**Outcome Evaluation**

**UNDP Regional Programme for Africa**

**(2008-2013)**

**Part 1: Main Report**

Prepared for

UNDP-RBA

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*We, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, meeting in Paris on 2 March 2005, resolve to take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to the UN five-year review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) later this year. As in Monterrey, we recognise that while the volumes of aid and other development resources must increase to achieve these goals, aid effectiveness must increase significantly as well to support partner country efforts to strengthen governance and improve development performance. This will be all the more important if existing and new bilateral and multilateral initiatives lead to significant further increases in aid.*

**“From the preamble of the Paris Declaration**

 **on Aid Effectiveness, 2005”**

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**Executive Summary**

*The Executive Board mandated RBA to conduct the outcome evaluation of the Regional Programme for Africa 2008-2011, which subsequently was extended until the end of 2013****.*** *The regional programme includes four focus areas, namely, poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs, consolidating participatory and democratic governance; conflict prevention, peace building and energy, environment and sustainable development. The programme contains 17 outcomes which are the subject of the present evaluation. After a careful review of pertinent documents and interviews with key stakeholders and partners in the field, the Evaluation Team has come to the following main findings, lessons and recommendations for the next regional programme.*

1. ***Findings***
2. ***Findings related to the Regional Programme as a Whole***

 ***Coherence and approach***

* *The RCFIII encompasses four thematic areas with a total of over 15 projects or interventions. But it does not look that the programme comprises of mutually-reinforcing and interrelated projects that operate in ways that ensure synergies and complementarities, except within the governance programme. There are few operational linkages between and among various programme interventions. For example, the relationships between private sector development interventions under focus area 1 and the economic governance component under focus area 2 are not clear. Some outcomes are not only confusing, but interventions geared to their realization could have been merged into one consolidated outcome. For example, Outcome 4: trade negotiations reflect common African position, can be logically one of the results of Outcome 3: Strengthened capacity of African countries for increased participation in global trade and linking trade policies to poverty reduction. It also appears a breakdown in the logic underlying the four focus areas. Although it can be argued that conflict prevention and recovery can be separated from governance for operational reasons, this distinction is often blurred when confronted with realities. Conflicts are symptoms of bad governance, and as such conflict prevention logically falls under the broad governance strengthening agenda.*
* *The agenda of RCFIII has been largely defined to cover the majority of the countries. This approach is necessary, but not sufficient. Supplementary and complementary interventions on a sub-regional basis are lacking. Only the Energy/Environment focus area has regional and sub-regional approach, since issues differ among the sub-regions, because of their differing socio-economic structures.*
* *The realisation of 17 outcomes RCFIII has a number of well-focused interventions (projects). However, given the scarcity of resources and skills, RBA would have done better by concentrating its efforts on the areas where it has comparative advantage, such as MDG (e.g. poverty reduction, gender equality) and governance.*

***Change strategy: capacity development***

* *In the case of training programs for example, no evaluation results were available to determine their effectiveness. There is a need to design an evaluation tool to assist in determining the performance of capacity building efforts.*

***Results-based management***

* *The results-based management approach has guided the regional program document preparation and an M&E system was fully incorporated into the implementation process of RCFIII. However, this system is not fully utilised. The monitoring and the reporting are weak.*

***Resource mobilization***

* *Resource mobilisation is an important dimension in considering the effectiveness of the totality of the Programme. The Programme has had an uneven track in this regard. Yet, it is a critical to issues for the sustainability of programme activities, in as much as UNDP’s initial investments need to be up scaled through leveraging additional resources of development partners.*
1. ***Findings related to each focus area***

***Poverty Reduction and MDGs***

* *All outcomes in this focus area are relevant, reflecting UNDP’s strategic position and RBA’s intent, taking into consideration the African realities. Sustainability, on the other hand, is yet to be asserted in some outcomes, because interventions related to these outcomes are yet to be concluded.*

* *MDG based planning and Poverty reduction component provided strategic support to governments in the region in their efforts to meet the MDGs and operationalise poverty-focused development. Yet, there are constraints that are faced, for example by senior economists, a key capacity development modality of the RCFIII. This has to do with an almost “dual role” they play in providing much needed economic expertise to their national counterparts in planning and finance ministries, as well as meeting capacity gaps within the Country Office.*
* *One of the insights gained during interviews of senior economists is the lack of a full and systematic awareness of the totality of the Regional Programme and the missed opportunity for greater synergy within activities in the same focus area, as well as between focus areas.*
* *Effectiveness of the MDG-based planning component will in the long run critically depend on a sustained and intensified process to support national institutional capacity development and policy formulation that is MDG-focused and mobilising development resources to this end.*
* *The gender component of the programme has set down a solid foundation for achieving gender responsive national development. The strategy has been to develop a critical number of gender sensitive development planners and economists to provide skill and knowledge base to undertake this transformation. The next stage is a process of consolidating the investment at the country-level through strategic linkages to Country Programmes.*
* *Support for HIV/AIDS has focused on mainstreaming the issue into the human rights sector, working closely with the AU and at the sub-regional level mostly with SADCC. While this is important, the interface with development constituencies, in particular those working on MDGs, including programme stakeholders in national planning and finance partners, as well as National AIDS Commissions, has been limited.*
* *The African Human Development Report was just launched and it is envisaged that it will provide a valuable knowledge base for many of RBA countries that are facing critical food security crises. In particular, the report will be a useful resource for those countries focusing on food security as part of their MAF process.*

***Governance***

* *Participatory democracy and good governance, as the major strategic objective of RCF-III, has gained prominence in the regional and national agenda and is progressively and firmly taking root in the African continent. However, considerable challenges still persist.*
* *Linking norm formulation to norm implementation remains a critical step for democratic and good governance consolidation.*
* *There is a need to rethink the approach to electoral and anti-corruption assistance by adopting a more systematic strategy that targets the structural challenges and root causes of electoral conflicts and corruption. A holistic approach that engages governments at multiple fronts and is driven by a coherent anti-corruption strategy with links to the APRM Country Programme of action is worth trying.*
* *The governance components are not sufficiently synergised to ensure a solid coherence, coordination and teamwork, and to avoid fragmentation, duplication and high transaction costs in the process.*
* *The activities and outputs related to economic governance, including corporate governance and transparency in management of natural resources, have not received adequate attention and must be stressed in the next Programme, with linkages to the regional inclusive private sector development programme.*
* *Intra-African technical cooperation and collaboration under CAMPS and APRM is a very promising approach that can facilitate the sustainability of public sector reforms, since these are driven by countries themselves with no conditionality clauses. This approach, however, is yet to be institutionalised.*
* *Meaningful involvement and participation of civil society in the overall conversation on good governance is yet to be achieved.*
* *While UNDP’s substantive support is appreciated by beneficiaries, on the basis of complaints, its delivery mechanism is considered slow and not consistent with the imperatives for African ownership of development processes.*

***Conflict Prevention and Peace Building***

* *The results are below expectations in this focus area. The low results stem from a number of challenges that lie outside the control of UNDP. In all probability, UNDP’s design of the Programme has created some tensions with the beneficiaries.*
* *In particular, the outcome on Disaster Risk Reduction has failed to deliver, while it remains a key priority for the AU and the RECs. If the intended programme will not become operational in the short term, RBA will have to restart from scratch and ensure that the outputs in the programme remain relevant or adapt these based on the AU’s and REC’s needs.*
* *The radical change in the donor landscape affected the aid principles governing this focus area and UNDP has not adequately responded to that, creating uncertainty for partner donors and beneficiaries.*

* *The overall performance in this focus area fell short of expectations and UNDP’s strategic position as a consequence is weakened.*

***Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development***

* *The focus on access to energy services and environmental management was very appropriate in that it enabled UNDP to complement and add value to other UNDP energy/environment activities in the region, e.g., GEF, MFP, Boots on the Ground and Africa Adaptation Programme.*
* *The achievement of the outcome regarding enhanced capacities of regional and sub-regional institutions to deliver energy services has been met only partially (only ECOWAS and ECCAS have each a sub-regional energy access framework). With regard to EAC, progress has been very slow. Moreover, the introduction of MFPs in East Africa has not materialized, likely due to insufficient progress in working with EAC. It is recognised, though, that a number of other factors may have contributed to this situation and these may not have been necessarily within the control of the Regional Programme.*
* *The strategic and sound partnership that UNDP forged with UNEP and UNITAR was instrumental in strengthening the capacities of RECs, in turn, to support their member states in enhancing the level of participation of African governments and institutions in environment and in improving capacities of DNAs to access carbon finance.*
* *The concept of gender and energy was well addressed under both Outcomes, leading to substantial progress in meeting gender targets.*
* *UNDP is well-placed to continue to play a catalytic role in securing the participation of other partners from both the public and private sectors in support of its continued efforts for access to energy services to rural areas. In addition, given its existing support to the region on renewable energy and energy efficiency through GEF-funded activities, UNDP has the real opportunity of being a key player in the implementation of the United Nations Secretary General’s initiative of Sustainable Energy for All that will focus on the same areas of access to energy, energy efficiency and renewable energy.*

1. ***Lessons learned and their implications for the next regional program***
* *As MDG and governance focus areas of RFCIII show, to promote awareness and debates on the critical needs and priorities for accelerating integration is essential. Yet, this process is usually slow and requires a longer period of interventions.* ***Implications for the next program:*** *the dedication of 2012 as the year of shared values and all public activities that have been programmed to celebrate this year could be evaluated to inform the convening of similar events during the next program. Moreover, all African countries should be encouraged to engage in the preparation of the country governance report under the AGR and the validation workshop of the national report must continue to seek the presence of key prominent officials such as the Prime Minister and the President of the National Assembly.*
* *The Service Champion Country strategy can accelerate technical cooperation among African countries by employing experts from the continent and sharing best practices from countries with similar conditions. It can also help develop a sense of ownership of the development process.* ***Implications for the next program****: in addition to a better targeting of activities during the annual African civil service day, UNDP could mount a regional data base of African experts or practitioners on key public administration modernization and governance issues and use them for experience-sharing throughout the continent.*
* *Sharing of best practices on governance can increase learning on what works and what does not work in various situations, and reduce the need to reinvent the wheel. It can also contribute to accelerate the momentum for governance reforms. Knowledge sharing is thus an important factor in organisational or societal performance****. Implications for the next******program****: UNDP should continue with knowledge-sharing activities with attention on all the steps in the process: knowledge production, diffusion/dissemination and utilization.*
* *Capacity development is also a long-term process; hence, it requires long-term engagements and investments.* ***Implications for the next program:*** *UNDP should encourage well-targeted multiyear capacity building plans and multi-donor funding commitments (i.e. 5 years)within a program approach framework to avoid duplications, especially in the area of advanced training.*
* *Partnerships between UNDP and regional organisations will have to be built within the context of equality, transparency, consensus building, delivery on commitments and collective responsibility for results.* ***Implications for the next program****: UNDP could use the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda of Action as tools to engage partners, develop mutual accountability frameworks and set up plans to periodically evaluate collectively-agreed upon development results with them.*
* *UNDP is respected for its technical advice and support to AU and RECs staff and processes. There is a need, however, for UNDP to continue safeguarding its leadership role, while in some focus areas, such as peace and security, it needs to ensure effective relationships with both donors and RECs.* ***Implications for the next program****: Whenever possible closer and better coordinated efforts are called for.*

*The donor landscape has been changing and traditional and non-traditional donors have taken a prominent place. In preparing programmes/projects, non-core sources must be assessed realistically, as well as what role UNDP should play.* ***Implications for the next program:*** *All non-core financing should be strictly demand driven.*

* *The designation of an Energy and Environment Practice Leader in various RSCs elsewhere has yielded very good results, for it ensured that there is a structure in place to facilitate a coordinated effort for collaboration among various Programmes and to seek opportunities to complement each other’s activities. This lesson should be a good example for application in RSC in Africa. As the experience of the PREP project shows, slow replacement of the project staff has been detrimental to project implementation, ergo jeopardising expected outcomes..* ***Implication for the next program****: UNDP should establish swifter recruitment of the required personnel*
1. ***Recommendations for the next regional program***
2. ***Recommendations related to the regional program as a whole***
* *UNDP can streamline focus areas, perhaps three altogether. The suggestion here is: (i) Poverty reduction and MDG; (ii) Governance; and (iii) Environment and climate change. These focus areas are not only where UNDP has comparative advantage, but also correspond to Africa’s priority needs and preferences.*

* *Fewer outcomes and outputs are preferable; both from substantive contribution point of view, as well as from the management stand point. All outcomes should be scrutinised and reformulated, paying a closer attention to their interrelationships in regard to the overall programme goals. The report cannot suggest which outputs should be retained or discarded. Once the focus areas are decided, then and only then can specific outcomes and related outputs be articulated.*
* *Supplement and complement RCFIV’s regional approach with sub-regional approach, such as eastern, western and southern Africa.*
* *In the design of RCFIV, formulate outcomes unambiguously and do not deviate at all from the SMART norm for the indicators of outcomes.The M&E system designed as an integral part of the Programme Document must be adhered to without deviation. Strengthen the monitoring system to ensure that the agreed support to stakeholders is provided in a timely manner. Devise evaluation tools to facilitate the assessment of the performance of capacity building interventions, notably training programs.*
* *Though not necessarily mandatory, in order to assure the realisation of expected outcomes, subject key projects to mid-term evaluations and make financial provisions beforehand for that purpose.*
* *Realistic financial plans should be the rule in the implementation phase of the projects. TRAC and non-TRAC resources should be assured before the implementation phase starts.*
* *Develop partnership and resource mobilization strategies to diversify sources of funding beyond conventional partners, including philanthropic organizations, emergent countries, private sector entities and the African Diaspora. Implement a more pro-active communication strategy to highlight the regional program results and ensure their visibility among key and potential partners.*
* *Staff appointments/replacements should be made swiftly and in time to avoid delays and the frustration of the beneficiaries.*
* *A re-evaluation of AU as partner and RECs is in order, because these institutions are not financially viable without external assistance. In most cases, AU, REC, and NEPAD cannot sustain results on their own, due to lack of contributions from their members and member states. Although the Team cannot advance a recommendation as to how eliminate this dependency, it is advisable that UNDP-RBA take note of this situation and design programmes/outcomes so that their sustainability is assured at the end of interventions.*
1. ***Recommendations related to each focus area***

***Poverty Reduction and MDGs***

* *This focus area is overloaded, criss-crossed with seven outcomes and sixteen projects. It is suggested here that this area be simplified, as well as reoriented. If the suggestion is accepted, it MUST also BE accepted that the reduction of poverty and MDG 1 are causally linked with private sector development/employment creation and investment. In which case, focus area 1 would have only three outcomes. Outcome 1 would be an expended private sector (including SMEs) and its markets. Outcome 2 would be greater investment flow. Outcome 3 would be capacity built in work force (including youth) that would be employable by the private sector. It is advisable that a sub-regional approach be viewed positively.*
* *The above recommendation presupposes a heavy involvement of senior economists. In addition to their many functions expounded elsewhere, the Senior Economist may be involved at all levels of this focus area from design to implementation.*
* *The role of senior economist is seen here as pivotal. In order to assure the sustainability of its results, the position must be protected from possible changes that might occur in the philosophy of future RCFs, which might leave it out of its ambit. To guard against this in RCFIV, the budget allocation for the project of a senior economist should be transferred gradually to the budget of the Country Offices in such a way that at the completion of RCFIV, the remuneration of the senior economist is fully incorporated into their budget.*
* *AfHDR is also be another supporting element to focus area 1. It is recommended that it should continue (perhaps published every other year), tackling the issues, for example, of private sector development in Africa together with clear and implementable policy advice.*
* *One of the projects for the attainment of Outcome 1 is “Pole de Dakar”. Essentially it is a governance/public administration project and if it is to be continued in RCFIV, it should be in the governance focus area Outcomes 6 and 7 should be just a component of a single outcome, tentatively called “Expanded Trade, Investment, and Private Sector in Africa’ as discussed above and be included in Outcome 1.*
* *Outcome 9 and its supporting project “Negotiating and regulating investment contracts” seems to be not a successful one, according to the evaluation report that was issued in June 2012. The examination of Outcome 9 and the project in question suggests that this project, which essentially deals with economic governance, should not be in focus area 1, but included, in a newly designed form, into focus area of governance.*

*Governance*

* *The current building blocks of the Governance Programme have created some results that must be sustained. At the same time, the Programme components must be restructured to better reflect the major thematic areas for bringing about democratic consolidation and good governance, i.e. support to civil society organizations, economic governance.* *Pro-democracy associations including watchdog organizations, human rights movements and the media organizations can play a catalytic role in corruption control strategies by among others exposing corruption cases and sensitizing the public on its destructive consequences, maintaining web-sites and hold meetings on corruption, thereby keeping corruption in the limelight as one of the central public policy issues for improved governance, sustainable growth and human development.*
* *UNDP-RBA should avoid confining the scope of the regional governance to traditional governance issues of constitutionalism and democracy and should expand on emerging issues, such as the oversight functions of parliaments in regard to the achievement of MDGs and climate change.*
* *In a politically charged environment like AU, to be more effective, technical support must be complemented with political advocacy targeted at the highest level of organisational leadership.*
* *The ownership of governance seems weak, as a number of stakeholders in the field were not aware of its existence and substantive content. There is a need for broader consultation and dialogue mechanisms during the Programme formulation and implementation stages to ensure sufficient buy-in and ownership.*
* *Democracy and governance are prominent and central in AU’s Shared Values vision and agenda. But the institutional environment under which AU operates cannot guarantee effectiveness and sustainability of any assistance. In order not to waste UNDP’s resources, specific projects should be undertaken to assist in addressing key performance-influencing factors.*
* *The regional governance component of RCFIII has helped AU and RECs with normative frameworks and instruments. The next Programme must give a special emphasis on the implementation of these tools. In this context, the Governance Programme needs to collaborate closely with the Country Offices to use UNDP country-level programming to promote the regional governance agenda.*
* *The capacity building of Programme beneficiaries is a key to its ownership. In particular, providing direct support to African management institutes, which instil values and culture, can help them learn how to manage and administer projects in the international context, in addition to the delivery of substantive products. The infrastructural assistance, such as regional or sub-regional libraries, should enhance the visibility and impacts of UNDP-RBA.*
* *UNDP should also advocate for African governments to be at the forefront for supporting capacities for building African institutions, including Africa Governance Institute, through regular contributions (Trust Fund for each institution). UNDP should use leadership at the highest political level, since RCF is well situated to advocate for the organisation of retreat sessions in favour of Heads of State and Government. Such meetings may coincide with AU annual Summits. The retreat sessions, conducted by seasoned experts, should focus and summarise new developments and best practices in selected areas of interest.*
* *There is a specific need to build capacity of women leaders and managers (through structured training programmes), which should lead to greater participation and representation in highest political and managerial positions*
* *In developing the continental normative framework on decentralisation and local development, UNDP should pay special attention to economic decentralisation.*
* *A monitoring and evaluation system should be established within the AU Department of Political Affairs to facilitate the task of tracking whether its Member States are implementing the commitments they have made with regard to the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance.*
* *UNDP should prioritise the building of governance structures in post-conflict states. There is no need to have stand-alone or separate units/departments for conflict prevention, peace and recovery, since conflicts are signs of governance failure, and should be redressed through governance improvements. Hence, conflict prevention and peace building efforts must be integrated in the larger governance reform initiatives, such as strengthening the rule of law, the electoral system, the modernisation of the security sector, the participation of minority groups in critical decision making, and decentralisation and public administration reforms.*

 ***Conflict Prevention and Peace Building***

* *This focus area should be reconceptualised based on a robust analysis of clients’ needs and UNDP´s technical response capacity. The areas of support that have been identified for this focus area remain relevant in order to respond to the needs of the AU and the RECs in future. In particular, Disaster Risk Reduction needs to be discussed, since beneficiaries have not received any assistance in this area and the status of the project is unclear to beneficiaries.*
* *UNDP should redesign AU’s and RECs’ specific programmes complementary to other donors or in close cooperation with them. This may enable UNDP to regain its strategic position.*
* *UNDP‘s Country Offices in RECs’ capitals to complement the Service Centre in Addis Ababa, and building strong partnerships with RECs must be incorporated into RCFIV.*
* *As mentioned under recommendations for governance, UNDP should consider a Programme that serves both conflict prevention and governance, which are part of the same challenge. Support to NEPAD and the Panel of the Wise, with a strong focus on pre/electoral support, and democratic elections must be kept in forefront in RCFIV.*

***Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development***

* *UNDP should continue to support the implementation of energy services to rural Africa in view of its comparative strength in this area, with regard to policy formulation, institutional set-up and capacity development. UNDP should also strategically position itself to plan an active role and be a key partner in the implementation of the Secretary General’s Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative in the region.*

* *In view of the evolving nature of climate change discussions, UNDP should use its sound partnerships with UNEP and UNITAR in turn to strengthen the capacities of RECs to support their member states in improving capacities of DNAs to access carbon finance. This support should continue to be beneficial to African governments and institutions to enable them to play an active role in global negotiations.*
* *Working with and through RECs, UNDP should continue to play the role of an “honest broker” in assisting Programme countries to negotiate “win-win” agreements on emission trading, the proceeds from which can be used as supplementary funding for access to energy services.*
* *The internal budgetary constraints that prevented RECs from providing the counterpart commitments during implementation should be addressed upfront with their respective management during formulation of the next RCF.*
* *The next RCF component on energy/environment should make provisions for designating one of the staff from among those working on different energy/environment projects and programmes at RSC as Energy and Environment Practice Leader. This will ensure that there is a structure in place to facilitate a coordinated effort for collaboration among various energy/environment Programmes and to seek opportunities to complement each other’s activities.*
* *With regard to gender and energy, the Gates-funded project showed that when clear objectives and targets are established upfront during formulation of the project/Programme Document, benchmarks can be used during implementation to measure progress in real quantifiable terms. Hence, RCFIV may wish to consider including, where feasible, measurable and easily monitorable targets with respect to gender and energy.*
1. **INTRODUCTION**

**1.1 Rationale and Purpose of the Evaluation**

The Executive Board mandated the RBA to conduct the outcome evaluation of the Regional Programme for Africa 2008-2011.[[1]](#footnote-1) Some projects of the Programme commenced operations in 2009 or later, and the majority of them are nearing the completion of their activities. A *Management and Technical Review* was conducted in late 2010/early 2011[[2]](#footnote-2) for the entire Regional Programme; however, the focus of this review was not on outcomes, but more on management. The present evaluation intends to assess the outcomes and aims to provide the necessary evidence for future decision-making by RBA’s management and for the independent evaluation to be carried out by the Evaluation Office (EO) at a future date. The evaluation, analyzes the Programme outcomes, and also looks into management issues, but does not discuss them at great length.

The present evaluation keeps in the forefront the evaluation of the previous Regional Programme (RCFII) carried out by EO in 2007[[3]](#footnote-3), since said evaluation contributed greatly to the design of the present Cooperation Framework. The present evaluation emphasizes the RCF’s added value in the regional context, and determines the role of the Programme in strategically positioning UNDP relative to regional develop­ment priorities.

Briefly, the objective of the evaluation is to assess the extent to which RBA’s Regional Programme and presence contributed to the achievement of the UNDP strategic objectives set out in the Strategic Plan of 2008-2013. The focus of the evaluation is on the developmental changes at the outcome level. Hence, it pays great attention to outcomes in determining UNDP’s contribution to development effectiveness.

The evaluation assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of each of the outcomes leading to the four Focus Areas listed above. Relevance is taken to mean the extent to which a development initiative and its intended outcomes are consistent with regional policies and priorities and UNDP’s corporate plan and its priorities. Effectiveness is understood to be the extent to which the initiatives’ intended outcomes have been achieved within the prescribed time. Efficiency measures the resources’ use in order to produce the desired outputs or outcomes. In an outcome evaluation, it is appropriate to estimate total resources used toward a given development outcome. Sustainability measures the extent to which benefits of initiatives continue after external development assistance ends.

* 1. **The Conceptual Framework of the Evaluation and Methodology**

The evaluation uses the Regional Programme Document Results Framework as a means to better understand and assess the logic of Programme interventions and its coherence with UNDP’s and RBA’s strategic plans, as well as Africa’s priorities as perceived by the Continent.

The evaluation criteria form the basis against which the performance of RCFIII in the concerned focus areas is gauged. The evaluation attempts to assess the extent to which all seventeen outcomes translated into four focus areas constitute a coherent Programme Framework.

Although the evaluation seeks to ascertain UNDP’s contribution to the planned outcomes, it is presumed that outcome achievement is a result of multifaceted efforts from various partners and stakeholders, and cannot, therefore, be attributed to one single agency. It is, however, valuable to determine how the Regional Programme collaborated with other partners who could have influenced outcomes and what kind of strategies were put in place to mitigate adverse influences.

The analysis consists of five steps to arrive at evidence-based conclusions and practical recommendations for future programming. These steps are: (i) review of project findings; (ii) analysis of whether and how outputs were achieved; (iii) analysis of how outputs lead to outcomes per Focus Area, with key findings identified; (iv) analysis of how outcomes in the four Focus Areas lead to the overall objective of the Regional Programme; and (v) conclusions with regard to the overall objective supported by the key findings, and recommendations for the future Programme per focus area. Each conclusion is assessed with regard to *relevance, effectiveness, efficiency* and *sustainability*.

The Results Framework provides a set of indicators used in each focus area to assess Programme performance against targets. The principal methodology for the assessment is the triangulation of information and data. Triangulation requires verification of at least three sources of information: perception, validation and documentation. The Team validated the information through cross-referencing of data sources. A mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches was also used to analyze data and assess the status of the outcomes. The data collection methods, combined with the evaluation matrix, ensured that the Team would have a robust evaluation method which permitted it to reach evidence-based conclusions.[[4]](#footnote-4)

* **Indicators and data collection methods**

The Results Framework provides a set of indicators used in each focus area to assess Programme performance against targets. The difficulties related to the design and plausibility of some of the listed indicators is briefly discussed in the Limitations Section of this Report.

To answer the evaluation questions, the Team used the following data collection methods, which illustrate the linkage between the evaluation criteria, questions and data sources.

* **Desk review of relevant documents**

The Evaluation Team reviewed projects and other documents related to RCFIII to identify trends, patterns, issues and underlying themes. This information was crucial in defining key evaluation questions (issues) and criteria. It also helped to assemble relevant data during the preparatory phase of the evaluation. An additional review of documents was undertaken in the field after consultations with informants and interviewees. The informants and interviewees were asked a common set of questions related to the evaluation criteria.

* **Interviews**

The Evaluation Team conducted extensive interviews at the UNDP headquarters and in the field with the personnel in charge of the RCFIII implementation as well as with the beneficiaries. The latter included: ECA, AfDB, AUC, RECs, etc. The Team also consulted governments and other stakeholders.

* **Field visits**

The Team visited Addis Ababa, Abuja, Dakar ~~and~~, Johannesburg and Pretoria in order to have firsthand information about the implementation of the different focus areas of RCFIII. Additional field visits were also undertaken by individual Team members to Gaborone (SADC), Lusaka (COMESA), Nairobi (CAMPS, UNEP) and Pretoria.

* **Focus group discussions**

Focus group discussions were conducted with relevant groups (particularly in RECs) conversant with RCFIII to assess its contribution from a broader developmental perspective.

* **Limitations**

The evaluation, including field trips to a number of African countries, was constrained by the limited time available; hence it was not possible to visit all of the countries where beneficiaries are located. The possibility of the unavailability of the interlocutors also constituted a limitation. Moreover, Easter was in the middle of the field visit, during which beneficiaries and UNDP staff were on leave. Alternatively, the Team communicated through e-mail and Skype, wherever possible, to ensure adequate data collection.

Different projects in the four Focus Areas have different starting dates and some have experienced delays in implementation. Such cases limited the judgments on outcomes. Additionally, the Results Framework has indicators, some of which did not respond to the SMART norms.[[5]](#footnote-5) Therefore, the Team tried to remedy this limitation, up to a certain point, through interviews with key actors, partners and focus group discussions.

**1.3 Conceptual Underpinning of the Evaluation**

This evaluation is based on the results-based management approach. The increasing demand for development effectiveness has prompted a shifting emphasis in development thinking and practice, from simply producing deliverables to issues regarding the relevance of development projects in yielding discernible improvements in development conditions, and ultimately in people’s lives. This novel management approach requires a reorientation from the conventional input-output project evaluation model to the one that focuses on outcomes or transformational changes resulting from the completion or use of project outputs.

In other words, contrary to a project evaluation that seeks to establish the relationship between project inputs, activities and outputs (see Graphic in Appendix D), an outcome evaluation is primarily concerned with how the outputs of given projects and other interventions, such as UNDP policy advocacy and advisory services, have or have not contributed to higher development objectives or changes in the intended developmental conditions. An outcome evaluation assesses how and why an outcome has or has not been achieved in a given context; the role that UNDP and other development partners have played in the process; the factors, both enabling and impeding, that affect the outcome, the consequences, positive and negative, intended or unintended; any lessons learned; and the recommended actions to improve performance. It is this outcome evaluation logic and approach that is applied in this study.

1. **REGIONAL CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES**

**2.1 Socio-Economic Trends**

Africa has a population of about one billion, most of it still in the youth bracket, presenting a potential labor force. The continent is endowed with abundant renewable and non-renewable natural resources and the challenge of development policy has centered for years around how to better utilise these resources to promote human and economic well-being in the region.

For several decades Africa used to be portrayed in much of the international development literature as a continent of despair and unending political and economic crises. This Afro-pessimism culminated in the eighties and early nineties, owing in part to failed structural adjustment and stabilisation policies. But over the last decade the African continent has scored remarkable development gains that have begun to turn despair into hope.

Despite a constraining global economic environment, Africa has shown, on average, unprecedented economic performance. The GDP growth for 2011 in the Sub-Saharan Africa was widespread and higher than in other developing regions of the world. At an estimated 4.9%, it is just shy of the pre-crisis (2003-2008) level of 5%. Excluding South Africa, the regional growth was 5.9%. Ten Sub-Saharan Africa countries grew at a rate of more than 6% in 2010-2011, many of them being oil or mineral exporting countries. Overall, about twenty Sub-Saharan Africa countries are expanding at a rate above the 2007-2008 levels. The fastest growing ones are Ghana, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Mozambique, which are also among the seventeen countries of “Emerging Africa”.[[6]](#footnote-6) As a result, between 1990 and 2008, the number of people in Sub-Saharan Africa with income ranges from $2 to $20 per day almost doubled from 109 million to 206 million.[[7]](#footnote-7)

In the social sectors, primary school enrollment has doubled in most countries, literally putting thousands of children in schools, with a special focus on girls. There have been substantial improvements in access to basic health services; for example, immunisation rates for diseases such as yellow fever and polio have risen to 90%. Across Africa there are considerable declines in mortality and morbidity rates, including those from HIV/AIDS.

These successes have been driven by a combination of factors, such as increasing democratisation and transparency, strengthening of governance institutions and implementation of more effective macroeconomic and social policies, and the creation of a friendly private sector environment.

**2.2 Development Challenges**

A look at the challenges that Africa present**s** may appear to be, in the first instance, a maze of interdependencies. However, dissecting it would not only lead one to a better understanding of the issues involved, but also to the conceptual foundation of RCFIII.

The achievement of MDGs within the targeted time frame remains a challenge for most countries in the region. While the political will has been strong, the implementation of MDG-based planning and policy making has been constrained largely by a lack of capacity and additional resources to accelerate the process. To a large extent, many countries have successfully completed their national MDG assessments and are on track to develop MDG-responsive policies and programmes. The current global economic crisis, and in some sub-regions conflict situations have seriously derailed development efforts of any kind. However, tangible progress is being made, particularly in education mostly at the primary school level, where in a significant number of countries gender parity is being achieved.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Gender equality is now recognised as a development issue and not an issue that pits men against women. To this end, much work has been done at the policy development and policy dialogue level. However, what has been most challenging is translating gender responsive policies into development practice in all sectors. There are many ad hoc examples of good practices, but the knowledge base for evidence-based gender sensitive planning and programming is unreliable and not based on national statistics to assist decision-makers in their planning process.

HIV/AIDS remains a major development challenge for the region. However, for different reasons it is losing visibility as a critical agenda. The new reality is that international partners, who in the past were the main sources of funding for HIV/AIDS programmes, have now substantially, reduced their contributions. It is now up to national governments to address the shortfalls to sustain current levels of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts and provide the required amounts of antiretroviral drugs. Moreover, discrimination against HIV/AIDS positive men and women has yet to be addressed as a human rights issue, ensuring them livelihoods and their rightful place in their communities.

The issue of youth development, and in particular employment, is increasingly recognised as a critical one for Africa’s sustained growth by the region’s leaders, civil society groups and development partners. At the AU Summit held last year in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea,the urgency of the youth issue in the region was the top agenda item. The unemployment challenge in the region is essentially one of youth unemployment, as they make up more than sixty per cent of the population in most countries in the region**.** This problem cannot be resolved without sustained growth in the African economies.

 In this context, it is an inescapable reality that in an increasingly interdependent world, the critical variables for growing confidence in the African economies and injecting a momentum for economic progress encompass a sustained commitment to democratisation, good governance, upholding the rule of law and respect of human rights. Although considerable progress has been made on improving governance, many challenges exist. The quality of elections is poor and suspect in some countries where they have been sources of violent conflicts. Some electoral management bodies lack the requisite capacities to ensure credible, transparent and fair election results. Corruption is still rampant in many countries, and basic human rights are not always protected. Inclusive participation in public affairs is still an elusive concept for most African citizens. Serious challenges remain with respect to strengthening the rule of law, economic governance and fostering a state that effectively delivers services and promotes pro-poor growth, inclusiveness and accountability. Creating a developmental state that is capable, accountable, transparent and responsive is still an enduring test.

These problems are aggravated in post-conflict countries where the breakdown of basic institutions of governance has led to persistent insecurity, lawlessness and lack of rule of law. Indeed, conflict and disaster risks remain a challenge across the continent and their increasing volume and complexity require an effective response capacity from regional organisations. Unfortunately, in the area of governance in general, severe capacity constraints impede the ability of AU and RECs not only to secure sustainable peace, implement and enforce compliance with continental norms, standards and instruments, but also to harmonise their interventions to ensure that they work toward collectively agreed upon objectives. The challenge of translating normative frameworks such as the Charters on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Public Service and Corruption Prevention remains considerably high. These realities underscore the need to fortify the national and regional governance infrastructure with a view to put in place political and economic reforms that are pro-poor and growth-enhancing in the furtherance of African integration and development.

While governance challenges must be fully addressed, it should also be indicated that energy access constitutes a serious constraint to Africa's efforts to attain sustainable and inclusive growth. Despite the continent's vast energy resources, its levels of energy access lag far behind the rest of the world. More than 600 million Africans still rely on traditional biomass as their main source of energy and more than 500 million have no access to electricity, with connection rates as low as 2.3% in many rural areas. In addition, energy supply has been hampered by high oil prices and inefficient utilities and end-uses. Cross-border collaboration in energy trade is also weak in the region. Thus, additional efforts are needed, in some sub-regions, to harness the benefits accruing from regional energy policy frameworks and coordination mechanisms, such as gas and power pools and the integration of regional energy markets. In addition to the mitigation of the effects of chronic droughts and the prevention of desertification and deforestation, Africa requires concrete measures to effectively respond to the adverse impacts of climate change, particularly on agricultural production, water supply, health, infrastructure, ecosystem management, and energy. Similarly, strengthened cross-border energy co-operation would enable access to low carbon energy-efficient technologies and renewable options, thus creating an opportunity for Africa to benefit from emerging carbon markets, and strengthen its global competitiveness.

Although the foregoing issues are not exhaustive, they highlight some of the salient development priorities and challenges that face the region and form the background against which development cooperation programming can be assessed.

**3. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FRAMEWORK AND PARTNERS**

**3.1 ODA and Other Development Assistance**

Despite its increased volatility, foreign aid plays a critical role in financing development programs in Africa.[[9]](#footnote-9) The donor sectors of interventions vary broadly, although bilateral donors tend to invest in social and service sectors and governance compared to multilaterals who are generally involved in the economic, productive, infrastructure and governance sectors. The UN system is mainly intervening in the social and administrative sectors, as well as in capacity building across sectors. Aid for trade, aimed at projects with regional dimension, is reportedly on the rise, with an emphasis on economic infrastructure, productive capacities and trade facilitation.*[[10]](#footnote-10)*

Development assistance from non-DAC contributors (emerging economies, non-governmental organisations, South-South cooperation, foundations and private donors) has been increasing. The available evidence indicates that initial estimates of the volume of cooperation from emerging economies in Africa was put at about $8.8 billion in 2006, with China leading the way. Africa accounted for 10% of China’s foreign direct investment in 2009. Brazil, India and South-Africa are part of a triangular cooperation compact that has proven effective in many African countries. Moreover, countries such as South Korea and Venezuela have considerably expanded their cooperation with Africa over the last decade.

On the philanthropic front, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation remains undoubtedly the leading donor to Africa. Its grants amounted to $1.56 billion in 2006 and have risen steadily since then, up to $3.8 billion in 2009. The Foundation allocates funds to three programmes: global health (50%), global development (15%) and the US (35%). Its contribution to global health amounts to nearly $2 billion annually, as compared with the approximate $14 billion per year for health from all other sources of ODA.

This multiplicity of donors has complicated the coherence of international aid architecture (aid fragmentation) in Africa and has brought up issues that affect aid effectiveness with regard to ownership, alignment, harmonisation and collective accountability for sustainable development results. In this vein, UNDP-RBA, with its long experience in aid coordination, can play a catalytic role through RCF in coordinating its efforts with other donors to ensure that aid to Africa is having a maximum and positive impact on poverty reduction and the achievement of MDGs in line with the requirements set in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. As a major African partner, UNDP is also expected to assist in seeking ways to strengthen South-South cooperation for the development of Africa.

**3.2 UNDP-RBA and Cooperation with Development Partners in Africa**

Value-adding multi-stakeholder partnerships, both national and international, have been at the heart of UNDP strategy for ensuring RCF’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Although these partnerships encompass collaboration with a variety of development actors, including AU and its RECs, national governments, African academic and research institutions and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), a special attention is devoted below to UNDP’s strategic partnerships with NEPAD, UNECA, African Development Bank (AfDB), UN agencies and the Breton Woods institutions, in addition to bilateral and other multilateral agencies, as well as emerging development actors. UNDP partnership with NEPAD, especially under the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is further discussed under Outcome 10 related more effective regional organisations.

UNDP has been actively working with NEPAD to assist in addressing the challenges facing the continent and in laying out a transformative and African-owned developmental vision and in operationalising it (NEPAD Four Year Strategic Plan). The Memorandum of Understanding between NEPAD and RBA entails interventions in a broad range of areas, including development policy and strategy, governance, South-South cooperation and aid effectiveness, knowledge management, environment and climate change, trade, gender equity and women empowerment. In this regard for example, UNDP facilitated the development of NEPAD’s Capacity Development Strategic Framework that was adopted by the 14th African Union Summit of February 2010, it supported it in developing consensus and in articulating common African positions on key international development issues, such as the problem of aid effectiveness during the Bussan Aid Effectiveness Summit in South Korea in 2011. UNDP assisted NEPAD in establishing the Africa Platform for Capacity Development, which turned out to be a powerful tool for promoting South-South cooperation, dialogue and aid effectiveness with capacity development as the driver for change. UNDP is providing assistance for strengthening NEPAD’s capacities on knowledge management.

Central to UNDP/NEPAD partnership arrangement has been UNDP’s continuing support to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is discussed under outcome 10. On the other hand, the vitality of UNDP partnership with UNECA is evident in joint governance initiatives aimed at promoting innovations, creative thinking and purposeful policy dialogue on the continent through African Governance Report (AGR-III) and African Governance Forum (AGF-VIII) and support to universities, think-tank and public administration institutes) and developing capable and responsive developmental states and leadership through support to Africa Public Administration and Governance Programme.

The collaboration with the African Development Bank is mainly articulated around the preparation of the African Economic Outlook and participation in the African annual economic conference co-sponsored by the AfDB, UNECA and UNDP. The partnership with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund seems more sporadic, focusing on projects of common interests, such as the Dakar Pole Project. The European Union contributes, among others, to the APRM Trust Fund.

The cooperation with the UN Agencies is facilitated through the reinvigorated Regional Consultation and Coordination Mechanism (RCM). Established in 1999 in line with the UN’s Delivering as One vision, its aim is to improve UN collective response in addressing the priority needs of AU and RECs. The convening of RCM rests with UNECA, while UNDP chairs its Governance Cluster. A ten-year capacity building programme for AU was devised within this mechanism.

Partnerships extend to bilateral donors, as well as emerging sources of development finance. The cases in point concern UNDP’s collaboration with the Government of Spain in support of governance and poverty reduction initiatives (Regional Programme for Social Cohesion and Youth Employment, contribution to the APRM Trust Fund). Norway, CIDA, DFID and French Cooperation are also among the major bilateral partners. On the other hand, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, an emerging source of development resources, collaborates with UNDP on environmental and climate change initiatives in Africa. The collaboration with the private sector, although fully recognised, is still forthcoming.

Most partners with which the Evaluation Team has interacted are satisfied with the quality of relationship. Some of them have demanded more transparency, especially on project finance. It is not evident, however, that mechanisms exist to account for development results, as required by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action under the mutual accountability principle.

**4. UNDP’s RESPONSE TO CHALLENGES**

* 1. **RCFIII - Programmatic Approach**

Practically from its establishment in 1965/1966, UNDP took seriously the regional challenges. Since 1970, it has been implementing Regional Programmes. The focus has always been to tackle various common issues using a programme approach. This approach is consistent with UNDP’s stand that interventions should not be the conglomeration of a series of projects, but rather a set of programmes within which projects are interrelated and have synergy.[[11]](#footnote-11) Common issues are those that in the regions the Country Offices (COs) alone could not incorporate into their programmes. Several instrumentalities have been tried and successfully. Regional Commissions were the first step. Subsequently, Sub-regional Resource Facilities (SURFs) were established in 17 locations; one being the Dakar centre. SURFs evolved into regional centres in mid-2000. These service centres combined technical support to COs and networking and knowledge management with a role in the management of Regional Programmes.

Regional Programmes (including those in Africa) contribute to the development results in the geographical areas within which they operate by addressing critical cross border concerns, positioning UNDP as a unique development partner; focusing on regional and sub-regional programmes has enhanced their relevance.[[12]](#footnote-12)

RCFIII seeks to meet Africa’s challenges from a regional perspective; hence its focus areas, outcomes germane to these focus areas, and the projects for the realisation of these outcomes are designed to operationalise the meeting of these challenges. The focus is on the capacity needs of the continent’s premier regional institutions, i.e., the African Union (AU) and its building blocks, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). To a lesser extent, regional initiatives are supported by country activities with cross border or sub-regional imperatives. The prime objective is also to provide support, which is complementary to the national initiatives with UNDP programmes.

The above mentioned task involves understanding the nature and complexity of these institutions, so as to derive pertinent reform strategies**.** This is important especially in regard to the often decried overlapping of mandates, functions and geographic coverage of most African regional and sub-regional bodies.

AU has the objective of achieving Africa’s full political and economic integration, and NEPAD was established in 2001 as a technical arm of AU to facilitate and accelerate that integration. But resource constraints, both human and financial, severely impede AU’s ability to comply fully with its mandates. Likewise, major RECs (ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, EAC and IGAD) that have a growing influence on their Member States, carry out political and economic functions (e.g., SADC and EAC focus on political and economic integration in Southern Africa and Eastern Africa) for which they are not fully equipped. The challenge for UNDP is on the one hand how to buttress the capacities of the AU Commission and NEPAD to develop and implement their programmes and AU’s regulatory frameworks, and on the other hand how to strengthen the operational and technical capacity of its RECs. The question can also be raised of how UNDP would better target its interventions in light of the ambiguous goals pursued by some regional entities.

In Africa, the Regional Bureau has implemented two Regional Programmes; the third one, subject of this evaluation, is still on-going. RCFIII does not deviate from UNDP’s philosophical or conceptual basis of the original conceptualisation of regional cooperation. As clearly stated in the Programme Document (October 2007), “It seeks to respond to Africa’s current and emerging priorities and challenges in a dynamic manner.” The result first was the delineation of intervention areas and then the articulation of focus areas and outcomes that are needed for Africa’s development. These focus areas, briefly described below, essentially indicate the grouping of outcomes, although the underlying logic is disputable. The realisation of these outcomes is the crux of the matter. Only and exclusively they are to crystalise UNDP-RBA’s efforts to contribute to Africa’s development priorities.

* 1. **RCFIII-Focus Areas**

The conceptual foundation of RCFIII is operationalised in four focus areas of attention which are briefly explained below. These areas are supplemented by two cross-cutting issues: gender equality and capacity development. Each focus area has several outcomes to be realised. It is these outcomes that are subjected to assessment in this Report. Below is a short description of four focus areas:

* **Poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs:** This Focus Area seeks to strengthen efforts for pro-poor growth, decent employment creation, reduction of inequalities and acceleration of progress towards the MDGs.
* **Consolidating democratic and participatory governance:**  Interventions in this area focus on the consolidation of democratic and participatory governance, including support to the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
* **Conflict prevention, peace building and recovery**: This Focus Area involves support to Africa's conflict prevention, peace building and recovery efforts, and collaboration with AU and the RECs, as well as in synergy with other UN Agencies and Advisory Subsidiary Bodies, such as the Peace Building Commission. The aim is to support regional mechanisms for crisis prevention and promote effective regional recovery and peace consolidation.
* **Energy, environment and sustainable development:** Interventions leading to the outcomes under this focus area are directed towards strengthening the capacities of regional, sub-regional and national institutions to support the formulation of policies for access to energy and environmental services, development of institutional frameworks and formulation of implementation plans.
* **Gender equality** is one of the two cross-cutting issues with which RCFIII deals. Given the conditions in Africa, it could not have been otherwise.[[13]](#footnote-13) The other one is **capacity building** which is incorporated into the design of most of the projects.[[14]](#footnote-14)

**Box: 1 Africa’s priorities**

RCFIII seeks to respond to Africa’s current and emerging development priorities and challenges in a dynamic manner, with the overarching purpose of developing local capacities across the four focus areas… While being fully aligned with Africa’s development priorities, RCFIII will be guided by the development effectiveness principles set out in UNDP’s 2008-2011 corporate strategic framework. In addition to being addressed as an underpinning principle for all interventions, gender equality will also be targeted as a specific goal, focusing on the enhancement of women’s economic and political empowerment. Given the serious capacity constraints facing the continent, the regional programme will not only design all of its policy and programmatic intervention from a capacity development perspective, but will also promote targeted institutional and human capital reinforcement programmes in critical areas…

**From***: Programme Document for Africa, 2008-2011*

* Proximity has permitted regular interaction, provision of technical expertise and engagement with the UNDP/COs and RECs. In several instances, Country Offices in Abuja and Gaborone expressed the desire to function as the liaison office for RECs and – if accredited to RECs – would be able to represent UNDP´s Regional Programme, while also supporting COs in the different REC countries. In such a scenario, COs would be brought together on themes that are of mutual interest and that support sub-regional and national needs.
	1. **Institutional Framework**

RCFIII is positioned between Global Programmes and Country Programmes and as such complements those efforts that have a specific focus on regional institution supporting Pan/African initiatives. At the Headquarters (HQ), the effective cooperation among RBA and BDP (including GEF, Boots on the Ground), BCPR, or programming and implementation is crucial, while in practice such cooperation is not always strong. Technical expertise is mostly located outside RBA and in most instances the other Bureaux have a global or country focus. RBA is therefore dependent on technical expertise from these Bureaux, while, in turn, these have to provide programme support to a Regional Programme.

In an effort to decentralise and support the RCFIII, two regional service centres were created, with one in Johannesburg and one in Dakar. These have supported the implementation of RCFIII based on the premise that being closer to beneficiaries and delegating authority to the manager of the Service Centre would improve effectiveness and efficiency of RCFIII. The Service Centres also permit other UNDP departments, such as BDP and BCPR, to locate additional staff in both capitals to support COs that do not have specific expertise. These “hubs” have proven to create some synergies between Programmes and support cross cutting themes, such as capacity development. Intra- and inter-communications, however, are weak, since vertical lines of responsibility between HQ and SC exist, while in different parallel units, such as BCPR and BDP, the staff is managed by the Service Centres.

During the implementation, the Ethiopia Country Office created a liaison office, which supports all interaction with AU. This has been an advantage, since this office could coordinate RC III activities across the focus areas and serves as an important entry point for political, as well as technical engagement with AU and ECA. However, the Team observed that this office is yet to have capacity to do so.

Beneficiaries have mixed reactions to the Centres and their roles. In the case of AU, it appears evident that close interaction with UNDP in Addis Ababa is a *sine qua non* for effective implementation of RCFIII and that this is preferred, compared to locating technical expertise in the Service Centres. RECs, however, are not located in either of the capitals and they would also like to engage with the Regional Programme nearby. In some instances, Programmes of RCFIII were located at a CO, where RECs are also located, which had positive spin-offs for both.

* 1. **Management and Implementation Arrangements**

**4.4.1 Management**

RCFIII is positioned between Global Programmes and Country Programmes and as such complements those efforts that have a specific focus on regional institution supporting Pan/African initiatives. At the Headquarters (HQ), the effective cooperation among RBA and BDP (including GEF, Boots on the Ground), BCPR, or programming and implementation is crucial, while in practice such cooperation is not always strong. Technical expertise is mostly located outside RBA and in most instances the other Bureaux have a global or country focus. RBA is, therefore, dependent on technical expertise from these Bureaux, while, in turn, these have to provide programme support to a Regional Programme.

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The Ethiopia Country Office houses a liaison office which was created to support all UNDP interaction with the AU increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of liaising between UNDP and the AU. This has been a particular advantage, since this liaison office coordinates RCF III activities across the focus areas and serves as an important entry point for political, as well as technical engagement with AU and ECA. However, the Team observed that this office is yet to have capacity to do so.

Beneficiaries have mixed reactions to the two Centres and their roles. In the case of the liaison office, it appears evident that close interaction with the AU in Addis Ababa is a *sine qua non* for effective implementation of RCFIII, and that this is preferred compared to locating technical expertise in the Service Centres. RECs, however, are not located in either of the capitals (Dakar or Johannesburg), and they would also like to engage with the Regional Programme nearby. In some instances, Programmes of RCFIII were located at a CO where RECs are also located, which had positive spin-offs for all: the programme, the REC and the Country Office.

The management of the Regional Programme is to a large extent distributed across two Regional Centres (RCs). Unfortunately, two regional centres, instead of adding to management efficiency, have created a series of difficulties. Fusing them into one is likely to eliminate a number of shortcomings. Two Service Centres has been confusing for beneficiaries, in particular, since they are not certain what contributions and expertise to expect. ECOWAS considers it inefficient to have a project located in the country office, while also having an expertise located in Dakar. Moreover, they have never been contacted by Dakar and consider this centre pointless. Granted, the fact that the Programme managers were based close to RECs has had some positive spin-offs. That proximity has permitted regular interaction, provision of technical expertise and engagement with the UNDP/CO and the AU or REC. But if indeed there were to be one Service Centre in Addis Ababa, there could be a role for COs at REC level to assist RECs and bring COs together on themes that are of mutual interest and support sub-regional and national needs. The Team welcomes the decision that the two Regional Centres will be fused into one and moved to Addis Ababa, headquarters of AU and ECA.

Two projects are directly managed from RBA headquarters. RBA was to undertake a series of evaluations, one of which was the mid-term review of the Regional Programme.[[15]](#footnote-15) However, although the evaluation of projects is explicitly stated in the Programme Document, hardly any evaluation has been carried out of those that are in the process of implementation or at the stage of completion. While these evaluations are not mandatory, according to the new rules of UNDP, they might have been operationally very useful from the stand point of management.

 The RBA Director exercises overall oversight and accountability for the implementation of the Programme, assisted by a Deputy Regional Director, in line with RBA's organisational structure and UNDP's regionalisation process. However, It is not clear fully clear, at least in the minds of some managers to whom they must report; to the manager in the RSC or RBA? Although project documents usually are clear in specifying reporting arrangements, this has led to confusion and resulted in different voices giving feedback and instructions, and has contributed to undermining the clear lines of accountability. Some project managers suffered from frustration, since instructions from RBA may differ from the advice of the Service Centre. In some cases, project managers who were located in the Country Office were also expected to report to the country office. Such confusion has also affected the principles of Results-Based Management. The present arrangements appear to work well only if individuals relate well to each other and there is a willingness to share information timely and communicate regularly.

Steering Committees meet at irregular intervals and implementation decisions are formulated weakly or are not clear cut, which confuses project managers. In the absence of clear reporting lines, this may cause delays and multiple efforts of coordination before decisions are implemented.

**4.4.2 Implementation Modality**

All projects, with the exception of two projects[[16]](#footnote-16), are implemented directly. Direct implementation (DIM) replaced what was called previously as (DEX). This implementation modality as opposed to either National execution (NEX) or agency(s) execution is the preferred mode of RCFIII. The reasons are multiple. However, the primordial reason is given in Executive Board Decision no: 98/2 which states: *“…shall remain limited to countries in special circumstances and apply only when it can be demonstrated that it is essential to safeguard the full responsibility and accountability of the Administrator for effective programme and project delivery.”* A programme such as RCFIII with very large financial commitments (Over $125 million dollars), multifaceted spheres of action, and wide geographical coverage could not be apportioned to various countries for national implementation. That would put in danger the accountability of the administrator. Moreover, DIM has certain advantages. One is resource mobilization, where speed of delivery and decision-making of UNDP management is necessary for mobilizing resources. A second is that Donors are increasingly being looked to not just as sources of funds for UNDP projects, but also as “partners” with shared goals and objectives for funding and project initiatives. Hence, timely implementation and the realization of expected results are their aims. NEX dispersed among various countries with different implementation capacities may not be able to deliver the expected outcomes.

Agency implementation may also not be appropriate, for a regional programme such as RCFIII requires a global view, as opposed to views and modus operandi of agencies, which are necessarily somewhat narrower and more directed to their area of expertise. It should be added, however, that UNDP’s lengthy and cumbersome procedure for hiring the necessary human resources, at times, hampers and slows down the implementation process.

**4. 5 RCFIII - Financial Resources**

 The total budget of the Programme was planned as $198,113,839, with expected Core sources amounting to $109,456,017 and expected Non-Core ones $37,060,706 i.e. 38.8% of the total. Most of the Non-Core sources were to come from bi-laterals and private foundations. However, during the implementation the financial picture changed somewhat. While deviation from the core sources was only a decrease of 15%, Non-Core sources did not materialize as expected, showing a 64% overestimation. The largest allocation of funds is for MDGs Focus Area constituting 65.8% of the total funds, whereas conflict prevention has the smallest allocation of funds, only 4.5% of the total funds. Since data on total expenditures comes up to the end of 2011 and since the Programme is expected to continue until the end of 2013, it stands to reason that the remaining funds (about 40% of total) will be used to complete several projects. The cost-sharing approach used by RBA generated not as good as expected interest among donors (30% of the total). Contributions have been received from bilateral donors and private and public sector funds.

**Table: Expenditures of RCFIII[[17]](#footnote-17)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Core****($)** | **Non-Core****($)** | **Total****($)** | **Core as % of Total** | **Non-Core as % of total** | **Expenditures as % of Total** |
| **Focus area 1: MDG and Poverty reduction** |
| 37,646,365 | 12,827,447 | 50,473,812 | 74.5 | 25.5 | 65.8 |
| **Focus area 2: governance** |
| 8,810,966 | 9,211,086 | 18,022,052 | 48.9 | 51.1 | 23.5 |
| **Focus area 3: Conflict prevention, Peace Building** |
| 3,295,338 | 137,903 | 3,433,241 | 96.0 | 4.0 | 4.5 |
| **Focus area 4: Energy, environment and sustainable development** |
| 3,796,025 | 1,005,821 | 4,801,846 | 79.1 | 20.9 | 6.3 |
| TOTAL |
| **53,548,492** | **23,182,262** | **76,730,754** | **69.8** | **30.2** | **100.0** |

Source: RBA, Management Support Unit

**5. FINDINGS**

This chapter analyses the outcomes stated in the Programme Document and the Results Framework. More detailed presentation, relating the outcomes to their respective outputs and their stated indicators, is given in Annex C. The purpose here is to analyse outcomes from the standpoint of four evaluation criteria, namely, **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability**. It should be kept in mind that some projects have started later than planned, some are still on-going. As was pointed out earlier, some of the indicators spelled out in the Results Framework are sometimes not conducive to pass an evaluative judgment. Finally, a number of projects designed at a later date did not adhere to the indicators of the Framework and often stated their own or neglected to spell them out.

**5.1 Poverty Reduction and MDGs[[18]](#footnote-18)**

In this Focus Area, there are 11 core projects, with some contributing to more than one outcome out of a total of seven envisaged outcomes. This Focus Area is the largest in the Regional Programme in terms of allocated resources and number of projects which are managed from three locations – RBA Headquarters and the RSCs in Dakar and Johannesburg. An analysis of the expected outcomes and the projects that contributed to their attainment are presented thematically in the interest of clarity and coherence.

**Outcome 1: Regional, sub-regional and national strategies for higher levels of pro-poor growth and reduction of gender inequalities formulated and implemented**.

This outcome was envisaged to be achieved through a portfolio of multi-thematic and multi-sectoral projects designed to address the challenges faced by regional development institutions and countries in the region to pursue MDG-focused development and poverty reduction. It is notable that Outcome I presents a most ambitious effort by the Programme to engage regional and sub-regional institutions on the MDG agenda and to simultaneously link this to country-level capacity development on the MDGs. The extent to which this complex and comprehensive agenda for change was achieved is highlighted in the analysis of the key areas of engagement that include Support to MDG-based planning and Poverty Reduction; Gender Equality; Youth Development; Capacity Development of Regional Institutions; HIV/AIDS; Trade and Development; and the Private Sector and Inclusive Market Development.

**MDG-based National Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies[[19]](#footnote-19)**

The support for promoting MDG-based economic planning and policy development was channeled through the **Regional Project for Supporting MDG-based national Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies in RBA countries.** This was the largest component of the entire portfolio of projects within RCF III, as it aimed to provide all 45 RBA countries with an enhanced capacity for mainstreaming MDG-based policy development and planning into national development frameworks including PRSPs. To achieve this outcome, a significant investment was made by the Regional Programme to recruit senior economists for all RBA Country Offices to up-grade their in-house capacity for MDG informed economic analysis and policy development. The country-based senior economists were reinforced with a network of MDG advisors based in the two Regional Service Centers in Dakar and South Africa. This up-scaling of the human resource base for undertaking MDG-based economic analysis and planning resulted in an enabling of national governments to address the challenge of meeting MDGs in a more comprehensive and systematic manner

**Relevance:** Achieving the MDGs is a pro-poor development agenda that has been endorsed by the AU, the major regional entity for establishing region-wide policy and setting standards and instruments for implementation. Many countries in the region have also fully adopted MDGs as a blueprint for equitable development and have incorporated MDGs into their national development frameworks. The support provided through the regional project has been critical and strategic to the extent that it has enabled countries to undertake evidence-based national MDG reports.

**Effectiveness:** The provision of senior economists to all 45 countries to specifically work on MDG-based poverty reduction strategies and provide the necessary analysis and policy development support has resulted in tangible and strategic outcomes for RBA countries. These senior economists in UNDP Country Office have added value by enabling countries to undertake evidence-based national MDG reports that have provided the knowledge base for MDG-based poverty reduction strategies and development. The key indicator for assessing achievement of the outcome on MDG-based planning and poverty reduction focused on targeting at least 35 countries incorporating inequality reducing policies. While there is limited data confirming policy and strategy development in all 35 countries there is substantial evidence to establish the critical role of senior economists in ensuring countries are on track by strengthening institutional and human resources for achieving the MDGs The team met with senior economists in Ethiopia, Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Botswana. The overall impression is that the economists have met the need of RBA countries to have skilled capacity to undertake country-led economic analysis and studies for MDG-based policy and planning processes. The provision of advisory services related to the MDGs is another important resource delivered through the Programme to the countries in the region. MDG support teams have been established in Dakar and Johannesburg and they provide services upon request. The work of the advisors and the senior economists working in tandem has resulted in the qualitative improvement of the analysis and content of national MDG reports. One major tangible outcome has been the successful assistance of the senior economists, with the collaboration of the regional MDG advisors, to the preparation of 35 national MDG Reports that effectively captured a realistic assessment of the achievement of MDGs. These 35 National MDG Reports made an important contribution to the 2010 Global MDG Report prepared by the UN Secretariat for the MDG Summit held in September 2010. More importantly, these reports very concretely highlighted the positive developments based on timely and accurate data largely produced through the work of the senior economists in collaboration with the MDG advisors.

Discussions held with the economists underscored the fact that they are encumbered with additional work not directly related to their TORs. This is because of the general limited capacity in UNDP Country Offices in the face of high demands placed on them as a key partner of national governments. From this perspective the senior economists do enhance the strategic positioning of UNDP at the country level. Government counterparts met by the team expressed their appreciation of the level of competence and expertise of the senior economists. Moreover, in one particular case the point was made of the need for senior economist to dedicate more time to working with national counterparts to better leverage their capacity building role. Herein lies the dilemma faced by the economists, i.e., keeping a balance between meeting the demands of the Country Offices and effectively servicing the needs of their principle clients - the national government counterparts.

A related project that contributed to Outcome I was the Dakar-based Pole Project funded by the French Cooperation. It provided valuable added capacity to the MDG component of the Programme, particularly in the area of poverty-focused public finance and budgeting management. The Pole provided advisory services to finance and planning ministries in 13 countries in West and Central Africa on results-based budgeting within a multi-year budgeting framework. One of the concrete achievements of the Pole has been its work in promoting a harmonized framework for public finance in line with the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s new directives. MDG advisors worked closely with the Pole advisors undertaking joint missions aimed at strengthening MDG perspectives in public financing and economic planning in general.

**Efficiency:** A significant portion of the Regional Programme resources has been expended on Outcome 1. Moreover, to a large extent, programme support provides expertise in the form of the senior economists and the regional MDG advisors, while the expected outputs are upstream and process oriented. In this case, any judgment on efficiency in terms of cost effectiveness is difficult to make, as the some are ongoing and others just beginning. However, other efficiency issues relate to the timeliness of recruitment of senior economists and the division of labor between tasks undertaken for the Country Office and tasks related to their TOR.

**Sustainability:** This is an issue that looms large as one looks forward to the next cycle of the Regional Programme. One of the expected results of the programme is a core team of central and sectoral planners trained in conducting MDG needs assessments and formulating MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. Indeed, if this has been achieved, then the need for a full time senior economist would not be justified. The real issue is: are senor economists and MDG advisors fully aware of this end game and working systematically to ensure this happens? They do receive full briefings on substantive issues, which are tools of their trade, but the point here is that inasmuch as the MDGs are multi-sectoral, senior economists need also to have a multi-sectoral orientation

**Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment**

One of the main findings of the evaluation of RCFII was the inadequacy of gender mainstreaming in the Programme. RCF III the approach taken was to redress this finding through support of the more comprehensive Regional Project for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Africa. The following specific outcomes were articulated: developing capacities for more gender-responsive macro-policy analysis; planning and programming aimed at recognising the role of gender relations in economic development and growth; creating an enabling environment for increasing women’s income and employment opportunities; and expanding women’s leadership and influence in policy making in both peace time and post-conflict contexts and in public and private governance.

**Relevance:** The Programme addresses key challenges as articulated in gender policy setting agenda frameworks of AU, such as the Solemn Declaration of Africa and the gender policy of AU. It also responds to the specific challenges faced by the sub-regional economic communities such as ECOWAS and SADC.

**Effectiveness:** One key outcome indicator is at least 15 countries with concrete gender-responsive national pro-poor growth strategies. The outcome indicator is not useful in determining effectiveness, as support has focused on the building blocks that will ultimately result in substantive and sustained gender responsive national development strategies. One key measure of the effectiveness of the gender component was the formulation of concrete gender responsive national pro-poor growth strategies. To this end, in collaboration with strategic partners both from within UNDP and other UN agencies, the regional gender project has succeeded in creating “breakthrough” achievements, particularly in terms of developing capacities of strategically placed national economists and planners to undertake s gender responsive policies and strategies in their respective development country contexts. The training in gender analysis skills provided through the Gender Economic Management and Planning Initiative is notable for its comprehensive coverage of macroeconomic policy making from a gender equality perspective through applying rigorous analysis to what is often viewed as gender neutral spheres of economic policy and planning. The other breakthrough is the partnership with the UN Institute for Economic Planning and Development (IDEP), an established and well-known regional development management institution in the region, in order to roll out this capacity development initiative. This strategic partnership has given credibility to mainstreaming gender equality concerns in economic development and management in the region.

An equally important achievement of r the project has been the institutionalisation of the Masters in Arts in Gender Responsive Economics established at the University of Makerere in Uganda. One of the weakest aspects of learning and skills development in gender analysis has been the lack of an institutional base to ensure continuity, credibility and sustainability. For too long, gender knowledge development and skills training has been managed as an ad hoc activity. At the country level, the gender project provided technical and substantive advisory services to UNDP Country Offices. Advisory services have been largely demand-driven, and both human and financial resources of BDP and the Regional Programme have been utilised.

In the ECOWAS sub-region, the project provided catalytic support to advocacy on the mandated policies and actions of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women and Peace and Security and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. This resulted in the Department of Peace Keeping scaling up the intervention, so that action plans were developed in ECOWAS countries. The strategic support provided to sub-regional institutions, such as ECOWAS, is to be underscored for the ripple effect created at the sub-regional level. At the country level, the gender project provides technical and substantive advisory services to UNDP Country Offices on a demand-driven basis providing client-tailored support.

Another strategic area of support which has been delayed, but is critical to gender-responsive national development strategies, is the generation of reliable statistics by national statistics offices. This activity has been planned jointly with the ECA’s Gender Centre and the Centre for African Statistics.

The gender programme has also supported women’s civil society groups, particularly in the area of women’s economic empowerment. The programme has provided a women’s group in Liberia with initial capital to start-up small economic enterprises for poor women.

**Efficiency:** In terms of disbursement of allocated resources and implementation of planned activities the gender programme scores well. However, there is inefficiency with regards to the complex transaction processes related to UNDP programming that often result in extended negotiations with partners. This has resulted in delays in start-up of activities and shortened periods for implementation impacting efficient delivery of resources and services. Moreover**,** there are only five regional gender advisors including the Programme manager for the 45 countries they service. From the efficiency point of view, they face serious constraints as they lack counterparts in the Country Offices that have the capacities and recognition as bona fide gender experts. If the mandate is to mainstream gender equality and if this is to be taken seriously by the Regional Programme, then it has to be addressed. Equally important is the need to make a distinction between resources allocated for catalytic purposes – meaning the regional gender project and resources allocated for mainstreaming which should be earmarked within the framework of the other focus areas.

**Sustainability:** The sustainability of the major investments made to develop capacity in gender responsive economic policy making and management is an outstanding concern. Currently, there are no built-in exit strategies, and much of the funding for participants enrolled in both the short course and the longer Master of Arts programme is from the Regional Programme. A major focus of the next cycle is to put in place strategies to ensure institution-based gender learning and skills acquisition that would become self-financing and therefore sustainable in the long term.

**Youth Social Cohesion and Employment**

The issue of youth development and particularly youth employment was addressed through the Regional Project for Social Cohesion and Youth Employment for Sub-Saharan Africa. This component was multi-faceted and aimed to address the issue of youth employment from a policy perspective, particularly focusing on developing an African centred labour market information system, as well as linking this to issues of social cohesion and dialogue with youth as the key actors. A related project, the Agri-Enterprise Development for Stimulating Rural Economies focused on the promotion of youth productivity in agriculture.

**Relevance:** The importance of the youth project to overall efforts of achieving higher levels of pro-poor growth has become a higher priority on the African development agenda. The African Heads of State Summit held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in July 2012, declared youth development and, in particular, youth employment as a high priority and endorsed specific target indicators for all member states to achieve over the next five years. The multi-faceted support provided By the Regional Programme at regional, sub-regional and country levels makes it a timely and targeted approach, with great potential for up scaling achievements and using lessons learnt for more effective policy and programme development for youth in the region.

**Effectiveness:** One key target indicator for the outcome on youth employment related to promoting the decent work agenda for African youth. Support provided through The Youth and Social Cohesion component has made a major contribution to addressing youth employment issues in West Africa by providing technical support to develop a draft ECOWAS Youth Employment Action Plan based on the ECOWAS Youth Policy. The draft Action Plan was due to be submitted to the Experts meeting and the Ministerial Council in May of 2012. Another important related initiative which has been carried out in collaboration with the Social Affairs Commission of the AU is the harmonisation and coordination of Labour Market Information System (LMIS) in Africa. This harmonised framework was to be presented to the AU Summit in June 2012 for implementation by all Member States. This will mark an important departure from the present fragmented system which is inconsistent with African labour market realities and does not capture the inherent specificities.. The collaboration with the AU has been recognized as a best practice by all partners for its potential to establish a uniform system for organizing labour market statistics across all countries in the region.

The Agro-enterprise development project is also known as the Songhai Project, named after the successful centre established in Benin. This joint initiative, involving FAO, IFAD, ILO and UNIDO, did deliver in establishing viable agriculture-based enterprises targeting youth. Not all the centres were equally successful, but it is notable that in crisis countries such as Liberia, as described by the Country Director, the project was effective in creating successful young agricultural entrepreneurs who contributed to the wealth of their rural communities. The evaluation of the project highlighted that the lack of clearly articulated exit strategy ran the risk of diminishing its gains.

The AU is also supporting the participation of youth through the African Youth Corps initiative in developing policy and programmes. These youth resources should be mobilized by the RP for ensuring ownership by youth and upscaling pilot initiatives such as those undertaken by the Agro-enterprise development project.

**Efficiency:** One efficiency issue which needs to be taken into account is the need to have a more comprehensive approach to youth development by systematically linking the different initiatives that are funded by the Regional Programme. For example, UNDP is funding a youth policy development initiative with the AU’s Youth Department which appears to be an ad hoc activity not linked to the larger programme that was being managed out of Dakar

**Sustainability:** The Youth programme has made tangible and strategic contributions to the youth development agenda in the region. The resources made available through the Spanish Development Cooperation have been utilized to initiate catalytic innovative initiatives that will need to be sustained to ensure upscaling and institutionalization of these results. There is a need to be strategic and synergistic in ensuring continuity of these activities that will bring much comparative advantage to UNDP e particularly in the context of the prioritization of youth development and employment by the Heads of State.

**Capacity Development of Regional Institutions**

The AU and the RECs have been the recipients of capacity development assistance from a wide range of multilateral and bilateral organisations. To a large extent, this support has been delivered in a fragmented and highly donor driven manner, conditioned on wide ranging rules, processes and timelines. The regional programme capacity development strategy aimed to address these challenges at three levels: strengthening the institutional capacities of AUC and selected RECs and subsidiary entities to accelerate the path to regional integration; enhancing leadership and ownership of African institutions through building partnerships for improved coordination and management of capacity development initiatives; and designing and implementing capacity development programmes as an integral part of UNDP country programmes in the region.

In Outcome I, capacity development was to be achieved through programme support for two projects: Regional Project to Strengthen Institutional Capacities to Accelerate Pro-Poor Growth and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa; and secondly, the Regional Project for Capacity Development for Negotiating and Regulating Investment Contracts. The performance of the regional programme in terms of achieving the envisaged capacity development outcome as a key strategy for achieving higher levels of pro-poor growth in the region has been evaluated as follows:

**Relevance:** The design of this multi-faceted, large-scale support for capacity development was formed by UNDP’s specific concept and approach on CD as well as RBA’s Poor Growth and Accountability (CD-PGA) strategy. In line with the core principles of both strategies, the support provided for multiple levels of support that would produce synergy and systemic change, in contrast to the piecemeal experiences of the past. The AU and the RECs have prioritized capacity development as a key strategy for increasing their development effectiveness. In recent years, international partners have overwhelmed the AU with capacity development support and UNDP’s strategic approach to development provides an alternative paradigm.

**Effectiveness:** A key indicator regarding strengthening capacities of the AU and the RECs was the number of pro-poor growth initiatives effectively implemented and regional analytical policy advocacy documents produced. A regional entity that has received extensive capacity development support is NEPAD. The presence of the CD team in Johannesburg, where the NEPAD secretariat is located, has meant that it has been a favoured beneficiary of the programme. The team explained that proximity has meant a much more intensive engagement with NEPAD. The dividends of such engagement are evident in the establishment of the African Capacity Development Forum under the leadership of NEPAD to promote partnerships, facilitate dialogue and resource mobilisation on capacity development. The discussions with the stakeholders at NEPAD did indicate the value added of such a mechanism, particularly since NEPAD is the benchmark agency of the AU in establishing common policy and programming platforms for adaptation and implementation by member states.

Somewhat less evident are the capacity development results of engagement with the four RECs (CEMAC, COMESA, ECOWAS and IGAD) identified for support. The mission had an opportunity to visit ECOWAS, but was not able to verify any tangible capacity development outputs that could be reported. However, the mission did take note that there are other key players such as the EU that are making considerable investments at the REC level and one is left asking whether there is a comparative advantage to UNDP’s involvement at this level. In contrast, UNDP has provided strategic support in the revitalization of the MANO River Union (MRU) by assisting the organisation in the formulation of a strategic institutional framework. As a result, the MRU has become a more effective institution and has assumed its critical mediator role in the sub-region’s political crises and development challenges.

At the apex is the AU, where it was envisaged that systems, procedures and competencies would be put in place to enable the organisation to implement its new Strategic Plan. One of the main results in this regard is the establishment of a Partnership Coordination Unit within the Directorate of the Secretary General of the AU. The mandate of this unit is to map and play a coordinating role with respect to the ever growing number of development partners and their relationship with the organisation. The Unit has only recently become functional with the appointment of the Head of the Unit and the recruitment of a technical advisor. It is too early to pass any judgment on how well it is functioning. However, it is readily apparent that while the “hardware” capacity appears to be in place, a more rigorous assessment of the human and financial resource needs of the unit is required.

The second project on capacity development on negotiating and regulating investment contracts is a country based activity targeting countries that are endowed with natural resources, such as diamonds, gold and oil. In Sierra Leone, for example, mismanagement and corruption involved in mineral resources not only stunted development, but fuelled the civil war. The expert advice provided through the project resulted in the renegotiation of unfavourable mining agreements, a pledge the in-coming President had made upon taking office. Inspired by these results, the Government has requested similar assistance on large scale investment in general and strengthening the new Public-Private Partnership Unit.

**Efficiency:** From an implementation perspective, some components have progressed as planned while others, such as the AU Partnership Unit, are just at the start-up phase. One possible explanation that may have affected the slow implementation of planned activities is that these are essentially political entities that have now shifted to taking leadership role in agenda setting for development in the region. Moreover, they have widely differing institutional characteristics, which determine the level of absorption of development assistance. For example, ECOWAS is considered a heavy weight regional body, as compared to its peers, such as CEMAC or IGAD, and, therefore, CD strategies have to take this into account.

**Sustainability:** An exit strategy was explicitly stated in the regional project document. However, given the many particulars of the institutional constraints faced by the regional and sub-regional institutions, capacity development is a process that requires a longer time frame than three years. There is a need for better targeting of institutions with capacity development strategies and tools in ways that address real needs and promote effective management of partnerships. Best practices in CD of other institutions in the region should be shared and adapted as appropriate.

**Outcome 2: Accelerated pace of progress towards the attainment of MDGs in Africa and adequate resources mobilised in support of them.**

Support for generating momentum for the achievements of MDGs in Africa was enhanced through the regional project, supporting MDG-based National Development and poverty reduction strategies in RBA countries. This support was to build on earlier extensive support provided by RBA to countries on their national MDG Reports and second generation MDGs-compliant PRSPs. In this phase, the aim was to refocus engagement to align more closely to the priorities articulated in MDG Breakthrough Strategy and to expand knowledge sharing, including MDGs progress reporting to upscale partnership, enhance policy dialogue and mobilise resources for initiatives at local level.

**Relevance:** A key strategy of the Programme was to utilise the MDG Acceleration Framework, which is a key corporate tool for operationalising UNDP’s Breakthrough Strategy. The Framework provides countries with a roadmap for mobilising all stakeholders and creating a consensus to allocate a significant level of development resources for achieving a priority MDG goal as identified by the MDGs Needs Assessment analysis. The relevance of this approach has been enhanced by RBA’s provision of senior economists in UNDP Country Offices to provide leadership for MDG-based policy analysis and dialogue. Through meetings with development partners that have participated in a MAF process, the Evaluation Team was able to verify that it is a credible and relevant approach.

**Effectiveness:** The provision of senior economists and MDG advisors to all countries to specifically work on MDG-based poverty reduction strategies and provide the necessary analysis and policy support has been a major driver for initiating the MAF at country level. The overall feedback both from UNDP COs and beneficiaries is that the economists are meeting a need of the countries to have skilled capacity on the ground to undertake country-led economic analysis and studies that provide the knowledge base for MDG-based policy and planning processes. One of the best practice scenarios shared with the Team with regard to MAF is the experience in Niger. The stakeholder was at the time ECA representative at the organisation’s sub-regional office in Bamako. As an outsider, he related the high level energy, leadership and consensus that were the result of the MAF process and the very successful outcome regarding mobilisation of the entire development community on the most urgent issue facing the country: food security.

Another strategic result contributing to Outcome 2 is the building of partnerships with other key development actors in the region, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB). Collaboration with AfDB on the preparation of the African Economic Outlook is a case in point. Previously this was a flagship publication of the Bank, but more recently UNDP took responsibility for authoring specific chapters of the report. This initiative provides an important entry point for, partnered with the AfDB in the organisation of the African Economic Conference, a major annual forum of economists sharing knowledge on wide ranging issues related to the region’s economic development.

**Efficiency:**~~,~~ To a large extent the key inputs of the Programme support are human resources in the form of senior economists and the regional MDG advisors, while the expected outputs are upstream and process oriented. In this case any judgment on efficiency in terms of cost effectiveness is difficult to make, as some are on-going and others just beginning.

**Sustainability:** This is an issue that looms large as one looks forward to the next cycle of the Regional Programme. One of the expected outputs of the Programme is a core team of central and sectoral planners training in conducting MDG needs assessments and formulating MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. Since formulating and implementing poverty reduction strategies will continue undoubtedly during the next phase, the sustainability of the Outcome as well as the fortification of its results will determine whether or not the outcome is sustainable.

**Outcome 3: Strengthened capacity of African countries for increased participation in global trade and linking trade policies to poverty reduction**,and **Outcome 4: Outcome of trade negotiations reflects common African position.**

Originally, the project was to feed into Outcomes 3 and 4. It was entitled“*Building African capacity to gain maximum benefit from inclusive globalisation and regional integration.*” Its objective was to develop the institutional capacity of AUC, RECs and African countries in order to enable them to participate effectively in global trade, link trade policies to poverty reduction and create a common African position in global trade negotiations. The project made a rather good start in realising some of its outputs.

**Relevance:** As designed, the outcomes were relevant. Trade is one of the motors of economic expansion. However, recognising this axiom is not sufficient to expand trade and taking policy measures to that effect is not sufficient. Policy measures are needed to foster[[20]](#footnote-20) trade in such a way that it contributes to the realisation of MDG’s first tenet, i.e., poverty reduction. Trade relations in the world are a fast changing phenomenon. At par with this condition, Africa will have to move towards a free trade area first within the Continent. This need was already articulated in the meeting of the African Union Assembly summit of January 2012. De facto, the meeting called for boosting intra-African trade by creating a *continental free trade area* (CFTA). The decision necessitates capacity building in RECs, such as COMESA, as well as AU. While project 9 was designed to strengthen capacity for trade and development finance negotiations, trade policy, and increased participation of women in regional and global trade, its slow implementation and new realities necessitate a new strategic response and a new design (possibly in cooperation with UNCTAD). In short, the Outcome remains extremely relevant to the African continent, as well as to individual countries, but to realise this Outcome new instrumentalities are needed.

**Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability:** Effectiveness: The component was not developed on the basis of a well-defined partnership based on a memorandum of understanding. Therefore, the relationship between the institutions, in particular with COMESA, which was the main focus of support from the Programme. Mission visit to COMESA confirmed that the few preliminary activities were undertaken on an ad-hoc basis with little consultation with the institution as a whole. It was surprising to find out that the project was not listed in the COMESA database of international partners.

From a management perspective, the project had poor oversight which resulted in a delayed start-up of two years by which time COMESA has changed its organisational priorities and the idea of setting up a Trade Unit was a non-starter. Yet, there is little documentation provided by the RP available to the team member who visited COMESA regarding the reasons for the delay and the lack of follow-up by staff of the project and overall manager of the RP. COMESA is a strategic REC in the region and it is urgent that UNDP redress the existing breakdown in partnership with the institution. It is also striking that the UNDP Country Office in Zambia was unaware of the difficulties faced by the project and the extent to which the relationship had deteriorated. From this standpoint much of what was envisaged in the project will have to be revamped and redesigned taking into account the findings and the lessons of this outcome evaluation.

Given the above analysis it is not relevant to discuss issues of efficiency and sustainability with reference to this particular outcome.

**Outcome 5:** **Capacity depletion halted in critical social sectors linked to pandemics especially HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.**

**Relevance:** The outcome is relevant in terms of addressing the critical need to respond to HIV/AIDS within national poverty reduction strategies and programmes in the region. Since this is one of the components of MDG, its relevance is obvious for the strategic position of UNDP and RBA. It does not have a purely health approach. It has a comprehensive development approach and it is in line with the UNAIDS division of labour as based on UNDP’s comparative advantage as regards governance, gender and poverty reduction. It has collaborated with AU and in particular with SADC.

**Effectiveness:** This Outcome has been achieved to a great extent.. Among the achievements are, in partnership with AU, a high level dialogue on HIV; consensus on prioritising intellectual property and trade law; repealing the laws criminalising HIV/AIDS and its transmission; support to the SADC Secretariat in producing key outcome indicators to be used in monitoring, evaluating and reporting HIV/AIDS responses by the planning, finance, local government, justice and infrastructure sectors in the SADC region; identifying indicators to mainstream HIV/AIDS, gender and human rights into non-health sectors and ministries; and collaboration among UNDP’s environment project, IOM and ILO, which integrated health (HIV, TB, Malaria) and gender into environmental impact assessment regulations and processes. What is not readily apparent is synergies with other focus areas in a more systematic manner, particularly on issues related to youth and gender equality.

**Efficiency:** This project has been efficiently implemented. The resources allocated to results achievement have been fully utilised at the completion of the project activities.

**Sustainability:** The sustainability of Outcome 5 requires formulating strategies for a ground game in partnership with regional and sub-regional institutions for translating results at the policy level into impact on the ground. This will also require much more synergy with other focus areas. A number of innovative and strategic initiatives centred on involving new actors such as municipalities and trade corridors. These have great potential for higher levels of impact on reducing the negative impact on social sectors.

**Outcome 6: Policy and regulatory environment conducive to private sector growth, including private sector participation.**

**Relevance: The** private sector is one of the main engines for growth; hence, its expansion is not only desirable, but also necessary. However, the expansion of the private sector requirestheenabling conditions and environment for its growth. Since the promotion of the private sector and its investment create more employments, and additional jobs are conducive to contribute to reducing poverty, this outcome is relevant for the strategic position of UNDP and also RBA in the Continent and the individual countries in Africa.

**Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability cannot be assessed at this stage.** It is too early to assess whether this outcome will be achieved effectively and efficiently**,** since project(s) leading to it are still in the early implementation phase. Its sustainability cannot be ascertained neither for the same reason.

One of the projects leading to Outcome 6 is “*Private Sector and Inclusive Market Development for Poverty Reduction in Africa: African Facility for Inclusive Markets.”*  It is also known as AFIM. Its objective is to facilitate appropriate policy and regulatory environment for private sector growth, including SMEs at the national and regional level. The target of the project, managed from Johannesburg, is RECs, Country Offices and SMEs. It is a successful project in terms of producing most of the expected outputs. It is also within UNDP’s private sector strategy. AFIM positioned UNDP in the critical space of private sector engagement and development of agri-business and food security in Africa, including co-organisation of the Agri-Business Forum. AFIM also organised and initiated public-private sector dialogue involving public and private sector, civil society, UN agencies and regional institutions. It also carried an assessment of the capacity of the regional institutions (such as AU, NEPAD, COMESA, etc.) for private sector development. Finally, it created private sector development capacity in twenty COs, governments, NEPAD, COMESA, ECOWAS and provided technical assistance to thirteen COs on policy advice with respect to private sector development. As stated above, many of the expected outputs have been realised; the remaining ones are expected to be realised at the end of 2013. Up to now, the project has spent only about 35 per cent of its budget; therefore, it faces no financial constraint. But it does suffer from difficulties and delays in recruitment. AFIM is far from being completed. Several activities need to be undertaken, such as developing AFIM Report for policy dialogue, a series of sub-regional and cross-border value chain projects, and a guide of best practices in non-agricultural sectors. Moreover, a mid-term evaluation is programmed, the result of which should shed light on the Outcome’s sustainability.

 **Outcome 7: Diversified private sector, including SMEs.**

There is no specific project leading to Outcome 7. It is expected that the results of two projects, namely, “*Social Cohesion and Youth Employment for Sub-Saharan Africa”* and *AFIM* would also contribute to the realisation of Outcome 7.

**Relevance:** This Outcome is extremely relevant~~,~~since it is causally related to employment creation and, therefore, to poverty reduction.The Team finds that *AFIM* is likely to be a successful project as discussed above

**Efficiency** and **Effectiveness:** With respect to these criteria,no judgment can be advanced at this stage, since projects are yet to be completed.

**Sustainability:**  Sustainabilitycan be questioned~~,~~ since the Outcome depends, at least partially, on a single project (AFIM) that is essentially directed to private sector development, which is still incomplete

**In summary,** UNDP’s Strategic Plan (2008-2011) clearly states that “the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the broader internationally agreed development goals, reflect a common understanding that global challenges must be managed so that they lead to broadly based, inclusive progress and so that attention is given to a set of specific dimensions of human development.” It must be kept in mind that not all, but some tenets of MDG are covered in this focus area; namely poverty reduction, gender equality~~,~~ and HIV/AIDS~~.~~ Focus Area 1 and the outcomes for its realisation are in concordance with UNDP’s strategic position. Outcomes support the development of national capacities at all levels, i.e., capacity building in RECs~~,~~ as well as in selected countries. The Senior Economists Programme attests to this fact. However, different scenarios emerge when specific projects target RECs. Hence, attitudes of RECs towards projects differ with different political agenda. Thereby, project results end up having different receptivity by these organisations. For example, Outcome 6 intends to develop capacity in regional and sub-regional organisations. However, these essentially being political organisations, their policies will change with the change of governments’ policies vis-à-vis the private sector. This may make certain capacity development in government officials redundant or irrelevant. Moreover, there is a rupture of communication between the project and AU. The interviews revealed that three most relevant directors (trade, industry and energy) had no knowledge of the activities of the *AFIM*. This situation reveals that projects probably are designed according to what it is thought to be useful, rather than responding to demand, latent or revealed. The gender, youth and HIV/AIDS projects have contributed to the outcomes and the financial resources have been effectively utilised. However, additional financial resources may be required in 2012 in order to fortify the strategic partnerships already established.

 **5.2 Consolidating democratic and participatory governance**

The RBA’s Regional Governance Program seeks to strengthen the institutional capacities of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to formulate, implement and monitor governance-related standards and policies that address regional and national development issues and integration. It has four components, namely: (a) Support to AU and RECs; (b) Support to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD; (c) Support to the Africa Governance and Public Administration Program (AGPAP); and (d) Support to UNDP/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Joint Governance Initiatives. Initially, these four components were conceived as stand-alone projects and had to be subsequently integrated into a coherent program framework. Therefore, contrary to other focus areas, which deal with individual projects, the governance sector forms a coherent program of action. The four (4) program outcomes are assessed below.

**Outcome 8: Enhanced political participation and managements of elections.**

Two program components are primarily responsible for the delivery of this outcome: Support to APRM/NEPAD, and Support to AU and RECs. The program outputs through which this outcome is realized entail support to activities aimed at enhancing national and regional capacities and processes for democratic governance, with an emphasis on the electoral support, management and monitoring capacities of the AU and the RECs ; strengthening the capacities of the APRM Secretariat to manage the APRM process; and fostering the engagement and participation of non-state actors, particularly the most marginalized groups in democratic processes and service delivery. A special emphasis in the RCF-III is on enhancing the participation of women in electoral processes and on the role of youth in governance processes.

The key outputs achievements to date include: one hundred African election observers trained~~,~~ ; a workshop organized for women groups, political parties and civil society in order to promote inclusive participation through gender equality and women’s empowerment; a pre-eighth Africa Governance Forum focusing on gender convened; a long-cycle based election methodology developed for the AU; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance formulated and adopted; one awareness building workshop for APRM Central African participating countries organized; and electoral support provided to the East African Community.

**Relevance:** Political participation and management of elections are critical components in various AU and RECs instruments and continental governance-related normative frameworks, including the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. They form the lynchpin of the AU Shared Values agenda and its commitment to the promotion of inclusive political systems, free and fair elections run by competent, independent and autonomous electoral management bodies. Fostering inclusive participation and strengthening governance institutions are also among key UNDP strategic objectives. This outcome is therefore relevant to African priorities and the strategic orientations contained in the UNDP Strategic Plan.

**Effectiveness:** Based on the two indicators provided in the program document, namely: (i)the percentage increase in the number of historically marginalised groups participating in democratic processes and assuming decision making roles in Africa; and (ii) the percentage increase in the number of countries holding credible, transparent and peaceful elections in Africa, the evaluation believes that this outcome is partially effective. The available evidence indicates that women participation in electoral processes and decision making has substantially increased in Africa, virtually competing in some regions of the continent with the global trends. At 24.6%, SADC is ahead of the global average (19.3%). Regionally, SADC is second behind the Nordic countries (40.8%). Since adopting the 50/50 target in 2005, women’s representation in parliament in SADC has been increasing at a faster rate than the Global parliament. It grew from 21% in 2005 to 24% in 2009 to reach 25% in 2011. At the same time, the Global Parliament rate was 16%, 19% and 19% respectively during the same period. Based on 2011 figures, five countries are at the top: South Africa (43%), Mozambique (39%), Angola (38%), Tanzania (35%) and Namibia (25%). The representation in the Cabinet in SADC has also improved, though at a slow rate, with three countries with over 30% women ( South Africa, Lesotho and Angola) and four countries close to going over the 30% mark (Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania and Malawi). [[21]](#footnote-21) Although the evaluation cannot attribute this increase to UNDP regional program results alone, it is plausible to argue that UNDP’s advisory services, advocacy and training have emphasized the need to achieve gender equality and women empowerment in line with the UN’s MDGs and relevant regional protocols, including the AU and SADC 50/50 gender representation in decision making structures by 2015 and 2020, respectively.

On the other hand, during the program period Africa has held more than fifty elections, including presidential, legislative and local. Over 85 % of these elections were considered fair, peaceful and transparent, except for the presidential elections in Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo. In Zambia and Senegal, the incumbents accepted the defeat and hence facilitated a peaceful transfer of power. The relative effectiveness, assertiveness and efficiency of the electoral management bodies (EMB) in the elections in Liberia, Senegal, Nigeria and Zambia suggest a general positive trend. Through voter education, there is a growing awareness by citizens of the importance of elections and the value of their votes, as exemplified by increased contestation of election results throughout the continent. In Guinea Bissau, for example, 60,000 youth openly protested in the streets because they were not registered to cast their votes during the 2012 presidential elections. These relative successes in part have been due to UNDP and other partners support to ACDEG, the training and deployment of electoral monitors and observers, as well as strengthened institutional and technological capacities of the EMBs.

There have also been noticeable improvements in political participation on the continent, resulting partially from the APRM. With ten countries at its inception in 2003, the UNDP-supported APRM has today thirty participating countries. As more and more countries are acceding to this mechanism, so is the bourgeoning in national populations who are freely invited to voice their concerns on the governance of their nations and the way forward.

A number of factors have contributed to the outcome. On a positive side, partnerships and synergies with the AU, RECs (ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC) and CSOs (ALRAESA), as well as UNDP Country Offices have been valuable in the collective definition of issues and solutions to effectively respond to electoral capacity constraints in the region. Also, partnerships to mobilize resources from a broad spectrum of actors through basket funds and other contributions (e.g., Spain, Norway) have helped to address the multiple challenges of democratic consolidation.

Despite progress, serious challenges exist, most of them related to the persisting fragility of the African State (i.e., the manipulation of the constitution and/or the high jacking of the electoral management bodies by incumbents), politicisation of ethnicity and religion and endorsement by world and regional powers of some African leaders who openly disregard electoral laws, abuse basic human rights and mismanage their economies; cultural factors (“You cannot point a finger at your brother”) and the way each African country perceives and interprets the continental governance agenda and its related programs, which are very much influenced by historical and political experiences and the realities the leadership faces. Therefore, some governments see the AU programs, such as the APRM, as being intrusive, and this may affect their engagement in the process. The challenge becomes how to secure their buy-ins beyond official speeches. In this respect, the implementation of APRM country programs of action remains the acid test for translating strategies that have been devised through participatory and inclusive processes into concrete actions at the AU Member States’ level.

The question has also been raised of how to quickly and effectively deal through the APRM Trust Fund with country requests to address pressing political problems in view of UNDP’s administrative procedures which beneficiaries consider as very slow!

**Efficiency:** The outcome is partially efficient. The synergies with other key partners (AU, donors, and Country Offices) have been instrumental in results achievement. The case in point is the collaboration with Country Offices, which had more value additions at relatively minimal cost. Country Offices without expertise on electoral matters partnered with relevant Regional Service Centers to secure in real time appropriate regional in-house expertise, thereby saving time and resources, which could have been spent on often expensive international consultants. Most of the respondents in CO were appreciative of the regional centres’ technical backstopping and advisory services. Resource mobilisation too has been relatively effective, especially with the APRM Trust Fund. The discussions with relevant personnel revealed that the Fund has enough cash reserves to cover its expenses.[[22]](#footnote-22) However, the APRM Secretariat complained about UNDP’s procedures, which, according to it, do not allow the Secretariat to quickly respond to requests from countries. There is also scarcity of quantifiable and clearly documented evidence to facilitate performance measurement (i.e., in the area of elections and women’s participation).

**Sustainability:** Sustainability is problematic, in light of AU and RECs inadequate capacities in election observation and monitoring. In addition, EMBs in many countries still need to be strengthened. Substantial investment is also required to fully assist in implementing APRM country action programs.

**Outcome 9: Strengthened political and economic governance and enhanced delivery.**

This outcome is primarily delivered through the Africa Governance and Public Administration Program (AGPAD), including the AU Conference of Ministers of Public Service (CAMPS) program and the Dakar Pole Project. The outputs through which this outcome is achieved entail: improving regional and national economic governance and service delivery capacities; strengthening the capacities of AU and RECs and their institutions for responsive, transparent and accountable public service delivery; building effective mechanisms at the State level to combat corruption; improving fiscal management; and effective management of natural resources.

Among the key output achievements to date are: the AU-Conference of Ministers of Public Service (CAMPS) revamped; the Public Service Charter finalized; three management Guides developed and addressing key challenges and solutions for modernising African public administration systems, especially in the areas of leadership, and human resource and performance management; the AU Anticorruption Strategy drafted and support provided for its implementation; and a results-based budgeting approach introduced in west and central Africa. However, no significant results have been accomplished to date on enhancing the capacities of small and medium enterprises and the private sector to effectively participate in economic policy at regional and national levels, as well as on improving transparency in management of natural resources. Efforts are reportedly underway to bolster these areas.

**Relevance:** The public administration systems in Africa face great challenges in terms of both human and institutional capacities, as well as overall policy environment. These challenges deeply constrain the ability to achieve the continent’s defined priorities toward stimulating growth and development, as set by the AU and the NEPAD agenda, including the MDGs. Further, there is a critical resource gap in meeting the demands placed on African public administration for the delivery of quality public services. In order to close this gap, strengthening of capacities in terms of policies that are pro-growth, pro-people, inclusive and equitable, as well as key systems and processes, including performance culture, is imperative. Strengthening political and economic governance and enhancing service delivery is, therefore, relevant to African development challenges and priorities.

**Effectiveness:** The indicator provided for the assessment of the effectiveness of this outcome is: “the percentage increase in countries that have adopted and implemented programs to improve service delivery in Africa”. The overall impression is that the outcome is partially effective. Effective delivery of public services remains essential for advancing human development and achieving the MDGs. Most important in this regard is the fight against corruption. Corruption in Africa hurts human development, diverting resources to private gains and reducing access to public services. Given the significance of this problem, UNDP-RBA has worked with Country Offices to develop and implement anti-corruption strategies. Virtually, almost every African country today has some form of anti-corruption program. The need to improve outcomes in MDGs-related sectors has prompted UNDP to emphasize a sector approach in the application of regional anti-corruption policies in areas such as education and health. Although too early to tell, the introduction through UNDP Pole Project in Central and West African countries of results-based budgeting is also more likely to have positive effects on service delivery, through a more transparent use of public funds.

Of critical importance in regional and national efforts to improve public service delivery has been the vision laid out and being promoted through the Public Service Charter and the AU’s CAMPS. The Charter appears catalytic to the continental public administration transformational agenda. Developed with UNDP support, it was opened for signature in Nairobi in May 2011 and within a short period of time, fourteen countries had already signed it. Six have initiated the process of ratification, while Kenya is the first country to ratify the Charter. The Charter presents fundamental principles and values to provide efficient, effective and innovative public services that are satisfactory to the community and users. It thus provides the standards and basic elements for modernizing the African public service.

Along with the Public Service Charter, the CAMPS was revamped and is today a full programme of the African Union devoted to the strengthening of the public administration capabilities to become the drivers of change within African public services. Initially limited to English speaking countries, presently the programme covers Central and Francophone African countries. As a result, there has been an 80% increase in participation of these regions and some have signed the Charter and begun the process of ratification.

Key to the CAMPS’s innovations for improving service delivery is the concept of service champion country (SCC). A SCC is specialised in one or several thematic areas of the implementation of the Africa Governance and Public Administration Program (AGPAP) in which its excellence is recognized by other African countries (e.g., performance management for Kenya, human resource planning and management for Algeria, ICT for Egypt, etc.). The SCC makes a contribution to programme implementation by actively promoting and ensuring that its area of work is effectively implemented. The SCC showcases its achievements, challenges and lessons learned during the Africa Public Service Day. This allows others to learn from its experiences. An SCC can be called upon by any other participating countries to assist in implementing the aspects of the AGPAP in which it has comparative strengths. This SCC concept is spearheading South-South technical cooperation with potential to speed up continental integration. It is a powerful tool for building new partnerships and developing a sense of ownership of the development process in the South.

A number of enabling factors to the realization of these outcome achievements can be noted: dynamic leadership provided by the Chairman of the CAMPS program; cooperation with the CAMPS program by most participating countries; synergetic relationships between UNDP and UNECA (Division of Governance and Public Administration), notably on anti-corruption initiatives; and collaboration between the regional governance team and UNDP field economists acting as entry-points on country macroeconomic and public finance issues (e.g., Public Finance team in RSC in Dakar), or country governance team leaders on public administration and corruption problems. However, structural and organisational factors continue to deflect the efforts toward corruption control).[[23]](#footnote-23) Likewise, the Public Service Charter remains overly ambitious in view of the often low status (also lack of resources) conferred to agencies or ministries in charge of public service in many African countries.

**Efficiency:** The Outcome is partially efficient. Building deep and strategic partnerships with African training institutions has been critical to the domestication and popularisation of regional public administration and management concepts, tools and strategies. Allying with these institutions is also effective in the progressive change of administrative culture.

**Sustainability:** Although the reform initiatives under SCC make sustainability much easier, overall, sustainability still raises questions in light of the fragile human, institutional and financial base of the AU and most of its Member States.

**Outcome 10: More effective regional institutions.**

This outcome is primarily delivered through support to AU and RECs and UNDP-UNECA Joint Governance Initiatives. The outputs through which this outcome is realized involve support to regional and sub-regional organisations to enable them formulate and implement their governance-related programs in ways to better respond to existing and emerging governance challenges and effectively advocate these among their various constituencies. The salient outputs that have been realized to date include: African countries sensitized for the ratification of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; the Public Service Charter popularized and domesticated; and the AU’s African Human Rights Strategy developed and adopted and its implementation plan finalized.

**Relevance:** Although Africa has seen considerable progress in its integration and South-South dialogue over the last four decades, the achieved results have been short of expectations. The ability of regional groupings to formulate, implement and monitor their regulatory frameworks and related programs has been severely constrained. Strengthening the capacities of the AU and its RECs thus occupies center stage in the regional governance agenda to spearhead the integration process. Developing more effective regional institutions is, therefore, relevant to AU and RECs priorities.

**Effectiveness:** Based on the indicator provided in the program document for the assessment of the effectiveness of Outcome 9, namely, “The AU and RECs effectively implementing their political and economic governance programmes and initiatives at regional and national levels with UNDP support”, this outcome is partially effective. After staying in limbo for several years following its adoption during the Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 30 January 2007, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) was finally ratified. This Charter remains today the most authoritative AU instrument, establishing collective standards and principles on democracy and elections. UNDP support was critical to the development, finalisation, and ratification of this Charter through its assistance to the Pan-African Parliament. Central to the vision of the ACDEG is the AU commitment to zero tolerance of unconstitutional changes of governments in Africa and the total embrace of a culture of democracy and peace. The AU and the ECOWAS are today in a position to react more rapidly and in a robust way to situations threatening democracy in Africa (e.g., interventions in Ivory Coast in 2010, and recently in Mali and Guinea Bissau).

In line with the ACDEG, the Executive Council of the AU, during the 18th Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, 28 February 2011, declared 2012 as the Year of Shared Values. Essential to the concept of Shared Values is democratic and good governance as a catalyst for Africa’s integration. The popularisation of the Shared Values throughout 2012 is meant to strengthen the commitment of AU Member States in the areas of democracy, governance, elections, human rights and free movement of persons as a means to accelerate continental integration and development. UNDP provided critical technical support for the development of the concept of Shared Values and its related implementation agenda, leading to the establishment of the African Governance Architecture and its pillar, the African Governance Framework.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) continues to assert its position as the AU’s leading development agency. UNDP supported NEPAD’s transformation into a planning and coordinating agency of AU, playing a critical role in the strategic repositioning of the continent in global affairs. Under NEPAD, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has emerged as the center piece of Africa’s plan for strategic renewal and rebirth. The primary purpose of this continental self-monitoring mechanism is to encourage African participating countries to adopt policies, standards and practices that foster political stability, economic growth and development and continental integration through experience-sharing and reinforcement of best practices. Good political and economic governance remains central to its mandate. With only ten members at its inception in 2003, to date the programme counts a membership of thirty participating countries. Among these, fifteen countries have completed the APR process by the Forum of the Heads of State and the 16th is awaiting the review (Zambia). Of these, five were completed during the regional programme period (2009 to 2011).  As stated earlier, the conduct of these reviews has contributed to opening up the political space and facilitated the expression of views by citizens on the state of governance in their respective countries.  They have also helped identify challenges and recommendations that are reflected in the National Programs of Action. The issues raised in the review reports have led to reforms in some countries (e.g., Ghana established a Ministry of Women Affairs after a critique on women’s representation in the Cabinet, and Rwanda set up a private sector reform agenda to create a private sector enabling environment). They have also brought to light major governance challenges on the continent, such as electoral conflicts and corruption, thereby feeding the AGR-III and AGR-VIII which focus on elections and management of diversity in Africa.

UNDP has been a strategic partner of the APR process since the inception of the program from the formulation of tools to the implementation of reviews. UNDP established an APRM Trust Fund in 2005 with an initial contribution of $2.75 million, paving the way to the support of and contributions from other development partners, including African governments. UNDP provides full support to the APRM Secretariat, facilitating inter alia every step leading to the APRM country report, from country assessment and review missions to the preparation of country programmes of action. The ultimate test of the APRM is, however, its ability to transform ideals into actions. Unfortunately, no systematic analysis of the APRM country programs of action has been conducted to date. Consequently, the level of implementation of the APRM action programmes is not known to UNDP and other stakeholders. Moreover, it is not yet clear how countries that have acceded to the program, but have not yet committed to the review process will be engaged.

The AU-UNDP efforts toward corruption control were discussed in the previous outcome analysis. Suffice it here to emphasize that the African Union Commission (AUC) has established an Anti-Corruption Advisory Board to ensure Member States comply with the African Convention for Combating and Preventing Corruption, which came into force in 2003. In line with the UNDP-assisted AU Human Rights Strategy, the AU has included in the work of the Global Commission on HIV/AIDS the rights and needs of Persons Living with HIV and AIDS (PLHIV) in sub-Saharan Africa. There is yet an urgent need to involve civil society organizations and the media at both national and regional levels in a systematic fight against corruption. Pro-democracy associations including watchdog organizations, human rights movements and the media organizations can play a catalytic role in corruption control strategies by among others exposing corruption cases and sensitizing the public on its destructive consequences, maintaining web-sites and hold meetings on corruption, thereby keeping corruption in the limelight as one of the central public policy issues for improved governance, sustainable growth and human development.

**Efficiency:** The Outcome is delivered efficiently. The newly revamped and now more comprehensive UN Programme of Support to the Ten-Year Capacity Building of the AU has given a new impetus to coherent and well-coordinated UN system wide support to the AU through the Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM). One of the nine clusters created for this purpose is the Governance Cluster that UNDP coordinates and co-chairs with the Department of Political Affairs of the AU. The proximity of the UNDP-ECA Joint Governance Initiatives programme component to AU and ECA has provided the opportunity for the program to develop strategic partnerships and alliances with these institutions that have facilitated the implementation of activities.

**Sustainability:** Sustainability is the biggest challenge of this outcome, since the major beneficiary institutions (AU, APRM Secretariat and the RECs) do not have the requisite internal expertise and adequateresources to sustain the outcome and output results to the extent that UNDP had to withdraw its support.

**Outcome 11: Better understanding, codifying and sharing best African practices on governance.**

This outcome is primarily delivered through UNDP-UNECA Joint Governance Initiatives and Support to APRM-NEPAD. The outputs through which this outcome is achieved entail: support on strengthening the capacities of African governance institutions, networks and think-tanks/research institutions to generate and disseminate policy-relevant knowledge related to governance, based on rigorous assessments, using Africa Governance Report (AGR) and Africa Governance Forum (AGF) as the main conduits; establishing best practice data bases; strengthening Africa Governance Institute (AGI); developing and enhancing governance assessment tools by building on knowledge generated and collected through the APRM country review reports; and sharing of governance best practices in Africa.

Key output achievements to date include: the AGR-III and AGF-VIII prepared in collaboration with ECA with 41 countries participating and 22 country reports completed; two multi-stakeholder forums organized, one on youth and another on gender; and a resource centre established within the Dakar-based Africa Governance Institute.

**Relevance:** In Africa, the scarcity of policy-relevant information is compounded by the limited availability of data and best practices on past and current development and governance initiatives to guide policy makers and analysts and avoid potential duplications of efforts. The institutional and human resource capacity constraints continue to limit many African governance institutions and think-tanks to effectively identify, collect, codify and share knowledge on good governance. Moreover, the quality and quantity of existing databases on best practices in Africa on good governance remain limited, not to mention the often weak and inadequate dialogue settings. A better understanding, codifying and sharing of African best practices on governance is, hence, relevant to African development priorities.

**Effectiveness:** The programme results framework identifies two indicators for the assessment of the effectiveness of this outcome: (1) increase in the number of African best practices codified; and (2) increase in the extent of dissemination of governance knowledge by regional/sub-regional organizations and African Institutes. The outcome achievements are generally satisfactory. The African Governance Report is now in its third edition; the first and second editions were published in 2005 and 2008, respectively. While the two previous editions were the work of the UNECA alone, the current edition is a result of joint efforts between UNDP and UNECA. A number of policy and background papers have been produced as part of this third AGR. What makes these documents special is that they have been prepared by country nationals themselves, participating and providing their own insights on development and governance achievements and challenges in their countries and the way forward.

Serving as an instrument for learning and experience-sharing, the APRM too has managed to publish eighteen country review reports, which highlight issues pertaining to democracy and good political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, socio-economic development in reviewed countries along with policy relevant recommendations. The APRM assessments are undertaken by technical research institutions at national level and African Experts at the continental level. As was the original intention, this is leading to building capacity of African institutions and a pool of African experts who can assist in matters of governance and development.

Regarding the increase in the extent of dissemination of governance knowledge by regional/sub-regional organisations and African Management Institutes, the Africa Governance Forum (AGF) has evolved, since its inception in 1997, as a valuable platform that facilitates the dissemination of best governance practices, as well as a policy dialogue framework on key governance issues among a wide range of stakeholders, including governments, CSOs, private sector and development partners. Along with these efforts, the Dakar-based Africa Governance Institute (AGI) has established an electronic documentation (resource centre) that is currently listed and freely available online, with nearly 3,000 articles, books and documents of institutions on governance in Africa. The average attendance at the resource center is reportedly around 14,000 visits per month (2011). The subscriptions continue to multiply (144 subscribers) although the tool is currently limited to French. The database of experts which has two interfaces (one public and one private) has nearly 150 experts and resource persons. As a result of all these efforts, there seems to be a deepening culture of dialogue on democratic governance in Africa, which is accompanied by a momentum of governance reforms. The various governance reports have brought a greater continental awareness on issues of political, social and economic inclusiveness, fairness, transparency, accountability, impoverishment, justice and peace.

Various factors have affected the production of these results. On a positive side, the third AGR and the eight AGF are part of UNDP-UNECA joint governance initiatives, managed through the UNDP Country Office in Addis Ababa. The proximity of UNDP-RBA support to the UNECA has facilitated the development of strategic partnerships and close working relationships between these two institutions. UNDP Partnerships with other actors such as the Norwegian Trust Fund have been critical in providing financial and technical support.

**Efficiency:** The outcome is partially efficient. The working relationship between UNDP-UNECA has been cordial, facilitating the carrying out of activities. The synergies between AGR-III and AGF-VIII have had a positive spin-off in terms of ensuring complementarities between these two continental initiatives, and by extension cementing their strategic linkages with the APRM. However, the disbursement of funds to the Dakar-based Africa Governance Institute has been very slow. This together with staff turnover has negatively affected the implementation rate of the support to the Coordination of UNDP-UNECA Joint Governance Initiatives.

**Sustainability:** The capacities of African management institutes and think-tanks are still fragile, especially in terms of financial capabilities.

**In summary**, the key priorities of the Regional Governance Program are coherent with African governance challenges and the UNDP Strategic Plan. However, the strategy (including resource commitments) that was adopted to bring about the desired changes needs to be revisited to ensure that it is made of the right mix of building blocks for democratic consolidation and good governance. Indeed, The RCF III and its RGP seek to consolidate participatory and democratic governance through the aforementioned four interrelated components. Its emphasis on strengthening the institutions of governance at regional and sub-regional levels, via these four pillars is evidently a right target, but experience and research studies show that ordinary citizens must also be empowered to make institutional actors accountable and responsive to their needs and priorities. The grass-roots governance mobilisation, through UNDP direct support to community associations and nongovernmental organisations that are engaged in democracy and good governance work at the regional and national levels becomes imperative.

Moreover, there is a need to design a separate programme component on economic governance with linkages to the inclusive private sector development programme with a view to increasing the visibility of this critical element for the realisation of the MDGs. Good governance impacts the realisation of continental economic, political and security objectives, as well. In this vein, a budget of about $20 million does not reflect the primacy of governance for achieving these goals.

In addition, while the programme strategy focuses on institutional strengthening of the AU and its RECs, one of its components is exclusively dedicated to the support of AU and RECs, making it as if the other three components have nothing to do with them. The same can be said about UNDP-ECA Joint Governance Initiatives, which must go beyond partnerships around AGR and AGF to include, for example, private sector development and corporate governance. A more logical way of reorganising programme activity clusters is warranted.

 Although the governance programme has been successful in developing partnerships and synergies with various actors and stakeholders facilitating its implementation, the overall implementation rate is less than 45%, due mainly to delays in its start-up[[24]](#footnote-24), its dispersed implementation structure, and the slow process of disbursing funds to some of its components (for example, to Africa Governance Institute under the Joint UNDP-ECA initiatives). This low implementation rate suggests that many planned activities have yet to be carried out to produce the required outputs that will contribute to outcomes. Leading change toward sustainability will require that a strategic approach to sustainability be adopted by addressing in a comprehensive and coordinated way the AU, RECs and African countries capabilities necessary to fulfill their stated mandates and use their resources in a more effective and transparent manner to achieve results. This is not simply a question of competencies, training, or exchange of best governance practices, but of primarily identifying with relevant stakeholders key structural and organisational impediments to improved regional governance agenda along with political mobilisation and other concrete action programmes that must be implemented over a certain period of time to tackle them.

Overall, participatory democracy and good governance have gained prominence in the regional and national agenda and are progressively and firmly taking root in the continent.Despite imperfections and uneven results, elections are held regularly with an assured level of effectiveness and efficiency in a growing number of countries. Citizens are more aware of the value of their votes and are more conscious about the issues of corruption, quality of services and accountability. The tendency toward naked dictatorship and autocratic regimes is vanishing. Popular participation is increasing, despite pending questions regarding its meaningfulness. The fact that more and more African countries engage in the widest possible national consultative processes with all of their stakeholders in a bid to address their governance shortcomings and weaknesses through APRM programmes of action is unprecedented in the history of the continent, and indeed, in the whole world. The potential for improving public service delivery has never been greater, as intra-African technical cooperation and dialogue intensifies with the potential to spearhead the continental integration.

Admittedly, these positive trends could not have been possible without UNDP and other partner assisted efforts to strengthen the institutional frameworks and systems of governance at continental, sub-regional and national levels. Accordingly, many respondents in the field noted that UNDP was a partner of choice. UNDP’s country presence has also had the advantage of allowing African countries to learn from each other, thereby promoting South-South cooperation. Notwithstanding the progress made, considerable challenges and threats to democracy and good governance still persist. There is, however, a need to build on ongoing progress and achievements to firmly place the continent on the path to political and economic renewal.

**5. 3 Conflict prevention, peace building and economic recovery**

There are four outcomes in this Focus Area and four projects in support of the outcomes.

**Outcome 12: More effective regional institutions for crisis prevention.**

Outcome 12 was to be realised through two (2) projects: 1.Support for the Implementation of the Peace and Security Agenda of the African Union Commission (2008-2011); and 2.Enhanced Regional Capacities in Africa for Preventing and Recovering from Crisis Caused by Natural Disasters and Conflicts (2008-2013). The latter has not yet started and only the first project can be assessed.

UNDP’s support to the AU´s Peace and Security Department (PSD) dates back to 1998 and the current project builds on previous interventions, when UNDP had a lead role and managed donor support to AU. The project is supporting the realisation of the outcome in a significant way. Support to the PSD through remuneration payment of staff and different capacity building projects, including the provision of ICT equipment, has contributed to PSD´s efforts to conduct its core business: preventing and managing conflicts, conducting analysis and strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The donor relations with the PSD, however, have shifted and the EU is now the largest contributor to AU and PSD. The donors preferred a more direct relationship with AU and considered a joint financing mechanism a step forward in aid effectiveness.

UNDP decided not to join the basket fund at a strategic moment in time when its own resources were significantly reduced and donors preferred a stronger joint donor voice, which could influence discussions on how PSD would become fully operational, implement its mandate and mobilise resources to ensure its long term sustainability. In this context, UNDP could have articulated and implemented its exit strategy, which had been stressed by the UNDP management for several years. The capacity support included: strengthening both the support and knowledge functions of PSD; providing equipment for key functions; and support to processes relevant to PSD’s mandate. Training was in most cases provided by UNITAR and mainly through e-learning instruments. The consultants were hired to provide specific services, including resource mobilisation, assessments, drafting, translations, etc. Missions and high level seminars were funded to contribute to decision-making processes and knowledge sharing. High implementation rates for the years 2009/2010 and 2011 are documented.

UNDP has built a partnership with AU/PSD since 1998 and is a respected donor. Given the changes in the course of this project, however, UNDP support is less visible and strategic mainly due to the shift in aid modality and with UNDP no longer being in a management position. The beneficiaries consider UNDP’s contribution “essential”, but would like it to be better targeted and to supplement what other donors are doing. UNDP did not participate in the monthly AU Partner Groups' (AUPG) meetings for Peace and Security to provide relevant information, which would have prevented overlap in the funding provided, for example, for the Central Early Warning Systems. The work plans were also not shared with other donors. The management arrangements were not optimal: too many stakeholders were involved at various levels: UNDP/RBA, UNDP/CO, UNDP/Liaison and the Project Manager based in Addis Ababa. This resulted in blurred lines of responsibility and supervision and stakeholders having different priorities, which has led to internal discussions and frictions.

**Relevance:** The Outcome is very relevant. Despite UNDP´s parallel support to PSD, its intervention was relevant in supporting the PSD in executing its mandate. A better performing PSD will enable the African Peace and Security Architecture to become effective in preventing conflict. The Outcome is also relevant in regard to UNDP regional strategic objectives, such as capacity building to manage and prevent conflicts at regional and national level.

**Effectiveness:** The Outcome is partially effective. Although the different activities may have contributed to processes leading to the Outcome, it appears impossible to define in detail and with evidence how these contributions have helped realise the Outcome. This is partly due to the very process nature of conflict prevention and how training and workshops have affected the knowledge base of the PSD. There is no follow up to evaluate and monitor that improvements such as capacity building have led to significant change in skills and technical knowledge. All the reporting is based on satisfying the input requirements. In contrast, specific equipment that has been purchased is in use and effective. Various workshops have been conducted and travel arrangements supported without identifying how such efforts have contributed to the desired outputs. There is also no evidence to what extent these activities respond to policies and strategies.

**Efficiency:** The Outcome is partially efficient. Frequent interactions with donors could have increased aid effectiveness~~,~~ as well as supporting the PSD through a joint basket fund. The transaction costs increased for both the recipient and UNDP. Within the project, there have been no budget overruns. Originally, the resources were to contribute to salary costs, but due to a change in needs, the available resources had to be re-budgeted for other expenditures in the annual plan. In addition, the resignation of the programme manager in May 2012 may cause a low level of expenditures and the office may have difficulty recruiting replacement for the remainder of RCF III.

**Sustainability:** Sustainability is in doubt**.** Although the implementation of an exit strategy was discussed several times, no progress was made. The beneficiaries view it a delicate topic, but consider UNDP´s contribution sustainable, if it can assist the PSD to become self-reliant.

**Outcome 13: Effective regional mechanisms for disaster preparedness and response.**

Outcome 13 was to be achieved through the project, Enhanced Regional Capacities in Africa for Preventing and Recovering from Crisis Caused by Natural Disasters and Conflicts (2008-2013). This project has not started~~,~~ but preparatory activities are undertaken. The project is an integrated CPR intervention that combines two stand-alone regional projects covering disaster risk reduction (DRR) and conflict prevention and management (CPM). The CPM component will contribute to two Regional Programme Outcomes:“*More effective regional institutions for crisis prevention*” and “*Greater responsiveness and sustainable recovery from crisis*”. (See below outcome 14). The DRR component is directed at contributing to the achievement of outcome “*Effective regional mechanisms for disaster preparedness and response*” by building-upon and expanding the UNDP/RBA assistance to African countries (on a pilot basis) and RECs (ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC) to create sustainable mechanisms for DRR as per the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015).

The project was to provide a platform to deliver DRR capacity development initiatives to strengthen the capacities of the three RECs and for them to integrate DRR into their development policies and mechanisms, thereby lowering the threat level of natural hazards to vulnerable populations. Priority focus areas are expected to include management of risks to developments associated with climate variability and change and preparedness for disaster response and recovery. An inception process has been initiated while recruitment of the Programme Manager continues. During the inception process, under the leadership of the UNDP Regional Service Centre in Dakar, it was expected that an inception workshop would take place, but this workshop has not taken place yet. The persons interviewed in the Dakar office noticed challenges in managing such a project with two centers (Dakar and Johannesburg) which do not have the necessary in- house expertise. In addition, they suggest that the project could supplement other projects undertaken at the AU level as well as other RECs. This would require strong coordination efforts among different UNDP regional services centers, including UNDP´s office in Addis Ababa. The interviewees also pointed to the necessity to closely liaise with BCPR for its technical expertise and the work it is undertaking at the country level.

**Outcome 14: Greater responsiveness to and sustainable recovery from crises.**

Outcome 14 was to be achieved through the project, Enhanced Regional Capacities in Africa for Preventing and Recovering from Crisis Caused by Natural Disasters and Conflicts (2008-2013). This project has not started. The needs in this area remain and a swift start to operationalise this programme is necessary. Please see above discussion under outcome 13.

**Outcome 15: Human security enhanced.**

Outcome 15 wasto be realised through two projects: 1) Enhanced Human Security Through the Strengthening of the Capacity of Regional and Sub-regional Organisations to Control Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa (2009 – 2011); and 2) Support for the Implementation of the Peace and Security Agenda of the African Union Commission (2008-2011), This Outcome is very ambitious and the project has only started to contribute to some strategic level preparations~~,~~ such as strategies, protocols and action plans. This includes the African Union strategy and action plan for enhancing border management in Africa, which was approved by the experts of the AU member states, and the action plan was to be submitted to the Heads of States at the AU Summit in June 2012. Its focus on 4 RECs and a sub-regional pilot in West Africa has started showing results, including support to the formulation of ECOWAS’ integrated strategic action plan for its fight against SALW illicit trafficking/misuse in the next 5 years. Training has been provided to staff of relevant government departments involved in border management in four pilot countries in West Africa. It has also contributed to enhanced coordination among the UN and other international stakeholders involved in border management activities.

The project had a difficult and late starts (May 2010), since AU and ECOWAS were both hesitant about the objectives. AU was reluctant, since very little consultation had taken place and ECOWAS was surprised to see the project start after a single mission and with no further interaction. ECOWAS considered 75 % of the project to be irrelevant~~,~~ since the organization had already implemented similar activities. The design was weak, including inadequate consultations with the beneficiaries and other donors.

After the arrival of the Project Manager (PM), the activities that were developed in the work plans received a stronger focus on human security and, in particular, on border management. Both AU and the RECs have benefitted from the project, and given that the Project Manager was located in Abuja, Nigeria. The partnership with ECOWAS and its donors has been strengthened. ECOWAS considers the cooperation with EU positive and the future joint support an important next step in supporting their Member States. AU considers the project well advanced in implementation and rates the effectiveness 4.5 (on a 1-5 scale), but regrets that the Project Manager was based in Abuja.

It appears that RBA has decided to close the project, but most stakeholders are not aware of this decision, including UNDP management at various locations in Africa. The interviewees expect the project activities to be implemented as scheduled. The donors are not aware that this development closure may prove counterproductive. In particular, EU in Abuja considers the work complementary to its efforts. It is particularly appreciative of UNDP’s technical expertise. EU is also reviewing its implementing agents and considers UNDP a possible contributor to the overall APSA and plans to continue support to ECOWAS. ECOWAS lacks project implementation capacity and it cannot be an implementing agency, since its internal compliance systems are not acceptable to EU.[[25]](#footnote-25) Moreover, in the course of the project, UNDP was granted the observer status at the AU Steering Committee on SALW, a move which is highly appreciated. The UNDP/CO in Abuja considers it a “privilege” to have the project in Abuja and, despite its UNDOP/CO lack of accreditation to ECOWAS[[26]](#footnote-26), has managed to start building a partnership with it. Moreover, the UNDP/CO supports a national Programme in SALW. For NGOs, the project contributes to building cohesion among AU and RECs, and UNDP’s neutrality and technical advice are relevant and effective. The NGOs consider the continental approach valuable. The delivery rate between 2010 and 2011 went from 51% to 70%. Given the closure of the project in May 2012, some activities will not be completed.

**Relevance:** The outcome responds to regional development and security needs~~,~~ as well as UNDP’s regional strategic objectives and supports also the AU/PSD project (Outcome 12). It is therefore relevant.

**Effectiveness:** The Outcome is partially effective, but only with regard to support to the development of strategies and action plans and its specific focus on border management. Close proximity to the CO in Nigeria and ECOWAS provided opportunities to build partnerships with donors, the beneficiary and the CO.

**Efficiency:** The Outcome is partially efficient. The Programme started late and its resources have not been exhausted. In line with the mandate of the AU-Regions Steering Committee on SALW to coordinate activities, it was recommended that the Steering Committee could serve as the Project Board~~,~~ rather than creating a separate body. This has prevented overlap and enhanced greater cost-effectiveness, enhanced coordination with relevant stakeholders and reduced the ~~less~~ bureaucracy.

**Sustainability:** The Outcome is partially sustainable. The closure of the project is happening at a time when the first results of capacity development could be expected and partnerships and strategic cooperation with the AU/ECOWAS are maturing. The border management initiative could be further developed beyond SALW objectives, since the approach and its capacity development address wider (economic) integration issues, as well as peace and security. The closure of the project has affected the partnership negatively, even if future support were offered to the AU and RECs to strengthen the APSA.

Project 17,Support for the Implementation of the Peace and Security Agenda of the African Union Commission (2008-2011) has one output which is complementary to project number 1 (see above under Outcome 12): Enhanced implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, including strengthening regional and continental mechanisms to control small arms and light weapons. The project has co-financed some activities, such as the support for the adoption of Small Arms and Light Weapons Policy for Africa (SALW) and the organisation of workshop for the African Steering Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and also the facilitation of lessons learned workshop for African experts on border management. This output consisted of financial support to the SALW specific project only.

 Outcomes 12, 13 and 14 should have benefitted from contributions through a project that has not yet started: Enhanced Regional Capacities in Africa for Preventing and Recovering from Crisis Caused by Natural Disasters and Conflicts. This project is a merger of two stand-alone projects, which were initially formulated to address disaster risk reduction (DRR) and crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) for the RECs, respectively. However, in March, the Advisory Board of the Regional Programme decided to combine the two with a view to improving coherence and reducing fragmentation within the overall Programme. The project has still not started and continues to experience delays. Observations from interviewees about the lack of achieving the outcome indicate that RBA does not have the necessary expertise in conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction. Its close cooperation with BCPR is necessary and robust technical and implementation arrangements are a pre-condition for effective implementation. The outcome remains relevant to the AU and the RECs and strong collaboration between BCPR and RBA is required, including what role RBA should play if BCPR assumes a leading role. Interviewees also mentioned that consultation processes have been weak and that a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the AU/RECs is lacking and how these projects will respond to these needs. Consultations are an important pre-requisite for building solid partnerships and there is a real danger that the support may not be sufficiently built on analysis of the needs and taking into account what other donors are doing.

**In summary**, this focus area has shown uneven results partly due to the fact that one project which was to serve two outcomes never started. The main causes of delay include RBA’s weak cooperation with BCPR, which has the knowledge and experience in conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction and needs to provide RBA with robust technical advice and assist in implementation. The performance of the four outcomes is weak and several factors have contributed to it. The regional programme RCFIII targets the AU and the RECs and the interrelationships and interdependencies among them. These organizations are primarily political institutions and differ profoundly from each other. The rationale for targeting these organizations may be based on the assumption that the latter are a homogenous group, which they are not. Any effort to assist them as a homogeneous group with a single project would be challenging. Many interlocutors would prefer more specific AU or REC focused assistance, which does not necessarily address all of the different organisations.

At AU level, the demand appears to focus on specific technical advice and further specialised training in areas pertinent to the APSA, possibly through a contingency fund that would supplement what other donors are doing. At REC level, UNDP is appreciated for its technical advice and its regional and sub-regional perspective; like the AU, their request is for similar types of expertise and support.[[27]](#footnote-27) In addition, REC’s key contribution lies in its support to Member States and a stronger involvement of the CO in the place where the REC is based would enhance the partnership. UNDP/COs in the REC could also provide support to sub-regional programmes of RECs.

SPACE

 Donors, government and REC officials have indicated that they prefer to interact directly with the UNDP/CO office (proximity is the main consideration) where the REC is located. This appears to be an important element in building partnerships and discussing evolving situations in the Peace and Security Architecture that are often of an urgent nature. Moreover, UNDP/CO can organise support in the other UNDP/COs in the Member States around themes of common interest. RECs are interested in such an approach precisely because UNDP has COs which RECs lack. COs in Abuja and Gaborone are not fully informed of the RCF’s activities at RECs level, irrespective of what the nature of the activity is or which UNDP bureau is actually engaging with the RECs. This has lead to situations where the “right hand does not know what the left hand is doing”, a problem which undermines partnerships with beneficiaries and donors and assumes that beneficiaries are the ones who need to understand who is doing what.[[28]](#footnote-28)

There is an inherent tension between UNDP’s design of the programme and beneficiaries’ needs and demands and their response to UNDP’s programme. The interlocutors repeatedly mention that consultations have been inadequate and projects had to adjust when implementation began. The DDR programme has failed to start~~,~~ while the needs in this area are substantial and constantly changing due to the nature of the problem. In addition, the design~~, moreover,~~ is seen as emanating from UNDP/HQ and by consultants hired to “sell the project”. It is remarkable how little attention has been paid to the wider donor landscape at the AU and the RECs. UNDP is a signatory to the aid effectiveness principles, yet appears not to take any of these principles seriously into account when designing or implementing its programmes.

In the past, UNDP has been able to mobilize resources and take a lead position, but its role has changed in a continuously changing environment, where other donors are emerging as leaders and resource mobilisation has proven more difficult. The SALW project is an example, where resource mobilisation is on the horizon for the benefit of the REC and its Member States, and where UNDP could play a constructive role in implementation, and provide its CO with more visibility. Yet, the project is closed.

* 1. **Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development**

There are two Outcomes in this Focus Area and two projects in support of achieving them. They complement other UNDP energy/environment activities in the region, such as GEF, MFP, Boots on the Ground and Africa Adaptation Programme. These outcomes “respond to Africa’s current and emerging development priorities and challenges through the design of policy and programmatic interventions” in energy, environment and sustainable development and are in line with UNDP’s goal, as outlined in its Strategic Plan 2008-2011, “to strengthen national capacity to manage the environment in a sustainable manner while ensuring adequate protection of the poor.”

**Outcome 16:** **Enhanced capacities of: (i) sub-regional and national institutions to deliver energy services, and (ii) regional and sub-regional institutions to manage and deliver environmental services.**

This Outcome was designed to be achieved through implementation of the various components of the Dakar-based Regional Energy Project for Poverty Reduction (PREP)[[29]](#footnote-29) and the Johannesburg-based Management of Environmental Services project. The outputs through which this Outcome is achieved are based on the provision of support to strengthen the capacities of regional, sub-regional and national institutions to assist with the formulation of policies for energy access and environmental services, develop institutional frameworks and propose implementation plans.

**Relevance:** The January 2006 White Paper, outlining a regional policy for access to energy services, that was prepared jointly with ECOWAS with the support of UNDP, proposed a road map for the member states to formulate a policy and embark on an action plan “to create the necessary conditions for a rapid increase in the provision of energy services to the poor in the region.” Hence, there is no doubt that this Outcome, and the activities necessary to achieve it, are very relevant to RECs and national governments in their efforts for access to energy services to the rural poor for job creation and poverty reduction. At the level of RECs, the projects provided a forum for discussions on a harmonised sub-regional approach to access to energy services and established a platform for information-sharing on both challenges and experiences at the individual country level. At the national level, the projects proved to be a powerful tool for the stakeholders to evolve policies that would provide access to energy services to be utilised in meeting social needs and, more importantly, in income-generating activities.

**Effectiveness:** The energy divide between the “haves” and “have-nots” is quite alarming in the African context. Hence, achievement of this outcome is of crucial importance to “bridge” that divide. The projects witnessed collaboration between RECs and National Multi-sectoral Groups (NMGs) to formulate national action plans in several of the countries. In addition, some national governments have been relatively successful in securing budgetary support, either from national resources and/or from donor governments/agencies, to promote energy access to the rural areas. Unfortunately, the situation is little different with regard to the RECs themselves. While they have generally supported the activities of the projects, their commitment to allocate internal resources for project counterparts ~~at~~ in their own institutions has been somewhat lacking.

**Efficiency:** This Outcome suffered somewhat from the absence of sufficient staff in Dakar to support the wide range of planned activities. Despite this, those outputs that were delivered, albeit with delays, were of very good quality. In addition, the partnerships with ECOWAS and SADC evolved pretty well, but not with EAC, due to the latter being “not very responsive”.

**Sustainability:** At the level of national governments, indications are that the outcome will be sustainable in the long run. This is supported by the fact that national structures at the level of decision-making and institutional set-up are in place in many of the countries. However, implementation experiences problems. Not all countries have formulated plans for access to energy services and only a handful have made arrangements to provide budgetary support allocated from national budgets or have secured donor funding for this purpose.

There is no doubt that other UNDP Programmes in the energy/environment area in these countries to some extent, will ensure the sustainability of access to energy services. However, additional support from the donor community active in the region, including the possibility of modalities involving public-private partnerships and fresh avenues of funding that may eventually become available under the United Nations Secretary General’s new initiative on Sustainable Energy for All will be necessary to move the process forward. This is necessary in order to consolidate the gains achieved so far and to ensure that the momentum that has been generated does not slow down.

**Outcome 17:** **Participation of African governments and institutions in environmental/carbon finance.**

This Outcome was designed to be achieved through implementation of selected components of the Johannesburg-based Management of Environmental Services projects. The outputs through which this Outcome is achieved are based on the provision of support to governments and institutions to bring them up-to-date with on-going climate change negotiations and discussions taking place at various COPs and elsewhere and on opportunities that could be available to them to access carbon finance. Such support would enable them to be apprised of the various issues that their countries may face as a result of climate change, to meaningfully contribute to debate at the global level, to make informed decisions based on the realities and challenges of their own countries/regions and on the various opportunities that may be available to them to adapt to and to mitigate the effects of climate change on their economies.

**Relevance:** The activities related to achieving this Outcome were very relevant and overdue, as they provided a roadmap that enabled African ministers and diplomats to synchronise their individual national positions on climate change, a subject that is high on the agenda of African Governments, and come up with a consolidated continent-wide position at the global level. This common position assisted AU during its preliminary discussions that eventually led to formulating its position document for Rio +20 and beyond.

**Effectiveness:** National governments have derived considerable benefits from the project in that they have been “empowered” to speak with one voice during climate change negotiations. In addition, capacity strengthening of national environmental focal points and DNAs has enabled them to develop creative options to supplement their national budgets for energy access with additional sources of financing, such as carbon finance. For example, identification of opportunities for CDM activities and formulation of projects, involving the participation of the private sector, will prove conducive in generating financial resources from the sale of emission reduction credits to further expand energy access to the rural poor.

**Efficiency:** The training workshops were very useful in assisting some of the RECs secretariat staff (ECOWAS, SADC and COMESA) and the member states in Africa to be sensitised and to develop in-house capacities to better understand the climate change negotiation process. They were also helpful in appropriately organising them to actively participate in negotiations and address/respond to climate change issues and, finally, to benefit from emerging environmental financing schemes, including CDM.

**Sustainability:** Sustainability of this outcome derives from the fact that the required capacities have been developed among the core group of African climate change negotiators to meaningfully participate in the global discussions, with a clear understanding of the issues that their countries face. These capacities will need to be regularly upgraded to match the constantly evolving positions of climate change negotiations at the global level in order to make informed decisions in the best interests of the continent. The upgraded capacities of some of the RECs, with clearly defined and targeted support from international partners, are expected to maintain the high quality and skills of the African partners in negotiations leading to Rio + 20 and beyond.

 **Summary**: The focus on access to energy services and environmental management under these two Outcomes was very appropriate, in that it enabled UNDP to complement and add value to other UNDP energy/environment activities in the region, e.g., GEF, MFP, Boots on the Ground and Africa Adaptation Programme.[[30]](#footnote-30) The first Outcome under this focus area, while culminating in a useful and pertinent platform for developing sub-regional-wide policies for energy access to the rural poor, suffered from insufficient/untimely support from UNDP due to lengthy delays in personnel recruitment and difficulties of some RECs to meet their commitments for counterpart staff or of their lukewarm participation in agreed-to activities. The second Outcome was instrumental in supporting the governments and sub-regional institutions to bring them up-to-date with on-going climate change negotiations and discussions taking place at various COPs and elsewhere and on opportunities that could be available to them to access carbon finance. This enabled them to make informed decisions based on a better understanding of the global climate change issues.

**5.5 Cross-cutting issues**

Both gender equality and capacity development are two important areas and both pervasive that cut across all focus areas. A number of projects leading to outcomes have either capacity development component or gender equality or both. There are also specific projects for capacity development and for attainment of gender equality. They are elucidated in their respective focus areas above. They are briefly repeated here in order to emphasise their relevance to cross-cutting issues.

**Gender equality** is specifically figured in Focus Area 1 (Outcome I project 3) and it is mentioned only very briefly. The *Regional Project for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment* addresses key gender and development challenges as they are articulated in gender policy setting agenda frameworks of AU, such as the Solemn declaration of Africa and the AU gender policy.

The project, in collaboration with strategic partners both from within UNDP and other UN agencies, has succeeded in creating “breakthrough” achievements, particularly in terms of their impact toward gender responsive development in the African context.

There are only 5 gender advisors for the entire continent. From an efficiency point of view, this is inadequate. If the mandate is to mainstream gender equality, then a different modus operandi has to be in place. From a resource standpoint, there is also serious constraint as the gender project’s allocations are limited and not commensurate with the scope of work designed.

Within the focus area of Governance, gender equality and empowerment is a major consideration in both the third edition of the AGR-III and AGF-VIII, both of which focus on the issues of democracy, elections and management of diversity in Africa. Gender equality is also mainstreamed in the electoral and political processes through the governance team’s training and advisory work.

Some specific gender activities have been included into RCFII, such as providing technical and logistical support to the African Women’s Committee for Peace and Development and the women peace mediators. For Outcomes 12 and 14, gender equality has been incorporated to a large extent: i) the gender focal point in the AU has been advising the project manager and beneficiaries and several specific activities have been undertaken to include NGOs ( including women based NGOs) in the implementation of the project. For example, capacity of key stakeholders’ networks (CSOs, CBOs, Parliamentarians, Women’s groups) has been strengthened to promote gender in the regional fight against illicit SALW trafficking and misuse. A six month research project on the UN PoA and women’s security in Africa, in close collaboration with civil society networks across regions, resulted in policy recommendations and high level advocacy preparedness.

The Outcomes under the Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development Focus Area with respect to gender and energy derived from a clear understanding of stakeholders that it was imperative to develop policies and formulate action plans that would prominently define the role that women can play in the provision of access to energy services and their participation in the process of climate change negotiations to secure carbon finance. For example, the Gates Foundation project made it very clear that the focus of policies and development of action plans for agro-industries in remote villages should specifically target women. Project results show that this is actually happening with a large number of women (over 2,000 rural communities with operational MFPs, targeting almost 74,000 women entrepreneurs in Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal combined. Source: Progress Report, July 2012) becoming involved in both on-farm (food processing, transformation of fruits into juice and soap making) and off-farm activities (battery charging, IT services and video clubs) that provide additional income to economically uplift the quality and standard of living of their families. In addition, the Gates-funded project witnessed a substantial increase in the girls-to-boys ratios in primary schools. Access to energy services “released” mothers of the extra pairs of hands they required for their chores, thus providing a golden opportunity to girls to receive an education as well. It is hoped that in a few years, the girls-to-boys ratio will also show an increasing trend at secondary school level.

Similarly, policies and development plans under the Environmental Management project ensured that the role of women was clearly defined. For example, in the context of the sustainable charcoal initiative, emphasis was put on the active role that women can play with regard not only to charcoal production and smoke-free stove fabrication, but also at the level of formulating proposals to access carbon finance.

**Capacity Development**: AU and RECs have been the recipients of capacity development assistance from a wide range of multilateral and bilateral organisations (see: project 4 in Outcome 1). To a large extent, support has been delivered in a fragmented and highly donor-driven manner conditional on wide ranging rules, processes and timelines. The Regional Programme’s capacity development strategy aimed to address these challenges at three levels: strengthening the institutional capacities of AUC and selected RECs and subsidiary entities to accelerate the path to regional integration; enhancing leadership and ownership of African institutions through building partnerships for improved coordination and management of capacity development initiatives; and designing and implementing capacity development Programmes as an integral part of UNDP country Programmes in the region.

**Box: 2 Capacity developments**

Capacity development in the context of national, sector, and thematic strategies: ensuring proper integration of capacity development priorities in key national, sub-national, sector and thematic strategies. Country systems: assessing, strengthening and promoting the use of country systems to implement policies and manage public resources - including. procurement, public financial management, results, statistics, and information systems. Enabling environment addressing the systemic impediments to local capacity development technical co-operation: working towards demand-driven efforts in technical co-operation and promoting the use of local and regional resources, including through South-South arrangements. Civil society and private sector: enabling local civil society and the private sector to play their role in capacity development. Fragile situations: tailoring, phasing and coordinating capacity building and development in situations of fragility, including countries emerging from conflict.

Source: *Accra Agenda for Action 2008. Quoted in OECD-DAC; 2008*

The performance of the Regional Programme in achieving the envisaged capacity development Outcome as a key strategy for achieving higher levels of pro-poor growth in the region has been evaluated taking the following into account.

Programme support for the capacity development Outcome was delivered through the Regional Project to Strengthen Institutional Capacities to Accelerate Pro-Poor Growth and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The design of this multi-faceted, large-scale support for capacity development was formed by UNDP’s specific concept and approach on CD, as well as RBA’s Poor Growth and Accountability (CD-PGA) strategy. In line with the core principles of both strategies, multiple levels of support were provided that would produce synergy and systemic change in contrast to the piecemeal experiences of the past.

At the outset what is striking about the Programme’s support for capacity development is the wide-spectrum of institutions and stakeholders that it aimed to service.

At the apex is AU, which envisaged that systems, procedures and competencies would be put in place to enable the organisation to implement its new strategic plan. One of the main outputs in this regard is the establishment of a Partnership Coordination Unit within the Directorate of the Secretary General of AU. The mandate of this Unit is to map and play a coordinating role with respect to the ever growing number of development partners and their relationship with the organisation. The Unit has only recently become functional with the appointment of the Head of the Unit and the recruitment of a technical advisor. It is too early to pass any judgment on how well it is functioning. However, it is readily apparent that while the “hardware” capacity appears to be in place, a more rigorous assessment of the human and financial resource needs of the Unit is required.

Another regional entity that has received extensive capacity development support is NEPAD. The presence of the CD team in Johannesburg, where the NEPAD Secretariat is located, has meant that it has been a favoured beneficiary of the Programme. The Team explained that proximity has meant a much more intensive engagement with NEPAD. The dividends of such engagement are evident in the establishment of the African Capacity Development Forum under the leadership of NEPAD to promote partnerships, facilitate dialogue and resource mobilisation for capacity development. Discussions with the stakeholders at NEPAD did indicate the value added of such a mechanism, particularly since NEPAD is the benchmark agency of AU in establishing common policy and Programming platformsfor adaptation and implementation by member states.

Somewhat less evident are the capacity development results of engagement with the four RECs (CEMAC, COMESA, ECOWAS and IGAD) identified for support. The Team had an opportunity to visit ECOWAS, but was not able to verify any tangible capacity development outputs that could be reported. However, the Team did take note that there are other key players, such as EU, that are making considerable investments at the REC level, which makes it questionable whether there is comparative advantage to UNDP’s involvement at this level. In contrast, UNDP has provided strategic support in the revitalisation of the MANU River Union (MRU) through assisting the organisation in formulating a strategic institutional framework. As a result, MRU has become a more effective institution and has assumed its critical mediator role in the sub-region’s political crises and development challenges**.**

From the implementation perspective it is apparent that some components have progressed as planned, while others, such as the AU Partnership Unit, are still at the start-up phase. It may be that the slow implementation of planned activities is due to these regional and sub-regional institutions being cut from the same cloth. In reality, however, they have widely differing characteristics which determine the level of absorption of development assistance. For example, ECOWAS is considered to be an important regional body as compared to its peers, such as CEMAC or IGAD; and, hence, CD strategies have to take this into account.

It is useful to note that an exit strategy was explicitly stated in the regional Project Document. However, given the many particulars of the institutional constraints faced by the regional and sub-regional institutions, capacity development is a process that requires a longer-time frame than three years. Yet, there is a need for better targeting of institutions with capacity development strategies and tools to address real needs and promote effective management of partnerships. Capacity development is also a pervasive concern throughout the Programme Document. Several projects in all the focus areas are specifically designed to enhance the capacity of RECs. To state them here, one by one, would be repetitive. Suffice it to note that in the Focus Area 1, each outcome is either wholly or partially incorporates capacity building within the projects.

In the area of Governance, a combination of capacity building strategies have been used to achieve governance Programme objectives, including training, advisory and advocacy services, South-South technical cooperation and coaching. The approaches to capacity building are multi-faceted, as well. For example, the APRM process being grounded on experience-sharing and dissemination of best practices tends to encourage technical cooperation and peer-learning among countries, bilaterally and regionally. The CAMPS Programme has been innovative in structuring the learning around the strengths of service champion countries. Policy or management tools either in the form of guides or reports, such as AGR, have been also developed to serve as instruments for learning, experience-sharing and policy-dialogue. National schools of public administration are being strengthened to serve as venues for the domestication of management tools that are devised at the regional level. However, capacity building faces continuing challenges of assessing human and institutional capacity constraints at all organisational levels and devising a realistic capacity enhancement strategy to anchor the Programme on a more sustainable path. For one, there is no a clear-cut strategy for up-grading the governance and political capacities to the highest level of African leadership, which is often considered as the weakest link in good governance improvements, or those of senior level officials from key Ministries that are driving the continental transformational agenda.

Within the focus area of conflict prevention, peace building and economic recovery, a project was designed to enhance the capacity of NEPAD. This project addresses various elements of CD, including individual, organisational and systemic issues. A capacity assessment was also conducted to support planning for effective implementation of a continental strategy and regional instruments on SALW control. Training modules, for example, have been developed and participants from government departments of signatories to the ECOWAS convention have been trained to develop joint approaches.

Undoubtedly capacity development is a long and arduous endeavour. In more cases than not, the Sisyphus[[31]](#footnote-31) syndrome sets in. Trained persons move elsewhere, institutions are changed, restructured, etc. Experience shows that capacity building and sustainability may easily be elusive and long term sustainability depends upon the extent to which capacity development programmes not only expend individual skills, but also create opportunities and incentives within which individuals operate and organisations make better use of the individuals.[[32]](#footnote-32)

With regard to capacity development under access to energy services, the process leading to the achievement of the Outcome required, for example, policy makers to formulate plans to develop capacity of village craftsmen/artisans to maintain and repair MFP equipment, to locally manufacture certain components, and to suggest improvements in others, so that making replacements would be less frequent and thereby availability of equipment would be ensured.

Under Environmental Management, the process for the achievement of the Outcome required the formulation of training Programmes at the regional level that would enable African Ministers and Diplomats to synchronise their individual national positions on climate change and develop a consolidated continent-wide position at the global level, such as their preparedness for the COPs, Rio + 20 and beyond. It also necessitated the development of a platform that would enable on-going capacity enhancement of stakeholders, taking into account the evolving nature of climate change discussions at the political level and availability of resources for adaptation and mitigation measures. At the national level, it required the development of a framework for strengthening the capacity of national institutions (e.g., Designated National Authorities) so that they become fully conversant with CDM procedures, eligibility criteria and contribution of CDM to national development priorities.

1. **CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

**General conclusions**

* Despite a number of challenges and the reduction of the original budget (non-core), RCFIII has made significant contributions to the development results in Africa. It strengthened, up to a point and at different levels, regional institutions, provided policy advice and addressed cross-border and common challenges.
* The Team noted positively the proper endeavours to create and/or fortify the capacity of RECs. However, the spills over effects of such endeavours on the Country Programmes are not fully perceptible. RECs cannot be strengthened merely for the sake of RECs alone. These Centres will have to cooperate with Country Offices singularly or collectively for meaningful projects as they deem appropriate. There is a shortcoming in this particular matter.
* The agenda of RCFIII has been largely defined to cover the majority of the countries. This approach is necessary, but not sufficient. Supplementary and complementary interventions on a sub-regional basis are lacking. Only the Energy/Environment focus area has regional and sub-regional approach, since issues differ among the sub-regions, because of their differing socio-economic structures. The Team is cognisant of the budgetary difficulties that RCFIII has faced. It has only managed to mobilise resources that are little less than half of the total expected outlays. This conclusion must not be disregarded for the sake of saving resources.
* The Team notes positively the programmatic approach taken by RBA and designing the RCFIII’s focus areas accordingly. Parallelly, for the realisation of 17 outcomes RCFIII has a number of well-focused interventions (projects). However, given the scarcity of resources and skills, RBA would have done better by concentrating its efforts on the areas where it has comparative advantage, such as MDG (e.g. poverty reduction, gender equality).
* It is noted that monitoring and reporting are weak, and they do not do justice to the good intentions of RCFIII and make outcome evaluation, as intended here, insufficiently comprehensive and error free.

* Given the breadth and width of RCF, direct implementation modality (DIM) is found to be the most convenient manner of executing interventions.
* The RCF III support to the outcomes is sustainable to a limited degree. In most cases, the AU and the RECs, but also NEPAD, cannot sustain activities and projects on their own due to lack of contributions from their members and member states.

**Box 3: MDGs**

1. Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty.

2. Achieve universal primary education.

3. Promote gender equality and empower women.

4. Reduce child mortality.

5. Improve maternal health.

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.

7. Assure environmental sustainability.

8. Develop a global artnership for development

* Resource mobilisation is an important dimension in considering the effectiveness of the totality of the Programme. The Programme has had an uneven track in this regard. Yet, it is a critical to issues of sustainability of programme activities, in as much as UNDP’s initial investments need to be upscaled through leveraging additional resources of development partners.
* It is also evident that Programme managers are not always aware of other partners’ involvement in activities targeted by the RCFIII and, therefore, opportunities for greater coherence/coordination in delivery of development assistance and policy dialogue on the comparative advantage of each partner’s support are missed.
* There is an M&E system incorporated into the implementation process of RCFIII. However, this system is not fully utilised.

**Specific Conclusions**

**Poverty Reduction and MDGs**

* All outcomes in this focus area are relevant, reflecting UNDP’s strategic position and RBA’s intent, taking into consideration the African realities. Sustainability, on the other hand, is yet to be asserted in some outcomes, because interventions related to these outcomes are yet to be concluded.

* MDG based planning and Poverty reduction component provided strategic support to governments in the region in their efforts to meet the MDGs and operationalise poverty-focused development. Yet, there are constraints that are faced, for example by senior economists, a key capacity development modality of the RCFIII. This has to do with an almost “dual role” they play in providing much needed economic expertise to their national counterparts in planning and finance ministries, as well as meeting capacity gaps within the Country Office.
* One of the insights gained during interviews of senior economists is the lack of a full and systematic awareness of the totality of the Regional Programme and the missed opportunity for greater synergy within activities in the same focus area, as well as between focus areas.
* Effectiveness of the MDG-based planning component will in the long run critically depend on a sustained and intensified process to support national institutional capacity development and policy formulation that is MDG-focused and mobilising development resources to this end.
* The gender component of the programme has set down a solid foundation for achieving gender responsive national development. The strategy has been to develop a critical number of gender sensitive development planners and economists to provide skill and knowledge base to undertake this transformation. The next stage is a process of consolidating the investment at the country-level through strategic linkages to Country Programmes.
* Support for HIV/AIDS has focused on mainstreaming the issue into the human rights sector, working closely with the AU and at the sub-regional level mostly with SADCC. While this is important, the interface with development constituencies, in particular those working on MDGs, including programme stakeholders in national planning and finance partners, as well as National AIDS Commissions, has been limited.
* The African Human Development Report was just launched and it is envisaged that it will provide a valuable knowledge base for many of RBA countries that are facing critical food security crises. In particular, the report will be a useful resource for those countries focusing on food security as part of their MAF process.

**Governance**

* Participatory democracy and good governance, as the major strategic objective of RCF-III, has gained prominence in the regional and national agenda and is progressively and firmly taking root in the African continent. However, considerable challenges still persist.
* Linking norm formulation to norm implementation remains a critical step for democratic and good governance consolidation.
* There is a need to rethink the approach to electoral and anti-corruption assistance by adopting a more systematic strategy that targets the structural challenges and root causes of electoral conflicts and corruption. A holistic approach that engages governments at multiple fronts and is driven by a coherent anti-corruption strategy with links to the APRM Country Programme of action is worth trying.
* The governance components are not sufficiently synergised to ensure a solid coherence, coordination and teamwork, and to avoid fragmentation, duplication and high transaction costs in the process.
* The activities and outputs related to economic governance, including corporate governance and transparency in management of natural resources, have not received adequate attention and must be stressed in the next Programme, with linkages to the regional inclusive private sector development programme.
* Intra-African technical cooperation and collaboration under CAMPS and APRM is a very promising approach that can facilitate the sustainability of public sector reforms, since these are driven by countries themselves with no conditionality clauses. This approach, however, is yet to be institutionalised.
* Meaningful involvement and participation of civil society in the overall conversation on good governance is yet to be achieved.
* While UNDP’s substantive support is appreciated by beneficiaries. On the basis of complaints, its delivery mechanism is considered slow and not consistent with the imperatives for African ownership of development processes.

**Conflict Prevention and Peace Building**

* The results are below expectations in this focus area. The low results stem from a number of challenges that lie outside the control of UNDP. In all probability, UNDP’s design of the Programme has created some tensions with the beneficiaries.
* In particular, the outcome on Disaster Risk Reduction has failed to deliver, while it remains a key priority for the AU and the RECs. If the intended programme will not become operational in the short term, RBA will have to restart from scratch and ensure that the outputs in the programme remain relevant or adapt these based on the AU’s and REC’s needs. AU’s and REC’s needs. The merged project Disaster Risk Reduction (DDR) and Conflict Prevention and Management (CPM) needs to be reassessed and discussed with beneficiaries. In particular the DDR component and its outcomes (Increased disaster risk management capacities and resources in selected Regional Economic Communities, Enhanced regional early warning and disaster preparedness and response through strengthening of national level capacities in at-risk nations to natural disasters, Improved coordination between Regional Economic Communities, civil society and the private sector, with national governments, to plan for, and to address, disaster risks) remain relevant. In RCFIV it is recommended that Climate Change receives a prominent place as this poses a particular challenge for the RECs and the AU. It will also provide UNDP-RBA with an opportunity to develop a programme which supplements country initiatives and to work together with the private sector and NGOs in a regional approach. Climate change is also part of the environment agenda which features prominently in focus area 4 and efforts could be combined in both focus areas for mutual benefit.
* The radical change in the donor landscape affected the aid principles governing this focus area and UNDP has not adequately responded to that, creating uncertainty for partner donors and beneficiaries.

* The overall performance in this focus area fell short of expectations and UNDP’s strategic position as a consequence is weakened.

**Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development**

* The focus on access to energy services and environmental management was very appropriate in that it enabled UNDP to complement and add value to other UNDP energy/environment activities in the region, e.g., GEF, MFP, Boots on the Ground and Africa Adaptation Programme.
* The achievement of the outcome regarding enhanced capacities of regional and sub-regional institutions to deliver energy services has been met only partially (only ECOWAS and ECCAS have each a sub-regional energy access framework). With regard to EAC, progress has been very slow. Moreover, the introduction of MFPs in East Africa has not materialized, likely due to insufficient progress in working with EAC. It is recognised, though, that a number of other factors may have contributed to this situation and these may not have been necessarily within the control of the Regional Programme.
* The strategic and sound partnership that UNDP forged with UNEP and UNITAR was instrumental in strengthening the capacities of RECs, in turn, to support their member states in enhancing the level of participation of African governments and institutions in environment and in improving capacities of DNAs to access carbon finance.
* The concept of gender and energy was well addressed under both Outcomes, leading to substantial progress in meeting gender targets.
* UNDP is well-placed to continue to play a catalytic role in securing the participation of other partners from both the public and private sectors in support of its continued efforts for access to energy services to rural areas. In addition, given its existing support to the region on renewable energy and energy efficiency through GEF-funded activities, UNDP has the real opportunity of being a key player in the implementation of the United Nations Secretary General’s initiative of Sustainable Energy for All that will focus on the same areas of access to energy, energy efficiency and renewable energy.

**Lessons learned and their implications for the next regional program**

* As MDG and governance focus areas of RFCIII show, to promote awareness and debates on the critical needs and priorities for accelerating integration is essential. Yet, this process is usually slow and requires a longer period of interventions. **Implications for the next program:** the dedication of 2012 as the year of shared values and all public activities that have been programmed to celebrate this year could be evaluated to inform the convening of similar events during the next program. Moreover, all African countries should be encouraged to engage in the preparation of the country governance report under the AGR and the validation workshop of the national report must continue to seek the presence of key prominent officials such as the Prime Minister and the President of the National Assembly.
* The Service Champion Country strategy can accelerate technical cooperation among African countries by employing experts from the continent and sharing best practices from countries with similar conditions. It can also help develop a sense of ownership of the development process. **Implications for the next program**: in addition to a better targeting of activities during the annual African civil service day, UNDP could mount a regional data base of African experts or practitioners on key public administration modernization and governance issues and use them for experience-sharing throughout the continent.
* Sharing of best practices on governance can increase learning on what works and what does not work in various situations, and reduce the need to reinvent the wheel. It can also contribute to accelerate the momentum for governance reforms. Knowledge sharing is thus an important factor in organisational or societal performance**. Implications for the next** **program**: UNDP should continue with knowledge-sharing activities with attention on all the steps in the process: knowledge production, diffusion/dissemination and utilization.
* Capacity development is also a long-term process; hence, it requires long-term engagements and investments. **Implications for the next program:** encourage well-targeted multiyear capacity building plans and multi-donor funding commitments (i.e. 5 years) within a program approach framework to avoid duplications, especially in the area of advanced training.
* Partnerships between UNDP and regional organisations will have to be built within the context of equality, transparency, consensus building, delivery on commitments and collective responsibility for results. **Implications for the next program**: UNDP could use the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda of Action as tools to engage partners develop mutual accountability frameworks and set up plans to periodically evaluate collectively-agreed upon development results with them.
* UNDP is respected for its technical advice and support to AU and RECs staff and processes. There is a need, however, for UNDP to continue safeguarding its leadership role, while in some focus areas, such as peace and security, it needs to ensure effective relationships with both donors and RECs. **Implications for the next program**: Whenever possible closer and better coordinated efforts are called for.
* The donor landscape has been changing and traditional and non-traditional donors have taken a prominent place. In preparing programmes/projects, non-core sources must be assessed realistically, as well as what role UNDP should play. **Implications for the next program:** All non-core financing should be strictly demand driven.

* In a programme such as RCFIII, there is a need to provide a structure to facilitate coordinated efforts for collaboration among various Programmes/projects. The opportunities for collaboration and synergies must not be missed, as they provide concrete possibilities to complement each other’s activities.
* The designation of an Energy and Environment Practice Leader in various RSCs elsewhere has yielded very good results, for it ensured that there is a structure in place to facilitate a coordinated effort for collaboration among various Programmes and to seek opportunities to complement each other’s activities. This lesson should be a good example for application in RSC in Africa. As the experience of the PREP project shows, slow replacement of the project staff has been detrimental to project implementation, ergo jeopardising expected outcomes.. **Implication for the next program**: UNDP should establish swifter recruitment of the required personnel

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* Capacity development is also a long-term process; hence, it requires long-term engagements and investments.
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* As the experience of the PREP project shows, slow replacement of the project staff has been detrimental to project implementation, ergo jeopardising expected outcomes. This should be a lesson for UNDP for establishing swifter recruitment of the required personnel.
1. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

**General Recommendations**

* It is advisable to streamline focus areas, perhaps three altogether. The suggestion here is: (i) Poverty reduction and MDG; (ii) Governance; and (iii)~~.~~ Sustainable Energy and Environment. The team believes that these focus areas are not only where UNDP has comparative advantage, but also correspond to Africa’s needs and preferences.

**Box 4: Suggestion of UNDP/EO**

Streamline the focus of the next RCF to a maximum of three clearly defined themes, with fewer outputs and outcomes under each theme. It should continue to focus on the regional priorities of strengthening democratic and participatory governance, conflict prevention, peace building, and disaster management. In addition, RCF resources should be concentrated on capacity-building for a smaller

number of larger interventions, linked to existing regional African institutions.

From: *Evaluation of UNDP’s second RCF, Africa 2002-*2006

UNDP/EO 2007. P. 36*.*

* Fewer outcomes and outputs are preferable; both from substantial contribution point of view, as well as from the management stand point. All outcomes should be scrutinised and reformulated. The report cannot suggest which outputs should be retained or discarded. Once the focus areas are decided, then and only then can specific outcomes be articulated.
* In the design of RCFIV, formulate outcomes unambiguously and do not deviate at all from the SMART norm for the indicators of outcomes.
* The M&E system designed as an integral part of the Programme Document must be adhered to without deviation.
* Realistic financial plans should be the rule in the implementation phase of the projects. TRAC and non-TRAC resources should be assured before the implementation phase starts.
* Staff appointments/replacements should be made swiftly and in time to avoid delays and the frustration of the beneficiaries.
* Strengthen the monitoring system to ensure that the agreed-to support to stakeholders is provided in a timely manner.
* Supplement and complement RCFIV’s regional approach with sub-regional approach, such as eastern, western and southern Africa.
* Though not necessarily mandatory, in order to assure the realisation of expected outcomes, subject key projects to mid-term evaluations and make financial provisions beforehand for that purpose.
* A re-evaluation of AU as partner and RECs is in order, because these institutions are not financially viable without external assistance. In most cases, AU, REC, and NEPAD cannot sustain results on their own, due to lack of contributions from their members and member states. Although the Team cannot advance a recommendation as to how eliminate this dependency, it is advisable that UNDP-RBA take note of this situation and design programmes/outcomes so that their sustainability is assured at the end of interventions.

**Specific Recommendations**

**Related to Poverty Reduction and MDGs**

* This focus area is overloaded, criss-crossed with seven outcomes and close to twenty projects. It is suggested here that this area be simplified, as well as reoriented. If the suggestion is accepted, it MUST also BE accepted that the reduction of poverty and MDG 1 are causally linked with private sector development/employment creation and investment. In which case, focus area 1 would have only three outcomes. Outcome 1 would be an expended private sector (including SMEs) and its markets. Outcome 2 would be greater investment flow. Outcome 3 would be capacity built in work force (including youth) that would be employable by the private sector. It is advisable that a sub-regional approach be viewed positively.
* The above recommendation presupposes a heavy involvement of senior economists. In addition to their many functions expounded elsewhere, the Senior Economist may be involved at all levels of this focus area from design to implementation.
* The role of senior economist is seen here as pivotal. In order to assure the sustainability of its results, the position must be protected from possible changes that might occur in the philosophy of future RCFs, which might leave it out of its ambit. To guard against this in RCFIV, the budget allocation for the project of a senior economist should be transferred gradually to the budget of the Country Offices in such a way that at the completion of RCFIV, the remuneration of the senior economist is fully incorporated into their budget.
* AfHDR may also be another supporting element to focus area 1. It is recommended that it should continue (perhaps published every other year), tackling the issues of private sector development in Africa together with clear and implementable policy advice.
* One of the projects for the attainment of Outcome 1 is “Pole de Dakar”. Essentially it is a governance/public administration project and if it is to be continued in RCFIV, it should be in the governance focus area.
* The project “Accelerating Efforts to Mitigate the Impact of AIDS on Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa” is a very good project contributing to Outcome 1. It is recommended that a similar project may be included in RCFIV, in order to assure the sustainability of the outcome. On the other hand in order to keep the focus area simple and workable, RBA may consider leaving HIV/AIDS issues to Country Offices concentrating its human and financial resources on Outcome 1.
* Outcomes 6 and 7 should be just a component of a single outcome, tentatively called “Expanded Trade, Investment, and Private Sector in Africa’ as discussed above and be included in Outcome 1.
* Outcome 9 and its supporting project “…Negotiating and regulating investment contracts” seems to be a failure, according to the evaluation report that was issued in June 2012. The examination of Outcome 9 and the project in question suggests that this project, which essentially deals with economic governance, should not be in focus area 1, but included, in a newly designed form, into focus area of governance.

**Related to Governance**

* The current building blocks of the Governance Programme have created some results that must be sustained. At the same time, the Programme components must be restructured to better reflect the major thematic areas for bringing about democratic consolidation and good governance.
* UNDP-RBA should avoid confining the scope of the regional governance to traditional governance issues of constitutionalism and democracy and should expand on emerging issues, such as the oversight functions of parliaments in regard to the achievement of MDGs and climate change.
* In a politically charged environment like AU, to be more effective, technical support must be complemented with political advocacy targeted at the highest level of organisational leadership.
* The ownership of governance seems weak, as a number of stakeholders in the field were not aware of its existence and substantive content. There is a need for broader consultation and dialogue mechanisms during the Programme formulation and implementation stages to ensure sufficient buy-in and ownership.
* Democracy and governance are prominent and central in AU’s Shared Values vision and agenda. But the institutional environment under which AU operates cannot guarantee effectiveness and sustainability of any assistance. In order not to waste UNDP’s resources, specific projects should be undertaken to assist in addressing key performance-influencing factors.
* The regional governance component of RCFIII has helped AU and RECs with normative frameworks, instruments and the Programme. The next Programme must give a special emphasis to the implementation of these tools. In this context, the Governance Programme needs to collaborate closely with the Country Offices to use UNDP country-level programming to promote the regional governance agenda.
* The capacity building of Programme beneficiaries is a key to its ownership. In particular, providing direct support to African management institutes, which instil values and culture, can help them learn how to manage and administer projects in the international context, in addition to the delivery of substantive products. The infrastructural assistance, such as regional or sub-regional libraries, should enhance the visibility and impacts of UNDP-RBA.
* UNDP should also advocate for African governments to be at the forefront for supporting capacities for building African institutions, including Africa Governance Institute, through regular contributions (Trust Fund for each institution). UNDP should use leadership at the highest political level, since RCF is well situated to advocate for the organisation of retreat sessions in favour of Heads of State and Government. Such meetings may coincide with AU annual Summits. The retreat sessions, conducted by seasoned experts, should focus and summarise new developments and best practices in selected areas of interest.
* There is a specific need to build capacity of women leaders and managers (through structured training programmes), which should lead to greater participation and representation in highest political and managerial positions.Overall, in all capacity building programmes, special consideration should be given to cultural governance**,** or attitudes, mind-sets and behaviours that obstruct African people from tapping into their potentials and working effectively together to enhance and expand Africa’s capabilities for self-renewal and growth.
* In developing the continental normative framework on decentralisation and local development, UNDP should pay special attention to economic decentralisation.
* A monitoring and evaluation system should be established within the AU Department of Political Affairs to facilitate the task of tracking whether its Member States are implementing the commitments they have made with regard to the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance.
* UNDP should prioritise the building of governance structures in post-conflict states. There is no need to have stand-alone or separate units/departments for conflict prevention, peace and recovery, since conflicts are signs of governance failure, and should be redressed through governance improvements. Hence, conflict prevention and peace building efforts must be integrated in the larger governance reform initiatives, such as strengthening the rule of law, the electoral system, the modernisation of the security sector, the participation of minority groups in critical decision making, and decentralisation and public administration reforms.

 **Related to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building**

* This focus area should be reconceptualised based on a robust analysis of clients’ needs and UNDP´s technical response capacity. The areas of support that have been identified for this focus area remain relevant in order to respond to the needs of the AU and the RECs in future.
* The merged project Disaster Risk Reduction (DDR) and Conflict Prevention and Management (CPM) needs to be reassessed and discussed with beneficiaries. In particular the DDR component and its outcomes (Increased disaster risk management capacities and resources in selected Regional Economic Communities, Enhanced regional early warning and disaster preparedness and response through strengthening of national level capacities in at-risk nations to natural disasters, Improved coordination between Regional Economic Communities, civil society and the private sector, with national governments, to plan for, and to address, disaster risks) remain relevant. In RCFIV it is recommended that Climate Change receives a prominent place as this poses a particular challenge for the RECs and the AU. It will also provide UNDP-RBA with an opportunity to develop a programme which supplements country initiatives and to work together with the private sector and NGOs in a regional approach. Climate change is also part of the environment agenda which features prominently in focus area 4 and efforts could be combined in both focus areas for mutual benefit.
* UNDP should redesign AU’s and RECs’ specific programmes complementary to other donors or in close cooperation with them. This may enable UNDP to regain its strategic position.
* UNDP‘s Country Offices in RECs’ capitals to complement the Service Centre in Addis Ababa, and building strong partnerships with RECs must be incorporated into RCFIV.
* As mentioned under recommendations for governance, UNDP should consider a Programme that serves both conflict prevention and governance, which are part of the same challenge. Support to NEPAD and the Panel of the Wise, with a strong focus on pre/electoral support, and democratic elections must be kept in forefront in RCFIV.

**Related to Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development**

* UNDP should continue to support the implementation of energy services to rural Africa in view of its comparative strength in this area, with regard to policy formulation, institutional set-up and capacity development. UNDP should also strategically position itself to plan an active role and be a key partner in the implementation of the Secretary General’s Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative in the region.

* In view of the evolving nature of climate change discussions, UNDP should use its sound partnerships with UNEP and UNITAR in turn to strengthen the capacities of RECs to support their member states in improving capacities of DNAs to access carbon finance. This support should continue to be beneficial to African governments and institutions to enable them to play an active role in global negotiations.
* Working with and through RECs, UNDP should continue to play the role of an “honest broker” in assisting Programme countries to negotiate “win-win” agreements on emission trading, the proceeds from which can be used as supplementary funding for access to energy services.
* The internal budgetary constraints that prevented RECs from providing the counterpart commitments during implementation should be addressed upfront with their respective management during formulation of the next RCF.
* The next RCF component on energy/environment should make provisions for designating one of the staff from among those working on different energy/environment projects and programmes at RSC as Energy and Environment Practice Leader. This will ensure that there is a structure in place to facilitate a coordinated effort for collaboration among various energy/environment Programmes and to seek opportunities to complement each other’s activities.
* With regard to gender and energy, the Gates-funded project showed that when clear objectives and targets are established upfront during formulation of the project/Programme Document, benchmarks can be used during implementation to measure progress in real quantifiable terms. Hence, RCFIV may wish to consider including, where feasible, measurable and easily monitorable targets with respect to gender and energy*.*

1. The Programme has been extended until 31 December 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. United Nations Development Programme*, Regional Programme for Africa (2008-2011) Management and Technical Review. January 2011. Vol .1 Main Report, Vol. 2 Annexes.* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See*: Evaluation of UNDP’s Second Regional Cooperation Framework in Africa (2002-2006*). Evaluation Office, May 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For the details of methodology used see: Annex D. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**ttainable, **R**elevant, **T**ractable. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Steven Radelet, Emerging *Africa.* Washington: Center for Global Development, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Data from the World Bank Group-Africa Region, Canadian Council on Africa’s Financial Institutions Conference, March 19, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See: *MDG Report* 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa passed from US$43, 927 million in 2008 to US$47,554 million in 2010. The net ODA per capita was $47 in 2011 as against $47,9 in 2010. The bilateral disbursements accounted for 62 % of the total ODA, or $29,299 million in 2010. The major bilateral partners remain the USA (27% of DAC countries), France (14%), United Kingdom (10%), Germany (8%), Japan (6%), Canada (5%), the Netherlands (5%), Spain (5%), Norway (3%), Sweden (3%) and other DAC countries (15%). Multilateral donors contributed $18,255 million in 2010, as against $16,614 in 2008. The top ten multilateral donors to Africa (2008-2010) include the European Union (31% of all multilaterals), IDA (26%), AfDB (12%), Global Fund ( 9%), IMF ( concessional Trust Funds-7%), UNICEF (3%), AFESD ( 2%), GAVI (2%), UNDP (2%), UNDFPA (1%) and other multilaterals (6%). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. On Aid for Trade see, UNECA *Press Release* No 102/2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. UN and particularly UNDP have a long history of preferring programme to project approach as articulated in UN general Assembly Resolution*s 44/211, 22 December 1989,* and *47/199, 22 December 1992,* and also, UNDP Governing Council Decision *92/23, 1992*. For details, see: Fuat Andic, et.al, The *Programme Approach: Ownership, Partnership, Coordination*. UNDP/EO. New York, 1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. For a succinct history of regional cooperation of UNDP, see: UNDP/EO*, Evaluation of UNDP contribution at the regional level to development and corporate results.* New York 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See: UN, *World Youth Report 2011*. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Details of each focus area and respective outcomes are elucidated in Chapter 5. Details of projects pertaining specific outcomes can be found in Part 2, Annex C. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. This mid-term review indeed took place and the result is published. See: United Nations Development Programme*, Regional Programme for Africa (2008-2011) Management and Technical Review. January 2011. Vol 1 Main Report, Vol. 2 Annexes.* [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. These two projects are: “Agri-enterprise development for stimulating rural economies” and “Capacity development for negotiating and regulating investment contracts”. The reason appeared to be some specialized services such as training could be provided by UNOPS. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. As of 31 December, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The eight components of MDG are as follows: (i) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (ii) achieve universal primary education; (iii) promote gender equality and empower women; (iv) reduce child mortality; (v) improve maternal health; (vi) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (vii) ensure environmental sustainability; and (viii) develop a global partnership for development. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The project document, originally formulated in 2006, was revised substantively in 2008 to include the expansion of RBA Economic Advisors in the field and was twice (2009 and 2011) supplemented with TRAC ($4 million) and reactivated trust fund resources to support new MDG-related priorities reflected in Phase II of the project. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See, for example, UNDP, *Making Global Trade Work for People*, (Kamal Malhotra et.al) New York 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Source: Gender Links 2011. SADC Gender Protocol Country Reports 2011 and IPU. www.ipu.org [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The APRM Secretariat manages another APRM account which is funded by participating countries. According to the CEO of the APRM, the level of participation and funding is satisfactory. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. For more information on approaches to corruption control, see Bruno Mukendi, Leadership and Change Management in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Liberia. UNDP: Capacity is Development- Global Event Paper, New York, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The governance program was signed on October 2009 and its implementation did not start until mid-2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. EU is preparing its 10th EDF Programme which will continue support to SALW and to ECOWAS. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. The RSC in Dakar has the accreditation. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. This is particularly the case for capacity building which is organisation based. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. This is also the case for broader UN interventions. Although UNDP has no specific programme with SADC (with the exception of some small activities SALW), DPO has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with SADC in the Peace and Security area. A strong coordination role for the RC/RR becomes apparent, if one UN needs to work in the eyes of beneficiaries and duplication is to be avoided. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Often referred to under its French acronym PREP (Programme Régional de l’Énergie pour la reduction de la Pauvreté) and includes the Gates regional component of the MFP project. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See Annex C, focus area 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. In Greek mythology, Sisyphus is condemned to roll a bolder up to the top of a hill, only to see it is roll back down and he must try again. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. See: Sakiro Fukuda-Parr, et.al (editors) *Capacity for Development*. UNDP, New York. 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)