question: Are we doing the right thing to solve the problem?

Efficiency

The efficiency criterion concerns how well the various activities transformed the available resources into the intended results (sometimes referred to as outputs), in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness.

Key question: Are we working cost-effectively?

#### Effectiveness

The effectiveness criterion concerns how far the project's results were used or their potential benefits were realized - in other words, whether they achieved the project purpose. The key question is what difference the project made in practice, as measured by how far the intended beneficiaries really could make use from the products or services it made available.

Key question: Are we achieving the project or programme objectives?

#### Impact

The term impact denotes the relationship between the project's purpose and overall objectives. This is the extent to which the benefits received by the target beneficiaries had a wider overall effect on larger numbers of people in the sector or region or in the country as a whole. In addition, it considers whether the programme/project has had other positive and negative impacts. It includes also the consideration of external factors e.g. changes of terms of trade.

Key question: Are we helping to achieve overarching development goals?

#### Sustainability

The fifth and final criterion, sustainability, relates to whether the positive outcomes of the project are likely to continue after external funding ends.

Key question: Are the results durable?

(see also: OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria, Prime Handbuch InWEnt)

# According to these definitions the guiding evaluation questions of the TORs are categorized under the respective evaluation criteria (in **bold letters**) and further questions are added:

#### Relevance

- Did the project design address the context of conflict prevention against which it was developed (situation analysis and identified conflict drivers)?
- Are the ongoing/planned activities likely to have an impact on peacebuilding?
- Did the services meet the needs of the target beneficiaries (women and youth)?
- Were the theories of change correct?

#### Efficiency

- Were the programmes implemented effectively (timely implementation, on track with plan for activity implementation and fund disbursement; building on synergies)?

#### Effectiveness

- Were stated project outputs achieved?
- What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended outputs and project outcome?
- To what extent has EPTSI outputs and soft assistance contributed to UNDP Guyana CP 2006- 2011 outcomes "Social Cohesion and peace building approaches factored into national development frameworks and integrated into programs at the national and local level to reduce real or perceived sentiments of insecurity. Due regard paid to gender, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law?"
- Has the EPTSI partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
- What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the EPTSI interventions?
- Which interventions or strategies hold the most promise for UNDP future work in the area of social cohesion, trust building among individuals and communities, youth participation and community capacity development in area of conflict mitigation?

#### Sustainability

- Can and will the communities and the governmental institutions continue the initiative and activities of the project after funding has come to an end?

# **Annex 3: Research Tools**

The following matrix gives a more detailed overview on the proposed evaluation methods:

## **1.** Analysis of Documents

The analysis of the documents serves as a first source of information on the programme and its background. It gives an overview on its performance and development. A first quantitative analysis will be done considering the number of target beneficiaries, products and services deliverables. The types of documents among others are: Background papers, project reports and documents, studies, relevant websites.

## 2. Semi-structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews are guided conversations, where broad questions are asked, which do not constrain the conversation, and new questions are allowed to arise as a result of the discussion. The interviewer should go on asking questions which relate directly to the first answers given: Why? How? When? Where? Pro and Con? The set of questions are prepared but open, allowing the interviewees to express opinions through discussion. Questions are generally simple, with a logical sequence to help the discussion flow. The interviews will be used to capture a broad range of aspects of the programme and an indepth understanding of the strength, weaknesses, challenges and risks. It is particularly appropriate to get a more comprehensive understanding of the views of the different interviewees and their background and at the same time on unintended effects of the programme. For this evaluation it is proposed to combine a set of open questions with standardised quantitative questions. The latter are comparable and allow to describe the survey variables by percentage, for example the overall usefulness of trainings on conflict resolution.

# 3. Focus Group Discussion

This is a moderated discussion with a group of 6–20 participants. The procedure is similar to the semi-structured interview, based on a prepared matrix of questions, but open. The time input is approx. 75 minutes. It will be used to get qualitative data and in depth information from a variety of persons with different perspectives that reflect together on a common issue in an open exchange. It serves as well as a participatory element within the evaluation process, as the participants can express their opinion and influence the direction of the discussion. It is suggested to use this method during the evaluation firstly during the field visit with villagers and other groups and secondly at the debriefing on the preliminary results at the end of the field visit. This way different opinions are captured and the results are cross-checked by the respective views of the participants.

# 5. Semi-standardised Observation

A semi-standardised observation can be categorised as predominantly qualitative research tool. The data is collected by close visual inspection of the evaluation object such as meeting, conversation or management procedure according to a thematic focus. However, it allows as well unexpected observations beyond the given framework. This method can be used to gather information on a specific issue in an illustrative way. For example with regard to the planned evaluation, the projects will be visited to observe the environment and the communication of the partners and target groups in order to learn more on the impact of the projects towards peacebuilding.

# Annex 4: Detailed List of Questions

# Relevance

	Essential questions	Interview Partners
1	INFORMATION BASE How solid was the information base at the outset of the programme? Have studies and especially conflict analysis been conducted or used for designing the programme?	UNDP, Partners
2	PROGRAMME DESIGN Is the programme meeting the actual peacebuilding needs in Guyana? How do the target beneficiaries describe the actual prior needs related to social cohesion, security and youth at risk? Has there been a change over the last 3 years? Is the programme adequately addressing these needs? How far is the programme aligned with the policies of the partner country and other donors? Have the underlying 'theories of change' been proved to be correct? Have the implementation partners been selected according to appropriate criteria?	UNDP, implementing Partners, target groups
4	PARTICIPATION Have consultations been made prior to the programme with potential partners, allies and target groups? At which stage and how have they been consulted?	UNDP, implementing Partners, intermediaries
5	OVERALL ASSESSMENT Which recommendations and lessons learned could be derived from the overall planning and design of the programme?	UNDP, Implementing Partners

# Efficiency

Essential questions	Interview partners
TIMELINENESS	UNDP, Implementing
Have the programme activities been implemented on track with the work plans?	Partners, external
If no, what hindered the timely implementation ?	experts
COORDINATION; COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT	
Has the coordination and communication between UNDP and partners been	
effectively organized?	
COST-EFFECTIVENESS	UNDP, Implementing
Which factors were advantageous to work cost effectively?	Partners,
OVERALL ASSESSMENT	UNDP, Implementing
How is the efficiency of the programme to be evaluated?	Partners
Which strengths and weaknesses could be identified?	
Which recommendations and lessons learned could be derived from the experiences?	
	TIMELINENESS Have the programme activities been implemented on track with the work plans? If no, what hindered the timely implementation ? COORDINATION; COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT Has the coordination and communication between UNDP and partners been effectively organized? COST-EFFECTIVENESS Which factors were advantageous to work cost effectively? OVERALL ASSESSMENT How is the efficiency of the programme to be evaluated? Which strengths and weaknesses could be identified? Which recommendations and lessons learned could be derived from the

## Effectiveness

	Essential questions	Interview partners
	Output 1 Youth empowerment and Livelihood	
12	Which measures have been realized with regard to (and are the targets met?)	UNDP, Implementing Partners, external experts, target
	<ul> <li>Vocational skills development to vulnerable youth and male youth at risk?</li> <li>Start-up business, micro loans and employment opportunities to young people?</li> </ul>	beneficiaries, intermediaries such staff of legal
	<ul> <li>Recruitment and placement of UN Volunteers trained in conflict resolution within communities at risk to become engaged in community facilitation?</li> <li>The establishment of community based youth clubs in order to organize cross community activities such as cultural and sport events and small scale development projects.</li> </ul>	institutions, civil society, police, government
	How does the youth perceive these activities per component? In which way have they benefited? What is for them the most important, effective and/or helpful input/effect?	
	How are the selection procedures for participation, if there any? How do the youth themselves describe their motivation for participation?	
	How far are the community members informed on these projects? In which way are they benefiting from the new institutions/structures and what are the most helpful strategies for social cohesion and youth at risk for them? Do they think that the governmental institutions have improved their performance within the last 3 years?	
	How do the governmental institutions and CSOs assess the success and impact of the components t? Did they profit in any way from the project? Please give examples. To which extent are they (RDCs,NDCs,AVCs) actively engaged in conflict resolution ? Do they feel that the relation between government institutions and the villagers has improved?	
	To what extent are the activities already contributing to the defined outcome to reduce the unemployment rate in the target regions and of the youth at risk?	
	Which kind of conflicts and how many could be settled by the facilitators/structures by now?	
	Which first results can be observed regarding reduced tensions within and between the communities?	
	Which problems could not be solved by the project activities and are still hindering positive developments? Which challenges did you encounter and which recommendations would you give for future programming?	
	Output 2: Enhancing Dialogue and Social Cohesion	
3	Which outputs have been delivered until today (and are the targets reached?)	UNDP, Implementing Partners (IP), externa
	<ul> <li>in terms of community mechanism on conflict resolution and dialogue in form of local forums/community councils</li> <li>in terms of functioning community safety plans</li> </ul>	experts, target beneficiaries,
	<ul> <li>in terms of training and awareness rising on constructive dispute resolution at community level with broad stakeholder participation (government, police, CSOs etc.)</li> </ul>	intermediaries such staff of legal
	- in terms of baseline survey to assess the situation in the respective	institutions, civil

	Essential questions	Interview partners
	communities	society, police,
		government, externa
	How do the members of the local forums/community councils for conflict resolution assess the success of their activities? In which way do they contribute to improve social cohesion and security? (examples) What is for them the most important aspect of the project?	experts
	How was the process of setting up the committees? Do they represent the interests of the different groups of the population? To what extent are the ordinary villagers are informed on the activities? In which case would they address the committees (in case of problems/crime/conflict/incident of violence)? How do ordinary villagers perceive the work of these committees and what is for them the most positive effect?	
	How do the different stakeholders, community members, young people and women benefit from the awareness raising activities on conflict resolution and the community safety plans? Have there been visible effects of these activities in the communities? Please elaborate.	
	Has the cooperation between community members and police showing any improvement? Could a decrease of tensions be observed and if yes in which way? Is there a decrease of crime in the communities in question (police records)? Do the villagers feel more secure?	
	How is the perception of the governmental institutions by now? What are the prevailing opinions with regard to their performance and is there a change compared to the point of time before the project has started?	
	Which difficulties could not be addressed by the program? Has the participation of women been strengthened due to the program (representation in committees and forums, rate domestic violence, trust in police)? How do the women themselves see their role and engagement? What is still needed to promote their engagement?	
	Which factors have contributed to achieve or not achieve the project outputs and outcome?	
	Which recommendations would you give?	
	Output 3: Reducing Risks	
4	Which activities have been undertaken with regard to	UN Agencies, implementing
	<ul> <li>Strengthening the capacities of the media with regard to peacebuilding and nonviolent conflict resolution?</li> </ul>	partners, external expert, target beneficiaries,
	<ul> <li>Improving the communication and public awareness at NDC level on service delivery incl. production of information and education material as posters and bulletins?</li> </ul>	intermediaries
	How do the media assess the usefulness of these activities? What is for them the most effective project input? Are the new skills successfully applied by the media? If not what is hindering the application?	

	Essential questions	Interview partners
	To which extent have the media improved their performance towards unbiased and	
	independent reporting according to the statements of experts, ordinary	
	viewers/readers/listeners? (reduced cases of hate speech, level of awareness among	
	journalists, increased number of positive messages, application of code of conduct)	
	How many media are aware of these conflict relevant practices? How many do	
	actively applying these approaches?	
	Which problems remain with regard to media and peacebuilding?	
	Do the ordinary community members are better informed on the functioning of the governmental institutions? Does this contribute to a better relation between villagers and public service?	
	Which problems did you encounter and which recommendations would you give?	
15	Cross-Cutting Themes:	
	To which extent has a 'rights based' approach been implemented throughout the program?	
	How is the participation of women throughout the program in the sense of gender mainstreaming? Are there specific measures implemented to address the concerns of women?	
16	OVERALL ASSESSMENT	
	How is the effectiveness of the different programme components to be evaluated? Which strengths and weaknesses could be identified?	
	Have there been unintended positive or negative effects?	
	Which factors have contributed to achieve or not achieve the project outputs and outcome?	
	Which recommendations and lessons learned could be derived for future programming ?	

# Impact and Sustainability

	Essential questions	Interview partners
17	To which extent have the deliverables of the project a wider overall effect on larger numbers of people in the sector, region or in the country as a whole?	UNDP, intermediaries, ext. experts, target groups
18	Has the EPTSI programme already been instrumental in setting agendas concerning inclusion and social cohesion and its approaches of other organizations?	UNDP, intermediaries, ext. experts, target groups
19	Which approaches within the project are enhancing the continuation of the project activities beyond the project period?	UNDP, intermediaries, ext. experts, target groups
20	Which kind of activities and initiatives and alliances have been created and will continue on their own after financing has discontinued?	UN Agencies, implementing partners, inter- mediaries, ext.experts

## Annex 5: List of Interviewees and Schedule

## Appointment Schedule - 8th May to 18th May 2012

## Tuesday 8th May 2012

10:00 am	Dropattie Sahadeo		
	Administrative Assistant - UNDSS		
10:15 am	Chisa Mikami UNDP		
	Deputy Resident Representative - UNDP		
10:45 am	Kenroy Roach UNDP		
	Monitoring & Evaluation Analyst - UNDP		
11:15 am	Trevor Benn UNDP		
	Governance Analyst - UNDP		
	George Wachira		
	Policy Advisor - UNDP		
1:30 pm	Trevor Benn - Governance Analyst (UNDP)		
	Shonette Morris - Former EPTSI Project Associate		
	Monica Sharma - Former EPTSI Project Coordinator		
3:00 pm	Vanessa Thompson - Former EPTSI Project Coordinator		

## Wednesday 9th May 2012

- 10:15 amGail TeixeiraOffice of the President -Presidential Advisor on Governance/ Outcome Board Member
- 1:00 pm LOA Ministry of Culture, Youth & Sports

Alfred King Ministry of Culture Youth & Sports

Permanent Secretary

1:30 pm	Devanand Ramdatt	Ministry of Culture Youth & Sports
	Assistant Director of Y	outh
2:00 pm	Hon. Dr. Frank Anthon	Minister of Culture Youth & Sports
3:15 pm	Hon. Ganga Persaud	Minister of Local Government and Regional Development
	Colin Croal	Permanent Secretary, MLGRD
4:15 pm	Dr. Steve Surujbally	Chairman, Guyana Elections Commission

# Thursday 10th May 2012

Finalization of Inception Report

12:00 pm	Nigel Dharamlall	Ministry of Amerindian Affairs
	Former Permanent S	Secretary
	Ministry of Local Go	vernment and Regional Development

# Friday 11th May 2012

6:00 am	Travel to Region 6
9:00 am	Alex Foster, President, St Francis Community Developers
	Beneficiaries of St Francis Community Developers
11:00 am	Focus Group - National United Nations Volunteers (Region # 6)
1:00 pm	NGO Representatives & Beneficiaries
	Albion Chapel Empowerment and Skills Training Centre - Fyrish
	All Saints Presbyterian Developmental Centre
	Eversham Community Developers - Project Cope
	Mibicuri Community Developers- Project Reach
	Shining Star Community Developers - Project LIFE
	Swing Star Community Developers - Project SAFE

Turn Your Life Around Community Developers

4:00 pm Sports facility JC Chandi Singh Secondary School

### Saturday 12th May 2012

9:00 am	Members & beneficiaries of Region 6		
	Palmyra /no.2 Community Support Group - meeting cancelled		
11:00 am	Members & beneficiaries		
	Alness /Ulverston - Community Support Group		
1:00 pm	Sports facility - Ministry of Culture, Youth & Sports		
	Berbice High School New Amsterdam - Region # 6		
3:00 pm	Members		
	Hope Town - Hope Town Community Support Group		
4:15 pm	Bush Lot Community Support Group		
5:15 pm	Sports Facilities - Bush Lot Secondary School		
5:30 pm	Depart for Georgetown Region # 5		

#### Monday 14th May 2012

- 6:30 am Depart for Linden
- 9:00 am Yolanda Hilman
  - **Regional Executive Officer**
  - Regional Democratic Council # 10
  - Maylene Stephens
  - Deputy Regional Executive Officer
  - Regional Democratic Council # 10
  - Sharma Soloman
  - Regional Democratic Council No. 10 Linden
- 10:30 am Regional Democratic Council # 10

	Mortimer Mingo - unavailable for this time	
	Former Regional Chairman	
	Regional Democratic Council # 10	
	Leon Roberts - Confirmed	
	Regional Information Officer	
	Regional Democratic Council # 10	
11:15 am	National United Nations Volunteers (Region # 10)	
2:00 pm	Members	
	Canvas City Community Support Group	
3:30 pm	Members	
	Wisroc / Block 22 Community Support Group Wisroc - Linden	
4:30 pm	Sports Facilities	
	Linden Foundation Secondary School Linden	
4:45 pm	Silver City Secondary School	

# Tuesday 15th May 2012

7:30 am	Depart Linden		
9:00 am	Jagnarine Somwar - no longer Administrator		
	Administrator		
	Kuru Kuru Training Centre		
	Teachers and Students, Kuru K	Curu Training Centre	
11:30 am	Eccles IT Centre, Eccles - East Bank Demerara - Region # 4		
2:00 pm	Members		
	StewartVille Community Support	ort Group- Region 3-meeting cancelled	
2:30 pm	Members & beneficiaries- Den Amstel Residents for Change		
4.30 pm	Bagotville Community Support Group		
	Bagotsville - West Coast Demerara (Region # 3)		
5:30 pm	Sports Facilities	LOA - Ministry of Culture, Youth & Sports	

Tuschen Secondary School Tuschen - East Bank Essequibo

# Wednesday 16th May 2012

9:00 am	Meeting at the office of Chisa Mikami		
10:00 am	Goldie Scott - confirmed		
	Chief Executive Officer		
	Volunteer Youth Corps		
	Dimitri Nicholson - Will be represented by Dwyne Mitchelle		
	Executive Director		
	Youth Challenge Guyana		
11:00 am	UNDP / Small Conference Room (SCR)		
	Focus Group - National United Nation Volunteers (Region # 4)		
	Hubert Forrestor		
	Chelauna Providence		
	Jean Wintz		
	Karen Fontonelle		
	Milton Smith		
	Denita Sam		
1:00 pm	Patrice Lafluer - represented by Babsie Persaud-Giddings,		
	Assistant Representative/ Project Board member		
	United Nations Population Fund		
1:30 pm	Beneficiaries UNDP/Large Conference Room (LCR)		
	Varqua Foundation - unable to make this time		
	Volunteer Youth Corps - 3 persons		
	Childlink Inc		
	Youth Challenge Guyana - 3 persons		
2:30 pm	Omattie Madray Childlink Ethnic Relations Commission		
	County Director		

Childlink Inc

Yvonne Langevine - meeting cancelled Chief Executive Officer Ethnic Relations commission - meeting cancelled **Ethnic Relations Commission** Carvil Duncan - meeting cancelled Commissioner **Ethnic Relations Commission** 3:15 pm Brian O'Toole Guyana Elections Commission Chairman School of the Nations Varqua Foundation Remmington Eastman (not available ) Former Head Media Monitoring Unit 4:00 pm Minister of Culture Youth & Sports - not available 5:00 pm East Coast Demerara (Region # 4) Members & Beneficiaries - Foulis Community Support Group

#### Thursday 17th May 2012

8:00 am	Dr. Roger Luncheon	Office of the Pr	esident/Outcome Board Chair
	Head of Presidential Secretariat		
	Office of the President		
9:00 am	Raymond Drouin - The H	High Commissic	on of Canada
10:00 am	Dhanmattie Sohai -		
	Democracy & Governan	ce Advisor	USAID
	William Gelman, Officer	in Charge	USAID
11:30 am	Robert Kopecký		
	Ambassador - Delegatio	on of the Europe	ean Commission - Cancelled
1: 30 pm	Sewchan - not available	for this time	
	Former Permanent Secr	retary	

	Ministry of Local Government & Regional Development
2:00 pm	Manzoor Nadir - Former Minister of Labour, Human Services & Social Security
3:30 pm	Lorene Baird
	Permanent Secretary
	Ministry of Labour, Human Services & Social Security
	Trevor Thomas
	Former Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Labour, Human Services & Social
	Security
	Beneficiaries - Board of Industrial Training - confirmed UNDP/SCR
4:15 pm	Genevieve Blackman - Ministry of Labour Human Services & Social Security
	Former CEO Board of Industrial Training
5:15 pm	Omattie Madray - County Director
	Childlink and Beneficaries

# Friday 18th May

10:00 am	Nicola Jenns - UNDP/SCR - (Conference call)
	DFID Caribbean Representative
11:00 am	UN Framework Team for Preventive Action (Conference call)
	Claudia Mojica
	Chetan Kumar
	Carla Khammar
1:00 pm	Representatives of Press Association
2:00 pm	Debriefing Meeting UNDP/LCR
	UNDP STAFF