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ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: CÔTE D’IVOIRE

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This evaluation was conducted by the Evaluation Office of UNDP, with Roberto La Rovere as evaluation manager. The office drew on the following persons to conduct the evaluation: team leader Nadia Bechraoui, and the team members Mamadou Coulibaly (on the poverty component, and the fight against HIV/AIDS); Clément Sekongo (on governance aspects); Asna Fall (gender) and Gabriella Buescher (crisis prevention and recovery). At the Evaluation Office in New York, Anna Dall’Oca provided research support.

Our thanks are extended to stakeholders and partners of UNDP-Côte d’Ivoire, including members of the Government, civil society, international development community, the United Nations family and members of the communities that the ADR team consulted during the evaluation. Their engagement was constructive, allowing the team to conduct the evaluation while maintaining independence.

We are grateful to Mr. Albert Mabri Toikeusse, Minister of State, Ministry of Planning and Development, who chaired the stakeholder workshop on 15 February 2013 in Abidjan. Credit should also be given to members of the reference group, led by the Director-General of Plan and Poverty Reduction Diaby Lacine.

The cooperation of Ngokwey Ndolamb, the UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, and the contribution by André Carvalho, former Country Director, and the new UNDP Country Director, Mr. Luc Gregoire, are acknowledged with thanks. We particularly appreciate the cooperation received from Aissata De, Deputy Country Director (Programme), who acted as focal point for the ADR; her support was crucial for the success of the evaluation. We also acknowledge the support by Christian Do Rosario, Deputy Country Director (Operations), and Emma Ngouan-Anoh, Assistant Resident Representative (Programme), and the other staff of UNDP-Côte d’Ivoire, including those in the field. We would also like to thank the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa for their valuable support and contribution to the process, and the interest in the process by the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery in New York.

It is our hope that this evaluation will help UNDP further leverage its strategic partnership with the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, as UNDP advances with its transformation process to become an ever more relevant and valuable partner to the country.
FOREWORD

The Assessment of Development Results (ADR) as a core area of the work of the Evaluation Office (EO) seeks to independently and systematically assess progress around key United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) interventions in countries which receive UNDP support. This ADR was conducted in collaboration with the Government of Côte d’Ivoire with a view to strengthening ownership of evaluation results by national partners, and consequently its credibility and utility. For this purpose and to oversee the process, a reference group was set up with participants from the Ministry of State for Planning and Development, the Country Office and Regional Office for Africa as main reference points and included other government ministries, the National Statistics Institute, United Nations Population Fund, the European Union, and members of the civil society and non-government organizations. The process was conducted by an independent national team and guided by a professional evaluation manager from the EO. Through this mechanism, both the Government and the EO ensured that established norms and standards for evaluation, such as independence, impartiality and rigorous methodology, were followed.

This approach also helped the evaluation team gather contributions from a wide range of national partners as well as from various activities that have been recently carried out, such as the report entitled ‘Repositioning UNDP in Côte d’Ivoire (2011-2013)’, drawn up in 2011, and the ‘Joint Review of the Priority Plan for Côte d’Ivoire’ by DPKO, PBSO, DPA and UNDP, written in September 2009. The result is a report that closely mirrors the national situation and is therefore of greater use to our national partners and UNDP itself, in view of a future commitment that is more focused towards informing a strategic direction for UNDP.

The evaluation showed that generally, and despite a context of political instability that has persisted since 2000, the UNDP programme has succeeded in achieving tangible results at both strategic and operational levels in all areas of intervention, including poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery and promoting the values of the United Nations.

However, administrative procedures must be reviewed as they are cumbersome and delay operational implementation, making it difficult to implement work plans within required timeframes and consequently placing expected outcomes at risk.

UNDP must focus its support so as to prepare Côte d’Ivoire to face not only its chronic challenges such as poverty, food insecurity and climate issues, but also the emerging challenges, those that will allow it to recover the stability needed to continue its development.

The conclusions and recommendations from this study help UNDP to reflect on its effectiveness and strengthen its strategic position in Côte d’Ivoire. Having provided the opportunity to take stock of what worked, what did not and why over the past 11 years, this study recommends the roles that UNDP could play in the future. The Evaluation Office sincerely hopes that this evaluation will support ongoing and future efforts by UNDP to enhance its support to the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and other national partners towards achievement of ever increasing levels of human development for the people of Côte d’Ivoire. We also hope that
the study will inform UNDP’s strategy more widely and that the recommendations from the ADR will lead to management action and implementation.

We believe that this evaluation was very timely, since it took place at the same time as the country’s recent strategic planning and formulation of the new programming cycle and innovative processes for a more secure and sustainable future.

Indran A. Naidoo
Director, Evaluation Office
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABRIS</td>
<td>Appui à la Base pour la Reconstruction/Réinstallation et Insertion Sociale (Support for Reconstruction/Re-equipment and Social Integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDCI</td>
<td>Association des Districts et Départements de Côte d'Ivoire (Association of Districts and Départments of Côte d'Ivoire)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Assessment of Development Results</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AGEPE</td>
<td>Agence d’Etudes et de Promotion de l’Emploi (Agency for the Study and Promotion of Employment)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>Association ivoirienne pour le progrès (Ivorian Association for Progress)</td>
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<td>ANADER</td>
<td>Agence Nationale d’Appui au Développement Rural (National Agency in Support of Rural Development)</td>
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<td>ANASUR</td>
<td>Agence nationale de la salubrité urbaine (Agency for Urban Cleanliness)</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>ARV</td>
<td>Anti-retroviral</td>
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<td>BCRP</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of UNDP</td>
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<td>BDP</td>
<td>Bureau for Development Policy of UNDP</td>
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<td>BOM</td>
<td>Bureau of Management of UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSS</td>
<td>Community-based seed system</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Climate change</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Crisis Exit Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFAF</td>
<td>Franc de la Communauté française d’Afrique (CFA Franc)</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>Chlorofluorocarbons</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICG</td>
<td>Centre d’Information et de Communication Gouvernementale (Centre for Government Information and Communication)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLRDP</td>
<td>Comités Locaux de Réconciliation et de Paix (Local Committees for Reconciliation and Peace)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDHCI</td>
<td>Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme en Côte d’Ivoire (National Human Rights Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Centre Nord-Ouest (central, northern, and western areas of the country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>UNDP Country Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMDDR</td>
<td>Communication in support of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOPAFAN</td>
<td>Coopérative des producteurs de la famille de Nazareth (Rice producers’ cooperative in Zouan-Hounien)</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Country Programme</td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Country Programme Document</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<td>CSCI</td>
<td>Convention de la Société Civile Ivoirienne (Civil Society Convention of Côte D'Ivoire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVDR</td>
<td>Commission Vérité, Dialogue et Réconciliation (Truth, Dialogue, and Reconciliation Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPG</td>
<td>Direction de l’Égalité et de la Promotion du Genre (Directorate of Gender Equality and the Promotion of Gender)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEX</td>
<td>Direct execution of projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIS</td>
<td>Enquête sur Les Indicateurs du SIDA (Survey of AIDS Indicators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENV</td>
<td>Enquête nationale sur le niveau de vie des ménages (Survey of Household Standard of Living)</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>UNDP Evaluation Office</td>
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<td>ESP</td>
<td>Election Support Programme</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>Essential Social Sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAFN</td>
<td>Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles (Armed Forces of the Forces Novelles)</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>UN Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISDES</td>
<td>Fonds Ivoire-Suisse de Développement Economique et Social (Ivorian-Swiss Economic and Social Development Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Forces Nouvelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross Enrolment Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFATM</td>
<td>Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gas</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Integrated Command Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFEF</td>
<td><em>Institut de Formation et d’Education Féminine</em> (Institute for Education and Training of Women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Income-generating activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td><em>Institut National de Statistique</em> (National Statistical Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPRSP</td>
<td>Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWRM</td>
<td>Integrated Water Resources Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less developed country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLIN</td>
<td>Long-lasting insecticidal mosquito nets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Ministry of the Economy and Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMPD</td>
<td><em>Ministère d’Etat, Ministère du Plan et du Développement</em> (Ministry of State for Planning and Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFFE</td>
<td><em>Ministère de la Famille, de la Femme et de l’Enfant</em> (Ministry of the Family, Women and Children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINRRI</td>
<td><em>Ministère de la réconciliation nationale et des relations avec les institutions</em> (Ministry of National Reconciliation and Institutional Relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSVG</td>
<td><em>Ministère de la Solidarité et des Victimes de Guerre</em> (Ministry of Solidarity and War Victims)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium-Term Expenditure Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYFF</td>
<td>Multi-Year Funding Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDDRC</td>
<td>National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NER</td>
<td>Net Enrolment Ratio for primary education</td>
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<td>NEX</td>
<td>National execution of projects</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NICT</td>
<td>New Information and Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
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<td>OA</td>
<td>Ouagadougou Accord</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONEP</td>
<td>Office National pour l’Eau Potable (National Office for Drinking Water)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALCP</td>
<td>Programme d’Appui à la Lutte contre la Pauvreté (Poverty Reduction Support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASU</td>
<td>Projet d’appui à la sécurité urbaine (Urban Security Support Project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAVVIOS</td>
<td>Prévention et Assistance des Victimes de violences Sexuelles (Prevention and Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIA HIV</td>
<td>Persons infected or affected by HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPCS</td>
<td>Programme Intégré de Pérennisation des Cantines Scolaires (Integrated Programme for School Canteens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Prenatal Consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNDDR/RC</td>
<td>Programme national de désarmement, démobilisation, de réinsertion et de réhabilitation communautaire (Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and for Community Rehabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNRCN</td>
<td>Politique Nationale de Réconciliation et de Cohésion Nationale (Policy for National Reconciliation and Cohesion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNRRC</td>
<td>Programme national de réinsertion et de réhabilitation communautaire (National Programme for Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMCT</td>
<td>Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBA</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-Based Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>REDD+</td>
<td>UN collaborative initiative for the Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPSFECO</td>
<td>Réseau paix et sécurité des femmes dans l’espace CEDEAO (Network of Women for Peace and Security in the ECOWAS region)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROAR</td>
<td>Results-Oriented Annual Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGFIP</td>
<td>Système Intégré de Gestion des Finances Publiques (Integrated System for Public Finance Management)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME/SMI</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises/Small and Medium Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNGRC</td>
<td>National Secretariat for Governance and Capacity-Building</td>
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<td>SPU</td>
<td>Strategic and Policy Unit</td>
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<td>TFP</td>
<td>Technical and Financial Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRAC</td>
<td>Target for Resource Assignment from the Core (UNDP's own funds)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTF</td>
<td>Thematic Trust Fund</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNGASS</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly Special Session</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>United Nations System</td>
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<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UVICOCI</td>
<td>Union des Villes et Communes, Côte d'Ivoire (Cities and Municipalities Union)</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
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<td>WDI</td>
<td>World Development Indicators Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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The Assessment of Development Results (ADR) is an independent evaluation of UNDP’s contribution to development results in the countries where it operates. The ADR in Côte d’Ivoire targeted the previous two Country Office programme cycles (2003-2007 and 2009-2013) as well as an intermediate cycle (2007-2008). Its objectives are: (i) to identify progress made towards expected outcomes in the relevant programme cycles; (ii) to analyse how UNDP in Côte d’Ivoire positioned itself, particularly within the context of the political crisis, to bring added value to the efforts made by the country in development terms; (iii) to propose conclusions and recommendations that will be used to develop UNDP’s new programming cycles and the next Country Programme.

The evaluation used various methods and approaches, such as analysis of a significant number of documents, holding meetings with individuals or groups and making field visits to projects in two large regions of the country (north and east). Security concerns made it impossible to access regions in the west of the country; nonetheless, interviews were conducted with resource personnel in Abidjan, the economic capital.

Thus nearly 200 people were interviewed during July 2012 as part of the mission to collect information from within the country. The mission concluded with a presentation of preliminary findings in Abidjan, at which around 40 people were present, including senior officials from national institutions and civil society organizations, UNDP representatives and other technical and financial partners. Additionally, during two trips to Côte d’Ivoire in March and May 2012, the Evaluation Office carried out a preparatory mission, which met with around 20 resource personnel at UNDP level, other partners, government members and figures from civil society organizations, in order to provide a framework for the evaluation. Once a quality assurance process was implemented and the report had been verified, a national validation and information-sharing workshop was held in Abidjan in February 2013.

**MAIN OBSERVATIONS**

The UNDP interventions were highly pertinent, both from a strategic perspective in relation to country benchmarks, and at an operational level in relation to the practical needs of the population and the beneficiary institutions in the field.

UNDP demonstrated reactivity and a great capacity to adapt during the entire period of crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, UNDP development interventions have been consistently aligned to the country’s priorities, which have translated into a shift of resource allocation and expenditure, new efforts to fight poverty during the 2003-2007 cycle, and crisis prevention and recovery activities, as well as governance initiatives during the 2007-2008 and 2009-2013 cycles, all in complete symbiosis with the evolving economic climate. UNDP’s successes are largely due, at the strategic level, to the support provided to the Government and governmental institutions, both at a centralized and local level, in terms of frameworks and tools for the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and development strategies, including gender results at the institutional level, despite the unstable conditions. At the operational level, UNDP directly provided the basis for a number of solutions, in particular to urgent problems, such as the support provided to the electoral process, the sustainable school meal programme, the promotion of income-generating activities and the creation of Centres for Prevention and Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence in two towns in Côte d’Ivoire.
In terms of UNDP’s more conventional thematic areas, it should be noted that:

**In the fight against poverty**, the most significant and most frequently cited results are those obtained thanks to the support of school meal programmes. Tangible outcomes have been registered in terms of food security for the population (especially children and, indirectly, parents) and in school enrolment, especially for girls, both in terms of school attendance and academic performance. This successful initiative, rightly regarded as ‘good practice’, has attracted the interest of other countries in the region.

**In terms of environmental protection**, and, more precisely, in terms of the protection of natural resources, many beneficiaries viewed UNDP interventions as insufficient and marginal, when they could, in fact, have helped solve some of the country’s structural problems such as land-tenure issues and its relationships with neighbouring countries.

**In terms of governance**, the successful organization of the 2010 presidential elections despite a difficult context, through technical support provided to the Independent Electoral Commission and the enduring dialogue between political parties and civil society, are widely attributed to UNDP. However, difficulties were encountered in terms of coordination with some donors on aspects relating to the management and accounting of funds entrusted to the electoral process, and in terms of aspects of reporting, as well as of administrative inefficiencies caused by factors beyond the control of the country office, such as changes in the dates of the elections. Moreover, UNDP was first to launch (in 2006) a process of decentralization for Côte d’Ivoire which has led to the promulgation of legislation devolving power to local authorities.

**In terms of crisis prevention and recovery**, interventions in infrastructure rehabilitation, access to basic social services, and income-generating activities were most frequently cited as having contributed to improving the living conditions and safety of communities, restoring an atmosphere of trust and strengthening social cohesion, especially in the west of the country, where a sense of abandonment was felt after humanitarian organizations left the country.

During the period assessed, the UNDP office consistently endeavoured to **promote the values of the United Nations**, even if the results have been rather mixed at times. Capacity-building, the participatory approach and gender and the Millennium Development Goals have been structurally integrated into its programme. Capacity-building has sometimes encountered issues of ownership, especially at a centralized level, mostly as a consequence of the high levels of mobility of the stakeholders during this unstable period. The gender policy implemented by the office has ensured that gender issues are considered in all programmes and projects supported by UNDP. Significant progress has been made at an institutional level, but further efforts are required in terms of the participation of women in the country’s decision-making and representation processes and bodies. Similarly, with regard to human rights, the efforts made to increase awareness have led to the creation of an entity responsible for human rights, but more needs to be done in terms of the prevention and punishment of human rights violations and access to justice.

**Meaningful results can be credited to UNDP in terms of what are known as non-project interventions**, with the most significant impact on the mobilization of resources in comparison with the operational coordination of aid. In fact, the Country Office has played an important role in terms of resource mobilization. In 2004 it was appointed as coordinator of resources (from the EU, Switzerland and Canada) by the Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). In 2007, it was appointed by the Government to organize a round table for mobilizing resources from – in particular – unconventional donors, to support the Crisis Exit and Emergency Programmes, as well as to organize the presidential elections. At the operational level, UNDP has created ripple
effects by encouraging other partners to take over pilot initiatives with a strong potential for success, such as contextualizing the MDGs in Tiassalé or the school meal programmes. However, efforts towards coordinating aid with United Nations System (UNS) agencies have been insufficient, even given that the instability of the socio-political environment was a limiting factor. Indeed, strategic coordination has essentially been non-existent and the search for synergies and partnerships in the field has had mixed results.

The lasting effect of the interventions and their outcomes has varied and has often been compromised by the crisis. All the stakeholders (members of the Government, representatives of civil society, development partners) recognized the quality of the support provided by UNDP to the political process in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as at the level of the approach used to build the capacity of national and local authorities. However, ownership of these processes has still not been achieved, particularly in the Government, because of the high level of turnover of senior officials due to the political instability. Likewise, the resurgence of conflicts, mainly in ex-CNO (central, northern, western areas of the country) zone, has threatened and sometimes even destroyed the achievements of UNDP interventions related to infrastructure rehabilitation and the resettlement of internally displaced persons.

The strategy adopted with regard to income-generating activities was not always effective and is not sustainable. Income-generating activities have been the programme’s preferred method of intervention, from an operational perspective, and were included in all UNDP thematic areas of concentration. The results are mixed and vary according to the target group; they are mostly positive for projects that focused on women and women’s groups, but less convincing with regard to the reintegration of former combatants, and also according to the sector of activity that was being promoted. Agricultural and livestock activities that require technical skills and take longer to show a return on investment, experienced more failure than activities in services. Furthermore, the absence of a holistic approach, the use of overly flexible criteria in the selection of beneficiaries and implementation partners (local NGOs) and the modest level of funding awarded to these projects, which tends to maintain a culture of dependency, sometimes compromised the sustainability of micro-projects, as did the multitude of activities in various sectors and over a scattered geographical area, which made monitoring and coordination difficult.

Programme dispersion has been a source of inefficiency for the Country Office. The choice was made to be present across the entire country and across all sectors, but with limited means this choice had only limited success. This dispersion has made it difficult to monitor and coordinate actions, and at times has generated duplication and redundancy in terms of work in the field, aside from the fact that the scope of activities remained modest compared to the scale of the needs.

The strategy for mobilizing resources, which worked during the period of crisis, is no longer suitable in its current form. During the succession of crises, the Country Office was heavily dependent on external resources mobilized from the donors present in Côte d’Ivoire, in particular the EU. However, as the country gradually moves towards a recovery phase, international aid seems to be shifting towards direct budgetary support for the Ivorian Government, thus reducing the traditional funding opportunities for the Country Office. Furthermore, the unpredictability of this type of funding hinders the effective planning of actions and also threatens their sustainability (maintenance of joint offices, having a presence throughout the country, continuing successful initiatives and reproducing them on a larger scale). It means that the Country Office focuses its efforts on mobilizing funding at the expense of its strategic advisory activities.

Difficulties were encountered in managing the delivery of the programme’s products. The administrative burdens most often mentioned relate to excessive delays in the disbursement of funds, which at times jeopardized the
The Country Office demonstrated efficiency through a strategy of creating field offices throughout the country. The outreach strategy adopted by UNDP from 2008, which involved opening local field offices throughout the country, was one of the most effective innovations, optimizing the value for money of the activities implemented. Involving local partners in the implementation and even the monitoring of projects also played a part in increasing efficiency, helping to achieve expected outcomes without generating additional costs for the organization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. Support the Ivorian Government to ensure its transition towards development. Côte d’Ivoire has entered a recovery phase and must now put in place transition mechanisms that will allow it to consolidate the results of humanitarian actions and focus on development issues. This will involve preparing to take over from UNOCI and the distribution of tasks between the various development partners.

Recommendation 2. Maintain a focus on well-defined areas of concentration. The Country Office must make the most of its strengths, focus on budget-friendly activities at the strategic level and activities at the operational level, and use its resources in a catalytic manner for pilot initiatives. By drawing on its network of expertise, and given its position as a neutral multilateral organization, it is ideally placed to initiate a national dialogue on structural problems (such as economic stimulus, job creation, reform of the administration and public bodies, restoring the authority of the State, rural land tenure reform, social cohesion and reform of the justice system). Drawing on its advocacy capacities, it should seek to generate a ripple effect among development partners in order to replicate successful initiatives on a larger scale. The office could intervene judiciously in areas/sectors that are generally ‘neglected’ but where needs are just as important, and reduce its presence in areas where new stakeholders are now involved and working on the same thematic areas, because the Country Office is not in a position to compete in terms of human and financial resources.

Recommendation 3. Pay greater attention to the management of natural resources and environmental protection. The UNDP Country Office should restore the management of natural resources and protection of the environment to the heart of its priorities and support the Ivorian Government in its reflection and its actions in terms of a greater application of, and compliance with, the regulatory framework, but also in terms of defining regional policies with neighbouring countries. This sector has been somewhat neglected during the crisis and there needs to be renewed interest in it given its intrinsic links to the other problems that the country must address such as poverty reduction, social cohesion, governance and land disputes.

Recommendation 4. Play a more proactive role in coordinating aid. At the UNS level, this means establishing a proper collaboration strategy with all the agencies, including a joint action plan in the event that another crisis should arise, in terms of programming and resource mobilization. It means going beyond the traditional proxy activities of UNDAF preparation and the participation in meetings and thematic groups by the country staff and the establishment of ad hoc partnerships. With regard to other financial partners of Côte d’Ivoire, the UNDP Country Office should be more proactive and play an intermediary role between the Government and all of its partners in order to ensure that aid is coordinated efficiently, on the one hand, and to ensure a better distribution and complementarity in the roles of each partner, on the other, within the spirit of the Paris Declaration.
Recommendation 5. Rethink the strategy for mobilizing resources. Given that official development assistance from the main donors is increasingly focused on budgetary support, UNDP risks seeing a decrease in local opportunities for resource mobilization and should therefore be prepared for this eventuality. Resource mobilization must become an integral part of planning activities, so that it becomes more predictable and less time-consuming for the programme, to the detriment of more strategic activities.

Recommendation 6. Take advantage of the transformative potential of the crisis so that UNDP can address the needs of communities, while also considering aspects of gender. UNDP must take advantage of the transformative potential of the crisis so that the services offered meet the needs of communities, while also considering the specific aspects of gender. In the medium term, this means supporting the implementation of the National Action Plan (2008-2012) for the Implementation of United National Security Council Resolution 1325 through its four components: (i) including issues of gender in development policies and programmes; (ii) ensuring the participation of both women and men in the development process; (iii) protecting women and girls from sexual violence; and (iv) strengthening the participation of women in the decision-making process.

Recommendation 7. Rethink the intervention strategy in the field. Choose a limited number of pilot interventions in the field and adopt a holistic approach, based on preliminary studies and rigorous criteria for the choice of projects, service providers and beneficiaries, to produce lasting results, focusing on quality over quantity.

Recommendation 8. Ensure greater visibility. Develop a communication policy that exceeds the framework of the institutional mandate in this area and is more focused on specific needs. The objectives will be to: (i) provide a better understanding of UNDP’s mandate and change the negative image of donors that it gives; (ii) improve the visibility of its interventions at all stages of programme implementation, not just when projects are signed, e.g. by providing a budget line dedicated to communication in each project; (iii) help the programme communicate when projects end or local offices close.

Recommendation 9. Pay more attention to ensuring that actions have lasting effects. To ensure the sustainability of achievements, systematically plan an exit and takeover strategy that can be carried out on a larger scale, by identifying alternative sources of funding from other donors or by ensuring the existence of budget lines in the Government.

Recommendation 10. Improve the functioning of operations. Continue with efforts to improve the functioning of operations within the Country Office in order to relieve the impact of bureaucracy and address the delays in disbursement of funds. To increase the motivation of UNDP field staff in joint offices, earn the trust of the staff by developing a clear contracting policy.

Recommendation for UNDP Headquarters. To enable Country Offices to be in a position to react to a crisis situation, a support mechanism should be put in place by the UNDP headquarters/regional bureau, with the objective of processing support requests from Country Offices and organizing timely and appropriate responses.
The Assessment of Development Results (ADR) is an independent evaluation carried out by the Evaluation Office (EO) of UNDP. The aim of the ADR in Côte d’Ivoire is to assess the role and effectiveness of the contribution of UNDP to the development of the country, as well as its strategic positioning during the programming cycle 2009-2013.

Since, however, Côte d’Ivoire has experienced a series of successive crises since 2002, it is relevant to extend the scope of the evaluation to previous cycles, namely the 2003-2007 programming cycle and its extension (2007-2008), since some results are the consequence of previous factors or of interventions initiated at that time.

Based on the information collected and the conclusions derived, the assessment proposes recommendations to the UNDP Country Office in terms of the strategic and operational directions. This will be used in developing the next programming cycle, which is expected to become operational in 2014.

1.1 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The performance and strategic positioning of the UNDP programme in Côte d’Ivoire were evaluated from two perspectives. First, the analysis focused on activities in the two main thematic areas the Country Office has engaged in since 2009: 1) poverty reduction, with a view to contributing to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which supports the national response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and strengthens the protection and sustainable management of the environment; and 2) governance, which, in addition to questions pertaining to democracy, includes the reinforcement of public administration and local governance, the promotion of the private sector, peacebuilding, and crisis prevention.

Performance was evaluated on the basis of the following criteria:

- Relevance of UNDP interventions and programmes to national development priorities within the context of national priorities and the perceived needs of the population;
- Effectiveness of UNDP interventions in terms of expected outcomes and achieved objectives, as well as in terms of reach to the beneficiary groups;
- Efficiency of UNDP interventions in terms of the rational use of human and financial resources in attaining the expected outcomes;
- Sustainability of results, and the capacity for their translation to a larger scale.

The ADR evaluated the strategic positioning of UNDP in Côte d’Ivoire by emphasizing its value added in particular when compared to other development partners, as well as the specific strategies it puts in place in support of development efforts in Côte d’Ivoire.

The period covered by the evaluation corresponds to a time of successive crises in the country. Consequently, the ADR did not take only the initial situation as its basis for the assessment, but also the country’s exceptional situation along with its corollary of impacts on priorities, needs, and stakeholders. Some criteria, such as the relevance of the programmes, had to be examined by taking into account the context in which the crises took place, together with other criteria such as the capacity to adapt, anticipate, and coordinate as well as the flexibility necessary in conflict or post-conflict situations. The ADR examines the
losses that would have been incurred had UNDP not been present during the period under study. This issue was almost consistently raised during interviews with the various groups of actors (representatives of the Government, UNDP, civil society, and beneficiaries).

The analysis has taken into account the organization's mandate as well as the country’s development priorities. These implied systematic analyses of the context and of the socio-economic and political priorities of UNDP in the areas of poverty reduction, governance, prevention and management of crises, without losing sight of cross-cutting issues such as human rights, results-based management, and the reinforcement of capacities.

In this post-conflict country, the evaluation also took into account the presence of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). This fact had at times represented a source of confusion for both beneficiaries and partners as to whom the assessment was being made for. Neutrality or impartiality generally represents a strong asset of UNDP. Therefore, the evaluation examined how UNDP operated as an impartial partner. Moreover, the consequences of the perception of neutrality are examined since this normally constitutes a strong asset of UNDP in general, although it was questioned in Côte d’Ivoire. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire required the setting up of a crisis unit that operated somewhat autonomously, and in parallel with the Country Office, as well as the creation of four sub-offices within the country.

Several UNDP programme assessment missions were carried out during the same time as the evaluation. The ADR takes into account the conclusions, lessons and recommendations from these assessments, updates information, and validates several facts. The assessment also uses lessons drawn from similar case studies to identify the recurring and determining elements to be taken into account in the analysis of conflict and post-conflict situations.

Gender, as a cross-cutting issue, was the subject of a thorough assessment in the evaluation. The specific tools developed by UNDP to address this question were used to determine the extent to which it is dealt with by the Country Office, and to evaluate the related outcomes.

1.2 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH


The evaluation was carried out by an independent team consisting of an evaluation expert from the New York UNDP EO, an international consultant as project leader, a second international consultant responsible for the gender theme, and two local consultants, both monitoring and evaluation experts. The first local consultant was in charge of the themes of poverty, the MDGs, and the environment, while the second was responsible for aspects relevant to governance and crisis prevention and recovery. The local consultants received support from the rest of the team as well as remote assistance by an expert with excellent knowledge and experience of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. The team was also supported by a research assistant from the UNDP EO, who collected relevant documents and data.

Two preparatory missions were carried out by the EO between 12 and 16 March 2012 and between 13 and 18 May 2012, which resulted in a preliminary report explaining, among other things, the methodology used and containing an evaluation matrix detailing the aspects of interest to be examined. This matrix is included in Annex 7.

By the time of field data collection (July 2012) the portfolio of the Côte d’Ivoire Country Office consists of 32 projects in progress and 70 to be closed. Of these 70 projects, 32 started in 2000/2001 and were thus developed outside the assessment period. They were excluded from the sample population except for three projects recommended by the programme team, namely the Poverty Reduction Support Programme (PALCP), the programme Support for Reconstruction/Re-equipment and Social Integration (ABRIS – Appui à la base pour la reconstruction/reinstallation et insertion sociale), and the programme Communication in Support of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion (COMMDDR). The project sample thus amounts to 73 projects, comprising 20 on governance, 21 on crisis prevention and recovery, and 32 on poverty reduction, including protection of the environment and fight against HIV/AIDS. Sampling was based on the following seven criteria:

- Programme coverage (projects covering the various components);
- Budgetary level;
- Geographic coverage;
- Maturity (covering both completed and active projects);
- Coverage of all cycles (projects from the 2003-2007, 2007-2008, 2009-2013 cycles);
- Execution modalities (including both nationally and directly executed projects); and
- Perceived quality (covering successful projects and projects reporting difficulties).

Accordingly, the 37 selected programmes and projects fall under the various areas covered by the Country Programme and are divided relatively equally between poverty reduction, governance, and crisis prevention and recovery. Projects specific to the environment, gender, and the fight against HIV/AIDS are also included in the sample. The budget for each project varies (13 projects run on budgets of over US$5 million, 17 lie between US$1 million and US$5 million, and seven run on under US$1 million). The selected projects are implemented throughout the country or in one or more specific area(s). Although the focus is on programmes and projects in progress, the selection also includes programmes and projects for which more than one phase has been implemented over several programming cycles. The execution modality (by the Government or by UNDP) was taken into account together with the perceived degree of success, that is, whether the programmes and projects were previously or are currently perceived as largely successful or as having limited success, i.e. having nearly or completely failed to achieve results, as assessed by the programme consultants of the Country Office and according to existing evaluation documents.

The table summarizing the sampled projects is presented in Annex 2.

The evaluation team visited projects located in:

- The Gontougo area (East zone), with Bondoukou as administrative centre;
- The Poro area (North zone), with Korhogo as administrative centre; and
- The Gbêke area (Central zone), with Bouaké as administrative centre.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>No.</th>
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<th>Number of sampled projects</th>
<th>Total number of projects</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Governance/Gender</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Crisis prevention</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Poverty/Environment/HIV</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>73</td>
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The city of Tiassalé, located between Yamoussoukro, the political capital and administrative centre of the Ram region, and Abidjan, the economic capital and administrative centre of the Lagunes area, was also visited since it was selected to be the pilot city for the national initiative for the adaptation of the MDGs to the country’s context. However, it was not possible to visit the west of the country, an area that has been particularly affected by the crisis since it broke out in 2002, as the level of safety was deemed too low. The evaluation mission compensated for this by conducting research and interviews in Abidjan with the coordinator of the United Nations joint office in Guiglo and an implementation partner based in Zouan-Houien.

Five groups of actors were interviewed as part of primary data collection (see Annex 6): (i) ministries and national institutions; (ii) local administrations; (iii) civil society organizations (CSOs); (iv) development partners; (v) agencies of the United Nations System (UNS). Three interview methods were used: (i) semi-structured individual interviews; (ii) focus groups of beneficiaries on project sites and within the Ministry of the Family, Women and Children for the analysis of the theme of gender; and (iii) a questionnaire completed by some development partners. Secondary information was drawn from various sources, namely:

- Documents relating to the UNDP methodological framework;
- Strategy documents on UNDP-UN cooperation (WCO-UNDAF, CPD-CPAP);
- Strategic documents on Côte d’Ivoire (PRSP, national reports on the MDGs, Presidential programme, sectoral NDP and related documents);
- Documents and evaluation reports on the sampled projects;
- Evaluation reports of UNDP (ROAR), evaluation of activities related to crisis prevention and recovery, and UNDP positioning;
- Other UNDP and Côte d’Ivoire documents related to development and cooperation, in particular in countries affected by crises and conflicts.

Data collection in the field took place mainly between 19 June and 12 July 2012 and continued over the following few days. Having a team with national experts based in the country made it possible to collect missing data or requiring verification. Before leaving the country, the evaluation team presented its observations and preliminary findings at a meeting organized by the Ministry of State for Planning and Development (MEMPD) on 11 July 2012. This meeting brought together about 40 participants who, in addition to evaluators, consisted of representatives of UNDP, of ministries and administrations, development partners, and agencies of the UNS.

Particular expertise (gender and crisis prevention and recovery) was called upon on an ad hoc basis to strengthen the team in accordance with identified needs.

Before being analysed and presented in this report, each information, result or preliminary conclusion was, for verification, triangulated by various sources, at times by using several data-collection methods. Moreover, consultants used analyses conducted during UNDP evaluation missions in other countries affected by crises and conflicts as well as evaluations carried out in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, one of which related to crisis prevention and recovery activities, while the other focused on the repositioning of the Country Office in a post-crisis context.

1.3 EVALUABILITY AND LIMITATIONS

The evaluability of the Côte d’Ivoire Country Programme was assessed during the preparatory mission in May 2012. The conclusion was that, in general, conditions were met regarding the availability of information, which was to be gathered through qualitative collection methods and from a variety of sources, and that the gaps and difficulties likely to be encountered did not constitute insurmountable obstacles for an evaluation such as the ADR to be carried out.
Indeed, the latter being qualitative in nature, the impact of UNDP interventions in the country was emphasized in order to measure their contributions to development rather than the activities themselves.

In terms of data, preliminary data collection carried out by the Evaluation Office in New York and in the Country Office made it possible for the evaluation team to have access to exhaustive sources of quality information for the literature review, supplemented and improved by the numerous sources of information encountered during the various interviews.

Support from the Ministry of State for Planning and Development and its regional offices greatly facilitated the organization of site visits and of appointments with the targeted interviewees over a very short period of time. This was also true of UNDP and sub-office coordinators, who showed great willingness to assist in ensuring the proper implementation of the mission. The presence of local consultants within the team, with their strong network of contacts on a national scale, was a considerable asset.

However, the level of insecurity prevailing in Côte d’Ivoire during the mission limited site visits in the west of the country and forced the team to resort to other sources of information (including the collection of as many documents as possible, conducting telephone interviews and meetings with resource persons based in that part of the country but present in the Abidjan area at the time of the mission).

The main constraint encountered by the ADR involved the unavailability of some key interviewees. As a result, interviews had to be postponed on several occasions, thus decreasing the chances of meeting other actors. In addition, the reference group was not yet fully functional due to limited communication. In fact, a briefing session planned for the start of the evaluation mission could not be held or rescheduled for reasons beyond the team’s control. The evaluation team sent out for this purpose a questionnaire, but only one answer was received. To make up for this setback, the majority of actors were met individually, with some of them deeply involved in the ADR, thus avoiding negative impacts on the evaluation.

1.4 EVALUATION REPORT

This ADR report is structured as follows: (i) an executive summary outlining the results; (ii) an introduction presenting the context and methodology of the evaluation (Chapter 1); (iii) presentation of the development context and challenges for Côte d’Ivoire (Chapter 2); (iv) a review of UNDP responses to this situation (Chapter 3); (v) a presentation of the results in terms of contributions to the development of the country (Chapter 4); (vi) an analysis of the framework for the functioning of the strategic positioning of UNDP (Chapter 5); and (vii) the main conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 6).
Chapter 2

NATIONAL CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE

The geographical and demographic characteristics of Côte d’Ivoire are presented in Tables 1 and 2.

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<thead>
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<th>Table 1. Geographic Indicators</th>
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<td>Geographical location</td>
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<td>Elevation</td>
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<td>Rivers</td>
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Map 1. Geography of Côte d’Ivoire

Source: Country Profile, Radio France Internationale, 2011

Map 2. Ethnic Composition of Côte d’Ivoire

Source: Association Générale des Ivoiriens
Chapter 2. National Context and Development Challenges

Data on the economy of the country are provided in Table 3, along with other relevant indicators, and give a general overview of Côte d'Ivoire.

### ECONOMY

Agriculture continues to be the key sector in the Ivorian economy. It is the occupation of 49 percent of the active population and accounts for 29 percent of GDP as of 2009. Traditional exports consist of cocoa (of which Côte d'Ivoire is the largest producer in the world, accounting for 40 percent of global production, and directly or indirectly providing employment for six million people), and coffee (of which Côte d'Ivoire is the world’s fourth largest producer), which remains the top cash crop. In addition to these principal products, palm oil, coconut, rubber, bananas, pineapples, cotton, and cashew nuts are substantial crops and are produced mostly for export. The industrial sector represents 26 percent of GDP and employs 14 percent of the population. It is a growing sector, especially the sub-sectors of food processing and petrochemical/para-chemical industry, which represent 17.6 percent and 20 percent of manufacturing activity respectively. The service sector represents 45 percent of GDP, and employs 26 percent of the active population (source: AfDB).

### BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRISIS

Table 4 provides a summary of major events in the history of Côte d'Ivoire since its independence in 1960.

To evaluate the role and contribution of UNDP to development outcomes in Côte d'Ivoire over the past decade, it is crucial to understand the context in which it has functioned since the coup in 1999. This event triggered a series of crises in the country, including the events of 19 September 2002, which became an armed rebellion that led to a division of the country into two parts, with two distinct administrations and two armies, a situation that held until 2010. There were numerous efforts to reach a solution and return to peace, with the involvement of regional and international communities. Several agreements were signed (Accra I, II, and III, Lomé,
### Table 3. Economic Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (2011)</td>
<td>Nominal GDP (adjusted for inflation): US$1,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP per capita (adjusted for PPP and inflation): US$1,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic structure and percentage of active population (Source: AfDB, 2009)</td>
<td>Agriculture: 29% of GDP and 49% of active population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industry: 26% of GDP and 49% of active population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Services: 45% of GDP and 26% of active population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major export products</td>
<td>Cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, oil and gas, gold, nickel, diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(export prohibited by the UN Security Council since 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major import products</td>
<td>Assorted manufactured goods, industrial equipment, petroleum and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chemical products, grains, dairy products, beverages, and tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI (% of GDP, 2010)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign debt (% of GDP)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer price inflation (2011)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military spending (% of GDP, 2008)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WDI

### Table 4. Timeline of Key Events in Côte d’Ivoire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-</td>
<td>Period of economic prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Economic downturn, due to structural causes: deteriorating terms of trade, rising oil prices, rising US$ exchange rate, high foreign debt, high production input costs, high population growth rate (3.3% in 1998), low literacy rate (28.5% of women, 40.6% of men), high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (between 10.5% and 12%). Challenges: Poverty, HIV/AIDS, poor governance, insecurity, and instability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suspension of foreign aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>October and December: Presidential and legislative elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second Republic established under President Laurent Gbagbo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>March: Municipal elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October: National Reconciliation Forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>International economic and financial cooperation resumed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August: Broad-based government established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 September: Military coup, as an armed rebellion in the north divides the country in two, creating a situation that persists until late 2010 (with the southern region under the control of the Government, while the centre, north, and west of the country (the so-called ‘CNO region’) are under the control of rebels known as the Forces Nouvelles – FN).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Late September: Emergency summit of ECOWAS heads of state results in a ceasefire on October 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September: Accra I Accord.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October: Lomé Agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continues)
Table 4. Timeline of Key Events in Côte d’Ivoire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**24 January**: Linas-Marcoussis Agreements signed, ratified by UN (Security Council Resolution 1464, 4 February) and Government of National Reconciliation established.  
Safe zone created by an ECOWAS military contingent and French ‘Operation Unicorn’ forces.  
Resolution 1528 of **27 February** creates a UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).  
**March**: Accra II Accord.  
**August**: National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (NCDDR) created, which subsequently becomes the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of ex-combatants and for Community Rehabilitation (PNDDR/RC).  
**December**: First national report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). |
| 2004 | **July**: Accra III Accord.  
**November**: Peace accord violated, period of violence. |
| 2005 | **April**: Pretoria Agreement, mediated by the African Union, calls for an end to hostilities, the disbanding of militias, and the resumption of the disarmament process.  
**October**: UN Security Council Resolution 1633.  
**30 October**: End of official term for Laurent Gbagbo, deadline for presidential elections. |
| 2007 | **February**: Solemn Declaration on Equality of Opportunity, Equity, and Gender.  
**4 March**: Ouagadougou Accord (OA) and Supplementary Agreements.  
UN Security Council Resolution 1765 extends the mandate of UNOCI and support to French forces until 15 January 2008.  
**20 March**: Establishment of a new government led by a Prime Minister from the FN.  
PNDDR/RC spun off into two entities: the Integrated Command Centre (ICC), responsible for military matters, and the National Programme for Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation (PNRRC), responsible for civilian matters.  
**July**: National Crisis Exit and Reconciliation Programme. Two transitional governments.  
**18 July**: Donor round table. |
| 2008 | **April**: Code of conduct adopted by all political groups.  
**September**: Process authenticating 2,000 electoral rolls and registering the population begins.  
**22 December**: National Reunification Agreement.  
Relatively stable security environment; public administration officials return to duties, including in CNO region. **Challenges**: Combating a sense of scepticism with regard to the administration; strengthening human resources; rehabilitating basic infrastructure; identifying key individuals; rural property; disarmament; post-electoral risks. |
| 2009 | Redeployment of administration and restoration of government authority in the CNO region.  
**March**: The process begins for the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative.  
**April**: National Policy on Equal Opportunities, Equity, and Gender adopted.  
Decision point for the IMF/WB HIPC initiative to be reached. |
| 2010 | Second national report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) published.  
National Strategy to Combat Gender-based Violence; revised Family and Personal Code in progress.  
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) established; it is subsequently dissolved and reformed in the first quarter of 2011.  
**31 October**: First round of presidential elections.  
| 2011 | **11 April**: Laurent Gbagbo arrested.  
**21 May**: Alassane Ouattara sworn in.  
**June**: New government of reunited nation formed.  
**11 December**: Legislative elections.  
Linas-Marcoussis, Pretoria), and several United Nations resolutions were passed, including resolution 1528 of March 2004, which founded UNOCI. However, no noteworthy progress towards peace was achieved, and preparations for presidential elections in 2005 did not move forward, leading to a return to hostilities by the belligerent parties. In institutional and administrative terms, the crisis led to impeded functioning and poor performance in public services, increased corruption and fraud, and the establishment of poor governance practices.

Economically, the crisis had a negative effect on growth. Many businesses moved away from Côte d'Ivoire, aggravating unemployment and poverty. The decline in economic activity also had an impact on public finances and national debt. Investment levels fell. In social and human terms, the crisis fractured Ivorian society and brought the authority of the State into question. It also led to substantial loss of human life, a culture of bribe-seeking, and large-scale population displacement, estimated at over 1.7 million people.

The educational system was disrupted, particularly in the north, which had a negative impact on already low enrolment rates. The health situation and healthcare infrastructure deteriorated.

In late 2006, a direct dialogue facilitated by the President of Burkina Faso, then President of ECOWAS, eventually brought about an agreement between the political groups. This mediation resulted in the signing of the Ouagadougou Accord (OA) on 4 March 2007. The OA provided for the creation of a government of national reconciliation and the adoption of a roadmap based on three points: 1) a general identification of populations; 2) an electoral process; and 3) defence and security forces. The groundwork was laid for a response to the two key questions behind the conflict: Ivorian identity and citizenship, and the legitimacy of power. However, ending the crisis would not merely require that credible elections be held: it would also need to involve meaningful progress in the disarmament process and genuine reunification of the government.

A Crisis Exit Programme (CEP) that included an urgent component was laid out, and the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programme was restarted. The security environment began to gradually improve, civil servants began to return to duty throughout the country, including in the former CNO regions, and infrastructure gradually began to be restored. However, it proved difficult to maintain adherence to the commitments made in Ouagadougou. The process of identifying and registering voters, which began in September 2008, was administered by a sluggish and poorly organized apparatus according to some sources, without a clear financial plan or alternatives in case of delays in the pledged funding. Delays and poor organization led to a tense atmosphere between the various entities responsible for the process. Ultimately, the registration of slightly over six million Ivorian voters (out of an estimated 8.6 million) was only completed on 30 June 2009. A comparison of the electoral register with historic voter rolls from 2000, which was conducted to verify the nationality of individuals not listed on the roll, then provided feed for further controversy.

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2 UNFPA, January 2007: information obtained from a report on living conditions of IDPs and host families in Government-controlled areas.

3 International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing No. 62, 2 July 2009. However, according to the UNOCI Division of Electoral Assistance report ‘Identifying General Population and Registration of Voters’, the preparation of elections to exit the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire remains a success story on the pilot model applied to all stages and involving all stakeholders and national bodies concerned, in terms of the accuracy of the procedure, of the rigour of the legal framework, and finally about the reliability of the national directory of individuals and electoral lists originating from the process which was accepted by all.

4 The Ministry of Finance estimated the borrowing of electoral operations to be 220 billion FCFA in July 2008. This package should also finance the civil service, and the national reintegration, rehabilitation and emergency programmes. Of this total budget, the Government should take 145 billion FCFA and the international community finance the rest. The EU, which pledged US$ 34 million, has been the largest donor to the process.
Meanwhile, the disarmament and rehabilitation processes stagnated. The disarmament of combatants was confined to a few highly publicized operations carried out to destroy light weapons, and both sides kept significant forces in place and continued to bring weapons into Côte d’Ivoire in violation of a UN arms embargo – a clear sign that mutual trust had not been re-established. Three options were offered to former combatants: they could choose to re-join the new army that would originate from the reunification of the two former belligerent forces (5,000 former combatants), opt for professional reintegration under the National Programme for Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation (PNRRC), which aimed to provide jobs for demobilized combatants through local development projects (income-generating activities), or join a national civilian service designed to strengthen the spirit of citizenship of the young by means of training/awareness building and their participation in community projects. However, due to lack of financing, these programmes, which had begun half-heartedly in any case, were discontinued in 2009. The redeployment of the administration, which had been defined as a top priority under the terms of the OA, was only partially carried out. This was largely due to resistance on the part of former regional commanders in the area controlled by the northern Forces Nouvelles (FN), several section commanders, autonomous commanders who failed to obey the orders of their superiors, and sometimes reticence on the part of the population, which had become accustomed to no longer paying taxes. The Government did not function normally throughout this period, with a presidency more preoccupied with political intrigue and preparation for elections than with economic and social questions. At the end of 2009, Côte d’Ivoire found itself once again in a situation that could be described as ‘neither war nor peace’, characterized by an outwardly peaceful environment under an OA that was poorly implemented and whose survival was in danger.

After repeated initiatives, which included the dissolution and reconstitution of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), presidential elections were ultimately held, with a first round on 31 October 2010 and a second round on 28 November 2010. The results were contested by one of the candidates, leading to a post-electoral crisis. A period of intense violence ensued around Abidjan and particularly in the southwest of the country, along the border with Liberia, which resulted in the massive displacement of populations from affected regions to other parts of Côte d’Ivoire and to Abidjan, and a flood of refugees into bordering countries. This instability culminated in the arrest of former President Gbagbo in April 2011 and the inauguration of President Alassane Ouattara the following month, followed by relatively smooth legislative elections in December 2011. However, these elections were marked by low turnout, clearly highlighting the considerable effort still needed to reconcile Ivorians with politics and democratic institutions.

Despite overall improvement, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire remains fragile and unstable, and many challenges remain to be confronted at a time when the country must set out on a transition to a recovery process following the humanitarian phase. Among its highest priorities, the Government needs to confront the weak and unbalanced state of its security apparatus and restore its two-tiered justice system to working order. In terms of security, the priority is to integrate several thousand FN combatants into the new army. UNOCI continues to fill the security void in Abidjan and the west of the country pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and SCR/RES/2000 (27/07/2011). Significant quantities of small arms remain in circulation and threaten not only Côte d’Ivoire but also neighbouring Liberia and Ghana as well as all members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the areas of reconciliation and justice, the issue of impunity for those responsible for violating human rights remains a concern in Côte d’Ivoire, and the recently founded Truth, Dialogue, and Reconciliation Commission (CVDR) does not genuinely adhere to international standards for democracy and impartiality. Its president, former
Prime Minister Banny, is not viewed as a neutral party by either citizens or international observers.

Fundamental institutional reforms should be carried out as soon as possible, including, among others: (i) a redrafting of the Constitution (with a redefinition of presidential powers and the promotion of sound political practices); (ii) a re-examination of the property law and its application; (iii) the inception of a national dialogue about the reforms needed to consolidate peace; (iv) the question of truth and justice as it relates to abuses committed during the crisis; (v) the issue of corruption and governance; (vi) the relationship of Côte d’Ivoire with its immediate neighbours and the wider West African region; and (vii) the management of the country’s historical heritage in terms of immigration and intermarriage.

### 2.2 ATTAINING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

This progress report is based on the second national report on the MDGs for Côte d’Ivoire, published in 2010. Table 5 lists the goals set for Côte d’Ivoire on each indicator along with their status as of 2008, the year for which the most statistical information is available.

#### POVERTY REDUCTION

Worsening poverty in Côte d’Ivoire, which affects rural areas more severely, has resulted in an increase in the percentage of the population living under the national poverty line, from 38.4 percent in 2002 to 48.9 percent in 2008. The northern region is most affected, having nearly four out of five poor people in 2008. This region

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**Table 5. MDG Targets for 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of population living below the national poverty line</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Net school enrolment, boys</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Net school enrolment, girls</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gender Parity Index</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of seats held in Parliament by women</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mortality rate for children under 5</td>
<td>125/1,000</td>
<td>50/1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG 5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maternal mortality rate</td>
<td>543/100,000</td>
<td>150/100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG 6</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prevalence of HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>Under 2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG 7</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of forested area</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of population with access to drinking water</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of population with access to improved sanitation</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG 8</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of official development assistance to social services</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>20%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Level of commerce (with developed and less developed countries)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Government of Côte d’Ivoire*

is followed by the western region (63.2 percent), centre-west (62.9 percent), north-west (57.9 percent), east-central (57 percent) and north-east (54.7 percent)\(^5\). The west and north-east, the two areas that were poorer in 2002, registered in 2008 a slight decrease due to establishment of economic and humanitarian corridors.

The political and military crisis the country has undergone in the past decade brought about utter disarray in social and economic structures, including the system of agricultural production, and therefore threatens food security of populations. The armed conflict of September 2002 highlighted the food problems in the Central, Northern and Western (CNO) regions. Indeed, as shown by the results of the survey conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2006, 566,500 people of these regions have been identified as being in a situation of food insecurity (i.e. 9 percent of rural households) and 1,109,600 people (20 percent of rural households) in high risk of food insecurity. The Moyen Cavally region had the highest proportion of food-insecure households (43 percent). The nutritional situation was worrisome in the north, with an overall prevalence of acute malnutrition of 17.5 percent, four percent with a severe form and an 80.7 percent prevalence of anaemia among children aged 6 to 59 months\(^6\).

It has also resulted in the massive internal displacement of populations and emigration to neighbouring countries. The global financial crisis has also had a negative impact, affecting several major export sectors.\(^7\) In terms of employment, a negative trend in the ratio of jobs to people of working age\(^8\) has resulted in the closure of many large businesses and headquarters of international institutions, low levels of investment, and continuing high population growth.

![Figure 1. Percentage of Population Living Below the National Poverty Line](image-url)


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\(^7\) This includes the export of timber, which has suffered as a result of the international real estate crisis, rubber, for which demand has fallen due to the difficulties encountered by the automotive industry in Europe and the United States, and oil, for which prices have fallen on international markets.

\(^8\) Over half of the working-age population is employed, and the informal sector accounts for 90 percent of employment.
In 2000, Côte d’Ivoire began the process of developing a poverty reduction strategy, which led to the adoption of an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) in 2002. However, its implementation was interrupted by the outbreak of the crisis and the suspension of international aid that same year. The Ouagadougou Accord of 2007 restarted that process. The adoption of a final PRSP in 2009 and the satisfactory introduction of an economic and financial programme allowed the country to reach the decision point for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and to benefit from a significant reduction in its debt. To reach its poverty MDG of 16 percent by 2015, the Ivorian Government projected a need for an annual growth rate of 7 percent over the period (2009–2015). However, the situation deteriorated again in 2010 due to the post-electoral crisis, which likely compromised fresh initiatives. In the area of employment, the Government developed a National Employment Development Plan (2006–2009), focusing on self-employment, but this was never implemented due to the turbulent political environment. Although several initiatives for the economic integration of young people have also been launched, the unemployment situation has continued to deteriorate. In the light of observed trends, it seems unlikely that Côte d’Ivoire will achieve MDG 1 in 2015 despite investing considerable effort to this end.

**UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION**

The net enrolment rate showed little upward variation until 2008. It showed a slight decline from 56.9 percent in 2000 to 56.1 percent in 2008, and it has increased slightly since 2009, now standing at 61 percent. An analysis in the second national report on the MDGs notes a disparity in favour of boys and students from higher income groups, with significant regional variation, the lowest enrolment rates being found in the north and north-west.

In general, the series of crises Côte d’Ivoire has undergone has affected the situation in the education sector, with the closure or destruction of schools in the former CNO region, insufficient numbers of teachers, weak levels of investment (11.5 percent of the overall government budget in 2009, well below the 20 percent recommended by the 20/20 Initiative), and a rate of increase in

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9 The 20/20 Initiative recommends that developing countries dedicate 20 percent of their public spending to essential social sectors (ESS), especially education, health, drinking water and sanitation, and that donor countries dedicate 20 percent of ODA to this priority.
enrolment rates that remains too low if the target of 100 percent enrolment in primary education for both girls and boys is to be reached by 2015.

**GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN**

Significant institutional benefits should be highlighted. There has now been a Directorate of Gender Equality and the Promotion of Gender (DEPG – Direction de l’Egalité et de la Promotion du Genre) within the Ministry of the Family, Women and Children (MFFE) since 2006, which aims to ensure respect for equality between men and women, coordinate gender-related actions, and combat gender-related violence nationwide. Gender units have also been created within the 14 technical ministries. Policies and reference documents have been created to ensure that gender is taken into account in all sectors. These include the National Action Plan for Enacting United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), passed in 2008, and the National Policy on Equal Opportunities, Equity, and Gender, adopted by the Cabinet in April 2009. However, in practice, despite manifest political will, progress has not been as significant as expected due to persistent cultural resistance, illiteracy, and inadequate enrolment in school and training programmes, which primarily affects women, as well as the series of crises Côte d’Ivoire has suffered. The proportion of women on legislative bodies is just 8.9 percent, putting Côte d’Ivoire in 108th place out of a total of 137 countries. Only 26.8 percent of public sector employees were women in 2010, of whom only 12.2 percent held senior positions. Moreover, between 2005 and 2010, the number of women in government fell from 16.6 percent to 7.5 percent, with only 22.3 percent of these in non-agricultural sectors.

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10 The National Development Plan for the Education and Training Sector for the period 1998-2010 was revised in 2007, placing emphasis on access to education for girls and a reduction in observed inequalities between women and men, including young girls. Law No. 95-696 on schooling, which reaffirms the right to education and equal treatment for all in preschool and primary and early secondary education, was also passed on 7 September 1995.
often-unreliable provision of vaccines, poor-quality vaccine administration techniques employed by health care workers, and a lack of response to vaccination campaigns (resulting from prejudice or lack of information) by the population.

**IMPROVEMENT IN MATERNAL HEALTH**

Thanks especially to humanitarian programmes, the maternal mortality rate fell from 580 per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 470 in 2008, according to the World Development Indicators (WDI) database, while according to government sources, the number is 543 deaths per 100,000 births. However, it remains a concern. The proportion of births assisted by trained personnel rose from 51.9 percent to 56.8 percent between 2000 and 2008, and the rate of use of prenatal visits held at above 85 percent in the 2000s.

However, the unavailability and inaccessibility to the population of maternal health care services and the poor quality of services on offer are obstacles to the attainment of the MDGs by 2015, as is the low percentage of financing devoted to reproductive health in the health budget, which is estimated at less than 1 percent.  

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11 According to the 2001 Abuja Summit commitments, 5 percent of the health budget should be devoted to reproductive health.
THE FIGHT AGAINST HIV/AIDS, MALARIA, AND OTHER DISEASES

The international funds mobilized allowed Côte d’Ivoire to improve its HIV/AIDS national response mechanism and to achieve a generally satisfactory improvement on the relevant indicators since 2000. Indeed, the estimated prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the population fell from 6.9 percent in 2000 to 3.7 percent in 2008, according to data from the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) report. The percentage of pregnant women...
visiting prenatal clinics also fell, dropping to 4.5 percent in 2008 albeit after rising from 9.5 percent in 2000 to 9.7 percent in 2002. By contrast, the proportion of the population with an advanced stage of HIV infection and with access to antiretroviral treatment almost doubled from 2006 to 2009, rising from 21.3 percent in 2006 to 31.6 percent in 2008 and to 41.2 percent in 2009. However, the greater poverty and vulnerability resulting from the various crises, including the post-electoral crisis, have promoted risky behaviour in certain sectors of the population, especially the young, leading to the spread of HIV, particularly because they lack knowledge about the infection. Indeed, the 2005 survey of AIDS indicators (EIS) estimated that only 22 percent of young people between the ages of 15 and 24 had accurate and complete information on HIV/AIDS.

The incidence of malaria remained high between 2000 and 2008, hovering around 8 percent, with a slight drop between 2002 and 2003. In the early 2000s, hospital fatalities rose to 4.6 percent then stabilized at around 4.2 percent. From 2006 to 2008, the use of long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLIN) rose significantly (from 3 percent to 14.8 percent), thanks to public information campaigns designed to change the population's behaviour and a steady supply of LLINs for the most vulnerable populations, namely children under 5 and pregnant women, with about 1.5 million LLINs distributed free of charge during this period.

Côte d’Ivoire is widely affected by tuberculosis, with an estimated prevalence of 582 cases per 100,000 and an incidence of 420 new cases per 100,000, including all forms of the disease, in 2007 according to the World Health Organization (WHO). This is due to several factors including impoverishment, overcrowding, and HIV infection. The 55 percent screening rate for pulmonary tuberculosis is significantly lower than the 70 percent standard set by the WHO.

*SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES*

Although available statistics on forest cover are neither recent nor reliable, they do indicate that the area occupied by the forests decreased from 16 million hectares in 1900 to 4 million or even less than 3 million hectares today, corresponding to a loss of more than 75 percent, according to available sources (the 2010 MDG National Report). Despite a forestry plan prepared for the period 1988-2015 and establishing the Forestry Development Corporation (SODEFOR), the Government’s efforts for a more effective management and sustainable forest did not manage to halt this trend to reduce forest areas: wood today remains the main source of energy for rural households and households that use low energy efficiency methods of production/consumption. Reforestation activities are, especially in the Savannah region, hampered by the harsh climate and frequent bushfires. The target of 20 percent set by the Government within the framework of MDG 7, which corresponds to 6.45 million hectares, will be hard to reach by 2015. Forests, national parks and reserves located primarily in areas ex-CNO remain inaccessible due to insecurity there. In addition, the poor forestry protection mechanisms of the organizations responsible, which are ill-equipped for oversight, cannot prevent the illegal occupation of protected forests by settlers or farmers. This fact is at the root of many conflicts for land deforested areas, and sometimes feelings of animosity towards foreigners.

In the absence of recent data, what is available shows that the rise in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2000 (252,717.15 Gg CO₂-eq) compared to 1990 (48,195.31 Gg CO₂-eq) is due to the firing-up of two power plants (Azito and Ciprel), increased use of farming fertilizers, and more cars in large cities. Industries in Abidjan emit 70 tons daily of sulphur dioxide, 21 tons of nitrogen oxide and 12 tons of toxic dust\textsuperscript{12}. However, Côte d’Ivoire is in compliance with its obligations from the Montreal Protocol on
ozone layer depleting substances; the goal of eliminating methyl bromides and halons by 2015 was achieved in 2004 and chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) reduced by 87 percent in 2010, with their elimination by 2015 looking achievable.

Water resources remain generally adequate, although a regional disparity is noticeable. Moreover, water resources are threatened by pollution and the general degradation of the soil as a result of human activity. Abidjan produces about 150 million m³ of groundwater per year, enough to feed 70 percent of people, but it will reach its limits in 2012. In addition, traces of pollution and lower levels have already been observed. To achieve the effective management of resources, the government of Côte d’Ivoire has implemented an institutional and regulatory framework for Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), in compliance with the Water Code. The human water consumption sector in Côte d’Ivoire has recorded good results, giving 80 percent of the population sustainable access to improved sources of water in 2010, according to the WDI. This change has been made possible by projects aimed at rehabilitating and strengthening the provision of drinking water that have been initiated in cooperation with development partners. However, the high cost of connections in urban areas and of maintenance of works in rural areas is a limiting factor. Reaching the target of 82.5 percent by 2015 will depend on a permanent return to socio-political stability and the mobilization of sufficient resources to finance the necessary investment.

The protected land area has hardly changed since 1990, and in 2010 represented 19 percent of the national territory. As for protected marine areas, there are none in Côte d’Ivoire. Although recent data are not available, the reality on the ground shows that the disappearance of vegetable, animal, and water species is increasing year on year. This is essentially due to the destruction of natural habitats (through deforestation, bush fires etc.), poaching, pollution, and the effects of the socio-political crises. Strong measures are needed to reverse this trend. The Government is committed to increasing the proportion of protected areas to conserve biodiversity by 10 percent in 2008 to 14 percent in 2013 and 20 percent in 201513.

The environment is strongly affected by urbanization: there are now 127 cities of which 8 have more than 100,000 inhabitants. Abidjan concentrates alone more than 44 percent of the urban population. Urbanization is growing rapidly, with rates from 15 percent in 1960 to 48 percent in 2007. This phenomenon is explained by rural exodus and immigration from neighbouring countries. Given this, housing needs have become important: over 70 percent of households did not have access to housing in 2002. Despite efforts to reduce this deficit, demand outstripped supply. Even when housing exists, access is restrictive because of the high cost of acquisition and rents. In 2008, 35.8 percent of the population had no access to latrines. The phenomenon of precarious and informal settlements is growing in major cities. The urban and rural environments are highly degraded by the combined effects of the economic crisis, the war and displacements. The wastewater and rainwater drainage have been placed alongside the priorities in the national investment programmes. At the household level, in urban areas, only 40 percent have access to adequate sanitation. As a result, certain diseases are resurfacing.

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT

Until 2007, the trend was for the proportion of official development assistance (ODA) devoted to basic social services to be relatively small. It was only after the signing of the Ouagadougou Accord in March 2007 that it bounced back to 50 percent in 2008 and 2009.14 Until end of the 1990s, the bulk of ODA funds for to basic social sectors went to education. Since 2000 most of this assistance has gone to the drinking water sector.

14 The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development (1995) recommends a threshold of 20 percent.
The number of products from Côte d’Ivoire on international markets has been increasing since 1992. This is due to the diversification of exports and to a steady increase in exports to developed countries, even during the socio-political crises. The same trend can be seen for imports, albeit at reduced levels, and with a tailing off from 2002 as a result of the emergence of conflict.

Figure 7. Proportion of ODA Devoted to Basic Social Services (%)

Source: MEF

Figure 8. Level of Trade (Developed and Less Developed Countries) (in US$ millions)

Source: MEF
[Graph taken from 2010 MDGs national report.]
As for trade relations with less developed countries, exports are also on a steady rise. Indeed, Côte d’Ivoire is the main exporter in the subregion. Meanwhile, imports have increased, albeit more slowly. However, a loss of competitiveness by traditional basic products points to an urgent need for revitalization of trade.

### 2.3 CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

#### THE ECONOMIC SECTOR

In 2011, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and per year at purchasing power parity (PPP) was estimated by the World Bank to be US$1,803 at current value. The annual real GDP growth rate from 2000 to 2011 saw significantly greater fluctuations, with negative values following each major crisis experienced by the country (1999 coup, 2002 military-political crisis, 2010 post-electoral crisis) and a return to positive values during attempts at a return to peace, especially after the signing of the OA in 2007. Further, GDP growth was revitalized thanks to massive ODA provided by Côte d’Ivoire’s development partners, particularly in support of the electoral process. However, the pace of economic growth has remained inadequate in view of demographic growth of over 2 percent per year over the period.

Côte d’Ivoire’s economy faces a number of structural problems, including lack of investment, which has hovered around 10 percent since the 1980s (whereas it was 20 percent during the previous 20 years of prosperity), as a result of the country’s high level of indebtedness. However, reaching the completion point of the HIPC Initiative has enabled Côte d’Ivoire to cancel a large part of its outstanding debt and to have access to additional financing with which to increase its public investment capacity. In general terms, however, the economy suffers from a lack of competitiveness, which is linked to low productivity, especially in the agricultural sector, the high cost of production inputs, especially electrical power for industrial use, and inadequate exploitation of the country’s oil, mineral, and geological potential.

The primary sector suffers from insufficiently intensified agriculture, which leads to an increasing demand for cultivable land, which has exacerbated the problem of deforestation, and persistence of traditional farming practices. Inadequate access by farmers to improved seed, fertilizers, irrigation and modern mechanization techniques, and very low processing rates for agricultural products explains the sector’s low productivity. In addition, the sector is affected by a massive rural exodus. For its part, the secondary sector, which has the potential to

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**Figure 9. Change in Growth Rates (Real GDP and Population)**

![Graph showing change in growth rates for real GDP and population from 2000 to 2011.](source: WDI)
be a source of growth, is being impeded by an unfavourable business environment, with a complex tax regulatory system, high production costs, corruption, and racketeering. Its activities have also been weakened by the unstable socio-political situation and a state of insecurity during the crises. The tertiary sector remains dominated by informal activities, especially in land transportation and trade. In particular, difficulties are linked to degradation or inadequacy of road and transport infrastructure and to a low rate of bank use. This results in an increase in the money supply, leading to high inflation. The country’s financial system and the management of its public finances are dysfunctional.

The main challenges for the agricultural sector are linked to problems of access to and preservation of land, despite the adoption of a law on rural land tenure, and to the issue of financing. Meanwhile, in the industrial sector, the challenge is to increase the capacity for creating wealth and employment in the private sector in an environment that offers few incentives for doing business or growing enterprises. The fight against tax fraud, the restructuring of public enterprises, and the strengthening of government capacities are the main challenges faced by the public finance sector. As for the trade sector, it must overcome constraints linked to the liberalization and opening up of markets to regional and international competition, including persistent fraud and the reduced competitiveness of local products.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Côte d’Ivoire is classified among the group of countries with low human development. According to the UNDP Human Development Report (HDR), the country’s Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.4 in 2010, ranking it 170th out of 187 countries, despite the formulation of a national poverty reduction strategy which was initiated as far back as 2001 and the integration of the MDGs into this strategy in 2004 in compliance with the country’s international commitments. This strategic framework, which has undergone many reviews, had the ambition of achieving a number of objectives by 2015. However, this was undermined by the country’s successive military and political crises. As indicated earlier, most of the indicators remained stagnant or even regressed, especially the poverty indicator, which deteriorated significantly, soaring from 10 percent in 1985 to 48.9 percent in 2008, thereby slowing down HDI growth and keeping it at among the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa and among the countries with lower human development.
Chapter 2. National Context and Development Challenges

The decentralization process is also fraught with difficulties as a result of the incomplete transfer of authority, the inability of the State to meet its financial, material, and human commitments, and inadequate statistical data, which hinders the development of measurable diagnostics. Moreover, local stakeholders (especially the young, women, and the media) contribute only marginally to the development process. Finally, local elected officials must be sensitized to the need to be accountable, and local government authorities must have the capacity to manage rural land-tenure issues.

On the whole, years of crises have weakened Côte d’Ivoire and isolated it from the international community. In addition, the absence of a trade strategy has prevented the country from benefiting fully from the integration of the regional ECOWAS market.

The environment has become increasingly fragile as a result of the depletion of the forest cover caused by intense human activity. Classified forests and national reserves in the CNO region, and neighbouring countries are being subjected to bush fires, destructive exploitation for the production of firewood and charcoal, and to the inappropriate declassification of protected areas and illegal infiltration into these. In addition to the environmental problems it creates, deforestation contributes to land tenure-related conflicts in rural areas, a process that constitutes one of the structural causes of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire and sometimes leads to a resurgence of animosity towards foreigners who come from neighbouring countries to supply charcoal. The air and ecosystems are being severely affected by pollution and a lack of appropriate systems for the adequate treatment of pollutants from domestic, agricultural,

Politics, Institutions, and Governance

Poor governance has been a recurrent issue in Côte d’Ivoire, a country that has experienced severe political instability since 1999 when the first coup occurred, followed by a period of civil war, including several escalations. Today, in the wake of the inauguration of a new president and the appointment of a new Government, the challenges in terms of governance are numerous. Priorities include working towards national reconciliation, restoring the security of individuals and property, restoring the authority of the State, making decentralization a reality, and implementing reforms in the security forces (army and police).

At present, the national defence and security system is plagued with structural problems that worsened the socio-political instability as well as the insecurity of individuals and property across the country. The judicial system remains inefficient and is marked by a lack of institutional autonomy, slow procedures, and uneven infrastructure distribution. Consequently, citizens have only limited access to judicial services as well as inadequate protection, especially for the most vulnerable. The credibility of the judicial and penal system has also eroded as a result of poor conditions in prisons, massive violation of human rights, and persistent impunity.

Clearly, some progress has been made in terms of institutional\textsuperscript{15}, economic and financial\textsuperscript{16} governance. Yet the fact remains that Côte d’Ivoire is facing major problems resulting from its legal and institutional framework, which is not conducive to development of the economic sectors, difficulties in enforcing existing laws, poor governance in public enterprises, and the multiplicity of regulatory bodies and the lack of coordination among them.

\textsuperscript{15} Including establishing institutions such as the National Secretariat for Governance and Capacity Building, the Independent Electoral Commission, the National Commission on Human Rights in Côte d’Ivoire, the Centre for Information and Government Communication.

\textsuperscript{16} Ratification of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which aims to ensure transparency in managing mining and energy, and introduction of the Integrated Public Finance Management System.
industrial, mining, and maritime activities. The sanitation sector has seen no improvement over the years. Moreover, the poor management of rainwater often leads to floods and landslides. The drinking water supply infrastructure has deteriorated significantly, and the sector is adversely affected by inadequate regulations and reduced capacities of economic operators in this area. The housing sector is marked by a housing shortage and poor living conditions in general.

The lack of tangible results in the sustainable management of natural resources and protection of the environment is due to the low level of investment and deficiencies in the institutional and regulatory framework for this sector. Moreover, the sector has been particularly affected by the crisis as a result of the Government’s difficulties to manage and protect these resources during that period as well as their destructive use by, on the one hand, the population (for its livelihood) and, on the other, by warring factions, to finance their war effort.

CRISIS PREVENTION AND THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

The degradation of the social and political climate as well as of social cohesion during the last decade, which was marked by conflicts between various communities, was caused by several factors, including insufficient economic growth in the face of rampant population growth, poor land management, the exclusion and marginalization of some groups, which was magnified by the media, and attempts at political and military destabilization. Beyond the humanitarian phase, there is the need for Côte d’Ivoire to initiate a recovery and development programme based on investment, which will put the country on the path to sustainable growth and generate wealth and employment and thereby reduce poverty.

Meanwhile, other potential conflict triggers and sources of destabilization must be addressed:

- Cross-border problems associated with the influx of Ivorian refugees into neighbouring countries and mercenaries into Côte d’Ivoire from Liberia due to lack of harmonized national/regional policies on small-arms proliferation and cross-border management;
- The issue of internally displaced persons, who are civilians who continue to bear the brunt of the conflicts and tend to seek refuge in major cities, including Abidjan;
- The issue of management and access to natural resources, especially water and oil, which are also potential conflict triggers (land ownership issues, rivalries over land-use between farmers and cattle breeders, diversion of resources to finance the war effort or rebellions, infiltration by foreign populations, etc.);
- The absence of clear policies on conflict prevention in countries of the region;
- Unresolved issues of impunity, human rights violations and determining nationality.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Côte d’Ivoire reached the decision point under the HIPC Initiative in 2009, and as a result benefited twice from debt relief (amounting to CFAF 538 billion and CFAF 287 billion in 2009 and 2010 respectively) and other ODA. Over the
period (2000-2009), assistance came mainly from
the OECD Development Assistance Committee
(DAC), and accounted for 76 percent of the
cumulative total.

However, aid delivery over the same period
was uneven, with highly volatile annual figures
fluctuating in line with the social and political
situation in the country. These amounts were
particularly high following the signing of the
various peace agreements and very low in times
of crises, particularly as a result of the suspension
of bilateral funding.

During the last decade (2000-2010), the share of
ODA in the country’s GDP reached its peak, or
almost 10 percent, at two key times: in 2002, with
the resumption of international economic and
financial cooperation following initial attempts
to restore peace, and in 2009, during the effective
launch of the electoral process soon after the
reunification agreement and adoption of a Code
of Good Conduct, which paved the way for the
presidential elections of 2010.

The new government of President Alassane
Ouattara has set for itself the objective of raising
ODA in order to enable the country to make productive investments. The preparation of
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)
and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF) has also helped to build capacity in
resource mobilization.

It is against this background that UNDP and
the United Nations, as well as other develop-
ment partners have intervened to help the coun-
try address the challenges it faces. The analysis of
this intervention, especially as regards UNDP, is
the main focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 3

UNDP RESPONSES AND STRATEGIES

This chapter describes how UNDP, while building on the strategies of the United Nations through the common framework of UNDAF, develops responses to the development challenges identified in the previous chapter. In particular, it focuses on how the Country Office deals with the major problems that arise in Côte d’Ivoire while adapting to changing conditions. It also casts light on the issues and areas of intervention evaluated in Chapter 4.

Since 1993, when the two parties signed the basic cooperation agreement, UNDP has been a key partner of Côte d’Ivoire. Programming documents have been developed over a five-year period (2003-2007 and 2009-2013), in partnership with stakeholders (government representatives, bilateral and multilateral partners, private sector and civil society) and in consultation with the country team. These documents are aligned with national priorities and those of the UNS cooperation framework, which is the result of a participatory planning exercise based on a previous joint country assessment, and they have taken into account the results of the evaluations of the previous cycle. The Country Programme (2003-2007) has been extended in the form of an action plan covering the period 2007-2008 in order to take into account changing needs in a context of crisis and to revise this action plan accordingly. Similarly, the focus of the current Country Programme shifted in late 2011, and the parties concerned will officially ratify the programme this year. In addition to its own resources, UNDP manages funds from various sources (with contributions from the Côte d’Ivoire Government, bilateral and multilateral donors, and other agencies or UNS programmes). In addition, at the request of the Government and its partners, two funding mechanisms (basket funds) have been established, one used to coordinate the resources for the presidential election, and the other to finance the country’s Crisis Exit Programme.

3.1 INTERVENTION STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME CYCLES

COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2003-2007)

Although the UNDAF of the UNS for the period 2003-2007 (which was based on the Common Country Assessment conducted in 2002) was neither formally validated nor used by all UNS agencies, it nevertheless served as a background document for UNDP in the preparation of its country programme for the same period.

The UNDAF is structured around five strategic axes:

i. Poverty reduction;
ii. Governance and human rights;
iii. The fight against HIV/AIDS;
iv. Globalization and subregional integration; and
v. Peace and security.


The programme’s main purpose was to promote sustainable human development, poverty reduction, better living conditions and health, education and knowledge, good governance, and
national capacity-building for positive integration into the process of globalization.

The strategic axes identified have integrated the MDGs while focusing on the areas in which UNDP has a comparative advantage. Capacity-building has been the framework of their implementation. Gender has been treated as a cross-cutting issue, as has the promotion of new information and communication technologies (NICT).

The Country Programme (2003-2007) defined two major objectives, each one broken down into two strategic axes that include the following features:

**Objective 1: Governance**
- **Strategic axis 1:** Promoting good governance, human rights, peace, and security, for which the following three priority areas have been identified:
  i. Civic education and human rights, including the capacity of civil society organizations and the media to participate in promoting democratic values;
  ii. Support dialogue and national policy discussion, capacity-building for democratic institutions and the electoral process, decentralization and community participation;
  iii. Good economic governance and national capacity-building for economic and financial management.

- **Strategic axis 2:** Positive integration of the country into the process of globalization in five main areas:
  i. National capacity-building, both public and private, to be negotiated within the framework of the multilateral trading system;
  ii. Support for the national effort to develop a national strategy for integration into the globalization process;
  iii. Review of the policy and regulatory framework with regard to the commitments of Côte d'Ivoire as part of the multilateral trading system;
  iv. Support for the competitiveness of the national economy, especially the small and medium enterprise and industry sectors, through integration of productivity factors related to globalization (quality, NICITs, marketing information and networks); and
  v. Integration of social and human issues into the national strategy for integration into the globalization process in order to prevent the poverty, social exclusion, and marginalization that can result.

**Objective 2: Poverty**
- **Strategic axis 1:** Contributing to poverty reduction through:
  i. Support for the development of national and regional strategies for reducing poverty as part of the PRSP;
  ii. Capacity-building for implementing these strategies, including monitoring of the MDGs for the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger;
  iii. Institutional support for the protection of the environment and natural resources and coordination of sectoral policies through the development of regulatory mechanisms;
  iv. Productive capacity-building at grassroots level; and
  v. Capitalization of experiences and expertise and mobilization of resources for replicating relevant experiences and capacity retention, placing emphasis on support for the MDGs on universal primary education through participation in community development in schools.
Strategic axis 2: Participating in the fight against HIV/AIDS, focusing UNDP’s interventions by considering:

i. The links between HIV/AIDS, poverty, and national development; and

ii. Results-based programme management. The partnership with UNDP is centred on: (a) developing national policies and strategies and implementing initiatives against HIV/AIDS by integrating the commitments of Côte d’Ivoire within the framework of relevant international agreements and conferences and the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on HIV/AIDS (June 2001); (b) clarifying the institutional framework and coordination of the national response, including that of civil society; and national capacity-building for implementation of a multi-sector, decentralized, and participatory approach linked to the strategic planning documents; (c) supporting social mobilization at community level through preventive actions and promoting a responsible attitude with regard to infected and affected populations; and (d) advocating and promoting the rights and duties of infected persons by supporting the establishment of a legal and administrative framework.

COUNTRY PROGRAMME ACTION PLAN (CPAP) 2007-2008

The CPAP (2007-2008) is an extension of the Country Programme (2003-2007), which is aimed not only at supporting government efforts to achieve the MDGs but also at implementing the CEP stemming from the Ouagadougou Accord. The context of the military and political crisis since 2002 has led new priorities and opportunities to emerge, according to which the programme has been adjusted. When the crisis occurred between the presentation of the draft programme in June 2002 and its approval in January 2003, the UNDP Executive Board recommended that the programme focus on the pillars most likely to provide a solution to the problems caused by the crisis and postpone any globalization-related interventions. The programme is thus structured around the following:

- The promotion of good governance, human rights, and peace;
- Poverty reduction, including the fight against HIV/AIDS; and
- Post-crisis management and recovery.

The issue of gender has been included because it continues to be considered as cross-cutting. In addition, once the participatory approach, which was adopted as a method of promoting strategic partnerships and national ownership of programmes and projects, proved effective (that is, it was confirmed by the mid-term review carried out in 2006), it was maintained and reinforced across all the actions in this programme. This approach was also adopted with regard to cooperation with other development partners, which was a key asset for UNDP, especially in a crisis-exit context, where coordination was crucial in creating synergies. The programme approach that had been initiated as a mechanism for coordinating and mobilizing resources as well as the national implementation methods, which were not entirely appropriate, consequently required more capacity-building for the structures involved.

COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2009-2013)

This programme was developed in December 2008 in partnership with the stakeholders in Côte d’Ivoire. It was based on priorities of the PRSP and those of the UNDAF (2009-2013), which is the first real development assistance framework created jointly with UNS agencies.

The five UNDAF outcomes that have been identified are as follows. By 2013:

- Peace will have been consolidated by strengthening the safety of persons and goods and by creating favourable conditions for national reconciliation, community reintegration, and respect for human rights;
National and local institutions and civil society organizations will have been restored across the country, and good governance capacities strengthened to better serve all segments of the population while respecting gender equality and human rights;

Capacity of Government, private sector and other groups, mainly the most vulnerable, to create jobs and wealth and ensure food security will have been strengthened;

There will be equal access for all to basic quality social services and social protection and assistance for vulnerable groups will have improved;

Water, forestry, and environmental resources will have been protected, preserved, and managed in a sustainable and coordinated manner.

The current Country Programme (2009-2013) is UNDP’s contribution to national reconciliation, post-crisis recovery, and the socio-economic stimulus in Côte d’Ivoire in the context of the many challenges identified during the programming of the UNDAF and the CPAP for the period. It revolves around three main pillars:

i. Governance, including human rights and peace;

ii. Poverty reduction with a view to achieving the MDGs, including the fight against HIV/AIDS and environmental protection; and

iii. Crisis prevention and recovery.

The CPAP reflects the continued support of UNDP for implementing government crisis-exit programmes, particularly in the areas of redeployment of the administration and the reinsertion of ex-combatants, ex-militia members, young people involved in the conflict, and at-risk young people, community rehabilitation, reconciliation, national cohesion, and organization of elections. Support was also considered with regard to the policies and programmes and projects for the ongoing decentralization and local development process, poverty reduction, the strengthening of the technical and financial capacities of local communities and vulnerable groups for developing economic activities, environmental issues, gender integration, and HIV/AIDS and human rights.

Based on the experience gained, lessons learned, progress made in previous years, and the comparative advantages of UNDP in Côte d’Ivoire, the expected results of the Country Programme were defined in terms of national priorities for recovery and development as specified in the PRSP (2009-2013) with a view to achieving the MDGs.

Five results or outcomes were identified as part of the poverty pillar:

- The capacity of the Government and decentralized authorities for economic governance, development policy, and strategy was strengthened;
- The sources of income for vulnerable groups, including young people, women, and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and local communities were improved;
- The protection and sustainable management of the environment were improved; and
- Sustainable access to drinking water, sanitation facilities, and energy services was improved for the populations, especially women and children.

In terms of governance, the main results and expected outcomes are:

- Electoral processes should be participatory and democratic;
- Processes of decentralization and local development should be more effective; and
- The Government should be more efficient, transparent, and accountable.
Regarding crisis prevention and recovery, all projects and programmes will contribute to the following outcome: The security environment, dialogue, and national cohesion will improve.

In May 2011, the Regional Bureau for Africa undertook a mission to Côte d’Ivoire to reposition the crisis prevention and recovery activities within the new strategic context, and taking into account the multiple challenges to which Côte d’Ivoire must respond quickly, given the resource constraints faced by the Country Office. It was therefore recommended that the Country Office revise its programme and define two major components instead of three by integrating the interventions related to crisis prevention and recovery into governance. In addition, it was recommended that the programme shift towards support for political dialogue in order to facilitate national reconciliation as well as the effectiveness of public policies so as to promote the early resumption of economic activities, with more opportunities for job creation, especially for young people. The programme also aimed to support promotion of local mechanisms and opportunities for the prevention and management of conflicts in the context of a socioeconomic rehabilitation strategy for rural communities.

With this in mind, the Country Office started to reorganize the expected outcomes of its programme and reduce them from nine to seven, in order to reinforce the effectiveness of the interventions. This change will be reflected in the revised UNDAF and CPAP coherently with the National Development Programme 2012-2015. The proposed outcomes are as follows:

**Poverty reduction to achieve MDGs, including environment, sustainable development:**

- Capacity to develop and implement development policies at central and local levels has improved;
- Vulnerable communities and groups enjoy improved sources of income and better access to basic socio-economic infrastructures; and
- Improvement in the protection and sustainable management of the environment.

**Governance and crisis prevention and recovery:**

- Democratic processes (elections, control of government action) are participatory;
- Government is more effective, transparent, and accountable;
- The processes of decentralization and local development are more effective;
- The security environment, dialogue, and national cohesion have improved.

Table 6 shows the correlation between changes in the national priorities and those in UNDP support during the period assessed, including changes in the UNS programming frameworks.

### 3.2 CHANGE IN UNDP RESOURCES AND EXPENDITURE

UNDP resources come from core funds received from headquarters each year (TRAC funds) and thematic trust funds (TTFs), but above all from mobilizations contributed by donors to the execution of the programme. From 2004 to 2007 the Country Office received contributions from headquarters budget ranging between US$4 million and $5 million annually, with a peak around 2008/2009/2010, corresponding to the run-up to the presidential elections. Since 2010, the resources from headquarters have tended to decrease. As regards all resources equal to or greater than US$500,000 mobilized by the office during the period 2004-2011, the Country Office depends on donor resources for more than 59 percent of its funding, and the EU\(^{17}\) and Japan are its largest donors (50 percent of funding between them over the period), in addition to the

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\(^{17}\) The EU is increasingly considering moving towards assisting Côte d’Ivoire in the form of budgetary support.
### Table 6. Comparison of UNDAF and CPD With National Policies in Côte d’Ivoire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES</th>
<th>RESPONSE BY THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM</th>
<th>UNDP TARGETED OUTCOMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Re-establishment of political and social dialogue with all political actors and social components in Côte d’Ivoire (national reconciliation forum)</td>
<td>• Poverty reduction</td>
<td><strong>Governance Objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social, economic, and cultural development policy</td>
<td>• Governance and human rights</td>
<td>• Promotion of good governance, human rights, peace, and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Formulation of an interim IPRSP with 6 pillars: 1) streamlining of macroeconomic framework; 2) private sector promotion; 3) more equal access to and quality of basic social services; 4) decentralization; 5) promotion of good governance and capacity-building; and 6) security of property and persons</td>
<td>• Fight against HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>• Positive integration of the country into the globalization process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improved participation in the electoral process by CSOs and political parties</td>
<td>• Globalization and subregional integration</td>
<td><strong>Poverty Objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The national institutional framework developed is functional and the policies and plans for the fight against AIDS improve the national, multi-sector, and decentralized response</td>
<td>• Peace and security</td>
<td>• Contribute to poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ouagadougou Accord (4 March 2007)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Participate in the fight against HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Authority of the State, security, social cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identification of populations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Presidential and legislative elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Peace-building, the security of property and persons, good governance</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Governance Pillar (including the issue of Gender)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decentralization as a means of public participation in the development process and reduction in regional disparities and land management</td>
<td>• Improved participation given to the aspirations of the people in the definition of development programmes and strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improved access to and quality of basic social services, environmental protection, promotion of gender equality, and social security</td>
<td>• Improved participation in the electoral process by CSOs and political parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Streamlining of macroeconomic framework</td>
<td>• Government institutions are effective and respond better to citizens’ needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Job and wealth creation are supported in rural areas through the promotion of the private sector as an engine of growth</td>
<td>• The national institutional framework developed is functional and the policies and plans for the fight against AIDS improve the national, multi-sector, and decentralized response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International context and subregional integration</td>
<td><strong>Poverty Pillar</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The national institutional framework developed is functional and the policies and plans for the fight against AIDS improve the national, multi-sector, and decentralized response</td>
<td>• MDG-based development and poverty reduction policies are improved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Development Plan (2012-2015)</strong></td>
<td>• Strategies and initiatives for poverty reduction focused on gender equality are consolidated at grassroots level and involve the private sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• People live in harmony, society is made safer, and good governance is ensured</td>
<td>• Access of populations to basic social services and energy resources has improved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wealth creation has increased and is sustained and inclusive and distributed equally</td>
<td>• The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on vulnerable groups are minimized through a multi-sector and decentralized approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Populations, especially women, children, and other vulnerable groups have equal access to quality social services</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Crisis Prevention and Recovery Pillar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Populations are living in healthy conditions and with sufficient means of living</td>
<td>• National capacity for the risk management of crises has improved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Repositioning of Côte d’Ivoire on the regional and international stage is effective</td>
<td>• The functions of governance have been restored to normal and social cohesion and national reconciliation have been consolidated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender equality and capacity-building for women are guaranteed in the peace process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Review of UNDAF/CPAP in 2012**

**UNDAF (2009-2013)**

- **Poverty Reduction Pillar with a view to achieving the MDGs**
  - Government institutions and local authorities are implementing strategies for the MDGs
  - Better access to jobs and IGAs for local communities and vulnerable groups (young people and women)
  - Improved services offered for the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS
  - Improved protection and sustainable management of the environment
  - Improved access to drinking water, sanitation, and energy services

**CPD/UNDP CPAP (2009-2013)**

- **Governance Pillar**
  - Electoral process made more democratic and participatory
  - Improved decentralization and local governance
  - Improved participation by citizens
  - More efficient, transparent, and accountable government
  - Respect for fundamental rights
  - Increased private sector participation in the national economy
  - Improved security environment, dialogue, and social cohesion
### Table 7. Summary of Own Resources of Country Office (2004-2012) (thousands of US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAC 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRAC 3</td>
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<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>5.85</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
<td>18.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>20004 – National, Regional, Local</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>20008 – TTF DG Gender</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>20100 – TTF DG Legislatures</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20300 – TTF Justice Human Rights</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20500 – TTF DG Decentr., Loc. Gov</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26100 – TTF CPR Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>26500 – CPR Small Arms Red.</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>26951 – CPR TTF Gender</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>0.006</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27030 – TTF for HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54050 – AIDS TFF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62000 – GEF Voluntary Contr.</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>4.67</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.96</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.64</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.02</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.77</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.27</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.63</strong></td>
<td><strong>56.22</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: Côte d’Ivoire, UNDP Country Office, 2012

### Table 8. Summary of Contributions over US$500,000 Received Per Year (millions of US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>GFATM</td>
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<td>4.62</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire Gov.</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>FISDES</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6.70</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.47</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.38</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.96</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.33</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.39</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.59</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.62</strong></td>
<td><strong>142.51</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Côte d’Ivoire, UNDP Country Office, 2012
A record amount of resources were mobilized during the interim phase of the CPAP (2007-2008), during which nearly 80 percent of the total amount was allocated to emergency and crisis exit programmes as well as to electoral basket funds.

In general, the Country Office allocates 50 percent of its resources each year on average, except in 2011, during which the programmed resources reached 70 percent.

In terms of allocation, budget distribution and expenditure by area of intervention have changed over the past two programming cycles as well as the interim cycle in response to the needs generated by the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. The analysis shows a downward trend concerning the budgets dedicated to the poverty pillar from one programming cycle to the next in favour of the governance pillar. From 2004 to 2011, the governance pillar recorded 45 percent of the amount of the budgeted total over the period in relative terms, compared with 34 percent for the poverty pillar and 21 percent for the crisis prevention and recovery pillar.

In terms of expenditure, the total amount for the period 2004-2011 was US$179,629,000 out of a total budget of US$207,563,000, an average rate of execution of 86 percent. The average
Figure 15. Resources Mobilized By UNDP, By Donor (2004-2011, in millions of US$)

Source: Côte d'Ivoire UNDP Country Office

Figure 16. Change in Budgets by Area of Intervention (in thousands of US$)

Source: Côte d'Ivoire UNDP Country Office
In conclusion, the budget allocations and expenditure levels strongly reflect the cyclical fluctuations experienced by the country over the period. Resources mobilized from both own funds and donors peaked in 2008-2009, following the signing of the Ouagadougou Accord and in the run-up to the presidential elections. Meanwhile, the Country Office still relies heavily on funds mobilized from other technical and financial partners, including the European Union and Japan, in terms of volumes contributed and regularity of payments.

Following on from this chapter, subsequent chapters evaluate the contributions of UNDP to development results in the country, its specific approaches and comparative advantages, and the efforts made by the Country Office to promote the values of the United Nations.
Chapter 4

UNDP’S CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE

This chapter assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of UNDP’s contributions to development results in Côte d’Ivoire. The assessment follows the structure of the Country Programme and programme outcomes. For each component of the programme, the specific achievements are first analysed and discussed in great detail, and then are presented in a way of summary in relation to the assessment criteria, within each component.

During the period 2003-2012, the programme went through a series of revisions, the purpose of which was to take into account the country’s changing needs and priorities. During the interim cycle (2007-2008), crisis prevention and recovery was added to the thematic clusters of poverty reduction and democratic governance to support the Government’s CEP within the framework of the Ouagadougou Accord. The programme returned to the two thematic clusters in 2011, following various UNDP headquarters missions in 2011.18 The environment and energy cluster is now included in the poverty axis, as is the fight against HIV/AIDS. As for governance, it now includes crisis prevention and recovery activities, which will be the subject of a separate section of this report because they were part of a separate module until the end of 2011. The question of gender equality, which was tackled as a cross-cutting issue by the programme, will be integrated into the appropriate sections of this chapter.

The analysis will also distinguish between effects at the strategic level (after the strengthening of institutional capacities in the planning, programming, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of development activities) and those at the operational level, which result from activities that directly improve the population’s living conditions or living environment.

4.1 POVERTY REDUCTION WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING THE MDGS

4.1.1 MAIN UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE VARIOUS EXPECTED OUTCOMES

Strengthening the Capacities of Government Institutions and Local Communities for Economic Governance and the Development of Pro-poor Policies and Strategies that Integrate Gender Equality

At the strategic level, UNDP has developed strong partnerships with the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, even during the worst moments of the crisis between 2008 and 2010 and consistently supported it over the entire decade in constructing development policies and strategies that favour the poor while also integrating the MDGs at central and local government level. This support has given the Government tools for improving the coordination of government activities, allowed resources to be mobilized, and strengthened national planning and forecasting capacities. Sector action matrices for poverty reduction have been developed, and four drafts of PRSP and NDP produced. UNDP supported these at every stage, including:

- Preparation of the interim PRSP in 2001;
- Finalization of the first full PRSP in 2002;
- Implementation review and update in 2007;

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18 Inter-agency evaluation mission, requested by the Security Council, 1-14 May 2011; BCPR mission aimed at repositioning the crisis prevention and recovery activities within the new context in June 2011; and joint RBA/BCPR/BOM/BDP mission to refocus the UNDP programme in the short and medium terms at the end of 2011.
Development of national strategy based on MDGs, taking into account recommendations by the Ouagadougou Accord;

Preparation of the second full PRSP in 2009;

Update and transfer to the NDP in 2011; and

Finalization of the NDP in 2012.

Integrating the MDGs into the PRSPs and monitoring the indicators provided a measure of the progress made towards achieving the MDGs, and it has helped determine which sectors lacked recent or reliable statistical data. Two national reports on the MDGs were published in 2003 and 2010, with UNDP support.

The tools for targeting and monitoring the poverty indicators are now available, and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) monitoring and evaluation mechanism is operational. The latest monitoring activity was carried out in a workshop held at Yamoussoukro in February 2012 with the objective of evaluating PRS implementation over the period 2009-2011.

Further, in 2010, the Country Office and the Dakar Centre for Regional Services also provided considerable support to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) in preparing the MTEF, which is required for implementing the PRSP and has traditionally been the responsibility of the World Bank and European Union.

At the sectoral level, strengthening of capacity also translates into technical support to the process of formulation of policies, strategies and programmes (employment, HIV/AIDS, integrated management of water resources, environment, education, agriculture, etc.).

At the local level, a development plan integrating an approach based on human rights, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and gender equality was developed with the city of Tiassalé, representing a test case for applying MDGs in Côte d’Ivoire. UNDP support has enabled the development of a diagnostic document (so that a reference point could be defined) and a strategic development plan for the city, which aims to successfully reverse current trends.

On the matter of gender equality, the programme played an important role in providing institutional support for the MFFE, especially in an intervention aimed at improving performance. At the institutional level, a national Gender Equality Unit, which has become the Directorate of Gender Equality and the Promotion of Gender (DEPG), was created within the Ministry in 2006. Its mission is to oversee respect for gender equality and to coordinate matters of gender in general and of gender-related violence in particular. Similarly, the project supporting gender equality in the country’s electoral process and the programme strengthening the capacities of locally elected women have contributed to their effective participation in decision-making, even if they still only participate in the electoral process as voters or candidates in a limited way.

Gender equality has been the subject of specific actions implemented to continue improving responses to the crisis and the impact of UNDP post-crisis activities in Côte d’Ivoire. The main results relate to:

- Implementation of gender equality units within the 14 technical ministries, with varying degrees of success, although not all of them are currently active;

- Support for a Centre for Excellence for women in the Man region, an area particularly affected by the conflict, in collaboration with other UNS agencies, and providing information, raising awareness of human rights and violence against women, and identifying vulnerable persons and groups;

- Strengthening the understanding of gender equality in the country and the dissemination of Resolution 1325 in terms of both content and implications in order to further the acceptance and implementation by the various development actors, namely the Government, civil society and especially
UNDP support has also involved the strengthening of the technical and financial capacities of IDPs, of those who have returned to their areas of origin, and of communities conducting regeneration activities. Support was provided via seminars in order to strengthen the population’s technical capacities, followed by the financing of activities in support of food security. For this purpose, the ABRIS and NERICA Community-based Seed Systems (CBSS) projects have enabled the financing of micro-projects in areas severely affected by the crisis since 2002. These contributed to a reduction in rural exodus and to an improvement in the living conditions of beneficiaries, including their food security. Indeed, the implementation of the project CBSS-NERICA since 2001 has produced 7,482 tons of seed in community and individual plots without fertilizer, from 7,401 producers, 77 percent of whom are women, grouped into 139 associations or cooperatives in 24 departments, 41 sub-prefectures and 137 localities. This project has enabled women beneficiaries to gain some economic independence and secure food for the family with the earliness of the variety of cultivated seeds maturing during the lean period, i.e. when food is lacking in the villages19.

In terms of poverty reduction, many women and young people belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups have benefited from funding for training courses and work experience placements through programmes such as 1,000 Micro-projets, Emploi Jeunes, the Poverty Reduction Support Programme (PALCP), ABRIS, and PRAP/MDG. These vulnerable groups have been widely supported at the national level. Furthermore, the micro-projects that were visited in the region of Poro (in the north of the country) during the fieldwork phase showed the extent to which UNDP actions have been beneficial in reducing poverty and enhancing food security and social cohesion.

UNDP has financed several IGAs in the form of community projects in the region, including the donation of three motorcycle taxis, the renovation of several factories that produce local products.
Chapter 4. UNDP’s Contribution to Development Results in Côte d’Ivoire

Box 1. Experience of the Village of Zouan-Houien

After a period of calm following the war, in Zouan-Houien, in the west of the country, UNDP responded in 2004 to a request for support from Father Jean-Louis, of the Catholic Capuchin Mission. This consisted of financing (US$100,000) through inputs and technical supervision of a rice-growing project led by the mission. The first phase supported 2,376 households and provided 30 tons of seeds as well as technical support to farmers, who subsequently organized themselves into a cooperative, following encouragement by UNDP, in order to develop the rice-growing in the lowlands outside the village. The following year, support was renewed, and extended to 3,600 additional households. This UNDP support enabled:

- A reduction in food insecurity by enabling the population to grow basic food products;
- The generation of income through the trading of surplus products (sale of 55 tons of maize to ICRC, 53 tons of rice seed to the NGO Caritas, and 30 tons of rain-fed rice to FAO);
- The development of a new agricultural activity (the farming of lowlands, which was hitherto unknown in the area), and the provision of the necessary technical knowledge;
- The provision of healthy work for the population;
- A reduction in crime and insecurity in the region;
- An end to the negative effects on the population of price speculation over food products that led to unfair competition from neighbouring countries (Guinea and Liberia).

The cooperative thus created (COOPAFAN) includes 25 percent of female heads of household. It is not yet economically viable, and it has also been weakened by the effects of the post-electoral crisis (and therefore required additional UNDP support in 2011, which benefited 3,700 households). But it managed to raise other sources of financing, including from the Côte d’Ivoire diaspora. In addition, it has been a source of inspiration since a further six cooperatives have been created based on the same model. According to Father Jean-Louis, the presence and support of UNDP, the only body to have remained in place at the height of the crisis, were determining factors in preventing the region of Zouan-Houien from becoming a lawless area and from falling victim to agricultural price speculation, which would have further affected a population already greatly harmed by the conflicts. UNDP also enabled the return of confidence and hope among the population, and it helped people re-integrate into their area of origin and rebuild productive capital. Creating a sense of belonging among the communities has also strengthened social cohesion.

In this context, UNDP has reduced suffering by supporting the farming of vegetables and rice (for example, in 2011, under the NERICA CBSS project, a total of 30 ha were sown, including 20 ha in the Haut Sassandra region and 10 ha in the Savanes region, benefiting 449 people),

promoting production of shea butter and soap from nuts, and financing and providing technical assistance to pig and poultry farmers.

The projects, which target vulnerable groups, have had a wide range of positive outcomes for the beneficiaries and have helped them meet their food requirements. The projects have also given people self-confidence and a sense of pride in their work. The strategy of adapting projects to local needs (taking into account the specific characteristics

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20 Evaluation of production tools under the CBSS project for post-election, from 26 September-1 October 2011.
of each region) has strongly contributed to their success. According to the information collected and analysed so far, the same results and effects have been observed in other regions, including Lagunes (south), Gontougo (east), and Gbêkê (centre), and the Montagnes region (west).

The programme has contributed to youth employment through its direct support of the Agency for the Study and Promotion of Employment (AGEPE) by generating data on employment with the aim of better determining the number of potential job seekers and improving forecasts. AGEPE has also received funding for the equipment of its Employment Monitoring Centre and for a seminar on the theme of employment. This resulted in the reorganization of its services, the recovery process of statistical production, better analysis and a fairer programming of the employment. These activities are seen as supporting work experience for qualified young people. UNDP has also contributed to the professional training and career development for people graduating from these programmes, such as girls attending the Institute for Education and Training of Women (IFEF) and young people considered at risk, who have been supported by the Emploi Jeunes project 21.

In its 1998 policy statement, the Government, aware of the need to maintain or improve results on universal public education, adopted an Integrated Programme for the Sustainability of School Canteens (PIPCS), with the support of UNDP and WFP. This programme involved helping rural and semi-rural communities to establish food security mechanisms in school canteens, designed to complement humanitarian aid by giving the beneficiaries the appropriate technical training and necessary tools and equipment to develop IGAs. The experiences of Sustainable School Canteens in rural areas seem to be more successful. For example, 80 percent of 12,000 people in one of the beneficiary villages (Teforo) derive their subsistence from the community production of food crops. This activity has ensured the supply of 200 students per day for seven of the nine months that constitute the school year. However, the establishment of these school canteens has resulted in significant recurrent annual costs, which neither the Government, nor its financial partners, nor of course the parents of the students themselves, can continue to finance in the long term.

Protection and Sustainable Management of the Environment

In terms of the environment, there was little UNDP activity during the period 2003-2007 due to lack of resources for ensuring adequate results. Much of this activity was carried out at the request of the Government of Côte d’Ivoire but did not form part of a coherent framework. However, from 2009, a programme of support for environmental protection and sustainable management of natural resources has been implemented. It allowed the updating of the policy of integrated management of water resources, a revision of the forest policy, the development of a sustainable development strategy and a strategy for the prevention and management of disaster risk, the strengthening of capacities to manage for results, issues related to climate change, the clean development mechanism (CDM) and the launch of REDD +. In addition, UNDP has managed Ivorian-Swiss Economic and Social Development Fund (FISDES) resources for the management of the Tai Park through infrastructure rehabilitation and ecotourism research infrastructure including support of the Ivorian Office of Parks and Reserves. The micro-GEF funding project has continued its activities that have contributed to strengthening the capacity of NGOs and community-based organizations. These activities have helped to ascertain the steps to be taken and the institutional frameworks that would be required for a more sustainable management of these sectors.

21 For example, conservation activities and marketing of fishery products initiated by a youth organization of the town of Port-Bouet (Abidjan) also received support from the programme that helped 43 people to obtain a minimum average income of 75,000 FCFA per month.
In this way, Côte d’Ivoire has established a regulatory and institutional framework for the environment and sustainable management of natural resources. However, the implementation and application of legislation has encountered difficulties due to a lack of human, material, and financial resources, which was made worse by the conflicts, which encouraged the illegal use (through poaching, trafficking, and looting) and over-use of these resources.

In operational terms, the GEF microfinancing programme has led to greater community responsibility in the sustainable management of natural resources and to improved welfare through 85 IGAs that have been set up in the areas of biodiversity, climate change, and international waters. In fact, it has helped lead successful experiences such as the rehabilitation of mangroves within the context of biodiversity conservation in the Bingerville lagoon and develop beekeeping and drying techniques for cocoa cleaners in terms of fight against pollution, preservation of the ozone layer and climate change.

Another successful collaboration of UNDP in this area was made with FERREAD. With a staff of 172 members from different organizations protecting the environment, and a member of the steering committee of the UNDAF, FERREAD in 11 years covered almost all regions of Côte d’Ivoire. This received joint funding for the education and training of actors of civil society organizations and the private sector on the impacts of climate change on biodiversity, agriculture, water resources, coastal erosion, and socio-human development. The result was a collective awareness of the private sector on the need to preserve the environment, which has resulted in the establishment of a service for the management of the environment within the chamber of trade and industry of Côte d’Ivoire. More specifically, UNDP funded for a total of 5.6 million FCFA the project for the implementation and validation of the diagnostic study for the implementation of adaptation and mitigation options of climate change. This study has increased the interest of local officials on the threats represented by climate change.

Improvement in Permanent Access to Drinking Water and Sanitation Facilities and Services (particularly for Women and Children)

UNDP has contributed to an improvement in living conditions by restoring 100 water pumps in villages of the Gontougo region, along the border with Ghana. This activity has been well-received by local populations and has reduced the need for women and young girls to collect water, and has also led to an improvement in health due to a decrease in water-borne diseases resulting from drinking stagnant water. A partnership with the National Office for Drinking Water (ONEP) has also allowed the drinking water network to be extended to disadvantaged districts of the city of Abidjan.

Improvement in Services for the Prevention of HIV/AIDS Infection and for Caring for People Suffering from or Affected by HIV

Groups identified as vulnerable (women, at-risk young people, orphans and other vulnerable children, and people affected by HIV/AIDS) were brought together into cooperative groups so that they could benefit from a programme financing projects aimed at improving social cohesion based on local development, the support of school-feeding programmes, and care for children and adults made vulnerable by AIDS (PALCP, 1,000 Micro-projets, PIPCS).

In collaboration with UNAIDS, UNDP has empowered women by training them on leadership techniques and ways of responding to the violence and discrimination that people suffering from or affected by HIV can be subject to. It also contributed to developing the national strategy against HIV/AIDS and the operationalization of the multisectoral and decentralized response adopted by the Government (2006-2010 and 2012-2015). Thus, national capacity in planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of control interventions were strengthened. UNDP support to the mobilization of resources for the support of key national programmes to fight against major diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis was made evident by
supporting the formulation and development of projects in 2002 as main recipient of the funding by the Global Fund. The main contributions of the project to strengthen the national response to HIV/AIDS in Côte d’Ivoire through the Global Fund are as follows:

- At the level of community involvement, 162 companies were able to establish a committee to fight against HIV/AIDS, 35 religious organizations have received support, over 1,875 orphans and vulnerable children have received support through support to NGOs, and 46 percent of young people aged 15 to 24 use condoms consistently.

- In terms of improving access to voluntary counselling and testing, opening 48 specialized centres and training 465 people allowed to cover more than 106,442 patients for HIV testing.

- In terms of prevention of HIV mother-to-child transmission, opening 35 PMTCT centres helped more than 1,838 women and 1,526 children get ARV prophylaxis by this project.

- In the context of decentralization/devolution of management, the project has also helped improve the quality and access to comprehensive care through creation of PIAVIH in 14 more health regions, of centres to support by ARVs and, in 40 health districts, of centres of support for opportunistic infections. In total, more than 17,561 people benefited from ARV treatment.

In parallel to its direct support in projects, the UNDP Country Office played a significant catalytic role during the evaluation period. In fact, following the drafting of the third version of the PRSP and the request of the Government, UNDP organized a round table to bring together its financial partners and mobilize the financial resources needed for implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy. It is expected that UNDP will organize a similar event to implement the NDP.

UNDP’s advocacy work in the MEMPD has led to Tiassalé being registered as a pilot city for the localization of MDGs, a move that has aroused interest in participating by development partners such as authorities at Tiassalé, the World Bank, UNICEF, UNOCI, UNFPA, the NGO Save the Children, and UNAIDS.

It is also thanks to UNDP that Japan was joined by the European Union in 2006 in helping with the establishment of 200 sustainable school canteens in the CNO region, with the Support Project for the Sustainability of School Canteens (PAPCS) becoming a concrete reality. PAPCS was completed in May 2009; assessments have shown that the achievements of this project could be further reinforced by focusing on the importance of local and community development, with women’s groups at the heart of the project. In practice, it has become clear that the 30-month lifespan of the project was not sufficient to ensure its sustainability, and that a longer project duration would have enabled the results of the project to be properly consolidated, by becoming a real driver of post-crisis transition in the targeted areas. Since January 2010, the European Union has agreed to finance the extension of the project through consolidation of the process of ensuring the sustainability of school canteens in areas experiencing food insecurity. This action is seen as making an overall contribution to the reconstruction of the education system in Côte d’Ivoire and reduction of poverty through an improvement in school enrolment and retention rates, particularly for girls, in areas that experience high levels of food insecurity and are severely affected by the conflicts, as well as through the integration of women into the economy. These activities have therefore involved:

- Establishing a mapping survey of school canteens and of groups likely to support schoolfeeding programmes through their activities;

- Monitoring purchases and distributing inputs;

- Identifying the groups that should receive equipment;
Chapter 4. UNDP’s Contribution to Development Results in Côte d’Ivoire

4.1.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The programme has resulted in significant capacity-building for the State and its institutions and for local communities. However, when the poverty reduction, environment, HIV/AIDS, and MDG components are considered in terms of the expected outcomes for programme beneficiaries, the results are, in operational terms, somewhat mixed because there was not sufficient critical mass for the activities to generate a significant impact. UNDP actions have met the needs and expectations of national institutions, communities, and local authorities. The poverty reduction, environment, HIV/AIDS, and MDG components have contributed to the achievement of the MDGs thanks to the positive impact they have had on programme beneficiaries. In particular, operational activities have had a direct impact on the MDGs in general. Relevance for the beneficiaries themselves is also a key issue to the extent that they are the subject of the evaluation of the impact of these activities. In this context, the support UNDP provides to communities in the Poro region, for example, is highly relevant, because, with the highest rates of poverty in the country (77.3 percent as opposed to 40.3 percent in 2002), this region needs both humanitarian aid (food security, nutrition, community revival, security, and reestablishment of state authority) and development activity (economic recovery in the face of generalized impoverishment).

4.1.3 EFFECTIVENESS

Overall, assessments have shown that UNDP activity over this period (2003-2012) remained aligned with the country’s development needs, both in terms of its planned needs in relation to the national development strategy and the needs that have arisen from circumstances created by the crisis the country has been experiencing since 2002. UNDP’s Poverty and MDG Programme made a substantial contribution to the development of policies, specific strategies that particularly favour women and young people, mechanisms for access to basic social services, and new opportunities for production and increasing incomes. The results that have been achieved at these various levels are relevant as they correspond closely to the country’s national priorities, as indicated in the four versions of the PRSP and the NDP since 2012.

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4.1.3 EFFECTIVENESS

The programme has resulted in significant capacity-building for the State and its institutions and for local communities. However, when the poverty reduction, environment, HIV/AIDS, and MDG components are considered in terms of the expected outcomes for programme beneficia
impact due to low funding levels and an insufficient funding duration. On the other hand, the crisis in the most affected areas has also cancelled some positive results. Similarly, the choice of beneficiaries, and monitoring have not been conducted in optimal conditions. The wide dispersion of project activities and UNDP’s desire to be everywhere at once reduced the effectiveness of its work.

4.1.4 EFFICIENCY
The changes in the levels of funding for the governance, poverty, and crisis and recovery components of the programme between CPAP 2004 and CPAP 2011 have been to the advantage of the governance component, with resources contributing to the financing of the 2009-2010 elections, which helped the country recover from the state of emergency into which the 2002 crisis had plunged it. During the same period, budgetary resources allocated to the poverty component decreased without the poverty reduction activities losing their position as development activities.

While the proximity strategy adopted from 2008 onward through the establishment of sub-offices throughout the country allowed UNDP to make relatively efficient use of the modest budget allocated to the poverty component in comparison with the levels of financing for governance and crisis prevention and recovery, the delays reported in the delivery of funds due to the lengthy and cumbersome procedures involved sometimes prevented projects from being run successfully, while poor coordination between the different partners in the field sometimes led to a duplication of activities and reduced efficiency.

4.1.5 SUSTAINABILITY
In terms of the outcomes of the sustainability strategy through which beneficiaries take ownership of the projects, some of the community projects and even individual projects have achieved sustainable models of financing. An example is the financing of umbrella associations in Karakoro (a community project) and the pig farm in Fronan (an individual project). The rice-growing project in Zouhan-Houien is also worth noting as a clear example of local communities taking ownership of a project. The sustainability mechanism that has been established is already functional and receives partial funding from the European partners of the Mission des Capucins. As a result, seven new cooperatives have been planned based on the same model, one of which has already received funding from the Ivorian diaspora.

Nonetheless, in several instances, the lack of an assistance mechanism and post-project follow-up, together with a non-holistic approach to these micro-projects and what has often been perceived as an abrupt withdrawal by UNDP, has been behind the failure of some of the projects. An example is the chicken-breeding project in Yezimala, which ended with the chickens being shared out among the beneficiaries.

4.2 GOVERNANCE
4.2.1 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF UNDP TO EXPECTED OUTCOMES
UNDP activity has allowed for capacity-building and the raising of awareness over national affairs among actors, and covers a wide range of themes, including institutional governance, peace, security, elections, human rights, decentralization, and local development.

Institutional Governance and Supporting the Peace Process
UNDP activity has helped improve the functioning of democratic institutions. This is particularly notable in its contribution to the understanding of the peace agreement and the improvement of government communication through the creation of a Centre for Government Information and Communication (CICG). Furthermore, the programme has contributed to an improvement in the organization of parliamentary activity, most notably by making parliamentary assistants available to the parliamentary parties and by strengthening the capacities of Parliament in terms of its regulatory and legislative procedures.
The capacities of key ministries (in charge of finance and development) have also been strengthened to ensure a better understanding of methods of good economic and financial governance and planning. In view of the frequent collaboration and close relations developed by the Country Office with the Ministry of Planning and Development, we can say that these results could hardly have occurred in the absence of UNDP, particularly at the height of the socio-political crisis that hit Côte d’Ivoire and caused the departure of several development partners, for security reasons.

In terms of the peace process, UNDP has supported Côte d’Ivoire in the development of a national action plan for implementing Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council. This resolution, which applies in times of crisis, covers prevention, peacebuilding, and recovery, calls on UN agencies and all member states to incorporate principles of gender equality. A conflict-awareness training session was organized in relation to this resolution, focusing on stakeholders’ ability to manage their programmes, given the challenges often encountered in times of crisis. Nonetheless, ownership of Resolution 1325 has remained low, as it is not well known in Côte d’Ivoire, which poses a challenge in terms of regional representation.

**Support for Participatory and Democratic Election Processes**

During the two programme cycles (2003-2007 and 2009-2013) as well as during the interim period (2007-2008), UNDP supported Côte d’Ivoire in matters of democratic governance through a range of strategic initiatives, including:

- Assisting with the electoral process (Electoral Support Programme/PAPE);
- Assisting with the decentralization process and community participation;
- Assisting with good economic governance, including capacity-building in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF);
- Capacity-building in decentralized and local organizations (PASU);
- Capacity-building in CSOs and the media with a view to promoting democratic values;
- Supporting dialogue and political cooperation at a national level; and
- Capacity-building in democratic institutions (supporting gender integration in the electoral process).

In order to re-establish democracy and the rule of law, UNDP has provided technical support to the IEC, notably in relation to the organization of the electoral process (presidential and legislative elections). This assistance primarily took the form of resource mobilization and the management of the contributions made by external partners in the form of a basket fund. As part of its support to the electoral process and the activities financed by the Peace Building Funds, UNDP actively worked together with a range of actors on a series of programmes designed to raise awareness.

Furthermore, the assistance provided by UNDP to the electoral process by making available high-level experts to the IEC and supporting CSOs and the DEPG helped mobilize the population and led to participation by women in the electoral process. In 2010, with UNDP support, the Network of Women for Peace and Security in the ECOWAS region (REPSFECO) organized two awareness road shows to encourage women to participate in the presidential elections as electoral observers. In 2007, UNDP advocacy work also led to the approval and ratification of the Formal Declaration by Côte d’Ivoire on Equal Opportunities and Gender Equality by the President of the Republic, a document that served as a guidance tool for the National Gender Policy in Côte d’Ivoire and resulted in the agreement on quotas of 30 percent for women in elected or administrative positions.

During the 2011 legislative elections, vigorous awareness actions by UNDP were carried out to encourage women leaders to submit their nominations. Thus, out of a total of 943
registered candidates (independent and listed), 106 female candidates were registered, 11 percent of the total.

At the same time, by supporting the organization of the General Assembly on Civil Society in 2009, which allowed for the development of a charter consisting of 50 commitments signed by all political parties, UNDP helped strengthen the Civil Society Convention of Côte d’Ivoire (CSCI). This convention therefore increased in status and credibility among donors and with Côte d’Ivoire’s development partners, as well as with the Government itself, which subsequently made it a privileged partner in social, economic, and development matters.

As a general rule, UNDP had a positive impact at the strategic level by contributing its expertise in planning, based on a participatory approach, which ensured that all sectors of society, and in particular women, were included in the electoral process, and by facilitating access to financing thanks to its strong ability to mobilize funds, even if these funds were considered insufficient. Nonetheless, its contribution has remained low as regards the anticipation of crises and its positioning on strategic issues such as the strengthening of the judicial system, the media, job creation, and dealing with land-tenure issues.

**Support for the Decentralization Process and Local Development**

Since 2003, in order to effectively contribute to local development and decentralization processes, which are prerequisite to the redefinition of government functions, UNDP has been operating a programme that aims to support decentralized cooperation by strengthening the capacities of local actors. Through this programme, elected local officials (particularly elected women), working under umbrella organizations such as the Union of Cities and Municipalities of Côte d’Ivoire (UVICOCI) and the Association of Districts and Départements of Côte d’Ivoire (ADDCI), have been able to benefit from assistance with the aim of: (i) simplifying involvement in the crisis recovery process at the local level (redeployment of local administration and participation of regional authorities in the organization of court hearings); (ii) reaffirming the role of elected local officials in providing local services; (iii) supporting the convening of decentralized general assemblies that allowed to perform a diagnostic of the decentralization process started at end of the 1970s and to formulate recommendations for accelerating its start; and (iv) finalizing the legal texts that allow for the implementation of the decentralization process, which nonetheless remains incomplete.

In addition, UNDP has provided a framework to test the collaboration between the ministry, ADDCI and UVICOCI and, thanks to a technical partnership with the MACOM (Mission to Support Conduct of Municipal Operations), created under a PACOM project funded by the World Bank. Mayors were equipped with a participatory and operational mechanism to analyse transparently and respond to funding requests. Given constraints to implementation of the programme during the crisis period, UNDP has also helped to explore the various opportunities offered by decentralized cooperation in terms of resource mobilization and partnerships for sustainable local development, including exploring within the Ivorian diaspora. On the basis of these successful experiences, a guide to support decentralized cooperation achieved with support of UNDP is being developed. UNDP has also facilitated exchanges of experiences with Mali and Senegal as part of cooperation on decentralization.

In addition, the successful experience of the Programme for the Support of Urban Safety has enabled UNDP to develop a methodology in the field of community safety.

By supporting the redeployment of the administration and the reestablishment of state authority (justice, police, etc.), UNDP has made a significant contribution to a return to normality, the security

initiatives have been carried out by UNDP from its sub-office in Bouaké with the aim of supporting community-based recovery. In particular, this has involved training officials and providing computer equipment for the prefecture and the four sub-prefecture buildings in Bouaké as well as renovating police stations.

Since 2006, UNDP has been the main organization that has continued to support government efforts to prepare legal texts relating to decentralization. In particular, UNDP has worked in close collaboration with the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), the MEMPD, and the Ministry of the Interior, even when the crisis was at its worst between 2008 and 2010.

UNDP’s contribution has also been focused on capacity-building activities for administrative services, healthcare services, schools, and universities through retraining and continued education (renovation of Campus I in Bouaké and accommodation buildings A and E in the forest campus, as well as renovation of the administrative buildings of Bouaké’s law courts).

Furthermore, as regards helping to increase the effectiveness of the public administration system, the Country Office has established activities that have led to a noticeable increase in knowledge about the security situation in Abidjan, following 13 local appraisals and a study on the sense of insecurity. These studies have helped to encourage the development of appropriate and efficient municipal policies for preventing insecurity.

Police stations have received communications and computer equipment to enable them to better carry out their work at local level. Furthermore, the Country Office has helped set up and run multicultural operational consultation mechanisms in the form of community security committees, in order to encourage discussion and actions for prevention insecurity, and local planning, which are management tools that local elected officials can use within their districts.
UNDP has thus contributed widely to capacity-building within the Ivorian Government through the promotion of social cohesion, peacebuilding, and economic recovery.

4.2.2 RELEVANCE

UNDP’s interventions in support of democratic governance during the 2003-2012 period have been in line with centrally defined national strategies and priorities, including: (i) the need to support the Ouagadougou Accord; (ii) technical support for the electoral process; (iii) support for the redeployment of the administration; and (iv) reinforcing government institutions and central decision-making structures.

The contribution of UNDP has also been in line with the priority needs of decentralized authorities and elected local officials through training activities and technical support.

4.2.3 EFFECTIVENESS

UNDP efforts have brought about tangible results for both the central government and the decentralized entities. Technical support from UNDP has made a significant contribution to successful, participative, and inclusive presidential and legislative elections. The evaluation report ‘Repositioning UNDP in Côte d’Ivoire (2011-2013)’ confirms UNDP’s contribution by stating, “UNDP has played a central role in the presidential election process, managing the elections basket fund and providing assistance to the IEC and organizations of civil society”. According to the report: UNDP has “been able to adapt to constant changes in the political and electoral areas maintaining a dialogue with the Prime Minister, the IEC and UNOCI. This gave it authority and visibility that were recognized by all stakeholders at both the national and the international level.” This critical contribution of UNDP has led to the creation of democratically elected bodies and authorities capable of promoting economic and social development. Through the Election Support Programme (PAPE), UNDP has reinforced the capacities of IT specialists in the IEC by making high-level international consultants available to them. UNDP also made a meaningful contribution to putting women at the heart of the electoral process in 2010.

The effectiveness of UNDP actions can also be seen in its work in capacity development for public administrative bodies, local government, and CSOs. Support for the redeployment of the administration and the restoration of state authority in formerly rebel-held areas is another successful UNDP contribution to strengthening governance, as is the training of local actors and village farming collectives, with the objective of establishing autonomous and sustainable management of school canteens.

However, effective restoration of a secure urban environment through the Urban Security Support Project (PASU) remains very limited owing to poor visibility of this project’s actions among communities in the interior of the country. The recent UNDP involvement in issues related to strengthening the State’s legal and judicial systems leaves room for improvement.

UNDP’s most effective actions have primarily been in capacity development, an area in which it has clear and widely recognized strengths.

4.2.4 EFFICIENCY

By holding a round table of donors and managing funding sources to finance the presidential elections, UNDP organized and encouraged contributions from many donors with a view to supporting crisis-recovery initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire. The mutualization of sources of financing made a major contribution to the optimal use of mobilized funds, even if problems in management and reporting were observed.

The efficiency of UNDP actions can be clearly seen in its coordination of actions by development partners on the ground, and especially in the synergy between actions carried out by on-site local offices jointly with other actors. For example, in the Bouaké region, the local office has been coordinating actions by development partners following the departure from the area of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In the Savanes region, the Korogho local office has demonstrated its strengths by mobilizing aid agencies and project execution agencies (research agencies and local NGOs) in order to assist with initiatives aiming to strengthen local governance and community participation. Throughout the region, UNDP has had a positive effect on the actions of other UN agencies as well as on local operators working on specific projects.

**4.2.5 SUSTAINABILITY**

Although the effectiveness of UNDP in promoting democratic governance and community participation is widely recognized, the sustainability of the outcomes achieved through actions carried out on the ground is not always a given in most cases, owing to a number of factors, including weak monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for capacity development actions (a problem of ownership). This was the case, in particular, for competence transfers between international UNDP experts and IEC technicians, which was not genuinely achieved apart from the timely assistance provided by these experts for the holding of presidential elections. Even by the admission of IEC representatives themselves, no evaluation of the development of IEC technicians’ competence was undertaken following their collaboration with UNDP experts to ensure the effective transfer of competences for the organization of future elections.

In the former CNO regions, ongoing insecurity did not allow for the monitoring of community organization efforts supported by local governance support projects. In addition, the lack of security resulted in the total destruction of new premises and IT equipment in the prefecture of Bouaké, which had been financed by UNDP at great cost.

Recurring conflicts between ranchers and farmers derailed the sustainable consolidation of groups of producers such as the Darakokaha producers’ group in the Savanes region (Katiola).

Given the situation of crisis, the focus was on urgent interventions to reduce vulnerability of populations, mitigate institutional instability and polarization, which have been a constraint in planning and implementation and explain the limits in terms of sustainability of some of them.

However, it must be recognized that support for some ministers, including the Minister of Economy and Finance and the Minister for Planning and Development, have been viable thanks to results such as the adoption and institutionalization of results-based management (RBM) principles and the adoption of the MTEF.
population, and promote human security and respect for human rights while also building a basis for more sustainable development. UNDP helped support the direct dialogue process initiated by the mediator from Burkina Faso among political groups involved in the crisis. It also supported the application of the Ouagadougou Accord and the CEP that followed it.

Main UNDP contribution to crisis prevention and recovery can be seen in the following areas.

**Improvement of the Security Environment**

From June 2010 until the elections in November of that year, the UNDP Country Office and the entire UNDP management were primarily concerned with the process of preparing for presidential elections and with negotiations with relevant partners to this end. However, technical teams in charge of the three elements in the programme did not have adequate autonomy to fulfil their duties during this period as security and humanitarian questions took precedence over all others. This explains the poor performance of the programme.

In terms of strategy, UNDP developed the capacities of the Ivorian Government by holding the first national conference on “Combating the Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Côte d’Ivoire”, which led to creation by the Government of an institutional and normative framework in the form of a National Commission to Combat Small Arms and Light Weapons. In addition, a SALW search as well as awareness-raising campaigns were launched. To facilitate the work of the internal security forces, eight police stations and six military police stations were restored and re-equipped in the former CNO area.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

Before the post-electoral crisis and from 2005 onward, UNDP developed a Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration programme in partnership with several ministries, UNOCI, UNICEF, and national and regional NGOs, with a budget of approximately US$5 million, targeting ex-combatants, former militia members, and vulnerable women affected by the conflict. However, the process was halted several times, particularly due to the resurgence of the crisis between December 2010 and April 2011. UNDP and other UNS agencies are now working to reactivate the process as the questions of disarmament and proliferation of light weapons are directly related to the issue of youth employment and economic rehabilitation. Programmes are now more precisely targeted geographically and focus on promising sectors.

UNDP has provided technical and logistical operational support to national entities responsible for disarmament and demobilization, including the Integrated Command Centre (ICC) and the PNRRC. It has helped strengthen military leadership and cohesion between the security forces, and it has embarked on preparatory efforts to train the new army and reintegrate 1,501 former members of self-defence groups and 5,100 former combatants, including 200 women and 57 physically disabled individuals.

**Community Rehabilitation and Recovery**

A total of 15,707 individuals, including 2,000 IDPs, 1,500 young people, and 5,600 women have been assisted through socio-economic recovery projects, while 115 rapid-impact projects have served more than 9,140 people (in collaboration with UNOCI), and 187,000 people have benefited from rehabilitated socio-economic and educational infrastructure. UNDP has assisted in the return of 726 IDPs in Zou and Bouaké, the rescue of 114 IDPs, and the economic rehabilitation of 12,666 IDPs and host populations, including 10,371 women, through the work of 190 organizations. It has helped to revitalize the local economy through the rehabilitation of markets and distribution of kits to returning IDPs and the restoration of agricultural and handicraft production by vulnerable populations.

UNDP has set up two Centres of Excellence for female victims of gender-based violence, one in the city of Man, the other, the Centre for
Prevention and Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence (PAVVIOS), in the municipality of Attécoubé in Abidjan.

Support for the creation of the Man Centre of Excellence has helped improve socio-economic conditions for women affected by the war in the Montagnes region and to care for victims of gender-based violence. These initiatives were informed by the achievements of the project initiated in 2003, especially the Project for Support for Reconstruction/Re-equipment, and Social Integration (ABRIS), in order to meet the urgent needs of populations that were direct victims of the crisis. These initiatives represent contributions by UNDP to the establishment of appropriate humanitarian mechanisms and to conflict prevention and management through the deployment of activities for transition to post-conflict recovery. The PAVVIOS Centre (see Box 2) is a pilot centre for the holistic treatment of victims of sexual violence through psychosocial and post-traumatic support.

**Reconciliation and Social Cohesion**

Strategically, UNDP has assisted the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Institutional Relations (MINRRI) and the Ministry of Solidarity and War Victims (MSVG) in developing a National Policy for Reconciliation and Cohesion (PNRCN) and preparing for establishing peacetime infrastructure. Since the end of the post-electoral crisis, support has also been provided for the development and adoption of a National Programme for Social Cohesion. The PNRCN has been the basis for the development process of the National Policy of Solidarity and Social Cohesion (PNSCS) in 2011, under the

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**Box 2. The Centre for Prevention and Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence**

The Centre for Prevention and Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence (PAVVIOS), which has been operational since 2008, has become a Centre of Excellence for the treatment of women and girls who have survived sexual violence.

The centre is now under the institutional authority of the Ministry of the Family, Women and Children, under the Directorate of Gender Equality and Gender Promotion, in collaboration with the municipality of Attécoubé, where the centre is located.

After three years, the PAVVIOS centre has become a model facility for the care of survivors. The centre, whose creation was supported by UNDP, will remain within the municipality of Attécoubé through 2012. It has achieved encouraging results in enabling victims to file rape charges and in ensuring that the perpetrators of these rapes receive appropriate sentences in the Ivorian courts.

The centre is part of long-term efforts based on a close collaboration between communities, village chiefs, neighbourhoods, families, and ethnic groups. For this reason, the activities of the centre have encouraged the creation of a broad support network, with the assistance of key actors and social service providers. Key actors also include the police, the military police, judges, doctors, and social workers, whose awareness has been raised through training courses on the subject of gender-based violence.

The social service providers consist of trained volunteers, men and women, who reside in the municipality. These volunteers are present in the community and know it intimately, therefore are familiar with ways and customs of the communities. Thanks to them, the centre is quickly alerted when a rapist goes on the rampage or when a survivor is abandoned or scared off by a third party. Some results:

- In five years of active existence (August 2008-June 2012), 66 cases of alleged rape of women and girls have been reported and treated, with 62 of the cases (or 94 percent) involving minors. The age of the victims ranged from 2 to 17. Of these only 60 were enrolled in school, with others unemployed or employed as salespersons;

- A total of 12 perpetrators have received sentences ranging from five to 20 years. Other cases are awaiting trial. Some alleged rapists are currently wanted by police;

- A total of 17 women have received subsidies through UNDP. These subsidies have been accompanied by competence development and training in basic bookkeeping.
leadership of the Ministry of State, Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Solidarity (MEMEAS), and of UNDP, with the support of civil society organizations.

In the area of social cohesion, during the period preceding the post-electoral crisis, on-site interventions included the training of 300 opinion leaders and the creation of 56 Local Committees for Reconciliation and Peace (CLRP). Community awareness-raising events on nonviolence have been held, particularly targeting 150 members of local youth communities during the electoral period and on community radio. Intercultural exchange workshops have been organized as part of a partnership between UNDP and an international NGO24. Specific conflict management actions have been carried out with ranchers, farmers, bozo fishermen, and native populations in order to bring them into cohabitation pacts. Actions in support of victims of the crisis have been undertaken with UNDP support to help them overcome trauma.

Under the humanitarian action plan, UNDP and UNFPA, in collaboration with UNOCI, are in the process of establishing a project aiming to support the reintegration of returned populations, restart economic activity in host communities, and rebuild social cohesion in Côte d’Ivoire. The Gender Marker code for this project is 2A (see Annex 8), and its operational objective is to assist communities in strengthening the involvement of women, carry out activities that aim to manage trauma, and raise socio-cultural awareness as well as awareness of the need to combat gender-based violence and HIV.

Despite these initiatives, it should be noted that programmes supporting social cohesion and the Truth, Dialogue, and Reconciliation Commission (CVDR) have had only a limited impact to date because of the relative socio-political instability and community tensions, exacerbated by attacks by armed groups in some areas, particularly the west, and which are not conducive to the process of recovery and social cohesion. It is therefore too early to evaluate the programmes described above. UNDP is currently in talks with UNOCI and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) about the best way to collaborate in this area. UNDP is expected to concentrate on local cohesion and support for the Government. In the area of support for the CVDR, UNDP is planning to collaborate with OHCHR and UNOCI in supporting the dialogue as well as methodological aspects and to help in the development of an action plan by the commission.

However, the credibility of the UN system may be affected by the scepticism that prevails in relation to the reconciliation process started in Côte d’Ivoire and the impartiality of the CVDR. Impunity and repeated human rights violations over a decade remain problematic.

**Redeployment of the Administration and Restoration of State Authority in the former CNO Region**

The support of UNDP made it possible to redeploy 52 judges and 70 court clerks and to equip 10 local judiciaries before the post-electoral crisis. A total of four prefectures in the Savanes region were also equipped, and prefects were trained in the Bandama Valley. UNDP also helped to rehabilitate sub-prefectures and the homes of sub-prefects in the west of the country and to equip administrative services, campus residences for eight schools, colleges, and universities, and one health centre. These interventions also entailed capacity development for six state bodies through technical and logistical support for post-crisis rehabilitation. Since the end of the post-electoral crisis, several types of support have been provided to redeploy and resettle government officials as part of a restructuring of government authority, which has made it possible to rehabilitate and equip four prefectures and 12 sub-prefectures and to train 191 members of the civil service in the area of social cohesion.

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24 Search for Common Ground.
4.3.2 RELEVANCE

The intervention of UNDP in any strategic or operational capacity is always conducted within the Government’s CEP, which itself was the result of a participative workshop that united all social partners. As a result, these interventions closely meet the Government’s recovery needs, particularly for restoration of its authority through the rehabilitation of destroyed infrastructure, increased presence among the population in order to support the creation of IGAs, and the rehabilitation of basic community infrastructure in order to meet food security and social cohesion needs.

4.3.3 EFFECTIVENESS

IGAs have helped develop the capacities of populations in which women constitute the majority by providing the technical knowledge that allows them to acquire means of subsistence. These activities have served as excellent starting points for social cohesion by making it possible to improve the living conditions of populations that receive assistance and restore confidence and a desire for collective responsibility (as in the creation of cooperation groups in Bondoukou, which involve people who have never worked together, or the associations of women from different ethnic groups in Zouan and Houien). This has been particularly true for IDPs and refugees in the former CNO region, even if results remain modest in comparison with the scale of needs. Moreover, limited financing levels and a lack of critical mass have resulted in negligible quantitative impact. In addition, IGAs aiming to rehabilitate former combatants have not all been successful, particularly in the case of recently returned combatants and of activities that do not immediately begin to show returns, such as farming and ranching. By contrast, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and support for restoration of state functions had positive psychological effects on the population.

4.3.4 EFFICIENCY

The proximity strategy adopted by UNDP in the form of on-site local offices throughout the country has been a highly efficient innovation, which has made it possible to optimize the cost-to-quality ratio of the activities deployed.

The involvement of local partners in executing projects, such as the Ivorian Association for Progress (AIP) in Bouaké, the National Agency in Support of Rural Development (ANADER) in Bondoukou and Korogo, the NGO ARK (Animation Rurale Korhogo) in the Chigata Islands in Korhogo, or joint actions to promote DDR involving UNOCI, FAO, the International Rescue Committee, and Search for Common Ground have been a major factor in raising efficiency since it leads to results being achieved without engendering additional costs to UNDP. However, delays in allocating financing and slow progress of UNDP procedures sometimes compromised the optimal completion of projects and endangered their success.

4.3.5 SUSTAINABILITY

The contribution of UNDP to crisis prevention and recovery has given new hope to large sectors of the population affected by the past decade of socio-political instability in Côte d’Ivoire. Concrete actions have been implemented in support of security, the DDR process, community rehabilitation, social cohesion, and the redeployment of the administration in the former CNO region.

Although the effectiveness of these interventions is widely recognized, the lack of resources to implement monitoring and evaluation mechanisms put in place by the field offices in order to sustain the achievements has been hindering their consolidation and sustainability. The situation worsened with the post-electoral crisis that generated the loss of several achievements in the areas of conflict, particularly in the west of the country.

The sustainability of support for the rehabilitation of former combatants is particularly challenging owing to the comparative instability of the recipients of this support. Ongoing instability and
insecurity in the former CNO region also threaten the sustainability of UNDP interventions, as does a lack of additional and sustainable financing for maintaining local offices or joint UNS offices. The following chapter reviews the conditions under which contributions to development results have been achieved, with an emphasis on both ameliorating and aggravating factors.
CHAPTER 4. UNDP’S CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Chapter 5
STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF UNDP

How UNDP strategically positions itself to add value is assessed based on the relevance of its strategies and approaches to addressing key developmental challenges in Côte d’Ivoire and its ability to adapt to changes and to outside factors, including those related to a crisis situation. In addition, this chapter will assess whether and how UNDP has benefited from its institutional strong points at the national level.

5.1 STRATEGIC RELEVANCE AND CAPACITY FOR ADAPTATION

The UNDP programme has proved broadly beneficial and well suited to the country’s needs and priorities. The alignment between programme frameworks (CPD, CPAP) and the country’s strategic objectives is the result of a close collaboration with the Government and stakeholders from the inception of the programme and throughout its implementation. The programme has been involved in the preparation of key strategic documents for Côte d’Ivoire and is therefore ideally placed to suggest solutions regarding development issues that arose during the period of study.

The UNDP Country Office has been virtually the sole development partner to have remained present in Côte d’Ivoire throughout the period of political crisis, which began in 2002. It has been mindful of the various governments that ensued (especially between 2003 and 2007) while still attempting to respond to emergencies, thereby displaying a great capacity for adaptation. All this has been achieved despite a volatile political and social context, with frequent changes in priorities and partnerships.

Following the Ouagadougou Accord and the implementation of the national crisis and reconciliation programme, UNDP emergency recovery interventions have seen an increase at the expense of more traditional operations for long-term development. This has given rise to several issues. Insufficient coordination and synergy between the various components of the programme or with other partners have occasionally led to overlap or inappropriate choices involving beneficiaries or NGOs. The lack of internal human resources has generated a heavy operational workload. This has affected programme strategies and the renewal of projects in the pipeline and has had an impact on efficiency in tasks such as reporting or the provision of funds. The approach followed until recently was generally oriented towards projects. However, corrective action was decided upon in late 2011 at UNDP headquarters and in the Country Office, and these decisions are currently being implemented.

The Country Office has found a balance between upstream interventions, which are implemented at strategic and institutional levels, and field interventions, which respond to community needs. The outreach strategy adopted during the crisis consisted of deploying field offices throughout the country, including the eastern region of the country (which seems to have been abandoned by the international community in favour of more intense conflict areas in the west and north as well as in Abidjan). The strategy has been highly appreciated by interviewees and has allowed the Country Office to implement its activities despite an uncertain and unpredictable environment and to develop links and partnerships with local stakeholders, including local authorities, decentralized ministerial structures, NGOs, and communities. Underlying these tangible results is a visible field presence that has been beneficial in terms of mobilizing funds from a greater number of donors. However,
this has in turn increased the pressure on the Country Office because as a result of limited resources, it has been unable to meet every need. An example is the approach based on the development of IGAs, which has generally been successful but has often encouraged beneficiaries to develop unrealistic expectations in terms of financial and material support that exceed the capacities of the implemented projects.

5.2 ABILITY TO CAPITALIZE ON STRENGTHS

5.2.1 ABILITY TO CAPITALIZE ON INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS

Global Network of Expertise

Thanks to its presence in various countries and a network-based structure, UNDP is appreciated and considered a partner capable of providing appropriate quality expertise by efficiently sharing best practices across countries experiencing similar situations. As an example, the support of the expert of the Sub-Regional Resource Facility (SURF) office in Africa has been a tremendous asset in guiding the Ivorian process of decentralization; the PASU project had several opportunities to share its innovative experience in terms of prevention of urban insecurity in many regional and international forums and UNDP has been able to provide highly qualified and appreciated experts within the context of the preparation of the draft framework of administrative reform.

South-South cooperation is a solution that has been commonly implemented in UNDP programmes and has been used continuously throughout the two programming cycles being studied here. This has led to the development of exchanges of regional and international expertise through reciprocal visits between countries, including the exchange of visitors to and from countries within a region or with other countries of the South. These visits allow countries to share lessons learned from their experience in various areas and to learn about best practices in other countries. Among several successful examples are those that have contributed to the establishment of the Côte d’Ivoire institutional framework for the promotion of gender equality, including the participation of representatives of the Government and civil society in the regional workshop on Gender Issues and the MDGs organized by the Regional Office for Africa in November 2007, as well as the provision of an international expert by the MFFE to help define the role and mission of the future Directorate for Gender Equality and the Promotion of Gender by drawing inspiration from the experiences and best practices being implemented in neighbouring countries, including Benin. Similarly, UNDP supported the organization of a high-level mission by the Guinean Ministry of Planning, which sent a delegation to learn more about the Ivorian experience in economic forecasting. Representatives from a dozen countries also visited to observe the country’s decentralization model, and a school canteens project has also given Côte d’Ivoire the opportunity to position itself once again at the forefront of development initiatives within the subregion. Côte d’Ivoire has also benefited from learning about Congo’s experience of electoral issues and from exchanging best practices for decentralized cooperation with Mali and Senegal. Finally, more recently, Ivorian government officials have attended international conferences on the issue of small arms. Within UNDP, support between Country Offices in Mali, Chad, and Senegal has been developed, particularly with the aim of strengthening the management of operations.

Capacity Strengthening

Capacity strengthening is an area that is recognized as being one of UNDP’s strengths. As a result, it has been a regular part of Country Office interventions in various ways, including the provision of quality expertise in various fields, the sharing and validation of information, the use of this information in meetings or workshops held with government institutions, the provision of studies and reports published by UNDP headquarters, the organization of project management and accounting training sessions (for NGOs and communities), training on topics related to UNDP values such as gender or human rights (for ministries, local authorities,
and civil society organizations), the organization of technical training for populations working in agriculture or livestock breeding, and the provision of supplies and equipment and other material to ensure livelihoods. These operations have generally been greatly appreciated and applauded, except for a few training workshops that lacked consistent involvement as a result in part of high turnover in managerial positions in the administration during the crisis but also due to the fact that the human resources available were often not in a position to make decisions, which resulted in operations not being fully acted upon (for example, the submission of some gender units to ministries focused on technical domains).

**UNDP Neutrality**

UNDP’s multilateral and neutral position is often viewed as an asset. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Country Office has benefited from this advantage as it has been able to maintain an ongoing dialogue with all parties throughout the country’s period of instability. It is also thanks to this status that UNDP was unsurprisingly appointed by the Government to support the organization of presidential and later legislative elections. However, the organization’s neutrality was challenged at the very height of the Ivorian crisis as a result of confusion between its status and that of UNOCI. In practice, the mission, which was established in 2004 by Resolution 1528 of the Security Council and is composed of both military and civilian members, has a broad scope. It is responsible for enforcing the ceasefire, implementing the DDR process, supporting humanitarian operations aimed at maintaining public order and the peace process, and providing assistance in terms of human rights and awareness-raising. UNDP works together with UNOCI on many of these issues and their respective roles have occasionally not been fully defined and explained to stakeholders.

The confusion was particularly significant since the UNDP Resident Representative is also the Humanitarian Coordinator and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and was devoted to solving the political and security issues during the crisis period. Moreover, and on several occasions, premises belonging to UNDP especially in the west, were looted, without distinction between agencies. However, several partners suggest that it has been a missed opportunity for UNDP at the strategic level, not to capitalize on this comparative advantage as this would have helped spark a dialogue with the Ivorian Government in the hope of suggesting solutions to sensitive or fundamental issues underlying the crisis, such as the development of rural land-tenure reform and clearing up the pending question of nationality.

**5.2.2 ABILITY TO CAPITALIZE ON STRENGTHS WITHIN THE COUNTRY**

**Establishing Connections with the Donor Community**

Given its well-established presence in the country, UNDP has extensive connections with the donor community in Côte d’Ivoire. The organization’s expertise and credibility have built trust among donors, allowing it to request funding. Evidence of this situation is found in the round tables organized at the request of the Ivorian Government, which bring together various financial partners and helped set up basket funds for preparation and implementation of both the presidential and legislative elections as well as the implementation of the Government’s CEP. However, the Country Office has not wished – or been able – to provide leadership in coordinating aid, a role it has traditionally occupied in many other countries. The EU has taken up a coordinating role in Côte d’Ivoire, with UNDP as co-leader.

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25 Only one donor mentioned that it did not contribute funds to UNDP because a convention exists between the respective headquarters, which simplifies and accelerates procedures.
At the operational level, the Country Office has played an essential role due to the ripple effect it created within the framework of the pilot project for contextualizing the MDGs in Tiassalé before the crisis by involving several international partners such as UNOCI, the World Bank, and UNICEF, as well as national partners (municipalities, ANASUR, etc.).

Additional Advantages

The UNDP Country Office enjoys a number of country-specific assets that were pinpointed by a number of interviewees during the evaluation. These assets are its knowledge of the field and the strong institutional partnerships it has built in Côte d’Ivoire, its flexibility and ability to frequently adapt to a difficult and changing context, and its participatory approach, which constitutes the backbone of its interventions at all stages (design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation).

Managerial and Technical Capacity of the Country Office

The aim of this section is to describe whether the Country Office has been able to effectively implement the programme at a technical level over the period being evaluated by the ADR and to identify potential obstacles that may have an impact on service delivery and thus on the efficiency of development aid. Its purpose is not to carry out a comprehensive evaluation, an individual performance assessment, or a programme audit.

The UNDP office in Côte d’Ivoire currently employs approximately 40 individuals on fixed-term contracts, including 8 international staff. It also relies on approximately 50 individuals on service contracts. At its head, a Resident Representative and Resident Coordinator also serves as Humanitarian Coordinator and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. A Country Director is responsible for the daily management of the office, assisted by two Deputy Directors, in charge of programmes (appointed in February 2012) and of operations (appointed in January 2012). A communications officer and an associate executive are also in the Country Office. The programme employs a resident representative assistant (ARR/P), 8 programme officers (consultants, specialists, and analysts), and three associates, working across two units, one responsible for issues regarding poverty, the environment, and the fight against HIV/AIDS, the other in charge of governance, crisis prevention and reconstruction. Gender-related issues are dealt with by a focal point who is part of the Governance Unit and ensures that this dimension is integrated into all UNDP programmes and projects. A national expert is responsible for addressing gender issues as part of the HIV/AIDS dimension, and an analyst, assisted by an associate, ensures the monitoring of project finances. The Directorate of Operations, which is in charge of administrative and financial operations, serves as a framework for the operational programme and consists of a deputy director of operations and 23 employees divided into 6 units (2 for operations, 4 for finance, 4 for purchases, 3 for IT, 3 for human resources, and 7 in charge of logistical issues). Within the Office, a Strategy and Policy Unit, headed by a senior economic adviser, consists of an MDG specialist and an administrative assistant. This unit provides advice regarding strategies to be adopted by the Country Office or the Ivorian authorities. The unit was previously shared with UNDP-Guinea but has been fully dedicated to Côte d’Ivoire since 2009. The Country Office does not have a separate unit in charge of monitoring and evaluation.

The office’s current configuration is the result of changes in programme strategy and content in response to changing priorities in Côte d’Ivoire as well as budgetary constraints resulting from a mission carried out by UNDP headquarters and the UNDP regional bureau in 2011.26

As was noted in previous sections, the UNDP Country Office has always aligned its activities with national priorities over the period reviewed by the ADR, as defined in the different

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generations of documents presenting strategies aimed at reducing poverty.27

A Post-Crisis Unit was created within UNDP in 2003 with a view to responding to the military and political crisis, which had rapidly spread. The unit sought to support humanitarian action and had the objective of gradually incorporating more sustainable operations. Four field sub-offices were created throughout the country in order to effectively implement the strategy adopted by the Country Office and to work towards providing assistance nationwide.

In addition to the positive results it has achieved, the approach has been seen as relevant and effective by all UNDP partners (the Government, civil society, and beneficiaries as well as other donors) and it has strengthened the organization’s credibility in the field. That said, the recent closing of several sub-offices has been seen by some as being too abrupt, and this has generated misunderstandings and frustrations, especially at local level. Two of these sub-offices joined together several UNS agencies that are operating in the area. However, their sustainability is not assured since these agencies will financially disengage themselves at the conclusion of their activities in the area.

Given that the period of crisis has been prolonged, the component related to crisis prevention and recovery interventions gained momentum in 2007, while the governance component moved from second to first place in terms of allocated budget and expenditure between the 2003 and 2009 cycles, pushing the poverty component back into second place. These changes confirm once again that the Country Office has shown great adaptability in the face of stressful events and has responded appropriately to requests made by the Ivorian Government.

On the other hand, given the complexity of the post-election crisis and of the entrenched positions of the various players, the efforts of the office’s outreach to communities and to opinion leaders, the campaign called ‘fair play’ with famous members of the national football team (Didier Drogba and other) and through NGOs have proved inadequate and much less effective due to weak collaboration at the strategic level between the different UN agencies and limited support from headquarters at that time.28

In addition, the Country Office has faced difficulties related to a lack of adequate skills for responding to challenges and to a very heavy volume of operational tasks to be carried out, particularly in support of UNOCI during the preparation of the presidential election. This has affected regular activities regarding other programme components, and the project pipeline has therefore not been sufficiently developed in subsequent years.

During the period prior to the elections and during the post-election crisis, humanitarian and security issues dominated. In general, the four tasks performed by the Resident Representative29 and the strong involvement of this official in peacebuilding initiatives resulted in the UNDP programme strongly and successfully focusing at one time on emergency interventions (e.g. reconstruction) in support of UNOCI operations, but becoming dispersed throughout a host of projects and deviating somewhat from its traditional mandate.

By default and in most cases, the programme was implemented according to a national implementation modality, except in the case of a few projects funded by donors that have entrusted their management to UNDP or of sensitive projects that required the neutral position of UNDP (such as providing support during the electoral process).


28 According to the Country Office, the elements in this crisis were perceived at a very early stage within the office. However, the common perception is that these warnings were not heeded in time by headquarters.

29 This official is also Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, and UNDP representative.
While the military and political crisis was at its most acute and the public administration was guilty of many lapses and while the country was split into two separate governments and was facing security constraints as well as the lack of a coherent development policy, the Country Office continued to provide uninterrupted support, except for a brief period of a few months during the post-electoral crisis. The recurring interruptions in the flow of international aid, in particular aid upon which the projects implemented by UNDP depended, led to delays in the completion of initial planning and, in some cases, to some actions being cancelled due to lack of funding. However, none of those interviewed mentioned this as having had a significant negative impact. In this regard, it must be noted that UNDP is one of the few aid agencies to have maintained its presence in the country throughout the crisis.

At the operational level, two main problems were repeatedly pointed out by the evaluation. One is the delay in disbursement of funds, which was criticized by numerous implementing partners and beneficiaries, and the other is the quality of monitoring procedures, in particular post-project monitoring as well as reporting, mainly within the context of managing the electoral basket funds, a concern that was mentioned by several development partners. The operational strategy adopted by the Country Office since early 2012 and now being implemented should help overcome the difficulties mentioned in connection with the first problem. However, it is too early to observe any positive effects of its implementation, though these should become visible in terms of reducing delays and improving project performance.

The strategy integrates four components: (i) an established internal control framework comprising a system of delegation of authority; (ii) standard operating procedures; (iii) a system-oriented operation, and (iv) the monthly preparation of a full dashboard tool consisting of 24 indicators for monitoring and providing decision-making support for management, the team of programme advisers, and the Country Office in its entirety. Awareness and information campaigns are also being conducted to overcome an insufficient mastery of UNDP operational procedures, both internally and for some implementing partners, given that in the past the issue has contributed to difficulties with the implementation of the system and has also generated administrative obstacles.

With regard to monitoring, whether it is provided by national coordinators or UNDP advisers in accordance with a selected modality did not seem to be a major problem in the implementation of programmes and projects. However, monitoring should be further strengthened by the systematic use of the dashboard tool set up by Operations, especially as most interviewees emphasized the fact that post-project monitoring is a weakness that often leads to the interruption of micro-projects in the field. UNDP has partially resolved the issue by setting a six-month follow-up period for projects being carried out by providers (including NGOs and decentralized technical services). However, this solution remains inadequate given the limited human and material resources available to these projects.

Moreover, the Country Office suffers from a lack of visibility during its interventions, both at the strategic and the operational level, resulting from various causes, including the separation of tasks taken on by the programme and those performed by the communications officer. In practice, communication remains highly institutional as it focuses on managing content on the Country Office website, writing brief press releases, and ensuring media coverage of event launches. The communications officer is rarely associated with the different stages of a project or its follow-up due to a lack of resources. Meanwhile, UNDP projects are unable to allocate sufficient budgetary resources to communication, including media coverage, or to share successful operations, lessons learned, and best practices. Moreover, the completion of projects or the closure of sub-offices was not sufficiently planned or explained in advance, which resulted in local frustration and the feeling of being abandoned. Similarly, the partitioning of the Strategic and Policy Unit (SPU) has affected the efficiency of strategic counselling and has had an impact on
Chapter 5. Strategic Positioning of UNDP

A team focusing on gender issues is led by UNFPA and brings together focal persons from various agencies including UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women, and UNOCI. The team was set up to monitor the implementation of a framework that takes gender issues into account (through gender-differentiated indicators and the collection and analysis of disaggregated data), facilitate and strengthen the capacity of office and project teams in that domain, and develop a UNS advocacy strategy for gender concerns. Like other agencies, UNDP adopted the eight priority themes of the joint programme concerning gender and crisis (2006-2007) during the post-conflict transition and reconstruction phase. These themes are: (i) peace and security; (ii) access to basic services; (iii) the fight against poverty; (iv) the fight against gender-based violence; (v) the fight against HIV/AIDS; (vi) reproductive health; (vii) the fight against prostitution; and (viii) the right to participation and decision-making. More specifically, the Country Office has established a policy of promoting gender equality and has been seeking to increasingly cross-integrate this dimension into all its programmes and projects, with varying degrees of success. Support received in this area is either institutional (through education, training, and advocacy) or operational. An example is the study that focused on identifying the major principles underlying the promotion of gender equality. These principles have been integrated into the PRSP and other sectoral strategies such as the study of the orientation framework for the inclusion of gender issues in post-crisis programmes. Training on the promotion of gender equality has been provided to encourage the participation of women in the peacebuilding and social cohesion processes as well as in elections. UNDP support has translated into the inclusion of women and other vulnerable groups in IGAs and other actions aiming to reduce vulnerabilities. Despite the fact that results are visible at an institutional level, including through the creation of the DEPD within MFFE in 2005 and the PAVVIOS Centre and the Man Centre, which implement prevention strategies and provide assistance to victims of sexual violence, greater effort is needed to promote awareness of gender issues, given the aim of

5.3 Promoting the Values of the United Nations

Activities related to the promotion of the values of the United Nations (including human rights, MDGs, and gender) have been carried out either through specifically targeted initiatives or indirectly through programmes and projects being implemented.

Human Rights

The support of UNDP has focused on strengthening the capacity of ministry officials and members of civil society based on an approach promoting human rights. Similar training has been provided to the armed forces and the police. Unfortunately, the implementation stage has not been fully successful due to the numerous violations of human rights that took place during a decade of crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and to the persisting issue of impunity.

MDGs

In contrast, approaches to the MDGs have been fully integrated into the national and sectoral developmental policies and strategies of the Ivorian Government, including strategies for conflict prevention and reconstruction. During these participatory activities, 234 experts and 10 NGOs were trained in methods for assessing the needs as well as the costs involved in achieving the MDGs, which now serve as a framework for the Government to provide resources and carry out programme reviews with UNS agencies.

Gender

In matters of gender and at the level of the UNS, UNDAF (2003-2007) has cross-integrated gender issues into its programmes through its thematic frameworks. A team focusing on gender issues is led by UNFPA and brings together focal persons from various agencies including UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women, and UNOCI. The team was set up to monitor the implementation of a framework that takes gender issues into account (through gender-differentiated indicators and the collection and analysis of disaggregated data), facilitate and strengthen the capacity of office and project teams in that domain, and develop a UNS advocacy strategy for gender concerns. Like other agencies, UNDP adopted the eight priority themes of the joint programme concerning gender and crisis (2006-2007) during the post-conflict transition and reconstruction phase. These themes are: (i) peace and security; (ii) access to basic services; (iii) the fight against poverty; (iv) the fight against gender-based violence; (v) the fight against HIV/AIDS, (vi) reproductive health; (vii) the fight against prostitution; and (viii) the right to participation and decision-making. More specifically, the Country Office has established a policy of promoting gender equality and has been seeking to increasingly cross-integrate this dimension into all its programmes and projects, with varying degrees of success. Support received in this area is either institutional (through education, training, and advocacy) or operational. An example is the study that focused on identifying the major principles underlying the promotion of gender equality. These principles have been integrated into the PRSP and other sectoral strategies such as the study of the orientation framework for the inclusion of gender issues in post-crisis programmes. Training on the promotion of gender equality has been provided to encourage the participation of women in the peacebuilding and social cohesion processes as well as in elections. UNDP support has translated into the inclusion of women and other vulnerable groups in IGAs and other actions aiming to reduce vulnerabilities. Despite the fact that results are visible at an institutional level, including through the creation of the DEPD within MFFE in 2005 and the PAVVIOS Centre and the Man Centre, which implement prevention strategies and provide assistance to victims of sexual violence, greater effort is needed to promote awareness of gender issues, given the aim of
seeking to change traditionally engrained views and attitudes in these matters.

The UNS, including UNDP, can count on tools and mechanisms such as the Gender Marker (see results in Annex 8) that raise the level of consideration given to gender equality and is intended for programme and project managers both at headquarters and in decentralized offices. The Gender Marker is based on a rating system on a scale from 0 to 3 according to whether the results of the programme or project contribute strongly or not at all to gender equality. The rating concerns active projects that received funding and are operational. Codes 2A, 2B indicate that there is systematic collection of gender-disaggregated data in the projects concerned and that the design of both quantitative and qualitative indicators has allowed for gender to be mainstreamed and disparities reduced in UNDP-supported projects. In this context, the project creating sustainable school meal programmes, which falls under both gender and local development, helped communities to take charge of the food supply for the programme and enhance access to school by girls. UNDP’s support has helped make 372 canteens 75 percent autonomous and another 200 25 percent autonomous, which compares favourably to the period before 2003, when 100 percent of funding depended on donors.

This chapter, like the previous one, gave a detailed description of the highlights of the evaluation as well as its main impacts. The final chapter will summarize the main conclusions and articulate appropriate recommendations.
Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This closing chapter first details the main findings of the evaluation with respect to the contributions to development results and the processes of delivering and positioning UNDP in the country. These points are considered in terms of the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Following this, recommendations are centred on these findings.

6.1 CONCLUSIONS

6.1.1 KEY FINDINGS

Conclusion 1. UNDP’s interventions were shown to be highly relevant and to have produced highly successful results not only at the strategic level in relation to country benchmarks but also at the operational level in relation to the concrete needs of communities and institutions benefiting from the interventions on the ground.

The alignment of UNDP’s interventions is reflected in the changes observed within the programme’s thematic areas. The efforts made to reduce poverty, which were the more important in relative terms as regards resources allocated and expenditure during the first cycle, shifted towards crisis prevention and recovery and governance during the interim cycle (2007-2008) and the current one (2009-2013). This aligns closely with the change in the temporary situation in the country and its needs and priorities. In addition, the participatory approach that characterized the wording of UNDP’s programming documents and the responsiveness and adaptability it showed in the face of the volatile political situation during the crisis ensured that the programme’s areas of intervention were aligned with the country’s priorities and needs. Similarly, discussions on the ground with stakeholders (implementing partners and beneficiaries) and the review of past evaluation reports show a very favourable view of UNDP and a feeling of abandonment and frustration when it is no longer involved.

The success of UNDP interventions is due primarily, at the strategic level, to the support provided to the Government and its institutions, mainly at the central level but also at the local level, in terms of frameworks and tools for the formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of development policies and strategies (PRSP, MDG reports, MTEF, NDP, National Strategy for Decentralized Cooperation, etc.). The results for gender were also positive at the institutional level despite the unstable crisis-related conditions, and this resulted in capacity-building within the MFFE and in support for the formulation of policies and strategies for the promotion of gender.

At the operational level, the programme has contributed directly to many solutions, especially to urgent problems directly related to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire during the last decade. Included in this successful support is the assistance provided to the electoral process, sustainable school meal programme, and the IGAs present in most of the interventions and in all thematic areas, which are aimed at capacity-building in communities, including vulnerable groups and women, in terms of technical skills and means of earning a livelihood. The Centres for Prevention and Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence that were established in two cities in Côte d’Ivoire are also examples of good practice.

Thematic Areas

In the fight against poverty, the most significant and most frequently cited results are those obtained thanks to the support of school meal
programmes. Tangible outcomes have been registered in terms of food security for the population (especially children and, indirectly, parents) and in school enrolment, especially for girls, both in terms of school attendance and academic performance. This successful initiative, rightly regarded as good practice, has attracted the interest of some 12 countries in the region, including Togo, which adapted the Côte d’Ivoire model in implementing pilot school meal programmes.

In terms of environmental protection and natural resources in particular, many beneficiaries viewed UNDP interventions as insufficient and marginal even though they could have managed to help in solving some structural problems, including land-tenure issues and relations with neighbouring countries.

In terms of governance, the successful organization of the 2010 presidential elections despite a difficult context, through technical support to the IEC and the enduring dialogue between political parties and civil society, are widely attributed to UNDP efforts despite limitations related to difficulties in managing funds and keeping accounts as well as administrative delays, which were made worse by donor interference. Similarly, the initial efforts towards decentralization that led to the promulgation of a law on devolving responsibilities to local authorities must be credited to UNDP support since the agency has been the only international organization dealing with this area since 2006.

In terms of crisis prevention and recovery, interventions in infrastructure rehabilitation, access to basic social services, and IGAs were the activities most frequently cited as having contributed to improving the living conditions and safety of communities, restoring an atmosphere of trust, and strengthening social cohesion, especially in the west of the country, where a sense of abandonment was felt after humanitarian aid ended.

In all its interventions, the UNDP Country Office has endeavoured to promote the values of the United Nations, even if the results appear mixed in this regard. Capacity-building, the participatory approach, the MDGs, and the issue of gender have been structurally integrated into the programme, and have sometimes been the object of specific projects. Capacity-building encountered occasional problems of ownership, especially at the national level, in particular because of the high degree of mobility of beneficiaries that characterized the period of crisis. As regards gender, the policy set by the Country Office and the gender focal point ensured that the issue was considered in all UNDP-supported programmes and projects. Nationally, significant progress has also been made at the institutional level, as with the creation of the DEPG as well as of gender units in the relevant ministries, which consider issues related to gender and equality in all strategic documents as well as on the ground. However, much remains to be done in terms of women’s participation in decision-making and in terms of representation in Côte d’Ivoire. Regarding human rights, efforts towards raising awareness were conducted, which led to the creation of an entity responsible for human rights. However, given the crisis Côte d’Ivoire went through, much remains to be done in terms of prevention, punishment of human rights violations, and access to justice.

Conclusion 2. UNDP non-project interventions have also led to meaningful results in the country with greater impacts for resource mobilization and advocacy relative to aid coordination.

These contributions have mainly focused on resource mobilization and advocacy and, to a lesser extent, on the coordination of aid from UNS agencies and other development partners. The Country Office has played an important role in terms of resource mobilization: in 2004, it was appointed as coordinator of resources (from the EU, Switzerland and Canada) by the Electoral Assistance Division of UNOCI. In 2007, it was appointed by the Government to organize a round table for mobilizing resources from unconventional donors to support the crisis exit and emergency programme, and organizing
presidential elections. At the operational level, UNDP has created ripple effects by encouraging other partners to take over pilot initiatives with strong potential for success, such as contextualizing the MDGs in Tiassalé or the school meal programmes. By contrast, efforts towards coordinating aid have fallen short, even if sociopolitical instability in Côte d’Ivoire was a limiting factor. Indeed, strategic coordination beyond the standardization process involved in preparing UNDAF and thematic groups within the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and other UNS agencies has essentially been non-existent. On the ground, the search for synergies and partnerships has led to mixed results depending on the project, as efforts were clearly hampered by the crisis and its consequences.

Conclusion 3. The lasting effect of the interventions and their outcomes has varied and has often been compromised by the crisis.

In terms of capacity-building, all stakeholders interviewed (members of the Government, development partners, representatives of civil society, and beneficiaries) recognized the quality support provided by UNDP to the political process in Côte d’Ivoire as well as at the level of the approach used to build the capacity of national and local authorities. However, ownership of these processes has still not been achieved, particularly in the Government, because of the high level of turnover of high-ranking officials due to political instability.

Likewise, the resurgence of conflicts, particularly in ex-CNO areas, has threatened and sometimes even reduced the hope of lasting effects for the results of UNDP interventions in terms of infrastructure rehabilitation and the resettlement of IDPs.

Conclusion 4. The strategy adopted for IGAs has not always been effective and is not sustainable.

IGAs have been the preferred method of intervention of the programme, operationally speaking, and are included in all UNDP thematic areas of concentration. The results are mixed and vary according to the target group. Overall, the results were positive for the projects for women and women’s groups, although less so for the reintegration of ex-combatants and in some sectors of activity being promoted, such as agriculture and livestock farming, which require additional technical knowledge and take longer to show a return on investment compared to other activities.

However, the lack of a holistic approach, the use of criteria that are too flexible in how they select beneficiaries or implementation partners (local NGOs), and the modest level of funding granted to non-repayable loans, which tends to lead to a mind-set of dependence, have sometimes compromised the sustainability of micro-projects, as has the multitude of activities in various sectors and scattered geographic locations, which have made coordination and monitoring difficult. Nevertheless, the interventions have always given priority to beneficiaries belonging to vulnerable or marginalized groups, such as women, children, at-risk young people, IDPs, refugees, or persons infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS. By contrast, because of the lack of critical mass, the scope of the interventions remains limited given the magnitude of the needs. Lack of post-project monitoring, due to limited resources of Côte d’Ivoire mainly at the decentralized level, threatens the sustainability of achievements.

Conclusion 5. Programmatic dispersion has been a source of inefficiency for the Country Office.

The decision to be present operationally throughout the country and in all thematic areas despite limited (budgetary) resources has encountered difficulties. This has made it difficult to monitor and coordinate interventions, sometimes leading to duplication and waste in interventions on the ground. Besides, the scope of interventions remained modest as compared to the magnitude of the needs.

Conclusion 6. The strategy adopted for resource mobilization, which worked during the crisis, is no longer appropriate for the Government.
The Country Office, during the periods of crises, became heavily dependent on external resources mobilized from donors present in Côte d’Ivoire, in particular the EU. However, while the country gradually moved to a recovery phase, international aid seems to move more towards direct budgetary support for Côte d’Ivoire’s Government, thus reducing funding opportunities for the Country Office. In addition, the unpredictability of this type of funding hinders the proper planning of interventions and threatens their sustainability (maintaining joint offices, having a presence throughout the country, and continuing successful initiatives and reproducing them on a larger scale). This puts pressure on the Country Office to focus on mobilizing funding at the expense of strategic advisory activities.

Conclusion 7. Difficulties were encountered in managing the delivery of the programme’s products.

The administrative burdens most often cited relate to long delays in the disbursement of funds, which at times jeopardized the implementation of projects and, given the limited human resources, made it difficult to execute the work plans within the deadlines. This situation created tensions within the operational actions and affected monitoring and quality assurance with regard to issues of funding. Moreover, reporting failures were mentioned by some development partners.

Conclusion 8. The Country Office has demonstrated efficiency using a strategy of sub-offices throughout the country.

The local strategy adopted by UNDP since 2008 – using sub-offices throughout the country – was one of the most effective innovations, allowing the optimization of the cost-quality ratio of the activities implemented. The involvement of local partners in project implementation and monitoring has been a factor in promoting efficiency, helping achieve the desired outcomes without creating further costs.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNDP COUNTRY OFFICE

6.2.1 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. Support Côte d’Ivoire’s Government to ensure its transition towards development.

Côte d’Ivoire has entered a recovery phase, and the UNDP Country Office should support the Government in putting in place transitional mechanisms that will enable it to reinforce and take over humanitarian actions and focus on development issues. In particular, the Country Office should draw up a plan to take over from UNOCI and to identify the thematic areas it will support and in which it might benefit from skills transfer as well as those that could be taken on by other partners, including regional organizations.

Recommendation 2. Maintain a careful focus on well-defined areas of concentration.

The Country Office should assess its strengths and identify the niches where it has comparative advantages. In particular, by using its network of expertise and given its position as a neutral multilateral agency, it is well placed to initiate a national dialogue on fundamental issues related to structural problems in Côte d’Ivoire (such as an economic stimulus and job creation, the reform of government and public institutions, restoration of the State’s authority, rural land-tenure reform, the effective protection of natural resources, and social cohesion).

Within its areas of concentration, the UNDP Country Office should prioritize interventions that are strategic, budget-friendly, and operational by using its limited resources as a catalyst and by testing pilot initiatives. Through its capacities for advocacy, its role should be to create a ripple effect among development partners in order to replicate successful initiatives on a larger scale. The UNDP Country Office could intervene judiciously in thematic areas generally neglected but where the needs are greatest, and reduce its presence in these areas when new
stakeholders become involved in the same thematic areas since it cannot compete at the level of human or financial resources.

More specifically, and as examples, as the list is not exhaustive, the Country Office initiatives could support the fight against gender-based violence, women’s participation in future local and regional elections, strengthening of capacity of women elected in democratic governance. It might also be involved in monitoring activities funded in the field of training/rehabilitation of young people, school feeding, and support to associations of widows head of the family because of the war. It would also be desirable that the Country Office continues to support the capacity-building of ministries on management tools, monitoring and evaluation of development activities and invest it in themes relating to the rule of law, justice and elections in general.

**Recommendation 3. Pay greater attention to the management of natural resources and environmental protection.**

The UNDP Country Office should put the management of natural resources and protection of the environment at the centre of its priorities and support the Ivorian Government in its reflection and actions towards better enforcement/compliance with the existing regulatory framework, but also in terms of the definition of regional policies with neighbouring countries. Indeed, this sector has been somewhat neglected during the crisis and requires a renewed interest insofar as it is correlated to many other related problems which Côte d’Ivoire is facing, such as the fight against poverty; social cohesion, governance, land disputes, etc.

**Recommendation 4. Play a more proactive role in coordinating aid.**

As regards UNS agencies, a proper collaboration strategy needs to be defined together with the other agencies, including a joint action plan in case another crisis arises, in terms of programming and resource mobilization beyond the traditional proxy activities of UNDAF preparation and participation in UNCT meetings and focus groups or through ad hoc partnerships. As regards the financial partners of Côte d’Ivoire, the UNDP Country Office should be more proactive, and play an intermediary role between the Government and all its partners, in order to better coordinate aid on the one hand, and define more compatible and complementary roles of each partner, within the spirit of the Paris Declaration.

**Recommendation 5. Rethink the strategy for resource mobilization.**

Given that ODA for Côte d’Ivoire is shifting gradually towards budgetary support from major donors (especially the EU), UNDP risks seeing its local opportunities for resource mobilization decrease and should therefore prepare for this eventuality. Resource mobilization must become an integral part of the planning activities, so that it becomes more predictable and less time-consuming for the programme, as this comes at the expense of more strategic activities.

**Recommendation 6. Take advantage of the transformative potential of the crisis so that UNDP can meet the needs of communities, while also considering aspects of gender.**

UNDP should take advantage of the transformative potential of the crisis so that the services it offers meet the needs of communities, while also considering specific gender aspects. In the medium term, it should help put the National Action Plan (2008-2012) in action with a view to implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 through its components: (i) including issues of gender in development policies and programmes; (ii) ensuring the participation of both women and men in the development process; (iii) protecting women and girls from sexual violence; and (iv) strengthening women’s participation in decision-making.

**6.2.2 OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Recommendation 7. Rethink the intervention strategy on the ground.**
Choose a limited number of interventions of a model or pilot nature on the ground by adopting a holistic approach based on preliminary studies and rigorous criteria for the selection of projects, service providers, and beneficiaries, which will provide lasting results that focus on the qualitative rather than the quantitative.

**Recommendation 8. Ensure greater visibility.**

Develop a communication policy that exceeds the framework of the institutional mandate in this area and that is more focused on specific needs. The objectives would be three-fold: (i) provide a better understanding of UNDP’s mandate and change the negative image of donors; (ii) improve the visibility of its interventions at all stages of programme implementation, not just when projects are signed, e.g. by providing a budget heading dedicated to communication in each project; (iii) help the programme communicate when projects end or sub-offices close.

**Recommendation 9. Pay more attention to ensuring that actions have a lasting effect.**

To ensure the sustainability of achievements, systematically plan an exit and takeover strategy that can be carried out on a larger scale, by identifying alternative sources of funding from other donors or by ensuring the existence of budget lines in the Ivorian Government. To increase the chances of specific community projects having lasting effects, give greater consideration to the cultural context. For example, in areas where patriarchy dominates, encourage men to take part in community projects aimed at women.

**Recommendation 10. Improve the functioning of operations.**

Continue with efforts to improve the functioning of operations within the Country Office to reduce the impact of bureaucracy and address the delays reported in the disbursement of funds. To increase the motivation of UNDP field agents in joint offices, earn the trust of the staff by developing a clearer contracting policy.

### 6.3 Recommendation for UNDP Headquarters

To allow the Country Office to respond to a crisis situation, a support mechanism should be implemented by UNDP headquarters/regional bureau with a view to channelling the requests made by the Country Office and to organizing the response in terms of support so that it is appropriate and provided in a timely manner.
Annex 1.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

The Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is to conduct a country evaluation, or Assessment of Development Results (ADR), in Côte d'Ivoire to identify and assess the evaluative elements of UNDP’s contribution to development results in the country. The approach will also help demonstrate the effectiveness of UNDP’s strategy in facilitating and supporting national efforts to achieve these results. ADRs are independent evaluations carried out as part of the provisions of UNDP’s General Evaluation Policy. Based on the principle of ownership, the EO seeks to conduct ADRs in collaboration with the national Government where possible. The objectives of ADRs are:

- To provide substantive support for the accountability functions of the Administrator towards the Executive Board;
- To ensure greater accountability by UNDP towards national stakeholders and the country’s partners;
- To serve as a quality assurance tool for UNDP’s interventions at country level; and
- To contribute to the learning process in the Country Office, UNDP, the region, and the country.

The ADR for Côte d’Ivoire will be conducted around mid-May 2012, that is, towards the end of the current UNDP programme cycle (2009-2013). It will also cover development activities from the previous Country Programme (2004-2008) and provide recommendations on strategic directions to the UNDP office in Côte d’Ivoire based on information and analyses as well as on lessons learned, with a view to preparing the UNDP Country Programme that starts in 2014. The ADR will be conducted in compliance with the Standards and Norms and the Ethical Code of Conduct of the United Nations Evaluation Group.30

2. RECENT HISTORY

Beginning on 19 September 2002, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a gradually intensifying political and military crisis, with a significant impact on the country’s economy, social cohesion, and territorial unity. In 2007, the country initiated a process aiming to end the crisis based on the Ouagadougou Accord (OA), which planned for the reunification of Côte d’Ivoire and the holding of free and fair presidential elections. The Accord allowed for presidential elections to be held at the end of 2010, which led to Alassane Ouattara being declared the winner by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), with 54.1 percent of the vote. Nevertheless, fellow presidential candidate Laurent Gbagbo contested the results and was declared the winner by the country’s Constitutional Council. However, it was Alassane Ouattara who was recognized as the only duly elected president of Côte d’Ivoire by the international community. From December 2010, the political crisis continued to worsen, massacres took place in the west of the country, and there was an exodus of populations from Abidjan towards neighbouring countries as well as widespread insecurity. In April 2011, the northern Forces Nouvelles (FN) took control of the entire country with a speed that took all observers by

surprise. With the support of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French army, FN forces liberated Abidjan from troops loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo and allowed for the legitimately elected president to assume his duties. With the inauguration of the new president in May 2011 and the creation of a new government on 2 June 2011, Côte d'Ivoire finally became reunified and is on its way to restoring its public administration and services and to bringing about national reconciliation.

2.1 DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

The main challenges faced by Côte d'Ivoire relate to restoring security, re-establishing the authority of the State by redeploying the operational capacities of the central government and local authorities, economic recovery, and job creation. The major effects of the crisis experienced by Côte d'Ivoire since 2002, which were aggravated by the recent post-electoral crisis, are: economic decline, a weakening in the social fabric, an increase in poverty for more than half of the population, bloated armed forces (which now include the national army, the Republican Forces (FRCI), and various armed groups), and a considerable setback in progress towards achieving the MDGs. The new Government has a number of pressing preoccupations, including the issues of restoring confidence in national and local government structures, security, the authority of the State, and the capacity for public authorities to take account of the sufferings of the civilian population and to attend to their needs. The economic and social vulnerability of civilian populations as a result of the economic crisis, the disintegration of basic social services, the increase in unemployment, particularly among young people, and the reintegration of demobilized former combatants and of personnel are also concerns for the government and its technical and financial partners (TFP).

3. UNDP AND CÔTE D’IVOIRE

The agreement between UNDP and the Government of Côte d’Ivoire outlines the conditions under which UNDP will assist the Government in successfully carrying out its development projects. The objective of the first Cooperation Framework between UNDP and Côte d’Ivoire (1998-2000) was to promote sustainable human development by strengthening national capacities for designing and managing projects, poverty reduction, the promotion of gender equality, environmental protection, and good governance, in compliance with UNDP’s mandate and with national priorities. The 2009-2013 UNDP cooperation programme in Côte d’Ivoire was created in a context in which the country was divided in two, with two parallel economies and two different visions for the country’s priorities, and at a time when the commitment by political and military forces under the Ouagadougou Accord was still recent. It represents UNDP’s contribution to the process of national reconciliation, reconstruction, and socio-economic recovery during the post-conflict period as well as to national development priorities and progress towards achieving the MDGs.

The programme has three main focus areas, or pillars:

- Poverty reduction, with a view to achieving the MDGs;
- Governance;
- Crisis prevention and recovery.

The third pillar emerged following the Ouagadougou Accord as a reflection of specific strategies linked to national reconciliation, reconstruction, the issue of small arms, the reintegration of former combatants, and the presence young people in the security forces. The three pillars were implemented in a context where: i) the country was divided into two zones (North and South); ii) the legitimacy of the Government was being restored; iii) the national army was being reunified; and iv) communities were undergoing a process of reconciliation after years of crisis.

Capacity-building is a constituent of the programme at the level of both central and local government and takes place in synergy with the
sectoral interventions by United Nations System (UNS) agencies as embodied in the UNDAF, as well as with other cross-cutting issues such as human rights and gender equality with a view to accelerating human development and achieving the MDGs.

3.1 THE UNDP OFFICE IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE
The UNDP Office in Côte d’Ivoire has 54 staff members, including 8 international employees (technical consultants), local and international United Nations volunteers (UNV), and local staff. The office is currently led by a Resident Representative (RR) (Ndolamb Ngokwey) and a Country Director (André Carvalho), a Deputy Programme Director for DDR/P (Aissata De, who joined in February 2012), and a Deputy Country Director for DDR/O Operations (Christian Do Rosario, who joined in January 2012). The Country Office also includes a Policy and Strategy Unit, which is managed by a principal economic consultant and includes an MDG specialist. The programme team consists of an assistant to the RR/Programme, a governance specialist, two programme specialists, and two programme analysts, who divide their time between the poverty and the governance units.

3.2 UNITED NATIONS COUNTRY TEAM AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COORDINATION
UNDP’s main partners, including UN agencies, are listed below and grouped by programme sector, some of which are active in many sectors and particularly in the Ministry of State for Planning and Development (MEMPD). UNDP’s work in Côte d’Ivoire is made possible through the establishment of institutional and operational partnerships with multilateral partners (EU) and bilateral partners (Japan, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, France, Italy, UAE, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), government authorities, decentralized local authorities, civil society, NGOs and grass-roots communities, the private sector, and United Nations agencies. The partners in each priority area are as follows:

**Democratic governance:** Office of the Prime Minister, National Assembly, Ministry of the Interior, IEC, Cities and Municipalities Union of Côte d’Ivoire (UVICOCI), and Association of Districts and Départements of Côte d’Ivoire (ADDCI).

**Poverty reduction:** MEMPD, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Education, Ministry of the Environment, Water Affairs, and Forestry, Ministry of Industry and Private Sector Promotion, Microfinancing Programme of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), International Fund for Agricultural Development, Ivorian-Swiss Economic and Social Development Fund (FISDES), Japanese Non-Project Matching Fund, the EU, regional assemblies (Conseils Généraux), women’s groups, grass-roots community organizations, NGO ANADER (National Agency in Support of Rural Development), BENTD (National Bureau for Technology and Development Studies), CNRA (National Centre for Agricultural Research), and the MTN Foundation.

**HIV/AIDS:** Ministry for the Fight against AIDS, Ministry of Health and Public Sanitation.

**Crisis prevention and recovery:** National Programme for Economic Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation (PNRCC), National Programme for the Redeployment of Government (PNRA), Denmark, Sweden, the EU, Japan, Belgium, Norway, and NGOs.

**Gender:** Ministry for the Family, Women, and Social Affairs, UN-Women, NGO Search for Common Good, Sweden, and NGO International Friendship Service.

4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION
This is the first ADR to be conducted in Côte d’Ivoire and covers the current Country Programme (2009–2013) as well as the previous programme (2004–2008). Although the focus of the ADR will be on the current programme, it will cover ongoing projects that began earlier,
and the analysis will be conducted from the perspective of a longer period (where appropriate) while taking into account strategic issues and views raised by stakeholders contacted to date. It will address UNDP activities in the country, non-project activities, and commitments made in the context of regional and global initiatives. The ADR will analyse a sample of projects to be chosen based on criteria defined in the inception report.

The evaluation will consist of two main components: (a) an analysis of UNDP's contribution to development results through the outputs of its programmes; and (b) the strategy adopted by UNDP to meet specific demands in Côte d'Ivoire while simultaneously pursuing the human development objective. For each component, the ADR will present remarks as well as an evaluation based on the set of criteria provided below. In addition, detailed criteria will be consulted in the 2010 ADR manual and the inception report.

UNDP's contribution through its positioning and strategies.

UNDP's positioning and strategies will be analysed based on the agency's mandate and the development priorities of the country as agreed upon (provided these are clearly stated). This requires a systematic analysis of UNDP's focus as part of the country's development and its policies on poverty reduction, democratic governance, and crisis management and resolution, while laying emphasis on the strategies adopted by UNDP to maximize its contribution.

The following criteria will be applied:
- Relevance and effectiveness of the country programme as a whole;
- Emphasis on comparative advantages; and
- Promotion of United Nations values from a human development perspective.

Although it is mandatory to use the above criteria and to take into account the sub-issues raised, the ADR will also review how various factors influenced UNDP's performance. The evaluation criteria form the basis of the ADR's methodology. Evaluators will generate findings within the scope of the evaluation and use the above criteria for their assessment. These findings and assessments will be used to draw conclusions and make recommendations. The issues listed above will be covered in detail in the preliminary report.

5. EVALUATION PROCESS

As indicated below, the ADR will take place in four phases, each representing a series of achievements and activities that should normally be completed before the next phase begins:
- Preparation and structuring;
- Data collection and analysis;
- Report drafting and revision; and
- Follow-up and dissemination.
**PHASE 1: PREPARATION**

The EO has conducted preliminary research for the evaluation and will upload relevant documents to a website developed for the evaluation team. The evaluation manager drafted these Terms of Reference (ToR) after holding discussions with major stakeholders during a preparatory mission from 11 to 17 March 2012 as well as with the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) in New York. The evaluation manager of the ADR is currently putting together the team. In collaboration with the team leader, he will prepare the preliminary report that will outline the design of the evaluation following the inception mission (see Section 8).

**PHASE 2: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS**

**Data collection:** Based on the ToR and studies and documents compiled for the ADR, the team will conduct the evaluation by collecting appropriate data.

- Field visits, interviews, and observations will normally be carried out through the Country Office;
- The team will gather data in accordance with the principles stated in Section 6 and especially in the preliminary report, which will address the key issues contained in the evaluation matrix;
- All interviews will be based on recommended interview protocols, and a written summary of each interview will be prepared, taking into account the agreed upon structure.

**Data analysis:** The evaluation team will analyse the data collected to formulate a series of assessments, conclusions, and recommendations, as follows:

- Once the data have been collected, the evaluation team will devote a few days to analysing it. The evaluation manager will join the team at this stage and participate in analysis and validation;
- The results of the analysis will consist of preliminary assessments based on each evaluation criterion and issue, general conclusions, and strategic and operational recommendations;

- After the formulation of preliminary assessments, conclusions, and recommendations, the evaluation team will share this information with the Country Office. To avoid factual or interpretation errors, it will organize a validation (and information) workshop that will bring together stakeholders and the reference group.

**Information and feedback meetings** – An information meeting will be organized at the end of the data collection and analysis phase to present preliminary findings, conclusions, and perhaps appropriate recommendations to stakeholders and receive feedback for inclusion into the first draft of the report. A final stakeholder meeting will be held when the draft report is ready to present the evaluation results to major national stakeholders and to review the way forward. The objective of this second meeting will be to enable a better understanding of the process by drawing conclusions for lessons learned and making recommendations based on the report, thus strengthening national ownership of the development process and of a sense of responsibility in UNDP’s interventions at country level. Significant remarks will be integrated into the final ADR evaluation report.

**PHASE 3: REPORT DRAFTING AND REVISION**

- **First draft and quality assurance** – The team leader will submit a full draft of the report to the EO within two weeks following the workshop. The EO will accept the report as a first draft if it is in compliance with the ToR, the ADR Manual, and the guidelines adopted, and provided that it satisfies the quality requirements. The draft will be subject to quality assurance by means of external review.

- **Second draft, verification and comments from participants** – The first draft will be reviewed by the team leader, who will incorporate feedback from the external
review process. Once revisions have been satisfactorily implemented, it will become the second draft. The EO will send this second draft to the UNDP Country Office and the RBA for verification and to check for any errors, omissions, or incorrect interpretations. This draft evaluation will also be sent to the reference group for comments or amendments. The team leader will revise the second draft, incorporating comments and amendments, and then present the revised draft as the ADR final report. The EO may request further revisions if it considers them necessary.

PHASE 4: FOLLOW-UP

- **Response from UNDP Management** – The Management of UNDP in Côte d’Ivoire will prepare a response to the ADR under the supervision of the RBA. The RBA will be placed in charge of overseeing and supervising the implementation of the monitoring activities in the Evaluation Resource Centre.

- **Communications** – The ADR report will be widely distributed in both paper and electronic format. Care will be taken that the assessment report be made available at the time of the UNDP Executive Board’s meeting in order for a new Country Programme Document to be approved. The EO will distribute the report widely at UNDP headquarters and among the evaluation units of other international organizations and evaluation consultancies and research institutions in the region. The Ministry of State for Planning and Development and the Country Office will distribute the report in the country itself. The report and the Management’s response to it will be published on the UNDP website in French and English, with an Executive Summary in French, English, and Spanish. Copies in French will be printed and sent to the Country Office and its counterparts for distribution, and it will be made available through the Evaluation Resource Centre.

6. EVALUATION MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

The UNDP EO will carry out the ADR in collaboration with the Country Office, the MEMPD, and the RBA, and will provide technical assistance with managing the assessment. These institutions will collaborate in guaranteeing the quality and smooth operation of the ADR process. In the light of this, the evaluation manager of the ADR has formulated the ToR for the entire ADR. He will contribute to the selection of team members and assist the team leader in organizing dialogue sessions and stakeholder meetings. The first draft of the report will be submitted to him, and he will assess its acceptability. He will also organize the process of review and follow-up. In addition, he will support the evaluation team in understanding the scope, process, approach, and methodology of the ADR, provide advice and information to the team for the purpose of quality assurance, and will assist the team leader in finalizing the report. The EO will be responsible for all costs related to the ADR.

**ADR Reference Group**

The reference group will compile comments and contribute to the review of the ToR as well as of the first draft of the ADR report. It will take part in the interviews and in the dialogue sessions and meetings held with stakeholders. The reference group was established with the support of the EO and consists of the MEMPD as the main reference and counterpart to UNDP, the RBA, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the Family, Women and Children, the National Statistical Institute, UNFPA, the EU, the Civil Society Convention of Côte d’Ivoire, and the International Rescue Committee.

**The Government counterpart in Côte d’Ivoire**

The MEMPD is UNDP’s official counterpart in Côte d’Ivoire. In this capacity, it must facilitate the conducting of the ADR by facilitating access to the necessary sources of information from other government entities. It will contribute to guaranteeing the independent nature of the assessment and, together with the Country Office,
will jointly organize interactions with stakeholders. It will facilitate the organization of meetings, including the final information meeting. As a member of the reference group, which it also helped to assemble, it will nominate consultants who may potentially serve on the evaluation team (but without playing a decisive role in their selection). It will also play a role in the dissemination and use of the conclusions and recommendations.

**The UNDP Office in Côte d’Ivoire**

The Country Office will lead the evaluation team in consultation with key partners and other stakeholders. It will make available any information needed by the evaluation team concerning programmes, projects, and UNDP activities in Côte d’Ivoire, and will provide the necessary documents and information in support of the report. The Country Office will provide the evaluation team with specific support, e.g. by organizing meetings with staff and project beneficiaries, assisting in project site visits, and organizing validation workshops and final workshops as well as by providing the evaluation team with dedicated office space. However, in order to ensure the independence of the views expressed during interviews and meetings with stakeholders, the Country Office will not be represented at these meetings. During the evaluation process and particularly during the main mission, it is expected that the Country Office will cooperate with the evaluation team and respect its independence and need for unhindered access to data, information, and individuals connected with the operation. It is also expected that the Country Office will provide written comments on the draft evaluation report within the required deadlines. The evaluation team will work with full transparency and will guard the synergy with the UNDP Country Office and its counterparts in the central Government. It will be responsible for collecting data, except in case of a conflict of interests, in which case the ADR director will be responsible for the data collection. Given the fact that the majority of Country Office staff and partners only speak French, the timetable and resources need to take this into account, allotting sufficient time and resources for managing the process of having documents translated.

**7. EVALUATION TEAM**

The evaluation team will be responsible for conducting the evaluation, as described in Section 5. It will allow them to assist in the preparation of the preliminary report (undertaken by the ADR director), to undertake data collection, analyse structured data, present preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations, conduct validation and feedback workshops with participants (whenever possible), and prepare the first, second, and final drafts of the ADR report and the Executive Summary. The EO will assemble the ADR evaluation team, which will consist of the following members:

**The ADR director** in the EO, who will provide support with evaluation design, data analysis, and the preliminary report.

**The team leader**, who will be responsible for overseeing the process and coordinating the completion of the ADR and the preparation and revision of the draft and final reports. The team leader will have extensive experience of a wide variety of development issues as well as substantial knowledge of UNDP and UN programmes in low-income countries. The team leader must be French-speaking and have solid experience of UNDP and/or ADRs and evaluations. The estimated workload for the team leader is 50 days, of which 23 days will be on site as part of the main mission, analysis, and drafting of the preliminary report (including travel and active steering of the facilitation and validation/feedback meetings), 10 days for preparation (including participation in the inception mission and the selection of consultants), 14 days for drafting the final report, and three days for actively facilitating the final meeting with stakeholders.

**National team specialists**: National consultants will assist in the collection and analysis of data. They will assist the team leader, collect data, and will be responsible for writing parts of the report. The workload of each national team specialist is estimated at about 30 days, with approximately 90 working days required in total. This will
generally include preparation and training (two-three days), on-site work (18 days), participation in the workshop (one day), and writing the report (five to eight days). A total of two to three consultants will therefore be recruited depending on their various skills and availability. Interviews and recruitment will take place in May 2012. Selection criteria will include experience of UNDP or UNS operations, full familiarity with written and spoken French (knowledge of English would be an advantage), solid experience of major UNDP operational areas in Côte d’Ivoire (poverty reduction, governance, crisis prevention), appropriate educational background in the area of evaluation (reviews, evaluations, and an ethos of complete independence), and the ability to write critically and creatively. Other advantages will include an extended network of contacts (in government, the area of evaluation, etc.) and the ability to provide on-site logistical coordination (teamwork, management of data collection, and if possible, the ability to lead a team). Applicants must not be currently (or have been recently) employed by the CI Government. They must be fully available, that is, they may not have any other concurrent commitments, and must be able to fully commit themselves to the ADR in June-July 2012. The appointment of qualified women and of independent-minded female evaluation professionals will be encouraged. The combination of skills, the scope of the consultants’ activities, and the duration and conditions of each contract will be decided by the team leader and the ADR director.

8. **TIMETABLE**

The time-frame and responsibilities of the ADR are approximately as follows, and do not imply full-time work by the evaluation team during this period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Person/entity responsible</th>
<th>Duration (2012)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparation: inception, research, initial document collection</td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory mission</td>
<td>EO + CO</td>
<td>11-17 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Terms of Reference</td>
<td>EO + CO</td>
<td>End of April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inception mission – Design of ADR, selection of evaluation team</td>
<td>EO/CO, TL</td>
<td>Mid-May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inception report: objectives, methods, evaluation matrix</td>
<td>TL and ADRD</td>
<td>End of May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main mission: collection/analysis of data, drafting of report (including:</td>
<td>ET + EO + CO</td>
<td>End of June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workshop at which results are presented and comments received)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of first draft of ADR report</td>
<td>TL/ET</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments and internal/external revision</td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second ADR draft report, comments by CO, Government, RG, RBA, and audit</td>
<td>TL/ET, EO</td>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final stakeholder workshop</td>
<td>ET + EO + CO</td>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of final draft of ADR report (and Executive Summary)</td>
<td>ET</td>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing and publication, printing of final document, dissemination</td>
<td>EO + CO</td>
<td>December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. EXPECTED RESULTS

The outputs expected from the evaluation team are:

- An inception report describing the evaluation matrix, as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of this document (15 pages maximum, excluding appendices), produced by the team leader in collaboration with the ADR director, the EO, the Country Office, and the Regional Office;

- The first, second, and final drafts of the Côte d’Ivoire Assessment of Development Results (ADR: approximately 55-60 pages for the main text excluding annexes, and an Executive Summary of 4-6 pages);

- A draft summary of the evaluation on the basis of the Executive Summary;

- Presentation during informational and final meetings with stakeholders.

All sections of the report must comply with the standard structure for an ADR report, which includes an overview of the development context and challenges in Côte d’Ivoire (Chapter 2), a summary of UN responses to this situation, including the UNDAF and the UNDP programme in Côte d’Ivoire for 2004-2008 and 2009-2013 (Chapter 3), a summary of the major findings of the evaluation team (Chapter 4), and the main conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 5). All drafts and the final version of the report will be in French and English. The French version will be distributed in hard copy (particularly in the country) while the English version will be made available for downloading from the EO website. The Executive Summary will be made available in French, English, and Spanish.
**Annex 2.**

**SAMPLE OF PROJECTS INCLUDED**

The criteria used to select projects for inclusion were:

1. Project coverage (all components represented);
3. Maturity (in the 2009-2013 programme, both closed and ongoing projects represented);
4. Geographic coverage (various regions of the country represented);
5. Budgetary scale (projects with various different budgets represented);
6. Execution modalities (both NEX and DEX projects represented);
7. Quality (both successful projects and less successful projects presented).

**POPULATION**

The portfolio of projects run by the Country Office in Côte d’Ivoire includes 32 ongoing projects and 70 that are about to close. Among these 70 projects, 32 started in 2000/2001, and were therefore designed outside of the period covered by the evaluation. They were therefore not included in the population from which the sample was taken, except for three of them that were recommended by the programme team, namely PALCP, ABRIS, and COMMDDR. Thus the population of projects from which the sample was drawn became 73, with 20 projects on governance, 21 projects on crisis prevention, and 32 projects on poverty reduction, including environmental protection and combating HIV/AIDS. Applying the above criteria, the following sample was produced:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Sample Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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## Annex 3.

### SAMPLING – PROJECTS LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
<th>Contact Person(s)</th>
<th>CPAP</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Location(s)</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNANCE</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>00057717 ESP/DEX/closed</td>
<td>66,979,821</td>
<td>UNDP Madeleine Oka-Balima 225 20 31 74 25 <a href="mailto:m.oka-balima@undp.org">m.oka-balima@undp.org</a> + Moktar Lam</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>Office of Prime Minister; MEF; UNS; UNOCI; NGOs; TFPs</td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>00036501 School cafeterias/NEX/ongoing</td>
<td>9,452,961</td>
<td>UNDP Joseph Ezoua 225 20 31 74 27 <a href="mailto:Joseph.ezoua@undp.org">Joseph.ezoua@undp.org</a></td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>Ministry of Education National School Cafeteria Directorate Support structures NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>00013145 PASU/NEX/ongoing</td>
<td>7,181,210</td>
<td>UNDP Madeleine Oka Balima + Nat. coordinator Adiko Agnès Gnammon 22522527290; <a href="mailto:Agnes.adiko@undp.org">Agnes.adiko@undp.org</a></td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior UVICOCI BTC EU</td>
<td>Regional Vallée du Bandama: Bouaké, Béoumi, Katiola, Sakassou, Katiola, Dabakala; Savanes Region: Korhogo, Férkessedougou, Boundiali, Tengrela; Dengué Region: Odienné; Worodougou Region: Boundiali, Savanes Region: Bondoukou; Nassian, Bouna; Région des Montagnes: Man, Dannané, Kouibly, Bangolo, Zouan-Hounien, Biankouman; Moyen Cavally Region: Duékoué, Guiglo;</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>00021903 MEF Capacity building</td>
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<td>MEF MEMPD</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Project</td>
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<td>Contact Person(s)</td>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Location(s)</td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
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<td>1,303,027</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>Network of women</td>
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<td>100,075</td>
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**GOVERNANCE (continued)**

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<th>Partners</th>
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<tr>
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<td>6,844,312</td>
<td>UNDP Paulin Yéwé 225 22 52 66 22 <a href="mailto:Paulin.yew@undp.org">Paulin.yew@undp.org</a></td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister MEMPD</td>
<td>Regional Former CNO regions Populations from CNO region population at large</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5,669,573</td>
<td>UNDP Paulin Yéwé Expert Anzian Kouadja 225 22 52 66 17 <a href="mailto:Anzian.kouadja@undp.org">Anzian.kouadja@undp.org</a></td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister; MEMPD; Ministry of the Interior; Min. of Foreign Affairs; Min. of African Integration; Min. of Defence; Min. of Education; National Assembly; ECOWAS Small Arms Programme; LIDHO; RASALAO WANEP-CI; APDH; UNICEF; UNOCI</td>
<td>Former combatants, former militia-men, groups of vulnerable women, population at large</td>
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</table>

(continued)
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<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
<th>Contact Person(s)</th>
<th>CPAP</th>
<th>Partners</th>
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<td>Support to DDR process/DEX/ closed</td>
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<td>Reintegration of former combatants (France)/DEX/ongoing</td>
<td>2,817,286</td>
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<td>Vallée du Bandama and Savanes Region (now Regions of Gebe and Region of Hambole): Bouaké Katiola</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>00070211</td>
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<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>Regional</td>
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<td>Former combatants, former militiamen and former members of self-defence groups At-risk youth Affected host communities population</td>
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<td>Support for re-establishment of State authority and social cohesion/DEX/ongoing</td>
<td>1,803,500</td>
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<td>Region west of Moyen Cavally and the mountains (Duekoué, Guiglo, Blolequin, Toulepleu, Bangolo, Man, Danané, Zagné, Vavoua, Zouan-Hounien and Lakota) and Abidjan</td>
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<td>Region of Bas-Sassandra (now Regions of Nawa, Gboklé, and San Pedro): San-Pedro, Sassandra, Soubré and Tabou</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>00013156</td>
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<td>COMMDDR/DEX/closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Budget (US$)</td>
<td>Contact Person(s)</td>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Location(s)</td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
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<td><strong>POVERTY/HIV/AIDS ENVIRONMENT</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>UNDP Emma Anoh-Ngouan 225 20 31 74 00 NPC Silué Sionseligan 225 05 60 90 38 <a href="mailto:sionligam@yahoo.com">sionligam@yahoo.com</a></td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>MEMPD; ANADER; CNRA; NGOs/CSOs; IFAD</td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
<td>Producers of basic seed Producers of commercial seed Women's organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7,156,760</td>
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<td>Country-wide</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,658,147</td>
<td>UNDP Emma Anoh-Ngouan NPC Fatima Silué 225 20 30 13 99 <a href="mailto:Fatima.silue@undp.org">Fatima.silue@undp.org</a></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>MEMPD; MEF; ANADER; FDP; NGOs/GCOs</td>
<td>Regional Region of Lagunes, Nzi-Comoé, Denguélé, Sud-Bandama, Agnéby, Dix-Huit Montagnes, Moyen-Cavally, Sud-Comoé, Moyen-Comoé, Bafing, Bas-Sassandra, Vallée du Bandama, Zanzan, Marahoué, Haut-Sassandra, INS Women Youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>UNDP Emma Anoh-Ngouan NPD Alexandre Assemien 225 20223022; <a href="mailto:alexassem@undp.org">alexassem@undp.org</a> Interim NPC Fatima Silué 225 20 30 13 99 <a href="mailto:Fatima.silue@undp.org">Fatima.silue@undp.org</a></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and Development; Ministry of the Economy and Finance; NGOs/GCOs; private sector; UNS; Local authorities</td>
<td>Regional Regions of Lagunes, Savanes, Denguélé, Worodougou, Fromager, Haut-Sassandra, Marahoué, Dix-Huit Montagnes, Nzi-Comoé, Région des Lacs, Denguélé, Vallée du Bandama IDPs Youth organizations Women</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>UNDP Emma Anoh-Ngouan NPD Alexandre Assemien</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>MEMPD NGOs/GCOs</td>
<td>Regional Regions of Lagunes, Vallée du Bandama, Dix-Huit Montagnes, Moyen-Cavally, Denguélé, Savanes, Zanzan, Bas-Sassandra Unemployed youth Women IDPs Communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continues)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
<th>Contact Person(s)</th>
<th>CPAP</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Location(s)</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,782,539</td>
<td>UNDP Joseph Ezoua</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning; Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training; Ministry of Employment and Youth; Local authorities/UVICOCI/ADDCI Youth organizations</td>
<td>Regional South (Abidjan and periphery: Port-Bouët, Yopougon, Cocody and Songon); Centre (Bouaké); East (Bondoukou); West (Touleupleu; Issia, Gagnoa, etc.); Western Centre (Bouafli, Zuénoula).</td>
<td>Young men and women</td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>1,140,782</td>
<td>UNDP Joseph Ezoua</td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
<td>Ministry of Industry and Private Sector Promotion; I2T (Institut de Technologie Tropical)</td>
<td>Regional Regions of Savanes, Nord Est, and Vallée du Bandaman</td>
<td>Economic interest groups Farmers’ cooperatives, cashew nut producers; developers; equipment manufacturers</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,857,734</td>
<td>UNDP Joseph Ezoua</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire Office for Parks and Reserves; GTZ; Centre suisse de recherche scientifique</td>
<td>Regional Guiglo, Ti</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,509,743</td>
<td>UNDP Emma Anoh-Ngouan</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>Ministry of the Environment, Forests and Water Planning; Ministry of Planning and Development; ANDE; CNDD; NGOs; University; Research Centres</td>
<td>Regional Ti</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>4,205,000</td>
<td>UNDP Emma Anoh-Ngouan</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>Ministry of the Environment, Forests and Water Planning; Ministry of Planning and Development; ANDE; CNDD; NGOs; University; Research Centres</td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
<td>(continues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Budget (US$)</td>
<td>Contact Person(s)</td>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Location(s)</td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>43,578</td>
<td>UNDP Emma Anoh-Ngouan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of the Environment and Rural Development</td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4.

DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Methods used</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>UNDP, UN agencies, central government, bilateral and multilateral cooperation agencies, civil society, independent sectoral experts.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Questionnaire</td>
<td>Central government, UNS agencies, members of RG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme/programme: activities by projects</td>
<td>Documentary review</td>
<td>A sample of 37 projects (out of 73 from the period 2003-2012) was chosen for more in-depth review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>About the projects selected, with donors, executing agents and beneficiaries, following a review of the documents and in order to gather additional information and perceptions of the various stakeholders involved in UNDP’s activities to varying degrees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Site visits</td>
<td>In order to validate preliminary analyses and to collect additional information in order to apply a process of triangulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme activities not linked to a specific project</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Primary information gathered mainly during interviews.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX 4. DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS

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Annex 5.

DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

COUNTRY CONTEXT

WEST AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (BOAD)


Lengthening Financial Contracts, and Issue in the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) region, AfDB, Development Research Department Development Research Brief No. 3, June 2010.


ECOWAS


INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

Côte d’Ivoire: sécuriser Le Processus Electoral, Rapport Afrique No. 158, 5 May 2010, ICG.

Côte d’Ivoire: is war the only option? Africa Report No. 171, 3 May 2011, ICG.

Une période critique pour stabiliser la Côte d’Ivoire, Rapport Afrique No. 176, 1 August 2011.

Côte d’Ivoire: continuing the recovery, Africa Briefing No. 83, Dakar/Brussels, 16 December 2011, ICG.

UNOCI

La force de la paix, Vol. 3 No. 0013, January 2012, UNOCI.

RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE


NATIONAL DOCUMENTS

STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS


Project: Etude Nationale prospective « Cote d’Ivoire 2040, Bureau National de la Prospective (Office of Foresight), Republic of Côte d’Ivoire.


REPORTS ON THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS


MDG-3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women, UNICEF CI.

Reproductive Health at a glance: Côte d’Ivoire, World Bank, April 2011.

DOCUMENTS ON POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES


STUDIES

National Development Programme


Other studies

Sources de la croissance économique, pauvreté, inégalité et implications de politiques économiques en Côte d’Ivoire, UNDP and INS, September 2011.

Annual reviews


Other documents

Programme présidentiel 2011–2015 Vivre ensemble, Dr. Alassane Dramane Ouattara.

UNDP STRATEGIC PLANS AND MYFF


UNDP STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

Country Programme Action Plans


Country Programme Documents


Millennium Development Goals

Programme d’Appui à la Réduction de la Pauvreté et à la réalisation des OMD (PARP/OMD) 2009-2013, UNDP.

Reports on human development


Côte d’Ivoire, HDI values and rank changes in the 2011 Human Development Report, UNDP.

UNDAF


Results Oriented Annual Reports


Results Oriented Annual Report for Côte d’Ivoire, UNDP, 2008.


Results Oriented Annual Report for Côte d’Ivoire, UNDP, 2011.

Resident Coordinator’s Annual Reports


Results and Use of Funds: years 2004 to 2010, Resident Coordinators Annual Report, UNDG.

Other


EVALUATIONS


An independent evaluation of the “1 000 micro-projects for socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-militia members and youth at risk in Côte d’Ivoire”, Competence on Global Co-operation for UNDP CI, December 2009.

UNDP Global Staff Survey, December 2009.


PROJECT DOCUMENTS


Projet d’appui à la base pour la reconstruction, réinstallation et l’insertion sociale (ABRIS), Ministry of Planning and Development/UNDP, March 2003.

Appui au comité de suivi des Accords de Linas-Marcoussis, Office of the Prime Minister/UNDP, August 2003.


Sous-projet de soutien en faveur des ex-combattants désarmés et démobilisés sur les sites dans le cadre du processus de désarmement et de démobilisation, Japan/UNDP, July 2004.


Projet d’appui à l’alimentation en eau potable en milieu rural et au raccordement de 100 centres de santé au réseau public d’eau potable, Ministry of Infrastructure/UNDP, July 2008.

Projet intégré d’appui au redéploiement de l’administration, au retour et à la réinsertion des PDI et à la cohésion sociale, Ministry of State for Planning and Development/UNDP, July 2008.


Programme d’appui à la réduction de la pauvreté et à la réalisation des OMD (2009–2013), Republic of Côte d’Ivoire/UNDP.


Sous-programme de renforcement des capacités du réseau des femmes élues locales ivoiriennes, Ministry of State for Planning and Development, UVICOCI, RFGL-CI/UNDP, March 2010.


OTHER DOCUMENTS

Greening the Blue Helmets, Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations, Executive Summary, UNEP, May 2012.


Présentation powerpoint du bureau conjoint du système des nations unies à Korogho, Ouattara Péyagori, National Coordinator, July 2012.

Présentation générale powerpoint des projets des zones centre et nord, Ouattara Péyagori, National Coordinator, July 2012.

PowerPoint presentation by the joint office of the UNS in Bouaké, Sémon Didier, National Coordinator, 2012.

Review document of activities by the joint office of the UNS in Bouaké, Sémon Didier, National Coordinator, 2012.

Summary statement on projects financed by UNDP in Bouaké, Sémon Didier, National Coordinator, 2012.


Annex 6.

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

PRIME MINISTRY
Amani Ipou Félicien, Executive Secretary, CNPRA
Diop-Boaré Abibatou, Technical Adviser
Général Désiré Adjoussou, President, ComNAT
Kossomina Ouattara Daniel, National Coordinator, PNRCC

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Dago Lazare, Technical Adviser
Gohourou Parfait, Director-General of Decentralization and Local Development
Yapi A. Fidel, Dr, Director of Studies, Programming, Monitoring and Evaluation

INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Adou Antoine, Special Adviser to the President of the Commission

MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE
Bessy Marius, Technical Adviser

NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR REHABILITATION AND COMMUNITY REINTEGRATION
Ehuí Esther, Adviser
Kouamé Adja, In-Charge, Studies and Projects
Kéhi Edouard, Adviser to the National Coordinator
Touré Laurent, Evaluation Chief
Traoré Mamadou, Adviser to the National Coordinator

INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Adou Antoine, Special Adviser to the President of the Commission

MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE
Bessy Marius, Technical Adviser

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS
Ba Ibrahim, Director-General
Kone M’Bana Hippolyte, Chief of Studies and Research Division

NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF GOVERNANCE
N’Guessan N’dri Jérôme, Assistant National Secretary

MINISTRY OF FAMILY, WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Adama Kone (DIFEF)
Adopo Achille (DPFFASE)
Angbomon Jean-Marie (MEMEAS)
Appaou Joseph (DPED)
Bedfort Joseph (PAVVIOS)
Bedou Kossi Sylvestre (Cabinet)
Doumibia Youssouf (DEPG)
Kaba Fofana Yaya (DEPG)
Kouadio Marie (DIFEF)
Kouame Philomène (DIFEF)
Kouadio Marie (DIFEF)

MINISTRY OF STATE OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
Diaby Lanciné, Director-General
Kouame Lancina, Deputy Chief of Staff
N’Dia Youssouf, Planning Expert, Assistant DG, Poverty
Seka Pierre Roch, Chief of Staff
Tiacoh Georges
Jules Lella

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Kaba Fofana Yaya (DEPG)
Kouadio Marie (DIFEF)
Kouame Philomène (DIFEF)
Lath Mel Alain Didier (DEPG)
Lebie Zahoui (Cabinet)
Oulaï Annick (DEPG)
Meïté Assétou
Seri Kanon Jean (DPED)
Tuho Clément

MINISTRY DELEGATED TO THE DEFENCE BY THE PRIME MINISTER
Ahonzo Alexis, Chief of Staff

MINISTRY OF TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING
Ako N’Tamon

MINISTRY FOR THE PROMOTION OF YOUTH AND CIVIC SERVICE
Koffi N’dri Philippe, Director-General, Agence d’Etudes et de Promotion de l’Emploi

MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Nasséré Kaba, Deputy Chief of Staff
Ochou Delfin, Prof., Director-General, Environment

MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS
Diabaté Joséphine, Dr., Director-General, Fight Against AIDS

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION
Glaou Oyau Sophie
Koné Karidja, Director of School Canteens
Koné Raoul, Deputy Chief of Staff

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
Traore Abdoulaye

CITY OF BONDOUKOU
Adoni Ablan Marie, Assistant for the PARP/OMD
Ama Kra Odette, NGO ‘Notre Grenier’
Bela Yacouba’s Cooperative Group Niaka à Teforo
BINI, NGO ‘Notre Grenier’
Coulilibaly Salia, Regional Director of Planning and Development
Coulilibaly Benogo, Head, Agence National de Développement Rural (ANADER) Bondoukou
Gouan Hervé, supervisor ANADER in cultivation techniques
Goun Germain François, Prefect, Gontougo
Hien Mialara, Community Manager, Head of School Canteens
Issa, Président, Ben Kadi Cooperative Group of Filakiédougou
Kassi Benie, head of the organization of beneficiaries of projects supervised by ANADER
Koffi Sawane, President of the Mi-Koki Mi-Ango Association of Yazimala
N’dri Veance, Area Manager, ANADER of Bondoukou
Noubadoum Joseph, Office of Human Rights, UNOCI Bondoukou
Ouattara Abdoulaye and Ouattara Yacouba, project leader, Jeunes coiffeurs
Siloué Brahim, Chief Financial Officer, NGO ‘Notre grenier’
Yathe Archmed, Regional Coordinator, PASU

COMMUNITY OF KOUN-FAO
BATA Djigima, Head, Vegetable Crops, Aimons Taba Cooperative Group
Cissé Mamadou, President, Aimons Taba Cooperative Group

CITY OF KOROOGHO
Chigata Silué, Deputy Mayor
Coulilibaly Adama, Municipal Counsellor
Coulibaly Labala, Technical Director, General Council  
Coulibaly Zié, Vice President, General Council  
Dosso Namizata, Préfecture Chief of Staff  
Doukouré Mamery, Secretary-General, General Council  
Fofana Daouda, Director  
Konan Sam Ataki, Commandant, 4th Region  
Kouadio Eugène, Sub-Prefect  
Samouka Touré, Dr. MEMPD  
Adrien Konan, Representative, Prodemir/GIZ  
Blé Kouamé, Coordinator, UNFPA  
Mantika Markella, in-charge, DDR/UNOCI  
Quattara Péyagori, Coordinator, UNDP  
Tinde Adama, UNOCI Security  
Ahoua Coulibaly, Coordinator of Salem Inter Women  
Ahoua K. Désiré, Analyst/Coordinator  
Amara Diarrassouba, Counsellor, Canteen CESAC 1 EP1  
Lossemi Fanny, Supervisor, OSD  
Tuho Eugène, Administrative Assistant, CARITAS  
Sorho Valérie Tiépe, Director, ARK  
Soro Madjouma, President, NGO Wobe Wognon  
Traoré Kartio, HIGATA  
Traoré Souleymane, Regional Coordinator DREH/Canteen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Projects and Beneficiary People/Communities Met</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme</strong></td>
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</table>
| POVERTY    | PALCP; 1000 microprojets | Réhabilitation du Site de Production Artisanale de Ouraniéné | ONG COOBAO | Valy Coulibaly - Président  
Coulibaly Salimata  
Représentante des Femmes |
| POVERTY    | ABRIS        | Projet de fabrication de savon à base de Nîmes | Groupement de 50 femmes chefs de ménage | Soro Tchélourgo - Membre |
| CPR        | FISDES       | Projet de réhabilitation des commissariats | Le Ministère de l’intérieur | Konan Sam Ataki |
| POVERTY CPR| UPC- Emploi Jeune | Projet d’élevage de pondeuses du quartier sinistré de Korhogo | Groupement | Konaté Alassane |
| POVERTY CPR| UPC; PIP/CS  | Projet de Réhabilitation de l’EPP Nanguin | L’école et la cantine | Traoré Souleymane |
| CPR        | Appui emploi Jeunes; UPC | Réinsertion de 32 ex-combattants démolisés dans le secteur de la boucherie moderne dans la région des savanes | Groupement de six ex-combattants | Konaté Alassane - Président |
| POVERTY    | PARP/OMD     | Projet de Moulin de Karakoro; Faitière 84 Groupements issus de 72 villages et regroupant (4018 membres dont 168 hommes) | Coopérative Chongagniri des productrices de vivriers | Yéo Fanta Gérante |
| POVERTY CPR| PARP/OMD; CPR (Projet d’appui à la relance des activités socio-éco desgroupements féminins) | Projet d’appui à la production de Karité | Groupement Tchérimin (40 femmes veuves et chef de famille) | Yéo Tchanhidabella  
Soro Kozolowa  
Yéo Tchafaga  
Soro Habi  
Yéo Natogoma  
Yéo Naminata |
**BOUAKE**

Cissé Ibrahima, ANADER  
Gango Kragba, Regional Director, MEMPD  
Gnago Kragba, Director, Planning and Regional Development, MEM  
Esmel Elie, Area Manager, ANADER  
Koko Koko Yao, DREN Bouaké 1  
Kouamé Monique, Canteen Coordinator, DREN  
Kouassi épouse Aka Ane, TS/OPA, ANADER  
N’Guessan Alexis, Wholesale Market, Bouaké  
Didier Semon, Coordinator, UNDP  
Angbomé André, Secretary-General, NGO OAP  
Berté Oumar, President, NGO ESI  
Fofana Pétiori, Coordinator, NGO PAIPS  
Frère Denis K, Director, NGO Maison de l’enfance  
Guei Madou, NGO AIP  
Kassi Elia, Director, OIC-CI  
Koffi Konan Claude, Director, NGO Espoir Vie  
Koffi Monique, AOT, PNU/SB Bouaké  
Kouakou Robert, Programme Manager, Bouaké Eveil  
Moloa Bomisso, Director, OIS Afrique  
Ouattara Allamadogo, Social Worker, NGO Maison de l’enfance  
Sangaré Moussa, Programme Officer, NGO Espoir -Vie  
Yao Kouamé Robert, DAAF, NGO IAP  
Fofana Alassane, Accountant, Cabinet Nassaïb  
N’Guessan Alexis, Executive Director, BVP  
Yao Bekanti Bonespoir, Head of Monitoring and Evaluation, BVP

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<tr>
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<th>Projects</th>
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<th>Resource Persons</th>
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<td>GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Réhabilitation des infrastructures</td>
<td>Communauté villageoise « tchèlè yédjè » Ecole-cantine</td>
<td>Coulibaly Bazoummana, chef de communauté</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>communautaires de Darakokaha</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Projet de réinsertion d’ex-combattant dans Un ex-combattant</td>
<td>Traoré Otiémé, responsable ANADER</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>l’élevage de porcs de Katiola</td>
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<td>POVERTY</td>
<td>PIP/CS</td>
<td>Appui aux AGR</td>
<td>Groupement de femmes chefs de ménage de Katiola</td>
<td>N'Dri N’Goran</td>
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<tr>
<td>POVERTY</td>
<td>PIP/CS</td>
<td>Appui aux AGR</td>
<td>Coopérative « Eyo-Enian de Refierkro (37 membres dont 30 femmes)</td>
<td>Touré Yah Sécretaire générale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POVERTY</td>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Réhabilitation du marché de N’dakro</td>
<td>Groupement des femmes de N’dakro</td>
<td>Mme Adja Vice-Présidente</td>
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<td>POVERTY</td>
<td>EMPLOI</td>
<td>Projet d’installation de jeunes à risque</td>
<td>Groupement de jeunes</td>
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<td>JEUNES</td>
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<td>POVERTY</td>
<td>PARP/ OMD</td>
<td>Installation des jeunes tisserands</td>
<td>Jeunes gens du quartier N’gatakro</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Projet emploi jeunes/habitat pour l’humanité</td>
<td>Jeunes gens de la commune de Djebonoua</td>
<td>Bouabré Larissa Estelle</td>
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<td>GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Renforcement des capacités de la Préfecture de région</td>
<td>Préfecture de région</td>
<td>Diandé Loring, Sous préfet de Brobo, secrétaire général par intérim du préfet de Bouaké</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TIASSALÉ
Tagro Lazare, President, NGO APPLOMD
Traore Oumar, Deputy Mayor

CIVIL SOCIETY
Coulibaly Tiorna, Coordinator, Centre de Recherche et d’Etudes Africaines (CREA)
Koffi Loukou Jules, PCA, Fédération des Réseaux et Associations de l’Environnement (FEREAD)
Ngouan Patrick, National Coordinator, Convention de la Société Civile
Père Jean-Louis, Mission Catholique des Frères Capucins, Zouan-Houan

PRIVATE SECTOR
Akpane Eustache, Director of the Bureau of Research, Global Challenge Corporation - CI
Alla Carole, former deputy coordinator, UNDP Office in Bondoukou
Negue Francis Kouami, Management Consultant, Monitoring and Evaluation of Programs and Projects, responsible for the final evaluation of the project YERP

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGENCIES
Daubelcour Djanamé, Head of Mission, Embassy of France
Demaison Alain, Cooperation Attache, Embassy of France
Ethmane Adel, Political Counsellor, African Union
Gillet Yves, First Counsellor, Chief of Operations for Cooperation, European Union
Inoue Susumu, Ambassador of Japan
Kojiro Fujino, Deputy Resident Representative, JICA
Nishiuchi Kazuhiro, Counsellor, Embassy of Japan
Oquet Christian, Counsellor, Cooperation, Embassy of France
Prinz Karl, Ambassador of Germany
Sorensen Gigja, Political Attache, European Union

INTERNATIONAL NGOS
Falcy Louis, International Rescue Committee
Kanyatsi Quentin, Country Director, Search For Common Ground

UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES
Da Camara Gomez Sophie, Chief of Division, DDR, UNOCI
Konte Maïga Suzanne, Representative, UNFPA
Kouassi Dosso Djeneba, Civil Affairs Officer, Coordinator of Activities for Social Cohesion, UNOCI
Koyara Marie-Noëlle, Representative, FAO
Lucovic de Lys Hervé, Representative, UNICEF
Nsabimana Charles, in-charge, Judicial Affairs, Division of State Law, UNOCI
Piazza Cecilia, Chief, Civil Affairs Division, UNOCI
Simard Françoise, Chief, Division of State Law, UNOCI
Talnan Edouard, UNFPA
Ouattara Drissa, Division of Civil Affairs, UNOCI

UNDP
Adoni Ablan Marie, Programme Coordinator, MDG/PAP Bondoukou
Assande Arsène, Coordinator, UNDP Office in Guiglo
Bamba Sekou, Project Coordinator, Support for Good Governance
Carvalho André, Country Director
De Aissata, Deputy Country Director/Programme
Mbanda Martin, Senior Adviser, Post-Conflict Unit
Ngokwey Ndomb, Resident Representative
Ngouan-Anoh Emma, Assistant Resident Representative/Programme
Oka-Balima Madeleine, Specialist, Gender and Governance
Ouattara Oumar, Financial Analyst
Tsassa Célestin, Principal Economic Adviser
Yapo Serge Armand, Programme Analyst, Governance
Yathé Archimède, Project Coordinator, PASU, Bondoukou
Yewe Paulin, Programme Adviser
### 1. Criteria: Relevance of UNDP’s interventions in terms of objectives and approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Were UNDP’s activities aligned with national strategies? Are they in agreement with people’s needs in the country? | • How did UNDP contribute to national policies and strategies?  
• In which areas and in which forms? What are some examples of good contributions?  
• Did the activities contribute to resolving a particular development problem in Côte d’Ivoire? | • Development reports and diagnostic documents for the country (UNDP and government)  
• Contact persons | • Documentary research  
• Interviews with contact persons and beneficiaries | • Results effectively envisaged in the programming frameworks of the Government and the UNS  
• Results acknowledged to have been relevant by the contact persons and beneficiaries interviewed | Highlight the coherence between the results and the various benchmarks with regard to development policies followed by the country and UNDP |
| • Were UNDP’s approaches adapted, necessary, and in phase with national initiatives? And with regard to focus areas? And the partnerships established?  
• Among its focus areas, which components of UNDP’s activities should it concentrate on? | • Development reports and diagnostic documents for the country  
• Contact persons | • Documentary research  
• Interviews with contact persons and beneficiaries | • Results effectively envisaged in the programming frameworks of the Government and the UNS  
• Results acknowledged to have been relevant by the contact persons and beneficiaries interviewed | Highlight the coherence between the results and the various benchmarks with regard to development policies followed by the country and UNDP |
1. **Criteria:** Relevance of UNDP's interventions in terms of objectives and approaches (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were the approaches, models, resources made available, and conceptual framework of UNDP since 2003 coherent in order to bring about the anticipated outcomes, particularly with regard to the MDGs?</td>
<td>• What was the responsiveness of UNDP in Côte d’Ivoire with regard to the realignment of its programme in 2003-2013 when faced with the changing needs and priorities of the country?</td>
<td>Development reports and diagnostic documents for the country</td>
<td>• Results effectively envisaged in the programming frameworks of the Government and the UNS</td>
<td>Highlight the coherence between the results and the various benchmarks with regard to development policies followed by the country and UNDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Did the activities conform to local and international standards?</td>
<td>Development reports and diagnostic documents for the country</td>
<td>• Results acknowledged to have been relevant by the contact persons and beneficiaries interviewed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Was the participative approach used systematically to plan and implement programmes, and what was achieved in Côte d’Ivoire?</td>
<td>Contact persons</td>
<td>• Contact persons and beneficiaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Criteria:** Effectiveness in achieving the anticipated results with regard to coverage and beneficiary groups and by thematic areas (poverty, governance, crisis prevention)

| What outputs did UNDP produce in each thematic area? | What were their contributions to achieving the anticipated results? Were the final results intended or unintended, positive or negative? | Status reports or final reports of projects in the programme | • Number of central or local government institutions strengthened by the programme with regard to poverty reduction with a view to achieving the MDGs | Analyse and highlight the level of output delivery by capacity-building projects |
| • Did UNDP assist central government institutions/local authorities in implementing reforms aimed at achieving the MDGs and reducing poverty? | • Did UNDP assist local communities and vulnerable populations in obtaining better access to employment opportunities and income-generating activities? | Contact persons who were stakeholders in project execution | • Various achievements, products, and performances credited to the central or decentralized government, the private sector, local communities including vulnerable groups, resulting from skills acquired through the programme with regard to poverty reduction for the MDGs, governance, human rights, and crisis prevention and recovery | Analyse and highlight the impact of these outputs on the context and the beneficiaries, i.e. to what extent were the anticipated results achieved with regard to capacity-building? |
| • Did UNDP assist institutions in ensuring their availability, accessibility, and the quality of basic social services to the most vulnerable groups, and women in particular? | • Did UNDP assist local communities and vulnerable populations in obtaining better access to employment opportunities and income-generating activities? | Beneficiary persons and institutions | • Analyse and highlight the level of output delivery by capacity-building projects |

(continues)
### 2. Criteria: Effectiveness in achieving the anticipated results with regard to coverage and beneficiary groups and by thematic areas (poverty, governance, crisis prevention) (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Did the programme contribute to the development of institutional and technical skills with regard to the protection and sustainable management of the environment, and if so, to what extent?</td>
<td>• Status reports or final reports of projects in the programme</td>
<td>• Documentary review</td>
<td>• Number of people whose capacities were reinforced with regard to the protection and sustainable management of the environment</td>
<td>Analyse and highlight the indications and arguments in favour of or against the sustainability of the results obtained with regard to protection and sustainable management of the environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Did UNDP assist populations in participating in environmental protection and improving access to drinking water, sanitation services, and power supply?</td>
<td>• Contact persons who were stakeholders in executing projects</td>
<td>• Individual or group interviews</td>
<td>• Number or percentage of beneficiaries who accessed various services (drinking water, sanitation, power)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent was democracy (including local governance) strengthened and civic participation improved?</td>
<td>• Beneficiary persons and institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Did UNDP contribute to the development of the public administration’s skills with regard to fundamental rights at a national and local level?</td>
<td>• Status reports or final reports of projects in the programme</td>
<td>• Documentary review</td>
<td>• Number of institutions, structures, and actors that were strengthened by the programme with regard to human rights and gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent was UNDP effective in coordinating aid with regard to the mobilization of resources and integration of the human development approach and other UN values? Was it improved?</td>
<td>• Contact persons who were stakeholders in executing projects</td>
<td>• Individual or group interviews</td>
<td>• Accomplishments, outputs, and performance with regard to human rights and gender due to support offered by the programme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What place was given to Gender in the implemented programmes?</td>
<td>• Beneficiary persons and institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accomplishments, outputs, and performance with regard to human rights and gender due to support offered by the programme</td>
<td>• Status reports or final reports of projects in the programme</td>
<td>• Documentary review</td>
<td>• Analyse and highlight the level of output delivery by capacity-building projects on gender equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Analyse and highlight the impact of these outputs on the context and the beneficiaries, i.e. to what extent were the anticipated results achieved with regard to gender equality?</td>
<td>• Contact persons who were stakeholders in executing projects</td>
<td>• Individual or group interviews</td>
<td>• Analyse and highlight the level of output delivery by capacity-building projects on gender equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2. Criteria: Effectiveness in achieving the anticipated results with regard to coverage and beneficiary groups and by thematic areas (poverty, governance, crisis prevention) (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Which factors affected the achievement of the programme’s results?</td>
<td>• Which factors favoured the delivery of outputs and, as a result, the achievement of the projects’ results?</td>
<td>• Status reports or final reports of projects in the programme • Contact persons who were stakeholders in executing projects • Beneficiary persons and institutions</td>
<td>• Documentary review • Individual or group interviews</td>
<td>• Number and nature of factors that facilitated the delivery of project outputs</td>
<td>Analyse and highlight the factors that facilitate the delivery of outputs by the projects, and thus the achievement of the programme’s results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Which factors hindered the delivery of outputs and the achievement of project outcomes?</td>
<td>• Status reports or final reports of projects in the programme • Contact persons who were stakeholders in executing projects • Beneficiary persons and institutions</td>
<td>• Documentary review • Individual or group interviews</td>
<td>• Number and nature of obstacles to the delivery of project outputs</td>
<td>Analyse and highlight the factors that hindered the delivery of outputs by the projects, and thus the achievement of the programme results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Criteria: Efficiency with regard to management and programming

| How did UNDP use its resources to achieve the desired results? | • Were the programmes implemented within deadlines? Did they incur additional expenses, and if so, how much and why? | • What is the impact of the crises on project duration? | • When faced by difficulties in implementation, did UNDP and its partners respond promptly and find solutions? | • What was the nature and quality of monitoring and evaluation during the period of insecurity? | • Status reports for the projects • Persons and institutions active in the implementation of the programme’s projects • Persons and institutions who benefited from the programme’s activities • Relevant observers who were present in the area | • Documentary review • Individual interviews | • Costs relative to the quality of outputs and acquisitions | • Cross verification/comparison of costs for procurement and output delivery on one side and the quality of what was procured and delivered on the other • Highlight the quality of procurement procedures |
### 3. Criteria: Efficiency with regard to management and programming (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With regard to programming?</td>
<td>• Were UNDP resources used for the activities that were likely to produce the most significant results?</td>
<td>• Status reports for the projects</td>
<td>• Documentary review</td>
<td>• Cost of procurement and delivery of outputs in relation to standards (if applicable)</td>
<td>• Cross verification/comparison of costs for procurement and output delivery on one side and the quality of what was procured and delivered on the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Was there a problem with projects being spread too thinly?</td>
<td>• Persons and institutions active in the implementation of the programme's projects</td>
<td>• Individual interviews</td>
<td>• Quality of procurement and delivery procedures in relation to UNDP standards</td>
<td>• Highlight the quality of procurement procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Did the UNDP programme maximize opportunities for synergies with activities by other partners in order to reduce costs in relation to anticipated results?</td>
<td>• Persons and institutions who benefited from the programme's activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Relevant observers who were present in the area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Were procurement and delivery procedures transparent and rational?</td>
<td>• Status reports for the projects</td>
<td>• Documentary review</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What is the quality of operational planning by UNDP? Are planning tools stable and robust (how many revisions)?</td>
<td>• Persons and institutions active in the implementation of the programme's projects</td>
<td>• Individual interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How quick and of what quality were local UNDP disbursement protocols?</td>
<td>• Persons and institutions who benefited from the programme's activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How did UNDP compare to other UN donors and others with regard to the rate of disbursement?</td>
<td>• Relevant observers who were present in the area</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there a better mechanism for managing funds?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Could there be better effectiveness, accountability, and flexibility in process management (particularly in complex processes like elections)? What was the capacity to manage baskets of funds?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How effective was UNDP in partnerships?</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How effective was UNDP in financing, procedures, transparency, communication, and ability to act in phase with other actors and beneficiaries on all these points?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. Criteria: Efficiency with regard to management and programming (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Were the appropriate personnel employed with regard to thematic areas like the environment, the Global Fund etc., but also gender?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What was the capacity and effectiveness of the NEX implementation modality?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What was done with recommendations from audits?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. Criteria: Sustainability

What was the sustainability of the outcomes obtained?

Would institutions supported by UNDP be able to continue to operate without this support?

Do the Government and other actors contribute to the sustainability of UNDP’s actions?

- Were activities by UNDP designed to take into account the identifiable risks? Was an exit strategy put in place? How does UNDP propose to withdraw from activities that have been run for years?
- Were national and local capacities in the various thematic areas sufficiently developed/strengthened to allow UNDP to gradually withdraw?
- Once pilot initiatives have been tested, has a plan for scaling up these initiatives been prepared in case they succeed?
- What is the Government doing to make investments made through UNDP (and other donors) more sustainable?

- Status reports for the projects
- Persons and institutions active in the implementation of the programme’s projects
- Persons and institutions who benefited from the programme’s activities
- Relevant observers who were present in the area

- Analysis and highlight the indications and arguments in favour of or against the sustainability of the results obtained with regard to institutional capacities in governance, human rights, and crisis prevention and recovery

(continues)
## 5. Criteria: Positioning (strategic relevance and ability to adapt)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| What was UNDP’s positioning in relation to the other UN agencies and cooperation actors in dealing with national development priorities and problems? | • Did the UNDP programme facilitate the implementation of national strategies and policies and was its work complementary to that of the Government?  
• Was emphasis placed more on policy and strategy or on operational aspects? Was there an interface more with the Government or with actors from civil society, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups?  
• What would the optimal balance be between upstream and downstream activities?  
• Has UNDP adapted to the changing development problems and priorities of Côte d’Ivoire? Does it have an adequate mechanism for dealing with significant changes in the country’s situation, particularly with regard to urgent crises?  
• How does UNDP balance the Government’s requests for short-term aid and the needs of long-term development?  
• Should UNDP concentrate more on activities linked to human rights and providing support to the most disadvantaged and marginalized populations? | • Status reports for the projects  
• Persons and institutions active in the implementation of the programme’s projects  
• Persons and institutions who benefited from the programme’s activities  
• Relevant observers who were present in the area | • Documentary review  
• Individual or group interviews | • Anchor points for UNDP’s positioning | Analyse the positioning anchor points from the point of view of revealing comparative advantages and any limitations |
| Ability to adapt to changes in context?                                    |                                                                                      |                                                                              |                               |                                             |                                                                                           |
### 5. Criteria: Positioning (strategic relevance and ability to adapt) (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance between short-term ability to adapt and long-term development goals?</td>
<td>• How did UNDP respond to needs for capacity building? Is it obliged to limit itself to capacity building at the expense of operational activities? &lt;br&gt; • Is there coordination between UNDP/other UNS agencies and other partners? What was the contribution by headquarters and the regional bureau to the dialogue with national actors on the role of UNDP, strategies, and entry points? Can further improvements be made? &lt;br&gt; • Was UNDP strategy designed to maximize the use of its strong points, its expertise, its network and contacts? &lt;br&gt; • How effective was its positioning? &lt;br&gt; • How was this positioning perceived by the other actors (governments and development partners)? &lt;br&gt; • If necessary, what should UNDP's new positioning be in the development context of the country?</td>
<td>• Status reports for the projects &lt;br&gt; • Persons and institutions active in the implementation of the programme's projects &lt;br&gt; • Persons and institutions who benefited from the programme's activities &lt;br&gt; • Relevant observers who were present in the area</td>
<td>• Documentary review &lt;br&gt; • Individual or group interviews</td>
<td>• Specific contributions ascribed to UNDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does UNDP position itself in relation to the rest of the United Nations System, the international community, and national counterparts overall?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there effective coordination between UNDP and the other United Nations agencies in shared areas of interest?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which of UNDP's strong points did the programme seek to apply through its projects?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6. Criteria: Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>Specific sub-issues</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection methods/tools</th>
<th>Indicators/standards for determining success</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What development approach is UNDP implementing in Côte d’Ivoire?</td>
<td>• How can it be ensured that all UNDP support has an impact on poverty reduction and good governance?</td>
<td>• Status reports for the projects</td>
<td>• Methods, tools, supports, and entry points</td>
<td>Outline the conceptual and strategic changes that have taken place in the programme and the reorientations that are still relevant to the development context of Côte d’Ivoire and the subregion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What conceptual framework has been developed by UNDP in support of short- and long-term development in Côte d’Ivoire?</td>
<td>• Did the current CPD focus on the right areas, in its choice of specific themes?</td>
<td>• Persons and institutions active in the implementation of the programme’s projects</td>
<td>• Focuses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well have UNDP strategies been able to adapt in response to changes in needs, tools, and planning cycles?</td>
<td>• Has UNDP taken leadership with regard to realigning priorities?</td>
<td>• Persons and institutions who benefited from the programme’s activities</td>
<td>• Partnership strategies of the programme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How can more funds be mobilized to the benefit of the regional rather than the national context?</td>
<td>• Relevant observers who were present in the area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How can the ADR better serve the country programme? And the UNDAF?</td>
<td>• Diagnosis and analysis section of the evaluation report on the results of the mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Annex 8.

**VERIFICATION FORM FOR PROJECTS/GENDER MARKER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project code</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Evaluation of gender-sensitive needs</th>
<th>Gender-sensitive activities</th>
<th>Expected results (gender-sensitive)</th>
<th>Number of crosses</th>
<th>Gender score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00052432</td>
<td>Institutional support project with the Directorate of Gender Equality (DEPG) from the Ministry of the Family, Women and Social Affairs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00062309</td>
<td>Support project for the integration of gender considerations in the Ivorian electoral process</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00070317</td>
<td>Capacity-building programme for female elected officials in local government</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00036501</td>
<td>Project for making school cafeterias sustainable (gender &amp; local development)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIV12/ER/47084/R</td>
<td>Support project for the reintegration of returning populations and the restarting of economic activities by host communities in order to restore social cohesion in Côte d’Ivoire (WITHDRAWN)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table summarizes the scores awarded by the programme advisers who were sensitized to gender. The scores awarded in this table are 2 and higher, which indicates a significant contribution to equality between the sexes, and that gender-sensitive needs are reflected in the activities planned and the results expected. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the projects presented above are projects whose aim is to address the issue of gender equality. The code 2A awarded to these five projects shows that UNDP has supported projects specifically targeting gender equality and/or specifically working with women – a revealing indicator of its strategy to take into consideration the gender aspect in its projects.