## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNS</td>
<td>Blue Nile State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTOR</td>
<td>Back-to-office-Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAHW</td>
<td>Community Animal Health Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRS</td>
<td>Community Based Reintegration and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRU</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRMA</td>
<td>Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAC</td>
<td>Community Security and Arms Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEX</td>
<td>Direct Execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCRP</td>
<td>Joint Conflict Reduction Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTR</td>
<td>Mid Term Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKS</td>
<td>North Kordofan State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Peoples’ Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Programme Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Doc</td>
<td>Project Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIP</td>
<td>Request for Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDDRP</td>
<td>Sudan DDR Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDDRC</td>
<td>Sudan DDR Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sudanese Pound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>South Kordofan State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNG</td>
<td>Special Needs Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Semi-Structured Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Technical Reintegration Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAAF/G</td>
<td>Women Associated with Armed Forces/Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XC</td>
<td>Ex Combatants</td>
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</table>
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Executive Summary

UNDP has been implementing ‘Reintegration’ component of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR programme) in Sudan since 2009 through a four-year project, initially in partnership with United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the Government of Sudan. Following the secession of South Sudan and departure of UNMIS in July 2011, UNDP has assumed full responsibility for providing technical support to the Government of Sudan through the Sudan DDR Commission. The Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP) reintegration (R) component is aimed at facilitating and accelerating the economic and social reintegration of former combatants and Women Associated with Armed Forces/Groups (WAAF/G) into civilian lives, thereby contributing to broader reconciliation and recovery across Sudan.

The programme is funded by multiple donors and received a total of US$ 76.08 million\(^1\) as of December 2011.

The DDR programme underwent a mid-term review (MTR) in 2010 which made several major recommendations towards increasing effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project. The current evaluation is an end-of-the-project evaluation, focusing especially on the ‘R’ component of the DDR to draw lessons for future. The purpose of this evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of the Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP) reintegration (R) intervention in terms of its contribution to facilitating transition and integration of ex-combatants (XC) and associated members to civilian life.

Overall Findings:

The design of the DDR programme was underpinned by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which made assumptions about a post-conflict peace-building scenario. The reality that followed partly compromised the relevance of a DDR programme, without links to other peace-building and development programmes in the country. Long delay between disarmament conducted by parties to the conflict and reintegration assistance also contributed to this. While the discharge/disarmament occurred in 2006-07, reintegration started only in 2009 due to numerous factors, some of which were beyond UNDP’s control.

The implementation of reintegration activities under the Sudan DDR Programme has progressed steadily during 2011-12, despite ongoing conflict and difficulties of access in several areas. The programme may have made a small contribution in helping ex-combatants re-establish livelihoods in their communities, although the programme’s contribution to helping communities deal with issues related to conflict, insecurity and arms proliferation has been limited. The programme’s approach, as per its initial design, has so far been predominantly focused on individuals, and the programme has now taken note of this gap and launched Community Security and Small Arms Control Activities to address these gaps.

The programme has been so far driven by the political necessity of being seen to be delivering according a seven-year old agreement. To make its outputs and outcomes sustainable, the programme needs to be driven solely by the needs of communities and vulnerable sections of population affected by conflict, displacement and militarization of society in future. The new programme design now in draft from goes some way toward addressing this flaw.

Detailed findings:

1. The economic reintegration support to XC has picked up momentum during 2011-12, after a slow start in previous years. However, within the overall design of the DDR

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\(^1\) UNDP. Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme – Annual Progress Report, 2011
programme in Sudan, the large time lag between disarmament and final stage of reintegration has negated some of the potential benefits of conventional DDR programmes. Several factors – some beyond UNDP’s control - including ongoing conflict affected timely provision of packages.

2. Lack of independent verification in the early phases of the DDR process (demobilization) has sometimes diluted integrity of the economic support and the potential benefits to genuine XCs.

3. Some progress has been made since the MTR toward building capacity and linkages with specialist institutions for delivery of the reintegration programme.

4. Progress towards a community-based approach to reintegration has been slow, although communities appear to appreciate the scope and potential benefits from it so far, and this would require significantly greater investment of resources and emphasis than being currently given.²

5. There has been strong oversight and scrutiny by UNDP country office over operational aspects of the DDR programme. This needs to be backed up with strategic programme support and programmatic quality assurance.

6. In UNDP, there appears to be a compartmentalization within various teams and sub-teams, without a common focal point for external stakeholders in the States to interact with.

7. Technical capacity and experience with UNDP and among IPs in designing, planning and implementing large-scale livelihoods programme remain limited which affects the programme effectiveness.

8. There is need to examine the cost-effectiveness of economic reintegration support and explore various alternative methods of delivery like linkage with MFI institutions, banks and use of cash transfers to potential beneficiaries.

9. The programme has been so far driven by the political necessity of being seen to be delivering according a seven-year old agreement. To make its outputs and outcomes sustainable, the programme needs to be driven solely by the needs of communities and vulnerable sections of population affected by conflict, displacement and militarization of society in future. The new programme design now in draft form goes some way toward addressing this flaw.

Recommendations:

Reorient the programme to communities’ needs to deal with issues of conflict:

R1: Significantly increase the investment in the community-based approach to reintegration through CSAC and linkages with UNDP’s JCRP.

R2: Ensure that direct beneficiaries of the future economic packages programme are only those who are determined vulnerable sections of community and who may not necessarily be XCs, but providing assistance to whom will strengthen the community’s ability to deal with wider issues of local conflict, arms proliferation and human suffering, and create conditions for transition towards peace.

R3: Beyond the commitments already made by UNDP and international community, selection of all future direct beneficiaries of the programme need to be verified and

² This approach is envisaged in the next phase of the project.
endorsed by the community through a participatory process of decision making and verification.

**Strengthen the Programme’s capacity for ensuring quality and effectiveness:**

**R4:** Continue the follow up on the MTR recommendations, and periodically review progress on key actions taken for implementing the recommendations.

**R5:** UNDP management needs to review the predominantly procedure- and output-oriented administrative, monitoring and reporting system that is currently in place, and re-align it to outcome and results which need to drive the programme. This will require a significant culture shift in the organization.

**R6:** To fast-track contracting implementing partners, implement the Long Term Agreement process that has been developed for all future contracts.

**R7:** The DDRP needs to recruit a livelihoods specialist in order to provide technical support in its programming.

**R8:** Examine the cost-effectiveness of economic reintegration support and explore various alternative methods of delivery such as linkage with microfinance institutions (MFI) and banks.

**R9:** Utilizing lessons in cash programming emerging from other countries, UNDP needs to examine the feasibility of using cash transfers to potential beneficiaries as this may help enhance cost-effectiveness of the economic package.
Section 1

Introduction, Purpose and Methodology of the Review

1.1 Background to the Evaluation:

UNDP has been implementing ‘Reintegration’ component of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR programme) in Sudan since 2009 through a four-year project, initially in partnership with United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the Government of Sudan. The independence of South Sudan in July 2011 led to split of the DDR Programme into two separate programmes, one covering the new Republic of South Sudan (South) and the other covering the Republic of Sudan (North). The Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP) reintegration (R) component is aimed at facilitating and accelerating the economic and social reintegration of former combatants and Women Associated with Armed Forces/Groups (WAAF/G) into civilian lives, thereby contributing to broader reconciliation and recovery across Sudan. Its primary objective is to build the capacity of DDR participants to generate income, gain employment and a livable wage, and pursue peaceful and sustainable livelihoods in both urban and rural areas. This is to be achieved by providing individual participants with a combination of material assets, training in essential and marketable agricultural, business, entrepreneurship and vocational skills, apprenticeships/job placements, alternative education and follow-up support.3

The project underwent a mid-term review (MTR) in 2010 which made several major recommendations towards increasing the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project. As the current project is coming to an end at the end of December, this end-of-the-project evaluation was undertaken to examine the results of the project, focusing especially on the ‘R’ component of the DDR to draw lessons for future.

1.2 Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation:

As outlined in the terms of reference (ToR), the purpose of this evaluation was to provide an independent assessment of the Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP) reintegration (R) intervention in terms of its contribution to facilitating transition and integration of ex-combatants (XC) and associated members to civilian life. The evaluation also provides recommendations that are expected to assist in identifying appropriate strategies and operational approaches to strengthen the new community-based reintegration and security programme4 envisaged for the future.

As per the ToR, the main objectives of the evaluation were threefold:

(a) assess the SDDR programme and the results achieved so far towards meeting the overall objective of the programme;
(b) generate lessons learned and best practices; and
(c) develop recommendations for future community-based reintegration interventions.

4 ToR for Evaluation of Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
The stated scope of the evaluation included reintegration activities carried out during the last four years (2009-2012) in the two former Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan States) and four Central Sector States (Khartoum, White Nile, Sennar, and North Kordofan). However, scoping during inception phase of the evaluation indicated that rather than four-year time horizon for evaluating the project, a more realistic time frame would be to cover the period after July 2011.  This is for the reason that prior to July 2011, various components of DDR (DD on the one hand – led by UNMIS and various government actors, and R – led by UNDP) remained disjointed because of the political and complex nature of the programme, making attribution of overall results challenging. Since July 2011, UNDP has a clear mandate and overall responsibility to carry forward the R component, and hence in order to assess the progress and results, it is best to particularly focus on post-UNMIS period for this evaluation, i.e., July 2011 to current. This is also reasonable considering that a MTR took place in 2010 which covered the period 2009-2010. A further reason justifying limiting the scope of this evaluation was that most of the reintegration work took place only after July 2011.

More details on the revised scope and rationale are provided in the Inception Report outlining key elements of the evaluation approach, framework and methodology which were agreed with the CO. In brief, the inception report identified the following to be feasible focus for this evaluation:

a) Evidence of individual benefits to ex-combatants and Women Associated with the Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G);

b) Direct support and social benefits to communities and individual combatants;

c) Community involvement in the reintegration process through diverse mechanisms of social reintegration and community security.

1.3 Organization of the Evaluation:

The evaluation was commissioned by the UNDP country office (CO) in Sudan and managed by the DDR programme management unit (PMU) of UNDP. Through a competitive international recruitment process, two independent consultants – one international and one national - were selected and tasked to carry out the evaluation. The UNDP-DDR team provided support in arranging meetings and interviews, field visits and ensured that the evaluation team had access to necessary documents.

The evaluators and declaration of any bias:

Abhijit Bhattacharjee is an independent evaluation and strategy expert with over twenty-nine years of senior management and consulting experience in international organisations in various parts of the world. With extensive experience in NGOs, the United Nations, Government aid agencies and Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, he has carried out short-term consulting assignments for UNDP (and other UN agencies) from time to time, but has never sought or occupied any full- or part-time staff position in any of the UN agencies, and had not worked for the Sudan DDR Programme for in any capacity.

Hassan Ali Gadkarim, a Sudanese national, is an independent consultant with about twenty years of research experience at the Economic and social Research council in Sudan, and thirteen years of research experience with regional GCC organizations. He has undertaken short-term consulting assignments for various national and international organizations including Oxfam, Red Crescent-Sudan, NORCROSS, Danish Red Cross, USAID, ADRA, UNAIDS, and UNDP, but has never sought or occupied any full or part-time staff position in any of the UN agencies, and had not worked for the Sudan DDR Programme in any capacity.

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5 See Inception Report – Annex 2
6 Attached as Annex 2 with this report
1.4 Methodology:

1.4.1 Methodological approach

The overall methodology was based on both inductive and deductive approaches using qualitative data gathered through a mixed-method approach from a carefully selected range of sources as indicated below.

The data collection for this evaluation was mainly done through purposively selected key informant interviews (KIs), semi-structured discussions (SSI), documents research, and case studies and telephone interviews with beneficiaries (ex-combatants who were provided with direct support under the programme). The evaluation also used the data from documents made available by UNDP.

1.4.2 Evaluation framework

The evaluation used OECD/DAC criteria to answer the key evaluation questions detailed in the ToR and as amended in the inception report. The evaluation being a qualitative assessment against the OECD/DAC criteria, the key methods and sources of data used were as indicated below.

Key methods and sources of data

1. Semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews and site visits

The review conducted key informant interviews and semi-structured interviews (SSI) with stakeholders – UNDP-DDR programme staff, key government of Sudan officials, implementing partners (IP) and individual beneficiaries. Overall, the evaluation team met with 17 UNDP-DDR staff, 19 IP staff responsible for implementing the DDR programme, 22 individuals who were direct beneficiaries of the reintegration programme. Site visits were conducted in Khartoum and North Kordofan State (NKS), as permission for the evaluation team’s travel outside of these areas could not be obtained. A few (6) beneficiaries in South Kordofan State (SKS) were interviewed on phone. The following table shows the breakdown of primary data sources (key informants, semi-structured interviews and site visits) in different locations during the fieldwork:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary data sources</th>
<th>Khartoum</th>
<th>Other regions</th>
<th>Telephone interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP CO staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP-DDR staff</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan DDR Commission/ Government officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO IP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Agencies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs/UN agencies (Non IP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured discussion with Beneficiary groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Documents

Key documents were also used to supplement data gathered through case studies, SSIs and KII. Some of the vital documents which were examined by the team are listed in Annex 4 of this report.
3. Research questions based on the evaluation framework

Based on the objectives and evaluation framework, specific questions for research were developed and used during the inception phase. These are provided as Annex 2 and formed the reference point for data gathering and analysis.

1.4.3 Triangulation of data

Triangulation is a core principle in mixed-method data collection as it ensures that results are linked up into a coherent and credible evidence base. Although the evaluation relied on the following methods, these were limited by the lack of independently verifiable first-hand data that could be collected by the team as field visits could not take place in five of the six geographical areas the evaluation was supposed to cover:

- Source triangulation. The consultants compared information from different sources, i.e. at various management levels in different functional units and organizations (UNDP CO, UNDP-DDR team, SDDRC, IPs), beneficiaries and data available from various reports;
- Method triangulation. The consultants compared information collected by different methods, e.g. interviews and document review; and
- Oral presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions to UNDP CO in Khartoum as part of the validation process.

1.5 Limitations:

As explained in the inception report, this evaluation has been ill-timed. One of the biggest festivals in Sudanese calendar, Eid, fell during a week (last week of October) in the middle of the evaluation which meant that no meeting or interview could be scheduled during this period. Furthermore, three other major limitations the evaluation suffered from were:

1. A mid-term review (MTR) was undertaken in later part of 2010 which made extensive observations on several aspects of the programme. Although the MTR findings were accepted, discussions on the recommendations are currently underway and their implementation in a substantive way is yet to commence. Because of this, the current evaluation often ended up drawing the same conclusions as the MTR in several instances.

2. Permission to travel outside Khartoum could not initially be obtained for the evaluation team, and hence the team had to stay put in Khartoum during the entire duration (18 days) of the evaluation. However, after the first draft was submitted, a brief visit to Elobeid area of North Kordofan was organized for the national consultant which enabled some primary data-collection from beneficiaries and site visits.

3. The evaluation was further constrained by the fact that dozens of interviews which the evaluation team wanted to have with stakeholders not directly involved in implementation of the project (donors, NGOs, other UN agencies, researchers) could not be organized due to a major holiday falling in the middle of the evaluation.
1.6 Format of the Report:

The report is presented in five sections. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the context of the Sudan DDR project, followed by presentation of key findings on the focus areas – as defined in the ToR and subsequently revised in the inception report- in section 3. Section 4 draws conclusions based on the criteria for evaluation as per the ToR and evaluation framework. In sections 3 and 4, wherever relevant, the report draws key conclusions at the end of each sub-section. In the final section (section 5), the report summarizes the overall findings and presents recommendations for future.

Section 2

Introduction to Sudan DDR Programme Context and Content

2.1 The Programme Context and Objectives:

In accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme was launched in 2009. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was mandated by UN Security Council resolution 1590 (24 March 2005) to assist in the establishment of the DDR programme and its implementation. In this context, an Integrated UN DDR Unit was established to assist the relevant national institutions in the DDR process. Broadly speaking, UNMIS took the lead in supporting the demobilization and reinsertion of DDR participants while UNDP was the lead agency on economic and social reintegration. Besides, other UN Agencies such as UNICEF and WFP were also involved in the reintegration of child soldiers and reinsertion support respectively.

As per the project document (ProDoc), the programme focuses on reintegration of ex-combatants (XCs) and associated members including Special Needs Groups (SNGs) who meet the eligibility criteria, and also link with other national recovery and priority programmes aimed at returnees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and host communities to ensure community security and social cohesion and longer term reintegration opportunities.

Following the independence of South Sudan and the subsequent departure of UNMIS, DDR programme was formally split between two countries – one covering the new Republic of South Sudan and the other covering the Republic of Sudan. At the end of its mandate, UNMIS demobilized 36,254 of the 90,000 XCs originally envisaged for North Sudan in the CPA, and this number represents the current caseload for reintegration in the Republic of Sudan. Delivery of reintegration package to these individuals is managed by UNDP, in...
partnership with Sudan DDR Commission which has its branches in the States as well. It is to be noted that selection of the individuals who are eligible for the reintegration programmes is not upto UNDP which has to follow the list provided by UNMIS and the Government of Sudan.

As per the National DDR Strategic Plan,9 “Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.” Essentially, it consists of providing demobilized XCs and WAAF/G with assistance to develop their livelihood options when they go back to their communities. The options could be in the areas of farming, livestock rearing, setting up small businesses and petty trades for which UNDP provides financial assistance upto a maximum of US$1,10010 (including training) which is provided through NGO implementing partners.

The stated intent of the programme as per the ProDoc was to pave the way for human security, reconstruction and development, and was to take place within a comprehensive process of peace and reconciliation, post-conflict stabilization, conflict reduction and peace building. However, as has been acknowledged in several UNDP documents in the past two years including the MTR conducted in 2010, the DDR programme in general and implementation of the reintegration component in particular is yet to achieve any of the above. Seen to be providing a ‘package’ worth about US$ 1,100 to demobilized XCs has become an end in itself. Several factors can be attributed to for this flaw, some of it beyond UNDP’s control:

- The “comprehensive peace” and post-conflict environment that underpinned the CPA and DDR did not realize on the ground, and even after the independence of South Sudan, armed conflict continues in Protocol areas;
- In the context of ongoing conflict and insecurity at community levels, over-riding emphasis on providing benefits to individual XCs and WAAF/G could have little positive impact on security, peace and stabilization – in fact as the MTR and several studies11 have shown that adopting an individual-based reintegration programme rather than a community-based one is placing the burden of economic and social reintegration primarily on the shoulders of the communities absorbing the ex-combatants;
- There has been a long time gap between ‘discharge’ from army/armed groups and demobilization (often four years and more), and between demobilization and reintegration (one to two years, or even more);
- Implementation of DDR in near-total isolation from other conflict resolution, reduction of small and light weapons, peace building, stabilization initiatives in the country.

Acknowledging these weaknesses, UNDP has already begun integrating some of the elements of community-oriented programmes into the R programme. Moreover, for the next phase of the R programme (staring January 2013) which is currently under discussion with various stakeholders, a radical redesign of the entire R programme is being contemplated.

2.2 Implementation Modality and Management:

The secession of South Sudan resulted in separation of the DDR Programme into two programmes. This also meant the end of UNMIS’ mandate on 9th July, which left a range of issues to be dealt with by UNDP-DDR, and included revising the programme’s organizational structure. Most importantly, the UNDP Country Office oversight over the programme was strengthened through setting up new offices (in Khartoum and at the state level). The restructuring resulted in the reduction of international staff from 32 to 14 by the end of 2011. Overall, the UNDP Country Office strengthened its oversight and the programme is now

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10 Currently set at SDG 2,800

11 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Unrealistic Expectations: Current Challenges to Reintegration in Southern Sudan, By Julie Brethfeld
considered part of the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU), thereby enhancing opportunities to explore synergies with other UNDP programmes. The UNDP-DDR had already been preparing contingency plans since January 2011 and as such there was relative ease in transitioning to a post-UNMIS and post-separation situation. A new office location for the UNDP-DDR was established and there is now a regular forum between the UNDP-DDR and UNDP Country Office senior management to discuss the direction of the programme.

Within UNDP, the project comes under what is called Direct Execution modality (DEX or DIM\(^1\)), with co-ownership of the project by national government. The Government of Sudan has set up a Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC) which is the main counterpart for UNDP Project Management Unit (PMU). UNDP-PMU is, with support from SDDRC, primarily responsible for overall management of project activities, reporting, accounting, monitoring and evaluation of the project, supervision of the implementing agents and financial management of donor resources. The PMU is headed by a Programme Manager who is assisted by a programme implementation team\(^2\) and support staff.

At the national level, the project is overseen by a Project Board which is responsible for its governance. The Board meets twice a year and is co-chaired by SDDRC Chairman and UNDP Country Director. The board also has representation from donors in its meetings. It provides advice when substantive changes are needed to programme strategy and structure and endorses regular programme reports to donors and other stakeholders.

\(^{12}\) Direct Implementation Modality
\(^{13}\) Currently consists of: Project Support Team in charge of coordination of all activities in Khartoum, and three Project Implementation Offices based in Kadugli (for Southern Kordofan State), Damazin (for Blue Nile State) and Abyei.
At the state level, the project implementation is overseen by State DDR Commission which has a Technical Reintegration Committee (TRC) to monitor and provide support to the work of implementing partners on the ground. The TRC meets every fortnight and is the joint decision making body on programme implementation at state level that includes representatives from relevant line Ministries, NGO Implementing Partners (IP) and State DDR Commission. The TRC Mechanism serves as the main instrument for verification and certification of IP reintegration activities.

2.3 Project Activities and Resources:

The DDR programme falls within UNDP’s overarching programme framework as outlined in the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) document which, in line with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) priorities, focuses on three key programme areas in Sudan, namely:

(a) Poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs;
(b) Democratic governance; and
(c) Crisis prevention and recovery. UNDP’s programme is based on the understanding that conflict and development are inextricably linked.

The DDR programme is designed to focus on:

• Supporting the social, economic, psychological and political reintegration of XCs and associated members, inclusive of all categories targeted and eligible for DDR from SAF, PDF, and SPLA;
• Enhancing the capacity of relevant institutions, especially national ones, to ensure sustainable reintegration of XCs; and
• Supporting the building, through the Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) pilot projects, of physical assets for the communities that are positive contributors for security and stability (i.e. police stations, water wells, community centers, etc.).

The programme is funded by multiple donors and received a total of US$ 76.08 million\textsuperscript{14} as of December 2011. The breakdown of funds sources is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds received from Donors since start of the project</th>
<th>In US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,873,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>26,804,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>9,943,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway*</td>
<td>7,808,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>5,404,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>9,030,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Building Fund (PBF)</td>
<td>4,680,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5,538,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Funds Received:</strong></td>
<td><strong>76,083,276</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Overview of expenditures per output/activity (US$)\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Expenditure during 2009\textsuperscript{15}</th>
<th>Expenditure 2010 &amp; 2011</th>
<th>Expenditure January-September 2012</th>
<th>Total Expenditure since start, as of 30/09/2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity development</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2,090,232</td>
<td>429,827</td>
<td>2,520,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6,949,193</td>
<td>1,324,314</td>
<td>8,273,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public awareness</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>151,632</td>
<td>171,431</td>
<td>323,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>33,274,519</td>
<td>6,953,984</td>
<td>40,228,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAC</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>526,714</td>
<td>426,337</td>
<td>953,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,580,754</strong></td>
<td><strong>42,992,289</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,305,893</strong></td>
<td><strong>61,878,936</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 Lessons Learned from the Previous Reviews and Evaluations:

The DDR programme has gone through at least two major reviews since 2009, starting with
an assessment of the demobilization process, followed by a mid-term review of the entire programme in 2010, besides several UNDP internal reflections and reviews as evidenced from various reports. The assessment report (2009) highlighted major flaws in the demobilization process including lack of an independent verification system leading to large number of ineligible candidates findings their way into the list, an issue which was also evidenced in the MTR the following year. Besides this, the serious delay – sometimes up to two years or more – in providing reintegration package to the demobilized individuals was creating tension and unrest among the genuine XCs.

The MTR conducted in December 2010 provided a series of key suggestions to ensure effective running of the programme, such as increased focus on community based reintegration with a stronger CSAC component; strengthening the training component, and opening these for community members as well as XCs to ensure positive reception amongst community members; pursuing partnership with private sector and more focus on small arms control initiatives at communities and promotion of regional initiatives for the cross-border control of small arms.

Following the MTR, UNDP took stock of the changing situation on the ground, and there now appears to be a consensus within UNDP and SDDRC that the programme now demands gradual shift from a narrow individually-targeted DDR approach to a more inclusive long-term strategy that contributes to community recovery, peace and small arms control. The MTR also recommended merger of DDR with the CSAC as a way to create synergy of both interventions and stressing the need to complement DDR by addressing broader community security issues.

Finally, as UNDP notes in its Draft ProDoc (2012), the programme was insufficiently decentralized and embedded in the broader peace-building and development programming in the country and did not focus enough on building capacities of line-ministries and local government to make reintegration efforts sustainable. Capacities of local government and civil society to provide effective and equitable support to the ex-combatants and communities are insufficient and local Government and traditional structures for managing small arms, conflict resolution and dispute management are weak and in some instances dysfunctional. The future plans for the programme will attempt to address these.

17 Ian Rowe & Laurent Banal, with inputs from Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe (2009). Sudan: Assessment of the Disarmament and Demobilization process, 28 November 2009
Section 3
Evaluation Findings on Overall Results

In this section, evaluation findings are presented under three headings in line with the focus areas listed in the ToR—
1) provision of economic reintegration support to XCs and WAAF/G; 2) social reintegration support and community security in prioritized areas; and 3) strengthening institutional capacity and linkages at national level for DDR programme.

3.1 Economic Reintegration Support to XCs and WAAF/G:

Overview

Under the programme, reintegration packages are provided to demobilized XCs and WAAF/G. Each package comprises training and financial assistance (through provision of materials, equipment, tools) to enable a demobilized beneficiary to engage in a vocation or livelihood activity of his/her choice. The average package per beneficiary comprises two main components—a direct assistance worth US$800, and another US$700 going toward training, monitoring and follow up, and programme management/overhead cost of the implementing agency.

After a slow start during 2010, the delivery of reintegration packages picked up momentum during 2011-12, and latest data show that the programme has already covered 20,350 of the 36,254 demobilized XCs and WAAF/G, and another 4,451 are already registered with IPs for receiving assistance.

Table 4: Region-wise coverage of Demobilization and Reintegration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Demobilized</th>
<th>Registered with IPs (% of demobilized)</th>
<th>Packages received (% of demobilized)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile State</td>
<td>5442</td>
<td>5066 (93)</td>
<td>4641 (85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan State</td>
<td>24309</td>
<td>15275 (63)</td>
<td>11399 (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sector</td>
<td>6500</td>
<td>4460 (69)</td>
<td>4310 (66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36251</strong></td>
<td><strong>24801 (68)</strong></td>
<td><strong>20350 (56)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to DDR-PMU, it is expected that by the end of the year, a total of about 28,000 will have received their reintegration package, leaving a pending caseload of about 8,000 to be dealt with in the next phase of the programme starting January 2013, for which currently discussion is underway with donors.

Time lag between demobilization and reintegration

As was pointed out in previous reviews, the time gap between disarmament (discharge from army) and demobilization, and between the latter and reintegration has been long. The evaluation team met with over a dozen men and women in various parts of Khartoum who received reintegration assistance during 2012, and the pattern is the same (Box 1)—discharged in 2006 (after CPA), demobilized in 2010-11, and received reintegration package in 2012.

19 Sudan DDR Summary Report – Excel spreadsheet, dated 07 October 2012
20 Derived from source as in footnote 20
Analysis of data provided by the PMU showed the following pattern:

- In South Kordofan State (SKS) which has the largest caseload, about 2000 who were demobilized in 2009 were registered with IPs in 2011, and another batch of 1500 from 2009 demobilization were registered in 2012; about 1200 demobilized in 2010 and 3600 demobilized in 2011 were registered in 2012. Average time lapse between demobilization and registration was about 12-15 months.

- In the central sector, the time gap is shorter, with most of the demobilized cases being registered within 3-12 months, with average being 9 months.

The reasons for the delay in between demobilization and start of reintegration process are stated to be two-fold: (a) UNDP procurement process for selection of IPs takes upto 9-12 months, and (b) often the quality of the list (of demobilized XCs and WAAF/G) provided by the Government is poor and incomplete which takes several weeks to months for the IPs to trace the right candidates and sort out the final list with SDDRC and UNDP. To address this problem, UNDP-PMU is now introducing Long Term Letters of Agreements (LOA) signed with pre-qualified NGO IPs with successful track record with the programme. This will significantly reduce procurement delays in future.

Delivery of assistance package

Through competitive process of soliciting Request for Proposals (RfP), UNDP selects IPs for delivery of packages for which a contract is drawn up for, normally, six months during which the list provided to the IP needs verifying, followed by training and orientation of the selected beneficiaries, delivery of the package itself depending on the chosen livelihood activity, and finally follow up support. Given the slow progress during 2009 and 2010, since 2011, UNDP and SDDRC have tried to speed up implementation and have successfully reached a sizeable number, despite months of renewed conflict during 2011 which restricted access in the priority areas.

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21 UNDP. Disarmament, Demobilization and Disintegration. List of contracts signed in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (completed contracts), as of 14 October 2012.
22 The security situation is responsible for inaccessibility to some of the XCs in the case of SKS and BNS. In the case of the Central Sector most XCs were transferred from other states so it took time to verify their authenticity.
The short time-frame within which all these services are required to be delivered mean that the process become compressed. Livelihoods development is a long-term process which requires extended support and mentoring, besides establishing forward and backward linkages with markets and local economy. The way the package is delivered, absorption capacity of the beneficiary, market and local economy cannot be adequately taken into account. The fact that of the dozen activities/ small businesses seen by the evaluation team in Khartoum, only two have been said to be successful in the sense that their capital has remained intact and the business is generating regular income for the families after about 5-6 months of injection of the capital, points to the fact that livelihoods development can not be delivered – as one senior local NGO Director stated – ‘like insertion assistance’. Although the evaluation team has not visited all regions, interviews with XCs in SKS (phone interviews and NKS (visited by the team) who received reintegration package indicate that the insertion of capital has been made very effective use of by those who were already engaged in some vocation or enterprise, but relatively less effectively by those went into an activity for the first time.

In a large number of cases, recipients sold their package (sheep, goat, cattle) to raise badly needed cash either to pay off old loans, or for medical expenses or children’s education – IP reports after 4-6 weeks of distribution show this to average about 20-30%, but actual figure could be much higher, according to several key informants. It therefore should come as no surprise that the evaluation team was told by majority of the beneficiaries interviewed that given an option, they would have opted for cash.23 Even those who have made good use of the support said that if they had the cash they would have been able to obtain more supplies or materials for the same price – many complained that the price of sheep, goat or cows provided was much higher than what they could get these for in the area,24 and quality of animals was often poor. This was also observed in at least one staff BTOR which stated that most of the participants who opted for livestock were not really satisfied as they were complaining about the quality of the livestock and with not enough quantity of fodder to feed the animals till they started producing any economic return.25

The delivery was compounded during the past several months by rapid devaluation of Sudanese currency and inflation all around. Although it was initially envisaged that for those opting for sheep (or goats), the project would provide 9 (or 10) and those choosing cows will be provided three cows, with rapid price increases this became untenable, and so sometimes IPs either provided less number of animals or very young animals which will take years of rearing before becoming productive.26

List of beneficiaries for R package

Questions have been raised in all previous reviews and assessments on the need for independent verification of the list of XCs and WAAF/G ‘demobilized’. While accepting that UNDP or SDDRC, as per the National Reintegration Strategy, goes by the list provided by UNMIS and the Government, accounts of several IPs who work with the communities and were interviewed for this evaluation suggest that in a large number of cases, people who have had little to do with any role in army or armed groups make it to the list simply by being related to or being in the good books of local commanders and other people of influence, while a number of genuine cases do not make it to the official list. This has caused tensions and discontent in number of communities. At the State levels, the commission staff as well as UNDP are aware of this, but no one has a clear idea of how to go about dealing with this. The 2010 review did recommend verification of the candidates before being considered for R

23 See Annex 5 – case stories based on telephone interviews in SKS
24 UNDP’s Annual Report for 2011 noted that there were concerns expressed with regard to the prices claimed by some IPs for the cost of the package, which were believed to be higher than the market prices. (source: UNDP Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. Annual Progress Report, January–December 2011)
25 BTOR. Sakina Diab, 27/6/2011
26 UNDP. Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration Programme - Reintegration Component: DDR participants’ satisfaction survey, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states, January 2011
package, but this has not yet happened. From the little primary-data based evidence this evaluation could gather, targeting errors of type 1 (inclusion of those who are not eligible) and type 2 (exclusion of those who are eligible) still remain major issues in the delivery of reintegration package as this undermines the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme (discussed in section 4). However, as mentioned earlier, UNMIS was responsible for compiling the demobilization data which UNDP relies on in providing reintegration support.  

Conclusions:

1. The economic reintegration support to XCs has picked up momentum during 2011-12, after a slow start in previous years. However, within the overall design of the DDR programme in Sudan, the large time lag between disarmament and final stage of reintegration has negated some of the potential benefits of conventional DDR programmes. Several factors – some beyond UNDP’s control - including ongoing conflict affected timely provision of packages.

2. Lack of independent verification in the early phases of the DDR process – for which UNMIS was responsible - has sometimes diluted integrity of the economic support and the potential benefits to genuine XCs.

3.2 Social Reintegration Support and Community Security:

Overview

In Sudan, the amount of Small Arms and Light Weapons constitute key threats to stability at the local and regional levels. As recognized by the SDDRC and the UNDP, the individual based approach to DDR cannot respond to the challenges caused by a large part of the armed populations that may cause violence. Many communities also engaged in armed conflict as a means to gain political control and protect their own sources of livelihood.  

The DDR project introduced social reintegration and Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) initiatives in 2010, with the aim of providing peace dividends to conflict-affected communities so as to neutralize potential triggers of armed conflict and also facilitate effective reintegration of ex-combatants. The CSAC project document notes that communities, including local authorities, are central in any attempt at disarmament in Sudan. Implemented by the Sudan DDR Commission and UNDP, in addition to ‘soft’ components, the CSAC programme supports ‘hard’ components like construction of health clinics, water infrastructure and projects which meet communities’ practical needs. Overall, the CSAC programme aims to improve community security and social welfare of DDR participants, contributing to enhanced peace and security at the community level. CSAC is being implemented in pockets where a large number of XCs are returning.

It is to the credit of the SDDRC and UNDP that the Community Security component of DDR recognizes the fact that absorptive capacities of communities – on many levels – are also a concern for the success of DDR. The coping capabilities of communities have been stretched to the extreme through the conflict – with the greatest burden falling on the shoulders of women. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have been undermined or destroyed in many instances. Strengthening these capacities is vital to facilitate reconciliation between former combatants and communities.

All these elements highlight the need to have area-based, community centred approaches to reintegration support and community security. The government has rightly emphasized the need for the CSAC to address the issue of small arms and light weapons in communities and to create an enabling environment for effective DDR. The programme is at its initial phase, but some initiatives have been taken on conflict mitigation and community leader

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27 All current caseload data were already compiled in 2009 and 2010 by UNMIS.
evaluation findings. The geographical target areas are set at the three Transitional Areas, Darfur, eastern Sudan and Khartoum State.

Limited scope and funding for community approach

Communities and XCs interviewed by the evaluation team stated that the social component of the DDR programme – supporting women’s groups, training in gender and conflict-related issues, awareness raising and a host of other practical issues – have been useful, though of much limited scale.

Despite realizations by both SDDRC and UNDP, the community component of the programme has remained limited by the investment made in it – total spend so far since its inception has been less than one million dollars, with funding coming from Japan and Norway for this component. By any analysis, this appears small, if one takes into account the fact that nearly $25 million has been spent on providing reintegration assistance to about 20,000 individuals, large number of who were probably financially better-off than most other members of the community, and would not have normally been qualified to be target of any development or humanitarian assistance, except for the fact that a political process agreed some seven years ago gifted them this bonanza. A political process that also promised, but delivered little, for communities.

The 2010 review noted very aptly, “the three Transitional Areas have suffered greatly from the protracted civil war. The effects are widespread and have touched most, if not all, communities. In this context both ex-combatants and individual community members feel alienated from the state by the lack of development and social services available in their communities. In this context, an individual centred reintegration approach risks sending the wrong message to communities, which are increasingly coming to view the DDR programme as a way of appeasing the former combatants. The message that comes across is that the only way to access the economic/development assistance is by participating in violence.”

This evaluation noted that in the new programme design (to start in 2013), UNDP lays a strong emphasis on scaling up the CSAC component and merging it with the R component in what it calls a Community Based Reintegration and Security (CBRS) approach. The new programme may still provide R support to the remaining 8,000 or so previously demobilized XCs, but it will do so by involving the community in identification and planning of activities. Moreover, there may be an entirely new caseload within the framework of new peace agreement expected to emerge from the ongoing negotiations on the current conflict in the South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. It is expected that in the new approach, the weaknesses of the current programme in terms of inadequate follow up and weak linkages of livelihoods programme with local economy and markets will be overcome as the implementation will take place over a longer time-frame.

Further demobilization may also continue, and this will be done by the Government of Sudan, with SDDRC taking the lead. The new plan envisages involvement of representatives of the communities in verification of eligible combatants, the processing of ID cards and initial profiling of combatants before they are brought into the reintegration programme. UNDP will provide technical assistance and support to the SDDRC in the process.

As per the draft seen by the evaluation team, the new programme approach still suggests that it will ensure at least 80% of the overall target beneficiaries are ex-combatants, and the remaining will be civilians identified as WAAF/G or people with conflict carrying capacities (such as unemployed youth at risk). The evaluation thinks that this arbitrary targeting and prioritization runs contrary to the theory of change that underpins the community-centred approach outlined in the new programme. If the basic premise is that communities are affected, it is the vulnerability of the community that needs to be addressed, and this may or

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31 Some UNDP sources stated that the strategy is supposed to be flexible - the ratio will vary from community to community depending on the assessment findings.

32 ProDoc (Draft, 2012)
may not involve addressing the needs of XCs in some communities. The danger is that by putting a target to be reached, the programme may end up chasing the target – as it is now – and lose sight of the overall purpose for which the programme was designed.

Conclusion:

3. Progress towards a community-based approach to reintegration has been slow, although communities appear to appreciate the scope and potential benefits from it so far, and this would require significantly greater investment of resources and emphasis than being currently given.

3.3 Strengthening Institutional Capacity and Linkages:

Capacity building

UNDP has worked very closely with SDDRC at federal level as well as in the states over the years. The Commission has developed capacity for planning, implementation, monitoring and overall management of the DDR programme, with technical support from UNDP. UNDP seconded staff to work with the Commission in critical areas where the latter needed support. At the State level as well, the Commission has a small complement of staff who have been trained in monitoring and providing support to the work of IPs. UNDP has been able to facilitate linking IPs with some of the crucial line-departments like agriculture and livestock who provide technical support at the implementation level.

Another area where UNDP appears to have made some difference in the work of IPs and SDDRC is in bringing in gender sensitivity in their programmatic thinking and approach. Through training and sensitization, the DDRP gender unit has made attempts to encourage all IPs and state commissions to gather and monitor gender disaggregated data which is slowly beginning to take place.

A key achievement of the DDR has been capacity building of NGOs in programme delivery; although the focus may have been mainly on UNDP policies and procedures, this has created a pool of potential NGO implementing partners for other UNDP/UN Programmes in future. Partnership between UNDP, and Sudan DDR Commission and Government Institutions has also been strengthened as a result of the DDR.

Two Contract Management Workshops were conducted for the newly contracted IPs to bolster their capacity to successfully implement reintegration services, while adhering to the standard monitoring and reporting requirements of the programme. IPs, particularly the local NGOs found the training programmes organized by UNDP on financial reporting, monitoring and evaluation (M & E), proposal writing very helpful. Besides helping them in implementing current project activities, some of the IPs have been using these methods in their other works as well. UNDP’s rigorous selection process and subsequent scrutiny of progress reports and financial data have encouraged these IPs to put in place robust systems in their organizations.

It was however noted from various reports (MTR, monitoring reports) and from the few site visits made by this evaluation team that most of the IPs had little experience and capacity in designing and implementing livelihoods and economic activities, and on these programming issues, support from UNDP was also limited. This evaluation fully concurs with what the MTR had to say (as below) in this regard and notes that the situation may not have changed much since the MTR:

“The review team has also found that the mechanics of the technical implementation of the

UNDP. Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme - Quarterly Progress Report, January-June 2012

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Evaluation of Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme – Final Report

DDR programme has been valued higher by programme management than a continuous analysis of how to achieve sustainable impact and actually delivering on the promise of reintegration, security and development in Sudan”.

The MTR then went on to say: “The review found that despite constituting an enormous economic programme, there is little reflection in the DDR programme design or delivery of sophisticated understanding of livelihoods, sector development, economic value chains, or enterprise development”.

This evaluation could not sum up the situation more succinctly.

Linkages

A weakness of current CSAC appears to be its weak linkage with other similar initiatives in the country on conflict resolution, peace building, reconstruction and development. Besides UNDP, there are several other actors working on related issues in the country, but awareness of these within UNDP – as revealed during interviews – was poor and most UNDP interviewees suggested that UNDP was the only major player on conflict resolution, peace building and related areas in the country. However, interviews with several external stakeholders suggest that there are many others – including Save US, Practical Action, SOS Sahel and several national NGOs who have significant work in these areas at community level in South Kordofan and BNS. CSAC has implemented number of infrastructure projects (water, school, etc.) in a small number of villages in Blue Nile State, without any reference to other activities that are going on in the area or to area development plans. One senior NGO Director who works in BNS said that there is need for all major players to sit together with local government and coordinate their plans, and they would have looked to UNDP to facilitate this, but UNDP simply goes and ‘delivers’ a small project within 4-6 months and then leaves.34 UNDP programmes are designed in-house, without real dialogue with IPs or other agencies.35

Within UNDP, CSAC coordinates with a larger programme called Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) which is jointly implemented by UNDP and International Organization of Migration (IOM). JCRP and CSAC have launched a joint initiative on peace mobilization in some of the communities where CSAC works. The programme also works closely with another initiative, the Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) which undertakes State and community-level participatory mapping and analysis. It however appeared from the interviews this evaluation team has had that although at senior programme management and coordination level in Khartoum, there is awareness and understanding of various other initiatives within UNDP, at the level of programme delivery at grassroots level, such awareness may not be there. UNDP runs a Youth Employment Programme in BNS and South Kordofan. DDR programme staff were unaware of this, according to one IP. In NKS, UNDP implemented three large projects during the first three months of the year. According to one senior official of the State, the government agencies had to deal with three different UNDP coordinators coming and going, and coordinator of each project did not know about the other projects.

Conclusions:

4. This evaluation concludes that some progress has been made since the MTR toward building capacity and institutional linkages for delivery of the reintegration programme, with NGOs as well as government institutions. The programme has made some progress toward creating linkages with other initiatives in the country on conflict resolution, peace building and development, and greater programmatic leadership is needed to create stronger linkage and interface with initiatives outside of UNDP’s direct involvement.

5. In UNDP, there appears to be a compartmentalization within various teams and sub-teams,

34 UNDP staff stated that CSAC always signed MOUs with state ministries for sustaining the infrastructure projects after UNDP leaves.
35 CSAC is implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Interior with which UNDP has regular discussions.
Section 4

Assessment Against OECD/DAC Criteria for Evaluation

4.1 Relevance:

Questions addressed: (a) Has UNDP been able to help design DDR processes within the context of local and national recovery and other development strategies in Sudan? (b) Were the social and economic reintegration approaches, resources and conceptual frameworks relevant to achieve intended outcome and output to support the CPA peace process, increase community stabilization, community security, armed violence reduction and nation building? (c) Do the partners, target groups and beneficiaries consider that the interventions contributed to community reintegration and peace building? (d) Have reintegration interventions responded to the needs and priorities identified by governments and UN partners?

Relevance is concerned with assessing whether projects are in line with local needs and priorities and refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme.

As has been discussed in section 2, design of the DDR programme was underpinned by the CPA which made assumptions about a post-conflict peace-building scenario. The reality that followed partly compromised the relevance of a DDR programme, without links to other peace-building and development programmes in the country. Lack of independent verification of those who made it to the list of the eligible beneficiaries, as well as the programme being implemented largely in isolation from the issues of conflict, post-conflict transition, recovery and reconstruction that affect communities in general have further undermined the relevance of the reintegration programme.

UNDP has attempted, through the CSAC component, to overcome this flaw in the programme. However, the scope and scale of CSAC currently has been very limited in the overall context of the programme. At this moment, all stakeholders including partners and communities do not see the DDR programme achieving anything beyond delivering an output in the form of an economic package to selected XCs. As was noted in the MTR, the primary source of instability in the communities was not from the returning ex-combatants, but unresolved grievances and conflicts within and between the communities. The economic package has in some cases enabled XCs to develop their livelihoods in a sustainable manner and facilitate reintegration, but their contribution to peace building has been minimal, if any at all. By all accounts, currently the programme only meets the aim of fulfilling a commitment the international community and the UN had made in 2005, and to this limited extent, the programme still remains relevant. If the programme were to continue in the same way as now, without radical changes to its design and mode of implementation, it is highly unlikely that the programme will meet its ambitious goals of enabling individual XCs to become catalysts for economic growth in their communities, to improve security for the communities, or to contribute to the demilitarization of society.

SDDRC and UNDP are fully aware of this, and have acknowledged this as a major weakness of the programme design. The draft of a new programme which is currently under discussion addresses these shortcomings through a community-based security approach which could
make the DDR programme highly relevant in future. It seeks to achieve improved community security, social stabilization and inclusive economic growth in Southern Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile States by effectively reintegrating ex-combatants through community-based reintegration, small arms management and conflict mitigation and increased local capacities to deliver effective economic and social services to the communities (ProDoc 2012).

On the question whether or not the programme responded to the needs and priorities identified by the government, the answer has to be affirmative, although questions remain over selection of people on the list for receiving reintegration package.

Conclusion:

6. Design of the DDR programme was underpinned by the CPA which made assumptions about a post-conflict peace-building scenario. The reality that followed partly compromised the relevance of a DDR programme, without links to other peace building and development programmes in the country, although with a stronger emphasis on community-based approach, UNDP is attempting to address some of the initial design flaws.

4.2 Effectiveness:

Effectiveness measures the extent to which the project or activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs.

Reintegration results

As has been mentioned in the methodology section of this report, this evaluation had very little access to primary independently verifiable data, except what it could gather in Khartoum and NKS through a few site visits. This limited data, supplemented by data obtained from desk reviews and key informant interviews with UNDP and IPs, indicate that the programme has targeted a large number of people and created an atmosphere of satisfaction among the XCs, especially the people with disabilities (PWDs) who, amongst the XCs, were particularly targeted. People who were promised an economic package when they were disarmed received their due, and some of them may have utilized the package to rebuild their livelihoods. However, a sizeable number of beneficiaries have sold what they got in order to obtain cash for various urgent needs like settlement of loans, pay for children’s education, buying essential household items, and a range of other uses. Furthermore, a large time-gap (4-6 years) between disarmament and receiving reintegration package has limited the effectiveness of the reintegration programme, even during 2011-12 phase of implementation.

It appears that by and large, the reintegration support has been more helpful for those XCs who were already into some economic activity, farming or business. It is to be noted that most of the XCs and WAAF/G were disarmed and went back to their communities 4-6 years before they received the R package, and therefore they have already been involved in some sort of vocation. What the economic package did was to help them expand their
business or activity, and those who were not into any business or trade, a large number of them simply used the package as supplementary cash gift. In one interesting case, one recipient sold what the project gave him, and with the cash he bought a horse and small tools that he now uses for working in traditional gold mining. In another case in Elobeid in NKS, one XC resold his ‘package’ (sheep) to the same supplier at a price SDG800 less than the original purchase price as the former valued the cash more than sheep. Several IPs informed the evaluation team that as they do not provide long term support of follow up after distributing the package – usually ends with one visit and one phone call to the beneficiary a few weeks after distribution – they are aware that many beneficiaries sell off their package at whatever price they can fetch in the local market.

The package is so small (US$ 800 worth of direct assistance) that even where beneficiaries have utilized it for building livelihoods, it could only provide a supplementary income. No family, however small, can support itself on the income generated from an investment of this size. It is understood that many ‘successful’ beneficiaries reported to UNDP that they found the training more useful than the package itself, and they would have wanted more advanced training and support in different areas. The project did explore the option of linking with microfinance institutions (MFI) so that the beneficiaries could obtain loans utilizing the seed money received from the project. However, according to microfinance specialist organizations in the country, MFI penetration in rural areas is poor and their modus operandi is not geared toward assisting rural population or the poor.

The effectiveness of the support could be further increased if the IPs or UNDP staff were well trained in analysis of livelihoods pattern, markets, local economy and value chain. The IPs have very little capacity in these areas and whatever capacity building support is being provided under the project, these are predominantly focused on making the IPs compliant with UNDP procedures. A typical example of this weakness was seen in a ‘cooperative’ poultry farm the project helped establish (Box 2). Had there been an in-depth understanding of how or when cooperatives succeed or fail, one would have realized that instead of bringing 25 XCs who are located in different parts of the sprawling city of Khartoum together to undertake production collectively, it would have been probably more effective if they were to raise the chicken in their own homes and come together for either marketing (if the production was large – which could not have been the case with 100 layers each) or for buying inputs (feed and layers). This initiative was by design destined to fail.

It is understood that the choice of activities or enterprise is left to the XCs. The evaluation believes that while leaving the choice to individuals, IP and/or UNDP need to satisfy itself that what is being proposed is feasible and viable. The proposal for sheep fattening in Khartoum city came from XCs, but someone should have flagged up that they needed to factor in the cost of fodder which they would have to buy regularly – something that would not have been a factor in rural areas.

**Box 2: Midrar poultry farm, Soba East, Khartoum**

In April-May this year, under the leadership of an XC who is a veterinarian 25 XCs were brought together and with support from the project, first through a training and then through an investment support of SDG 71,000 rented a poultry shed with another big farmer in the area, and bought 2,500 layers. Of the 25 farmers, nine of them live in the neighbourhood and the rest are scattered all over the city of Khartoum. Now only 1,800 layers are alive as the others died of diseases, and egg production has declined to about five boxes per day, each box selling for SDG 10. Only three farmers who live close to the farm visit it and work on it regularly, and others have not visited for months. The lead farmer said that for other farmers to travel to the farm takes time and costs money. Now they have decided to sell off the remaining chicken to cut losses and close the business.

In the adjoining two sheds where a commercial farmer (who owns all the sheds) is running his own egg production business for the last several years, no such diseases or decline in egg production has happened and he continues with his business as usual.

**37** The evaluation heard from several sources stories of bulk sale of cows, sheep and goats to butchers in some areas as the beneficiaries desperately wanted cash. Furthermore, most families interviewed by the evaluation team stated that their flock started dying due to diseases which they could not treat and that was another reason why people preferred to sell off.
Capacity building and partnership

Discussed in section 3.3.

UNDP’s value addition

UNDP is known for its ability to work with line Ministries and government institutions at various levels, both federal and State levels. UNDP’s support to the SDDRC in Khartoum as well as in the states has been critical for delivery of DDR programme. UNDP’s good relationship with the government has been effective in ensuring reasonable access to the project areas despite ongoing security clearance problems. The Sudan DDRC has established good working relationship with the State Authorities as well as national security personnel. Both have been very supportive in the implementation process by providing relevant security information and protection to implementing partners.38

UNDP also brings in high standard in scrutiny of inputs and outputs. The procedures and standards it requires IPs to follow does encourage robust procedures within IPs as well. UNDP has put in place a range of measures for monitoring and reporting on progress (Box 3), and these are followed rigorously. The downside is that these are focused predominantly on inputs (resources) and outputs, and not as much on outcomes and results. According to contracts, IPs are required to submit narrative reports, milestone report (which is linked to payment schedule), financial report, tracking sheet, weekly update, photos and other relevant documents. Payments and release of installment are made in accordance with the specific milestone accomplishments and achievements.

Conclusion:

7. Technical capacity and experience with UNDP and among IPs in designing, planning and implementing large-scale livelihoods programme remain limited which affects the programme effectiveness.

8. The effectiveness of the reintegration programme has been compromised by years of gap between disarmament and receiving economic assistance.

4.3 Efficiency:

(a) Have resources of reintegration interventions been efficiently used to achieve relevant outputs? (b) Have reintegration interventions been implemented within intended deadlines and cost estimates? (c) What were the strengths and weaknesses of the individual economic approach and strategies utilized by the reintegration interventions? (d) Were there any unanticipated events, opportunities or constraints in the peace process, political leadership and local economic growth that contributed to improvement in reintegration of ex-combatants? (e) Have associated risks on reintegration at the national and local level been anticipated and addressed? (f) Were management capacities of SDDRP adequate to deliver activities in a timely and efficient manner? (g) What measures

38 SDDRC & UNDP. Interim Monitoring Guidelines - DDR/Reintegration Implementation in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States (Absence of UNDP Field Staff). Updated February-2012
Efficiency measures how economically inputs (funds, expertise, time) have been converted into outputs.

**Pace of implementation of reintegration component**

Since 2011, the pace of implementation has been speeded up and UNDP appears confident of being able to cover about 28,000 of the 36,254 XCs who were already demobilized and needed reintegration assistance by December when the current project ends. Implementation during 2009-10 appears to have been slow, probably because it took time to work out the modalities of working with the SDDRC and the IPs. It is remarkable that during the past eighteen months or so, despite the security situation being unpredictable with restricted access for several months, the project has made significant progress in implementation. Developing and utilizing the capacity of the state commissions has been crucial for this success in an otherwise difficult environment.

UNDP’s procurement procedure however still remains cumbersome and adds to delays. During the last round of IP selection, it took almost a year, and several revisions, between soliciting proposals and issuance of contracts. Once the contracts are issued, implementation is rushed and effective implementation time given to IPs is about 4-5 months as at least 8-10 weeks are wasted in finding the right list of XCs to be covered. Interviews with IPs and DDR staff suggest that there is tedious and numerous paperwork involved at every stage of the process of implementation, so much so that IPs spend most of the time on complying with procedures, and relatively less on programmatic side of implementation.

**Cost of delivery and value for money**

On the cost side, UNDP-DDR seems to think that they have got the package right – each XC/WAAF getting a direct assistance equivalent to US$ 800, with additional US$ 200 going into training, US$ 100 into monitoring and follow up, and US$ 400 as programme support and management cost for the IP. From experiences in other countries, including Somalia which is known by the international aid system for its high operating cost (with all operations being run from Nairobi), the operating, support and training cost (US$ 700 per beneficiary) does look excessive, especially because the delivery is conducted over a very a short period, without much of a process follow up (except one visit and a few phone calls). The entire exercise from counseling to training through to procurement, delivery and completion follow-up is done almost on an assembly-line production basis. However, the evaluation team, not having been able to visit many of the areas outside Khartoum and NKS, and see for themselves the operations on the ground, it accepts UNDP’s view that the balance is right. However, the evaluation would suggest that, going into the future, this be reviewed.

An issue that needs to be raised here is also whether or not providing cash assistance, instead of in-kind assistance, would be more efficient, cost-effective, and would deliver better value for money for the beneficiaries, should UNDP continue to deliver economic packages like it does now. Until recently, aid agencies have been generally averse to the idea of cash. But recent experiences, starting with Tsunami in Asia and then the Horn of Africa drought operations in Somalia, North Eastern Kenya and Ethiopia during 2011, show that in a large

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30 As mentioned earlier, UNDP is now introducing Long Term Letters of Agreement with pre-qualified IPs which will address the problems of procurement delays.
number of situations, cash has delivered better value at lower operating cost.\textsuperscript{40} Several researches have been conducted into cash operations particularly in Somalia where access in Al-Shabaab areas was difficult, and it was found that (i) cash did reach the intended recipients more efficiently, and (ii) wherever markets were under-developed, cash injection into local economy helped kick-start the market. This is not to say that cash operations are easy to plan and implement. They require detailed research and meticulous planning, and could be a great opportunity for engaging with private sector – banks, traders and suppliers. Tie-up with banks and developing a secured system of payment involving community-based and independent verification system could lower the operating cost and ensure greater benefits to the individual beneficiaries overall. An ideal scenario would be to involve international MFI specialists like BRAC or Grameen or other INGOs specializing in microfinance working in partnership with local banks and NGOs in design and implementation of such an approach.

Risk management

Working with SDDRC, UNDP has developed a detailed risk management framework taking into account various uncertainties in the programming context. Some of the key elements of the framework are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Mitigating Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Inability to access remote areas on a regular basis impedes monitoring of progress and results which in turn undermines reporting and reputation of the programme</td>
<td>During such times UNDP relies of SDDRC to carry out monitoring and support for implementation. SDDRC has an understanding with the State and Security authorities for free access by Implementing Partners to accessible areas. Contracting project to NGOs to operate in areas perceived to be inaccessible to other NGOs is also an option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Perceived lack of UN ‘neutrality’ by target communities, especially in SPLA dominated areas because of more focus on Government and PDF dominated areas</td>
<td>Low profile approaches (avoidance of the use of UNDP logos and UN number plates on SDDRC vehicles); SDDRC to work closely with community leaders in sensitizing ex-combatants to report for reintegration support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Low level of understanding of UNDP monitoring requirements by commission/monitors may compromise quality of monitoring activities.</td>
<td>Continuous training provided to relevant Commission staff for improved performance monitoring and reporting. Each SDDRC staff provided with a handbook of M&amp;E Guidance Notes and Implementation SOPs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{40} A number of research and evaluation studies on cash distribution in Somalia and North Easter Kenya has come out in the past several months which may be worth studying by the DDR team to debunk the belief that cash is inappropriate and carries greater risk of leakage or inappropriate use. See (1) ICAI.\textit{DFID’s Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa, September 2012}; (2) DFID– Transferring Cash and Assets to the Poor, National Audit Office, November 2011, http://www.nao.org.uk/idoc.ashx?docId=fb0610e-635c-4d08-937c-34966a611c&version=1; (3) Somalia Cash Consortium. \textit{Combined Risk Analysis}, 4 November 2011. (4) \textit{Investing Cash Transfers to Raise Long-Term Living Standards}, Gerlter Martinez and Rubio-Codina, 2012, http://www.povertyactionlab.org/publication/investing-cash-transfers-raise-longterm-living-standards. (5) \textit{Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group, Save the Children – Hiran. Quarterly M&E Report} (October – December 2011), revised draft, 20 March 2012. Similar studies have also come out from Haiti where several agencies have provided significantly large doses of cash for livelihoods development and reconstruction.
4. Favoritism by the frontline delivery staff, field monitors, IPs; possibility of corrupt practices during delivery and resentment among demobilized XCs who may not be accessible due to security reasons. Ethics of conduct and policy guidelines enforced to mitigate potential corrupt and other malpractices; examine individual case sheets of the XCs with photographs of the kits; cross verification of IP tracking sheets, random phone calls to the beneficiaries to ascertain whether services and kits were received.

UNDP monitors key elements of the risk framework regularly and IPs appreciate the efforts put into this work by UNDP staff.

### Quality assurance and management practices

At the inception stage of this evaluation, it was noted that lack of access to project sites would limit the data available for an informed judgment on management practices and capacity of SDDRP to deliver results on the ground. Based on the reports produced by the project and interviews with IPs, it appears that SDDRP has acquired substantial capacity both at the PMU and SDDRC level to administer, oversee and monitor delivery of activities. As has been noted before however, the focus is mainly on managing the mechanics of implementation based on compliance procedures, with deeper programmatic analysis and strategic direction to the programme still being weak.

The stronger oversight by UNDP Country Office has resulted in closer cooperation with other UNDP programmes. In the past two years, some attempts have been made to integrate various elements of community approach and deeper nuances to the community security approach, but preoccupation with administration of cumbersome reporting and compliance procedures takes away precious time of staff from strategic programme guidance. This is compounded by the fact that most of the IPs have limited capacity. Reports from IPs and those produced by SDDRP are all by and large focused on inputs and outputs, with an analysis of outcome and results lacking. The programme reports by SDDRP on occasions tend to be over-generalized, without sufficient rigour of data (See Box 5).

### Partnership strategies

The main partnership in the SDDRP is between UNDP and the SDDRC, at both federal and state levels. UNDP has worked very closely with the Commission to develop capacity of the latter and adopted a joint approach to delivering the programme. There is a shared understanding and mutually supportive relationship that underpins this partnership. Several interviewees mentioned absence of UNDP staff located in the field a problem as this hampers smooth communication flow. State officials feel that all decisions affecting work in their area are taken by UNDP, SDDRC and IPs in Khartoum without involving the State commissions during negotiations which cause difficulties during implementation.
In so far as the IPs are concerned, the relationship is more of a short term contractual nature, with IPs acting as sub-contractors for a designated component of delivery. There is very little dialogue or space for programmatic discussions, except with reference to the outputs that need to be delivered as per the contract, and capacity building or training support provided to IPs are limited to the compliance requirements under the contract. Although there are mechanisms like Technical Reintegration Committees (TRC) at State levels where programmatic issues are discussed, KIIIs indicate that these are more focused on day-to-day task of input and output monitoring and stock-taking of security and access issues.

Conclusions:

9. There has been strong oversight and scrutiny by UNDP country office over operational aspects of the DDR programme. This needs to be backed up with strategic programme support and programmatic quality assurance.

10. There is need to examine the cost-effectiveness of economic reintegration support and explore various alternative methods of delivery like linkage with MFI institutions, banks and use of cash transfers to potential beneficiaries.

4.4 Connectedness:

Questions addressed: To what extent the reintegration interventions, at the local level, were coordinated with other interventions? Have the reintegration interventions built on / match the individual and local capacities/ needs? To what extent the reintegration interventions formed a part of an integrated package?

Connectedness is about the need to assure that activities are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.

As discussed earlier, while there have been some institutional linkages with various line Ministries and government departments over implementation of the project, there has been weak linkage between the DDR component and other recovery, development and peace building strategies and programmes in the country. The original ProDoc envisaged “closer collaboration with long term national development programmes” and “establishing formal linkages with relevant ministries, commissions, donors, NGOs and UN agencies and programmes”. The evaluation found evidence that in the past year or so, UNDP is putting increasing emphasis on this and, it appears from the new ProDoc (2012), that this aspect will receive adequate attention in future programme. At the State level, the programme is working with relevant state ministries (State Ministry of Education, State Ministry of Social Welfare, State Ministry of Agriculture and State Ministry of Animal Wealth, in particular).

4.5 Sustainability:

Questions addressed: (1) To what extent was sustainability considerations taken into account in the design and implementation of SDDRP interventions, results definition and monitoring of reintegration? (2) Were exit strategies appropriately defined and implemented, and what steps have been taken to ensure sustainability of results to support inclusive reintegration and livelihood creation for the demobilized combatants and women associated with armed groups? (3) How did the development of partnerships at the national and state level contribute to sustainability of the results?

Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.

The evaluation team is mindful of the fact that programme implementation has taken place in a very complex environment. Only since July 2011, the reintegration work has gained momentum and it is too early to ask questions about sustainability of a project which deals with such complex issues as livelihoods development, peace building and community
security. The evaluation found that a number of XCs and WAAF/G who were already engaged successfully in some livelihoods activities and vocations may have been able to expand and/or consolidate their economic status. It is reported by UNDP that in SKS, IPs like FAO and NMIAD selected DDR participants of certain educational and skills level, trained them as community animal health workers (CAHWs) and equipped them with basic tool kits and drugs. The trained CAHWs work in their respective communities to provide veterinary services in selected cluster communities benefiting the DDR participants as well as community members. The CAHWs were linked with the Ministry of Animal Wealth at state level who in turn enroll them for replenishment of drugs/animal vaccines and for refresher training opportunities.

There is a consensus that the economic package by itself, without strong linkage with community security and peace building component is not sufficient. Most of the beneficiaries see the package as a top up or a subsidy. At the moment, the evaluation has not found evidence that the project benefits will sustain in terms of impact on community security and peace. The attitude of respondents interviewed by the evaluation team toward the economic package is that something “free” is better than nothing and they are grateful for this. UNDP states that the involvement of the relevant line ministries is part of the exit strategy with the anticipation that that state ministries/department will continue to provide assistance and deal with related issues when UNDP would have phased out its assistance.

The evaluation however believes that the new programme design to be launched from 2013 does incorporate elements which, if seriously implemented, will give the project greater chance to sustain the outputs.

Conclusion:

11. The programme has been so far driven by the political necessity of being seen to be delivering according a seven-year old agreement. To make its outputs and outcomes sustainable, the programme needs to be driven solely by the needs of communities and vulnerable sections of population affected by conflict, displacement and militarization of society in future. The new programme design now in draft form does go some way toward addressing this flaw.

4.6 Overall outcome/results:

The programme may have made a contribution to helping XCs re-establish livelihoods in their communities, although to what extent this has contributed to the goals of reintegration programme remains a matter for debate. All interviews with XCs and IPs during the evaluation confirm the fact that by and large the ex-combatants, even during active participation in hostilities, were never uprooted from their ‘home’ communities; they participated in frontline confrontations as and when called, but usually the absence from homes was no more than for a few months to a little over a year. It needs to be acknowledged that, as was rightly pointed out in the MTR, in Sudan, the combatants’ links with their home communities remained intact even during the years they were actively engaged in battlegrounds. In the face of this, it is difficult to assess the R interventions in Sudan by conventional yardstick of reintegration of XCs into civilian life. What is however clear is that the programme’s contribution to helping communities deal with issues related to conflict, insecurity and arms proliferation, all of which have affected them in the past and continue to affect them now, has been minimal, if any.
Section 5

Overall Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations

The design of the DDR programme was underpinned by the CPA which made assumptions about a post-conflict peace-building scenario. The reality that followed partly compromised the relevance of a DDR programme, without links to other peace building and development programmes in the country, although with a stronger emphasis on community-based approach, UNDP is attempting to address some of the initial design flaws.

The implementation of reintegration activities under the Sudan DDR Programme has progressed steadily during 2011-12, despite ongoing conflict and difficulties of access in several areas. Following the secession of South Sudan and departure of UNMIS in July 2011, UNDP has assumed full responsibility for providing technical support to the Government of Sudan through the Sudan DDR Commission, and some progress has been made with regard to building institutional linkages with various government line-ministries. The programme may have made a small contribution to helping XCs re-establish livelihoods in their communities, although the programme's contribution to helping communities deal with issues related to conflict, insecurity and arms proliferation, all of which have affected them in the past and continue to affect them now, has been minimal, if any.

The programme has been so far driven by the political necessity of being seen to be delivering according a seven-year old agreement. To make its outputs and outcomes sustainable, the programme needs to be driven solely by the needs of communities and vulnerable sections of population affected by conflict, displacement and militarization of society in future. The new programme design now in draft form does go some way toward addressing this flaw.

5.1 Conclusions:

Overall results

1. The economic reintegration support to XCs has picked up momentum during 2011-12, after a slow start in previous years. However, within the overall design of the DDR programme in Sudan, the large time lag between disarmament and final stage of reintegration has negated some of the potential benefits of conventional DDR programmes. Several factors – some beyond UNDP’s control - including ongoing conflict affected timely provision of packages.

2. This evaluation concludes that some progress has been made since the MTR toward building capacity and institutional linkages for delivery of the reintegration programme, with NGOs as well as government institutions. The programme has also made progress toward creating linkages with other initiatives in the country on conflict resolution, peace building and development, and greater programmatic leadership is needed to create stronger linkage and interface with initiatives outside of UNDP’s direct involvement.

3. Progress towards a community-based approach to reintegration has been slow, although communities appear to appreciate the scope and potential benefits from it so far, and this would require significantly greater investment of resources and emphasis than being currently given.
Management of the programme

5. There has been strong oversight and scrutiny by UNDP country office over operational aspects of the DDR programme. This needs to be backed up with strategic programme support and programmatic quality assurance.

6. In UNDP, there appears to be a compartmentalization within various teams and sub-teams, without a common focal point for external stakeholders in the States to interact with.

7. Technical capacity and experience with UNDP and among IPs in designing, planning and implementing large-scale livelihoods programme remain limited which affects the programme effectiveness.

Programme effectiveness

8. There is need to examine the cost-effectiveness of economic reintegration support and explore various alternative methods of delivery like linkage with MFI institutions, banks and use of cash transfers to potential beneficiaries.

5.2 Lessons:

1. Lack of independent verification in the early phases of the DDR process – for which UNMIS was responsible - has sometimes diluted integrity of the economic support and the potential benefits to genuine XCs.

2. The programme has been so far driven by the political necessity of being seen to be delivering according a seven-year old agreement. To make its outputs and outcomes sustainable, the programme needs to be driven solely by the needs of communities and vulnerable sections of population affected by conflict, displacement and militarization of society in future. The new programme design now in draft form does go some way toward addressing this flaw.

5.3 Recommendations:

Reorient the programme to communities’ needs to deal with issues of conflict:

R1: Significantly increase the investment in the community-based approach to reintegration through CSAC and linkages with UNDP’s JCRP.

R2: Ensure that direct beneficiaries of the future economic packages programme are only those who are determined vulnerable sections of community and who may not necessarily be XCs, but providing assistance to whom will strengthen the community’s ability to deal with wider issues of local conflict, arms proliferation and human suffering, and create conditions for transition towards peace.

R3: Beyond the commitments already made by UNDP and international community, selection of all future direct beneficiaries of the programme need to be verified and endorsed by the community through a participatory process of decision making and verification.

Strengthen the Programme’s capacity for ensuring quality and effectiveness:

R4: Continue the follow up on the MTR recommendations, and periodically review progress on key actions taken for implementing the recommendations.
R5: UNDP management needs to review the predominantly procedure- and output-oriented administrative, monitoring and reporting system that is currently in place, and re-align it to outcome and results which need to drive the programme. This will require a significant culture shift in the organization.

R6: To fast-track contracting implementing partners, implement the Long Term Agreement process that has been developed for all future contracts.

R7: The DDRP needs to recruit a livelihoods specialist in order to provide technical support in its programming.

R8: Examine the cost-effectiveness of economic reintegration support and explore various alternative methods of delivery such as linkage with microfinance institutions (MFI) and banks.

R9: Utilizing lessons in cash programming emerging from other countries, UNDP needs to examine the feasibility of using cash transfers to potential beneficiaries as this may help enhance cost-effectiveness of the economic package.