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END OF PROJECT EVALUATION

GoJ/UNDP RECSA Project: Enhancing Human Security in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa by Preventing the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms through Practical Disarmament

FINAL REPORT

October 31, 2012

1. **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

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October 2012

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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

1. **Armament in the RECSA region**: Many of the RECSA member states have experienced internal violent conflicts for along time. While most of them have and/or are slowly recovering from this scourge, the negative impacts of the conflict are still evident. In addition, the factors that had triggered these conflicts in the first place still linger while new ones continue to emerge. Long experiences with violent conflicts have led to heavy armament by governments as well as increasingly militarized communities. Many of these arms are now surplus, obsolete and require to be destroyed.

2. **Practical Disarmament**: Practical Disarmament (PD) offers an unprecedented opportunity for the region to address the problem of proliferation of illicit and that of surplus and obsolete SALW. PD is more comprehensive and responds to diverse factors that lead to armament. However, thus far, there has not been an agreed and harmonised approach among countries on how to carry out PD.

3. **The GoJ/UNDP RECSA Project**: The Government of Japan (GoJ) through UNDP-Kenya provided funds to the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) to implement a project entitled "Enhancing Human Security in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa by Preventing the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms through Practical Disarmament". The project had four objectives namely (a) to strengthen Existing Institutions in the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW; (b) to enhance SALW stockpile Management; (c) go develop Best Practice Guideline on Practical Disarmament; and, (d) to Enhance the Capacity of RECSA through administrative support.

4. **Evaluation:** The 12-month project was implemented over an 18-month period after a no-cost extension of 6-months. As a standard requirement, an end of project evaluation was carried out. The primary aim of the evaluation was to provide the development partner – Government of Japan, UNDP and RECSA and their stakeholders with an analysis of the project efficiency and effectiveness. This was done through the evaluation of results achieved against expected goals and objectives, inputs and outputs as envisioned in the project document. The evaluation process was further tasked to elaborate strategic and operational recommendations that could inform future interventions addressing the question of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) by different practitioners in the region. The evaluation exercise entailed the following specific objectives (a) evaluate the level and rate of delivery of project resources and activities against overall objectives; (b) assess and evaluate the key risks and challenges faced during implementation of activities and their impact; (c) to establish the extent to which the project has achieved its objectives (as stated in the project document); (d) deduce lessons learnt and document success stories; and, (e) to establish the overall and lasting impact of the project.

5. **Methodology and Process:** A combination of approaches was used for the end-of-project review. These included: **Desk Review** - relevant project documents; **Field Visits** - missions to and partner consultations in selected representative Member States (Key Informant Interviews, in depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were employed in the field); **Consultations** – regular consultation with the Technical

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Reference Team (UNDP, RECSA and KNFP); **Validation/Feedback Workshop** – presentation of draft findings. A generic Assessment Tool was developed focusing on: project's relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of implementation, impact, sustainability and Lessons Learnt. The following outputs were realised: Inception report, Literature review, Field report, Draft and Final reports.

2.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

2.2.1 Overall Assessment

6. **Overall Finding**: It is the opinion of this report that the project intervention was well founded and made significant contribution towards the fight of the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Project outputs like the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament were a first in the region and since its realization several countries have adopted them as standard practice for their disarmament interventions.

7. The levels of insecurity in some countries of the RECSA region are high and have many negative impacts on the communities. The project had envisaged working, for example, in Somalia, a country that could greatly benefit from such a project, but the prevailing insecurity could not permit any effective implementation. It was significant that the project adapted learning and sharing process in its implementation, which was important for benchmarking project activities as well as enhancing opportunities for information exchange and peer learning between different stakeholders.

8. While the evaluation did not focus on detailed 'value-for-money' and 'economies of scale' analysis of the project, our subjective estimation is that, the value of the project outputs match, and probably surpass, the monetary value of the grant, US$2 million (with a project absorption rate of approximately 98%)[1], provided. This can be credited to the deliberate efforts made by the project to harness and seek complementation from other on-going partner project processes.

9. **Project concept**: it is noted that the project was funded under an emergency response mechanism however, the problem addressed while, in some circumstances, entails some emergency components, is rather a very deeply entrenched endemic phenomenon rooted in diverse socio-political, -economic, -cultural and -environmental societal attributes. Thus, a one-year project is a very short project, and, if not well articulated, can generate huge expectations and pressure on the implementation partners who do not have the necessary matching resources.

10. **Important**: It is the opinion of this report that while one-year projects are an important intervention, they should entail or be linked to longer-term, new and/or on-going project interventions. On the other hand, in this particular case, the project identified and initiated unique niche interventions, in particular the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament and the Software for the management of SALW, whose momentum and the interest generated needs to be continued and supported with additional dedicated funding.

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[1] RECSA, Final Project Report, December 2011

11. It is also important that even with one-year projects, especially those that undertake innovative and niche interventions, require a preparation phase of four-six months to ensure that all the relevant stakeholders are properly acquainted with the proposed project interventions and are cognizant of what is required of them. In addition, this preparatory phase allows all the principal implementing partners, especially where they not worked together before, to understand and harmonise they respective standing working processes. Indeed, one-year interventions should be clearly identified and understood to be 'pilot' interventions.

12. **Achievements**: The Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament were an outstanding achievement alongside the initiation of the development of a Software for the management of SALW. It is noted that even with these key achievements, a lot of work still needs to be done in terms of field testing, incorporating the changes, popularizing and domesticating the individual components.

Another achievement of the project was its contribution in ensuring that the debate on the negative impacts of SALW was kept alive at various levels of government and also facilitating both vertical and horizontal communication and feedback channels as witnessed by the high level consultations that constantly brought together stakeholders from government, Members of Parliaments, Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms, development partners and agencies, civil society organizations, research organizations among others.

13. **Lessons Learnt**: These can be generally categorized into three; lessons learnt from project design concept, challenges with the implementation processes and missing gaps.

   a) **Design Concept:**

   (i) The main lesson learnt was that as a result of the complicated nature of the problem of SALW and the great need for a wide range of diversified needs, one-year projects, even with modest resources, are too short and the pressure to meet project timelines can affect the quality of service delivery/project interventions. This was not made any easier, for example, by the overly ambitious project outputs and the very stringent and bureaucratic requirements for approvals and resource disbursement procedures.

   (ii) Another important lesson is that with one-year projects the outputs should be limited to one or two and even with these, if the interventions are unique and innovative, should be understood to be only pilot interventions that should incorporate a well mapped-out strategy to graduate them into longer term projects and/or mainstreaming/integrating them into on-going interventions.

   b) **Implementation process**

   (i) The project was too ambitious and two project outputs could have sufficed especially given the inevitable nature of work with governments with different bureaucratic and individual interests/imperatives that are well beyond the control of such a project.

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(ii) As the principal partners, GoJ, UNDP and RECSA had not previously worked together, the project took time to understand and harmonise its operations with those of the other two partners; that is, there were initial teething challenges with synchronisation and reporting by the project but these were overcome in due course. It was also apparent that the technical capacity of the implementing agency, RECSA, was severely limited.

(iii) While the Project Steering Committee (PSC) was a good idea, its members were drawn from partners who were already busy with their schedules and the limited time in which the project had to be implemented could not allow for adequate synchronization between the partners (PSC) own work and the added demands of the project.

(iv) The key implementation partners, National Focal Points (NFPs), were not afforded the necessary leeway to design, schedule and implement the stipulated project activities in concordance with their already planned activities. It was equally ambitious to expect that these entities could take up the project activities, for example, popularization of the BPG, on their own without dedicated resources and technical backstopping.

Indeed, one-day popularization campaigns as carried out by the project, however well attended or even with the widest cross-section of stakeholders, are clearly insufficient and especially so because the NFPs lack the resources to carry out additional widespread, consistent and comprehensive campaigns.

c) Missing Gap

(i) The biggest missing gap identified by the various stakeholders was the lack to address issues of policy and legislation on SALW issues. Even though the different Member States are bound by the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol, amongst other binding protocols, the process of developing, adopting and domesticating the relevant policies and legislations on SALW is still in its infancy. Member States require continued material and technical support in this area of intervention. Sufficient attention should also be paid to the standardization and harmonization of various instruments across the Member States.

2.3 Specific Findings

Strengthening existing institutions in the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW

1) **Achievements:** From a project point of view, the outputs under this objective were realized and especially the sharing of experiences between the Member States and fora on practical disarmament and the training on the database management was good.

2) **Challenge and Lessons Learnt**: There is a clear disconnect between what was proposed in the project document, the need/expectations on the ground and also the components that would be necessary to ensure that the objective, as stated in the project document, is realised. Aspects such as, insufficient technical capacities, lack of training materials, partner exchange visits, inadequate resources to implement activities, lack of transport, among others, were identified as critical in strengthening

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existing institutions. Regional meetings, as carried out by the project, are important but the information is sometimes limited to the participants alone and does not cascade to their respective constituents, as the resources to do so are inadequate/absent.

Enhancing Stockpile management

1) **Achievements:** The envisaged number of arms to be destroyed was by far surpassed by the project[2]. A model Software for the management of SALW was developed tested and training on it conducted in selected Member States. Innovative gender sensitive interventions for sensitization campaigns were adopted and supported by the project.

2) **Lessons Learnt**: There are large quantities of surplus, obsolete and illicit arms that require destruction. While governments are desirous about the destruction of these arms they lack the capacity and resources to do it. Even simple and inexpensive things, for example, strong lockable metal storage boxes are lacking at many police stations thus risking loss/theft of firearms.

It was variously expressed that arms collected from the public should be destroyed where they are collected rather than transporting them to central destruction sites, usually within military facilities. Destroying the arms at the point of collection ensures that the populations witness the destruction and transport and storage costs are reduced.

Development of Best Practice Guidelines (BPG) on Practical Disarmament

1) **Achievement:** BPG on PD were developed and 1.500 and 1.000 copies in both English and French respectively were produced and sent to the Member States. One-day popularization workshops were held at the capital cities bringing together a wide cross-section of stakeholders. The BPG were a first in the region and selected Member States have adapted them in their disarmament interventions.

2) **Lessons Learnt:** The Best Practice Guidelines, being the first time they were introduced in the region should probably have been first pilot-tested in a designated zone, for example, the Karamoja Cluster and/or in one country, for example, South Sudan for a period of not less than one year. The lessons gained can then be used to finalize the BPG before they are rolled-out to the Member states. Clearly this could not have been done with the one-year project.

One-day popularization meetings in the capital cities were clearly inadequate and expecting the NFP to undertake the same across the country was ambitious as they lacked the resources to do so. The project should have supported popularizations meetings in at least every district headquarter but the time and resources to do so was not there.

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[2] The project had envisaged destruction of 25,000 firearms but realised a total of 41, 369 firearms, over 640 tons of UXOs, over 350,000 ammunitions and over 7,000 grenades (RECSA, Final Project Report, December 2011)

Capacity of RECSA developed and administrative support improved to enhance programme implementation

1) **Achievements**: Through the project, RECSA was able to establish a good working relationship with the UNDP and thus lay a firm foundation for future cooperation. Additionally, the project supported the building of RECSA's administrative capacity through contributions to the wage bill (37%), operational costs and purchase of materials and equipment. A Disarmament Expert was employed for four-months and an Accounts Assistant engaged to backstop the project activities. This support was important to RECSA as the built capacity will be important for future project interventions.

2) **Lessons Learnt:** In situations where the principal stakeholders/partners have not worked together before, it critical that the project takes time at the beginning of the project implementation to clearly understand the working processes of the other partners. With this understanding, the project is able to timely respond to the reporting, budgeting and/or accounting requisites of the project document.

   RECSA's technical capacity is inadequate and the late engagement, and for only four-months, of the Disarmament Expert was not helpful to the project. The latter challenge was attributed to the late disbursement of project funds to RECSA that also meant that commencement of the implementation of project activities was delayed (by six-months which necessitated a no-cost project extension) and the little technical capacity at RECSA was seriously stretched.

2.4 SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

2.4.1 Overall Recommendations

1. Conflicts in the RECSA region are diverse and fluid and for this reason continued and comprehensive interrogation of the reasons why communities are and/or seek to be armed or seek to be armed should be done and the data/information obtained used to assess the country's status with disarmament, and in particular the peoples' mind-sets, and then design knowledge/experience/intelligent-based interventions. This is especially so because, while insecurity is considered to be one of the main reason for self-armament, issues related to socio-political, -economic, -cultural and -environmental aspects are equally critical and require due attention.

2. Project launch meetings where the project document is shared in, for example, a regional meeting of Member States, should be followed-up with meetings at the country levels where the activities outlined in the project document are mainstreamed and integrated with the existing National Action Plans and Annual Workplans. This way project activities can be properly sequenced and timed and the budgets drawn to reflect available resources.

   Indeed, the National Focal Points, jointly with RECSA should jointly develop project activities and agree on the expected outputs/deliverables and timeframes. Resources should then be availed to the implementing partners to facilitate and implement the project activities. RECSA's role should be to guide, facilitate, supervise and monitor but not carry out the actual implementation of the activities.

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By so doing, the challenge of technical capacity within RECSA can be, to some extent, mitigated.

3. It is important to have an element of institutional capacity building for the partners/stakeholders as components of the project. This is especially important as reliance on national governments to capacitate them is faced with challenges. Even with government entities, for example, the NFPs and various Commissions, it is important to provide them with adequate resources to ensure that they maintain a semblance of independence especially from conflicting political influences by government. On their part, governments should be encouraged to continue the realization of the appropriate policies, legislations and enabling environment that support SALW management initiatives.

4. There is no doubt that the project generated a lot of momentum and expectations at the national and regional level. In the course of implementation, pertinent needs were identified through different fora and monitoring missions. In addition, the partnerships and cooperation generated and strengthened by the project offer a firm ground for national and regional approaches to the challenges of SALW.

5. The development of the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament, for example, was a key contribution by the project in the fight against SALW. There is need to further consolidate these unique contributions among other gains made by the project. In addition, there is need for continued response to the needs and expectations that the project generated; hence, the need for a phase II of the Project to build on the interventions already initiated.

2.4.2 Specific Recommendations

1. In order to ensure that all the relevant stakeholders are working in tandem, it is important that when projects are conceived, the partners are closely involved. The project document (proposal) should be shared and explained, in detail, to the stakeholders and especially members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) who require to be intimately familiar with its contents.

   In addition, to ensure that stakeholders are familiar with the project, it is recommended to have a preparatory phase, for example, of six-months. The preparatory phase should be used to prepare and introduce the project activities to the partners. This way, the partners will be better prepared for the project implementation and more partners/practitioners can be interested/incorporated in the project implementation.

   Equally important, a project preparatory phase can ensure that the implementing agency has adequate time to familiarize, understand and integrate the reporting, budgeting and accounting demands as contained in the project document.

2. Developing acceptable software for the management of SALW is a major challenge given the security imperatives of individual Member States. The domestication process or individual customisation of the prototype software ensures that these imperatives are taken into consideration. To facilitate this process from the very beginning, local software developers in the respective countries can play a more prominent role whereby, a technical team from selected

Member States is constituted to fine-tune the minimum standards of the prototype software developed by professional software firms.

A dedicated pilot-testing phase of the software can then be undertaken with the field data used by the technical team to update the software before it is rolled-out. The software can then be continuously improved upon as it is domesticated by the Member States.

3. Awareness creation among the citizenly on the dangers of SALW should be consistently and comprehensively undertaken. Similarly, activities like the popularization of the BPG need to be supported across the country, in the very least to at least each district headquarters.

   For purposes of efficiency and effectiveness, District Task Forces/Teams should be formed and charged with various aspects of the management of SALW[3]. This way, the planned activities are more in tune with the conditions on the ground and it would be easier to monitor and make follow-ups. Naturally, such an undertaking is expensive as capacities have to be built but in the end, the operations will be more cost effective and be better owned by the respective stakeholders and thus more sustainable.

4. More coordination and cooperation among the different stakeholders is necessary to avoid duplication of efforts or un-necessary competition, but, more importantly, to ensure complementarity between project interventions, for example, arms marking, infrastructure related activities like the building of police posts, armouries/ammunition safety boxes and transport among others which have critical bearings on the successful outcome of SALW management activities.

5. The time lag between the introduction of projects and the commencement of the actual activities should be as short as possible. This ensures that the momentum built at the introductory stages is maintained and carried into the project implementation.

   The same goes for the need to mainstream project activities with already planned and/or on-going initiatives to offer the best complementarity possible.

   In addition, there is need to continuously strength relationships with different government departments, for example, the Foreign office, Executive, Migration, and Custom, Judiciary, Revenue Authorities among others to get a better buy-in into the intended project activities.

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[3] Tanzania offers a good example of efficient District Task Forces that supported by appropriate legislation

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2.5 General Summary of all findings

1. The purpose of the project was to enhance human security in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa by preventing the proliferation of illicit small arms through practical disarmament. It has been questioned[4] the extent to which the project applied the concept of Practical Disarmament (PD) to enhance human security in the region. It should be noted that the project's contribution was in the development of the Best Practice Guidelines (BPG) on PD. This was successfully done and the fact that the BPG have been adapted by some Member States can be surmised to imply that they are indeed contributing towards the enhancement of human security (a very wide concept) in the region.

2.5.1   Establish the extent to which the project has achieved its objectives (as stated in the project document)

Objective 1 – To strengthen existing institutions in the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW

2. Member states were invited and took part in the launch of the project with the opportunity to share and exchange experiences. The project facilitated various entities in the member states to conducted public sensitization and awareness campaigns on the dangers of proliferation and misuse of SALWs. The project document was shared among the respective implementing partners at a regional meeting.

   The various NFPs attending project supported meetings were urged to share the information with their constituencies that included security agencies like the military, police and the prisons departments, development partners, civil society organizations and other relevant stakeholders. Even though the NFPs were committed to share the information with their various stakeholders, they faced challenges of doing this more effectively given the limited resources at their disposal.

3. The project established a Project Steering Committee Steering Committee (PSC) comprising of: UNDP – to represent the interests of the development partners; Kenya Nation Focal Point (KNFP) to represent the National Focal Points of the participating countries; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to represent Regional Economic communities (RECs); African Peace Forum (APFO) to represent the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the Government of Japan (GoJ); and, RECSA the implementing partner.

   The Project Steering Committee (PSC) was a noble idea. In longer-term projects, more than one-year, innovative strategies need to be devised to ensure efficient communication and information exchange/feedback channels between the PSC and the National Focal Points. Resources are necessary, for example, for missions by the PSC to selected projects in the different Member States.

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[4] Participants to the Validation/Feedback Workshop on the draft report, October 8, 2012, Nairobi-Kenya

Objective 2 – Enhancing SALW stockpile management

Arms Destruction

4. There are many SALW in illegal possession and/or that are obsolete and that require to be destroyed as countries lacks adequate storage facilities for collected weapons and even where the storage facilities exist, the danger from explosion as a result of the natural deterioration of the SALW is real.. The arms destroyed included: Ethiopia, 358.411 ammunition of different calibres, 3.320 firearms of different types, 7.639 grenades and UXOs and 1 MANPADS; Tanzania – 6.877 firearms of different types; Uganda - 600 tonnes of UXOs and ammunition of different calibres and 31.272 firearms of various types; Rwanda - 40 tonnes of UXOs. In addition, support to the amnesty programme in Burundi resulted in the voluntary surrender of 160.657 ammunition of different calibres, 540 bombs of different types, 38 land mines, 12.820 grenades and 2.594 firearms of different types[5].

5. There is need to continue the destruction process and at the same time support the provision of facilities like arms safety strong boxes, armouries, specialized arms transport, permanent destruction facilities, training of specialized arms destruction units among other facilitation. Prior to any destruction exercise, comprehensive public awareness campaign was carried out through public meetings, FM radios and TV broadcasts, community leaders and other stakeholders. The destruction exercises were witnessed by government representatives, military, police, the NFP, members of the civil society, development organizations, selected community leaders and the media.

Software development

6. The project supported the development of Software for record keeping and monitoring of SALW that was compatible with the marking machines already in use in the region. The record keeping was a natural component of the arms marking exercise. The prototype software met the minimum requirements for record keeping as provided for within the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering Sates (Nairobi Protocol) and the Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol.

7. Developing acceptable software is a major challenge given the security imperatives of individual Member States. To facilitate the process of software development, from the very beginning, local software developers in the respective countries can play a more prominent role whereby; a technical team from selected member states is constituted to fine-tune the minimum standards of the prototype software. A dedicated pilot-testing phase of the software is recommended before the technical team can updated it before the final roll-out.

8. The current software still requires further field testing to overcome the few challenges it is facing in regards to interoperability and back-up systems. Member States wish that upon completion, the software could assist in the identification of the arms and their traceability to the rightful owners in order to facilitate investigations and

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[5] RECSA, Final Project Report, December 2011

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prosecutions in case of misuse. The domestication process or individual customisation of the prototype software ensures that these imperatives are taken into consideration.

Awareness Campaigns

9. The project adopted a unique intervention for the sensitization campaigns and, especially among the youth. In collaboration with other partners, the project used various instruments for the sensitization including: newspaper supplements in leading dailies and roadshows, essay competitions in schools, drama, public matches, information flyers and leaflets.

Objective 3 – To develop best practice guidelines on practical disarmament

10. Experiences from different member states were used as the primary benchmark to shape the contents and development of the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament. The BPG were launched in fora attended by relevant stakeholders in the individual countries including representatives drawn from the government, development partners, Civil Society Organizations and staff from the RECSA Secretariat.

11. Experience with the BPG pointed out to the need for a bridged version of the BPG broken into specific sections and produced in small information booklets in several key languages. 'How-to-manuals' based on the BPG were also identified as an important requirement. The example from South Sudan where the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC) spearheaded the creation of an Ammunition Working Group that comprises high-ranking officers of government to coordinate disarmament activities under the BPG is worth promoting.

2.5.2   Assess and evaluate the key risks and challenges faced during implementation of activities and their impact

10. Among the risks and challenges that faced the project implementation is the sheer large number of SALW in circulation and the fact that some of the countries were still faced with active conflicts. Uganda, for example, has 31.000 firearms held in Nakasongola and 300 Tons of UXOs held in Moroto, 7.000 grenades, and 350.000 ammunitions among other stockpiles held in different parts of the country[6]. In a June 2012 report, the Small Arms Survey (SAS) estimated that there are between 530,000 and 680,000 firearms in civilian hands in Kenya[7].

11. General high levels of insecurity and persistent criminal activities attributable to political, economic and social challenges including the rehabilitation and re-integration of combatants and disarmed civilians, refugee influxes[8], land issues, un-employment, on-going violent conflicts in adjacent countries, emerging threats like

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[6] Kimani M.J. and Abdisamad Abdiwahab, Field Visit Report of September 20, 2012 quoting consultative meeting with different stakeholders on September 08, 2012 at the Uganda National Focal Point (NFP) Offices, Kampala; and, visit to Magamaga Barracks on September 06, 2012

[7] Manasseh Wepundi, Eliud Nthiga, Eliud Kabuu, Ryan Murray, and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, June 2012, A Special Report, Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment, p. 19, Small Arms Survey, Switzerland

[8] Refugee influxes are a significant source of illicit SALW, for example, there are approximately 300.000 firearms in the refugee camps in the Daadab Refugee Complex (Remarks by David Kimaiyo, National Focal Point Coordinator-Kenya during the Validation/Feedback Workshop held in Nairobi on October 08, 2012)

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terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking among others, are some of the factors that continue to constrain the government's ability to eradicate illicit small arms and light weapons. Countries, especially those struggling to emerge from active violent conflict, are in need of large amounts of resources, as the challenges are many and diverse. The project provided resources but the expectations from the countries were much higher than the project could meet.

12. As SALW are closely related to issues of security, different arms of government (and some stakeholders including the public) have different opinions of how best to deal with the problem. Indeed, there is a conflicting interpretation of what interventions like disarmament means or what it should entail. This points out to the fact that awareness creation on the dangers of SALW is usually not consistent and/or comprehensive enough.

13. It was evident, for example in the case of Kenya, that despite the very good intentions of the project, the limited technical capacity at RECSA posed challenges and slowed the implementation of project activities. In addition, RECSA faced some initial challenges understanding and implementing the stringent reporting, budgeting and accounting procedures demanded by the UNDP; thus, resulting in delays, for example, with disbursements.

14. Infrastructure related activities, for example, the building of police posts, armouries/ammunition safety boxes and transport among others have a strong bearing on the successful outcome of SALW management activities. However these components are inadequate in many Member States. In sum, the project implementation was faced by a number of challenges including:

   o Bureaucracy impediments that resulted in the late release of funds after project approval culminating on the loss of 5-months of project time
   o Bureaucracy in Member States that delayed the approval to implement activities
   o Inadequate technical capacity at the RECSA Secretariat resulting in slowed project implementation
   o Internal country specific issues, for example, the war in Somalia, large refugee influxes, electoral processes among others
   o High expectations and expressed needs by stakeholders that could not be matched with availability of resources
   o Inadequate baseline data and information on SALW across the region that hampered the measurement of effectiveness of the project implementation

2.5.3   Deduce lessons learnt and document success stories

Project Concept

15. One-year projects are fairly short especially where they encounter unexpected bureaucratic impediments that might delay the project implementation. In addition, implementing partners are under tremendous pressure to meet project deadlines. Six-month preparatory phases of projects allows the implementing partners to set-up the required strategies and prepare themselves for the implementation process.

16. Some of the challenges facing the Member States do not require inordinate large amounts of resources; for example, some of the countries do not have secure armouries and/or arms storage strongboxes at the various police stations across the

country. Many of the challenges are, however, well beyond the scope of such a project, for example, the challenges emanating from limited physical infrastructure. However, these challenges must be taken into account as they affect the project implementation. Thus, the need for cooperation and collaboration between stakeholders involved in different facets of related project interventions.

Arms destruction

17. Destruction of surplus, obsolete and illicit SALW is critical as the countries lack adequate storage facilities for the collected weapons. The number of trained experts on arms destruction is limited and even those available require constant training especially in light of the latest technological developments. To effectively mop up illicit arms concerted efforts, over a long time, will need to be undertaken by the governments with support from development partners, stakeholders and the public.

Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament

18. The development of the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament was a key contribution by the project in the fight against SALW. There is need to further consolidate this unique contribution among other gains made by the project. Among others, Burundi and South Sudan has, for example, purposely adopted the BPG for selected disarmament interventions. In addition to the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament, the project was able to produce four (4) publications on various aspects of SALW in the region. These documents are an important resource on the subject of SALW.

Software on SALW management

19. It was commendable that the project undertook learning missions to UNREC, which had previously developed customised software for SALW and to the Republic of South Africa where the company that had supplied the Couth MC 2000 marking machines to several member states, to benchmark the development of the software. The mission to UNREC, for example, eliminated the need for the project to spend resources on aspects of the maintenance of records on Brokering and Brokers in the member states as provided for by the Nairobi Protocol, since UNREC was already doing it.

20. The software for the management of SALW needs to incorporate generous flexibility in terms of, for example, number of fields provided and ability for cross-matching, integration and/or exportation of files (to multiple servers). However, these requirements, valid as they may be, even if provided for in the software, might not meet the security thresholds of some Member States. The final version of the software should be left to the Member States to individually customize in the process of the domestication of the minimum standards provided. Regular re-fresher training of the operators is important particularly as they get more proficient with a domesticated version of the software.

Sensitization Campaigns

21. There is need for continued sensitization of all the relevant stakeholders on the dangers of SALW in order to guarantee continued support for project activities. At the government level, such sensitization will guarantee that the relevant and appropriate policies are developed and implemented. The youth factor in SALW as well as organized criminal gangs/networks that take advantage of the weak laws in the countries is a continued challenge in many Member States and require more focus and dedicated interventions designed to address them.

Project Implementation

22. Sufficient technical capacity at RECSA was required. For example, the presence of the disarmament expert at the start of the project would have speeded up the implementation process. The delay in project funds release and the short duration of the project, one-year, affected the identification and engagement of the disarmament expert. It was also important that RECSA understood clearly the various working processes of the principal partner, the UNDP, as this would have avoided the initial challenges experienced with the harmonization of reporting and accounting procedures. Fortunately, these challenges were harmoniously resolved and the project implementation was smooth.

In addition, bureaucratic challenges, like late approval of permissions, meant that, sometimes activities were undertaken at the wrong time e.g. destruction in Uganda was carried out in the rainy season thus taking 14 instead of seven (7)-days. Resources should be dedicated to ensure that adequate lobbying is important to ensure that stakeholders are well prepared to undertake the prescribed activities efficiently and effectively.

2.5.4   Establish the overall and lasting impact of the project

23. There is no doubt that the project generated a lot of momentum and expectations at the national and regional level. In the course of implementation, pertinent needs were identified through different fora and monitoring missions. Destruction of excess SALW reduces the costs of storage and the danger of explosion posed by their inevitable deterioration while in storage[9]. Naturally, a country experiences a reduction in the number of SALW related crimes when the arms are mopped up and removed from circulation.

24. The presence of fully operational legal entities including the National Focal Points (NFPs), Permanent National Commissions on Disarmament among others, even though not entirely created under the project, means that project activities initiated through the project will continue. This is especially so given the fact that all the project activities were carried out through these institutions.

25. It was novel for the project to design project activities that complemented other on-going project initiatives, for example, the Arms Marking machines, Armed Violence Observatories, training and awareness creation among other interventions. The close

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[9] There is also a high likelihood of arms disappearing from storage where those in charge engage in corrupt practices knowing very well that there is no proper record keeping and/or stock taking

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working relationship and involvement of the Civil Society Organizations, local and community leaders in the different countries was important to ensure the sustainability of the project interventions. In addition, the partnerships and cooperation generated and strengthened by the project offer a firm ground for national and regional approaches to the challenges of SALW. For example, the learning missions to Liberia and Sierra Leone opened avenues for peer learning and continued information and experience sharing between different stakeholders.

26. The project supported government led and owned interventions, for example the Regional Disarmament Committee (REDICOM) and further supported innovative regional initiatives like the Leadership Conference and the Regional Dimensions of Conflict conference. These initiatives ensured that the debate on SALW remained active and relevant and that there was horizontal and vertical communication among the relevant stakeholders.

2.5.6   Evaluate the level and rate of delivery of project resources and activities against overall objectives

27. The project was successfully implemented as demonstrated by the fact that the outputs, for example, the number of arms destroyed, by far exceeded the projected numbers in the project document. The resources envisaged and allocated in the project document for different activities were utilized as projected. Where there were divergences, for example as a result of a Member States not being ready to undertake a given task; key in point, no training on software was undertaken in Djibouti and Kenya because in the former the country had not finalized the marking of arms and in the latter a national survey of small arms was underway, the resources were re-allocated, after the necessary approvals, to other project activities.

28. Irrespective of the inevitable delays in securing the necessary approvals, the key stakeholders GoJ, UNDP and RECSA established a cordial working relationship and understanding. It is from such mutual understanding that the project received a no-cost extension period for six months to be able to complete projects that had encountered various, sometimes unavoidable bureaucratic delays, for example, from scheduled national referendums and elections, in different member States.

29. There is demonstrated goodwill towards RECSA in the region as well as the recognition of its technical expertise in human security and development by various stakeholders. An example of this recognition was the close collaboration of the project with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR). RECSA assumed the lead role on SALW management of the IC/GLR Project 1.1.2 Disarmament of Armed Nomadic Pastoralists and Promotion of Sustainable Development in Zone 3[10]. Indeed, Zone 3 was the focus during the baseline studies on disarmament that informed the development of the Best Practice Guidelines on Disarmament. Stakeholders recommend that RECSA continue support for interventions such as:

o   Promoting/encouraging voluntary disarmament with all types of disarmament being done jointly and in a coordinated manner. Indeed, disarmament to be considered in all peace and development interventions undertaken in the region;

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[10] Zone 3 refers to: South Eastern Sudan, North-Western Kenya, North-Eastern Uganda and South-Western Ethiopia

- o Joint MoUs between Member States implementing similar or closely related disarmament and development activities especially alternative income generating activities geared towards improving the welfare and security of the people in order to devalue the importance of owning/misusing arms;

- o Community awareness creation and mobilization on aspects of disarmament incorporating the local administrations as well as traditional structures of governance;

- o Lobbing governments to ratify, domesticate and implement provisions contained in various protocols as well as accord the needed political goodwill to disarmament initiatives; and,

- o Carrying out functional monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for all disarmament interventions in order to draw lessons and good practices that can be replicated or adapted to suit specific country contexts.

30. There is need for continued response to the needs and expectations that the project generated. Hence, it is imperative that a phase II of the Project be elaborated to build on the interventions already initiated.

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3. INTRODUCTION

3.1 GoJ/UNDP RECSA Project

Thus far, the lack of regional standards on the disarmament of armed groups continues to hinder the effective cooperation of regional governments to undertake the needed joint and coordinated disarmament operations. Even though the proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) traverses national and international borders, the regional governments have varied legal and policy instruments to address the problem. Experience has clearly indicated that the need for a regional approach to the challenges of SALW is not in dispute.

Of the several tools and instruments available, the Nairobi Protocol for Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa provides an irrefutable opportunity to initiate and elaborate regional processes to tackle SALW issues. Among others, the Protocol provides for the: establishment of Best Practice Guidelines on stockpile management, harmonization of legislation at the regional level, public awareness and advocacy campaigns on the dangers of SALW, and the destruction of surplus and illicit SALW. Indeed, to date, there has been considerable progress in the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol. However, one of the outstanding challenges has been the lack of guidelines on the critical aspect of practical disarmament for the region.

Recognizing and acknowledging this gap, the Government of Japan (GoJ) through UNDP-Kenya provided funds to the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) to implement a project entitled "Enhancing Human Security in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa by Preventing the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms through Practical Disarmament". The purpose of the project was to enhance human security in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa by preventing the proliferation of illicit small arms through practical disarmament. The project had four objectives namely:

1. To strengthen Existing Institutions in the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW;

2. To enhance SALW stockpile Management;

3. To develop Best Practice Guideline on Practical Disarmament; and,

4. To Enhance the Capacity of RECSA through administrative support.

The 12-month project was implemented over an 18-month period after a no-cost extension of 6-months to end in October 2011. Over this period, the project carried out diverse activities across the region. As a standard requirement, an end of project evaluation was carried out. The primary aim of the evaluation was to provide the development partner – Government of Japan, UNDP and RECSA and their stakeholders with an analysis of the project efficiency and effectiveness. This was done through the evaluation of results achieved against expected goals and objectives, inputs and outputs as envisioned in the project document.

The evaluation process was also tasked to elaborate strategic and operational recommendations that could inform future interventions addressing the question of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) by different practitioners in the region. The evaluation exercise entailed the following specific objectives:

1. Evaluate the level and rate of delivery of project resources and activities against overall objectives;

2. Assess and evaluate the key risks and challenges faced during implementation of activities and their impact;

3. To establish the extent to which the project has achieved its objectives (as stated in the project document);

4. Deduce lessons learnt and document success stories; and,

5. To establish the overall and lasting impact of the project.

The evaluation exercise was carried out using agreed Assessment Tools (see annex) that focused on six general issues thus, the project's relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of implementation, as well as the project's impact, sustainability and Lessons Learnt.

3.2 The problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Africa in general and the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa and Bordering States region in particular, faces continued instability occasioned by violent conflicts that are prevalent across many countries. There are many factors and dynamics to conflicts in the region, not least, unsustainable exploitation of national and shared trans-boundary natural resources, un-coordinated and un-regulated cross-border movements of populations, un-compromising heavy-handed governance, weak institutions and border controls, prevalence of organized criminal networks, easy availability and misuse of both illicit and illicit small arms, among other factors.

The proliferation of SALW entails several dynamics including aspects of supply, demand and misuse. While every armed conflict entails its unique aspects, a worrying trend with the phenomenon of SALW in the region is the spill over effects of the illicit proliferation and application across local, national, regional and international borders.

The widespread availability and increased misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) have had devastating negative socio-political, -economic, -cultural and -environmental impacts including, inability to resolve conflicts peacefully, undermining socio-economic development, death and displacement of populations, denial and abuse of basic human rights, unsustainable use of resources, environmental degradation among others. These impacts are a threat to the realization of sustainable human security and development for most of the populations in the region.

Notably, the problem of illicit SALW in the hands of populations is not unique to the region but is a worldwide challenge. As far back as the year 2000, the United Nations Secretary General in his Millennium Report (A/54/2000), acknowledged that the proliferation of SALW was not merely a security issue but was also an issue of human rights and development. This is because the proliferation of SALW sustained and exacerbated violent conflicts, threatened the functions of legitimate governments and the application and observance of international humanitarian law as well as endangered the work and safety of peaceworkers and humanitarian practitioners.

In July 2008, the Third Biannual Meeting of States in its meeting in New York addressed itself to the negative impacts arising from the deficit capacity to control transboundary illicit arms flow, lack of regional framework for practical disarmament among other factors

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prevailing in conflict affected areas. The meeting called upon concerned and able practitioners to facilitate affected countries to adequately manage their stockpiles of SALW through practical disarmament by building their human and material capacities. The GoJ/UNDP RECSA project was a contribution towards this call.

4. PROJECT OUTPUTS

4.1 Output 1: Strengthen existing institutions in the fight against illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

One of the challenges with the control of the proliferation of illicit SALW has been that even where clear-cut interventions have been elaborated, there is still lack of capacity among institutions and structures responsible for their implementation. Output one of the project aimed at responding to the challenges emanating from weak and nascent institutions and structures that are mandated with the responsibility of reducing the proliferation of SALW. As provided for in the Nairobi Protocol, National Focal Points (NFPs) on SALW have been established in the Member States. The NFPs have developed and are at various stages of implementing their National Action Plans (NAPs) on SALW.

As a contribution to alleviating the problems of capacity, the project, aimed at enhancing the capacities of the National Focal Points (NFPs) and selected CSOs through various interventions. These included: training, information sharing on best practices and guidelines for disarmament, baseline surveys on SALW in the region, and the development of customised software for effective management of SALW.

4.1.1 Regional meetings to launch the project

The project was launched on April 20th 2010 in Mombasa, Kenya. Representatives drawn from the National Focal Points (NFPs), the Project Steering Committee (PSC), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), government representatives and other key stakeholders attended the meeting. During the launch, the participants were briefed on the objectives and expected outputs of the project. The expected role of each stakeholder was outlined. At the meeting, ideas were shared on how best to undertake the project implementation and a commitment sought from all the stakeholders to support the realization of the project.

4.1.2 National Fora on disarmament

Meetings and workshops were held to discuss and review progress on disarmament initiatives in the region. The regional meeting to launch the project was preceded by a 2-day regional meeting on disarmament with four countries: Burundi, DRC, Kenya and Uganda presenting case studies of the disarmament initiatives they had undertaken. The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the regional baseline studies were presented and improved upon at the meeting. The baseline studies were meant to generate data for the elaboration of the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament.

4.2 Project Output 2: Enhance Stockpile Management

Stockpile management of conventional ammunition is a wide-ranging term that covers specific technical areas related to the safety and security of weapons and explosive ordnance, that is, munitions[11]. Stockpile management includes such aspects as the determination of

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[11] Through long usage, munitions has come to mean, in a strict sense, weapons and ammunition, although broadly it embraces all war materials. "Ammunition" has the same derivation, but it has come to apply strictly to propellants, projectiles, and explosives [Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/munition#ixzz28zje1oDb] Accessed on October 11, 2012)

stockpile sizes, types of stockpiles and the management of ammunition in service. Effective stockpile management refers to procedures and activities necessary for the undertaking of safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation and handling of munitions as an integrated system.[12]

Countries in the region have committed themselves to rid the region of illicit SALW through disarmament and destruction. However, one of the key challenges to disarmament and destruction of SALW revolves around the pertinent issue of possession, ownership and application. For example, some sections of the communities, particularly the migrant pastoralist communities in the region, have insisted that they have legitimate reasons why they need and hold arms. One of the reasons given is that their governments are incapable of providing them with adequate security for the people and their property. Since government procedures for granting permission to own arms are tedious and cumbersome, the communities solicit for the arms themselves. Unfortunately, these arms are not always used to secure their safety but are often used to commit crimes.

4.2.1   Arms collection and destruction

Effective disarmament, arms collection and destruction, requires the cooperation of governments and the local communities. Transparency in arms collection and destruction minimises the, all too often, accusations levelled at government security functionaries that recovered arms are fraudulently sold and re-circulated in the conflicts.

The project supported various arms collection and destruction initiatives in different countries including Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. To start with, assessments of stockpiles to be destroyed was done to establish their magnitude and also to formulate the destruction strategies. The arms to be destroyed were collected and transported to designated destruction sites. Various destruction methods were used including open detonation for UXOs, cutting of firearms of small calibre and roasting of ammunition using incinerators. After open burning remnant metal parts were crunched using McIntyre 4000 machines followed by smelting. Specialized units from the military and the police provided technical expertise for the destruction.

⌘	Country	Action	Type of Arms						
			Firearms	**Ammunition**	**Grenades**	**UXOs**	**Manipads**	**Bombs**	**Landmines**
1	Burundi	Surrender	2.594	160.657	12.820			540	38
2	Ethiopia	Destruction	3.320	358.411	7.639		1		
3	Rwanda	Destruction				40			
4	Tanzania	Destruction	6.877						
5	Uganda	Destruction	31.272			600			

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[12] Further reading: Conventional Ammunition Stockpiles, Parliamentary Handbook, 2008, Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Stockholm-Sweden; Conventional Ammunition in Surplus: *A* Reference Guide, Edited by James Bevan, January 2008 Chapter 8: Stockpile Management: Planning by Adrian Wilkinson, pg. 76; and, Note by the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly, United Nations A/63/182, 28 July 2008.

The respective National Focal Point Coordinators, senior government officials, community representatives, representatives from development partner organizations and RECSA were present to witness the destruction. Adequate safety measures were always taken including the transportation of the materials, location and cordoning off of the destruction sites, sitting arrangements for officiating guests among others. The project supported final verification of the destruction sites as well as post programme review meetings. The National Focal Point Coordinator, a technical official from the military/police and a representative from the RECSA secretariat undertook the verification exercises. The objective of the verification and review meetings was for ensuring efficiency, effectiveness and credibility of the destruction exercises.

Dedicated publicity of the arms destruction exercises through newspaper articles, talk shows on FM stations, news/feature/documentary items by National Broadcasting Stations and public matches by school children was undertaken. The publicity was primarily aimed at assuring the public that the exercise was genuine but also more importantly to instil confidence and security that would ultimately contribute to the realization of cultures of peace.

While the destruction exercises were generally successful, a number of setbacks were encountered especially logistical related including: inadequate transportation[13] facilities, wet weather conditions, lack of proper temporary storages, inadequate destruction facilities among others. It was clear that member states required to be facilitated to establish permanent destruction facilities. In addition, specialized technical teams should be capacitated with up-to-date arms destruction skills and knowledge. Additionally, concerted efforts are required for the marking/identifying of the arms earmarked for destruction. Equally important, all the relevant stakeholders including the local communities must be involved and be witness of the actual destruction exercises.

4.2.2 Development of Software for Data Capture

In addition to the collection and destruction of SALW, project output two further sought to build the national capacities and infrastructure for the safe keeping, monitoring and accounting for the SALW. One of the strategies undertaken by the project was to develop a regional software to be used for managing SALW databases in the region.

Regional meetings to Develop Database

The development of the customised software for the management of small arms and light weapons records was conceived under four modules. These were: Module 1: Arms Marking; Module 2: Assignment and Issuance of Firearms in Government; Module 3: Issuance of Firearms to Civilians; and, Module 4; capture of Records on Disposal/Destruction. Under each module the software specifications developed had to meet the minimum requirements on record keeping as provided for in the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States and the Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol. It was anticipated that the software would be available in the official RECSA languages of Arabic, English and French.

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[13] Challenges with good transportation are not limited to arms alone but across the board, for example, there is need to provide covered vans to transport Arms Marking Machines as they are susceptible to dust. On the other hand, supplying ruggedized equipment can be an added advantage

An inaugural meeting to validate Module 1 of the software development was attended by National Focal Point representatives and officers drawn from firearm registries in Burundi, DRC, CAR, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda as well as a representative from UNREC. It was noted during the meeting that there were several commonalities across the member states. These included the fact that: member states were keeping records manually, different departments/agencies in government had different requirements for data and kept independent records and hence there was no uniform record keeping, arms marking was on-going in some member states while material and technical capacities was inadequate. The meeting agreed that the software to be developed had to meet minimum regional standards that allowed information exchange. The software would also be flexible enough to allow for the capture of country specific peculiarities and needs of member states. It was explained at the meeting that upon the completion of its development, the software would be pilot-tested, fine-tuned and training on it conducted before it was rolled out.

Development of Strategies

One of the requirements of the Nairobi Protocol (NP) is for State Parties to establish control and management mechanisms for SALW in non-state and state possession. Towards this requirement, RECSA has over time supported the training of various central registry officers on record keeping. RECSA has also supported officers from the armed forces on the creation and management of SALW databases. These initiatives have been complemented by the purchase and distribution of Couth MC 2000 marking machines, computers and related hardware to several member states. The Couth MC 2000 marking machines were arrived at because already several member states had purchased and were using them albeit with the information being captured manually.

Aware of the need for saving resources by avoiding to repeat what had already been done, RECSA used part of the project funds to facilitate learning visits to UNREC, which had previously developed customised software for SALW and to the Republic of South Africa where the company that had supplied the Couth MC 2000 marking machines to several member states was located.

The customised software envisaged by the project was in response to the four components outlined in the Nairobi Protocol (NP) and the Best Practice Guidelines (BPG); thus, (a) Marking – Article 7 of the NP and Section 1.3 of the BPG; (b) Assignment and issuance of firearms to government departments – Article 6 of the NP and Section 1.2.3 (b) of the BPG; (c) Issuance of firearms to individual civilians – Article 3 of the NP and Section 1.2.3 (a) of the BPG; and, Destruction of obsolete/surplus SALW – Article 8 and 9 of the NP and Section 1.4.3 of the BPG.

Even though the Nairobi Protocol provided for the maintenance of records on Brokering and Brokers in the member states, the GoJ/UNDP RECSA project did not undertake any activity on this, as it was cognizant to the fact that UNREC was already doing it.

In-country Training on Database Creation and Management

After the development of the customised software for SALW records management, RECSA undertook to pilot test and train member states on its use. The pilot testing and training lasted between 3-5 days each and was envisaged to be done in several phases. The first phase that included a practical demonstration of the functionality of the software was also used to gather

data and information for refining the software. The other phases included the incorporation of the changes proposed, installation of the hardware[14]/software, training of system administrators and supervisors, population of the database with marked weapons, monitoring and technical backstopping support.

It was established from the pilot test/training interactions that the pilot testing phase was critical in order to properly customize the software. The suggestions from the member states were very detailed and varied and incorporating them into the systems required two-three weeks. It was observed that the customized software was a determinant factor of arms marking exercises.

4.3 Output 3: Develop Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament

The concept of Practical Disarmament (PD), first used in the UN in 1995, was in response to the emergent phenomena of possession of SALWs by non-state actors including civilians, criminal groups and militias among others. Since then the concept has increasingly gained currency as it became evident that there was need to target these armed group of actors with practical measures different from the regulations and sanctions that are, ordinarily, imposed on countries that are in conflict situations. In recent years, the concept of PD has expanded and has assumed measures that go beyond simple technical interventions to take into consideration demand factors as well as the accountability and reform of state security entities that is usually done through, among others, Security Sector Reform (SSR) interventions.

In its basic form, PD, in addition to the physical removal of weapons, deals with other socio-economic and political aspects including, among others, good governance - political development, improved public security and reforms to promote development; measures to enhance socio-economic transformation; and, social tolerance and cohesion that is necessary for the restoration of complete justice and peace. The aim is to avail a comprehensive approach that, ideally, diminishes the need for arms possession in the society. This is possible when the felt needs of the communities are addressed and in particular those that give rise or fuel the need for disfranchised communities to acquire weapons. Indeed, it has been postulated that the evolving concept of PD is continuously opening opportunities to address the conventional/traditional and new dimensions of conflicts within the region. This is being achieved where existing initiatives for peace-building such as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) measures are complemented by long-term interventions under PD and in the process contributing to sustainable human development and security.

Output three of the project was aimed at supporting the development and promotion of guidelines and standards for a harmonised approach on practical disarmament in the region. Practical disarmament, especially in marginal areas of countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda that have armed populations in and across their borders, has faced numerous challenges. Chief among these is the un-precedented insecurity in these areas, which has been a key driver to community self-armament. In acknowledging this, the project endeavoured to work closely not only with the governments but also closely involve the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the respective communities. It has been established that it is only through active involvement that the stakeholders own initiatives like the best practice guidelines. Active involvement was also meant to secure the support of the stakeholders in disarmament initiatives in the region.

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[14] The hardware included (a) Entry Level Server, (b) Desktop Computers, (c) UPS for the server and computers, (d) Network cables, (e) Portable HDD and (f) OTP Keys.

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4.3.1   Carry out Baseline Study on Practical Disarmament

In collaboration with other partners, the project supported the carrying out of a comprehensive baseline study on disarmament related issues in four selected countries − Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. Each one of the countries had its own peculiar attributes but in sum represented the cases/scenarios replicated in the majority of RECSA countries. The study sought to establish and document such aspects as: analysis of key drivers to self-arming and routes of illicit proliferation of SALW especially in urban areas of the target countries; strategies used (voluntary, forceful, community, military etc.) in disarmament; the legal policy frameworks within which disarmament was undertaken; efforts to integrate development and security considerations; roles of different stakeholders including the police, military, civic administration, development partners, NGOs and CBOs, community leadership etc. in the disarmament initiatives; international and regional cooperation initiatives on disarmament; and, an analysis of individual roles played by regional initiatives such as IGAD (CEWARN initiative), African Union, East African Community (EAC), RECSA, the ICGLR, UN, EAPPCO among others.

The baseline field study was preceded by a methodology workshop that brought together the identified researchers from the four countries and other experts on SALW. The methodology workshop fined-tuned the research approach, data collection tools and instruments and agreed on the research timeline. In addition, given the different competencies of the researchers as well as the specific circumstances in each of the research countries, a plan on how each of the researchers could complement one another was developed.

The identified researchers were backstopped by the National Focal Points in each of the research countries and by RECSA and its partners. Backstopping also involved the timely response to changes and modification of the research strategies whenever challenges were encountered in the course of the research.

4.3.2   Exchange Visits on Best Practice Guidelines

A number of countries in Africa have in the past gone through devastating civil unrests but were, fortunately and despite many challenges, able to pull out of the violent conflicts. Many of these countries are not only enjoying relative peace but are striding towards long-term consolidation of peace and peaceful coexistence among their populace. These countries, for example, Liberia and Sierra Leone, offer valuable insights and lessons on how to successfully implement post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and in the case of Liberia an additional component of Rehabilitation.

Conscious of the benefits of peer learning, the project facilitated learning missions to both Liberia (19-24th July, 2010) and Sierra Leone (9-16th September, 2010). During the learning missions meetings were held with a large cross-section of stakeholders who had taken part in the DDR(R) initiatives. The missions also studied/reviewed various documents and reports. Relevant data was gathered and was used to benchmark the development of the BPG. The participants in the learning missions included representatives from National Focal Points (NFPs), UNREC, IGAD, Civil Society Organization, ISS, the leading technical expert on the development of the BPG and RECSA.

4.3.3   Development of Best Practice Guidelines

Once the field research was completed and draft reports were made, RECSA convened a validation workshop in Mombasa, Kenya on the 30-31 August 2010. The purpose of the validation workshop was to receive the research findings, discuss them and offer feedback to the researchers. The validation workshop also offered an opportunity to member states that had not been part of the study countries to share their specific insights and experiences with disarmament in their own countries.

RECSA formed a technical expert team to thoroughly review the country study reports and extract lessons that could be included in the Best Practice Guidelines (BPG). An additional task for the team was to identify gaps in the country study reports and recommend ways of filling them. The project later published these country case-studies as stand-alone documents and as well as in one consolidated report. The technical expert team was also tasked to review the learning mission reports as well as other relevant documents to gather data and information for the BPG.

The technical expert team compiled the draft Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament that comprised substantive components including: an introduction detailing the concept of practical disarmament; context and background information on disarmament; general provisions for practical disarmament; guidelines for disarmament specific armed groups among other supporting chapters.

The draft BPG were then subjected to validation by a regional workshop on 4-5th October 2010 in Kampala, Uganda that brought together representatives from the National Foal Points (NFPs), regional intergovernmental organizations, Civil Society Organizations, assorted technical experts (DDR and Amnesty Commissions), JICA and the UNDP. The meeting reviewed the draft BPG and gave their inputs for its refinement. At the end of the workshop representatives from the Member States accepted the document and directed that the BPG be popularized throughout the region.

4.3.4   Publicity Campaigns and use of Media to popularize the Guidelines

After the validation and publication, RECSA undertook to popularize the BPG among its member states. The popularization was done through forums that brought together a wide cross-section of representatives from government, Civil Society Organizations, media, research institutions, development partners, regional and international organizations amongst other stakeholders.

The forums, held in Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, The Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, went further than disseminating the BPG but also as sensitization opportunities on the stakeholders roles in the control and management of SALW and such initiatives as disarmament and peacebuilding in general.

4.4 Output 4: Develop and improve RECSA's capacity for administration and support to enhance programme implementation

The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) is an inter-governmental organization that traces its origins to 2002 when the Nairobi Secretariat on SALW was established by thirteen member states and

mandated to coordinate the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration signed in 2000. Following the signing of the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States on 21 April 2004, RECSA was established in June 2005, under Article 2 of an Agreement reached at the 3rd Ministerial Review Conference by Member States signatory to the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol. As at August 2012, RECSA had fifteen (15) Member States including: - Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. To be a member, a state needs to make an application that is considered by the existing member states and once accepted the applicant has to accede to the founding documents to attain full membership.

The mission of RECSA is to coordinate action against Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa and Bordering States and by doing so contribute towards the realization of a safe and secure sub-region in a peaceful continent free from arms proliferation. RECSA does this through the coordination of action in the Member States through their respective National Focal Points (NFPs) to prevent, combat and eradicate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, ammunition and related material in the Great Lakes, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States. RECSA partners with the African Union, regional governmental bodies and relevant Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

RECSA is the only inter-governmental institution in the region whose sole mandate is to address the proliferation of illicit SALW. While RECSA has successfully endeavoured to undertake this mandate, the fact is that the organization is still in its nascent stages. For this reason, it is expedient to continue building its technical and material capacities to enable it discharge its mandate effectively. Output four of the project aimed at enhancing RECSA's human and administrative capacities to ensure that it effectively delivered on the project's outputs.

A Disarmament Specialist was hired and began work in September 16th 2010 for a period of four (4) months. The Specialist oversaw the everyday coordination of the project activities. Additional technical capacity, an Accounts Assistant, was hired and started work in July 2010.

With resources from the project, RECSA was able to attend the fourth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS 4) in June 2010. The Biennial Meeting brings together Member States of the United Nations to review progress in the implementation of United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in all its Aspects.

4.4.1   Administrative capacity

Two (2) Laptop computers, anti-virus software and a printer were purchased for use by the project staff. The project contributed towards the salaries of technical and seconded staff, operating and overhead costs to enable RECSA carry out its technical and administrative support roles more efficiently.

5. SUSTAINABILITY

RECSA was cognizant of the need to ensure that activities started under the project were carried forward by the respective National Focal Points and for other stakeholders to be involved in the implementation process. Project sustainability can simply be understood to mean the maintaining of outcomes, goals and products emanating from the project process and ensuring that the same is institutionalized. Sustainability is determined by time and changing social, economic and political contexts. One year of project implementation is not sufficient to determine any measureable degree of sustainability. However, the project remained conscious of the need for sustainability and undertook several activities that will, in no doubt, contribute towards sustainability. In brief these activities included the following initiatives.

5.1 Cooperation and collaboration with other partners and complementary activities

In recognition of the fact that the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW can only be won through the pooling of different strengths and competencies, RECSA sought the cooperation and collaboration of different partners. These partners included, government agencies, Regional Economic Cooperation (RECs) agencies, research and training institutions, civil society organizations among others. An example of the agencies RECSA sought close collaboration with, through the project, was the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR). Under one of IC/GLR's projects envisaged under the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region, is the IC/GLR Project 1.1.2 Disarmament of Armed Nomadic Pastoralists and Promotion of Sustainable Development in Zone 3[15] whose overall objective is to ensure regional stability and human security through the disarmament of the pastoralist groups, strengthening state and community capacities and securities as well as enhancing economic development in the region. Through the project, RECSA assumed the lead role on SALW management. Indeed, Zone 3 was the focus during the baseline studies on disarmament that informed the development of the Best Practice Guidelines on Disarmament.

5.1.1 Regional Disarmament Committee

In a meeting held in August 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the IC/GLR Secretariat and the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), under the Office of the Prime Minister, Uganda, was signed. KIDDP assumed the technical responsibility of overseeing the implementation of IC/GLR Project 1.1.2. In respect to the disarmament component of Project 1.1.2, a Regional Disarmament Committee (REDICOM) was officially launched in a meeting in Kampala, Uganda on 19th-22nd January 2009. The REDICOM membership is primarily drawn from the Member States – Kenya, Sudan and Uganda with Ethiopia having an observer status. Ethiopia is not a signatory to the IC/GLR Protocol but its role in the region's disarmament efforts is crucial. The project played a key role in the formation, inauguration and operationalization of REDICOM.

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[15] Zone 3 refers to: South Eastern Sudan, North-Western Kenya, North-Eastern Uganda and South-Western Ethiopia

5.1.2   Leadership Conference

The IC/GLR and its partners are cognizant of the fact that the nature of the security challenges experienced in Zone 3, cannot be effectively addressed unless all the community leaders work together in solving the problems affecting the communities. It has been established that community leaders at the grassroots levels have a great influence on the norms and behaviour of their communities. The project collaborated with the IC/GLR and the GIZ to host a leadership conference, March 30-April 02, 2011, bringing together leaders drawn from Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, community leaders, civil society organizations, politicians, religious organizations and business entities in Zone 3. The conference was aimed at defining the strategies for effectively engaging the community leadership, creating ownership and securing the support of the leadership in Zone 3, in particular the traditional and political leaders in implementing the project and to disseminate the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament.

5.1.3   Regional Dimensions of Conflicts

Successfully addressing the fluid regional dimensions of conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa and Bordering States is critical in contributing towards the attainment of sustainable development and human security for all. One key aspect of conflicts in the region is their dynamic fluidity, which calls for continuous examination of the context of the conflicts if better-informed and sustainable interventions are to be developed and implemented. The project collaborated with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGL/R) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to organize a regional conference aimed at exploring the various regional dimensions of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region and analysing the challenges and prospects for sustainable peace. Examples of conflict dimensions explored at the workshop included: key drivers and triggers of conflicts; profile and analysis of illegal armed groups; sexual and gender-based violence; regional implications of the conflicts on political, social and economic development; links between illegal exploitation of natural resources and conflict and the impact of small arms on conflicts among others.

5.2 Integration and Mainstreaming of project activities

The majority of conflicts in the Great lakes Region, Horn of Africa and the Bordering States continue to evolve and encompassing different attributes one of them being the continued proliferation and use of illegal SALW. The conflicts present complex challenges to peace and development interventions. Member states in the region acknowledge the need to pursue comprehensive and practical disarmament programmes as a vital goal for stabilization.

The project supported different fora where the issues of peace were discussed and on-going interventions reviewed. An example of one such meeting was organized in Kampala, Uganda from October 26-28, 2011. The objective of the meeting was to: review Practical Disarmament issues; deliberate on alternative livelihoods for pastoralist communities; assess the progress with cross-border cooperation and coordination on disarmament; receive details on possible cross-border interventions; and, prioritize on the proposed mitigating interventions. The meeting brought together participants from Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda, EAC, IGAD, ICGLR and RECSA under the auspices of the Regional Disarmament Committee (REDICOM).

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Notably, one of the key objective of the meeting was to identify clear follow-up project activities that member states, stakeholders and partners could undertake to complement the concluded GoJ/UNDP RECSA project. Some of the proposed interventions to facilitate the search for peace and security included the following:

1. Promoting/encouraging voluntary disarmament with all types of disarmament being done jointly and in a coordinated manner. Indeed, disarmament to be considered in all peace and development interventions undertaken in the region;

2. Joint MoUs between Member States implementing similar or closely related disarmament and development activities especially alternative income generating activities geared towards improving the welfare and security of the people in order to devalue the importance of owning/misusing arms;

3. Community awareness creation and mobilization on aspects of disarmament incorporating the local administrations as well as traditional structures of governance;

4. Lobbing governments to ratify, domesticate and implement provisions contained in various protocols as well as accord the needed political goodwill to disarmament initiatives; and,

5. Carrying out functional monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for all disarmament interventions in order to draw lessons and good practices that can be replicated or adapted to suit specific country contexts.

5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

Simply defined, monitoring usually refers to the continuing function of an on-going project processes or interventions that are aimed primarily at providing the project management and their relevant stakeholders with indications of progress, or lack thereof, towards the achievement of the desired project results. Evaluation on the other hand, usually refers to a selective exercise that attempts to systematically and objectively assess progress towards the attainment of the desired or planned project outcomes.

In project implementation, monitoring and evaluation is done at two distinct but closely connected levels. At one level, the process focuses on the outputs; these are the specific products and services that result from the project inputs invested as part of the implementation. The other level focuses on the outcomes of development efforts; these are changes in development conditions that the project intended to impact.

The monitoring and evaluation undertaken under the project was on the first level to track the achievement of benchmarks/indicators for each activity, RECSA monitored the performance of the Annual Workplan. It also established a Project Steering Committee (PSC) comprising of: UNDP – to represent the interests of the development partners; Kenya Nation Focal Point (KNFP) to represent the National Focal Points of the participating countries; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to represent Regional Economic communities (RECs); African Peace Forum (APFO) to represent the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the Government of Japan (GoJ); and, RECSA the implementing agency. The main reason for identifying these agencies was that all of them were based in Kenya and thus this eliminated the financial and logistical constraints that would otherwise prevail had the representatives been drawn from elsewhere.

The project also used the following tools to monitor performance as provided for in the annual workplan:

1. Quarterly Progress Reports: with both the technical and financial components;

2. Annual Progress Reports; and,

3. Field Visits Reports: joint field visits by the UNDP, RECSA and representatives of regional governments.

5.4 Publicity and Publication Outputs

It is standard practice with projects supported by the UNDP to ensure that, unless agreed otherwise, the UNDP is appropriately acknowledged as the development partner and its logo and disclaimer adequately captured. Such publications that must also be reviewed by the UNDP beforehand include: information given out to the Press, project beneficiaries, all related publicity materials, official notice, reports and publications. Under the project, various publications were realized (see annex: References and Bibliography) and in all of them the Government of Japan and the UNDP were properly acknowledged and accredited.

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6. Field Findings

6.1 Introduction

It is an unfortunate historical fact that many countries in the RECSA region have experienced internal violent conflicts that date back to periods immediately after their gaining independence in the early 1960s. In some countries, armed civil conflict has lasted for more than 20-years. This is a long time and communities in the region have increasingly become militarized. Even countries that have, luckily escaped, outright civil rebellions, they have not been spared a share of violent conflicts particularly in the borderlands that are home to their migrant pastoralist communities.

In recent times, electoral and politically-based conflicts are another scourge that shackle many of the countries. To add to this, crimes like trafficking (drug and human), piracy, money laundering and terrorism have steadily taken root in the region. The climate of insecurity and impunity enjoyed by an advantaged class through inept and fraudulent administrations has also given rise to the escalation of criminal gangs that perpetuate different crimes such as carjacking, kidnapping, blackmail and extortion among others. Unfortunately, these crimes are increasingly being prosecuted using SALW.

Other crimes that involve the use of illicit arms include, among others, cattle rustling, competition over resources (water and pasture), attacks by militia groups, border related conflicts, child abductions, intra-ethnic attacks and revenge attacks, unemployment and food insecurity, generalized political instability and psychological trauma. As a result the region has excessive amounts of surplus, obsolete and illicit SALW that are either in stores and/or in circulation. These arms are a danger to the populations and are contributing to insecurity and generalized poverty.

The project, through various activities made a significant contribution towards the needed arms management initiatives in the region

6.2 Findings

6.2.1 Objective 1 – To strengthen existing institutions in the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW

In all the countries visited, the member states abide and are signatories to various Regional and International Protocols – Bamako, Nairobi, Ottawa (mines), Geneva among others. The countries have also taken bold steps towards addressing the challenges they face from the proliferation and misuse of SALWs. They have, for example, established National Focal Point (NFPs) on SALW; established technical commissions on civilian disarmament, established National Commissions and have and/or are in the process of enacting domestic laws to regulate SALW.

Member states were invited and took part in the launch of the project. The launch was a good opportunity to share and exchange experiences. The project facilitated various entities in the member states to conducted public sensitization and awareness campaigns on the dangers of proliferation and misuse of SALWs. The project supported member states to attend various regional and international fora to share experiences on SALW. The various NFPs attending project supported meetings were urged to share the information with their respective constituencies back home. The constituencies included security agencies like the military,

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police and the prisons departments, development partners, civil society organizations and other relevant stakeholders. One of the forums where this information was shared was during the annual Small Arms Action Week. The Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) was selected to represent the National Focal Points (NFPs) of the RECSA member states in the Project Steering Committee (PSC).

6.2.2   Objective 2 – Enhancing SALW stockpile management

In all the countries visited, there are many SALW in illegal possession and/or that are obsolete and that require to be destroyed. Uganda, for example, has 31.000 firearms held in Nakasongola and 300 Tons of UXOs held in Moroto, 7.000 grenades, and 350.000 ammunitions among other stockpiles held in different parts of the country. Many of these stockpiles are obsolete and the government has committed itself to destroy them alongside other recovered illicit arms held by disparate groups. Destruction is critical as the countries lacks adequate storage facilities for the collected weapons.

Arms destruction

The project supported the assessment of arms e.g. UXOs in Moroto-Uganda, to ascertain their numbers in preparation for destruction. Such assessments carried out by a team from the 3rd Division Armoury were usually witnessed by representatives from the NFP, police, the Inspector General of Military Equipment (IGME) and RECSA. The IGME and Field Engineering Units of the UPDF identify the appropriate destruction sites and provide the necessary technical expertise to carry out the exercise.

Prior to any destruction exercise, the NFP and the UPDF's Public Liaison department draw up a comprehensive public awareness campaign carried out through public meetings by the Resident District Commissioner's (RDC) Office, through FM radios and TV broadcasts by the national broadcaster (UBC TV) and community leaders. Destruction of arms was carried out in Nakasongola, Kigo prison, Moroto, Chepikunya, Mayuge and a symbolic one at Munyonyo presided over by His Excellency the President of the Republic, Yoweri K. Museveni.

The public is kept away from the actual destruction sites which are securely cordoned off but is represented by the RDC's office, senior UPDF officials, police, the NFP, UANSA, members of the civil society, development organizations, selected community leaders and the media.

Destruction of excess SALW reduces the costs of storage and the danger of explosion posed by their inevitable deterioration while in storage. Naturally, a country experiences a reduction in the number of SALW related crimes when the arms are mopped up and removed from circulation.

In sum, the stockpile management interventions adopted by member states included arms marking, registering, collection, storage, destruction among others. Not all were supported by the project mainly because of the large numbers of SALW and lack of both human and material capacities to carry out the necessary activities. Fortunately, there are other partners in the field undertaking these activities. For example, under a different project, Arms Marking Machines were provided by the UNIMISS and RECSA in South Sudan. It was however observed that there had been a debate of which marking machines, UNIMISS or RECSA

supplied, were better but this had largely been an unnecessary distraction from the important work of marking arms.

Software Development

The project supported the development of Software for record keeping and monitoring of SALW. The record keeping was a natural component of the arms marking exercise that had been very successfully undertaken, for example, in Uganda by the police, prisons department and the UPDF.

Again using Uganda as an example, the NFP was involved in the exploratory workshop held to customize the software (outline the type, nature and form). A software development firm that had prior experience with arms marking in the region was contracted to develop the customized software. This was necessary in order to ensure that the software was compatible with the marking equipment already in use in the region. The software specifications were aimed at meeting the minimum requirements on record keeping as provided for within the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn and Bordering States (Nairobi Protocol) and the Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol.

Upon the development of the prototype software, the NFP participated in training and pilot testing of the software. Pilot-testing the software was undertaken for the purposes of ensuring its suitability before a final version was released and disseminated. One of the challenges of developing a Software on SALW is the need to accommodate very varying security imperatives of individual Member States. Indeed, even within a Member States there are differing requirements by different security arms of government. As a result of this, the pilot testing pointed out to need for generous flexibility with the software in terms of, for example, number of fields provided and ability for cross-matching, integration and/or exportation of files (to multiple servers). These requirements, valid as they may be, if incorporated might not meet the security thresholds of some Member States.

The current software and related hardware requires sufficient back-up components. This is because of the many cases of power outages, common in African countries. Without sufficient power back-up, for example, all the data already entered, at the time of the power outage/load shedding, might be lost and thus requiring that fresh entries are made.

It must be noted that even with the above challenges, Uganda, for example, had captured a total of 108 firearms owned by civilians and another 3.000 in the hands of private security firms. Many more SALW are yet to be marked and populated into the database.

Awareness creation

A unique intervention by the project was in the sensitization campaigns and especially among the youth. Various instruments were used for the sensitization including: newspaper supplements in leading dailies and roadshows, essay competitions in schools, drama, public matches, information flyers and leaflets. Raising awareness on the dangers of SALW among the youth had a significant impact not only on them but as well among their parents and the citizenly in general. Women were given special attention during the project implementation. Following the successful public awareness campaign, Burundi for example, offered an Amnesty to those holding illegal arms to surrender them to the government. Those returning

arms during the Amnesty call, 19-28th October 2009, were awarded domestic tools and implements including bicycles provided other complementary projects. This is one of the interventions provided for in the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament.

6.2.3   Objective 3 – To develop best practice guidelines on practical disarmament

Countries like Uganda have had not only a long experience with issues related to SALW but also, more importantly, had undertaken all the conventional aspects of disarmament. Others like Kenya have had experience with armed civilians – pastoralists and criminal gangs. Experiences from these countries, among others, were used as the primary benchmark to shape the contents and development of the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament. An expert on SALW issues from Uganda who was also identified as a member of the Technical Team that finally developed the BPG spearheaded the comprehensive base-line study.

Member states participated in the validation of the BPG and since publication, several member states have embraced the BPG with Burundi and South Sudan offering good insights into their practicability. For the fact that the launching of the BPG involved the relevant stakeholders in the individual countries including representatives drawn from the government, development partners, Civil Society Organizations and staff from the RECSA Secretariat, it can be said that the level of awareness on the dangers of illicit SALWs among the different stakeholders was raised.

Workshops were held to popularize the BPG but even though a large cross-section of stakeholders were involved, the popularization was limited to the headquarter levels of government. It was envisaged that the NFPs would continue with the popularization exercise in the rest of the country.

The experience with the BPG in the Jongolei State in South Sudan pointed out to the need for abridged versions of the BPG. The specific sections should be produced in small information booklets.

In addition, it was also observed that many of the partners carrying out disarmament activities would appreciate a 'how-to-manual' based on the BPG. Ordinarily this is part of the domestication process but, countries like South Sudan, given the many challenges they face, cannot be expected to readily embark on such a process. This is especially so because the partners also recommended that the BPG be translated into key local languages.

Even though it had been hoped that the various NFPs would carry out the needed training and popularization of the BPG, it was obvious that they needed facilitation to be able to do this thoroughly and across the entire country. A need was also expressed to avail sufficient copies of the BPG to all the relevant stakeholders.

It was noteworthy to note that the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC) in South Sudan spearheaded the creation of an Ammunition Working Group that comprises high-ranking officers of government to coordinate disarmament activities under the BPG.

6.3 Sustainability

The presence of fully operational legal entities including the National Focal Points (NFPs), Permanent National Commissions on Disarmament among others, even though not entirely created under the project, means that project activities initiated through the project would continue. This is especially so given that legal frameworks have also been enacted and/or are in the process of being enacted and put in place in many of the countries.

Again, under different projects and to further support stockpile management, RECSA has provided member states with Arms Marking machines and marking of arms held by the police and the army has been undertaken. In addition, other partners have supported the different member states to create databases for collected and marked weapons, construction of secure armouries, realization of Armed Violence Observatories, training and awareness creation among other interventions. All these interventions complement one another and contribute towards sustainability.

Another component key to sustainability has been the close working relationship and involvement of the Civil Society Organizations and local and community leaders in the different countries. Indeed, a pointer to sustainability and successful implementation of the project, for example in Burundi, was visits by officials from Congo Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire and South Sudan to bench-mark their individual interventions.

6.4 Risks and Challenges

Among the risks and challenges that faced the project implementation was the sheer large number of SALW in circulation and the fact that most of the countries were still faced with active conflicts. However, the desire and determination of governments to address the problem of SALW is unquestionable. This is demonstrated by the enactment of policies and laws, public sensitization and other related project interventions being undertaken.

General high levels of insecurity and persistent criminal activities attributable to political, economic and social challenges - including the rehabilitation and re-integration of combatants and disarmed civilians, land issues, un-employment, on-going violent conflicts in adjacent countries, emerging threats like terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking among others, are some of the factors that continue to constrain the government's ability to eradicate illicit small arms and light weapons.

As already pointed out, there are large numbers of surplus, obsolete and illicit SALW in circulation. In the case of Uganda, for example, it is not uncommon for communities to find large caches of weapons that were buried in the ground a long time ago by departing and defeated armed groups. Indeed, the Northern and Western parts of the country are yet to be addressed in disarmament activities. The presence of such large quantities of arms, some unknown, continues to be a challenge to governments.

Countries struggling to emerge from active violent conflict are in need of large amounts of resources, as the challenges are many and diverse. The project provided resources but the expectations from the countries were much higher than the project could meet.

To mop up these arms concerted efforts, over a long time, will need to be undertaken by the government with support from development partners, stakeholders and the public. Some of the challenges facing these countries do not require inordinate large amounts of resources; for

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example, some of the countries do not have secure armouries and/or arms storage strong-boxes at the various police stations across the country. Hence, weapons that are not properly secured are sometimes lost and/or misused when they fall in the wrong hands. Provision of strong safety boxes would be a welcome intervention.

Another example is the lack of properly designed and designated transport vehicles (and storage facilities) for SALW. It was noted that in past destruction exercises where arms had to be transported to safe destruction sites, open-deck pick-up trucks were used. This is potentially dangerous to the security personnel and the population along the routes of transport. Such mode of transport also necessitates the need for large armed escort convoys that are expensive to maintain.

As SALW are closely related to issues of security, different arms of government (and some stakeholders including the public) have different opinions of how best to deal with the problem. For example, in one incident in Uganda, the NFP (and the UPDF) had a difficult time lobbying and convincing the country's top leadership of the need to undertake destruction of arms. In such cases, bureaucratic impediments seriously hamper project activities.

Bureaucratic challenges can also mean that activities are undertaken at the wrong time (destruction in Uganda was carried out in the rainy season thus taking 14 instead of 7-days) either because of late granting of the necessary permission (in Magamaga, assessment was done in May 2010 but destruction approval was given in June 2011), late disbursement of funds, political expediency or in order to meet project timelines among other reasons. These impediments meant that stakeholders were usually not well prepared but nevertheless undertook the prescribed activities albeit less efficiently and effectively.

Other challenges are well beyond the scope of a project like this but must be taken into account as they affect the project implementation. These include, for example, the challenges emanating from limited physical infrastructure in countries like South Sudan. Indeed, the limited infrastructure affected the mobility even for BCSSAC staff.

Similarly, there is a general lack of adequate trained human capacity to undertake the needed activities. This is further exacerbated by the inadequate public awareness on the dangers of SALW and how to address the problem among the top leadership, local leaders and the communities in general. That is why, for example, disarmament in South Sudan, is usually led by the military which is not very well acquainted with provisions that guarantee human rights observation. Indeed, there is a conflicting interpretation of what interventions like disarmament means or what it should entail. While this dilemma is largely with the top bureaucrats in state capitals, the stakeholders/communities are more in touch with their situations and consequently their needs. Hence, the need for their active involvement in project implementation.

There were also bureaucratic delays experienced with the disbursement of funds. This was largely attributed to the delay in the approval of activities.

6.5 Recommendations

Given the diverse nature and fluidity of conflicts in the region, every effort should be made to interrogate the reasons why the communities are armed or seek to be armed. South Sudan, has for example, expressed the need to conduct an updated comprehensive analysis of disarmament activities undertaken between 2006 and 2012. The data/information should be used to assess the country's status with disarmament, and in particular the peoples' mind-sets, and then design knowledge/intelligent-based interventions on experience. While insecurity is considered to be one of the main reasons, issues related to socio-political, -economic, -cultural and –environmental aspects should be given due attention.

All too often, and for various reasons, new projects elicit many expectations from stakeholders. Indeed, this is justifiable given the many needs in the region and the limited resources available to meet these needs. Where the stakeholders/implementing agencies are not adequately aware of the project details, they may have expectations that cannot be met by the resources available within the project.

In order to ensure that all the relevant stakeholders are working in tandem, it is important that when projects are conceived, the partners are closely involved. The project document (proposal) should be shared and explained, in detail, to the stakeholders and especially members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) who require to be intimately familiar with its contents.

To ensure that stakeholders are familiar with the project, it is recommended to have a preparatory phase, for example, of six-months. The preparatory phase should be used to prepare and introduce the project activities to the partners. This way, the partners will be better prepared for the project implementation and more partners/practitioners can be interested/incorporated in the project implementation. A project snow-balling effect occurs when an increasing number of partners are engaged in the project implementation. In addition, an introductory phase would ensure that the project activities are better harmonized/integrated into on-going partner activities to enhance complementarity.

Project launch meetings where the project document is shared in, for example, a regional meeting of member states, should be followed-up with meetings at the country levels. At these country level meetings, the activities outlined in the project document should be mainstreamed and integrated with the existing National Action Plans and Annual Workplans. By so doing, the project activities can be properly sequenced and timed and the budgets drawn to reflect available resources. This way stakeholders are not disappointed when their expectations are not, in their opinion, met.

Systems should be put in place where the key stakeholders, for example, the National Focal Points, jointly with RECSA develop project activities jointly and agree on the expected outputs/deliverables and timeframes. Resources should then be availed to the implementing partners to facilitate and implement the project activities. RECSA's role should be to guide, facilitate, supervise and monitor but not carry out the actual implementation of the activities. By so doing, the challenge of technical capacity within RECSA can be, to some extent, mitigated.

Meaningful engagement of the NFPs and leaving them to take full control of the project implementation empowers them and builds their own capacities and at the same time ensures ownership of the project processes.

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For purposes of ensuring that all the stakeholders, and especially the National Focal Points participate more actively in similar projects, strategies needs to be developed of how they can influence the project decisions. The Project Steering Committee (PSC) is a noble idea. In longer term projects, more than one-year, innovative strategies need to be devised to ensure efficient communication and information exchange/feedback channels between the PSC and the National Focal Points. Resources will be required, for example, for missions by the PSC to selected projects in the different Member States.

There is need to continuously strength relationships with different government departments, for example, the Foreign office, Executive, Migration, and Custom, Judiciary, Revenue Authorities among others to get a better buy-in into the intended project activities.

Selected CSOs and the media undertake most of the public sensitization activities. While this is effective, efficiency can be enhanced if there was a more diversified network of stakeholders/task forces doing it. The network can include faith-based organizations and grassroots elected leaders. The idea is to increase horizontal communication that also cascades downwards to the grassroots levels.

It was evident, for example in the case of Kenya, that despite the very good intentions of the project, the limited technical capacity at RECSA posed challenges and slowed the implementation of project activities.

RECSA should negotiate for longer-term projects, as one-year interventions tend to interrupt on-going project activities by partners with demands for high institutional capacity inputs yet without matching resources and/or clear elements that enhance/contribute to sustainability.

For purposes of obtaining the best impact, the implementing agency and its partners should prioritize project activities and where they will be implemented. Important and innovative interventions like the BPG should be thoroughly pilot-tested in, for example, the Karamoja cluster alone. After 1-2 years, the BPG could be updated and then rolled out on a large scale.

Developing an acceptable software is a major challenge given the security imperatives of individual Member States. The domestication process or individual customisation of the prototype software ensures that these imperatives are taken into consideration. To facilitate this process from the very beginning, local software developers in the respective countries can play a more prominent role whereby, a technical team from selected member states is constituted to fine-tune the minimum standards of the prototype software developed by software firms.

Alternatively, selected individual countries can be facilitated to develop their own context specific software. A team of experts from these countries should then meet and harmonize a standardized software that meets the necessary minimum standards.

A dedicated pilot-testing phase of the software can then be undertaken. The field data can be used by the technical team to updated the software before it is rolled-out. The software can continuously be improved upon as it is domesticated by the Member States.

Innovative ways of creating context-based community awareness, including use of FM Radio and other channels of communication, need to explored and their use maximized. During the development of the messages, the elders and local leaders should be actively involved.

Awareness creation among the citizenly on the dangers of SALW should be consistently and comprehensively be undertaken. For example, out of ignorance, a school in one of the Member States was reported to be using an UXO as a school-bell. In the same neighbourhood, children were said to be playing with hand grenades. The children in these two instances are exposed to inordinate danger. Similarly, activities like the popularization of the BPG need to be supported across the country, in the very least to at least each district headquarters.

For purposes of efficiency and effectiveness, District Task Forces/Teams should be formed and charged with various aspects of the management of SALW. This way, the planned activities are more in tune with the conditions on the ground and it would be easier to monitor and make follow-ups. Naturally, such an undertaking is expensive as capacities have to be built but in the end, the operations will be more cost effective and be better owned by the respective stakeholders and thus more sustainable.

Infrastructure related activities, for example, the building of police posts, armouries/ammunition safety boxes and transport among others are important and have a strong bearing on the successful outcome of SALW management activities.

The youth factor in SALW as well as organized criminal gangs/networks that take advantage of the weak laws[16] in the countries require more focus and dedicated interventions designed to address them.

More coordination and cooperation among the different stakeholders is necessary to avoid time wasting side-shows, for example and as reported in South Sudan, the unhelpful comparisons between the UNIMISS and RECSA marking machines. In cases like this, the two systems should be analysed and all the different stakeholders encouraged to promote a harmonized system and/or the more superior one.

It is important to have an element of institutional capacity building for the partners/stakeholders as components of the project. This is especially important as reliance on national governments to capacitate them is faced with challenges. Even with government entities, for example, the NFPs and various Commissions, it is important to provide them with adequate resources to ensure that they maintain a semblance of independence especially from conflicting political influences by government. On their part, governments should be encouraged to continue the realization of the appropriate policies and enabling environment that support SALW management initiatives.

The time lag between the introduction of the project and the commencement of the actual activities should be as short as possible. This ensures that the momentum built at the introductory stage is maintained and carried into the project implementation. The same goes for the need to mainstream project activities with already planned and/or on-going initiatives to offer the best complementarity possible.

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[16] Lack of appropriate legislations as well as, where enacted, the variance of the same between Member States poses serious challenges in the fight against the proliferation of SALW. There sis need for comprehensive and harmonised legislation and support to governments to address this challenge is critical in all Member States

7. CONCLUSION

Many of the RECSA member states have experienced internal violent conflicts for a long time. While most of them have and/or are slowly recovering from this scourge, the factors that had triggered these conflicts still linger while new ones continue to emerge. Unfortunately, many of the conflicts in the region are prosecuted using SALW. There are numerous negative impacts of this phenomenon, not least death and displacement of population and destruction of property among others. Long experiences with violent conflicts have meant that many communities have increasingly become militarized. In addition, there are other many factors cited why communities need and/or seek to be armed. It should also be pointed out that, the violent conflicts as well as selfish geo-political considerations have, in the past, led to heavy armament by governments. Many of these arms are now surplus and obsolete.

Practical Disarmament (PD) offers an unprecedented opportunity for the region to address the problem of proliferation of illicit and that of surplus and obsolete SALW. PD is more comprehensive and responds to diverse factors that lead to armament. However, thus far, there has not been an agreed and harmonised approach among countries on how to carry out PD. The GoJ/UNDP RECSA project was in response to this gap.

7.1 Project outputs

Output 1 - Existing Institutions in the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW strengthened: It is acknowledged that the capacity of institutional framework to coordinate and implement SALW interventions is critical in the fight against the proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The project provided an opportunity where baseline surveys and relevant information particularly on best practices would be shared. The project facilitated capacity building through regional and national workshops on SALW for the National Focal Points, regional bodies and civil society organizations.

Output 2 - Stockpile Management Enhanced: The Nairobi Protocol provides for Member States commitment to identify and adopt effective stockpile management programmes for the collection and disposal of surplus, redundant or obsolete SALW in their possession. The Project contributed towards this endeavour through public awareness and the collection and destruction of surplus stockpiles of SALW. It also facilitated the development of a customised software for SALW records management.

Output 3 - Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament Developed: Divergence of legal and policy frameworks and the lack of agreed and harmonised regional standards on the disarmament of disparate armed groups has, to date, seriously hindered the simultaneous and coordinated disarmament exercise among the RECSA Member States. In response to this challenge, the project supported the development of Best Practice Guidelines for Practical Disarmament.

Output 4 - Capacity of RECSA developed and improved administrative support to enhance programme implementation: Lack of adequate technical and material capacities of institutions involved in addressing issues of SALW present a significant challenge to their effective and efficient discharge of their mandates. In order to ensure that RECSA delivered on the project outputs, the project made provisions to support capacity building, technical and material, within the Secretariat

7.2 Challenges

The project implementation was faced by a number of challenges including:

- o Bureaucracy impediments that resulted in the late release of funds after project approval culminating on the loss of 5-months of project time

- o Bureaucracy in Member States that delayed the approval to implement activities

- o Inadequate technical capacity at the RECSA Secretariat resulting in slowed project implementation

- o Internal country specific issues, for example, the war in Somalia, refugee influxes, electoral processes among others

- o High expectations and expressed needs by stakeholders that could not be matched with availability of resources

- o Inadequate baseline data and information on SALW across the region that hampered the measurement of effectiveness of the project implementation

7.3 Sustainability

In several instances, the output of the project results surpassed the set targets, which was a positive indication that the project was relevant and needed. Despite its limited mandate, it is noteworthy that other partners in the region are implementing SALW interventions that are complimentary to the ones implemented by this project. This means that the project activities would be continued. Governments on their part have in place institutions and instruments charged with the responsibility of addressing issues of SALW. It is through these institutions that the project worked thus guaranteeing official recognition and eventual institutionalization of the activities.

7.4 Way-Forward

There is no doubt that the project generated a lot of momentum and expectations at the national and regional level. In the course of implementation, pertinent needs were identified through different fora and monitoring missions. In addition, the partnerships and cooperation generated and strengthened by the project offer a firm ground for national and regional approaches to the challenges of SALW.

The development of the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament was a key contribution by the project in the fight against SALW. There is need to further consolidate this unique contribution among other gains made by the project. In addition, there is need for continued response to the needs and expectations that the project generated. Hence, there is need for a phase II of the Project to build on the interventions already initiated.

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8. ANNEXES

8.1 ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
BCSSAC	Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control
CBO	Community-based organisations
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EAPCCO	Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
IC/GLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KIDDP	Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme
MS	Member States
Nairobi Protocol	Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
NAP	National Action Plan
NFP	National Focal Point
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
PD	Practical Disarmament
RECs	Regional Economic Committees
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
REDICOM	Regional Disarmament Committee
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDDR	United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNREC	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UXO	Unexploded Ordinances

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8.2 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Armed groups: A group that has the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; is not within the formal military structures of a State, State-alliance or intergovernmental organization; and is not under the control of the State(s) in which it operates. *[UN IDDRS]*

Arms control: The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions. *[UN IDDRS]*

Civil Society: Voluntary sector made up of freely and formally associating individuals pursuing non-profit purposes in social movements, religious bodies, women and youth groups, indigenous peoples' organizations, professional associations, unions, etc. *[UN IDDRS]*

Criminal: A person who indulges himself in illegal activities

Development: Condition in which the quality of life of a people, community, or state is progressively improved due to corresponding improvement in the quality of a variety of social, economic, political and cultural indicators such as education, health, infrastructure, livelihood, water, housing, governance institutions and systems.

Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR): A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. [*UN IDDRS*]

Disarmament: The collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. Simply put, disarmament is a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants and unauthorised civilians. [*UN IDDRS*]

Demobilization: The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). Simply put, demobilisation is the process of taking the combatants out of military organisational and command structures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of combatants reverting to rebellion. [*UN IDDRS*]

Reinsertion: Reinsertion starts after demobilization but before reintegration commences. It encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year. [*UN IDDRS*]

Reintegration: The process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance. Simply put, reintegration is the process of helping former combatants form that weapons have been collected and have been removed from military structure to integrate socially and economically into civilian life in a community of their choice. Reintegration concerns reinsertion into the community of combatants from life in military camp, and resettling them into civilian life. [*UN IDDRS*]

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Evaluation: A systematic and objective measurement of the results achieved by a project, a program or a policy, in order to assess its relevance, its coherence, the efficiency of its implementation, its effectiveness and its impact, as well as the sustainability [Part 1: The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework <www.**undp.org**/**evaluation**/documents/HandBook/part_1.pdf]

Feedback: A process within the framework of monitoring and evaluation by which information and knowledge are disseminated and used to assess overall progress towards results or confirm the achievement of results (UNDP (2009), Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, United Nations Development Programme, One United Nations Plaza, New York, USA http://web.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/ch1-1.html [Accessed August 9, 2012]

Lesson Learned: A lesson learned is an instructive example based on experience that is applicable to a general situation rather than to a specific circumstance. It is learning from experience. Lessons learned can reveal "good practices" that suggest how and why different strategies work in different situations. (UNDP (2009), Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, United Nations Development Programme, One United Nations Plaza, New York, USA http://web.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/ch1-1.html [Accessed August 9, 2012]

Monitoring: A continuous data collection and analysis process is implemented to assess a project (a program or a policy) and compare it with the expected performance [Part 1: The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework <www.**undp.org**/**evaluation**/documents/HandBook/part_1.pdf]

Pastoralist: A person who indulges in a subsistence system of livestock production that is based primarily on domesticated animals, including cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, donkeys and camels and to a small extent poultry, usually, but not always, relying directly or indirectly on the communal or free range grazing of the livestock on natural pastures. The livestock husbandry is both culturally and economically dominant, much of the time involving mobility to track seasonally available pastoral resources.

Possession: The owner or a person, to whom the owner has transferred possession of a firearm, has possession of the firearm, while it is in his/her physical possession or under his/her control. [*Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons*]

Security:

State-centred security: The military capability of the state to protect itself from external threats.

Human security: The wholesome safety and well-being of individuals and communities, it is the absence of threats to the basic needs and welfare of individuals; Citizen participation in processes of decision making in matters that directly or indirectly affects their lives.

Human Security approach focus on the individual and contends that there can be no security if the individual is not free of threats to his/her wellbeing. It stresses the protection of human rights and individual freedoms, and entrenches the right to good, responsive and accountable governance. Human Development is an integral element of human security.

Security Sector Reform (SSR): A dynamic concept involving the design and implementation of a strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support reform of the national security infra- structure. The national security infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, private–military companies (PMCs), correctional services and civil society. [*UN IDDRS*]

Small arms and light weapons (SALW): [*Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, art.1*]

Small arms: Weapons designed for personal use and shall include: light machine guns, sub-machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles, and semi-automatic rifles. "small arms" shall also include: "firearms", meaning:

(a) any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899;

(b) any other weapon or destructive device such as an explosive bomb, incendiary bomb or gas bomb, grenade, rocket launcher, missile, missile system or mine

Light weapons: include the following portable weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 100 mm calibre, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns, shoulder-fired rockets, anti-aircraft weapons and launchers, and air defence weapons

Stockpile management: Procedures and activities regarding safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation and handling of munitions. [Ref: Conventional Ammunition Stockpiles, Parliamentary Handbook, 2008, Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Stockholm-Sweden]

Stockpile: A large, accumulated stock of weapons and explosive ordnance. Often used interchangeably with stock or to denote the weapons retained in a specific ammunition storage facility or depot. [Ref: Conventional Ammunition Stockpiles, Parliamentary Handbook, 2008, Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Stockholm-Sweden]

Sustainability: "Sustain - to cause to continue (as in existence or a certain state, or in force or intensity); to keep up, especially without interruption diminution, flagging, etc.; to prolong." [*Webster's New International Dictionary*. (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1986)]

UXO: Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected yet remains unexploded, either through malfunction or design or for any other reason.

Weapons management: Weapons management refers to a national government's administration of its own legal weapons stock. Such administration includes registration, according to national legislation, of the type, number, location and condition of weapons. In addition, a national government's implementation of its transfer controls of weapons, to decrease illicit weapons' flow, and regulations for weapons' export and import authorizations (within existing State responsibilities), also fall under this definition. [*UN IDDRS*]

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7.4 TERMS OF REFERENCE: CONSULTANCY- EVALUATION OF THE GoJ/UNDP RECSA PROJECT

Background

The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) is an Inter-Governmental organization with a mandate to coordinate the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States.

It was established in June 2005 by the 3rd Ministerial Review Conference. There are 13 Member States signatory to the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol namely: - Burundi, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.

The mission of RECSA is to coordinate action in the Member States against Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States.

RECSA received funds from Japan Government through UNDP-Kenya to implement a one year project entitled "Enhancing Human Security in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa by Preventing the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms through Practical Disarmament". Part of the funds will be applied to carry out an end-of-project evaluation.

The evaluation will focus on the RECSA II project 2009-2010 which received a six-month extension to end in October 2011.

The purpose of the end-of-project evaluation is to provide the donor, UNDP and RECSA as well as stakeholders analysis of the project effectiveness. It will evaluate results achieved against expected goals and objectives, inputs and outputs set forth in the project document.

The evaluation will offer strategic and operational recommendations, which will inform future programs on small arms and light weapons to RECSA and its partners.

Specific objectives are:

1. Evaluate the level and rate of delivery of project resources and activities against overall objectives,

2. Assess and evaluate the key risks and challenges faced during implementation of activities and their impact;

3. To establish the extent to which the project has achieved its objectives (as stated in the project document);

4. Deduce lessons learnt and document success stories

5. To establish the overall and lasting impact of the project.

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7.6 ASSESSMENT TOOLS

GoJ   Cooperating to Disarm

END OF PROJECT EVALUATION

GoJ/UNDP RECSA

Enhancing Human Security in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa by Preventing the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms through Practical Disarmament Project

ASSESSMENT TOOL

[This Assessment tool has six-sections addressing the issues of: **Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness** (of project implementation), **Impact, Sustainability, and Lessons Learnt.** The Tool will be administered through a general semi-structured questionnaire with general guiding questions for a one-to-one interactive interview with Key-stakeholders. Where possible the questionnaire will be shared with the stakeholders well before the meetings with the Evaluation Team].

OUTPUT 1: STRENGTHEN EXISTING INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLICIT PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)

1.1 Regional meetings to launch the project

a) How many regional meetings to launch the program held (where and why?)

b) What was the outcome of these meetings? (Any unforeseen needs/challenges by the partners?)

c) Were there any divergences between expressed needs, at the meetings, and planned project activities?

d) How were such divergences (if any) addressed?

1.2 National Fora on disarmament

a) How many regional fora on disarmament were held (where and why?)

b) What was the topic/subject of discussion and outcome of these meetings? (Any unforeseen needs/challenges by the partners?)

c) Were there any divergences between expressed needs, at the meetings, and planned project activities?

d) How were such divergences (if any) addressed?

OUTPUT 2: ENHANCE STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT

2.1 Arms collection and destruction

a) How many arms (by type – firearms, ammunition, grenades, UXOs, MANPADS, bombs, landmines) were collected? Did this number differ from the project plans? (By how much, where and why?)

b) Did the actual collection method/strategy differ from the project plan/strategy (what was the difference and why?)?

c) How many arms (by type) were destroyed? Did this number differ from the project plans? (By how much, where and why?)

d) Did the actual destruction method/strategy differ from the project plan/strategy (what was the difference and why?)?

e) Were there any other complementary activities (transport, storage, awareness) were under undertaken (where, why?)

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f) What challenges were experienced with the collection and destruction of the arms (which ones, where, why and how were the challenges (if any) addressed?)?

2.2 Development of Software for Data capture

2.2.1 Regional meetings to Develop Database

a) How many regional meetings to develop databases were held (where and why?

b) What was the outcome of these meetings (Any unforeseen needs/challenges by the partners?)?

c) Were there any divergences between expressed needs, expressed at the meetings, and planned project activities?

d) How were such divergences (if any) addressed?

2.2.2 Development of Strategies

a) How were the strategies for software development and data capture developed (consultancy, adaption of existing, type community involvement?)?

b) Which institutions were involved in the development of software and data capture (private (software developers), public (government?))?

c) Were any regional harmonized and centralized registers developed (new ones, adapted, who was involved (private/public?)

d) Which challenges (if any) were experienced with the development of software and data capture (development, customization, piloting, training, adoption/adaptation?

⌘	Country	Assessment	Collection	Transportation	Destruction						Storage
					Ammu.	Bombs	Firearms	Grenades	Landmines	Manipad	
1	Burundi										
2	Ethiopia										
3	Kenya										
4	South Sudan										
5	Uganda										
	Magamaga										
	Moroto										

2.2.3 In-country Training on Database Creation and Management

a) How many regional training on database creation and management held (where and why?)?

b) What was the outcome of these meetings (Any unforeseen needs/challenges by the partners?)?

c) Were there any divergences between expressed needs, expressed at the meetings, and planned project activities?

d) How were such divergences (if any) addressed?

OUTPUT 3: DEVELOP BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES ON DISARMAMENT

3.1 Carry out Baseline Study on Practical Disarmament

a) How many baseline studies were carried out (where, why?)

b) What strategies were adopted for carrying out the baseline surveys (why?)?

c) What challenges were encountered carrying out the baseline survey and how (if any) were they overcome (where, why?)

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3.2 Development of Best Practice Guidelines

a)   What were the strategies adopted for developing the Best Practice Guidelines?

b)   What were the <u>challenges</u> and <u>lessons learnt</u> in developing the guidelines?

3.3 Exchange Visits on Best Practice Guidelines

a)   How many exchange visits were undertaken (where, why, by who?)

b)   What unique benefits (to the project) did visits have?

c)   What were the challenges (if any) in realizing the exchange visits (how were they overcome?)?

3.4 *Publicity Campaigns and use of Media to popularize the Guidelines*

a)   How many publicity campaigns were undertaken (where, why?)

b)   What were the strategies used to hold the publicity campaigns (organization, duration, participants?)

c)   What were the <u>challenges</u> (if any) and <u>lessons learnt</u> from the publicity campaigns? (where, why?)

OUTPUT 4: DEVELOP AND IMPROVE RECSA'S CAPACITY FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT TO ENHANCE PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

4.1 Project Administration

4.1.1   *Project Conception*

a)   How was the project conceived and what informed the formulation of the project activities?

b)   To what extent were the stakeholders involved in the project design and did the National Action Plans of Member States inform the overall project design?

4.1.2   Project Steering Committee

a)   What informed the constitution of the Project Steering Committee (PSC)?

b)   How were the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the PSC elaborated (please attach a copy of the ToRs)?

c)   What challenges did the PSC face in its operations?

4.1.3   Project Implementation

a)   How were the individual project activities in the Member States identified and what inputs did the NFPs have in deciding the same?

b)   How were the roles of the NFPs, other stakeholders and RECSA in project implementation defined?

c)   Is budgeting for project activities done with the stakeholders and does RECSA transfer monies to the stakeholders and/or administer it itself (why this)?

4.2 Staff capacity

a)   What staff capacity was planned (what was the ideal and actual?)

b)   Were there challenges experienced filling this capacity (if any how were they addressed?)

c)   Were the challenges with staff induction, mainstreaming, working relationships (if any how were they addressed?)

4.3 Administrative support

a)   Was the administrative support to RECSA sufficient/adequate (if not what was the impact of the shortfall and how was it addressed?)

4.4 Project complementation

a)   How does RECSA ensure sufficient buy-in by the stakeholders and ensure that the project activities are sustained beyond the project?

    b) Did this project complement other past, on-going or planned RECSA initiatives (how/to what extent was the complementation?)

    c) Were there any challenges in the mainstreaming of the project into RECSA work (if there were, how were they addressed)

4.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

    a) How were the project activities internally monitored/evaluated against the other RECSA activities (where there was complementation)

    b) What challenges (if any) were encountered with internal monitoring/evaluation of the project activities?

5. SUSTAINABILITY

[This was not a Project Output but it is important to establish the extent of partner contribution]

5.1 Integration and Mainstreaming of project activities

    a) How did the project activities fit/complement the National Action Plans (NAPs) of Member States/Partners (by country)?

    b) What kind of contribution was given by the Member States/Partners towards the project (monetary and in-kind contribution)?

    c) What specific capacities were built/strengthened through the project activities (where, how)?

    d) How were the local/affected communities (incl. local authorities) involved in the project implementation (benefits)?

    e) Were there any spin-off activities/projects were triggered by the project (which, where, how)?

    f) Are there any specific inputs required to ensure that project sustainability is guaranteed (short and medium-term)?

PUBLICATIONS OUTPUTS

[NEWSLETTERS/PAMPHLETS/POSTERS/NEWSPAPER ARTICLES/POLICY BRIEFS]

⌘	Name of Publication	Date Published	Author/Country	No. of Copies
Quarterly Reports				
Annual Reports				
Best Practice Guidelines				
Country Reports				
Articles				
Others				

Assessment Tool Guidelines

[In applying the Assessment Tool, kindly bear the following aspects in mind, as they will form the basis of the Evaluation for the different project aspects].

1. Project Relevance and Effectiveness

The project Effectiveness will be interrogated based on the: Project design (project components), project objectives and the Implementation strategy adopted

1.1 Target area/group

    a) How relevant was the identification of the target/focus countries?

1.2 Strengthening capacity of existing institutions

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a) How effective was the strengthening of the capacities existing institutions? Were the intended results achieved?

b) How effectively was the enhancement of the stockpile management done? Were the results achieved?

c) How effective was the development of best practice guidelines on practical disarmament?

d) How effective was RECSA's capacity developed/improved to enhance program implementation?

e) How effective was M&E carried out? Were tools developed? Monitoring done?

2. Project EFFICIENCY

This will be interrogated based on physical facilities, human resource, funds, duration

a) How (procedures) was Human Resources (incl. Consultants and partners) identified and recruited?

b) How were the physical resources (if any) e.g. motor vehicles, facilities etc. identified and procured?

c) Were UNDP procurement procedures followed?

d) Were timelines for each activity in the objectives achieved/observed?

e) Was authority sought for any extensions?

f) Were the extensions justified?

g) Was each activity implemented within the budget line?

h) Was the budget line allocated to each activity adequate?

4. IMPACT of the project

a) Was there a baseline survey? Did it come up with all the necessary baseline data?

b) Were the project beneficiaries appropriately identified?

c) Who were the beneficiaries and did they deserve the benefits?

d) How did they benefit? (short and long term)

5. SUSTAINABILITY

g) To what extent can the benefits be continued accruing after 5 to 10 years?

h) What characteristics make the output sustainable or unsustainable

i) Has the community capacity been strengthened enough to be able to run the project activities by themselves?

j) Has the project facilitated putting in place/developed local structures (e.g. CBOs, etc.)?

k) To what extent has the local community developed a sense of ownership towards the project interventions?

l) Do the countries/communities have the capacity to continue with or complete activities initiated by the project?

m) Do the local government authorities fully support the initiatives taken by the project?

6. LESSONS LEARNT

a) Did the project achieve its objectives?

b) How should the project be designed differently to achieve the objectives better?

c) How should the resources have been allocated/used more efficiently?

d) How should the methodology have been implemented differently for better results?

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