Terminal Evaluation of UNDP/GEF project:
Capacity Building for Sustainable Land Management in Jamaica

Evaluation conducted by Alexandra Fischer

GEFSEC Project ID: PIMS 3468
Agency's Project ID: 00044037
Evaluation time frame- November 2012- December 2012
Date of Evaluation Report: December 4, 2012 (first draft), December 18, 2012 (second draft), December 21 (final draft)
Country: Jamaica
GEF Operational Program: OP15
Strategic Priority: SLM-1
Executing Agency: Forestry Department

Acknowledgements: *The evaluation consultant would like to thank the UNDP Jamaica Country Office and the government of Jamaica for the support they provided throughout the realization of this Terminal Evaluation, as well as the many stakeholders who provided valuable feedback on the project.*

Contents

1 List of Tables

2 Executive Summary

Table 1: Project Summary Table

<table>
<tr><td>Project Title:</td><td colspan="4">Sustainable Land Management in Jamaica</td></tr>
<tr><td>GEF Project ID:</td><td>3468</td><td></td><td>At endorsement (Million US$)</td><td>At completion* (Million US $)</td></tr>
<tr><td>UNDP Project ID:</td><td>00044037</td><td>GEF financing:</td><td>475,000</td><td>403,489.89</td></tr>
<tr><td>Country:</td><td>Jamaica</td><td>IA/EA own:</td><td>45,000</td><td>27,604.48</td></tr>
<tr><td>Region:</td><td>LAC</td><td>Government:</td><td>125,000</td><td>$8,094.07</td></tr>
<tr><td>Focal Area:</td><td>Land degradation</td><td>Other:</td><td>316,000</td><td>325,695</td></tr>
<tr><td>FA Objectives, (OP/SP):</td><td>OP-15/ SLM-1</td><td>Total co-financing:</td><td>486,000</td><td>361,393.55</td></tr>
<tr><td>Executing Agency:</td><td>Forestry Department</td><td>Total Project Cost:</td><td>961,000</td><td>435,366.53</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Other Partners Involved:</td><td rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">ProDoc Signature (date project began):</td><td>Jan. 8, 2008</td></tr>
<tr><td>(Operational) Closing Date:</td><td>Proposed:
December 2010</td><td>Actual:
November 30, 2012</td></tr>
</table>

Please note that all figures are estimates as the final project reporting was not yet approved at time of finalization of the TE report.

- **Brief Description of the Project**

This project was designed as part of a global portfolio project to build capacity in reducing land degradation in Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States. In Jamaica, land degradation is seriously affecting the integrity of ecosystem functions and services upon which its biodiversity, agricultural production and income-generating opportunities depend. The main perceived causes of this land degradation are: 1) expansion of the agricultural frontier; 2) decline of agricultural productivity and unsustainable farming practices; 3) undervaluation of agricultural lands; 4) limited water availability; 5) impacts of mining practices; and 6) increased squatting. Various barriers to addressing the problem of land degradation were identified, including the fragmented policy and institutional framework; weak institutional leadership, capacity and technical knowledge; and insufficient economic incentives and instruments.

The objective of this project is to "to integrate sustainable land management within decision-making and development planning and strengthen capacities to implement best practices for sustainable land management". The following three project Outcomes were developed:

Outcome 1: SLM is mainstreamed into national institutions, policies, strategies, and plans;
Outcome 2: Capacity for management, application and adaptation of SLM is developed and enhanced;
Outcome 3: Monitoring, evaluation, lessons learned and adaptive management are achieved.

The key project stakeholders identified at the design stage include: the Forestry Department (FD) as Executing Agency (EA); the Planning Institute of Jamaica, an Agency of the Ministry of Finance and Planning ,which coordinates all international support, including GEF projects; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry of Local Government and Environment, which housed the UNCCD focal point (since then separated into Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change and Ministry of Local Government and Community Development.; and user groups, including farmers, communities and the private sector.

The Terminal Evaluation was carried out from November to December 2012 in close adherence to the UNDP/GEF guidelines and Terms of Reference for this consultancy. The methodology involved an extensive review of all relevant project documentation; interviews with 26 stakeholders; a presentation of initial findings to the Project Steering Committee; follow-up phone interviews, correspondence and review of documentation; detailed analysis of the findings; and preparation of the draft and final reports.

- **Main evaluation findings**

Project design/ formulation

The project design identified an appropriate long-term goal, objective and associated Outcomes. In addition, the main assumptions that could be expected to influence the project were identified, with the notable exception of Outcome 3, for which no assumptions were listed. However, there were several deficiencies in the logical framework, including inconsistencies between indicators and targets and inappropriately formulated indicators. Furthermore, Outcome 3 was not included in the logframe at all. A more careful revision of the logframe at the design stage would have been useful to strengthen its utility as a management tool.

The ProDoc comprehensively described the management arrangements for this project and detailed the role of the Executing Agency and Implementing Agency, as well as that of the project steering committee. All key stakeholders were identified in the stakeholder involvement plan and an appropriate replication strategy was included. While the project design described other related projects and interventions, it did not provide details on how interlinkages with this project would be achieved.

Project implementation

UNDP and EA Execution

As Implementing Agency (IA), UNDP provided regular support to promote achievement of project deliverables. This included preparation of reports early on in the project before a project manager was in place, making direct payments to suppliers before the EA capacity assessment was complete, and guiding the EA on reporting and M&E requirements. UNDP also played a key role when the project was at risk of early closure by bringing in senior management to meetings, convening meetings of the ProDoc signatories, underscoring the implications of early closure on the country, promoting adaptive management strategies, and collaboratively making key decisions to increase project delivery rates. Interviewees recommended that for future projects UNDP should carry out the EA capacity assessment sooner and should provide more in-depth and ongoing training to executing agencies and PMUs on reporting and M&E requirements to reduce the possibility of delays.

The Forestry Department gained significant capacity in managing an intersectoral project that required collaboration with numerous other agencies involved in the field of sustainable land management (SLM). At the same time, it experienced some challenges in the execution of this project. The two consecutive project managers were relatively unfamiliar with the UNDP/GEF reporting requirements, which, combined with the transition period between the two, contributed to serious reporting delays and the need for frequent revisions of reports. This in turn led to the inability to make payments and to delays in achieving project deliverables. While risk tables were included in quarterly reports, more comprehensive assessment and management of project risks could have been carried out. Interviewees also commented that the project managers and the EA as a whole could have provided more guidance to the consultants, particularly in the earlier stages of the project, to facilitate development of key project outputs. The Forestry Department took some time to fully understand its roles and responsibilities as executing agency, but did provide adequate support for project execution, particularly for procurement, administrative and accounting aspects. The CEO of the FD was commended for her leadership as Co-Chair of the project steering committee (PSC) and for her active role in pushing for completion of project deliverables.

Monitoring and Evaluation Design and Implementation

The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan included in the Project Document (ProDoc) was comprehensive and included all the main necessary elements such as annual PIRs, reports on lessons learned, financial audits, and project evaluations. However, as previously highlighted, the design of the logframe itself had several weaknesses. For the most part, the M&E Plan was implemented, however, some of the elements were submitted late (most notably the financial and narrative reports), which limited their usefulness as monitoring tools, and a Mid-Term Evaluation was not carried out. Several interviewees cited the general lack of familiarity of the project managers and the EA with the M&E system and insufficient utilization of the logframe to guide implementation, underscoring the need for the provision of more training in this respect. The Project Steering Committee played an important role in monitoring the project, with frequent meetings, good participation and a very active Co-Chair from the FD. More timely feedback from the PSC to the consultants on some key project deliverables would have been useful.

Adaptive management

The IA and EA employed adaptive management on various occasions to deal with changing conditions on the ground and issues that arose during project implementation. Examples include the hiring of a field liaison and public relations officer to interact with the communities and speed up implementation of the demo projects, the change in the site for the limestone quarrying demo project, and the dropping of one of the demo projects due to time constraints and low engagement of the stakeholder. Feedback from M&E activities such as PSC meetings contributed to some of the adaptive management measures put into place, though more timely submission of reports would have enhanced the timeliness of adaptive management. Overall, adaptive management was critical to the project's performance, but in several instances, decisions could have been made sooner to reduce the significant project delays experienced.

Partnership arrangements

The project brought together many stakeholders involved in the cross-cutting issue of SLM that might not otherwise have had the opportunity to work together. Stakeholder workshops and training sessions were generally

well-attended and well-received. The PSC had broad membership from key stakeholders, representing state and non-state agencies, and had high participation rates in general. The project benefitted from the establishment of partnerships with other agencies, including the National Irrigation Commission and the Mines and Geology Division, which were critical to the successful implementation of the demonstration projects. The project also worked with a number of different communities to implement the demo projects and provide training. The delays in starting up the demonstration projects during which time there was little contact with the communities led to some loss of momentum, which was later regained. Some of the demonstration projects, such as the agroforestry project, had high community participation throughout, while others, such as the small-scale irrigation project, could have benefitted from more interaction with the community to obtain buy-in at the early stages of the project. Overall, feedback from community members on the demo projects and training activities was positive. The project also established partnerships with the private sector, primarily through their involvement in the demonstration projects and their participation in training sessions on SLM in mining and quarrying. Some challenges were experienced at times owing to the different priorities of the private sector from those of the project. In general, interviewees commented that feedback from various stakeholders on key project documents was sometimes slow and that greater linkages with other ongoing projects and programs could have been made.

Results and Sustainability

The project made significant progress in terms of achieving its objective of integrating SLM within decision-making and development planning and strengthening capacities to implement best practices for SLM. Jamaica's first ever SLM Policy was developed and vetted by key stakeholders through a participatory process. There is commitment in the Land Administration Division to integrate this policy into the broader National Land Policy under development. As inputs to develop the policy, a review of the legislative framework for SLM was carried out, as well as an institutional capacity assessment. In addition, terms of reference were developed for organizational restructuring to better address SLM. Awareness of the issue and capacities to implement best practices in SLM were strengthened within different agencies, communities and the private sector through various stakeholder sessions and training workshops. Even greater impact might have been achieved if the capacity building component had been carried out over a longer period of time instead of condensed in the last months of the project. The four demonstration projects that were established are particularly promising as they showcase diverse approaches to SLM in terms of the rehabilitation of bauxite mines and limestone quarries, the establishment of a small-scale irrigation system using solar energy, as well as the implementation of different types of agroforestry systems. The planned output of developing a Medium-Term Investment Plan was not achieved due to time constraints and other challenges, which is considered the main shortcoming with regard to project achievements. The associated logframe targets to increase investments in SLM were therefore not met.

The project contributed to mainstreaming UNDP priorities such as gender equity, sustainable livelihoods and disaster risk reduction. Efforts were made to ensure a gender balance in the activities carried out and there was strong female participation in project management and oversight. Many of the practices promoted in the demonstration projects and training activities are designed to promote sustainable livelihoods and reduce the vulnerability of local populations to disasters. The project was considered highly relevant to the stakeholders interviewed in light of the significant levels of land degradation in Jamaica and the relatively low levels of awareness of the issue and of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) itself. Country ownership was perceived to be relatively high, though some interviewees indicated that greater support at the ministerial level would have been beneficial in the earlier stages of the project.

There is considerable commitment to follow-up on project achievements among the main agencies involved, such that socio-political issues are not likely to pose a risk to project sustainability. Furthermore, the institutional, policy and governance framework supports the promotion of SLM and is in the process of being strengthened. The main risk to sustainability is considered to be financial as the government of Jamaica faces severe limitations in its ability to scale up project activities due to the current fiscal crisis.

The final estimated project delivery rate was 84%, with some differences between planned and actual expenditures; in particular, fewer resources were spent on project management than planned, presumably due to the period of time during which the project was without a project manager. The project was considered to be cost-effective with the majority of deliverables having been achieved while staying under budget. Furthermore, additional in-kind resources were leveraged from agencies and the private sector above and beyond the original co-financing commitments, although not all were quantified.

Recommended Actions to Follow up on the Project's Benefits

To build on the project and increase impact, the best practices showcased through this project should be further promoted by the agencies involved as well as by the individuals trained through the project. As part of this effort to promote replication, increased information sharing with other projects and programs and the documentation and dissemination of the demo project experiences are recommended. Scaling up of the best practices promoted will require work to identify additional funds, including collaboration with the private sector. Increased sensitization of decision-makers both in the public and private sectors, and the promotion of increased awareness of Jamaica's commitments under the UNCCD will also be important to ensure that the topic of SLM continues to be prioritized and that the necessary investments are made. Additional education and training on SLM will be needed to build on the project's capacity building efforts as people learn through repetition. Interviewees also noted that increased interlinkages need to be made with other issues such as climate change, and with other development interventions, to maximize impact. It will be important to follow up to ensure that the SLM Policy developed through this project is integrated into the National Land Policy as planned. Finally, further research at the demo project sites should be carried out and the results disseminated.

Best Practices

The project demonstrated a number of best practices that warrant highlighting for future adoption by UNDP/GEF and other projects.

- **Regular meetings of PSC to guide project implementation**

The regular engagement of the PSC was critical in keeping the project on track and facilitating its implementation, especially in light of the various challenges that were encountered.

- **Convening of core group of ProDoc signatories to move project forward when project at risk**

When the project was at risk of early closure, the core group of ProDoc signatories, namely, UNDP, PIOJ and FD, met on several occasions to make critical decisions to move the project forward.

- **Substantial inter-agency collaboration**

The project brought together different stakeholders from government, the private sector and communities through the PSC as well as the demonstration projects and set the basis for future collaboration, which is key for a cross-

cutting issue such as SLM. One interviewee commented that it took some time to achieve this inter-agency collaboration, but that it was eventually achieved.

- **Development of MOUs with the National Irrigation Commission and Mines and Geology Division to provide funding for demo projects and push delivery**

The signing of MOUs and transfer of funds to agencies had an important impact on ensuring that the demo projects were executed and on increasing the delivery rate when the continuation of the project itself was at risk.

- **Hiring of field liaison and public relations officer to work directly with communities**

The hiring of the field liaison and public relations officer proved to be an excellent move that served to ensure that communities were adequately engaged and that the demo projects were completed.

- **Training workshops adapted to different audiences**

The content and style of presentation of information in the training workshops was adjusted to suit the different target audiences to ensure that the information would be accessible to them.

- **Project community-level activities minimized during election time**

The project was able to maintain a non-partisan stance and avoid alienating community members by avoiding entry into the communities during election campaigning time.

- **Local community members employed to carry out awareness surveys**

Local community members were trained to administer the public awareness surveys, which likely increased their' willingness to talk about the issue of SLM.

Recommendations based on Lessons Learned

Project design stage:

- **Allow for preparatory phase in project timeline**

The project timeline needs to take into account the preparatory activities that must be carried out before substantive project activities can commence, such as procurement of the key team members, capacity assessment of the EA, setting up of the project's financial system and establishment of a steering committee.

- **Set realistic dates for achievement of project targets in logframe**

Given the start-up period required for projects and the possibility of unforeseen events, the target dates for achievement of project deliverables should not be overambitious.

- **Include budget for dedicated project assistant to take on administrative/ reporting tasks**

If possible, funding for dedicated project assistants should be allocated (if not though GEF funds, using co-financing), as it is difficult for project managers to take on all administrative functions as well as technical oversight. This could go a long way to reducing reporting delays.

- **Ensure that the PM salary is high enough to attract candidates with the desired skill set**

If the PM will be expected to carry out technical functions in addition to project management, additional funds from budget lines besides the project management budget line may be employed. Co-financing could also be sought.

- **Allocate sufficient budget for information sharing and project promotion and consider budgeting for public relations officer**

Sufficient funds for information sharing and dissemination activities and for work with communities are important to increase the project's visibility and to promote replication and scaling up of project activities. As was the case with this project, a public relations officer could be hired to take on these responsibilities.

- **Ensure project design is not overly ambitious**

It is important not to include too many project elements for a medium-sized project of this type to ensure that the project scope is manageable and that there is sufficient time remaining at project end to see results.

- **Ensure logframes are up to standard**

Logframes need to be carefully developed and reviewed at the design stage to ensure that they are conform to logframe standards in order to facilitate monitoring and evaluation.

- **Include tangible activities in project design to mainstream issues such as gender**

It is recommended that concrete activities to mainstream UNDP priorities such as gender equity, sustainable livelihoods and disaster risk reduction, be included in the project design.

- **Do not include deliverables that depend on activities outside of projects' control**

Deliverables such as the approval of policy documents, which are out of the control of the Project Management Unit, the EA, and the IA, are not always easy to achieve and their inclusion in the project design should therefore be considered carefully and avoided whenever possible.

- **Develop conservative budgets for demonstration projects to account for unforeseen costs**

To ensure that budgets are as realistic as possible, the agencies with the appropriate expertise should be fully involved in costing them and contingency funds should be included, especially given the possibility of unforeseen events occurring and cost increases between project design and implementation.

Project implementation stage:

- **Complete the Executing Agency capacity assessment early on in project implementation**

To avoid delays and enable the EA to make direct payments as soon as possible, the capacity assessment of the EA should be carried out by UNDP as early as possible.

- **UNDP to provide regular training to EA and PMU on reporting requirements and M&E system**

It is strongly recommended that UNDP provide in-depth and regular training on UNDP/GEF reporting and M&E requirements to PMs and EAs to prevent reporting delays that could jeopardize achievement of project deliverables.

- **Revise logframe if substantial changes are made to the project**

If any significant changes are made to the logframe (such as the dropping of an important project deliverable), the latter should be revised during project implementation to facilitate reporting and evaluation.

- **Do not wait for candidates who are unavailable for an extended period of time**

Key positions should only be offered to candidates who are able to accept the offer immediately or within a short period of time to reduce delays in project implementation.

- **Carefully consider how best to name positions to facilitate procurement**

The titles of consultancies should be carefully selected, keeping in mind the likely pool of applicants and their backgrounds.

- **Lay out roles and responsibilities of each key project stakeholder, including those of EA**

The responsibilities of all participating agencies should be written out, including those of the EA and of the project team, to avoid misunderstandings and ensure sufficient engagement.

- **Involve all key stakeholders from the outset**

It is critical to ensure that all key stakeholders are involved from project outset to avoid potential problems and associated delays, and to reach out to decision-makers to seek their support. Community members also need to be engaged from the beginning to avoid tensions and limited buy-in.

- **Carry out sufficient project promotion to increase level of support**

One of the ways to reach out to all key stakeholders is by engaging in extensive project promotion and awareness activities throughout implementation.

- **Enhance information exchange among ongoing environmental projects**

For this project, greater information exchange with other related projects in the country as well as the region would have been useful to enhance learning and increase continuity among different project investments.

- **Make interlinkages with relevant ongoing national policy processes from project outset**

This is important to ensure consistency between different policies. For example, in the case of this project, more interlinkages could have been made at project outset with the process of development of the National Land Policy.

- **When working with private sector, have appropriate contacts and equipment in place before initiating work**

In so far as possible, attempts should be made early on to identify appropriate private sector contacts who fully understand and buy into project goals, and to determine where equipment will be sourced, before proceeding with the implementation of pilot projects in order to reduce delays.

- **Ensure demo projects respond to community interests and priorities**

It is critical that the project offer responds to community interests, such as crop preferences, in order to maximize buy-in and uptake of the practices promoted.

- **Maintain regular engagement with communities to avoid distrust**

Ongoing contact with communities should be maintained to avoid situations of distrust that can emerge when there is a period of disengagement and insufficient follow-up with communities.

- **Appreciate and respect subtleties of each community**

Technical personnel need to respect cultural differences and practices between communities in the transfer of information and technology.

- **Secure contributions from community members to enhance sustainability**

For projects to be sustainable, community members should recognize the associated benefits and be willing to assume some of the financial and labour costs involved.

- **Undertake a cost-benefit analysis before implementing demonstration projects**

It is important to carefully assess whether the costs of proposed activities can feasibly be assumed by communities after project closure and whether the benefits are considered to be sufficiently positive to attract community interest. This is critical for sustainability.

- **Conduct training activities over extended period of time to maximize learning and impact**

Training activities carried out over a longer period of time than the project was able to achieve can have a greater impact on learning and levels of uptake.

- **Train SLM trainers in facilitation skills**

Besides including SLM content, train the trainer workshops should provide future trainers with an introduction to basic facilitation skills to enable participants to learn how best to deliver the information to target audiences.

- **Set strict deadlines for obtaining feedback from key stakeholders to avoid delays in completion of project deliverables**

It is important for the PMU to consistently set deadlines for receipt of feedback from stakeholders to reduce delays in the finalization of project outputs.

- **If necessary, meet with individual stakeholders to obtain feedback on key project deliverables**

When feedback from key stakeholders is not forthcoming, project managers may need to meet with individual stakeholders or stakeholder groups face-to-face to solicit targeted feedback.

- **Make effective use of 'virtual' processes of decision-making**

Projects with tight timelines need clear rules for virtual approvals and stakeholder commitment to providing feedback when requested to do so.

- **Plan well in advance for recruitment of consultants**

Due to the time required to recruit consultants, projects need to start the process early to ensure that timelines are not compromised.

- **Ensure all TORs are sufficiently clear and detailed**

All TORs need to contain appropriate levels of detail, and guidance should be provided to consultants to ensure that roles and responsibilities are fully understood.

- **Clarify to consultants that NEX projects are managed by the government EA and not by UNDP**

Consultants need to be clear on the fact that NEX projects are managed by the government executing agency and not by UNDP and that they should seek guidance from the EA when needed.

- **Provide regular feedback and guidance to consultants**

The provision of regular feedback consultants is important to facilitate completion of project deliverables.

- **Encourage consultants to plan appropriately to reduce likelihood of late submission of products**

Consultants need to plan their time appropriately in order to meet target dates for submission of project deliverables.

- **Target actions to areas with greatest degradation risk**

To maximize impact on land degradation levels, it would be useful to target future activities to those geographic areas most at risk of land degradation.

- **Plan for project sustainability in close collaboration with participating agencies**

Financial commitments from relevant agencies to allocate funds for project follow-up were not formalized, although agencies have expressed their commitments to continue with the work initiated by the project. It would be useful for participating agencies to develop exit strategies detailing how they will continue to provide support and training after project closure and the funds available for this work.

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Table 2: Ratings of Project Performance*

Criteria:			
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	Rating	2. IA& EA Execution	Rating
M&E design at entry	Moderately Satisfactory	Quality of UNDP Implementation	Satisfactory
M&E Plan Implementation	Moderately Satisfactory	Quality of Execution-Executing Agency	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall quality of M&E	Moderately Satisfactory	Overall quality of implementation/ execution	Moderately Satisfactory
3. Assessment of Outcomes	Rating	4. Sustainability	Rating
Relevance	Relevant	Financial resources:	Moderately Likely (moderate risks to sustainability)
Effectiveness	Satisfactory	Socio-political:	Likely (negligible risks to sustainability)
Efficiency	Satisfactory	Institutional framework and governance:	Likely
Overall Project Outcome rating	Satisfactory	Environmental:	Likely
		Overall likelihood of sustainability:	Moderately Likely

*Note that a full explanation of the rating scale is provided in Annex 9 of the Report.

3 Acronyms and Abbreviations

Demo projects	Demonstration projects
EA	Executing Agency (also termed Implementing Partner)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FD	Forestry Department
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEF SGP	Global Environment Facility Small Grants Programme (implemented by UNDP)
GoJ	Government of Jamaica
IA	Implementing Agency
JCDT	Jamaica Conservation Development Trust
LAMD	Land Administration and Management Directorate
LD	Land degradation
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
LFMC	Local Forest Management Committee
LLDE	Lead Land Degradation Expert
Logframe	Logical Framework
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAL	Ministry of Agriculture and Land
MGD	Mines and Geology Division
MoFP	Ministry of Finance and Planning
MSP	Medium Sized Project
MTIP	Medium Term Investment Plan
NAP	National Action Program
NEPA	National Environment and Planning Agency
NEX	National Execution
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIC	National Irrigation Commission
PIOJ	Planning Institution of Jamaica
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PM	Project Manager
PMU	Project Management Unit
ProDoc	Project Document
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RSC	Regional Service Centre
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TORs	Terms of Reference
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program

4 Introduction

4.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

1. This Terminal Evaluation (TE) is a requirement of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Global Environment Facility (GEF) and was initiated by the UNDP Jamaica Country Office. It was conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures for such evaluations established by UNDP and GEF.

2. The overall objective of the TE was to analyze the implementation of the project and review the achievements of the project to deliver the specified objective and outcomes. It established the relevance, performance and success of the project, including the sustainability of results. The evaluation also brought together and analyzed best practices, specific lessons and recommendations pertaining to the strategies employed and implementation arrangements, which may be of relevance to other projects in the country and elsewhere in the world. Since no Mid-Term Evaluation was carried out due to significant early project delays, the TE could not examine the extent to which recommendations at the mid-way point of the project were implemented.

3. The TE provided a comprehensive and systematic account of the performance of the completed project by assessing its project design, process of implementation and results vis-à-vis the project objective and outcomes. The TE had three complementary purposes:

    - To promote accountability and transparency, and to assess and disclose levels of project accomplishments;
    - To synthesize lessons that may help improve the selection, design and implementation of future UNDP-GEF activities;
    - To provide feedback on issues that are recurrent across the portfolio and need attention, and on improvements regarding previously identified issues.

4.2 Key Issues Addressed

4. This evaluation analyzed the following five main criteria:

    - Relevance**.** The extent to which the activities are suited to local and national development priorities and organizational policies, taking into consideration changes over time.
    - Effectiveness**.** The extent to which the results have been achieved or how likely they are to be achieved.
    - Efficiency**.** The extent to which results have been delivered with the least costly resources possible; also called cost-effectiveness or efficacy.
    - Sustainability**.** The likely ability of an intervention to continue to deliver benefits for an extended period of time after completion. Projects need to be financially, socially and environmentally sustainable.
    - Impact: Verifiable improvements in ecological status, verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, or indications that progress is being made towards achievement of stress reduction and/or ecological improvement (through process indicators).

5. The evaluation report provided general information about the evaluation; outlined the project description and development context; analyzed the project's design and implementation (including the M&E system);

assessed the level of achievement of project results and; commented on the sustainability of project outcomes. As specified in the TORs, certain elements were rated using a scale from Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory. Conclusions, best practices and lessons learned as well as actions to follow up on the project were highlighted at the end of the report.

4.3 Methodology of the Evaluation

6. The methodology for this Terminal Evaluation included the following components:

A) Evaluation Preparation:

- The consultant carried out an extensive review of documentation, including the Project Document and all other relevant information. The list of documents studied is provided in Annex 5 of this report;
- The overall development situation of the country (based on the UNDP Common Country Assessment and other available reports) was reviewed.
- An initial teleconference was held with the UNDP CO Environment and Energy Programme Advisor and the Environment and Energy Programme Associate. .
- An Inception Report was prepared with a detailed mission programme, including the evaluation methodology to be followed.

B) Evaluation Mission:

- At the beginning of the mission an inception meeting was held with the Environment and Energy Unit of the UNDP Jamaica Country Office to plan the mission, confirm TORs and establish any specific requirements for the mission.
- Interviews were carried out with 26 stakeholders involved in different capacities in the project (see Annex 4 of this report).
- Field visits were carried out to three of the four demonstration projects in the parishes of Clarendon and St. Elizabeth.
- Additional material received during the mission was reviewed with a focused attention on project outcomes and outputs.
- The initial findings were presented by the consultant to the Project Steering Committee (PSC) at the conclusion of the mission and a discussion ensued, giving PSC members an opportunity to comment on and contribute to the draft report.
- At the end of the mission, a close-out meeting was held for debriefing at the UNDP Country Office.

C) Report preparation:

- Final interviews that could not be scheduled during the mission were carried out;
- The initial findings were discussed with the project's RTA (Jose Vicente Troya);
- A detailed analysis of the data was undertaken;
- Follow-up phone calls were made and e-mails sent to address information gaps;
- The information was consolidated and a draft report prepared. The draft was prepared in accordance with the guidelines and Terms of Reference for this Terminal Evaluation (see Annex 1 of this report). Upon receipt of the reviewers' comments, a final evaluation report will be prepared.

4.4 Structure of the Evaluation

7. The structure of this evaluation followed the Terms of Reference provided by UNDP Jamaica and approved by the UNDP-GEF Regional Service Centre (RSC) (see Annex 1 of this report). UNDP Guidelines for Evaluators as well as GEF evaluation policies were followed as well as the specific expectations of the Implementing Agency (IA) and Executing Agency (EA), also referred to as the Implementing Partner.

5 Project Description and Development Context

5.1 Project Start and Duration

8. The Project Document was signed in January 2008 with a three-year implementation period and a planned closing date of December 2010. The process of identifying a qualified project manager (PM, officially referred to as Lead Land Degradation Expert- LLDE) willing and able to take on the role was protracted and the first project manager only finally came on board in January 2010. The Inception workshop and first stakeholder consultation took place in June 2010.

9. As a result of various delays, a project extension was obtained. The project operational closure date was eventually set for November 30, 2012 and the financial closure date for December 31, 2012.

10. The total GEF contribution was USD 500,000 with USD 486,000 committed as co-financing.

5.2 Problems that the Project Seeks to Address

11. Land degradation is seriously affecting the integrity of ecosystem functions and services, on which the biodiversity, agricultural production and income-generating opportunities of rural Jamaica depend. The main causes of land degradation were identified in the ProDoc as: 1) expansion of the agricultural frontier; 2) decline of agricultural productivity and unsustainable farming practices; 3) undervaluation of agricultural lands; 4) limited water availability; 5) impacts of mining and quarrying practices; and 6) increased squatting.

12. A number of barriers preventing these problems from being adequately addressed were identified in the ProDoc as:

    - Fragmented and overlapping policy and institutional framework limits options for ecologically sound and sustainable management of land resources, as reflected in issues such as conflicting policies on land usage;
    - Weak institutional leadership and capacity to implement, coordinate, and enforce existing land management programmes;
    - Technical knowledge and capacities to identify, disseminate and implement best practices for sustainable land management are lacking;
    - Low land ownership and the high transaction costs associated with acquiring land titles contributes to low adherence to best practices for sustainable land management;

- Marginal awareness of SLM requirements at all levels;
- Insufficient economic incentives and associated instruments; and
- The National Spatial Information System does not provide a comprehensive mapping of current land-use practices that contribute to land degradation.

13. The proposed intervention was designed to address the majority of these barriers.

5.3 Immediate and Development Objectives of the Project

14. . The project's long term goal is to "to prevent and arrest land degradation by institutionalizing sustainable land management practices." The objective of the project is to "To integrate sustainable land management within decision-making and development planning and strengthen capacities to implement best practices for sustainable land management". The project Outcomes are:

Outcome 1: SLM is mainstreamed into national institutions, policies, strategies, and plans;
Outcome 2: Capacity for management, application and adaptation of SLM is developed and enhanced; and
Outcome 3: Monitoring, evaluation, lessons learned and adaptive management are achieved.

5.4 Expected Results

15. The Logical Framework presented in Table 3 identifies the Project Objective and three Project Outcomes, as well as associated indicators, baselines and targets. Note that the Logframe included in the ProDoc did not include Outcome 3.

5.5 Baseline Values Established

16. The logframe specifies the baseline values established for this project. For an analysis of the appropriateness and quality of the project design, including its expected results and baseline values, please see Project Design section- Analysis of logframe.

5.6 Main Stakeholders

17. The ProDoc adequately describes the role of the main stakeholders to be involved in project implementation. These stakeholders include:

- Forestry Department, which would be responsible for project coordination and management and which would execute two of the demonstration projects;
- Ministry of Local Government and Environment, which houses the focal point for the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and which would play an important role in policy development;

- Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), an Agency of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, which coordinates all international support, including all GEF projects and which would play an important role in terms of SLM financing;
- Ministry of Agriculture and Land, which would be involved in policy development and would benefit from institutional strengthening;
- User groups, including farmers, communities and the private sector, to be involved in the demonstration projects.

6 Findings

6.1 Project Design/ Formulation

- **Analysis of logframe/ Results Framework (Project logic/strategy; indicators)**

18. The project design adhered to the structure of the global portfolio project, and included the main elements of the latter, including the mainstreaming of SLM into policies and programmes, capacity building, and development of a medium-term investment plan (MTIP). The logical framework identifies an appropriate long-term goal, project objective and three project outcomes that follow logically from the objective. However, there are a number of deficiencies in the formulation of project indicators, baseline values, targets and sources of verification.

19. There are several instances of inconsistencies between the indicators, baselines and targets where the logical links between them are not immediately apparent. For example, for Outcome 1, the indicator is "political will and public opinion drive the SLM mainstreaming process", the baseline value is a "fragmented and overlapping policy and institutional framework" and "weak institutional leadership and capacity…" and the target is "an overall policy for SLM developed and endorsed by a consensus of stakeholders". In this example, the indicator should have been related to the policy and institutional framework. Under Outcome 2, the target related to capacity building is framed as an output-level target (provision of training to a certain number of stakeholders), rather than one that effectively measures increased capacity among key stakeholders.

20. There are also some potential inconsistencies between different sections of the logframe. For example, in terms of the funding available for SLM, at the project objective level and at the level of Outcome 1, the target is a significant increase of over 10% in investments in SLM practices compared to baseline funding, while another target for Outcome 1 is that "80% of financing requirements for the MTIP secured", which is likely to be a substantially more ambitious target than the 10% target.

21. One significant oversight in the logframe is that Outcome 3 is not included at all (though there are outputs and activities associated with Outcome 3 in the provisional workplan). The absence of indicators, baselines, targets, sources of verification and assumptions for this Outcome makes it difficult to carry out associated monitoring and evaluation activities.

22. The indicators provided in the logframe are not always phrased appropriately. Some are written as targets (e.g., under Output 1.4, "significant agreement (>90%) among public on the need for SLM"), and some are phrased as sources of verification (for example for Output 1.1, one of the indicators is "assessment report").

23. The logical framework generally includes appropriate baseline information for the indicators established. With a few exceptions, the baseline values are descriptive, rather than quantitative. For example, at the project objective level, one of the baseline values is "marginal awareness of SLM requirements at all levels", which is too vague to be able to measure project impact against this baseline. If the quantitative information was not available at the time of project design, the logframe should ideally specify that the data will be collected at project onset. In a few instances, the baseline values are not formulated as such; for example, one of the baseline values at the project objective level is "technical knowledge and capacities to identify and implement best practices for SLM"; this is formulated as an indicator rather than as a description of the actual baseline level of technical knowledge and capacities.

24. There are also some issues related to the targets identified for each Outcome. In some cases the targets do not correspond with the Outcome under which they are included. For example, under Outcome 2, the target of a "policy dialogue meeting of all key stakeholders endorses overall SLM policy document, MTIP" is a repetition of one of the targets for Outcome 1 and is not appropriate for Outcome 2, which is focused on awareness and capacity building.

25. Given the reality of capacity limitations in Small Island Developing States, many of the targets were rather ambitious, particularly in terms of the dates for which the targets are expected to be achieved. New projects take time to get started and to carry out the procurement process for the PMU and key consultants, set up the financial system and hold the inception workshop, etc. Nonetheless, the logframe includes several targets that were to be reached within six or nine months of project start-up. For example, as part of the process of developing the SLM framework policy, the first target is that the policy and regulatory framework would be analyzed and a report submitted to Cabinet six months into the project. The SLM training program and material was expected to be approved by consensus within nine months of project initiation. Other major project outputs were expected to be achieved within one year of project initiation, such as the Medium-Term Investment Plan.

26. Many of the stakeholders interviewed commented that the project design as a whole was rather ambitious with a number of different elements to implement in a relatively short time frame. Others felt that the project scope would have been feasible if the project had not faced so many delays due primarily to procurement and reporting issues.

27. In terms of the specific deliverables of the project, one of the proposed demonstration projects was to promote sustainable practices on leased lands to address land title issues, which some interviewees felt should not have been included in the project design. Land titling is considered a slow and complicated process to deal with in Jamaica and would have been difficult to address in the time span of the project.

- **Assumptions and Risks**

28. In general, the project design adequately identified the assumptions that had to hold for the project to achieve its expected results, such as continued political support, stakeholder commitment and no dramatic changes to the economy. However, there were a few assumptions that seem inappropriate for this particular project. For example, the assumption that "SLM can be implemented in an integrated manner through a framework SLM policy" calls into question the project design itself- if such integration cannot be achieved through a framework SLM policy, why include such policy development in the project design?

29. As mentioned previously, Outcome 3, which relates to project monitoring, evaluation, lessons learned and adaptive management, was not included in the logframe, and as such, there were no assumptions provided for this Outcome.

- **Lessons from Other Relevant Projects Incorporated Into Project Design**

30. The evaluator cannot comment on the extent to which the *global* project design took into account lessons learned from other projects. At the national level, there were some differences of opinion as to whether the project was sufficiently adapted to the context; some interviewees indicated that there was considerable effort to adjust the design to the Jamaican reality and to "get it right", while others felt that some elements of the project design were not as relevant (e.g., the development of the MTIP).

- **Planned Stakeholder Participation**

31. The ProDoc includes a comprehensive analysis of the principal stakeholders of the project and outlines a strong stakeholder participation plan. The following table taken from Annex 6 of the ProDoc identifies the proposed role of each of the project's main stakeholders.

Table 3: Stakeholder roles

Stakeholder	Stakeholder's interest in SLM	Justification for inclusion of stakeholder	Expected role of stakeholder
Forestry Department (FD)	Project coordination, agro-forestry, institutional strengthening, policy development	Responsible for country's forest estates and executing National Forest Plan	Project coordination and management; executing two of the five proposed demonstration projects (note that this was later changed to four). Staff will receive training, GIS resource persons and research findings
Ministry of Local Government and	Policy development	Focal Point for UNCCD, CBD and other international environmental conventions	Member of PSC, policy development, legislative reforms

Environment (MLGE)			
Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoFP)	SLM financing	All GEF projects have to be channeled through this Ministry	Facilitates government commitments to financing CCD NAP implementation and SLM
Ministry of Agriculture and Land (MAL)	Policy development, institutional Strengthening	Guides development of the agricultural sector; land distribution for both agricultural use and human settlement.	Member of PSC, policy development, legislative reforms; Staff to be trained in land management tools, including GIS
Ministry of Housing, Transport, Water and Works (MHTWW)	Policy development	Mandate for water and human settlement sectors	Member of PSC, policy development, legislative Reforms
Ministry of Industry, Technology, Energy and Commerce (MITEC)	Fosters investment in productive capacity and use of new technologies	Mandated to spearhead industrial modernization; to promote development of small and microenterprises	Expected to provide grants for the technological development of the agricultural sector
Rural Physical Planning Department (RPPD)	Land use proposals, crop zoning, institutional strengthening	Mandate for land capacity assessment data on agricultural lands	Formulation of land utilization and zoning strategies
Rural Agricultural Development Authority (RADA)	Development of early warning system for drought, soil husbandry training, institutional strengthening	Responsible for agricultural extension services	Resource persons for SLM training on soil conservation; to be involved in three of the five demonstration projects
National Irrigation Commission (NIC)	Development of small-scale irrigation infrastructure	Manage, operate, maintain and expand such existing and future irrigation schemes	Resource persons in the installation and effective operation of small scale systems
Jamaica Bauxite Institute (JBI)	Development of land rehabilitation techniques due to bauxite mining	Regulation of the bauxite sector	Resource persons and research findings on land rehabilitation disseminated to mining sector, and

Now the Ministry of Local Government. The subject of the Environment is now with the Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change.

Now the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The subject of land management was transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister in 2007 and is now in the Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change (MWLECC). The subjects of water and forestry are also with the MWLECC.

Now the Ministry of Transport, Works and Housing. The subject of water is now with the Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change.

			used for policy formulation and planning
Mines and Geology Division (MGD)	Development of land rehabilitation techniques of limestone quarry and bauxite mining	Regulates mineral extraction	Resource persons and research findings on land rehabilitation disseminated to mining and quarry sector, and used for policy formulation and planning
National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA)	Biodiversity conservation and watershed management	Regulates environmental management	Member of PSC, policy development, legislative Reforms
Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ)	Project approval, policy development, R&D for planning and development	Initiating and coordinating the development of plans, programs and policies for the economic, financial social, cultural and physical development of Jamaica, research on national development issues. Responsible for coordination of all bi-lateral and multi-lateral interventions.	Finalization Sustainable Rural Development Policy, mainstreaming of policy into development planning
Jamaica Conservation and Development Trust (JCDT)	In-kind co-financing; reforestation and wildlife conservation activities; public education campaign	Responsible for the management of the Blue Mountains and John Crow National Park	Resource organization for networking with local farmers and communities; Implementation of wildlife conservation and natural resource management programmes in and around the BMJCNP
User groups: farmers, communities, private sector	Demonstration projects on smallscale irrigation infrastructure, land rehabilitation techniques, agroforestry, soil conservation and appropriate cultural practices	The effectiveness and sustainability of SLM can only be achieved by ensuring stakeholder involvement in the definition of the problem that affects them, and development of workable solutions	Trainees; Provision of land, time labour and resources

32. It should be noted that there has been significant institutional restructuring since the project was designed, such that the location of some of the departments and ministries listed in the table above has changed.

33. In addition to detailing the main project stakeholders, the ProDoc also outlines the proposed composition of the Project Steering Committee (see management arrangements for more details).

34. The actual stakeholder participation in the project design was strong. The development of the project corresponded with the drafting of the NAP and as such consultations on both were linked. Focus group meetings were held to review the issues and recommendations that emerged from the national consultations to prepare the NAP. In addition, consultations with key stakeholders were carried out to determine the root causes of land degradation, barriers to SLM, and to identify possible solutions. A national workshop was organized to finalize the project strategy, outcomes, outputs, and activities and to obtain recommendations for the design of the demonstration projects.

35. The only concern expressed during interviews regarding stakeholder participation in the project design phase was the limited involvement of UNCCD focal points. It was suggested by one interviewee that this might have been the reason why the Jamaica SLM project did not have enough of a focus on UNCCD activities related to preventing land degradation in prioritized geographic areas (and instead adopted a broader focus on the promotion of SLM in general).

- **Replication Approach**

36. The ProDoc clearly outlines how the project was designed to promote replication (see Annex 8 of ProDoc). The demonstration projects would act as learning sites for the promotion of best practices. They planned to seek the participation of farmers in neighbouring communities to train SLM champions and promote wider uptake. The Medium Term Investment Plan would identify the financing required to promote replication of the practices demonstrated by the project and others to increase the institutionalization of SLM. The more holistic and integrated policy framework to be developed by the project would also be supportive of increased replication. Finally, the ProDoc commits the project to holding regular workshops every four to six months to promote sharing of lessons learned and generate momentum for replication. Perhaps one element missing from the analysis was greater detail on how each of the agencies involved in the project's demonstration projects would allocate the technical personnel and resources to promote replication after project closure (although perhaps this could have been addressed under the MTIP).

- **UNDP Comparative Advantage**

37. UNDP Jamaica had a substantial comparative advantage to act as Implementing Agency for this project. It has a physical office in the country, which facilitates the provision of administrative support and technical backstopping to the Executing Agency. In addition, UNDP successfully implemented the demonstration project aspect of the Jamaican component of the IWCAM (Integrated Watersheds and Coastal Area Management) regional project (involving a watershed project in NE Jamaica) and also implements the GEF Small Grants Program (GEF SGP), which provides funding to projects to reduce land degradation and to promote integrated forest management, among other investments.

- **Linkages between Project and Other Interventions within the Sector**

38. The ProDoc identified several other related projects being implemented by the UNDP in Jamaica, such as the demonstration aspect of the IWCAM project, the GEF SGP program, and the work of UNDP with the government of Jamaica in disaster reduction. Other relevant initiatives being carried out in Jamaica in the area of land degradation are described in the baseline activities section.

39. However, the ProDoc does not provide details on how linkages among these projects will be achieved (for example through UNDP meetings or website updates). It is recommended that future Project Documents include this information.

- **Management Arrangements**

40. The ProDoc identifies appropriate management arrangements, specifying the EA and the IA for the project and their respective roles. It also outlines the functions of the Project Steering Committee (PSC), responsible for providing technical oversight, as well as reviewing and approving annual work plans and the budget. As for the composition of the PSC, the ProDoc indicates that this should include a balanced representation of all key government ministries, academic institutions and NGOs and that the Conservator of Forest, members of the country's land degradation and drought management committees, the CCD focal point and a UNDP representative would be members of the PSC. It might have been useful to also specify which other key institutions and organizations should be part of the PSC.

41. As per the ProDoc, a Project Management Unit (PMU) was to be established within the Forestry Department, consisting of the PM or Lead Land Degradation Expert, and a small support staff (administrative assistant, accountant and driver). The PMU would be responsible for project management; administrative, technical and financial reporting; management of the selection process for contracts; and recruitment of consultants.

42. The ProDoc specified that this project would be executed under the UNDP National Execution (NEX) procedures. UNDP CO in Jamaica would be responsible for managing the GEF funds and would make quarterly advances to the PMU. It would have perhaps been opportune to indicate that this financial modality is dependent on satisfactory assessment of the EA's capacity, which was not yet complete at the time of project design. In the interim, UNDP would be responsible for making direct payments.

43. The UNDP CO would also be responsible for providing management oversight and bears the ultimate responsibility for project monitoring, evaluation, timely reporting by the PMU and ensuring submission of annual audits to the UNDP Headquarters. The regional coordination unit in Panama would provide technical backstopping, UNDP GEF policy advice, and trouble shooting and advisory services as necessary.

6.2 Project Implementation

Monitoring and Evaluation (Design at entry and Implementation)

Monitoring and Evaluation Design at entry (*Moderately Satisfactory*)

44. As highlighted in the Project Design/Formulation – Analysis of Logframe section, the project design identified an appropriate project goal, objective and outcomes, but it included some inconsistencies between indicators, baselines and targets and some inappropriately framed indicators and targets. Outcome 3 was not included in the logframe at all. A more careful revision of the logframe during project design to ensure appropriate formulation and internal consistencies would have been useful to facilitate monitoring and evaluation and assessment of final project performance.

45. The Monitoring and Evaluation Plan described in the ProDoc is considered comprehensive and appropriate with all the main elements including: an inception report, annual PIRs, annual TPR meetings and reports, annual audits, annual reports on lessons learned, a terminal report, three surveys, an end-of-project regional lessons learned workshop, and mid-term and terminal evaluations. The amount allocated for the implementation of the M&E Plan was USD 89,750

Monitoring and Evaluation Implementation (*Moderately Satisfactory*)

46. The majority of the activities included in the M&E Plan were carried out. These included an inception report, annual PIRs (and quarterly progress reports), which reported on lessons learned, two awareness surveys and a Terminal Evaluation. The final amount spent on M&E is estimated at USD 32,246.90 (for two surveys, the financial audit of 2011 and the TE), less than the USD 89,750 allocated in the ProDoc budget. At the time of this evaluation, the draft terminal report was in the process of being reviewed.

47. Terminal Evaluations are requested to include comments on the level of consistency between the PIR self-evaluation ratings and the TE findings. In this respect, the PIR ratings for progress toward achievement of project objectives ranged from Unsatisfactory in 2009 to Satisfactory for the subsequent years. The evaluator is of the opinion that given the significant project execution delays and low delivery rates for all but the last PIR reporting year, coupled with the achievement of the majority of the planned project deliverables, overall ratings of Moderately Satisfactory for project execution and Satisfactory for achievement of project results are appropriate.

48. Some interviewees commented that project monitoring and evaluation could have been stronger. Many of the narrative and financial reports were submitted late, which reduced their usefulness as tools for monitoring and subsequent adaptive management. The logframe served as a guide for project execution but could have been followed more closely to ensure achievement of all the targets. In an effort to promote increased understanding and utilization of the logframe, the UNDP Jamaica CO modified the template for annual progress reports to include reporting on the logframe (the template provided under the portfolio project was a shorter one that did not require this). Given the lack of familiarity of project managers with the UNDP/GEF M&E requirements, the EA would have benefited from more training. Interviewees also commented that the UNDP could strengthen its M&E activities.

49. The decision was made not to carry out a Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE), as the substantial delays in project implementation meant that there was little to report on by the project mid-point (furthermore MTEs are not compulsory for MSPs). While formal tripartite meetings as such were not carried out, the PSC, which met regularly, included the EA, IA and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), responsible for coordination of all international cooperation projects in the country. Furthermore, when the project was at risk of early

closure, as signatories of the ProDoc, these three parties were convened on several occasions to move the project forward.

50. A financial audit was carried out for the year 2011, as expenses surpassed the threshold required for an audit. The management response has since been implemented. A final audit is still required for 2012.

51. Separate annual lessons learned reports were not produced, though lessons learned were included in the annual and quarterly reports prepared and were also discussed during the stakeholder workshops. There was some discussion among the PSC members of the possibility of compiling and packaging the lessons learned by project end for broader dissemination but this has not yet been done.

52. The Project Steering Committee (PSC) played an important role in project monitoring. The key stakeholders were represented on the committee and participation levels were generally high. The PSC was Co-Chaired by the Forestry Department and the Land Administration and Management Directorate. Meetings were held regularly, at times even monthly, with the exception of a time between 2008 and 2009 when there were delays related to the procurement of the PM. It is recommended that such periods without meetings be avoided if possible and that meetings be held every three months at a minimum throughout project implementation as PSC members can provide useful input even when project activities are stalled. Most interviewees indicated that the PSC was highly active and that the Co-Chair of the PSC (CEO of the Forestry Department) played a critical role in the project. The PSC continued to meet even in the gap between project managers. Besides providing input and guiding project implementation, the PSC also played an important networking role to overcome challenges related to communication with stakeholders.

53. Through the PSC, the main challenges being experienced by the project were voiced and members gave input to help address them. Several stakeholders did mention, however, that feedback on some of the draft products of consultancies could have been more timely, and that this contributed to delays in the finalization of these products. One interviewee also mentioned that the steering committee could have been more proactive in asking the appropriate questions to ensure accountability and in making greater demands for the delivery of achievements in the expected timeframe (e.g., with regard to the MTIP), although this was not the consensus viewpoint among stakeholders interviewed. Another interviewee commented that PSC members could have been more decisive at times; the example cited was the need for a clearer recommendation from the NEPA representative as to whether or not the invasive species of *Calliandra* could be used for the limestone quarry demonstration project.

- **Implementing and Executing Agency –Implementation, execution, coordination and operational issues**

Implementing Agency Execution (*Satisfactory)*

54. UNDP performed its role as IA satisfactorily, providing regular support to the EA and stepping in at critical points in project implementation. Early on in the project when no project manager was in place, UNDP took

Note that the land degradation committee was proposed to be on the PSC in the ProDoc but was not active at the time of project implementation.

on the task of preparing quarterly reports. UNDP was also responsible for making direct payments to suppliers until the EA capacity assessment was completed in late 2010. The capacity assessment process started late and was somewhat protracted, which led to some frustration on the part of the EA. This may have been in part because UNDP needed to become familiarized with this relatively new process and because of the difficulty in obtaining some of the information required from the Forestry Department. It is recommended that for future projects, UNDP complete the capacity assessment as early as possible. Interviewees indicated that capacity assessments of EAs have now become standard practice for the UNDP Jamaica CO.

55. During the early stage of the project, the UNDP managed the process of procurement for the first PM (referred to as the Lead Land Degradation Expert or LLDE), which took about two years. This extensive period of time was attributed to insufficient capacity in Jamaica within the specialized field of SLM, the difficulty of finding someone with both the required technical and administrative/managerial background, the salary being offered, and the procurement process, which is lengthy in and of itself.

56. UNDP maintained close contact with the two project managers to provide support and to ensure adherence to reporting guidelines. Despite this support, there were significant delays in submission of narrative and financial reports by the EA, which had a significant detrimental impact on project execution. Given the general lack of familiarity among many EAs and PMs with the UNDP/GEF reporting and M&E requirements, interviewees concurred that UNDP needs to provide greater training with each new PM and with the EA at the outset of projects, as well as ongoing follow-up. UNDP Jamaica CO has already taken on board this recommendation and organized an introductory training session in 2012 for all UNDP projects (not only those in the environmental portfolio). Further training is planned.

57. UNDP was an active participant on the PSC and provided follow-up on issues raised. UNDP also played a key role when the UNDP Regional Technical Centre presented the option of early project closure to the government in late 2011 due to low delivery rates. At this point, the UNDP Jamaica Country Office made a commitment to the RSC to push the delivery up to 40% by end of 2011, which would remove the project from the red-flag zone and took several steps to prevent this from happening. These steps included engaging in discussions with the Regional Technical Adviser (RTA) for the project, bringing in UNDP Senior Management to a PSC meeting to highlight the gravity of the situation, underscoring the implications of early closure on the country, convening the core group of the PSC to make important decisions to move the project forward, and supporting the EA on adaptive management strategies to be employed. Thus the ProDoc signatories, UNDP, PIOJ and the Forestry Department met on several occasions in late 2011 and invited the demonstration project implementing agencies to a meeting as well (NIC and Mines and Geology). As a result, the project was able to increase its delivery significantly in a short period of time and remain open. UNDP consistently demonstrated strong attendance and participation at events such as the project launch, stakeholder consultations, policy consultations and the closing workshop, where UNDP supported the Forestry Department in providing a neutral and unbiased platform to facilitate open and transparent stakeholder participation and discussions.

58. By way of information sharing, UNDP CO shared information on this project and on the demo projects at PSC meetings of other UNDP executed projects, so that the PSC members of other projects would be aware of the project outputs with the aim of building on potential synergies. UNDP CO shared the information on the demo projects with other UN Agencies, for example by inviting the FAO to view the small-scale irrigation

demo project and to attend the demo project launch. UNDP also shared the demo project information with the UNDAF Pillar 1 Working Group and led the discussions on a proposed joint initiative for including replication of the small-scale irrigation demo project as a potential for joint UN Agency Programming and Delivering as One, with GEF SGP, FAO, UNEP and UNDP partnership for the UNDAF 2012-2016 cycle.

Executing Agency Execution (*Moderately Satisfactory*)

59. The execution of this project is rated as moderately satisfactory. The Forestry Department (FD) provided adequate support for project execution, particular in the later stages of the project, and the FD CEO was commended for her active role in co-chairing the PSC and guiding the project. In addition, the FD ensured that the project continued to progress toward its objectives in the gap between project managers. However, the project suffered from extensive narrative and financial reporting delays, which undermined delivery, as well as insufficient communication between the PM and the consultants at times. Procurement issues also caused substantial delays.

60. The Forestry Department was selected as the EA (or Implementing Partner) for this project, despite the fact that SLM is not part of its core functions. This is because no one institution or division has SLM as its mandate in Jamaica and it was felt that FD had the capacity to carry out the role of EA for the project. Given the cross-cutting nature of SLM, the execution of the project required that FD collaborate with many other agencies with mandates related to SLM. Interviewees commented that even greater collaboration could have been achieved earlier on in the project but that this project enabled FD to gain significant capacity in managing intersectoral projects.

61. Interviewees commented that the Forestry Department may not have fully understood its role as EA during the early stages of the project and could have provided greater support to the first project manager. This sense of ownership in the managerial sense increased significantly over time and FD provided appropriate support later on in the project, for example in terms of recruitment processes, administrative functions and accounting. The Executive Secretary to the CEO was assigned to the SLM Project as part of her responsibilities and a project accountant from FD was utilized in the latter stages of the project. The Executing Agency CEO was commended for the active role she took in co-chairing the PSC and in responding to the red flags raised in late 2011 by ensuring that the recommendations were put in place.

62. As highlighted previously, the process of identifying a PM (or LLDE) was a difficult one. Both the first PM and the second individual hired (when the first manager did not renew his contract) were not sufficiently familiar with the UNDP/GEF reporting and M&E requirements. This led to serious narrative and financial reporting delays. As a result, UNDP could not advance funds to the EA (once the capacity assessment was complete in late 2010) as there were no reports to back up whether the previous funds had been liquidated. This led to a situation where the PM and project consultants were not paid for extensive periods of time. Furthermore, project deliverables were stalled as a result. Reporting delays were exacerbated by the personnel changes in the project; with the lapse of time between the two PMs and the incompletion of some reports by the first PM, the second PM had to catch up on reporting for activities that had taken place before she was in place. When reports were submitted, they often had to be revised when they did not adhere fully to the

requirements. Outstanding payments were finally made by the end of 2011 when the previous reports were approved.

63. Quarterly reports generally cited project risks as well as countermeasures. In the last two years of the project, however, the only risk mentioned was the possible impact of weather on the planting activities for the demonstration projects. The original Project Document cited several possible risks, such as the commitment of financial resources to the key institutions mandated to implement SLM and the continued commitment of key agencies to collaborate through integrated approaches to SLM after project closure. A more comprehensive assessment of all the risks that could jeopardize completion of project deliverables and greater attention to risk monitoring (and management where possible) would have been useful.

64. Some interviewees commented that insufficient guidance was provided by the PMs and the EA as a whole to the main consultants (although this improved during the last stage of the project). For future projects, it is recommended that PMs go over TORs with consultants and coordinate implementation of the workplan to ensure clarity on the deliverables. It is also important that regular feedback be provided to consultants to facilitate finalization of deliverables. This was less of a problem in the last stage of the project, when more regular feedback was provided and timely payments were made.

65. One of the stakeholders interviewed commented that it took time for the EA and the PSC to fully grasp the concept of SLM and that the distinction between SLM and the reduction of land degradation was not clear to all participants. The project promoted SLM practices at large, while addressing the issue of land degradation from the point of view of UNCCD would have benefitted from more of a focus on the priority geographical areas that have been identified as most at risk of degradation.

- **Adaptive Management**

66. The IA and EA employed adaptive management on various occasions to deal with changing conditions on the ground and issues that arose during project implementation. For example, the difficulties encountered in identifying a suitable project manager for the project led to a review of the budget and the allocation of some additional funding for the position. When the first project manager did not renew his contract, the EA stepped in to minimize the impact of his absence and continued to ensure that steering committee meetings took place and that progress to achieve deliverables was made until such time as a replacement could be found. During this time, the FD led the procurement process for a new PM, advertised for a natural resource sociologist, circulated reports and maintained some engagement with stakeholders. Another example of adaptive management was the PSC's decision in late 2011 to bring on a field liaison and public relations officer to work directly with communities and ensure implementation of the demo projects. This turned out to be a very positive move that significantly increased delivery.

67. Adaptive management was also needed for the successful execution of the demo projects. Due to delays in getting them started, their budgets had to be revised and approved again. One of the pilot projects related to land tenure issues was dropped due to time constraints and other challenges such as the limited engagement of the stakeholder. Moreover, the site for the limestone demo project had to be changed as the quarry operator was not cooperative and was focused on selling boulders to another project. MOUs were developed with

those agencies outside of FD that were implementing the demo projects (National Irrigation Commission and Mines and Geology Division) in order to be able to channel project funds to them.

68. Despite the fact that adaptive management measures were put in place on repeated occasions, in some cases, decisions should have been taken sooner to reduce the significant project delays experienced. One interviewee commented that "actions were not taken until absolutely necessary". For example, the addition of the field liaison and public relations officer and the drafting of the MOUs with the agencies were only decided upon in late 2011 when the project itself was at risk. It could also be argued that the issue of reporting delays should have been dealt with earlier- either through the provision of more in-depth training by UNDP or through staffing changes.

Feedback from M&E Used for Adaptive Management

69. Feedback from M&E activities contributed to the adaptive management measures employed. For example, PSC meetings and meetings of the core group of ProDoc signatories (UNDP, PIOJ and FD) led to various critical decisions being made, such as the hiring of a field liaison and public relations officer. The financial audit carried out for 2011 led to the development and implementation of a management response.

70. The usefulness of project reports in promoting adaptive management was somewhat undermined by the fact that they were often submitted late. In general and as highlighted in the previous section on adaptive management, the feedback loop of monitoring activities leading to adaptive management could have been more timely to reduce project delays.

Stakeholders/ Partnership Arrangements

71. The project brought together stakeholders that might not normally have worked together, both through the PSC and through other elements, such as the demonstration projects.

72. A total of three stakeholder workshops were organized to sensitize stakeholders about the project, obtain feedback on key project deliverables (particularly the SLM Policy) and provide information on project results. These were well attended (for example, the second stakeholder workshop had 46 participants and the final workshop 52 participants). The stakeholder training workshops associated with the demo projects, and on-site capacity development at the demo project sites were generally well-attended with a few exceptions, and the final train-the-trainer workshop had 68 participants.

73. The project benefitted from the establishment of several partnerships with other agencies to facilitate achievement of deliverables. MOUs were drafted with the NIC and with Mines and Geology to channel funds for these agencies to carry out two of the demo projects. These partnerships were critical to enable the demo projects to proceed and to increase project delivery to the point needed to prevent early project closure.

74. Other key stakeholders were involved to differing degrees in project implementation. As highlighted in the M&E section, the PSC comprised the main stakeholders of relevance to the project and attendance levels at

meetings were generally high. A few stakeholders, such as RADA, the Land Administration Division and the UNCCD focal point, could have participated to a greater degree but were constrained by other commitments.

75. One of the challenges faced by the project was that the different agencies involved in the project generally do not have a direct coordinating unit (or personnel) dedicated to SLM, so that it took time to identify the right contacts and to gain focus and obtain responses from some of these organizations. Another issue that arose was the need to resensitize the highest management levels of the stakeholder agencies involved in the demonstration projects after a period of inactivity and limited contact.

76. One of the challenges experienced by the project was slow feedback from stakeholders on key project documents, which led to delays. These included, for example, the SLM Policy, the policy review report, and the capacity assessment report. The PM dealt with this situation by arranging meetings with each stakeholder agency to solicit feedback.

77. Interviewees commented that greater linkages with other ongoing projects and programs could have been made, such as with the UNDP/GEF Small Grants Program. Such coordination was limited by the significant project delays and the need to achieve the majority of project deliverables in a compressed period of time once activities finally got going.

78. During project design, JCDT was identified as a co-financing partner. The organization carried out the planned co-financing activities, through this was done before the majority of project activities commenced (due to the significant project delays). While many activities related directly to the promotion of SLM practices, such as training in soil erosion, some were not fully relevant to the project. Greater impact might have been obtained if the project had maintained closer communication with JCDT once project activities started to see if other synergies could have been achieved.

79. At the level of the community, stakeholder participation was generally strong. However, the period of time between project managers when there was little contact with communities led to a reduction in the level of enthusiasm and interest of some community members in the demo projects. As a result, the second PM had to take some time to re-establish communication and physical presence in targeted communities. The employment of the field liaison and public relations officer had a positive effect on the relationship between the project and the communities.

80. There were some differences in the level of community involvement between the various demo projects. For some of them, such as the agroforestry demo project, community members were highly involved- perhaps because an organizational structure was already in place in the form of the Local Forest Management Committees (LFMCs). The mining and quarrying demonstration projects had less community involvement, mainly because the nature of the projects themselves did not lend itself as well to community participation. In recognition of this fact and with the desire to ensure that the communities still benefitted from these projects, the project offered community members training workshops, based on their interests. In the case of the small-scale irrigation project, interviewees commented that there was insufficient community engagement at project outset, which reduced the level of buy-in. For this same demo project, an oversight led to the omission of the logo of the Rural Agricultural Development Authority (RADA) on the demo project sign, which led to some

tensions and delays, which were later overcome. RADA was eventually fully involved in providing training to farmers as part of the demonstration project.

81. The project also worked with the private sector, primarily through the demonstration projects. This was challenging at times as their interests were not always consistent with those of the project. For example, one of the sites had to be moved as the operator had recommenced quarrying activities and was not considered to be prioritizing the demo project work. It was also sometimes difficult to obtain the equipment required for the work and to obtain permission from the private sector to use certain data. For the limestone quarrying demo project, a bauxite company ended up stepping up to the plate and providing additional heavy equipment to speed up the work.

6.3 Project Results

Overall results (attainment of objectives) (*Satisfactory*)

82. The project objective was "to integrate sustainable land management within decision-making and development planning and strengthen capacities to implement best practices for sustainable land management". The project developed Jamaica's first ever SLM Policy, which is an important achievement. The impact of this policy development on the level of inclusion of SLM in decision-making will depend on the integration of this policy into the wider National Land Policy under development in Jamaica, for which there is commitment. Capacities to implement best practices in SLM were strengthened within different agencies involved in SLM, communities and the private sector through a number of well-attended stakeholder workshops and training sessions and through the demonstration projects. The capacity building component of the project might have been further strengthened if implemented over a longer period of time, rather than being condensed in the last phase of the project due to the significant earlier project delays. The main limitation in terms of achievement of expected results is the fact that the Medium-Term Investment Plan was not developed as planned and the associated targets were therefore not reached. The next section will describe the level of achievement of each of the project's three Outcomes and of the targets included in the logframe (see Table 3).

Effectiveness (*Satisfactory*)

Outcome 1: SLM is mainstreamed into national institutions, policies, strategies, and plans

83. The project led to the drafting of the country's first Sustainable Land Management (SLM) Policy, which was one of the project's key priorities. The policy was developed with adequate stakeholder participation and a workshop to solicit input was held in November 2011, with 17 participants representing 11 key regulatory agencies in attendance. The feedback provided was incorporated into the final policy. Guidelines recommended in the UNCCD were also incorporated in the policy, despite the fact that the NAP itself could not be integrated (because it has not been finalized). As the first policy of its kind in Jamaica, it represents an important step, though it could be argued that a more detailed analysis of some of the relevant issues could have been included in the Policy.

84. Given that the country is embarking on a process of developing a broader National Land Policy (NLP), the decision was made by stakeholders that the SLM Policy should be integrated into the NLP. By project end, the SLM Policy had been officially submitted by the CEO of the Forestry Department to the Land Administration and Management Directorate (LAMD) of the Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change, which is currently reviewing the NLP in its entirety and will be responsible for the integration of the SLM Policy into the NLP. It is intended that, in addition to including references to SLM throughout the chapters of the NLP, there will be a new, separate chapter on the SLM Policy. In the meantime, the Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change has submitted the draft SLM Policy to Cabinet to sensitize the government about SLM. A steering committee is currently meeting regularly to review each chapter of the draft NLP. There remains work to be done to ensure consistency between the two policies. While a representative of LAMD was on the steering committee, one interviewee suggested that greater coordination and communication between the project and the LAMD earlier on in the project could have increased the level of consistency. The first draft of the NLP is expected to be complete by March 2014.

85. As inputs for the development of the SLM Policy, an institutional capacity assessment and a review of the legislative framework for addressing SLM were carried out. In addition, Terms of Reference were developed for organizational restructuring to strengthen the capacity to address SLM. While the TORs were developed, the revised institutional mandates were not approved by Cabinet, as the decision was made to await the approval of the SLM Policy.

86. The output of developing a Medium-Term Investment Plan was not achieved by the project. Interviewees commented that the severe project delays meant that some project activities had to be prioritized over others and the decision was made to focus on the SLM policy, the demonstration projects and the training workshops. The development of a MTIP was also considered challenging as it would have required a broad discussion among agencies, the engagement of the private sector and high-level commitment from the GoJ to allocate funding toward SLM. Other stakeholders commented that it may not have been prioritized because it was considered a less visible output and because it would have been difficult to identify any additional sources of funding for SLM activities in the current fiscal climate. Finally, one of the reasons cited for the fact that the MTIP was not developed was that it had been meant to provide funds for the implementation of the NAP, which was not approved during the lifetime of the project.

87. The project design specifically referred to the output:"MTIP developed to catalyze development of CCD NAP and SLM". As noted above, approval of the draft NAP did not occur. The draft NAP still needs to be realigned with the UNCCD 10-year strategy before being submitted to Cabinet for approval. Changes in political administration and Ministries, insufficient political will and lack of funds (either within the project or outside of it) hampered this process.

Outcome 2: Capacity for management, application and adaptation of SLM is developed and enhanced

88. A total of four demonstration projects were implemented through this project, three of which were visited by the evaluator. Time restrictions and other challenges led to the decision to drop the fifth planned demonstration project related to land titling. While all the demonstration projects started considerably late, interesting results that showcased innovative SLM practices were evident.

89. The bauxite mining rehabilitation project in Mocho, Clarendon was carried out in recognition of the fact that bauxite mining is the largest contributor to deforestation in the country. The demonstration project built on previous work led by the Forestry Department to carry out a novel approach to rehabilitation using timber tree seedlings. Statutory requirements require the land to be returned to productivity. While varied end uses are permitted, the usual practice has to been to add top soil and plant grass species . In this demonstration project, the *Calliandra* cover crop species was planted to improve soil quality, and a variety of over a dozen timber tree seedlings was subsequently planted. The SLM project enabled a second phase of planting of timber tree seedlings, and provided funds for equipment for thinning, maintenance work, construction of contour barriers to reduce soil erosion, and soil quality testing. A tour was provided to the evaluator of the 2.5 hectare site. The *Calliandra* trees were well established and different species of timber trees were growing in the managed shade. The use of leguminous plants to rebuild soil fertility was considered a good practice, despite the initial concern about the use of an invasive species (it was later determined that it would not pose a problem in the dry climate in which it was planted). In order to promote replication, the Forestry Department organized a site tour with members of the National Restoration Committee (which includes various government agencies, bauxite companies, universities and colleges) with a total of 23 participants. In addition, FD provided a tour of the site to two of the other three main bauxite mining companies in the country. Interviewees indicated that the level of replication will depend on the level of environmental awareness of the companies which in turn will influence their willingness to pay the additional costs involved, and the interest of mining companies in imitating what is seen as a successful demonstration site. The demonstration project itself will continue to receive maintenance from the Forestry Department to manage the shade of the *Calliandra* trees, control soil erosion, promote the continued growth of timber tree seedlings, and collect data on the survival rates of different species in the measurement blocks. The benefits of this method of rehabilitation include the reestablishment of timber species that have been significantly depleted, increased biodiversity such as birds and bees, enhanced forest connectivity, and reduced soil erosion to increase land productivity for farming.

90. A second demonstration project was carried out to establish a small-scale irrigation system in the community of Lititz in the parish of St. Elizabeth, which has no piped water. The demo implementation involved a partnership with the National Irrigation Commission (NIC). The work involved the resuscitation of an existing parish tank, including removal of surface vegetation, excavation, cleaning, repaving of the tank, placing of cover for sanitation purposes and installation of ladders as a safety measure. A submersible pump was also installed, powered by solar energy panels purchased through the project (providing low maintenance costs and environmental benefits). A number of individuals commented on the wisdom of not only supporting agricultural production but of doing so using alternative energy. In addition, the project paid for the purchase of tanks, irrigation tubes, and drip tubes. On-farm training was provided by NIC in water management, and in the efficient operation of irrigation systems. RADA provided complementary training in land management techniques (continued use of dry mulching, establishment of border crops to control pests, etc.), with a total of 40 farmers trained to date. A total of four farmers (chosen due to their physical proximity to the tank) directly benefitted from the establishment of the drip irrigation system, which is estimated to be 95% efficient in terms of water usage. There is the potential for 14-20 other farmers to be connected in the future. In addition, approximately 300 farmers could benefit from the collection of water from the tank to water their cattle. The NIC plans to implement an 18-month exit strategy during which time it will continue to provide training using the demo sites (farmer field school approach), monitor the system and collect data, including on the project's impact on crop yields and livelihoods. It is hoped that the lead farmers will also continue to educate using the

farmer to farmer methodology. The project builds on other rainwater harvesting activities underway in the area with the support of FAO. To ensure sustainability, a committee still needs to be established to manage the system to address issues such as the policing of the area and funding for maintenance. Significant potential for replication exists as the country has 380 parishes and many such tanks that require rehabilitation.

91. Some of the challenges experienced during this pilot include the long protracted procurement procedures that the project needed to follow (e.g., for the purchase of the solar pump), some confusion within the community as to who would benefit from the project, initial institutional issues with a key agency that was not recognized at the outset, and a significant dry period. On the positive side, the project has already generated significant media attention and benefits have begun to be experienced. For example, one of the participating farmers had a bumper crop of melons after the system was established.

92. A third demonstration project involved the establishment of agroforestry systems on five different sites in the Upper Rio region of Clarendon, covering a total of 3.14 hectares, three of which were visited by the evaluator. On one of these, timber tree seedlings only were established based on the farmer's request and training workshops were provided. When interviewed, the farmer expressed his satisfaction with what the project had to offer and with the training provided and had already begun replicating the planting of timber tree seedlings on his own initiative. On a second site with significant flooding problems, the main project intervention involved the construction of a drain. In addition, a variety of timber and fruit tree seedlings and annual crops were planted so that the site could function as a demo site, and training workshops were held. The beneficiary farmer indicated that she was pleased with the regular assistance provided by RADA and the FD. Another agroforestry site was established to demonstrate appropriate practices on highly sloped land for farmers who have no other options but to put such land into production. On this farm, timber tree seedlings were planted on the steepest slopes and on other less steep slopes, fruit trees and cash crops are being planted. Ditches and waterways were reconditioned and reshaped to reduce soil erosion and live barriers using pineapple will be planted. Farmer participation on this site in the training sessions on agroforestry and integrated pest management was high, perhaps because they are already experiencing the effects of land degradation, less productivity and landslides. School children have also been brought up to see the site. A communal nursery exists to grow the seedlings. The FD plans to continue to provide training on the demo site on a quarterly basis. One of the challenges for further replication will be the significant labour required to build the water trenches. The agroforestry project was considered the one with the highest level of community involvement of all the four demonstration projects. The presence of the Local Forest Management Committee with its own established structure may enhance the sustainability of the work.

93. The fourth demonstration project was the rehabilitation of a limestone quarry. Some delays were experienced when the initial quarry site chosen was determined not to be suitable as the quarry owner was not cooperative and was focused on selling boulders to another project. A new quarry site was selected in Montego Bay. Additional delays were experienced due to remedial work required to establish the benches needed for planting and due to difficulties securing the appropriate heavy equipment to carry out this work (this was eventually obtained from a bauxite company and additional support was provided by loaning a bulldozer to speed up the work). Planting of *Colliandra* seedlings was undertaken recently and two workshops for quarry and mine operators were held with a total of 94 participants. Additional planting and remedial work will still be undertaken for this pilot. Monitoring will be carried out on the growth rate of the seedlings. Funding to promote further replication of this demo site may be available from the restoration bond that operators are

required by law to post, particularly if costs can be kept down (by minimizing the need for equipment costs and for remedial work). The Mines and Geology Division plans to produce a Project Document, which would be shared with other operators and agencies, and to seek publicity once the demo work is completed. The Division indicated that it is very interested in this project as it represents the first experience in limestone rehabilitation in a country with approximately 100 limestone quarries of different sizes.

94. In general, the demonstration projects were considered to have been a highly relevant project achievement, serving as models for the implementation of practices that in many cases had not been showcased before in Jamaica. The limiting factor was the little time available for their implementation. The continued use of the demo project sites has been established through informal agreements (e.g., with the community members involved in the agroforestry sites) and formal agreements (e.g. for the mining sites).

95. As highlighted previously, training was carried out in association with the demo projects on topics such as land husbandry, crop care and integrated pest management. Interviewees indicated that the training activities were adequately tailored to the audience at hand. Written training material for each demo project was developed and disseminated, such as hand-outs on best practices in composting and integrated pest management. The training workshops were well-received and addressed issues that community members felt to be of relevance. The training could have been further strengthened by beginning the demonstration projects earlier and carrying the training out over a longer period of time.

96. In addition to the specific demo project training, a one-day "train the trainers" workshop was held near the end of the project with representatives of a cross-section of stakeholders including government agencies, extension officers, universities, and community trainers. In total, 68 individuals attended representing 17 stakeholder groups, and the feedback was positive. The private sector was not included in this workshop as they participated in two separate training workshops for quarry and mining operators. Issues such as land degradation, integrated pest management, compositing and biological waste management, biodiversity, and basic land husbandry were covered. One interviewee commented that it would have been useful not only to teach SLM content but also basic facilitation skills- the 'how to' of training and the need to adapt training to the particular target group. Interviewees indicated that they have begun applying what they have learned in their ongoing practices. A training manual is still in the process of being revised for distribution to the participants though it would have been preferable to have finalized this in time for the workshop. It has been recommended that the training manual be modified to include the topic of SLM as it relates to mining to make it a comprehensive document that covers all aspects of SLM showcased by the demonstration projects.

Outcome 3: Monitoring, evaluation, lessons learned and adaptive management are achieved.

97. Adaptive management was employed on various occasions to deal with different challenges that arose (see adaptive management section of this report for more detail*)*. This was critical to project performance though it could have been implemented sooner in some cases to reduce the delays experienced. Lessons learned were shared at PSC meetings and in annual and quarterly reports, rather than through the development and dissemination of separate annual reports on lessons learned. Project experiences were also shared in several stakeholder workshops, which had high participation levels from a broad spectrum of stakeholder groups. Project monitoring could have been strengthened as described in the M&E section of this report through the more timely preparation and submission of reports, among other elements.

98. As planned, a survey was undertaken on levels of awareness within several communities in 2012 before the training activities were undertaken. As a result of project implementation delays and difficulties hiring the rural sociologist to carry out this work, the survey was not carried out at project outset. A follow-up survey was carried out a few months later to assess the level of satisfaction with the SLM training and support provided and to determine whether and how these individuals might continue to spread the message. The results of the surveys were shared in a stakeholder workshop. Given that different target groups were interviewed for the two surveys, it is not possible to make a direct comparison of the results and to measure project impact on awareness levels. The final end-of-project survey on project impact that was included in the original ProDoc was not carried out due to time restrictions.

Table 4: Level of Achievement of Project Objective and Outcomes based on Project Indicators

Long-term goal: *To prevent and arrest land degradation by institutionalizing sustainable land management practices.*						
Project strategy	**Indicators**	**Baseline**	**Target**	**2012 end of project status**	**TE Comments**	**Rating**
Project objective: To integrate sustainable land management within decision-making and development planning and strengthen capacities to implement best practices for sustainable land management	**Impact Indicators:** ▪ National policy framework governing land management is guided by an overall policy on sustainable land management ▪ Government budgetary allocations for SLM increased and decreased for unsustainable land management programmes and projects ▪ Best practices for sustainable land management are implemented within the framework of an overall SLM policy ▪ Broad acceptance and increased use	▪ Increased rate of land degradation due to insufficient dissemination of SLM best practices ▪ Land management programmes are unsustainable beyond foreign donor investments ▪ Fragmented and overlapping policy and institutional framework to undertake SLM ▪ Weak institutional leadership and capacity to implement, coordinate, and enforce existing land management programmes ▪ Technical	**By the end of the project:** ▪ An overall policy for sustainable land management developed and endorsed by a consensus of stakeholders ▪ Significant increase [>10%] in investments in SLM practices over baseline funding at Year 0 ▪ Policy dialogue meeting of all key stakeholders endorses overall SLM policy document, MTIP ▪ Training provided to at least 80 government and non-governmental professionals responsible for and	An SLM policy was developed and a policy dialogue meeting held to endorse the SLM policy document, in line with the established logframe targets. An MTIP was not developed and could therefore not be endorsed at the policy dialogue meeting. There was no quantification of the level of investment in SLM practices at project end compared to baseline funding. Training was provided to 68 individuals at the train the trainer workshop (including representatives from government, academic, non-government agencies and communities), 94 individuals in two workshops held for quarry operators and 65 farmers involved in the different demonstration sites were trained by RADA. It is estimated that the total number of individuals trained	At the project objective level, the targets related to the development of a widely endorsed SLM policy was achieved, as was the target on provision of training in SLM. Due to project time constraints and other challenges, the MTIP was not developed. The indicator of increased government budgetary allocations for SLM and its associated target of a 10% increase in investments in SLM does not appear to have been achieved.	S

	of best practices for SLM	knowledge and capacities to identify and implement best practices for SLM ▪ Marginal awareness of SLM requirements at all levels ▪ Insufficient economic incentives and associated instruments	who have a stake in the implementation of SLM.	was 220, significantly surpassing the target established in the logframe.		
Outcome 1: Sustainable land management is mainstreamed into national institutions, policies, strategies, and plans	▪ Political will and public opinion drive the SLM mainstreaming process ▪ Government budgetary allocations for SLM increased and decreased for unsustainable land management programmes and projects	▪ Fragmented and overlapping policy and institutional framework to undertake SLM ▪ Weak institutional leadership and capacity to implement, coordinate, and enforce existing land management programmes ▪ Insufficient economic incentives and	**By the end of the project:** ▪ An overall policy for sustainable land management developed and endorsed by a consensus of stakeholders ▪ Significant increase [>10%] in investments in SLM practices over baseline funding at Year 0	As highlighted at the objective level, the project succeeded in developing and endorsing an SLM policy for the country, however, the level of investments in SLM practices was not addressed.	The SLM policy was developed and endorsed. It has not yet been approved by Cabinet as the decision was made to integrate the policy into the wider National Land Policy under development. The Land Administration and Management Directorate has committed to ensuring that this integration occurs and has prepared a Cabinet Note on the SLM Policy. The MTIP was not developed and the levels of investments in SLM pre- and post- project were not measured. The evaluator was not given any data to indicate that the target of	MS

		associated instruments ▪ Land management programmes are unsustainable beyond foreign donor investments			a 10% increase in investments in SLM was achieved.	
Outcome 2: Capacity for the management, application and adaptation of SLM is developed and enhanced	Broad acceptance and increased use of best practices for SLM Best practices for sustainable land management are implemented within the framework of an overall SLM policy	Increased rate of land degradation due to insufficient dissemination of SLM best practices Marginal awareness of SLM requirements at all levels Weak institutional leadership and capacity to implement, coordinate and enforce existing land management programmes Technical knowledge and capacities in Jamaica are lacking on identifying and implementing best practices for sustainable land management	Policy dialogue meeting of all key stakeholders endorses overall SLM policy document, MTIP Training provided to at least 80 government and non-governmental professionals responsible for and who have a stake in the implementation of SLM	The SLM policy was developed and endorsed, but the MTIP was not developed. Training was provided to an estimated 220 government and non-governmental professional through the train the trainer workshop, workshops associated with the demo projects, and workshops with quarry and mine operators.	Based on the outputs achieved for Outcome 2, increased technical capacities and awareness levels were achieved by the project and best practices in SLM promoted through training and demo projects (though not within the framework of the SLM policy). The levels of dissemination of best practices and replication could have been higher if project activities had been implemented over a longer period of time (i.e., if there had been less earlier delays). As indicated in the section of the report on project design, there are weaknesses in the design of this logframe; in the case of this Outcome, the target related to the	S

					development and endorsement of the SLM policy and MTIP is inappropriately included here under Outcome 2, which is focused on capacity building (the same target is also under Outcome 1 and at the objective level). Furthermore, the target related to capacity building is not framed as an outcome-level target that would actually characterize the level of capacity among key stakeholders. There are no targets included here that relate to changes in awareness levels or in the amount of uptake of SLM best practices. The inadequacy of the targets therefore makes it difficult to assess the level of achievement of this Outcome based on the logframe alone.	
Outcome 3: Monitoring, evaluation and lessons learned (adaptive collaborative	*None identified in logframe*	*Not specified in logframe*	Not specified in logframe. Based on the outputs identified, one can assume that the targets for this Outcome would relate to the development and implementation of	The Monitoring and Implementation Plan developed at the project design stage was implemented for the most part (see M&E section for more details). The PSC played a key role in project	Lessons learned were gathered and disseminated through reports and several stakeholder workshops. Furthermore, this Terminal Evaluation includes an extensive	S

management) and project management			a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, including lessons learned, and creation of project management structures	monitoring and guidance through regular meetings and provision of input. As IA, UNDP also played an important role monitoring the level of achievement of project deliverables. However, monitoring reports were generally not submitted in a timely fashion, which reduced their usefulness as tools to guide further project implementation. Lessons learned were shared, though no stand-alone annual lessons learned reports were produced or disseminated. Additional dissemination might be useful to increase impact. The creation of the project management structures was substantially delayed at project outset by a period of two years due to the difficulty in identifying a suitable candidate willing and able to take on the position. A further three months was lost when the first project manager did not renew his contract and a new manager needed to be found.	overview of the lessons learned from this project. The monitoring and evaluation component could have been further strengthened through the development of a stronger logframe and through more timely project reporting. On the positive side, the PSC played a critical role in project monitoring. Project management structures were put in place, though this process was delayed by procurement issues.	

Relevance (*Satisfactory*)

99. The project was deemed relevant by the stakeholders interviewed, in light of the significant levels of land degradation being experienced in Jamaica and the impact on the livelihoods of its inhabitants. Moreover, levels of awareness of UNCCD and of Jamaica's obligations under it and of best practices in SLM were considered to be relatively low, underscoring the need to implement a project such as this one. The project was consistent with existing government commitments and policies, such as the draft Sustainable Rural Development Policy, and with the GEF land degradation strategy. The key project outputs were generally well received by the stakeholders involved in the issue of SLM, including the training workshops, the demonstration projects and the SLM policy itself.

Efficiency (*Satisfactory*)

100. The rating for project efficiency, that is, the extent to which the project results were achieved with the least costly resources possible, is Satisfactory. The majority of the expected project objectives were achieved, while not all GEF funds were used. The estimated final project delivery rate was 84% (to be confirmed as final project reporting was not yet approved at the time of finalization of the TE report). In addition to the originally committed co-financing, in-kind resources were leveraged from several agencies responsible for the implementation of the demo projects and from the private sector. Interviewees felt that the project was relatively cost-effective.

Finance

101. The final estimated project expenditures were $435,366.53 compared to the original project budget of $520,000 (including GEF and TRAC resources). This corresponds to an estimated final delivery rate of 84%. There were some variances between planned and actual expenditures. While almost all the planned expenditures for Outcome 1 were made (estimated 93% delivery rate), the expenditures for Outcomes 2 and 3 were lower than planned (estimated 83% and 80% delivery rates, respectively), while for project management, only an estimated 67% of the budgeted expenses were made. The under-spending in project management was presumably due to the period of time during which the project did not have a project manager.

102. The final estimated co-financing obtained was $361,393.55 (compared to the $489,890 included in the ProDoc); all figures are yet to be confirmed as final project reports have not yet been approved. This includes an estimated $8,094.07 from the government of Jamaica in in-kind and cash co-financing (figure based on draft final review report), and the $316,000 committed in the ProDoc from JCDT. The co-financing from GoJ represents significantly less than the amount that had been committed in the ProDoc of $128,890. According to the EA, this was primarily because much of the in-kind co-financing was not tracked and quantified. The UNDP provided an estimated total of $27,604.48 in TRAC resources by project end (based on CDRs), less than the $45,000 originally committed. The total funds committed from JCDT were all obtained. Due to the lateness of the project, the JCDT co-financing activities were carried out before the main project activities commenced. Some of these activities are perceived by the evaluator as being less relevant to the project's objectives (e.g., support for research or presentations on biodiversity) while other activities were highly complementary (e.g., re. sustainable livelihoods, organic farming and soil conservation training, promotion of

reduced slash and burn practices). Additional in-kind resources were provided during project implementation from government agencies such as NIC and the Mines and Geology Division, and from the private sector, but not all these leveraged resources were quantified. A total of $9695.00 was leveraged from the private sector (Noranda Jamaica Bauxite Partners and individual quarry owner).

103. A financial audit was carried out for 2011 and an additional audit for 2012 still needs to be carried out. The 2011 audit identified a number of issues such as the overstatement of expenditures from 2011 (by including expenditures from 2010), and the lateness of the financial reports. Otherwise, the audit found that the statements of assets and of the cash position fairly represented the balance of inventory and that of the cash and bank balances respectively. A management response was prepared to address the issues identified, the results of the audit were discussed at the level of the PSC, and the management response was implemented.

104. The project was considered to be cost-effective, with government agencies making contributions of their time and funds for expenses such as travel costs, which kept the costs low. Where possible, meetings were held at the FD and food was obtained at the community level to enable more resources to be available to bring in more people. The consultant costs were within budget. One of the interviewees commented that perhaps there was too much of an emphasis on keeping costs low as part of the prevailing cultural mindset and insufficient appreciation of the need to show budget delivery. By the time of the TE, the project had underspent with a final estimated delivery rate of 84%.

Table 5: Summary of Expenditures by Outcome and Year
(*Note: These figures are based on the CDRs received by the evaluator on Dec. 14, 2012– figures still need to be confirmed once final project reporting is received and approved by UNDP*):

	2008	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**Total Budget**
Outcome 1						
Total Project Budget as in PRODOC	64,500	21,750	20,000			106,250
Disbursed (GEF)			52,479.08	41,145.65	5,492.20	99,116.93
Disbursed (TRAC)						
Delivery Rate						93%
Outcome 2						
Total Project Budget as in PRODOC	55,000	108,750	110,250			274,000
Disbursed (GEF)				90,723.94	136,174.18	226,898.12
Disbursed (TRAC)						
Delivery Rate						83%
Outcome 3						
Total Project Budget as in PRODOC	17,950	25,900	45,900			89,750
Disbursed (GEF)				23,587.47	33,838.55	57,426.02
Disbursed (TRAC)				1633.39	12,562.62	14,196.01
Delivery Rate						80%
Project Management						
Total Project Budget as in PRODOC	10,000	19,250	20,750			50,000

Disbursed (GEF)			697.34	12,953.48	6,398.00	20,048.82
Disbursed (TRAC)	995.91				12,412.56	13,408.47
Delivery Rate						67%
Total Project Budget as in PRODOC	**147,450**	**175,650**	**196,900**			**520,000**
Total Disbursed (GEF)			**53,018.90**	**168,410.54**	**181,902.93**	**403,489.89**
Total Disbursed (TRAC)	**995.91**			**1633.39**	**24,975.18**	**27,604.48**
Total unrealized losses				**628.78 (GEF)**	**3565.03 (GEF)** **372.57 (UNU)**	**4566.38**
Total unrealized gains	**-1.68 (TRAC)**		**-157.52 (GEF)**	**-130.07 (GEF)**	**-4.95 (UNU)**	**-294.22**
Total	**994.23**	**0**	**53,018.90**	**170,542.64**	**210,810.76**	**435,366.53**
Total Delivery Rate						**84%**

Table 6: Co-Financing Table:

Co-financing (Type/source)	UNDP own financing (USD)		Government (USD)		Other Sources (USD)		Total Financing (USD)		**Total Disbursement (mill. US$)**	
	Proposed	Actual	Proposed	Actual	Proposed	Actual	Proposed	Actual	**Proposed**	**Actual**
Grants (cash)	45,000	$ 27,604.48	3890.00	3890.00			48,890	31,494.48	48,890	**31,494.48**
Credits										
Equity										
In-kind			50,000	4,204.07	316,000	316,000			441,000	329,899.07

			(FD) 75,000 (PIOJ)		(JCDT)	(JCDT) $9,695 (Noranda Jamaica Bauxite Partners and individual quarry owners				
Non-grant instruments**										
Other types										
Totals (estimates as final project reporting not yet in)									489,890	361,393.55

*Other sources refer to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector, etc. Specify each and explain "Other sources" of co-financing when possible.

** Describe non-grant instruments (such as guarantees, contingent grants, etc.)

Country ownership

105. The stakeholders interviewed felt that the project had a substantial level of country ownership and responded to country priorities. The CEO of the Forestry Department was highly supportive of the project and active as Co-Chair of the PSC. Overall, FD provided adequate support in areas such as procurement and financial oversight and felt ownership over the project. It should be noted, though, that FD may not have fully understood its role as Executing Agency during the earlier stages of project implementation when the first project manager was in place, which led to insufficient communication and cooperation between this individual and the FD. Over time, the roles and responsibilities of FD as EA were clarified.

106. Some stakeholders interviewed noted that there could have been greater higher level political support for the project at the ministerial level, but this improved over time and with the recent change in administration.

107. The level of support at the level of the Directors of the other agencies involved in the project was considered high. The demonstration project activities were consistent with the mandates of the participating agencies, who felt substantial ownership over them. For example, the Forestry Department had already carried out a first phase of work on the rehabilitation of the bauxite mine and was committed to building on this work.

108. The project contributed to several goals identified in the country's development plan, Vision 2030, including Goal 4: "Jamaica has a healthy natural environment" and the outcome "sustainable management and use of environmental and natural resources". Land is considered a significant priority in this plan. Nevertheless, there is room for greater awareness and prioritization of SLM and of the UNCCD itself (and the government's commitments under it). At present, while the GoJ has a UNCCD focal point, there are no associated staff members to support this work nor is there a coordinating body for the UNCCD.

Mainstreaming

109. The project contributed to the mainstreaming of UNDP priorities such as gender equity, sustainable livelihoods, and disaster risk reduction. However, one of the interviewees commented that the project design should have included more specific and tangible activities related to these issues. This would have facilitated further mainstreaming as it is felt that there is still a lack of clarity among the IA and the government as to how to mainstream such issues into projects.

110. A detailed strategy to address the role of gender in SLM was not developed at the design stage. Efforts were made during project implementation, however, to strive for a gender balance in the activities carried out, such as the training workshops and the demo projects. In addition, there was strong female participation at the level of project management and oversight (e.g., high numbers of women on the PSC, female Co-Chairs of PSC and female second project manager).

111. Several of the demo projects were designed to promote sustainable livelihoods, particularly the agroforestry projects and the small-scale irrigation system. Initial anecdotal evidence for the small-scale irrigation system demo project suggests that positive impacts on crop yields were already being experienced,

though quantitative data is not yet available. As demonstration projects, the number of beneficiaries was relatively limited. In that sense, significant impact on livelihoods will depend on the extent of replication.

112. It is too early to comment on the project's impact on Jamaica's ability to cope with natural disasters, but it is likely that the implementation of more sustainable land management practices, for example, on hillsides, would reduce the vulnerability of local populations. The SLM policy developed through this project, if effectively implemented, could also have a positive effect on the reduction of disaster risk.

113. The project contributed to the UNDAF for the Government of Jamaica (2007-2011), specifically, UNDAF Outcome 3: "By 2011 national capacity to ensure equity and equality strengthened, and the population of targeted vulnerable communities enabled to reduce poverty, improve their livelihoods and better manage hazards and the environment.", specifically country programme outcome 3.3: "integrated land, coastal zones, water and energy management practices improved", including outputs such as 3.3.1: "Institutional capacity strengthened to efficiently implement policies and plans" and 3.3.2: "Land, water and sanitation management strengthened in targeted communities". The Country Programme Action Plan between the Government of Jamaica and UNDP for 2007-2011 included energy and environmental security as one of the three programme areas, with a focus on land and coastal zone management especially in rural areas affected by poverty.

114. The project was also consistent with the priorities identified for the 2012-2016 UNDAF, CPD and CPAP, for example the UNDAF Outcome 1: "National, local authorities & most vulnerable communities island-wide improve natural resource management & resilience to disasters." The project is particularly relevant to the achievement of the Country Programme output 2: "Increased capacity for sustainable land management in Jamaica" and its associated targets: "finalised Sustainable Land Management Policy submitted for inclusion in National Land Policy; new areas implementing sustainable land management practices; and capacity development for agencies and institutions."

Sustainability (*)

Financial risks (Moderately Likely sustainability rating)

115. The government of Jamaica faces severe financial limitations in its ability to scale up project activities. Moreover, a recent study showed that overseas development assistance to Jamaica is continuing to decrease. The project did not develop a Medium-Term Investment Plan to address the funding gap for implementing the activities prioritized in the country's draft NAP or for promoting SML in general.

116. Despite this situation, many of the activities carried out in the project form part of the mandates of the institutions that were involved in the project and benefit from the commitment of the relevant agencies to follow up on the project work. As such, they are likely to continue to be promoted with the budget available. It should also be noted that given the positive impact of the small-scale irrigation project in St. Elizabeth, the UNDP has approached FAO and the GEF Small Grants Program for them to consider securing resources for the replication of this project in the next UNDAF (2012-2016) cycle. In any case, it will be important to identify innovative ways to sustain and replicate project activities with the limited resources available and to consider greater mobilization of funds from the private sector.

Sociopolitical (Likely sustainability rating)

117. Overall, it is felt that there is sufficient socio-political support for the sustainability of project impact. The agencies that participated in the project demonstration activities, such as FD, NIC and Mines and Geology, had strong ownership of the demo projects as these either supported activities that were already ongoing (as in the case of the rehabilitation of the bauxite mine), or were activities for which they had long sought funding (such as the rehabilitation of the limestone quarry by the Mines and Geology Division). Furthermore, the activities formed part of the agencies' mandates. This situation increases the likelihood of continued support for the demo projects and further replication.

118. FD is committed to continuing to work in the Upper Minho region due to the proximity of the forest reserve. The two demo projects under their responsibility were carried out in areas with Local Forest Management Committees, which enhances the sustainability of the actions undertaken.

119. NIC is implementing several water harvesting projects in St. Elizabeth parish in cooperation with FAO and is ensuring linkages among the different projects. NIC is developing an 18-month exit strategy to continue to provide follow-up to this demonstration project. There has also been some discussion about the possibility of establishing an agro-park using the improved irrigation system. A committee will need to be established in St. Elizabeth to provide follow-up and protect the investment (e.g., to take charge of ensuring security, to determine how water will be allocated, and to ensure maintenance is provided). RADA has indicated that it will continue to carry out agricultural extension activities in this project area, as well as for the other demonstration projects involving farmers, such as the agroforestry one.

120. In order to ensure that the limestone rehabilitation site continues to function as a demo site and to permit data collection to take place, there is a signed MOU between the Division and the quarry operator committing him to leaving the site undisturbed for a period of at least three years. In addition, no material is to be removed from the site once the rehabilitation is complete. The Mines and Geology Division is interesting in sharing the lessons learned in the re-vegetation of the limestone quarry and promoting future re-vegetation of other quarries across the country. In addition, the National Restoration Committee will have a role to play in providing follow-up to project achievements as part of their mandate is to develop guidelines for the rehabilitation of lands disturbed for quarrying; the information from this project will form the basis of the guidelines which are currently being developed.

121. The private sector benefitted from some training in the rehabilitation of quarry sites through two workshops and visited the demo project site. Their level of motivation to build on the project's results, in particular the quarry operators, is believed to be varied, with some having expressed their interest in replicating the demo project and even coming up with their own suggestions as to what should be planted, while others seem to be adopting more of a business as usual stance.

122. Beyond the specific demonstration projects, FD has committed to disseminating the training manual produced through the project to all trainers who participated in the train the trainers workshop. However, it is not yet clear whether an organized and regular training programme on SLM will be carried out after project closure and which agency(ies) would take responsibility for doing so.

123. The Land Administration Division has committed to developing a fully consulted National Land Policy and to ensuring the integration of the SLM Policy into said policy. PIOJ's Sustainable Development Division has also expressed its intention of following up on this issue.

124. It is evident then that interviewees agreed that there is political will and institutional commitment within agencies such as the Forestry Department and the Mines and Geology Division to continue to build on the project's actions and results. However, the level of institutionalization of the practices promoted by the project would likely have been greater if the activities had been implemented over a longer period of time.

125. Based on the interviews carried out by the evaluator, there is support at the level of farmers to continue to carry out the activities promoted by the project. This may be particularly true for farmers that are organized, for example, into Local Forest Management Committees. Furthermore, the follow-up awareness survey indicated that those who were trained in SLM are willing to continue to disseminate SLM information, primarily through informal conversations and on a non-cost basis. However, the level of uptake of practices could be constrained by the rather short period of implementation of the demo projects. Farmers are more likely to replicate practices if they see tangible benefits associated with them (such as reduced soil erosion and increased crop yields). This was not always possible within the timeline of the demo projects. However, this issue will be minimized to the extent that agencies continue to provide follow-up to these farmers as they have committed to doing.

126. It should also be noted that some new programs are building on project work. For example, a programme hosted by USAID is considering the establishment of an Agroforestry Field School, which would build on initiatives commenced with the agroforestry demonstration project.

Institutional framework and governance (Likely sustainability rating)

127. The policy environment to support the continued promotion of SLM and sustainability of project results is in the process of being put in place. Besides the existing environmental legislation, Jamaica is developing a National Land Policy (NLP), and the Land Administration Division has committed to the inclusion of the Sustainable Land Management Policy in the NLP. The country has a draft National Action Program (2006), but this still needs to be aligned with the UNCCD 10-year strategy and submitted to Cabinet for approval. It is unclear when this process will take place. Nevertheless, some actions consistent with the draft NAP continue to be implemented.

128. In terms of rehabilitation after mining, legislation requires bauxite companies to reclaim the land, which obliges them to rehabilitate the land within a certain time frame and according to certain specifications. This legislative requirement enhances project sustainability. Furthermore, quarry operators are obliged to post restoration bonds, which means that some funds for rehabilitation may be available.

129. The technical know-how to continue to promote SLM resides in different institutions, such as the Forestry Department, RADA, and the Mines and Geology Division. Existing capacity was strengthened to a certain extent through the training activities carried out with this project. Further capacity building to expand this knowledge base is still recommended.

Environmental risks (Likely Sustainability rating)

130. Environmental factors are not believed to pose a significant risk to the sustainability of project results. While environmental disasters such as hurricanes could have an impact on the demonstration projects (and already did- for example, the banana plants established on one of the agroforestry plots were destroyed with hurricane Sandy), the SLM practices promoted will generally increase the resilience of ecosystems to such extreme events.

Impact

131. It is too early to be able to identify project impacts on ecological status or reductions in stress on ecological systems. The main project activities were implemented over a relatively short time period, particularly because of the significant earlier delays, and some of the demonstration project activities were still being finalized at the time of this Terminal Evaluation. The project remained primarily at the demonstration stage and did not yet achieve significant scaling up.

132. It should be noted that at the level of some of the demonstration projects, data is being gathered in order to be able to assess impact over time. For example, at the bauxite mine rehabilitation project, growth rates of timber tree seedlings are being measured at monitoring plots.

133. The project has developed tools and capacities that are likely to have a positive impact on the increased adoption of SLM practices in the country. In particular, the drafting of the country's first SLM policy, the development of an SLM training manual, the showcasing of innovative SLM practices through the demo projects and the capacities built should be noted. The perceived sustainability of project impact is relatively high as described in the previous section of the report.

7 Conclusions, Recommendations & Lessons

7.1 Conclusions

134. The project's most significant achievements were considered to have been the coordination achieved among different stakeholders involved in the issue of SLM; the building of capacity within agencies, communities and other stakeholders on SLM; the establishment of four diverse demonstration projects to serve as tangible models of different SLM best practices; and the drafting of the country's first SLM policy. Significant project delays meant that the project had a relatively short period of actual implementation, and there was therefore little time to carry out the training activities and to promote replication/ scaling up of the demo projects. Time pressures also meant that certain planned activities were dropped, most notably, the Medium-Term Investment Plan. Nevertheless the project had a positive role in raising awareness of the issue of SLM in Jamaica and there is significant interest within various agencies to build on the project's activities in terms of further training, providing follow-up to the demo projects, ensuring the integration of the SLM policy in the broader National Land Policy, and securing the latter's approval by Cabinet. The project's objectives continue to be perceived as highly relevant for Jamaica and country ownership of the project was relatively high.

135. One of the main challenges to project execution was human resource limitations in project management. This contributed to substantive procurement delays to identify suitable project managers as well as project reporting, monitoring and evaluation issues resulting from the relative unfamiliarity of the two project managers with these aspects of UNDP/GEF project management. While it took some time for the Forestry Department to fully understand its roles and responsibilities as EA at project outset, overall it provided appropriate support for project execution, particularly in terms of procurement, administrative functions and accounting. The role of the CEO is to be commended in Co-Chairing the PSC and moving the project forward. The project was cost-effective and secured substantial co-financing including additional leveraged resources from the public and private sector. The project ended up under-spending somewhat with an estimated final delivery rate of 84%. UNDP was considered to have performed its role as IA satisfactorily, providing substantive support to the EA in terms of reporting, procurement and making direct payments to suppliers in the early stages of the project, and helping to make key decisions when the project was at risk of early closure. Additional training to the EA and to PMs in reporting, monitoring and evaluation would have been useful as well as the earlier completion of the EA capacity assessment. Adaptive management measures were employed throughout the project to address various issues that arose and these was crucial to project achievements, though in some cases they could have been carried out sooner to reduce project delays.

136. The main perceived risk to the sustainability of project impact is financial as government agencies are faced with severe financial restrictions in the current fiscal climate. Relevant stakeholders will therefore need to find innovative ways to maximize the use of resources and to continue to sensitize decision makers about the importance of prioritizing investments in SLM. The final sections of this report will highlight the main recommended actions to build on the project; the best practices employed by the project; and the key recommendations based on lessons learned.

7.2 Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project and proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

- **Follow up to promote integration of Sustainable Land Management Policy into the National Land Policy**

At the time of this TE, the National Land Policy had not yet been approved and as such, the SLM Policy had not been officially adopted either. Follow-up is therefore needed to ensure that the SLM is incorporated into the NLP as planned. The Land Administration Division in the Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change, which is leading the process of development of the NLP, has committed to ensuring that this occurs.

- **Identify funds to carry out further SLM work**

Scaling up of the best practices promoted through the project will require additional funds. The private sector will need to be engaged in this effort, if not by providing the capital itself (though such financial commitments would be important), by providing know-how on how to generate revenue. The possibility of developing a financial strategy (or MTIP) as originally envisaged for this project should also be considered, though a lead agency to carry out this task would need to be identified.

- **Promote replication of demonstration project experiences and community-level work**

The demonstration projects showcased new or relatively uncommon practices that warrant further replication. For example, the bauxite rehabilitation project was the first time that rehabilitation after reclaiming was carried out using Calliandra (*Calliandra calothyrus*) as a cover crop and then timber tree species. The further replication of such experiences will depend not only on the level of institutional interest in doing so, but critically in the identification of funding sources (see previous recommendation). The expansion of SLM best practices to additional farmers is also important to increase impact. This will benefit from continued extension services from agencies such as RADA and from farmer-to-farmer outreach.

- **Document and disseminate demonstration projects experiences and lessons learned**

Documentation and broad dissemination of the demonstration project experiences is considered a low-cost action that would facilitate information sharing and promote increased replication. This is particularly relevant given that many of the demo projects, such as the bauxite mine rehabilitation using timber species, the limestone rehabilitation and the rehabilitation of the parish tank, were novel initiatives for the country. The packaging of the lessons learned will need to take into account the target audience. While there is no budget available for this, some of the agencies involved, which have demonstrated strong interest in the work undertaken to date, could take the initiative of documenting these demo project experiences. The project deliverables could also be uploaded onto the regional UNDP network.

- **Increased sensitization of decision-makers**

Further replication and promotion of SLM practices will depend in part on the level of interest and sensitization of decision-makers both in the public and private sectors. For example, within the bauxite mining industry, changes in rehabilitation practices and in the species utilized may require increased political will at the corporate level to assume the extra costs involved. All of this depends, in turn, on increased awareness of the benefits of adopting SLM practices.

- **Additional education and training on SLM with general public**

Ongoing education and training is needed to build on what the project has already achieved as people tend to learn through repetition. Based on the survey results, one particularly effective means of spreading information is through radio advertising. As part of this effort, continued technical extension services will also be important.

- **Promote further information sharing with other projects and programs and greater interlinkages with other issues**

The project was perceived to have fallen short in terms of sharing information with other projects and programs and establishing interlinkages among issues and interventions. Information on the project's achievements and lessons learned can still be shared, for example, with the UNDP/GEF Small Grants program and with other SLM projects that were implemented in the region. The project deliverables could also be packaged and disseminated to each PSC member to store at his/her institution to preserve the institutional memory of this project and promote further information sharing. Interlinkages between the issue of SLM and other issues such as climate change should also be made. Furthermore, future development interventions could build on what the project achieved at particular sites, as the implementation of several activities in the same locality and adoption of a multi-sectoral approach may have a greater impact on poverty reduction.

- **Further research and dissemination of research results**

A number of the demo projects showcased pioneering approaches and involved research to measure impact. To build on this, further research and dissemination of the research results is recommended. For example, the bauxite demo project showed that timber tree seedlings can be successfully established on mined-out land if work is undertaken shortly after mining activities terminate before too much top soil is lost through erosion. Given the many bauxite sites that were reclaimed years ago, additional research is needed on how to establish timber trees on these lands. Further research on the impact of small-scale drip irrigation systems on yields and ultimately on farmer livelihoods is also required.

- **Promote increased awareness of UNCCD as well as alignment and approval of NAP**

Interviewees commented that there is still limited awareness of the UNCCD within Jamaica. Increased understanding of the UNCCD's objectives and of Jamaica's obligations under the convention, as well as the formal approval of the NAP, could play a role in increasing the sustainability of project impact. This could also lead to increased investments in SLM activities and support for NAP implementation.

7.3 Best Practices

The project demonstrated a number of best practices that warrant highlighting for future adoption by UNDP/GEF and other projects.

- **Regular meetings of PSC to guide project implementation**

The PSC met regularly for the active stages of this project, at times almost monthly, generally surpassing the quarterly meetings committed to in the ProDoc. Interviewees indicated that this regular engagement of the PSC was critical to keeping the project on track and facilitating its implementation, especially in light of the various challenges that were encountered, such as the loss of the first project manager.

- **Convening of core group of ProDoc signatories to move project forward when project at risk**

When the project was at risk of early closure, the core group of ProDoc signatories, namely, UNDP, PIOJ and FD, met on several occasions to make critical decisions to move the project forward. This had a significant positive impact on increasing project delivery. Such a core group (which could function like an Executive Group) can speed up progress and does not undermine the need for a steering committee, which tends to be a broader group that is more focused on the provision of technical advice.

- **Substantial inter-agency collaboration**

Interviewees commented that the project brought together different stakeholders involved in SLM from government, the private sector and communities that might not otherwise have worked together. This occurred mainly through the PSC and the demonstration projects and established the basis for future collaboration. One interviewee commented that it took some time to fully achieve this inter-agency collaboration and for other agencies to appreciate how they might benefit from the project, but that this was eventually achieved.

- **Development of MOUs with the National Irrigation Commission and Mines and Geology Division to provide funding for demo projects and push delivery**

It is often difficult for already stretched agencies to allocate the technical staff and funds to implement demo projects. The signing of MOUs and actual transfer of funds to agencies can therefore have an important impact on

the execution of demo projects, by ensuring that the agencies have the necessary funds and are held accountable for the activities. For this project, this move was critical in increasing the delivery rate when the continuation of the project itself was at risk.

- **Hiring of field liaison and public relations officer to work directly with communities**

The hiring of the field liaison and public relations officer proved to be an excellent move that served to ensure that the demo projects would be completed on time. The individual hired was commended for being in touch on the ground and intervening regularly with the community. In this case, the field liaison and public relations officer also assisted the PM in reporting tasks.

- **Training workshops adapted to different audiences**

The content and style of presentation of information in the training workshops were adjusted based on the particular target audience. For example, the training sessions provided in Colonel's Ridge were adapted to the local farmers' level of knowledge to ensure that the information would be accessible to them. One of the interviewees commented that those trained received "the information in a digestible mode."

- **Project community-level activities minimized during election time**

The second project manager took the conscious decision to avoid going into the communities during the period of election campaigning so that community members would not confuse project activities and expenditures with a particular political party. Contact was maintained via telephone. In this way, the project was able to maintain a non-partisan stance and avoid alienating community members.

- **Local community members were employed to carry out awareness surveys**

The consultant charged with the development and implementation of the public awareness surveys trained local community members to administer the survey. This was felt to have increased community members' willingness to talk about the issue of SLM (as opposed to an outsider coming in and questioning local residents).

7.4 Recommendations based on Lessons Learned

Project design stage:

- **Allow for preparatory phase in project timeline**

A number of preparatory activities need to be carried out before substantive project activities can commence. These include, among others, the development of TORs for the principal project staff and consultants; the shortlisting, interviewing, and hiring process; initiation of the staff and consultants; setting up of the project's financial system; establishment of project steering committee; capacity assessment of the EA; and holding of an inception workshop. These start-up activities take time. For example, interviewees commented that the procurement process both with the UNDP and with the GoJ is relatively long and can take eight to ten months or longer. The inclusion of a preparatory phase in the project timeline would enable the project team to work on appropriate timelines that are adapted to national realities.

- **Set realistic dates for achievement of project targets in logframe**

The target dates for achievement of project deliverables need to better take into consideration what is feasible. Given the start-up period for projects (see previous recommendation), it may not be feasible to include many targets for deliverables to be completed within the first six months of project initiation. Realistic programming is also essential given the strong possibility of unforeseen events occurring during the project lifespan that could delay execution. For example, in the case of this project, apart from the procurement and reporting delays, other external factors, such as changes in government administrations and the onset of a dry period, also caused delays.

- **Include budget for dedicated project assistant to take on administrative/ reporting tasks**

It was difficult for the PMs to take on all project management, monitoring and technical oversight functions without dedicated support staff, and as a result, reporting delays were a significant issue. While the Executing Agency is expected to provide support for project execution, it may not be realistic to assume that existing staff members within EAs can take on the often extensive and time-consuming tasks of project reporting, monitoring and evaluation, on top of their regular workload. In any case this would decrease their capacity to carry out their ongoing functions. It is therefore recommended that funding be sought for dedicated project assistants if possible (if not with GEF funds, using co-financing). This could also facilitate procurement for project managers as it is often difficult to find individuals with both the required technical and administrative/managerial backgrounds.

- **Ensure that the PM salary is high enough to attract candidates with the desired skill set**

Procurement of the first project manager (and to a lesser extent the second project manager) was very protracted. The PSC felt that the relatively low salary being offered may have been one of the reasons for the difficulties encountered. It is important to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the project manager. If this individual will be expected to carry out technical functions (as well as project management), then additional funds from other budget lines can be allocated to top up the funds available from the limited GEF project management budget line.

- **Allocate sufficient budget for information sharing and project promotion**

A number of stakeholders indicated that there was insufficient budget allocated for information sharing and dissemination activities. This would include production of written material that is developed for different target audiences and appropriately packaged. Funds for such activities are critical as they may have a significant impact on the extent of replication and scaling up of project activities. It may also be worthwhile to consider including a budget (either through GEF funds or co-financing) for a public relations officer to increase communication with stakeholders and to maximize support and uptake. Although the individual came in late in the project, the hiring of the field liaison and public relations officer for this project had a very positive impact on the level of community involvement and on the completion of the demonstration projects. Such an individual on the project team can carry out increased sensitization work with communities from the outset to explain the objectives of demonstration projects and the benefits to be obtained as well as to solicit their input, and can serve to increase the level of community support and ultimately increase the level of replication of project activities. This person could also be involved in public relations work to give such projects greater visibility outside of the immediate agencies involved. These tasks would be difficult for the project manager to assume given his/her multiple other responsibilities.

- **Ensure project design is not overly ambitious**

It is important not to include too many project elements for a medium-sized project of this type, especially given the start-up time needed for projects and the relatively short project duration. By ensuring that the project scope is

manageable, efforts can be focused on achieving deliverables, leaving enough time to see the fruits of the investment and promote replication. Of course, it should be noted that without such significant delays in execution, the original project design would have been more feasible to implement.

- **Ensure logframes are up to standard**

As explained in the section on project design, the logframe had several weaknesses in terms of the formulation of the indicators, baseline and targets; inconsistencies between indicators and targets; and overambitious timelines. This then makes it more difficult to carry out monitoring activities and to evaluate the project's achievements.

- **Include tangible activities in project design to mainstream issues such as gender**

In order to ensure that UNDP priorities such as gender equity, sustainable livelihoods and disaster reduction are adequately mainstreamed in projects, tangible activities to achieve this mainstreaming need to be included in the project design. This is critical as interviewees commented that there is still generally insufficient understanding of how to achieve this mainstreaming.

- **Do not include deliverables that depend on activities outside of projects' control**

The project design included as one of its outputs the development of the MTIP to catalyze the development of the NAP, which must have stemmed from the global project design which included the timely completion of high-quality NAPs as one of its desired outputs. However, deliverables such as the approval of policy documents, which are out of the control of the Project Management Unit, the EA, and the IA are not always easy to achieve and their inclusion in the project design should be considered carefully and avoided whenever possible.

- **Develop conservative budgets for demonstration projects to account for unforeseen costs**

The cost of the demo projects was originally underestimated in the project's budget and monies needed to be reallocated to increase the funding available for some of the demo projects (e.g., the small-scale irrigation project). Contingency funds should be included in such budgets given the possibility of unforeseen events occurring and given likely cost increases between the project design and implementation phases (as a result of the lapse of time between the two). The agencies implementing the demo projects should be fully involved in costing them so that the budgets are as realistic as possible. This will require a full understanding of what is needed on the ground to carry out the projects and the appropriate technical people on board to carry out this task.

Project implementation stage:

Preparatory work

- **Complete the Executing Agency capacity assessment early on in project implementation**

The capacity assessment of the EA took an extended period of time, which meant that FD could not make direct payments until late in 2010 and was dependent on UNDP for doing so. Delays were due in part to UNDP's unfamiliarity at the time with this relatively new process, and with the late start of the assessment. In addition, UNDP experienced some difficulty in obtaining certain required documents from the Forestry Department for reasons of confidentiality (alternative documentation was later requested that met the requirements). To avoid such delays, UNDP should complete EA capacity assessments before the main project activities commence. Once

the assessment begins, it is important for both the IA and EA to set aside time to carry out the necessary site visit to finalize it. This recommendation has already been taken on board by the UNDP Jamaica CO and is being implemented with new projects.

Monitoring and Evaluation

- **UNDP to provide regular training to EA and PMU on reporting requirements and M&E system**

With this project, the lack of familiarity of the Project Managers and to a certain extent the Executing Agency, with the UNDP/GEF reporting requirements and monitoring and evaluation system led to substantial reporting delays and in turn, project delays. It is therefore critical that thorough, regular and sufficiently detailed training be provided on how to prepare each of the required reports. This should be done early on when the PM assumes his/her role. Furthermore, if there is a change in project management, the new PM needs to be trained as well. It is advised that the UNDP take a proactive approach in ensuring that this occurs before significant reporting delays are experienced that could jeopardize achievement of project deliverables. The UNDP Jamaica CO has already begun implementing this recommendation and has carried out an initial training session in 2012 with all projects across the different portfolios. Further training with new project managers as they come on board and refresher courses are planned. Though the following recommendation may be somewhat outside of the scope of this project evaluation, several of those interviewed also recommended that the reporting requirements for UNDP/GEF projects be simplified.

- **Revise logframe if substantial changes are made to the project**

If any significant changes are made to the logframe, the latter should be revised during project implementation to facilitate reporting and to ensure that what is being reported on corresponds to the up-to-date project strategy. In the case of this project, the output related to development of the MTIP was not carried out for various reasons, but the logframe was not subsequently revised. Among other consequences, failure to update the logframe can negatively impact terminal evaluations as the evaluator is obliged to measure the level of achievement of the targets included in the logframe. The UNDP Jamaica CO has now started implementing the practice of modifying logframes for other projects when necessary.

Procurement issues

- **Do not wait for candidates who are unavailable for an extended period of time**

During the initial UNDP-led procurement process for the first project manager, the individual selected to take on the job at one point indicated that they would not be available until later in the year. When that time came to pass, the individual did not accept the position after all, meaning that several months of project time had been lost. The lesson learned is not to offer positions unless the candidates can accept the offer immediately or within a short period of time to reduce delays in project implementation.

- **Carefully consider how best to name positions to facilitate procurement**

The search for a "natural resource sociologist" to carry out the awareness surveys for this project proved fruitless until the decision was made to change the name of the consultant sought to "rural sociologist". The titles of consultancies should therefore be carefully selected keeping in mind the likely pool of applicants and their backgrounds.

Stakeholder participation

- **Lay out roles and responsibilities of each key project stakeholder, including those of EA**

The responsibilities of all participating agencies should be written out, including those of the EA and project team to avoid misunderstanding and to ensure sufficient engagement. Several interviewees commented that the EA may not have fully understood its responsibilities vis-a- vis the project in the first year or so of project implementation. The role of other stakeholders such as RADA may not have been fully appreciated by all project proponents at project outset either.

- **Involve all key stakeholders from the outset**

It is critical to ensure that all key stakeholders are involved from project outset to avoid potential problems and associated delays. For one of the demonstration projects, a key stakeholder, RADA, was not sufficiently engaged during the early stages and their logo was omitted from the demo project sign, causing inter-agency friction. There was also insufficient community involvement in the early stages of this project, which led to some tensions and limited buy-in early on, underscoring the importance of engaging with community members from the outset as well. In order to ensure high participation of community members in project activities, the most appropriate ways of reaching people in each community must be identified (for example, town criers might be appropriate for some communities, while the church might be a more effective means of communicating to people in another). It is also critical to reach out to decision-makers and to sensitize them about such projects to seek their support. One effective way of doing this is by bringing local politicians to demonstration sites so that they can see what is being done firsthand, as was done with this project.

- **Carry out sufficient project promotion to increase level of support**

Linked to the previous recommendation, one of the ways to reach out to all key stakeholders is by engaging in extensive project promotion activities. Time restrictions and insufficient funds for this led to limited project promotion and awareness activities. Among other benefits, stakeholder sensitization about project scope and objectives can be important to identify the right contacts within organizations and to access key information needed for projects.

- **Enhance information exchange among ongoing environmental projects**

For this project, greater information exchange with the UNDP/GEF Small Grants Program and with other SLM projects being implemented in the region could have been useful. Some interviewees recommended that UNDP hold formal regular meetings to maximize information sharing and learning among different environmental projects and programs, following the practice of some other UNDP Country Office Environment and Energy Units in the region. Increased cross-referencing among UNDP/GEF and other ongoing projects could also ensure greater continuity of different project investments as one project could pick up where another left off.

- **Make interlinkages with relevant ongoing national policy processes from project outset**

In the case of this project, more interlinkages could have been made at project outset with the process of development of the National Land Policy to ensure that the SLM policy developed through this project would be consistent with it.

- **When working with private sector, have appropriate contacts and equipment in place before initiating work**

Delays were experienced when the operator of the limestone quarry demonstration project recommenced mining activities, resulting in the need to find an alternate site. There were also delays in securing use of the heavy equipment required to carry out some of the demo project work. In so far as possible, attempts should be made early on to identify appropriate private sector contacts who fully understand and buy into project goals and to determine where equipment will be sourced before proceeding with the implementation of pilot projects in order to reduce delays.

- **Ensure demo projects respond to community interests and priorities**

This is critical to maximize buy-in and uptake of the practices promoted. While this was usually done, for at least one of the demo projects with farmers, some of the crops originally promoted did not correspond to farmers' preferences. As a result, the project modified its approach and offered higher and faster yielding varieties of the crops the farmers were already planting. At a higher level, it is important to consider the social readiness of communities to receive projects to ensure that the value of such projects is fully appreciated and to maximize uptake and replication. This may require some initial awareness building within communities so that the project objectives and benefits are fully understood.

- **Maintain regular engagement with communities to avoid distrust**

The transition between the two project managers translated into several months during which time there was little to no contact with the communities to be involved in the demo projects. Lack of follow-up with communities who have been 'sold' on projects can lead to distrust and even hostility when contact is made again. It is therefore critical to try to maintain ongoing contact with communities to avoid such situations. If a period of disengagement does occur, additional time and effort must be spent on reengaging with the communities and building momentum.

- **Appreciate and respect subtleties of each community**

Project teams need to take time to understand who the key players are in each community and how communities interact with relevant stakeholders to ensure that projects are appropriately adapted. Cultural practices can vary in different communities and it is important for technical personnel to respect such cultural differences in the transfer of information and technology. For example, with this project, it was found that farmers in some communities base their planting timelines on the cycle of the moon and this needs to be respected when planning project activities.

- **Secure contributions from community members to enhance sustainability**

For projects to be sustainable, community members should recognize the associated benefits and be willing to assume some of the costs involved. This is important to increase ownership and enhance the sustainability of demonstration projects. Thus efforts should be made to obtain commitments from community members to share in the financial and labour costs and to carry out project follow-up.

- **Undertake a cost-benefit analysis before implementing demonstration projects**

It is important to carefully assess whether planned activities to be promoted with community members can actually be sustained after project closure, that is, whether the costs can feasibly be assumed and whether the

benefits are considered to be sufficiently positive to attract community interest. This is critical to maximize uptake and promote replication and to enhance the sustainability of project impact.

- **Conduct training activities over extended period of time to maximize learning and impact**

Interviewees indicated that the training activities carried out with the project could have had greater impact if implemented over a longer period of time and if they had been more spaced out. Due to time restrictions in the last stage of this project, such activities were condensed over a short period of time.

- **Train SLM trainers in facilitation skills**

Besides including SLM content, train the trainer workshops should provide future trainers with an introduction to basic facilitation /training skills to enable participants to learn how best to deliver such information. For example, the importance of adapting material to particular target groups could be highlighted.

- **Set strict deadlines for obtaining feedback from key stakeholders to avoid delays in completion of project deliverables**

It is important for the PMU to consistently set deadlines for the receipt of feedback from stakeholders in order to reduce delays in the finalization of project outputs.

- **If necessary, meet with individual stakeholders to obtain feedback on key project deliverables**

When feedback from key stakeholders is not forthcoming, project managers may need to meet with individual stakeholders or stakeholder groups face-to-face to solicit targeted feedback. The second project manager did this successfully in order to be able to finalize important project deliverables, such as the SLM policy. Such individual meetings may take more time. Project programming must therefore take this into account with realistic timelines.

- **Make effective use of 'virtual' processes of decision-making**

While the project did send out information regularly for virtual approvals, responses were not always forthcoming from the PSC and other stakeholders and decisions were sometimes stalled. Projects with tight timelines need clear rules for virtual approvals in which such approvals must be given in writing and non-response is taken to mean approval. Stakeholder commitment to provide feedback when requested to do so is also needed. This could increase the effectiveness of these processes of decision-making.

Engagement with consultants

- **Plan well in advance for recruitment of consultants**

Due to the time required to recruit consultants, projects need to start the process early to ensure that timelines are not compromised. It could be argued that the procurement process to hire the rural sociologist should have started earlier. The extended period of time it took to hire the individual to carry out the awareness surveys led to a situation in which the survey of pre-project awareness levels was carried out later than desired.

- **Ensure all TORs are sufficiently clear and detailed**

While most of the TORs for the project were considered by stakeholders to have been well developed, some could have been more detailed. Besides making sure that the TORs contain sufficient detail, it is important to go over them carefully with consultants to ensure that roles and responsibilities are fully understood. In some cases, the

division of responsibilities between the project manager and key consultants was not clear for this project (for example in relation to some of the demonstration projects and the convening of stakeholders).

- **Ensure consultants understand that NEX projects are managed by the government EA and not by UNDP**

Perhaps due to insufficient guidance received from project management during certain stages of the project, some interviewees commented that the consultants kept coming back to the UNDP for advice. It therefore needs to be made clear to consultants that NEX projects are managed by the government executing agency and not by UNDP.

- **Provide regular feedback and guidance to consultants**

Insufficient communication from the project managers and the PSC to the consultants was a factor that caused some frustration, delayed payments and ultimately, late completion of deliverables. The provision of regular guidance to consultants is important to successful and timely project execution.

- **Encourage consultants to plan appropriately to reduce likelihood of late submission of products**

Besides the problem of feedback being provided late to consultants, some consultancy deliverables were not submitted on time. This underscores the need for consultants to plan their time appropriately in order to meet target dates for submission of project deliverables.

Maximizing impact and sustainability

- **Target actions to areas with greatest degradation risk**

Some project activities, such as the demo projects, were not necessarily targeted to those geographic areas in the country identified as most degraded or at highest risk for further degradation. It would be useful to target future activities to these areas to increase impact on reducing land degradation.

- **Plan for project sustainability in close collaboration with participating agencies**

The ProDoc had included an analysis of sustainability, which depended on four main elements: a strengthened policy framework; establishment of a critical mass of expertise in SLM; political will; and the assurance of economic revenues from SLM to implement best practices. The project did not end up developing a Medium-Term Investment Plan that would have identified possible revenue sources to continue to promote SLM, which is considered a weakness in terms of planning for sustainability. As such, financial commitments from the relevant agencies to allocate funds for project follow-up were not formalized, although they have expressed their commitment to build on the work initiated by the project (for example, vis-à-vis the demo projects). It would be useful for each participating agency to develop an exit strategy detailing how it will continue to provide support and training after project closure, the length of time for this support and the funds available for this work. The NIC for one is in the process of developing an 18-month exit strategy for the small-scale irrigation project, though funding constraints remain an issue.