Community Policing Project
End-of-Project Evaluation

Report presented to

UNDP SUDAN

January 2013

Afaf Abu-Hasabo (Ph.D.)
Evaluation Consultant
afafabuhasabo@hotmail.com

Acknowledgments

Afaf Abu-Hasabo (Ph.D.)
Evaluation Consultant
Khartoum, Sudan
November 2012.

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms & Abbreviations

A2J	Access to Justice
CBO	Community based organisation (s)
CSC	Community Safety Committees
CSWG	Community Safety Working Group
CSIC	Community Safety Information Centre(s)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CP	Community Policing
CPVs	Community Policing Volunteers
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID	Department of International Development (UK)
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HAC	Humanitarian AID Commission
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INGO	International Non – Governmental Organisation (s)
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JCCs	Justice and Confidence Centres
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officer (s)
NCPB	National Community Policing Board
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisation (s)
NPTA	National Police Training Authority
PFCPU	Police Family & Child Protection Unit
PSC/NCPB	Project Steering Committee/National Community Policing Board
RoL	Rule of Law
S/CAC	State/County Advisory Committees
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SP	Strategic Partnership
SPF	Sudan Police Force
SPLM/A	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPOL	United Nations Police

Section I

<div align="center">

Executive Summary

</div>

Sudan presents one of the most complex and challenging development contexts because of its high propensity for armed internal conflict and a history that stretches back decades to independence in 1956. The longest running conflict between the Government of Sudan (GoS) in the north and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was resolved on January 2005 with the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which eventually led to the secession of the South following the self-determination referendum of July 2011. The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) resolved relatively successfully the conflict in the Eastern region and its implementation is on-going. A series of peace agreements were also concluded over the past few years to resolve the Darfur conflict; however, it continues to simmer or erupt intermittently in different forms and in different areas. Moreover, a new conflict commenced in the border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile – viewed by many as a by-product of the CPA's unresolved issues which augmenting the already high numbers of IDPs in the country. The issue of community policing (CP) and police reform assumed increasing importance oer the years as a potential tool of conflict management. Currently, Sudan still hosts two UN missions [UNAMID and the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)] as well as a large humanitarian operation in Darfur.

The Sudan Police Force (SPF) was established in 1903 as a highly centralized institution whose main mandate is to preserve order and enforce law and a Popular Police (PP) Administration - later named the Sudan Popular and Community Police - was established in as part of the SPF with the objective of enhancing the role of the community in policing.

The CP project was approved in September 2009 as a component of the RoL programme that was ongoing since 2006 in support of the successful implementation of the CPA and to improve IDPs and other vulnerable groups' Access to Justice (A2J). Seven states, with heavy IDPs presence, were selected for piloting the project (South Darfur, North Darfur, West Darfur, Khartoum, Kassala, Blue Nile and South Kordofan). <u>The project's primary objective was defined as improving police-community relationship through a change of police mentality and profile from law enforcer to service provider and increasing community capacities and participation in solutions and measures to enhance their communities' safety within IDP camps especially for women and children</u>.

The project was funded by core UNDP funds as well as by the Strategic Partnership (SP) framework allocations supported by a number of international partners. UNDP opted for the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) by UNDP with the UN peace-keeping missions in Sudan – the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in Sudan

<div align="center">

4

</div>

(UNMIS) until the secession of the South Sudan in July 2011 and the departure of UNMIS – as well as the GoS police, as primary implementing partners on the ground . A National Community Policing Board (NCPB) that also functions as Project Steering Committee (PSC) oversees implementation of the project and is chaired by GoS police with membership from UNMIS (CIVPOL) and UNDP.

The project design was reviewed in terms of adequacy and effectiveness in achieving project objectives including the technical design (strategy, outputs, indicators and activities), and management, coordination and implementation arrangements taking into consideration contextual changes during the project's lifetime. The evaluation also examined relevance of the project objectives to both government priorities and UNDP's stated objectives and whether identified challenges and risks have affected the full attainment of these objectives and how/can they be mitigated in similar future engagements if UNDP so decides. The results of the evaluation are intended to guide and inform future UNDP interventions in the area of access to justice and human security for vulnerable groups.

The Evaluation Methodology and Analysis Framework are based on a merger between quantitative and qualitative approaches revolving around **results** in the five key criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, synergies/coordination and sustainability. Triangulation of data recorded in various documents was verified through interviews of IDP communities and Community Safety Working Groups (CSWGs), formal meetings with concerned institutions such as UNAMID, GoS police, regional project management teams and UNDP RoL team. Where field trips were not feasible for security reasons, a telephone interview (of the CP project manager in Blue Nile state) and a long meeting with the South Kordofan RoL regional manager during his evacuation to Khartoum were arranged.

The project design is assessed as appropriate encompassing the right elements of clearly defined objectives, inputs/outputs/activities, strategy and a detailed management structure at both national, state and locality levels all against a situation analysis that captured and reflected the complex context and challenges. However, while the strategy identifies clearly the principles, upon which support to the police should be based, the definition of indicators seems to place emphasis unevenly and quantitatively on capacity building through training. In a strongly centralized institution like the police, supporting policy development and **institutional change** and the review and updating of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), in combination with training, would advance achievement of the project's objectives in a sustainable manner.

 The project suffered drastic slippage in implementation in varying degrees from region to region due to various factors and circumstances that are detailed in the report. Some of these factors could be classified as force majeure (conflict) correctly identified in the risk analysis section while others were more of an institutional and procedural nature (centralization on the part of both police and UNDP project management) and yet others relate to the project's strategic planning and management quality. The delay and absence of a project management team at the national

level for a project that partners with the highly centralized and strong police institution may have also contributed to tipping the direction of the project towards the quantitative (i.e. numbers of workshops/participants, numbers of police stations and community aid posts constructed and/or renovated) rather than the qualitative (sustainability, policy and institutional change, decentralization , Standard Operating Procedures [SOPs] etc.).

In evaluating the project, a distinction was made between the quantitative and the qualitative indicators of outputs and results. Overall, and in spite of challenges, the project reflected progress in terms of quantitative numbers of trainees, workshops and rehabilitation of corrections facilities. The project activities also put in place a pilot organizational nucleus of CP in target communities – including Khartoum state - building on previous work accomplished under the RoL programme since 2006 by expanding the CP organizational structure at community level with the formation of additional CSWGs in target states. Start-up activities implemented in all seven states were on the right track concentrating on building consensus nationally on the concept of community policing itself. Wide consultations with the Police, traditional chiefs and community members upfront built consensus and a sense of ownership by the primary target beneficiaries - police and IDP and "squatter" communities. Training of both police and communities and awareness raising activities were conducted during the lifetime of the project driven mainly by the two partner UN missions in Darfur, the Protocol Areas, the Eastern region and Khartoum as well as by the GoS police.

The qualitative strategic aspects of the project's management and performance, however, lagged. Regional management approaches at state level were more successful than Khartoum state in enhancing the qualitative aspects of outputs generating some positive results and lessons to be applied in future similar endeavours in spite of the complex conflict setting in which they were employed.

Some of the strategic decisions and activities at regional level achieved results in resolving bottlenecks faced in implementation and in enhancing linkages and securing sustainability. High turnover in police personnel (and UNPOL) because of periodic re-assignment and the high degree of centralization of the decision-making process in the police institution both necessitated for UNDP to conduct negotiations at the decision-making and policy level of GoS police HQs to resolve those two bottlenecks. At the regional level, some generated results include securing a breakthrough agreement of GoS police HQs to a degree of decentralized approval powers to the field in Blue Nile and Darfur states. Additionally, UNDP regional RoL management team in Blue Nile state negotiated with police decision-makers and secured agreement to exempt the pool of 19 police officers trained as trainers in the Blue Nile state from regular re-assignment to be retained as primary CP trainers *thus eliminating the high turnover rate of trained personnel to ensure continuity and expansion of police training.*

Increased utilization, at regional level, of local paralegals, formerly trained under UNDP's A2J programmes, as primary community trainers with UN missions providing technical support is a management decision that is assessed as conducive to sustainability. A better level of linkage with other RoL projects of UNDP and relevant UN agencies was also attained at the regional level

through an integrated and expanded management structure of the RoL portfolio as a whole including this CP project with government participation. Experimenting with replicability of CP in states other than the ones currently covered by the project, enhancing the role of popular media- specifically radio – and sports events in expanding outreach and awareness raising to beyond target communities are all positive initiatives undertaken at the regional level .

Conclusion and Recommendations;

The CP project was conceived in and survived one of the most complex and challenging situations at a time when the population, displaced as a result of conflicts in different regions of Sudan, was the largest globally. In the new post-CPA context, with a constitution-making process launched and an impending general elections scheduled for 2014, it is time to plan for and manage the RoL sector generally and community policing specifically in a more strategic manner with the hope that whatever intervention is being carried out would help bring the country closer to peace and stability.

While UNDP's commitment to the RoL package as a whole is reconfirmed in the new programme cycle and appropriate measures are being undertaken to support and strengthen the RoL sector, key recommendations in this report may also be relevant to the RoL programming as a whole and to CP programming in particular as CP is programmed as an integral component in a holistic framework of support to the implementation of decentralization and capacity-building of local government for service delivery including police as a "provider" of service. Building civil society organizations' capacities for oversight and as pressure groups on government for policy change would complement and enhance progress towards democratization and RoL. The section below summarizes key recommendations and lessons that emerged out of this evaluation analysis.

1. It is recommended that the project be extended into the next programme cycle as a medium to long-term process. As such, it will require commitment - in its first stages until it takes root - from the different stakeholders especially GoS, UNDP and the international community.

2. Project management: The separation of project management per se and the provision of quality assurance by UNDP RoL team specialists within the DIM modality through the placement upfront of a strong project management team that can negotiate policy and resolve serious bottlenecks.

3. Institutional change and training: From the global experience and "Best Practice" in CP (Annex V), strong emphasis is placed on institutional change in police reform. In Sudan, there is a need to support decentralization both as a policy issue and an institutional/organizational change one generally. More specifically, in the case of this project, decentralization would remove a serious bottleneck to the introduction of CP in Sudan.

4. Monitoring and evaluation: Enhance the use of surveys as a primary tool for accurate measuring of progress towards achieving the qualitative impact and for evidence-based results (mini surveys of specific target groups such as women, youth, disabled etc.) and of police

(different levels/ranks of police and CPVs). Improve the quality of monitoring reporting with more in-depth analysis of contextual changes, challenges and bottlenecks, lessons and results.

5. Sustainable Capacity-building:

Formulate an overall training strategy upfront in order to focus capacity-building activities eliminating waste and enhancing impact; embedding training into an established national training entity - preferably the NPTA – with support from UNDP and others to build a a core of police trainers, exempted from routine re-assignment allowing only short term training deployment to states to conduct police and CP training.

Negotiate amending existing police re-assignment regulations whereby basic short training is mandatorily linked to assignment and re-assignment for all police levels.

In the context of Sudan (multi-ethnic, multi-dialect and low levels of education in targeted communities) capacity-building results are maximized if the trainer is from the community itself wherever available.

Simplify the training package of complex legal and human rights for the rank-and-file body of NCOs and CPVs given the different educational level of target groups and include more practical legal cases Training of communities may also be accompanied with organizational skills training.

Traditional authority is a group that needs to be specifically targeted in any CP training strategy as this group can help further the CP objective. Customary law and traditional authorities have been supported but only to a relatively limited degree according to the RoL outcome evaluation. [1]

6. Project management and CP structures issues include :

Accelerate the formation and expansion of the national PSC immediately both to relevant UN agencies (IOM, UNICEF, UNHCHR, WHO etc.) as well as to other relevant GoS entities (Family and Child council, HAC etc.). At the national level, it is strongly recommended that the new Project Steering Committee (PSC) includes one/two senior women police officers as core members (not on an invitation basis).

At the regional level, UNDP/Khartoum together with the national project steering committee (PSC) should develop and issue guidelines on the mandatory composition of CP structures (to ensure a balanced ratio of target groups (such as women, youth, the poor and disadvantaged groups etc.) to be applied by all states. Also, develop guidelines on procedural issues in

---

[1] United Nations Development Programme Outcome Evaluation for the Country Cooperation Framework 2002-2006/Bridging Programme 2007/08 for Sudan Rule of Law (RoL) - 13 January 2009

conducting business e.g. quorum, to ensure that decision-making is not monopolized by a few active members.

Accelerate formation of community policing structures in the different states (CSWGs, Advisory Committees etc.) wherever they were not formed.

7. <u>Coordination & Synergies</u>: The RoL portfolio needs to be monitored at the policy level in a more integrated manner with a reasonable degree of decentralization of implementation to the regional level to cater for the different socio-political and contextual situations in the different regions[2].

8. <u>Miscellaneous Issues include:</u>

Enhance the role of media and the Arts/drama – especially radio – to expand outreach utilizing such entities as the formal CP department's media section together with state and national radio and other forms of art such as theatre.

At project formulation stage, careful analysis has to be made of all factors that may negatively and drastically affect the project's progress to minimize waste of resources e.g. elections in 2014 and possible government reshuffle.

Pilot areas are extremely poor – either IDP camps or squatter areas that lack basic services. In almost all cases these areas lack electricity - the primary crime catalyst. Governments are usually hesitant to provide this vital service to displaced populations as it may hinder government's programmes of returning the IDPs to their original areas and in squatter areas where it may hinder government's urban planning, UNDP may want to discuss with local authorities. It may be possible to negotiate the provision of limited renewable solar energy pending the return of IDPs.

Given the poverty level of target CP areas and communities, it would be useful to try and team-up with any other UN agency or INGO running some community development activities alongside the CP ones with some practical basic benefits to the community e.g. microcredit, health clinic etc. A major GoS micro-credit programme is currently running and expanding to cover all of Sudan. CP project may want to partner with a local bank to introduce a micro-credit facility into CP areas as part of the national programme – if possible.

Introduce a RoL/CP electronic newsletter in English and Arabic to be circulated to all stakeholders to build support for CP amongst all stakeholders.

---

[2] A possible modality is an RC thematic group that meets quarterly or twice a year to review RoL progress reports of the different regions and that includes international representation from relevant UNCT members (UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, OHCHR, UNDSS etc.) and national representation (police, judiciary, civil society representation etc.

Section II.

A.   Background & Context

Sudan presents one of the most complex and challenging development contexts. It has a high propensity for internal conflict with a history that stretches back decades to independence in 1956 and is still on-going in different shapes and in different parts of the country. This created a country profile where a conflict situation in one region coexists with a humanitarian one in another and a post-conflict recovery situation is in juxtaposition with a standard normal development one in others. At the root of this propensity for conflict may be the drastic regional differences in the socio-economic and political context that is attributed to urban and regional biased planning that has contributed over the years to sharp differences in poverty and socio-economic indicators such as literacy, health, education etc. This premise is supported by the fact that equity in the distribution of wealth and power has dominated the negotiations of every peace agreement concluded since 2005.

The longest conflict between the Government of Sudan (GoS) in the north and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was resolved on January 2005 with the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which stipulated for self-determination for southern Sudanese that eventually led, to the secession of the South and the formation of the South Sudan country in July 2011. The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) resolved successfully the conflict in the East and its implementation is on-going to date. As for Darfur, a number of peace agreements were also concluded over the past few years to resolve the conflict; however, it continues to simmer or erupt intermittently in different areas and forms depending on shifting alliances between the different factions to the conflict as well as with government. The end result of the various conflicts was one of the largest Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) in any one country in the world.

To support the successful implementation of the CPA and to improve IDPs and other vulnerable groups' Access to Justice (A2J) and the human rights situation, UNDP, partners and donors launched a multi-faceted RoL programme in 2004. The programme included training and awareness raising of human rights concepts targeting the police, IDPs and other conflict-affected communities, refurbishment and construction of police stations and detention centres in conflict-affected regions to meet minimum basic standards, capacity-development of the judiciary and supporting A2J through the establishment of networks of lawyers and Justice and Confidence

Centres (JCCs). The RoL programme was funded by core UNDP funds, by a number of international donors as well as by a Strategic Partnership (SP) framework3 which was supported by a number of international partners. The SP was managed by UNDP under the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) supported by the UN peace-keeping missions on the ground – the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

With the resolution of the north-south conflict, the secession of the south and the formation of the South Sudan country in 2011, a substantial number of southern Sudanese IDPs returned to their original regions in the South. However, conflict commenced in the border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile – viewed by many as a by-product of the CPA's unresolved issues – which together with the on-going Darfur conflict augmented, again, the number of displaced populations. Currently, the Sudan still hosts two missions [UNAMID and the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)] as well as a large humanitarian operation in Darfur that provides assistance to almost 2.2 million people4. The outbreak of a new conflict demonstrates the continuing fragility of the situation.5

With new conflict erupting intermittently in different regions of the country the displacement of population continued to pose a problem both for the government as well as the IDPs which rendered the issue of community policing (CP) and police reform increasingly important as a potential element of conflict management.

B.   Description of the Intervention

The Sudan Police Force (SPF) was established in 1903 as a highly centralized institution whose main mandate is to preserve order and enforce law. This functional purpose of the SPF shaped its organizational structure - a centralized hierarchical structure enforcing law and order. A Popular Police (PP) Administration - later named the Sudan Popular and Community Police - was established as early as 1992 as part of the Sudan Police Force (SPF) with the objective of enhancing the role of the community in policing. The PP, however, mirrored all other police administrations since independence in 1956 and reported to the formal police headquarters and the Ministry of Interior.

The strong military orientation of the police and the perception in the mind of, especially IDP communities, that there is little difference between the military and the police when dealing

---

3 The Strategic Partnership (SP) framework (2005-2012) provide a framework and a flexible funding mechanism to enhance the effectiveness of governance and RoL programming at the national, state and community levels in support of peace in Sudan. It was launched as a two-year partnership, later extended into a second phase, between the UNDP, the GoS, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), DFID, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

4 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) – The UN estimated that at least 2.2 million people remained internally displaced in Sudan at the end of 2011. This figure includes 1.9 million IDPs in Darfur, 200,000 IDPs in South Kordofan, and 66,000 IDPs in Blue Nile.

5 Nine different protocols – mostly dealing with security issues – were recently signed between the Sudan and South Sudan in Ethiopia/Addis Ababa on 27 September 2012 but have not so far been implemented on the ground.

with the community persisted. A community-based approach to policing usually emphasizes the twofold objective of reforming the police and changing their public image and relationship with the communities.

The Community Policing project was conceived in September 2009 at a time when optimism levels were high when peace agreements were concluded, an interim constitution was agreed upon and a government of national unity was formed. The project built on pilot RoL activities that were conducted since 2006 as a component of the "Access to Justice" and "Strengthening Human Security for Vulnerable Groups in Khartoum IDPs Camps and Squatter Areas" projects.

One of the challenges to reform the police service and institutions is how to forge a stronger relationship and positive interactions between the police and the community. Hence, the project's primary objective was defined as improving police-community relationship through a change of police mentality and profile from law enforcer to service provider and increasing community capacities and participation in solutions and measures to enhance their communities' safety within IDP camps especially for women and children. The information and capacity development activities aimed at changing the institutional culture of the police from law enforcement to a rights-respecting one to improve the information flow within the police as well as between police and the communities they are serving so that crime is reduced while citizens' rights are respected.

According to the project document, this meant that the police reform process should cover the following areas:
• Organizational management
• Training and education
• Policy development
• Recruitment, selection, retention and promotion practices
• Staff development
• Police/community relationship

Six outputs were listed in the 'Results and Resources Framework 2009-2010' as follows:
Output 1: Project Management & Operational Costs
Output 2: Strategic Organizational Development;
Output 2: Capacity development, training and awareness-raising;
Output 3: Development of Community Safety Working Groups (CSWG), safety plans & information centres;
Output 4: Establishment of Local Safety Working Groups & Development of Community Safety Plans;
Output 5: Functional Community Safety Centres and Equipment for Community Policing officers
Output 6: Project Monitoring, Evaluation and Documentation of Lessons Learned[6].

---

[6] Some of the "Outputs" Numbering and definition were subjected to change in different sections of the document and, later, in the progress report.

The primary beneficiaries of the project were defined as the IDP communities as well as "squatter areas", particularly women and children, who are currently most affected by crime, conflict and the lack of support mechanisms for victims of crime. The primary partners in this project are GoS police administration, police personnel, local authority officials and law enforcement officers, community representatives, traditional leaders and civil society groups in seven states selected for piloting the project (South Darfur, North Darfur, West Darfur, Khartoum, Kassala, Blue Nile and South Kordofan). Within civil society, the project targeted national and local NGOs, women and youth groups.

UNDP opted for the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) of the project with a UNDP national RoL programme specialist overseeing project implementation and quality assurance as per UNDP rules and regulations. UNAMID, UNMIS and GoS police – in Khartoum – were the primary implementing partners on the ground until the secession of the South Sudan in July 2011 and the departure of UNMIS. UNAMID continues to be a primary implementing partner in the greater Darfur region.

A National Community Policing Board (NCPB) that also functions as Project Steering Committee (PSC) oversees implementation of the project and is chaired by GoS police with membership from UN police (CIV POL)/ UNMIS – until its withdrawal in July 2011 - and UNDP. The NCPB also included the national Director of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) department, two State Police Commissioners on rotational basis and two communities' representatives. Regional committees, similar to the NCPB, were also established in the different regions but with an expanded composition and wider mandate as will be detailed in the analysis, . Community Safety working Groups (CSWG) and local Advisory Committees were also planned and/or established at states' level to complement the management structure of the project. A project management team was to be recruited to handle the day-to-day management of the project.

A total of USD2,927,259 was estimated as required resources for the project to provide the necessary inputs that would result in specific outputs achieving the project's primary objective as defined above. The most _recent UNDP financial record covering the period January 2009 - November 2012 indicates actual expenditure of USD1,164,985.86 in total_.[7]

C.   Evaluation Scope, Objectives and Approach

This end-of-project-evaluation is conducted in accordance with UNDP's rule and regulation on planning, monitoring and evaluation which strongly recommends that pilot projects or those that are going into a next phase should be evaluated.[8] The new Country Programme for Sudan (2013 – 2016) indicates that "…. UNDP will develop capacities of rule of law/justice institutions, including formal/customary courts, prosecutors, legislature, prisons and police."[9]

---

[7] Table1 – p.18 of this report – (provided by the UNDP/RoL Team -Khalafalla email message dated 14/10/2012)
[8] UNDP " Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating For Development Results" – p.142
[9] Draft Country Programme Document for Republic of Sudan (2013-16) – section III, item 16

The evaluation covered the project period from approval in 2009 to present. The project design was reviewed in terms of adequacy and effectiveness in achieving project objectives including the technical design (outputs, indicators/benchmarks and activities), and management, coordination and implementation arrangements taking into consideration contextual changes during the project's lifetime. The evaluation also examined whether the project objectives are still relevant to both government priorities and UNDP's stated objectives for the next cycle and whether identified challenges and risks have affected the full attainment of these objectives and how/can they be mitigated in similar future engagements if UNDP so decides. The results of the evaluation are to guide and inform future UNDP interventions in the area of access to justice and human security for vulnerable groups.

To sum up, it is expected that the results of this evaluation exercise will include, inter-alia[10]:
- An objective opinion on the achievement of the intended project objectives;
- Advice on the continued relevance and suitability of current and future RoL projects' objectives and outputs and making proposals on changes where necessary;
- Assessment of the sustainability aspect and providing an objective opinion of local authorities' and CSOs' capacities to take over once the UNDP project comes to an end;
- Recommendations on resources (human, financial, internal, external) necessary for implementation of future and/or uncompleted activities;
- Advise on effectiveness of coordination arrangements both between implementing partners and UNDP and between Government, UN partners and UNDP.

The evaluation revolved around the five pillars of:
- **Relevance** of the project and its strategic alignment in terms of how the objectives and related activities of the project have been strategically positioned and defined with respect to the political situation.
- **Results:** Applying the table of intended results and indicators presented in Annex III of the project document as closely as possible, the evaluation will seek to assess the performance of the project against its stated objectives, indicators and targets.
- **Efficiency**: The evaluation will assess the cost-effectiveness of the project vis a vis the RoL portfolio as a whole and possible structural changes that could be instituted to enable activities to continue in an efficient and integrated manner for maximum impact in legal reform. The evaluation will seek to identify factors – both extraneous and internal – that have affected portfolio and programme efficiency.
- **Sustainability** of Results: The evaluation will seek to assess the sustainability of capacities and systems created; the sustainability of the community representative entities created under the project, continuation of training, advocacy and awareness raising activities as well. More generally, it will seek to assess the effects of the portfolio on dependency on external assistance.
- **Synergies, Coordination and Partnerships**: Similarly, the evaluation will assess the partnerships established and the form of this collaboration.

---

[10] See Annex I (Terms of Reference)

The Evaluation Methodology and Analysis Framework are based on a merger between quantitative and qualitative approaches. Using the five key criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, synergies/coordination and sustainability, the evaluation was based largely on direct evaluation, but also made use of meta-evaluation, drawing on past evaluations of the project or of the RoL sector as a whole where appropriate. In this case, a desk review of official project documents (progress monitoring reports, needs assessment studies, related evaluation reports, financial reports and available official statistics and data etc.) and examination of contextual information about the project implementation was conducted. The data collection methodology included reviewing the project document and annual work plans as well as other primary and secondary sources of data taking into account the following:

- *Results and Resources Framework (Annex III in project document)* which lists intended targets and results, the baseline for the results and the indicators and benchmarks used.
- Examination of contextual information and baselines contained in the project document;
- Probing the pre-selected results indicators and going beyond these to explore other possible result indicators, and *determine whether the indicators have actually been continuously tracked;*

Triangulation of data recorded in various monitoring reports and other documents was verified through interviews. Group discussion with IDP communities and CSWGs, formal meetings with concerned institutions such as UNAMID, GoS police, regional project management teams and UNDP RoL team were conducted. Depending on the specific situation, individual or group, either a structured or open-style approach was used to back up the conclusions reached. These interviews covered a wide spectrum of representation or individuals from different segments and reflect varied perspectives. *Where field trips were not feasible for security reasons, a telephone interview of the CP project manager in Blue Nile state was conducted and a long meeting with the South Kordofan RoL regional manager was arranged during his evacuation to Khartoum*.

In all interviews, emphasis was placed on extracting lessons to be learned for any future intervention in CP under the RoL sector if UNDP so decided and revolved around a core of standard questions as follows:

- Were stated outcomes or outputs achieved?
- What difference did it make that UNDP sponsored this project?
- To what extent are these results or impact sustainable??
- What could be done differently?
- What lessons were learnt about what worked and what did not work and what were the challenges and risks that may have hindered the full attainment of result and can these challenges and risks be mitigated in the future.

In addition to the above-listed standard questions, project-specific issues were added to cover project-specific aspects and regional contexts that are crucial to arriving at an objective assessment.

The evaluation exercise was guided by one of the key principles in UNDP's revised evaluation policy endorsed in 2011 which emphasizes that, from the perspective of human development and human rights "......Evaluation is guided by the people-centred approach of UNDP to development, which enhances capabilities, choices and rights for all men and women. Evaluation abides by universally shared values of equity, justice, gender equality and respect for diversity". The evaluation was, therefore, conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation (UNEG 2008) reference material (5) and in compliance with the evaluator code of conduct (e.g. measures to safeguard the rights and confidentiality of their sources, provisions to collect and report data, etc.)

The evaluation was also guided by the UNEG norms for evaluation in the United Nations system that stipulated for: independence, intentionality or a clarity of the rationale for the exercise, transparency, ethics, impartiality and objectivity, meeting maximum quality standards as defined by the Evaluation Office, timeliness – unless unforeseen delay factors intervene and finally utility whereby they prove useful as a management tool for evidence-based decision-making with the interpretation of findings grounded in the realities of the country and context, and the recommendations practical and realistic.

Finally, it is pertinent to note that the consultant worked closely with the RoL team in UNDP/Khartoum and project manager a.i. The consultant made field visits to selected states covered by the project and interviews were conducted with the regional RoL project teams as well as with CSWGs, local police, paralegals and NGOs etc. Meetings and field visits were conducted in Khartoum, Kassala and North Darfur states. In North Darfur, meetings with the team that regionally manages the project in the three Darfurs, which was adequate for project evaluation purposes of the three Darfurs. However, as predicted in the project document's risk analysis section, conflict and the security situation in two important states hindered field visits for the purpose of this evaluation. Unfeasibility of visiting the Protocol Areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states was mitigated as indicated in the paragraphs above by extended telephone interviews with the RoL officer of Blue Nile and meeting with the regional team leader who was evacuated to Khartoum at the time. The consultant also benefitted from the comprehensive package of documentation made available by the UNDP RoL team in Khartoum.

D.   Analysis of Implementation & Results

Success of community policing interventions is dependent upon a number of technical factors related to the planning, design and implementation of the intervention. In addition to these practical factors, success or failure may also be dependent upon the critical factors of political and institutional commitment to adopt changes in the policing philosophy and practices to allow the police to serve communities more effectively and equitably. Success or failure is also dependent upon communities' perception of their own safety and is a critical measure of how effective

protection strategies are. Within this framework, the analysis will start first with a brief assessment of the original project design (situation and risk analysis, strategy, management structures and approach, indicators and targets etc.), move on to an assessment of the planning and implementation of the project and, finally to conclusion, recommendations and lessons learnt.

D.1. Design

The project design was reviewed in terms of adequacy and effectiveness in achieving project objectives including the technical design (outputs, indicators/benchmarks and activities), and management, coordination and implementation arrangements taking into consideration contextual changes during the project's lifetime.

The project is well designed encompassing the right elements in terms of clearly defined objectives, inputs/outputs/activities, strategy and a detailed management structure at both national, state and locality levels all against a situation analysis that captured and reflected the complex context and challenges. However, some technical design issues that could have been rectified at the project appraisal review (PAC) stage include:

Background - It would have been useful to make some reference to the pilot work undertaken to introduce the community policing and human rights concepts in the post-CPA phase. The project document could have briefly reflected in a "Background" section on how the project links and builds on extensive CP pilot work in Khartoum state IDP camps since 2006 and up to the approval of this project in 2009. Community policing was introduced as a component of UNDP's RoL portfolio in response to the findings of the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and UNDAF, both of which encouraged interventions to enhance rule of law and human rights awareness. ***The "Strengthening Human Security for Vulnerable Groups in Khartoum IDPs Camps and Squatter Areas"*** project was started in 2006. Its main objectives were to strengthen immediate human security for IDPs and urban poor, improving access to justice and restoring confidence between IDP communities and the police in the squatter areas and IDP camps in and around Khartoum by introducing and strengthening community policing activities. UNPOL, UNMIS and UNAMID were the primary implementing partners under the SP framework. The final evaluation of the RoL outcome stated that "….UNDP RoL staff and paralegals have trained many thousands of Sudanese citizens, IDPs and stakeholders in basic human rights principals, as well as Sudanese legislation impacting rights across both Northern and Southern Sudan"[11]. In other words, this pilot project of the RoL programme ***set a foundation and a baseline*** for the current project worthy of being mentioned as a background to the current project.

Strategy - The adoption of a strategic management approach provides the opportunity for ensuring that community policing is endorsed as a primary approach to policing in Sudan and in formulating future CP strategies and operational initiatives. While the strategy identifies clearly the principles, upon which support to the police should be based, the definition of targets and

---

[11] United Nations Development Programme Outcome Evaluation for the Country Cooperation Framework 2002-2006 /Bridging Programme 2007/08 for Sudan Rule of Law (RoL) – 13 January 2009.

outputs seems to place emphasis unevenly and quantitatively on capacity-building through training. In a strongly centralized institution like police, supporting *policy development and institutional change management* and *the review and updating of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), in combination with training*, would advance achievement of the project's objectives in a sustainable manner.

Outputs are crucial to monitoring and evaluation. Hence, consistency in the referencing and definition of outputs upfront is important for accuracy of and measuring progress as implementation progresses. There is some discrepancy in the numbering and definition of outputs between different sections in the body of the project document text and between AWPs (2011 & 2012) and the project document. Output 6, "Project monitoring, evaluation and documentation of lessons learnt", in the project document seems to have been dropped in progress reports and a new output 6 is included as "Capacity of the Police Family & Child Protection Units (PFCPU) strengthened". Output 6 in particular, as defined in the original project document, has additional importance as it relates to important evaluative survey activities listed in the project's Annex III "Results and Resources Framework 2009-2010" none of which were reported on subsequently in any of the progress reports. Any new "unintended" outputs from project activities may be given a new number and monitored as such.

Indicators are the measuring tool essential for monitoring and assessing progress once targets are defined. It is always recommended to use disaggregated and actionable SMART indicators (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time bound). However, "….A frequent weakness seen in formulating indicators is the tendency to use general and purely quantitative indicators ….These are often weak indicators as they merely communicate that something has happened but not whether what has happened is an important measure of the objective."[12]

In the case of CP, measuring the impact of safety and protection initiatives can be exceptionally difficult, particularly in a conflict context when variables and changes in context and personnel can make it difficult to have clear analysis over time. The selected indicators concentrated almost exclusively on the quantitative aspects of the outputs (number of training workshops, number of police/community participants and civil work completed, police stations and community posts renovated/constructed) all of which are important indicators of the capacity-building and awareness-raising objective. The reporting on progress of activities was also disaggregated in terms of gender indicating the numbers of female/male trainees. However, ***the harder to qualify qualitative aspects of the objectives, those that capture the "essence" of change, were lacking (community perceptions of police, change of police mentality, change in crime trend***).

Risks were initially identified in the results frameworks with their potential impacts and posed challenges confronting the project. However, two major events that had a negative impact and caused substantial slippages in project implementation and progress were not factored in i.e. ***the***

---

[12] PME HandBook – page 62 - Box13

planned general elections in 2010 and referendum for South Sudan in 2011 both of which resulted in a complete halt of project implementation due to the devotion of all GoS police, UNAMIS and UNAMID human resources towards those two major events. In addition, unforeseen risks arose from a changing operational context - in this case the conflict that erupted in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states causing a complete suspension of project activities during the period June 2011 to May 2012 and continues intermittently to date.

D.2. Results

At the project level, a standard evaluation exercise generally relates to the operational level of delivery of outputs by implementing activities using allocated inputs and resources. In addition to these standard norms, the evaluation of this project took into consideration as well the complexity and urgency that characterized the socio-political and humanitarian context in which the project operated at the time which may explain some of the decisions and the challenges faced in implementation.

The project implementation plan was designed to respond to a specific situation (post-CPA), to meet urgent needs of that situation (largest IDP population/humanitarian programme globally) in an almost unique context (a combination of active conflict, post-conflict and normal development setup) where two UN peace-keeping missions were actively involved particularly in the security sector. The UNDP opted for the DIM implementation modality and, for quick impact, relied heavily on the two existing peace-keeping missions – UNMIS and UNAMID – to capitalize on their wide coverage of conflict-affected regions, their human and logistical resources and their mandate in the human security domain which they shared with GoS police.

Overall, and in spite of challenges, *the project reflected progress in terms of the quantitative aspects and outputs* setting an organizational foundation for CP in target communities – including Khartoum state – and building on previous work accomplished under the RoL programme since 2006 by expanding the CP organizational structure at community level with the formation of additional CSWGs in target states. Start-up activities *were on the right track concentrating on building consensus nationally on the concept of community policing itself* given the centralized nature of the police institution on the one hand and the intrinsic negative perception of police amongst targeted communities (IDPs and poor squatter areas inhabitants) on the other. Wide consultations with the Police, traditional chiefs and community members upfront built consensus and a sense of ownership by the primary target beneficiaries - police and IDP and "squatter" communities. Training of both police and communities and awareness raising activities were conducted during the lifetime of the project driven mainly by the two partner UN missions in Darfur, in the Eastern region, he Protocol areas and in Khartoum as well as by the GoS police. The gender dimension as well was taken into consideration with a mandatory women-inclusive profile for the composition of the CSWGs and for trainees.

The project, however, suffered drastic slippage in implementation of planned activities in varying degrees from region to region due to various factors and circumstances that will be detailed in the analysis. Some of these factors could be classified as *force majeure* (conflict) correctly identified in

the risk analysis section while others were more of an institutional and procedural nature (centralization on the part of both police and UNDP project management) and yet others relate to the project strategic planning and management quality as will be further elaborated in the analysis.

On the qualitative strategic aspects of the project's performance, regional management approaches at state level were more successful than Khartoum state in enhancing the qualitative aspects of results and generated some positive results and lessons to be applied in similar future endeavours in spite of the complex conflict situation in which they operated.

The variance in the evaluation of results and delivery of outputs between the centre/Khartoum state and the regions (Kassala, the Darfurs and the Protocol Areas) could be attributed to the variance in the context in which the project operates (conflict, post-conflict/recovery or normal development) as well as by the difference in management styles and strategic planning approaches. While the conflict situation postponed or completely halted training activities in some states, the regional project management at the states' level reflected strategic and forward looking planning approaches deemed more conducive to sustainability and worthy of detailing in this evaluation report as possible "Lessons to be Learnt" in future endeavours[13].

In relation to the above, it is also important to note that in evaluating this project a distinction is made between the quantitative and the qualitative outputs. Overall, and in spite of challenges, ***the project reflected good progress in terms of quantitative outputs (i.e. numbers of workshops/participants, numbers of police stations and community aid posts constructed and/or renovated) and in establishing a number of community working groups in target communities which set a good foundation for community policing*** in all states – including Khartoum state - driven mainly by the wide coverage and specialized resource of the primary implementing partners - UNAMID and UNMIS up to May 2011 when the latter departed.

However, on the qualitative aspects of the project's performance   (sustainability, efficiency, synergies and coordination, replicability etc.) some regional management approaches at state level were relatively successful in enhancing the qualitative aspects of creating synergies and coordination, sustainability, replicability as will be detailed later.

The delay in the recruitment of a project management team may have affected the strategic direction of the project given that the CP project is one of only two RoL projects that are nationally managed (the other being support to the Judiciary). While the effect was mitigated at the regional level by some strategic decisions, the Khartoum state component of the project was the most affected from a strategic planning perspective by the absence of a project manager.[14]

---

[13] Reference boxes 1- 4 in this report.

[14] In over 30 months of project life since approval (September 2009 – December 2012), the project had a full-fledged international project manager for only 10 months (October 2010 – July 2011). The Project is currently managed by a project manager a.i. (RoL Officer who is a Lawyer by training with a Masters degree in Gender and Conflict). The RoL Officer was briefly supported by a International UNV. An attempt was made to recruit another International manager but the selected candidate declined the job.

Moreover, two key activities (formulating a training strategy and establishing a training steering committee) listed in the project's Results and Resources Framework (Annex III) were not performed. Both products would have provided a more focused and sustainable approach to capacity-building and training and made it less driven towards the quantitative rather than the sustainable. A combination of a well-designed training strategy and a training committee to oversee the implementation of the strategy would have maximized progress towards achieving the objective and mitigated the effect of the departure of the primary implementer of training (UNMIS).

Sustainability concerns were validated in relation to the heavy reliance in implementation on time-bound peace-keeping missions which proved to be a factor in implementation delay – particularly in Khartoum - where UNMIS was the exclusive implementer until its departure in July 2011. Moreover, given that high turn-over rate in GoS police personnel was cited as a major challenge in the implementation of this project and given the size of the police institution nationwide, sustainability considerations mandated a more strategic policy level course of action that could have been adopted regarding capacity-building and training.

The main investment in police capacity-building and training is best placed on institutionalizing training and integrating an updated and comprehensive curriculum and modules inclusive of not only global concepts of human rights and community policing but also issues and approaches to **_institutional change management_** especially of a strong mentality-set and centralized institution like the police. The training material produced since 2009 with UNMIS and GoS police which included basic concepts of community policing and ways of developing a partnership between the police and the community as well as inputs on human right, gender and child protection, HIV/AIDS - could be expanded and refined to meet the needs of different police levels and categories. A parallel step would be to invest in training a core of police trainers and a core of change managers at the senior policy setting level that would form the sustainable "nucleus" or "catalyst" of change in this centralized entity. The National Police Training Authority (NPTA) seems like the natural site for this target.

In relation to the above, it is pertinent to note that a UNDP exit strategy has been adopted belatedly. A Letter of Agreement was signed with the Police NPTA in late 2011 and with a number of civil society organisations to undertake the training and awareness raising responsibilities that were carried out by UNMIS. Also, a Letter of Agreement was signed with the Council of Child Welfare to undertake reform of the Regulations pertaining to the implementation of Child Law.

UNPOL/UNMIS achieved quick impact on police training which they carried on since 2006. Community training activities, however, faced different types of challenges: a recurrent challenge cited in progress reports from the field as well as in Khartoum, was the inability of UNPOL/UNMIS staff to access IDP camps. Permission from the relevant governmental authorities to access IDP camps delayed the implementation of planned project activities in some IDPs camps. From a sustainability perspective as well as for other considerations, community training and capacity-building mandated a different approach to implementation of community related activities whereby greater reliance is placed from the start on supporting local entities (NGOs/CBOs/paralegals) with access and acceptability to IDP communities as primary implementers. Peace-keeping missions would provide support to these local entities technically.

In the Greater Darfur region, implementation slippage occurred, in spite of the continued presence of UNAMID, as a result of the volatile security situation on the one hand, the high turnover rate in UNAMID personnel and re-assignment of almost all state police that were already trained and introduced to CP and global human rights concepts. In addition, the Darfur component suffered a set-back as a result of losing the outgoing police team immediately after a long period of negotiation during the first quarter of 2012 to reach an agreement on the work plan and prior to the conclusion of a Letter of Agreement (LOA) which necessitated a restart of a fresh round of explanation and negotiation with the new team.[15] High turnover in police personnel (and UNPOL) because of periodic re-assignment and the high degree of centralization of the decision-making process in the police institution both necessitated for UNDP to conduct negotiations at the decision-making and policy level of GoS police HQs and UNPOL/UNAMID to resolve those two bottlenecks.

A number of initiatives undertaken at the regional level in response to the specific context and circumstances need to be taken into consideration in any future RoL programming generally and community policing specifically. Regional management teams in Kassala and the Protocol Areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states opted, upfront, for more sustainable options in community training in a number of ways. UNAMID and UNMIS – prior to its departure - continued their primary role in training of police trainers while their role in community training was more supervisory as well as providing technical input in curriculum development and supporting paralegals in community training as explained hereunder:

- UNMIS (in the Protocol Areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states) had a major role to play jointly with the National Police Training Authority in the training of a core of police trainers (ToT). In Blue Nile state 19 police personnel were trained as trainers. *UNDP regional management team negotiated with the police decision-makers the exemption of the pool of trainers from periodic re-assignment thus eliminating the high turnover rate of trained personnel to ensure continuity and expansion of police training.*

- *Community training and awareness raising activities on the other hand were mostly carried out through capitalizing on and strengthening synergies with A2J* using paralegals and lawyers' networks. Following extensive discussion and negotiation

---

[15] In interviews with the state police of north Darfur, it was revealed that the majority of officers were deployed to El-Fasher less than a year ago.

with UNMIS in Blue Nile state, UNMIS role was confined to providing technical support - first by training paralegals in CP concepts as well as in developing a multi-sectoral curriculum that included SBGV, Child rights, human rights etc.

- _The use of trained paralegals for community training under the CP resolved the important issue of access, language and knowledge of local communities as well._ The multi-national, multi-language personnel of both UNAMID and UNMIS were not the best medium for conveying concepts of community policing and rights to a target community of unexposed and sometimes illiterate displaced persons and traditional leaders. In Kassala, paralegals registered as the ElSharq Organization for Legal Aid and Culture - introduced real life cases into the training as well as relevant articles from the child and family law in simplified forms for demonstration.

- The same implementation approach was employed by the Kassala and Darfur Regional Teams with former JCC paralegals trained in CP concepts and utilized as community trainers in CP activities in spite of the presence of UNAMID forces in the Darfur region to date.

- _At the regional level, UNDP regional RoL team are assisting former JCC paralegals and lawyers networks register as NGOs, building on their previous legal training under the A2J by training them in community policing concepts and with some basic training in NGO management including resources mobilization._ Sub-contracting these paralegal NGOs as community trainers in CP is a step to enhancing efficiency, sustainability and effectiveness. A number of donors and INGOs currently sub-contract former JCC paralegals for different legal training activities in their new capacity as NGOs.

- In Blue Nile state, where JCCs activities are still ongoing, A2J and CP management and planning are carried out in a complementary and coordinated manner.

The decision to rely primarily on paralegals (who are products of the A2J project, have access to the target communities and are in most cases from the communities/region themselves) is in conformity with and operationalizes some key recommendations of the RoL final outcome that UNDP "…..explore ways to avail itself of the synergies that exist between its various RoL projects" and develops "….. a strategic framework for the sustainability of JCC's and paralegals/RoL Promoters throughout Sudan as part of its comprehensive RoL sector strategy."[16]

In Khartoum state, project implementation suffered slippage in key activities since UNMIS departure, due in part to the delay in the recruitment of a project management team/manager e.g. delay in identifying and sub-contracting NGOs/CBOs for community training, delays in the formation and membership of a new and expanded national Project Structure Committee (PSC)

---

[16] United Nations Development Programme Outcome Evaluation for the Country Cooperation Framework 2002-2006/Bridging Programme 2007/08 for Sudan Rule of Law (RoL) – 13 January 2009, P.75

after UNMIS departure to include other relevant partners, recruitment of an architect to resume construction of CSICs (posts) etc. To ensure the continuation of the project activities, a number of letters of agreements were signed recently with the Police training authority, NPTA, and with CSOs for the implementation of project activities.

UNDP/Khartoum is currently in the process of re-vitalizing and reshaping the project in such a way as to incorporate lessons gained so far as well as to cater for the new political and contextual changes (secession of the South and the departure of southern Sudanese; relocation of UNMIS to Juba; commencement of new conflict in the bordering Protocol Areas and displacement of affected populations etc.). Negotiation are underway with GoS police to form a new expanded PSC/NCPB to include relevant partners and stakeholders from government e.g. HAC, NGOs, and relevant sister UN Agencies to improve coordination and synergies.

UNDP/Khartoum signed a LoA in late 2011 with the Police National Training Authority to replace UNMIS in conducting CP training in Khartoum and nationally. In relation to training, one important issue discussed with the Training Authority is the possibility of designating a core of police trainers to be based in Khartoum and exempted from routine deployment except for short term deployment, as needed, to the different states on training assignments of regional police. This would resolve a recurrent problem faced at state level of the negative impact of high turnover within police (and, in the case of Darfur, in UNAMID personnel as well) depleting the body of police who had already undergone training on CP and other human rights issues.

While the NPTA is expected to take over the primary responsibility in police training after UNMIS departure, the search for appropriate partners to take over the lead in community training and mobilization in Khartoum state needs to be intensified. CAFA - a community development CBO specialized in the provision of basic services to IDPs and marginalized communities in Khartoum - was sub-contracted only in the second half of 2012 to conduct community training under the CP project. At the time of this evaluation, CAFA has just completed the first of a three month community training contract. In addition to CAFA, UNDP provided small Grants to community members (Local Safety committee) overseeing Al-Barak Community Aid Post (in AL Barak former IDP Camp) to provide training to the local community. Negotiations were on-going with a well-established a Khartoum-based CSO CISM to be sub-contracted for Police training on human rights and community policing.

It would be pertinent to note that under the completed A2J project in Khartoum state, six JCCs were established. In addition, two legal aid NGOs participated in the A2J activities, Al-Manar and Mutaawenat. ***Investing in training any one of these two options (paralegals or a legal aid NGO/CBO) on CP concepts, seems to be a more efficient and cost-effective approach to replace UNMIS in Khartoum state*** as primary implementing partners particularly in community capacity-building and awareness-raising and as "catalysts" of community organization for CP.

D.2.1. Efficiency

This evaluation seeks to identify factors – both extraneous and internal – that have affected (boosted or hampered) the achievement of project results from an efficiency perspective. As was explained in the preceding section, the project suffered drastic implementation slippages in varying degrees from region to region and for various reasons. Two major national events that were not identified in the risk analysis, general

elections and the referendum, impacted the implementation of the project negatively by draining the key implementing partner's human and logistical resources away from planned activities. Other factors, some of which were mentioned in the "implementation" analysis section above, had to do with efficiency and institutional and procedural matters.

Putting in place a project management team was indicated as Output 1 in the project document and was scheduled to be accomplished by the second quarter of the first year of project launching in September 2009. However, as was reiterated in different places in this evaluation report, recruiting a project manager suffered a one year delay which may have negatively impacted project implementation and, more importantly, strategic direction. There was no indication under the "key challenges" section of periodic progress report clarifying the reasons behind this slippage. Moreover, _**In over 30 months of project life since approval (September 2009 – December 2012), the project had a full-fledged international project manager for only 10 months (October 2010 – July 2011**_). The project is currently managed by a project a.i. (a Lawyer by training with a Masters degree in Gender and Conflict) . The RoL Officer was briefly supported by a International UNV. Attempt was made to recruit another International UN but the selected candidate declined the offer.

At the regional level some strategic decisions were taken concerning the composition and management structures of the project . CP in the Protocol Areas, Kassala and the Greater Darfur region is managed, not as a stand-alone project but as an integrated component of the RoL portfolio by one RoL Steering Committee with expanded membership that includes the different relevant departments of local police, paralegals and UN agencies (UN Women SGBV specialist, UNFPA, UNICEF, IOM etc.). In South Kordofan, the Advisory Committee is co-chaired by UNDP and police and includes relevant UN agencies such as IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF& UNMIS (until its departure in 2011). In Kassala state, a Steering Committee that manages the RoL portfolio, is chaired by a senior retired judge with an expanded membership of UNDP, DDR, UN Women and other relevant UN agencies.

The Khartoum state component of the project is managed strictly by UNDP and GoS police and – until its departure – UNMIS (the PSC). UNDP is currently negotiating expanding the PSC membership to include relevant GoS entities (e.g. HAC, National Council for Child Welfare) and UN Agencies. The Khartoum state component of the project was the most affected by the delay in the formation and expansion of the Project Steering Committee after UNMIS departure.

Community policing is a complex and sensitive area for programming *especially if it is conducted in an active conflict set-up or a post-conflict one.* It is also an area of programming where the primary partner is the police institution, which, by definition is centralized and resistant to civilian interference. Coupled with these two factors in the case of this project was the fact that the police institution shared with the UNPOL/UNMIS a similar mandate. Hence, the project was more driven by short-term quick impact

outputs and less with the sustainable longer-term, vision that contributes to the outcome and eventually, results.

As mentioned earlier, CAFA - a community development CBO specialized in the provision of basic services to IDPs and marginalized communities in Khartoum - was sub-contracted in late 2012 for three-months to conduct community training and awareness-raising activities[17]. It would be pertinent to note that under the completed A2J project in Khartoum state, six JCCs were established. In addition, two legal aid NGOs participated in the A2J activities. Investing in training any one of these two options (paralegals or a legal aid NGO/CBO) on CP concepts, is a more efficient and cost-effective approach to replace UNMIS in Khartoum state as a primary implementing partners for CP activities.

The new UNDP funds disbursement modality has been recurrently cited by regional RoL teams as a a serious procedural bottleneck that needs to be resolved due to the numerous demands required to satisfy the new policy. A new corporate policy of UNDP stipulated for direct payment to government counterparts based on AWPs which further contributed to the slowdown of implementation at state level. The LoA is signed with government to cover government-implemented activities. AWPs are discussed and finalized annually as part of the planning process as an approach to enhancing national ownership. Negotiating an AWP and finalizing a LOA at state level with state level police counterparts is in itself a time consuming process after which the latter mandatorily has to go back to GoS police HQs. in Khartoum for clearance and signature. However, the LoA disbursement modality was used, alongside the DIM working advance, to enable government institutions to implement certain activities under the DIM using their own financial regulations. This mechanism was used to give advances to the government institutions to implement some activities and later on the advances will be accounted for vis a vis the AWP. The use of this modality is encouraged as a UNDP policy to enhance the capacities of counterparts.

Regarding budgetary allocations and expenditures under the project, the total initial estimated budget for the duration of the project was US$2, 927,259 of which of which an amount of USD1,164,985.86 had been secured as detailed in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Donor Contributions

Donor	Contributions (USD)
DFID	742,278.86
Netherlands	387,294.83
SIDA	35,412.17
Total	**1,164,985.86**

---

[17] According to UNDP, a capacity assessment exercise was carried out to determine the suitability of CAFA to carry out training on issues related to CP. On the one hand, police is a "closed" entity that is not easy to engage with and on the other , the interest of the CSO in working with police counts. CAFA seems to satisfy the criteria in addition to its previous engagement with the police at locality level

As is reflected in Table 2 below, total expenditures between 2009 and up to November 2012 amounted to US$1,027,133.25 of the USD2,927,259 estimated project budget for the full implementation of the project. *This total expenditure figure reflects the slippage that occurred in project implementation since 2009 and up to date putting the project's delivery rate of outputs at around 35-40% of total **estimated** budget required. However, the project delivery rate would be 88% if actual expenditure of USD1,027,133.25 is calculated against actual total resources received from DfID, SIDA and the Netherlands of USD1,164,985.86 up to November 2012.*

Table 2. Statement of Expenditures for the period Jan. 2009 - November 2012

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Project Management	20,399.11	160,938.00	231,159.86	244,752.99	657,249.96
Strategic Organizational Development		84,214.68	765.63	23,589.90	108,570.21
Capacity Development	83.19	51,531.23	41,502.30	62,440.58	155,557.30
Establishment of Local Safety Posts.			21,976.96	7,823.45	29,800.41
Functional Community Safety Information Centres			9,222.90	19,643.16	28,866.06
Capacity of Police Family & Child Protection Units			34,194.70	12,894.61	47,089.31
Grand Total	**20,482.30**	**296,683.91**	**338,822.35**	**371,144.69**	**1,027,133.25**

Analysis of the project in terms of inputs/outputs per se reveals that about *64% of actual expenditure was on "CP **and** SP management" (US$657,249.96) and 36% (US$369,883.29) went into community policing activities of strategic organizational development and capacity development*.

There were hardly any activities in 2009 as indicated by a total of expenditures of around US$20,468 which increased incrementally in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Because of the state of the existing police structures and the absence of community policing structures, civil works expenditures were included. However, it is not always clear under which project the civil works expenditure is charged as demarcation lines of outputs and expenditure are not always clear in projects funded under the SP modality. With the SP as the overall source of funding for all RoL portfolio including A2J and CP, expenditures from allocations for the different components of the RoL projects were sometimes blurred which may also need to be resolved in future if the same SP modality is continued for efficiency and evaluation purposes.

To conclude, given the recurrent and demonstrated effect of UNDP's new disbursement modalities, there is need to come up with a more efficient system of funds disbursement that would not hinder project implementation - within the rules and regulations of UNDP. At states' level there is a strong view that project implementation could be accelerated with more decentralized management from both GoS police and UNDP/Khartoum. It may be possible for UNDP/Khartoum to engage with GoS police in negotiating the possibility of piloting decentralizing some of its CP-related powers to the state level on a pilot basis to accelerate implementation and increase efficiency. At least in one regional team's case, a decentralization initiative to ease the effect of the bottleneck on implementation was attempted and could be built on for all states[18].

In addition to the stated delay factors of turn-over in Gos police and peace-keeping missions' personnel, a recurrently identified implementation challenge at the regional relates to the centralization of decision-making at the institutional level on the part of GoS police. The CP project is one of two projects only in the RoL portfolio (the other being the judiciary) that is nationally managed i.e. centralized - which seem to reflect the same highly centralized mode of management that characterizes the two institutions of the police and the Judiciary. Given the centralized nature of the police institution in Sudan, concluding agreements with GoS police at state level remains to be a challenge. A tremendous amount of time is spent on consultations with HQs in Khartoum on AWPs and LoAs.

The project strategy specifies that support to the police will be governed by the clear mission statement of providing "…..services to community and facilitate a sense of security….with the reform process based on principles including: Decentralised decision-making and operational management". However, there is no evidence that the decentralization issue was negotiated with police either from a policy or operational level **at the national project management level** – even on a pilot scale in any one state – as a target or output of this project. The rigid centrality of the police institution has been recurrently mentioned as a major slow down factor in implementation progress. ***The "..need for the distribution of police powers between the national level and the sub-national level" is in keeping with the INC and objectives of the peace agreements as well as with UNDP's programming emphasis on local governance for service delivery.*** Decentralization, even on a pilot level to one state for demonstration and lessons to be learnt, could have been attempted and included as an important target in police reform at the institutional level.

Decentralization was indicated as a core principle on which UNDP support to police reform is built. However, it was clear from the various documentations and interviews that

---

[18] The case of the LOA signed in Nyala by the GoS Police director was a positive step although he had to get clearance from Khartoum. In West Darfur and ND, the GOS Police are now ready to sign agreements and if the project continues into 2013, it is anticipated that agreements will be concluded by February 2013.

support to "decentralization" of the police institution was not defined as a target which may partially be due to the unstable security situation in 5 of the 7 states where the project is operational.

One regional initiative, however, was successful in achieving a breakthrough. The Blue Nile state police was successful, with UNDP's support, in getting approval for at least partial decentralized authority to decide on and approve their training plans and funding by external sources. In South Darfur as well, the regional project team concluded a LoA with GOS Police on May 2012 that was signed off at the state level and the provisions of the agreement were successfully implemented indicating a significant breakthrough in the centralised institution. The activities are ongoing and are expected to be completed during early 2013

Both the situation analysis and project strategy sections emphasized the need for decentralization and distribution of powers between the national and sub-national levels and the need for integrating citizen participation to enhance safety and security of person and property and to increase accountability and promote public confidence in the police, were both emphasized. In a strong and historically centralized institution like the police, putting in place a strong project management team in any planned new phase of the project would advance strategic decisions and resolve some bottlenecks that have hampered implementation in this phase.

D.2.2. Monitoring & Reporting

Baselines, indicators and target should be clearly aligned with each other using the same unit of measurement to produce a solid database for evaluations. Evaluations in UNDP are guided by the principles of human rights and gender equality. In order to make excluded or disadvantaged groups visible, data should be disaggregated by gender, age, disability, ethnicity, socio-economic grouping/poverty and any other relevant differences where possible.

While emphasis in measuring progress is placed on the quantitative indicators of training data (workshops, awareness-raising sessions and participants numbers) the lack of consistent data breakdown in reporting as well as the lack of boundary between the CP and A2J projects makes it difficult to make an accurate analysis. From a quick and partial review of different progress reports produced throughout the life of the project, only a rough estimate of the number of persons who participated in any kind of training organized under the CP project – from police and communities - could be presumed. Consistent data breakdown and analysis of data through multiple lenses, including socio-economic grouping, ethnicity and disability, wherever possible, would enhance evaluation accuracy. Marginalized groups are often subject to multiple forms of discrimination, and it

is important to understand how these different forms of discrimination intersect to deny rights holders their rights.

A possible monitoring and measuring tool that captures the "essence" of change as mentioned above, could have been conducting selective surveys upfront (as baseline) and at the end of the project cycle (for progress or results). Surveys' results , defined as change in percentages of the surveyed group "before" and "after" would represent a solid indicator for measuring progress. The Resources Framework" and the "Quality Management for Project Activity Results" matrix both included survey activities that could have made it possible to measure progress in those qualitative components of the intended results, there is no evidence in progress reports that these activities were carried out.

A draft report was commissioned by UNDP in 2011 as one of a set of inputs that UNDP and the GoS employ to assess progress towards the achievement of CPAP outcomes[19]. While this study conducted study survey, and other RoL project indicators, the study was basically geared towards assessing RoL **_outcome indicators_ not the specific CP project ones.**

The study clearly indicated that "…. residents in the unstable and insecure areas complain of the rise in armed robbery and crime in general. On the other hand, those living away from armed conflict areas feel that the crime rate has been decreasing, and that it is limited to petty crime."[20] It is also unclear if IDP and "squatter" communities targeted by this project participated in the survey to convey a sense of the specific project results. Given that indicators are defined as change in percentages of the "before" and "after", surveys would have provided an adequate indicator for measuring progress in changing community "perceptions" of police on the one hand and police "mentality" on the other as a result of this specific CP project. Communities' perception of their own safety is a critical measure of how effective protection strategies are which also renders importance to urgency in the formulation of communities' safety profiles and plans as important Indicators of progress in installing a perception of safety and security.[21]

---

[19] "Tracking of 2011 Values of CPAP Indicators: Indicator Tracking Report (2011) - UNDP 2009-2012 " - , prepared by North South Consultants Exchange of Cairo, Egypt in association with SANAD of Khartoum, Sudan.
[20] Ibid, p. 68.
[21] For example, in a meeting with the IDPs in Abu Shoak camp, a severely negative perception of the both UNAMID and GoS forces was reflected by the community. Both local police and UNMID forces were severely criticized in terms of the lack of response to the community's security and safety concerns. Complaints were voiced that the police and/or UNAMID forces won't respond in time to criminal incidents even as they were taking place.

In the case of this project, monitoring and management tools included AWPs plus monthly, mid-annual and annual progress reports. Annual progress reports consolidated the data that was conveyed during the year in the different reports from the field and were submitted for review by the Project Executive Board/National Community Policing Board (PEB/NCPB). These annual reports were repetitive, lacked solid analysis, listed activities and did not generally highlight lessons learnt. For example, almost all reports listed the 2010 general elections and 2011 referendum as having delayed implementation. Also, as late as January-July 2012 consolidated progress report, the withdrawal of UNMIS is still cited as having "….affected negatively the delivery of the activities …." . Field management teams also cited their need to receive more feedback from UNDP/Khartoum in terms of comments and/or amendments which would reassure the regional teams that they were on the right track.

Following the departure of UNMIS in July 2011 and as late as the date of this evaluation exercise, the establishment of a new and expanded national Executive Board/Steering Committee for the project was not yet realized. This may have been due to reluctance on the part of the police to introduce "others" to what they consider as strictly police business in conflict/conflict-prone areas and within highly volatile communities (IDPs). This has been correctly identified in the Risk Analysis section of the project document (Annex 1) under "Governance". However, as the project is ending, it can be correctly concluded that more effective approaches and measures need to be employed by UNDP to neutralize this "institutional resistance" risk in any future sequence to CP programmes. It is also reasonable to conclude that the presence of a strong project management of a calibre that can carry on policy dialogue and influence a strong centralized institution like the police would contribute to the realization of this step that is crucial to the attainment of output II "Strategic Organizational Development" of community policing activities

with the inclusion of other governmental, UN and non-governmental representative in the national monitoring body of the project.

D.2.3. Relevance

This evaluation also considered the project's objectives and results from the perspective of relevance to both national, UNDP and UN global and country-specific mandate and goals. The objectives of the project correspond to Article148 of the INC which defines the police and its competencies "….stressing the need for decentralisation, impartiality and integrity". Item 2 of the same Article further stresses that "… The Police shall be decentralised in accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. According to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), community policing structures should be developed in IDP camps, as outlined in Article 273. UNAMIS, in coordination with the Parties, shall train community police in IDP camps to enable them to effectively perform policing functions in the camps as the basis for a community police force for those IDPs on their return to their home areas".

The objectives also correspond to CPAP Outcome 5 "…Rights upheld and protected through accountable, accessible and equitable Rule of Law institutions" and CPAP outputs of "….5.1 Capacities strengthened of Rule of Law institutions; and 5.2 Access to justice, particularly for vulnerable groups.

Community policing project also contributes to outcome 2 of the UNDAF "…improved democratic governance at all levels based on human rights standards with particular attention to women, children, displaced population and other vulnerable groups toward achieving sustainable peace and development".

The objectives of the project correspond to Article 148 of the INC which defines the police and its competencies "….stressing the need for decentralisation, impartiality and integrity". Item 2 of the same Article further stresses that " The Police shall be decentralised in accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. According to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), community policing structures should be developed in IDP camps, as outlined in Article 273. UNAMIS, in coordination with the Parties, shall train community police in IDP camps to enable them to effectively perform policing functions in the camps as the basis for a community police force for those IDPs on their return to their home areas".

The objectives correspond to CPAP Outcome 5 "…Rights upheld and protected through accountable, accessible and equitable Rule of Law institutions" and CPAP outputs of "….5.1 Capacities strengthened of Rule of Law institutions; and 5.2 Access to justice, particularly for vulnerable groups. Community policing project also contributes to outcome 2 of the UNDAF "…improved democratic governance at all levels based on human rights standards with particular attention to women, children, displaced population and other vulnerable groups toward achieving sustainable peace and development" .

The relevance and urgency of community policing stems primarily from the actual situation of a country like Sudan suffering from extensive devastating conflict in more than one region (the South –separated as of July 2011 – the Greater Darfur region, the Protocol Area of Abeyi and the states of South kordofan and Blue Nile). The magnitude of displacement of the population as a result of decades of internal conflict since independence and up to date compounded by a high level of poverty assessed by official sources (GoS Central Bureau of Statistics) at 46%) and decreasing vital natural resources due to environmental degradation and abuse, heightens the relevance of community policing to the development agenda.

Conflict inevitably leads to either a weakening of the RoL and disregard of basic human rights or to a total lack of human security particularly for vulnerable groups and while Sudan is considered to have a relatively strong and highly centralized and disciplined police institution that goes back to the early twentieth century (1903), communities, particularly vulnerable groups in a perpetual conflict situation, view police more as an extension of the army and as a law enforcer not a service provider. Equally important is the fact that the police also view themselves more as law enforcers rather than service providers. A community-based approach to community policing will contribute to human security and "…when successfully executed…. (CP) can both develop security and secure development**."**

D.2.4. Synergies, Coordination and Partnerships

The final RoL outcome evaluation under the 2nd Country Programme and Bridging Programme between its various RoL projects and between the RoL and Governance Projects in order to fully capture the "dynamic" of the RoL process in Sudan.." In addition, the UNDP's RoL team may consider further strengthening of linkages with relevant UNDP projects such as the CRMA and DDR that though falling outside the RoL portfolio could be a factor in progressing the CP project. Controlling the availability and circulation of small arms to increase community safety through DDR and identifying candidate "hot spots" for CP intervention through the CRMA vulnerable groups.

UNDP was encouraged to better link its various projects, especially with regard to the criminal justice system and clearly map out how fundamental rights are impacted at each stage of civil and criminal justice, law enforcement and the correction process.**[22]**The project's progress report for January – December 2011 states that "..As part of UNDP rule of law ongoing projects, this project links with other rule of law projects, as it is being implemented in seven States across Sudan where UNDP's RoL Programme operates."

Complementarity and strong linkages between all RoL programmes are crucial to a rights-based approach that UNDP embraces. This is particularly relevant when considering elements of security

---

[22] UNDP Outcome Evaluation 2002-2006/Bridging Programme 2007-2008, p.6.

and safety of citizens generally but especially of vulnerable groups such as IDPs, women, children etc. in a conflict-prone and turbulent context. As the final outcome evaluation of the Sudan RoL report recommended, UNDP may explore "...ways to avail itself of the synergies that exist between its various RoL projects and between the RoL and Governance Projects in order to fully capture the "dynamic" of the RoL process in Sudan." UNDP was also "....encouraged to better link its various projects, especially with regard to the criminal justice system…"[23]

The UNDP has a number of governance and RoL projects that cover all three sides of the legal reform triangle i.e. the prosecution and police, the Judiciary and, access to justice. The UNDP Sudan RoL programme comprises projects in the following key areas of the legal sector at national and sub-national levels: I) building the capacity and infrastructure of judicial, prosecutorial, law enforcement and correctional institutions in Sudan (including courts, police, prisons, legal affairs/justice, and customary courts/traditional leaders) via training and provision of infrastructure; ii) promoting peace and the rule of law through legal information and training; iii) facilitating access to justice through legal assistance initiatives (including both paralegal/rule of law promoter/lawyer led mediations and referral of court cases to lawyers); iv) protecting the rights of most vulnerable groups (IDPs) women (including SGBV) and children through legal information, trainings, interventions and technical advising. In its next programming cycle, UNDP may try to create synergies with relevant RoL projects wherever possible. Some practical suggestions that are not exhaustive but may enhance synergies and linkages between the different RoL programmes include:

- The procedure of submitting the draft project document at formulation stage to an expanded Project Appraisal Committee (PAC) should be strictly adhered to. An expanded PAC which would include representation of all the different RoL institutions (Judiciary, police & prosecution etc.) on the side of the government as well as relevant UN sister agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women etc.) and relevant project staff outside the RoL team would help identify weaknesses up front and would enhance linkages with other programmes.

- At the national level, UNDP's RoL portfolio should be supported by a senior and experienced small team of GoS legal retirees or national legal experts from the different legal sub-sections of the legal sector. Such a team could be on a retainer contract to meet three or four times annually to review progress of the RoL portfolio as a whole, assist with advice and possibly finalizing AWPs and would generally act as a resource group or think-tank for the RoL.

---

[23] Ibid.

- It is also worth considering the commissioning of a high-calibre national expert to conduct a mapping exercise of work pertaining to the RoL sector indicating ongoing programmes (of UNDP as well as others engaged in the sector such as EU, DfID, other concerned UN agencies etc.) and reflecting gaps in the support to this sector. Such a map could be translated into an accompanying RoL framework that together would constitute a helpful tool for strengthening linkages, avoiding duplication and increasing information flow if diligently updated. Such a tool may also impact positively resource mobilisation efforts for the sector.

- Establishing a Resident Coordinator Working Group (RCWG) for the RoL would strengthen coordination, synergies and complementarity within the system and international partners and interested donor countries.

- A RoL periodic electronic newsletter that is widely circulated to both GoS legal entities as well as partners, donors and sister agencies would also strengthen information flow and may help with resource mobilization.

Given that achievement of meaningful change in police reform and police mentality and integrating CP can only be achieved over a long period of time, UNDP may need to outline a resources and partnership strategy for CP activities. In addition to producing a periodic newsletter on CP activities, UNDP can periodically organize a UN/donor information meeting to present and discuss CP activities, challenges and achievements.

Both DfID and USAID seem to be, potentially, interested partners currently engaged in some similar RoL activities. It is also anticipated that UNDP's CP project will also collaborate with DFID's "Access to Justice in Sudan" project and "Citizen Police Academy" one. Interviews at the regional level pointed out to USAID as a potential interested partner. ***It may be useful to also investigate other non-traditional partners/donors for the next phase of the project***. The Qatari government, for example, have a special interest in the Darfur region and may be agreeable to partnering with UNDP to enhance communities' safety and security[24].

D.3. Cross-cutting Issues

D.3.1 The Gender dimension
According to reports from pre-project phase of activities in the RoL sector*, a total of 240 GoS female police officers were given special training by women UN police officers in gender and child protection duties with emphasis on women and children issues.* This group form a good foundation for the gender aspect under the CP project and should be identified, trained as trainers and deployed on short-term training missions all over the Sudan. Training of women in target communities is best conducted separately when women can communicate their concerns and opinions freely and frankly.

Moreover, a key project result pertains to the Family and Child Protection Unit of the Sudan Police. In this respect , a consultant was recruited to review the work of the Family and Child unit Protection of Sudan Police in a number of localities outside Khartoum and an assessment report was produced.

While all CSWGs and other CP structures list women as members, the active participation of women in CP structures at the local levels seems to vary from one region to the next depending on the context and traditions. Women nominated as members of the CSWGs are not always actively involved or do not always voice their concerns within the group due to one or the other of reasons (shyness/intimidation in the presence of men, occupation with the heavy household workload etc.)

At the national level, there are no female core members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) but a female police officer may join a PSC meeting on an invitation basis and as needed. It would be advisable to consider including one or two senior women police officers, or from a relevant agency, as core members (not on an invitation basis) in the new expanded PSC.

---

[24] A Darfur Rehabilitation Conference is planned to take place soon in Doha/Qatar under the auspices of the Qatari government.

Finally it is pertinent to note that gender disaggregated data is strictly adhered to in training statistics reporting the numbers of police women and women in communities that participated. Some specific training and awareness raising activities also specifically target women.

D.3.2. Civil Society

NGOs/CBOs are an important partner in any CP effort from a sustainability and effectiveness perspective. Generally, because of their week capacity, CSO/CBOs have only been able to operate serving as an extended hand of international organizations who are unable to access the conflict or peripheral areas in Sudan. Civil society organizations especially those rooted in peripheral squatter communities or IDP camps need capacity-building effort to be able to shoulder awareness responsibilities and community mobilization for a rights-based approach to basic services including security and safety.

Sudan has recently accepted most of the recommendations resulting out of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of human rights on how civil society may be capacitated and engaged in the implementation of these recommendations. A new UNDP project is currently under formulation to support implementation of the UPR recommendations and to work directly with civil society organisations to enhance its capacity as a watchdog on human rights related issues.

Additionally, the paralegal body built through the A2J project and lawyers' networks in different states could play a major role in CP as well as the new UPR-oriented project with additional capacity-building effort, to ensure sustainability as was demonstrated in Kassala, the three Darfurs, south Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

Capacities and capacity-needs of civil society (traditional leadership NGOs/CBOs etc.) and the media (radio, TV, newspapers) need to be further capacitated in relation to CP issues but also in relation to RoL issues generally particularly in oversight of sector reform and activities (police/popular police/community policing) as well as in advocacy and awareness-raising.

E.   Conclusions & Recommendations

The CP project was conceived in and survived one of the most complex and challenging situations at a time when the population, displaced as a result of conflicts in different regions of Sudan, was the largest globally. Safety and security of person and property for IDPs, and other vulnerable groups was lacking and particularly so for women and children. External and internal financial resources as well as "good will" to support the successful implementation of the CPA were largely available, target geographic areas were outlined and groups were clearly defined.

In the new post-CPA context, with a constitution-making process launched and an impending general elections scheduled for 2014, it is time to plan for and manage the RoL sector generally and community policing specifically in a more strategic manner. Needless to say, in a country like Sudan with a high-propensity for internal conflict, conflict still poses as a risk that cannot be ignored and has to be factored into any programming endeavour with the hope that whatever intervention is being carried out would help bring the country closer to peace and stability.

Effective community participation in securing safety of person and property – especially for vulnerable groups – and integrating community policing structures and concepts on the part of a highly centralized institution with a dominant "law enforcement" mentality, is not an easy task. It has to be planned as an integral component in a holistic framework of support to the implementation of decentralization and capacity-building of local government for service delivery including police as a "provider" of service. Building civil society organizations' capacities for oversight and as pressure groups on government for policy change would complement and enhance progress towards democratization and RoL.

The section below summarizes a set of key recommendations and lessons that emerged out of this evaluation analysis and which may be taken into consideration in the next phase of RoL and community policing programming.

Box 4 . Kassala – Practical CP lessons:

In Kassala, the community's aid & information post is built within the premises of the police station and while it consists of a very basic structure, it helped in both mitigating the community's fear factor as well as providing easier access to police.

The RoL committee – is chaired by a senior retired judge with membership of UNDP, DDR , UN Women and other relevant UN agencies- manages the whole RoL portfolio thus ensuring synergies.

The project management set criteria for the composition of CSWGs to ensure adequate representation of all stakeholders particularly women and other vulnerable groups in the community.

The training content targeting women introduced aspects of the family law (divorce, custody, alimony etc.) in addition to the standard core training material on human rights.

1.Commitment to extension: It is recommended that the project be extended into the next programme cycle. Introducing and operationalizing the concept of CP

nationwide in the context of Sudan will be a medium to long-term process. As such, it will require commitment - in its first stages until it takes root - from the different stakeholders especially GoS, UNDP and the international community.

While some pilot work was started on a smaller scale as a component of UN peace-keeping missions since 2006 and continued in a more structured and expanded form under this project since 2009, ***substantial implementation slippage for reasons detailed in this evaluation report, indicates that only an estimated 40% of the project's defined targets have been achieved to date mostly in training and community awareness raising.***

2. Project management: In case of extension of the project, identifying and putting in place a complete project management team upfront is crucial to the achievement of substantive qualitative results with UNDP RoL specialists providing quality assurance within the DIM modality. A strong project management team can negotiate policy and resolve serious bottlenecks.

3. Institutional change and training: From the global experience and "Best Practice" in CP, strong emphasis is placed on institutional change of police. In the "Best Practice" examples cited from across the globe (Annex V) ten out of fourteen examples emphasize institutional change as a step towards a change a "law enforcer" mentality to a "service provider" in addition to training. Institutional change mandates:

> 3.1 That an overall training strategy be formulated as indicated in section IV of the project document. A training strategy focuses capacity-building activities eliminating waste and enhancing impact of capacity-building interventions.

> 3.2. It is recommended that the project consolidates training material developed since 2006 with GoS police training curriculum to produce a core training curriculum for police with modules and tools tailored to meet police training at different levels (commissioned officers, NCOs, rank and file police and CPVs).

> 3.3. Training is to be embedded into an established national training entity –preferably the NPTA – with UN peace-Keeping missions – wherever they exist - providing only technical support within the time-bound framework of their mission.

> 3.4. To concentrate on raining a core of police trainers, within the NPTA, and negotiate with GoS police HQs. exemption of this core of CP trainers from routine re-assignment allowing only short term training deployment to states to conduct police and CP training.

> 3.5. Negotiate amending existing police re-assignment regulations whereby basic short training is mandatorily linked to assignment and re-assignment for all police levels. Depending on the rank of the trainee, CP should also be an integral part of basic training to police across the country repeated with refresher courses whenever trainee is re-assigned.

3.6. In the context of Sudan (multi-ethnic, multi-dialect and low levels of education in targeted communities) capacity-building results are maximized if the trainer is from the community itself wherever available. Paralegals/CBOs from the region should be introduced to and trained on community policing concepts to be the primary trainers and "mobilizers" of communities for sustainability considerations.

3.7. UNDP's support to the training package for the rank-and-file body of NCOs and CPVs should take into consideration the need for simplified presentation of the complex human rights global concepts given the different educational level of target groups (NCOs/CPVs).

3.8. It is recommended that community training material include more practical cases of legal/criminal cases explained to cater for especially, people with less or no education; training of communities may also be accompanied with organizational skills training.

3.9. Four important community groups that need to be specifically targeted in any CP training strategy are women, youth, traditional authority and CPVs. Emphasis on traditional authority in particular can help further the CP objective. Customary law and traditional authorities have been supported by UNDP RoL to date, but only to a relatively limited degree according to the RoL outcome evaluation. [25]

3.10. The importance of prioritizing NCOs's training and capacity-building emanates from the fact that these are the groups directly concerned with CP and are in direct daily contact with communities but are usually less aware of global concepts of human rights.

3.11. From the global experience and "Best Practice" in CP (Annex V), strong emphasis is placed on institutional change in police reform. In Sudan, there is a need to support decentralization both as a policy issue and an institutional/organizational change one generally. Negotiate with Gos police HQs. piloting decentralization as a first step in one state building on, for example, the initiative of Blue Nile state.

3.12. To review and update, together with GoS police, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which defines CPVs and police duties and behaviour in discharging their responsibilities.

4. Monitoring & Evaluation:

4.1. It is recommended in similar future endeavours to conduct a series of group-specific mini surveys periodically (specific groups of communities such as women, youth, disabled etc.) and of police (different levels/ranks of police and CPVs) as a primary tool for accurate measuring of progress towards achieving the qualitative impact (change of perceptions

---

[25] United Nations Development Programme Outcome Evaluation for the Country Cooperation Framework 2002-2006/Bridging Programme 2007/08 for Sudan Rule of Law (RoL) - 13 January 2009

and of mentality). Ideally, an end-of-project comprehensive survey would make it possible to point out to an evidence-based result.

4.2. For the purposes of accurate monitoring of progress and evaluation, adhere to uniformity in the definition of and reference to outputs in all reporting documentation throughout the life of the project. Any new output added during the course of project implementation should be assigned a different number and monitored as such .

4.3. It is recommended that progress reports quality be improved through more in-depth analysis of contextual changes, challenges and bottlenecks, lessons, unintended results etc.

5. <u>Project management and CP structures</u> :

5.1. Accelerate the formation and expansion of the national PSC immediately both to relevant UN agencies (IOM, UNHCHR, WHO etc.) as well as to other relevant GoS entities (Family and Child council, HAC etc.).

5.2. At the national level, it is strongly recommended that the new Project Steering Committee (PSC) includes one/two senior women police officers as core members (not on an invitation basis).

5.3. UNDP/Khartoum together with the national project steering committee (PSC) should develop and issue guidelines on the mandatory composition of CP structures (to ensure a balanced ratio of target groups such as women, youth, the poor and disadvantaged groups etc.) to be applied by all states covered by the CP.

5.4. Also, issue guidelines on procedural issues in conducting business e.g. quorum, to ensure that decision-making is not monopolized by a few active members .

5.5. Accelerate formation of community policing structures in the different states (CSWGs, Advisory Committees etc.) wherever they were not formed.

6. <u>Coordination & Synergies</u>: The RoL portfolio needs to be monitored at the policy level in a more integrated manner with a high degree of decentralization of implementation to the regional level to cater for the different socio-political and contextual situations in the different regions. Currently integration of the portfolio management is exercised at UNDP's level through the RoL team but it has to also extend beyond UNDP to the wider UNCT and international partners as well as relevant government levels[26]. Some practical steps to be taken as mentioned earlier include:

---

[26] A possible modality is an RC thematic group that meets quarterly or twice a year to review RoL progress reports of the different regions and that includes international representation from relevant UNCT members

6.1. The procedure of submitting the draft project document at formulation stage to an expanded Project Appraisal Committee (PAC) should be strictly adhered to. An expanded PAC which would include representation of all the different RoL institutions (Judiciary, police & prosecution etc.) on the side of the government as well as relevant UN sister agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women etc.) and relevant project staff outside the RoL team would help identify weaknesses up front and would enhance linkages with other programmes.

6.2. At the national level, UNDP's RoL portfolio should be supported by a senior and experienced small team of GoS legal retirees or national legal experts from the different legal sub-sections of the legal sector. Such a team could be on a retainer contract to meet three or four times annualy to review progress of the RoL portfolio as a whole, assist with advice and possibly finalizing AWPs and would generally act as a resource group or think-tank for the RoL.

6.3. It is also worth considering the commissioning of a high-calibre national expert to conduct a mapping exercise of work pertaining to the RoL sector indicating ongoing programmes (of UNDP as well as others engaged in the sector such as EU, DfID, other concerned UN agencies etc.) and reflecting gaps in the support to this sector. Such a map could be translated into an accompanying RoL framework that together would constitute a helpful tool for strengthening linkages, avoiding duplication and increasing information flow if diligently updated. Such a tool may also impact positively resource mobilisation efforts for the sector.

6.4. Establishing a Resident Coordinator Working Group (RCWG) for the RoL would strengthen coordination, synergies and complementarity within the system and international partners and interested donor countries.

6.5. A RoL periodic electronic newsletter that is widely circulated to both GoS legal entities as well as partners, donors and sister agencies would also strengthen information flow and may help with resource mobilization.

7. <u>Miscellaneous Issues:</u>

7.1. Media – especially radio – and the Arts/drama are the fastest way to expand outreach for both awareness raising and mobilization. The formal CP department has its own media section which, together with state and national radio, as well as other forms of art, could be used to the maximum extent possible in ***all states*** to expand outreach. Public

(UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, OHCHR, UNDSS etc.)   and national representation (police, judiciary, civil society (lawyers, NGOs/CBOs, representation of some IDP/traditional leadership from the IDP communities etc.) etc.

communications strategies should be developed at local levels with the project's help in designing the right information and awareness-raising products for a wider outreach.

7.2. At project formulation stage, careful analysis has to be made of all factors that may affect   negatively and drastically the project's progress. Publicly known national   events that may affect implementation should be factored in and mitigation plans considered in any future sequence to this project to minimize waste of resources e.g. elections in 2014 and possible government reshuffle.

7.3. Pilot areas are extremely poor – either IDP camps or squatter areas that lack basic services. In almost all cases these areas lack electricity - the primary crime catalyst. While the government is usually hesitant to provide this vital service to displaced populations as it may hinder government's programmes of returning the IDPs to their original areas and in squatter areas where it may hinder government's urban planning, UNDP may want to discuss with local authorities the provision of limited renewable solar energy pending the return of IDPs and link up with the UNDP's environment team to find out possibilities.

7.4. Given the poverty level of target CP areas and communities, it would be useful to try and team-up with any other UN agency or INGO running some community development activities alongside the CP ones with some practical basic benefits to the community. eg. income generating, microcredit, health clinic etc. A major GoS micro-credit programme is currently running and expanding to cover all of Sudan. CP project may want to partner with a local bank to introduce a micro-credit facility into CP areas as part of the national programme – if possible.

7.5. Introduce a Community Policing electronic newsletter in English and Arabic to be circulated to all stakeholders to build support for CP amongst all stakeholders.

ANNEXES

Annex I – Terms of Reference
Community Policing Project Evaluation

Background and Context:
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 2005 provides a guide, and a sound institutional framework to achieve lasting peace and sustained development to the benefit of all the Sudanese people. The signatories to the CPA and the Interim National Constitution, 2005 committed themselves: "to gearing governance, in the coming output of our political advancement, towards the enhancement of economic development, promotion of social harmony, deepening of religious tolerance and building trust and confidence in the society generally."

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) present the Government of Sudan (GoS) Police with a clear opportunity to complete a transition from a paramilitary model to a one where community participation and respect and protection of human rights are emphasized. The peace era offers a chance to address many of the acute and chronic problems such as the problem of insecurity in internally displaced persons (IDPs).

A Popular Police (PP) Administration was established in 1992, as part of the Sudan Police Force (SPF); following many earlier attempts to harness the role of the community in policing. The PP, however, mirrored all other police administrations – working alongside them, and reporting to police headquarters at the various levels.

Community oriented policing is a philosophy and organizational strategy based on the idea that both the community and the police must work as equal partners to address issues of safety and security at community level and had led to fundamental changes , philosophic and institutional, within the entire police regime in countries where it was implemented. It has led to fundamental changes. There is an emergent need to facilitate building of mutual trust, respect and partnership between the public and the police to promote better understanding with public through a nationwide Programme which connects the Police and the community to achieve the common goal of ensuring safety and security for one and all. Community based policing pilot envisages establishment of such a mechanism and relationship from the strategic to the grass root level.

Further to a specific request from the GoS Ministry of Interior, the UNDP Community Policing Project is intended to support national authorities in elaborating a national framework on community-based policing that provides for an accountable and closer working partnership between the civilian police and the communities. The primary target audience of this project is the GoS police administration, police personnel, local authority officials and law enforcement officers, community representatives, traditional leaders and civil society groups in seven pilot States (South Darfur, North Darfur, West Darfur, Khartoum, Kassala, Blue Nile and South Kordofan). Within civil society, the project will target national and local NGOs, women and youth groups. Donor governments, UN staff, UNMIS, UNAMID and international NGOs are also partners as they have a key role to play in supporting and facilitating implementation. The primary beneficiaries will be the

citizens of targeted States as well as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are currently most affected by the crime, conflict and the lack of support mechanisms for victims of crime.

The philosophy of community policing involves forging of partnerships to address issues that concern both the police and citizens. It encourages finding of local workable solutions to deal with community security concerns, especially those involving vulnerable sections like women, children and IDPs. It encourages building of mutual trust and confidence and underlines the interdependence of the Police and community in maintaining peace and harmony in the society. Police reform is increasingly being recognized as a fundamental element of conflict management. A police service supported by the community and capable of arresting insecurity may have a far-reaching impact in enabling lasting economic, social and political development. Police reform may also complement and embolden other programming in the areas of security sector reform, rule of law and good governance.

The overall objective of the project is to achieve safer communities through increased capacity and community participation in community policing and support to the police in North Sudan. Specific objectives of the community policing project include:

• Promoting the thinking that the police is service provider for society and communities,

• Building the capacity for community policing as a means of promoting safety, security and access to justice and lessening the gap between the citizens and the rule of law institutions, with a specific focus on female Officers and NCOs;

• Integration of the police community safety structures into community led processes , the expected outputs of the community policing project are as follows:

1. Organizational and Capacity Development
2. Pilot site capacity development - training and awareness-raising
3. Development of strategic community safety plans and information centers
4. Documentation of lessons learnt and project evaluation
5. Extension of community policing across all States in North Sudan

Stakeholders:
Started in September 2009 and will end in December 2012; the project was partly implemented through United Nations Mission in Sudan Police (UNPOL). UNPOL cooperated closely with the Sudan Police (Popular Police) in the implementation of the project activities, especially in Khartoum State, South Kordofan State, Blue Nile State, Kassala State, while United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNMID) implemented the project activities in North Darfur State, South Darfur State, and West Darfur States. In order to ensure national ownership, a Police Development Committee (PDC) consisting of the Sudan Police, UNMID Police and UNDP functions as a Steering Committee (Project Board) to provide guidance for the implementation of the project. To broaden the membership of the PDC UNCIEF was included.

Evaluation Purposes:
The aim of the evaluation is, after two and half years of implementation, to assess whether the project achieved the objectives intended. The results of the evaluation are to guide the form and direction of the similar projects for future implementation. It is also expected that the results will be used to inform future UNDP interventions in the area of access the justice and human security for vulnerable groups.

The specific purpose of this consultancy is to provide an independent in-depth evaluation of the impact of the project in terms of introducing the concept of community policing, especially in IDPs' camps implementation and its management and implementation modalities and make recommendations to facilitate the future UNDP interventions in the area of Rule of Law. Is it expected that the results of this evaluation will include, inter-alia:

- An objective opinion on the achievement of the intended project results;
- Advice on the continued relevance and suitability of current and future Rule of Law projects objectives and outputs and making proposals on changes where necessary;
- Shed lights on what corrective arrangements need to be taken (if any) and by whom
- An objective opinion on local authorities capacity building and CSOs Capacity development, in terms of a sustainable take over once UNDP projects come to an end;
- Recommendations on resources (human, financial, internal, external) necessary for implementation of future and/or uncompleted activities;
- Advise on effectiveness of Rule of Law and coordination arrangements both between implementing partners and UNDP and between Governmental and UN partners and UNDP

Scope and objectives:
The consultant will undertake and be responsible for the assignment. She/he will work closely with the main project stakeholders and the Portfolio Project Manager in UNDP Program. The evaluation will cover the project period from the commencement to present, at the sites of implementation in 7 States (Khartoum, Kassala, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur States).

The consultant is expected to look into the status of implementation and determine whether or not the results expected have been achieved as well as challenges and risks that may have hindered the full attainment of these results and impacts and how these challenges and risks can be mitigated in the future. Another element the consultant will into is the project design in terms of adequacy and effectiveness of the design to deliver the project objectives. The assessment will cover technical design (including outputs, indicators and activities), and management, coordination and implementation arrangements; and. The evaluation should examine whether the project objectives are still relevant and whether they remain relevant for future Rule of Law projects with consideration of the appropriateness of the outputs for the outcomes intended. The evaluation shall also look into the adequacy of management arrangements in overseeing the project implementation taking into accounts any contextual changes.

Methodology:
The methodology proposed by the consultant in consultation with UNDP; should merge between quantitative and qualitative approaches as much as possible to ensure that adequate attention is given to all assessment objectives is desirable. It is recommended that the data collection methodology includes reviewing relevant project documents as well as other primary and secondary sources of data taking into account the following:

a) Results Framework for a description of the intended results, the baseline for the results and the indicators and benchmarks used. Obtain information from the project gathered through monitoring and reporting on the results. This will help inform evaluation of whether expected results were met;

b) Examination of contextual information and baselines contained in project documents;

c)   Validation of information about the status of the results that is collected from contextual sources such as the project Community Policing Posts, beneficiaries, partners or monitoring reports;

d)   Probing the pre-selected results indicators and going beyond these to explore other possible result indicators, and determine whether the indicators have actually been continuously tracked;

e)   Review of existing documents and materials such as support documents, evaluations, assessments, and a variety of temporal and focused reports including review mission, programme/project reports whether to donors or other partners;

f)   Consultation and interaction with key stakeholders and beneficiaries including gathering the information on what the partners have achieved as regards the results and what strategies they have used including focus group/ committees discussions;

g)   Field visits to the Community Policing Posts, UNDP, as well as with donors and government partners.

Key evaluation products and deliverables:
The Consultant is expected to provide the following:

a)   An Inception Report including the evaluation work plan outlining the time frame and target dates for the provision of key deliverables; a comprehensive overview of the methodological approach to be applied, including sample questionnaires and other data collection tools. The inception report provides the programme unit and the evaluator(s) with an opportunity to verify that they share the same understanding about the evaluation and clarify any misunderstanding at the outset. Hence, It is also expected that the inception report should include a proposed schedule of tasks/activities and deliverables, designating a team member with the lead responsibility for each task or product and agree on the structure of the detailed report outlines.

b)   A debriefing with the UNDP/Governance & Rule of Law Unit that may include, as UNDP may require, a presentation and facilitated discussion on the draft report, findings and recommendations, including areas for further support;

c)   A draft report for review by Gov/RoL unit and key stakeholders. Comments and feedback on the draft report will be consolidated by the task manager and shared with consultant to consider in the final report.

d)   Final Report that incorporates inputs and results of reviewing the draft report, meets UNDP quality standards, taking into account final comments and recommendations, should be delivered by the consultant.

The Final Report shall be submitted both in soft and hard copies and shall include the following sections:

•   Executive summary;
•   Introduction, description of the evaluation methodology;
•   An analysis of key interactions (the results, substantive influences, projects contribution and how UNDP works with other relevant actors) and clear variables measuring the results;
•   Key lessons learnt, highlighting possible future recommendations;
•   Conceptual Framework to guide future programming and projects;
•   Assumptions made during the evaluation and study limitations;
•   Conclusions and recommendations
•   Annexes: ToRs, field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed, etc

Qualifications; Experience and Competencies required:

- An advanced degree in Political Science, Economics, International Development, Public Policy or Law and/or a relevant field;
- Minimum five years' experience working in the area of governance and rule of law programming, formulation of strategic plans, and / or related capacity development strategies;
- Minimum of five years' experience in conducting evaluations and/or assessments of a similar nature and magnitude, particularly in the area of Rule of Law and access to Justice;
- Ability to organize and manage results-oriented strategic and thematic evaluations; Substantive knowledge and understanding of evaluation and development evaluation in particular;
- Excellent knowledge of current development issues particularly those pertinent to UNDP's Practice Areas and to Sudan specifically;
- Good technical skills in measurement and evaluation; and RBM
- Familiarity with the political of cultural and socio-economic context of Sudan ; as well as the development challenges in Sudan;
- Work experience of minimum of 5 years with international organizations and/or donors;
- Excellent command of oral and written English and knowledge of Arabic languages is highly desired;

Evaluation Ethics:

The evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation (UNEG 2008) reference material (5) and the consultant must use measures to ensure compliance with the evaluator code of conduct (e.g. measures to safeguard the rights and confidentiality of their sources, provisions to collect and report data, etc.)

Implementation Arrangements:

The designated Gov/RoL Program Officer will be directly responsible for managing the evaluation process, and would oversee all stages of the evaluation conduct to ensure that the process is being conducted as per the agreed plan and guidelines. The PO will coordinate with the Community Policing Project Manager (PM) to support and facilitate the timely conduct of the evaluation. The PM will provide administrative and logistical support, and will facilitate coordination and liaison with key stakeholders in Khartoum and the field.

Additionally, UNDP will constitute evaluation "Reference Group" comprised of key stakeholders and UNDP relevant staff. The Reference Group will guide the evaluation process and will provide methodological and substantive inputs into the evaluation process as well as peer review of the evaluation deliverables.

Timeframe for the evaluation process:

The time breakdown for the main activities of the evaluation is estimated to be five weeks as stated in the table below:

Item	Days
Preliminary meetings, literature review and consultations with UNDP and Community Policing counterparts	6
Inception report	By Day 7
Data collection through field visits, secondary data review, visiting partners institutions	12
Follow-up meeting, data analysis and draft zero	6
Debriefing to the project stakeholders	Day 25
Incorporating the comments and submission of final report	5
Total work days 30	30

Cost:

The consultant will be remunerated at UNDP IC rate in the Sudan. The cost of travel outside Khartoum will be fully be covered by the project unless they are calculated and included in the consultant's fees. Payments will be issued by UNDP according to the schedule of the payments, which will be specified in the contract for Individual contracts. Schedule of payments will be prepared based on deliverables as will be detailed in the contract.

Conditions of Work:

UNDP will support and facilitate the consultant by providing office space, provide administrative and logistical support, in line with the UNDP rules and regulations governing consultancy contracts. The Consultant will be expected to use his/her own computer facilities in addition to paying for her/his own travel to and from the sites in line with her/his contractual terms.

Annex II - Meetings & Interviews

UNDP - Khartoum:
Noha Abdelgabar/Programme Specialist RoL………………………………………13 Sept 2012
Khalafalla ElShiekh/Finance officer
Evariste Sibomana/Governance & RoL Team Leader
Nuha Abdelgadir/ M& E Specialist
Zeinab Hemidan/Project manager a.i.

UNDP Regional offices:
Kassala:
- Souraya /governance & RoL Team Leader.………………………………………..3 October 2012
- Hayder, UN Coordination Office………………………………………………..3 October 2012
- Mohammed ElMutasim/RoL officer……………………………………………2-3 October 2012

North Darfur:
- Christopher Laker/Governance & RoL Team Leader……………………………10 October 2012
- Ibrahim Khair/RoL officer
- Gafar Salim/RoL

Protocol Areas:
Lawrence Oematum /RoL Team Leader /Protocol Areas (met in Khartoum)........November 2012
Abbas ElAmin/RoL Officer – Blue Nile state (by Telephone)……………………………….November 2012

Police:
National PoliceTraining Authority (NPTA)…………………………………………………………………27 Sept 2012
- Lt. General ---------- Hamid Mannan – Director, NPTA
- Maj. General ----- Musa mohammed Mahmoud Osman – Director, Directorate for Officer Training.
- Meeting with Deputy Commissioner for Police

Darfur:
- Meeting with GoS Police/El Fasher………………………………………………………10 October 2012
- Meeting with Chief Prosecutor/El Fasher

Kassala:
- Community Police Coordinator

UNAMID:
- Dr. Mutasem A. Almajali – Deputy Police Commisioner – Policy & Planning (and UNAMID team)……………………………………………………………………………………….9 October 2012
- Donor Liaison/UNAMID police – El Fasher

- Training officers/UNAMID police – El Fasher

Community Safety Working Groups & NGOs:
- Community Animators Friends Association (CAFA)…………………………….24 Sept 2012
- AlBaraka Community Safety Working Group (Haj Yusef)…………………..24 Sept 2012
- Hai AlMurabaat Community Safety Working Group………………………3 October 2012
- Hai Al-Noor Community Safety Working Group……………………………. 3 October 2012
- JCC - East Organization for Legal Aid & Culture……………………………4 October 2012
- Gaafer Abdel Rahman – Lawyer/Activitist……………………………………11 October 2012

National Council for Child Welfare;
- Secretary General of the National Council for Child Welfare a.i
  Fath Alrahman Mohammed Babiker………………………………………………25 Sept 2012
- Sulafa Bastawi/Social Worker

Annex III - Documents and References

The consultant will be provided with the following documents among others:
1. Evaluation Report Template; UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results;
http://web.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/Annex7.html

2. community Policing Project Documents.

3. United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan (2009-2012).

4. UNDP Country Programme Document and UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (2009-2012).

5. Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation (UNEG 2008);
http://web.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/Annex7.html

6. UNDP Results-Based Management: Technical Note;

7. Other documents and materials related to the programme as the consultant may require.

8. Final Evaluation Report "Strengthening Human Security for Vulnerable Groups in Khartoum IDP Camps and Squatter Areas" by Ilham Abdalla Bashir - Independent Consultant Sociologist, Public and Tropical Health Researcher, 2011

9. Draft Report "Needs Assessment of the Family and Child Protection Unit" by Nada Mustafa Ali (Ph.D.) TOKTEN Expert.

10. Sudan Five Year Strategic Plan 2012-2016

11. Strategic Partnership Quarterly and Annual Progress Reports 2009-2012.

12. 2012 community Policing Project Brief.

13. CP Khartoum final Evaluation Report.

14. GOVERNANCE AND RULE OF LAW UNIT STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME CONCEPT DESIGN (2013 – 2016), Draft, August 2012.

16. POLICE REFORM THROUGH COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING: PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION,
http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UN/POLICE_REFORM.

17. Draft Report, Tracking of 2011 Values of CPAP Indicators - Indicator Tracking Report (2011) - UNDP 2009-2012 Sudan Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP).