



EXTERNAL FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Support to Civil Service Reform in Timor Leste

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AusAid - Australian Agency for International Development
CSC - Civil Service Commission
CDCU - Capacity Development Coordination Unit
ICT - Information Communication and Technology
ID - Identity
INAP – National Institute of Public Administration
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoF - Ministry of Finance
MoSA – Ministry of State Administration
MoSS – Ministry of Social Solidarity
M&E - Monitoring and Evaluation
NDPS - National Directorate of Public Service
NDP - National Development Plan
OPM - Office of the Prime Minister
PMIS - Personnel management Information System
PM - Prime Minister
CSR project - Civil Service Reform Project
SWG - Sector Working Group
TASI -Temporary Advisory Service Initiatives
UNDP -United Nations Development Programme

An Executive Summary

The Support Civil Service Reform Project (the SCSR project) was approved in 2008 as a three year project, which was extended to 2012 to enable achievement of important project objectives. The main goal of the project is to “*support the development of strategic capacities required to enhance management of the civil service and to increase national ownership of the capacity development process and the management of advisory support in line with well-defined needs*”. The SCSR project strategy was designed around four key outputs to address a series of challenges that the Government faced at that time, specifically: (1) a Management Information System is in place that enhances transparency and supports personnel processing and strategic planning of human resources in the civil service; (2) strategic management of civil service is enhanced; (3) a mechanism is in place for the provision, management and monitoring of technical assistance in response to well-identified capacity development needs; 4) efficiency and sustainability of capacity development efforts enhanced through targeted training and development of civil servants to increase the core capacities of the government.

The project evaluation was carried out to review the progress in delivering the results as envisaged in the project framework, and to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project implementation strategy in contributing to, or inhibiting, the achievements of the project results. The evaluation was conducted by a team of two consultants in the period of 29th September – 13th October 2012. The evaluation methods encompassed a desk review of relevant project documentation and reports, and semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders.

Project relevance

The project strategy proposed by the SCSR project was in line with the broader policy and development context in the country and with the vision of public sector management in Timor Leste. The planned outputs were relevant to address the key challenges of the Government at the time of project design. The project was designed as a package and different components of the project were to support each other to achieve the ambitious outcome of the project. However, in 2009 there was a major downsizing of project’s scope due to a lack of project resources. As a result, some components of the project were only partially implemented while others were not implemented. There is no evidence that the project document was amended to bring the project design in line with the resource mobilization gaps, or with changes which occurred within the Government during the course of the project.

Project effectiveness

The effectiveness of the project was mainly demonstrated through the achievement of concrete project results under each of the outputs.

Under output (1) an automated system for human resource management for the civil servants (PMIS) was established and is now operational. Around 300 civil servants in the office of the Civil Service Commission (the CSC) and line ministries were trained to access, use and maintain the system. The trained users were authorized to update information on the PMIS system and have been entering and updating information in the CSC. Support to line users is provided on demand, usually by contacting the CSC. However, there is no well-defined support center or real “help desk” for line ministries where they can seek clarifications and advice in using the PMIS. A user guide has been developed and disseminated to line ministries to help users in the line ministries to utilize the PMIS. Procedural guidelines for users are still to be developed.

Under output (2) medium term strategic plans in three ministries – MoFA, MSS, MSA – and one agency (the CSC) were developed and approved by their respective Ministers. Importantly, the concept of strategic planning was introduced to ministry staff for the first time and the required capacities and awareness to develop strategic plans were enhanced. General guidelines were developed and anchored within the CSC; however, no dissemination and institutionalization of guidelines has followed. As a result, scaling up of these initial experiences has been lagging. Summarizing, it can be stated that the intended output to enhance strategic management in the ministries has been partially achieved.

Implementation of output (3) was limited to the provision of technical assistance in key strategic areas of the administration. The assistance targeted the Office of the Prime Minister (the OPM) and the State Secretary of the council of Ministers and provision of high level strategic advice to the Prime Minister himself. The evaluators concluded that the support to high level policy formulation was crucial for a quality policy formulation process in Timor Leste. Similarly, the support provided by the Executive Advisor aiming to strengthen management and operations of the OPM can be considered as extremely useful and effective.

Prospects for project sustainability

The readiness of the Government to manage the PMIS on their own is sufficient and can be rated as high. The evaluation team is confident that the PMIS as the most important, authoritative source of civil service information will be maintained and developed further by the Government when the SCSR project support is over. Several factors should be highlighted to support this conclusion. Firstly, a supportive policy framework to maintain PMIS is in place and there is strong political commitment to succeed this project. Secondly, basic institutional capacities in the line ministries and the CSC to maintain and develop the PMIS are present, but require continued strengthening. Importantly, it was emphasized that local ownership of the PMIS calls for special attention and needs to be enhanced.

Since the support to the development of strategic plans was limited to three pilot ministries and one agency thus making the extent to which this support has influenced similar developments across other line ministries and the overall planning system and culture difficult to assess. Although it is evident that the concept of strategic planning was introduced through the SCSR project and knowledge and expertise on strategic planning was enhanced in the pilot ministries and the CSC. However, some shortages should be mentioned, such as limited institutionalization of general planning guidelines and strategic planning practice in general. There was little dissemination and showcasing of best practices across line ministries and scaling up to the policy level due to a lack of strategic targeting of the relevant state institution.

Under the output on the management of technical assistance, the most important UNDP contribution has been made through the facilitation of policy and institutional management advice to the Office of the Prime Minister. That support, which was in essence demand driven to respond to the urgent priorities of the Prime Minister, has been instrumental to improve quality of the policy formulation process in Timor Leste. Also, the Executive Assistance provided to the OPM under this project has contributed significantly to the introduction of operational systems and procedures of the OPM. Since significant attention was devoted to developing the capacities of national staff, the systems established with the support of the SCSR project remains sustainable and will operate supporting the operations of future Governments.

Main conclusions and recommendations are the following:

- The strategy of the SCSR project and planned logic of interventions was relevant to address immediate capacity needs and longer term, sustainable capacity development for sound public sector management. It was also assessed to be highly relevant to the broader policy and development context in the country and in line with Government priorities.
- The intended output on the PMIS to a large extent is achieved - the PMIS is operational and staff in the CSC has the capacity to operate the system, regular reports on the civil service are produced and users in the pilot ministries are trained. However, the PMIS is still not operational in the line ministries, because of internet connection issues and the ongoing process of validation. The PMIS as the most important, authoritative source of civil service information will be maintained and developed further by the Government when the SCSR project support comes to term. However, continued capacity development and IT support, in particular for maintenance and expert advice is needed beyond the UNDP support project.
- The intended output to enhance strategic management of the civil service is partially achieved. Medium term strategic plans in three ministries – the MoFA, MoSS, and MSA and in the CSC were developed and approved by their respective Ministers. Importantly, the concept of strategic planning was introduced to the ministry staff for the first time and the required capacities and awareness to develop strategic plans were strengthened. Furthermore, the SCSR project has definitely influenced development of strategic management capacities in the pilot ministries and CSC and helped to ensure that the strategic planning approach is well understood and internalized within those ministries and CSC. However, there was little dissemination and showcasing of best practices on strategic planning across line ministries and scaling up to the policy level.
- High level strategic policy advice to the PM was crucial and instrumental for a quality and strategic policy development process in Timor Leste. Support to the OPM provided by the Executive Advisor was also considered critical to enhance administrative capacities at the center of government. Administrative systems developed with the support of the Executive Advisor will be maintained supporting the operations future Governments.
- It is recommended that the international PMIS implementation advisor develops an exit strategy for the CSR project and presents it to UNDP senior management and to the President and the commissioners of the CSC. Most importantly there should be a change of roles between the international and national system administrator. Given the continuing need for capacity development and IT support for maintenance and future developments, the government should negotiate with other development partners for future support to the PMIS.
- The evaluation has confirmed that the UNDP has been very successful in providing support to the center of Government – the OPM and the Secretariat of State of the Council of Ministers. In the view of the evaluators, this type of support is strategically very well positioned to open up important entry points for the UNDP's future involvement. It is highly recommended to continue this type of support, utilizing the momentum attained to build on these achievements and further strengthen capacities at the centre of government, so as to coordinate important horizontal policies (e.g. strategic planning, civil service reform).

Introduction¹

Country context and project summary

Timor-Leste became an independent nation in May 2002 after a UN transitional administration oversaw it from 1999-2002. In the immediate years after independence, the country benefited from massive development assistance, mainly focusing on institution building and the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks to organise the new nation state. There have been several initiatives aimed at public administration capacity building and civil service strengthening, including the Institutional Capacity development Initiative (ICDS), Transitional Advisory Support Initiative (TASI) project, Human Resource Management in Civil Service Project, to the currently ongoing Support to Civil Service Reform Project.

The Support Civil Service Reform Project (the SCSR project) was approved as a three year project 2008-2010, which was extended to 2012 to enable achievement of some of the project objectives and to compensate for the delayed implementation of some of the activities as a result of amendments to the legal and regulatory framework of the civil service. The main goal of the UNDP project is to “*support the development of strategic capacities required to enhance management of the civil service and to increase national ownership of the capacity development process and the management of advisory support in line with well-defined needs*”.

To achieve this goal the project had four main project outputs:

- A Management Information System is in place that enhances transparency and supports personnel processing and strategic planning of human resources in the civil service.
- Strategic management of civil service is enhanced (strategic plans developed, Ministerial functional reviews conducted, roles and responsibilities of organizational structures clarified, staffing plans developed, capacity development action plans finalized and strengthened capacity of civil service management issues and roles).
- Mechanism in place for the provision, management and monitoring of technical assistance in response to well-identified capacity development needs.
- Efficiency and sustainability of capacity development efforts enhanced through targeted training and development of civil servants to increase the core capacities of the government.

Objectives of the Project Evaluation:

This project evaluation is to review the progress in delivering the results as envisaged in the project framework. Assess the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project implementation strategy in contributing to, or inhibiting, the achievements of the project results. Analyse the key achievements of the project, document lessons learned and provide recommendations for consideration in future UNDP assistance to the sector.

¹ Introduction is based on the Terms of Reference for evaluation of the Support to Civil Service Reform in Timor-Leste Project and Project Document (revised)

Limitations of evaluation

The project was designed during the first constitutional government of Timor Leste in 2006/2007 and was implemented upon the coming of the fourth constitutional government in 2008 -2012. Between the period of the design and implementation, there have been significant changes in relation to human resources in the ministries and other Government institutions due to the change of the Government in late 2007 and recent change of government in August 2012. Consequently, a number of project counterparts left or changed their positions and evaluation team had difficulties in identifying relevant stakeholders for interviewing. Some key institutions that existed at the design phase of the project such as the Capacity Development Coordination Unit (CDCU) disappeared while new institutions have been created (e.g. the Public Service Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission).

Similarly the UNDP project team has undergone a major transformation in the course of the last three years. In addition to turnover in the project team, there have also been consecutive changes in the composition of the governance team in the UNDP country office. Hence the evaluation team faced a lack of institutional memory with regard to project activities, achievements and challenges for the period 2008, 2009 and 2010. Equally important is to remind the specific donor context that emerged shortly after the design of the project. As UNDP had finalised the design of the project, AUSAID also launched its new Public Sector Capacity Development programme, which provided for millions of AUS Dollars of support (and technical assistance) to public sector institutions, including those that UNDP had been requested to support. As a result, UNDP was not able to mobilise substantive donor resources for the project and had to downscale initial project ambitions. Lack of funding explains why a number of project activities could not be implemented (*see Annex 3: Summary of Outputs*).

Methodology of evaluation

The evaluation was carried out by a team of two consultants – one international and one national consultant. The timeframe for the evaluation was 29th September – 13th October 2012. The evaluation methods encompassed a desk review of relevant project documentation and reports (*see Annex 2: Documents Reviewed*), semi-structured interviews were held with a number of stakeholders (*see Annex 4: List of Interviewees and Evaluation Schedule*). For the purpose of the evaluation, an interview guide for various stakeholders to be interviewed was developed (*see Annex 2 Evaluation Questions*).

Report structure

The evaluation report consists of the executive summary, introduction and three main chapters. The introduction covers the purpose and methodology of the evaluation. The following chapter is structured around key evaluation findings based on the evaluation criteria: (1) relevance of the intervention, (2) effectiveness at the level of project objectives and intended outputs, and (3) prospects for sustainability of project results. In this chapter key findings and achievements are also outlined as well as the challenges to be addressed in the future. The last chapter of the report presents conclusions and recommendations.

1. Key evaluation findings

1.1. Project relevance

The relevance of the SCSR project was assessed against the broader national and development context, as well as the needs and priorities of the target groups.

The UNDP assistance to the SCSR project was *aiming to support the development of strategic capacities required to enhance management of the civil service and to increase national ownership of the capacity development process and the management of advisory support in line with well-defined needs.*

In order to achieve this outcome the SCSR project strategy was designed around four key components to address a series of challenges that the Government faced at that time while managing the continuing development of the civil service. The SCSR project strategy was designed in a consultative manner², benefiting from consultations with the national institutions involved in the initiative, in particular the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management (MoSATM), the Secretariat of State for Administrative Reform (SSAR), the National Directorate for Public Service (currently CSC), the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP – Instituto Nacional Administracao Publico), the Capacity Development Coordination Unit (CDCU – previously under the Prime Minister’s office but dissolved upon the coming fourth constitutional government) and National Directorate for Planning and External Coordination (NDPEAC – under the then Ministry of Planning and Finance but dissolved upon the coming fourth constitutional government) and the Ministries. Active consultations also took place with the main donor organizations.

The project strategy proposed by the SCSR project was in line with the broader policy and development context in the country and with the vision of public sector management in Timor Leste, articulated in Section 137 of the Constitution, which states that “public administration shall aim at meeting public interest and that it shall be structured so as to prevent excessive bureaucracy, provide more accessible services to the people, and ensure the contribution of individuals interested in efficient management.” Such a vision was further elaborated in the very first National Development Plan of Timor Leste (2002- 2007) with specific focus on promoting good governance through a responsible and responsive government. For this, the initiation of the SCSR within the broader policy and development context of Timor Leste was significantly relevant.

Based on the interviews with a former regional advisor from the UNDP Asia Pacific Regional Centre in Bangkok and the former Chief Technical Advisor of the SCSR project, the project strategy was designed as a package and different components of the project were to support each other to achieve the ambitious outcome of the project. However, in 2009 there was a major downsizing of project scope due to lack of project resources. As a result, some components of the project were only partially implemented while others were not implemented (*see Annex 3: Results and resource framework and discussion below*). Since the project strategy was meant to be implemented as a package of outputs the lack of funding radically influenced project results, which also had an impact on the relevance of the project, which was accordingly diminished, in spite of its initial accuracy.

² Based on the interview with a former Regional Advisor in Bangkok

The project strategy was not revised to reduce the scope and ambition of the project based on the changes in funding which had been decreased by over two thirds from approx. USD 19 million to approx. USD 5 million. In the view of evaluators the project required revision and adjustments taking into account the financial sources available. A regular update of the risk log of the project was recommended to support adjustment of the project strategy. Apparently, such risk assessment updates did not take place or have not been documented.

There is no evidence that the project document was amended to bring the project design in line with the resource mobilization gaps, or with changes which occurred within the Government during the course of the project. For example, the indicative activities of component two still refer to the directorate of National Development Planning and External Assistance Coordination (NDPEAC) and the Public Sector Management Sector Working Group (PSM-SWG) of the first constitutional government of Timor-Leste which were abolished upon the coming of the fourth constitutional government in late 2007. The project's progress reports which have been regularly produced report on specific project outputs for which resources were available but omit to make recommendations on adjustments to the project design in response to the changing context and project environment. The absence of written reports/notes on project risks and challenges presented an additional challenge for the evaluation team when drawing its conclusions on project development, achievements and challenges.

The relevance of the four components of the project is discussed below:

The first component of the SCSR project was aiming to establish a Public Management Information System (PMIS). The need to establish an automated PMIS was a direct response to address the challenge faced by the Government of Timor Leste in the area of civil service personnel management, particularly, the lack of accurate data or information on the civil service. Prior to the establishment of the automated PMIS, the Government had employed paper-based record system in the NDPS (currently the CSC). While the paper-based record management system was a good starting point, it suffered from incomplete and inaccurate information and therefore made it impossible for strategic human resource management and planning. The UNDP intervened upon a specific request from the Government to help establish an automated PMIS that would be able to respond to the needs of the Government. In doing so, the UNDP, through an external consultancy firm, assisted with system design, development of PMIS software, upgrading of equipment, training of civil servants, developing procedures for updating and maintaining the data and maintenance of the system. The former NDPS and current CSC have been the main counterparts of this project component since the start of the project. The CSC has taken full ownership of the PMIS and is then lead agency within government for ensuring the maintenance and the updating of the data on the PMIS.

The second component of the project was to enhance the strategic management capacities in the public administration. Support to strategic planning at the line ministry level was very relevant taking into account the overall public management context at the time of project design - the release of the Programme of the 4th Constitutional Government, the drafting of the Organic Law for each Ministry, preparations for the development of the National Development Plan (2008 – 2012). In line with these developments it was important to support line ministries in the development of capacities for strategic planning. Back in 2008, ministries lacked medium-term strategic plans; planning was limited to the annual budgeting processes only. The concept of strategic planning was new to most line ministries, and there was little knowledge or capacities to develop strategic plans. Until then, much of the planning activities had been undertaken by or with substantive support of consultants and international advisors.

In the framework of the project four medium term strategic plans were developed namely for the ministries of Social Solidarity (MoSS), Foreign Affairs (MoFA), State Administration (MoSA) and for the Civil Service Commission (2009-2014). All of them contained a capacity development component as well as a monitoring and evaluation mechanism. It is important to note that special attention was to be devoted to the capacity development component of the strategic plans and the monitoring and evaluation mechanism. This component of the strategic plans was meant to provide a clear, demand based capacity development framework for the ministry/agency concerned. This was considered extremely important (1) to ensure the capacity development of civil servants to enable them to implement strategic objectives, and (2) to justify the plans for additional technical assistance. Importantly, general planning guidelines were developed by the project to support ministries in the development of medium term strategic plans.

The main stakeholders to provide guidance for this output were the MoSATA, the SSAR, the MoSS and the MoF.

The third component of the project was aiming to design a mechanism to provide, manage and monitor technical assistance in response to well-identified capacity development needs.

This component of the project was very much in line with the priorities set out by the Government. The Government had made it very clear that Timorese civil servants should assume greater roles and responsibilities at all levels of the administration. Therefore, dependence on advisory services by expatriate specialists was planned to be steadily reduced over the years to come. To achieve this output the project was planning to work in partnership with the MoSA, MoF and SSAR to develop guidelines for technical assistance and establish a mechanism to mobilize the necessary technical assistance resources which were to be identified based on specific capacity development needs of the ministries. Additionally, it was planned to create a monitoring system to assess the performance of external TA. However, due to insufficient resources project activities in this component were limited to the provision of specific technical support to few Government agencies such as the Office of the Prime Minister, the Secretariat of State of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense and Security (legal advisory services) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Under component four it was planned to increase capacities of the state institutions responsible for providing targeted training and development support. Despite the efforts of all the capacity building interventions, the need for training and educational development of the civil service staff was and still is recognized by the government. This component was aiming in cooperation with the INAP and the MoSA to support the design, development and implementation, of priority training and development activities. Priority training programmes were planned to be identified through the process of the development of the strategic and annual sector plans (under component 2) or individual capacity assessments at line ministry level. At the same time support was planned to be provided to INAP to be able to respond to the needs of the civil service. Unfortunately, due to the shortage of resources, the project was not able to implement this component.

Under this component, the project was also to address capacity gaps in translation and interpretation, which continues to be a major challenge in Timor that limits the availability of information in multi-language form. The number and quality of interpreters and translators in Public Administration still remains well below the desired level. In order to support the public administration, the SCSR project was aspiring to support an assessment of the needs of the public administration agencies and to formulate strategies and support initiatives to train a pool of translators and interpreters. The results of this component were limited to the

assessment of the level and quality of translation and interpretation services across the civil service.

Overall, the planned outputs were relevant to address the key challenges of the Government at the time of project design. However, due to lack of financial resources most of the components were not or only partially implemented. In particular, the third component was implemented only on a very limited scale focusing mainly on technical support to some ministries and agencies. Component four of the project will not be discussed in the evaluation report, since no activities were implemented under this component.

1.2. Project effectiveness

The effectiveness of the project was assessed on the basis of three criteria: (1) the extent to which the expected outputs were achieved; (2) on the level of satisfaction of the main beneficiaries and (3) overall quality of the results/outputs.

The overall objective of the UNDP SCSR project was ‘to support the development of strategic capacities required to enhance management of the civil service and to increase national ownership of the capacity development process and the management of the advisory support in line with the defined needs.’ This broad objective was supported by four main components with specific individual outputs. The effectiveness of the project was mainly demonstrated through the establishment of an automated system for human resource management for the civil servant (PMIS), and individuals of civil service commission and line ministries were trained to access, use and maintain the system. Mid-term strategic plans were also developed in three ministries and one agency (the CSC) and ad hoc support to the Prime Minister’s office was provided to assist with the institutional framework for government in general. The project was, however, less effective in ensuring national ownerships of some of the components of the project and fell short in achieving some of its outputs due to two important factors, which were a financial shortage and staff turnover within the Government.

Component One - PMIS

The expected output for the first component was *the establishment of Personnel Management Information System to enhance transparency and support personnel processing and strategic planning of human resources in the civil service.*

Level of achievement of the output and output targets. The project established the PMIS, which is now operational, and the central module of the PMIS is functioning. It includes personal information such as name, date of birth, nationality, education-background, past experience, leave accrual and performance rating. The PMIS is mainly used as a depository of information and for the payment of salaries. Regular reports are produced by the CSC and shared with the Government and line ministries on civil service population and key developments.

The PMIS stored all civil servant information in January 2011 after the national census of civil servants conducted in May 2010. Since then the PMIS was expected to be ready as the authoritative source of civil servant information of the Government. This, however, is yet to be achieved due to the continuing process of data validation; this is aimed to be completed before the end of 2012. The usage of PMIS is still limited to the CSC.

The PMIS has now been manually linked to the payroll system to allow the monthly payment of salaries of civil servants. However it still requires full integration with the payroll system and it still has not achieved the whole purpose of strategic human resource management of the

government; capturing staff movement, updating of individual's education and providing an automated performance appraisal.

Institutional and individual capacities to manage the PMIS. Around 300 civil servants in the office of the CSC and line ministries were trained to use the system both for viewing purposes and for updating personnel information on the system such as leave accrued, update information on training attended or qualifications received. Eight CSC staffs (including the chief of PMIS in the CSC) were trained as system administrators. The PMIS units within the line ministries were established to help update and manage the PMIS system.

Despite the fact that a relatively high number of civil servants were trained as PMIS users, impact is hampered due to the very high rotation of civil servants. The PMIS department in the CSC also lost a number of well-trained staff. Therefore, on the job training and classroom training remains a necessity and should be continued by the CSC. The current PMIS implementation advisor stressed the lack of in-house manpower, especially for data validation. A shortage of skilled employees especially in ICT is also still very acute.

Usage and access of the PMIS by line ministries. The trained users of the line ministries were provided with passwords to allow accessibility of the system and to enable updating of personnel information within authorized limits. The performance appraisal and termination of term of employment can only be done by the CSC according to the CSC mandate by law no 7. After the initial installation in 2007, the PMIS system could be viewed by most ministries, however, due to some server issue, the line ministries have had no viewing access to data related to their respective ministries since March 2012. The trained users were authorized to update information into the PMIS system and have been entering and updating information in the CSC since then. Also, the data validation process is still underway. In 2010, the trained users from the line ministries were co-located in the CSC office for up to four months to enter and update personal information from their respective ministries.

Methodological assistance and support to the line ministries. Support to line users is provided on demand, usually by contacting the CSC and asking for the necessary information. There is no well-defined support center or real "help desk" for line ministries where they can seek clarifications and advice in using the PMIS. Based on the interviews, if they have any issues to resolve they usually revert to the UNDP implementation advisor and/or the Quidgest Company who were contracted to develop and implement the system (for IT support).

A user guide has been developed (in Tetum and Portuguese) and disseminated to line ministries to help users in the line ministries to utilize the PMIS. However, procedural guidelines for users are not in place yet, providing clear instructions on what kind of data can be entered and how to deal with specific problems while entering data. For instance, what to do if for a particular civil servant there is no birth certificate available?

Component Two – Strategic Management

The expected output of component two was - *strategic management of civil service is enhanced (strategic plans developed, Ministerial functional reviews conducted, roles and responsibilities of organizational structures clarified, staffing plans developed, capacity development action plans finalized and strengthened capacity of civil service management issues and roles).*

Results for this component were achieved in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), the Ministry of State Administration (MSA)³ and the CSC. The evaluation team was able to meet with the planning divisions from the MSA and MSS and with the CSC but unable to meet with representatives from the MoFA.

Level of achievement of the output and output targets. It can be stated that the intended output to enhance strategic management in these ministries has been partially achieved. Medium term strategic plans in three ministries – MoFA, MSS, MSA – and one agency (CSC) were developed and approved by their respective Ministers. Importantly, the concept of strategic planning was introduced to the ministry staff for the first time and required capacities and awareness to develop strategic plans were enhanced. General guidelines were developed and anchored within the CSC; however, no dissemination and institutionalization of guidelines have followed. As a result, up scaling of these initial experiences has been lagging.

Approach and methodology utilized to achieve the output. Support to the three ministries and the CSC was provided in a similar fashion without unified format. Consultants were deployed under three months contracts with the civil service reform project to work with the MoFA, MoSS and MoSA to facilitate and support the development of the mid-term strategic planning process. Based on the interview with former CTA Mr. Bryan Holford, the project team had established one precondition for the pilot ministries to participate in the project, namely that the process of planning in the line ministries would be led by a senior official.

Although a unified structure was not obligatory all plans were required to have a capacity development strategy, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and an annual action plan. Strategic planning teams were established in the ministries to lead the process of planning. All three ministries had 2-3 day retreats with senior staff to discuss their strategic plans.⁴ All strategies were approved by the Ministers and presented to the Council of Ministers.

The interviews have confirmed that strategies were developed in a participatory manner. Different stakeholders were involved in the development process of strategic plans. For instance, in case of the MoFA and MoSS not only employees of the Ministry were involved into the process, consultations took also place at internal and inter-ministerial level, as well as at district and Suco level. In case of the MoFA, Timor-Leste missions abroad, namely ambassadors and consuls, were also involved and consulted throughout the process.

Furthermore, senior civil servants, and the Ministers had a driving seat in the planning process of the MoSS, the CSC and MoFA but not in the MoSA. Both the MoFA and MoSS have

³ The strategic plan for MoSATA was developed but no evidence provided to the evaluation team. The development of the strategic plan for MoSATA was confirm by the then Director of Strategic Planning and the now Director Decentralization Program. .

⁴ Interview with former CTA Mr. Bryan Holford

ultimate ownership over the process as well as over the strategic plan itself. This was emphasized in particular by the representatives of the MSS. Also the Minister herself was steering the process of strategy development.

The UNDP SCSR project Annual report of 2010 indicated that general planning guidelines were developed in consultation with the MoFA and the CSC to support ministries in development of medium term strategic plans. These guidelines were presented in a draft form to the CSC but no evidence of guidelines was provided to the evaluators. Hence, there is no evidence that the guidelines were utilized after the implementation of initial pilots under this the component of the project.

The quality of support and beneficiary satisfaction. The MoFA with the support of the short-term consultant developed a six-year strategic plan for the ministry through a thorough consultation process. The MoSS were supported at the initial stage to develop the strategic development plan, however, three months were insufficient to finalize it. The MoSS then took the initiative to deploy another advisor funded by the ministry budget to complete both a mid and long term strategic plan for the ministry. The representative of MoSA also expressed that three months period was insufficient for ensuring capacity building of staffs throughout the process of developing the strategic plan. Such an issue would not have occurred if there were sufficient funds to fully implement the component four, which was aimed for supporting and strengthening strategic planning exercises through training support and technical assistance.

The strategic plans for both ministries are developmentally sound and include a capacity development strategy, an annual action plan and monitoring and evaluation mechanism in line with the expected targets of the project. However, the experiences of different ministries in the development process of the mid and long term strategic planning exercise is mixed. The representatives of the MoSS were satisfied with the process of developing the medium and longer-term strategic framework and emphasized the participatory approach of this important exercise, as well as the involvement of senior managers in the process and the Minister in particular. The MoSA, however, is less satisfied due to two competing factors. According to the representative of the MoSA, a consultant was deployed under the SCSR project to support and facilitate the development of the strategic plan in the ministry. However, the process was thoroughly consultant driven due to the lack of availability of staff in the ministry to take the leading role. The director who was responsible for leading the process of strategic planning admitted that the ministry was paying too little attention to this important exercise, therefore the drafting of the strategy was mainly driven by the international consultant. The other important factor was that the recruitment process of the consultant excluded the MoSA therefore no consideration was given to language barriers or the insufficient absorptive capacity within the ministry. The MoSA representative emphasized that the results would have been much better if staff of the ministry had been more engaged in the process.

Monitoring and evaluation of implementation of strategic plans. The evaluators have very little information on the process of implementation. Because of the lack of output indicators and regular monitoring of implementation of the strategic plan, it is difficult to say what progress in implementing strategic objectives has been made. It should be noted, that currently there are some efforts to strengthen the monitoring function within the ministries. It was also decided to establish Monitoring and Evaluation Directorates in the ministries.

This situation was complicated by the lack of follow up and monitoring of impact and results on behalf of the UNDP project. Follow up monitoring to ensure that the strategic plans developed were used, the capacity development strategy was implemented and the monitoring and evaluation mechanism were mentioned, but no evidence of such monitoring was provided to the evaluation team.

Component Three: Clear mechanism to manage technical assistance

This component was limited to the provision of technical assistance in key strategic areas of the administration. The assistance was targeting the Office of the Prime Minister (the OPM) and the State Secretary of the council of Ministers and provision of high level strategic advice to the Prime Minister himself. However, in particular with regard to advice to the Prime Minister, the nature of the support makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness of the outcomes, due to lack of clear indicators to measure.

High level policy support to the Prime Minister was provided on demand. Areas of advice were requested by the Prime Minister and ranged from strengthening the liaison role between the Government and Parliament, medium term plan for the CSC, the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission, Dili Sanitation and Drainage Masterplan, pension/retirement scheme to preparation of the long term national development strategy till 2030. High-level technical advisory support provided to the Centre of Government (OPM and the Prime Minister) was and still is essential. Interviewees considered support to high level policy formulation as crucial for a quality policy formulation process in Timor Leste.

The SCSR project provided an Executive Advisor to the OPM. The support provided by the Executive Advisor was aiming to strengthen management and operations of the OPM. The results of the support include a records management system, coordination of priorities for the Prime Minister, provision of advisory support to the PM during meetings and accompanying him to events and visits (including international delegations), and capacity development to support national staff within the Office. The support provided by the Executive Advisor is considered as extremely useful and effective.

1.3 Prospects for project sustainability

Sustainability was assessed by analysing the extent to which benefits of the SCSR project continue after the project has come to an end and what is the national capacity to maintain, manage and ensure development results in the future.

It is challenging to assess overall sustainability of the project. Because of the significant gap in project funding, there were major changes of the project strategy and some outputs of the project were not or only partially achieved (see *Annex 3*). Therefore, the prospects for project sustainability will be analyzed discussing separate project components.

Component One: PMIS

Readiness of the Government to manage the PMIS on their own is sufficient and can be rated as high. The evaluation team is confident that the PMIS as the most important, authoritative source of civil service information will be maintained and developed further by the Government when the SCSR project support is over. Several factors should be highlighted to support this conclusion.

Supportive policy framework to support the PMIS is in place. Firstly, The Civil Service Act (2004) states very clearly that the PMIS is the only data base to be accessed and utilised for human resources management for the public service across the country⁵. Secondly, the importance of the continuing use and maintenance of the PMIS earned significant support from the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers (A statement of support was made by

⁵ Civil Service act, 2004

Prime Minister Gusmao on local television in September 2012). The Decision of the Council of Ministers requests all line ministries to cooperate with the CSC on the PMIS. Thirdly, this view is supported in the Strategic Development Plan of the CSC, outlining the PMIS as a component under the first priority of the CSC to be maintained and implemented in the next 5 years. Finally, it is important to emphasize that a recent agreement between the Minister of Finance and the President of the CSC was signed to ensure an interface between the PMIS and the payroll system.

Furthermore, the President of the CSC is an evident champion of the PMIS. He has a clear vision of the PMIS development and is able to articulate it clearly. The President expects to finalize the data validation process and to issue a permanent ID card to all civil servants by the end of this year and to continue providing passwords to PMIS users in the line ministries allowing them to access and utilize the system within their own ministries. The President of the CSC is confident that after data validation is finalized the interface with the payroll system will be established. Given the significant importance of the PMIS for the government of Timor-Leste and the enormous support earned at the high-level of the government and the enthusiasms of the users within the line ministries, the evaluation team is of the view that the PMIS system will continue to be maintained by the government of Timor-Leste with or without the support of donor.

Basic institutional capacities in the line ministries and the CSC to maintain and develop the PMIS is in place, but requires further strengthening. As discussed in chapter 1.2 the capacities of the CSC staff and the line ministries were built over the course of five years. The PMIS units were established in the line ministries embedded in the Human Resource Units. Still, there is a need for continuing and regular capacity development to ensure sustainability of the PMIS beyond the end of UNDP project. Based on the report of the Diagnostic Assessment Mission on the CSC there appears to be a lack of user training in the use of the PMIS system and that training was not performed when new updates of the system were introduced⁶. This problem should be resolved and training should be provided on a continuous basis by the CSC PMIS team. Therefore, there is a need to prepare a quality training curriculum in collaboration with INAP which has now come under CSC supervision. Training curricular should include basic PMIS training for all staff supporting the personnel management function. It would also be useful to develop a standard training curriculum on ICT for all civil servants in the future. A team of trainers should also be trained to be able to provide training on a continuous basis via the CSC/INAP.

Local ownership to be strengthened. Local ownership of the PMIS requires special attention. Local staff should take over the responsibilities of managing the PMIS. Based on the interviews with representatives of line ministries and the President of the CSC the National administrator would be capable of managing the PMIS, as soon as the UNDP funded International PMIS advisor terminates her contract in December 2012. It is therefore important that the National Administrator starts playing a key role now in managing the PMIS and that the international implementation advisor, for the remainder of her contract, shifts to only provide advice and support to the National administrator.

Component Two: Strategic management capacities

It is important to note that support to the development of strategic plans was limited only to three pilot ministries – the MoSA, MoFA and MSS and one agency (the CSC). The extent to

⁶ Diagnostic Assessment Mission for the Civil Service Commission: Strategic Review Report. IDA International, 2011.

which this support has influenced similar developments across other line ministries and the overall planning system and culture is difficult to assess after almost five years have passed since the initial strategic plans were developed with UNDP project support.

The concept of strategic planning was introduced through the SCSR project. A medium term strategic planning framework was introduced and conceptualized through the UNDP civil service reform project within selected line ministries. Back in 2008 no ministries had a strategic plan and the concept of strategic planning was very new to civil servants. Previously, planning was limited to the annual planning and budgeting processes only. These pilots were a way of engaging selected Ministries to introduce a strategic planning model and process. Thus, the project could be credited for initiating a strategic planning process within the ministries and contributing to the development of a strategic planning culture in the country.

Knowledge and expertise on strategic planning was enhanced in three pilot ministries and the CSC. Based on the interviews, preparation of strategic plans in the pilot ministries generated relevant experience and understanding of strategic planning and these ministries are better equipped to conceptualize the current five year planning process initiated by the PM in 2012. According to the Director for Strategic Planning in the MoSS “it was very easy for then Ministry to develop the five year plan, since they already had previous experience with three year strategic plan”.

However, some shortages should be mentioned, which may have had a negative impact in relation to the sustainability of project results. Firstly, there is limited institutionalization of general planning guidelines and strategic planning experience in general. The general planning guidelines were anchored with the CSC. But the CSC does not have a mandate to coordinate and provide methodological support in the area of strategic planning, the Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, was responsible for coordinating the strategic planning process for the government from 2007 – 2012. Lack of project realignment, particularly, targeting relevant state institutions or ministries was the main obstacle to further utilization of project results and planning guidelines developed with the support of international consultants under SCSR project. There was little dissemination and showcasing of best practices across line ministries and scaling up to the policy level due to lack of strategic targeting of the relevant state institution.

Component Three: Clear mechanism to manage technical assistance

Clear mechanisms to manage international technical assistance have been a challenge in Timor Leste. The (now dissolved) Capacity Development Coordination Unit (CDCU) in the PMO was never able to play a meaningful and credible role in this area. The UN mission also (and UNDP and other donors) were not able to establish credible procedures and monitoring systems in this regard.

The most important UNDP contribution, however, has been made under this component of the SCSR project namely through the facilitation of policy and institutional management advice to the Office of Prime Minister. That support, which was in essence demand driven to respond to urgent priorities of the Prime Minister, was and is extremely important and useful. While it is difficult to assess the sustainability of such support, it has nevertheless been crucial to the policy formulation process in Timor Leste. Also, the Executive Assistance provided to the OPM under this project has contributed significantly to the introduction of operational systems and procedures of the OPM. The executive assistance also devoted significant attention to enhance capacities of national staff. There are also systems developed with the support of the Executive Advisor - a records management system, mechanism for

coordination of priorities for the Prime Minister, system of protocol, operations management are sustainable and will operate supporting the operations of future Governments.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Project relevance

- The strategy of the SCSR project and planned logic of interventions was relevant to address immediate capacity needs and longer term, sustainable capacity development for sound public sector management. It was also assessed to be highly relevant to the broader policy and development context in the country and in line with Government priorities.
- The project design and strategy consisting of four components was regarded as one package, with different components of the projects supporting each other to achieve the ambitious outcome of the project. However, because of a lack of financial resources, some components of the project were not or only partially implemented.
- Since the project strategy was to be implemented as a package to achieve the intended outcome the lack of funding radically influenced project results and, as a result, the relevance of the initial project strategy was diminished.
- The project strategy was not revised to lower the ambition and address possible bottlenecks. In the view of evaluators the project required revision and adjustments taking into account the financial sources available. Furthermore, a regular update of the risk log of the project was recommended to support adjustment of the project strategy. Apparently, such risk assessment updates did not take place or have not been documented.

Project effectiveness

- It can be concluded that intended output on the PMIS to a large extent is achieved - the PMIS is operational and staff in the CSC have the capacity to operate the system, regular reports on the civil service are produced and users in the pilot ministries are trained. However, the PMIS is still not operational in the line ministries, because of internet connection issues and the ongoing process of validation.
- The transparency of the system was enhanced and the PMIS supports personnel processing, however the function of strategic planning of human resources in the civil service is yet to be achieved. Additionally, the lack of a connection between the PMIS and the payroll continues to constitute a major challenge that restricts the impact of the PMIS system and its usefulness as a strategic management tool. An agreement between the MOF and the CSC has been signed in this regard but has not yet resulted in tangible improvements.
- The intended output to enhance strategic management of the civil service is partially achieved. Medium term strategic plans in three ministries – the MoFA, MoSS, and MSA and in the CSC were developed and approved by their respective Ministers. Importantly, the concept of strategic planning was introduced to the ministry staff for the first time and the required capacities and awareness to develop strategic plans were strengthened. General guidelines were developed and anchored within the CSC, however, no dissemination and institutionalization of guidelines has followed. The scaling up of these pilots has not materialised essentially due to a lack of funding.

- The quality of the strategic planning methodology applied in the pilot ministries was relevant, emphasizing the process of planning, active participation of different stakeholders and leadership of national senior officials. In all three ministries and in the CSC strategic plans have embraced capacity development plans and monitoring and evaluation tools. However, the experience of different ministries in the development process of the strategic planning exercise is mixed. The representatives of the MoSS were satisfied with the process, the MoSA, however, was less satisfied admitting however the lack of commitment and interest on the side of senior management in the ministry, which left the process largely consultant driven.
- The period of three months was not adequate to build relevant capacities and develop strategic plans. It should be reminded that back in 2008 ministries were not aware of the concept and process of strategic planning. Also, based on the best practice of other countries, the development of a strategic plan would take at least six months. Again, due to limited resources, the preparation of the strategic plans had to be rushed, resulting in limited capacity building.
- High level strategic policy advice to the PM was crucial and instrumental for a quality and strategic policy development process in Timor Leste. Similarly, support to the OPM provided by the Executive Advisor was considered critical to enhance administrative capacities at the center of government.

Prospects for sustainability

- The PMIS as the most important, authoritative source of civil service information will be maintained and developed further by the Government when the SCSR project support comes to term. This conclusion is supported by several important preconditions – a supportive policy framework for the PMIS is present, basic institutional capacities to manage the PMIS are in place, and there is strong political commitment to succeed this project. However, continued capacity development and IT support, in particular for maintenance and expert advice is needed beyond the UNDP project support.
- Local staff, specifically the National PMIS administrator should take over the responsibilities of managing the system. It is important that the National Administrator starts playing a key role in managing the PMIS and that the international implementation advisor shifts her role to only provide advice and support to the National administrator.
- Back in 2008 no ministries had a strategic plan and the concept and notion of strategic planning was very new to the line ministries. The concept and process of strategic planning were introduced in the pilot ministries through the CSR project for the first time.
- The SCSR project definitely influenced development of strategic management capacities in the pilot ministries and CSC and helped to ensure that the strategic planning approach is well understood and internalized within those ministries and CSC.
- There was little dissemination of general guidelines for strategic planning across line ministries and scaling up to the policy level. The guidelines therefore have not been utilised as much as they should have been. Similarly, there was little dissemination and showcasing of the best practices on strategic planning across line ministries and scaling up to the policy level.

- There was a lack of follow up and monitoring of the implementation of the strategic plans on the side of the UNDP. Dissemination of lessons learned and showcasing of best practices could have been utilised to maximize the sustainability of results.
- The lack of a proper institutional framework and ownership of the guidelines and strategic planning process may have had a serious impact on the sustainability of project results. National ownership over the guidelines and the process was diminished because of a lack of dissemination and scaling up to the policy level.
- Since, project activities were limited only to three ministries it is problematic to assess the possible impact of the project on the development of policy guidance for strategic planning in the government. It can be only assumed that the SCSR project has contributed to the development of a strategic planning culture in the country.
- The efforts of any future intervention in strategic planning should be aligned with the ability to identify and develop the capacities of local counterpart responsible for strategic planning. It is important to ensure that at the end of the intervention national counterpart is able to continue providing the necessary methodological support and guidance to ensure that the capacities of ministries and government agencies are in place and improving.

Recommendations:

- It is recommended that the international PMIS implementation advisor as soon as appropriate develops an exit strategy for the CSR project and presents it to UNDP senior management and to the President and management of the CSC. Most importantly there should be a change of roles between the international and national system administrator. The National PMIS administrator should now assume overall responsibility for managing the PMIS. The international PMIS implementation advisor should play the supporting role only. Given continuing needs for capacity development and IT support for maintenance and future developments, the government should negotiate with other development partners for future support to the PMIS.
- The exit strategy should include, but not limited to, the following tasks to be carried out prior to mid December 2012:
 - Develop a training package consisting of a training module and training materials for utilisation of the PMIS and transfer to the CSC (INAP) prior to the completion of the project in December 2012.
 - Organize training for the trainers of a team of civil servants (not less than 5, select the most capable ones from the PMIS and the line ministries) to prepare and strengthen the capacity of trainers to deliver regular training. This would help ensure that training is provided on continuous bases in the future.
 - Establish a PMIS helpdesk and prepare staff within the PMIS to be able to provide advice on a regular basis. Disseminate contacts (e-mail, phone number) so that civil servants easily know who to contact with specific questions.
 - Develop procedural guidelines for users in the line ministries.
 - Request Quidgest to develop simple IT procedural guideline and train IT specialists within the CSC to provide future IT advice.

- Develop a set with responses to frequently asked questions (FAQ).
- Provide support to HR network as an institutional network for learning. Identify best performing line ministries in the area of the PMIS and encourage peer-to-peer learning.
- Provide support to the CSC to develop the implementation plan of the PMIS in line ministries as part of the SCSR project exit strategy.
- The evaluation has confirmed that the UNDP has been very successful in providing support to the Center of Government – the Office of the Prime Minister and the Secretariat of State of the Council of Ministers. In the view of the evaluators, this type of support is strategically very well positioned to open up important entry points for the UNDP's future involvement. It is highly recommended to continue this type of support, utilizing the momentum attained to build on these achievements and further strengthen capacities at the centre of government, so as to coordinate important horizontal policies (e.g. strategic planning, civil service reform).
- Based on the reports available⁷ and interviews with different stakeholders it is evident that there is a pressing need to develop the capacities of civil servants and modernize the system of civil service. The UNDP would be very well placed to support the Minister of State in analysing current bottlenecks and providing a roadmap for a developing a professional civil service management system. Special attention should be devoted to enhancing the systems of civil service capacity development.

⁷ Timor Leste Civil Service Review by the World Bank – June 2011

Annex 1: Guiding Questions for semi-structured interviews

Personnel Management Information System (PMIS)

Ministries, other stakeholders:

- Have you heard about PMIS? (yes/no) is your institution use the system?
- Do you find PMIS useful/not useful for your institution? Please specify.
- What is the most important data your ministry is usually looking for?
- What are the key problems you are facing?
- Who is responsible for PMIS in the ministry? How this responsibility is institutionalized (TOR of responsible civil servants, Organic Law of the Ministry)?
- How many civil servants have the capacity to work with the PMIS in your ministry?
- How often you submit necessary information to the CSC? What problems, if any, do you face in this regard?
- How do you ensure that the quality/accurate data are provided to the CSC?
- Do you receive quality advice from the CSC/help desk?
- How would you rate the cooperation with the CSC?
- In your opinion, how the PMIS can be improved to be helpful to your ministry and the system of Public Administration?

UNDP, Project staff + Previous project Manager

- In your view, is the PMIS functional?
- Is PMIS operational in the line ministries? Are they able to fill in the data and utilise the data based on their needs?
- What was the strategy of capacity development to introduce PMIS (for CSC and ministries)?
- How many civil servants have been trained?
- What was the level and quality of cooperation between different stakeholders in implementing PMIS? What kind of mechanisms there utilised?
- Was the help desk in CSC established? Is it functional nowadays?
- What are the obligations of the ministries to submit information on regular bases? Do they submit necessary data on time? What key problems ministries are facing?
- Have technical passports for data provision been developed/approved/ and by whom?
- How regular the reports on civil service population are released?
- How many of staff members you have in the CSC? Are they trained?
- What type of public relation activities have been carried out?
- Was the study on PMIS integration with payroll carried out?
- What are the key challenges linking the PMIS with the payroll?
- What are key obstacles to implement the PMIS?
- How would you rate in the scale of ten the ownership of the Government of the PMIS? Please elaborate.
- What would be your recommendations for the future UNDP involvement?

Development of strategic plans/MCDACs

Ministries, other stakeholders:

- Did your ministry have strategic development plan and Annual Action Plan? Who has approved the plan?
- Who led the development of strategic plans within your ministry?
- Was this plan useful for your ministry? Provide examples, evidence.
- Have you heard of MCDAP (Ministerial Capacity Development Action Plan)? How did/does it relate to the strategic plan?
- What was the process of development of strategic plan and MCDAP? What was the role of the consultant? What was the role of the Minister/departments/other stakeholders?
- Was the development of strategy and MCDAP supported by capacity development activities? (Workshop for senior management)?
- Were there any guiding methodology used in the production of the strategic plan and the MCDAP?
- What are possible shortcomings of proposed methodology/approach? Provide concrete examples.
- Do you apply the methodology proposed by UNDP for development of five year strategic plan?
- What are some of the required processes in the management of changes in the PMIS?
- Can you provide us information on what is in the regular reports produced in the PMIS?
- What are some of the significant impacts the PMIS have made to the human resource management of the civil service in general?

Strategic policy support to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)

- Could you specify what type of on-the-job capacity development support has been provided to the OPM?
- What concrete products were developed and results achieved in relation to strategic policy advice for the Prime Minister?
- How instrumental was our support in developing the Strategic development Plan till 2030?
- Was the Prime Minister satisfied with support provided?
- Who is responsible for monitoring and implementation of the Strategic development Plan in OPM? Is there a specific unit/person responsible for planning issues?
- How is the link with five year Government programme and ministerial strategies ensured?
- What are the concrete results/products developed in the framework of provision of executive support to the OPM? How sustainable are the results? Please provide concrete examples?
- What is the system for implementation of the Government/Prime Minister's priorities?

General questions on sustainability and impact of the project

- To what extent was the logic/approach of this project adequate to address the challenges of public administration?
- To what extent the project activities influenced the culture and the system of public administration in the country?
- To what extent have this project been supported by the stakeholders?
- How would you assess the cooperation between the relevant stakeholders in this project? How does this cooperation affect the sustainability of the project?
- What are the intended and unintended, positive and negative, effects of this project on people, local communities, institutions and environment?
- What do the direct beneficiaries perceive to be the effects of this project?
- To what extent does this project contributed to the enhanced capacity development of the involved institutions?
- What are the risks at hand for the sustainability of project results? What factors might have a negative impact on the project's sustainability?

General questions for project staff:

- What was the overall budget of the project (UNDP track, donors?)
- What was the budget for each of the four outputs?
- How many international/local consultants were involved in the project?
- How big was UNDP to manage the project?

Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

1. Project documents

- Project Document(Revised) January 2008
- Project Annual Report 2008
- Project Annual Report 2009
- Project Annual Report 2010
- Project Annual Report 2011

2. Government of Timor Leste's Documents

- Program of the fifth Constitutional Government
- Timor Leste Government's Strategic Plan 2011 – 2030
- Civil Service Commission Strategic plan 2009 - 2014

3. Other Reports

- Timor Leste Civil Service Review by the World Bank – June 2011
- Diagnostic Assessment Mission for the Civil Service Commission: Strategic Review Report. IDA International, 2011
- Functional and Organizational Review of the Civil Service Commission in Timor Leste, George O' Farrel, June 2012

Annex 3: Summary of outputs

SUMMARY OF SCSR KEY PRODUCTS AND OUTPUTS AGAINST PROJECT OBJECTIVES (AND RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK)

Intended outputs	Output Targets	Indicative Activities	Results achieved
<p>1. A Personnel Management Information System (PMIS) is in place that enhances transparency and supports personnel processing and strategic planning of human resources in the civil service.</p> <p>Output Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PMIS operational (2008-) Number of staff trained to operate / administer the system (2008) Regular statistical reports available on the Civil service population System changes are produced in a timely manner <p>Baseline: No information system available to automate HR processes or report on CS populations</p>	1.1 – The PMIS is operational and staff in the CSC have the capacity to operate the system	1.1.1 Technical development of PMIS 1.1.2 Capacity development for key counterpart staff in NDPS 1.1.3 Establish PMIS help desk in NDPS 1.1.4 Operational and hardware environment in place to support PMIS	<p>PMIS system development has been completed however CSC changes to legislation (e.g. career regime, performance appraisal system) require further enhancements. Future changes to the system will include payroll system in MOF and linkage with ID card processing.</p>
	1.2 – PMIS operational in pilot ministries and key staff trained	1.2.1 Training of key counterpart users in pilot Ministries 1.2.2 Review of progress undertaken 1.2.3 Strategy for further implementation updated	<p>PMIS implementation adviser recruited to support the training of key users and managers and oversee data validation of records.</p> <p>A National PMIS System Manager recruited.</p>
	1.3 – Regular reports produced on the civil service population and movements	1.3.1 Reporting needs are identified and addressed 1.3.2 Training provided to key users (HR and management)	<p>Approximately 300 civil services within the office of the CSC and line ministries were trained to use the PMIS.</p>
	1.4 – System updates reflect changes to legislation & regulations (ongoing)	1.4.1 Regular reviews conducted to identify system needs with key user groups 1.4.2 Liaise with PMIS contractor on system changes 1.4.3 Support the process to manage system changes 1.4.4 study on integration of PMIS and payroll system (MoF)	<p>Two CSC staffs were trained as system administrators.</p> <p>PMIS reports are regularly produced and used by CSC and line agencies in human resource planning and budgeting</p> <p>System updated to reflect new legislation changes (career regime).</p> <p>PMIS is operational in most Ministries.</p>
	1.5 – PMIS rolled out to all ministries (2008-10)	1.5.1 National Implementation strategy developed for all ministries 1.5.2 Public relations activities to	<p>The PMIS is operational at the CSC. RDTL with uses from line ministries to access the database at the CSC office. The access in the line ministries is</p>

		<p>promote awareness and application</p> <p>1.5.3 Training on personnel records management systems</p> <p>1.5.4 review of HRM Information systems</p>	<p>disconnected in March, 2012 because of technical problems.</p> <p>The software technical support and maintenance is provided by the contracted company - Quidgest.</p> <p>Approximately a total number of 17,882 civil servants data, collected during the Civil Service Sensus in 2010, entered into PMIS, validated, and closed. The data entry of the remaining 9,410 is ongoing.</p>
<p>2. Strategic management of the civil service is enhanced (strategic plans developed, Ministerial functional reviews conducted, roles and responsibilities of organisational structures clarified, staffing plans developed, capacity development action plans finalised and strengthened capacity of civil service management issues and roles).</p> <p>Output Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic and annual plans are produced by target ministries (2008 -) • MCDAP guidelines reviewed and approved by PSM SWG (2008) • MCDAPs coordination process and establishment of management working groups in target Ministries (2008) - MCDAPs for all ministries started and senior management workshops undertaken in pilot Ministries 	<p>2.1 – Methodology and tools for strategic planning approved and utilised</p>	<p>2.1.1 Support input to the NDP2</p> <p>2.1.2 Development of common strategic and annual planning guidelines and tools (through NDPEAC and PSM SWG)</p> <p>2.1.3 Key counterparts trained in guidelines and tools</p> <p>2.1.4 Facilitation of strategic plans in target Ministries</p> <p>2.1.5 Dissemination and implementation of strategic plan (including M&E systems)</p>	<p>Medium term strategic plans for Ministries of Social Solidarity, Foreign Affairs and State Administration developed (and CSC). Plans included capacity development strategy and action plan and monitoring and evaluation mechanism.</p> <p>project provided technical Assistance to the CSC to develop planning guidelines which link the requirements of the planning within the Annual Action Plan was provided.</p> <p>These guidelines, developed in close consultation with the CSC and MOF, have been presented in draft form to the CSC.</p>
	<p>2.2 – Policy and methodology for conducting Capacity Development Action Plans in place</p>	<p>2.2.1 MCDAP policy, guidelines and tools reviewed, adjusted and approved (through the PSM SWG and TWG)</p> <p>2.2.2 Training and development of key counterpart staff</p>	<p>MCDAP policy not continued by 4th Constitutional Government. Capacity development planning has been incorporated into the strategic planning activities for each of the 3 ministries.</p>
	<p>2.3 – Ministerial capacity development action plans prepared for targeted Ministries</p>	<p>2.3.1 Pilot target Ministries identified</p> <p>2.3.2 Implementation plans developed</p> <p>2.3.3 Communication strategy developed and implemented</p> <p>2.3.4 MCDAPs prepared for target Ministries</p>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Priority positions identified for all ministries from the MCDAP process (2008/9) <p>Baseline: Initial MCDAP conducted in MAFF. No further implementation of CDAPs.</p>	<p>2.4 – Improved understanding of public sector management issues and roles</p> <p>2.5 – Strengthened participation in regional fora</p>	<p>2.3.5 MCDAPs costed and presented to ministries and PSM SWG for approval</p> <p>2.4.1 Regional workshop on public sector management experiences (Vietnam, Indonesia, Fiji, Australia)</p> <p>2.4.2 Follow-up local workshops with senior managers</p> <p>2.5.1 Preparation for and participation in key regional fora (e.g. ACCSM, Pacific Plan) for key executive and technical staff</p>	<p>Support was provided to Government officials to participate in workshop to consider requirements for implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption.</p>
<p>3. Clear mechanism is in place to provide, manage and monitor technical assistance in response to well-identified capacity development needs.</p> <p>Output Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contributions for TASI mobilized to fund the advisors for the MCDAP process (2008-10) - TASI operational guidelines in use (2008-) - Regular workplans developed for TASI activities - Priority positions identified for all ministries from the MCDAP process (2008-10) - Regular reporting on TASI implementation available (2008-10) <p>Baseline: Guidelines for TASI Fund operation not</p>	<p>3.1 – Methodology for use of TASI developed</p> <p>3.2 – A mechanism in place to mobilize the necessary technical assistance resources which have been identified from the results of the comprehensive MCDAP process</p>	<p>3.1.1 Revise TASI objectives and guidelines</p> <p>3.1.2 Disseminate updated objectives and guidelines</p> <p>3.2.1 Donor resource mobilization strategy in place</p> <p>3.2.2 Implementation TASI Fund guidelines</p> <p>3.2.3 Links established with MCDAPs process</p> <p>3.2.4 Existing management and coordination arrangements reviewed and issues addressed</p>	<p>Guidelines developed for provision of technical advisory support and shared with counterpart agencies.</p> <p>During 2008 the project supported the placement of 19 advisors in Government agencies. Executive Advisor to the Office of Prime Minister – The Executive Advisor to the Office of the Prime Minister provided support to the management and operations of the Office of the PM. Legal Advisor Defence and Security – support was provided reviewing all legislations presented to the Council of Ministers to ensure alignment with the Constitution and international law requirements. Legal Advisor – Legislation/International Law – support was provided to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in the development of international treaties and domestic legislation. The Hon. Steve Bracks provided strategic policy advice to the Prime Minister and senior government and parliamentary officials on various issues on continues bases. Five missions undertaken in 2010 (March, May,</p>

clear			August, October, and December) covering the finalization and consultation of the “From Conflict to Prosperity, Timor-Leste’s Strategic development Plan 2011-2030, the development of a pension/retirement income scheme, Dili Sanitation and Drainage masterplan development and implementation, the implementation of anti-corruption systems, and civil service reform.
<p>4. Efficient and sustainable capacity development efforts enhanced through targeted training and development of civil servants to increase the core capacities of the state institutions</p> <p>Output Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Priority training needs identified through MCDAPs - Curriculum and materials development - Training of key counterparts - Pool of qualified translators / interpreters <p>Baseline: Limited pool of suitably qualified translators / interpreters in public administration (baseline to be further</p>	<p>3.3 – Monitoring system in place to assess the performance of TA</p> <p>4.1 – Selected HRD programs designed, developed and implemented based on Sector plans / MCDAPs and harmonised with other donor supported initiatives</p>	<p>3.3.1 M&E system developed for TASI initiatives</p> <p>3.3.2 Regular assessment of TASI activities</p> <p>3.3.3 Regular reports provided for consideration by donors and PSM SWG</p> <p>4.1.1 Training program needs identified</p> <p>4.1.2 Design, develop and deliver selected training HRD programs (e.g. Induction training for Civil Servants)</p> <p>4.1.3 Facilitate the development of local capacity to implement these programs</p> <p>4.1.4 Evaluate and report to PSM SWG on implementation</p>	<p>Support to key officials to attend a pensions training course at the ILO training centre in Turin, Italy. This was followed up with the drafting of a Civil Service pensions policy paper and its presentation and discussions with senior officials through two workshops.</p>
	<p>4.2 – Priority translation and interpretation capacity needs identified and addressed</p>	<p>4.2.1 Assessment of current levels of translation and interpretation skills</p> <p>4.2.2 Strategy to address translation / interpretation need</p>	<p>A mission to assess the level and quality of translation and interpretation services across the civil service was completed (October – December 2008). Strategies to: (i) establish accreditation standards for translation and interpretation; (ii) further develop and implement <i>tetun ofisiál</i>; and (iii) organise translation and interpreting services in a multilingual administration have been drafted and presented to key government and development</p>

developed through Activity 4.2.1)			partners
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Annex 4: Meeting Schedule (as the report will be distributed, needs some sanitation as there are notes in the margin that are internal logistics)

Time	Person/Institution	Meeting Venue	Contact Person	Status
Day 1st, Monday 1st October 2012				
12.30 01.30	Arrival of Mr. Patrick Keuleers/Senior Policy Advisor BDP HQ Arrival of Ms Jurgita Siugzdiniene Consultant, Public Administration Reform and Local Governance	Arriving with Batavia Air Arrival: Merpati Air lines at 14:10 Hotel: Novo Horizonte Dili	Ms. Elizabeth Soares/SCSR Project Associate; e-mail address: elizabeth.soares@undp.org; Telp. +670 7794 8835 Landline: + 670 331 2481, Ext: 2013 Assigned Driver: 1. Lino Soares	Completed
15.00-16.00	Meeting with Farhan Sabih/head of Governance Unit	Governance Unit UNDP	Mr. Joao Pereira/PO Governance Unit	Completed
16.00-17.00	Meeting with: 1. Ms. Mikiko Tanaka/CD UNDP; 2. Ms. Noura Hamladji/DCD UNDP; 3. Mr. Farhan	UNDP CDs Office	Delfina Ferreira/ OIC Special Assistant to UNDP CD and DCD Telp. 77417249; Ext. 2045	Completed

	Sabih/ACD Governance; 4. Mr. Joao Pereira/PO Gov Unit			
17.00- 17.30	Meeting with: Mr. Ken Inoue/ Director and Chief Governance Advisor Democratic Governance Support Unit United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste and his team	Office of Democratic Governance Support Unit, UNMIT Dili, Timor-Leste	Mr. Ken Inoue: Mobile: +670 731 1848 Land line: +670 330 4100 Ext.5518 UNMIT O brigado Barracks;	Completed
Day 2nd, Tuesday, 2nd October 2012				
09.00- 10.00	HE. Thomas Cabral/Secretary of State for Administrative Decentralization	MSA RDTL Caicoli Dili	Mr. Domingos Soares/Policy Coordinator LGSP; Telp. +670 77260618	Completed
	Office-Base Work		Farhan Sabih/ Head of Governance and Joao Pereira/PO Governance	
	Office-Base Work		Farhan Sabih/ Head of Governance and Joao Pereira/PO Governance	
14.00- 15.00	HE. Jorge da Conceição Teme/Minister of MSA RDTL	MSA RDTL Caicoli Dili	Mr. Domingos Soares/Policy Coordinator LGSP; Telp. +670 77260618	Completed

15.30-16.30	Meeting David Hook/ Governance Specialist World Bank	Office of the World Bank		Completed
18.30-19.30	Meeting with Acting UN SRSG Finn Reske-Nielsen	At SRSG's Office O brigado Barak Caicoli	Michiko IKARASHI (Ms.) Administrative Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste UNMIT; Telp.+670 77230621 Ext. 5002 E-mail: ikarashi@un.org	Completed
19.00	Dinner with CD, SCSR Evaluations Mission team and LGSP Mission team	At Discovery Inn (Hotel & Restaurant)	Delfina Ferreira/ OIC Special Assistant to UNDP CD and DCD Telp. 77417249; Ext. 2045 Assigned: Lino R. dos Santos	Completed
Day 3rd, Wednesday, 03 October 2012				
09.00-11.00	Meeting with HE. Mr. Liberio Pereira/President of the Civil Service Commission RDTL	Office of the CSC RDTL Caicoli Dili	Mr. Joao Pereira/PO Governance Unit Ms. Mimi /Secretary of the President of the Civil Service Commission, Telp +670 77359774	completed
11.00-12.00	Meeting with the Commissaries of the Civil Service Commission RDTL	Office of the CSC RDTL Caicoli Dili	Ms. Mimi /Secretary of the President of the Civil Service Commission, Telp +670 77359774	Completed
14.00-15.00	Skype teleconference with Mr. Bryan Holford, Former CTA of SCSR Project	Farhan's office	Bryan's skype address: holfordslaos	We have to recontact Bryan to move it to either 1 o'clock or 12 o'clock

14.00-15.00	Meeting with: Mr. Satoshi Nakajima Minister Counsellor Japanese Embassy in Timor-Leste	Japanese Embassy Pantai Kelapa Dili		Completed
15.30-16.20	Cameron Reid A/g Director Governance for Development AusAID Australian Embassy Dili Mobile +670 7732 6613	Office of AusAid, Australian Embassy Fatuhada Dili	Contact 77326613	Completed
16.30-17.00	Meeting HE. Ana Pessoa Pinto/Prosecutor General of the Republic	Office of Prosecutor General of the Republic RDTL	Sra. Avelina , Telp: 77305161	Confirmed
Day 5th, Thursday 04 October 2012				
09.30-10.30	Meeting HE. Agio Pereira/Minister of Presidency of the Council of Ministers	Office of the Minister of Council of Ministers, Palacio do Governo RDTL	Sra. Elizabeth Baptista Telp: + 670 77936043 Landline: 333 1270 e-mail: lizbaptista@gmail.com Location Mr. Agio's office. In the same bldg of PM RDTL' office @ Palacio do Governo(Government Palace). Kindly, ask the security guard for the office of Minister AGIO PEREIRA, Ministe for Council Ministry...in that bldg and they will escort you to his office.	Confirmed

10.30-11.30	Meeting with Fidelis Magalhaes/Chief of Civil House, Presidency of the Republic RDTL	Office of Civil House of the Presidency of the RDTL, Aitarak Laran Dili	Sra. Zelila Carvalho , Telp. : 7713773 Zelila.carvalho@yahoo.com Mr. Fidelis Magalhaes, Telp. 77230050	Completed
14.00-15.00	Meeting Mr. Flaviano Godinho/ Director INAP (National Institute for Public Administration),	INAP Comoro Dili	Mr. Flaviano Telp: +67077326806	Completed
15.30-16.30	Meeting with Director DNPACE Ministry of State Administration (MSA), Mr. Miguel de Carvalho	MSA RDTL Caicoli Dili	Isabel, telp. 77317825; 3310079	Completed
16.30-17.03	Meeting with Directors of CSC RDTL: 1. Mr Alfredo Orleans Magno/Inspector General CSC RDTL 2. Mr. Cornelio dos Santos/Director of Investigation and Sanction of CSC RDTL 3. Mr. Nelson Filomeno do Rego/Director of Training and Development CSC RDTL 4. Ms. Imaculada/Chief Recruitment and Appointment Civil Service Commission RDTL;	CSC Office Caicoli Dili	Telp. 3339090 Ms Nina/Secretary of the President of the Civil Service Commission, Telp +670 77359774	

17.30	Office Based Work	UNDP Country Office Caicoli Dili	Ms. Elizabeth Soares/SCSR Project Associate; e-mail address: elizabeth.soares@undp.org; Telp. +670 7794 8835 Landline: + 670 331 2481, Ext: 2013	Completed
Day 6th, Friday , 05 October 2012				
8.00-17.30	Field visit to nearby district (Patrick + Joao) Jointly with LGSP Team	Ermera	Assigned: Lino R. dos Santos	Completed
0445 – 05.30	Debriefing with Acting SRSG Finn Resek-Nielsen and UNDP CD Ms. Mikiko Tanaka	UNDP CDs Office	Delfina Ferreira/ OIC Special Assistant to UNDP CD and DCD Telp. 77417249; Ext. 2045	Completed
Day 7th, Monday, 08 October 2012				
09.00 – 10.00				
09.30 – 10.00	Debriefing with UNDP CD Ms. Mikiko Tanaka For Jurgita Siugzdiniene	UNDP CDs Office	Delfina Ferreira/ OIC Special Assistant to UNDP CD and DCD Telp. 77417249; Ext. 2045	Completed
10.30	Meeting with: Quidgest team	At QuidGest office in Landmark, 2 nd Floor Fatuhada, Dili, TL	António Guedes de Amorim Telp: + 670 745 6429 E-mail: antonio.amorim@quidgest.com	Completed
11.30	Meeting with: Ms. Anabela Sequeira, PMIS Implementation Advisor	TBC	Ms. Anabela Sequeira Telp: + 670 7729 9450 E-mail: furak.alves@gmail.com Or furak.alves@gmail.com	Completed
14.00 –	Meeting with Director	CSC Office Caicoli Dili	Telp. 3339090	Completed

15.00	from CSC RDTL: Mr. Cornelio dos Santos/Director of Investigation and Sanction of CSC RDTL		Ms Nina/Secretary of the President of the Civil Service Commission, Telp +670 77359774	
15.00 – 16.00	Meeting with Director from CSC RDTL: Mr. Nelson Filomeno do Rego/Director of Training and Development CSC RDTL	CSC Office Caicoli Dili	Telp. 3339090 Ms Nina/Secretary of the President of the Civil Service Commission, Telp +670 77359774	Completed
16.00 – 17.00	Meeting with Director from CSC RDTL: Ms. Imaculada/Chief Recruitment and Appointment Civil Service Commission RDTL	CSC Office Caicoli Dili	Telp. 3339090 Ms Nina/Secretary of the President of the Civil Service Commission, Telp +670 77359774	Cancelled
17.00-18.00	Meeting with UNDP PDHJ Project Manager, Ms. Barbara de Oliveira and Director for Good Governance of PDHJ Mr. Ambrossio Drafiano	PDHJ Office Caicoli Dili	Sra. Barbara de Oliveira, Telp.+670 77430737 Barbara.oliveira@undp.org	Completed
Day 8 th , Tuesday, 09 October 2012				
08.00-09.30	Meeting with: Mr. Amandio Freitas Director for Strategic Planning for Ministry of Social and Solidarity RDTL	Ministry of Social Solidarity Office Caicoli Dili	Sra. Bendita Telp: 670 7729 0098	Confirmed
09.00 – 10.00	Meeting with: Director of Strategic Planning for Ministry of Foreign Affairs RDTL	TBC	Need to send the formal letter for this purpose of meeting to their Secretary General Sr. Francisco Tilman Cepeda at Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	TBC

09.30-10.30	Meeting President of the Civil Service Commission RDTL	Office of the President of the CSC RDTL	Ms. Mimi /Secretary of the President of the Civil Service Commission, Telp +670 77359774	TBC
10.00-11.00	Meeting Mr. Felix Piedade, MoF National Adviser for	MoF RDTL Government Palace Dili		TBC
11.30-12.30	Meeting with Simon Fenby, Senior Adviser at PM's office		Simon Fenby's Phone #: + 670 7738 2377	Confirmed
14.00 – 15.00	Meeting with Director General for Policy in Ministry of Finance	Ministry of Finance' office	Haven't find the right contact person.	TBC
15.15-16.30	Meeting with Professor Dr. Aurelio Guterres, Rector of UNTL (Former Advisor for MSS for Strategic Planning;	UNTL, Bairro Formosa Dili	Dr Aurelio's Telp # Telp. 77327272 His Secretary: Mr. Jacinto, telp. 77249155	Confirmed
16.45-17.45	Meeting with Ms. Elizabeth Exposto, Executive Advisor to Prime Minister's Office	Prime Minister's Office		TBC

