UNDP CPAP OUTCOME EVALUATION
2012: KEN OUTCOME 49 –
EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND EARLY RECOVERY

JULY 2012
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Abbreviations:
ACORD – Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development
AVAR – Armed Violence and Small Arms
AU – African Union
ASAL – Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ADR – Alternative Dispute Resolution
CPAP – Country Programme Action Plan
CP – Country Programme
CBO – Community Based Organization
CSO – Civil Society Organization
CDF – Constituency Development Fund
CPR – Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CEWERN – Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism
DC – District commissioner
DfID – Department for International Development
DRR – Disaster Risk Reduction
DPC – District Peace Committee
EASF – Eastern Africa Standby Force
IPSTC – International Peace Support Training Centre
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ICC – International Criminal Court
KNFP – Kenya National Focal Point on small Arms and Light Weapons
KPfPS – Kenya Partnership for Peace and Security
KNDR – Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation
KPR – Kenya Police Reservists
MYWO – Maendeleo Ya wanawake organization
MRC – Mombasa Republican Council
MOYAS – Ministry of Youth and Sports
MoSSP – Ministry of State for Special Programmes
MoNK&L – Ministry of Northern Kenya and Livestock
NDMA – National Drought Management Authority
NCCK – National Council of Churches of Kenya
NCIC – National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCRC – National Crime Research Centre
NCEWERT – National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Tracking
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NSC – National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
NPC – National Peace Committee
NYVS – National Youth Volunteers Scheme
NPI-Africa – Nairobi Peace Initiative
NDOC – National Disaster Operations Centre.
OCPD – Officer Commanding Police Division
PB – Peace Building
PEG – Project Executive Group
RECSA – Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
RBM – Results Based Management
SRIC – Security Research and Information Centre
SRF – Strategic Results Framework

SALW – Small Arms and Light Weapons

TOR – Terms of Reference

TJRC – Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission

UNV – United Nations Volunteers

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

WVI – World Vision International

UNDAF – United Nations Development Assistance Framework
Acknowledgements

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Lastly, the evaluation team is heavily indebted to the many respondents we interviewed in government offices, NGOs, CSOs, FGDs and key informants for accommodating us at short notice and providing most accurate data and information unreservedly.

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Executive summary

This evaluation of UNDP’s progress towards achieving outcome 49 focuses on assessing how and why outcome 49 was or is not being achieved given the country context, within the given time frame and the role UNDP and other partners have played in this regard. The evaluation also helped to clarify underlying factors affecting the situation, highlighted unintended consequences, generated lessons learned and recommendations to improve performance in future programming.

Field work was conducted in 5 counties namely: Isiolo, Narok, Sotik, Kiambu and Kitale. These were selected based on the on-going work in these counties supported by UNDP. In all locations Focus group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with men, women and government and non-government key informants. Written interviews were also conducted with UNDP staff.

In regard to outcome 49, the overall perspective on performance of UNDP with respect to the realization of its objectives was rated as progress towards positive change. This rating system assesses the degree to which progress towards achieving the outcome has been made, without attribution to any partner. Positive change therefore means that there is evidence that movement from baseline towards the outcome measured by the outcome indicator was established.

However, it was difficult to explicitly track progress from the UNDP reports. Whereas all the reports had documented useful information about progress towards the outcome, there is a huge gap in tracking quantifiable cumulative achievements in line with the set targets and indicators.

Having said that, there are many commendable elements within UNDP that contributed towards bringing about significant results, despite the difficult economic, political, social and climatic circumstances under which they’ve been achieved. UNDP should build on those elements that are most effective and reconstruct a strong programme in future. These would include strengthening peace structures right from the national to the village levels, stronger lobbying for enactment of crucial legislative policies, establishing robust regionalized mechanisms for control of small arms proliferation, expand partnership to NGOs or CBOs that have capacity at local levels, address underlying causes of conflict such as land distribution, strengthen capacity at county level to implement devolved systems and commit adequate resources to build people’s resilience.

Key evaluation questions

The evaluation was designed to address the five central evaluation questions: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. The outputs were assessed with reference to whether these five criteria were fulfilled fully, partially or not at all. Overall, seven outputs were achieved partially whereas
only two were achieved fully. Tremendous achievements were realized in the implementation of the projects. However, weaknesses were noticed in advocacy and lobbying with the government for enactment of new legislations.

**Key findings and recommendations**

UNDP has pursued this outcome in partnership with the government and civil society under challenging circumstances. During this time the global economy plummeted whereas locally food prices escalated, unemployment for the youth was worsening as well as the country was recovering from the worst post-election violence ever to happen in Kenya. Additionally, a severe drought in decades affected the Horn of Africa region in 2011. The key findings and recommendations are vital for revising the existing programme and for future programming.

**Finding 1:**

The outcome and output statements in key documents such as the CPAP, Strategic Framework and the UNDAF are not consistent and create an impression of lack of coordination in developing the various documents.

**Recommendation:**

Ensure consistency in formulating outcomes, outputs and indicators. To achieve this UNDP Kenya should implement UNDP’s two-way results framework that builds on the top-down and bottom-up planning process.

**Finding 2:**

Indicators, baselines and targets in the CPAP/CPD results framework are not effectively used by UNDP and national partners for monitoring and reporting of outcomes. This can be attributed to lack of a comprehensive indicator tracking system.

**Recommendation:**

In order to harmonize and utilize information in the key documents, there is need to develop an M&E e-database where all data regarding outcomes, outputs, indicators, baselines and targets are uploaded on a shared drive and made accessible to everyone involved in programme monitoring.

**Finding 3:**

Capacity building for DPCs was centered on material support such as office equipment, badges and uniforms, trainings, transfer of knowledge and sharing experiences. Although trainings and knowledge transfer has been achieved considerably, a lot still needs to be done on material support.

**Recommendation:**
DPC members need to be provided with uniforms and security marked badges for identification. This will help deter unscrupulous people masquerading as DPC members from harassing innocent *wananchi*. In addition, it will help DPC members earn recognition and respect in the community.

**Finding 4:**

DPCs are operating without any definitive funding from the government or donor agencies. In most cases they are left to seek funds for themselves. Which is a tall order given their capacity. Besides, the funding expected from NSC is embroiled in unwinding bureaucracy and is always received late or not at all.

Recommendation:

Discussions should be held between UNDP and government ministry partners to agree on a cash disbursement framework and generate a service level agreement to facilitate speedy transfer of funds between UNDP, government and field offices.

Resource mobilization and donor linkages should be an integral part of trainings for all DPCs and other county and district level structures.

**Finding 5:**

The enactment of national policies has been extremely slow. On the one hand, this has allowed for garnering of support from senior government officers and cabinet ministers and also resulted in the most extensively interrogated documents right from the grassroots to the national level. On the other hand, the slow pace has raised doubts on the commitment of the government to enact these crucial policies.

Recommendation:

Enactment of national policies should be of high priority in the current and next programming cycle. Concerted and high level lobbying by UNDP is needed to fast track the enactment of the pending national policies. The process could be accompanied with ‘dangling of a carrot’ or ‘wielding a big stick’. For example further funding to support DPCs could be pegged on the enactment of the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention. Alternatively, strategic trade embargos could be influenced among trading partners to press for the enactment of the pending laws.

**Finding 6:**

According to the NCIC annual report, hate speech and ethnic discrimination are the leading complaints received at the secretariat. It is feared that this will get worse as the country moves closer to the next general elections.

Recommendation:
Intensive civic education needs to be carried out before the next parliamentary and presidential elections. This will help people understand their rights and freedoms and not be deceived by politicians into hostilities.

Police and NCIC should be on high alert to monitor hate speech ahead of the next elections and mete out stiffer penalties to those found guilty.

Finding 7:

Whereas voluntary disarmament has yielded much, there is still a huge amount of illicit SALWs with the public. The result is sporadic violent conflicts especially in the pastoral communities.

Recommendation:

Promote alternative livelihood programmes in the ASALs and increase the presence of government officers including security agents in the perennial hotspots. Secondly, legitimize both traditional and modern surveillance and early warning mechanisms and enforce decisions made by alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. For example the Modogashe declaration has faced challenges due to inability to enforce decisions made against offenders.

Finding 8:

Much effort has been spent towards developing alternative livelihoods for pastoral communities. These have included crop farming through micro-irrigation and dryland farming. This concept raises questions of sustainability due to salination in the long run and inability to endure prolonged drought like the one experienced in 2011 (being the worst in 60 years).

Recommendation:

Promote long-term livestock related layering programming for livestock value chain inclusiveness and resilience building. Layered investment strategy offers an opportunity to assess how varying depths of investment impact on resilience-building and economic growth. To be meaningful, however, it requires that implementing partners working on different layers partner and collaborate with one another, both technically and operationally. It also requires that layering occur down to the community and household level. As such, the resilience program should include amongst its targeted beneficiaries, though not solely, those who have benefitted from previous donors with cash/food activities. Similarly, the livestock value chain program should include amongst its beneficiaries those who have benefitted from the resilience program once it has been established. Layering to this level allows for a process of graduation from food assistance to resilience-building and economic growth.

Finding 9:
Capacity to handle devolved structures at county level is definitely going to be a challenge once the constitution is implemented in 2013.

Recommendation:

There is need to partner with NGOs and CBOs for wider reach and improved service delivery as well as to fill the government’s capacity gap.

Finding 10:

Conflicts in Kenya are a manifestation of deep seated historical injustices that must be addressed.

Recommendation:

To ensure that returns are sustainable, the underlying causes of conflict such as land distribution and inequities must be addressed through restitution and legislation.
Introduction

Background
According to the evaluation plan of the UNDP Country Office in Kenya, an outcome evaluation is to be conducted in the third quarter of 2011 for the following Country Programme Outcome 49 – “Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced”. This Country Programme outcome aims to contribute to the achievement of UNDAF OUTCOME 2.2: Humanitarian Impact and Risk of Natural and Human-Made Disasters.

The UNDP is therefore taking stock of its work, contribution and influence in support of initiatives and responses to: Conflict prevention and peace building and reduction of the proliferation of illicit small arms; disaster risk reduction; and livelihoods recovery. The purpose of this review and evaluation is to ensure that its planned projects, programme and portfolio on conflict prevention and peace building as well as disaster risk reduction are relevant to national priorities and support the achievement of the planned outcome. The aim is to take stock of how UNDP influences the work of its partners to contribute to the attainment of this outcome.

The evaluation focuses on the impact of UNDP interventions and its contribution to conflict prevention and peace building, disaster risk reduction and livelihood recovery.

Objectives of the Evaluation
The main purpose of this evaluation was to:

- Assess the progress made towards the achievement of the outcome;
- Determine contributing factors and impediments;
- Assess the contribution UNDP has made /is making to the progress towards the achievement of the outcome and
- Assess UNDP partnership strategy in relation to the outcome and the extent to which the partnership strategy supports and/or promotes the achievement of the outcome.

The results of the outcome evaluation will be used to guide future programming. In this regard the evaluation also focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the current programme, lessons learnt and
best practices or future interventions, better ways of coordinating donor interventions and priority areas of focus for future programming.

**Justification and scope**

This evaluation adheres to the policy of UNDP to conduct an evaluation of outcome to measure the progress of conflict prevention towards achieving its results in the final year of programme cycle. This outcome was selected because it has a strong bearing in the next parliamentary and presidential elections which in retrospect plunged Kenya into the worst violence to date.

The focus of an outcome evaluation is to reveal how UNDP actions are achieving human development changes. The product of this evaluation consists of progress towards achieving the outcome, contributing and limiting factors to the achievement of the outcome, UNDP contribution and an assessment of the partnership strategy. These evaluation results will be used to inform priority areas of focus for future programming.

The key issues addressed in this evaluation include relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact of the outcome.

**The Development Context**

**Peace building and conflict prevention in Kenya**

Although generally regarded as a stable and peaceful country amidst a troubled region, Kenya has in the past and in recent times experienced violent conflicts, some of which, are regarded as low level and intermittent while others can be classified as high intensity. The low level and often incessant conflicts are driven by competition for scarce natural resources like pasture and water for livestock, arable land, cattle and generally diminishing territories amongst the local communities mainly based in rural areas.

Conflicts within the urban settlements and populations are driven by factors such as the proliferation of informal settlements due to rapid rural-urban migration, unemployed youth turning into criminals, extortionist rings, armed gangs and militia and scarcity of housing and basic social amenities.

On the other hand, high intensity violent conflicts are related to ethnic-based political competition for state control and public resources. These types of conflicts largely follow the 5 years electoral cycles and have been previously witnessed in 1991/2, 1997/8 and recently during the 2007/8 cycle. In some instances, these conflicts have also tended to be exacerbated by additional factors, such as: poor leadership based on ethnicity and polarization; a culture of bad governance and paying lip service to the rule of law over the years; the erosion of existing mechanisms for local conflict management; long-standing land and identity disputes having acquired ethnic or clan dimensions; and the lack of mechanisms for political and social dialogue among various interest groups and communities, especially with regard to perceptions of exclusion or marginalization. Violent conflicts generally do assume the
inter-communal dimensions with armed gangs and militia from different communities and identities fighting against each other.

The effects of the conflicts in Kenya include: a divided and polarized society along ethnic and regional identities as opposed to shared national identities, common values and aspirations; exclusion and marginalization of certain sections of society from state governance and economic development especially ethnic minorities, women and the youth; slow economic growth and opportunities for meaningful employment of large sections of the population especially the youth standing at 75% of the total population; proliferations of armed gangs and militia comprising mainly of the unemployed and disenfranchised youth who have contributed significantly to armed violence and crime; the conflicts along Kenya’s highly porous and unprotected boarders with neighboring countries like Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda have also contributed largely to the internal conflicts and crime within Kenya due to availability of illicit SALW; and in 2007/8, in the aftermath of the hotly disputed presidential elections, Kenya was plunged into violent conflict and anarchy which again manifested in the form of inter-ethnic struggle for state control and power. The violence left nearly 1,300 people dead, over 500,000 internally displaced and reversed economic growth from 7% in 2007 to nearly 1% in 2008.

However, over the years, there have been various attempts to address some of the conflicts in Kenya especially those related to natural resources in northern Kenya. The establishment of the District Peace Committees (DPCs) in northern Kenya provided impetus to community based conflict resolution. In the recent past and in the aftermath of post elections violence in 2008, the electoral / political dispute was also mediated with the participation of international community and local actors. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process that was facilitated by a panel of African eminent personalities including the former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan provided an opportunity to Kenya not only for immediate short term conflict resolution but also set conditions or agenda for long term policy, legal and institutional reforms that would ensure a stable, peaceful and prosperous nation.

Based on this background UNDP takes a three pronged approach to conflict prevention: Conflict-Sensitive Development Programming, National Capacities for Conflict Management, Building Consensus Through Dialogue, Special Initiatives i.e. Youth Programming in Conflict Prevention and Recovery, Gender in Conflict Situations. The UNDP work in conflict prevention and peace building is within the thematic practice area of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR).

**Disaster risk reduction in Kenya**

Kenya is highly vulnerable to natural disasters mostly drought and floods. Other hazards include landslides, environmental degradation, technological disasters, HIV and AIDS, disease epidemics and epizootics, and conflict, among others. Over time, disaster events have increased in number, frequency, complexity and impact. Drought impacts have worsened in the past 10 years, affecting an estimated 4.5
million people annually. The most serious drought in 2008/9 disrupted the lives of 10 million people in pastoral/agro-pastoral areas and informal urban settlements. Over 20% of the livestock population was decimated and a surge in natural resource-based conflicts ensued. Similarly, floods though more geographically limited, are becoming increasingly frequent and severe. On an annual basis, some Ksh. 49 million in damages and Ksh 37 million in humanitarian action are incurred in Nyanza Province alone as a result of floods (World Bank 2004).

The impact of drought has intensified over the years and is likely to worsen with climate change. Available records indicate that in the last 100 years the country has experienced over 29 droughts. In the past four decades droughts have become more frequent, more widespread, and more intense. Major recent droughts were in 1983/1984, 1991/1992, 1996/1997, 1999/2001, 2005/06, 2008/09 and 2011.

Threats from natural hazards, combined with high population growth, isolated chronic insecurity and unplanned urbanization threaten to undermine Kenya’s development. Climate change is apt to amplify disaster losses and related humanitarian outlays in Kenya. In its fourth assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns of an increase in the incidence and intensity of drought and floods. According to the report, Africa is the continent most vulnerable to climate change because of the interactions among multiple stresses at different levels and low adaptive capacities.

Recurrent disasters in Kenya have caused severe food shortages and eroded the effectiveness of the livelihood systems of the poor. Disasters have resulted in secondary effects that hinder the prospects of full, sustainable recovery, especially when exacerbated by stresses such as HIV and AIDS, insecurity and widespread poverty. With every disaster, many poor households lose shelter, crops, food, income opportunities, household items, productive assets and are also at risk of communicable diseases brought by disasters.

Despite recurrent natural and human-induced hazards in Kenya, disaster management remains largely reactive, with weak coordination mechanisms, high levels of vulnerable populations and inadequate capacity to monitor and assess disaster risks. As a result, the country loses billions of shillings in damages and spends more on emergency response, resources that would otherwise be spent on development. The overall effects of the 2008-2011 drought in Kenya have been estimated at Ksh 968.6 billion (US$12.1 billion) which includes Ksh 64.4 billion (US$805.6 million) for the destruction of physical and durable assets, and Ksh 904.1 billion (US$11.3 billion) for losses in the flows of the economy across all sectors.

Attempts have been made by the government and other actors to address disaster risk reduction in the country. These include establishment of a dedicated Ministry to coordinate disaster risk reduction and emergency response. Other institutions formed include National Disaster Operation Centres (NDOC) and

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1 Refer to PDNA pg 2
the Crisis Response Centre among others. At the local level Disaster Management Committees have been formed to facilitate local level disaster management.

UNDP supports the government and works with other stakeholders to ensure that disaster impacts are effectively managed in order to protect and promote sustainable development. To achieve this, UNDP focuses on creating an enabling environment through enactment of policies and mechanisms to ensure integration of development planning with disaster reduction, mitigating the humanitarian impact and risk of natural and human made disasters.

**Methodology**

The methodology used for this outcome evaluation was designed to perform an evaluation of the outcome with a diversity of projects. The evaluation design was based on qualitative methodology through Focus Group Discussion, individual structured interviews and field visits. The evaluation team divided the assignment into the following tasks, each with its specific activities and outputs.

**Table 1: Tasks, activities and outputs of the outcome evaluation**

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<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Consultations with stakeholders</td>
<td>Preliminary review of key documentation provided by country office</td>
<td>Classification of documents by relevance, objectivity and value</td>
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<td>Consultations with key UNDP stakeholders</td>
<td>Refinement of work plan, schedule of site visits and interviews</td>
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<td>Interaction and planning among national consultants</td>
<td>Inception Report</td>
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<td>Desk review</td>
<td>Conduct independent literature searches</td>
<td>Unclassified data</td>
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<td>Develop data gathering tools for site visits</td>
<td>Refinement of evaluation matrix addressing key evaluation questions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-depth review of documentation provided by country office</td>
<td>Questionnaires, checklists, FGD guides</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultations with field and Nairobi offices and site visits</td>
<td>Interviews with UNDP staff, NGO, agencies and government representatives</td>
<td>Unclassified data</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews with beneficiaries, project stakeholders, NGOs and field office staff</td>
<td>Preliminary compilation of assessments, conclusions, recommendations</td>
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### Site visits

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<tr>
<th>Data Analysis</th>
<th>Data compilation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-depth review of consultations</td>
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<td>Cross checking/ triangulation of data</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interaction among national consultants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feedback and Reporting</td>
<td>Validation workshop</td>
<td>Presentation of summarized first</td>
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<td>draft report</td>
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<td>Presentation of final report</td>
<td>Final report</td>
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**Desk Review:** The literature provided was voluminous and confusing. However, the evaluation team conducted a triage, identifying those documents that were most relevant to the outcome evaluation and extracting from them the key issues and questions. Based on this review, an evaluation matrix was compiled. More refinement was made on the matrix as the evaluation progressed and key questions were made clearer.

The evaluation team consulted a wide range of documents including annual reports, strategic documents, work plans, workshop reports, publications, assessment reports and conducted an internet research.

**Sampling and sample size:** Given that the evaluation adopted a qualitative research methodology, purposive sampling was espoused. The evaluators actively selected 7 implementing partners out of a list of 29 partners, to represent both government and civil society organizations. Similarly 5 DPCs were selected to represent the three thematic areas under study namely: peacebuilding, DRR and Livelihood recovery.

**Consultations with implementing partners:** The evaluation team conducted consultations with a number of sampled implementing partners that were selected by the evaluation manager. Interviews were held in two principal ways. In some cases the evaluation team met with two or more individuals from a particular organization for a discussion and in most cases in-depth interviews were carried out with government officials, NGO staff and others.

**Field visits & FGDs:** Field visits were conducted to five sites that were selected by UNDP based on the three thematic areas. These were: Narok, Sotik, Isiolo, Kiambu and Kitale. It had been envisaged that the evaluation team would visit at least one location each per the three thematic areas of peacebuilding, DRR and livelihood recovery. However, the DRR projects in Turkana and Garissa were not visited due to insecurity concerns.

**Data analysis:** All the data collected was qualitative and therefore qualitative data analysis methodologies were used for analysis. First the evaluation team went through familiarization with the data by reading and re-reading the deskreview, interview and field visit summary reports. Next, themes
were constructed based on the emerging issues and guided by the indicators in the TOR. Finally, mapping and interpretation of data was done. Flow charts were drawn to establish cause-effect relationships and using Spradley’s universal semantic relationship methodology, conclusions were made. A ranking criterion was selected based on the three point rating system for outcomes and outputs found in the ‘Guidelines for outcome evaluators’ handbook.

**Reliability and validity of the data:** The findings deduced from the data were compared with external evidence from secondary data. Data analysis was carried out by the lead evaluator assisted by the assistant evaluator. Cases of deviance were noted and verified. Lastly, during data interpretation, the data was retained in its original form as much as possible. By employing focus group discussions, key informant interviews, questionnaires and desk reviews; it was possible to triangulate the responses into a report and ascertain validity and reliability of the data.

**The Logic of outcome evaluation:** outcome evaluations work backwards from the outcome. They take the outcome as the point of departure and assess a number of variables. The following logic has guided this evaluation in reviewing the outcome, gathering information, assessing progress toward the outcome and making recommendations.

The country context was reviewed to fully comprehend the outcome

Progress toward the outcome is clearly defined

Indicators are specified to track progress

Evidence is accumulated to determine the extent of progression toward the outcome

Factors are identified for explaining why the outcome was or was not attained

UNDP’s contribution to these factors and the achievement of the outcome is assessed

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2 UNDP Evaluation office, Guidelines for outcome evaluators, monitoring and evaluation companion series #1, pg 22
Findings and Conclusions

Description of the outcome:

CP Outcome 49 which states “Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced”; integrates two aspects of emergency response: i) increasing national capacity for conflict prevention, peace building, reduction of small arms and light weapons proliferation and ii) disaster risk reduction and restoration of livelihoods and community resilience for recovery from crisis. In Kenya, conflict can be said to be directly linked to structural factors key among them being resource base distribution. For that matter, places prone to disaster are inherently vulnerable to conflict due to the scramble for diminished resources and large movement of people and capital\(^3\). Therefore the formulation of CP outcome 49 appropriately integrates conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction which must be tackled simultaneously to attain peace and livelihood improvement.

With substantial resources being diverted to respond to conflicts and disasters, the Government of Kenya places much emphasis on comprehensive management of conflicts and disasters as a critical part of overall national development. Conflict and natural disasters can derail progress towards attaining MDGs and vision 2030. Conflicts especially in the North Eastern and North Western parts of the country are exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons from neighboring countries through the porous borders.

Effectively, the goal of the Government under vision 2030 is to attain “security of all persons and property throughout the Republic”. This is a demonstration of the Government’s commitment to conflict prevention and peace building.

According to the Kenya Vision 2030, “over 70 percent of natural disasters affecting the country are weather-related. In the recent past, there has been an increase in frequency, magnitude and severity of disasters. The impacts include loss of life and property and destruction of infrastructure. The current approaches to disaster management are towards disaster response as opposed to disaster risk reduction. The government’s priority under vision 2030 is to insulate development from natural hazards”. The CPAP outcome 49 is therefore relevant to the country’s needs and priorities.

\(^3\) NSC, National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and conflict trends in Kenya, 2011
Outcome/output analysis

It was not clear to what extent Results Based Monitoring (RBM) has been used for this outcome. Results Based Monitoring “aims to improve management effectiveness and accountability by defining realistic expected results, monitoring progress toward the achievement of expected results, integrating lessons learned into management decisions and reporting on performance”\(^4\). Under RBM, output and outcome indicators are clearly defined. This is not the case for CP outcome 49. For example the TOR has 18 indicators but they are not disaggregated into outcome or output indicators. Similarly, the UNDP Kenya Strategic Framework 2010-2013 is not organized along outcomes and outputs. The results framework\(^5\) in the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2013 on the other hand, has clearly defined outcomes and outputs. However, the outcomes in the CPAP are divided into three parts addressing peace building (PB), Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and livelihoods recovery yet in the TOR, the three parts have been brought under one outcome.

Even though, the reality is that project documents were approved before the outcome was developed, this discrepancy is again noticed in the outcome statement in other core documents. Examination of outcome 49 reveals that it is not mirrored in the UNDAF 2009-2013 document. Incidentally, the outcome essentially sums up all the four CP outcomes in the UNDAF document\(^6\). Further still, the higher level UNDAF outcome 2.2 as stated in the TOR is at variance with UNDAF outcome 2.2 appearing in the UNDAF document and the CPAP 2009-2013. Whereas in the TOR it states “Humanitarian impact and risk of natural and human made disasters reduced”, the UNDAF document states “measurably reduced risks and consequences of conflict and natural disaster” and the CPAP states “National plans and policies for conflict and disaster management operationalized and capacity developed at national and district levels”. Although the meaning is retained in the first two statements, there is clear indication that editing and revision of the UNDAF and CPAP were mismatched.

Since the outcome has several dimensions that cannot be tallied in a single indicator, it was worthwhile to deconstruct\(^7\) the outcome into various parts to determine whether change has taken place or not.

Peace building and conflict prevention

Policy formulation, adoption and implementation

The enactment of policies related to peace and conflict prevention has been slow. All the policies that were in draft form at baseline still remain in draft form. A Draft National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management, encompassing the establishment of a National Peace Commission (NPC) has been developed. It is awaiting consideration by the cabinet. A Draft Policy and Legislation on small arms

\(^{4}\) UNDP evaluation office, Guidelines for outcome evaluators, Monitoring and Evaluation Companion series #1
\(^{5}\) Refer to Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), pg 58-63
\(^{6}\) UNDAF 2009-2013, pg 36
\(^{7}\) UNDP evaluation office, Guidelines for outcome evaluators, Monitoring and evaluation companion series #1, pg 13
reduction has been produced for consideration of the Cabinet. Draft legislation has also been produced to strengthen the existing legal framework on the possession of arms and to provide stiffer penalties for offenders. Other policies yet to be passed are the IDP draft bill and the Draft National IDP policy. These policies are still pending cabinet approval before being introduced in parliament for debate and legislation. It is presumed that the cabinet, apart from the laborious government bureaucracies, has prioritized crucial legislation related to constitution implementation at the expense of the other bills/policies including the above.

Unless these legislations are passed, the gains made in peace building and conflict prevention are founded on quicksand. For example there is varied understanding of the role of the District Peace Committees (DPC) in different places. In Narok and Kiambu, the DPC members protested at the manner they are treated by the Provincial Administration. The chiefs feel that the DPCs are out to take up their positions in view of the new constitutional dispensation and political utterances. This is exacerbated by the DPC members themselves who move around bragging that “siku hizi hakuna chief” (translated: there is no chief nowadays). They lamented at lack of proper facilitation from the DCs and government officials. Sometimes when they report a matter to the chief, he turns around to frustrate them and the culprit is set free.

The DPCs do not have reliable funding sources. Most of them rely on NSC through the provincial administration and NGOs for funding and facilitation. The DPCs cannot be funded directly from the exchequer due to lack of a policy framework. Likewise, CDF and county councils when approached would say “their funds are already designated”. The private sector on the other hand insists the government should fund the DPCs.

It is imperative that the relevant legislations are passed to entrench the DPCs in the government system and enable the exchequer to fund peace interventions in the country.

Since all the legislations that were earmarked for approval at the baseline have not been approved, this output indicator is rated partially achieved.

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**Kenyan Policy Formulation process:**

**Stage 1:**
Draft policy from ministry or govt dept through public participation is send to KLRC and AG’s office for preparation into a bill.

**Stage 2:**
Draft bill from KRLC & AG’s office released to CIC and stakeholder’s review. It can be put on hold here.

**Stage 3:**
CIC seeks consensus with stakeholders and fills any gaps

**Stage 4:**
CIC convenes a roundtable to make amendments

**Stage 5:**
AG prepares the Bill and is released to cabinet for approval

**Stage 6:**
Cabinet receives the bill, makes amendments and approves. Amendments are made in consultations with CIC

**Stage 7:**
Bill is published by AG and tabled in parliament for debate. Parliament then passes

**Stage 8:**
AG prepares the vellum copy and is taken to the President for assent. President assents. AG publishes it into law.

Source: CIC website
There were two indicators related to this activity in the TOR namely: i) The quality and volume of engagement of youth on reconciliation, peace building and conflict prevention and ii) The level and quality of engagement and support to capacities of women in peace building and conflict prevention. However, to enhance clarity in activity measurement, two more indicators were assessed. These are; increased level of participation of youth in promoting national dialogue and reconciliation initiatives and vulnerability of youth to criminality, armed violence and recruitment into militia.

There is significant progress towards gender equality and women participation in conflict and peace building efforts. All the five DPCs visited had adhered to the 30% minimum gender ratio as stipulated in the Kenya constitution 2010\(^8\). This progress was attributed to several determining factors:

a) Enforcement of the Kenya constitution 2010 which safeguards the inalienable rights of the Kenyan citizens regardless of their gender as outlined in the bill of rights.


Women capacity was built, under the auspices of Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization (MYWO), through training in community dialogue, conflict management, peace building, conflict analysis and mapping, conflict early warning, negotiation, mediation, reconciliation and arbitration. In Mombasa those trained are spearheading dialogue with MRC.

Table 2: Composition of DPC members in selected districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DPC</th>
<th># of men</th>
<th># of women</th>
<th># of youth</th>
<th>% women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narok North District</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotik District</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo District</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Nzoia District</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu District</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field visits

Through Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS), the National Youth Volunteer Scheme (NYVS) engaged youth within their communities to harness their energies and take a proactive role in community development. Selected youth were placed in different organizations (CBOs and Public institutions) to nurture them into useful and productive members of society. In Marsabit, youth were placed in different organizations as volunteers after youth based community conversations on mediation, dialogue and reconciliation. Inter-community youth exchange visits were carried out to promote interaction and reconciliation following the 2007/08 post-election violence. As a result of these activities, youth have increased their level of participation in peace meetings; some have formed youth council networks.

\(^8\) Kenya Constitution, 2010, article 27 (8)
social action groups to enable continuous engagement with peace processes and there is “increased number of youth willing to adopt nonviolent means of dispute resolution”.

The youth whose unemployed rate stands at 50% have untapped and unutilized potential which is fodder for engaging in criminal activities with gangs and armed militia. This makes them vulnerable and prone to manipulation by the rich and political elites in furtherance of their economic and political interests. In Isiolo it was clear that the youth do not have money to buy firearms. It is therefore the rich who supply these small arms to the youth for their own selfish interests. In Kiambu, through the efforts of the DPC, the *Mungiki* threat has waned. The DPC was instrumental in reaching out to the youth through dialogue, counseling and drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes. With the foregoing, it can be concluded that the above output was fully achieved.

**Promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation**

**Hate speech:** The political parties’ forum was established to provide safe space for dialogue across party lines. The forum has contributed towards greater engagement of political parties on issues such as devolution, peace building and implementation of the constitution. The other forum is the parliamentary forum for peace which brings together MPs for awareness creation and to sensitize them on hate speech.

According to Section 13 of the NCIC Act of 2008, hate speech is defined as any utterance intended to incite feelings of contempt, hatred, hostility, violence or discrimination against any person, group or community on the basis of ethnicity, religion or race.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NCIC annual report, 2010*

NCIC has been monitoring hate speech although there is no available data on annual trends. However, the available data shows that the number of hate speech cases fluctuates with the political season. For example in 2010, hate speech peaked in July, just before the national referendum. This has always been true during election years. To respond to the threat of hate speech, NCIC has trained 270 police officers...

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10 UWIANO Platform for Peace: Strategic leadership agenda for 2012 and Beyond.
on hate speech and provided them with audio recorders for use in monitoring hate speech across the country.

**Peace Index:** Rights bodies and commissions have been formed to facilitate dispute resolution. Among them are National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), Truth, Justice and Reconciliation commission (TJRC), Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC), Uwiano Platform for Peace among others. These bodies have been established by law to handle issues that relate to peacebuilding and conflict situations independent of the formal legal justice mechanisms. It is expected that these rights bodies should monitor the peace index and advice the government.

Published by the Institute for Economics & Peace, the peace index tries to measure peacefulness. It gauges the level of safety and security in society and also looks at the extent of domestic or international conflict.

Table 4: Peace index and global ranking for Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>2.252</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Peace Index, 2012

The chart above shows that peace index went extremely high in 2008 basically due to the post-election violence. The same trend was observed in 2010 as a result of the national constitution referendum. Since then the peace index has been improving recording the best value in 2012 in six years. Although conflicts have been rising during election years, there is a constant level of conflict which is not linked to
electioneering. This can be attributed to the incessant conflicts in the disaster districts of northern Kenya which are linked to resource sharing.

In conclusion, the two parameters, hate speech and peace index are correlated. It therefore follows that if hate speech is brought to a minimum it will have an impact on the peace index. Luckily, the law apparatus are actively getting involved in detecting and prosecuting hate speech. NCIC with support from UNDP has built the capacity of the police force to record and prosecute hate speech wherever and whenever it occurs. DPCs are also playing an essential role in monitoring and reporting hate speech.

**District Peace Committees**
The District peace committees were fashioned after the provincial administration structure. The

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**How the DPC tamed Mungiki in Kiambu**

They were a menace. You couldn’t build without paying them. They could snatch even the dairy card for delivering milk to the dairy plant until you pay them. People parts would be found on the road. “Haungeongea. Hii ilikuwanga ya mwisho, ndio mnaulizwa: na hawa vijana wenu? Na haulizii kwa sauti” (translated: you couldn’t mention Mungiki. It usually was the last issue on the agenda. That’s when it would be asked in whispers “what about your youth?”). But all that has changed. The peace committee spearheaded by the chairlady started to help the police and the DC. The peace committee talked to the youth and they themselves agreed to be watchmen. The victims of Mungiki abuse started looking for the chairlady and reported the issue to her. Some were arrested and taken to the police but others promised to reform. Those seen to be reforming were supported with alternative sources of income. “Walipewa mafuta, maharagwe – yaani mkono wa makaribisho kutoka kwa serikali” (translated: they were given cooking oil and beans as a sign of goodwill from the government). Currently we use those who have reformed to ‘catch’ the others.

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provincial administrators provide oversight and support to the peace committees. The structure starts with the NSC at the national level, provincial peace forum, district peace committee, divisional peace committee, location peace committee, sub-location peace committee and village peace committee. Peace Monitors engaged by the NSC support the DPC secretariat at the district level. They are volunteers seconded to the government at District level by United Nations Volunteers (UNV). With the advent of the new constitution, this structure will be revised to accommodate the counties once the provinces are abolished. However, the DPCs have not yet been fully entrenched in the country’s administrative system awaiting the enactment of the National Policy on Conflict and Peacebuilding.

The formation of DPCs in 150 districts has been a huge success for the NSC with support from UNDP. Whereas the target was to establish 50 District Peace Committees, it is amazing that this target was surpassed. This was majorly attributed to the impetus emanating from the work of the Kenya National
Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement (agenda 4) which among others recommended the strengthening of national mechanisms for preventing violence and peace building\textsuperscript{11}. DPCs have proven to be valuable interface structures between the government, community leaders and CSOs when responding to conflict and insecurity situations.

The role of DPCs spans from early warning, community dialogue, conflict management and resolution, peace building, monitoring of small arms, crime prevention, apprehending drug and alcohol abusers, mediators, arbitrators as well as disaster response, community policing, domestic and communal problem solving, sensitization on peace and conflict transformation, tackling cattle rustling among others. The humongous amount of work performed by the DPCs calls for speed enactment of the National Policy on Conflict and Peacebuilding and other legislations, without which the DPCs will collapse from their own weight.

The work of peace committees has resulted in reduced frequency of conflicts, early detection of potential violence, harmony and synergy in peace building efforts among state and non-state actors. In all the five districts visited it was reported that through the efforts of the peace committees, conflicts have reduced. Nevertheless, in Sotik the men reported that conflicts have reduced whereas women reported the contrary. Further investigation revealed that “men do not consider an incidence as conflict until it escalates to violence; whereas women will register any incidence that disrupts their normal routine as conflict. It is therefore true that dispute cases have increased in Sotik, since they are monitored and reported early but few have escalated to violence\textsuperscript{12}”.

The anatomy of conflict supports this. According to Brahm E.(2003), conflict has seven stages namely: latent conflict, emergence, escalation, hurting/stalemate/violence, de-escalation, settlement/resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Fig. 1: Conflict stages

\textsuperscript{11} Consolidating the peace process and establishing the foundations for a successful political transition: UNDP Kenya strategic framework 2010-2013. Pg 6
\textsuperscript{12} Anna Chebet – Peace Monitor, Sotik District corroborated the information given by men and women FGDs.
The potential for conflict exists whenever people have different needs, values, or interests; this is the latent conflict stage. The conflict may not become apparent until a "triggering event" leads to the emergence (or beginning) of the obvious conflict. Emergence may be followed quickly by settlement or resolution, or it may be followed by escalation, which can lead to violence.

Peace Committees have been instrumental in pacifying potentially destructive incidences. In Narok, a dispute arose between the government and the local community regarding the resettlement of IDPs on Rose farm.

The DPC intervened and advised the government to rescind the decision, a view that was upheld. Finally the IDPs were resettled in Nyandarua and Subukia – a win/win situation. In Isiolo, *morans* from Samburu had planned a cattle raid. One DPC member got information and alerted the DC and the OCPD Isiolo, who immediately sent police to intervene. A fight ensued and 3 raiders were killed and the raid was thwarted. In Kiambu, a public plot reserved for a hospital had been sold to a private developer. The peace committee learned of it and intervened. They decided to invite the media and pull down the fence. This compelled the buyer to surface and was taken to the police. He later agreed to vacate the plot and peace was restored.
Challenges:
Despite immense success, DPCs have equally faced profound challenges. DPCs across the country are faced with severe inadequate funding. Whereas funding from NSC is expected on a quarterly basis, this has not been forthcoming. According to one Peace Monitor, “Grants from NSC are irregular and inadequate. What is supposed to be quarterly funding has become annual”. Accordingly, DPCs lack office space and lack appropriate facilitation. Members said they are forced to use their own money for logistics like travel, lunch, accommodation and even airtime. This was summed up by a DPC member as below: “Tumeuza kuku ndio tusafiri mpaka kuku imeisha na hiyo inaleta ugomvi nyumbani” (translated: we have sold and exhausted all the chicken at home to raise funds for transport and this has brought conflict in the family).

Although trainings for the DPC members have been carried out, most are not fully equipped to handle incidents. Again those who have been trained lack funds to cascade the same to others. Roles and responsibilities of DPCs are not clearly defined. In some places DPCs have taken on more than their fair share to an extent of claiming to be doing the chief’s work. This has infuriated the provincial administration who have responded, in some cases, with resistance. For example when an incident is reported, the provincial administration will take too long to respond or worse still respond ineffectively. The distraught party then starts to plan for revenge attacks and it becomes a vicious cycle.

Lack of trust and stereotypes between communities are an impediment to peace efforts. In Sotik, it was reported that the Kisii believe that “every Kipsigis is a cattle thief”. On many occasions feuding communities do not trust each other. “You may talk and agree, but the next day things erupt”. This statement was mentioned twice in Sotik and Isiolo from a government official and a peace monitor.

Lack of badges and uniform for identification were cited as challenges for the DPC. Whereas a few members have badges and uniforms, majority still don’t have. This predisposes them to great risks while in the line of duty. It was recommended however, that the badges should have a security mark to avoid impersonation. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that this output was partially achieved.

Fig: 2: Example of a DPC identification badge and uniform.
Community Early Warning System

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWERN) is an initiative of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The mandate of CEWERN is to promote peace and stability in the Horn of Africa states (Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and create a mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. In Kenya, the CEWERN program is currently targeted at two mainly pastoralist areas namely, the Karamoja cluster covering Kenya/Sudan/Uganda and the Somali cluster covering Kenya/Ethiopia/Somalia. CEWERN has employed field monitors within these clusters who report to the National Research Institute or Africa Peace Forum, which in turn relays the information to the response unit or NSC (CEWERU). The information is further transmitted to CEWERN headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for processing before its relayed back to the member state. Kenya has borrowed from this model to ensure that the country has a clear national conflict early warning system.

Following the implementation of the CEWERN project, the situation room at NSC is now fully equipped with state-of-the-art data collection and analysis equipment and an SMS alert platform. In 2010, SMS alerts that were received at the situation room per day were on average 600. This peaked on the eve of the referendum to 5,000 SMSs per day.

The Early Warning mechanism has been weak on feedback though. Partners as well as community people do not receive feedback on issues raised in their annual reports and other channels. Despite this setback, this output was fully achieved.

Management of illicit SALWs and reduced armed violence

The proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is a major concern for countries in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region. The proliferation of SALW is considered one of the major drivers of conflict in the region. The Government of Kenya, realizing this has made some significant milestones in addressing the endemic challenge of SALWs. Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) was established as a multi-agency initiative and a Directorate within the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, and is located within the Office of the President. The KNFP was established in 2002 and became operational in 2003, bringing together various Government ministries, departments and
Civil Society organizations in the management and control of small arms and light weapons in Kenya. The establishment of KNFP as an interagency directorate within the Office of the President has ensured an inclusive multi-stakeholder approach to SALW management.

KNFP undertook a national arms mapping in 2003 which informed the development of the National Action Plan (NAP) to combat illicit arms in the country. The NAP was implemented under ten themes. However, some of those themes were not fully implemented due to lack of resources.

KNFP has established and trained 8 Provincial Task Forces (PTF) and District Task forces (DTFs) in 53 districts. KNFP facilitated the drafting of the national small arms policy which was finalized and submitted to the Minister in 2009. To date it has not been enacted into law. By 2010, Kenya had destroyed over 25,000 illegal arms and 50,000 rounds of ammunition and by 2011, KNFP had marked 60,000 government firearms. This greatly improved the identification and traceability of government firearms thus significantly reducing the misuse of these firearms. However, despite the aforementioned achievements, KNFP is greatly constrained in limited financial resources which have resulted in its ‘inability to fully implement the National Action Plan’. This plan recommends among others the adoption of the National Small Arms Policy and the finalization and enforcement of the development and disarmament policy framework.

According to Wepundi, et al, perceived causes of SALWs demand are the need for protection (1) of property especially livestock (29.5%), (2) from other clans (16.2%), and (3) from criminals (14.5%) among others.

Proliferation of firearms has gone down since 2003 when coercive disarmament operations started in various parts of the country. Despite the drop in the number of firearms nationally, some zones have recorded a significant increase in gun possession. For instance western and Rift Valley went up by 6.4% and 6.8% respectively. This can be attributed to the aftermath of PEV which left majority of households feeling more insecure during election periods. By the time of compiling this report, there were reports of intertribal clashes in Tana River between the Pokomo and Orma castigated by political undertones. Therefore peaceful management of national elections is important for reducing the demand for SALWs.

A total of 36 District Task Forces (DTF) were established and trained surpassing the target of 24 districts. Since the establishment of DTFs there has been an improvement in SALW collection, storage and disposal. Nationally more than 6,000 SALW were recovered and destroyed by the year 2010. In Isiolo, where UNDP is implementing the Armed Violence and Small Arms Reduction (AVAR)project, more than 500 firearms were recovered through a voluntary disarmament exercise in 2011, though government

Success story: How a local initiative in Wajir resulted in a nationwide outcome

In Wajir District, women for peace group started a local initiative to end firearms fuelled violence. This led to the formation of a more inclusive multi-clan – Wajir Peace Group – which brokered a local peace pact – Al Fatah declaration. Later this became Wajir Peace & Development Committee that was integrated as a sub-committee of the DDC in 1995. This heralded the creation of local peace committees for violence reduction and security management, first in Northern Kenya and later countrywide.

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officials insist that it was not ‘voluntary’ rather ‘intelligence led’ disarmament. Through use of intelligence and community informers, homesteads with firearms are mapped, the area is condoned off and a thorough search is carried out and firearms are recovered. Firearms are a source of livelihood and “nobody will surrender their firearms voluntarily” a government official said. The community however, reported that firearms were surrendered voluntarily but they lament that it was done selectively thus exposing them to attacks from their neighbors who were not disarmed.

Arms management is a critical undertaking in prevention and control of the proliferation of SALW. More than 105 law enforcement officers in-charge of armories, camps or stations were trained on stockpile management, safe custody of arms and record keeping. The main objective was to strengthen the skills of law enforcement officers on arms control and management. This was because of the fact that government owned firearms were being used in criminal activities due to poor accountability mechanisms. For instance in Isiolo, it was clear that cattle rustling related conflicts escalated upon issuance of firearms to the Kenya Police Reservists (KPR). As a result of the training, cases of state-owned arms being used for criminal activities have not been recorded in the NCEWERT system.

Through KNFP facilitation, the government has signed, domesticated and implemented relevant international and regional protocols, declarations and guidelines on SALW. The National policy on SALW has been developed and is awaiting cabinet approval and subsequent legislative processes to be enacted into law.

However, KNFP which has been in existence for the last 8 years has not received any direct government budgetary allocation. This has in essence made it donor dependent impacting negatively on programs implementation. The enactment of the National policy on SALW will definitely facilitate direct government funding. Due to the slow enactment of the necessary laws and the resurgence of tribal clashes using lethal firearms, it can be concluded that this output was partially achieved.

Disaster risk reduction and livelihood recovery

Disasters and violent conflicts are among the two greatest threats to human development. It is therefore important that crisis prevention and recovery become cornerstones of any development work. Countries should manage conflict and disaster risks and be ready to rebuild for resilience once a crisis has happened. In order to ensure that development efforts are holistic in situations of fragility, elements of crisis prevention and timely recovery must be incorporated. This requires a focus on skills and capacities in national institutions and communities.

The Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Unit works with government and other stakeholders to find sustainable solutions to disaster impacts. The specific focus of the unit is to: support the country in developing a legal, policy and institutional framework that guides the country in Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery; support mainstreaming of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) into long term development
plans; implement projects that strengthen livelihoods, the recovery and resiliency of communities impacted by disasters and addressing the needs of vulnerable groups such as IDPs and communities hosting refugees.

There were three projects implemented during the period under review. These were the Refugee Host community project which later transitioned into the Disaster Recovery Project, the Post Election Violence Livelihoods Recovery project and the Disaster Management project of Kenya.

Table 5: Disaster Risk Reduction projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee host community project/Drought Recovery project</td>
<td>Turkana &amp; Garissa</td>
<td>MoNK&amp;AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEV Livelihoods Recovery project</td>
<td>Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldoret &amp; Kitale</td>
<td>MoSSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Management Project of Kenya</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>MoSSP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP annual report, 2010

**Policy formulation, adoption and implementation in Disaster Management**

Gaps in Disaster preparedness in Kenya have remained a challenge for decades. Surprisingly, the National Disaster Management Policy (NDMP) that was initially prepared in 1999 and revised by the Ministry of State for Special Programmes in September 2009, has not yet been presented to Cabinet for approval. As a result of this legislative gap, most emergency response initiatives have tended to be ad-hoc, short-term and mainly of emergency relief nature. The delay is largely attributed to continuous amendments being made to the draft policy to include new issues affecting the country, such as climate change, earthquakes and political violence.

Due to lack of a comprehensive disaster preparedness policy, response to disasters such as bombings, droughts, floods and epidemics tend to be slow, poorly coordinated and unnecessarily expensive. The Government has however, recognized the need to establish an institutional, policy and legal framework to effectively manage disaster risk and preparedness.

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13 Kenya Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), pg 164
At the state level, the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) was established and the NDM Policy along with the IDP Policy are being pushed. Additionally, the Contingencies and County Emergencies Act 2011 was enacted under the new constitution. At the UNDP level, there is a global commitment to double up the funding support for the DRR at the National levels based on UNDP Administrator commitment. Although the NDM policy is still in draft form as it were at baseline, progress has been made in other areas leading to establishment of NDMA, IDP draft policy and enactment of the Contingencies and County Emergencies Act 2011. This output therefore was partially achieved.

**Capacity enhancement:**
UNDP continuously supported Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP) with its work plan on Disaster Risk Management. Assistance was given to MoSSP by providing human resources to reinforce their capacity, and also provided technical and professional support during relevant trainings. In addition, UNDP allocated funds for the project activities to be carried out successfully. A National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategic Plan is being finalized for dissemination to the stakeholders.

The Government through the Ministry of State for Special Programmes with financial support from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiated a number of measures to prepare the country to adapt processes that mitigate against disasters. Among them were the development of National Risk Hazard Vulnerability and Capacity assessment and the equipping of the National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC) with 7 flat screens and increased bandwidth from Kenya Data Networks. This has upgraded NDOC control centre by enhancing their ability to receive urban disaster information and determine the response time. In addition, the disaster risk response coordination database system was developed and launched.
Disaster Risk Management in Kenya and Strengthening Early Recovery and Preparedness Coordination Mechanism in Kenya projects were implemented to enhance the capacities of the state and non-state actors. The aim of these projects was investing in people and reducing poverty and vulnerability - in particular regarding disaster management. Under these projects, three joint trainings on Disaster Risk Reduction & Early Recovery (DRR & ER) for government officials were carried out. The trainings were not only to inform and empower government officials (in Nairobi and two disaster prone areas: Garissa and Turkana), but also to ensure that DRR & ER components are included in policies and decision making.

Since the serious impact of repeated disasters has not been as well recognized as the immediate loss from disasters, the need to strategically address disaster risk reduction and early recovery was emphasized through strengthening the government’s institutional capacity in dealing with DRR and ER. At community level, beneficiaries are now more aware of the disasters and the impacts of their repetitiveness. With the Post Drought National Assessment (PDNA) results, more beneficiaries better understand the economic loss deriving from lack of preparedness. In addition, GOK has been bringing

**Disaster Risk Response Coordination Database System**

The Ministry of State for Special Programmes lacked a database that stores and manages data which was critical for disaster preparedness and mitigation planning. This greatly hampered the Ministries ability to reduce vulnerability levels.

The Ministry had for a long period of time stored data and generated reports manually. Their data was stored only on excel spread sheets and Microsoft word therefore limiting flexibility to generate useful relevant reports to decision makers.

Cybertech engineering a consultancy firm procured by the Government, through UNDP funding, developed a Disaster Risk Response Coordination Database System. The system is able to capture, analyze and manage disaster data. This database is web-based therefore accelerating public access over the website. It is able to collect post disaster impact data all over the country. It is able to generate reports immediately on demand.

The database has inbuilt intelligence and thus can update electronic data submitted at county level without having to carry out double entry at headquarters level. The information provided will include historical data, post disaster impact data and early warning information.
together institutions/organizations to celebrate the International Disaster Risk Reduction Day. This is to create awareness and empower communities with better understanding of DRR and also to equip them with practical knowledge. For instance an estimated 500,000 people in urban areas have been impacted through capacity building for fire responders whereas 200,000 people in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) have benefitted through humanitarian interventions linked to Early Recovery.

While new systems and institutions (e.g. NDMA) are constantly being created, relevant staff and expertise in the government structure still remain a challenge. Coordination among different institutions is another challenge to ensure sustainability. Apart from the human resource challenges, the existing institutional capacity is tailored towards a centralized system with a single hazard approach, yet with the new constitution coming into effect in 2013, this capacity ought to realign to the two centers of power - County and State. No efforts are being done to realize this.

As a sustainability strategy, DRR/ER specific TORs have been developed and made part of the performance contracting of government officials including capacity development. Also UNDP will continue to support areas with GoK funding gaps which are indentified as priority areas. Partners on the other hand are encouraged to mainstream and inbuilt DRR project needs in all the departments to ensure they are included/funded under the regular planning cycles. Lastly, Early Recovery (ER) is now a requirement to access humanitarian Emergency Response Fund (ERF) funding from UNDP.

Tremendous progress has been made on this output. However, it is lost to analysts why the NDM policy has never been enacted into law in a country that experiences cyclic disasters with increasing severity. For this reason, this output is rated partially achieved.

Coordination of Early Recovery

Early Recovery is an approach to humanitarian work that seeks to provide sustainability to humanitarian action, and provide a more fluid process between life-saving emergency relief and recovery / development. UNDP is responsible for leading early recovery globally through the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER). In Kenya, the Early Recovery Sector Working Group (ERSWG), co-chaired by UNDP and the Government of Kenya, performs the role of coordinating early recovery initiatives through humanitarian interventions. In response to the 2011 drought emergency, the Early Recovery Sector was re-established after a period of dormancy. It’s mandate is to coordinate national activities of more than thirty members (NGOs, UN agencies, and national institutions), and to advocate for early recovery approaches (leading to sustainable humanitarianism) to be integrated into the work of all humanitarian sectors and actors.

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The ERSWG has a standard weekly reporting format that captures need, response and gaps for all affiliate organizations. This weekly reporting is coordinated by OCHA. Other coordination activities include:

- Capacity building for humanitarian actors
- Coordination of Early Recovery Fund (ERF) which provides funding for NGOs and UN agencies projects (not exceeding six months) with rapid and flexible initial funding to meet unforeseen emergency needs of vulnerable communities
- Hosts a all-in-one survey of surveys database
- Coordinates a 3W excel sheet showing who is doing what where. This information is vital to identify organizational/sector capacity to scale or fill the gaps in certain areas.

The government of Kenya also has a ‘ministerial committee’ comprising of Ministry of Water, Public Health, Roads, Youth Affairs, MoSSP, Defense and Agriculture that coordinates emergency response and early recovery. Through this committee the government distributed food, tents and other basic needs in Turkana, Marsabit and Samburu using KDF trucks. In addition the committee responded in Gilgil during flash floods and is coordinating flood response in western Kenya.

Other achievements of the ministerial committee were the implementation of the short rains assessment, achievement of zero rated tax on food imports, construction of huge dams in semi-arid areas to be used for irrigation and watering of livestock, training on DRR at county level, hazard mapping, kazi kwa vijana project, community radio in local dialects, establishing of DRR clubs in schools, production of daily flood watch bulletins and capacity building for contingency planning for provincial administrators.

UNDP on its part, in collaboration with the Government, implemented recovery projects in Garissa and Turkana counties. The main objective of these projects was to reduce violent conflict and improve the living conditions of the targeted affected population, mitigate the severe effects of the cyclical droughts common in the host community areas through provision of basic social services and security, peace building and community skills in resource management; sustainable livelihoods and support to income generating activities. This was to ensure diffusion of tension between the refugees and the host communities and prevent possible escalation of violent conflicts.

The projects sought to reduce the impact and risk of drought (a major hazard in the country) through various interventions at the community level. Some of the activities under these projects were aimed at reducing conflict through peace building. To achieve this, local institutions e.g CBOs, administrative authorities were supported to ensure harmonious coexistence within the communities and across borders.

Through support of social economic sectors of food security, livelihoods, education, and water, communities were trained on appropriate technologies of food production, entrepreneurship and business skills, and sustainable management of assets like water pans, boreholes etc.
Other achievements included the establishment of 350 hectares of green belt for dryland farming (using trapezoidal circular buds), grass reseeding and fish farming. Through construction and drilling of shallow wells and boreholes, 5,500 and 40,000 community members gained access to safe water in Kakuma and Dadaab respectively. Six groups of reformed warriors were trained and provided with grants to start up income generating activities.

There were challenges including delays due to complex business processes on funds disbursement both in Government and UNDP. Similarly, adverse weather conditions caused by drought affected rain dependent activities while issues of insecurity hampered regular monitoring of activities.

Working through the GOK and integrating these activities into their mainstream activities ensured sustainability. In most ministries the activities are part of their performance contracts. The creation of a National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) by GOK, which is represented up to county level creates the requisite institutional capacity to ensure sustainability.

Observed impact of these interventions is better knowledge on technologies and business skills leading to more food availability and accessibility, reduced distances to water facilities, higher enrollment of school going children especially girls, peaceful coexistence among neighboring communities and creation of temporary employment for the youth.

According to Venton C.C et al (2012), adequate resources and capacity must be committed to building resilience. Short-term interventions with no provision for long-term operations and maintenance are unsustainable. Outcomes produced by these interventions should contribute to reducing the impact of a drought so that external humanitarian relief is reduced, less regularly required or ideally eliminated. Below is a summary of disaster resilience interventions.
Table 6: Recommended Disaster resilience Interventions (abridged).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Disaster resilience interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food/Cash transfers</td>
<td>Distribution systems privatized and local food commodities used whenever appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>Communities and districts active participation in EW/FSIS data collection and regular use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| WASH                 | Implementation of Regional/District water strategies: expansion of water pans, boreholes, shallow wells, bikads etc.  
                        | Drip feed irrigation schemes where appropriate.                                                   |
| Nutrition & Health   | Comprehensive coverage of facility-based and outreach health and nutrition services (including NIDs), stock out of medical and nutrition supplies. |
| Livestock            | Ongoing facilitation of livestock market facilities, market information systems and linkages with buyers.  
                        | Livestock insurance schemes.                                                                      |
| Education            | Expand provision of boarding schools for pastoralists (for girls and boys), teacher training and vocational and technical colleges. |
| Infrastructure       | Road construction, electrification, improved communication networks, expanded financial services etc |

Source: Economics of Early Response & Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia

Although there was tremendous progress towards achieving this output, it is important to re-focus more on integrated and long-term interventions that guarantee resilience for communities. This output is therefore rated partially achieved.

Livelihoods and Resilience Building:

This output contributes to the recovery and reintegration of PEV IDPs process through the restoration of livelihoods in affected areas. The output resonates with the draft IDP policy which provides for appropriate responses by government and other stakeholders to address the challenges faced by IDPs in line with the UN Guidelines on internal displacement. Similarly, the Medium Term Plan for the implementation of Vision 2030, identifies governance, peace building and conflict management as some of the strategies for the achievement of a competitive and prosperous nation. Short to medium-term
measures for restoration of security, peace and economic livelihoods are also contained in this Government plan.
Likewise, the draft National Disaster Management policy whose intention is to address disaster preparedness, mitigation, responses and recovery including early warning systems; adds credence to the relevance of this output to the government’s national priorities.

The Post Election Violence Livelihoods Recovery Project was developed to restore and expand livelihoods opportunities for communities that were intensely affected by the post election violence in 2007/2008. The Project supported livelihood recovery including the recovery of small businesses through provision of basic entrepreneurial knowledge, technical skills, capital and building resilience of populations affected by post election crisis. The project was being implemented through Ministry of State for Special Programmes with technical support from the line ministries’ of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, Trade, Public Works, Gender, Youth Affairs and Finance.

The overall objective of the project was to contribute to the post-election violence recovery and reintegration process through the restoration of livelihoods in affected areas.

At baseline it was stated that 92% of the youth in PEV affected areas have formal education but lack basic entrepreneurial skills. Consequently, they couldn’t engage in any gainful employment thus becoming easy target for gangs and militia groups. It was therefore vital to support the establishment of 4 District Business Solution Centres (DBSC) to provide entrepreneurship trainings to both the IDPs and affected communities in Nakuru, Eldoret, Kitale and Kisumu Counties. Through these DBSCs, 200 IDPs and additional 2085 youth have obtained technical training in entrepreneurship. Among them, 32 groups were trained and started on a revolving fund scheme. The fund is managed by ministry of trade and is meant to support individual businesses. The target was to reach at least 50% of unemployed youth within the affected areas with training in entrepreneurial skills by December 2010. Presumably the achievement made is far below the 50% mark but a comprehensive household survey needs to be carried out to ascertain the progress made.

The trainees have either set up or expanded their livelihoods activities which include poultry keeping, mushroom farming, rice farming, goat keeping, fish farming, bee keeping, green house farming, detergent and candle making, rabbit rearing as well as provision of ICT services by some youth groups. Some IDPs and youths have also formed self help groups to help mobilize resources to initiate income generating projects at group levels. 72 dairy cows were given to individual group farmers as Community Rotating Cow (CRC). CRC has proved to be quite successful that UNDP is supporting the farmers to procure a 3000 litre milk cooling plant in Eldoret.

The DBSCs are thriving under a board of management and are offering business advice to clients as well as managing a databank of available business opportunities.
A total of 1842 families benefitted with farm inputs and thus realized an improvement in their household food security, from the harvest they made. Families were able to get enough food for themselves while selling the surplus for income. Assuming a family size of 7, these families represent only 9%\(^\text{15}\) of the target community. This is a far cry from the target achievement of 50% that was set in the *Livelihood Recovery Project Initiation Document (PID)*. The youth who participated in the ‘tree for job’ short term employment, have initiated a poultry keeping project as a group. The ‘tree for job’ was a *Kazi Kwa Vijana* (KKV) initiative which saw over 733 youth plant about 134,988 trees in schools, recreational parks and other places for a fee. Similarly, several other youth are individually engaged in rabbit rearing, hairdressing salons and so on. The target was to have at least 40% youth access informal employment by December 2009. To ascertain this achievement was beyond the scope of this evaluation and a project evaluation needs to be carried out to establish progress towards this result.

Those who needed psycho-social counseling were taken through individual therapy to provide space for a one on one session with the counselors. Through Psycho-education, groups and individuals were equipped with life skills to enable them deal with daily life skill challenges, repressed feelings of anger and bitterness, post trauma stress disorder and ability to deal with the emerging psychological and emotional issues.

Through implementation of these output activities community infrastructure including markets, water dams and access roads were restored. The resultant impact is improved trade at the community level, skills development, job creation especially for the youth and diversified livelihoods opportunities including livestock re-stocking, agricultural activities, small businesses, fish farming and beekeeping among others.

Implementing through GOK - MOSSP and other line ministries - provided an existing structure and system through which sustainability could be guaranteed. To enhance the capacity of the beneficiaries, every activity was accompanied with a training component. Other sustainability measures taken by partner ministries were to integrate those activities into their regular plans. For example Ministry of Trade has incorporated DBSC into its regular plans. Groups on the other hand were assisted to register or sign agreements with various government departments to offer oversight in monitoring and reporting on their groups.

Despite livelihood and resilience building efforts being made by UNDP and partners, numerous other IDPs remain unsettled. Failure to resettle 255 families of IDPs from Rongai, Nakuru in Endebes, Kitale has been blamed on politicians. KNHRC in a statement in 2011 said “Under article 39 of our Constitution, all Kenyans, including IDPs, have the right to settle anywhere in the country. Statements made by leaders bordering on intolerance and incitement against Kenyans who are IDPs undermine the provisions of the Constitution and are a breach of existing law. We remind everyone, particularly our leaders; that statements that depict IDPs as ‘outsiders’ in certain places feed the same sentiments of

\(^{15}\) To calculate 9%; refer to Livelihood Recovery PID pg 12 for total target population which is 141,991. Assume each family has 7 members x 1842 = 12,894 beneficiaries. Divide 12,894 by 141,991 you obtain 9%. However, this requires verification through a household survey.
hate and intolerance that brought about their displacement in the first place. Under similar controversial circumstances, the Government was forced to shelve a planned resettlement of approximately 850 IDPs on Rose Farm in Mau Narok following resistance from the Maasai Community and local leaders. The local community said the land was their ancestral land and they would not allow ‘outsiders’ in the name of IDPs to be resettled there. On one hand these kinds of sentiments portray hate and intolerance. However, it was also clear that no substantive consultations with communities where IDPs were being resettled had been undertaken leading to such resistance and tension between these communities and IDPs. For instance the case of the Rose farm in Narok was hailed as victory for the District Peace committee who intervened and forced the government to rescind the resettlement. Had the government gone ahead with the resettlement, it would have been a recipe for conflict. Therefore whereas IDP resettlement rightly remains the government’s priority, it should be handled carefully to minimize on possible tribal hostilities.

This output is relevant to national priorities and the target beneficiaries. Efforts have also been made to initiate legislation and entrench recovery activities in government plans to ensure sustainability. However, progress towards achieving the set targets is behind schedule largely due to late commencement of activities. For this reason the output is rated partially achieved.

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16 Refer to www.irinews.org
Summary and conclusions

Table 7: summary of outcome/output rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Score:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced</td>
<td>Positive change</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy formulation, adoption and implementation</td>
<td>Partially achieved</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and women involvement in peace building and conflict prevention</td>
<td>Fully achieved</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation</td>
<td>Partially achieved</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community early warning system</td>
<td>Fully achieved</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of illicit SALW and reduced armed violence</td>
<td>Partially achieved</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy formulation, adoption and implementation in disaster management</td>
<td>Partially achieved</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity enhancement</td>
<td>Partially achieved</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of Early recovery</td>
<td>Partially achieved</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods and resilience building</td>
<td>Partially achieved</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average score</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.22 or 20/27 = 0.74 or 74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above analysis indicates that the degree to which progress towards the achievement of outcome 49 was made, without attribution to any partner is **Positive change**. This is impressive given the economic, social and political challenges Kenya underwent in the last five years. According to most respondents’
opinion, outcome 49 was 80% achieved. This sits well with the average score of 74% (2.22) as obtained from the above analysis.

**Contributing and Limiting Factors**

While discussing factors affecting the outcome, it is important to mention that contributing factors are pro-active opportunities to be seized whereas limiting factors are negative constraints to be removed.

**Contributing factors:**

1. **Availability of funds:** Following the eruption of the post-election violence, the international community response was quick and inspirational. This included prominent personalities like South African retired Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu, the then chairman of AU John Kufuor, retired presidents Chisano, Kaunda and Mkapa. This unfolding stream of dignitaries culminated in the arrival of the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. This apparent interest from the international community presented an opportunity for the government, CSOs and UNDP to solicit for sufficient funding to address the evolving scenario.

2. **Established systems of government/clear communication channels:** The strong government presence at the grassroots in form of the provincial administration facilitated quick establishment of DPCs. In some places DPCs were allocated office space by the provincial administration.

3. **Synergy among partners:** All the partners involved in conflict and peace were coordinated by the NSC. This created harmony and eliminated cases of duplication and wastage of resources. Effectively accelerating the achievement of the set outputs. In addition, the participating partners co-financed the projects either in cash or in-kind.

4. **Use of post modern technology:** Use of the internet made communication with collaborating partners faster and hustle free. The PfPS secretariat facilitated an interactive website where any partner would simply post their reports or surveys and these would be easily accessible by other partners.

5. **Political goodwill:** The political leadership was under immense scrutiny from the international community and the citizenry to deliver on the agenda 4 promise. The committee of eminent persons, the EU ambassadors’ caucus and the ICC process were putting pressure on the delivery of the promise towards restoration and institutionalization of peace structures.

17 USA is listed as one of the most influential groups towards peace in Kenya by ‘UWiano platform for peace, strategic leadership agenda for 2012 and beyond’, 2011 pg 15
6. **Communities are responsive:** Communities were saying “never again” shall we experience such a state of mayhem and despondency in our country. They were therefore ready to hang on anything that would guarantee peace and stability for future. Likewise in disaster districts, communities have experienced perennial food insecurity and are always ready to support initiatives that would alleviate their suffering.

7. **The needs were glaring:** In both the conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction, the needs were glaring. This attracted the government, CSOs and the UN agencies to channel their support towards peace building and livelihood recovery.

Limiting factors:

1. **The unpredictable weather:** In regard to disaster risk reduction, the unpredictable weather is a major hindrance to the attainment of the outcome. Whereas farmers do all they can to plant a crop, once the rains fail the expected output in terms of improved food security cannot be realized. This is made worse when the drought is prolonged like in the year 2011. The severity of the drought causes even the reservoirs like water pans and boreholes to dry up. In this case livelihood alternatives like micro-irrigation and dryland farming cannot be sustained. The drought situation unfortunately ignites conflict due to huge movements of populations and livestock.

2. **Hate speech:** Hate speech and negative ethnicity were invariably blamed for the 2007/08 post-election violence. Yet, hate speech continues unabated on FM radios, vernacular music and public rallies. A few politicians have been arraigned in court but eventually set free for lack of evidence. Although NCIC has assigned gadgets\(^{18}\) to the police officers to record hate speech, these efforts are yet to bear fruit in terms of taming hate speech.

   According to the NCIC annual report, hate speech and ethnic discrimination are the leading complaints received at the secretariat. It is feared that this will get worse as the country moves closer to the next general elections.

3. **Mistrust among communities and the government:** Communities that have been hostile to each other for generations will usually remain suspicious of each other. That’s why when programs like voluntary disarmament or peace agreements are implemented they will not cooperate fully. For example the Samburu declined to sign the Modogashe declaration claiming that it favors Muslims whereas in Isiolo, the voluntary disarmament has been vilified as favouring some communities.

4. **UNDP/GOK slow Business processes:** Whereas UNDP’s strategy of working with partners is laudable, procedures of fund disbursement and other internal business processes are slow. Most partners complained that they consistently received their funding from UNDP late. Even

\(^{18}\) The Standard Newspaper, 28\(^{th}\) July 2012
after raising this matter with relevant officers from both UNDP and NSC, the issue has not improved. This was collaborated by UNDP staff who lamented about “lengthy procurement processes within UNDP/GOK and delayed disbursement of funds. This particularly affected agricultural activities which are tied to seasons”. An attempt to explain this was made that there is a disconnect between the UNDP’s fiscal year and the GoK’s fiscal year. Whereas UNDP follows the calendar year, the government’s fiscal year begins in July and ends in June. Consequently, by the time UNDP releases funds to the government at around April/May, the government is closing their books and won’t receive any funds. As a result this funding is factored in the government’s subsequent fiscal year which starts in July. Due to several logistical delays, the funding that should have reached partners early in the calendar year is finally received by September onwards. Regrettably, one key informant remarked, “what is supposed to be quarterly funding has become annual”. A solution ought to be worked out to resolve this discrepancy and at the minimal the partners and peace monitors should be adequately informed of the expected funding delay.

5. **Cultural barriers against women**: Women and other vulnerable groups like children, youth and the disabled suffer disproportionately the consequences of conflicts and disaster. It has been demonstrated that women invariably have access to resources, power and decision making before, during and after conflict. However, due to cultural stereo-types, women are rendered powerless in conflict prevention mechanisms let alone sitting on the negotiating table during times of conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. In effect, their contribution to conflict prevention and resolution is not felt.

6. **Lack of legislation**: Crucial legislations that are meant to boost this outcome have not been enacted. These include the National Policy on Conflict and Peace Building, National Policy on Disaster Management, National Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the IDP policy. All these policies are still awaiting the cabinet approval. A writer in the Standard newspaper summed it up thus “It is lamentable that the National Policy on Conflict and Peace Building, drafted five years ago has not been adopted despite its great significance especially taking note that the nation is still divided along ethnic lines that triggered the post election violence”.  

7. **The Monitoring and Evaluation function**: UNDP’s efforts to promote Results Based Management are not yet fully felt in UNDP Kenya. Indicators, baselines and targets in the CPAP results framework are not effectively used by UNDP and national partners for monitoring and reporting on progress towards the outcomes. This can be attributed to the lack of an indicator tracking system which results in lack of cumulative figures to show progress towards attainment of the outcome.

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**UNDP Contribution**

UNDP is engaged with the Government of Kenya and civil society partners to sustain the momentum from the peaceful referendum and support a national dialogue on the way forward through elevation of the Uwiano Platform as a vessel for national conversations over differences on the constitution and other matters of national importance.

Support has also been provided to the enhancement of local level coordination and capacity for rapid response, which includes strengthening the capacities of District Peace Committees as well as the operational relationship with the police, as part of an effective national early warning and response mechanism. These interventions are all part of a broader strategic framework that holistically addresses peace building and conflict management in Kenya.

UNDP funded the establishment of an elaborate early warning and response system called amanikenya@108 in 2010 shortly before the referendum on the constitution. amanikenya@108 is a public platform that engages Kenyans in adding their voice to peace building efforts at local and national level. The platform integrates the use of SMS, Incident Reports and Media reports to help strengthen peace and conflict prevention efforts in Kenya. This system uses these various components of reporting to encourage and coordinate peace efforts in Kenya.

UNDP through the Disaster Risk Management project provided assistance to Government to develop relevant policy documents. These activities included formulation of a Disaster Risk Reduction National Strategy and plan of action, lobbying for the National Disaster Management Draft Policy to be enacted into law, formulation of necessary monitoring & evaluation tools and programmes for disaster risk reduction taking into account international and national frameworks such as the Hyogo Framework, Africa DRR strategy and Kenya draft policy for DRR. The Project also sought to explore opportunities for external support through cost-sharing funding and facilitating fund raising efforts through collaboration with bilateral donors and NGOs.

UNDP constitutes project executive groups (PEG) for each project whose mandate is to provide overall project oversight and review progress as well as manage any amendments required to ensure smooth running of the projects. The PEG meetings are consultative, roping in partners and government representatives. It is evident that key partners are consulted and coordinated. However, PEG discussions are limited to the ‘attainment of projects’ outputs’20.

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20 Joint Host community project Annual report, 2010.
Partnership strategy

Partnership strategy was evaluated under three components namely:

- Design of partnerships
- Formation of partnerships and
- Implementation of partnerships

**Design of partnerships:** UNDP utilized multiple strategies for implementing interventions and managing projects. These included strengthening partnerships with CSOs, public sector and private sector; advocacy and communication for effective stakeholder engagement and participation in policy dialogue; research and dissemination of best practices and lessons learned; promotion of south to south cooperation through exchange programmes.

Other strategies were engaging women, youth, local leaders and persons with disabilities. Further, UNDP expanded its volunteerism programme at local community level to gain a competitive edge in reaching out to communities.

The main strategic partner in this partnership was the Government of Kenya. The government executed this partnership through the NSC as the main implementing agency with other partners serving as implementing partners (IP). PfPS on its part, other than being an implementing partner, also coordinated partnerships with other CSOs.

**Formation of partnerships:** NSC provided overall leadership, coordination and harmonization of partnership strategy and programme implementation. It provided in-kind resources like office space and technical expertise at both national and local levels. In addition, financial assistance received from donors/UNDP were channeled through NSC to the implementing partners on a quarterly basis. However, this was not strictly observed as seen from the evidence gathered from partners’ interviews.

Implementing partners on their part contributed physical office space, salaries for programme staff, office stationery, office equipment and motor vehicles. The key implementing partners were: KNFP, NCIC, MOYAS, ARLMP, MYWO, PfPS, SRIC, and Picha Mtaani. Others were MoSSP, MNK&L and Peacenet Kenya.

**Implementation of partnerships:** This partnership arrangement yielded many results. Duplication of efforts was eliminated. For example in Turkana District, Oxfam and World Vision used to run parallel DPCs. However, with the introduction of the partnership strategy, a harmonized DPC was formed and synergies harnessed. Through CSOs, it was possible to reach out to the ultra-poor and the most disadvantaged groups in society and offer valuable community mobilizing and community level

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21 Refer to CPAP pg 45.
interventions. This also facilitated provision of in-kind resources from the government, UNDP and CSOs for the establishment of sustainability structures. For instance, CSOs through PfPS secretariat, shared one website that posted best practices and assessments done by various CSOs thus avoiding the need to repeat studies whose results were already available. On its part, UNCT harnessed the highest level of technical expertise drawing from UN agencies, provided capacity building through volunteerism under the UNV modality, reduced transaction costs through cost-sharing and fostered South-South experiences through capturing and sharing best practices and exchange visits. This partnership enabled state and non-state actors to work together. Regular joint monitoring and evaluation meetings were held under the auspices of key ministries whereas joint programmes were implemented with support from the government and UNDP.

The Conflict Early Warning Early Response System (CEWERS) was launched in partnership with UWIANO. The system was necessary to provide an effective and efficient way of collecting, verifying and analyzing data in a systematic way and disseminating the same to government and national actors for response. With time CEWERS has evolved into a robust system that gathers information from diverse sources to inform response. In addition, the establishment of DTFs has brought an improvement in SALW collection, storage and disposal. There has been an increase in the number of illicit arms recovered and surrendered to the government through improved collaboration and cooperation between DTFs, DPCs, and government structures.

Progress made towards the outcome was possible due to the partnerships. UNDP lacks grassroots structures and so it relied on the government machinery for implementation of all its programmes. Soft assistance was provided in drafting and lobbying for policy legislation. However, there was insufficient advocacy to fast-track the enactment of these policies into law. On top of that, joint evaluations were not carried out as would have been expected. Nevertheless, numerous publications were produced based on joint assessments and research.

**Recommendations**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programme Coherence:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation for next programme cycle:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The outcome and output statements in key documents such as the CPAP, Strategic Framework and the UNDAF are not consistent and create an impression of lack of coordination in developing the various documents.</td>
<td>Ensure consistency in formulating outcomes, outputs and indicators. To achieve this UNDP Kenya should implement UNDP’s two-way results framework&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt; that build on the top-down and bottom-up planning process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring and Evaluation Function:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation for current and future programmes:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators, baselines and targets in the CPAP/CPD results framework are not effectively used by UNDP and national partners for monitoring and reporting of outcomes. This can be attributed to lack of a comprehensive indicator tracking system.</td>
<td>In order to harmonize and utilize information in the key documents, there is need to develop an M&amp;E e-database where all data regarding outcomes, outputs, indicators, baselines and targets are uploaded online and are accessible to everyone involved in programme monitoring.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity Building:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation for current and next programme cycle:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity building for DPCs was centered on material support such as office equipment, badges and uniforms, trainings, transfer of knowledge and sharing experiences. Although trainings and knowledge transfer has been achieved considerably, a lot still needs to be done on material support.</td>
<td>DPC members need to be provided with uniforms and security marked badges for identification. This will help apprehend unscrupulous people masquerading as DPC members from harassing innocent <em>wananchi</em>. In addition, it will help DPC members earn recognition and respect in the community.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Resource Mobilization:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation for current programme:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>DPCs are operating without any definitive funding from the government or donor agencies. In most cases they are left to seek funds for themselves. Which is a tall order given their capacity. Besides, the funding expected from NSC is embroiled in</td>
<td>Discussions should be held between UNDP and government ministry partners to agree on a cash disbursement framework and generate a service level agreement to facilitate speedy transfer of funds between UNDP, government and field</td>
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<sup>22</sup> Refer to ‘Results Based Management, Concepts and methodology’. Pg 9
unwinding bureaucracy and is always received late or not at all.

Recommendation for next cycle of programme:

Resource mobilization and donor linkages should be an integral part of trainings for all DPCs and other county and district level structures.

Enactment of national policies:
The enactment of national policies has been extremely slow. On the one hand, this has allowed for garnering of support from senior government officers and cabinet ministers and also resulted in a most extensively interrogated document right from the grassroots to the national level. On the other hand, the slow pace has raised doubts on the commitment of the government to enact these crucial policies.

Recommendations for current and next programme cycle:

Enactment of national policies should be of high priority in the current and next programming cycle. Concerted and high level lobbying by UNDP is needed to fast track the enactment of the pending national policies.. For example further funding to support DPCs could be pegged on the enactment of the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention.

Hate speech:
According to the NCIC annual report, hate speech and ethnic discrimination are the leading complaints received at the secretariat. It is feared that this will get worse as the country moves closer to the next general elections.

Recommendation for current and next programme cycle:

Intensive civic education needs to be carried out before the next parliamentary and presidential elections. This will help people understand their rights and freedoms and not be deceived by politicians into hostilities.

Police and NCIC should be on high alert to monitor hate speech ahead of the next elections and mete out stiffer penalties to those found guilty.

Proliferation of SALWs:
Whereas voluntary disarmament has yielded much, there is still a huge amount of illicit SALWs with the public. The result is sporadic violent conflicts especially in the pastoral communities.

Recommendation for next programme cycle:

Promote alternative livelihood programmes in the ASALs and increase the presence of government officers including security agents in the perennial hotspots. Secondly, legitimize both traditional and modern surveillance and early warning mechanisms and enforce decisions made by alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. For example the Modogashe declaration has faced
challenges due to inability to enforce decisions made against offenders.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Disaster risk Reduction and livelihood recovery:</th>
<th>Recommendation for next programme cycle:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Much effort has been spent towards developing alternative livelihoods for pastoral communities. These have included crop farming through micro-irrigation and dryland farming. This concept raises questions of sustainability due to salination in the long run and inability to endure prolonged drought like the one experienced in 2011 (being the worst in 60 years).</td>
<td>Promote long-term livestock related layering(^2) programming for livestock value chain inclusiveness, rangeland management and community based disaster management.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Devolved government structures:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity to handle devolved structures at county level is definitely going to be a challenge once the constitution is implemented in 2013.</td>
<td>There is need to partner with NGOs and CBOs for wider reach and improved service delivery as well as to fill the government’s capacity gap.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Historical injustices:</th>
<th>To ensure that returns are sustainable, the underlying causes of conflict such as land distribution and inequities must be addressed through restitution and legislation.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts in Kenya are a manifestation of deep seated historical injustices that must be addressed.</td>
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**Lessons learnt: Best practices from outside the country and within**

\(^2\) Layering strategy targets same beneficiaries for a prolonged period of time and allows a process of graduation from food assistance to resilience building and economic growth. It requires that implementing partners collaborate so that targeted beneficiaries remain the same as per the previous intervention. It’s like a baton passing relay.
**Modogashe Declaration – Kenya**

**Background:**
The Modogashe Declaration is one of the most successful community peace agreement that has largely contributed to a reduction of conflicts mainly in North Eastern and Upper Eastern Kenya. It was endorsed in 2001 by select communities in North Eastern, Upper Eastern and Coast Provinces. It was then recommended that the revalidation of the Declaration be conducted after every 2 years with a view to continually ensure its relevance.

**Documentation of Peace Processes: Lessons Learnt**
1. Agreement should always be written and the signature of the representatives should be appended on the documents.
2. The successful enforcement of community peace pacts depends on the inclusivity of a wide range of actors.
3. Often times, there arise inconsistencies in enforcement of the agreements. This calls for review and revalidation to be in tandem with peace and conflict dynamics and trends.
4. There is need to give the declarations a neutral name that is representative of the whole region. Communities misunderstand the meaning of the declaration when the title is that of a particular area like Modogashe or Garissa.

**Notable Community Peace Agreements**
- Mohamed Subay-Auliyahan Account, 1998
- Auliyahan-Abdwak Accord, April 2000
- Garre-Ajuran Peace Agreement, 2001
- Abdalle-Maqabul Peace Agreement, 2003
- Borana-Garre Agreement of 2008
- Garre-Degodia Banissa Agreement, 2010
- Al Fatah Declaration, 1993
- Modogashe Declaration (Modogashe, 2001; Garrisa 2005; Garrisa 2011)
- Abdwak-Abdalla Accord of October 2010
- Lokiriama Peace Pact (Turkana-Matheniko) 1971
- Maikona/Walda Peace Declaration, 2009

**Strategies And Programs For Addressing Crime In Chicago**

**Introduction**
Most strategies aimed at addressing crime in Chicago are funded by both the Federal and State governments. Over the years, the City has implemented violence prevention or suppression with varying levels of success. Among these are the following:

**Strategies and Programmes**

Numerous strategies and programmes have been put in place to address the problem of organised crime in Chicago as discussed in this section.

**1. Chicago Project for Violence Prevention**

This project was conceived in 1995 with a view to:

a) Work with community and government partners to reduce violence in all forms
b) Help design interventions required to better define what should be included in a community or city anti-violence plan.

The project takes a strategic public health approach to violence prevention. This approach has been employed to address and reduce other serious health threats, such as child mortality, heart disease, HIV/AIDS, smallpox, and polio. It includes a full commitment to a specific objective (in this case stopping shootings), the setting of long-term and short-term goals, strategy development based on best practices and adapted to the local situation by local practitioners, and a management structure that works at both the community and city/county levels. The public health approach relies heavily on public education to change attitudes and behaviors toward violence, outreach using individuals recruited from the target population, community involvement to change norms, and evaluation methods to monitor strategy.

The Chicago Project has formed partnerships with community-based organizations to develop comprehensive strategic plans for reducing violence. An Advisory Board and Steering Committee, comprising criminal justice, health, religious, and civic leaders, provide support for strategy development and leverage city and county resources for the project and its partners.

The project is supported by private foundation grants and with local, state, and federal funds. The project is housed at the School of Public Health at the University of Illinois Chicago. To accomplish its mission of preventing violence, the Chicago Project initially developed a plan and built an organizational structure to provide technical assistance and support for a comprehensive and community-based effort to reduce and prevent violence.

Eventually, through discussions with community partners, crime experts, and representatives from a cross-section of government agencies, the Chicago Project’s steering committee developed an 8-Point Plan for reducing violence, dubbed CEASEFIRE, which was launched in 2000.

CeaseFire was adapted from the best violence reduction work of several cities—notably Boston, which had extraordinary successes in the 1990s—and the best research of public health of the last several decades. After reviewing gang violence reduction projects initiated and evaluated by the US Department
of Justice and lessons emerging from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods and mindful of the public health approach discussed earlier, the Chicago Project added the community and public education components to its violence reduction initiative.

2. **CeaseFire Program**

CeaseFire program is the first initiative of the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention. It works with community-based organizations to develop and implement strategies to reduce and prevent violence, particularly shootings and killings. CeaseFire relies on outreach workers, faith leaders, and other community leaders to intervene in conflict, or potential conflicts, and promote alternatives to violence. CeaseFire also involves cooperation with police and it depends heavily on a strong public education campaign to instill in people the message that shooting and violence are not acceptable. Finally, it calls for the strengthening of communities so they have the capacity to exercise informal social control and respond to issues that affect them.

CeaseFire is a mix of five key components:

- Community mobilization
- Youth outreach
- Public education
- Faith-based leader involvement
- Criminal justice participation
- Conflict Mediation

3. **Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS)**

This has been implemented for the last 17 years. It is based on active partnerships between the police residents, and municipal entities. The City of Chicago has 25 Police Districts, 280 Police Beats and 13,000 police officers. Both the Police and the residents identify crime and develop response options. Besides the police providing security services, they also complement the provision of other services including fixing of street lights, opening up of trenches, pruning of overgrown trees etc.

4. **Crime Mapping, Monitoring and Response:**

Through the Crime Prevention and Information Center (Fusion Center), the Police Department undertakes crime monitoring and response. The cameras, computers and videos are able to report crime real time on a 24 hour basis, with agencies such as FBI, CIA and others as networking closely to avert crime. The ‘hot line’ as well as the SMS Systems are used widely to enable the public report crime. At the District level are District Advisory Committees with composition from a wide range of stakeholders who conduct crime mapping and reporting. The Committees have thematic Sub-Committees to address topical issues that create disorder such as domestic violence, drug and substance abuse. The Committees meet regularly, 3-4 times a month. According to the State Attorney’s office in Chicago, homicides reduced from 600 in 2003 to 450 in 2004 due to this strategy.
5. **Action-oriented research in partnership with the academia**

Working together with the academia has been very useful in providing information on organised crime. Universities are often conducted to carry out research and other intervention studies that are then disseminated widely. Such studies also inform the strategies for intervention and prevention.

6. **Parole programs**

These are also implemented jointly with the Police Department, the State’s Attorney, Prison Authorities, Safer Foundation among others. Such programmes involve public sensitization meetings on the dangers of engaging in crime, drug abuse etc. through such meetings, the top gangs are often named and warned of dire consequences as part of deterrence. Sometimes, reformed gangs are also engaged to talk to the public under the ‘In My Shoes’ Programme whereas ex-inmates are also engaged to talk about their personal experiences and the effects of prison life under the ‘Choices and Decision’ Programme.

7. **Gang-Intervention (GI) Program**

This is being implemented by the DFSS Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). It focuses on awareness, intervention and prevention for gang-affiliation to over 50 youth and their families. The approach is through offering education, employment and leadership opportunities to the youth.

8. **Balanced and Restorative Justice vis-à-vis criminal justice**

In what is known as the ‘case management system’, the Juvenile Intervention and Support (JISC) that was established in March 2006 employs early intervention and the application of graduated sanctions for repeat offenders. The Chicago Police Department, in conjunction with the Chicago Department of Children and Youth Services and a coalition of juvenile justice system partners and other stakeholders are piloting this in 6 Districts. The model is designed to prevent recidivism by processing cases of offenders and determining whether to refer them to court or handle them through balanced and restorative justice. Restorative justice is used theoretically in schools through learning. Practically, it is used through community engagement where community members are urged to take responsibility for community healing. In this case, community sessions including peer jury are conducted where both the offender and the victim are brought together to interact. Community trained volunteers are engaged as Victim/Offender conferencing facilitators in an effort to repair broken relationships. Statistics indicate that putting a juvenile through a one year programme costs a paltry $1,500 while incarceration of the juvenile would cost a whooping $70,000.

9. **Chicago Public Schools Violence Prevention Initiative**
Violence erupts daily at the end of the school day in dozens of elementary and high schools in Chicago. This is an initiative that targets all public schools. In partnership with the Police, residents and all stakeholders, the initiative entails provision piece meal conflict prevention, management and resolution skills and knowledge in the school’s curriculum. It also entails provision of physical safe passage to pupils to enable them go through their education. Parents physically come out to line up along the pathways to schools in the morning and evening in an effort to provide safe passage for the children on their way to and from school. In some instances, CSOs and FBOs hire community watch workers to provide safety and security for the children. There are over 500 of such workers.

10. Summer Jobs Program

The City of Chicago has an active Summer Jobs Programme for the youth. It provides opportunities for those who have lost jobs, and those seeking employment. Together with this is the Re-Entry Programme that targets ex-convicts or ex-prisoners, who would otherwise be in competition with all the others on the job market.

11. Chicago Safe Start program

It works by preventing violence across the lifespan of a child and reduce its negative impacts when it occurs. The programme believes that exposure to violence at the home and or community can change the life of a child forever. Hence, focus is on primary prevention – preventing violence from its happening by increasing awareness, identifying alternatives, responding early, surrounding children with protection, supporting parents and caregivers, strengthening community connections and working towards a culture of peace and justice.

12. Social Service program

With funding from both Federal and State Government and other Foundations, this is mainly implemented by the St. Sabina Faith and Community Center. The Center attempts to provide stability in an environment permeated with insecurity, unemployment; absentee landlordism; confinement and limited community interaction. It has several programmes ranging from devotionary to food stuffs, clothing, emergency shelter, employment training and placement, leadership training, and sporting activities.


One of the most fundamental pieces of organized crime legislation is the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organized Act (RICO), prosecutors may charge anyone who is both a member of an enterprise and who has demonstrated a pattern of criminal behavior with “racketeering.” Each racketeering conviction can result in a 20-year prison sentence and a $250,000 fine. Regarding the ownership of illicit SALW, the passing of the Unlawful Use of a Weapon by a Gang Member Bill into law provides for a minimum of 1 year jail sentence for possession on an illicit firearm.
The development of this Strategic Plan took cognizance of the landscape of conflicts and the dynamics of peace building and conflict prevention initiatives in Kenya over the past fifty years. From this experience, major lessons have been reflected upon, analyzed, and documented including:

1. Available Early warning systems in Kenya are partially effective since they focus only on the triggers of violence and do not mitigate against systematic causes that require social justice initiatives. In some cases, the warning may come when the conflict has degenerated into violence.

2. Police and security-based approaches continue to receive undue emphasis in situations of violent conflict. Evidence shows that a more integrated approach, anchored in diplomacy and social justice concerns is more sustainable. The role of women as key actors is essential for effective implementation of conflict management activities.

3. There is a critical need for approaches that ensure that externally driven peacebuilding initiatives can continue even after support ceases. The absence of such approaches is responsible for the cycle of violence that has characterized communities, especially those living in Eastern and Northern Kenya. Similarly, over-emphasis on a hurried exit strategy can be counter-productive unless local ownership and capacity is strengthened from the on-set.

4. Peacebuilding and conflict management should be context-specific and involve all stakeholders. Community participation and ownership in the peacebuilding process is essential for success of such initiatives as disarmament etc.

5. Sustainable peace building requires a measure of constructive engagement between civil society and government. There two should explore areas of cooperation rather than perceive each other as rivals.

6. Many of the potent “feeders” of violent conflict are normally external to the affected communities. Essentially, this requires sustainable peace building initiatives to embrace strong capacity for monitoring. Analysis and advocacy.

7. The nature of media coverage and analysis is critical to the outcome of peace initiatives. In most conflicts, hate media campaigns have been responsible for triggering violence. On the other hand, strategic use of media by peace actors has been instrumental in securing sustainable peace initiatives.

8. Peace building initiatives are most successful when they run concurrently with nation building and fundamental structural, constitutional, institutional, and economic reforms.

9. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have proven effective in managing community level conflicts, particularly when the state recognizes and supports them. In cases where their application has the potential to guarantee peace, they have been used to resolve disputes instead of formal judicial processes. Similarly, where peace committees have been deployed and backed by technical support, peace initiatives have been more successful.
Community Rotating Cow (Best Practice)

In order to support livestock restocking in the PEV affected areas, a concept was jointly developed by Ministries of Livestock and Special Programmes. The concept proposed the principle of Community Rotating Cow (CRC). In this concept, in-calf heifers are distributed to identified beneficiaries who are part of an organized group. The beneficiary would then pass on the offspring when the cow calves down. An assessment was conducted in the 4 (Nakuru, Kisumu, Kitale & Eldoret) districts to identify beneficiaries for restocking and their training needs. 48 beneficiaries were identified and have so far been taken through refresher training on animal husbandry. Procurement of the animals is in process and distribution is scheduled before the close of the year. In order to minimize loses and hence ensure sustainability of this component, a cow insurance cover was provided by the project for the first year after distribution. Beneficiaries were then to seek for further insurance individually in the subsequent years. An affordable premium rate was negotiated by the project on behalf of the beneficiaries.

Fig 3: Beneficiaries of the CRC project receiving cows

Source: PEV Annual Report, 2011

Given the attachment the beneficiary communities have to cows, the concept of ‘rotating cow’ (passing over the calf) is helping to restore closer ties for peaceful coexistence. The concept encourages members of the group from one ethnic community to pass over the calf to another member from a different ethnic community. The farmers are also benefiting from the milk they get from the cows.
The project has also noted an increase in the number of IDPs who are joining and those wishing to join the current groups given the benefits they associate with this project. In Uasin Gishu county 5 cows from last year’s distribution calved and the calves were handed over to the next line of beneficiaries after weaning.

Fig 4: A second level beneficiary receiving a calf

Source: PEV Annual Report 2011

With the availability and consumption of milk, nutrition at the household level especially for children has improved. Household income from the sale of surplus milk has also improved and some households have acknowledged using the milk sale proceeds to pay school fees for their children.

To support the dairy farming initiative the project is in the process of procuring a 3,000 liters capacity milk cooling plant for the farmers. Tenders were floated and awarded to a supplier. Ministry of livestock is implementing this activity and is also providing technical support to the beneficiaries including on-farm training on dairy cattle management.
Annexes

Annex I: References


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1. Background Information

The growing demand for development effectiveness is largely based on the realization that producing good “deliverables” is simply not enough. The relevance of efficient or well-managed development projects and outcomes is their ability to yield discernible improvements in development conditions and ultimately in people lives. Being a key international development agency, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been focusing on achieving clearly defined results. This has been pursued in recent times through results-based management (RBM) approach.

As part of its efforts in enhancing RBM, UNDP has shifted from traditional activity-based project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to results-oriented M&E. An outcome evaluation assesses how and why an outcome is or is not being achieved in a given country context, within a time frame and the role UNDP and other partners have played in this regard. Outcome evaluations also help to clarify underlying factors affecting the situation, highlight unintended consequences (positive and negative), generate lessons learned and recommend actions to improve performance in future programming.

Brief National Context Related to the Outcome

Peace building and conflict prevention in Kenya

Although generally regarded as a stable and peaceful country a midst a troubled region, Kenya has in the past and in recent times experienced violent conflicts, some of which, are regarded as low level and intermittent while others can be classified as high intensity. The low level and often incessant conflicts are driven by competition for scarce natural resources like pasture and water for livestock, arable land, cattle and generally diminishing territories amongst the local communities mainly based in rural areas.
Conflicts within the urban settlements and populations are driven by factors such as the proliferation of informal settlements due to rapid rural-urban migration, unemployed youth turning into criminals, extortionist rings, armed gangs and militia and scarcity of housing and basic social amenities.

On the other hand, high intensity violent conflicts are related to ethnic-based political competition for state control and public resources. These types of conflicts largely follow the 5 years electoral cycles and have been previously witnessed in 1991/2, 1997/8 and recently during the 2007/8 cycle. In some instances, these conflicts have also tended to be exacerbated by additional factors, such as: poor leadership based on ethnicity and polarization; a culture of bad governance and paying lip service to the rule of law over the years; the erosion of existing mechanisms for local conflict management; long-standing land and identity disputes having acquired ethnic or clan dimensions; and the lack of mechanisms for political and social dialogue among various interest groups and communities, especially with regard to perceptions of exclusion or marginalization. Violent conflicts generally do assume the inter-communal dimensions with armed gangs and militia from different communities and identities fighting against each other.

The effects of the conflicts in Kenya include: a divided and polarized society along ethnic and regional identities as opposed to shared national identities, common values and aspirations; exclusion and marginalisation of certain sections of society from state governance and economic development especially ethnic minorities, women and the youth; slow economic growth and opportunities for meaningful employment of large sections of the population especially the youth standing at 75% of the total population; proliferations of armed gangs and militia comprising mainly of the unemployed and disenfranchised youth who have contributed significantly to armed violence and crime; the conflicts along Kenya’s highly porous and unprotected boarders with neighbouring countries like Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda have also contributed largely to the internal conflicts and crime within Kenya due to availability of illicit SALW; and in 2007/8, in the aftermath of the hotly disputed presidential elections, Kenya was plunged into violent conflict and anarchy which again manifested in the form of inter-ethnic struggle for state control and power. The violence left nearly 1,300 people dead, over 500,000 internally displaced and reversed economic growth from 7% in 2007 to nearly 1% in 2008.

However, over the years, there have been various attempts to address some of the conflicts in Kenya especially those related to natural resources in northern Kenya. The establishment of the District Peace Committees (DPCs) in northern Kenya provided impetus to community based conflict resolution. In the recent past and in the aftermath of post elections violence in 2008, the electoral / political dispute was also mediated with the participation of international community and local actors. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process that was facilitated by a panel of African eminent personalities including the former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan provided an opportunity to Kenya not only for immediate short term conflict resolution but also set conditions or agenda for long term policy, legal and institutional reforms that would ensure a stable, peaceful and prosperous nation.

Based on this background UNDP takes a three pronged approach to conflict prevention: Conflict-Sensitive Development Programming, National Capacities for Conflict Management, Building Consensus Through Dialogue, Special Initiatives i.e. Youth Programming in Conflict Prevention and Recovery, Gender in Conflict Situations. The UNDP wok in conflict prevention and peace building is within the thematic practice are of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR).
Disaster risk reduction in Kenya

Kenya is highly vulnerable to natural disasters mostly drought and floods. Other hazards include landslides, environmental degradation, technological disasters, HIV and AIDS, disease epidemics and epizootics, and conflict, among others. Over time, disaster events have increased in number, frequency, complexity and impact. Drought impacts have worsened in the past 10 years, affecting an estimated 4.5 million people annually. The most serious drought in 2008/9 disrupted the lives of 10 million people in pastoral/agro-pastoral areas and informal urban settlements. Over 20% of the livestock population was decimated and a surge in natural resource-based conflicts ensued. Similarly, floods though more geographically limited, are becoming increasingly frequent and severe. On an annual basis, some Ksh. 49 million in damages and 37 million Ksh. in humanitarian action are incurred in Nyanza Province alone as a result of floods (World Bank 2004).

Threats from natural hazards, combined with high population growth, isolated chronic insecurity and unplanned urbanization threaten to undermine Kenya’s development. Climate change is apt to amplify disaster losses and related humanitarian outlays in Kenya. In its fourth assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns of an increase in the incidence and intensity of drought and floods. According to the report, Africa is the continent most vulnerable to climate change because of the interactions among multiple stresses at different levels and low adaptive capacities.

Recurrent disasters in Kenya have caused severe food shortages and eroded the effectiveness of the livelihood systems of the poor. Disasters have resulted in secondary effects that hinder the prospects of full, sustainable recovery, especially when exacerbated by stresses such as HIV and AIDS, insecurity and widespread poverty. With every disaster, many poor households lose shelter, crops, food, income opportunities, household items, productive assets and are also at risk of communicable diseases brought by disasters.

Despite recurrent natural and human-induced hazards in Kenya, disaster management remains largely reactive, with weak coordination mechanisms, high levels of vulnerable populations and inadequate capacity to monitor and assess disaster risks. As a result, the country loses billions of shillings in damages and spends more on emergency response, resources that would otherwise be spent on development.

Attempts have been made by the government and other actors to address disaster risk reduction in the country. These include establishment of a dedicated Ministry to coordinate disaster risk reduction and emergency response. Other institutions formed include National Disaster Operation Centres (NDOC) and the Crisis Response Centre among others. At the local level Disaster Management Committees have been formed to facilitate local level disaster management.

UNDP support the government and works with other stakeholders to ensure that disaster impacts are effectively managed in order to protect and promote sustainable development. To achieve this, UNDP focuses on creating an enabling environment through enactment of policies and mechanisms to ensure integration of development planning with disaster reduction, mitigating the humanitarian impact and risk of natural and human made disasters.
**Programme Overview**

The third UNDAF for Kenya covers the period 2009 – 2013, and it focuses on the UN System’s response to national priorities and needs in a collective, integrated and coherent manner. The UNDAF outcomes are formally accepted as the strategic contributions of the UN to the Vision 2030 national priorities. The UNDAF (2009-2013) is substantively linked with the Country Programme Document of UNDP, ensuring that all UNDP’s programmes are consistent with UNDAF outcomes.

The Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2013 is developed so as to operationalise the Country Programmes and to establish the commitments, particularly of resources, of the UN agencies and the government. The Government of Kenya and UNDP Kenya are in mutual agreement on content of the CPAP and their responsibilities in the implementation of the Country Programme.

Under the current UNDP Kenya Country Action Work Plan (CPAP), the priority interventions include the following:

1. Conflict prevention and peace building and reduction of the proliferation of illicit small arms
   - To support enactment and operationalization of plans, strategies, policies and laws related to peace building and conflict prevention
   - To promote a culture of peace through peace education
   - To promote national reconciliation and dialogue at national and community level
   - To strengthen conflict early warning and response mechanisms in Kenya
   - Promote measures and controls for the reduction of armed violence and management of SALW
   - To strength capacities for national institutions and community based committees

2. Disaster risk reduction
   - To support the adoption and implementation of the disaster management policy and harmonization of sectoral policies on disaster risk reduction for effective implementation
   - To support mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction in key development sectors for example the Arid and Semi-arid lands policy (ASAL)
   - To support development of capacities of local authorities working with communities at risk to deal with adverse effects of natural and man-made disasters

3. Livelihoods recovery
   - To assist communities build back their lives through rehabilitation of destroyed infrastructure such as schools, health facilities and water dams etc
   - To support recovery of small businesses through provision of entrepreneurial skills for business
   - To promote recovery policies that promote business networking, market linkages and social-economic development
   - To support refugee-host community cross border initiatives for restoration of livelihoods and peaceful co-existence

**The evaluation process**

According to the evaluation plan of the UNDP County Office in Kenya, an outcome evaluation is to
be conducted in the third quarter of 2011 for the following Country Programme Outcome 49 – “Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced”. This Country Programme outcome aims to contribute to the achievement of UNDAF OUTCOME 2.2: Humanitarian Impact and Risk of Natural and Human-Made Disasters Reduced Humanitarian Impact and Risk of Natural and Human-Made Disasters Reduced.

Outcome evaluations move away from the old approach of assessing project results against project objectives, towards an assessment of how these results contribute, together with the assistance of partners, to a change in development conditions. Outcome evaluations work backwards from the outcome; they take the outcome as their starting point and then assess a number of variables.

In this context, UNDP would like to take stock of its work, contribution and influence in support to initiatives and responses to: Conflict prevention and peace building and reduction of the proliferation of illicit small arms; disaster risk reduction; and livelihoods recovery. The purpose of this review and evaluation is in order to ensure that its planned projects, programme and portfolio on conflict prevention and peace building as well as disaster risk reduction are relevant to national priorities and support the achievement of the planned outcome. The aim is also to take stock of how UNDP influences the work of its partners to contribute to the attainment of this outcome.

Outcome to be evaluated

According to the evaluation plan of the UNDP Country Office in Kenya (referred to as UNDP Kenya, hereafter), an outcome evaluation will be conducted in the third quarter of 2011 for outcome 49 of the CPAP of UNDP Kenya: ““Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced”. A detailed results framework for the outcome is summarized below:

Intended Outcome:
Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced

Indicators:

For conflict prevention and peace building:

1. National and local dialogue and reconciliation events leading to community peace agreements and social contracts
2. Policies drafted, adopted and implemented
3. Quality training of security agents and civilians on conflict prevention
4. The institutional and operational capacity of NSC improved
5. No of DPCs established and the level of operations and support of local peace structures
6. The quality and volume of engagement of youth on reconciliation, peace building and conflict prevention
7. The level and quality of engagement and support to capacities of women in peace building and conflict prevention
8. The quality and level of management of illicit SALW including stockpile management and destruction
9. The level of civic awareness on the dangers of illicit SALW
10. The quality and quantity of publications of topical papers and reports
11. The level of and quality of engagement with partners on issues of conflict prevention and peace building in Kenya
12. Media relations, partnership and participation in conflict prevention and peace building
**For disaster risk reduction**

1. Strengthened coordination role of the Government,
   2. Enhance capacity of the Government and partners to assess the impact of floods on lives and livelihoods. 3. Developed a programme for recovery intervention

**For livelihoods recovery**

1. Enhanced capacity to conduct early recovery needs assessment; 2. Programme developed to address early recovery needs, 3. No. of early recovery meetings.

**Target:**

**For the conflict prevention and peace building component:**

1. By 2013, inter-communal dialogues, reconciliation and social contract agreements facilitated in at least 50 districts
2. Support to establishment and capacity strengthening of at least 50 district peace committees (DPCs)
3. Capacity of the National Steering Committee (NSC) on conflict prevention and peace building strengthened
4. At least 300 police and civilians trained on conflict prevention and peace building skills
5. Trained personnel to mainstream climate change and carbon finance in development planning
6. Neighborhoods volunteers scheme launched and 100 volunteers trained
7. Youth engaged in cultural exchange programmes for peace through the Ministry of youth
8. The role of women in peace building strengthened
9. Armed violence and illicit SALW reduced in pastoral areas
10. Research and documentation undertaken and topical papers published
11. Mobilize and strengthen strategic national and local partnership in conflict prevention & peace building
12. Engage media in conflict prevention and peace building

**For disaster risk reduction & early recovery**

1. Early recovery assessments and proposals developed
2. Disaster management policy adopted and implemented
3. Harmonised sectoral policies related to disaster risk reduction
4. Improved coordination among partners

**Baseline:**

1. Existing but weak national institutions for conflict prevention and peace building and disaster risk reduction e.g. the NSC, National Disaster Operations Centre, peace committees, task forces on SALW and disaster management committees
2. Draft policies for conflict management, disaster risk reduction and illicit SALW in place but not yet adopted and operational.
3. Limited number of trained personnel with skills on conflict management and disaster management
4. Existing natural and man-made disasters in Kenya including conflicts, draughts, floods and epidemics

**2. Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation**
The main purpose of the external evaluation will be to assess the following:

(i)  *Outcome analysis* – Evaluate the progress that has been made towards the achievement of the outcome (including contributing factors and constraints);

(ii) *Output analysis* - Determine contributing factors and impediments and extent of the UNDP contribution to the achievement of the outcomes through related project outputs (including an analysis of both project activities and soft-assistance activities

(iii) *Output-outcome link* - Assess the contribution UNDP has made /is making to the progress towards the achievement of the outcome; and

(iv) Assess UNDP partnership strategy in relation to the outcome and the extent to which the partnership strategy supports and or promotes the achievement of the outcome. The results of the outcome evaluation will be used to guide future programming. In this regard the evaluation will:

- Identify strengths and weaknesses in the current Programme/Projects in respect of the stated outcome.
- Extract lessons and best practices for future interventions
- Propose better ways of coordinating donor interventions in the sector
- Identify priority areas of focus for future programming.

3. Evaluation Scope

This evaluation focuses on assessing how UNDP’s interventions have contributed to the achievement of the outcome on “Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced. It assesses the relevance of these interventions in contributing to attainment of the

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1 For UNDP, soft assistance activities include advocacy, policy advice/dialogue, and facilitation/brokerage of information and partnerships.

outcome. Further, this evaluation assesses the relevance of this outcome and how it contributes to the achievement of the UNDAF 2.2: *Humanitarian Impact and Risk of Natural and Human-Made Disasters Reduced Humanitarian Impact and Risk of Natural and Human-Made Disasters Reduced.*

Specifically, it will:

- Evaluate the impact of UNDP interventions and its contribution to conflict prevention and peace building as well as disaster risk reduction programmes in Kenya.
- Assess the appropriateness and relevance of the UNDP strategies, projects and programmes in addressing the identified problems and hence contributing to the achievement of the outcome.
- Assess if the outcome has been achieved or will be achieved given the outputs and activities supported by UNDP.
- Provide appraisal on the validity/relevance of the outcome for UNDP supported interventions, and the extent to which the set of results have or can be achieved; (results occur at three levels: impacts, outcomes and outputs. The term results is inclusive of those three levels).
- Determine the quality of programme design (strengths, gaps and weaknesses) and provide recommendations as to their improvement;
- Identify lessons learnt from the implementation of this ongoing interventions in this area;
- Review and assess the programme’s partnership with the government bodies, civil society and private sector, international organizations in Programme implementation and comment on its
sustainability;
- Review and assess the efficiency of implementation and management arrangements of the Programme;
- Review links/joint activities with other UNDP programmes and UN Agencies and how these have contributed to the achievement of the outcome;
- Where appropriate provide recommendation on how best to implement the CPAP outcome and the its planned interventions

Outcome Analysis

- Examine relevance of the outcome in the context of the conflict and disasters and development issues in Kenya
- Determine if there has been progress made towards the achievement of the Outcome, and also identify the challenges to attainment of the Outcome.
- Examine contribution, effectiveness and relevance of on-going UNDP projects (only indicative) in achieving the intended outcome.
- Identify factors that contributed to or adversely affected the achievement of the Outcome. How have UNDP”s advocacy, partnerships and donor-coordination contributed towards the achievement of the outcomes.
- Analyze the underlying factors beyond UNDP”s control that influence the outcome
- Distinguish the substantive design issues from the key implementation and/or management issues, including the timeliness of outputs, the degree of stakeholders and partners” involvement and how the process is well managed or carried out
- Ascertian the prospects of sustainability of the benefits from UNDP interventions related to the outcome, i.e. can it be assured that the benefits would be maintained even after the withdrawal of UNDP
- Assess whether the approach used is the most cost effective, compared with alternative approaches to accomplishing the same objectives.

Output Analysis

- Determine whether or not the UNDP outputs are still relevant to the Outcome
- Examine whether or not sufficient progress has been made in the attainment of UNDP outputs and how they are contributing to the attainment of the outcome
- Identify the factors (positive and negative) that affect the accomplishment of the Outputs
- Assess whether and how conflict prevention, peace building and disaster risk reduction issues as promoted by UNDP have been addressed and promoted the resolution of identified issues. i.e. whether UNDP activities have improved stakeholders involvement in this area and other related concerns in Kenya. For example, whether or not conflict prevention and peace building and disaster management have been mainstreamed in national policies and strategies including Vision 2030.
- Assess UNDP”s ability to engage in conflict prevention and peace building and disaster management dialogue at national level with key partners including key line ministries, donors, NGOs, private sector and civil society
- Assess whether there are areas where UNDP could contribute to that would improve achievement of outcomes and impacts.
- Analyze how conflict prevention and peace building and disaster management risks and opportunities have been integrated in all practice areas such as governance, poverty, environment, CPR, gender, capacity development) within UNDP as well as within the UN system.
- Analyze outputs achieved in relation to the involvement of targeted beneficiaries, especially marginalized communities. Has UNDP support increased the resilience of communities to the impacts of conflicts and disasters?
- Assess gender equality and mainstreaming in UNDP interventions.

**Output-Outcome Link (Causality Linkages)**

- Determine causality linkages between UNDP’s outputs or other interventions to the achievement of the outcome (including the key outputs, projects and soft and hard assistance that contributed to the outcome);
- Identify key contributions that UNDP has made/is making to the outcome (e.g. in mainstreaming conflict sensitive development and mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in all sectors of national development);
- Determine causality linkages between UNDP soft-assistance activities and the achievement of the Outcome;
- Has UNDP contributed to sustainable national capacity development (by using its exposure to best practices in other countries, south-south cooperation, holistic and participatory approach); UNDP’s ability to respond to changing circumstances and requirements in capacity development for responding to conflict prevention and peace building and disaster management at all levels;
- Analyze the prospect of the sustainability of benefits beyond UNDP interventions (what would be a good exit strategy for UNDP).

**Partnerships Analysis**

- Examine the partnership among UN Agencies and other donor organizations in the relevant field: What partnerships have been formed? What has been the role of UNDP? What has been the level of stakeholders’ participation? How have these impacted the achievement of the outcome?
- Determine whether or not there is consensus among UNDP actors, partners and stakeholders on the partnership strategy to achieve the outcome.
- Determine whether UNDP’s partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective; UNDP’s capacity with regard to management of partnerships; UNDP’s ability to bring together various partners across sectoral lines to address governance concerns in a holistic manner;
- Analyze how partnerships have been formed and how they performed.
- Examine how the partnership affected the achievement of or progress towards the Outcome.

4. **Evaluation Methods**

An overall guidance on outcome evaluation methodology can be found in the *UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results* and the *UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators*. The evaluators are expected to come up with a suitable methodology for this outcome evaluation based on the guidance given in these two documents. It is suggested that the evaluators make the evaluation process participatory through consultations with key stakeholders in order to utilize existing information, examine local sources of knowledge and to enhance awareness about and mainstreaming results-based management.

During the outcome evaluation, the evaluators are expected to apply the following approaches for data collection and analysis:

- Desk review of relevant documents (project documents with amendments made, review reports -
midterm/final, donor-specific, etc);
- Discussions/interviews with the Senior Management and programme staff of UNDP Country Office;
- Briefing and debriefing sessions with UNDP and the Implementations Partners, as well as with other donors and partners;
- Interviews with key informants (including gathering the information on what the partners have achieved with regard to the outcome and what strategies they have used) with partners, stakeholders and other donors;
- Field visits to selected project sites and discussions/interviews with project teams, focus group meetings with project beneficiaries;
- Consultation meetings.

**Interviews:**
The consultants will liaise and gather information through meetings and interviews with key informants, with the various stakeholders, cooperating partners in the sector, NGOs and private sector representatives, as well as beneficiaries and local communities in project sites.

**Field Visits:**
A few field trips will be undertaken to project sites to confirm and verify developments on the ground.

**Presentation of the Findings:**
The initial conclusions and recommendations will be presented to UNDP country office.

5. **Evaluation Team Composition**

a) **Evaluation Team**

The Evaluation Team will consist of two consultants: one Lead consultant and one assistant national expert. Under the overall supervision of UNDP Deputy Country Director, (Programme) the Evaluation Team will conduct a participatory outcome evaluation.

b) **Evaluation Ethics**

The Evaluation should be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG Ethical guidelines for Evaluation.

c. **Requirements**

**Qualification requirements for the Lead Consultant/Team Leader:**

- Higher education at the level of at least a master degree in peace, conflict and development studies, disaster management, project management, political science, international relations, business administration and related social sciences
- Strong understanding of capacity development/strengthening Strong evaluation skills and extensive experience (at least 10 years) in conducting evaluations, programme management, strong working knowledge of UNDP, government institutions, the civil society sector and working with state public authorities on issues related to climate change.
- Knowledge of conflict prevention and peace building and disaster management is essential
- Extensive knowledge of result-based management and evaluation,
- Experience in applying SMART indicators and reconstructing or validating baseline scenarios;
• Minimum 10 years professional expertise in international development co-operation, conflict prevention and peace building and disaster management, in programme evaluation, impact assessment and strategic recommendations for continued support/development of programming/strategies including strong reporting skills;
• Good professional knowledge of the Africa region
• Extensive experience in working with the donors;
• Demonstrated analytical, communication and report writing skills;
• Fluency in speaking and writing English

The Lead Consultant will be the **Team Leader** who will have overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of all deliverables including the final evaluation report to UNDP. Specifically, the team leader will perform the following tasks:
• Lead and manage the evaluation mission;
• Design the detailed evaluation plan and methodology and evaluation survey instruments;
• Ensure efficient division of tasks between the mission members;
• Conduct the outcome evaluation in accordance with the proposed purpose and scope of the evaluation;
• Draft and communicate the evaluation report to UNDP;

*Qualification requirements for the Assistant Consultant Expert*
• Advanced university degree in areas such as peace, conflict and development studies, disaster management, project management, political science, international relations, business administration and related social sciences
• Experience in policy analysis, development work in the area of conflict prevention and peace building and disaster management and related issues
• Proven expertise in programmes, project/programme management;
• Sound knowledge and understanding of the conflict prevention and peace building and disaster management policies, strategies and institutional frameworks in Kenya
• Some experience in conducting evaluations.
• Good English knowledge level.
• Good analytical and writing skills

S/he will perform the following tasks:
• Review documents;
• Participate in the design of the evaluation methodology;
• Conduct the outcome evaluation in accordance with the proposed objective and scope of the evaluation;
• Draft related parts of the evaluation report;
• Assist the Team Leader in finalizing the draft evaluation report through incorporating suggestions received.

6. **Planning and Implementation arrangements**

a) **Management arrangements** – The UNDP country office will be responsible for liaising with the project team to set up the stakeholder interviews, arrange the field visits, co-ordinate with the Government on the hiring of the consultants and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the country for the evaluation team. These Terms of Reference follow the UNDP policies and procedures, and together with the final agenda will be agreed upon by the UNDP
Regional office, UNDP Country Office and the Government. These parties will receive a
draft of the final evaluation report and provide comments on it prior to its completion.

**b) Time frame and schedule (tentative) for the evaluation:**

The mission will commence on 15 April 2012. The duration of the assignment is for
4 weeks including writing of the report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk review, Inception Report (Evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan, and survey instruments)</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>On-line</td>
<td>UNDP CO/ consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial briefing</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Upon arrival to Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>UNDP CO, National expert consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations, meetings as well as for phone/in-person interviews related to the Programme including relevant partners Analysis and synthesis</td>
<td>12 days</td>
<td>Nairobi and some districts</td>
<td>UNDP CO and consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of draft evaluation report</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing with UNDP Stakeholders read and comment on the draft</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of evaluation report incorporating additions and comments provided by projects staff and UNDP CO</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of the final evaluation report to UNDP Kenya</td>
<td>1 days</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>consultants</td>
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</table>

The consultancy is expected to take approximately 30 working days to complete and only 25 consultancy days will be paid in respect of each consultant.

**c) Key Deliverables**

1) An Inception report
2) Debriefing of UNDP and partners
3) Initial briefing on major findings, conclusions and recommendations to UNDP, Outcome Board and the Evaluation Management committee before the lead consultant leaves Kenya.
4) Draft report to be widely circulated to the stakeholders for their comments 5 days after the lead consultant leaves Kenya.
5) A comprehensive analytical report in English – the key product expected from this outcome evaluation (Hard copy and a soft copy in MS Word and Acrobat reader) that should, at least, include the following contents:

- **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**
- **INTRODUCTION**
- **THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT**
• EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
• FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
  - Status of the outcome
  - Factors affecting the outcome
  - UNDP contributions to the outcome through outputs
  - UNDP partnership strategy
  - Rating of progress on outcomes and outputs

• LESSONS LEARNED
• RECOMMENDATIONS

6) Evaluation summary brief (3 to 5 pages)

* ANNEXES: TOR, field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed, Questionnaires etc.

d) Document for reference by the evaluators

UNDP Corporate Policy Documents:
  1. Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluation for results
  2. UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
  3. UNDP Result-Based Management: Technical Note
  4. UNDP Evaluation Policy

UN/UNDP Kenya Country Office Documents:
  4. UNDP Kenya 2010 Annual Report
  5. Annual Work Plans and Progress Reports
  6. Programme documents and relevant thematic reports
  7. Other documents and materials related to the outcome to be evaluated (from the government, donors, etc.)

e) Reporting
The consultant(s) will be reporting directly to UNDP senior management. The Outcome Board composed of UNDP, Government Partners, NGOs and representatives of the donor community will also be involved in the management of the evaluation.
An inception report
  a) A Draft Report
  b) The Final Report (Hard and Soft)
  c) Evaluation summary brief (3 to 5 pages)

f) Duration of Assignment
The assignment should be executed within a period of one month and only 25 working / consultancy days will be paid for.

g) Fee
The national consultants will be recruited and paid in accordance with UN terms, conditions and
procedures governing local consultancies. The fee will be based on only 25 consultancy days and the prevailing daily rate as per the remuneration scale for the various categories and qualifications of the respective consultants.

**h) Terms of Payment: 100% after completion of the assignment.**
The terms of payments will be according to the UNDP procurement rules and regulations.

**Annexes:**
1. Evaluation report template and quality standards
2. UNEG Norms and standards
3. Code of conduct for Evaluators in the UN System

**APPLICATION PROCESS**

Qualified and interested candidates should submit their applications quoting the title, "Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced" to the following email address: consultants.ken@undp.org

The applications should include:-

1. Detailed Curriculum Vitae
2. UNDP Personal History Form (P11)
3. Proposal for implementing the assignment

The remuneration for the consultant will be based on prevailing UN rates.
### Annex III: List of People interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dickson Magotsi</td>
<td>Senior Programme Manager, National peacebuilding &amp; Conflict Management Secretariat (NSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK Maina</td>
<td>National Coordinator, Peace building and conflict management (NSC) secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice Mwangi</td>
<td>National Project Officer, Kenya drought Recovery Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Ng’ang’a</td>
<td>PfPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy Ndungu</td>
<td>PfPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Owiro-Chege</td>
<td>MYWO, Programme Officer –Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esther D. Mwamure</td>
<td>DO1 Sotik District, Bomet County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Kiprono Langat</td>
<td>Chairman Sotik DPC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anna Chebet</td>
<td>Peace Monitor, Sotik District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justus Musau</td>
<td>SDO, Narok North District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph S. Pareyio (HSC)</td>
<td>Chairman DPC, Narok North District</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rev. Samuel Ole Kishoyan</td>
<td>DPC chaplain, Narok North District</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elly Maloba</td>
<td>Peace Monitor – Narok North District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqo Guru Guyo project</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator Armed Violence &amp; Small Arms Reduction/Peace Dividends</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samuel M. Mburu</td>
<td>DO1, Isiolo District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander M. Mativo</td>
<td>Ag. DC Kiambu District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Silakwa Tirot</td>
<td>Chairman DPC, Kwanza District</td>
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Annex IV: Questionnaires

I) Partners
My name is xxxxxxxx I have been contracted by UNDP to undertake an evaluation of effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced.

Objective: The purpose of this review and evaluation is in order to ensure that its planned projects, programme and portfolio on conflict prevention and peace building as well as disaster risk reduction are relevant to national priorities and support the achievement of the planned outcome. The aim is also to take stock of how UNDP influences the work of its partners to contribute to the attainment of this outcome. Ask the staff member if they are happy for you to write their comments down. Explain that the names of informants will not be included in the review. Only a summary of views will be shared (No attribution to individuals only to offices). Explain that the interview will take at most 30 minutes. The information obtained will be used solely for the purpose of the evaluation and shall be treated with high degree of confidentiality.

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<tr>
<th>Name of primary respondent(s):</th>
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<tr>
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<td>National Steering committee</td>
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<td>Address Line(s)/Phone number</td>
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Relevance:

1. What projects did you implement in partnership with UNDP?

2. What have been the achievements at local and national level? (policies, conflict prevention, peace building initiatives) – 50 DPCs, 300 p/men, 100 vol, cultural exchange for youth)

3. Do you think the initiative was relevant to the national priorities? Explain.

4. What problems was the initiative addressing?
5. Was the strategy used appropriate?

6. Was the initiative relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries?

Effectiveness:

1. What was UNDPs contribution?

2. What were the major factors that influenced the achievements?

3. What challenges did you encounter?

Efficiency:

1. Were the activities cost effective?

2.Were the objectives/accomplishments achieved on time?

3. Do you think the partnership strategy has helped UNDP to be more efficient? (cost-sharing)

Sustainability:

1. What is the sustainability strategy? CB?

2. What are the financial and economic (trading) mechanisms to ensure continued flow of benefits once the UNDP assistance ends?

3. What policies (procedures, principles) & regulatory (rues, guidelines) frameworks are in place to support continuation of benefits?

4. What institutional capacity exists to ensure sustainability (systems, structures, staff, expertise)

Impact:

1. What difference has the initiative made in the lives of beneficiaries?

2. What % or how many people have benefitted?

3. What lessons can you share?

ii) Guidance for FGDs with adults and key informants

(FGD Group size: 8-10 men or women. FGDs are to be done separately e.g. men alone and women alone)

Introductions: My name is xxxxxxxxx I have been contracted by UNDP to undertake an evaluation of effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs.
Explain the **purpose** of the discussion. (To assess the extent to which the project attained/achieved the stated goal and objectives, document lessons learnt and best practices. This discussion is one such engagement activity. The information obtained will be used solely for the purpose of the evaluation and shall be treated with high degree of confidentiality)

Explain that the discussion will take around one hour.

Ask participants if they are willing to proceed with the discussion and if the time proposed is okay (**informed consent**). Ask permission to write down the opinions expressed by them. Confirm that all views will be treated with **confidence**; no names will be attributed to the views that are summarized in the evaluation report.

Invite everyone to say their name and where they are from.

**Relevance:**

1. What kind of problems did the PEV (or any other conflict) create for you and your families?
2. What are the most useful activities that UNDP or the implementing partner did to help people address their immediate/long term problems?
3. Are you satisfied with your involvement in this process? Why?

**Effectiveness:**

1. What changes have you seen in the community as a result of the UNDP interventions?
2. What contributions has UNDP or the implementing partner made towards these changes?
3. What factors influenced the achievement of these changes?
4. What challenges were encountered during implementation?

**Efficiency:**

1. Was the response timely?
2. Was the project implemented in the most efficient way or you think there would have been a better way?

**Sustainability:**

1. Are there social, financial and economic mechanisms in place to ensure sustainability of the gains made?

**Impact:**

1. What has happened as a result of the programme implementation?
2. What real difference has the outcome activities made to the beneficiaries?
3. How many people have benefitted?
iii) Guidance for interviews with UNDP staff
These guiding questions are for discussions with UNDP staff. These interviews shall take around 30 minutes.

Introduce yourself and explain the purpose of the interview.

Outcome 49: “Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced”. This Country Programme outcome aims to contribute to the achievement of UNDAF OUTCOME 2.2: Humanitarian Impact and Risk of Natural and Human-Made Disasters.

Ask the staff member if they are happy for you to write their comments down. Explain that the names of informants will not be included in the review. Only a summary of views will be shared (No attribution to individuals only to offices).

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Relevance:
1. Name the projects you implemented under outcome 49.
2. How were these projects relevant to the current national priorities and to the UNDP Country Programme Document?
3. To what extent are the activities and outputs aimed at strengthening institutional and community capacity building?

Effectiveness:
1. What achievements have you realized since 2009 to date under this outcome?
2. What contribution has UNDP made towards the observed changes?
3. Name the implementation partners and their roles.
4. What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of your objectives?

**Efficiency:**

1. Were objectives achieved on time?
2. Do you know of an alternative way of delivering the same project in a more efficient way?
3. How has the partnership strategy influenced the efficiency of the UNDP outcome through cost-sharing measures and complementary activities?
4. What challenges were encountered in implementing this project?

**Sustainability:**

1. Has a sustainability strategy, including capacity development of key national stakeholders, been developed and implemented?
2. Are there financial and economic mechanisms in place to ensure the ongoing flow of benefits once the assistance ends?
3. What policy and regulatory frameworks are in place that will support continuation of benefits?
4. Does the requisite institutional capacity (systems, structures, staff, expertise, etc.) exist to ensure sustainability?

**Impact:**

1. What was the impact of your project’s interventions?
2. What real difference has your project’s activities made to the beneficiaries?
3. How many people have been impacted?

**iv) Peace Monitors Interview Guide**

1. What training did you go through to equip you for this work?
2. What process of capacity building do you take the peace committees through?
3. Do you have a manual or reference guidelines for PC functionality?
4. How has peace dividends worked in your area?
5. What challenges are you facing?
6. Was there any partnership in the implementation of this project?
7. What was the role of each partner?
8. Do you have a project design?
9. Are there gaps in the design or its OK?
10. Were the communities involved in developing the design? How?
11. What is the exit strategy for your involvement with this community?
12. Do you work with traditional alternative dispute resolution structures? How?
13. Give us any recommendations you may have.
Annex V: Activity Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Activity Schedule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22nd May</td>
<td>Initial briefing done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd - 25th May</td>
<td>Inception report submitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th May</td>
<td>Meeting with Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th June</td>
<td>Letter of introduction ready</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th June - 15th June</td>
<td>Started interviewing partners(interviewed 6 partners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th June - 22nd June</td>
<td>Field visits to Narok and Sotik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th – 7th July</td>
<td>Field visit to Kitale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th – 11th July</td>
<td>Field visit to Isiolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th July</td>
<td>Field visit to Kiambu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th – 31st July</td>
<td>Data analysis and report writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st August</td>
<td>Submitted zero draft to UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Nov</td>
<td>Validation workshop</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feedback</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submit final report</td>
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</table>

Annex VI: Modogashe Declaration Implementation report

The Modogashe declaration was negotiated among the communities from nine neighboring districts of Isiolo, Marsabit, Moyale, Wajir, Mandera, Tana River, Samburu, Garissa and Nairobi under the facilitation of the then newly constituted National Steering Committee on peace building and conflict management. The all inclusive process brought on board a range of stakeholders including peace committees, traditional elders, religious leaders, NGO representatives and members of district and provincial security committees from the region.

Modogashe peace model was born out of necessity to address vicious cycle of conflict in the arid parts of Northern Kenya. It was hailed as one of the exemplary community peace initiative by the peace actors from across the eastern Africa region. The declaration was conceived at a time when the region was engulfed in a protracted period of raiding and communal violence of 1990s which also witnessed the fall of the Republic of Somalia that opened flood gates of illicit weapons which propelled the conflict dynamics to new heights.

The situation was further aggravated by lack of adequate security personnel to man the vast rangeland and poor responses to conflict which also in turn ignited demand for firearms as all the communities’ “stockpiled arsenals” for self protection.
It was against this backdrop that community leaders and NGO peace actors volunteered to address the issue by coming up with agreed rules based on local context and the realities faced by the ethnic community’s residing in the area.

Implementation challenges.

The declaration identified key conflict issues which were spelt out as cattle rustling, highway banditry, unauthorized grazing and proliferation of small arms. Conflicting communities were brought together to negotiate among themselves the rules to address these problems.

The subsequent review conducted in 2005 reinforced the provision of the declaration through additional clauses to make the rules more explicit and further incorporate civil rules to tackle arms trafficking and murder cases.

However, implementation of the peace agreement has continued to experience mixed results with success and challenges reported in almost equal weights across the region. In Isiolo and neighboring districts of North Eastern Province where the majority of the populations profess Islamic religion the declaration registered notable success in bringing down the levels of conflict.

According to Garbatulla District Peace Chairman Mr. Harun Roba, the declaration most notable achievement is the creation of a forum through which the conflicting parties can talk to each other.

“In the past when the raiders cross into their territory with stolen animals we abandon further pursuit and leave the rest to police or retreat to organize counter attack to compensate the loss. But with the declaration in force we negotiate and recover the animals but still the accompanying penalties for breach of the accord stands,” he observed.

“This has discouraged killing and rustling because the culprits can no longer go unpunished,” he adds.

But other provisions like unauthorized grazing have not been honored by the parties concerned since there were no penalties prescribed under the accord.

The timely payment of compensation also remains another problematic area according to the residents. Delays, partial payments and non compliance have become the order of the day. In Sericho of Garbatulla District blood compensation to be paid by Borana community for the killing of a Degodia tribesman in 2005 is yet to be completed while a similar payment expected of Ajuran community by the Boranas is yet to be settled a years down the line. These unfulfilled commitments often blow minor issues out of proportion whenever dispute occurs.

“It’s against our faith to fail to pay blood compensation to the surviving family members. But collecting contributions from mobile clan groups is not easy and when we fail to met agreed deadline and end up being blamed,” laments Mr.Bule Yelehow, member of Alfatah council of elders during one of the proceedings.
In Isiolo triangle, covering parts of Samburu East, Laisamis and Isiolo North districts, the enforcement of the declaration has been wanting. From the onset the Samburu community expressed their reservation to abide by the clause to compensate women which affected the overall implementation of the accord.

The alternative approach applied by the security forces to forcefully confiscate livestock from Samburu as punishment only resulted in revenge and escalation of further conflict within the triangle that is still on-going.

In the larger Marsabit District unresolved issues, political incitement, ethnicity and dissolution of the district peace committee by the District Commissioner in 2005 among others undermined the full implementation of the declaration. This was blamed for the unprecedented level of violence among Gabra, Borana and Rendille culminating with the infamous Turbi massacre of July 12 2005.

Annex VII: Categories of Outcome Analysis

Outcome evaluations include four categories of analysis:
1. Status of the outcome
2. Factors affecting the outcome
3. UNDP contributions to the outcome
4. UNDP partnership strategy

These categories correspond to the four standard objectives of an outcome evaluation noted in Part 1 (i.e., assess progress towards the outcome, assess the factors affecting the outcome, assess key UNDP contributions to outcomes, assess the partnership strategy).

These four categories of analysis vary depending upon what it is that the Country Office and stakeholders hope to gain by the evaluation. In one case, for example, the purpose of the evaluation might be to validate that the outcome selected is relevant to the country’s needs and the partnership strategy is appropriate. This would make categories two and four the primary categories of analysis, with category one playing a lighter role and category three almost no role. In another case, the purpose of the evaluation might be to catch impediments to output production early to prompt mid-course adjustments. Categories three and four would assume more importance. And in another example, the purpose might be to learn lessons about UNDP’s contribution to a given outcome over the Country Programme cycle so as to design a better assistance strategy for the next Country Programme. Category three would assume greater importance and the other three categories would be examined in equal depth.

These guidelines take as the norm the situation in which UNDP (1) set out to affect an outcome described in the Strategic Results Framework (SRF) or elsewhere, (2) fashioned a strategy to do so with its outputs and in tandem with partners, and (3) succeeded in affecting the outcome. It should be noted, however, that there are exceptions to this norm. In some cases, UNDP may not intend to affect a certain outcome but will anyway. In other cases, UNDP may intended to affect a certain outcome but will not succeed due to a variety of factors.

Step One: Ascertaining the status of the outcome
Outcome evaluations derive their “power” from using the outcome as the point of departure. The analysis net is cast
wide to include everything done — within the project realm and beyond it — that can be perceived to have influenced
the outcome in question.

The first step in an outcome evaluation is for the evaluators to ascertain the status of the outcome. Evaluators
should take the following steps:

1. Begin with the SRF for a description of the intended outcome, the baseline for the outcome and the
   indicators and benchmarks used. Obtain information from the country office gathered through
   monitoring and reporting on the outcome. This will help inform evaluators of whether change has taken place.

2. Obtain contextual information beyond what UNDP has tracked. Before organizing an outcome evaluation,
   the country office will have undertaken preliminary data collection (contextual data as well as evaluations,
   monitoring reports, etc.) and, depending upon the country office, possibly started to analyze the data. An
   outcome evaluation is not only designed to tap UNDP-specific information about the outcome but also to
   derive contextual information from other sources that detail trends in policy formulation, changes in human
   development indices over time and other changes.

3. Examine contextual information and baselines contained in project documents, the CCF (for older
   programmes) or the Country Programme (for newer programmes), Common Country Assessment/United
   Nations Development Assistance Framework (CCA/UNDAF) and other sources. These documents speak to
   the outcome itself, as opposed to what UNDP is doing about it, and how it was envisaged at certain points
   in time preceding UNDP’s interventions. The situation analysis section of both the Country Programme and
   the project document, for example, could each provide useful information and hyperlinks to other sources of
   information.

4. Employ a means to validate information about the status of the outcome that is culled from contextual
   sources such as the SRF or monitoring reports. To do this, evaluators may use interviews or
   questionnaires during the evaluation that seek key respondents’ perceptions on a number of issues, including their
   perception of whether an outcome has changed. For example, an outcome evaluation addressing the
   outcome “improved efficiency, accountability and transparency in tax collection and budget execution at the
   state level” could seek the opinion of state administrators and tax authorities, citizens’ groups and
   “average” citizens to ascertain if they think progress has been made towards this outcome within the relevant time
   period.

5. Probe the pre-selected outcome indicators, go beyond these to explore other possible outcome indicators,
   and determine whether the indicators have actually been continuously tracked. The one or two indicators
   provided for in the SRF are unlikely to yield sufficiently relevant evidence of change in the outcome. In
   time, it is expected that SRF outcome monitoring will lead to modification in the outcome indicators
   themselves. Alignment of SRF and other UNDP planning and management instruments must be seen as a
   two-way, iterative process.

6. Undertake a constructive critique of the outcome formulation itself (and the associated indicators). This is
   integral to the scope of outcome evaluation. Evaluators can and should make recommendations on how
   the outcome statement can be improved in terms of conceptual clarity, credibility of association with UNDP
   operations and prospects for gathering of evidence.
Step Two: Examining the factors affecting the outcome

Analysis of factors that influence outcomes is the intellectual core of outcome evaluation. A thorough understanding of the factors that influence outcomes represents the rationale for any development intervention and UNDP involvement — bridging the gap between “what is needed” and “what can be done”. Examining the factors that influence an outcome tests the development hypothesis UNDP has formulated, as well as its underlying assumptions. This demands analytical maturity, substantive knowledge of development and affinity with reality of the national cultural, political and institutional environment. Factors influencing development are multiple, complex, interrelated and ever-changing.

Examining the factors influencing the outcome is the second step of analysis in outcome evaluation. Evaluators should take the following steps:

1. Use to the extent possible the data collection and analysis undertaken by the country office prior to an outcome evaluation, as noted in Step One. Evaluators might also need to “strike out on their own” in this particular category of analysis to gain a better understanding of how an outcome has been influenced. This could include speaking with experts in the field, consulting diverse data sources and speaking with partners.

2. Identify the major contributing factors that “drive” change. Do not identify or elaborate all conceivable factors. Contributing factors may be pro-active opportunities to be seized or negative constraints to be removed. Indicate the direction in which policy or institutional action will have the greatest developmental pay-off. Evaluators should limit their analysis to five or six contributing factors so they may focus on the key factors.

3. Examine local sources of knowledge about factors influencing the outcome. Synthesize existing documentation about national development as reflected in analysis undertaken by government, donors, NGOs, academia and “think tanks”. Evaluators should not seek to develop their own theories about the dynamics of national development, nor should they transplant “cookie-cutter” solutions from elsewhere. Neither should evaluators be constrained in voicing their own ideas or highlighting areas in which gaps appear in the body of local knowledge.

4. Resolve the issue of UNDP having an unintended effect or not having the intended effect. For example, an evaluation looking at a decentralization outcome could find that the outcome did not progress because local government employees were so poorly paid that they had to concentrate on their own income generation rather than doing their public sector job. This kind of information would, for example, help evaluators reconcile their finding on the failure to achieve the outcome with their finding that UNDP’s outputs were delivered as planned. In this case, they could explain that the outputs planned were not the most relevant in light of the critical contextual factors that influenced the outcome.

Step Three: Assessing the contribution of UNDP

UNDP contributions to changing the outcome take the form of the outputs produced as part of the full range of project and non-project activities and efforts. For UNDP, the unit of account for influencing outcomes is the overall country office strategy — comprising the entire range of projects, programmes, policy advice and dialogue, brokerage and advocacy efforts.
Assessing the contribution of UNDP to outcomes is the third step of analysis in outcome evaluation. Evaluators should take the following steps:

1. Determine whether or not the UNDP strategy and management of overall country operations appears to be coherently focused on change at the outcome level. Time is required to bring UNDP’s diverse programme planning, management, reporting and partnership instruments into alignment. This is to be expected, as is the need for a gradual build-up of staff and stakeholder understanding of the rationale and methodology of outcome evaluation. In the near future, evaluators may wish to ask questions such as: Is management focused on outcomes or limited to outputs? Do discussions with the government focus on outcomes? Can the staff articulate the outcome strategy?

2. Look at whether UNDP’s in-house planning and management of different interventions has been aligned to exploit synergies in contributing to outcomes. This entails examining the projects, programmes and activities that fall outside of projects or programmes and considering whether or not they are coordinated in a way that links their outputs to the outcome in question. Evaluators should consider a number of questions:
   - Are key partners consulted and coordinated?
   - Are common activities taking place?
   - Is information being shared between projects/programmes?
   - Are outcomes forming the basis of planning for joint activities?

3. Determine whether or not individual outputs are effective in contributing to outcomes. This is perhaps the most important step in this category of analysis. The key criterion is the plausibility of the linkage between UNDP and the outcome. Are individual outputs effective in contributing to outcomes? Evaluators should focus their analysis on those outputs that have been, or show potential to be, truly strategic in making progress towards the outcome.

An important aspect of assessing the UNDP contribution is drawing the link between UNDP outputs and outcomes. Both the SRF and outcome evaluation depend on the credibility of the link drawn by evaluators between outputs and outcomes. This affects the SRF as an overall organizational results management framework and the outcome evaluation as an instrument of review. Credibility is strongest when outcome evaluations are perceived as revealing rather than contriving linkages between outputs and outcomes. The evaluator must spell out explicitly, to the extent possible, a “chain of causality” that reveals credible linkages between UNDP outputs and outcomes.

Although degrees of credibility will be apparent, scientific “proof” will rarely, if ever, be available. This is particularly true given the outside (exogenous) factors that may have influenced changes to the outcome. In assessing the contribution of UNDP outputs to outcomes, the methodological imperative is plausibility of association. This is established through the best professional judgment of the evaluators and backed by analysis of data and perceptions. The strength of the linkages between UNDP outputs and the outcome is directly influenced by the quality of the outcome formulation. The establishment of a plausible association is easier when an outcome has been tightly formulated or deconstructed into smaller parts.

In some cases, however, evaluators may find that it is easier to draw a clear and direct linkage between UNDP outputs and “intermediary” results that do not quite reach the level of development change as articulated in SRF outcomes. These may be valid results that significantly improve development at the local level but may not change the national development situation. The establishment of plausible association is less of a challenge at the “intermediary” results level between outputs and outcomes — and this may be where evaluators find the greatest number of cases in which UNDP can be clearly seen to have made a difference. UNDP efforts may lead to changes that are “real” and material aspects of development but which do not change national aggregates. The evidence is not merely anecdotal. However, it would be unreasonable to claim that UNDP outputs changed the picture of the nation. Evaluators should be prepared, if necessary, to make this kind of analysis in this category.
Step Four: Assessing partnerships for changing the outcome

Outcomes are influenced by a complex range of factors. Making change happen invariably requires the concerted action of several different institutions and managers. No single actor can be held accountable for change that occurs at the outcome level.

The purpose of the review of partnerships is not to assess activities or performance of partners per se. Rather, it is the design of partnership strategies, the formation of partnerships with UNDP and the implementation of those partnerships that are being assessed. (Review of outputs jointly produced by partners acting in concert does belong within the scope of outcome evaluation.)

The fourth step of analysis in outcome evaluation is assessing the partnership strategy that UNDP crafted and implemented. Evaluators should take the following steps:

1. Determine whether or not there is consensus among UNDP actors, stakeholders and partners that the partnership strategy designed was the best one to achieve the outcome. To do so, look at the degree of mutual support among partners based on affinity and common interest defined by joint monitoring missions, evaluations, the implementation of project-related activities and so on. Determine whether or not partners’ activities in the same outcome are coordinated with those of UNDP or even point to a common outcome. And, determine whether or not partners have a common appreciation of problems and needs.
2. Look at how the partnerships were formed and how they performed. This entails an analysis of the roles of the respective partners (who is a leader, key player or player). It also require the evaluator to determine if partners who seek to influence an outcome synchronize their strategies, if communication tools exist among partners (group meetings, web pages, reading groups, participation in joint missions), and if the initiatives or actions of one partner hinder previous or current assistance or results of others. In addition, it entails an analysis of whether or not the partnership is a mechanism for ongoing dialogue and if arrangements for operational coordination among partners are conductive to results.
3. Look at how the partnership strategy affected the achievement of or progress towards the outcome. Determine whether or not the outputs were produced via partnerships, whether national capacities were built in partnership, and whether “soft” assistance and advocacy were done in partnership.
4. Undertake joint evaluations. Outcome evaluations lend themselves to joint evaluations because outcomes can only be achieved in partnership with others. Joint evaluations are most useful when outcomes are selected and interventions are planned in partnership with others. Then the evaluation can look at the status of the outcome, contributing factors, the contribution of each party to the outcome in question and the partnership strategy used.
Annex VIII: Governance and Management of the Evaluation

Oversight Team
The oversight team had overall responsibility of supervising the evaluation process and ensuring quality of results. The team consisted of Erastus Ethekon, Judy Wakahiu and Evelyn Koech. More specifically the oversight team:

- Provided the consultants with relevant documents and materials
- Liaised with the consultants to set up stakeholder interviews
- Arranged for field visits
- Ensured timely provision of per diems
- Ensured proper travel arrangements were in place for site visits
- Received and provided comments on the final evaluation report
- Shared the final report with relevant stakeholders

Annex IX: Evaluation Matrix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>Specific sub-question</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Data collection method and tools</th>
<th>Indicators/success standard</th>
<th>Methods for data analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome:</strong> Effectiveness of emergency response and early recovery for communities and IDPs enhanced</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Was the formulation of the outcome a strategic exercise based on national priorities?</td>
<td>Is the outcome relevant to current national priorities and to the UNDP Country Programme Document? Is the UNDP strategy for this outcome appropriate to the problems the outcome addresses? How does the outcome respond to relevant needs from the perspective of the beneficiaries? To what extent are the activities and outputs aimed at strengthening institutional and community capacity building?</td>
<td>CPAP 09-13 UNDP Kenya annual reports AWP &amp; progress reports CCF SRF ROAR KNHRC reports KRCs reports MSSP reports Donor reports Research papers Published journals Media reports</td>
<td>Desk review Interview with UNDP staff FGD with communities Interviews with govt officials Open-ended questionnaire</td>
<td>Quality training of security agents and civilians on conflict prevention The institutional and operational capacity of NSC improved The level and quality of engagement and support to capacities of women in peace building and conflict prevention The level of civic awareness on the dangers of illicit SALW The quality and quantity of publications of topical papers and reports</td>
<td>Triangulation (simultaneous use of perception, validation and documentation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Is the outcome achieved or has progress been made towards it? Has UNDP made significant contributions in terms of strategic outputs?</td>
<td>To what extent were the objectives of the outcome achieved / are likely to be achieved? What contribution has UNDP made towards the observed changes? What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?</td>
<td>CPAP 09-13 UNDP Kenya annual reports AWP &amp; progress reports Country program document</td>
<td>Desk review Interview with UNDP staff FGD with communities Interviews with govt officials</td>
<td>By 2013, inter-communal dialogues, reconciliation and social contract agreements facilitated in at least 50 districts The quality and level of management of illicit SALW including stockpile management and destruction</td>
<td>Triangulation, Spradley’s universal semantic relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>What is the estimated resources (project, soft assistance) UNDP dedicates to this outcome?</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>What is the estimated resources (project, soft assistance) UNDP dedicates to this outcome?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What is the extent of UNDP’s contribution to the outcome versus that of its partners?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Were activities cost-efficient? Were objectives achieved on time? Were the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives? How has the partnership strategy influenced the efficiency of the UNDP outcome through cost-sharing measures and complementary activities?</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Were activities cost-efficient? Were objectives achieved on time? Were the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives? How has the partnership strategy influenced the efficiency of the UNDP outcome through cost-sharing measures and complementary activities?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>CPAP 09-13 UNDP Kenya annual reports AWP &amp; progress reports Country program document Kenya 09-13 UNDAF 09-13 KNHRC reports KRC reports MSSP reports Donor reports</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Desk review Interview with UNDP staff FGD with communities Interviews with govt officials Open-ended questionnaires</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Enhanced capacity to conduct early recovery needs assessment Programme developed to address early recovery needs Enhance capacity of the Government and partners to assess the impact of floods on lives and livelihoods. The quality and volume of engagement of youth on reconciliation, peace building and conflict prevention At least 300 police and civilians trained on</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Triangulation, Spradley’s universal semantic relationships</td>
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<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>UNDAF 09-13 Evaluation reports Partners progress reports (KRC, MSSP, KNHRC)</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Open-ended questionnaires</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Strengthened coordination role of the Government Develop a programme for recovery intervention No. of early recovery meetings. The level of and quality of engagement with partners on issues of conflict prevention and peace building in Kenya Media relations, partnership and participation in conflict prevention and peace building</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Open-ended questionnaires</td>
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<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Will the positive change in the development situation endure/continue in future?</td>
<td>Has a sustainability strategy, including capacity development of key national stakeholders, been developed and implemented? Are there financial and economic mechanisms in place to ensure the ongoing flow of benefits once the assistance ends? What policy and regulatory frameworks are in place that will support continuation of benefits? Does the requisite institutional capacity (systems, structures, staff, expertise, etc.) exist to ensure sustainability? What should we stop doing, continue doing, or start doing in order to promote community resilience?</td>
<td>CPAP 09-13 UNDP Kenya annual reports AWP &amp; progress reports Country program document Kenya 09-13 UNDAF 09-13 KNHRC reports KRC reports MSSP reports Donor reports</td>
<td>Desk review Interview with UNDP staff FGD with communities Interviews with govt officials Open-ended questionnaires</td>
<td>Support to establishment and capacity strengthening of at least 50 district peace committees (DPCs) No of DPCs established and the level of operations and support of local peace structures Capacity of the National Steering Committee (NSC) on conflict prevention and peace building strengthened Disaster management policy adopted and implemented Early recovery assessments and proposals developed Trained personnel to mainstream climate change and carbon finance in development planning</td>
<td>Triangulation, Spradley’s universal semantic relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>What were the positive or negative, intended or unintended, changes brought about by this outcome?</td>
<td>What was the impact of UNDP interventions and its contribution to conflict prevention and peace building as well as disaster risk reduction programmes in Kenya?</td>
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</table>
|        | What has happened as a result of the programme implementation?                                                                 | CPAP 09-13  
UNDP Kenya annual reports  
AWP & progress reports  
Country program document  
Kenya 09-13  
UNDAF 09-13  
KNHRC reports  
KRC reports  
MSSP reports  
Donor reports  
Local and INGO reports | Desk review  
Interview with UNDP staff  
FGD with communities  
Interviews with govt officials  
Open ended questionnaire  
Direct observation | Disaster management policy adopted and implemented  
Harmonized sectoral policies related to disaster risk reduction  
Improved coordination among partners  
National and local dialogue and reconciliation events leading to community peace agreements and social contracts | Triangulation, Spradley’s universal semantic relationships |