Executive summary

At its midpoint, the Communities Programme (CP) was evaluated by external specialists from the UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre in a forward-looking manner to see how it may strengthen its impact for the second half of the existing project and beyond. Evidence from stakeholders at the national and local levels, as well as internal stakeholders from different vertical programs, shows that CP’s ongoing presence and support to broad participatory, capacity-building and poverty reduction approaches make UNDP programming at the local level across sectors more effective. In the words of a representative from Farfor district administration, the CP approach has worked well because it (1) helped the district administration develop positive relations, through regular dialogue, with its community; (2) relied on a needs assessment before starting any new initiative; (3) built the capacity of the rayon administration; (4) provided financial support; (5) integrated the local government at every step and was fully transparent, and (6) opened their eyes to what is happening outside (an example is creating a network of entrepreneurs in the North and South). From the perspective of a Parliamentary Deputy, the CP’s contribution to transformational change was districts finding own resources to solve development problems and not just looking to the central government to solve all of its problems.

Going forward, CP should retain this approach with the aim of strengthening local governance and poverty reduction. The district development plan (DDP) can continue to be a platform for engagement, taking a more strategic orientation that assesses how other sectors interact with these primary goals. To achieve this more programmatic approach, the extreme flexibility of CP in serving as a delivery mechanism for any local programming may need to be examined. Engagement aimed at economic development would benefit from a somewhat different, more market driven and commercial approach. It can be most effective at the district level where there is adequate scale and access to markets. The jamoat level may become more important with the reform of the independent budget and agrarian reform; CP can support pilot jamoats to create capacity to implement these reforms as well as work on critical public services such as drinking water supply.

It is recommended that during a project retreat in March, existing technical areas of intervention should be analyzed on a geographic and thematic basis to determine where there is critical mass for a programmatic approach (along with other considerations such as local government commitment). Along with this programmatic approach there will be needed additional focus on monitoring that goes beyond counting of individual activities to connecting the dots among the interventions and explaining how they reinforce one another to achieve a greater development result. This type of monitoring can be done in partnership with local governments, so they also see the value of collecting more outcome-oriented information on their performance. The key issue to be addressed is "Know what you are doing, and why."
**Introduction**

A mission consisting of Ms Clare Romanik, Local Governance Policy Specialist, BRC and Mr Stephan Schmitt-Degenhardt, Policy Specialist for Private Sector Development, was asked to conduct a forward looking mid-term review of the Communities Programme (CP) in Tajikistan. In the briefing it was agreed to focus on the following key questions:¹

1) Is the CP on the right track?  
2) To what extent were the key recommendations of the 2009 evaluation heeded (i.e., improving M&E system and programme approach)?  
3) Is the CP supporting the “delivery as one UNDP” and contributing to multiple outcomes of the Country Programme Document?  
4) What should be the future of the area offices?

In short, the mission found that the CP is on the right track and that programme approach and delivery as one UNDP is on the way, which has contributed to achievement of outcomes for energy and environment, crises prevention and recovery, and health, in addition to the main CP outcomes of poverty reduction and good governance. To continue to be able to contribute to multiple outcomes, the area offices should be kept as they fulfill a vital function. There is room for improvement in regard to the M&E system, especially to capture the “development story” and not just the success of individual activities.

**Key questions**

**Is the CP on the right track? – Cooperation with the Governments**

**CP and the Tajik Governments are in a trusted partnership**

The CP has managed to gain the trust of the local, regional and national authorities. Trust is of crucial importance in initiating development processes, influencing policies and creating platforms for multi-stakeholder partnerships. Colleagues from vertical programmes told that without this trust fostered by CP’s ongoing presence and collaboration, their work at the local level would not have been as effective.

A key element of this trust building is the CP’s long term presence ‘on the ground’. The five area offices have been functional for more than a decade, and managed to establish personal relationships with key stakeholders inside and outside government. This enabled the area offices to convince the stakeholders of UNDP’s impartiality, and to bring stakeholders together.

¹ This deviates a bit from the ToR.
Another key element is UNDP’s general approach to involving the partner (here, the government) at every step, heed its views, and to react fast. This particular approach has been praised in many interviews, and highlighted as outstanding in the context of donor cooperation.

Donors in Tajikistan, such as SDC, see Policy Advice as UNDP’s key strength, and suggest a further strengthening of UNDP’s presence at national level. The mission underlines this and sees it as a logical step of the CPs trust, experience and presence on the local level: through feedback mechanisms, experiences on the ground shall be taken into consideration for policy changes at national level. On the other hand, national initiatives can be tried and tested on the ground. With implementation of the Agrarian reform and Jamoat law, having this national-local link will become more important. Other international players would find it difficult to establish and support this link.

Thus, the CP shall provide a ‘policy bracket’ encompassing governance oriented interventions at all stages from the local to the national level.

Where poverty reduction is the main aim of CP interventions, the focus should be at the district (rayon) level, which is the lowest level for economic development in any significant way. Moreover, CP has established working relationships with the district administrations, and through the process of formulating district development plans, the district administrations have opened up to working together with the private sector and even responding to their concerns.

Where the intention is to improve public services, the focus can be at the jamoat level. Another important reason to strengthen the capacity at the jamoat level is to encourage implementation of the 2009 Law on Jamoats, particularly with regards to gradual introduction of an independent budget for jamoats. Through work on improving public services, CP can use a human-rights based approach by empowering marginalized groups in participatory processes, as well as support other essential governance principles such as transparency, effectiveness, and responsiveness.

**The District Development Plans – a flagship**

The District Development Plans (DDPs) are the common thread throughout CP programming and have created a platform for numerous other activities. An evaluation of the 23 districts where the CP supported the elaboration of DDPs showed that districts with DDPs managed to mobilise more resources than those without. This effect has also been underlined by the visited District Authorities. But DDPs do not only result in such direct effects, but, more importantly still, have indirect effects.

The elaboration of DDPs should be seen as annually revolving process to reflect adjustments to changes in the environment. Feedback mechanisms need to be put into place so that updates to the plans will be efficient in collecting information from citizens and businesses on their relevance within

---

2 Economic activity occurs at jamoat and even mahalla level, but the ability to connect to markets starts at the district level.
the current context. Ideally, citizens and business can also be involved in monitoring the implementation of the DDPs.

The CP should consider elaborating a mechanism to sustainably secure replication and full outreach to all districts of the DDPs. In terms of investment (of time and money) such mechanism might at first require even more investment from CP then a simple straight implementation. It might as well be slower, and of lower quality. Still, the CP should not continuously replace government in such tasks. One possibility the mission identified is to cooperate with the Institute for Civil Service Training.

The CP should then also elaborate an exit strategy for its involvement in the DDPs. Such exit strategy should envisage the CPs full retreat by 2015. The use of a cadre of experts within the Ministry of Economy is a good start. The next step is for the Ministry to recognize the value of the DDPs by setting aside budget for this coaching by the experts.

“Self-starters” – those districts that developed DDPs on their own – may be the most promising for future work. If a district has undertaken all steps to formulate the plan in a participatory manner, then it demonstrates a high level of commitment to CP/UNDP principles and should be considered for working on a programme basis, as described below.

The DDPs themselves would benefit from a more strategy oriented elaboration. At present, the DDPs\(^3\) vision statement, SWOT analysis, description of “Problems and priorities by main sectors” and “Strategy and tasks of ... sector” are rather compilations of bullet points with little clear linkage, relation and explanation. Though the table (chapter 2.1.4) contains goals, tasks and activities, the linkages between these are missing (are the described activities necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve the outlined tasks, and the tasks for the goals?). What is the precise relation between the goals and the identified main problems, and between the problems and the vision? Why have certain activities/tasks/goals priority over others? What is the optimal sequence of implementation? Etc. Further, almost all problems are described as “lack of solution” instead of a problem description itself. While such simplified plan elaboration is an adequate strategy to get the Districts “on board”, the replication and outreach strategy should foresee not only a quantitative enhancement, but also a qualitative enhancement.

The Poverty-Environment Initiative is a good example of how vertical programs can translate sectoral issues into the analysis and consideration of priorities established through the DDPs. The benefit of bringing expertise from the various vertical programs is the ability to create indicators relevant for the national context that also allow the district to compare how it stands in relation to the rest of the country. For example, while all districts must consider natural disaster, land degradation, conflict, health problems, poverty, and energy needs, their relative priority will be different for each district based on the local situation. If these priorities are assessed through the DDP process, there will be more coherence in introducing vertical program interventions.

---

\(^3\) Only based on the examples of Gafurov and Rasulov Districts, the only ones translated into English.
Care needs to be taken that unintended negative side-effects of the DDPs will be limited. Such side-effects can stem from government officials a) seeing such plans as replacement for the old-style planning economy thus adhering to and implementing them rigidly (because of which rolling plans are useful), b) being subject to a ‘control-illusion’, ignoring that numerous additional requirements need to be fulfilled to develop an economy (because of which the strategies should be properly developed), c) being under-ambitious in their planning should the central government evaluate their performance on plan achievement, and d), potentially most importantly, demanding “voluntary contributions” from private companies to fulfill the plans, thus reducing incentives to grow, perform, and invest into the District, and precisely what other project initiatives are trying to reduce. This latter aspect requires especially central budget allocation.

Central budget allocation is needed for support of DDPs implementation. This is an example of CP bringing to the national policy forum needs identified at the local level. Many countries have a regional development fund to fund projects that are identified in the development plans of their sub-national governments. They may also fund priorities that are consistent with those articulated in the regional / district development plans. Criteria can be established so that funding provided is made in a transparent manner.

Capacity building is core to the programme

High turnover within the government makes continuous capacity building a Sisyphus Task. The CP cannot continuously replace the GoT in fulfilling essential functions such as training of its government officials. It must therefore support the development of corresponding capacities and mechanisms within the government that will eventually be able to sustainably fulfill such essential function. The World Bank views IT capacity as core to capacity development of government staff, which is true for local government as well as central government staff. This could perhaps be done more effectively by outsourcing such training to qualified companies in the region.

Alternatively –or additionally- the CP might consider addressing the roots of the high staff turnover. In so doing, chances for progression within the government should not be sacrificed for stability of specific functions. The World Bank has successfully supported the new Public Administration Law and implementation of the Civil Service Wage Grid, which as of September 2011 extends to the entire civil service include local governments. It expected to have a positive impact on government staff capacity by increasing salary levels for junior professional staff, where attraction and retention had been most problematic and removing nontransparent bonuses. In partnership with ICST, CP may analyze the impact of the new system on local government staff turnover to see which other obstacles may still be present.

On a long way to a coherent programme approach

The first steps have been taken

A coherent programme approach requires more than being just a delivery mechanism. The CP’s Intervention Matrix foresees five vertical interventions (rural economic development, sustainable environment and energy, crisis prevention and recovery, health and good governance), two horizontal interventions (capacity building at national and at sub-national level), and three cross-cutting themes (gender, climate change mitigation and adaptation, cross-border cooperation). Properly designed, such matrix approach should create many synergetic and reinforcing effects between its individual components that create a coherent whole. Thus, the combined impact of the programme, including all synergetic effects, should be larger than the sum of the programme’s individual interventions, disregarding synergies.

The first steps towards an integrated programme implementation have been taken, but a long way is still to go. These first steps are clearly the most challenging, difficult, and time consuming, and the CP and the Country Office can therefore be lauded for their achievements.

Still, linkages between CP projects appeared to be more isolated and less systemic. Repeatedly, the same few cases where synergies were created were mentioned (e.g. between TB and Micro Credit, vocational training). The mission gained the impression that staff – understandably – focuses on the implementation and achievements of their own project, with little knowledge of potential opportunities for connecting to other projects implemented within the CP and creating additional positive effects. Vertical thinking and planning in project terms appear to clearly dominate. Again, implicit internal incentive systems as well as donor requirements seem to hamper a true programme approach.

Also the impressive numbers produced by the CP take little account of synergetic effects. This can also be seen in the CP’s 2011 Annual Report, which almost consistently shows high total output, but provides much less insight into the interplay of the different interventions and the synergetic impacts created on the ground.

Utilising the CP just as ‘delivery mechanism’ seems to be the principal understanding. But while the promotion of the CP as ‘delivery mechanism’ is excellent from cost-cutting viewpoint, it might hinder further integration into a programme and achievement of the two core aims (poverty reduction and good governance). By the very notion of the word, a delivery mechanism is a simple service provision which neither instills integration, nor searches for additional synergetic effects. Should ‘programme’ be the main objective, the emphasis on ‘delivery mechanism’ will have to be balanced accordingly.

Delivery mechanism or programme?

By intuition, a programme approach should always be superior to an island implementation of projects. But, as will be shown in the next chapter, a programme approach also comes at a cost. And, for
the given portfolio of UNDP in Tajikistan, its potential for positive impact on the ground still needs to be proven. In principle, a programme approach should have two different benefits: It should reduce the implementation cost, and it should increase the impact.

The cost-reduction benefit of a programme approach goes beyond that of a “delivery mechanism”. The Area Offices do apparently reduce already implementation cost, but a closer programming could, e.g., create further co-financing potentials for training, capacity building, consultings, and similar. Without being able to prove it, the mission gained the impression that many cost-cutting potentials are not yet utilised.

A programme approach should especially enhance the CP’s impact and sustainability. The underlying notion of this is that a given community or target group will benefit over-proportionally from a ‘critical mass’ of support (interventions), lifting it beyond a development threshold (e.g., poverty trap), and enabling it to continue its development utilising solely own resources (endogenous development).

The notion of the existence of a “critical mass” in development is often cited and theoretically conclusive. Yet, these Advisors so far did find little scientific evidence that such “masses” exist and at which level they could have been achieved. UNDP Ukraine does e.g. state “in target rayons and municipalities where there exists a critical mass of local self-governance structures and successful community-led development initiatives, the Local Self-Governance and Participation component strategy will complement the continuing processes of Community Development and Volunteerism.” [UNDP Ukraine. (no date). Local Development Programme - Community Experiences for Policy Solutions. Executive Summary. Last page]. The EC LEADER Tool-Kit sees as a prerequisite for an area-based approach that “the area chosen must have sufficient coherence and critical mass in terms of human, financial and economic resources to support a viable local development strategy. The population must meet the critical mass criteria.”

The CP implemented 594 individual interventions of 13 types in 242 Jamoats, with an average of 2.5 interventions per Jamoat, and a maximum of 7 (Amondara and Ivan Tojik Jamoats in Zerafshan). If synergetic effects were created between the individual projects one could assume an over-proportionally higher development impact in Jamoats with more interventions than with less. Conducting a study that evaluates these impacts would be very useful. It could compare Jamoats with 6 or 7 interventions with selected Jamoats with just a few, and compare the difference.

Creating programmes

A programme that creates synergies requires common project planning. Only if projects are planned together across all vertical and horizontal interventions a programme can emerge. The likely drawback

of this is that individual projects cannot maximise numbers any more, such as ‘number of beneficiaries reached’, as they cannot select the areas and approaches that create from individual (vertical) perspective the largest output. On the contrary, compromises have to be found that do however, in their entirety, create additional impact and sustainability that might be beyond the individual (vertical) projects objective.

**A programme approach therefore needs to be continuously and consistently communicated to donors from a very early stage onwards.** Without the buy-in from the multiplicity of donors no programme approach can be developed to full potential, as donors pursue differing, partially contradicting priorities. This is likely to require the involvement of Senior Management. Nevertheless, only some of the more advanced donors will probably demonstrate this flexibility.

**Selling a programme approach to donors would probably be facilitated by a clear and focused profile and strategy of UNDP in the country.** If donors identified with UNDP a clear profile and associated a competitive advantage in this area with the organisation, programme resource mobilisation might be facilitated. Implicitly included in this is that UNDP would also have to reject requests from donors for programmes or projects that do not match its focus.

**As a further step in generating a coherent Communities Programme, the mission suggests to organise a retreat of the programme staff as well as the other involved practices.** The goals of this retreat would be to

a) map the current interventions by locality (to be carried out before the retreat, however, placing the interventions on the map during the retreat will allow each program to appreciate possible areas of collaboration or coordination, as well as visually spell out areas where CP is strongest);
b) identify further synergetic potentials between the individual projects,
c) develop a coherent impact chain of the CP including its different project combinations (cf. the CP Intervention Matrix),
d) identify and agree on common “filters” for selecting and approaching interventions (cf. later),
e) identify potential “champion” districts based on a combination of local government commitment and capacity, where the programme approach could first be attempted,
f) identify existing staff who could serve as “integrators” for particular regions where a preponderance of interventions related to their technical area are being implemented. The “integrators” would be expected to seek other types of interventions that are synergetic to existing ones. elaborate a vision for the CP beyond 2015.

**The current ProDoc of CP is valid until the end of 2015. However, the targets, activity results and budget cover the period of 2010-2012. The 2013 targets and budgets should be developed and included into existing RRF to allow continuity of the programme operations throughout 2013. The RRF will be revised as per the outcomes of the stakeholders’ retreat tentatively scheduled for March 2013.**
The character of the CP programme

Addressing poverty through a commercial or a social approach?

It has been outlined above that the CP’s apparent competitive advantage lies in its close relationship with the Governments. One pillar of the CP is therefore clearly confirmed to be capacity building to the Governments at national, oblast and district levels. But is the CPs “vertical” focus rather on social programmes or on commercial programmes. There are important differences.

Social approaches, as predominantly applied in the CP project, usually address the most vulnerable directly. They rely mostly on grants or strong subsidies, and can target a large variety of sectors. As they rely on subsidies, they are re-distributive, and require a constant source of funding to achieve replicability and sustainability. Only governments can provide this funding. Social approaches do therefore require from the onset an (at least intended) budgetary backing by the government. Often, social approaches alleviate poverty without a strong poverty reduction effect.

Commercial approaches target particularly income poverty through employment creation. They rely on functioning markets and the private sector. Their impact on poverty is indirect, through a trickle-down effect. Businesses can either be incentivised to hire vulnerable and poor, or business sectors can be targeted that do by nature make more use of this target group. While some subsidies might be temporarily (or in some cases even permanently) required, the driving force behind these approaches is the profit motive. Commercial approaches do therefore require interventions that strengthen markets and the private sector (as prime employment provider). They contribute more to poverty reduction than alleviation, though often, the ones who first get a job are not necessarily the most needed and excluded.

The promotion of social enterprises and CSR might be an alternative way to address poverty. However, the first one depends on a sufficiently large pool of social entrepreneurs, characterized by voluntarily working without profit motive. As incentive systems are currently in most societies, this approach is therefore neither reliably scalable, nor can it be reliably targeted to specific people, regions and sectors. In consequence, while it is useful to create an enabling environment for their development, and foster awareness to increase their creation, it is not a reliable strategy a country can be built upon.

CSR, in as far as it is based on philanthropy, falls into a very similar category. Once we consider it within the new approach to CSR, it is again a profit driven undertaking, thus following a commercial approach – with a social face.

Both approaches are absolutely necessary to fight poverty, but both approaches in parallel, implemented by the same organisation (UNDP) in the same area, can lead to conflicting messages: One household receives a grant or a high subsidy to enable it to generate a minimal survival income, while the same organisation expects from (potentially) the neighbouring household to pay fully because

---

7 Capacity development at the jamoat level would be very targeted, for example, in support of the introduction of the independent budget and could be done in coordination with other donors.
that one wants to make a true business out of a similar activity. Similar examples abound. International experience shows that the issue is not the (justifiable) different treatment of different people, but that all is visibly (or implicitly and known) stemming from the same organisation (UNDP).

A parallel implementation can also lead to a ‘softening of boundaries’ of the programme staff. A critical measurement of ownership in a commercial approach is the willingness and ability to pay, which is notoriously difficult to measure. It is then a fast slide to conclude that people who are not willing to pay are not able to pay, and thus entitled to substantial subsidies or grants. The credibility of the programme staff can suffer. Assume, for example, the programme subsidises business development services for small businesses. It is in line with international good practice to request from the receiving business a substantial cost sharing. Now, the programme does simultaneously support income generating activities for women. As this is more socially oriented, it provides support services free of charge. For most recipients, such distinctive treatment is almost impossible to understand, thus reducing credibility of the overall programme or causing moral hazard to misrepresent their situation. As well, the individual programme officer, faced with a women headed business that presents itself as unable (or unwilling) to pay, might easily remove this business from the business target group, but add it to the income generating activities target group, which allows the free provision of services. It must be noted that most recipients will not distinguish between different UNDP programmes, and not even between different UN Agencies.

Lastly, both approaches require a different counterpart structure. While the social approach is mainly oriented towards various governmental authorities and NGOs, the commercial approach is mainly oriented towards private sector organisations and just those governmental authorities responsible for the business climate. Running both approaches in parallel thus significantly adds to complexity.

Note, however, that the CP can in principle implement differing approaches in different oblasts.

The following table outlines one possible way to structure poverty reduction interventions. It provides also some typical characteristics of the respective approaches, and typical intervention examples.

*Table: Approaches to poverty reduction*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Sub-target</th>
<th>Principle approach</th>
<th>Main partner</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial poverty</td>
<td>Increase of income</td>
<td>Self-employment</td>
<td>Business development</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Private sector, start-up, business growth, BEE, VC, corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income generation</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Subsidised</td>
<td>Food security, micro-enterprises, micro-loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Commercial or subsidised</td>
<td>Governmental/PS</td>
<td>VT, education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Matching supply-demand | indirect/direct | commercial or subsidised | Gov't/PS | Labour market information systems, BMOs, employment offices, VT

Reduction of expenditures under own control | requiring investment | direct | commercial or subsidised | Gov't/PS | EE in houses, hh budgeting, micro saving

Reduction of expenditures not under own control | requiring investment (from gov't or others) | indirect/direct | subsidised | Gov't/PS | streets, infrastructure, micro-hydropower

Non-financial poverty

Access to services

| Services principally available | direct | subsidised | Gov't/NGOs | connection to existing utility grids, school/health cost, corruption
| Services unavailable (for individual) | direct | subsidised | Gov't/NGOs/PS | access to water/electricity/health care

Social exclusion

| Based on changeable characteristics (of individual) | direct | subsidised | Gov't/NGOs | TB, migration, education
| Based on unchangeable characteristics (of individual) | direct | subsidised | Gov't/NGOs | women, race, religion, disabilities

Potential common implementation criteria

‘Implementation criteria’ in this sense are well defined filters through which all CP projects are screened. They are predominantly addressing the ‘how’ and not the ‘what’. Such filters facilitate a common understanding, a unified approach to project implementation, and a clearer communication.

The mission suggests the following ‘must’ filters/criteria:

- Clear and feasible replication and exit strategy from the onset
- Political commitment by the respective local government (ideally, also reflected in DDP)
- Only piloting / prototyping (to be implemented in a few locations to test the approach, while there should be buy-in for government budgetary support for the scaling up)
- Inclusion of governance aspect and feedback mechanism to national level
- Non-substitution of government (from the beginning, at least in-kind support by the local government to cement their involvement)
- Coherence of interventions from target group perspective
- Evidence based interventions and continuous monitoring
- Achievement of critical mass / ability to ‘connect the dots’
- Development perspective from territorial / Jamoat perspective (and not sectoral)
- Synergies with other interventions [including non-UNDP]

The retreat should identify beyond these ‘must’ criteria appropriate further criteria. These could, e.g., be: minimisation of the subsidy/grant paid out, involvement of private sector, implementation through partners, conscious element of different trials / freedom to fail, rural-urban linkage. Further, there could be a clear definition of ‘vulnerable’, of prerequisites to be fulfilled by partner governments or target areas and of minimal partner contributions. Though all these filters do not by themselves guarantee a further strengthening of a coherent programme intervention, they do, if well defined, help channeling the activities of the participating programmes.

Given limited –and decreasing- resources the CP should also chose between addressing many different sectors in one geographic area versus some sectors in many geographic areas. The former approach shifts the CP more to a typical territorial development project, while the latter approach emphasises the sectoral intervention. While the project document is more oriented towards the former, it does not make this orientation explicit, thus also leaving room for an orientation towards the latter.

**Know why you are doing what you are doing**

The above mentioned elaboration of a programme impact chain (versus project impact chain) will significantly support both, CP and partner governments, in further increasing their awareness of the ‘why’ of the interventions and actions. But the ‘why’ has a second important aspect: Evidence based planning and implementation.

**A management information system for the CP**

Being such a complex programme, the CP would significantly benefit from a management information system (MIS). The elaboration of such MIS will certainly be challenging, as the complexity of the programme needs to be reduced into constantly measurably and still manageable data and information. While the MIS will have some pure project related elements, it should focus on the programme elements, i.e., and data reflecting the combined efforts of more than one project. This in itself will facilitate discussion across UNDP Programme Units, and orient thinking and efforts towards a common goal.

Besides serving as a very important management tool, an adequate MIS is also a very valuable communication tool towards UNDP itself, donors and the interested public. With comparatively short
time lags, the management will be informed about relevant outputs, outcomes and impacts of the programme, and can hence react fast with up-to-date information to any inquiry.

The above mentioned criteria, together with the MIS, will also help drafting new project concept notes and project proposals much faster, as essential information and guidance for approaches is available and does not require re-discussion and negotiation.

Evidence based planning also for the partner Governments

Planning can only be as good as the evidence that supports it. But for their planning processes (e.g., the DDPs), Governments need to rely on usually rather meager and imprecise data. The CP should therefore consider supporting Governments to establish simple but adequate M&E systems and the capacities to obtain these data. It might be possible to expand the proposed Local Economic Performance Indicator (LEPI) to comprise not only economic but also social, environmental and governance indicators, and to be organised according to elements of an impact chain. Such indicator system would facilitate the understanding of the linkages of different interventions. The indicator might be supported by a more widespread use of public hearings.

But data need to be correctly interpreted to be of use. Anecdotal evidence however points to it that most government officials, especially at lower governmental levels (Districts, Jamoats), seem to have difficulties to critically interpret and analyse provided data. The CP should therefore consider supporting local statistical capabilities in both, statistical offices and government.

Evidence based approaches everywhere

Also other UNDP projects and programmes are very evidence based driven: the Crisis Prevention Team emphasised the importance of evidence based policy making in its project on Agro-Biodiversity. The Poverty and Environment Initiative agreed with districts on a set of 37 indicators which are to be collected at local level.

The future of the area offices

The CP’s area offices are a pillar of reliability and trust enablement for UNDP Tajikistan. They provide the platform for continuous engagement with stakeholders and have thus essential functions far beyond their actual delivery function. Such platforms are one of the competitive advantages of UNDP in the country.
Area offices should be maintained in every region where UNDP plans more comprehensive and long term involvement. They should especially be maintained where a partnership built on trust is essential for the long term success of the projects.

But area offices do not necessarily need to be financed through the CP project. Alternatively, they could be seen as local representations of the Country Office, though base financing would be a direct burden on Tajikistan’s TRAC funds. However, as in the current model, the Country Office could recuperate most or all investment (or even achieve a net-benefit) by selling the Area Office’s services to the projects at elevated prices. For example, a formula could be calculated where a portion of “overhead” costs (eg. rent, guards, administrative staff) could be applied to each hour or day requested of an AO manager or programme specialist.

While area offices do also not necessarily need to be staffed with specialists covering all vertical sectors, they do require cross-cutting awareness and insight. In other words, it might not be required to have one specialist from each UNDP practice area, but those present need to be able to “connect the dots” across all practice areas (without being necessarily specialists).

Cost reduction in Area Offices should also not go that far that their presence borders insignificance. An Area Office will still need to be a representative of UNDP, and would thus risk credibility if it was, e.g., staffed with just two people sitting in one room.

Further observations

Further observations: Governance

CP’s work on governance needs to be rooted in the appropriate level of government. In considering at what level of government the CP can work to improve governance, several aspects need to be analyzed and compared, including current and future responsibilities (according to anticipated reforms). The traditional form of self-government of the Tajik people is the mahalla, and it effectively organizes community life. The head of the mahalla serves important functions such as collection of fees for gas, electricity, water, and maintaining public spaces. Even if UNDP does not anticipate providing direct or exclusive assistance to mahalla, their contributions must be recognized in the country’s overall local government system.

At the level above the mahalla is the jamoat, which is defined in the 2009 law as local self-government, but cannot be considered a true local government by international standards because it does not have an independent budget. Without an independent budget, the jamoat cannot determine how to spend its budget. Without discretionary funds, it has very little influence over the territory’s development. More than 80 percent of the jamoat budget is needed for the municipal administration, education and health. Jamoat leaders may request additional funds for specific activities to support fire prevention, cultural life, sports and recreation, celebrations, or social assistance to vulnerable
populations, but these are not always received. There is no basis for supporting economic development at the level of jamoat.

**Capacity development of pilot jamoats can push forward implementation of reforms that have been on hold too long.** CP is well-placed to negotiate with key actors within the national government on how to proceed with the pilot phase of the jamoat reforms. Before the pilot jamoats are transferred to independent budgets, CP can provide training on budgeting and financial management, perhaps in collaboration with deconcentrated offices of the Ministry of Finance, and with other donors working in this area. Jamoats will be expected to have a much greater role in service delivery and economic development therefore necessitating systemic capacity development. CP can work with the Institute for Civil Service Training on developing practical materials as well as a strategy for delivering training in the regions.

**Despite the lack of financial and institutional capacity at the jamoat level, it may be the best level of government for improving drinking water service, an essential public service.** The mission witnessed the re-introduction of water services within a jamoat as a result of collaboration with a local private company that took on this responsibility. Similarly, the recently concluded USAID Tajikistan Safe Drinking Water Project worked at the jamoat level and created community water boards for maintaining water system. Because water is so important, members of rural communities are often willing to contribute their efforts to improve drinking water. Only 20% of Tajikistan’s rural population has access to centralized sanitary drinking water. This is a strong argument for CP to work on this issue; with the other argument being that this is UNDP’s competitive advantage. By combining CP’s expertise with that of the Energy-Environment Programme, UNDP can propose and support more institutionally sustainable solutions. A lesson from some early renewable energy projects applies here: local ownership of the system is the most important factor for (sustained) success.

**At the district (rayon) level, where CP has concentrated its efforts on the district development plans (DDPs), business processes can be improved and in fact incorporated into the implementation of the development plans.** To improve the quality of the DDPs, they should address how the district administration operates. For example, the administration can see whether it can improve how it organizes service delivery. Drawing on the experience of UN Women in Moldova, CP could work with district and jamoat level to create coordinated service provision particularly for the benefit of women and vulnerable groups of population. In Moldova the Joint Information Service Bureau (JISB) brings together nine services focusing on the areas of employment, labour market and social protection providing guidance and advice and thus addressing challenges at the local level. One aspect of the service delivery innovation was increasing efficiency, convenience and transparency with a “one-stop-shop” or “one window” located in an easily accessible and visible place in the building of the rayon council and/or rayon administration premises (with operational costs fully covered by local sources including rayon council). JISB sittings take place once a week, providing opportunity for local population to benefit from its coordinated services in the areas of employment, social protection, SME development, land cadastre, agriculture and etc. To ensure its effective functioning, Memorandums of Understandings were signed between service providers, and rayon administration. By sitting together, the service providers become familiar with each other’s work and are able to take a more holistic view
of clients and identify complementary services (eg. active labour market services for those receiving social benefits). Another service delivery innovation of the JISB is mobile visits to villages (coordinated with local village leaders) that are especially beneficial for women and rural population not able to travel to the rayon center, including the disabled or those who care for the disabled.

The more significant and lasting impact of DDPs comes not from the plan itself but from the planning process. There are four key attitudinal changes that occur when the planning process is done well: (1) local administrations attitude toward citizens and business and vice versa; (2) a collective sense that setting the development direction is a responsibility of the local population (i.e. development is not imposed, but enabled by higher levels of government); (3) while not adequate for meeting all needs, local resources can be mobilized for development priorities; (4) while some level of infrastructure (physical capital) is a prerequisite, social and human capital also need to be developed (within community, private sector and local administration), administrative processes have to be improved (for efficiency and transparency) and natural capital (natural resources) must be used effectively so that its value is not degraded.

Governance principles on which to base programming interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance principle</th>
<th>How the principle relates to activities and objectives of local government programming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic vision and consensus orientation</td>
<td>The process of creating district development plans (DDPs) can be used to build a collective, broad and long-term perspective on sustainable human development, and what is needed for such development. Public-private dialogue is another example of forming consensus orientation on main economic development challenges and specific issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and rule of law</td>
<td>This is built on the free flow of information. The Public Access to Information Law in Tajikistan can form a basis for interventions. Local governments’ (LG) and deconcentrated state agencies must understand their obligation to publish and make information available. Citizens, businesses, and CSOs need to learn how to request and make use of information (eg. budget, tenders, land records). To ensure legal frameworks are enforced consistently, targeted assistance may be necessary to vulnerable groups such as through legal empowerment of the poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness and efficiency</td>
<td>Local government acts to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve citizen satisfaction with public services, including human security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Implement DDP with own resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strengthen capacity of its staff to be competent in their functions and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability / Responsiveness</td>
<td>LG executive and representative branch have clear roles with the latter having adequate capacity to perform oversight over the executive. LG explains to citizens their performance and seeks feedback from citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 In this area, collaboration with the Tajikistan Land Registration and Cadastre System Project of the World Bank would be ideal.
Participation / Legitimacy

Participation strengthens the legitimacy of government by connecting the government to those governed. By participating, citizens become more aware of what government is doing and how it operates, and it develops capacity for oversight. LG creates permanent mechanisms for collecting input of citizens, private sector and CSOs for use in local decision-making. Citizens, CSOs and business groups have capacity to represent their interests.

Equity / Inclusion

Generally, this relates to equal access to services. It also can include use of the territorial plan and budget for supporting marginalized groups. Finally, there should be an official LG policy with respect to gender equity that is implemented.

Resilience and environmental sustainability

Local development (action by LG and other local actors) has a long-term view to the wealth-generating potential of the territory’s natural resources; sustainable (agricultural) production is encouraged and effectively regulated. Resilience against climate change and natural disasters is built into planning, particularly for infrastructure investment.

Inclusion of anti-corruption projects

Arguably the two most relevant interventions to reduce poverty are anti-corruption and education. Corruption produces high cost especially for the poor, both, in direct as well as indirect terms. Indirectly, it deprives the economy of viable businesses, as they are reluctant to invest and grow. For businesses, increasing the predictability of corruption is more important than holistic attempts to reduce overall corruption.

With the Sector Integrity Risk Assessment project, UNDP Tajikistan has gained experience in a very interesting model, which should be expanded to cover business-related corruption. The project manager was open to further discussions on this. The CP could also consider supporting e-governance as an effective tool to reduce corruption.

Additional emphasis on education

Education is a major factor in influencing the mindsets of the future generation. Tajikistan’s education sector is said to be rather closed to outside support, yet, the ... of the ... assured the mission that she can support the organisation of targeted interventions.

The CP could support project weeks and extracurricular activities especially in elementary schools in target areas. The topics of such activities would spread from general education (e.g., on analysis,
creativity, fairness, computer use) to specific awareness raising events (e.g. on energy efficiency, water use). Such interventions are found cheap and would enable AOs with limited donor funds to continue producing development results.

**Further observations: Poverty reduction**

**Increasing disposable income**

Increasing the disposable income of the poor through cost reduction has a similar impact on their lives as an increase in income. But our focus in poverty reduction is usually predominantly on increasing their incomes, as this meets established benchmarks. Some potentials for cost cutting and thus increasing disposable incomes are mentioned in the following.

Despite free health care, out-of-pocket expenditures for health care use form a large part of the expenditures of households, especially poor households. A sustainable cost reduction at this front would hence have a strong poverty reduction impact. In preparation for the planned retreat, the Health and the Poverty Reduction Units should therefore attempt to identify commercially viable ways how to reduce healthcare expenses sustainably. Every percentage of reduction could have already a significant poverty impact. Note, the solution needs to be sustainable.

Rural poor spend around 20% to 30% of their annual cash income on heating. An average household is said to require either 1.5 tons of coal or 5cbm of wood per season for heating. Coal can be purchased in summer at 0.7 Somoni per kilogram, and in winter at 2.0 Somoni per kilogram. Accordingly, the annual heating bill is between 1,050 Somoni if pre-financed, and 3,000 if financed as you go. For wood, often preferred but environmentally more questionable, the cost are between 1,000 (summer purchase) and 2,000 (winter purchase).

**Solar air heaters could easily save 60% of the annual energy cost.** Constructed and installed in a do-it-yourself manner for under US$ 200, they could provide most of the household heating demands, as Tajikistan counts on 340 sunny days per year. The investment cost are easily re-financed within the first season. Without additional heat storage, they could be used all through the day, thus requiring traditional heating (with coal or wood) only in the morning before sun-rise (thus, 60% savings). The installation of do-it-yourself heat storages, made of PET bottles, could further improve efficiency and might even allow up to 100% cost reduction.

**Business enabling environment for the Private Sector**

The State Committee has an interesting initiative to support the implementation of reforms. It is establishing a database where businesses can constantly control when they will be subject to an inspection, and by whom. Though such database would only be helpful to those businesses with internet.
access, local business organisations could take over the dissemination of the information to members through SMS. This database idea appears worthwhile to further assess and potentially pursue.

**Private sector structure**

The meso level, comprised of business membership organisations (BMOs), is essential for business development, but weak in Tajikistan. While the AfT has positive experience with working together with the Farmers Association, other organisations retreat from this area because sustainable progress is too difficult to achieve. Yet, a difficult process cannot be a sufficient reason for retreating from this essential area.

**The BMO related targets formulated by the CP are broadly adequate.** If they however make developmental sense, then all three targets need to apply to the same organisations, and the organisations need to be of substantial nature. If, e.g., a typical donor driven private sector association has 20 members, and membership is increased free of charge by 15%, then no real progress has been achieved. The mission could not measure the progress in these targets, as there is no monitoring.

**Should the CP decide to focus on business development, it will have to include cooperation with and strengthening of BMOs.** Reportedly, there are over 200 Farm Business and around 40 business associations in the country, none of which shall be financially sustainable (some shall however have achieved about 50% to 60% financial sustainability). The approach would thus have to be very incentive oriented and hands-off. Expectations of donors and within UNDP would have to be well managed: It is likely that even after years, only marginal progress will be achieved.

**Though standing in direct competition to BMOs, one should consider the establishment of a truly independent, yet Government financed, business ombudsman.** Such institution (also promoted by SIC) needs to enjoy the full trust of the businesses (and the Government), and should explicitly be seen as only temporarily, until BMOs can take over its functions.

**Business training**

**Business training for small and medium enterprises could be organised in an almost self-financing manner.** The mission was informed that standard and free-market based computer or English training classes cost in the province about 150 Somoni per session of 15h (with 15 to 30 students in the class). This reflects the willingness and ability to pay of the provincial “middle class”. For a similar price it

---

9 2a) Sustainability index of targeted private sector organisations, service users and community based organisations is increased at least 10%. 2b) Mechanisms for participation of civil society and private sector are established and used in 100% of targeted district and sub-districts where development planning is supported through CP. At least 3 organisations involved in each targeted district/jamoaat. 2c) Membership in private sector associations and civil society organisations is increased by at least 15% in targeted areas.
should be possible to organise standard business management, accounting, export/import and similar trainings. There is no need to bias the market – and UNDP’s budgets - with unnecessary subsidies.

Micro loan activities

The provision of micro loans seems to be one of the focal points of intra-UNDP and intra-UN cooperation. Micro loans are given to TB affected people, to disaster affected people, to women, etc. Micro loans can have a positive impact on poverty reduction, but there is no clear automatism. It is thus worth and necessary to deeper evaluate the actual impact of the micro loans.

The visited micro loan organisation confidently claimed that its loans make whole villages rich, but could not provide any evidence. While the organisation is screening loan applicants on their poverty status, no strict guidelines and categorizations could be presented, and the anecdotal evidence provided referred to obviously richer clients (purchase of tractors). Though the (short and medium-term) evaluation of the loan’s impact is costly, it would be worth the expense, as it provides evidence for approaching donors as well as Government.

The very laudable financial management and outreach of this micro loan organisation would hence benefit from a more systematic approach and monitoring. The organisation has achieved operational sustainability a few years ago, and seems to have by now also achieved financial sustainability.

If the CP decided to concentrate more on small enterprise development, the current average loan size would certainly have to be substantially increased to at least $10,000. Considering that worldwide, average loan size in micro credit is around $500, in Latin America $1,000, but in EE and the CIS countries almost $2,000, it shows how much the loans of these organisations are targeted towards the subsistence economy. This is unlikely to have substantial economic impact.

Instead of continuing to finance micro loan organisations with own budget, the CP might consider building their capacities and linking them up with international investors. The micro finance system is flooded with private money in search of investment opportunities. Alone the top ten investors control 59% of the micro finance assets (2010). The countries of EE/CIS are together with Latin America the largest recipients of these funds (35%, versus 37% LAC, 9% South Asia and 19% the rest).

Public Private Partnership (PPP)

Interpretations of “PPP” within UNDP appear to range from an informal agreement between government and a business to the construction of power stations and highways. Outside the development arena, PPPs are usually only defined to as contractual long term agreements that involve an optimisation of allocation of risk and profits. “Core PPP” comprise Build-Own-Operate (BOTs, and related), concessions, lease contracts, management contracts and service contracts.
A presented example of a water service provider in Kulyab District cannot be counted as a PPP as it lacks the characteristic of an optimal allocation of risk and profits and the temporal characteristic of the contract. Rather, it is a privatisation in a regulated sector\textsuperscript{10} to a social entrepreneur. It is a social enterprise as, under the given circumstances, the business does have little chances to make an adequate profit reflecting the risk taken. And as social enterprises depend on entrepreneurs willing to forego profit making possibilities, the model is hardly replicable.

Potential niches for business development

There appear to be many areas where niche businesses could have an impact: recycling could be one of them. According to the Environment Committee, waste management—or rather the absence of it—is a serious threat in Tajikistan. Experience shows however that solid waste, properly sorted and recycled, is very valuable. UNDP has experience in other countries which could be transferred to Tajikistan. All projects have in common that they are low skill employment intensive.

Further observations: Programme implementation

Outputs and outcomes

The outcome indicators of the Country Programme Results and Resource Framework are broad, partially impossible to measure objectively, and do neither have an indicated baseline, nor values. While a ‘poverty rate’, a ‘rate of economic growth’ (poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs), and a ‘prevalence of HIV’ and an ‘incidence rate of TB and malaria’ (health) could still be determined, a ‘degree of inclusiveness’ (good governance), a ‘degree of compliance’ (environment and energy – how shall compliance with individual conventions be weighted and aggregated?) and an ‘availability of capacity’ cannot.

The CP’s M&E system does neither constantly measure the output nor the outcome indicators (as far as measurable at all). The mission can therefore not draw any conclusions on the CP’s impact.

Though the relation between economic growth and poverty reduction is more complex than often stated, there is broadly acknowledged and proven that there is, in general, a positive correlation. Yet, there is no automatism between the two: the correlation depends on the “profile of growth [...] , the sectoral location of the poor and the extent of mobility across the sectors”.\textsuperscript{11} The project document does not give any further indicators as to where these links are seen in Tajikistan. As both goals –of

\textsuperscript{10}Note that some authors include privatisation in regulated sectors as PPP but refer to it as PPP in the broad definition. Still the visited example lacks the optimal risk and profit allocation characteristics.

poverty reduction and economic growth appear to be equally weighted in the outcome indicator, the CP’s scope of engagement would have to be extremely broad to just address this outcome indicator.

The stated outcomes and indicators appear to remain relevant for Tajikistan’s development situation. Yet, one cannot automatically conclude from ‘relevance’ to ‘optimal’: To identify which interventions would be optimal for the CP, one would have to analyse three distinct, yet related issues: 1) What are the partner’s development priorities?, 2) Where are the bottlenecks in Tajikistan’s development?, 3) Where is UNDP’s competitive niche? In the crossing point of the three, UNDP should focus with the CP. 12

The three outputs of the CP are heavily interlinked because of which a priorisation between them is not useful. Sub-national governments need, e.g., capacitated partners from the civil society and the private sector to participatorily develop meaningful plans. They also do need an enabling policy framework that gives them the flexibility and means to elaborate plans adjusted to their specific reality.

The CP appears to have placed a strong emphasis on Output 1, somewhat neglecting the equally relevant Output 2. Output 3 misses the important aspect of implementation of such policies and regulatory frameworks.

In developing new output targets, CP can explicitly recognize the multi-sectoral approach for which it is striving to achieve. For example, instead of counting improvements separately in different sectors, they can be amalgamated, such as: “Provision of basic services (e.g. water, energy, school, health) is improved (measured by community opinion and objective measures) in a financially, institutionally and environmentally sustainable manner in at least X jamoats.”

Managing operations

Operations should be a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Regrettably, UNDP rules and procedures are complex and not very flexible. The dominant preoccupation of all UNDP staff with operations, rules and procedures was clearly evident by the fact that every meeting partner of the mission first spoke about operational aspects. Still, it appears that also within the UNDP context more flexibility and less preoccupation with operations might be possible.

Examples were mentioned were UNDP did apparently procure at much higher cost than other organisations (NGOs). Though this is sadly frequently the case, careful and well managed procurement can achieve similar results, having even the potential to procure under common market prices. However, this process requires much time and energy from the procurement department as well as sufficient lead time from the procuring project.

12 It needs to be acknowledged that there’s a great deal of subjectivity especially in the second issue: What is a bottleneck is in the eye of the beholder. Further, the third issue implies not only the objective element where UNDP has a competitive niche, but also the subjective assessment where partner’s assume UNDP’s competitive niche.
Knowledge management within the programme

The Agro-Biodiversity project raises awareness through mobile theatres. It is not clear to the mission of this approaches’ impact has every been evaluated. If so, and if found positive, the CP could apply this approach also for many other community mobilisation activities.

The intended UN Trust Fund for Human Security

The mission received the concept note for the intended UN Trust Fund for Human Security and commented on it. Noteworthy are the high potential for adverse incentives and crowding out, created by some of the intended project components. This includes:

- An explicit focus on female headed households, as it might provide perverse incentives for households at the margin of migration to do so – the families will be supported by the programme.
- A simultaneous focus on food security and income generation for rural households. The former requires a concentration on staple crops, which are always lowest in terms of profitability and income generation ability. The latter requires a diversification towards higher value crops, which are usually more risky. Given small plots, achieving food security and simultaneously producing for the market in sufficient quantities is seldom possible.
- A focus on women-led agro-processing businesses. Given limited local markets this can lead to a crowding out of existing local businesses, unless the project links the new or the existing businesses up with extra-regional or even international markets (AfT project!). As these existing businesses are likely to be male owned and only marginally profitable, a small disruption of the market will lead to business closure and migration of the former business owners. The women left behind can then again be taken care of by the project.
- The focus on remittance financed community projects makes sense but might put the – originally- recipient households under enormous social pressure. Instead of using the remittances for their own advancement, or for creating and expanding their own business, they are induced (or forced) to invest into community projects. Such projects help everyone, and especially the poorest, but prevent the slightly better off from advancement and employment creation.
- The project aims at employment creation but has little activities related to this.
- The envisaged replication mechanism disregards the necessity to constantly subsidies the approach.
- To achieve financial sustainability, micro-associations and cooperatives require a minimal size.
- When implementing food-for-work programmes, food should be procured locally to stimulate markets. To avoid price raising effects of this extra demand, such programmes need to be planned and announced with anticipation so that farmers can accordingly produce more.
• A training on energy saving techniques is useful but –at least in terms of electricity- does not change the availability of electricity during crucial times of the year.

Donor coordination

Tajikistan is already well ahead of other countries in terms of donor coordination. This is evident in the Development Coordination Council and the numerous working groups. The coordination could be further improved if a donor matrix was established for those donors working at the local level. The matrix would show projects, project partners, time-frame, geographic area of implementation and outcome of each donor financed project. Despite the difficult environment, donors must take care not to establish parallel structures: The mission was informed that Government is not invited to all the working groups – not even as observer.

The future of the CP

An improvement of the Human Development Index (HDI) might be one CP outcome indicator to strive for. As the HDI can be broken down to district level –and is already being measured in 26 districts- it would be an adequate approach for UNDP to take the HDI level as a primary indicator.
Outputs according to ToR

Scope of the Review

Outcome analysis

- To what extent are the outcomes set out in the ProDoc relevant to international and national frameworks such as MDGs, NDS/PRS?

Output analysis

- What is the quantity, quality and timeliness of outputs? What factors impeded or facilitated the achieving of such outputs?
- Are the monitoring and evaluation indicators appropriate to link these outputs to the outcome, or is there a need to improve these indicators?

Output-outcome link

- Assess UNDP’s ability to develop national capacity in a sustainable manner (through exposure to best practices in other countries, holistic and participatory approach).
- Has UNDP been able to respond to changing circumstances and requirements in capacity development?
- What is the prospect of the sustainability of UNDP interventions related to the outcome?

Recommendations

- Provide preliminary recommendations on how the UNDP Communities Programme can most effectively continue to support the Government and how the poverty reduction and governance portfolio should be designed.

Deliverables according to ToR

- Executive summary;
- Introduction;
- Description of the review methodology;
- Analysis of the situation with regard to outcome, outputs, resources, partnerships, management and working methods;
- Key findings;
- Conclusions and recommendations for the future programme implementation,
- The entry points for more effective fundraising, communications and integration of CP (a) within its key programmatic portfolios, (2) within CO and (3) the UN system in general. Entry points for more close engagement of BRC experts in addressing the identified capacity gaps (ie communications) are to be determined by the review mission.