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United Nations Development Programme
Evaluation Office
220 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017, USA
Tel. (646) 781 4200, Fax (646) 781 4213
Internet: www.undp.org/evaluation

Empowered lives. Resilient nations.
EVALUATION OF UNDP SUPPORT TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

January 2013
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The evaluation was conducted by the Evaluation Office of UNDP, with Alan Fox as evaluation manager. Jon Bennett served as Team Leader and led an evaluation team composed of Benjamin Tortolani, Gabriella Buescher, Guillaume Lacaille, Kenneth Mpyisi and Nasser Yassin.

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FOREWORD

Violent conflict has a profound effect on human development, limiting opportunities for hundreds of millions of persons to live, work and get educated. It is no surprise that countries experiencing violent conflict face the greatest challenges in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The United Nations Development Programme has increasingly oriented its work towards addressing the structural dimensions of modern conflicts, including the root causes of cross-border/intra-country and intra-national violence.

This evaluation focuses on the evolving role of the United Nations Development Programme in conflict-affected settings, particularly in situations where UNDP is engaged during and immediately after an integrated United Nations peace operation. Building from the findings, two key conclusions from the evaluation are important to highlight.

First, UNDP plays a vital role in the United Nations peacebuilding architecture, with a capacity to operate ‘at scale’ across multiple programme areas, before, during and after the outbreak of conflict. UNDP is well positioned to ably serve as an integral partner in peace operations, providing coordination, programme management and technical expertise, especially during transitions to peacebuilding and post-conflict development.

Second, UNDP operational effectiveness and efficiency have been improving, with clear evidence that the organization can now respond quicker and more effectively to requests for assistance in the wake of conflict and disaster events. To further increase its effectiveness, UNDP needs to more consistently and comprehensively analyse the country context within which it operates, so as to better anticipate and prepare for the onset and recurrence of violent conflict.

It is important to note that this is one of two global evaluations being presented to the annual session of the Executive Board in 2013 and, for the first time, the management responses to the evaluations are annexed to the evaluation reports themselves. I believe that this is an important step to improve transparency and to facilitate utilization of the report.

Indran A. Naidoo
Director, UNDP Evaluation Office
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)</td>
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<td>BDP</td>
<td>Bureau for Development Policy (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOM</td>
<td>Bureau of Management (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Crisis prevention and recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWGER</td>
<td>Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs (United Nations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>ERD</td>
<td>Emergency Response Division (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International financial institution</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated mission planning process</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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<td>RBA</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Africa (UNDP)</td>
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<td>RBAP</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific (UNDP)</td>
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<td>RBEC</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (UNDP)</td>
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<td>RBLAC</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Violent conflict has a profound effect on human development. Conflict reverses developmental gains, disrupts economic markets and fractures governing institutions, greatly diminishing people’s ability to live, work and get educated. Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is essentially unreachable for many conflict-affected countries. The causal chains connecting conflict and development compel this investigation into whether UNDP interventions are helping to create the level of stability that is necessary for countries to advance their human development goals.

The main objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess how UNDP programming and policies support peacebuilding within the framework of large international operations and how UNDP supports a country’s transition from immediate post-conflict to development; and
- Evaluate how UNDP response mechanisms function at headquarters and at operational levels during periods of transition in conflict-affected countries.

To achieve these objectives, the evaluation team has reviewed a broad set of UNDP programme activities in conflict-affected countries, then extrapolated and conflated findings that can be represented as ‘typical’ and from which corporate lessons can be derived. The evaluation also looks at how UNDP operational partnerships with other United Nations offices and organizations have strengthened the broader United Nations and international response in conflict-affected countries and probes what added value UNDP brings to the table. In so far as UNDP is engaged before, during and after Security Council–mandated peace operations, the evaluation considers how UNDP is meeting expectations across these transitions.

Attention is given to stabilization and state-building and those programme activities that form the core of UNDP work in immediate post-conflict settings. The evaluation examines how the UNDP role in conflict situations is perceived by others, whether this role could or should be enhanced, and what comparative advantage UNDP is demonstrably capable of exploiting.

UNDP has reoriented its conflict prevention and recovery support to more directly address the structural dimensions of modern conflicts, and to help partner countries identify and address the root causes of cross-border/intercountry and intranational violence. The evaluation considers to what extent there is evidence of such a reorientation and its results. The assessment considers whether the UNDP crisis response and management mechanisms are calibrated appropriately for carrying out expected support. This includes assessing whether rapid and predictable funding and human resources are available and being used in crisis situations, and how UNDP is perceived as a partner among counterparts in peace operations mandated by the United Nations Security Council.

The evaluation was conducted using a combination of country visits, desk-based case studies and research, and a series of interviews with stakeholders, including other United Nations organizations, donors, non-governmental organizations, UNDP partners, and academic and independent researchers. In accordance with the norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group, the evaluation sought to distil findings on programme outcomes in terms of their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.
As of May 2012, globally there were 17 peace operations led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and an additional 15 special political and/or peacebuilding field missions managed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). This evaluation incorporates findings from 9 primary case studies that were reviewed in detail (Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste) and 11 secondary country case studies (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nepal, occupied Palestinian territories, Sierra Leone and Uganda).

The sample represents about 60 percent of countries that come under an integrated mission; it also includes those countries that have commanded the greatest financial and personnel resources in the last decade. The nine primary case studies are drawn from four of the five UNDP regions, with the greatest number from Africa. The case studies were selected to capture a comprehensive and evaluable picture of UNDP activities across the diversity of conflict-affected circumstances in which it works. Field visits were undertaken for six of the nine case studies. The consultants chosen for the remaining three had recent extensive field experience in their chosen countries (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and South Sudan).

**BACKGROUND**

For the purposes of this evaluation, a conflict-affected country is one that in its recent past has experienced, is in the midst of experiencing or demonstrates the risk factors for violent unrest between forces (both organized and informal groups) that typically emerge from disputes over the distribution of resources (financial, political, natural, etc.) in a given society. Conflict occurs overwhelmingly in developing countries, typically those with high levels of unemployment, a lack of recourse to formal justice systems and large youth populations. A chief characteristic of countries in such circumstances is their functional deficiency in national governance and justice systems, making it difficult if not impossible to provide basic public services and to restore the necessary foundations for economic development and sustainable peace.

While each armed conflict has its own unique traits, there are some generally accepted common characteristics that typify them in the 21st century:

- Armed conflicts do not lend themselves to quick and clean definition. While open conflicts between countries and civil wars have both diminished significantly, nearly all contemporary conflict has a regional character, in which a given conflict emerges or has impact across borders.
- Armed conflicts have generally revolved around challenges to a government’s authority. The distinction between organized belligerents and civilians is often unclear.
- Armed conflicts do not follow linear paths of resolution, but cycles of recurrence and prolonged instability are common on the journey away from conflict.
- Peacebuilding is essentially an effort to create institutions for the peaceful management of conflict. Moving away from conflict is a political and developmental process that takes a generation, as long as 25 to 30 years.

United Nations integrated missions were first introduced in 1997 and further defined in 2000 through the landmark Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi report, and the ensuing United Nations reform process. Integrated missions were first informally used operationally during the United Nations deployment of two peacekeeping operations in 1999 to East Timor and Kosovo. The operational formulation of bringing together the work of security, political and development actors in theatre was central to the recommendations of the Brahimi report, which ushered in the age of modern United Nations peace operations.
The onset of relative stability in a conflict-affected country logically shifts the focus of attention to longer term peacebuilding and redevelopment. Acknowledging gaps between the time-bound nature of United Nations security engagements and the longer term development needs as countries transition from conflict, in 2005 the General Assembly and Security Council adopted a resolution creating a new United Nations peacebuilding architecture, comprised of three units:

- The Peacebuilding Commission, an intergovernmental entity that aims to bring together the resources of the international community for peacebuilding activities and to provide integrated strategies for peacebuilding and recovery. The commission convenes the relevant actors, including international financial institutions and other donors, United Nations organizations, civil society organizations and others in support of these strategies, and maintains focus throughout the peacebuilding process in a given country.

- The Peacebuilding Support Office assists and supports the Peacebuilding Commission, administers the Peacebuilding Fund and supports the efforts of the Secretary-General to coordinate the United Nations system in its peacebuilding efforts.

- The Peacebuilding Fund, created by the Secretary-General in 2006 at the request of the General Assembly and the Security Council, provides financial support to catalytic interventions that encourage longer term engagements through development actors and other bilateral donors.

Since its founding in 1965, UNDP has played a major role in providing development assistance to countries. Since the early 1990s this has included efforts to prevent conflict before it occurs and to assist in recovering in its aftermath. The role of UNDP continues to evolve in keeping with the changing nature of conflict and the expanding array of international and regional humanitarian and development actors.

The formal acknowledgment by the General Assembly, in its 1991 resolution 46/182, of the need to incorporate longer term development considerations into humanitarian and recovery activities provided the basis for the UNDP mandate in immediate post-conflict settings. In particular, the General Assembly recognized the need for a coordinated and multidimensional response across the United Nations system. As a result, the longstanding function of UNDP as supporter and manager of the Resident Coordinator system was more clearly defined.

In an effort to move beyond ad hoc programming and to establish a clearer role within the United Nations system, UNDP has reorganized and made strategic adjustments. In 1995, the Emergency Response Division (ERD) was created, providing the first formal headquarters-level UNDP entity focused on technical support to country offices facing conflict situations. ERD teams were established to provide strategic support to country offices and resident coordinators in times of crisis and could also deploy personnel to conflict-affected countries on a limited basis (20 to 30 days) to develop plans for a UNDP response in these situations. ERD also became responsible for providing Secretariat-level support to the UNDP Crisis Committee, established in 1997. The biweekly meetings of the Crisis Committee brought together representatives from each regional bureau and key operational offices to consider crisis situations and to design UNDP programme and resources deployment.

Today, the scope of UNDP crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) work is extensive and growing. CPR was included in the work plans of 39 countries in 2002. By 2010, this practice area was included in 103 country programmes, with an annual programme expenditure of over $193 million. Five countries accounted for 40 percent of country level programme expenditures (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Sudan), with Afghanistan alone representing 23 percent. During 2010, 60 percent of contributions to UNDP for crisis prevention and recovery work came from other ‘non-core’ sources. 
and were directed towards specific countries or thematic areas. UNDP programme expenditures for CPR annually represent about 25 percent of the organization's global programme expenditure.

The 2008–2011 Strategic Plan: Accelerating Global Progress on Human Development provides the context for the present scope of UNDP services to conflict-affected countries. The main crisis prevention and recovery outcomes include:

- Enhancing national conflict prevention and disaster risk management capabilities;
- Ensuring improved national governance functions post-crisis; and
- Restoring the foundations for local development.

The Strategic Plan (DP/2007/43/rev.1) pays particular attention to implementation issues, noting on page 11 that “UNDP may need to (i) do more to help address risks before crises occur; (ii) help build capacity to respond faster to crises and put early recovery actions into place even during the humanitarian stage of a crisis; and (iii) have in place predictable internal funding and resources for rapid deployment after a crisis.”

The Strategic Plan states that UNDP will work across the United Nations system to assist in initiating immediate early recovery and transition activities, and facilitate post-crisis recovery strategies, both short term and medium term, into longer term frameworks. It will work to support the establishment of norms and guidelines; provide assessment and programming tools to support country-level recovery processes; and provide advocacy support to boost funding for recovery efforts. Furthermore, the Strategic Plan states that more attention and support will be given to Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) and Resident Coordinators (RCs) so that they can better perform their roles in conflict prevention. The Strategic Plan envisages UNDP playing a significant role in the emerging United Nations peacebuilding architecture, supporting the Peacebuilding Commission at the country level by assisting with the development of nationally owned, integrated peacebuilding strategies, and through the implementation of project activities supported by the Peacebuilding Fund.

**FINDINGS**

**Finding 1.** UNDP’s comparative advantages are perceived to be its on-the-ground presence; close partnership with government; role as a bridge between humanitarian, peacebuilding and development efforts; and role in governance and institutional change in the management of conflict. There are risks to having a wide remit and long-term presence, including a tendency towards ad hoc and overly ambitious programming, which consequently has impeded UNDP performance.

The perceived UNDP advantages must be considered through the lens of the United Nations reform process: how UNDP contributes to the United Nations ‘delivering as one’ and whether its in-country position and broad scope of activity are used to the comparative advantage of the entire United Nations country team. One of the inherent problems of UNDP presence in a country before, during and after a crisis is that it builds a historical expectation that the organization will respond positively to the many wide-ranging requests for support it receives. The result can be ad hoc and overly ambitious support programmes, coupled with limited financial and human resources and sometimes slow delivery.

**Finding 2.** Despite recognition of the importance of conflict analysis and the development of its own tools, there is no UNDP-based standard operating procedure for when and how to conduct conflict analysis. As a result, its conduct in both substantive and procedural terms remains varied across UNDP. Likewise, a ‘theory of change’ is underused by UNDP.

A recent inter-agency consultation across 10 conflict countries highlights some of the pitfalls in pursuing a silo ‘project’ approach without
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

commensurate analysis. It found that projects with a primarily economic focus can inadvertently exacerbate resource competition and perceptions of injustice and contribute to further tensions among groups. Nevertheless, there are country-level experiences that speak to the importance of both conducting and regularly updating conflict analyses. The UNDP experience in Nepal is illustrative: On the basis of its ongoing conflict analysis the UNDP country office was able to provide vital strategic oversight throughout the country’s civil war and subsequent peacebuilding process.

Finding 3. UNDP often works in conflict settings through project support units, which are generally embedded in the public sector and operating parallel to it. While this method can enhance the pace and quality of service delivery, it also runs the risk of weakening institutions that countries must rely on over the long term.

The Strategic Plan denotes capacity development as a nationally led change process rather than a supply-driven approach directed by outsiders. But there can be tensions between promoting nationally led change processes and the inherent risks in a conflict-affected country. UNDP and other international organizations often struggle in conflict settings to find an effective balance between directly providing services and expanding state capacities to deliver services. The calculus is especially difficult in places such as Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a weak state government has yet to establish nationwide reach and has been unable to address many of the underlying causes of the continuing conflict.

The sustainability of UNDP support to conflict-affected countries depends not only on the manner in which the quest to build national capacities is carried out, but also the organization’s ability to advocate for and maintain international support for longer term peacebuilding activities once the initial crisis has passed. Building strong and inclusive local government is regarded as a benchmark towards sustainability of the peacebuilding process in post-conflict environments. Yet international support has not always been sufficient or timely. UNDP spending figures themselves confirm this lack of attention. In 2008/2009, 70 percent of expenditures in non-fragile countries were spent on local governance. In contrast, in fragile countries expenditures for local governance were only 14 percent, of which the largest portion (29 percent) was spent on law and justice reform.

Finding 4. ‘Before, during and after’ is the common UNDP refrain in regard to its work in conflict-affected settings. On account of its global deployment and broad technical and administrative mandates, UNDP is engaged in virtually all facets of the work of United Nations country teams in conflict settings. Concerns have been raised that the UNDP role may be overly broad, sometimes encroaching on the relief and recovery work of specialized agencies.

UNDP works in all developing countries affected by conflict. It has many roles, which are often defined through country and context-specific demands. UNDP programmatic and policy support aims to build national capacities to prevent conflict before it breaks out, mitigate its effects and help with recovery in its aftermath. The nature of UNDP assistance is further shaped by a multitude of operational partners, from political, peace and humanitarian operations that function under Security Council-mandated frameworks to other international development actors and to host governments themselves. Beyond its programmatic role, UNDP has financial, administrative and coordination functions within the United Nations system and provides a bridge between humanitarian relief activities, peacekeeping and longer term recovery and development in conflict-affected countries.

The broad and expanding array of UNDP activities in conflict settings is not universally embraced. Other United Nations organizations seeking funding and engagement in conflict settings have expressed concern that UNDP sometimes ‘over-reaches’ by engaging in technical support beyond its expertise and by favouring its own programmes when administering multi-donor trust funds. In a competitive funding environment, there is no
easy answer to this concern of overreach other than for UNDP to continue to provide evidence of its comparative strength in specific areas. The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) provides a useful framework for the division of labour at the outset of an integrated mission, but with some notable exceptions (Liberia, Timor-Leste) there has been less coherence and direction at the drawdown stages.

Finding 5. Development activities cannot stop or prevent conflict alone, but the work of UNDP and other organizations can support and encourage national conflict prevention capacities. Evidence suggests that UNDP has been able to contribute to conflict prevention, especially by expanding national capacities that help to mitigate and manage the underlying structural causes of violence.

What constitutes conflict prevention support for UNDP encompasses a range of development activities, including the establishment of forums for non-violent settlement of disputes, employment generation activities and rule-of-law development support. With the onus on national actors as the protagonists in a conflict prevention setting, UNDP support has increasingly been geared towards building so-called ‘infrastructures for peace’ – the case-specific set of interdependent state structures, cultural norms and resources that cumulatively contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Finding 6. UNDP has been effective in providing timely technical and financial assistance to national rule-of-law projects. This includes supporting reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential legal infrastructure and expanded access to legal aid. Especially noteworthy are UNDP efforts to address the challenge of bridging traditional dispute resolution and formal justice systems and furthering transitional justice in post-conflict contexts.

For many development organizations, including UNDP, there remain gaps between the theoretical understanding of legal systems and the complexity of designing and implementing projects in conflict settings. Greater understanding of the political economy of a given country in conflict is needed in order to approach the related elements of legal reform in a coherent fashion. For instance, judicial training that allows judges to make better judgments is not likely to have much impact if there is no judicial independence, if corruption still dominates the legal system or if the police system is destroyed or biased. Similarly, benefits gained from raising the capacity of the lower courts can be entirely undermined if the final court of appeal is incompetent or corrupt.

Finding 7. UNDP is widely perceived as an experienced and impartial provider of electoral support, with notable examples of effective assistance in several conflict-affected countries. UNDP has moved away from supporting elections as events and towards aiding the electoral cycle as a whole. Technical inputs remain overemphasized, and there have been cases where the political concerns of an operation, particularly those pertaining to keeping a peace agreement on track, have clashed with the more immediate concerns of UNDP over political plurality in elections.

Electoral support as a coordinated effort within an integrated mission can be very successful, but it is not without pitfalls. The cautious political imperatives of a Security Council–mandated operation are not always compatible with the ‘social contract’ obligations of UNDP to broaden participation in elections despite potential objections from an incumbent government.

Finding 8. UNDP has made progress in supporting opportunities for women to participate more fully in the emerging political and legal landscape of post-conflict countries. Notable successes include the expansion of female access to justice in some countries, especially for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Many conflict-affected countries have little capacity to collect and analyse disaggregated data, including on gender variables. As part of the Early Recovery Strategy, outlined in 2009, UNDP indicated its intention to collect more gender-disaggregated
data for priority countries and to develop more gender-sensitive assessment tools. The strategy also highlights UNDP intentions to identify and use more consultants with gender expertise as immediate crisis response advisers.

Gender-based violence almost always increases during civil war. Despite the disproportionate impact of conflict on women, they are often not included in decision-making and planning processes in most conflict-affected countries. UNDP is currently supporting programming on gender-based violence in 22 countries, including in development and crisis contexts. The evaluation found that, although UNDP made concerted efforts to mainstream gender issues within its own programmes, the issue of macro-analysis and influence on government policy received relatively less attention. The macroeconomic framework set in the post-conflict period is likely to endure for many years. It will determine how the economy grows, which sectors are prioritized for investments and what kinds of jobs and opportunities for employment will be created and for whom. Yet the placement and promotion of women’s voices in this process remains below par.

Finding 9. UNDP has had varied success in its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts, reflecting diverse context-specific factors in conflict settings. In a number of cases, UNDP has succeeded in fostering innovative approaches. There has been a tendency to concentrate on immediate outputs rather than longer term impacts.

UNDP provides technical assistance on DDR in 20 countries, using a holistic approach that involves the wider community in addition to ex-combatants. DDR is always an inter-agency effort requiring collaboration, and UNDP has made increasing efforts to coordinate with peacekeeping troops. The real UNDP comparative advantage in DDR is in the reintegration of former combatants, but it is vulnerable to unpredictable funding patterns, particularly for longer term reintegration programmes. Resources have tended to focus on the physical return process and integration ‘packages’, and far less on community integration strategies and the associated reconciliation and peacebuilding that they entail.

Finding 10. Security is central to the stabilization agenda in conflict-affected countries, and UNDP is frequently called on to assist with security sector reform. Security issues rarely fall under donor aid programmes, so bilateral assistance is usually drawn from limited alternative funds and is often insufficient. Success is largely determined by the willingness of recipient countries to initiate reforms. UNDP efforts to bolster civilian oversight are noteworthy. Better sequencing and coordination between reform of the security sector and other sectors is encouraged.

The security sector is not an autonomous, independent collection of public institutions; rather it is an integrated component of a country’s public administration and thus part of the state’s overall governance system and structure. Civilian oversight is essential, as are UNDP efforts to bolster this sector. It is one of the most effective methods of ensuring that the state does not become the source of insecurity but is part of the solution to it. Security sector reform cannot be divorced from other governance reforms. Yet precisely because security issues rarely fall under donor aid programmes – bilateral assistance for security issues is consequently drawn from limited alternative funds – they tend to be a parallel and relatively underfunded function within the broader aid effort.

Finding 11. UNDP interventions in livelihoods and economic revitalization are an important and often innovative component of the broader United Nations approach to conflict-affected settings. Within integrated missions, there has been some tension between the time-bound and technical nature of the approach taken by peacekeepers towards DDR and UNDP’s longer term developmental objectives, which focus on building local capacities for economic generation. Similarly, donor time frames in conflict-affected settings are relatively short, limiting the scope and scale of UNDP interventions.
While UNDP’s livelihood work in conflict-affected settings is widely acknowledged as beneficial in terms of contributing to immediate peacebuilding and conflict prevention aims, its broader impact and sustainability need consideration. Most information provided by UNDP on these activities is based on tangible outputs, such as numbers of jobs created and individuals trained. Meanwhile, broader issues regarding creation of longer term economic opportunities in conflict-affected societies remain uncertain. Nearly every country considered for this evaluation remains among the lowest in per capita income globally and will most likely remain as such for a generation during its emergence from conflict. With this in mind, it may be beneficial to consider UNDP initial interventions as stop-gap in nature in conflict-affected settings, laying the foundations for economic development in the future.

**Finding 12.** UNDP administers the pivotal coordinating role of the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator in integrated missions, straddling the political, humanitarian and development dimensions. Management effectiveness in these missions is highly context-specific. A critical unresolved issue for the United Nations is the extent to which humanitarian and development activities should be decoupled from the political process.

United Nations integrated missions face complex and competing aims. A recent study from the United Nations Integration Steering Group highlighted the often confusing and inconsistent interpretation of policy that arises in the midst of crisis response activities. The importance of linking political, security and development objectives in conflict-affected states is no longer an issue of debate. However, a holistic approach does not always alleviate tensions that can arise among humanitarian, development, political and security agendas. As a step towards improving cooperation, there are now quarterly meetings at the Assistant Secretary-General level between DPKO, DPA and UNDP to review priorities and interventions. Another positive step in the United Nations integration effort has been the evolution of the Integrated Missions Planning Process.

**Finding 13.** The ‘cluster’ approach is chaired by the humanitarian coordinator with the primary support of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. UNDP leads the Early Recovery Cluster, which has received mixed reviews. Criticism has been directed especially at a lack of clarity in purpose, insufficient funding and little use of monitoring and evaluation tools.

Experience with the Early Recovery Cluster in recent events has highlighted confusion over the kinds of recovery projects that are deemed eligible for inclusion in a Consolidated Appeal Process or its equivalent. In some cases critics contend that too much attention has been paid to crisis security, law-and-order measures and transitional justice, and not enough attention to longer term planning and capacity-building efforts.

**Finding 14.** UNDP has effectively promoted dialogue between government and civil society at national and local levels. By engaging a wider range of stakeholders, this has enabled a broadening of the constituency for peacebuilding and improvements in programme design in priority areas.

UNDP is beginning to exploit new opportunities in conflict-affected countries to use South-South cooperation. Benefits include the relatively swift deployment of personnel who have a better understanding of the country circumstances, as well as the use of appropriate technologies and techniques. This is especially true in cases where sufficient local government capacity will take a generation to build.

**Finding 15.** UNDP manages multi-donor trust funds in many conflict settings. The management of these funds has encountered some criticism with respect to high overhead charges, slow disbursement and the perception of preferential treatment for the organization’s own development support programmes. Greater attention should be given to capturing lessons to inform country offices and partners.
The particular mix of funds in any post-crisis effort is specific to the context. All 20 of the conflict-affected countries reviewed for this evaluation showed a significant surge in UNDP financing for country-based programming in the aftermath of major conflict events. In every case, budgets for the UNDP country office remained elevated for at least several years thereafter.

**Finding 16.** UNDP has made important refinements and improvements in human resources and procurement in recent years, with clear evidence that the organization can now respond quicker and more effectively to requests for assistance in the wake of conflict and disasters. Continuing improvements are needed, however, as the logistical, recruitment and procurement procedures that UNDP uses remain in many cases insufficient to the demands of a highly fluid conflict environment.

Guidelines and procedures are important, but the success or failure of UNDP in conflict-affected countries usually comes down to the pace of response and the quality of personnel. The onus is on UNDP to quickly deploy high-calibre and well-trained staff and consultants in the field. A slow response has reputational and operational consequences to the organization. There is evidence that UNDP has improved its surge and fast-track procedures, and there are cases where a rapid and effective response is recognized.

**Finding 17.** UNDP plays a prominent role in the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Its effectiveness is contingent on realistic planning, rapid response, quality personnel, effective coordination with partners and sufficient funding.

For UNDP, the period of transition from peacekeeping operations is complex and sensitive. Its support activities often take on elevated significance in consolidating a country’s progress away from conflict. The effective management of these transitions is of particular interest at present as several United Nations peacekeeping operations are soon to wind down, with support continuing through integrated peacebuilding offices, United Nations country teams and special political missions. New United Nations Transition Guidelines should provide an opportunity for more effective and practical inter-agency planning and budgeting.

**Finding 18.** UNDP relies heavily on non-core donor contributions to fund its programme activities, especially in conflict-affected countries. In 2010, 70 percent of UNDP global country programme expenditure was funded through ‘other donor resources’. Democratic governance activities, in particular those aimed at extending government legitimacy and enhancing capacities for conflict management and service delivery, have generally been the main areas for UNDP support in conflict-affected settings.

In countries where an integrated peacekeeping operation has been deployed, there is often a discernible jump in UNDP programming expenditure, reflecting both the elevation of the situation and the broader international attention. Timor-Leste, for example, experienced a 30 percent jump in UNDP programme expenditures in the year following deployment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.

**Finding 19.** UNDP lacks a coherent and systematic assessment of progress towards CPR objectives within their country support programmes. Specific indicators or benchmarks have not been established for UNDP work in crisis environments, and there is no consistent practice regarding the setting of baselines at the outset of country-based projects in order to track progress and improvement.

Gauging the efficiency and effectiveness of UNDP support in conflict-affected settings can be problematic, as many project activities are process-oriented, time-bound and subject to a rapidly changing political landscape. The relationship between resources committed and outcomes achieved is not linear; it requires a more subtle theory of change with incremental and measurable benchmarks.
CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1. UNDP is one of very few international organizations able to operate ‘at scale’ across multiple programme areas, before, during and after the outbreak of conflict. This work directly links to the broader UNDP emphasis on achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and to UNDP cross-cutting priorities such as women’s empowerment.

UNDP comparative advantages are perceived to be its on-the-ground presence; close partnership with government; role as a bridge between humanitarian, peacebuilding and development efforts; and role in governance and institutional change in the management of conflict. The wide scope of UNDP activity constitutes a weakness when resources are spread too thinly. Country offices have not always matched the inherent ‘worth’ of an activity against the likely impact it will have in achieving wider organizational goals. There is a tendency to continue implementing some portfolio activities with insufficient staff and/or financial resources when their continuing relevance is questionable or when there are other international organizations better equipped to deal with them. The evaluation found only rare examples of a clear articulation of theories of change that allowed UNDP to develop and monitor meaningful change indicators. Hence, the default position has been to assume that all activities contribute to peace and are of equal worth.

Conclusion 2. UNDP is often caught off guard and unprepared when conflict erupts, despite its in-country position and close contacts with government and civil society. Anticipating conflict and helping to prevent it requires detailed and operational conflict analyses to be carried out at the country level.

A conflict analysis sets the stage for a theory of change. Once the problem is assessed and the triggers of violence are known, a theory of change suggests how an intervention in that context will change the conflict. But this must be preceded by a thorough understanding of context. The operational landscape in most conflict-affected countries is characterized by new and fluid forms of internal conflict, usually brought on by multiple ‘triggers’. UNDP (and the United Nations in general) invests a great deal in data collection and analysis, yet it often seems ill-informed about the political tensions and relationships that can so quickly develop into violence.

Despite recognition of the importance of conflict analysis and the development of its own conflict analysis tools, there is no UNDP-based standard operating procedure for when and how to conduct conflict analysis. As a result, its conduct in both substantive and procedural terms remains varied across UNDP. UNDP has been very good at codifying the dynamics of conflict in a generic sense, through increasingly sophisticated strategic analyses, particularly at a global level. But there remains a disjuncture between the holistic conceptual umbrella of ‘knowledge’ within the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the operational constraints of individual countries. The result in some cases has been a waste of resources on small, inconsequential activities that have traction only for the duration of the ‘project’, but little long-lasting impact on peacebuilding.

Conclusion 3. The effectiveness of UNDP programming support in conflict-affected countries is often contingent upon events in the political and security realm, which are largely beyond UNDP power to influence. Where a modicum of political settlement has been reached and peacekeeping has maintained security, UNDP interventions have been able to support a broader conflict resolution and peacebuilding agenda, and ultimately a development agenda.

During the past decade, UNDP has built substantive capacity in many core areas of peacebuilding that are relevant to its development mandate, showing that it can be very effective when political and security situations have stabilized. Some of the greatest UNDP achievements in post-conflict peacebuilding have been in states that are either (a) geopolitically less prominent and hence the United Nations’ role is greater vis-à-vis other actors; or (b) beset with geopolitically charged environments (like Kenya or Georgia) where political and security influences
have become so polarized by internal/external influences that UNDP is able to take on a ‘non-threatening’ mediation role.

Where the semblances of political reconciliation have been scant and violence ongoing, UNDP interventions have had limited impact, and progress has been frequently reversed due to low national buy-in for development interventions or to the resumption of conflict.

**Conclusion 4.** UNDP administers (but does not direct) the critical coordinating role within integrated missions in crisis situations, straddling the political, humanitarian and development dimensions. Management effectiveness in these missions is highly specific to the context. One area that needs greater attention is the dissemination of learning derived from managing pooled multi-donor trust funds.

Conceptual and operational issues between UNDP and its security, political and humanitarian partners in integrated missions often revolve around the inherent tension between the time-bound nature and approach of a peace operation as opposed to UNDP’s longer term development agenda. The IMPP has provided a useful and structured mechanism for ensuring UNDP involvement at the inception of a mission, yet case study findings indicate that UNDP influence in the process remains relatively small compared to the security and political concerns of other actors.

The global experience of UNDP in managing pooled multi-donor trust funds is not systematically captured, but such knowledge could be useful when a country office needs to understand and explain to its partners the various options available. Given the continued need for support where UNDP is expected to manage/administer trust funds in the context of recovery from both conflict and disaster, greater attention should be given to institutional arrangements to more effectively manage this issue at the corporate level.

**Conclusion 5.** UNDP has demonstrated that it can be an effective partner and participant in peacebuilding. Problems arising during the transition to peacebuilding point to a lack of logistical and substantive preparedness, as well as a reduction in donor funding after the drawdown of the integrated mission.

UNDP is well considered for its implementation of activities funded through the Peacebuilding Fund. In addition, the UNDP partnership with DPA in Security Council–mandated integrated peacebuilding offices (including Burundi and Sierra Leone) have demonstrated the utility of combining development activities and political processes.

Unlike the planning process at the start of integrated missions, no equivalent planning and guidance has taken place for the transition to peacebuilding or the drawdown of peacekeeping operations. *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict*, a report of the Secretary-General, and the recent development of new United Nations Transition Guidelines should provide an opportunity for more effective, actionable inter-agency planning and budgeting.

UNDP has effectively promoted dialogue among government and civil society at national and local levels, enabling a broadening of the constituency for peacebuilding. The United Nations Conflict Prevention Partnership (where ‘deliver as one’ is the mantra) and the Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action (chaired by UNDP) are both useful entry points for increasing coherence in conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. The Framework Team is particularly useful in providing programme design and strategic advice to the resident coordinator.

**Conclusion 6.** UNDP has achieved a measure of success with expanding opportunities for women to participate more fully in the emerging political and legal landscape of post-conflict countries. Notable successes include the expansion of female access to justice in some countries, especially for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. UNDP has been less successful in its efforts to improve the gender balance of its own staff working in conflict countries.

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The eight-point agenda for gender equality has been an important UNDP effort and a potential blueprint for the wider United Nations system. It has yet to be harnessed as the working gender strategy within integrated missions.

Conclusion 7. UNDP has yet to strike an optimal balance between direct programme implementation and national implementation in many countries affected by conflict. Direct service delivery may escalate the achievement of specific outcomes and may be initially necessary to safeguard against corruption. However, it also runs the risk of weakening institutions that countries must rely on over the long term.

The issue of sustainability can sometimes clash with the desire to ‘get the job done’, particularly in countries where capacity constraints are profound. UNDP typically works in conflict settings through project support units, operating in parallel with the national public sector. The wage and benefit incentives used to attract talented staff for these United Nations assignments are, in fact, salary stipends, and they often create major distortions in the public service labour market. As noted in Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict, it is important to avoid negative impacts on national capacity-development, such as the brain drain of local capacity to international and bilateral organizations.

Conclusion 8. UNDP operational effectiveness and efficiency have been improving, with clear evidence that the organization can now respond quicker and more effectively to requests for assistance in the wake of conflict and disasters. Continuing improvements are needed, however, as the logistical, recruitment and procurement procedures that UNDP utilizes remain in many cases insufficient to the demands of a highly fluid conflict environment.

The UNDP surge initiative and fast-tracking procedures have gone some way towards addressing the challenge of a shortage of skilled staff on hand at the outbreak of conflict. While temporary rapid deployment may help achieve short-term immediate recovery aims, there are trade-offs; the very nature of fragile states demands the building of relationships and trust over a protracted period. The effectiveness of UNDP in conflict situations will remain contingent on the quality and capabilities of in-country management and staff. Selecting skilled staff to fill appointments in countries at risk for conflict and carrying out robust training programmes for staff in these countries constitute the two most important actions to ensure UNDP effectiveness.

Volunteers of the United Nations Volunteers programme comprise one third of all international civilian personnel in eight of the nine primary case studies of the evaluation where there is an integrated mission. It is therefore important for UNDP to give greater recognition to the important contribution made by these volunteers towards peace and development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. UNDP should significantly enhance the quality and use of conflict analysis at the country level, including guidance and standard operating procedures detailing when and how analyses should be developed and periodically updated. Effective analyses of needs and risks should, crucially, lead to a theory of change for the planned UNDP support, and then directly to a sequence of activities and a means of measuring progress against objectives.

There is at present no UNDP-based standard operating procedure for when and how to conduct conflict analysis. As a result, its conduct in both substantive and procedural terms remains varied across UNDP. Nevertheless, there are country-level experiences that demonstrate the value of conducting and regularly updating conflict analyses.

Recommendation 2. UNDP should make greater efforts to translate corporate management cooperation between UNDP, DPKO and DPA to the specifics of country priorities and the sequencing of interventions. This would imply a more central role for UNDP in the planning stages at the beginning of integrated missions and then through the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and in
the drawdown of an integrated mission. Clear corporate guidelines and criteria need to be developed in this regard.

The IMPP has proved a useful and structured mechanism for ensuring UNDP involvement at the inception of a mission, yet case studies indicate that UNDP influence in the process remains relatively small compared to the security and political concerns of other actors.

**Recommendation 3.** UNDP should be unambiguous in establishing what recovery projects are eligible for inclusion in a Consolidated Appeal Process or its equivalent. UNDP should make better use of situation teams that convene quickly during the outbreak of conflicts.

Experience with the Early Recovery Cluster in recent crisis events has highlighted confusion over the kinds of recovery projects that are deemed eligible for inclusion in a Consolidated Appeal Process or its equivalent. In some cases critics contend that too much attention has been paid to crisis security, law-and-order measures and transitional justice, and not enough to longer term planning and capacity-building efforts.

**Recommendation 4.** Greater attention should be given to institutional arrangements in order to more effectively manage and disseminate knowledge on pooled multi-donor trust funds at the corporate level – and how this can serve country offices requested to manage such funds.

Until recently, UNDP global experience in managing multi-partner trust funds was not systematically captured. Such knowledge is useful when a UNDP country office needs to understand and explain to its partners the various trust fund options and to know how to set up a trust fund. The Independent Evaluation of Lessons Learned from Delivering as One notes that the “firewall in the management of the MPTF [Multi-Party Trust Fund] has worked effectively”. Yet given the continued need for support where UNDP is expected to manage/administer trust funds, not only in the context of post-conflict recovery but also for post-disaster recovery, greater attention should be given to conveying the institutional arrangements to partners.

**Recommendation 5.** To reinforce the importance of ‘delivering as one’ in post-conflict settings, the UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Executive Board should raise with the United Nations Secretariat and Security Council, for their consideration, the importance of establishing clear guidance on the division of labour and resources during the drawdown of integrated missions. This would help to ensure that individual organizations such as UNDP are adequately prepared for their enhanced role during transition and post-transition.

**Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict** recommended enhancing the United Nations’ use of standing civilian capacities. The recommendation underscored the pivotal role of UNDP in resource mobilization and development support in post-conflict settings. It also recommended that UNDP take the lead role in clusters relating to core national governance functions, justice and capacity development.

For UNDP, the period of transition from peace-keeping operations is complex and sensitive, a time when its support activities often take on elevated significance in consolidating a country’s progress away from conflict. The effective management of these transitions is of particular interest at present as several United Nations peacekeeping operations are soon to wind down, with support continuing through integrated peacebuilding offices, United Nations country teams and special political missions. New United Nations Transition Guidelines should provide an opportunity for more effective, actionable inter-agency planning and budgeting.

**Recommendation 6.** Cooperation with international financial institutions, including the World Bank, should be further developed in the areas of joint approaches to post-crisis needs assessments and crisis prevention planning.

The IMPP has been designed to help achieve a common understanding of strategic objectives in a particular country by engaging all relevant parts
of the United Nations system, and to provide an inclusive framework for action that can also serve to engage external partners, such as the international financial institutions, regional organizations and bilateral donors. Post-crisis needs assessments (PCNA) are now being developed through a collaborative scoping exercise undertaken by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank. PCNAs help to identify the infrastructure and government support activities that are needed to support countries as they move towards recovery.

**Recommendation 7.** UNDP should establish an internal human resources programme designed to prepare and place female staff in conflict settings and should set tighter benchmarks for offices to meet gender targets.

UNDP has a mixed record of accomplishment in terms of the gender balance of its work force in some conflict-affected countries. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 2010 women made up only 23 percent of the staff. In post-crisis Côte d’Ivoire, in 2011, only two women were employed, neither in key posts. This poor gender ratio is replicated in the integrated United Nations Operation in Côte D’Ivoire. These and other examples attest to the need for a concerted effort to meet gender targets in conflict-affected countries.

**Recommendation 8.** All programming for conflict-affected countries should articulate a clear exit strategy. Direct implementation projects should be required to justify why they cannot be nationally executed and should include capacity development measures and a time frame for transitioning to national implementation modalities.

While it is clear that building national and subnational capacity takes time and depends on many factors, including a robust education system, UNDP has yet to strike an optimal balance between direct programme implementation and national implementation in many conflict countries. Direct service delivery can escalate the achievement of specific outcomes and may be initially necessary to safeguard against corruption. However, it also runs the risk of weakening institutions that countries must rely on over the long term. The capacity for governing that gets built through UNDP support can be quickly eroded by the ‘brain drain’ that takes trained national counterparts to new jobs either in the private sector or, perversely, in international aid organizations such as the United Nations.

**Recommendation 9.** UNDP should expand its staff training programmes for countries identified as at risk for conflict, revise hiring procedures for staff to stress experience in conflict settings and provide additional incentives for experienced staff to continue working in conflict-affected hardship posts.

The UNDP surge initiative and fast-tracking procedures have gone some way to addressing the challenge of a shortage of skilled staff on hand at the outbreak of conflict. However, the effectiveness of UNDP in conflict situations will remain contingent on the quality and capabilities of in-country management and staff. Selecting skilled staff to fill appointments in countries at risk for conflict and carrying out robust training programmes for staff in these countries constitute the two most important actions to ensure UNDP effectiveness.

**Recommendation 10.** UNDP should establish new guidance for project development in crisis-affected countries, including generic sets of benchmarks and indicators. This should also include monitoring, evaluation and reporting on progress in conflict settings. These tools should build from programme indicators developed in non-conflict contexts and then be revised to reflect changed circumstances brought on by conflict.

New guidance is needed because UNDP currently lacks a tool for the coherent and systematic assessment of progress towards crisis prevention and recovery objectives within country support programmes. Specific indicators or benchmarks have not been established for UNDP work in crisis environments. Nor is there consistent practice regarding establishment of baselines at the outset of country-based projects in order to track progress.
As part of its evaluation programme, the Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts thematic evaluations that assess how specific UNDP policies and programmes contribute to overall development results globally, regionally and nationally. Collectively these programmes are designed to contribute to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and various UNDP initiatives, and they should be viewed as part of a comprehensive programme that seeks to contribute to development. Sound development is a prerequisite for peace and stability, and in this regard UNDP has devoted significant effort and resources in support of conflict-affected countries. The evaluation has focused on this critical component of UNDP work since its success directly influences the rest of UNDP’s work around the globe. The evaluation thus proceeds from the premise that peace and stability are essential for development.

Set out below are brief explanations of the purpose, scope, methods, process and structure of the evaluation.

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation provides an independent assessment of the evolving UNDP role in conflict-affected settings where UNDP is one among several operational partners during and immediately after a peace operation mandated by the United Nations Security Council. The evaluation provides findings, conclusions and recommendations relating to UNDP’s mandate, operational efficiency, resource capacity and comparative advantage in a competitive aid environment. In particular it considers the UNDP role within integrated United Nations peacekeeping operations and the relationships and partnerships under such circumstances. It further considers the UNDP contribution to developing national capacities for conflict prevention, mitigation and recovery.

This is the second evaluation led by the Evaluation Office focusing on UNDP support to conflict-affected countries. The previous evaluation, in 2006, concluded that UNDP plays an essential support role in conflict-affected states and possesses expertise in several post-conflict areas. The report noted that UNDP has been hampered in delivering on its stated goals by institutional, resource and operational challenges that limit its ability to adequately address the root causes of conflict. To be a more effective and reliable actor, the evaluation recommended that UNDP build substantive capacity in core areas of peacebuilding, improve the effectiveness of implementation and enhance coordination and partnerships. Six years later, the current evaluation follows up on these issues and gauges the extent to which perceived shortcomings have been addressed and recommendations have been taken up.

1.2 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation focuses in particular on UNDP support in conflict-affected countries that are host to a United Nations peace operation mandated by the Security Council. The decision to focus on integrated missions and the UNDP role in transitions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding was made based on several factors:

- There is general recognition that UNDP has an important and expanding position in the United Nations peacebuilding architecture;
- Peacebuilding structures and procedures are currently under review at the United Nations, bringing heightened interest in past UNDP performance; and
Focusing narrowly on integrated missions and peacebuilding avoids taking an overly broad scope and should enable the evaluation to generate useful conclusions and recommendations.

Although the emphasis is on ongoing programmes measured against UNDP objectives as set out in the current Strategic Plan (2007–2012), the evaluation also puts UNDP strategies into historical context, looking at the evolution of United Nations and UNDP conflict-related work since the start of the millennium.

### 1.3 MAIN OBJECTIVES

The main objectives of the evaluation, as articulated in the evaluation terms of reference and Inception Report, are to:

- Assess how UNDP programming and policies support peacebuilding within the framework of large international operations, and how UNDP supports a country’s transition from immediate post-conflict to development; and

- Evaluate how UNDP response mechanisms function at headquarters and operational levels during periods of transition in conflict-affected countries.

To achieve these objectives, the evaluation team reviewed a broad set of UNDP programme activities in conflict-affected countries, and then extrapolated and conflated findings that can be represented as ‘typical’ and from which corporate lessons can be derived. The evaluation also looks at how UNDP operational partnerships with other United Nations offices and organizations have strengthened the broader United Nations and international response in conflict-affected countries and probes what added value UNDP brings to the table. In so far as UNDP is engaged before, during, and after operations mandated by the Security Council, the evaluation considers how UNDP is meeting expectations across these transitions.

Attention is given to stabilization, state-building and the programme activities that form the core of UNDP work in immediate post-conflict settings. The evaluation examines how UNDP’s role in conflict situations is perceived by others, whether this role could or should be enhanced, and what comparative advantage UNDP is demonstrably capable of exploiting.

UNDP has indicated that its conflict prevention and recovery support has been reoriented to more directly address the structural dimensions of modern conflicts and to help partner countries identify and address the root causes of cross-border/intercountry and intra-national violence. The evaluation considers to what extent there is evidence of such a reorientation, and its results. It considers whether UNDP crisis response and management mechanisms are calibrated appropriately for carrying out expected support. This includes assessing whether rapid and predictable funding and human resource support are available and being used in crisis situations, and the perception of UNDP as a partner among counterparts in United Nations Security Council–mandated peace operations.

#### 1.3.1 DEFINING ‘CONFLICT AFFECTED’

For the purposes of this evaluation: A conflict-affected country\(^1\) is one that in its recent past has experienced, is in the midst of experiencing, or demonstrates the risk factors for violent unrest.

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\(^1\) While the broad characteristics of what constitutes a conflict-affected country have been informally identified across numerous documents, no definition of ‘conflict affected’ has been codified in United Nations documentation. Likewise, development organizations outside the United Nations system, in particular the World Bank and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), either do not officially define countries as ‘conflict affected’ (World Bank) or they conflate the phrase with ‘fragility’, which has been defined as states that have weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing.
between forces (both organized and informal groups) that typically emerge from disputes over the distribution of resources (financial, political, natural, etc.) in a given society.

A chief characteristic of countries in such circumstances is their functional deficiency in national governance and justice systems. This makes it difficult if not impossible to provide basic public services and to restore the foundation for economic development and sustainable peace. This definition of conflict-affected takes into account the fluid, context-specific nature of UNDP support. An escalation of unrest can be unexpected or recurring. Moreover, in virtually every case, UNDP has a presence in these countries before, during and after periods of violence. Unlike organizations with a time-bound ‘emergency’ mandate, UNDP is charged with continuity, adaptability and appropriate response to crises as they emerge.

1.4 EVALUATION METHODS

The evaluation was conducted using a combination of country visits, desk-based case studies and research, and a series of interviews with interested parties, including other United Nations organizations, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academic and independent researchers. In accordance with norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group, the evaluation sought to distil findings on programme outcomes in terms of their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

The evaluation is framed by a selection of key questions as outlined in the Inception Report and Evaluation Matrix. Evaluation criteria were used to make judgments on UNDP performance and overall contribution.

The documentation on conflict and the role of international organizations is extensive, focusing on both conflict and development. The evaluation team identified key policy and programme documents across a broad range of sources from UNDP, the United Nations Secretariat and other United Nations organizations, plus international financial institutions (IFIs) and academia.

Since the evaluation is thematic and focuses on corporate-level findings, it was important to obtain insights and overviews from senior United Nations officials, donors, academics and NGOs in New York and elsewhere. In some cases these individuals were interviewed specifically in relation to a country case study; in most cases, their opinions were sought on the broader questions relating to the evaluation. A full list of those consulted can be found in Annex 3.

The evaluation was subject to the common constraint of obtaining evidence and data from programmes that stretch back across many years. A particular challenge was high staff turnover and the difficulty in gaining access to individuals who had moved on from the country or policy arena under study. Documentation fills some gaps in this respect, but it rarely captures the full extent of the difficulties of working in a conflict environment. Moreover, we accept that since the evaluation is looking back over six years, many of the problems will already have been addressed or accounted for in subsequent programme designs.

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2 The extent of armed conflict required for a state to be considered ‘conflict affected’ is not a debate that this evaluation takes up in any detail. However, it is worth noting that one of the most widely used operational definitions of armed conflict states that it is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Code Book, www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all.htm). This definition is useful when developing indices of countries in conflict, but the current evaluation, for which the intention is to consider the changing circumstances for UNDP support when a state is conflict affected, calls for a slightly broader definition.

3 The 2011 United Nations Review of Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/65/747) identifies a lack of core government capacities as a defining feature across countries emerging from conflict and the primary focal area of international support in conflict-affected countries.
Table 1. Primary country case studies

AFRICA

Burundi is in the aftermath of conflict. In 2004 it was host to a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). In 2006, ONUB was replaced by the Security Council-mandated United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), and the country has since been on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. Burundi now hosts a special political mission, the United Nations Office in Burundi. Despite international and domestic efforts, Burundi continues to exhibit some of the unresolved root causes of the previous conflict.

Côte d’Ivoire has had an integrated peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), since 2004. The country experienced a widespread outbreak of conflict in 2011, triggering UNDP’s emergency response mechanisms. The conflict has a regional dimension given the flow of refugees to neighbouring Liberia.

Democratic Republic of the Congo was one of the countries covered in the 2006 evaluation of UNDP work in conflict-affected countries. It is also the focus of a recent country-level assessment of development results by the UNDP Evaluation Office, covering some of the same ground as this thematic evaluation. The ongoing conflict affects significant parts of the country. UNDP works within the framework of a Security Council–mandated integrated peacekeeping operation. An operational transition is beginning, as the peacekeeping mission (the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or MONUSCO) is facing pressure to withdraw.

Liberia has been host to an integrated peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNmIL), since 2003. It is in the process of drawdown and handover to a longer term presence. Liberia is on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda and receives funding administered by UNDP through the Peacebuilding Fund.

South Sudan has been host to a Security Council–mandated integrated peacekeeping operation since its conflict with the North ended in 2005. UNDP has played a central role in the operation, holding positions of mission leadership. The country has undergone a major transition, and after it declared independence in July 2011, the peacekeeping operation was replaced by a new operation (United Nations Integrated Mission in South Sudan, UNmISS) that is military based yet has a strong peacebuilding focus. Conflict remains widespread not only with the Republic of Sudan but within South Sudan.

ARAB STATES

Lebanon is host to a Security Council–mandated peacekeeping operation (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL) and a special political mission (United Nations Special Coordinator of the Secretary-General for Lebanon, or USCOL), both of which work closely with UNDP. The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006 caused an expansion of UNIFIL and USCOL activity. It also led UNDP to shift its programming to put more emphasis on crisis prevention and recovery support.

Somalia has been subject to protracted conflict for decades. It has both a special political mission (United Nations Political Office in Somalia, or UNPOS) and a regional peacekeeping operation (African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM), both mandated by the United Nations Security Council. Somalia was the subject of a recent assessment of development results that highlighted the difficulties faced by UNDP in delivering services as a ‘provider of last resort’ in a bitterly divided country.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Timor-Leste has since 1999 been host to integrated peacekeeping operations that served as interim administrators as well as security providers. The most recent peacekeeping operation (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste, or UNMIT) was deployed in the second half of 2006. Now it is in the process of handing over policing and security responsibilities to the Government. Timor-Leste had not been evaluated by the UNDP Evaluation Office since the country was established, but an assessment of development results was in progress as this evaluation was carried out.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Haiti was included in the 2006 conflict evaluation produced by the UNDP Evaluation Office. The country hosts a Security Council–mandated integrated peacekeeping operation and was the recipient of a massive international humanitarian relief effort after the January 2010 earthquake. Periodic conflicts and natural disasters have been devastating for Haiti, and it offers important lessons for humanitarian and development actors.
1.4.1 CASE STUDY SELECTION

As of May 2012, 17 peace operations were being led globally by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and an additional 15 special political and/or peacebuilding field missions were being managed by the Department of Political Affairs. This evaluation incorporates findings from 9 primary case studies (those visited and studied in depth) and a further 11 secondary country case studies (using source material). The sample thus represents about 60 percent of countries that come under an integrated mission, but the sample includes countries that have commanded the greatest financial and personnel resources in the last decade. The nine primary case studies are drawn from four of the five UNDP regions, though a greater number are from Africa. The case studies were selected in order to capture a comprehensive and evaluable picture of UNDP activities across the diversity of conflict-affected circumstances in which UNDP works. Field visits were undertaken for six of the nine case studies, and the consultants chosen for the remaining three had recent extensive field experience in the chosen countries (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and South Sudan).

In selecting which countries to study, the evaluation team sought a mix of experiences and situations. The criteria included:

- Experience with an outbreak of violent conflict during the past decade;
- Reflective of a wide geographic distribution, representing four of the five UNDP Regional Bureaux;
- UNDP operations in the presence of other United Nations actors under Security Council mandate (peacekeeping, peacebuilding, political missions);
- Inclusion of a selection of countries that are in transition, with integrated peace operations being scaled down or soon to withdraw altogether; and
- Selection of several countries simultaneously being assessed by the UNDP Evaluation office in 2011 through the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) process; and several countries included in the 2006 evaluation of UNDP support to conflict-affected countries.

The countries selected for case studies, broken down by region, are shown in Table 1. Each country is on the list of ‘special focus countries’ created by the BCPR in coordination with the regional bureaux.

In addition to the 9 primary cases, the evaluation draws on information from 10 other countries (and one territory) that currently or previously have had a Security Council or Peacebuilding Commission mandate (see Table 2). Taken together, these 20 cases comprised 37 percent of total UNDP programme expenditure between 2005 and 2010, and nearly 40 percent in 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Secondary country case studies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
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<td>Arab States</td>
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<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
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4 The 2011 cohort of ADRs include these countries that should be considered for conflict case studies: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka.

5 There were six case study countries in 2006: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan.
This evaluation examines the common strengths, weaknesses and lessons emerging from across the sample. The case studies are not designed to cover the full gamut of UNDP programmes, but rather to draw out lessons common to most countries and circumstances. As this is a thematic study of strategy, approach, operational capacity and institutional coherence, it gives less emphasis to the specificities of the country programmes and greater emphasis to how the organization as a whole responded to the challenges inherent in working in a transitional conflict setting.

To ensure consistency and a common approach to qualitative data collection and analysis, several tools were employed. These included:

- A common evaluation matrix covering the key evaluative criteria and related evaluative questions;
- A list of key stakeholders and partners to be interviewed at headquarters and in the field; and
- Basic interview protocols; although interviewees had the opportunity to expand upon areas of their individual competency, the consultants covered a minimum list of key questions, based on the evaluation matrix, to ensure consistency across all case studies.

A standard case study report format was derived from the evaluation matrix and adapted to the specifics of each context. Along with the elements contained in the matrix, the case study reports cover cross-referenced data available from the supportive literature.

### 1.5 THE EVALUATION PROCESS

The evaluation was conducted by a team guided and led by the UNDP Evaluation Office. The Inception Report and draft final report were reviewed and commented on by an external advisory panel, consisting of three persons with expert knowledge of conflict and development issues. The Evaluation Office also established a reference group of staff from UNDP headquarters units (regional bureaux, Bureau for Development Policy [BDP] and BCPR). They were asked to comment on the evaluation scope and process as it began, and then to review the draft final report for errors and omissions.

The evaluation process had various phases. During the preparatory phase, a concept note and terms of reference were developed, and the evaluation team, advisory panel and reference group were formed. Next came an inception phase, which involved initial fact-finding and development and then revision of an Inception Report, followed by incorporation of comments and suggestions from the advisory panel and reference group. A data collection phase then commenced, which included preparation of country case studies. The analysis and report writing phase began as data collection was completed. It included synthesizing the findings from case studies, interviews and background literature reviews and drafting the evaluation report.

### 1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report has four chapters. This introductory chapter discusses the rationale, objectives, scope and methods for the evaluation. Chapter 2 provides context for international assistance to conflict-affected countries. It also gives a descriptive review of UNDP’s involvement in conflict-affected countries and the evolution of the institutional apparatus currently in use. Chapter 3 presents the evaluation findings, covering UNDP strategic planning, country programming and programme implementation. Chapter 4 provides the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.
Chapter 2

THE CONTEXT FOR UNDP SUPPORT TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

This section explores the changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War period, briefly discussing the international community response. Particular attention is given to the evolving United Nations response to conflict and the advent of integrated missions. While peacekeeping has long been the hallmark of United Nations action, this section discusses the shift in emphasis to peacebuilding. UNDP plays a central role in the United Nations peacebuilding architecture and has revised its structure, plans and programmes to enhance its capacity to support countries as they recover from violent conflict.

2.1 CONFLICT TRENDS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Violent conflict has a profound effect on human development. Conflict reverses developmental gains, disrupts economic markets and fractures governing institutions, greatly diminishing people’s ability to live, work and become educated. Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is essentially unreachable for many conflict-affected countries. The causal chains connecting conflict and development compel this investigation into whether UNDP interventions are helping to create the level of stability that is necessary for countries to advance their human development goals.

Contrary to general perception, the worldwide incidence of violent conflict has actually decreased over the last 20 years. On average there were 53 ongoing conflicts per year during the first three years of the 1990s in contrast to 33 conflicts per year through the first decade of the 21st century. Conflict occurs overwhelmingly in developing countries, typically those with high levels of unemployment, a lack of recourse to formal justice systems and large youth populations.

While each armed conflict has its own unique traits, some common characteristics typify the conflicts of the early 21st century:

- Armed conflicts do not lend themselves to quick and clean definition. While open conflicts between countries and civil wars have both diminished significantly, nearly all contemporary conflict has a regional character, in which a given conflict emerges or has impact across borders.

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7 Uppsala University conflict data (www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets). The majority of conflicts that broke out during the first decade of the 21st century were in countries that had previously experienced conflict. This reality has driven use of the phrase ‘new old conflicts’ as well as the realization that some of the hardest cases remain to be addressed.

8 Over 93 percent of conflict during 2009 was located in developing countries. See L. Themner and P. Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflicts 1946-2010’ in Journal of Peace Research (Sage, 2011).

Armed conflicts have generally revolved around challenges to a government's authority. The distinctions between organized belligerents and civilians are often unclear.

Armed conflicts do not follow linear paths of resolution, and cycles of recurrence and prolonged instability are common on the journey away from conflict.

Moving away from conflict is a political and developmental process that takes a generation, as long as 25 to 30 years. Peacebuilding is essentially an effort to create institutions for the peaceful management of conflict.

2.2 DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO CONFLICT

The widespread outbreak of conflict that characterized much of the 1990s and the changing global order this represented were met with initial ambiguity and inefficiency across the United Nations system and the wider international community. The typical United Nations response to conflict events during this period was deployment of peacekeepers, specifically via mandates by the United Nations Security Council. Coordination between the peacekeeping missions and parallel United Nations humanitarian and development support was ad hoc and poorly defined, with multiple United Nations organizations often working at cross purposes. The challenge for the United Nations was to forge a more integrated response, one that emphasized peacebuilding and paid greater attention to the structural root causes of violent conflict.

United Nations integrated missions were first introduced in 1997 and further defined in 2000 through the landmark Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi report, and the ensuing United Nations reform process. Integrated missions were first used informally during two peacekeeping operations in 1999, to what were then East Timor and Kosovo. Bringing together the work of security, political and development actors in theatre was central to the recommendations of the Brahimi report, which ushered in the age of modern United Nations peace operations.

Integrated missions represent a strategic partnership between peacekeeping operations and United Nations country teams. The rationale for integration rests with the assumption that security and political objectives, as well as development objectives, stand a greater chance of success when implemented in a coordinated fashion by the United Nations Secretariat, peacekeepers and country teams. Integrated missions emphasize joint planning and the engagement of a broad range of security, development and humanitarian actors, including national authorities and local populations, within a long-term peacebuilding effort.

United Nations integrated missions can take multiple forms at the country level, but all are expected to involve (i) integrated or closely aligned planning among participants; (ii) agreed timelines and a division of responsibilities for implementing tasks related to the consolidation of peace; and (iii) mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. The IMPP facilitates the planning of multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations. It has been designed to help achieve a common understanding of United Nations strategic objectives in a particular country by engaging all relevant parts of the United Nations system, and to provide an inclusive framework for action that can also serve to engage external

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10 During the decade between 1989 and 1999, on average 49.2 violent conflicts were ongoing each year, affecting more than 40 different countries (aggregated from Uppsala University Conflict Dataset, www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/).


12 This text is adapted from UN Peacekeeping: Guidelines and Principles, published by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, New York, 2008.

13 Internal United Nations document, Decisions of the Secretary-General, 25 June 2008 meeting of the policy committee.
partners, such as the IFIs, regional organizations and bilateral donors.

Multidimensional, integrated United Nations peacekeeping operations are normally headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) who has overall United Nations authority. The SRSG is supported in this task by a ‘triple-hatted’ deputy SRSG/RC/HC. This deputy leads the coordination effort for humanitarian, development and recovery activities and brings concerns raised by the country team to the attention of the SRSG. The DSRSG also serves as the principal interface between the country team and the military/police/security component of the operation, normally led by a Force Commander.

In 2005, an independent assessment of United Nations integration was commissioned by the Expanded Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Core Group.14 There followed a series of guidance notes focused on the interface between peacekeeping, humanitarian action and development. One important shift in emphasis, highlighted in the 2006 IMPP guidelines, is a move away from purely structural integration to an approach that emphasizes country context and the need to forge a consensus around joint strategic planning.

The latest clarification of roles and responsibilities was set out in a June 2008 Secretary-General Decision. It made clear that “integration is the guiding policy for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office.”15 The 2008 Decision did not, however, mention how humanitarian relief activities should be linked to integrated missions. This was clarified through a policy instruction issued by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2009 and is summarized as follows:16

- One foot in and one foot out: A DSRSG/RC/HC is appointed, but OCHA maintains a clearly identifiable presence outside the mission. Considered appropriate for situations in flux, this is the default relationship.
- Two feet out: OCHA has a clearly identifiable presence outside the United Nations mission and an RC/HC role separate from the United Nations peacekeeping or political mission. This approach is appropriate for exceptionally unstable situations.
- Two feet in: A DSRSG/RC/HC is appointed and an OCHA office is integrated into the United Nations mission. This is appropriate for stable, post-conflict settings.

Since 2000 the number of Security Council–mandated United Nations political, peacekeeping and/or peacebuilding missions with multidimensional mandates has more than doubled.17 The consequent growth in expenditures has been exponential. At the end of 2010, the United Nations maintained 110,000 military, police and civilian peacekeeping personnel in the field, with an annual budget expenditure of over $7 billion. The United Nations’ political and peacebuilding missions at the end of 2010 involved nearly 4,000 civilians deployed at a cost of $600 million.18

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15 Secretary-General Decision No. 2008/24, June 2008.
16 Derived from the update of the 2009 IMPP Guidelines, cited in Metcalfe et. al, UN Integration and Humanitarian Space: An independent study commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group, STIMSON/Overseas Development Institute, December 2011.
17 In recognition of the need for multidimensional approaches to addressing conflict, during the last decade longer term peacebuilding and development priorities have been incorporated more frequently into peace operation mandates, especially in support to governance and rule of law. See Sherman, Tortolani, Parker, Building the Rule of Law: Security and Justice Sector Reform in Peace Operations in Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010.
Table 3 identifies the key United Nations participants in most integrated missions, including the areas where they are active at the operational level. As can be seen from the multiple checkmarks for UNDP in Table 3, UNDP gets involved in all phases of an integrated United Nations mission. It has a technical support role covering its traditional practice areas: governance, poverty alleviation, environment and sustainable development, and crisis prevention and recovery. Under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, UNDP leads on just one humanitarian cluster – the Early Recovery cluster – but it also participates in numerous thematic or sector working groups within each country. Moreover, it provides administrative backstopping for the United Nations through the DSRSG/RC/HC post, which includes coordination, funds management and representation support to non-resident agencies. Until recently there were some tensions between UNDP and OCHA over integration of early recovery into humanitarian response and its eligibility for access to humanitarian funding. This topic is touched on later in the report.

2.3 TRANSITIONING FROM PEACE-KEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING

The onset of relative stability in a conflict-affected country logically shifts the focus of attention to longer term peacebuilding and redevelopment. The General Assembly and Security Council, acknowledging gaps between the time-bound nature of United Nations security engagements and the longer term development needs as countries transition from conflict, in 2005 adopted a resolution creating a new United Nations peacebuilding architecture, comprised of three units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. The United Nations system in integrated missions: Participants and areas of work*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of basic security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
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*Note: This table is adapted from one included in the Report of the Secretary-General on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/64/747 – S/2011/85), which suggests this broad division of labour in conflict-affected settings.
The Peacebuilding Commission is an intergovernmental entity that aims to bring together the resources of the international community for peacebuilding activities and provide integrated strategies for peacebuilding and recovery. The Commission convenes relevant actors – including IFIs and other donors, United Nations organizations and civil society organizations – in support of these strategies and maintains a focus throughout the peacebuilding process in a given country.19

The Peacebuilding Support Office assists the Peacebuilding Commission, administers the Peacebuilding Fund and supports the Secretary-General’s efforts to coordinate the United Nations system in its peacebuilding efforts.

The Peacebuilding Fund was created in 2006 by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Its purpose is to provide financial support to catalytic interventions that encourage longer term engagements through development actors and other bilateral donors.20

The Peacebuilding Fund supplements the main UNDP programme activities. Projects funded by it are geared towards addressing the following priority areas:

- Peace-sustaining processes, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as strengthening prisons, police forces and peacetime militaries;
- Good governance, national dialogue and reconciliation, including promotion of human rights, ending impunity and stamping out corruption;
- Economic revitalization linked to general peace dividends such as by strengthening economic governance through promotion of partnerships with the private sector, development of microenterprises and youth employment schemes, and management of natural resources; and
- Reconstruction of basic infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, safe drinking water and proper sanitation.21

Between 2007 and 2011 UNDP implemented just under $150 million in programming supported by the Peacebuilding Fund. As the largest recipient of its resources, UNDP implemented 112 specific peacebuilding projects in 22 conflict-affected countries, 16 of which are host to Security Council–mandated peace operations. Though UNDP programme expenditure supported through the Peacebuilding Fund is marginal relative to UNDP’s broader expenditures, it represents a significant area of UNDP activity in conflict-affected settings.

2.4 EVOLUTION OF THE UNDP ROLE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

Since its founding in 1965, UNDP has played a major role in providing development assistance to countries. Since the early 1990s this has been based on the dual aims of preventing conflict before it occurs and assisting in recovery in its aftermath. The role of UNDP continues to evolve in keeping with the changing nature of conflict and the expanding array of international and regional humanitarian and development actors.

Formal acknowledgment by the General Assembly in 1991 of the need to incorporate longer term development considerations into humanitarian and recovery activities provided the basis for UNDP’s mandate in immediate

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20 Creation of the Fund was initially requested in General Assembly Resolution A/Res/180.
post-conflict settings. In particular, the General Assembly recognized the need for a coordinated and multidimensional response across the United Nations system. This led to a clearer definition of UNDP’s long-standing function as supporter and manager of the Resident Coordinator system.

In an effort to move beyond ad hoc programming and to establish a clearer role within the United Nations system, UNDP has reorganized and made strategic adjustments. In 1995, the Emergency Response Division was created, providing the first formal headquarters-level UNDP entity focused on technical support to country offices facing conflict situations. ERD teams were established to provide strategic support to country offices and RCs in times of crisis, and they could also deploy personnel to conflict-affected countries on a limited basis (20 to 30 days) to develop plans for UNDP response in these situations. ERD also became responsible for providing Secretariat-level support to the UNDP Crisis Committee, established in 1997. Its biweekly meetings brought together representatives from each regional bureau and key operational offices to consider crisis situations and to design UNDP’s programme and resources deployment.

In 1995 UNDP’s executing arm, the Office of Project Services (UNOPS), was separated from UNDP, becoming an autonomous agency. With removal of its project implementation role, UNDP country offices began taking on more institutional support functions in conflict-affected countries. In 1996 the UNDP Executive Board made available the Target for Resources Assignment from the Core (TRAC) line of funding. With oversight from ERD, the TRAC 1.1.3 line freed up 5 percent of UNDP’s core resources for activities in countries considered to be in ‘special development situations’. This allowed ERD and UNDP to more flexibly and rapidly respond to disasters and conflict situations and to build programming for conflict prevention and mitigation. In 1998 the Executive Board explicitly mandated UNDP in “special development situations” to manage projects and be responsible for project outputs under direct execution where national execution was not feasible.

Today, the scope of the UNDP crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) work is extensive and growing. It includes support in the following programme areas:

- Conflict prevention;
- Crisis governance and rule of law;
- Women in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and recovery;
- Immediate crisis response;
- Livelihoods and economic recovery; and
- Disaster risk reduction.

CPR was included in the work plans of 39 countries in 2002. By 2010, this practice area was included in 103 country programmes.

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22 ARes46/182, December 1991: “There is a clear relationship between emergency, rehabilitation and development. In order to ensure a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, emergency assistance should be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development. Thus, emergency measures should be seen as a step towards long-term development.”

23 Under this system, a Resident Coordinator is appointed as the main focal point of all organizations of the United Nations system dealing with operational activities for development in a given country. UNDP’s role as manager of the RC system dates back to the 1970s. See UN General Assembly Resolutions 32/197, 20 December 1977.


26 Executive Board Decision D 95/23.

27 DP 1996/1.

28 UNDP Evaluation Office, Evaluation of Direct Execution, May 2001. This decision was extended only to those countries that reached the threshold of special circumstances. Executive Board Decision D/98/2.
with an annual programme expenditure of over $193 million. Twenty-nine countries accounted for 40 percent of country-level programme expenditures (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Sudan), with Afghanistan alone representing 23 percent. During 2010, 60 percent of contributions to UNDP for crisis prevention and recovery work came from non-core sources and was directed towards specific countries or thematic areas. UNDP programme expenditures for CPR annually represent about 25 percent of UNDP’s global programme expenditure.

2.5 UNDP ENGAGEMENT FOLLOWING THE BRAHIMI REPORT

The initial and largely ad hoc engagement of UNDP in crisis prevention and recovery during the early 1990s was replaced by a structured UNDP developmental response around the turn of the century. It now represents a major area of programmatic focus and expenditure. Getting to this point has been an iterative process, evolving as the nature of conflict has evolved and building on the consensus that security, development and sustained peace are inextricably linked.

The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi report) fundamentally changed the way UNDP approaches its work in conflict-affected countries. Partially informed by shortcomings in the 1990s, the Brahimi report articulated the need to more closely link peace operations and political processes with broader development activities in order to comprehensively address conflict situations. This had significant implications for UNDP, which was then assigned responsibility for a wide spectrum of conflict and post-conflict activities – from contributing to prevention to providing leadership in peacebuilding activities. In particular, UNDP was increasingly involved in the reintegration of ex-combatants, development of national conflict prevention and mitigation capacity and providing support to building accountable democratic governing structures.

With an eye towards developing a holistic United Nations approach to conflict, the Brahimi report suggested designating UNDP-managed Resident Representatives/Resident Coordinators (RRs/RCs) as the ‘development wing’ of peacekeeping mission leadership. This recommendation was based on the 1999 precedent established in East Timor and Kosovo, where the RC served as the DSRSG, essentially elevating the profile of development concerns in conflict-affected countries. Overall, the Brahimi report underscored UNDP’s then under-used capacity for bridging gaps between immediate relief activities and longer term reconstruction.

2.6 ESTABLISHING THE CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY BUREAU

A January 2000 review of UNDP’s reintegration work in post-conflict countries looked at the functioning of the Emergency Response Division over the course of its first five years. There had been a proliferation of special funds, all of which had been mobilized by the former ERD head. This included the TRAC 1.1.3 funds, which remained largely unused, to the detriment of country-level programming and to populations caught in a cycle of conflict. The report recommended a reorganization of ERD to provide better technical support to country offices. More broadly, it called for UNDP to recognize that its

30 Of $105.1 million contributed to the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, $42 million was non-earmarked, contributed by Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Source: BCPR Annual Report 2010, p. 59.
work in conflict-affected countries had become a central area of activity. In late 2000 ERD was elevated to bureau level, creating the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, with a director at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.

Establishing a separate policy bureau was expected to enable UNDP to better leverage the organization’s comparative advantages and experiences in conflict-affected countries, enhance its delivery capacity, provide a platform for mainstreaming conflict sensitivity across UNDP business practice areas and build stronger partnerships across the United Nations system. The new Bureau’s responsibilities were then broadened to include:

- Ensuring that UNDP plays a pivotal role in transitions between relief and development;
- Promoting linkages between peace and security and development objectives;
- Supporting government efforts to manage crisis and post-conflict situations; and
- Helping to prevent conflict by building capacities of governments and civil societies to analyse potential risk factors that give rise to violent conflict and developing strategies to address the root causes of conflict.

A small proportion of UNDP’s extensive support for crisis prevention and recovery programming comes from two ‘seed funding’ sources managed by BCPR: core funding designated for countries in ‘special development situations’ (TRAC 1.1.3) and voluntary contributions to the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF). In 2011 support provided by BCPR to country offices included 7.2 percent of UNDP core programmable funds, plus direct funding from donors to the CPR TTF. (However, under the recent reorganization, BCPR units in the regional service centres were abolished, reducing BCPR’s ability to support country offices directly.)

UNDP has periodically reviewed the structure, policy and performance of BCPR, in light of growing expectations. The most recent strategic review, carried out in 2009-2010, recognized that the contribution of this Bureau was central to the UNDP mandate, even as it highlighted many areas for improvement to enhance support delivery. In particular the review urged initiation of a change process that would aim to provide:

- Improved CPR support strategies and impact through better mainstreaming, enhanced use of analytical capacity and priority setting, to be addressed through a reorientation of resources;
- Improved leadership capacity and coordination;
- Structural alignment to reflect current demands, especially across BCPR’s three main clusters;
- Enhanced talent management and staff capacities;
- Adjustments to financial structures that engender longer term development, efficient resource allocation and better use of partnerships; and
- Improved and systematized monitoring and evaluation.

As part of its response to the strategic review process, UNDP initiated a major reorganization of BCPR, transferring nearly all resources and functions from the Geneva liaison office to UNDP’s New York headquarters. A newly designed Directorate, headed by the Deputy Administrator, includes three divisions: (i) Advisory and Programme Support Division, with the Governance and Rule of Law Group and three technical support teams: Disaster, Conflict Prevention and Country Support Management; (ii) Strategic Resource Management Division; and (iii) Policy Planning Division. BCPR’s coordination with the wider humanitarian system includes an early recovery support unit that remained in Geneva.
2.7 THE STRATEGIC PLAN: ACCELERATING SUPPORT TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

The 2008-2011 Strategic Plan: Accelerating Global Progress on Human Development\textsuperscript{32} provides the context for UNDP’s present scope of services to conflict-affected countries. The main crisis prevention and recovery outcomes include:

- Enhancing capabilities in national conflict prevention and disaster risk management;
- Ensuring improved national governance functions post-crisis; and
- Restoring the foundations for local development.

The strategy pays particular attention to implementation issues. It notes that “UNDP needs to: (i) do more to help address risks before crises occur; and (ii) help build capacity to respond faster to crises and put in place early recovery actions even during humanitarian stages of crises; and (iii) have in place predictable internal funding and resources for rapid deployment after crises.”

The Strategic Plan states that UNDP will work across the United Nations system to assist in initiating immediate early recovery and transition activities and to facilitate incorporation of short-term and medium-term post-crisis recovery strategies into longer term frameworks. It will work to support the establishment of norms and guidelines; provide assessment and programming tools to support country-level recovery processes; and provide advocacy support to boost funding for recovery efforts. Further, the Strategic Plan states that more attention and support will be given to HC/RCs so they can better perform their roles in conflict prevention. The Strategic Plan envisages UNDP playing a significant role in the emerging United Nations peacebuilding architecture, supporting the Peacebuilding Commission at country level by assisting with development of nationally owned, integrated peacebuilding strategies, and through the implementation of project activities supported by the Peacebuilding Fund.

2.8 THE NEW DEAL: PARTNERSHIP FOR ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES

At the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (November-December 2011), a number of countries and international organizations (including the United Nations Development Group) endorsed an agreement on a new global direction for engagement with fragile states. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States sets out five goals — legitimate politics, justice, security, economic foundations and revenues and services — to give clarity to the priorities in fragile states. Participants in the International Dialogue\textsuperscript{33} agreed:

- “to use the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) as an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGs to guide our work in fragile and conflict-affected states. By September 2012, a set of indicators for each goal will have been developed by fragile states and international partners, which will allow us to track progress at the global and the country level.”
- “to focus on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility based on a country-led fragility assessment developed

\textsuperscript{32} UNDP Document DP/2007/43 Rev. 1. The period for the duration of the strategic plan was subsequently extended by two years to 2013.

\textsuperscript{33} The International Dialogue was created in Accra in 2008 as an international forum for political dialogue between countries affected by conflict and fragility, their international partners and civil society groups supporting transitions from conflict to stability. More than 40 countries and organizations participate in the International Dialogue. This includes the 19 conflict-affected and fragile countries that are members of the G7+ group, members of the OECD/DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility and civil society organizations.
by the G7+ with the support of international partners, a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the PSGs to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue.

- “to build mutual trust by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results. We will enhance transparency, risk management to use country systems, strengthen national capacities and timeliness of aid, improving the speed and predictability of funding to achieve better results.”

UNDP and its partners have made considerable investment in this important initiative, developed over four years. It is a critical part of the most recent thinking influencing UNDP’s strategy for supporting conflict-affected countries. Of the seven pilot countries for New Deal implementation, five are UNDP mission countries, and of the nine primary case studies for this evaluation, four are New Deal countries.

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Chapter 3

ASSESSMENT OF THE UNDP CONTRIBUTION IN CONFLICT SETTINGS

This chapter sets out a series of findings on the work of UNDP in conflict-affected countries, emphasizing examples from the country case studies. It assesses a number of key sectors and cross-cutting themes in which UNDP is engaged, but the scope of enquiry is limited to activities that have a direct bearing on ameliorating a situation in which violent conflict dominates the operational landscape. The question is not whether the activity has an inherent development advantage, but whether at a particular time and place the activity is relevant and effective in preventing conflict or mitigating its effects.

Key finding: UNDP’s comparative advantages are perceived to be its on-the-ground presence; close partnership with government; role as a bridge between humanitarian, peacebuilding and development efforts; and role in governance and institutional change in the management of conflict. There are risks to having a wide remit and long-term presence, including a tendency towards ad hoc and overly ambitious programming, which consequently has impeded UNDP performance.

UNDP’s perceived comparative advantages are depicted as a combination of the following:

- Institutionally and programmatically UNDP is able to bridge humanitarian, peacebuilding and long-term development efforts.
- Through a solid staff presence on the ground, UNDP is able to present a level of continuity and predictability that few international agencies can offer.
- Irrespective of the size of its programme, UNDP can act as a political broker outside the foreign policy interests of bilateral donors.

These perceived advantages must also be considered through the lens of the United Nations reform process – that is, how UNDP contributes to the ‘delivering as one’ system and whether its in-country position and broad scope of activity benefit the entire country team.

One of the inherent disadvantages of UNDP’s presence in a country before, during and after a crisis is that it builds a historical expectation that the organization will respond positively to the wide-ranging requests for support it receives. In Somalia, for example, UNDP has been subject to donor pressure to implement activities that go beyond its development mandate. This ‘provider of last resort’ role is perhaps inevitable where UNDP is one of the few agencies actually on the ground. The result can be ad hoc and overly ambitious support programmes, coupled with limited financial and human resources and sometimes slow delivery. These constraints have in some cases impeded UNDP performance.35

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35 The same observation was made in the recent CIDA Development Effectiveness Review of UNDP, 2008-2011 (February 2012) which is itself a meta-evaluation of UNDP’s own evaluation output. Of the 55 UNDP evaluation documents assessed, 11 were found to have highlighted the criticism over scope, ambition and resources.
The first of two lines of enquiry in the evaluation is how UNDP programming and policies support peacebuilding and how UNDP supports a country’s transition from immediate post-conflict to development. The discussion begins by looking at how UNDP analyses conflict. We then look at the ‘niche’ programme areas where UNDP’s comparative advantage lies: conflict prevention; justice and rule of law; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); gender; livelihoods; and elections. Capacity development is an overriding element of each, but here it is considered in a subtopic. This is followed by a discussion of how effectively UNDP operates in integrated missions, including how it manages multi-donor trust funds and how rapidly it scales up during transitions to peacebuilding.

3.1 ANALYSING THE CONTEXT FOR CONFLICT

Key finding: Despite recognition of the importance of conflict analysis and the development of its own conflict analysis tools, UNDP has no standard operating procedure for when and how to conduct conflict analysis. As a result, the conduct of conflict analysis in both substantive and procedural terms remains varied across UNDP. Likewise, a ‘theory of change’ is underused by UNDP.

International development actors, including UNDP, broadly recognize the importance of conflict analysis when engaging in conflict-affected settings. Its use is based on the reasoning that a comprehensive understanding of a given conflict context and the broader international responses will guide strategic engagement for development activities; enable programme flexibility based on knowledge of potential conflict drivers; and engender a general ‘do no harm’ approach to interventions. For its part, UNDP has developed its own Conflict-related Development Analysis tool to integrate conflict prevention principles into programme design and provide development practitioners with a mechanism for better understanding the linkages between development activities and conflict.

Despite recognition of the importance of conflict analysis and the development of tools like the Conflict-related Development Analysis, UNDP has not developed a standard operating procedure for when and how to conduct conflict analysis. As a result, its conduct in both substantive and procedural terms remains varied across UNDP. Conflict analysis at the country level covers the spectrum from internal, monthly assessments of the country situation and developments to highly collaborative and comprehensive one-off processes that involve the consent of a full range of actors in a given context.

Nevertheless, there are country-level experiences that underline the importance of both conducting and regularly updating conflict analyses. The UNDP experience in Nepal is illustrative: Based

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36 Conflict analysis mechanisms have been developed by many international development institutions: The World Bank has used a ‘Conflict Analysis Framework’ as has the United States Agency for International Development. The UK Department for International Development has a ‘Strategic Conflict Assessment’ mechanism and the European Commission uses ‘Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict’.

37 These general principles are the bedrock for OECD’s engagement in fragile states and are also reflected in United Nations Development Group/ECHA’s Interagency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations, 2004.

38 During 2012, an internal initiative was launched by BCPR staff who recognized the lack of both guidance and an effective mechanism for conflict analysis. The initiative aims to gather lessons at country level on conducting conflict analysis and ‘refreshing’ the Conflict-related Development Analysis mechanism. Source: Internal UNDP correspondence on CPRNet mailing list dated 1 February 2012; QUERY: How to do effective conflict analysis?

39 UNDP Nicaragua reports that it prepares a monthly conflict analysis that compiles all internal reporting into a comprehensive situational assessment (CPR Net Responses). On the other hand, in 2008–2009 UNDP Kyrgyzstan conducted a conflict analysis that, due to host country sensitivity about the term ‘conflict’, was renamed a peace and development analysis.
on its ongoing conflict analysis the UNDP country office was able to provide vital strategic oversight throughout the country’s civil war and subsequent peacebuilding process. When the conflict began to hamper the Nepali Government’s ability to provide core services, beginning in 2002 and continuing through 2006, the UNDP approach shifted from capacity development to service provision. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2006, UNDP was able to adjust its position both to support the consolidation of peace and to work within the frameworks developed by a new set of political actors through the United Nations Mission in Nepal, the peace operation mandated by the Security Council. UNDP adaptability in Nepal reflected the demands of this fluid, conflict-affected setting. Adjustments were informed by analysis supported by BCPR. They resulted, in 2007, in establishment of a UNDP Nepal-specific Peacebuilding and Recovery Unit.40

In Sudan, UNDP has undertaken geo-referenced state-by-state mapping and analysis of key security threats, including socioeconomic risks. A pilot Threat and Risk Mapping Analysis scheme was launched in Southern Kordofan State in 2006, carried out through stakeholder consultations at both state and local levels. The mapping effort was subsequently expanded into a conflict risk and mapping assessment covering eastern Sudan, the three Protocol Areas (Abeyei, Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan State), Darfur and South Sudan. This exercise has helped UNDP identify hot spots, prioritize interventions and improve coordination with the wider aid community.

A recent inter-agency consultation covering United Nations work in conflict-affected countries highlights some of the pitfalls in pursuing a silo ‘project’ approach without commensurate analysis.41 In particular, participants noted that “projects with a primarily economic focus can inadvertently exacerbate resource competition and perceptions of injustice, while also increasing tensions among groups”. One method for managing these dynamics can be to establish dialogue processes and mechanisms, involving communities, the government and economic actors, to identify and address existing and potential sources of tension.

In recent years there has been increasing discourse in the development community over how to incorporate a ‘theory of change’ both as a programme tool and as a means of measuring potential impacts of an intervention.42 Conflict analysis/assessment and theory of change are related but distinct concepts. The first identifies and delineates a problem and its causes; the second establishes a hypothesis for how an intervention might change the context in which the problem resides, and how to measure whether in fact it has. In programme design, theories of change guide the intervention design by suggesting what sorts of interventions in the conflict setting are likely to lead to the desired changes. Change indicators can then be developed to monitor programme implementation. At the evaluation stage, theories of change focus evaluation efforts on the intended changes and the expected processes by which an intervention may lead to those changes.

We cannot here delve into the complexities and debates around theories of change, but simply

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42 A theory of change is a set of beliefs about how change happens. It explains why and how people think certain actions will produce the changes they desire in a given context, at a particular moment in time. Source: C. Church and M. Rogers, Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs. Search for Common Ground, 2006; OECD/DAC, ‘Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility’, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD, 2012 For a useful introduction see, for example, Susan Nan, Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID, 2010.
note that the idea has entered the lexicon of
development thinking. UNDP has yet to use it
in any consistent manner, though there are prece-
dents. In the field of evaluation, the revised
guidelines of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) will also
include an exposition of the use of the approach.

3.2 EXPANDING POST-CRISIS CAPACITY

Key finding: UNDP often works in conflict
settings through project support units, which
are generally embedded in the public sector and
operating parallel to it. While this method can
enhance the pace and quality of service delivery,
它 also runs the risk of weakening institutions
that countries must rely on over the long term.

The Strategic Plan describes capacity develop-
ment as a nationally led change process rather
than a supply-driven approach directed by
outsiders. Yet there are inherent risks to taking a
nationally led programme approach in conflict-
affected countries, where government capacity is
often weak and governance systems can be opaque
and vulnerable to corruption. In conflict settings
UNDP and the other international agencies often
struggle to find an effective balance between
directly providing services and expanding state
capacities to deliver them. The calculation is espe-
cially difficult in places like Democratic Republic
of the Congo, where a weak state government has
yet to establish a nationwide presence and has
been unable to address many of the underlying
causes of the continuing conflict.

As demonstrated in Haiti, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and
other countries, UNDP typically works with
government to establish project support units,
operating in parallel to the national public sector.
These are often managed by international staff
and consultants who then comb through the civil
service to find highly capable people to staff the
units. The wage and benefit incentives used to
attract talented civil service staff are, in fact, salary
stipends, and they often create major distor-
tions in the public service labour market. While
providing more rapid and initially more effective
results, direct UNDP implementation through
project support units runs the risk of weakening
the institutions that the countries must rely on
over the long term. In an August 2011 report on
civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict, the
Secretary-General drew attention to this problem
and made clear the need to “avoid any negative
impact on national capacity-development, for
example the brain drain of local capacity to inter-
national and bilateral organizations.”

UNDP work in Burundi underscores some of
the key challenges facing the sustainability of its
interventions. Due to both low national capacity
and international donor priorities, around 90
percent of the programming conducted during
the period of BINUB’s deployment was delivered

43 A useful overview of current thinking and practice can be found in Isobel Vogel, Review of the Use of ‘Theory of Change’ in International Development, DFID, April 2012.
44 In Latin America, for example, UNDP collaborated with the Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation (Hivos) to produce Theory of Change: A Thinking and Action Approach to Navigate the Complexity of Social Change Processes, UNDP/ Hivos, May 2011.
46 An extreme case is Afghanistan. With aid estimated at $15.4 billion in 2010/11 and international military spend exceeding
$100 billion, the World Bank has raised alarms over the severe economic distortion this creates. See World Bank Afghan-
by UNDP staff through the direct implementation modality, staff estimated. This approach has limited improvement in capacity among government bodies; indeed, a national capacity-building strategy was put in place in 2012. While UNDP counterparts in the Burundi Government expressed their gratitude for UNDP’s interventions, they were concerned that their impact would diminish after 2011, with the closure of the integrated mission. The evaluation takes note of the fact that time is required to build national and subnational capacity and that success depends on a robust education system. In Cambodia, for example, until very recently UNDP had 200 national staff supporting local governance – two decades after the conflict ended.

The sustainability of UNDP support to conflict-affected countries depends not only on how national capacities are developed but also on the organization’s ability to advocate for and maintain international support for longer term peacebuilding activities once the initial crisis has passed. Building strong and inclusive local government is regarded as a benchmark of sustainability in the peacebuilding process in post-conflict environments. Yet international support has not always been sufficient or timely. UNDP spending figures themselves confirm this lack of attention. In 2008/2009, 70 percent of expenditures in non-fragile countries went to local governance. In contrast, in fragile countries local governance accounted for only 14 percent of expenditures, of which the largest portion, 29 percent, was spent on law and justice reforms.48

Re-establishing or strengthening local governance as part of a peacebuilding or state-building endeavour requires a thorough analysis of the root causes of a conflict and its dynamics and power struggles as well as underlying grievances and challenges. It also requires a thorough assessment of the capacities of local government units and the development, with central government authorities, of a strategic framework to ensure that reforms do not themselves exacerbate tensions. In Liberia, UNDP support to decentralization efforts focused mainly on administrative decentralization, with little or no attention to political and fiscal decentralization. The process was further hampered by the huge human and institutional capacity gaps prevailing at all subnational levels. The result has been a very slow process towards strengthening local governance.49

UNDP points out that in post-conflict situations, such as in Sierra Leone and Somalia,50 a fundamental problem is the weak absorptive capacity of government. This extends from infrastructure development to public financial management and administration. An important UNDP initiative has been provision of integrated financial management systems and the Aid Information Management System (AIMS), along with training in their use. These systems are designed to assist developing countries in managing aid flows and to reflect them in national budgets. Establishing such systems in post-conflict situations is an important milestone in governance and public accountability. When sustained, they provide constructive examples of UNDP’s transfer of capacity and ownership to national authorities. A recent review of the work in Burundi, Central African Republic and Sierra Leone points to such ‘good practice’.51 Key lessons emerging are:

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51 UNDP, Comparative Experience: Aid Informational Management Systems in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations, October 2010.
AIMS works best when project portfolio categories are linked to national budget categories and priority sectors of the national development plan.

Governments themselves must be responsible for data validation; it cannot be driven by donors.

Public access to data is essential to accountability.

AIMS provides a ‘recovery gap’ analysis that complements post-conflict needs assessment.

Relatively greater support can be given to restoring state functions than to ensuring that they function democratically. In Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNDP’s Assistance aux Institutions de Transition (AIT) programme provided capacity building to the National Assembly, the Senate and five civic commissions. The key donor for this, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), also committed to providing core funding to these institutions, should they perform well. The AIT programme performed relatively well, and most transition institutions were able to develop their legal framework and management tools. However, activities financed by the AIT programme were limited to certain aspects of their mandates. For example, the legislature received significant capacity building assistance for drafting laws but little support for the checks and balances role that it was meant to play during the transition. So although the AIT programme helped restore state functioning, much more was needed to strengthen the democratic functioning of these institutions.  

Key finding: ‘Before, during and after’ is the common UNDP refrain in regard to its work in conflict-affected settings. On account of its global deployment and broad technical and administrative mandates, UNDP is engaged in virtually all facets of the work of United Nations country teams in conflict settings. Concerns have been raised that the UNDP role may be overly broad, sometimes encroaching on the relief and recovery work of specialized agencies.

UNDP works in all developing countries affected by conflict. It has many roles, which are often defined by demands specific to the country and context. UNDP’s programmatic and policy support aims to build national capacities to prevent conflict before it breaks out, mitigate its effects and help with recovery in its aftermath. UNDP support to countries is invariably (but not always) framed within the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which outlines the country team’s collective development objectives. Country programme documents, developed on a five-year cycle, specify the activities (and the desired outputs) that UNDP plans to initiate across its main practice areas: governance, poverty reduction, environment and sustainable development, and crisis prevention and recovery, plus several cross-cutting issues: gender, capacity development and South-South cooperation.

The nature of UNDP assistance is further shaped by a multitude of operational partners, from political, peace and humanitarian operations that function under frameworks mandated by the Security Council, to other international development actors and host governments themselves. Beyond its programmatic role, UNDP has financial, administrative and coordination functions within the United Nations system. It provides a bridge between humanitarian relief activities, peacekeeping and longer term recovery and development in conflict-affected countries.

The broad and expanding array of UNDP activities in conflict settings is not universally embraced. Other agencies seeking funding and engagement in

conflict settings have expressed concern that UNDP sometimes ‘overreaches’ by engaging in technical support beyond its expertise and by favouring its own programmes when administering multi-donor trust funds. In a competitive funding environment there is no easy response to this concern, other than for UNDP to continue to provide evidence of its comparative strength in specific areas. The IMPP provides a useful framework for the division of labour at the outset of an integrated mission, but with some notable exceptions (Liberia, Timor-Leste) there has been less coherence and direction at the drawdown stages.

3.3.1 Preventing Conflict

Key finding: Development activities alone cannot stop or prevent conflict, but the work of UNDP and other agencies can support and encourage national conflict prevention capacities. Evidence suggests that UNDP has been able to contribute to conflict prevention especially by expanding national capacities that help mitigate and manage the underlying structural causes of violence.

UNDP support to conflict prevention encompasses a range of activities, including the development of forums for non-violent settlement of disputes, employment generation activities and support for developing the rule of law. Given that national actors are the key protagonists in conflict prevention, UNDP support has increasingly been geared towards building ‘infrastructures for peace’ – a context-specific set of interdependent state structures, cultural norms and resources that cumulatively contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Work in conflict prevention has entailed a close operational partnership with DPA in recognition that development cannot be separated from politics and security.

Conflict prevention entails three related activities: (i) helping to reform governance and the institutions required for peaceful management of conflict and prevention of emerging violent conflict; (ii) identifying non-violent means of resolving tension; and (iii) stopping the spread of ongoing conflict. These can be further categorized as operational prevention (direct intervention such as deployment of peacekeepers, and DDR) and structural prevention (addressing root causes in governance, human rights, etc.). The Strategic Plan emphasizes UNDP support to national partners’ conflict prevention efforts and the development of long-term national capabilities and institutions.

A deduced ‘theory of change’ for UNDP prevention support is that the root causes of violent conflict can be addressed before conflict erupts by building institutional capacities and a new environment of cooperation, consultation, collaboration and vigorous debate. UNDP’s Conflict-related Development Analysis guidelines identify political, security, economic, social and environmental factors that lead to conflict. But UNDP has not yet stated clearly, from the standpoint of corporate policy and strategy, what its theory of change is in terms of preventing violent conflict.

UNDP often partners with other United Nations agencies, departments and programmes to provide integrated ‘Delivering as One’ assistance for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in sensitive, conflict-prone situations. This response comprises several elements covering activities that range from creation of integrated prevention strategies at headquarters level to the development of entry points in conflict-prone countries and implementation of long-term programmes.

UNDP is co-chair, along with DPA, of the Inter-agency Framework for Coordination on Preventive Action (the Framework Team). It comprises

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54 Reflecting the importance of this partnership, UNDP and DPA leadership issued a practice note to all United Nations Resident Coordinators, country directors and political mission leaders on enhanced cooperation on conflict prevention activities.
22 agencies, departments and programmes that provide integrated support to RCs and country teams on conflict prevention strategies. The Framework Team has a non-operational role, providing programming design and strategic advice to RCs at country level.

In operational terms, the Joint UNDP/DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention (Joint Programme) supports the Framework Team’s work through deployment of Peace and Development Advisors. Deployed jointly by UNDP and DPA, these individuals work with national stakeholders to build trust and emphasize the need for local conflict management capacity. They can play a preparatory role before long-term conflict prevention programming begins. Peace and Development Advisors provide a point of entry to local stakeholders in the absence of a Security Council mandate. At the end of 2011, 30 such advisors or similar conflict prevention specialists were deployed internationally.56

UNDP’s work in conflict prevention is truly global. As of mid-2012 UNDP maintained active conflict management activities in 45 countries. Several of the countries considered for this study have benefited from the organization’s contribution to conflict prevention, particularly through the development of national capacities for mediation.

In Sierra Leone, following a brutal civil war from 1991 to 2002, the Lomé Peace Agreement provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. UNDP worked closely with the International Centre for Transitional Justice in developing an approach to community-based reconciliation. Activities included organizing preliminary investigations into human rights violations during the civil war and organizing research on traditional conflict resolution and reconciliation processes among the various ethnic groups, to complement the work of the Commission. UNDP also facilitated and organized public education on the work of the Commission. A truth commission can lay the foundations for reconciliation, but the process sometimes pre-dates and normally outlasts a truth commission.

Along the border of Sudan and South Sudan, UNDP supported training for partner agencies involved in the Sustained Peace for Development programme, funded from 2010-2012 through the Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund. A midterm evaluation reported that, “The conflict sensitivity training conducted by UNDP for partner agencies was extremely useful, with agencies reporting that it influenced their programming in the Joint Programme and other interventions. It is a positive example of inter-agency collaboration that can have wide-ranging impact on the quality of crisis/post-conflict programming in Sudan.” This positive assessment is tempered by the fact that the initiative was part of a wider package of activities involving eight United Nations agencies that suffered from contextual delays, such as the necessity to abandon an office, and excessive emphasis on assessments at the expense of actual ‘peace dividend’ inputs.57

Other examples drawn from the case studies demonstrate that a timely intervention by UNDP helped to mitigate conflict. In Timor-Leste UNDP assistance in training community mediators helped reduce conflict when the country had a dramatic influx of returnees in 2009, following several years of conflict. When Guinea transitioned from civilian to military rule in early 2010, UNDP helped design a multi-stakeholder platform that forged consensus on the modalities.

56 In Chad, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Peru and Ukraine.

57 Steve Munroe, Mid-Term Evaluation, Sustained Peace for Development: Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Sudan through targeted interventions in selected communities along the 1-1-1956 border, MDG Achievement Fund Secretariat, January 2012.
This same platform then enabled national authorities to contain the spread of violence that erupted during the electoral process in late 2010. Meanwhile, conflict among disenfranchised youths in Guinea-Bissau was defused in part by a UNDP-supported platform for dialogue among the country’s youth organizations.58

### 3.3.2 Crisis Governance and Rule of Law

Key finding: UNDP has been effective in providing timely technical and financial assistance to national rule-of-law projects. This includes supporting reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential legal infrastructure and expanded access to legal aid. Especially noteworthy are UNDP efforts to address the challenge of bridging traditional dispute resolution and formal justice systems and furthering transitional justice in post-conflict contexts.

UNDP’s work in fragile and conflict-affected countries is rooted in the belief that it is well positioned to help national partners in four key areas: (i) women’s security and access to justice, (ii) capacity development of rule-of-law institutions (courts); (iii) facilitation of transitional justice; and (iv) promotion of confidence building and reconciliation.

Under the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011, rule of law and access to justice fall within the focus areas of both Democratic Governance and Crisis Prevention and Recovery. In addition to the rule-of-law programme, in July 2012 UNDP created a special unit on crisis governance, which supports the political and administrative aspects of governance in countries affected by crisis. The unit’s global framework comprises five programmatic areas:

- Building responsive and accountable institutions;
- Promoting inclusive political processes;
- Fostering resilient state-society relations to strengthen (or renew) the social contract between state and society;
- Promoting partnerships across the entire spectrum of national and international institutions; and
- Strengthening the rule of law within an early recovery framework and during transitions.

The Secretary-General has urged the United Nations and its agencies to “focus on finding better ways to support Member States and their populations in the domestic implementation of international norms and standards, working to achieve compliance with international obligations and, most critically, strengthening the institutions, policies, processes and conditions that ensure effective enforcement and enjoyment of a just national and international order.”59 Such support is especially critical for countries stabilizing after conflict, and it constitutes a key focus area for UNDP.

A common feature of conflict-affected countries is the lack of public confidence in the composition and functioning of the national justice system. Outreach beyond main towns is often non-existent, and the prosecution element of the criminal justice system is weak, stemming from the lack of qualified prosecutors. The risk is that a dysfunctional justice system perpetuates a culture of settling disputes through mob violence. Some of the factors that led to violent upheaval in almost all of the countries reviewed for this evaluation were human rights violations, unresolved land disputes, rampant corruption and impunity for crimes perpetrated.

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58 Adapted from information provided by UNDP/BCPR and Chetan Kumar, op. cit.

UNDP has supported staffing while national institutions are (re)built, in some instances for prolonged periods of time, such as in Afghanistan. In many countries UNDP has made important contributions to reducing capacity constraints nationally and subnationally and in training a fledgling judiciary. The Justice System Programme in Timor-Leste and the Support to the Judiciary of South Sudan programme have been highly regarded. In Liberia UNDP supports the Ministry of Justice to improve prosecution services through the Peacebuilding Fund. For both the Liberia and Timor-Leste projects the measure of success has been an increase in the number of cases reviewed by prosecutors and a decrease in the number of cases dropped or dismissed due to lack of follow-through by victims or witnesses. UNDP also monitors whether public perception of prosecutors and the Ministry of Justice improves, but in most countries the results have been inconclusive.

UNDP’s flagship Justice System programme in Timor-Leste has made significant inroads into addressing capacity constraints at national and subnational levels and in training a judiciary almost from scratch. In 2010 the programme helped launch a new integrated case management system to be used by the Office of the Prosecutor General, Corrections Service, Ministry of Justice, Public Defender’s Office and National Police. By early 2011, the capital, Dili, and three district capitals were linked electronically, allowing prosecutors and judicial clerks to have instant access to the same case information. The scheme includes on-the-job training, provision of information and communication technology specialists, and management advice.

For many development organizations, including UNDP, there remain gaps between the theoretical understanding of legal systems and the complexity of designing and implementing projects in conflict settings. Greater understanding of the political economy of a given country in conflict is needed to approach the related elements of legal reform in a coherent fashion. For instance, judicial training that helps judges to make better judgments is not likely to have much impact if there is no judicial independence, if corruption still dominates the legal system or if the police system is destroyed or biased. Similarly, benefits gained from raising the capacity of the lower courts can be entirely undermined if the final court of appeal is incompetent or corrupt.

**Formal and informal justice systems**

There are often significant gaps between the formal justice system and actual justice practices in communities. UNDP has given considerable effort to addressing the challenge of establishing boundaries between formal justice and traditional dispute resolution systems, especially when formal systems will have little outreach in the districts for quite some time. The problem is that judicial reform may be perceived as part of an elite agenda, whereas non-state customary systems may be more in tune with local values. Such systems are also seen as cheaper, quicker and more accessible, and they can serve as bridges to more formal systems. Yet traditional justice systems can also be highly discriminatory, inaccessible to women and incompatible with international standards. This tension between formal and customary legal structures is a critical issue in virtually all of the conflict-affected countries where UNDP operates.

In Puntland (Somalia), UNDP’s support for establishing a formal judicial system was controversial and may have served to fuel conflict in some instances. As a result of the emergent formal legal system, customary structures, especially ‘elders’ groups’, were threatened by the reduction in their authority and influence. This led to an alarming increase in assassinations of judicial officials in 2009 and 2010. This has not deterred the effort, but it has sparked a debate over how to make rule-of-law programming more sensitive to conflict.

In contrast, women in the autonomous Somali-land region of Somalia have increasingly turned to the UNDP-supported emergent formal structures since they provide a forum for women’s voices to be heard, in contrast to traditional and customary mechanisms that exclude women. A thorough
analysis of existing justice mechanisms is needed to understand how different segments of society can access justice or are denied justice, and to evaluate whether traditional systems can be effectively merged with a new rule-of-law paradigm.

The UNDP Rule of Law Programme has made knowledge and programming advances in three key substantive areas: strategic justice and security reform; legal awareness and assistance as legal empowerment; and women’s empowerment and legal pluralism. An emphasis on access to justice targets the heightened vulnerability of minorities, women, children, prisoners, detainees, displaced persons and refugees, which is evident in all conflict and post-conflict situations. Access to justice has gained prominence largely because of the growing disappointment with mainstream rule of law and judicial and legal assistance programmes characterized by a top-down, state-centric approach that places a premium on formal institutions, particularly the judiciary.

Transitional justice

Transitional justice refers to a range of approaches that societies undertake to redress the legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuse associated with a previous period of violence. UNDP often plays an important role in furthering transitional justice in post-conflict contexts. Mechanisms include prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, reconciliation practices and institutional reform. In Sierra Leone UNDP supported the Special Court set up to try those who bore the greatest responsibility for atrocities during the civil war. But the perception of many was that this was a political tool of the President that siphoned off scarce resources from the domestic judicial and human rights sector.

Many of the lessons emerging from the review of UNDP work promoting justice and the rule of law are specific to a context, but there are some common conclusions:

- National leadership and ownership of a transitional justice mechanism is essential. Because of weak post-war human capacities in most countries, the recruitment of staff from the diaspora is to be encouraged.
- Transitional justice mechanisms are expensive, and sufficient resources should always be assured before the process is undertaken, or expectations will not be manageable. This includes the importance of matching the process with improvements in people’s material conditions.
- The more successful efforts are those that allow communities to see commensurate improvements in rule of law and governance. Greater efforts are therefore needed to ensure that the wider UNDP portfolio is integrated with community-based reconciliation and that it is not a stand-alone activity.

3.3.3 REFORMING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Key finding: UNDP is widely perceived as an experienced and impartial provider of electoral support, with notable examples of effective assistance in several conflict-affected countries. UNDP has moved away from supporting elections as events and towards aiding the electoral cycle as a whole. Technical inputs remain overemphasized, and there have been cases where the political concerns of an operation, particularly those pertaining to keeping a peace agreement ‘on track’, have clashed with the more immediate concerns of UNDP over political plurality in elections.

In an integrated mission, UNDP works with the Electoral Assistance Division of the DPA and,

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in some cases, with DPKO. In practical terms, UNDP assistance involves specific technical support, often with multi-donor financing through UNDP country offices. In certain instances (Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories), UNDP has been involved in supporting electoral system reform; in other cases (South Sudan) it has helped to build the electoral apparatus almost from scratch.

There have been some notable electoral successes. The mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) committed it to “continue to assist the Liberian Government with the 2011 general presidential and legislative elections by providing logistical support, particularly to facilitate access to remote areas, coordinating international electoral assistance and supporting Liberian institutions and political parties in creating an atmosphere conducive to the conduct of peaceful elections.” 63 UNDP worked closely with UNMIL, managing the Liberia Emergency Governance Fund, which supported UNMIL’s election objectives in 2005 and again in 2011. Results were generally very positive. By-elections for Senate seats were smooth and successful, voter registration was carried out effectively in all 15 counties and the National Election Commission demonstrated its ability to rapidly disaggregate, analyse and graphically present data collected during the registration process. The only negative comment voiced by stakeholders concerned the considerable delays in processing payments of election workers. 64

Burundi and South Sudan also provide examples of effective delivery of technical support for elections. The United Nations Integrated Service Centre in Burundi, administered by UNDP, allowed for implementation of a significant increase in operational activities surrounding the elections during 2010, funded by over $28 million of UNDP programme expenditure. Besides logistical and material support, UNDP provided start-up and technical assistance to the Independent National Electoral Commission, which ensured the smooth running of the five successive rounds of elections in that year. 65 In South Sudan UNDP gave essential support for the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum. This was provided particularly through the management of the Basket Fund established to develop the capacity of the Referendum and Elections commissions, and through work in voter education, domestic observation, media training and procurement of essential materials.

**Elections as conflict triggers**

Support for electoral processes can facilitate inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, but UNDP recognizes that elections can also be extremely divisive and lead to violence. Côte d’Ivoire provides important lessons in how elections are often polarizing events that can underscore unresolved grievances and lead to more rather than less conflict. UNDP had only a supporting role in the 2010 presidential election; it managed the Basket Fund for Elections and supported the Independent Electoral Commission and civil society organizations. The international pressure for elections had the unforeseen effect of aggravating the lack of political reconciliation and disarmament during the post-conflict period. The ensuing violence around the election also destroyed much of the electoral reform accomplished prior to November 2010. 66

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64 The Liberia country office confirmed that UNDP never paid electoral workers directly; it only made transfers to the Independent Electoral Commission, which in turn made payments to the workers. The delays encountered therefore may not have been directly attributed to UNDP.
65 2010 Results Oriented Annual report (ROAR), Burundi. The evaluation acknowledges that the ROAR is a self-evaluation, but this success is echoed by a number of other interviewees.
66 Interviews with UN partners in Côte d’Ivoire, October 2011.
In hindsight it can be seen that too much emphasis was placed on elections as a primary path to peacebuilding, at the expense of attention to wider conflict triggers such as disenfranchised youth, impunity from prosecution and, most of all, a lack of reconciliation.67 Likewise, in Afghanistan the artificial deadlines set by the Security Council and the international community did not allow for capacity building or essential peacebuilding before the elections. The result was instability.68

UNDP has sometimes had difficulties in penetrating the deeply embedded ethnic or sect allegiances that dominate election procedures, such as in Lebanon. Indeed, technical institutional support can sometimes obscure the fact that electoral support further reinforces patronage systems. On the other hand, elections can be an opportunity to give a voice to previously marginalized people. In Afghanistan and Liberia, for example, there were notable gains in involving women in the political process around post-conflict elections.

**Elections and integrated missions**

Electoral support as a coordinated effort within an integrated mission can be very successful, but it is not without pitfalls. The cautious political imperatives of a Security Council-mandated operation are not always compatible with the ‘social contract’ obligations of UNDP to broaden participation in elections despite potential objections from an incumbent government. In some cases the political concerns of an operation, particularly those pertaining to keeping a peace agreement ‘on track’, have clashed with UNDP’s more immediate concerns over political plurality in elections.

In Sudan, for example, tensions between the United Nations integrated mission in Sudan and the United Nations country team came to a head when security concerns were perceived as systematically prevailing over democratic election concerns. The mission was apparently reluctant to raise any sensitive issues with Khartoum for fear of destabilizing the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As a result, UNDP was left negotiating the involvement of civil society and non-governmental organizations in the elections with little political backup from the mission.69

### 3.3.4 EMPOWERING WOMEN IN CONFLICT SETTINGS

**Key finding:** UNDP has made progress in supporting opportunities for women to participate more fully in the emerging political and legal landscape of post-conflict countries. Notable successes include the expansion of female access to justice, especially for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.

There is evidence that the systematic abuse of women’s rights both contributes to state fragility and is an outcome of it, and that gender-based and sexual violence increases dramatically in post-conflict societies.70 There is also evidence that women’s contributions to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding are under-valued, as recognized in Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). It also stresses the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security.

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67 The report of the independent, international commission of inquiry on Côte d’Ivoire, A/HRC/17/48, confirms that elections were only a catalyst for underlying tensions around ethnic divide, land issues and human rights violations.


69 Veygard Bye et al., *Democracy Support through the United Nations: Sudan Case Study*, evaluation submitted to NORAD, October 2010. UNDP has also expressed its frustration at donors for simply wanting elections to be ‘ticked off’ as a condition of the comprehensive peace agreement, but without rocking the boat with either of the dominant incumbent parties in Sudan or South Sudan.

UNDP efforts with respect to gender and women’s empowerment are cross-cutting in nature. They include strengthening the security of women through law, security and justice reform; supporting women’s increased participation in political participation; and providing women with equal livelihood opportunities.

UNDP has developed an eight-point agenda of practical, positive actions on behalf of girls and women in crisis:

- **Strengthen women’s security in crisis:** Stop violence against women.
- **Advance gender justice:** Provide justice and security for women.
- **Expand women’s citizenship, participation and leadership:** Advance women as decision-makers.
- **Build peace with and for women:** Involve women in all peace processes.
- **Promote gender equality in disaster risk reduction:** Value women’s knowledge and expertise.
- **Ensure gender-responsive recovery:** Support men and women to build back better.
- **Transform government to deliver for women:** Include women’s issues in the national agenda.
- **Develop capacities for social change:** Work together to transform society.

In settings that are fragile and affected by conflict the focus has been on pushing for greater political representation and participation in the political reform process. A cornerstone of this approach has been including ethnic, religious and tribal minorities in democratic processes and protecting their ability to influence the allocation of resources and other decisions. This includes promotion of gender quota systems in political parties.

UNDP support to quota systems in South Sudan is notable, although progress in women’s participation has moved slowly there. The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (drawn up in 2005) stipulated a 25 percent quota for women’s participation at all levels of government. UNDP’s country programme action plan, and more particularly the Strategic Partnership supported by Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, sought to ensure that a gender equality perspective was integrated into the framework of the country programme, and in fact the UNDP country office has two gender advisors. In a country with particularly acute capacity constraints, it is unsurprising that strategies to create gender-responsive institutions and human resource development remain at a nascent level, along with those aimed at bringing a gender perspective to planning and budgeting processes in government (and, indeed, in many civil society institutions).

Gender-based violence almost always increases during civil war. Yet despite conflict’s disproportionate impact on women, they are often not included in decision-making and planning processes in conflict-affected countries.

UNDP is currently supporting programming on gender-based violence in 22 countries, in both development and crisis contexts. The evaluation found that although UNDP has made concerted efforts to ‘mainstream’ gender issues within its programmes, the issue of macro-analysis and influence on government policy received relatively less attention. The macro-economic framework set in the post-conflict period is likely to endure for many years. It will determine how the economy grows, which sectors are prioritized for investments and what kinds of jobs and employment opportunities are created and for whom. Yet the placement and promotion of women’s voices in this process remains below par.

In Sierra Leone and Somalia, UNDP helped rebuild bodies such as the attorney general’s office, family protection units at police stations and special courts to address specific needs around sexual and gender-based violence. In Somalia, a referral system was established in Hargeisa,
Somaliland, through which clan elders refer cases of sexual and gender-based violence to formal courts. This resulted in a 44 percent increase in sexual violence cases reaching the formal courts in 2011 compared to the previous year. Likewise, in Sierra Leone, the courts are reducing the backlog of cases involving sexual and gender-based violence while also fostering institutional responses, such as assigning police focal points to attend court sessions. In Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNDP provided logistical, administrative and technical support to 15 mobile courts, in partnership with other organizations. They heard 330 cases (about 70 percent related to sexual violence) in 2011, and 193 perpetrators were sentenced for crimes related to sexual violence. This included the country’s first-ever convictions of military officers for crimes against humanity on the basis of sexual violence.

Through UNDP support, Iraq now has five fully operational family protection units, two in Iraq and three in the autonomous Kurdistan region. To increase police investigative capacity UNDP trained 38 police officers from the Kurdistan region and the central government on interviewing techniques, forensics and chain of evidence before their deployment to the family protection units. In 2011, 2,095 cases were reported to these units. A more lasting result is that the Iraqi Government has allocated land for 14 additional family protection units in different governorates. In addition, UNDP has had a major influence on the draft domestic violence law in the Kurdistan region and a draft domestic violence law in Iraq.71

Many conflict-affected countries have little national capacity to collect and report on disaggregated data, including gender variables. As part of its Early Recovery Strategy, outlined in 2009,72 UNDP indicated its intention to collect more gender-disaggregated data for priority countries and to develop more gender-sensitive assessment tools. The strategy also highlights UNDP intentions to identify and use more consultants with gender expertise as immediate crisis response advisers.

Gender awareness in Liberia is a notable success story. The UNDP country office chose gender equality as one of its overarching themes and mainstreamed it through all programme components. The effort is especially focused on creating awareness and building capacity for policy formulation and implementation.73 Women were also empowered through the elections process. Through the National Elections Commission rural women received civic and voter education, and women’s groups were trained to expand outreach to different parts of the country. Among the 33 groups that received UNDP micro-grants to carry out voter education in 15 counties, 30 percent were women’s organizations. Messages urging women to participate in voter education and elections were aired by 41 radio stations. Through UNDP facilitation, positive strides were also made in engaging political parties to mainstream gender in their manifestos.

Gender mainstreaming has also been emphasized in Timor-Leste. This was demonstrated by a concerted effort to include women in the Community Dialogue and a preparatory phase for rule-of-law training in which 40 percent of the trainees were women. A law against domestic violence has also been enacted. UNDP’s justice programme in Timor-Leste included some important legislative achievements, including a draft law on legal aid. However, UNDP did not make optimal use of opportunities for engaging in the gender thematic workgroup despite a large programme presence. Other opportunities were missed in gender justice, discussions on

customary law, legislation pertaining to land and gender mainstreaming.

Since 2009 UNDP has supported 10 senior gender advisers through its global programme on Advancing Women, Peace and Security in Burundi, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and, most recently, Haiti. However, UNDP has a mixed record of accomplishment in terms of the gender balance of its work force in some conflict-affected countries. In Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010 only 23 percent of the staff was women. In post-crisis Côte d’Ivoire, in 2011, UNDP employed only two women, neither in key posts. This poor gender ratio is replicated in the integrated mission in Côte D’Ivoire. The reasons given relate to difficulties in finding experienced French-speaking women willing to work in unstable environments. Perhaps reflective of this, neither of these countries gave gender issues significant priority until recently. The inadvertent result is staffing patterns within UNDP offices that mirror entrenched local customs regarding the role of women in the workforce.

The eight-point agenda for gender equality is an important UNDP effort and a potential blueprint for the wider United Nations system. It has yet to be harnessed as the working gender strategy within integrated missions and used as an effective advocacy and action tool. It has also helped shape a seven-point action plan (2010), and UNDP has been appointed global co-lead for inclusive governance, economic recovery and access to justice, especially for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, based on its existing areas of programming strength.

### 3.3.5 DISARMING, DEMOBILIZING, REINTEGRATING

**Key finding:** UNDP has had varied success in its DDR efforts, reflecting diverse context-specific factors in conflict settings. In a number of cases, UNDP has succeeded in fostering innovative approaches. There has been a tendency to concentrate on immediate outputs rather than longer term impacts.

UNDP provides technical assistance to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants in 20 countries. It promotes a holistic approach, which involves the wider community in addition to ex-combatants. DDR is always an inter-agency effort requiring coordination, and UNDP has made increasing efforts to coordinate with peacekeeping troops. The real UNDP comparative advantage in DDR is in reintegration, but it is vulnerable to unpredictable funding, particularly for longer term reintegration programmes. Resources have tended to focus on the physical return process and integration ‘packages’ (varying levels of financial support for basic provisions, including food and water, accommodation, health care and livelihood support); far less has been provided for community integration strategies and the associated reconciliation and peacebuilding it entails.

Throughout 2011, viable job opportunities were reportedly created for 26,147 male and at least 10,029 female ex-combatants and associated members globally through UNDP/BCPR work in nine countries. This totals 36,176 ex-combatants and associated members, representing 16 percent of the 224,276 male and 72,015 female ex-combatants and associated members in these nine countries. Preparatory support for

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76 The evaluation notes, however, that other agencies such as UNICEF demonstrated the flexibility to rapidly change staff according to circumstances, something not apparent in UNDP.
job creation was provided in an additional six countries. This marks a significant level of rapid livelihood support to ex-combatants and associated members in the aftermath of armed conflict in these countries.

UNDP effectively supported DDR in Burundi, where 3,500 former National Forces of Liberation members were integrated into the national defence forces and national police. In 2009, with help from the Peacebuilding Fund, a further 10,186 of the National Forces of Liberation ‘associated adults’, including 1,052 women, were given return kits, transported to their communities of origin and provided with two instalments of return assistance. Likewise in Liberia, UNDP worked closely with the National Commission and UNMIL and was instrumental in the design, coordination and implementation of the entire DDR programme, providing technical expertise and acting as manager of the DDR Trust Fund.77

UNDP has fostered innovative approaches to DDR ‘deadlock’ in highly armed societies, especially where a close bond remains between former commanders and their soldiers. In Afghanistan from mid-2004 UNDP supported a commander incentive programme that provided senior commanders with a promise of government appointment, redundancy payment and other monetary incentives, thereby linking disarmament with political reintegration. UNDP worked closely on this with the United Nations assistance mission in Afghanistan, and the scheme was evaluated as highly successful at that specific moment in Afghanistan.78 ‘Second generation’ DDR practices such as this, targeting specific groups within a wider DDR spectrum, have also been tested in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia with varied success.79

There has been a tendency to concentrate on outputs – numbers demobilized and presented with reintegration packages – rather than longer term impacts. In part this is due to the collaborative nature of the enterprise, in which DDR is a central component of a Security Council-mandated mission and often a requirement of a post-conflict settlement. The problem is that once the highly complex technical (and inter-agency) aspects of the exercise are complete, partner agencies close their projects, donor funding drops and follow-up work is consigned to a relatively small UNDP budget. In some countries positive gains are then offset by the resumption of local conflicts, leading to secondary displacement. This was the case for DDR programming during the period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, from early 2005 until South Sudan seceded in July 2011. The cumulative effect can be a return to arms and a reinforcement of warlord dynamics after the attention of the international community has moved elsewhere.

The 2005 comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan set out provisions for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 90,000 former combatants in the South. The integrated DDR unit (involving UNMISS, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA) was established under UNMISS to assist national institutions in the DDR process. UNDP took the lead in support of the reintegration component. The DDR initiative emphasized an individual (as opposed to community-based) approach to DDR, using a host of reinsertion and reintegration incentives. The process did not begin until 2009, four years after the signing of the peace agreement, and even then it initially focussed on only 34,000 candidates, largely comprising ‘special needs groups’. There was, however, little formal coordination between support to DDR and other

important areas such as security sector reform, small arms and light weapons control, and rule-of-law programming.

There were tensions between United Nations agencies in southern Sudan over the five-year period, particularly between UNDP and DPKO. Despite some progress towards greater cohesion since 2008, UNDP and UNMISS maintained separate systems for recruitment, procurement, financial management, human resource management and communications. They also maintained separate offices in Juba. This in turn compromised the ability of the Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit to support the capacity of the DDR commissions.

Even within UNMISS itself, collaboration and cooperation between the DDR Unit and the Recovery, Return and Reintegration Section was reportedly very poor. On a broader level, the international community as a whole gave disproportionate attention to the physical return of internally displaced people, refugees and ex-combatants at the expense of addressing social cohesion, political inclusion and reintegration. There was too much ‘number counting’ in the return process, with relatively little attention to durable solutions after distribution of the reintegration package. Greater emphasis should have been given to employment generation, especially for young men, and conflict resolution.

Despite UNDP’s long-standing presence in Côte D’Ivoire, the effectiveness of its DDR activities was limited between 2005 and 2010. This was due to the lack of reconciliation and political stalemate, which kept the country divided. The outbreak of conflict in 2011 underscored this reality, and with the installation of a new regime UNDP was forced to reassess its programming profile, starting essentially from scratch.

3.3.6 SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Key finding: Security is central to stabilization in conflict-affected countries, and UNDP is frequently called on to assist with security sector reform. Security issues rarely fall under donor aid programmes, so bilateral assistance is usually drawn from limited alternative funds and is often insufficient. Success is largely determined by the willingness of recipient countries to initiate reforms. UNDP’s efforts to bolster civilian oversight are noteworthy. Better sequencing and coordination between reform in the security sector and other sectors is encouraged.

In many fragile and post-conflict states insecurity is pervasive, in both rural and urban areas. All too often the institutions that possess the legal monopoly of coercive power – the military and the police – are themselves sources of insecurity rather than what they should be: public institutions providing justice, equity and the preservation of peace. UNDP’s work in the security sector is designed to improve the efficiency, accountability and professionalism of security service delivery in conflict-affected countries. In this regard, UNDP co-chairs the United Nations Interagency Task Force on Security Sector Reform with DPKO. This headquarters level coordinating forum seeks to engender a ‘One UN’ approach to national and regional security sector reform processes.

As noted in the midterm review of the Global CPR Programme, UNDP is engaging in efforts to strengthen police and prison systems and even supporting reform activities within the military. The effectiveness of UNDP work on security sector reform has been variable. In some instances UNDP has taken on this work without fully considering the implications in terms of staff safety, necessary expertise and the need for sufficient government ‘buy in’ to the proposed reforms.

A clear example is UNDP engagement in training and equipping the Somali police force. Funding through official development assistance (ODA) often impairs the ‘whole government’ approaches necessary to security sector reform. The link between it and DDR activities is often unclear.

Stabilization is an incremental process, and UNDP is only one of many overlapping missions. Stabilization precedes reconstruction, but reconstruction helps consolidate a level of security attained by stabilization, giving people and their leaders a stake in a non-violent future. UNDP straddles both these processes. The security sector is not an autonomous, independent collection of public institutions; rather it is an integrated component of a country’s public administration, and thus part of the state’s governance system and structure. Civilian oversight is essential, as are UNDP efforts to bolster this sector. Civilian oversight is one of the most effective methods of ensuring that the state becomes not a source of insecurity but part of the solution to insecurity.

Security sector programming generally lies outside ODA budgets, being confined to parallel and relatively smaller bilateral funding pools. The difficulty is in finding a common policy platform that links these activities to areas such as DDR and rule of law. It is universally acknowledged that security – including the reduction of predatory government armed forces through reform and introduction of professional standards – is central to the stabilization agenda. What is needed is better sequencing and coordination between reform in the security sector and other sectors.

Timor-Leste provides an example of UNDP efforts to bridge the transitional gaps in the drawdown of United Nations peace operations. Weak policy capacity was one of the causes of conflict, so long-term capacity building engagement with this sector was needed. With BCPR technical and financial support, UNDP launched a joint United Nations Police/UNDP capacity-building project in mid-2011. The goal is for Timor-Leste to be better positioned and equipped to take over the United Nations Police work when UNMIT withdraws, scheduled for the end of 2012.

The project has been undertaken in close collaboration with UNMIT and has been largely successful to date. Yet without greater levels of public consultation, broad national ownership of state institutions will remain weak, limiting their legitimacy and effectiveness. Traditional non-state structures, despite being significant providers of security and justice, were not given the necessary access to influence policymaking. This neglect was compounded by UNMIT’s focus on establishing a formal system with little acknowledgement of the non-state sector and the security services it provides. A security sector review jointly undertaken by UNDP, UNMIT and the Timor-Leste Government was, after long delays, published in June 2008. But it mustered little government interest, and the outcome was a series of seminars, training courses and expert placements in the Ministry of Defence and Parliament. Rather than serving as a strategic assessment, the review became a means of funding minor projects that are the “bread and butter of a UNDP country team rather than a core function of a Security Council-mandated peace operation,” as noted in an essay published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy.

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81 UNDP, Assessment of Development Results: Somalia, 2010. The police force was perceived by many Somalis to be predatory and lacking legitimacy.


In Burundi accountability of national security bodies was enhanced by training members of the National Assembly and helping to draft a code of ethics for the National Intelligence Service. UNDP was the main operational partner of BINUB, the integrated peacebuilding operation. UNDP implemented three joint programmes, on peace and governance, justice and human rights, and security sector reform and small arms. These resulted in both operational capacity and financial resources, channelled through the Peacebuilding Fund and other sources. Meanwhile UNDP provided training in security sector oversight for 25 members of the National Assembly with the aim of improving the accountability of the National Intelligence Service through civilian oversight mechanisms.84

In Democratic Republic of the Congo, progress on decentralization, security sector reform and justice and reconciliation should have accelerated the consolidation of peace and democracy. However, the Congolese government was able to ‘pick and choose’ which programmes to implement. The stagnation of the decentralization process reflected that reality, as well as the stalemate reached in security sector reform. UNDP has not been able to dedicate significant resources to support international and Congolese efforts to reform the national army.85 Although security sector reform has been identified as a priority since 2002, no concrete results have materialized. This owes largely to the absence of political will on the part of Congolese authorities.

One of the key cross-cutting areas in post-conflict Liberia programming is the ongoing UNDP support to deepening community security and social cohesion. Both the Government and the United Nations have identified community security as an important priority alongside an overhaul of the police service. The United Nations Mission in Liberia leads on police reform, with UNDP assistance. In January 2008 the Liberia Governance Commission published a national security strategy after a year of discussions with civil society, security organizations, both houses of the legislature and international partners. The strategy identified and prioritized security threats and dilemmas. Government security agencies officially launched a new country mechanism in December 2009 to improve security policy and coordination at the country level. One part of the UNDP response to the mechanism is support to increase the number of trained female police officers, with a target of 30 percent of the force. The Government also recently endorsed the Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence, further pledging to monitor, measure and reduce armed violence by 2015.

A lesson that emerges from several of the evaluation case studies is that security sector reform cannot be divorced from other governance reforms. Yet because security issues rarely fall under donor aid programmes, security reform tends to be a parallel and relatively underfunded function within the broader aid effort. In South Sudan, although UNDP progress in the justice sector was noted,86 international assistance was fragmented. There was little formal coordination between support to DDR, security sector reform, small arms and light weapons control, and rule-of-law programming.87 In 2007, an independent

85 UNDP is involved in small arms reduction and police and penitentiary reforms. Regarding the reform of the Congolese army, UNDP only runs a small project that aims at improving living conditions of families of soldiers of a few brigades with the hope that it helps to reduce criminal activities by soldiers.
87 See, for example, A. Lukui, A. Abatneh and C. Wani, Police Reform in Southern Sudan, Policy Paper (Juba, South Sudan, North-South Institute Research Centre/Centre for Peace and Development Studies, June 2009). See also K. Osland, G. Thompson and A. Vogt, Joint Donor Security Sector Needs Assessment, An Independent Assessment of the Future Involvement of the Joint Donor Team in Security Sector Reform in Southern Sudan, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2007.
joint donor assessment of security sector reform advised that the division between the security sector and rule of law was counterproductive. However, no serious attempt was made to agree on a common policy framework for engagement that would effectively link interventions such as support for transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLA) into a regular army, the DDR programme (funded by the United Nations integrated mission and UNDP) and interventions in other rule-of-law areas, particularly the police.

It is perhaps a truism that the success of UNDP’s work in any of these countries will reflect the difficulties that emerge out of the specific context, with many political and military variables remaining beyond UNDP influence. In Guinea-Bissau, for instance, a joint programme on security sector reform and justice began in 2009 (involving UNDP, UN-Women, UNFPA and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). It aimed “to strengthen judicial and security sector democratic governance and better protect citizens’ rights through legislative reform and improve access to justice for the poor, with special focus on women…” This was a central plank of the conflict and peace-building efforts in Guinea-Bissau. Despite some progress made by the programme, the political/security situation remained poor, with civilian oversight of the military still in its infancy and rule of law a distant reality. Above all, progress could only be incremental, depending as it did on a significant and parallel political process that lagged behind.

3.3.7 LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Key finding: UNDP interventions in livelihoods and economic revitalization are an important and often innovative component of the broader United Nations approach to conflict-affected settings. Within integrated missions, there has been some tension between the time-bound and technical nature of the approach taken by peacekeepers towards DDR and UNDP’s longer term developmental objectives, which focus on building local capacities for economic generation. Similarly, donor time frames in conflict-affected settings are relatively short, limiting the scope and scale of UNDP interventions.

UNDP has recognized the importance of supporting the restoration of economic markets and livelihoods as a component of both short-term stability and sustainable peace. In 2009 the Secretary-General endorsed the Policy on Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration, jointly prepared by UNDP and the International Labour Organization (ILO). This United Nations-wide policy recommends focusing work on three separate yet reinforcing tracks of emergency employment generation in the immediate aftermath of conflict: stabilizing income generation and emergency employment; aiding local economic recovery to facilitate reintegration; and supporting longer term sustainable employment creation. Overall the policy suggests that support to post-conflict livelihoods should be guided by five core principles: (i) coherent and comprehensive approaches;
(ii) ‘do no harm’ interventions; (iii) awareness of conflict sensibilities; (iv) sustainability; and (v) gender equality. Centrally, the policy underscores the need for sound conflict analysis to guide interventions and the potential utility of incorporating employment creation activities into the preparation of post-conflict needs assessments.

UNDP indicates that it provides an integrated approach to livelihood recovery in conflict-affected settings. This includes providing support for emergency employment activities, including ‘cash for work’ schemes, designed to generate jobs and put people to work during the recovery process. UNDP also supports efforts in 20 countries to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, which usually entails establishing employment opportunities.

There is evidence across the case studies that well-established programmes contribute to economic recovery in three important respects:

- Engendering cooperation within communities creates trust and a degree of social cohesion.
- The creation of jobs and basic services is itself a ‘peace dividend’ if appropriately timed and resourced.
- Conflict-sensitive interventions can help to eliminate the competition for scarce resources.\(^93\)

Particular attention has been paid to reintegration programmes for conflict-affected populations and former combatants. In terms of approach, policy and the importance of inter-agency collaboration, this work is consistent with and buttresses the 2009 United Nations Policy on Post-Conflict Employment, Income Generation and Reintegration.\(^94\) It argues that employment plays a critical role at both micro and macro levels, in terms of ensuring stability, reintegration, socioeconomic growth and sustainable peace, while also providing the means for survival and recovery at household level. Broadly speaking, both the theoretical and the empirical cases for using employment programmes as a stand-alone tool for reducing violent conflict are weak. Where there is evidence of success, the assessments have been limited in scope, showing increases in employment but not clarifying whether or not conflict has been reduced as a consequence.\(^95\) By contrast, there is more encouraging evidence on using job creation as part of an integrated or comprehensive strategy to reduce and prevent armed violence.\(^96\)

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nepal, signed in November 2006, brought opportunities for UNDP to extend its livelihoods and employment portfolio. One component of this was the Micro-Enterprise Development Programme, which was designed to address root causes of inequality, targeting youth and rural dwellers. Programme reports indicate that it generated employment for almost 50,000 people, and that individual incomes increased nearly fourfold and household income more than doubled for beneficiaries since its launch in 1998. Sustainability remains a critical issue, as a recent (2011) evaluation of the programme noted that only 5 percent of the supported micro-enterprises could be considered sustainable, with 45 percent fully operational, another 20 percent seasonally operational, 17 percent inactive and 13 percent folded. The evaluation findings also indicate that an absence

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93 Clearly, the opposite is also true: An intervention can heighten the competition for resources and ‘do harm’ if the political economy is not appropriately studied.

94 The policy was launched in 2006 and revised in June 2009.

95 See, for example, Oliver Walton, Youth, Armed Violence and Job Creation Programmes: A Rapid Mapping Study, University of Birmingham, UK, 2010. The study was conducted on behalf of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre and the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre.

of marketing skills excluded many poor families from market transactions, and that access to credit remains a key issue for the micro-enterprises that were launched. Nevertheless, the project is viewed as an overall success, especially in fostering social cohesion in the aftermath of conflict.97

Some important lessons resonate from the small-scale enterprise projects that UNDP has carried out in conflict-affected countries:

- Small-scale enterprises often require a substantial mentoring period, six months or longer, to get established, and the necessary support includes practical business development skills. The individuals employed by UNDP and its partnering agencies (invariably NGOs) often do not have the requisite technical background or business acumen to help beneficiaries scale up and expand to wider markets that would bring sustainability to the enterprises. Technical capacity development is needed alongside knowledge of best practice.

- Since there are many entry points for development interventions in agriculture-related industries, donors (and UNDP) need to establish a clear and limited set of priorities for themselves. A value chain approach for specific commodities, combined with strengthening the capacity of districts to prepare their own development plans, would be advised.98

- Multi-sectoral armed violence reduction programming can benefit from greater use of pooled funds and better integration of these efforts in established government budget lines. UNDP projects work better when there is vertical integration involving regional, municipal and local levels and when there is also a link with non-governmental (informal) service delivery agents on the ground.

Within integrated missions, there has been some tension between the time-bound and technical nature of the approach taken by peacekeeping operations towards DDR and UNDP’s longer term developmental objectives, which focus on building local capacities for economic generation. Similarly, donor time frames in conflict-affected settings are relatively short, limiting the scope and scale of UNDP interventions. The case studies show that, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, livelihoods and economic revitalization frequently receive less priority than interventions relating to functions of the state and rule of law.

In an effort to raise coherence across UNDP interventions in livelihoods and economic recovery and provide consistent policy support to country offices, BCPR established a Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group at headquarters in early 2012. As the group becomes operational, it is envisioned to become a focal point for coordination on livelihoods across the United Nations system and among IFIs and to further bolster UNDP’s role as the coordinator of the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery.

Despite the challenges indicated above, UNDP interventions in livelihoods and economic revitalization remain an important component of the broader United Nations approach to conflict-affected settings. UNDP work in Burundi is illustrative of the effort to develop innovative techniques for providing gainful employment to former combatants. The Reintegration Programme in Burundi, carried out by the Government of Burundi with UNDP support, included what was termed the ‘3 x 6’ approach, which established a three-phase programme of business creation for former combatants and their host communities.

98 IFAD’s experience in Yemen with regard to value chains underlines the potential successes of such an approach (see J. Bennett, et al., Country Programme Evaluation: Yemen, IFAD, September 2011).
Phase 1, termed ‘inclusion,’ involved rapid and short-term (three month) income-generation activities. A total of 134 rehabilitation projects were established in five provinces, involving repairing paths and bridges, reforestation and producing bricks for schools. Phase 2, ‘appropriation,’ involved establishing new business associations, funded through a set-aside of one third of participant earnings during phase 1. A total of 150 associations were developed, mostly for farming, as well as light industry and services. Phase 3, ‘towards sustainability,’ involved continued financial and technical assistance to the associations for diversification, help in setting up new profitable micro-enterprises and establishment of a savings bank. All told, 156 micro-enterprises were created during phase 3, involving 2,604 people. Half were former combatants and half were host community members.

While UNDP’s livelihood work in conflict-affected settings is widely acknowledged as contributing to immediate peacebuilding and conflict prevention aims, its broader impact and sustainability need to be considered. Most of the information provided by UNDP on these activities is based on tangible outputs such as numbers of jobs created and individuals trained. Meanwhile, broader issues regarding creation of longer term economic opportunities in conflict-affected societies remain under-addressed. Nearly every country considered for this evaluation ranks among the lowest in per capita income globally, and they will most likely remain at that level for a generation as they emerge from conflict.99 With this in mind, it may be beneficial to consider UNDP’s initial interventions as stopgap in nature in conflict-affected settings, laying the foundations for economic development in the future.

3.4 COORDINATING HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

Key finding: UNDP takes on the pivotal role of coordinating the RC/HC in integrated missions, straddling the political, humanitarian and development dimensions. Management effectiveness in these missions is highly specific to the context. A critical unresolved issue for the United Nations is the extent to which humanitarian and development activities should be decoupled from the political process.

United Nations’ integrated missions face complex and competing aims. A recent study by the Integration Steering Group highlighted the often confusing and inconsistent interpretation of policy that arises in the midst of responding to crises.100 The importance of linking political, security and development objectives in conflict-affected states is no longer under debate; however, a holistic approach does not always alleviate tensions among humanitarian, development, political and security agendas. As a step towards improving cooperation, DPKO, DPA and UNDP now meet quarterly at the Assistant Secretary-General level to review priorities and interventions. Another positive step in the integration effort has been the evolution of the IMPP.

Levels of integration and cooperation vary across United Nations peace operations, as each gets developed in response to different conflicts and their unique contexts. Timor-Leste sits at the higher end of the scale in terms of close coordination among the country team members. UNDP has been a major player both as a participant in the inter-agency coordination body and

100 Metcalfe et al., op. cit. Of note here are examples drawn from Afghanistan (where some mission staff expected UN agencies to provide assistance in support of ‘stabilization’ military objectives) and Somalia (where some mission staff expected UN agencies to help consolidate territorial gains made by the African Union Mission in Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government).
as a broker and facilitator between the United Nations and the Government of Timor-Leste. In 2004 and 2005 UNDP was the only agency with a strategic position capable of bringing the United Nations family and particularly the United Nations mission into national planning processes. It is interesting to contrast this with the Southern Sudan mission (UNMISS), in particular during its early years. There was less coordination between UNMISS and UNDP in key areas such as rule of law, security sector reform and conflict prevention, resulting in duplication and poor information exchange. The differences are certainly driven by the context, but they also point to different priorities pursued by the management of these integrated missions.

Concerns have been raised in the humanitarian community that orchestrating relief activities within the peace operations unduly constrains their efforts to save lives. This has led to suggestions that the humanitarian coordinator role should be separate and distinct from missions mandated by the Security Council. In Somalia the RC/HC role was kept separate from UNPOS. In this case, humanitarian agencies successfully argued that the dynamics of the conflicting parties in Somalia called for a more distinct humanitarian leadership. This rationale centred on two main points: (i) the need to minimize the influence of the United Nations’ political objectives on its humanitarian imperatives; and (ii) the need to ensure that the priority given to the often difficult task of coordinating humanitarian interventions was not diminished by competing tasks. Humanitarian and political functions (and individuals) were also separated in Darfur (Sudan).

In Afghanistan United Nations integration arrangements since 2001 were based on optimistic assumptions of a ‘post-conflict’ phase. The RC/HC and OCHA were fully integrated into the United Nations assistance mission in Afghanistan, and there was no provision for a separate humanitarian role within the United Nations system. Even as hostilities intensified after 2006, the paradigm of ‘transition to recovery and development’ persisted. Subsequent events, including the contested presidential election in 2009, and now the transitional drawdown of coalition forces in 2012-2013, have intensified the view of some in the United Nations humanitarian community that political and humanitarian mandates in Afghanistan are not in alignment and should be decoupled.101

Closely linked to the issue of humanitarian coordinator autonomy in peace operations is the question of whether UNDP, through its administration of the DSRSG role, is hampered by its close association with integrated missions. As noted in a recent evaluation of the UNDP programme in Somalia: “UNDP is often seen as the ‘provider of last resort’, and some major donors, as well as UNPOS [United Nations Political Office in Somalia] expect the organization to support the political process or dispense administrative services on their behalf. For some observers and organizations involved mainly with humanitarian assistance, this association with the political process has damaged the image of the organization and reduced its capacity to fully deploy some of its traditional development activities.”102

These experiences in Somalia and Afghanistan might suggest that humanitarian and development support should be kept independent of peace operations in future Security Council-mandated missions. Strong arguments have been made for the reassertion of the humanitarian ‘space’ outside of integrated missions.103 Yet the decision on whether to make this a standard United Nations operating procedure needs very

101 WFP and UNICEF have both been outspoken in their advocacy for a separation of the HC role from the integrated mission.
103 Metcalfe et al, op. cit.
careful consideration. The whole point of integration is to reduce the diffusion and fragmentation of support and ‘deliver as one’ more effectively. It would run contrary to this principle if the various United Nations funds, agencies and programmes acted independently in conflict-affected countries, ‘untainted’ by the political and peacekeeping decisions mandated by the Security Council. It is also a significant problem for the entire country team if United Nations ‘political’ decisions are undermined by agencies convinced that they can and should act independently.

3.4.1 UNITED NATIONS CLUSTER MANAGEMENT

Key finding: The ‘cluster’ approach is chaired by the HC with the primary support of OCHA, while UNDP leads the Early Recovery Cluster. UNDP management of the cluster has received mixed reviews, with criticism directed especially at a lack of clarity in purpose, insufficient funding and a lack of monitoring and evaluation tools.

When an emergency occurs that requires a multi-sectoral response and multiple humanitarian actors, United Nations procedures call for establishing a cluster approach from the outset to plan and organize the international response. UNDP is an active participant in the United Nations clusters in conflict and disaster situations, as it chairs the Early Recovery Cluster and co-chairs, with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the sub-clusters of Rule of Law and Justice, which fall under the Protection Cluster. In 2011, the Secretary-General endorsed a report of the Review of Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict, which recommended increasing the United Nations’ use of standing civilian capacities. The recommendations underscored the pivotal UNDP role in resource mobilization and development support in post-conflict settings and called for UNDP to take the lead in clusters relating to core national governance functions, justice and capacity development.

Experience with the Early Recovery Cluster in recent events has highlighted confusion over the kinds of recovery projects deemed eligible for inclusion in a Consolidated Appeal Process or its equivalent. In some cases critics contend that too much attention has been paid to crisis security, law and order measures, and transitional justice, and not enough attention to longer term planning and capacity-building efforts.

In several countries under review, the distinction between the existing UNDP programme and the components of early recovery was not always clear. In Haiti, the capacity of the country and regional offices was overwhelmed by the scale and complexity of the response required, both in the initial response and during the recovery phase. As the regional office and headquarters became more heavily involved in support functions as well as surge capacity, decision-making and communication lines were confused and it was difficult to reach a common understanding of respective roles. The evaluation found that this confusion also constrained the work of the Early Recovery Cluster.

In Uganda, in areas affected by incursions of the Lord’s Resistance Army, UNDP’s leadership of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) since 2005 has been an exercise in “redefining its identity and clarifying its mandate and mission as a developmental agency working in an emergency environment.” This has taken place in order to coordinate the broad humanitarian and developmental activities that early recovery entails, according to an independent review of UNDP’s work there. UNDP made an important contribution towards (i) strengthening post-crisis

governance; (ii) facilitating early recovery at the local level; and (iii) supporting coordinated early recovery planning. UNDP had the benefit of working alongside a strong national partner in the aftermath of the conflict.

It should be noted that the UNDP effort had its share of perceived problems, including a lack of resources dedicated to early recovery, poor support from headquarters and problems inherent in the short duration of programming. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Early Recovery Cluster brief was poorly defined and the cluster group was burdened with too many elements. Coordination problems remained even after the cluster was abandoned in favour of the Integrated Strategic Framework.

3.4.2 PROMOTING DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

Key finding: UNDP has effectively promoted dialogue between government and civil society at national and local levels, broadening the constituency for peacebuilding. It has also supported improvements in programme design in priority areas through the engagement of a wider range of stakeholders.

In the aftermath of the 2006 crisis and ensuing displacement in Timor-Leste, UNDP rapidly responded with three projects to support the return of internally displaced people, each involving dialogue between communities and a government-run reconciliation process. These efforts were in support of the trust-building pillar of the government’s National Recovery Strategy. The Dialogue Project aimed to address the root cause of conflict in communities through a national process of conversation.106 The Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa (HHK) NGO Small Grants Fund provided grants to NGOs to implement trust-building activities in communities in Dili and other districts.107 The Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs (SERC) project complemented the other two projects by following up community dialogue and addressing the findings of monitoring reports on returned displaced people, which identified a lack of basic community infrastructure as a threat to stability.

UNDP interventions in all three projects responded to the priorities identified in Timor-Leste’s National Recovery Strategy and were anchored within the government process. The weakness was that UNDP did not follow up its support in terms of institutional strengthening, and it was a challenge to maintain the capacities of the dialogue staff at district level after the project ended.108

In a similar initiative, Liberia UNDP supported the participation of youth as Peace Ambassadors under a project financed by the Peacebuilding Fund; and in Lebanon local peacebuilding strategies and mechanisms were implemented in at least three conflict-prone areas.

UNDP is beginning to exploit new opportunities to use South-South cooperation in conflict-affected countries. The benefits are that personnel can be deployed swiftly and better understand the country circumstances, and it is easier to use appropriate technologies and techniques. This is particularly the case where building local government capacity will take a generation. An interesting new initiative has been launched by UNDP in South Sudan, where experts from surrounding

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107 About 12 NGOs were involved. Catholic Relief Services received about $225,000 over three years, remarking that “a lot can be done with small money”. Generally, the projects were deemed highly successful, though international NGOs with their own resources, such as Catholic Relief Services, fared better because they had a complementary programme in the same area (in this case, Baucau district).

108 See UNDP, Assessment of Development Results: Timor-Leste (forthcoming). The evaluation notes, however, that UNDP in 2012 launched a capacity-building project for the Department of Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion, which was created by the Ministry of Social Solidarity to build on and scale up the achievements made by dialogue staff.
countries have been used for institutional capacity development and civil service ‘mentors’ have been placed in district centres. This capitalizes on the political will of regional actors and enhances cooperation with regional institutions such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development. UNDP’s UN Volunteers, 80 percent of whom come from the South, have been instrumental in providing the regional talent placed under this initiative.

### 3.5 UNDP Response Mechanisms

The second line of enquiry in the evaluation concerns how UNDP response mechanisms function at headquarters and operational levels during periods of transition in conflict-affected countries. Here, we look at the administrative function with respect to multi-donor trust funds, how UNDP support scales up during transition periods and the responsiveness of UNDP human resources to these processes. Finally, we ask whether UNDP’s measurement of results in these situations responds to the evolving circumstances.

#### 3.5.1 Managing Multi-donor Trust Funds

**Key finding:** UNDP’s management of multi-donor trust funds in conflict settings has encountered some criticism with respect to high overhead charges, slow disbursement and the perception of preferential treatment for UNDP’s own development support programmes. Greater attention should be given to capturing lessons to inform country offices and partners.

There are two multi-donor trust fund mechanisms:

- Multi-donor trust funds (or multi-partner trust funds [MPTF]) that operate according to rules, procedures and guidance of the United Nations system. In this case UNDP’s administrative role on behalf of the system is exercised by the MPTF Office, which has no role in programme approval decisions; it only holds the money received in trust.
- Multi-donor trust funds contributed to UNDP directly by donors, which operate according to UNDP’s rules, procedures and guidance. In these cases UNDP serves as trust fund manager (managed by UNDP bureaux, mainly BCPR), and the funds are implemented by UNDP country offices without the involvement of the MPTF Office.

The particular mix of funds in any given post-crisis effort is specific to the context. All 20 of the conflict-affected countries reviewed for this evaluation showed a significant surge in UNDP financing for country-based programming in the aftermath of major conflict events, and UNDP country-office budgets remained elevated for at least several years thereafter.

Multi-donor trust funds cover a wide spectrum of circumstances, and are especially used in situations where governments are considered not yet able to take full responsibility for the financial management of international donor support. For example, nearly 60 percent of UNDP’s total spending in the Democratic Republic of the Congo comes through multi-donor trust funds, in particular the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, established at the end of 2009.109 This Fund is governed by a Stabilization Funding Board, which is co-chaired by the Prime Minister.

Resources to support programming under the South Sudan Recovery Fund, which is managed by the MPTF Office, are approved in consultation with relevant government entities, in particular the Ministry of Finance. Problems with disbursements from the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund in South Sudan set in motion a trend towards ‘substitute’ pooled mechanisms; there are now six such pooled funds. These include two

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managed by the MPTF Office – the Common Humanitarian Fund and the South Sudan Recovery Fund. A third, the Strategic Partnership Fund, is a UNDP fund administered by the Joint Donor Team. In the past there has been criticism that some of these mechanisms were slow with approvals and disbursement, and that they were too ‘United Nations-centric’.

The issue of overhead charges has been mentioned as a problem by a number of stakeholders. The South Sudan Recovery Fund includes overhead charges nearly 6 percent higher than those for the Basic Services Fund, which is run by a private contractor. In 2009 the team evaluating the Basic Services Fund suggested that the Government of South Sudan and the donors “may wish to consider whether the UN system costs of 15.9 percent offer value for money.” The evaluation team is aware, however, that projects funded by the United Nations, the European Union and other large multilateral organizations typically include a robust monitoring and evaluation programme as well as checks and balances to minimize opportunities for graft and corruption. These systems add to administrative overhead. The United Nations is also expected to make extra efforts in terms of gender balance and transparency in hiring procedures, requirements rarely imposed on private agencies.

Cost efficiency aside, the Common Humanitarian Fund in South Sudan has been beset by issues of slow disbursement. Rather than reducing transaction costs – a key rationale for its establishment – the Fund has merely shifted them from donors to NGOs and United Nations cluster leaders. Despite a perceived increase in humanitarian needs in 2009, donor contributions to the Fund decreased by 26 percent due to exchange rate fluctuations, establishment of the South Sudan Recovery Fund, the economic downturn in traditional donor economies and increasing donor reservations about the effectiveness of pooled funding mechanisms, among other factors.

It should be noted that in 2010 negotiations over the Fund, administered by the MPTF, led to a complete restructuring. Interventions were subsequently based around a stabilization approach firmly built on in-depth conflict analysis and sustained government engagement at both national and state levels. Likewise, the new South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund, established in February 2012, was reconfigured. This was a welcome, if somewhat late, reappraisal of how these funds could become flexible enough to address conflict as it arose.

The Peacebuilding Fund has been administered by the MPTF since 2006. It is responsible for

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110 J. Bennett et al., *Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan: Evaluation Report*, January 2009, NORAD/ITAD, Oslo; and W. Fenton, *Funding Mechanisms in Southern Sudan: NGO Perspectives*, Juba NGO Forum/Joint Donor Team (2008). The evaluation team is aware that criticism is not equal across all funds; the reader should refer to the cited documents for details. In particular, it is noted that MPTF policy states that transfers are made within three to five days of receipt of required documentation, a timeline that is met for about 95 percent of all transfers globally. The disbursement timeline for UNDP as trust fund manager of a UNDP trust fund and for other implementing agencies may be different.


112 J. Morton et al., *Review of Basic Services Fund, South Sudan*, DFID/TripleLine, 2009. We note that the MPTF Office disputes the 15.9 percent figure, claiming it is only 8 percent. It is likely that the higher percentage factors in some technical assistance costs as well.


114 OCHA (2009), *Common Humanitarian Fund Interim Report (Jan–Sep 2009)* prepared by the Common Humanitarian Fund Technical Unit of OCHA and the Common Humanitarian Fund Management Unit of UNDP.

115 In its first six months of operations the new South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund disbursed $60 million to United Nations agencies and NGOs, and international NGOs received 56 percent. UNDP received less than $1 million. Disbursements are recorded as having considerably improved.
receiving donor contributions and transferring the funds to United Nations organizations. The existence of a separate multi-donor trust fund office is cited by UNDP as evidence of separation between UNDP as administrator of the Fund and as recipient of funds from it. Some question the extent of this separation, given that UNDP received 60 percent of all funds from the Peacebuilding Fund during 2007-2011. The remaining 40 percent was dispersed across 15 other United Nations recipient organizations.

To conclude, we note that UNDP/MPTF is often asked to manage trust funds in conflict-affected countries, but organizationally, there is no specific unit that UNDP country offices can turn to when they need technical and advisory support to set up such funds (except for funds managed by the UNDP MPTF Office). Until recently, UNDP’s global experience in managing these funds was not systematically captured. Such knowledge could be useful when a UNDP country office needs to explain to its partners the various trust funds options and to know how to set up such trust funds.

A 2012 independent evaluation of Delivering as One noted that the “firewall in the management of the MPTF has worked effectively” and that many of the problems noted above have been addressed. Yet given the continued need for support where UNDP is expected to manage or administer trust funds – not only in the context of post-conflict recovery but also for post-disaster recovery – greater effort should be made to convey the institutional arrangements to partners. The complex and much-criticized South Sudan issues in particular raised questions over whether these mechanisms were fit for purpose in such a volatile conflict environment. Now, however, there seem to be marked improvements.

3.5.2 RESPONDING QUICKLY TO CRISES

Key finding: UNDP has made important refinements and improvements in human resources and procurement in recent years, providing clear evidence that the organization can now respond quicker and more effectively to requests for assistance in the wake of conflicts and disasters. Continuing improvements are needed, however, as the logistical, recruitment and procurement procedures UNDP uses often remain insufficient to the demands of a highly fluid conflict environment.

When conflict occurs, UNDP is often requested to play a central role in immediate recovery assistance. UNDP has defined early recovery as “the application of development principles of participation, sustainability and local ownership to humanitarian situations with the aim of stabilizing local and national capacities”. This means that early recovery should start as soon as possible during humanitarian action and that early recovery activities should be foundational in nature, designed to “seize opportunities that go beyond saving lives and contribute to the restoration of national capacity, livelihoods and human security”. This definition situates early recovery within humanitarian settings and firmly roots UNDP engagement during the humanitarian phase of crisis response. To address the challenges associated with its development role in this early recovery period, UNDP has developed several operational mechanisms to improve and accelerate delivery support to country offices and national authorities:

- The surge mechanism, established in 2007 and administered by BCPR, is designed to rapidly deploy experts to the field, often within days of the crisis, to enhance recovery efforts led by the UNDP country office. When a crisis situation is declared by the RR or RC, a crisis board is established at headquarters.

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to coordinate the UNDP response, operating under standard operating procedures. BCPR has developed a crisis prevention and recovery roster, comprising more than 100 consultants with technical and specialized experience in crisis prevention and recovery who can be quickly deployed.

Fast-track procedures have been established to enable fast and flexible procurement and spending during a crisis. These include the operations of the crisis board (under the regional bureaux) and UNDP collaboration with bodies such as the International Malnutrition Task Force and the various inter-agency task forces in the country.

Since 2005 UNDP/BCPR has chaired the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, which includes 30 agencies from the humanitarian and development community. UNDP’s role is to coordinate support from the multiple agencies of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to enhance the capacity of the RR/RC to plan and respond appropriately during the early stages of a crisis. In 2007, UNDP created an Early Recovery Team in its BCPR. This team provides UNDP country offices with technical assistance for early recovery programmes and spearheads the leadership of the CWGER.

Guidelines and procedures are important, but the success or failure of UNDP efforts in conflict-affected countries usually comes down to the pace of response and the quality of personnel. The onus is on UNDP to quickly deploy high-calibre and well-trained staff and consultants in the field. When response is slow, it has reputational and operational consequences for the organization.

In Sierra Leone UNDP played a key role in peacebuilding efforts under the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone. But following the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, UNDP struggled to implement its peacebuilding agenda. Projects that were flagged as quick impact and to be concluded within a year in fact took two years. UNDP’s performance significantly improved once it was fully staffed and revised its management structure to align it with Peacebuilding Fund projects and processes.

A recent evaluation of UNDP performance in Iraq showed that in four governance projects funded by the multi-donor trust fund, UNDP was not adequately prepared to implement projects, in terms of both personnel and critical resources. Recruitment processes were cumbersome, with accounts of staff hires taking up to half a year, with equal delays in reappointments. Procurement was seen as inadequate to support any type of rapid response. All together, these issues contributed to varying degrees of underperformance in the four projects.

It is important to keep in mind the difficulties in attracting talented staff to work in conflict settings. The work is hazardous, the duty stations are typically non-family and additional pay and promotion incentives are nominal. The evaluation team is aware that thousands of UN Volunteers have been working at the forefront of peace missions in eight of the nine key case studies of this evaluation. But the skill sets for working in conflict environments are specific, and the relatively small pool of experienced staff means that assignments are often temporary ‘on loan’ arrangements from other locations. In turn, this exacerbates a lack of continuity at a time of instability when relationships with governments are so critical.


119 Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Fund Review.

While Iraq and Sierra Leone highlight some staffing and procurement difficulties, there is also evidence that UNDP has improved its surge and fast-track procedures, and there are cases where a rapid and effective response is recognized. Following unprecedented violence in 2011 in Côte d’Ivoire, which severely disrupted and set back UNDP’s country programme, a decision was made to resume work in key areas such as electoral assistance, rule of law and DDR. Aware of the gap in staffing and funding, UNDP began by employing several consultants to recommend strategies on how to re-engage in areas such as justice, rule of law, DDR, policing and reconciliation. Following the Inter-agency Technical Assistance Mission in May 2011, BCPR funded a $1 million surge support to the UNDP country office, including deployment of 14 technical staff in assignments lasting three or four months.

In Haiti, UNDP was commended for its essential role in filling the staffing gap in its joint election support effort with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Indeed, Haiti experienced the biggest staff surge in UNDP history, with 60 staff recruited at short notice after the earthquake. The scale-up was not without problems, as the human resource systems and capacity for managing the initial surge were weak or absent. In addition, surge capacity was often deployed for periods that were far too short to be effective; and at the same time, other country offices that provided the surge staff, especially in French-speaking West Africa, were put under severe strain. Measures are being put in place to address this key vulnerability in the system, and UNDP and UNICEF are working together on guidelines for surge capacity for future emergencies.

3.5.3 SCALING UP UNDP ACTIVITY DURING TRANSITIONS

Key finding: UNDP plays a prominent role in the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Its effectiveness is contingent on realistic planning, rapid response, quality personnel, effective coordination with partners and sufficient funding.

For UNDP, the period of transition from peacekeeping operations is complex and sensitive. It is a time when support activities are key in consolidating a country’s progress away from conflict. The effective management of these transitions is of particular interest at present, as several United Nations peacekeeping operations are soon to wind down, with support continuing through integrated peacebuilding offices, country teams and special political missions. New transition guidelines should make inter-agency planning and budgeting more effective.

Considerable research has been conducted on the political and logistical process of withdrawing a United Nations peacekeeping presence, but little of it has highlighted the impact of withdrawal on UNDP planning processes and working methods both at headquarters and in the country. Nevertheless, transitions from peacekeeping to follow-on operations have and will continue to define an important portion of UNDP’s operational landscape.

Funding shortfalls after peacekeeping missions are inevitable, as donors with limited resources channel their discretionary crisis-response funding to the next erupting conflict. This has real consequences for the governments struggling to rebuild,
which are faced with widespread social and physical impacts, and the development agencies endeavouring to help them. A recent independent evaluation on Democratic Republic of the Congo confirmed that “multilateral agencies that sought to focus on peacebuilding in DRC were not entrusted with sufficient funds to overcome the immense obstacles beyond circumscribed projects. What remains is therefore a range of projects in which their design depends on confused and ever-changing donor strategies.”

The case of Burundi underscores the difficulties facing UNDP during transitions. The peace-building mandate UNDP was given was initially beyond its on-the-ground capabilities. The problem was compounded by excessive donor and UNDP expectations regarding how much could be achieved. In 2007, UNDP was only able to expend one third of budgeted resources, resulting in a temporary cessation of donor support to its peacebuilding work in Burundi. UNDP responded with new procurement structures, better logistical efforts and additional experienced staff. These enhancements enabled UNDP to become an important partner to the Government during the peacebuilding process and an enabler for the improved functioning of the integrated peacebuilding operation (BINUB).

Timor-Leste provides an example of more realistic transition planning. The Timor-Leste Transition Plan, developed jointly by the Government of Timor-Leste and UNMIT, includes well-designed inter-agency plans and budgets. Even with this plan, however, there are concerns that full implementation will be exceedingly difficult, with donor commitments reaching only half of anticipated need when the plan was unveiled in September, 2011.

UNDP has been expanding its partnerships with international financing institutions in post-conflict situations. For instance, post-crisis needs assessments are being developed through a collaborative scoping exercise undertaken by the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank. These assessments help to identify the infrastructure and government support activities needed to support countries as they move towards recovery. The assessments are designed to be key drivers of country team programmes and action plans, including subsequent UNDAFs. Post-conflict needs assessments have been conducted in Afghanistan, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

UNDP and the World Bank are also partnering on an initiative on state-building in fragile and post-conflict situations. Funded by Norway, it also addresses capacity development. The initiative includes identification of entry points – potential approaches and activities to increase the effectiveness of UNDP and World Bank programmes that support capacity development for state-building. Liberia and Sierra Leone are the initial target countries. In Liberia, UNDP and the World Bank collaborated on a public expenditure review of the security sector. This country-level consultation process also aims to develop diagnostic and capacity assessment tools that are sufficiently flexible to apply to different security settings.

3.5.4 THE FUNDING CHALLENGE

Key finding: UNDP relies heavily on non-core donor contributions to fund its programme activities. In 2010, 70 percent of UNDP’s global country programme expenditure was funded through ‘other donor resources’. Democratic governance activities, particularly those aimed at extending government legitimacy and enhancing capacities for conflict management and service delivery, have generally been the main areas for UNDP support in conflict-affected settings.


UNDP global programme expenditures grew by 38 percent between 2005 and 2010. During this period the development needs of conflict-affected countries came to represent a significant area of operational focus.126 Programming expenditure under the Crisis Prevention and Recovery corporate outcome line represents a 10 to 15 percent share of UNDP’s $20 billion in total programme expenditures between 2005 and 2009. This percentage increased from 15 percent to 27 percent from 2009 to 2010. Since UNDP’s global programme expenditure grew by approximately 15 percent in the same year, Crisis Prevention and Recovery now represents a greater proportion of the whole.127

In countries where an integrated peacekeeping operation has been deployed, UNDP programming expenditure often jumps discernibly, reflecting both the elevation of the situation and the broader international attention. Timor-Leste for example, experienced a 30 percent jump in UNDP programme expenditures in the year following deployment of United Nations peacekeepers.

Analysis of UNDP programme expenditure in the 20 conflict-affected countries128 selected for consideration for this evaluation reflects the extensive international attention devoted to addressing their development needs. These 20

126 This reflects overall international donor prioritization of countries considered conflict-affected or fragile. OECD/DAC data indicates that in 2008 $33 billion of official development assistance was directed to countries facing conflict and fragility. See OECD/DAC, ‘Ensuring Fragile States are not Left Behind: Summary Report’, Paris, February 2010.

127 Country-level expenditures for CPR grew from $576 million in 2009 to $1.16 billion in 2010. This was primarily the result of crisis governance support programming changes in the Afghanistan country office. See Annual Report of the Administrator, Document DP2011-22. See also presentation of Rebeca Grynspan to the Executive Board, 11 March 2011.

128 These 20 countries are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Uganda.
countries accounted for over one third of UNDP’s programme expenditure between 2005 and 2010. One of the countries is Afghanistan, where international focus has resulted in an enormous and anomalous programme expenditure that alone accounts for a significant portion of UNDP’s global programme expenditure: 16 percent in 2010 (Figure 1).

When the Afghanistan programme expenditure is removed, a significant proportion of UNDP programme expenditure is focused on the 20 conflict-affected settings. The remaining 19 countries accounted for a quarter of global UNDP programme expenditure between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 2).

UNDP financial support to conflict-affected countries can also be viewed in the context of broader financial flows. In general terms, the ODA funds channelled through UNDP account for only a small portion of total funding for the country. For example, in Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNDP programme expenditures of $1.3 billion represent 10 percent of the $13 billion in development aid provided to the country between 2005 and 2010. While the comparative size of UNDP funding varies by country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo figures are indicative of the broader aid environment.

In Lebanon, UNDP country office expenditures between 2005 and 2010 came to $190 million. The total ODA received by Lebanon during the same period exceeded $4.2 billion. In the case of Liberia, South Sudan and other conflict countries, the proportionate scale of UNDP financial support is higher, yet the fact remains that UNDP is not a donor, and its success cannot be measured by the size of its budget. In the case of Timor-Leste, the UNDP budget in 2009-2010 reached $17 million per year, equalling 13 percent of ODA at the time. As Timor-Leste becomes more capable of managing its own service delivery and as its national budget increases (it is expected to reach $1.7 billion in 2012), the UNDP development footprint can be expected to shrink.

In conflict-affected settings democratic governance activities have generally been the main areas for UNDP support, particularly those aimed at extending government legitimacy and enhancing capacities for conflict management and service delivery. On average, activities in this programming area accounted for over 40 percent of programming resources in the 20 analysed conflict countries between 2005 and 2009. A rise in programme funding for CPR during 2010, and a concomitant dramatic drop in activities under Democratic Governance, can be attributed almost exclusively to a shift in the characterization of expenditures within the Afghanistan country programme. Accordingly, the change does not represent a substantive shift away from UNDP’s primary focus on supporting national authorities. A consistent challenge for UNDP’s reporting in crisis countries is that projects on Governance or Rule of Law are largely reported under Democratic Governance outcomes, even when BCPR is the source of financing and technical support.

An important aspect of this budget discussion is that UNDP relies heavily on non-core130 donor contributions to fund its programme activities. In 2010, 70 percent of UNDP’s global country programme expenditures were funded through ‘other donor resources’. This is significant, as only five years earlier non-core resources comprised half of UNDP’s global programme expenditure.131 The issue of core versus non-core expenditures becomes more acute when it is examined at the country level. In the 20 selected countries,

129 In 2010 a reporting change that moved governance programming in Afghanistan to the Crisis Prevention and Recovery outcome area made CPR the largest programming area in special development situations.

130 Non-core support falls under UNDP’s mandated practice areas, but they are not governed by the Executive Board in the way core resources are.

non-core funds accounted for the overwhelming majority of programming expenditure during 2010.\textsuperscript{132} This predominance of non-core or ‘earmarked’ funding is fully consistent with the wider trend of increased targeting and earmarking of ODA to multilateral institutions.\textsuperscript{133}

3.5.5 LEARNING FROM RESULTS

Key finding: UNDP lacks a coherent and systematic assessment of progress towards CPR objectives within its country support programmes.\textsuperscript{134} Specific indicators or benchmarks have not been established for UNDP work in crisis environments and there is no consistent practice for setting baselines at the outset in order to track progress and improvement.\textsuperscript{135}

Gauging the efficiency and effectiveness of UNDP support in conflict-affected settings can be problematic, as many project activities are process-oriented, time-bound and subject to a rapidly changing political landscape. The relationship between resources committed and outcomes achieved is not linear; it requires a more subtle theory of change with incremental and measurable benchmarks.

The UNDP results-based management system obliges managers to understand why projects and other activities contribute to the outcomes sought, set meaningful performance expectations, measure and analyse results, learn from this evidence to adjust delivery and modify or confirm programme design, and report on the performance achieved against expectations. Although the architecture for systematic monitoring and evaluation at bureau and country levels is in place, it is not consistently applied.\textsuperscript{136}

UNDP’s Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results describes results as the totality of output, outcome and impact. However, the generic results-based management system used at country project level focuses very much on outputs. (In some countries, including Somalia and South Sudan, the system has been further developed in-country to capture medium-term results and impact.) The handbook contains basic principles for conflict-sensitive programming, but the cases studied in this evaluation suggest that they have been inconsistently applied at country level.

UNDP has mechanisms in place to share experiences across countries, through regional institutions, centres of excellence and exchange programmes. There are also joint knowledge management mechanisms in place across United Nations agencies, including joint assessment missions, poverty reduction strategy papers and coordinated donor communications strategies. UNDP has also promoted a ‘communities of practice’ approach, whereby forums are set up for UNDP practitioners and national partners to share experiences. Such communities of practice have been established in West and Central Africa and in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, in support of South-South engagement. The regional bar associations of Central Asia and the Caucasus have shared experiences; an Access to Justice Week was held in 2010 in the Asia-Pacific region covering justice assessments and informal justice systems; and an Asia-Pacific Consortium on Human Rights Based Approach to Access to Justice has been established.\textsuperscript{137}

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\textsuperscript{132} UNDP, Bureau of Management/Operations Support Group, 2010 ROAR input data.

\textsuperscript{133} See OECD, \textit{DAC Report on Multilateral Aid 2011}, Paris, p. 5: “Core multilateral contributions as a share of ODA fell to a low of 28% (USD 36 billion) in 2009 from a peak of 33% in 2001. Though scored as bilateral ODA, an additional 12% (USD 15 billion) was earmarked by sector, country, region or theme and channelled through multilateral organizations in 2009.”

\textsuperscript{134} UNDP, BCPR Monitoring and Evaluation System, 2008-2011, internal paper.


\textsuperscript{136} This was one of the findings of the Evaluation of Results Based Management, UNDP Evaluation Office, July 2007.

Each conflict represents a unique operational context. However, in drawing from our findings we are able to come to a series of conclusions that are generally illustrative of the challenges and improvements required for a more strategic engagement at the global level. Many of the findings from this study are specific to the country or context. In drawing conclusions we have chosen to highlight what appears to have common currency across many, if not all, circumstances. Here, and in the corresponding recommendations, we return to the objectives set out at the beginning of the report, which are to assess (a) UNDP programming and policies supporting peacebuilding, and how UNDP supports a country’s transition from immediate post-conflict to development; and (b) how UNDP response mechanisms function at headquarters and at operational levels during periods of transition in conflict-affected countries.

4.1 CONCLUSIONS

4.1.1 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING UNDP PROGRAMMING AND POLICIES SUPPORTING PEACEBUILDING AND UNDP SUPPORT TO COUNTRIES TRANSITIONING FROM IMMEDIATE POST-CONFLICT TO DEVELOPMENT

Conclusion 1: UNDP is one of very few international organizations able to operate ‘at scale’ across multiple programme areas, before, during and after the outbreak of conflict. This work directly links to the broader UNDP emphasis on achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and to UNDP cross-cutting priorities such as women’s empowerment.

UNDP’s comparative advantages are perceived to be its on-the-ground presence; close partnership with governments; role as a bridge between humanitarian, peacebuilding and development efforts; and its role in governance and institutional change in the management of conflict.

The wide scope of UNDP activity constitutes a weakness when resources are spread too thinly. Country offices have not always matched the inherent ‘worth’ of an activity against the likely impact it will have in achieving wider organizational goals. Also, there is a tendency to continue implementing some activities with insufficient staff and/or financial resources when their continuing relevance is questionable, or when there are other international organizations better equipped to deal with them.

The evaluation found only rare examples of a clear articulation of theories of change that allowed UNDP to develop and monitor meaningful change indicators. Hence, the default position has been to assume that all activities contribute to peace and are of equal worth.

Conclusion 2: UNDP is often caught off guard and unprepared when conflict erupts, despite its in-country position and close contacts with government and civil society. Anticipating conflict and helping to prevent its outbreak requires detailed and operational conflict analyses to be carried out at the country level.

A conflict analysis sets the stage for a theory of change. Once the problem is assessed and the triggers of violence are known, a theory of change...
suggests how an intervention in that context will change the conflict. But this must be preceded by a thorough understanding of context. The operational landscape in most conflict-affected countries is characterized by new and fluid forms of internal conflict, usually brought on by multiple triggers. UNDP (and the United Nations in general) invests a great deal in data collection and analysis, yet it often seems ill-informed about the political tensions and relationships that can so quickly develop into violence.

The drivers of conflict should not always be conflated with social and economic deprivation. These may be the symptoms rather than the causes of conflict. In many cases, the ambitions and abilities of local ‘strong men’ to harness support through predatory activity are the acute triggers of violence.

Despite recognition of the importance of conflict analysis and the development of its own conflict analysis tools, UNDP has no in-house standard operating procedure for when and how to conduct conflict analysis. As a result, the conduct of such analyses in both substantive and procedural terms remains varied across UNDP.

UNDP has been very good at codifying the dynamics of conflict in a generic sense, through increasingly sophisticated strategic analyses, particularly at global level. But there remains a disconnect between the holistic conceptual umbrella of ‘knowledge’ within BCPR and the operational constraints of individual countries. The result in some cases has been a waste of resources on small, inconsequential activities that have traction only for the duration of the ‘project’, but little long-lasting impact on peacebuilding.

Improved inter-agency coordination is one proven path towards developing better-informed assistance for conflict prevention in sensitive, conflict-prone situations. The United Nations Conflict Prevention Partnership and the Inter-agency Framework Team for Preventive Action (chaired by UNDP) are both useful entry points for increasing coherence in conflict prevention work, the latter being particularly useful in providing programme design and strategic advice to the United Nations Resident Coordinator.

**Conclusion 3:** The effectiveness of UNDP programming support in conflict-affected countries is often contingent upon events in the political and security realm, which are largely beyond UNDP power to influence. Where a modicum of political settlement has been reached and peacekeeping has maintained security, UNDP interventions have been able to support a broader conflict resolution and peacebuilding agenda – and ultimately, a broader development agenda.

During the past decade UNDP has built substantive capacity in many core areas of peacebuilding that are relevant to its development mandate. The organization has also shown that it can be very effective when the political and security situations have stabilized. UNDP has demonstrated excellence in its support for rebuilding justice systems and bridging the legal divide with traditional dispute resolution systems. It has spurred real and lasting security sector reform through civilian oversight and has developed innovative programmes linking economic development with the reintegration of ex-combatants.

Where the evidence of political reconciliation has been scant and violence ongoing, UNDP interventions have had limited impact. Progress has been frequently reversed due to low national buy-in for development interventions or the resumption of conflict.

Some of the greatest UNDP achievements in post-conflict peacebuilding have been in states that are either (i) geopolitically less prominent, and thus where the United Nations has a greater role vis-à-vis other actors; or (ii) in those geopolitically charged environments (such as Georgia and Kenya) where political and security influences have become so polarized by internal/external influences that UNDP is able to take on a ‘non-threatening’ mediation role.
UNDP country offices in some conflict settings do not effectively prioritize their interventions. They have a tendency to reflexively respond positively to the myriad demands placed upon them. Some of these demands are donor-driven and need to be better managed, while others reflect the host government’s lack of institutional capacity at a time when stabilization is imperative. In some countries this has resulted in fragmentation and an overly ambitious portfolio coupled with a thin spread of limited resources.

Conclusion 4: UNDP administers (but does not direct) the critical coordinating role within integrated missions in crisis situations, straddling the political, humanitarian and development dimensions. Management effectiveness in these missions is highly context specific. One area that needs greater attention is the dissemination of learning derived from managing pooled multi-donor trust funds.

Conceptual and operational issues between UNDP and its security, political and humanitarian partners in integrated missions often revolve around the inherent tension between the time-bound nature and technical approach of a peace operation versus the longer term UNDP development agenda, which focuses on building local capacities for economic generation. Another issue for UNDP is the relatively short donor time frames in conflict-affected settings, which limits the scope and scale of UNDP interventions.

The IMPP has provided a useful and structured mechanism for ensuring UNDP involvement at the inception of a mission. Yet our case studies indicate that UNDP influence in the process remains relatively small compared to the security and political concerns of other actors. The UNDP partnership with the Department of Political Affairs in some Security Council–mandated integrated peacebuilding offices (Burundi, Sierra Leone) has demonstrated the utility of combining development activities and political processes.

UNDP’s global experience in managing pooled multi-donor trust funds is not systematically captured. Such knowledge could be useful when a UNDP country office needs to understand and explain to its partners the various options available. Given the continued need for support where UNDP is expected to manage or administer trust funds, not only in the context of post-conflict recovery but also for post-disaster recovery, greater attention should be given to the institutional arrangements to manage this issue more effectively at the corporate level.

Conclusion 5: UNDP has demonstrated that it can be an effective partner and participant in peacebuilding. Problems arising during the transition to peacebuilding point to a lack of logistical and substantive preparedness, as well as a reduction in donor funding after the drawdown of the integrated mission.

The planning process at the start of integrated missions has no equivalent in the transition to peacebuilding and the drawdown of peacekeeping operations. The civilian capacities review and the recent development of new United Nations transition guidelines should provide an opportunity for more effective, actionable inter-agency planning and budgeting.

UNDP has effectively promoted dialogue between governments and civil society at national and local levels, enabling a broadening of the constituency for peacebuilding. The United Nations Conflict Prevention Partnership (where ‘deliver as one’ is the mantra) and the Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action (chaired by UNDP) are both useful entry points to increase coherence in conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. The Framework Team is particularly useful in providing programme design and strategic advice to the Resident Coordinator.

Conclusion 6: UNDP has achieved a measure of success in expanding opportunities for women to participate more fully in the emerging political and legal landscape of post-conflict countries. Notable successes include the expansion of female access to justice in some countries, especially for survivors of sexual and gender-based
violence. UNDP has been less successful in its efforts to improve the gender balance of its own staff working in conflict countries.

The eight-point agenda for gender equality has been an important UNDP effort and a potential blueprint for the wider United Nations system. It has yet to be harnessed as the working gender strategy in integrated missions.

4.1.2 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING UNDP RESPONSE MECHANISMS AT HEADQUARTERS AND AT OPERATIONAL LEVELS DURING PERIODS OF TRANSITION IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

Conclusion 7: UNDP has yet to strike an optimal balance between direct programme implementation and national implementation in many conflict countries. Direct service delivery may escalate the achievement of specific outcomes and may be initially necessary to safeguard against corruption. However, it also runs the risk of weakening institutions that countries must rely on over the long term.

The need for sustainability can sometimes clash with the desire to ‘get the job done’, particularly in countries where capacity constraints are profound. UNDP typically works in conflict settings through project support units, operating in parallel to the national public sector. The wage and benefit incentives used to attract talented staff for these assignments are, in fact, salary stipends, and they often create major distortions in the public service labour market. As noted by the Secretary-General in the August 2011 report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict, it is important to “avoid any negative impact on national capacity-development, for example the brain drain of local capacity to international and bilateral organizations.”

Conclusion 8: UNDP operational effectiveness and efficiency has been improving, with clear evidence that the organization can now respond quicker and more effectively to requests for assistance in the wake of conflict and disaster events. Continuing improvements are needed, however, as the logistical, recruitment and procurement procedures UNDP uses remain in many cases insufficient to the demands of a highly fluid conflict environment.

UNDP’s surge initiative and fast-tracking procedures have gone some way to addressing the challenge of a shortage of skilled staff on hand at the outbreak of conflict. While temporary rapid deployment may help achieve immediate recovery aims, there are trade-offs, as the very nature of fragile states demands time to build relationships and trust. UNDP effectiveness in conflict situations will remain contingent on the quality and capabilities of in-country management and staff. Selecting skilled staff to fill appointments in countries at risk for conflict and carrying out robust training programmes for staff in these countries constitute the two most important actions to ensure UNDP effectiveness.

UN Volunteers comprise one third of all international civilian personnel in eight of the nine primary case study countries hosting an integrated mission. It is therefore important for UNDP to recognize the important contributions these volunteers make to peace and development.

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: UNDP should significantly enhance the quality and use of conflict analysis at the country level, including guidance and standard operating procedures detailing when and how analyses should be developed and periodically updated. Effective analyses of needs and risks should, crucially, lead to a theory

of change for the planned UNDP support, and then directly to a sequence of activities and a means of measuring progress against objectives.

There is at present no UNDP-based standard operating procedure for when and how to conduct conflict analysis. As a result, the way in which these analyses are conducted, in both substantive and procedural terms, varies across UNDP. Nevertheless, there are country-level experiences that demonstrate the value of conducting and regularly updating conflict analyses. The UNDP experience in Nepal is illustrative – on the basis of its ongoing conflict analysis the UNDP country office was able to provide vital strategic oversight throughout the country’s civil war and subsequent peacebuilding process.

**Recommendation 2:** UNDP should make greater efforts to translate corporate management cooperation between UNDP, DPKO and DPA to the specifics of country priorities and the sequencing of interventions. This would imply a more central role for UNDP in the planning stages at the beginning of integrated missions and then through the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and in the drawdown of an integrated mission. Clear corporate guidelines and criteria need to be developed in this regard.

The IMPP has proved a useful and structured mechanism for ensuring UNDP involvement at the inception of a mission. Yet our case studies indicate that UNDP’s influence in the process remains relatively small compared to the influence of actors focussed on security and political concerns.

**Recommendation 3:** UNDP should be unambiguous in establishing what recovery projects are eligible for inclusion in a Consolidated Appeal Process or its equivalent. UNDP should make better use of situation teams that convene quickly during the outbreak of conflicts.

Experience with the Early Recovery Cluster in recent crises has highlighted confusion over the kinds of recovery projects that are deemed eligible for inclusion in a Consolidated Appeal Process or its equivalent. In some cases critics contend that too much attention has been paid to crisis security, law-and-order measures and transitional justice, and not enough to longer term planning and capacity building efforts.

**Recommendation 4:** Greater attention should be given to institutional arrangements in order to more effectively manage and disseminate knowledge on pooled multi-donor trust funds at the corporate level – and how this can serve country offices requested to manage such funds.

Until recently, UNDP’s global experience in managing multi-partner trust funds was not systematically captured. Such knowledge is useful when a UNDP country office needs to explain to its partners the various trust funds options and how to set up a trust fund. A 2012 independent evaluation noted the effective operation of the firewall in the management of the MPTF. Yet given the continued need for support when UNDP is expected to manage or administer trust funds in the context of post-conflict recovery as well as post-disaster recovery, more attention is needed on conveying the institutional arrangements to partners.

**Recommendation 5:** To reinforce the importance of ‘delivering as one’ in post-conflict settings, the UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Executive Board should raise with the United Nations Secretariat and Security Council, for their consideration, the importance of establishing clear guidance on division of labour and resources during the drawdown of integrated missions. This would help to ensure that individual organizations such as UNDP are adequately prepared for their enhanced role during transition and post-transition.

In 2011, the Secretary-General endorsed the report of the Review of Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict, which recommended enhancing the United Nations’ use of standing civilian capacities. The recommendations underscored UNDP’s pivotal role in resource mobilization and development support in post-conflict
settings. They also called for UNDP to take the lead in clusters relating to core national governance functions, justice and capacity development.

For UNDP, the period of transition from peacekeeping operations is complex and sensitive. This is the point at which UNDP support activities often take on greater significance in consolidating a country’s progress away from conflict. The effective management of these transitions is of particular interest at present, as several peacekeeping operations are soon to wind down, with support continuing through integrated peacebuilding offices, country teams and special political missions. New United Nations transition guidelines should provide an opportunity for more effective, actionable inter-agency planning and budgeting.

Recommendation 6: Cooperation with international financial institutions, including the World Bank, should be further developed in the areas of joint approaches to post-crisis needs assessments and crisis prevention planning.

UNDP has been expanding its partnerships with IFIs in post-conflict situations. For instance, post-crisis needs assessments are being developed through a collaborative scoping exercise undertaken by the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank. These assessments help to identify the infrastructure and government support activities needed to support countries as they move towards recovery.

The IMPP has been designed to help achieve a common understanding of strategic objectives in a particular country, by engaging all relevant parts of the United Nations system, and to provide an inclusive framework for action that can also engage external partners, such as the IFIs, regional organizations and bilateral donors.

Recommendation 7: UNDP should establish an internal human resources programme designed to prepare and place female staff in conflict settings and should set tighter benchmarks for offices to meet gender targets.

UNDP has a mixed record of accomplishment in terms of the gender balance of its work force in some conflict-affected countries. In Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010, only 23 percent of the staff was female. In post-crisis Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, only two women were employed, neither in key posts. This poor gender ratio is replicated in the integrated United Nations mission in Côte D’Ivoire. The reasons given relate to difficulties in finding qualified French-speaking women willing to work in unstable environments.

Recommendation 8: All programming for conflict-affected countries should articulate a clear exit strategy. Direct implementation projects should be required to justify why they cannot be nationally executed and should include capacity development measures and a time frame for transitioning to national implementation modalities.

It is clear that building national and subnational capacity takes time and depends on many factors, including a robust education system. But UNDP has yet to strike an optimal balance between direct programme implementation and national implementation in many conflict countries. Direct service delivery can escalate the achievement of specific outcomes, and it may be initially necessary to safeguard against corruption. However, it also runs the risk of weakening institutions that countries must rely on over the long term. The capacity for governing that gets built through UNDP support can be quickly eroded by a ‘brain drain’ that takes trained national counterparts to new jobs either in the private sector or, perversely, in international aid organizations such as the United Nations.

Recommendation 9: UNDP should expand its staff training programmes for countries identified as at risk for conflict, revise hiring procedures for staff to stress experience in conflict settings and provide additional incentives for experienced staff to continue working in conflict-affected hardship posts.

UNDP’s surge initiative and fast-tracking procedures have gone some way to addressing the
shortage of skilled staff on hand at the outbreak of conflict; however, the effectiveness of UNDP in conflict situations will remain contingent on the quality and capabilities of in-country management and staff. Selecting skilled staff to fill appointments in countries at risk for conflict, and carrying out robust training programmes for staff in these countries, constitute the two most important actions to ensure UNDP effectiveness.

**Recommendation 10: UNDP should establish new guidance for project development in crisis-affected countries, including generic sets of benchmarks and indicators. This should also include monitoring, evaluation and reporting on progress in conflict settings.** These tools should build from programme indicators developed in non-conflict contexts and then be revised to reflect changed circumstances brought on by conflict.

New guidance is needed, as UNDP lacks a coherent and systematic assessment of progress towards CPR objectives within country support programmes. Specific indicators or benchmarks have not been established for UNDP work in crisis environments, and there is no consistent practice for setting baselines at the outset of country-based projects in order to track progress.
Annex 1

KEY DEFINITIONS

Governance: The exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. Governance encompasses government and all other relevant groups, including the private sector and civil society organizations.139

Fragile states: Countries and territories experiencing armed conflict, emerging from armed conflict, or affected by acute political, social and economic vulnerability and susceptible to chronic forms of organized criminal violence.140

The social contract: A dynamic agreement between states and societies on their mutual roles and responsibilities.141

Capacity development: The process by which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time.142

Reintegration: The process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities. Part of a country’s general development, reintegration is a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.143

Conflict-affected country: A country that in its recent past has experienced, is in the midst of experiencing or demonstrates the risk factors for violent unrest between forces (both organized and informal groups) that generally emerge from disputes over the distribution of resources (financial, political, natural, etc.) in a given society.144

Nation building: Actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and to mobilize a population behind a parallel state-building project. Nation building may or may not contribute to peacebuilding.145

Peacebuilding: Action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.146

140 UNDP BCPR, Bureau for Development Policy, Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract, January 2012.
144 Own definition, derived from common usage.
145 Ibid. Confusingly equated with post-conflict stabilisation and peace building in some recent scholarship and US political discourse.
**Peacekeeping:** Deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both preventing conflict and making peace.\(^{147}\)

**Peacemaking:** Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Preventive diplomacy:** Action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur.

**Rule of law:** A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.\(^{148}\)

**Stabilization:** Action undertaken by international actors to reach a termination of hostilities and consolidate peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict.\(^{149}\)

**Theories of change:** Theories of change can take the simple format: “Successful action X will produce Y (movement towards peace).” Or the chain of logic might involve multiple steps: “action X will lead to Y, which will encourage Z, which will exert an influence on key actor A”. To create, uncover or test a theory of change, tools of analysis (e.g. conflict analysis) should be in place to spell out how the intervention (project, programme or policy) should create change.

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147 Ibid.


149 OECD/DAC, *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations*, 2008. The term dominant in US and UK policy, usually associated with military instruments, usually seen as having a shorter time period than peace building, and (particularly in US literature) associated with a post-9/11 counterterrorism agenda.

Annex 2

TERMS OF REFERENCE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

It is widely accepted that violent conflict can have a profound effect on human development. Conflict can reverse decades of development gains and is a major impediment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.150 Conversely, where there are accountable, equitable and resilient state institutions, economic and social opportunities are important forms of preventing conflict as well as mitigating it.151

About 1.5 billion people live in areas where conflict limits their ability to live, work and go to school. During 2009, 36 violent conflicts occurred around the globe, overwhelmingly in developing countries with high levels of unemployment, a lack of recourse to justice structures and large youth populations.152

Since the United Nations Charter was signed in 1945, the United Nations system as a whole has concerned itself with addressing the relationship between violent conflict and human development. Since UNDP was formed in 1965, it has played a key role in providing development assistance to countries both to prevent conflict before it occurs and to help in recovery in its aftermath. This role continues to evolve in keeping with the changing nature of conflict and the role of the United Nations. In both operational and organizational terms, and in parallel with its multiple partners in United Nations peace operations, UNDP has increasingly oriented its work to address the structural dimensions of modern conflicts, including the root causes of cross-border/intercountry and intra-national violence.

The paradigm for development support in conflict-affected countries continues to shift. The current operational landscape is characterized by new and fluid forms of internal conflict and organized crime at a time of financial austerity among donor countries. Political uncertainty is heightened in many countries by the growing impacts of climate change on resource scarcity. Where conflict is acute, the necessity for large multidimensional peacekeeping operations continues, as does the need for longer term peacebuilding and development assistance in post-conflict ‘transition’ periods. Both inside and outside the United Nations system many agencies are engaged in this endeavour. The challenge for UNDP is to continually reappraise and reassert its comparative advantage in a crowded arena.

With increasing demand for assistance with state reconstruction, governance, rule of law and security, as well as the complementary ‘traditional’ sectors of social and economic development, it is likely that demand for UNDP assistance in conflict-affected countries will continue to grow. With this in mind, the Evaluation Office, at the request of the UNDP Executive Board, is carrying out a thematic evaluation of UNDP’s assistance


to conflict-affected countries. Its purpose is to assess performance and results and to recommend improvements, as warranted.

**UNDP IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES**

As noted in the UNDP Strategic Plan, General Assembly resolution 62/208 requests the United Nations to contribute to the development of national capacities at all levels to manage conflict as well as post-conflict situations. UNDP assists countries that face imminent conflict and have experienced severe disruptions in critical national or local capacities, and it assists countries that have been designated by the Security Council or Peacebuilding Commission as having a priority-conflict situation. Operating through over 100 country offices, UNDP plays a key role in conflict transitions, providing a bridge between humanitarian relief and longer term recovery and development.¹⁵³

The organization’s current level of activity in conflict-affected countries is the result of an evolutionary process within UNDP and the broader United Nations system, which has increasingly incorporated conflict sensitivity into its work. In 2001, UNDP launched a second policy bureau specifically focused on crisis prevention and recovery, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

UNDP works in three types of conflict situations loosely defined by the kind of conflicts and the different expectations for UNDP from the United Nations, donors and partner countries:

1) In countries with Security Council or peacekeeping mandate: UNDP is active in 21 countries with a Security Council mandate, where United Nations agencies work jointly within an integrated framework.

2) In situations where there is no Security Council mandate or United Nations peacekeeping presence, yet where conflict is sufficiently widespread and pervasive that UNDP crisis prevention and recovery activities constitute its primary focus.

3) In countries facing low-level conflict, which may be contained in specific regions, where UNDP manages a full array of programmes and projects across each of its practice areas,¹⁵⁴ in addition to crisis prevention and recovery support.

In addition to policy and technical support, UNDP provides administrative services as manager of the United Nations Resident Coordinator system. This takes on added significance when countries are in crisis.

The UNDP 2008–2013 Strategic Plan¹⁵⁵ identifies the immensely disruptive impact of conflict on development and sets out a variety of anticipated support activities. The expectation is that in conflict-affected countries UNDP should:

1) Work to address conflict risks before they lead to violence;

2) Support capacity-building for conflict mitigation and early recovery responses; and

3) Have predictable funding and resource mechanisms capable of rapid deployment in times of urgency.

The Strategic Plan states that early recovery actions in conflict-affected countries will focus

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¹⁵⁴ UNDP practice areas: poverty alleviation, governance, environment and sustainable development, and crisis prevention and recovery, as well as ‘cross-cutting’ issues such as gender and south–south partnerships.

especially on establishing norms and guidelines; providing assessment and programming tools to support country-level recovery processes; and supporting advocacy to boost funding for recovery efforts. Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators will receive enhanced support so they can:

1) Initiate the planning process for recovery during the humanitarian phase;

2) Ensure better integration of crisis prevention, risk reduction and cross-cutting issues into early recovery and existing programmes;

3) Develop alternatives for improving resource mobilization for early recovery; and

4) Improve access to surge capacity.

UNDP has indicated that it will emphasize its support for the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and will collaborate with the United Nations Capital Development Fund to access a broad range of financial products, services and training.

UNDP post-crisis activities under the Strategic Plan include providing assistance with rehabilitation of productive assets and infrastructure and support for measures to strengthen community and other local organizations. UNDP intends also to help create secure environments through measures to build local and national capacities to demine farms and fields, reduce the availability of small arms and the incidence of armed violence, and support the reintegration of former combatants and other conflict-affected groups in host communities. Finally, the Plan notes that UNDP will ensure that gender empowerment is emphasized throughout all UNDP activities in crisis-affected countries.

**WORKING DEFINITION**

This evaluation uses the following definition for the term ‘conflict affected’:

- Conflict affected refers to a country that has recently experienced, is in the midst of or demonstrates the risk factors for violent unrest between forces (both organized and informal groups) that generally emerge from disputes over the distribution of resources (financial, political, natural, etc.) in a given society.\(^{156}\)

Using this formulation allows us to classify conflict-affected states according to the conflict phase, distinguishing states at risk of conflict, states in the midst of conflict and post-conflict states emerging from external or civil war.\(^{157}\)

Beyond this key definition, most of the terms to be used throughout the evaluation are derived from existing United Nations terminology, with a few from recent OECD/DAC documents.

**PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES**

In line with the broad objectives laid out in the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2013, the purpose of this thematic evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of UNDP’s evolving role in conflict-affected settings, particularly in situations where UNDP plays an important role during and immediately after a United Nations integrated peace operation. The time period for the evaluation is primarily from 2006 to the present, though the background to the evaluation will address events further back in time to explicate the evolution of UNDP approaches to conflict. Where there has been a Security Council mandate, and where

\(^{156}\) Derived from common usage.

\(^{157}\) While the evaluation will use the term conflict-affected, the evaluation team is aware that donors are increasingly interested in and concentrating resources on what are broadly termed ‘fragile states’. State fragility is not a clear-cut condition but rather exists on a continuum from collapsed states to well-functioning states. Fragile states are defined as those whose government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the population. These core functions generally consist of security, the rule of law, delivery of basic public goods and services, political legitimacy and development. Apart from reference to other studies, we will not use the term ‘fragile states’ in this evaluation.
UNDP works within a United Nations integrated framework, the evaluation will ask a number of broad questions relating to the mandate, operational efficiency, resource capacity and comparative advantage of the organization in a competitive aid environment. Drawing evidence from country case studies, it will also look at UNDP’s contribution to developing national capacities for conflict prevention, mitigation and recovery.

As with all UNDP evaluations, the study will (i) provide support to the Administrator’s accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board; (ii) support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in programme countries; and (iii) contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels. The evaluation will result in a set of conclusions and recommendations that will aim to strengthen UNDP’s delivery of development assistance in conflict-affected countries, especially in relation to other development partners.

**Objective One:** With reference to the UNDP Strategic Plan, assess how UNDP programming and policies support peacebuilding and how UNDP supports a country’s transition from immediate post-conflict to development.

The first objective is to assess UNDP achievements in conflict-affected countries with Security Council mandates against the objectives set out in the 2008–2013 Strategic Plan. In line with common practice, the evaluation will address relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, taking into account associated issues of partnerships, coordination and coherence.

An important element of this first objective is to enquire from partners in the wider United Nations system how they perceive the UNDP role in conflict situations, whether this role could or should be enhanced, and what comparative advantage UNDP is demonstrably capable of exploiting. Here we will consider, for example (i) the linkage between development and conflict, asking whether UNDP’s strategic approach, post-United Nations reform, allows an appropriate balance in approaches between the two; and (ii) the UNDP role and contribution to policies and strategies in peacebuilding at global and regional levels.

A previous evaluation of UNDP support to conflict-affected countries was carried out by the UNDP Evaluation Office in 2006. Its stated purpose was to evaluate the extent to which UNDP has helped “address the structural conditions conducive to conflict so that a recurrence of armed conflict could be prevented”. The evaluation findings suggest that UNDP plays an essential support role to conflict-affected states and has established expertise in several post-conflict areas. Nevertheless, the report concludes that UNDP has been hampered in delivering on its stated goals by a series of institutional, resource and operational challenges that limit its ability to adequately address the root causes of conflict. The evaluation suggests that in order to be a more effective and reliable actor, UNDP should build substantive capacity in core areas of peacebuilding, improve the effectiveness of implementation and enhance coordination and partnerships. Five years later, the current evaluation will follow up on these previous findings and conclusions and gauge the extent to which perceived shortcomings have been addressed and recommendations taken up.

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158 The previous evaluation identified recovery and reintegration of war-affected populations; the restoration of state authority and governance capacity-building; and reform of the justice and security sectors as areas of activity in conflict-affected countries where UNDP had developed expertise. See UNDP, Evaluation Office, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-affected Countries, DP/2007/3 (5 November 2006, New York). The evaluation also considered the changing character of conflicts around the world and the international response to growing human security concerns. Further, UNDP’s policies and operations in conflict-affected countries were examined in the context of United Nations reform, especially integrated United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. (DP/2007/3 (5 November 2006, New York).
Objective Two: Consider how UNDP response mechanisms function at headquarters and at operational levels during periods of transition in conflict-affected countries.

Whereas the first objective looks very much at corporate-level strategies, approaches and partnerships, the second one explores how they play out at operational levels, and the manner in which headquarters, regional bureaux and country offices relate. The key question here is whether the UNDP programme management approach and strategy are conducive to an effective and proactive role in post-conflict support. We will consider how UNDP functions strategically at headquarters and at operational levels in conflict-affected countries and assess whether its crisis response and management mechanisms are calibrated appropriately for carrying out the expected support. In particular, we will evaluate the UNDP contribution to post-conflict state building, looking at how UNDP has promoted national ownership and capacity development. This includes assessing whether rapid and predictable funding and human resource support are available and being used in such situations.

Attention will be given to how UNDP supports gender-related issues. These are usually articulated in programme design and implementation, but conflict can exacerbate deep structural fissures that manifest themselves in forms of gender-based violence and political discrimination, for example. Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) specifically recognizes the under-valued and under-used contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It also stresses the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security. Since UNIFEM (now UN-Women) is a relatively small actor, UNDP has assumed an important role in this respect. The evaluation will explore how UNDP has interpreted and promoted this resolution in practice and the changes that have taken place as a result.

For our purposes here we choose the key ‘transition’ phase, at which point there is a withdrawal of military-based and multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Here we will assess UNDP’s strategic and operational response and ask where its comparative advantage lies. This transition period is of particular concern at present as several United Nations peacekeeping operations are soon to withdraw from conflict-affected countries and hand over tasks to successor operations (integrated peacebuilding offices, United Nations country teams, special political missions, etc.).

For UNDP, the period of transition from peacekeeping operations is complex and sensitive, a time when its support activities may take on elevated significance in consolidating a country’s progress away from conflict.

Considerable research and debate has been conducted on the political and logistical process of withdrawing a United Nations peacekeeping presence, but little has been done that highlights the impact this has on UNDP’s planning processes and working methods, both at headquarters and in the country. Nevertheless, transition periods from peacekeeping to follow-on operations have and will continue to define an important portion of UNDP’s operational landscape. This evaluation provides an opportunity to contribute to this ongoing dialogue by providing an assessment, through case study

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159 These include countries where a peacekeeping withdrawal has taken place, like Burundi, Chad, Nepal and Sierra Leone, or countries where peacekeeping missions are incrementally preparing for withdrawal, like Haiti, Liberia and Timor-Leste. Meanwhile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and several others represent a different type of transition country, where the peacekeeping mission is not withdrawing, but an operational transformation therein holds equally important implications for UNDP’s support role.

research, of how UNDP reacts and prepares for the withdrawal of integrated peacekeeping operations and what best practices and lessons learned can be applied in future.

During periods of transition UNDP is often seen as a ‘provider of last resort’ for the United Nations in conflict-affected countries—a role that can become more acute when resources associated with a peacekeeping operation are withdrawn. A recent donor assessment has suggested that being a ‘provider of last resort’ leads to inefficient use of UNDP resources, an overstretched portfolio and often contradictory roles in conflict-affected countries.161 This evaluation will delve further into this finding by (i) analysing the decision-making process, along with results in several cases; (ii) addressing whether alternative ‘last resort’ options for the United Nations should be considered; and then (iii) identifying how UNDP may want to build capacity to handle these demands in the future.

**SCOPE**

Although the emphasis will be on ongoing programmes measured against the Strategic Plan, the evaluation will seek to put UNDP current strategic plans into historic context. It will look at the evolution of United Nations and UNDP work in conflict-affected countries over the last two decades and in particular since the beginning of this millennium. The opening chapter of the evaluation will briefly trace this history, though the substantive evaluative study will concentrate on the last five years.

The study will include an overview of UNDP work in the 80-plus countries it has identified as facing or experiencing violent tensions.162 A typology of roles and programmes will indicate the extent of this engagement. This will provide an important backdrop to the more detailed case studies that concentrate on the aforementioned ‘transition’ period and forms the core of the evaluation.

The evaluation will assess UNDP’s broad set of programme activities in conflict-affected countries and will extrapolate and conflate findings that will be represented as ‘corporate’. The process will include three levels of analysis: global, regional and country. The evaluation will not, however, posit new findings or recommendations specific to any one country. Instead the case studies will serve as examples to emphasize higher level issues, complimented by an overview of approaches adopted by the corresponding Regional Bureaux.

At a global level, the study will look at how the UNDP partnership with DPKO and DPA in particular has strengthened the United Nations peacebuilding architecture, how this is understood by the partners and what added value the organization brings to the table. Insofar as UNDP has a unique role to play both during and after an integrated peacekeeping mission, where are the potential or real areas of tension, and is UNDP able to meet expectations in transition periods?

Where regional approaches are promoted, particularly where a particular conflict has regional ramifications, we will explore the extent to which UNDP has encouraged and promoted these, and to what effect. The regional dimensions will be captured in two respects:

1. The extent to which the conflict itself spreads beyond borders, whether regional peacekeeping forces and/or mediation efforts are undertaken by regional bodies and whether the United Nations system as a whole has adopted a regional and integrated approach to the situation; and

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2. The extent to which UNDP itself, through its Regional Bureaux, has purposely adopted regional programmes and approaches that include frequent communication between country offices and supplementary technical and managerial support from the bureau.

At a country level, though these are invariably very context-specific, we will ask which approaches have common currency beyond the country in question and what lessons can be learned from these examples. The case studies are drawn from four of the five UNDP regional bureaux, though understandably a greater number are from Africa. A rationale for these is presented in Annex 2B. The sample is purposive, chosen on the basis of which countries best represent the transition period and the important differences between some of these situations.

They thus form the evidence base for a broader set of questions addressed in the Main Report. In some cases we will draw upon the assessment of development results (ADR) studies produced by the Evaluation Office on individual countries. Overall, we examine the common strengths, weaknesses and lessons that are exhibited across the sample. Obviously, the case studies cannot cover the full gamut of UNDP programmes, but rather, through a series of specific questions, they draw out lessons common to most countries and circumstances. In other words, since this is a thematic study of strategy, approach, operational capacity and institutional coherence, less emphasis is given to the specificities of the country programmes, in favour of putting greater emphasis on how the organization as a whole responded to the challenges inherent in working in a transitional conflict setting.

Where country visits are undertaken, the team will visit the regional service centre as part of the fieldwork. In the final evaluation report, country case studies will be grouped by regional bureau and, where appropriate, preceded with an analysis of the regional issues that inform operations and programmes in the individual countries.

### METHODOLOGY

#### KEY CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS

The evaluation will be conducted through a combination of country visits, desk-based case studies and research, and a series of interviews with stakeholders including other United Nations agencies, donors, NGOs, UNDP partners, academicians and independent researchers. In accordance with United Nations Evaluation Group norms and standards, at a minimum the evaluation will seek to distil findings on programme outcomes in terms of their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact.

In addition to UNDP guidance, note will be taken of the recent guidance piloted by OECD/DAC entitled ‘Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities’. It includes useful definitions of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, as well as important information on how to develop conflict analyses and whether to establish a ‘theory of change’ for conflict-oriented evaluations. The inherent theory of change found in much of UNDP’s programme design will be explored more fully than has typically been the case.

Since this is primarily a policy and strategy analysis, three major methodological elements will be taken into account: agenda setting, policy development and policy implementation.

- Agenda setting evaluates how the discussion on policy options was articulated and which ideas were brought forward. This step includes the involvement of internal and external stakeholders and their input to the decision-making process. The key question for this analytical step is: Why was the policy developed?
- Policy development evaluates the transformation of the agenda setting into policy as a response to the needs and necessities for promoting conflict prevention/mitigation. Here, the key question is: How was the policy developed?
- Policy implementation evaluates the steps
taken in relation to strategic documents and the transformation of the policy framework into action. Accordingly, the key question for this step is: How were processes and strategies employed?

Extrapolating from this, the main report will address the key questions detailed in Table A1.

The above set of ‘higher level’ questions will be informed by findings from country case studies that are expected to indicate at a minimum:

- The main forms/type of assistance provided by UNDP and the broader United Nations system in the country context;
- The extent to which the design and implementation of UNDP assistance is based on a comprehensive conflict assessment and implementation strategy (theory of change);
- The level of coordination between the United Nations and other international actors working in conflict-affected countries, and the extent to which UNDP capitalizes on partnerships in the United Nations system and among IFIs.

### Table A1. Key evaluation questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation objective</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>Method of enquiry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 1:</strong> With reference to the UNDP Strategic Plan, assess how UNDP programming and policies support peacebuilding and how UNDP supports a country’s transition from immediate post-conflict to development.</td>
<td>In considering the link between development and conflict, has the UNDP strategic approach, post-United Nations reform, allowed an appropriate balance in approaches between the two? How effective have been UNDP’s role and contribution to policies and strategies in peacebuilding at global and regional levels?</td>
<td>In addition to enquiry at all levels of the organization, it will be important to take into account external academic and independent analysis and evaluation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How well does UNDP conduct context analysis and diagnostic work and then translate this knowledge into strategy and programme development? How well does UNDP analyse and manage the risks inherent in engagement in conflict-affected countries?</td>
<td>Through case studies, existing literature and enquiry of monitoring and evaluation (M&amp;E) methods, examine levels of consistency, application and dissemination of context (conflict analysis). Also, how are risks assessed and how are decisions made over implementing high/low risk programmes? What level of backstopping has been available through BCPR?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How adaptable and rapidly does UNDP react to changing situations? This is particularly the case in periods of transition, post-Security Council mandate, where UNDP is asked to scale up its activities.</td>
<td>Backed by case studies, examine surge capacity, skill sets and the sequencing of these in the context of particular events.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In considering the comparative advantage of UNDP, what are the inherent opportunities and constraints that UNDP has as a United Nations institution with a distinct mandate? Has this been adequately exploited? Have there been opportunities at a regional level that have or could have been used?</td>
<td>Wider enquiry among United Nations agencies (DPKO, DPA, OCHA) as well as UNDP itself. Perceptions over added value of UNDP and its ability to fulfil expectations, especially in transition periods. Assessment of the effectiveness of UNDP as lead agency in the Early Recovery Cluster system and of the joint UNDP/DPA arrangement (PDAs). Regional issues explored through bureaux.</td>
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<td>How does UNDP respond to the changing external financing environment for countries in conflict (where earmarked voluntary funding is increasingly replacing core funding, with a greater demand for impact results)?</td>
<td>Enquiry at UNDP headquarters and regional bureaux over changing funding patterns and donor expectations and responses. Apart from global concerns, assessment of whether the two main BCPR funding mechanisms – Thematic Trust Fund and TRAC 1.1.3 – have been adequate to demands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- The level of coordination with national actors in identifying priority areas for UNDP work in conflict-affected countries;

- The flexibility (or lack thereof) of UNDP structures in the field and at headquarters to adjust operationally and strategically to shifts in a given context (outbreak of conflict, withdrawal of military peacekeepers, conflict triggers such as resource scarcity, elections, post disaster, increased organized crime);

- The extent to which gender-related concerns are articulated in programming design and implementation.

## Portfolio/Historical Review

The documentation on UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries is vast, covering both conflict and development foci. The evaluation cannot provide a comprehensive bibliography.

### Table A1. Key evaluation questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation objective</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>Method of enquiry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2:</td>
<td>Are the UNDP programme management approach and strategy conducive to an effective and proactive role in post-conflict support? How effective has its post-conflict state building agenda been, notably in relation to national ownership and capacity development?</td>
<td>Enquiry at bureau and country levels, particularly through RC/HC and RR. Also through OCHA and Special Representative of the Secretary-General offices as appropriate.</td>
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<td>How conflict sensitive is UNDP? Does UNDP apply an explicit 'do no harm' set of principles at an operational level, across the full array of programming and among its partners? How well does UNDP deal with the tensions and risks inherent in working in conflict-affected countries?</td>
<td>Primarily through case study enquiry, an examination of the differences between working in conflict and in more regular programming. Assessment of what adaptations are made and how well they are understood and applied.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How well does UNDP manage the tensions between its various functions (technical, administrative, programmatic) in conflict-affected environments? How effectively is UNDP able to integrate its programming within the wider United Nations mandate, and how comprehensive is the level of cooperation with other agencies?</td>
<td>Enquiry at bureau and country levels, particularly through RC/HC and RR, and through OCHA and SRSg offices as appropriate. An assessment of how well UNDP has used the United Nations Conflict Prevention Partnership; the added value of the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery; and whether there have been tensions between the UNDP’s coordination/management and implementation roles where UNDP has administered a multi-donor trust fund.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How well does UNDP capture and report on the results of its engagement in conflict-affected countries? Does UNDP acknowledge and report on an explicit theory of change? What kind of evaluation indicators are used to capture conflict-related programming? What level of national ownership of data has been promoted? How can UNDP best address the challenge of capturing results in emergent and rapidly changing contexts?</td>
<td>Enquiry through M&amp;E offices at country and bureau levels. Review of independent evaluations, reviews, etc. Reference back to BCPR.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How has UNDP interpreted and promoted Security Council Resolution 1325 (on gender issues in post-conflict) and what changes have been brought about as a result?</td>
<td>Enquiry through M&amp;E offices at country and bureau levels. Review of independent evaluations, reviews, etc. Reference back to BCPR.</td>
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</table>
but will identify key policy and programme documents canvassed across a broad range of sources from UNDP, the United Nations Secretariat and other United Nations agencies, plus IFIs and academia.

Documentation to be included in the programme review will include:

- UNDP policy and strategic documents relating to its support to conflict-affected countries;
- Policy and strategic documents generated by UNDP partners across the United Nations system, other international organizations and programme and donor countries;
- UNDP programme and project documents and results frameworks, monitoring and financial reports, and evaluations; and
- Academic literature that captures the current ‘state of the art’.

The portfolio review (i) helps to establish the boundaries of the evaluation, in particular the selection of country case studies and (ii) provides a bibliography annexed to the main report. Some key documents will have an annotated summary of key findings. A research consultant was hired by the Evaluation Office in February 2011 to begin this exercise. As is normal in evaluations that are primarily qualitative, the purpose of the document review is to triangulate and corroborate evidence from interviews and case studies.

Emerging from the programme review will be an account of the evolution of UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries over the last two decades. During this period, UNDP has increasingly prioritized its assistance in conflict-affected countries and developed multiple mechanisms that aim to enhance its support in this area. This descriptive historical section will be included in the evaluation report, providing the necessary contextual foundation for conducting case study research, analysing more recent UNDP work and providing potential recommendations.

EVALUABILITY

Qualitative evaluations are always open to conjecture. If triangulation—the bedrock of good evaluation practice—means asking three people in the same organization if they share the same opinion, nothing new will emerge. On the other hand, if the evaluator only consults UNDP detractors, the result will be equally biased. This said, a large part of what the evaluation articulates will already have a fairly wide consensus; the job of the evaluator is to bring it under one roof. Only where evaluative judgment is exercised will conjecture emerge. Thus the evaluation becomes a sounding board and a rare opportunity for reflection in an ever-changing environment.

To avoid the danger of making the scope of the evaluation over-ambitious, we have limited the enquiry to countries under a Security Council-mandated integrated United Nations mission, and more particularly to countries where this mandate is changing or drawing down, leaving a heightened role for UNDP. The evaluation will thus be limited by a judicious selection of key questions as outlined above, combined with the more specific country case study Evaluation Matrix (Annex 2B). This is neither a country programme evaluation nor a managerial appraisal. The danger is that the study will get sidetracked into an institutional appraisal of ‘who did what, and where?’ rather than become a learning exercise that derives generic lessons for the institution as a whole. It should also be forward as well as backward looking, with a series of targeted and realistic recommendations that, if accepted, can in five years time be evaluated as measurable objectives.

Another potential danger lies in the United Nations Evaluation Group evaluation criteria themselves: a highly effective programme can retrospectively receive an accolade for its relevance, despite having been unplanned and rather arbitrarily implemented during an inherently fluid and unfolding conflict situation. This is not to say that innovation is inappropriate—indeed,
flexibility and pragmatism are important tenets of conflict programming—but rather to recognize the tautology that results when a theory of change is retrospectively applied.

CONSTRAINTS

United Nations and other agency country offices, especially in high-profile conflict settings, are subject to ‘evaluation fatigue’. We will attempt to work around this by fielding only a small team (a maximum of two people per country, often just one) and ensuring that they are well briefed in advance, so they can avoid asking basic information questions and instead present a small set of succinct questions that cannot be answered through a literature review.

All country visits will be arranged through the Evaluation Office and at the convenience of the country office. Rarely will a country visit exceed 7-10 days, and rarely will it be necessary for the consultant to travel outside the capital, since this is not a project evaluation. Where possible, the consultants will arrange in advance their own interviews with individuals outside UNDP to minimize the administrative burden on the country office. However, consultants will adhere to all United Nations security protocols.

The evaluation will be subject to the common constraint of obtaining evidence and data from programmes that stretch back across several years. Most particularly, there is the challenge of high staff turnover and access to individuals who have moved on from the country or policy arena under study. Documentation may fill some gaps in this respect but rarely captures the full extent of the difficulties of working in a conflict environment.

There will be some predictable challenges of evaluating conflict-affected countries, including limited access to beneficiaries due to security and political constraints and data quality issues.

Finally, much of what UNDP does in conflict-affected countries is very specific to the context. For the most part, the evaluation deals with generic lessons that cut across countries, but examples particular to time and place will be used to highlight levels of complexity and the manner in which UNDP is able to adapt its response beyond a ‘one size fits all’ approach.

DATA COLLECTION

Each country case study, though brief (20 pages) will source (through footnotes) the accumulated literature of the past five years or so. This body of literature will form an organized bibliography attached to the main report.

Mixed methods will be used to obtain evidence:

- Review of programme/project documentation, including any additional evaluations that have become available to date.
- Interviews with relevant UNDP and other United Nations agency staff, government officials, donors, NGOs, funding mechanism managers, etc. At headquarters level such interviews will generally be restricted to UNDP, BCPR, DPKO, DPA and OCHA (see Annex 2C, provisional stakeholders list). In addition, the team will obtain an independent perspective from interviews with think tanks, academics, and other humanitarian actors.
- Focus group discussions with UNDP staff in country offices, possibly in a workshop format.
- Triangulation of information obtained from all sources.

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

To ensure consistency and a common approach to qualitative data collection and analysis, several relevant tools will be employed. These will include:

- The evaluation matrix, which covers the key evaluative criteria and related questions (Annex 2A);
CONDUCT OF THE EVALUATION

MAIN DELIVERABLES

The main output of the evaluation of UNDP’s assistance to conflict-affected countries will be a final evaluation report of approximately 60 pages excluding annexes. It will be a global thematic evaluation report covering the issues outlined here, including an executive summary based on the evaluation’s findings, recommendations and lessons learned. The final evaluation report will be presented and formatted in line with current Evaluation Office practice and will adhere to Evaluation Office and UNDP editorial guidelines.

The main deliverables of the evaluation will include:

- An Inception Report, describing the approach to the evaluation, including methodology, case study approach, team composition and responsibilities;
- A historical review of UNDP work in conflict-affected countries, included as a chapter in the main report. This chapter will outline UNDP’s organizational evolution in regard to addressing the development needs of conflict-affected countries as well as the context in which UNDP has worked during the evaluation period;
- Country and regional case study reports (11), produced by team members based on research generated during field research missions and on desk studies.
- The Final Report, with case studies as annex.
- A post-evaluation methodology brief describing the overall evaluation process, challenges and best practices. The brief will aim to share lessons from the evaluation process.

PHASES OF WORK

Table A2 details the implementation plan for the evaluation.

Table A2. Implementation plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Indicative timeline 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment of a Research Consultant</td>
<td>1 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct of initial document review and creation of concept note and terms of reference</td>
<td>1 February – 17 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment of Team Leader and Team Specialists</td>
<td>25 March – 30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination of personnel from relevant UNDP offices to participate in internal reference group activities</td>
<td>1 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of Evaluation Office Director’s external Advisory Panel</td>
<td>15 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team consultations with Evaluation Office, internal Reference Group and other headquarters-based stakeholders in New York</td>
<td>6–10 June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NEXT STEPS

Table A3 provides an overview of the indicative evaluation timetable.

EVALUATION TEAM

A core evaluation team comprising a Team Leader, Team Specialists and Research Consultant will carry out the evaluation. Additional team members, including nationals of the countries under study, will be hired as needed. A task manager appointed by UNDP Evaluation Office provides overall managerial and coordination support to the team.

MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE

The evaluation will be managed and conducted according to the UNDP Evaluation Policy, United Nations Evaluation Group norms and standards for evaluation, and the UNDP Evaluation Office methodology and procedural guidelines for thematic evaluations. UNDP Evaluation Office will oversee the evaluation and ensure its independence and credibility and the quality of the process and outputs.

Additionally, the following quality assurance mechanisms have been put in place for the evaluation:

- A senior Evaluation Office evaluator has been appointed to oversee all aspects of management and quality control of the evaluation. The Director and Deputy Director will provide oversight and guidance in the design and conduct of the evaluation.

- An internal Reference Group of headquarters-based UNDP peers has been constituted to provide periodic comments on the evaluation’s scope, methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations.

- An external Advisory Panel, comprising four senior experts with experience in conflict-affected countries, development and evaluation, has been established to advise the Director on the evaluation’s scope, methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A3. Evaluation timetable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliverable/Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Inception Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct of interviews/consultations with stakeholders at headquarters and in relevant organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of case studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct of country case studies, including field trips</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft evaluation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of tentative findings, conclusions and recommendations to UNDP stakeholders and Advisory Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of comments/edits on draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft final evaluation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation to an information session of the Executive Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal presentation to the Executive Board</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Terms of Reference Annex 2A

**EVALUATION MATRIX—COUNTRY/REGIONAL CASE STUDIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA</th>
<th>KEY QUESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
<td>Political and post-conflict situation. Key events over period including factors beyond control of development partners, MDG progress (and variation by gender, rural/urban, ethnic group, etc.); progress with peacebuilding and capable, accountable and responsive state-building. Importance of aid to the country and number of donors active in area. Key agreements/strategies/reviews that influenced UNDP’s work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td>With reference to the UNDAF, UNDP’s country programme document and five-year country programme action plan, has UNDP had a clear and focused country/sector strategy that explained the rationale for the interventions supported? What were the key underlying assumptions of the programme, and did these change over time (e.g., options considered, analysis done, choices made and why etc.)? To what extent were issues of conflict programming and responses adequately covered in the UNDAF/CPD?</td>
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<td>To what extent have country-specific strategies been aligned to the 2008-2011 UNDP Strategic Plan?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent were programme strategies (rule of law, DDR, mine action, needs assessment, etc.) based on a realistic analysis of the country situation, including political economy/conflict analysis? What analysis did the UNDP office undertake or draw on in developing its strategies and what tools/frameworks did it use? Were these appropriate/sufficient? Did the office consider the links between development and conflict?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over the period, how well were strategies aligned with development needs and policy priorities of the country (related to off-track MDGs? In line with peacebuilding strategy/needs, etc.)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent were strategies in line with corporate priorities, especially the 2008-2011 Strategic Plan? (Some reference can also be made to OECD/DAC fragile states policy [2005], and conflict guidelines, though these are not corporate documents.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were strategies in line with a focus on state-building and delivering security and justice for the poor – strengthening core functions of the state (e.g., security and justice, revenue mobilization) and improving accountability and legitimacy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were changes to strategies appropriate given the context, or were there too many/too few adaptations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk management</strong></td>
<td>How systematically did UNDP assess the external risks (i.e., political governance, conflict, economic and fiduciary) and the internal threats to the country strategy? Were regional and international factors assessed? Did UNDP consider the risk of potentially negative impacts of development assistance on the conflict situation? Were measures taken to minimize these (e.g., through UNDP’s Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive Approaches, associated conflict analysis tools, and peace and conflict impact assessment methods)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How comprehensive were plans to minimize the identified risks? What tools were used – e.g., scenario and contingency planning?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portfolio profile</strong></td>
<td>What interventions did UNDP support over the evaluation period? Was there an appropriate balance in the size and scope of the chosen portfolio?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP’s approach to gender and equity</strong></td>
<td>To what extent were UNDP gender strategies implemented – for example, the Policy Brief on Gender Sensitive Police Reform in Post-Conflict Settings? Does UNDP have an adequate mechanism to respond to significant and/or sudden changes in a conflict-affected country in respect of gender and vulnerability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results focus</strong></td>
<td>How far were UNDP’s planned interventions sufficiently results-focused and subject to monitoring? (Were there results frameworks? Was there a sufficient balance between quantitative and qualitative indicators to fully understand impact?) How far were the results of reviews used to reconsider design/direction of work, resources (financial and human) and staff allocation priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVALUATION CRITERIA</td>
<td>KEY QUESTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness and efficiency</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivering on strategy</td>
<td>How far were objectives set out in strategies achieved in practice (CAP performance objectives and other strategic outcomes)? What explains any areas of divergence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How effectively did the country office manage the strategic risks that emerged? To what extent did effective risk analysis assist UNDP’s engagement through the post-conflict transition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How did individual UNDP programmes function during the different phases of conflict (immediate post-conflict / humanitarian, post-conflict transition, new insurgency etc.)? What explains key successes and failures with regard to programme objectives? What were the roles of governmental and non-governmental actors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships</td>
<td>How did UNDP approach working with the United Nations country team; international finance institutions (World Bank, etc.); bilateral donors; the government (central, provincial, local); and civil society? Were there explicit strategies? What was the basis of any influencing agenda? Was the balance among chosen partners appropriate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Through the UNDAF process how effectively did UNDP work with other United Nations agencies? Was the UNDP sector work integrated with other United Nations agency work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did UNDP seek to strengthen harmonization across the United Nations system and the wider aid community?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How well did UNDP consult with development partners and communicate its aims and objectives to them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of resources</td>
<td>How far did planned spending and use of staff time reflect strategic objectives? Was there an appropriate balance between staffing in the country and in New York?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How effectively were surge operating procedures and deployments used?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Was geographic coverage too narrow or wide for the resources available?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were other donor resources and plans in the country taken into account to avoid over-aiding or under-aiding and aid volatility?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Was UNDP’s actual disbursement in line with expectations and plans? Were there any significant changes or delays?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How was staff time spent? (influencing, policy work, project/programme work, fieldwork, corporate reporting and activities, liaising with programme partners and other donors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Was the skill mix and continuity of staff appropriate to the country context and strategy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid effectiveness</td>
<td>How effective has UNDP been in pursuing its development agenda (including peacebuilding) with partners, including other United Nations agencies, the partner country government, civil society, NGOs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has UNDP operated in accordance with the emerging principles of aid effectiveness in fragile states? If not, why not? Have there been tensions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How well has UNDP communicated its results, lessons and good practice to the media and to a national (country) audience?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP’s delivery on gender and equity</td>
<td>With reference to UNDP’s Eight Point Agenda for Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality in CPR, how well were issues of gender and equity integrated across the programme?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were results disaggregated by gender, social group, etc.? What do the data show?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVALUATION CRITERIA</td>
<td>KEY QUESTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes and impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results measurement</td>
<td>How far were the objectives and performance indicators for individual UNDP interventions achieved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes and sustainability</td>
<td>What is the evidence to support the view that UNDP helped contribute to the peacebuilding process and/or improve the security situation in the country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent has the policy and governance environment (e.g. accountability, action on corruption) been strengthened? Is there evidence to show that technical assistance support is sustainable and renders results?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the evidence to show that UNDP has contributed to specific development outcomes (e.g., poverty reduction strategy paper) including ‘indirect’ benefits around policy dialogue?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are the development changes or reforms supported by UNDP’s country programme likely to be sustained / difficult to reverse? Have parallel systems been set up to deliver projects, and if so is there a plan to integrate them into government systems? To what extent has local capacity been built?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has UNDP added value through gains in aid effectiveness? For example, contributing analysis / tools/ support on harmonization?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengths and weaknesses of UNDP’s support programme</td>
<td>What are the key strengths demonstrated by UNDP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the key weaknesses demonstrated by UNDP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons</td>
<td>What lessons (from positive and negative findings) can be drawn for UNDP’s future work in the country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What lessons can be drawn more widely for UNDP and its work in other post-conflict and/or fragile situations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Terms of Reference Annex 2B
CASE STUDY SELECTION RATIONALE

To capture a comprehensive and evaluable picture of UNDP activities across the wide diversity of conflict-affected circumstances in which it works, the following set of criteria have been used in selecting the case study countries:

1. Considering the regional nature of conflict, UNDP’s regional orientation and variants of operational roles therein, the selection reflects a geographic distribution representing one or more case studies in four of the five UNDP regional bureaux.

2. To capture and assess how UNDP works at headquarters and in regional centres and country offices to incorporate conflict sensitivity into its work and how UNDP reacts when conflict emerges, the case selection includes countries that experienced an outbreak of violent conflict during the past decade.

3. Recognizing that UNDP operational partnerships with United Nations peace operations have significant impact on the nature and profile of UNDP’s work in conflict-affected countries, the case selection comprises countries where UNDP has operated in the presence of other United Nations actors under Security Council mandate (peacekeeping, peacebuilding, political missions).

4. Integrated peace operations have provided the operational frameworks for UNDP activities in many conflict-affected countries over the course of the last decade. Several of these operations will scale down or withdraw altogether in the near future, with attendant new demands on UNDP. The case selection includes countries where such a transition has occurred or will shortly occur.

5. Building on UNDP Evaluation Office’s ongoing work, the case study selection includes several countries simultaneously being assessed by the office in 2011 through the ADR process.163

6. This evaluation will be the second of its type, following one that was presented to the UNDP Executive Board in 2006. For purposes of measuring both the impact of that previous evaluation and the evolutionary progress of UNDP’s work in conflict-affected countries, the selection includes several countries included in the 2006 evaluation.164

Tables A4 and A5 present a selection of country cases broken down by region and chosen on the basis of the criteria described. Each country is on the list of Special Focus Countries created by BCPR in coordination with regional bureaux, selected on the basis of receiving what are called ‘proactive’ CPR interventions.

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163 The 2011 cohort of ADRs include the following countries that should be considered for conflict case studies: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka.

164 There were six case study countries in 2006: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country and rationale for selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td><strong>Burundi</strong> in 2004, in the aftermath of conflict, was host to a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). In 2006, ONUB was replaced by a Security Council-mandated United Nations integrated peacebuilding office (BINUB) and has since been on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. Burundi now hosts a special political mission, the United Nations Office (BNUB). Despite United Nations efforts, Burundi still exhibits many of the unresolved root causes of the previous conflict. As a case study, Burundi provides an opportunity to evaluate UNDP as an actor in a conflict-affected country that has seen the transition from a peacekeeping presence to a Security Council-mandated peacebuilding office and then to a political mission. The Burundi case study will require field research. <strong>Côte d’Ivoire</strong> has hosted an integrated peacekeeping operation (UNOCI) since 2004. The country experienced a widespread outbreak of conflict in 2011 that triggered UNDP’s emergency response mechanisms. There is also a regional dimension in terms of displaced persons and the emergency response in neighbouring Liberia. The Côte d’Ivoire case study will require field research. <strong>Democratic Republic of the Congo</strong> was one of the countries covered in the 2006 evaluation of UNDP work in conflict-affected countries and thus will allow the team to assess progress over the last five years. The country is also the focus of an ongoing ADR that will cover much of the same ground as this thematic evaluation. Democratic Republic of the Congo fulfills the following criteria: an ongoing conflict affects certain parts of the country; UNDP works in the overall framework of a Security Council-mandated integrated peacekeeping operation; and the beginnings of an operational transition are underway, with the peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) under pressure to withdraw. DRC will be a desk-based case study. <strong>Liberia</strong> has been host to an integrated peacekeeping mission (UNMIL) since 2003. UNMIL is now in the process of consolidation. It is on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda and receives UNDP-administered funding through the Peacebuilding Fund. Liberia provides the evaluation team with the opportunity to assess the UNDP contribution in conflict-affected countries in the framework of an integrated peacekeeping operation that in the process of drawdown and handover to a longer term presence. It also allows for assessment of the UNDP administrative role as custodian of the Peacebuilding Fund. The country is the focus of an ongoing ADR. Liberia will be a desk-based case study. <strong>South Sudan</strong> has been host to a Security Council-mandated integrated peacekeeping operation since its war with the North ended in 2005. UNDP has played a central role in the operation, holding positions of mission leadership in the South. The country is undergoing a major transition: the peacekeeping operation in South Sudan will be replaced by a new operation that will be military based yet have a strong peacebuilding focus. However, conflict is still widespread not only with Sudan (given that South Sudan became independent in 2011) but within the country. South Sudan will be a desk-based case study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong> is host to a Security Council-mandated peacekeeping operation (UNIFIL) and a special political mission (USCOL), both of which work closely with UNDP. The war between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006 elicited enhancements and increased activity on the part of both UNIFIL and USCOL. It also caused a shift in the UNDP programming profile to address the impacts of conflict. This context will provide the evaluation team with the opportunity to assess UNDP support in a country that has witnessed recent conflict transitions and where partnerships with other United Nations operations are central to addressing the causes of conflict. The Lebanon case study will require field research. <strong>Occupied Palestinian territory</strong> provides an opportunity to assess UNDP work in an extremely conflict-affected context, where Security Council-mandated peacekeeping operations provide traditional observer functions. The Palestine case study will require field research. <strong>Somalia</strong> has been subject to protracted conflict over decades. It has both a special political mission (UNPOS) and a regional peacekeeping operation (AMISOM), both mandated by the Security Council. Somalia was the subject of a recent ADR that highlighted both the UNDP difficulties in aiding development in conflict-affected settings and the issues of UNDP serving as provider of last resort in such circumstances. It is the focus of much international interest because of piracy (lack of rule of law) and terrorism. Somalia will be a desk-based case study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td><strong>Timor-Leste</strong> has been host to integrated peacekeeping operations since 1999 that have served as an interim administration as well as security provider. The most recent (UNMIT) was deployed in the second half of 2006. Now UNMIT is in the process of handing over policing security responsibilities to the Government. Timor-Leste has not been evaluated by the Evaluation Office since the country was established. The Timor-Leste case study will require field research. <strong>Haiti</strong> was included in the 2006 conflict evaluation. It is the host to a Security Council-mandated integrated peacekeeping operation. The devastating earthquake that hit the country in January 2010 has placed renewed emphasis on the work of the international community in helping the country recover from its years of conflict. The emphasis on rule of law and developmental aspects provide the evaluation the opportunity to assess UNDP performance and operational flexibility in an environment characterized by fluidity. Haiti will be a desk-based case study.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A5. Country characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Recent conflict (in the last decade)</th>
<th>Security Council mandate</th>
<th>Transition from peacekeeping operation (undergone or ongoing)</th>
<th>Recent/ongoing ADR</th>
<th>2006 evaluation report case study</th>
<th>Field research visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia and the Pacific</strong></td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab States</strong></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian territory</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America and the Caribbean</strong></td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Terms of Reference Annex 2C
PROVISIONAL LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS

The evaluation team will interview a wide range of stakeholders for the evaluation to take into account a diverse set of perspectives on UNDP's contribution and performance in conflict-affected countries. Table A6 provides a general list of stakeholder groups that the evaluation team will meet over the course of the evaluation. Each set of stakeholders includes both strategic and technical personnel so that gathered data addresses both global and operational evaluation questions. Table A6 is not exhaustive and will be added to during the evaluation process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Group</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>The team will carry out an extensive interview programme within UNDP, at the headquarters, regional centre and country office levels. This includes key persons in each of the Regional Bureaux as well as the two policy-level bureaux: BDP and BCPR. The evaluation team will seek strategic and operational level findings through these interviews to gain a comprehensive overview of policy and programmatic decisions and how they have impacted UNDP support in conflict-affected countries. All case studies will include interviews with the corresponding RR/RCs and Country Directors, plus key programme staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO/DPA/OCHA</td>
<td>Interviews with DPKO/DPA/OCHA personnel will be an important component of the evaluation process. Conducting interviews with DPKO/DPA/OCHA stakeholders will provide information both in terms of the perception of UNDP's general performance as a partner and UNDP's approach to sensitive conflict transition periods. Interviews will be conducted at the headquarters level with personnel working on both strategic and operational issues, and the evaluation team will also organize stakeholder interviews with DPKO/DPA when conducting country visits, as applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN peacebuilding architecture</td>
<td>UNDP has played both an administrative and operational role in the UN's peacebuilding architecture. The evaluation team will conduct interviews to gather information on both UNDP contributions to peacebuilding activities and performance in partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme country</td>
<td>UNDP's main operational partners and counterparts in national Governments in programming countries will be a critical focus of in-country interviews. These stakeholder interviews will provide unique perspectives on UNDP's role and performance in specific country contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia, policy think tanks, non-governmental organizations</td>
<td>Stakeholder interviews will be held with academics and policy think tanks to gain further insights into the perception of UNDP's contributions in conflict-affected countries. The evaluation team will also conduct stakeholder interviews with local NGO counterparts during country case study missions when appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral donors</td>
<td>UNDP's support effort in conflict-affected countries benefits from specific, dedicated programme and project support from donors. Interviews will be carried out with representatives from key donors/partners, providing a vital perspective on UNDP performance during a time of significant change in the extent and nature of aid flows. Donor country representatives from the EU countries, US, Japan, and Norway are likely candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other multilateral organizations</td>
<td>The team will interview persons from other development organizations that partner with UNDP in conflict-affected countries, with particular attention to the World Bank, the ICRC, and also to regional organizations such as the African Union and regional development actors (i.e. Inter-American Development Bank).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3

PEOPLE CONSULTED

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL

UNDP

Bernard, Emmanuelle, Programme Analyst, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Bhattacharjeya, Roma, Strategic Advisor on Gender, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

De La Haye, Jos, Policy Specialist, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Demetriou, Spyros, Partnership Advisor (United Nations / World Bank), Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group

Herwig, Malin, Policy Specialist, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Hiraldo, Fernando, Programme Advisor, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean

Keuleers, Patrick, Senior Advisor, Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy

Kumar, Chetan, Senior Conflict Prevention Advisor, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Leader, Nicholas, Senior Advisor, Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy

Lemarquis, Bruno, Coordinator, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Lund, Michael, Partnerships Officer, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Nanthikesan, Suppiramaniam, Monitoring & Evaluation Advisor, Regional Bureau for Africa

Ojielo, Ozonnia, Coordinator, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Ruedas, Marta, Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Ryan, Jordan, Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Sharkawi, Amin, Programme Management Advisor, Regional Bureau for Arab States

Sultangolu, Cihan, Director, Office of Human Resources, Bureau of Management

Tursaliev, Sanjar, Programme Specialist, Regional Bureau for Africa

Van-Rijn, Natasha, Country Specialist, Regional Bureau for Africa

Venancio, Moises, Senior Policy Officer, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Yilla, Sadia, Special Advisor, Office of Human Resources, Bureau of Management

Younus, Mohammad, Programme Advisor, Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Cull, Gillian, Somalia Team Leader, Division for Africa

Mojica, Claudia, Senior Programme Officer, Division for Latin America

Pichler-Fong, Alexandra, Political Affairs Officer, Policy and Mediation Division

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Brady, Justin, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
Kashyap, Ajay, Chief, Police Division, Mission Management and Support Section
Shkourko, Andrei, Senior Political Affairs Officer
Solinas, Ugo, Senior Political Affairs Officer
Suzuki, Ayaka, Chief, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
Titov, Dimity, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
Ulich, Oliver, Head, Partnerships Unit, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training
Van Quickelborne, Wouter, Political Affairs Officer
Zachariah, George, Coordination Officer, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training

UNited Nations Office For the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
O’Malley, Stephen, Chief, Central Emergency Response Fund
Belanger, Julie, Officer in Charge, Policy Development and Studies Branch
Chandran, Rahul, Former Team Leader and Author, Civilian Capacity Review, Policy Planning and Innovation Section
D’Andreagiovanni, Federica, Humanitarian Affairs Officer
Green, Scott, Chief, Evaluation and Studies Section
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
Brinkman, Henk-Jan, Chief, Policy Planning and Application Branch

UNited Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
Carty, Dermot, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Programmes
Doyle, Brendan, Chief, Programme Division
McCouch, Robert, Senior Evaluation Officer
Rogan, James, Chief, Recovery and Risk Reduction Section, Office of Emergency Programmes

CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACADEMIA
Mancini, Francesco, Director of Programs, International Peace Institute
Murphy, Craig, Author, The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?
Sherman, Jake, Deputy Director, New York University Center on International Cooperation
Slotin, Jenna, Director of Programs, Peace Dividend Trust

BURUNDI CASE STUDY

UNDP Burundi Country Office
Beye, Souleymane, Strategic Planning Specialist
Camara, Möriken, Finance Programme Specialist
Castro, Craig, Chief, Recovery Unit
Diallo, Oumar, Governance Advisor
Diouf, Awa, Gender Advisor
Gonzales, Gustavo, Country Director
Kabahizi, Jean, Programme Officer, Capacity Building
Kaneza, Elfrida, Recovery Unit
Karekuzi, Gervais, Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst
Kubwayezu, Floribert, Humanitarian Analyst
Manil, Marie, Special Assistant to the Country Director
Mugabiyimana, Thomas, Team Leader, CISNU
Ntunga, Rose, Programme Analyst
ANNEX 3. PEOPLE CONSULTED

Piccinni, Anna, Programme Officer, Peace and Governance
Rushemeza, Arthur, National Economist

UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL OFFICE IN BURUNDI (BNUB)
Condé, Cheikh, Chief, Governance

CIVIL SOCIETY
Bararufise, Marcelline, L’Association des Femmes Parlementaires du Burundi
Berahino, Gloriose, L’Association des Femmes Parlementaires du Burundi
Ngendakumana, Déo, l’Institut de Développement Économique
Dexter, Tracy, International Alert
Kamana, Marguerite, Maison des Femmes au Burundi
Minangoy, Robert, Plan d’Action Commun d’Appui aux Médias
 Ndaisenga, Adelaide, Synergie des Partenaires pour la Promotion des Droits de la Femme
Ndikumwami, Jean-Claude, Observatoire de Lutte contre la Corruption et les Malversations Économiques
Niyukuri, Jeanine, Institut de Statistiques et d’Études Économiques du Burundi
Nkeshimana, Léonidas, Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Électoral
Rubuka, Soline, Collectif des Associations et ONGs Féminines du Burundi

GOVERNMENT OF BURUNDI
Ndagijimana, Charles, Procureur Général Pré la Cour Anti-Corruption
Bararufise, Marcelline, Association des Femmes Parlementaires du Burundi
Berahino, Gloriose, Association des Femmes Parlementaires du Burundi

Habonimana, Léonidas, Commissaire Générale, Brigade Anti-Corruption
Mbonabuca, Thérence, Directeur Général de L’Administration du Territoire au Ministère de l’Intérieur
Miburo, Pierre Claver, Président, Cour Anti-Corruption Cour Anti-Corruption
Nahayo, Adolphe, Direction Générale chargée des relations avec l’Europe, l’Amérique et les Organisations Internationales, Ministère des Relations Extérieures et de la Coopération Internationale
Rwabahungu, Marc, Assemblée Générale
Sindibutume, Célestin, Directeur Général, Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale du Rapatriement des Réfugiés et de la Réintégration Sociale

DONOR REPRESENTATIVES
Beer, David, Embassy of the United Kingdom
Hoehne, Oliver, Conseiller politique, Ambassade de Suisse
Nindorera, Yves, Chargé de programmes, Ambassade de Belgique

WORLD BANK
Kruse, Aurélien, Economist

CÔTE D’IVOIRE CASE STUDY

UNITED NATIONS
Da Camara, Sophie, Chief, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Division, United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI)
De Lys, Hervé, Representative, UNICEF
Di Carpegna, Filippo, Associate Judicial Affairs Officer, Rule of Law Unit, ONUCI
Encontre, Ann, Representative, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Konan Banny, Charles, President, Commission for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation

Konaté, Suzanne, Representative, United Nations Population Fund

Matic, Margarethe, Deputy Head, Civil Affairs, ONUCI

Piazza, Cécilia, Head, Civil Affairs, ONUCI

Simard, Françoise, Chief, Rule of Law Section, ONUCI

Sy Savané, Kalilou, National Administrator, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

GOVERNMENT OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE

Adjoussou, Général, Président, Commission Nationale Pour Les Armes Legeres

Badau Darret, Mathieu, Ministre des ex-combattants et des victimes de Guerre

Cheik Bamba, Daniel, Directeur de cabinet, Ministre de l’intérieur

Georges, Bogolo Adou, Coordonnateur National, Programme de Service Civique National

Guillaume, Soro Kigbafori, 1er Ministre, Ministre de la Défense, Chef du Gouvernement

Kablan Duncan, Daniel, Ministre d’Etat, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

Kehi, Edouard, Conseiller au Opérations

Koffi Diby, Charles, Ministre de l’Economie et de Finances

Koffi Koffi, Paul, Ministre de la Défense

Koné Kafana, Gilbert, Ministre d’Etat, Ministre de l’Emploi, des Affaires Sociales et de la Solidarité

Kossomina, Daniel, Coordonnateur National, Programme National de la Rehabilitation Communautaire

Kouadio Ahoussou, Jeannot, Ministre d’Etat, Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice

Kouadja, Anzian, Secrétaire Exécutif Adjoint

CIVIL SOCIETY

De la Pintiere, Sébastien Thomas, Chief of Office, Danish Refugee Council

Falcy, Louis, National Director, International Rescue Committee

Kanyatsi, Quentin, Country Director ad interim, Search for Common Ground

LEBANON CASE STUDY

UNDP

Abbaro, Seif, Country Director

Assi, Raghed, Social and Local Development Portfolio Manager

Ghandour, Lana, former Peace Building Project Manager

Haijar, Fadi, Peace Building Project Manager

Krayem, Hassan, Democratic Governance Portfolio Manager

Moyroud, Celine, CPR Portfolio Manager

Nasr, Walid, Programme Coordinator, Resident Coordinator’s Office

Nassar, Joanna, Peace Building Project Officer

Rifai, Dania, Programme Manager, UN-HABITAT

Sharpe, Shombi, Deputy Country Director

GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

Naaman, Ramzi, Prime Minister’s Office

SOMALIA CASE STUDY

UNDP SOMALIA

Bendana, Alejandro, Programme Management Advisor

Boyle, Edmond, Programme Management Advisor
Dimond, Marie, Deputy Country Director
El-Ghannam, Mohamed, Programme Manager
Okoh, Ugo, Programme Management Analyst
Patterson, Laurel, Assistant Country Director
Ridley, Simon, Justice Project Manager

UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA
Birnback, Nick, Chief of Public Information
Price, Suzannah, former Special Assistant to SRSG

SUDAN CASE STUDY

UNDP SOUTH SUDAN
Conway, George, Deputy Head of Office (Programme)
Gaere, Liz, Policy Advisor
Gomez, Yusufa, Programme Specialist, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
Luwangwa, Francis, Project Manager, Support to States Programme
Mashologu, Mandisa, Team Leader, Poverty Reduction & Millennium Development Goals Unit
Nkubito, Eugene, Programme Specialist, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
Sadiki, Anselme, Programme Specialist, Governance
Saunders, David, Team Leader, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit

UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS IN SUDAN (UNMIS)
Grande, Lise, Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Representative
Lewin, Natalie, OCHA
Tedd, Leonard, Head, Emergency Preparedness & Response Unit, OCHA

WORLD BANK
Ali Kamil, Mohamed, Senior Health Specialist
Clarke, Laurence, Manager, South Sudan Programme
Kenyi, Christopher, Senior Education Specialist, Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds

JOINT DONOR TEAM
Alexander, Emily, Policy Officer, Governance and Rule of Law Team
Elmquist, Michael, Head of Office
Soede, Sjarah, Team Leader, Governance and Rule of Law Team
Von Westarp, Stefanie, Policy Officer, Aid Effectiveness

UNITED KINGDOM DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID)
Carver, Freddy, DFID Representative, South Sudan
Pepera, Sandra, Deputy Director, Head, Cabinet Policy and Research Division
Thompson, Graham, Senior Governance Advisor, Sudan

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (LONDON)
Fenton, Wendy, Coordinator, Humanitarian Practice Network
Pantuliono, Sara, Head, Humanitarian Policy Group

TIMOR-LESTE CASE STUDY

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Coelho, Hernani, Deputy Chief of Staff
dos Santos, Nuno, Economic Advisor
ANNEX 3. PEOPLE CONSULTED

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Pereira, Liborio, President

DIRECTORATE OF AID EFFECTIVENESS
Abilo, Jose, Director

UNDP TIMOR-LESTE
Belo, Jose, Community Projects Advisor
Bermundez, Maria, Senior Justice Advisor
Bishop, Jo-Anne, Consultant, Evaluation of National Recovery Strategy
Chakar, Alissar, Head, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
Chang, Kevin, Chief Technical Advisor, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
Rodriguez, Yolanda, Programme Officer, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
Sabih, Farhan, Acting Assistant Country Director and Head of Governance Unit
Serrano, Annie, Senior Gender Advisor
Tanaka, Mikiko, Country Director
Turqel, Marcelina, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
Xavier, Livio, Advisor, Conditional Cash Transfer

UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED MISSION IN TIMOR-LESTE (UNMIT)
Haq, Ameerah, Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Brandenburg, Eric, Deputy Chief and Special Advisor, Security Sector Support Unit
Carrilho, Luis, Police Commissioner
Cave, Shane, Anti-Corruption Advisor, Access to Justice Unit
Gentile, Louis, Chief, Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section
Hadi, Nadia, Humanitarian Coordinator, Regional Coordinator Office,
Mochida, Shigeru, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Security Sector Support and Rule of Law
Reske-Nielsen, Finn, DSRSG (Governance) and Regional Representative / Regional Coordinator
Weber, Carsten, Chief, Administration of Justice Support Unit

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION
Celestino, Norberto
Potpara, Dejan

CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACADEMIA
Dewhurst, Sarah, Columbia University
Garcillano, Clare, Justice and Peace Commission
Maria, Catherina, Catholic Relief Services

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION
Assalino, Jose, Chief Technical Advisor

OTHER OFFICIALS CONSULTED

UNDP REGIONAL CENTRE IN DAKAR
Broux, Armand-Michel, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Team
Corneille, François, M&E Regional Advisor, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
Djibo, Bintou Djibo, Resident Representative
Oduol, Elly, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Team

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
Cissé-Gouro, Mahamane, Regional Resident Representative
WORLD BANK
Baldé, Demba, Chief of Mission

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR WEST AFRICA
Loubaki, Rufin Gilbert, Deputy Regional Representative of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Vahard, Patrice, Chief, Human Rights and Gender

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
Jocondo, Kazimiro Rudolf, Resident Representative

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND
Fontaine, Manuel, Deputy Regional Director

UNDP ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL CENTRE
Basnyat, Aparna, Human Rights Mainstreaming Capacity Development Analyst
Behuria, Radhika, Regional Programme Specialist, Gender in Crisis
Jegillos, Sanny, Practice Coordinator and Regional Programme Coordinator, Regional Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme
Tamesis, Pauline, Practice Team Leader for Democratic Governance and Coordinator for Asia Regional Governance Programme
Annex 4

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Annex 5

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE EVALUATION OF UNDP SUPPORT TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

In accordance with the current strategic plan (2008-2013), UNDP supports national processes to accelerate the progress of human development with a view to eradicating poverty through development, equitable and sustained economic growth, and capacity development. Violent conflict slows down progress in human development and reverses development gains and achievements. For many conflict-affected countries, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is an unreachable target.

As highlighted in paragraphs 7 and 12 of the report of the Secretary-General on promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence (A/64/228), “The changing nature of armed violence over the past three decades, including in many situations in which the United Nations has been active in peace operations, post-conflict reconstruction, or development assistance, has blurred the line between armed conflict and crime, and between politically motivated and economically motivated violence…. The complex links between armed violence and underdevelopment — with armed violence being both a cause and consequence of underdevelopment — are becoming better recognized. Whether in societies wracked by armed conflict, criminal or interpersonal violence, widespread armed violence can impede the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.” In his 2009 report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304), the Secretary-General identifies areas in which the United Nations system can bring its collective experience to bear in helping countries avoid relapse into conflict.

Recognizing the importance of conflict prevention for sustainable development, and especially for combating fragility and achieving resilience, UNDP has, over the past decade, stepped up its work to assist countries requesting such support to strengthen their infrastructure for peace. This consists of networks of interdependent structures, mechanisms, values and skills, which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Aside from strengthening non-violent, problem-solving skills, the presence of infrastructure for peace helps deepen social networks, develops a shared sense of identity and civic engagement, and strengthens democratic values.

As UNDP has strengthened its support capabilities in this area, programme country requests for support have significantly increased. Between 2010 and 2011, conflict prevention and recovery expenditures rose from 15 to 24 percent of total UNDP expenditures. However, as the bulk of conflict prevention-related activities are reported elsewhere in the UNDP results framework, and therefore not picked up by the UNDP financial reporting system as a dedicated area of intervention, this means that the actual expenditure on conflict-related issues and results is far higher than the reporting system now identifies.
As part of the United Nations peacebuilding agenda, an increasing amount of UNDP conflict prevention and recovery work is being undertaken in United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding settings. Unlike in non-mission settings, UNDP conflict-related work in these settings calls for approaches and areas of focus that take account of inherent post-conflict volatility, incorporate the risk of relapse into conflict, contribute towards achieving the peacebuilding objectives defined by Security Council mandates, and strengthen integrated United Nations support to peacebuilding. The growing share of conflict prevention and recovery activities in the UNDP global programme portfolio also has implications for the Organization’s commitment to focus on measurable results, strengthen monitoring, evaluation, knowledge management, and learning.

It is in this context that the UNDP Evaluation Office undertook an evaluation of UNDP support to conflict-affected countries in the context of United Nations peace operations. The evaluation was undertaken from July 2011 to May 2012 and focused in particular on UNDP support to conflict-affected countries that are host to a Security Council-mandated United Nations peace operation. Nine countries were selected for the case studies, namely, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, South Sudan, Lebanon, Somalia, Timor-Leste and Haiti. In addition to these 9 primary cases, the evaluation drew on information from 10 other countries (and 1 territory), namely, the Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Iraq, Guatemala, Afghanistan, Nepal, and the occupied Palestinian territory, that have, or have had, a Security Council or Peacebuilding Commission mandate.

**ACHIEVEMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD**

The evaluation finds that the UNDP comparative advantages are perceived to be its presence on the ground, close partnership with government, its role as a bridge between humanitarian, peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts, and its role in governance and institutional change in the management of conflict. It also underscores that UNDP work in conflict-affected countries and through integrated missions is highly relevant, and that UNDP is able to operate “at scale” across multiple programme areas, before, during and after the outbreak of conflict.

UNDP has built substantive capacity in many core areas of peacebuilding that are relevant to its development mandate, and demonstrated excellence in its support for rebuilding justice systems and bridging the legal divide with traditional dispute-resolution systems. It has spurred real and lasting security sector reform through civilian oversight, and has developed innovative programmes linking economic development with the reintegration of ex-combatants, members associated with armed groups, as well as other returnees, and groups such as internally displaced persons and refugees, while strengthening recovery and security through mine action and small arms control measures.

According to the evaluation, UNDP has demonstrated that it can be an effective partner and participant in peacebuilding through promoting dialogue among government and civil society at the national and local levels, thus enabling a broadening of the constituency for peacebuilding. The United Nations Inter-Agency Framework Team for Coordination on Preventive Action, hosted by UNDP, provides useful entry points for increased coherence in conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, and especially in supporting United Nations country teams in their work with national counterparts aimed at developing integrated strategies for conflict prevention.

The evaluation underscores that the eight-point agenda for gender equality has been an important effort to support empowerment of women, and that UNDP has achieved a measure of success with expanding opportunities for women to participate more fully in the emerging political and legal landscape of post-conflict countries. Notable successes include the expansion of women’s access to justice in some countries, especially for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. It also notes, however, that UNDP has been less successful in its
efforts to improve the gender balance of its own staff working in conflict countries.

While recognizing the areas of current strengths, the evaluation also points to certain areas where UNDP can strengthen its impact. They include the ability to carry out detailed conflict analyses at the country level to help anticipate and prevent conflict outbreaks. Despite UNDP recognition of the importance of conflict analysis, and despite having developed its own conflict analysis tools, the evaluation found that as of the time of its review, no UNDP-based standard operating procedure existed for when and how to carry out such analyses at the country level.

The evaluation also finds that the UNDP presence in a country before, during and after a crisis builds expectations that the organization will respond positively to the wide-ranging requests for support that it receives. However, as a result of these expectations, UNDP embarks in some cases upon overly ambitious support programmes without sufficient financial and human resources, and this impedes UNDP performance and programme delivery.

Overall, the effectiveness of UNDP programming support in conflict-affected countries is found to be contingent upon events in the political and security realm, which are largely beyond the power of UNDP to influence. Where a modicum of political settlement has been reached and peacekeeping has maintained security, UNDP interventions have been able to support broader conflict resolution, peacebuilding and ultimately, the development agenda.

The evaluation finds that the UNDP immediate crisis response known as the SURGE initiative and fast-track procedures have contributed to addressing the challenge of a shortage of skilled staff at the outbreak of conflict. While temporary rapid deployment may help achieve short-term immediate recovery aims, there are trade-offs, as the very nature of fragile States demands the building of relationships and trust over a protracted period. The effectiveness of UNDP in conflict situations will remain contingent on the quality and capabilities of in-country management and staff and the resources at their disposal. Selecting skilled staff to fill appointments in countries at risk of conflict and carrying out robust training programmes for staff in these countries constitute the critically important actions to ensure UNDP effectiveness.

In light of the fact that United Nations Volunteers comprise one third of all international civilian personnel in eight of the nine primary case studies of the evaluation where there is an integrated mission present, it is important for UNDP to give greater recognition to the important contribution made by the Volunteers towards peace and development.

UNDP welcomes this evaluation and appreciates the lessons it provides for continuous organizational improvements. It agrees with the various issues outlined and the recommendations made. However, in accordance with the matrix in the annex to the present report, UNDP has already begun to address in 2012 some of the issues covered by the recommendations. In light of this, and as reflected in the matrix below, most if not all of the recommendations are scheduled to be addressed by the end of 2013.

The annex to the present report outlines the evaluation’s main recommendations and the UNDP responses.
**Recommendation 1:** UNDP should significantly enhance the quality and use of conflict analysis at the country level, including guidance and standard operating procedures detailing when and how analyses should be developed and periodically updated. Effective analyses of needs and risks should, crucially, lead directly to a sequence of activities and a means of measuring progress against objectives.

**Rationale for the recommendation:** The evaluation concludes that at present there is no UNDP-based standard operating procedure for when and how to conduct conflict analysis. As a result, the conduct of conflict analysis in both substantive and procedural terms remains varied across UNDP. Nevertheless, there are country-level experiences that demonstrate the value of conducting and regularly updating conflict analyses. In Nepal, for example, an ongoing conflict analysis by the UNDP country office provided vital strategic oversight throughout the country’s civil war and subsequent peacebuilding process.

**Management response:** UNDP country offices and regions have over the last decade developed various tailor-made approaches (such as the Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project in Latin America (PAPEP)), to endow UNDP with a stronger capacity for conflict analysis and conflict mitigation strategies/initiatives. In order to further strengthen these capacities, UNDP has over the past few years supported country offices by deploying Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs) within UNDP offices and/or United Nations country teams to provide analytical expertise and advice to the offices of the United Nations Resident Coordinator. However, UNDP recognizes that this has not been sufficient to address the challenge raised in the recommendation. As such, UNDP has already initiated a review of the Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA) tool and methodology, which is designed to support improved contextual and conflict analyses by UNDP country offices. The exercise will also include revisiting the standard terms of reference and profile for PDAs to strengthen analytical capacity for prevention. The exercise is led by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and is to be finalized by December 2012. Starting in January 2013, a comprehensive rollout plan to train UNDP programme staff in the use of the CDA tool will be initiated, beginning in UNDP priority countries. UNDP is also committed to reviewing the various approaches that have been developed by its various units to better inform a corporate strategy in this regard and to strengthen the relevance and the quality of the CDA tool. Importantly, UNDP has also begun to work on the development and establishment of an Early Warning and Early Action corporate system, which should be operational by March 2013. The aim of the system is to ensure that UNDP better detects possible crises before they erupt and has an effective mechanism to respond adequately and coherently in a preventive manner to safeguard development gains and avoid possible strife.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key action(s)</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Responsible unit(s)</th>
<th>Tracking</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.1 Finalize the update of CDA tool, including review of other approaches that exist in UNDP</td>
<td>By June 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux, Bureau for Development Policy (BDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 Conduct formal training on conflict analysis across UNDP programme staff, starting with staff in CPR priority countries</td>
<td>Roll-out of training in March 2013</td>
<td>BCPR</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3 Review additional support to ensure the effective implementation of the CDA tool</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux, BDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4 Identify two countries per region to undertake a systematic conflict analysis and put in place the capacities to periodically update the analysis. Monitor the usage of the analysis for UNDP programming</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux (in consultation with the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat [DPA])</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.5 Develop and establish an Early Warning/Early Action system</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux</td>
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Recommendation 2: UNDP should make greater efforts to translate corporate management cooperation between UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat (DPKO) and DPA to the specifics of country priorities and the sequencing of interventions. This would imply a more central role for UNDP in the planning stages at the beginning of integrated missions and then through the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and in the drawdown of an integrated mission. Clear corporate guidelines and criteria need to be developed in this regard.

Rationale for the recommendation: The evaluation found that the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) has proved a useful and structured mechanism for ensuring UNDP involvement at the inception of a mission, yet the case studies indicate that UNDP influence in the process remains relatively small compared to the security and political concerns of other actors.

Management response: In February 2011, UNDP established the Executive Team (chaired by the Associate Administrator) to better address protracted crises and complex emergencies. The Executive Team is a forum for UNDP Senior Management to provide clearer guidance to Bureaux and country offices in all mission planning stages and promotes a common position for senior-level coordination with other United Nations partners. The new United Nations system-wide policy on transitions, currently being developed for mission contexts, and the revision of the IMPP guidelines, which involves the participation of UNDP, will further reinforce institutional relations between UNDP, DPKO and DPA. In parallel and to complement this exercise, UNDP is also drafting a lessons learned paper on its involvement in mission start-up and planning processes. Both reviews will help to strengthen collaboration between UNDP, DPKO and DPA around all aspects of United Nations interventions in mission settings. While the engagement with the development agencies of Member States has always been substantial, UNDP has recently increased its engagement with the political departments related to the Security Council. Beginning with the Syrian Arab Republic, UNDP is co-chairing with DPA integrated task forces to develop the United Nations response in situations characterized by violent conflict or post-conflict recovery, but without a peacekeeping mission. At least two additional task forces of this nature will be co-chaired by the end of 2013. In the process of development of the internal lessons learned paper, UNDP Senior Management will also assess how it will measure engagement in the planning and sequencing of missions, and identify at which point or what triggers will prompt additional management action to ensure effective participation in the planning of these integrated missions.

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<tr>
<td>2.1 Revise the IMPP guidelines jointly with DPKO, DPA and other United Nations Development Group (UNDG) members</td>
<td>By the end of 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux, BDP (engaging DPA and DPKO)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Draft a common United Nations policy on transitions jointly with DPKO, DPA and other UNDG members</td>
<td>By June 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux, BDP (engaging DPA and DPKO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3 Engage systematically with Member States at key moments in the life of a United Nations mission (including mission planning; the drafting of resolutions of United Nations bodies related to peacekeeping operations and special political missions; and mission drawdown), to highlight a development perspective, the comparative advantages of development actors, in particular UNDP, as well as challenges and opportunities</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Regional Bureaux, BCPR</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4 UNDP needs to provide appropriate support to the new arrangements adopted by the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in September 2012 for the rule of law in crisis and post-crisis situations whereby UNDP and DPKO are appointed Global Focal Points and are expected to make sure that the whole United Nations acts together in peacekeeping, special political missions and other crisis situations</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, BDP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 A corporate UNDP Peacebuilding Strategy has been reviewed and approved by UNDP Senior Management as part of the formulation of the new strategic plan</td>
<td>October 2012</td>
<td>BCPR</td>
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Recommendation 3: UNDP should be unambiguous in establishing what recovery projects are eligible for inclusion in a Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) or its equivalent. UNDP should make better use of “situation teams” that convene quickly during the outbreak of conflicts.

Rationale for the recommendation: The evaluation found that UNDP support in setting up early recovery mechanisms and coordination faced numerous challenges. Experience with the Early Recovery Cluster in recent crisis events has highlighted confusion over the kinds of recovery projects that are deemed eligible for inclusion in a CAP or its equivalent. In some cases, critics contend that there has been too much attention paid to crisis, security, law and order measures and transitional justice, and not enough attention to longer-term planning and capacity-building efforts.

Management response: Early recovery remains a key part of UNDP work at the global and country levels. Interventions range from restoring core governance functions, providing support to livelihoods and income-generation activities, mine action and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. The ability of UNDP to link the humanitarian phase with long-term development efforts has led to increased CPR budgets over the past three years. However, based on the findings of the BCPR Portfolio Review, UNDP recognized the need to reassess its early recovery approach to better respond to the changing patterns of development aid in post-conflict and fragile environments. The review and update of the Guidance Note of the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) and the UNDP policy on early recovery were launched in May 2012. The conclusions of the review will help UNDP to better identify initiatives that can be included in CAP processes and that provide a more effective link between recovery and development. Importantly, UNDP places great emphasis on working closely with the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the United Nations Secretariat and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in particular on both reviews to ensure that the roles and responsibilities undertaken by UNDP under early recovery are recognized, differentiated from and complementary to the work of humanitarian organizations. A better understanding between UNDP and other humanitarian actors on respective roles, a clearer common definition of early recovery, along with a common set of guiding principles on the scope and funding mechanism for early recovery will prove an important way to facilitate the inclusion of commonly agreed early recovery projects in CAPs and other early recovery funding mechanisms. This closer partnership between UNDP and humanitarian partners could prove central in improving the mobilization of early recovery resources and more effectively bridging the relief-to-development continuum.

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<th>Key action(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Revise CWGER Guidance Note and the UNDP policy on early recovery, in close cooperation with OCHA, IASC, and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), and start a global initiative for early recovery resource mobilization, focusing on the specific challenges of immediate post-conflict situations</td>
<td>To be completed by the end of 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux, BDP (engaging DPA and DPKO)</td>
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<td>3.2 Provide training and technical support to country office staff for understanding CAPs, project eligibility requirements, humanitarian funding, and the humanitarian system generally to capitalize on the presence of humanitarian actors (that often operate parallel to peacekeeping missions and conflict-related approaches)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>OCHA/UNDP/(BCPR)</td>
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<td>3.3 Develop UNDP signature products for early recovery and provide training to country offices on the use of these products to allow for a level of predictability and uniformity in terms of its responses in early recovery and its possible inclusion in the Flash Appeals and CAPs</td>
<td>By end of 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, UNDP country offices</td>
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Recommendation 4: Greater attention should be given to the institutional arrangements to more effectively manage and disseminate knowledge on pooled multi-donor trust funds at the corporate level – and how this can serve country offices requested to manage such funds.

Rationale for the recommendation: The evaluation found that the UNDP global experience in managing multi-partner trust funds was not systematically captured. Such knowledge is useful when UNDP country offices need to understand and explain to their partners the various trust fund options and to know what they should do to set up a trust fund. Given the continued need for support where UNDP is expected to manage/administer trust funds not only in the context of post-conflict recovery, but also for post-disaster recovery, greater attention should be given to keeping partners aware of such institutional arrangements.

Management response: Various sources of information are already available regarding institutional arrangements and knowledge on UNDG multi-donor trust funds and UNDP-specific trust funds, such as the Joint Funding approaches section on the UNDg website and the MPTF Office GATEWAY, and the CPR Thematic Trust Fund information on the UNDP/BCPR website. However, UNDP has taken note of the recommendation and the need to make information more readily available to partners on the various modalities that can be used to fund programmes both directly through UNDP, as well as through UNDG arrangements with the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office as the administrative agent.

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<td>4.1 Additional guidance and information packages on different options for management of pooled trust funds in which UNDP is involved will be finalized and approved by the UNDP Senior Management. This guidance will elaborate specificities of a spectrum of CPR pooled funds (making a distinction between UNDP trust funds and MPTFs administered by the MPTF Office on behalf of UNDG, including Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and outline options that the country offices will take into account in proposing specific funding modalities for use in CPR environments</td>
<td>By May 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, MPTF Office/Bureau of Management (BoM), Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy (BERA)</td>
<td>Comments</td>
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Recommendation 5: To reinforce the importance of the United Nations Delivering as One initiative in post-conflict settings, the UNDP Executive Board should propose to the United Nations Secretariat and Security Council for consideration the importance of establishing clear guidance over division of labour and resources during the drawdown of integrated missions to ensure that individual agencies such as UNDP are adequately prepared for their enhanced role during and post-transition.

Rationale for the recommendation: In 2011, the Secretary-General endorsed a report of the review by his Senior Advisory Group entitled “Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict”, (see A/65/747-S/2011/85), which recommended enhancing the United Nations use of standing civilian capacities. The recommendations underscored the pivotal role of UNDP in resource mobilization and development support in post-conflict settings, and recommended that UNDP take the lead in clusters relating to core national governance functions, justice, and capacity development. For UNDP, transitions from peacekeeping operations represent a complex and sensitive operational period, where its support activities often take on elevated significance in consolidating a country’s progress away from conflict. The effective management of these transitions is of particular interest at present as several United Nations peacekeeping operations are soon to wind down, with support continuing through integrated peacebuilding offices, United Nations country teams and special political missions. New United Nations Transition Guidelines should provide an opportunity for more effective, actionable inter-agency planning and budgeting.

Management response: Although UNDP has been actively involved in the development of Standard Operating Procedures for Delivering as One, to ensure that specific aspects of transition settings were taken into account, a new review by the United Nations Integration Steering Group (ISG), chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, is in the process of developing a common policy on transitions for United Nations missions based on lessons and good practices from across the United Nations system. UNDP is actively involved in this process. UNDP, together with DPKO, OCHA and UNICEF, is currently having regular meetings with key Security Council members, at which critical issues in mission settings including transitions are discussed. UNDP has also initiated a lessons learned study from past mission transitions aimed at developing guidelines for its future action in this area. Contributing to joint and/or collective United Nations activities remains an important priority for UNDP that underpins all activity. However, despite the good intentions of UNDP, it is also important to highlight the fact that any success in this areas will depend on the willingness of all agencies concerned to work together.

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<tr>
<td>5.1 United Nations-wide policy on integrated mission transition to be developed</td>
<td>Approval by June 2013</td>
<td>Executive Office of the Administrator (EXO), Regional Bureaux, BCPR</td>
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<td>5.2 Lessons learned and guidance for UNDP engagement in integrated mission transitions being developed</td>
<td>By the end of 2013</td>
<td>BCPR</td>
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<td>5.3 Contribute to the development of UNDG Standard Operating Procedures for Delivering as One to ensure that they can be fully applied in transition settings</td>
<td>UNDG approval by the end of 2012</td>
<td>EXO, BCPR through UNDG-ECHA</td>
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Comments | Status
Recommendation 6: Cooperation with international financial institutions (IFIs), including the World Bank, should be further developed in the areas of joint approaches to post-crisis needs assessments and crisis prevention planning.

Rationale for the recommendation: UNDP has been expanding its partnerships with IFIs in post-conflict situations. For instance, Post-Crisis Needs Assessments (PCNAs) are getting developed through a collaborative scoping exercise undertaken by the UNDG and the World Bank. PCNAs help identify the infrastructure and government support activities that are needed to support countries as they move towards recovery. The IMPP has been designed by the United Nations to help achieve a common understanding of strategic objectives in a particular country by engaging all relevant parts of the United Nations system, and to provide an inclusive framework for action that can also serve to engage external partners, such as the IFIs, regional organizations and bilateral donors.

Management response: The issue covered by this recommendation has been a UNDP priority for several years. UNDP cooperation with the World Bank in crisis countries increased after the publication of the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development in the thematic areas of rule of law, employment creation, disaster risk reduction and crisis governance, including public sector administration and capacity development. UNDP is also chairing the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment Advisory Group, and leads in the United Nations system on joint work with the World Bank on Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA). The Advisory Group concentrates on further development of the PCNA methodology, and there are efforts to link the PCNA more closely with PDNA. UNDP is also an active participant in a system-wide effort that began in 2010 to strengthen cooperation with the World Bank on the ground in specific countries, supported by a Swiss Trust Fund. A review of this experience will be conducted by the end of 2013 to outline the impact of this cooperation and lessons learned in the first four pilot countries. The conclusions of the review will build on the closer cooperation that has been built between UNDP and the World Bank and will hopefully provide future avenues for increased collaboration.

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<td>6.1 Further develop and finalize the PCNA methodology, in close cooperation with the Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) of the United Nations Secretariat, in particular regarding support to country exercises, development of monitoring methodology and involvement of other regional organizations, in particular the regional development banks</td>
<td>By the end of 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, DOCO</td>
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<td>6.2 Establish a forum for engagement in job creation in fragile States with the World Bank and other partners; and implement pilot programmes that seek to enhance complementarity and the impact of collaborative support in selected countries</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>BCPR, BERA, BDP, Regional Bureaux</td>
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<td>6.3 Engage in joint analysis with the World Bank to identify countries where the PCNA approach might be limited to and would benefit from a more coherent United Nations/IFIs joint analysis</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>BERA, BCPR; Regional Bureaux (in consultation with DPA and DPKO as appropriate)</td>
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<td>6.4 Provide guidance and direction through the UNDP Executive Team for protracted crisis and complex emergencies on country-specific situations regarding engagement with the IFIs</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Executive Team; Executive Team secretariat; Regional Bureaux; BCPR</td>
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<td>6.5 Undertake at least two joint assessments with the World Bank of the capacity needs for implementation of peace agreements, and establish joint mechanisms to mobilize resources to meet these needs</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>BERA, BCPR, Regional Bureaux, the World Bank, Resident Coordinators in concerned countries.</td>
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<td>6.6 Provide joint implementation support to New Deal pilot countries with the World Bank through donor funded G7+ support mechanism</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux</td>
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Recommendation 7: UNDP should establish an internal human resources programme designed to prepare and place female staff in conflict settings, and should set tighter benchmarks for offices to meet gender targets.

Rationale for the recommendation: The evaluation found that UNDP has a mixed record of accomplishment in terms of the gender balance of its workforce in some conflict-affected countries. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010 only 23 per cent of the staff were women. In post-crisis Côte d’Ivoire, the vast majority of Professional staff in 2011 were male, with only two women employed, and neither of them in key posts. This poor gender ratio is replicated in the integrated United Nations mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The reasons given relate to difficulties in finding French-speaking and experienced women willing to work in unstable environments.

Management response: The requirements of ensuring gender equality are already included in the UNDP recruitment policies and procedures. However, it has proven continually difficult to attract female candidates to CPR settings. UNDP will address this challenge and provide additional training for the female UNDP staff and female consultants to be placed in conflict settings.

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<tr>
<td>7.1 Organize training/skills enhancement activities for female UNDP staff</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>Office of Human Resources</td>
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<td>selected to be posted in crisis environments</td>
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<td>BoM, BCPR</td>
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<td>7.2 Analyze issues pertaining to attraction and retention of female personnel</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>BoM, Regional Bureaux</td>
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<td>in crisis environments; develop and implement targeted response actions</td>
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Recommendation 8: All programming for conflict-affected countries should articulate a clear exit strategy. Direct implementation projects should be required to justify why they cannot be nationally executed, and include capacity-development measures and a timeframe for transitioning to national implementation modalities.

Rationale for the recommendation: The evaluation found that UNDP has yet to strike an optimal balance between direct programme implementation and national implementation in many conflict countries. The issue of sustainability can sometimes clash with the desire to ‘get the job done’, particularly in countries where capacity constraints are profound. Direct service delivery can escalate the achievement of specific outcomes; however, it also runs the risk of weakening institutions that countries must rely on over the long term. The capacity for governing that gets built through UNDP support can be quickly eroded by the brain drain that takes trained national counterparts to new jobs either in the private sector or, perversely, in international aid organizations such as the United Nations.

Management response: UNDP agrees with the need to ensure that all its projects, whether national implementation (NIM) or direct implementation (DIM), have an appropriate exit strategy and foster capacity-building. This is an important consideration under the current approval process for direct implementation of projects, which is granted to the country offices by their respective Regional Bureaux after consideration of the nature of the special development situation and specific comparative advantages of the country office in managing projects. It is important to clarify that the DIM modality has as much of an emphasis on capacity-building as does NIM. However, in crisis or post-crisis settings, national authorities are least able to cope with procedures imposed upon them by the NIM modality, which are, moreover, different from their normal operating procedures. It is, however, important that both NIM and DIM projects clearly outline their capacity-building objectives in line with the exit strategy. UNDP will also review the programme- operating modalities to ensure that there is no misunderstanding concerning how they contribute to national capacity-building.

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<tr>
<td>8.1 Review a selected number of country offices to determine their compliance</td>
<td>By the end</td>
<td>OSG/Evaluation Office,</td>
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<td>with the implementation of UNDP procedures on DIM from the perspective of their</td>
<td>of 2013</td>
<td>Regional Bureaux</td>
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<td>impact on national capacity development</td>
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<td>8.2 Refine approval process for DIM by adding a strong national capacity</td>
<td>Starting in</td>
<td>Regional Bureaux, OSG,</td>
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<td>assessment requirement and a clear strategy for capacity enhancement as well</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>EXO</td>
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<td>as a timeline for transition to NIM</td>
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<td>8.3 UNDP Senior Management to assess project implementation modalities for CPR</td>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>EXO/OSG/BCPR</td>
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<td>settings in the UNDP programme manual</td>
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Recommendation 9: UNDP should expand its staff training programmes for countries identified as at risk for conflict, revise hiring procedures for staff that stresses experience in conflict settings, and provide additional incentives for experienced staff to continue working in conflict-affected hardship posts.

**Rationale for the recommendation:** While the evaluation underscores the importance of the UNDP crisis response initiative known as SURGE in addressing the challenge of a shortage of skilled staff on hand at the outbreak of conflict, it notes that the effectiveness of UNDP in conflict situations will remain contingent on the quality and capabilities of in-country management and staff. Selecting skilled staff to fill appointments in countries at risk for conflict and carrying out robust training programmes for staff in those countries constitute the two most important actions to ensure UNDP effectiveness.

**Management response:** UNDP recognizes the need to continue improving the competencies and quality of staff assigned to conflict settings and will continue to improve training, recruitment systems and incentives within the framework and limits of related regulations.

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<tr>
<td>9.1 Define specific skills and competencies required for posts in conflict-affected hardship duty stations</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>BCPR, OHR/BoM</td>
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<td>9.2 Engage BCPR during the selection and appointment of senior managers for crisis country offices (deputies and above)</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>OHR/BoM, BCPR</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.3 Develop and introduce a team approach for assigning senior managers to crisis country offices, taking into account the capacities of the country office management team as a whole with the goal of filling capacity gaps</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>OHR/BoM</td>
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<td>9.4 Ensure that a staff member with skills in political analysis, facilitation, and conflict resolution is available to support the Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative in at least half (i.e., 20) of 40 priority countries</td>
<td>By December 2014</td>
<td>BCPR, DPA, Regional Bureaux</td>
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Recommendation 10: UNDP should establish new guidance for project development in crisis-affected countries, including generic sets of benchmarks and indicators. This should also include monitoring, evaluation and reporting on progress in conflict settings. These tools should build from programme indicators developed in non-conflict contexts, and then be revised in consideration of the changed circumstances brought about by conflict.

Rationale for the recommendation: The evaluation suggested that new guidance is needed as UNDP currently lacks a coherent and systematic assessment of progress towards CPR objectives within country support programmes. Specific indicators or benchmarks have not been established for UNDP work in crisis environments and there is no consistent practice regarding the setting of baselines at the outset of country-based projects in order to track progress.

Management response: UNDP guidelines for planning, monitoring and evaluation of interventions in crisis settings are contained in the “Compendium #1 – Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Prevention and Recovery Settings”. However, UNDP acknowledges the point made in the recommendation and the fact that the current Compendium does not address the specific issues of programme effectiveness, particularly in post-disaster settings. A recent review of the BCPR programme portfolio in CPR settings conducted jointly with Regional and Central Bureaux further stressed the need to implement existing guidance in this area in order to strengthen programme relevance and effectiveness, identify areas for strategic investment to maximize impact, and refocus on capacity development in CPR settings. A detailed action plan was established to implement the recommendations for the review, and includes the development of a special monitoring and evaluation system for crisis-affected countries that includes crisis-sensitive indicators, frequent contextual analyses, and more frequent monitoring visits. BCPR is also undertaking a pilot initiative to spearhead a new approach to monitoring and evaluation in conflict settings.

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<tr>
<td>10.1 Introduce and roll out a new results-based management support package to country offices</td>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>Operations Support Group (OSG)</td>
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<td>10.2 The definition of CPR relevant indicators will be part of the formulation of results chains for the new UNDP strategic plan</td>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>OSG/BCPR/BDP</td>
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<td>10.3 BCPR to spearhead pilot phase of new monitoring and evaluation approach in two pilot countries</td>
<td>Starting in January 2013</td>
<td>BCPR, Regional Bureaux, OSG</td>
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EVALUATION OF UNDP SUPPORT TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS