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Aceh Government Transformation Programme (AGTP)

Final Evaluation (July 2012)

Final Report

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Term	Meaning
AGTP	Aceh Government Transformation Programme
AMDAL	<i>Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan</i> (Environmental Impact Assessment)
APBA	<i>Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Aceh</i> (Aceh Provincial Budget)
APBN	<i>Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara</i> (National Budget)
BKRA	<i>Badan Kesiambungan Rekonstruksi Aceh</i> (Agency for the Continuing Reconstruction of Aceh)
BP3A	<i>Badan Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak</i> (Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Agency)
BRR	<i>Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi (Aceh-Nias)</i> , (Aceh-Nias Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency)
BAPEDAL	<i>Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan</i> (Environmental Impact Control Agency)
BAPPEDA	<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah</i> (Regional Development Planning Agency)
BAPPENAS	<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah</i> (National Development Planning Agency)
BKPP	<i>Badan Kepegawaian Pendidikan dan Pelatihan</i> (Aceh Personnel, Education and Training Agency)
CDNA	Capacity Development Needs Assessment
CDP	Capacity Development Plan
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPRU	Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
DIPA	<i>Daftar Isian Program dan Anggaran</i> (Budget Programme Implementation Form)
DISHUBKOMINTEL	<i>Dinas Perhubungan, Komunikasi, Informasi dan Telematika</i> (Communication, Information and Telematics Agency)
DJKN	<i>Direktoral Jenderal Kekayaan Negara</i> (Directorate General of State Asset Management)
DPKKA	<i>Dinas Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Kekayaan Aceh</i> (Aceh Financial and Asset Management Agency)
DPKKD	<i>Dinas Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Kekayaan Daerah</i> (Local Financial and Asset Management Agency)
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (House of Representatives)
DPRA	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh</i> (Aceh Provincial Legislative Assembly)
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EU	European Union
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> (Aceh Free Movement)

GIS	Geographic Information System
GoA	Government of Aceh
GoI	Government of Indonesia
IPAR	Internal Project Assurance Report
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
KPK	<i>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi</i> (Corruption Eradication Agency)
LAN	<i>Lembaga Administrasi Negara</i> (National Administration Institute)
LoA	Letter of Agreement
LOGA	Law on the Governing of Aceh
MDF	Multi Donor Fund
Migas	<i>Minyak dan Gas</i> (Oil and Gas)
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MTR	Mid Term Review
NGO	Non-government organisations
NIM	National Implementation Modality
NITP	Nias Islands Transition Project
NPD	National Project Director
NPM	National Project Manager
Otsus Migas	<i>Otonomi Khusus – Minyak dan Gas</i> (Special Autonomy – Oil and Gas)
PMU	Project Management Unit
QMR	Quarterly Monitoring Report
Renstra	<i>Rencana Strategis</i> (Strategic Plan)
PP	<i>Peraturan Pemerintah</i> (Government Regulation)
P2K	<i>(Unit) Percepatan dan Pengendalian Kegiatan</i> (Activity Acceleration and Control Unit)
RPJMD	<i>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah</i> (Provincial Mid-term Development Planning)
REDD	Reduction in Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SETDA	<i>Sekretariat Daerah</i> (Regional Secretariat)
SIRA	<i>Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh</i> (Aceh Referendum Information Center)
SKPA	<i>Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah</i> Aceh (Aceh provincial government offices)
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
STAN	<i>Sekolah Tinggi Administrasi Negara</i> (The Indonesian State College of Accountancy)
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UKP4	<i>Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan</i> (the Indonesian President's Work Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Aceh Government Transformation Programme (AGTP) is a capacity development programme, funded through the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) for Aceh and Nias and formulated by UNDP with the Provincial Government of Aceh in late 2008. It has responded to the need for transitional support to address capacity gaps in the provincial government's ability to effectively and efficiently assume the tasks and responsibilities inherited from the Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi (BRR). The programme has concentrated on support for the Provincial Executive to create an institutional and policy framework; on enhancing capacity for a range of key provincial government agencies; on the capacity of the Provincial Personnel, Education and Training Agency (BKPP) to help other agencies to manage the transition; and more recently to assist the province to transfer and manage non-BRR assets.
2. AGTP was jointly designed with Bappenas, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Province of Aceh and has been very relevant to the needs of Aceh in transition. As Aceh, with Indonesia's national government support, moves further away from recovery needs towards longer-term development priorities, the transition within AGTP towards bureaucracy reform to support service delivery shows that the programme has remained relevant to overall development priorities in Aceh. It has also been seen as appropriate and welcome by provincial agencies and their senior staff. It has been appropriate to the creation and/or strengthening of a number of important functions and agencies in Aceh, some of which have been innovations in bureaucracy reform.
3. The beneficiaries are civil servants in Aceh and the people of Aceh through the enhanced abilities of civil servants to deliver services to them. Aceh has largely navigated through the reconstruction and rehabilitation process. AGTP has had significant effect on the move through the transition period from the end of the BRR work to the situation today, where the Government of Aceh is able to, once again, deliver services to the people.
4. In particular, AGTP has been effective in supporting the Provincial Executive through the resourcing of a large team of advisors to government, drawn from academia and civil society. It has been effective in supporting the development of provincial capacity to handle and use additional funds from oil and gas revenues in the province, and while it took some time to achieve, in supporting the Province's Personnel, Education and Training Agency to develop a valuable and innovative role in Aceh. It supported the creation and early operation of a cutting edge financial management tracking system that has greatly assisted the province to match expenditures with annual plans. It has contributed to raising expectations of transparency and accountability from government in Aceh.
5. Nevertheless challenges remain. For instance the capacity development needs assessment processes begun under AGTP have only at this stage produced generalised capacity development plans for the agencies that participated. Agencies will still need to make significant efforts to turn these into concrete capacity development programmes. Similarly, despite the major gains made with BKPP, its laudable aim to become a centre of excellence will still require further efforts.
6. Consolidation of asset transfer support has been a late addition to AGTP, despite this issue being raised as early as 2009 with implementation only starting in October 2012,

and funding for major activities arriving in February 2012. Programme aims to have completed this by the end of AGTP were clearly not achieved, but the programme effectively delivered support for some Rp2.25 trillion worth of assets being transferred to the province of Aceh and its districts.

7. The DIPA mechanism for transfer of some of AGTP funds through the Ministry of Home Affairs directly to the Provincial Government was problematic in its early stages and respondents in Aceh have expressed frustration with it. However, the mechanism has demonstrated that it can deliver development partner funding through GOI systems and there is no reason why it should not be utilised in the future.
8. Due to a request by a donor for audit reports on nine UNDP projects funded under MDF, the top-up funding that would have ideally seen asset transfer work undertaken earlier, was delayed during 2011. This eventuated in the early release of staff from AGTP in mid 2011 and the consequent need to re-engage at the end of the year. This was most unfortunate.
9. Nevertheless, AGTP has been a reasonably efficient investment and has achieved a lot with what by general development programme standards is a modest level of funding. Evaluators suggest that efficiency could be improved by earlier planning for DIPA funding, by avoiding delays in funding through UNDP, by having a tighter technical and institutional focus during implementation and by more efforts to ensure consistent and comprehensive knowledge management.
10. Assessment of specifically attributable impact is not possible at this stage, but AGTP can be proud of its contribution to sensible governance measures for a more peaceful Aceh, in which the people can now expect better services and of the contribution that support for asset transfer makes to improvements in welfare and livelihoods.
11. The final section of this evaluation makes 8 recommendations. In summary they are:
 - a. UNDP should continue to focus on bureaucracy reform in Aceh, perhaps in line with its longer term goals for livelihoods, economic opportunity and environmental management and sustainability. Specific work on the district/province split in service delivery would be appropriate.
 - b. Bureaucracy reform in Aceh would benefit from a longer-term approach. Also, discontinuity in funding should as much as possible be avoided.
 - c. Aceh's own capacity to fund bureaucracy reform is not insubstantial. UNDP and GOI should attempt to harmonize their funding contributions with those of Aceh.
 - d. UNDP should support further capacity developments in Aceh on a very focused basis, continuing where appropriate with agencies it has already supported, and developing support for other agencies on a very selected, focused basis.
 - e. The gains made through the CDNA process supported by AGTP need to be consolidated through support to the agencies concerned to develop and implement practical capacity development activities. This requires detailed design of these activities.
 - f. UNDP and the GOI, particularly MoHA and Ministry of Finance, should not give up the DIPA mechanism but should seek ways of streamlining it.
 - g. More consistency is required for gender mainstreaming in the future, and this should be seen in the light of opportunities presented by increased receipts of funds from oil and gas to continue to strengthen the provision of

basic needs, health and education services and the management of natural resources with a greater emphasis on gender mainstreaming (i.e. opportunity and empowerment).

- h. UNDP and GOI should not assume that the gains made through AGTP Output 1 will automatically be retained in the future particularly with the new political environment in Aceh. For this reason, UNDP and GOI should consider further support for leadership and decision making in the future if this is requested by Aceh.

INTRODUCTION TO THIS DOCUMENT

12. This Final Evaluation Report for the Aceh Government Transformation Programme (AGTP) as implemented by the Governments of Indonesia and Aceh and by UNDP has been formulated by a two person team of independent evaluators. The Terms of Reference for the Evaluation Team Leader is given as Annex 1.
13. This report is the result of analysis of primary and secondary data including information and inputs from key relevant stakeholders through a series of interviews conducted in Jakarta, Batam Island and Banda Aceh. Importantly, this report provides the opportunity to assess lessons learned and good practices in order to identify key areas which are replicable for the future. It looks at necessary conditions for sustainability and provides recommendations that it is hoped will be used as a basis for design and management for results in future UNDP activities in Aceh and in the governance sector in general.
14. The evaluation team has developed, in addition to the standard table of contents for the evaluation, a set of three boxes each of which outlines the story and the good practices of one of the key agencies which have received AGTP support.
15. UNDP also organised a Reference Group (final evaluation presentation). This report has also accommodated comments, suggestions and additional information from the Reference Group.

DESCRIPTION OF AGTP

16. The Aceh Government Transformation Programme (AGTP) is a capacity development programme, formulated by UNDP in cooperation with the Provincial Government of Aceh in late 2008. Following the devastating tsunami in December 2004, the Government of Indonesia put into place the Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi (BRR) to assist governments to recover. With the closure of BRR in April 2009, the Governor of Aceh proposed to UNDP that a programme be established to address capacity gaps in the provincial government's ability to effectively and efficiently assume the tasks and responsibilities which it would inherit from the BRR.
17. At programme inception in early 2009, AGTP was budgeted at US\$13.976 million and aimed at three programmatic outputs and a management output:
 - Output 1)** Enhanced capacity of the Provincial Executive to create the institutional and policy framework for successful transition and recovery;
 - Output 2)** Enhanced operational capacity of key provincial government agencies (SKPA) to effectively fulfill their transition and recovery responsibilities;
 - Output 3)** Enhanced capacity of the Provincial Training & Human Resource Agency (BKPP) to retain, manage and transfer to provincial and district government agencies the knowledge and skills required for successful transition and sustainable recovery; and
 - Output 4)** The project is effectively implemented, monitored, reported and audited.
18. From mid-2011, AGTP added a further programmatic output, with additional funding of USD 3 million added to the programme at this time:

Output 5) Completed Transfer of RR assets and enhanced capacity of district governments to manage RR assets.

EVALUATION SCOPE & OBJECTIVES

19. This section is extracted from the Consultant's Terms of Reference (as per Annex 1). The evaluation will provide a critical assessment on two key phases of the project, first: the project's initial ad-hoc activities which addressed immediate needs of the Government of Aceh in assuming the mandate of rehabilitation and recovery during the transition phase (2008-2008) and after the closure of BRR (2009), and second: the project's post-transition activities (2010-2012) which were directed towards sustainable recovery and longer-term development, with reference to the Jakarta Commitment and existing development plans and programmes. The evaluation shall also provide an assessment of the viability of AGTP's exit strategy.
20. The objectives of the evaluation are as follows:
 - a. To assess to what extent the project has created an enabling environment which has helped shape government performance in managing post-tsunami transition process;
 - b. To assess effectiveness and achievement of AGTP's outputs;
 - c. To gain insights into the level of client satisfaction with the project. The clients include community and local government beneficiaries; national government partners and donors;
 - d. To review the effectiveness of the gender mainstreaming strategy;
 - e. To identify good practices and lessons learned in the area of capacity development to local government;
 - f. To identify good practices and lessons learned in the area of project implementation modality, including effectiveness of the DIPA Deconcentration modality; and
 - g. To provide recommendations for sustaining the benefits of the project and strategic issues and initiatives for a potential next assistance in Aceh.
21. In doing so, the evaluation is using the standard OECD/DAC Evaluation Criteria for Evaluation of Development Assistance namely, relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

EVALUATION APPROACH, METHODOLOGY & DATA ANALYSIS

22. This evaluation has been undertaken based on the use of the six UNDP evaluation criteria of relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, which are each covered in turn in below. The evaluation used the following approach and methodology:
23. **Secondary data collection:** The team undertook a desk study of key documents (for the list see Annex 2), including the programme design and reporting materials, the mid-term review, the Country Programme Action Plan and other materials provided by UNDP. Secondary data collection was augmented with materials provided by key respondents in Aceh.
24. **Primary data collection in Jakarta and Batam:** Key meetings in Jakarta and Batam were conducted and including with the Multi-Donor Fund, the Ministry of Finance, the

Ministry of Home Affairs, Bappenas and colleagues from UNDP. These meetings utilised a set of preliminary questions prepared at the commencement of the evaluation mission. The meetings of the evaluation team in Batam coincided with the Project Board Meeting for both AGTP and the Nias Islands Transition Project (NITP) held on 29-30 June, 2012.

25. **Primary data collection in Aceh:** Meetings and interviews were conducted in Banda Aceh from 2/7/12 to 12/7/12. The team approach was to elicit responses on how capacities to manage resources have changed and been built. This was done through a mixture of in-depth interview and as appropriate focus group discussion techniques. The evaluation involved a wide range of respondents involved in AGTP: current and former UNDP staff; key staff from administrative, planning and human resource agencies and staff from provincial sectoral offices. The evaluators were also able to interview some representatives from Bireun district for the Output 5 components. (Please see the List of People Interviewed in Annex 3).
26. **Key questions:** Key questions used for data gathering as outlined in the inception report for the evaluation are given in Annex 4. The Team presented a generalised set of questions which were adapted to the roles and participation of various agencies in AGTP and a specific set of questions that relate to the five individual outputs of AGTP.
27. **Feedback to AGTP Team:** Feedback was provided to the UNDP AGTP Team in Aceh towards the end of the in-field evaluation period. This was the basis for the evaluators to present and test their initial findings and recommendations. The findings and recommendations were also further refined during data analysis and report preparation in Jakarta.
28. **Data analysis:** The Team undertook regular reflection sessions whilst in Aceh which allowed an ongoing analysis of data received. The purpose of these sessions was to ensure that the two team members had the opportunity to share what they learned and to establish further data needs on an ongoing basis. Consolidation of data was undertaken in Jakarta after the visit to Aceh. This also revealed data gaps and allowed the team to request further data from UNDP in Jakarta.
29. **Presentation of initial findings:** On Friday 20th July, 2012 the team presented its initial findings to the Reference Group in the UNDP Office in Jakarta. The group consisted of colleagues from UNDP, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Bappenas.
30. **Report preparation:** The draft evaluation report was prepared and provided to UNDP Jakarta for distribution and comment to MOHA, Bappenas, MDF and the Government of Aceh including the National Project Director. Comments were received from colleagues in UNDP. Based on comments received the final report has been prepared.
31. **Statement of independence and standards from evaluators:** The evaluators have consulted UNDP resources on evaluation, its norms, standards and ethics. These norms, standards and ethics have adhered to during the evaluation. The evaluators are familiar with the OECD DAC criteria for evaluation. The evaluators are completely independent from UNDP Jakarta and at all times presented themselves as such to respondents.
32. **Limitations to this evaluation:** The following are noted as limitations to this evaluation:
 - a. This evaluation was undertaken concurrently with the closing of AGTP. This meant that AGTP staff in Jakarta and Banda Aceh were occupied with programme closure at the same time as the evaluation. Notwithstanding this evaluators were satisfied with the level of consultation they received from AGTP

staff. The evaluators also wish it to be known that initial meetings with both the Ministry of Home Affairs and Bappenas were restricted to short sessions on the sidelines of the AGTP/NITP Final Project Board Meeting and Closing Procedures in Batam on the 29th and 30th June. However, the team was able to meet with colleagues from the Ministry of Finance (Directorate General of State Assets) in Jakarta prior to travel to Batam and Banda Aceh and did further consult with key national stakeholders in presenting findings to the Reference Group on the 20th July in UNDP Jakarta.


- b. This evaluation was also undertaken at the time when senior GoA staff were heavily involved in planning workshops for the forthcoming provincial medium term development plan. This meant that the evaluators were unable to meet some of the key agency managers in Banda Aceh. We particularly wish to note that meetings were not possible with the Provincial Inspectorate, the Legal Bureau, the Communications Agency, and the Activity Acceleration and Control Unit, P2K.

FINDINGS

a. Comments on design and monitoring of AGTP


33. The original design of AGTP was prepared in 2008 in the form of the programme's Prodoc. The broad framework for the AGTP design as per the Project Document (Prodoc) is summarised in Figure 1 immediately below.

Figure 1: AGTP Broad Design Framework as per Prodoc



34. It is useful in a design process to attempt a test of *sufficiency*, which means in the case of the above framework we ask the question "if the intended results of outputs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are achieved then will this sufficient lead to the development objective of the programme being achieved"? The framework above states that if the provincial executive has the technical capacity to develop policies and programmes; key agencies have the operational capacity to manage transition; BKPP has the capacity to transfer knowledge and skills; and the project (programme) is effectively supporting all these developments then the recovery process will be more efficient and effective. Succinctly put, this logic states that if executive leadership is enhanced along with administrative capacity and there is a central agency that can support capacity gains, and there is management support from AGTP then Aceh will have improved its chances of full recovery. Broadly this appears to be reasonable logic; but there is clearly a caveat here that AGTP was not the only source of support for the province and that many other influences were at play.
35. In the annual report of 2011, the design framework for AGTP reflected a different emphasis. Figure 2 below shows this framework. Please note that the annual report did not mention the management output (which has been retained here as per the Prodoc for consistency) and that Output 5 on asset transfer was added in late 2011, in response to the provincial needs to work in this area.

Figure 2: AGTP Framework at End 2011



36. Clearly the conceptual framework for AGTP has had different versions during the three years to 2011. Figure 2 does appear reasonably logical in itself, but we are unsure when this was formally adopted. The functions of the Government of Aceh in transition and recovery have been better articulated in the new objective. The role of the executive now no longer includes appraisal and monitoring (presumably others do this) and the challenge for administrative units is now not just to manage, but to be effective. But, the

evaluation team is unsure when the development objective was changed and more importantly what was the process for the changes.

37. Shifts are also apparent in the indicators used for measuring progress in AGTP. Two examples will suffice.
38. In the Prodoc, the first indicator for Output 1 was "the number and percentage of concepts/requests/proposals from Provincial Executive referred to Tim Assistensi upgraded into strategy and policy initiatives (and percentage accepted by Provincial Executive after assessment) (also number implemented and number and percentage that refer to gender considerations)". By the time of the Internal Project Assurance Report for quarters 1 and 2 of 2009 this had been changed and considerably simplified to read "the number and percentage of Tim Asistensi prepared policies approved by the Provincial Executive". In the process the reference to gender had disappeared.
39. In the Prodoc, one of the indicators for Output 2 was "by November 2009, provincial, district and central government have completed all relevant legislative and regulatory instruments related to transition and arrangements for ongoing ABPN funds and donor fund destined for Aceh". Clearly this was an ambitious indicator to measure (and perhaps to achieve), as it was not included in the programme inception report of October 2009. Instead AGTP was to measure indicators such as "percentage of work plans completed on time" and "percentage of projects and procurement processes which fully comply with GOI requirements". By the time of the Internal Project Assurance Report for quarters 1 and 2 of 2010, the equivalent indicator for Output 2 had simply become "percentage of AGTP supported transition processes in line with AGTP recommendations and GOI/international standards". These indicators are all substantially different.
40. The evaluation team questions why both the design framework and the programme indicators have changed or have needed to change in the ways shown in the examples above. Apart from the difficulty in evaluating a programme against its original intentions or of tracking progress over time, there is a process of shift in programming that is not clear, at least to the evaluation team. We acknowledge that AGTP has needed to respond flexibly to the dynamic situation in Aceh and that changes can be tracked through successive regular reports. But there does not seem to be a systematic way of recording changes and approval of changes to design and to indicators. UNDP might consider the need to be more consistent in this in the future perhaps through formal revisions of the Prodoc, annual work plans and attached M&E plans. Ideally, consistency in the use of indicators over the period of programme implementation is desirable.

b. Relevance

41. This section comments on the relevance of AGTP. It responds to the need to evaluate the extent to which intended outputs of AGTP are consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of the Government of Aceh post-tsunami. The team was also asked to evaluate the extent to which AGTP was able to respond to changing and emerging development priorities and needs in the post-BRR closure period in a responsive manner. The team was also asked to look at the relevance of AGTP's support in regard to the ex-RR asset transfer and management process.

42. The evaluation team has found the intended outputs of AGTP to be highly relevant to Aceh in a period of transition. In this context, transition in Aceh encompasses the need to re-establish provincial government capacity after the completion of BRR's work, to move from post-disaster recovery to longer-term development as well as to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of peace within the province. AGTP has been relevant to both of these needs.
43. In aiming for Output 1 "strengthened capacity of the Government Executive to coordinate and facilitate the transition", AGTP was able to respond to the priorities and needs of the former Governor, in particular to obtain the support of a strong advisory team and a revitalised senior management team within the provincial government bureaucracy. The support and facilitation given by AGTP to the formation of the advisory team and the institution of the "fit and proper test" for senior civil service positions is considered highly relevant to the need at the time for the executive to have the advisory and administrative support it needed to formulate provincial policy in the post-BRR environment in Aceh. Important in this was the need to support the framework of special autonomy as enacted in the 2006 Law on Governing Aceh (LOGA).
44. In aiming for Output 2 "immediate transition support to local government agencies", AGTP has been able to respond to capacity building needs in a wide range of provincial agencies. In particular the evaluators note that the political and administrative situation in the early period of AGTP was highly dynamic and shifting and AGTP's flexible approach to different and emerging government agencies is noted as relevant to this environment. AGTP, in aiming for Output 2, at times appears ad hoc in its response, in that it has been hard for those outside the day-to-day administration of the programme (including funders) to track the wide range of agencies that have received support from AGTP and the frequent additions and/or changes to programme activities that have resulted. Nevertheless, we note that AGTP has been able to respond in ways that have assisted Aceh to develop innovative approaches to public services. The support to the Unit Percepatan dan Pengendalian Kegiatan (P2K) or Activity Acceleration and Control Unit and the institution of its contract and financial tracking system is a good example.
45. In aiming for Output 3 "institutional capacity for knowledge retention, management and transfer", AGTP has been highly relevant to the need to develop capacity within the province to manage and develop its pool of government employees. Clearly enhancing personnel training and management services at a time when Aceh needed to bolster the capacities of its civil servants to deliver services to the province both helped to create a new and more effective agency, the Badan Kepegawaian, Pendidikan dan Pelatihan (BKPP or Personnel, Education and Training Agency), and to transfer some of the national training and personnel management functions to the province. Despite early difficulties in assisting BKPP, this output has remained relevant to the needs of the province throughout the implementation period of AGTP.
46. During 2011 it was agreed that AGTP would aim for new Output 5, "rehabilitation and reconstruction assets are transferred and capacity of district governments to manage these assets is enhanced". This was and remains relevant to the needs of Aceh at the end of its transition period. While it is argued elsewhere in this report (paragraphs 109ff) that despite earlier efforts through Outputs 1 and 2, more substantial AGTP inputs into the asset transfer task should have been delivered earlier in programme implementation, there is no doubt that the challenge of transferring non-BRR assets to

the province and to the districts has been significant and AGTP response has been relevant.

47. AGTP has been responsive to the changing needs and development priorities of Aceh during the transition period 2008 to 2012. It is clear that at commencement of the programme AGTP was able to respond well to the needs of the Governor to formulate development policies and plans. There is a reasonable progression of response. In the early stages support was provided to agencies that were tasked with taking on the administrative challenges in the immediate post-BRR period. At the end of AGTP implementation we find the programme supporting agencies in their longer-term capacity development tasks, notably through the capacity development needs assessment and planning processes.
48. At inception, AGTP was consistent with UNDP's own overall planning framework. The Country Programme Action Plan for 2006-2010 clearly identified rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and North Sumatra as one of its five pillars. AGTP was therefore a central element of UNDP's strategy for Indonesia, and represented continuity of UNDP's commitment to Aceh (and Nias in North Sumatra) from its emergency response immediately after the December 2004 tsunami. In this regard the evaluators also note that management of AGTP passed from UNDP's Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) to its Democratic Governance Unit (DGU), a move that also reflects the change in the nature of UNDP support from post-disaster to longer term bureaucracy reform and thus enhancement of governance.
49. CPAP 2006-2010 was also designed to respond directly to Indonesia's Medium Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Mengengah Nasional or RPJMN) 2004-2009, which also included (in its final version) reference to the tsunami disasters and the need for emergency response, recovery and reconstruction phases. In this regard AGTP is relevant, through the CPAP 2006-2010, to Indonesia's highest level development plans and policies. AGTP was also designed in consultation with GOI's Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency, Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi or BRR, and intended to help in closing gaps in provincial capacity to take over and manage the transition from recovery to long-term development as BRR completed its mandate. In this regard AGTP has been relevant to GOI's own programmes of recovery in Aceh.
50. As Aceh, with Indonesia's national government support, moves further away from recovery needs towards longer-term development priorities, the transition within AGTP towards bureaucracy reform to support service delivery shows that the programme has remained relevant to overall development priorities in Aceh. Aceh also remains a priority within UNDP's new CPAP framework for 2011-2014, but now with a clearer focus on the new autonomy arrangements, the attainment of millennium development goals (MDGs), sustainable natural resources management, bureaucracy reform and democratic governance. In turn, the CPAP and the higher level UN Partnership for Development Framework 2011-2015 respond to GOI's RPJMN for 2010-2014, which itself stresses bureaucracy reform and attainment of MDGs. At completion AGTP thus remains relevant to GOI's own higher level planning framework and thus to the alignment of aid flows with national priorities, as called for by the Paris Declaration and the Jakarta Commitment.

51. It should be noted in this regard that the evaluation team is evaluating the performance of AGTP within the 2006 - 2010 CPAP framework, under which it was set up. However, recommendations for future activity in this evaluation align with the CPAP for 2011 - 2015 and the UNPDF and UNDP outcomes contained within it.
52. We have mentioned above the alignment of AGTP with national priorities. AGTP also conforms with other aspects of the Jakarta Commitment and Paris Declaration and the indicators used to measure them. We note in particular that it has promoted reliability in and use of public finance and procurement systems and in a broad sense the aim of mutual accountability in aid arrangements.

c. Appropriateness

53. The inclusion by UNDP of appropriateness as a separate evaluation criterion is intended to help "evaluate the importance of the initiatives relative to the needs and priorities, and examines whether the initiative as it is operationalised is acceptable and feasible within the contextual need of the Government of Aceh and Government of Indonesia in a post-BRR era". The evaluation team notes that the notion of a programme being "acceptable" is somewhat artificial. In any major initiative of this nature there will be winners and losers. It is clear that winners will generally say that the programme is appropriate and acceptable. Losers, if they can be found, are unlikely to agree.
54. As a prelude to evaluation comments on appropriateness of AGTP, it is worth stating that stakeholder analysis does not appear to have been an explicit design task. Rather stakeholder analysis was intended to be an ongoing activity throughout AGTP with the Capacity Development Needs Assessment process as a central tool for this. Therefore the evaluation team does not have a reliable baseline against which to assess whether AGTP's client agencies actually received the benefits they originally thought they would receive. The lack of AGTP pre-implementation baseline assessments is understandable from a design process that dealt with the highly changing and dynamic environment of 2008 in which BRR was still a major stakeholder and in which GoA was still re-emerging, and from the need to quickly grasp the opportunity to assist the Governor. However it is a design weakness of AGTP that it had no clear baseline against which to assess capacity developments.
55. But, appropriateness (including acceptability) of AGTP is reported to generally be high both from national government and Aceh government officials interviewed by the evaluation team. UNDP should not overly rely on this information as a) the evaluators were not able to interview many people that were in positions of influence at the commencement of AGTP (including the former Governor) and b) respondents are likely to say they have been satisfied with a programme if they would like continued further support.
56. Nevertheless, AGTP has clearly been appropriate to the emerging political and administrative situation from 2008 onwards. The former Governor is reported to have received the advisory team that he wanted and was able to benefit from a team significantly larger than is usually allowed under GOI arrangements (substantive advisory positions are limited to five in normal circumstance); Aceh had 49, albeit under

temporary arrangements. In a period of major uncertainty as transition began, this was appropriate to an executive and administration facing wide ranging challenges.

57. The Governor's team of advisors as supported by AGTP funding and technical assistance appears from the hindsight of programme completion to have had an appropriate mix of personnel. The team was drawn from academia, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), civil society and Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh (SIRA) and thus acted as an appropriate counterbalance to the regular civil service in Aceh. This was undoubtedly needed at the time in order to obtain inputs into social, economic, fiscal and political policy in NAD which it is reported that the regular civil service were unable to provide. However, in the absence of an opportunity to interview them, it is doubted that the heads of agency who were to later lose their positions through the implementation of the "fit and proper test" thought that AGTP support was appropriate and acceptable.
58. AGTP was appropriate to the creation and/or strengthening of a number of important functions and agencies in Aceh. For instance, it appropriately assisted in the development of personnel training and management through the BKPP, financial and contract monitoring through the P2K, the management of special oil and gas funding through Tim Otsus Migas and gender mainstreaming through BP3A. These agencies have gained capacity and strength with the help of AGTP, and remain supported by the province and thus appropriate to the needs of Aceh at programme completion.

d. Effectiveness

59. This section comments on the effectiveness of AGTP, both generally and on an output by output basis. As per the TOR it is intended to "evaluate the extent to which the intended results of AGTP have been achieved. This includes an assessment of cause and effect - that is attributing observed changes to project activities and outputs. Assessing effectiveness involves three basic steps: 1) Measuring change in the observed output, 2) attributing observed changes or progress toward changes to the initiative or determining AGTP contribution toward observed changes, and 3) Judging the value of the change (positive or negative)". This criterion can also be interpreted to include overall AGTP outcomes which are covered in the general comments immediately below.

General comments on AGTP effectiveness

60. As a preface to further comments on AGTP overall effectiveness, the evaluators note that the primary beneficiaries of AGTP have been the executive and civil servants in Aceh. Through the civil service, benefits have accrued to the people of Aceh.
61. The governments in Aceh have largely navigated through the reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Provincial and district management of services has been resumed. AGTP has contributed significantly to this, although is clearly only one programme of several that have assisted the province. It is impossible to attribute specific benefit that has accrued from AGTP alone. But, as an important initiative that has largely been driven by the national and provincial governments, we can conclude that its particular contributions are as covered below under each Output.

62. There is now clearer ownership of major post tsunami assets with a major AGTP contribution to asset transfer. After some initial discussion it was decided that AGTP would concentrate asset transfer activities on the so-called "off-off" assets ("off budget and off treasury") and "on-off" assets ("on budget but off treasury"). These are the assets that were left after reconstruction and rehabilitation period which were not recorded at the time as both part of the government budget ("on budget"), nor as directly using Indonesian Government funds ("on treasury"). Achievements are covered in more detail below and given the time available have been quite significant. However, from a general perspective the evaluation team notes that the process for the transfer of off-off assets has yet to be completed in the future.
63. Aceh now has greater control of oil and gas revenues sourced from the province and has been able to channel a good percentage of this to health and education services. AGTP has particularly contributed with initial establishment and early operational assistance to the Tim Otsus Migas, which now reports it no longer needs outside support. While clearly the opportunity for Aceh to utilise its own special natural resource related funds is entirely derived from the special autonomy arrangements as stipulated under the LOGA, AGTP was clearly "in the right place at the right time" to enable Aceh's own team of specialists in this field to get established in the process of integrating special resource funds from oil and gas with the normal provincial budget.
64. Aceh has also begun to see major improvements in civil service personnel management and training. AGTP has made a major contribution to this outcome through the provision of technical assistance and through facilitating the provision of national government expertise and assisting communication between Aceh and the national government. The effectiveness of supporting the emergence of the BKPP is covered in more detail below, but in general terms it is noted both that BKPP is publically saying it wishes to be a centre of excellence and that civil servants can now as a consequence expect better personnel management and training services.
65. Aceh has a financial management tracking system, linked to national government. While the evaluation team was unable to see this system fully in action (as an appointment with P2K during the team's time in Banda Aceh proved elusive), the team has seen evidence that an on-line portal exists, and is assured by MoHA officials that the system is on-line and functioning and most importantly linking the province with the central government.
66. All of these outcomes together mean that there is now clearly a greater expectation of transparency and accountability from government in Aceh. The process of bureaucracy reform has started and Aceh has been able to respond with some innovative approaches (as outlined above). Some of these approaches are now being rolled out in other parts of Indonesia (please refer to final comment under the "sustainability" section of this report for examples), so we can also conclude that AGTP facilitation has been effective in "raising the game" for bureaucracy both in Aceh and potentially in Indonesia in general.
67. "Raising the game" in this context means that a self-continuing mechanism has been put into place whereby clients and users of government services (including civil servants) can now expect a higher level of service with raised expectations of transparency and accountability. For provincial government to continue to meet these expectations this will mean further investment and above all the will to continue improving services. AGTP

has exhibited effectiveness in bringing national and provincial interests together in developing these innovative approaches. The strategy of providing technical assistance and funds to help the province to fill the gaps in capacity was correct for the period of transition in Aceh. Broadly we conclude that AGTP has helped Aceh to make important positive changes.

68. Nevertheless, UNDP and GOI need to acknowledge that challenges remain. For instance the capacity development needs assessment processes begun under AGTP have only at this stage produced generalised capacity development plans for the agencies that participated. The evaluation team suspects that much progress has yet to be made in translating these into concrete capacity development programmes. Similarly, despite the major gains made with BKPP, its aim to become (and more pertinently remain) a centre of excellence will still require further efforts. Recommendations on these and other related issues are included at the end of this report.
69. AGTP could perhaps have been more effective if it had been more equipped to assist districts in the province, particularly in the light of the need to more clearly differentiate the roles and functions of districts as opposed to the province in regard to the use of oil and gas revenues. It could have been more effective if it had provided more support for district administrative capacities (which has been mostly limited to asset transfer support in the last six months of AGTP). However this comment is made with the luxury of hindsight. AGTP was not set up to primarily provide support to district governments. This challenge remains for the future.

Effectiveness of Output 1 - Support the Provincial Executive

70. Output 1 is stated in the Prodoc as being: "Enhanced technical capacity of the provincial executive to develop policies and programmes, to appraise proposals and to monitor implementation." The associated outcome is "Strengthened capacity of the government executive to coordinate and facilitate the transition." The output statement is also stated in the prodoc executive summary as "Enhanced capacity of the Provincial Executive to create the institutional and policy framework for successful transition and recovery".
71. The evaluation team has found obtaining solid information on the achievements of Output 1 quite time consuming and difficult. Much of the written materials we have sighted were not easily accessible in the AGTP office in Aceh. We have since managed to find some written materials through UNDP Jakarta. This reflects two unfortunate aspects of AGTP - firstly that there have been major staff changes since the completion of Output 1 in 2009 and secondly that there has been some difficulty in documenting and retaining programme historical information in an easily findable and useable form. The team comments further on these issues under the heading of efficiency and more specifically immediately below on specific Output documentary products.
72. In regard to documentary products of Output 1, the paper trail is hard to trace. For instance, AGTP reports that it has provided significant support through the Tim Asistensi to the development of Aceh's transition related regulatory and policy framework. The programme IPAR report for quarters 3 and 4 of 2011 states that nine of twelve legal drafts prepared by this team were adopted into Qanun or provincial regulations by the

provincial executive and legislature, but are not specific as to which legal instruments it is referring. The programme progress report for quarter 2, 2011 reports that the Tim Asistensi was able to produce in total six LOGA ancillary regulations (of which three were adopted by central government), five Qanun adopted by the provincial legislature, one Governor's Regulation, five Governor's Decrees, two memoranda of understanding and one agreement. The evaluation team has not seen a consolidated list of these outputs or any of the actual outputs themselves (despite several requests). The team made several attempts to verify this work with the Legal Bureau in Banda Aceh, however no meeting eventuated.

73. AGTP reports also mention that "twelve of fourteen transition and coordination processes/ procedures have been put in place by the governor's advisory team in target provincial government offices in Aceh thus far (programme progress report for quarter 2, 2011)". In a similar manner, the evaluation team has not seen a consolidated list of these processes and procedures with where appropriate documentary backup relating to specific processes.
74. Notwithstanding these comments on difficulty in obtaining documentation, Output 1 was a significantly innovative approach to development assistance, in which the implementing agency (UNDP) was afforded the opportunity to work directly with an incoming provincial executive. This is indeed a rare opportunity, and demonstrates that UNDP was able to build upon the trust it had gained in staying the course throughout the post tsunami period in Aceh. Helping the governor to bring together the "tim asistensi" from a range of civil society and political backgrounds was, in the view of the evaluation team, quite extraordinary and effective. The support AGTP gave to the province in this way helped to set the course for the programme to be a vehicle for innovation and change in Aceh.
75. Of particular note was the "fit and proper test" for second level (echelon II) officials in the Aceh Provincial Government, which was administered by it in 2008. This resulted in the appointment or re-appointment of the 42 heads of all the agencies in the provincial government. This test opened up the opportunity for eschelon III individuals to apply for positions that are usually only open for eschelon II officers, provided they fulfilled the minimum administrative criteria. The Tim Asistensi was instrumental in the conduct of this exercise, which was supported by AGTP with the technical assistance of the University of Manchester. This effectively raised the bar for agency heads in the province and several respondents have noted that it resulted in the transparent and rigorous selection of a more effective senior management. AGTP support in this regard is considered to be highly effective.
76. The work of the Tim Asistensi also contributed towards the creation of the temporary agency Badan Kelanjutan Rekonstruksi Aceh (BKRA the Aceh Reconstruction Continuation Agency), which took over the rehabilitation and reconstruction work of the BRR after the latter agency completed its mandate in April 2009. The BKRA was instrumental in the completion of a large number of transport infrastructure and public building projects in NAD using unspent national funding. It also received AGTP technical assistance and financial support in its early stage. It is noted that BKRA completed its work and was dissolved with the additional funding disbursed by the end of 2010. Again AGTP support has been effective. However the related move of BRR asset transfer systems to the province failed to materialise in the early stages of AGTP implementation.

This highlighted the need for further support for asset transfer, which was noted in AGTP reports and discussions as early as 2009. Eventually this resulted in the creation of Output 5 for AGTP (see separate section below) and the work that the programme has done under this output, largely in 2012.

77. Other effective initiatives supported under AGTP are also noted. The management information systems sub-team of the Tim Asistensi was also effective in helping the province to develop a spatial planning information system, which now resides in the BAPPEDA. The province has also benefitted from the financial and contract management and tracking system implemented under P2K and the Tim Asistensi was also instrumental in establishing this new agency. BAPEDAL Aceh has received significant benefits from support through Aceh Green for environmental impact assessments in the oil palm plantation sector. AGTP also supported the establishment of the Aceh REDD (Reduction in Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) Task Force. In summary, the provincial government executive certainly saw the need to create various new institutions and teams, some of which have been highly innovative. This is a plus for AGTP.

Effectiveness of Output 2 - Support capacity building in key agencies

78. Output 2 is stated in the Prodoc as being: "Enhanced operational capacity of seven key provincial government agencies to manage the transition in a timely, efficient and transparent manner". The executive summary of the Prodoc also has the output statement "Enhanced operational capacity of key Aceh provincial government offices to effectively fulfil their transition and recovery responsibilities".
79. As originally designed this output was intended to assist the following seven agencies: the Office of the Secretary (Sekda) including the Bureau for Organisation (Biro Organisasi); the Legal Bureau in the Office of the Secretary (Biro Hukum); the newly formed Personnel, Education and Training Agency (BKPP); the Provincial Planning Agency, (BAPPEDA); The Provincial Finance Office (Dinas Keuangan); the Provincial Inspectorate; the Communication, Information and Telematics Agency (Dinas Perhubungan, Komunikasi dan Telematika); and the Provincial Environmental Agency, (BAPEDAL Aceh).

Good practices in AGTP - Box 1

Unit Percepatan dan Pengendalian Kegiatan (Unit P2K) - Activity Acceleration and Control Unit

The difficulty in managing public funding in an effective manner is not solely a problem for Aceh but also for Indonesia in general. However, Aceh Province has a unique experience in this regard.

In 2009, Aceh could only spend approximately 64 percent of its budget allocation for the fiscal year. The executive body of Aceh Province (i.e. the Governor) acknowledged the problem. The province as a result then established a special ad hoc unit for budgeting known as the Unit P2K. In 2009 the unit aimed to improve the APBA (local budget) absorption performance and to monitor the process. This unit was apparently inspired by a similar unit within BRR. Aceh is the first province in Indonesia to have this kind of unit. UNDP through AGTP supported the unit through the provision of operational funds.

The Unit has a tool called the "Upstream-downstream Controlling Format" to assist and monitor the execution of APBA activities. The tool was actually inherited from the BRR period. Using this tool P2K has regular meetings with all SKPAs. Details of budget implementation are compared with the expected expenditure and then published on-line in order to enhance the transparency of the process.

It is believed that with the assistance of Unit P2K, the budget absorption performance is increasing. Since 2010 the absorption rate has been above 90 percent. The unit has had significant impact on public financial management in Aceh.

It now appears that from the experience of Aceh, P2K's approach has become a model for public finance reform in Indonesia. This approach has been adapted and replicated in 5 provinces in Indonesia; Jambi, Central Java, East Kalimantan, Gorontalo and Central Sulawesi. It also arguably inspired the national government to establish a similar unit called Unit Kerja Presiden untuk Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan (UKP4) led by the ex Head of BRR, who has recently praised the Unit P2K in a meeting with the newly elected governor of Aceh and the leaders of the SKPAs.

Therefore, with these achievements and impacts in mind, it can be assumed that the support for this unit will continue and its continued existence will be strategically in-line with the local government structure in the future and therefore local funding will be available to support it.

This success story shows that without a large amount of funding or assistance, Unit P2K is able to perform effectively and efficiently and more importantly sustainably. It is a strategic component within the government structure and has met a real need of the Government of Aceh.

80.

this output as being relevant to only these agencies was probably a little restrictive for a

programme that has essentially been required to respond to demand for support. This underlines the essential nature of AGTP capacity support, which was to assist the province to fill gaps in its capacity as it came to terms with the major challenges of transition. Redefining the output as being relevant to "key agencies" in Aceh is, in the view of the evaluation team, an appropriate change to have made. However, we add the note that at times AGTP seems to have been a little too wide ranging and responsive in its support through Output 2 i.e. it has probably attempted to respond to too many requests. In the future, support of this nature might be more focused.

81. This redefinition has allowed AGTP to work with considerably more agencies than originally intended. By the end of 2010, AGTP was instrumental in helping the province to undertake capacity development needs assessments for: BAPEDAL; BAPPEDA; the Women's Empowerment and Protection Agency (BP3A); the Communications Office (DISHUBKOMINTEL); the Provincial Financial and Wealth Management Agency (DPKKA); and the Secretariat of the House of the People's Representatives for Aceh (Setwan). In 2011, AGTP extended this support to include four health institutions: the Zainoel Abidin General Hospital; the Aceh Mental Hospital; the Aceh Maternal and Children's Hospital and the Provincial Office of Health. All of these agencies were assisted to produce capacity development plans as a result of the needs assessments undertaken.
82. The evaluation team considers that the major value of the assistance to these agencies has been the process itself i.e. to undertake capacity assessments and produce capacity development plans. The opportunity for agencies to reflect on their roles, functions and responsibilities and to assess their strengths and weaknesses with a view to improving their capacities to deliver services in the future has clearly been welcomed by the agencies that the evaluation team was able to meet.
83. In addition to BAPPEDA, BAPEDAL, the financial agencies (both the DPKKA and the national representative office of the Directorate General of State Asset Management) and the Women's Empowerment and Protection Agency, the team also met with the Organisation Bureau under the Provincial Secretariat. While not the subject of a capacity development needs assessment itself, the Organisational Bureau has clearly played a central role in facilitating capacity development needs assessment and planning. Discussions with the Bureau show that it has clearly seen the support from AGTP to have been effective in fostering bureaucracy reform in the province.
84. Bureaucracy reform in a province such as Aceh needs to be seen from a long-term perspective. We see that the work of the AGTP funded specialists who facilitated the CDNA process has been of good quality, and has laid out a range of measures that each participating agency can and should take in the future. However, agencies will need to maintain the momentum for reform long after AGTP has finished. Work needs to go beyond the definition of broad capacity development plans to actually implement concrete capacity development measures. The scope of these measures (across the ten agencies who participated) is well beyond the financial scope of a programme such as AGTP, and will require the province itself to make investments. This is a challenge for the future.
85. It is pertinent here to mention some of the notable agency specific achievements of Output 2 (the following are not exhaustive but are given here as illustrations). The Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Agency has been assisted to define its

own priorities and to translate these into plans and budgets. The evaluation team was encouraged to see the energy and focus of the agency, and particularly its work in establishing gender focal points within a range of provincial agencies.

86. The team was also encouraged to see that BAPEDAL, with AGTP support has been able to make substantial contributions to environmental management of the oil palm industry and of regional hospitals, with a much stronger environmental impact assessment or AMDAL process now in place. In particular we note that the oil palm industry in Aceh has been involved in this process and is now under significantly more scrutiny from the province.
87. BAPPEDA Aceh also reports satisfaction with the support it has received from AGTP. Of particular note are the significant improvements the province has been able to make in implementing plans and disbursing funds on time. Also in this regard BAPPEDA expresses appreciation of the support the province has had in the establishment of the P2K function.
88. Significant support has also been provided through AGTP for the Aceh Green initiative, notably through support for the Aceh Green Secretariat. Aceh Green appears to be more of an approach or concept than a permanent part of the Aceh Provincial Government structure, and this resulted from work of the Tim Asistensi under Output 1 and was part of the vision of the Governor at the time. While the evaluation team notes that this unit has yet to be fully incorporated into the provincial government structure (and as noted above this may not actually happen), it did assist the former Governor to declare a moratorium on logging in the province. The Secretariat has also (inter alia) worked on Reduction in Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and has liaised with BAPEDAL Aceh on strengthened environmental impact monitoring. However, the evaluation team is unsure of the future of the Aceh Green initiative.
89. In summary, Output 2 has been effective in helping agencies to develop strategic tools and directions for capacity development and to bring about selected changes. Agencies now have the opportunity to further develop practical capacity development work plans. Conversely, the Output has probably been a little too ambitious and could have benefitted in the early days from the added focus that was not to come until the CDNA process was fully under way. It is likely that an earlier implementation of the CDNA process would have given more time for this Output to be fully effective. However, this comment does not detract from the considerable benefits (as above) that AGTP has been able to offer through this Output.

Effectiveness of Output 3 - Support the BKPP

90. Output 3 is stated in the Prodoc as being: "Enhanced capacity of the provincial training and human resource agency to retain, manage and transfer to provincial and district agencies the knowledge and skills required for a successful transition and sustainable recovery".
91. The evaluation team is of the opinion that despite the initial difficulties the Aceh government had in merging agencies responsible for training and personnel management this Output has largely been achieved and has been effective. At the

completion of AGTP we find a BKPP focused on its training and personnel management functions and committed to further improvements in the future.

92. In particular BKPP is able to manage the training process in the province and in doing so has developed with AGTP support an extensive series of training and personnel management capacities which are codified in its Standard Operating Procedure. The ability of the agency to develop and arrange training and conduct personnel management processes for provincial agencies has been doubly accredited; firstly by the National Institute of Public Administration (LAN) which now allows it to administer training for echelon 3 and 4 staff in the province; and secondly through ISO 9001 quality management accreditation.
93. The maintenance of accreditations is and will continue to be an ongoing issue for BKPP. During 2010 its LAN accreditation was actually withdrawn, and it was only with extensive work that this was regained in 2011. In addition, BKPP will need to ensure that it maintains the activities of the task force that is required to provide ongoing quality management as per ISO 9001. Continuation of ISO accreditation is contingent on an annual audit by an external team.
94. The retention of both of these accreditations is by no means guaranteed. However, the evaluation team is convinced that the BKPP has the management drive to maintain standards in the future. The head of the agency has quite clearly stated that BKPP seeks to develop as a centre of excellence for the province in the future. A number of in-depth discussions with training and personnel management staff have shown that the culture of aspiring to quality management in the agency's functions exists throughout the organisation.
95. Of particular note is that BKPP has managed (using funding from other sources including Japan) to establish a training campus with well resourced classrooms and an auditorium. The campus also includes a knowledge management centre, which AGTP supported with materials, training and equipment. Unfortunately on the days of visits by the evaluation team, the facilities were not being used, so there was no opportunity to see the training campus in action. Nevertheless, BKPP reports that it has a structured programme of training for provincial agencies. Furthermore other agencies contacted mentioned that their staff have been participating. The training function is now up and running.
96. Also of particular note is that with AGTP support, BKPP now operates an on-line personnel management system that is connected to GOI's regional office in Medan and to national facilities in Jakarta. The system allows the province to directly process (inter alia) staff promotion and pensions information and is reported to have brought major savings in time of processing applications. The evaluation team was able to directly observe this system in action. BKPP staff have been trained and are competent in its use.
97. As a major part of BKPP's increased capacity is the creation and accreditation of a team of 8 personnel assessors drawn from BKPP itself and from other provincial agencies. This team is now operational and provides an essential quality element in the processes of staff appointments and promotions. AGTP has also assisted BKPP to draw up a "Grand Design" for an Assessment Centre which cements in place the work of assessment within the framework of national competency standards and aims to promote a merit, equal opportunity based system for appointments to the Aceh

provincial civil service. This document is a milestone for the agency as it lays out the blueprint for further development of personnel assessment functions in the four years after AGTP assistance has been completed.

98. These major achievements within BKPP have largely come to fruition in the final year and a half of AGTP assistance. As mentioned before, there were difficulties in establishing and operating AGTP's programme of assistance for the agency in the initial two years. These difficulties were reported to have been largely to do with the merging of previously separate agencies and in BKPP's ownership of AGTP supported activities (as evidenced by the agency losing its LAN accreditation). The evaluation team is able to report that BKPP now has full ownership of and pride in its own achievements. The output is thus considered to have been implemented effectively.

Effectiveness of Output 4 - Programme management

99. Output 4 is stated in the Prodoc as being: "The Project is effectively implemented, monitored, reported and audited". This output statement has been retained throughout AGTP implementation.

Good practices in AGTP - Box 2

BKPP Badan Kepegawaian, Pelatihan dan Pendidikan (BKPP) - The Provincial Personnel, Training and Education Agency

The Law on Governance for Aceh (Undang Undang Pemerintahan Aceh or UUPA) stipulates that the provincial and district/municipality civil servants are under provincial and district/municipality authority. This gives Aceh a clear mandate to change local administration practices. The government of Aceh has legal authority to make necessary changes in management of administration and personnel. Based on this assumption the support of AGTP to the BKPP component - as one of its main focuses - is seen as highly strategic and appropriate.

BKPP is an amalgamation of three agencies: Badan Kepegawaian, Biro Kepegawaian and Badan Diklat which previously had similar and overlapping tasks. The Government of Aceh was willing to undertake bureaucracy reform but BKPP had its own difficulties in merging training and personnel management functions in its early days.

AGTP support for BKPP from 2008 to 2010 focused on building the capacity of the training function through a series of workshops and training events and through providing resources for and links to experts from the national system such as LAN and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The intention was to enhance the capacity of BKPP trainers and through them government officials in Aceh.

Despite the extensive support to this agency—not only from AGTP—BKPP initially was unable to perform as effectively as was hoped. Despite conducting training work, the AGTP support seemed not to be institutionalized enough within the agency. There was also question of ownership of programme supported activities within this agency as staff were reluctant to take part in CDNA/CDP processes. Some of the activities—even though they are quite innovative—such as the Knowledge Resource Center with its digital library have not been easy to effectively implement and maintain. Sustainable funding from BKPP's own budget for activities like this is still questionable.

During 2011, support to BKPP shifted from training to personnel management. In the last year and a half of AGTP support, the leader of the agency also changed and under this new leadership the agency began to perform in a much more focused, effective and efficient manner in a relatively short time. The leadership of BKPP is now clearly committed to further improvement in service delivery and is able to advocate for the agency.

Despite the ups and downs of work with BKPP, good results for BKPP have come through AGTP assistance. The agency:

- is managing the training process in the province using advanced methods and tools such as multi-media, FGD, etc.;
- has gained national and international accreditations from LAN and ISO 9001: 2008. BKPP received a “B” accreditation from LAN for conducting pre-service trainings for officers of rank (echelon) I , II and III and some leadership training for officer of rank III and IV. BKPP is the first government body in Indonesia to have gained ISO 9001 accreditation;
- has formulated a Draft Strategic Plan (Renstra BKPP);
- has developed Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) in compliance with international quality management standards;
- is, together with the Biro Organisasi, preparing a road map for Aceh's long term bureaucracy reform process;
- is implementing the Sistem Aplikasi Pelayanan Kepegawaian Online (SAPK) or online application system on personnel service;
- is formulating the Standar Kompetensi Pegawai (SKP) or Personnel Competency Standard;

Even so with those remarkable achievements, there is still uncertainty on how BKPP can independently manage to perform those activities through its own budgeting and planning mechanism without any outside assistance. This also includes efforts to maintain the accreditation that BKPP has successfully gained. But according to BAPPEDA, BKPP's proposal through its own Renstra for the next planning period is quite clear and feasible for funding through the provincial government.

100. The evaluation team has had access to the stream of monitoring documentation, the mid-term review of AGTP and summary financial disbursement information. It has not had access to any audit information. The team is satisfied that overall the management of AGTP has been effective. The programme has been able to deliver the agreed support to the Government of Aceh. Programme managers (including those in Aceh and in Jakarta) have been able to coordinate their activities well, despite the general observation that AGTP has been an ambitious and quite complex programme. The decision to appoint coordinators, each responsible for one output under the direction of the National Project Manager in Aceh and the Programme Manager in Jakarta, was sensible.
101. The evaluation team has drawn the conclusion that both current and former staff of AGTP have been hard working and skilled in what they do. They have collectively been a credit to UNDP.
102. The support of the Government of Aceh to AGTP, in particular through the National Project Director, has been excellent. Together with the support of the Ministry of Home Affairs (as National Coordinator), Bappenas and the Ministry of Finance at the national level (and through these agencies the support of more specialised agencies such as LAN), this shows that the partnership between UNDP and the government has been effective in delivering AGTP. The evaluation team has been able to review a selection of Project Board minutes, which show a consistency in oversight by GOI and UNDP.
103. The principles for management and implementation as outlined in section 5 of the Prodoc have been followed throughout the period of AGTP implementation. In particular we note that these articulate the position of both GOI and GOA as drivers and owners of AGTP. They also articulate the strategy of as much as possible utilising existing government resources (including staff). It is clear that the ability of AGTP to provide additional resources (largely funds and technical assistance) has complemented government resources in a logical and effective manner.
104. Notwithstanding these positive comments, we do note in the section on efficiency below that there have been limitations in funding flow and maintaining staffing levels.
105. We also note that the work on monitoring, which in the UNDP system requires extensive work, has devolved on a very small number of people, whose task it has been

to elicit information from colleagues. In an ideal work situation all colleagues should be responsible for regular monitoring, with the approach being a self-monitoring one backed up by specialist monitoring inputs (such as may be used in the Internal Project Assurance Report process). Instead the evaluation team has noted that the monitoring burden on a small number of staff has been very high. As an alternative that would also strengthen and consolidate the monitoring function, UNDP could also consider making more independent funding available to its specialised M&R staff in Jakarta, who currently have to rely on programme managers to make funding available for travel.

106. The evaluation team also notes that AGTP's capacity to collate, manage and make available the growing body of knowledge and lessons that has been gained throughout implementation of the programme has not been the programme's strongest feature. The evaluation team has found it consistently difficult for UNDP staff to locate specific documents, particularly relating to earlier stages in implementation. While this may be partly explained by the changes in staff that occurred during 2011 and partly due to focus on programme closure at this time, there is certainly a need for UNDP to be more consistent in document storage and knowledge management in future programmes.
107. A major exception to this has been the publication of the excellent book "Governance and Capacity Building in Post-Crisis Aceh", which was prepared by Australian National University Enterprise in conjunction with UNDP and the Multi Donor Fund. This book is available in both Bahasa Indonesia and English and offers major insights into governance in Aceh, within the post-crisis environment (tsunami as well as conflict), and cogently places governance and bureaucracy reform within the context of poverty reduction and the provision of basic services for the people of Aceh. The book offers many sensible recommendations for future strategies and activities related to governance in Aceh. Unfortunately, there does not appear to have been a large number of copies produced. It could and should be made available on-line.
108. For future knowledge management efforts, it is useful to refer to the major collection of knowledge and lessons available on line from BRR kc.monevacehnias.bappenas.go.id/. Clearly there have been extensive funds available for this exercise, including the establishment of a dedicated website. While UNDP may not have the resources available for a similarly thorough effort, the exemplary nature of this resource is a pointer for knowledge management in the future.

Effectiveness of Output 5 - Support asset transfer

109. Following earlier work on asset transfer under outputs 1 and 2 from 2008 onwards, this output commenced in late 2011 to consolidate efforts on asset transfer. Output 5 received operational funding in February 2012 and is simply stated as "Completed Transfer of RR assets and enhanced capacity of district governments to manage Rehabilitation and Reconstruction assets". While it is quite clear that the maximum of nine months available to achieve this output was not realistic and that AGTP cannot claim that rehabilitation and reconstruction asset transfer has by any means been completed, the evaluation team is of the view that work under this output has been very effectively delivered. In many ways this has been the most clearly articulated of AGTP's

outputs, as the work has followed one documented procedure of asset identification, documentation, valuation and transfer.

110. In total AGTP reports some Rp2.25 trillion (or approximately \$250 million at an exchange rate of Rp9000 to the dollar) of RR assets have been documented, verified, valued and transferred, which for a short period of time is a major achievement. The evaluation team notes that a consolidated list of assets transferred by type of asset is not available, so cannot comment on the specific benefits that the assets transferred have brought to the province and districts of Aceh. However, it is clear that despite significant gains in the final nine months of AGTP, the province still has a significant amount of assets that need to be transferred. This remains a significant challenge for the future.
111. The final consolidation effort for asset transfer through AGTP should have come on stream much earlier than it did. This technical area was not specifically targeted in the original programme design, although it is noted that initial policy work on asset transfer was supported by AGTP through the Tim Asistensi as early as 2008. Programme managers first raised the need to provide more concentrated assistance in asset transfer during 2009, but it was not until August 2010 that this issue became firmly on the agenda for discussion between UNDP and its funders. The evaluation team has viewed the sequence of decision making between August 2010 and the end of 2011 that resulted in funds actually arriving for Output 5 in February 2012, only a few months before programme completion.
112. The evaluation team is aware that cash flow problems related to audit discussions did occur between May and August of 2011, and this certainly had some bearing on late delivery of the output. We are also aware that there was debate as to the approaches of GOI to asset transfer, with the central Liquidation Team being formed to facilitate ex-BRR asset transfer. It was eventually agreed that AGTP support would be more appropriate to the transfer of non-BRR assets.
113. The benefits of Output 5 are most noticeable at the provincial level, where the government has been able to rely on AGTP for funding to bring national expertise for training and capacity development purposes. Both DJKN Aceh and DPKKA expressed appreciation of AGTP financial support in making this happen. There is also evidence that some capacity has been transferred to the districts – the evaluation team met with officials from the District of Bireun who report that the transfer of major assets within their district has largely been completed.

e. Efficiency

114. The team was asked to "evaluate how economically resources or inputs (such as funds, expertise and time) were converted to results. An initiative is efficient when it uses resources appropriately and economically to produces the desired outputs".
115. The evaluation team has concluded that efficiency has been somewhat variable among the Outputs of AGTP. The programme has been somewhat prone to being over responsive and diffuse – particularly in Output 2 where further follow through work for capacity development programmes is still needed. Output 1 was reasonably efficient in that it was able to provide a large amount of resources, very quickly and in a responsive

manner and with some innovative results. Output 3 has improved its efficiency, particularly in the middle to latter stages. Resources have been well focused in the last eighteen months. Output 5 has been very efficient in applying resources quickly and in a very focused manner.

116. The following tables are sourced from the Atlas system (Combined Delivery Report), are general in nature and show expenditure on an output by output basis over the period of AGTP implementation for both UNDP direct funding under the various Letters of Agreement and DIPA funding through the Ministry of Home Affairs. The tables show that the allocation for AGTP has been spent. Table 2 also shows total AGTP expenditure.

Table 1: AGTP expenditures by year and output (UNDP direct funds) in \$million

Output/Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Output 1	1.973	2.772	0.00	0.102	0.00	4.847
Output 2	0.139	2.164	1.866	0.335	0.188	4.692
Output 3	0.053	0.907	1.424	0.359	0.265	3.008
Output 4	0.012	0.513	1.048	0.352	0.303	2.228
Output 5	0.000	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.489	1.489
Total	2.177	6.356	4.338	1.148	2.245	16.264

Table 2: AGTP expenditures by year and output (DIPA funds and programme totals) in \$million

Output/Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Output 1	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Output 2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.191	0.128	0.319
Output 3	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.502	0.000	0.502
Output 4	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Output 5	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.065	0.000	-0.065
Total	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.628	0.128	0.756
Grand Total Direct & DIPA	2.177	6.356	4.338	1.776	2.373	17.020

117. There have been two major problems in funding flow for AGTP that bear comment in this evaluation.

118. Firstly the DIPA mechanism was clearly harder to establish and operate than anyone originally thought. AGTP (along with NITP) was the first project in which MOHA utilised the DIPA mechanism, and thus responded directly to the intent of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In this sense DIPA was an experiment (with the Disaster Risk Reduction Aceh and Safer Communities Through Disaster Risk Reduction projects using it later). The above tables, which are based on UNDP ATLAS records show that funds did not pass through the DIPA mechanism in 2010, but that funds did arrive in 2011 and in 2012. However, both UNDP and GOI respondents indicate that funding did arrive through DIPA in late 2010, (which was actually recorded in ATLAS as direct UNDP funding).
119. DIPA is not a true "on-on" mechanism because it operates in parallel to routine GOI systems, with separate bank accounts operated by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta and the Government of Aceh. The latter has been operated through a separate government team in Aceh, co-located with UNDP. Respondents consulted in the Aceh Government expressed some frustration with the difficulties initially experienced with the DIPA system. Several respondents said that the LOA arrangements for direct funding from UNDP should be used in preference in the future.
120. However, the evaluation team suggests that DIPA can (and should) be used in the future. It has demonstrated that it can deliver development partner funding through GOI systems. In the absence of a fully "on-on" mechanism this does allow GOI to track funds from a development partner through its own system. In this regard it is understood that donors in general have found grants to regions problematic to do through GOI systems (within the framework of the Minister of Finance Regulation No.40 of 2009 which regulates grant funding to provinces). DIPA has been implemented to be in line with this regulation and has been a useful experiment, which it is understood the Ministry of Home Affairs is now using elsewhere. The Ministry also notes that DIPA provides a useful stimulus for capacity development and improved performance in regions.
121. The second major funding flow problem occurred in 2011, and was in relation to the extension of AGTP with top-up funding to cover (inter alia) the asset transfer work. By the middle of 2011, the initial funding for AGTP (\$13.976 million) was beginning to be exhausted. While the top-up funding was clearly on the agenda, it is understood that there were delays in finalising this between May and August while audit reports of UNDP funding through MDF were being scrutinised. The evaluation team has not been appraised of the substance of this process, but it is understood that this involved considerable dialogue between UNDP headquarters and the European Union, which is a large contributor to MDF.
122. By mid-2011 it became apparent that UNDP would have to release existing AGTP staff in Aceh. All of the former AGTP coordinators duly left. Once the top-up funding was finalised in November 2011, UNDP engaged a new complement of coordinators who have guided the four operational outputs of the programme for the last eight months of the programme. The evaluation team notes that this situation has been detrimental to staff morale and continuity in AGTP. This is not a comment on the capacities of the two sets of coordinators, but rather a criticism of a system that can force major staffing changes at a very inopportune time for the programme.

123. Notwithstanding these comments immediately above, AGTP has been a reasonably efficient investment in that the many results outlined in the section above on effectiveness have been achieved for the \$17 million applied. By general development programme standards AGTP is a relatively modest investment, (although it is of a relatively large size in the UNDP context). We conclude (in general terms) that AGTP has achieved quite a lot for this modest investment. It has been reasonable value for money.
124. How could UNDP and GOI achieve better value for money in future initiatives? We suggest the following points:
- a. Plan earlier for the DIPA mechanism, even if this means starting the paperwork before designs for new initiatives are fully in place;
 - b. Avoid major delays in negotiating additional funding and in particular avoid having to lay off staff prematurely;
 - c. Maintain a tighter technical and institutional focus during programme implementation; and
 - d. Develop and maintain more consistent and comprehensive knowledge management and dissemination practices.

f. Impact

125. The team has been required to "evaluate changes in human development and people's wellbeing that are brought about by development initiatives, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended".
126. The broader outcomes of AGTP, which in UNDP terms are the organisational impacts of the programme, have been covered in the general comments on AGTP effectiveness and include several major results in bureaucracy reform. The following major changes in Aceh are noted as impacts towards which AGTP has made contributions.
127. Firstly, Aceh is at peace. While AGTP cannot claim a major role in bringing this about (this is far too high a level for the programme) it can be proud of having contributed to sensible governance measures to support ongoing peace. This is perhaps intangible but needs to be emphasised.
128. Secondly, the people of Aceh can now expect better services, particularly in health and education. Again AGTP has not been the only driver in this, but it has certainly made significant contributions to the increased capacity of agencies in Aceh to deliver services.
129. Thirdly, while the evaluation team has not seen a consolidated list of assets transferred by type of asset, we are sure that AGTP work on asset transfer will have an impact on people's welfare and livelihoods. This is particularly in regard to increased access to health and education assets and in the better access to markets offered by improved transport infrastructure assets. But we have been unable to offer any quantitative assessment of impact due to this work. It would be a useful exercise to examine this if data on asset types were to become available, as it would likely demonstrate some tangible impacts. It is also noted that impact from asset transfer is also contingent on funding being available from regional budgets for ongoing asset operation and maintenance.

g. Sustainability

130. The team has been required to "evaluate the extent to which benefits of the AGTP remain in existence despite the closing of the project. This includes evaluating the extent to which relevant social, economic, political, institutional, and other conditions are present and, based on that assessment making projection about the capacity of the Government of Aceh to maintain, manage and ensure the development results in future". The following areas are considered to have a high likelihood of sustainability.
131. The Tim Otsus Migas work is sustainable, as long as the oil and gas last. AGTP has supported provincial capacity to plan and budget for using these funds. Aceh probably has a ten year window for this to continue while hydrocarbon reserves last and assuming that resource companies are still prepared to extract. There are still challenges to utilise all of the available funding. Aceh is not short of funds, given that it has these funds additional to the usual national government allocations and provincial revenues. It is the distribution and use of available funds that will remain challenging.
132. BKPP has acquired capacities that should last into the future. It is making a difference to civil service management and capacity in Aceh. However, as noted above, challenges for this agency remain, particularly in ensuring provincial funding for training and personnel management work. The need to ensure continued accreditations and to ensure funding is available for the regular ISO audit process are noted.
133. The mainstreaming of gender and protection work is now clearly on the table in Aceh. The province now has a quite strong system of ten gender focal points in provincial agencies and we see no reason why this should not continue in the future, especially if civil service leaders are able to be fully committed to gender mainstreaming. However, in an essentially male dominated administration, challenges remain to fully benefit women within the civil service in the future.
134. The evaluation team feels that the process of bureaucracy reform in Aceh will continue, albeit with the continued need for support from agencies like UNDP. Once people have learned to demand better services and governance, the pressure remains to provide them. AGTP has contributed to this self-reinforcing mechanism. Outside influences could change this in the future e.g. further conflict.
135. Several of the provincial gains that have been supported through AGTP (and the gains through the NITP project in Nias) are now being replicated in other parts of Indonesia – the P2K financial monitoring approach and the fit and proper test are examples of this, as is the on-line system for personnel management that has been rolled out in Aceh. The Ministry of Home Affairs has noted that the national regulations on the fit and proper test are currently being formulated. It also notes that the competency gains in asset management and transfer are suitable for replication throughout Indonesia. Aceh has been assisted to lead the way on measures like this. In this sense there are results and benefits from the AGTP experience that will be sustained through their development and use elsewhere in Indonesia. This is to the credit of AGTP.

GENDER

136. Gender issues are not included in the criteria for evaluation of AGTP, and have been where appropriate commented upon throughout this evaluation report. However it is considered useful to draw together evaluation comments on gender in one place. It is noted that the 2010 inception report included an annexed gender strategy which inter-alia recommended support to the Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Agency (the BP3A) and the inclusion of gender mainstreaming in capacity development needs assessment/planning processes. Gender mainstreaming was included in the CDNA/CDP documentation for a number of agencies.
137. AGTP has supported the early operation of BP3A and should be commended for this strategic support for gender mainstreaming in Aceh provincial government. BP3A is showing significant capacity to further its mandate in women's empowerment and child protection in Aceh.
138. The evaluation team particularly notes the establishment of gender focal points in ten major agencies in Aceh and the increasing capacity of BP3A to promote gender awareness and lobby in the interest in women and children particularly in the area of service delivery (health and education). This demonstrates BP3A's increased capacity. But, while AGTP has contributed very positively in this regard, the evaluation team feels that BP3A will still benefit from continued support in the future. Much remains to be done in the context of a heavily male dominated administration.
139. From the perspective of AGTP management, the collection of gender disaggregated data has not been consistent (although this is not uncommon in development assistance agencies). For example, there are examples of training and meeting records where gender disaggregated data has been collected, and examples where it has not. The point here is not to collect gender disaggregated data for its own sake, but to act as an indicator for managers and implementers of the extent to which gender equity principles are being pursued.

Good practices in AGTP - Box 3

***Badan Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak (BP3A)/
Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Agency***

Aceh is one of the areas in Indonesia with the lowest level of participation of women working in public sector. Females only account for 36% of staff with the average national rate being 45% (UNDP 2010). The number of women in higher rank positions is also low. Only 11 percent of echelon III and 4 percent of echelon II are female. There are only 4 women out of 69 members of the legislative body, which were chosen from 304 women candidates who competed in the 2009 legislative election. Whereas there are some indications of increasing numbers of female representatives in parliament at national level and in other regions in Indonesia, the situation remains stagnant in Aceh. One of the positive steps that taken in addressing this issue was the enhancement of the status of the Biro Pemberdayaan Perempuan to become the Badan Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak (BP3A);

In 2010-2011, AGTP gave support to strengthening the institutional capacity of BP3A and supporting the establishment of Gender Focal Points within the provincial government offices (10 SKPAs) to effectively mainstreaming the gender perspectives into the bureaucracy and community programmes. They found out the training for CDNA/CDP supported by AGTP to be useful.

BP3A claims that they are now able to do gender mainstreaming training and coaching sessions, and socialization and advocacy to increase the awareness of gender issues at government events as well as in events in the 23 Kabupaten/Kota. They are also able to facilitate a gender strategy in the education sector in collaboration with the Education Agency, which is jointly funded by APBA, APBN and donors. They have also been able to formulate a strategic plan for securing sufficient funding from the APBA.

Regardless of being one of agencies that gained a relatively small amount of support from AGTP (compared to other agencies), BP3A claims that through the AGTP process their capacity in managing activities, advocacy and making networks with other stakeholders has increased. While these achievements cannot yet be said to be 100 percent institutionalized within the agency, staff who are working closely with AGTP have said that their personal capacities have increased.

There is still documentary evidence to suggest that the effectiveness of gender focal points has been constrained by frequent staff rotations as well as a lack of awareness and commitment amongst SKPA heads. The CDNA report for BP3A stated that the performance of focal points is relatively weak and their work is not always integrated with the planning and implementation of BP3A's workplan.

At the end of the day, there is no guarantee that a support for a gender oriented agency is in itself gender mainstreaming, but the achievements mentioned above can still be counted as an excellent start. BP3A will still need continued support in the future, especially in the context of a heavily male dominated administration

LESSONS LEARNED

140. The following are considered to be key lessons learned from this evaluation regarding the implementation of AGTP.
141. AGTP offers important insights for agencies wishing to work in transition from periods of post-disaster recovery to longer-term development, especially in the context of bureaucracy reform. Despite, or perhaps because of the initial administrative uncertainty, the province of Aceh was probably more open to bureaucracy reform than it otherwise might have been. It had already needed to come to terms with the massive changes that the tsunami and the subsequent onset of peace had brought, and had already been receptive to the massive amount of support available from Indonesia and its development partners. This, combined with the high level of support and ownership of the Government of Indonesia and the Government of Aceh, the alignment of donor support with national aims, and the need for all concerned to find ways of implementing special autonomy, did provide an enabling environment for innovation and change. UNDP internally differentiates between conflict and disaster recovery on the one hand and democratic governance on the other. It was active in Aceh from the period of immediate post-disaster support and has been able to participate in a complete cycle of transition (i.e. longer than AGTP itself) in which crisis transforms to long-term development (a reflection of chaos to order?). This is an important learning ground and is likely quite a rare opportunity, at least in Indonesia. It highlights the importance of retaining the experience, expertise and learning that this opportunity has provided.
142. The AGTP experience in working with GOI and GOA on asset transfer clearly offers perspectives in its own right. Most importantly, it is now 2012, almost eight years since the tsunami and asset transfer is still not complete. While this is clearly a result of the unprecedented level of assets that were constructed and installed and the vast range of funding sources that were used, it is abundantly clear that it takes a lot longer than may have been considered initially to bed assets down in a permanent home and in a manner that allows ongoing operation and maintenance resources to be made available. If, and it is hoped this is not the case, UNDP and GOI are faced with a challenge of a similar scale in the future, it is important that the work of AGTP in this is clearly documented for reference, particularly within the framework of the vastly increased experience that GOI itself now has in this important area. Earlier substantial action on asset transfer through AGTP would have been beneficial and this should be borne in mind for the future.
143. Programmes such as AGTP would benefit from longer planning and preparation periods. This is especially so for capacity building projects of this nature where longer-term bureaucracy reform is being attempted. It is particularly noted that more time is needed to establish funding channels through GoI, the DIPA funding mechanism in the case of AGTP. The DIPA, while problematic in its establishment has proven to be a useful and replicable funding mechanism, which in the absence of a true "on-on" mechanism does act to allow the accountable and traceable flow of donor funds within the GoI system. But it needs considerable time and effort to establish.

144. Direct assistance to the Provincial Executive has been of great value to the province. In the future however, this type of assistance would benefit from greater focus and if UNDP is to work on bureaucracy reform in Aceh in the future, more focus on absolutely key support to leadership should be possible. Support could also be given more directly to provincial legislature, especially as legislation comes through for its consideration.
145. Staffing changes are frequent at provincial level (as they are everywhere) particularly at the top management level. It is useful to remember 1) that staff changes require revisiting training and capacity building interventions to ensure that newly appointed staff receive the same support as their predecessors; and 2) when staff such as this move they sometimes take their functional (i.e. not structural) roles with them. Effectively this means that capacity can be transferred from one agency to another.
146. Bureaucracy reform is generational in nature, i.e. it will not occur overnight. Lessons from AGTP work with BKPP for instance show clearly that a four to five year timeframe is a minimum in which to expect the processes of reform to begin to take effect. It is also clear (again with the lessons from BKPP in mind) that ownership of programme activities needs to not only be with the provincial executive leadership, but with the senior management of each agency in which a programme aims to assist the reform process.
147. It is clear that knowledge retention within capacity building programmes is a key aspect that needs to be built-in from the start. Knowledge gained through capacity building is probably in the long-term the key institutional outcome affecting agencies. Plans and programmes come and go as do key members of staff. Therefore the capacity to retain knowledge (which encompasses skills and attitudes as well) is a key building block for the future and is best approached through regular opportunities for reflection by programme implementation staff and their institutional counterparts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

148. The following are the recommendations resulting from this evaluation. As they largely relate to future UNDP/GOI joint programming in Aceh in the future, they should be considered in the light of UNDP's current Country Programme Action Plan.
149. **Recommendation 1:** UNDP should continue to focus on bureaucracy reform in Aceh, acknowledging that the post crisis, rehabilitation and reconstruction period is now at an end. The evaluation team understands that UNDP is considering focusing on longer term development goals in livelihoods, economic opportunity, environment and climate change. The design of future assistance should acknowledge that there is unfinished bureaucracy reform business in Aceh. For example there is a need to support the province to clarify the balance between provincial and district/municipality authorities and roles. This is particularly within the contexts of special autonomy and oil and gas revenue. There may be additional opportunities to link with the Accelerated Development Programme for "left behind areas" as Aceh is already targeted in this programme.
150. **Recommendation 2:** Bureaucracy reform is generational in nature and requires actors to be there for the long haul. UNDP and the Government of Indonesia should carefully consider the need to take longer term programme approaches. Included in this is the

need to effectively communicate longer term needs to donors, with the view to avoiding discontinuity in funding.

151. **Recommendation 3:** There is a need to systematically explore Aceh's own capacity to commit major funding for its bureaucracy reform processes. It is clear that Aceh currently has significant resources and has already shown a capacity to invest in reform in its service delivery, particularly in the fields of health and education. UNDP and GOI should attempt to harmonize their funding contributions with those of Aceh and explore the complementarity that can come from combining national, regional and donor resources.
152. **Recommendation 4:** The capacity building processes and programmes through AGTP are not complete and all major agencies that the evaluation team has met have expressed desire for further support in the future. Future UNDP support for the Government of Aceh should recognize this. UNDP should provide support on a very focused basis, where appropriate continuing with agencies it has already been working with. Support for other agencies should be provided on a very selective and focused basis.
153. **Recommendation 5:** The gains made through the CDNA process supported by AGTP need to be consolidated through support to the agencies concerned to develop and implement practical capacity development activities. This goes beyond the creation of broad planning documents and actually requires detailed design of these activities and support for their implementation. In addition, for capacity building programmes like AGTP, if time permits, the CDNA process should ideally be undertaken during the design phase to form a baseline of information for program implementation.
154. **Recommendation 6:** UNDP and the GOI, particularly MoHA and Ministry of Finance, should not give up the DIPA mechanism but should seek ways of streamlining it. UNDP and the national and provincial governments have learned how to operate this mechanism. In particular major stakeholders need to recognize that the channeling of funds through the DIPA mechanism requires a significant preparation time. In this regard it is recommended that UNDP and GOI consider designing interim activities in bureaucracy reform for commencement not later than early 2013, even if a full new programme has yet to be finalized. This will help to maintain the momentum for bureaucracy reform and keep the DIPA channel open in advanced of a full programme. This would also help UNDP to retain some of the highly skilled staff it has in Aceh.
155. **Recommendation 7:** More consistency is required for gender mainstreaming in the future, and this should be seen in the light of opportunities presented by the migas money to continue to strengthen health and education services with a greater emphasis on gender mainstreaming (i.e. opportunity and empowerment). The opportunity for gender mainstreaming goes well beyond the creation of one gender specific agency and implies that gender be fully mainstreamed in all capacity development activities that UNDP undertakes in Aceh in the future.
156. **Recommendation 8:** UNDP and GOI should not assume that the gains made through AGTP Output 1 will automatically be retained in the future particularly with the new political environment in Aceh. For this reason, UNDP and GOI should consider further support for leadership and decision making in the future if this is requested by Aceh. This could usefully include work with the DPRA (possibly through the Setwan). While it is

not particularly feasible or desirable to support as large a team as the Tim Asistensi in Output 1 of AGTP, advisory support for the new Governor (if requested) could be considered.

Annex 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference for Team Leader

I. Position Information

Title: "Aceh Government Transformation Programme" (AGTP) Project Evaluation

Department/Unit: PMEUE

Reports to: Head of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (PMEUE)

Duty Station: Jakarta

Expected Places of Travel (if applicable): Jakarta and Aceh

Duration of Assignment: From end of May to end of June 2012 (30 effective working days)

II. Background Information

The Aceh Government Transformation Programme (AGTP) is a capacity development (CD) programme which was formulated in cooperation with the Provincial Government of Aceh in late 2008. With the closure of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) in April 2009, the then Governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf, proposed to UNDP on the formulation of a project which would address capacity gaps in the provincial government's ability to effectively and efficiently assume the tasks and responsibilities which it would inherit from the BRR.

The proposed project was initially designed to achieve the following outputs:

- (1) Enhanced capacity of the Provincial Executive to create the institutional and policy framework for successful transition and recovery. Policies were developed in close collaboration with a number of provincial agencies, including the Regional Development Planning Agency (BAPPEDA), the Environmental Impact Control Agency (BAPPEDAL), and the Provincial Health Agency;
- (2) Enhanced operational capacity of key provincial government agencies (SKPA) to effectively fulfil their transition and recovery responsibilities. Key agencies supported under this output were the Provincial Secretary (SETDA), Aceh Training and Human Resources Body (BKPP), BAPPEDA, Aceh Financial and Asset Management Agency (DPKKA), and the Environmental Impact Control Agency (BAPPEDAL);
- (3) Enhanced capacity of the Personnel Management, Education and Training Agency (BKPP) to retain, manage and transfer to provincial and district government agencies the knowledge and skills required for successful transition and sustainable recovery.

In mid-2011, AGTP received an additional funding of USD 3 million, in which the main purpose of the funding will be allocated to the completion of transfer and management process of ex-Rehabilitation and Reconstruction issue. Therefore, a new output was inserted to the project; namely:

- (4) Completed Transfer of RR assets and enhanced capacity of district governments to manage RR assets

The project also has another output on managerial aspect of its planning and implementation;

(5) The project is effectively implemented, monitored, reported and audited.

Initial project activities during 2008-09 under outputs 1-3 were designed to address the immediate capacity needs of the government in assuming the former roles and responsibilities of BRR. Notable activities included: support in the formulation of regulations and qanuns related to the implementation of the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA), a law which was promulgated by the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and includes the implementation of provisions of the MoU; the integration of special autonomy (Otsus) as well as oil and gas (Migas) funds with rehabilitation and reconstruction activities; assistance in the verification of assets owned by the provincial government which were previously managed by the BRR; a comprehensive gender mainstreaming strategy which included the establishment of gender focal points (GFPs) in key SKPAs in close collaboration with the Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Agency, and; the environmental monitoring of projects implemented by BRR.

2010 marked a shift in the implementation of demand-driven activities to the implementation of activities which addressed the longer term capacity needs of the provincial government, through the implementation of a capacity development needs assessment (CDNA) and impending capacity development plans (CDPs) in 8 SKPAs hand-picked by the Governor. While the CDNA has been completed in all target 8 agencies, the CDP was completed in 6 agencies.

More importantly, 2010 was also marked by the change of project implementation modality, from direct implementation, to national implementation mechanism (National Implementation Modality, NIM). This has ensured an active participation from central government, particularly Ministry of Home Affairs and BAPPENAS, in the project and thus strengthen the link of AGTP from its transition-support origin to long-term development continuum.

A direct consequence of the introduction of NIM is the subsequent change of fund channeling mechanism. While previously the project fund was directly channeled to local government's account, NIM uses Daftar Isian Penggunaan Anggaran (DIPA) mechanism. While this shift has brought UNDP closer to the principles of Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (alignment of development aid on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures) and the Jakarta Commitment (on strengthening country ownership over development), it has also presented UNDP, GoA, and MOHA with various technical challenges, as the three parties need to navigate procedures of Government of Indonesia's intricate planning and budgeting system to ensure timely implementation of AGTP.

Activities under the fifth output included the formulation of a steering committee, an ad-hoc project board, and an acting National Project Director (NPD), as well as regular monitoring and reporting activities by the Monitoring Unit, and internal project assurance (IPAR) visits by UNDP Jakarta every 6 months. A Mid-Term Review of the project has been conducted in August 2010, whereby the result showed several key findings and recommendations, among others: the unique role of AGTP in equipping the government of Aceh with the required capacity to take over the rehabilitation mandate from BRR; the need of AGTP to take more proactive role in linking provincial agencies with district and sub-district authorities to ensure the trickling down of capacity building initiatives which have been provided at the provincial level; as well as the recommendation for UNDP to

leverage the influence of donors on the government and lobby for fast-tracking the asset transfer process.

In its latest stage of project implementation, AGTP received additional funding of USD 3 million which extended the project period up to June 2012. More than seventy percent of the additional funding (USD 2.2 million) is used to support local government during the verification of rehabilitation and reconstruction (RR) assets, asset transfer process, as well as building the capacity of regional governments in asset management.

III. Evaluation Purpose

The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess the relevance, performance and success of the activities undertaken by the project. It also shall examine achievements, good practices and lessons learned from the project in order for the UNDP, Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), the Government of Aceh (GoA) and the donor (MDF) to identify key areas which are replicable and the necessary conditions for sustainability.

Knowledge and information obtained from the evaluation will be used as basis for better design and management for results of future UNDP activities in Aceh and in governance sector in general. The evaluation also supports public accountability of the Government of Indonesia, UNDP, and the MDF.

IV. Evaluation Scope, Objectives and Criteria

The evaluation will provide a critical assessment on two key phases of the project, *first*: the project's initial ad-hoc activities which addressed immediate needs of the Government of Aceh in assuming the mandate of rehabilitation and recovery during the transition phase (2008-2008) and after the closure of BRR (2009), and *second*: the project's post-transition activities (2010-2012) which were directed towards sustainable recovery and longer-term development, with reference to the Jakarta Commitment and existing development plans and programmes. The evaluation shall also provide an assessment of the viability of AGTP's exit strategy.

The objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

1. To assess to what extent the project has created an enabling environment which has helped shape government performance in managing post-Tsunami transition process;
2. To assess effectiveness and achievement of AGTP's outputs;
3. To gain insights into the level of client satisfaction with the project. The clients include community and local government beneficiaries; national government partners and donors;
4. To review the effectiveness of the gender mainstreaming strategy;
5. To identify good practices and lessons learned in the area of capacity development to local government;
6. To identify good practices and lessons learned in the area of project implementation modality, including effectiveness of DIPA Deconcentration modality;

7. To provide recommendations for sustaining the benefits of the project and strategic issues and initiatives for a potential next assistance in Aceh.

In doing so, the evaluation exercise shall use the standard OECD/DAC Evaluation Criteria for Evaluation of Development Assistance namely, Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability (for detailed: see pages 168-170 Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results: <http://www.undp.org/evaluation/handbook>.);

Relevance: evaluate the extent to which intended output of the AGTP are consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of post-Tsunami Government of Aceh. Also evaluate the extent to which AGTP project was able to respond to changing and emerging development priorities and needs in the post-BRR closure period in a responsive manner. Another aspect which needs to be looked at is the relevance of AGTP's support on ex-RR asset transfer and management process.

Appropriateness: Evaluate importance of the initiatives relative to the needs and priorities, and examines whether the initiative as it is operationalized is acceptable and feasible within the contextual need of the Government of Aceh and Government of Indonesia in a post-BRR era.

Effectiveness: evaluate the extent to which the intended results of AGTP have been achieved. This includes an assessment of cause and effect- that is attributing observed changes to project activities and outputs. Assessing effectiveness involves three basic steps: 1) Measuring change in the observed output, 2) Attributing observed changes or progress toward changes to the initiative or determining AGTP contribution toward observed changes, 3) Judging the value of the change (positive or negative)

Efficiency: evaluate how economically resources or inputs (such as funds, expertise and time) were converted to results. An initiative is efficient when it uses resources appropriately and economically to produces the desired outputs.

Sustainability: Evaluate the extent to which benefits of the AGTP remain in existence despite the closing to the project. This includes evaluating the extent to which relevant social, economic, political, institutional, and other conditions are present and, based on that assessment making projection about the capacity of the Government of Aceh to maintain, manage and ensure the development results in future;

Impact: evaluate changes in human development and people's well being that are brought about by development initiatives, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

V. Evaluation Questions

The consultant will work in a team to develop list of questions that will help generate information that are needed. Below is sample of questions for reference for the evaluators:

- Were stated outputs or outcomes achieved?

- What progress toward the outcomes has been made?
- What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended outputs
- To what extent have the outputs contributed to the outcomes
- Has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriated and effective
- What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness

Evaluation questions must be agreed by the project board who commission the evaluation.

VI. Methodology

The team of the evaluators will design detailed step by step work plan that specifies the methods the evaluation will use to collect the information needed to address its purpose and objectives. The overall approach and methodology should ensure the most reliable and valid answers to the evaluation questions and criteria within the limits of resources (for more detail see pages 172-177 of Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results): <http://www.undp.org/evaluation/handbook>.

Data Collection Methods

Primary data: The consultant may use questionnaires to collect primary data from beneficiaries, stakeholders, key informants, and expert panel. The data can also be collected through direct observation, interviews, focus group, and case studies. AGTP project will provide main data generated through monitoring during project implementation cycle. The information includes: Project document of AGTP (this include: Result Resources Framework with detail indicators, baseline and target), Quarterly Monitoring Report, Internal Project Assurance Report (IPAR), Mid Term review of AGTP, Minutes of Board Meeting, Project Fact Sheet, Donor Report, and M&E plan.

Secondary data: Secondary data will be collected by the consultant from other sources that have direct relevance for the evaluation purposes. This includes among other: National Planning Document (RPJM); Monitoring and Evaluation report of relevant projects / programme;

Stakeholder consultations: The consultations should include the following stakeholders: 1) beneficiaries, 2) reference groups, 3) national, provincial, and district counterparts, 4) UNDP staff and management, and 5) other UN and non-UN projects, particularly those working on post-disaster coordination, capacity development, and or asset transfer and management.

Data analysis: The evaluators will develop the procedures used to analyse the data collected to answer the evaluation questions and criteria. It should details the various steps and stages of analysis that will be carried out, including the steps to confirm the accuracy of data and results.

Findings: should be presented as factual statements based on an analysis of the data. They should be structured around the evaluation questions and criteria.

Conclusions: Should be comprehensive and balanced, and highlight the strengths, weakness of AGTP

Recommendations: The report should provide practical, feasible recommendations.

Lessons Learned: The report should include discussion on lessons learned for the evaluation that is newly gained from the particular circumstances.

VII. Evaluation Products (Deliverables)

At the minimum the product should include :

- Evaluation inception report: An inception report should be prepared by the evaluators before going into the full fledged data collection exercise
- Draft Evaluation report: The Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (PMEU) UNDP-Indonesia and Project Board will review the draft evaluation report to ensure that the evaluation meets the required quality criteria
- Final evaluation report

Review/approval time required to review/approve the outputs prior to authorizing payments:

No	Deliverables	Payment	Due date
1.	Inception report	20%	Day 6
2.	Draft evaluation report	40%	Day 23
3.	Final evaluation report	40%	Day 30

Submit the expected written outputs above in printed and soft versions; MS Word (.doc) format including power point presentation when necessary.

Annex 2: Key documents consulted

- AGTP Pro Doc Final, 2008
- AGTP Annual Report , January – December 2011
- AGTP Mid Term Review, August 2010
- AGTP Amendment Request , (Top Up proposal), 2011
- Internal Project Assurance Reports (IPAR) for AGTP
- Quarterly Monitoring Reports for AGTP
- Quarterly Progress Reports for AGTP
- Quarterly Fact Sheets for AGTP
- Country Programme Action Plans (UNDP) (2206 - 2010 and 2011 - 2014) (CPAP)
- Capacity Development Needs Assessment (CDNA)/Capacity Development Plan (CDP) Report, for 6 Selected Aceh Government Units, December 2010
- Capacity Development Needs Assessment (CDNA) for 4 selected health Agencies, 2011
- Tata Pemerintahan dan Pengembangan Kapasitas Aceh Paska Krisis: Sebuah Laporan Australian National University Enterprise, April 2012 (Governance and Capacity Development in Post-Crisis Aceh).
- Various Terms of Reference for the Tim Asistensi
- Various Letters of Agreement for AGTP activities
- Selected AGTP Board Minutes
- Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, UNDP, (2009)
- Various standard operating procedure and capacity development documents for BKPP
- Planning documentation for BP3A

Annex 3: Persons and agencies consulted

JAKARTA

Time	Activity	Venue
Monday, 25 June 2012		
10:00 – 12:00	Budiati Prasetiamartati (<i>Programme Manager DGU</i>) UNDP –	UNDP Office, Menara Thamrin
15:00 – 16:00	Shamima Khan (<i>Manager</i>) & Lina Lo (<i>Sr. Consultant Quality Assurance</i>) Multi Donor Fund (MDF)	MDF Office, BEJ
Tuesday, 26 June 2012		
11:00 – 11:30	Karoline Kemp (<i>Monitoring & Reporting Consultant – Poverty Reduction & Democratic Governance</i>) UNDP	UNDP Office, Menara Thamrin
16:30 – 17:30	Stephen Rodriques (<i>Deputy Country Director</i>) & Irman G. Lanti (<i>Assitant Country Director/Team Leader DGU</i>) UNDP	UNDP Office, Menara Thamrin
Wednesday, 27 June 2012		
16:00 – 17:30	Dedi Syarif Usman (<i>Direktur/Pengarah Tim Likuidasi</i>), Yanis Dhaniarto (<i>Kasubdit BMN-DJKN</i>) & Muhammad Ulin (<i>Staf</i>) DJKN – Ministry of Finance	DJKN Office, Gd. Syafruddin Prawira Negara II,
Thursday, 28 June 2012		
09:30 – 10:30	Danielle Ide-Tobin (<i>previously Quality Assurance for AGTP</i>) UNDP	UNDP Office, Menara Thamrin

NONGSA, BATAM ISLAND

Time	Activity	Venue
Friday, 29 June 2012		
13:30 – 14:30	Ilarius Wibisono (<i>Project Manager</i>) <i>Project Management Unit - AGTP</i>	Nongsa Point Resort-Batam Island

17:00 – 18:30	Aryawan Soetiarso Poetro (<i>Direktur Kawasan Khusus & Daerah tertinggal</i>) & Hermani Wahab (<i>Kepala Sekretariat Steering Committee AGTP-NITP</i>) BAPPENAS	Nongsa Point Resort-Batam Island
Saturday, 30 June		
07:00 – 08:00	Soesilo (<i>Direktur Penataan Daerah, Otonomi Khusus & DPOD</i>), Budi S. Sudarmi (<i>Kasubdit Otonomi Khusus Wilayah I</i>) & La Ode Ahmad (<i>Subdit Otsus</i>) <i>Departemen Dalam Negeri/ Ministry of Home Affairs</i>	Nongsa Point Resort-Batam Island

BANDA ACEH

Time	Activity	Venue
Sunday, 1 July 2012		
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Monday, 2 July 2012		
10:00 – 11:30	Husaini Syamaun (Kepala) & Zuriah (Staf) BAPEDAL	Kantor Bapedal
Tuesday, 3 July 2012		
09:00 – 10:30	Amrina (staf, LO AGTP) BP3A	Kantor BP3A
11:00 – 13:00	Armansyah (<i>Kepala Bidang</i>) dan Hadi (<i>Liaison Officer for SGTP</i>) BKPP – <i>Bidang Kediklatan</i>	Kantor BKPP – Bid. kediklatan
14:00 – 16:00	Azqa Rafiki AGTP- <i>Output 5 Coordinator</i>	Kantor AGTP-UNDP, Kantor Gubernur NAD
Wednesday, 4 July 2012		
09:30 – 10:45	Faisal Rizal AGTP – <i>Output 3 Coordinator</i>	Kompleks Kantor Gubernur NAD
11:00 – 12:30	Ronny (<i>Ketua Satker</i>) and Darwin (<i>Anggota Satker</i>) BPKP- <i>Bidang Kepegawaian</i>	Kantor BPKKP – Bid. Kepegawaian
15:00 – 16:30	Meeting with Bpk. Bachtiar (<i>AGTP- National</i>)	Lobby Hermes

	<i>Project Director)</i>	palace Hotel
17:30 – 18:00	Afrianto, Yafidz, Rizal Effendi <i>DPKKD -Dinas Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Kekayaan Daerah, Kabupaten Bireun</i>	Lobby Hermes palace Hotel
Thursday, 5 July 2012		
10:00- 11:00	Muzayyin Zahrina (<i>Output 2 Coordinator</i>) UNDP- AGTP PMU	Solong Coffee Shop
11:00 – 11:30	Yacob Ishadamy (<i>Consultant for Output 2</i>)	Solong Coffee Shop
15:00 – 15:45	Tabrani Usman (<i>Kepala</i>) & Dedi (<i>Staf</i>) Biro Organisasi – Setda Aceh	Kantor Biro Organisasi, Kompleks Kantor Gubernur NAD
Friday, 6 July 2012		
09:00 -10:30	Lesley Wright (<i>UNDP Monev Officer</i>) - UNDP Aceh Fithri F. Saifa (<i>AGTP Monev Officer</i>) UNDP-AGTP PMU	SMEA coffee shop
11:00 – 11:45	Hermawan (<i>Ketua Sekretariat</i>) Tim Otsus Migas	Hermes Coffee shop
Saturday, 7 July 2012		
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Sunday , 8 July 2012		
10:00 – 11:30	Ilarius Wibisono (<i>Project Manager</i>) <i>UNDP Project Management Unit - AGTP</i>	3 in 1 Coffee shop
Monday, 9 July 2012		
08:30 – 09:30	Safriza Sofyan (<i>Deputy for Aceh & Nias</i>) MDF	MDF Office
11:00 – 12:30	Nashrullah Muhammad (<i>Kepala</i>) BKPP	Kantor BKPP
Tuesday, 10 July 2012		
12:30 – 13:30	Mirza Hasan (<i>previously worked for AGTP in early phases</i>)	Rumah Makan Cut Mun
15:00 -16:30	Ischak Ismail (Kakanwil DJKN Wil.I Banda Aceh) & Surya Hadi (Ketua Pokja Aset Tim Likuidasi BRR) DJKN - KPKNL	Kantor Wilayah I DJKN Gd. Keuangan Negara

Wednesday, 11 July 2012		
11:00 – 13:00	Ilarius Wibisono (<i>Project Manager</i>) <i>UNDP Project Management Unit - AGTP</i>	Rumoh Aceh Coffee Shop
Thursday, 12 July 2012		
08:00 – 09:00	Warqah Helmi (<i>Sekretaris</i>) BAPPEDA	BAPPEDA NAD Office

JAKARTA

Time	Activity	Venue
Monday, 16 July 2012		
10:00 – 12:00	Simon Field <i>Former UNDP Programme Manager-Aceh</i>	Sari Pan Pasific Lobby
Wednesday, 18 July 2012		
09:00 – 10:00	Siprianus Bate Soro, <i>UNDP-Programme Manager CPRU and former Programme Manager for AGTP in Jakarta</i>	Menara Thamrin
11:00 – 12:30	Hester Smidt, <i>UNDP - M&R Officer</i>	Menara Thamrin
Friday, 20 July 2012		
9.30 - 11.30	Presentation of key findings to stakeholders <i>Arranged by UNDP</i>	Menara Thamrin

Annex 4: Key evaluation questions used by the team

A. Key evaluation question sets for all components:

The following key question sets (with the main DAC criteria to which they relate) were the basis of interviews by the team and were chosen from, adapted and augmented as required to reflect the roles and participation of different agencies in AGTP:

1. What have been the roles and responsibilities of respondent agencies within AGTP and its activities? (Background to all DAC criteria)
2. What has changed positively in government and governance in Aceh as a result of AGTP, particularly in the enabling environment for government to manage post tsunami transition? Has AGTP been able to respond to changing needs, priorities, policies in the province? If so what has it been able to respond to? (Appropriateness, effectiveness and impact)
3. How relevant has AGTP been to the needs of the province from the perspective of respondent agencies and their roles in transition? What were the needs as expressed by stakeholders when the project was designed? (Relevance)
4. What is the perception of the actual results or progress achieved? What do respondents think AGTP has achieved and why? What do they think it has not achieved and why? Have there been unintended results, either positive or negative? Has the project met the needs as per the design? (Effectiveness)
5. How satisfied have respondents and their agencies been with the performance of AGTP and the results they have achieved? What are the most important contributions made by the project? Why are these contributions the most important? (Appropriateness)
6. Now that the project is drawing to a close, which results are, in the opinion of the respondents, sustainable into the future, and which not? What will Aceh continue to be able to do as a result of AGTP? What capacities still remain to be developed in local systems? (Impact and sustainability)
7. What programmes and activities are respondent agencies intending to follow up and implement in the future? How will these be funded and managed? (Sustainability)
8. What lessons and good practices have emerged through AGTP that can be sustained in Aceh? Could they be utilised elsewhere? (Sustainability)
9. How have the various AGTP activities met the needs of women and men? How have both men and women been involved and what has each group gained? (Effectiveness)
9. Has UNDP managed the programme to the satisfaction of respondent agencies? What have been the good management practices used by UNDP, and what have been the shortcomings? What has been the contribution of the respondent agencies in Aceh and in Jakarta in managing the project? What have been the highlights and the challenges in their contributions? (Effectiveness)
10. How have financial resources been allocated through AGTP, particularly in reference to the split of funds between UNDP direct funding and National Government funding through the DIPA mechanism? What have been the highlights and the challenges in the use of these funding contributions? (Efficiency)

11. In the opinion of respondents and their agencies, have human resources been used well in the programme? Have they been able to effect changes in the way that the Aceh governments operate in managing transition? (Efficiency and effectiveness)

12. Has project reporting been relevant to agency needs and has it been clear, accurate and timely from their perspective? Do reports provide the information that stakeholder agencies require? How has the information been used? (Efficiency and effectiveness)

What else should the Team know, and are there any questions for the Team from respondents?

B. Output specific evaluation question sets:

The following are key question sets for respondents involved in the five outputs of AGTP and were chosen from, adapted and augmented as required to reflect the roles and participation of different agencies in the outputs of AGTP:

Output 1: Enhanced capacity of the Provincial Executive to create the institutional and policy framework for successful transition and recovery.

1. What are the key decisions, policies and regulations for transition and recovery that Aceh has adopted or is in the process of adopting to which AGTP support has contributed? (Appropriateness and relevance)

2. What has been the special AGTP contribution to strengthening the leadership in Aceh in making policies and decisions and in adopting new regulations for transition and recovery? What other support (for instance from other Indonesian and Aceh Government, donor or NGO programmes) has contributed to these policies and decisions and how have AGTP and other support programmes complemented each other? (Effectiveness)

3. What are the benefits to the people of Aceh in the policies, decisions and regulations adopted as a result of AGTP support? Have these benefits been targeted equally to women and men (and how) and have they met the needs of poor and other disadvantaged groups? (Impact and sustainability)

Output 2: Enhanced operational capacity of key provincial government agencies (SKPA) to effectively fulfil their transition and recovery responsibilities.

1. Which specific capacities have respondent organisations gained through involvement in AGTP? What can the organisations and their staff now do that they were not able to do before AGTP? What evidence is there to show that these capacities have been gained? (Relevance and appropriateness)

2. What has been the special AGTP contribution to these capacity developments? What other support (for instance from other Indonesian and Aceh Government, donor or NGO programmes) has contributed to these results and how have AGTP and other support programmes complemented each other? (Effectiveness)

3. (To the extent possible to ascertain) what do individual trainees feel they can now do that they were unable to do before? Have training and capacity development activities

equally benefited women and men, and how have they each benefitted? (Impact and sustainability)

4. From the perspective of participating agencies, what are the benefits to the people of Aceh resulting from the enhanced capacities they now have after AGTP support is finished? Have these benefits been targeted equally to women and men (and how) and have they met the needs of poor and other disadvantaged groups? (Impact and sustainability)

Output 3: Enhanced capacity of the Provincial Training & Human Resource Agency (BKPP) to retain, manage and transfer to provincial and district government agencies the knowledge and skills required for successful transition and sustainable recovery

1. Which specific capacities has the BKPP gained through its involvement in AGTP? What can BKPP now do that it was not able to do before? Has AGTP helped the agency to expand its role in human resources and training for provincial and district government agencies? What evidence is there to show that these capacities have been gained? (Relevance and appropriateness)

2. What has been the special AGTP contribution to these capacity developments? What other support (for instance from other Indonesian and Aceh Government, donor or NGO programmes) has contributed to these results and how have AGTP and other support programmes complemented each other? (Effectiveness)

3. (To the extent possible to ascertain) what do individual staff members of BKPP feel they can now do that they were unable to do before? Have capacity development activities equally benefited women and men, and how have they each benefitted? (Impact and sustainability)

4. From the perspective of BKPP, what are the benefits to the government agencies and through them the people of Aceh resulting from the enhanced capacities they now have after AGTP support is finished? Have these benefits been targeted equally to women and men (and how) and have they met the needs of poor and other disadvantaged groups? (Impact and sustainability)

Output 4: The project is effectively implemented, monitored, reported and audited

1. What have UNDP programme implementers learned as a result of their work in AGTP? What can they now do that they were not able to do before they commenced work with AGTP? Have male and female staff members been equally given the opportunity to learn and progress? How have the new skills and capacities contributed to benefits for Aceh? (Effectiveness)

2. What have been the successes and challenges of AGTP from the perspective of programme staff - in implementation, monitoring and results and financial reporting? Have there been any audits and what were the results?

3. What major risks has the programme had to deal with? How has AGTP responded to these and how might it have responded better? (Impact)

4. Have financial transfer mechanisms met the needs of the programme and the province in a timely and efficient manner? (Efficiency)

Output 5: Completed Transfer of RR assets and enhanced capacity of district governments to manage RR assets.

1. To what extent have post tsunami RR assets been transferred to the Provincial, District and Municipality governments in Aceh, split into on-on, on-off and off-off assets? How is the data obtained and are agencies confident that it is accurate?
2. What have been the successes and challenges in RR asset transfer? To what extent has AGTP support been able to influence asset transfer? (Effectiveness)
3. What can agencies involved in arranging asset transfer or agencies to whom assets have been transferred now do that they were unable to do prior to AGTP support? What evidence is there to show that these capacities have been gained?
4. What has been the special AGTP contribution to these capacity developments? What other support (for instance from other Indonesian and Aceh Government, donor or NGO programmes) has contributed to results and how have AGTP and other support programmes complemented each other? (Effectiveness, relevance and appropriateness)
5. (To the extent possible to ascertain) what can individuals within the agencies now do that they were unable to do before? Have capacity development activities equally benefited women and men, and how have they each benefitted? (Impact and sustainability)
6. In the view of agencies involved in asset transfer, what are the benefits to the local governments and their populations from the support for asset transfer provided by AGTP? Have these benefits been targeted equally to women and men (and how) and have they met the needs of poor and other disadvantaged groups? (Impact and sustainability)