**Report of the**

**Mid-Term Evaluation of the Sudan NAPA Follow-up Project: Implementing NAPA Priority Interventions to Build Resilience in the Agriculture and Water Sectors to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change in Sudan**

****

Farmers involved in participatory evaluation in South Darfur, Sudan, March 2013

**May 2013**

**A Project of the Government of Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme and the Global Environment Facility**

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**Dennis Fenton (team leader)**

**Mid-Term Review Report**

Undertaken during March – April 2013, by Abu El Gasim Abu Diek and Dennis Fenton

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government of Sudan | | | | | | | |
| United Nations Development Programme | | | | | | | |
| Least Developed Countries Fund for Climate Change | | | | | | | |
| Country:  Sudan | PIMS Number | 3925 | | | | | | |
| Atlas Project Number | 00057783 | | | | | | |
| Project Type | FSP | x | MSP |  | EA |  | |
| Implementing Agency | Higher Council of Environment and Natural Resources | | | | | | | |
| GEF Focal Area | Climate Change | | | | | | | |
| UNDAF Outcome | Outcome 1: By 2012, the environment for sustainable peace in Sudan is improved through increased respect for rights and human security with special respect to the communities directly affected by the conflict.  Outcome 3: By end of 2012, poverty, especially among vulnerable groups is reduced and equitable economic growth is increased through improvements in livelihoods, decent employment opportunities, food security, sustainable natural resource management, and self-reliance. | | | | | | | |
| UNDP CP Output | Strengthened capacity of national, sub-national, state and local institutions and communities to manage the environment and natural disasters to reduce conflict over natural resources. | | | | | | | |

**Project timeframe:**  **Project Budget:**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Project Document Signature Date: December 2009 | Total budget: US$6,800,000[[1]](#footnote-1) of which: |
| Original Planned Closing Date: December 2013  Current Planned Closing Date: December 2013 | GEF funds: US$3,300,000  UNDP funds: US$500,000  Government of Sudan funds: US$3,000,000 |
| Planned Project Duration: 48months |

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During the Evaluation, the experts had the opportunity to interact with many State government officers, technical experts, farmers and community representatives, who all gave their valuable time in order to contribute to this Evaluation. This is greatly appreciated.

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ALM Adaptation Learning Mechanism

APR/PIR Annual Project Review/Project Implementation Report

ARC Agricultural Research Corporation

AWP Annual Work Plan

CO UNDP Country Office

ET Evaluation Team

feddan unit of measure, 1 feddan equals 0.42 hectares

HCENR Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources

INC Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC

INC Sudan’s Initial National Communication (to the UNFCCC)

LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund

MEFPD Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development

MFNE Ministry of Finance and National Economy

MIC Ministry of International Cooperation

MTE Mid-term evaluation

NAP National Adaptation Programme

NAPA (Sudan’s) National Adaptation Plan of Action

PB Project Board

PIF (GEF) Project Identification Form

PMO Project Management Office

PPG (GEF) Project Preparation Grant

RC Regional (or State Project) Coordinator

RF Revolving funds

TC Technical Committee

TOR Terms of Reference

VDC Village development committees

# Executive Summary

**Background and Context**

Sudan’s Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC (2003) assessed the likely impacts of climate change and concluded that climate change, including decreasing annual rainfall, increasing rainfall variability and increasing average annual temperatures, was causing challenges. These were identified to include a reduction in ecosystem integrity, a decline in crop yields, frequent droughts, forced changes to planting dates, disease, insect infestations and a decrease in biodiversity. In turn, these were noted to lead to increased risks of food shortage, famine and poverty.

Building on those studies, the Government of Sudan, with support from GEF/LDCF and the United Nations Development Programme, prepared its National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA, 2007). This identified key zones, vulnerable States and sites, and critical sectors and sub-sectors. The current Project – “*Implementing NAPA Priority Interventions to Build Resilience in the Agriculture and Water Sectors to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change in Sudan*” – is a response to the NAPA and addresses several of the highest NAPA priorities.

The Project is implemented in a challenging context. The adverse socio-economic conditions, the strained natural environment, the complex political situation, security challenges and overall weak governance in the agriculture sector make it very challenging to effectively support natural resource management in remote and marginalized areas in Sudan.

The Project Objective is “*to implement an urgent set of adaptation-focused measures that will minimize and reverse the food insecurity of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, thereby reducing vulnerability of rural communities resulting to climate change, including variability*”. It has three Outcomes:

* Resilience of food production systems and food insecure communities in the face of climate change;
* Institutional and individual capacities to implement climate risk management responses in the agriculture sector strengthened;
* A better understanding of lessons learned and emerging best practices captured and up-scaled at the national level.

The Project design initially covered five locations representing the dominant agro-ecological zones with visible climate change impacts and the areas the most affected by recurring food insecurity. The five concerned States were Central Equatorial, Gedarif, North Kordofan, River Nile and South Darfur. However, following the secession of the Republic of South Sudan from Sudan, Central Equatorial State no longer lies in Sudan and the related Project activities have stopped,

The Project is financed by the Least Developed Countries Fund for Adaptation to climate change (USD 3,300,000), UNDP (USD 500,000) and the government of Sudan (USD 3,000,000). The Project is implemented by the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources. The Project Document was signed in late 2009 and the Project Inception workshop held in March 2010. The Project is planned to run for 48 months until end-2013.

Accordingly, this Mid-Term Evaluation takes place at a crucial moment, when key activities are beginning to show tangible results and the Project is gaining visibility. The specific purpose of this Evaluation is to assess and analyze progress being made towards the achievement of Outcomes and Objective, and, if need be, identify corrective measures. The Evaluation was undertaken in accordance with the UNDP and GEF monitoring and evaluation policies.

**Findings**

This Evaluation finds that the process to design the Project, and the Project design documents, are adequate, and provide a good basis for implementing the Project. Notwithstanding, there are gaps and weaknesses, and these are discussed in the main body of this report. These gaps were not sufficient to undermine the Project, because they could have been addressed early in Project implementation.

This Evaluation concludes that the Project has made considerable achievements at this stage. The Project is well focused on local priorities – food security, poverty reduction and climate change - and the Project targeting has been good. The rate of Project implementation has been adequate, and Project management has been overall good. The Evaluation finds that stakeholder involvement has been very good. The Project has managed to build around an array of stakeholders – local, State and national. This includes government agencies, experts, and in particular the local communities.

The Evaluation in particular notes the following Project achievements:

* It has developed the trust of a large number of beneficiaries, it has built their understanding of climate change, and helped change their attitudes to natural resource management practices (see Box below);
* It has promulgating appropriate technologies, demonstrated technologies in new locations and even introduced new technologies;
* It has directly helped over ten thousand people in diverse socio-economic and ecological conditions to adapt to climate change, increasing their resilience to climate variability and overcoming poverty;
* It has created a network of technical stakeholders in each of the four States, changing attitudes related to climate change and participatory approaches;
* It has initiated organizational strengthening at the village level; and,
* It has contributed to the body of national, regional and global knowledge on how to adapt to climate change.

|  |
| --- |
| **Box: elements of Project approach contributing to success at the village and community level**   * Initial focus on action, rather than on planning and assessment; * Focus on actions that have a visible impact for beneficiaries; * Project activities are designed to be simple and aligned to local needs and manageable; * Use of committed regional coordinators, embedded in State government, to provide continuous support and to link villages to national Project management; * Use of multi-sector, State level Technical Committees to ensure good backstopping and linkages; * Continuous support and dialogue by the PMO with all levels; * Strong overall support to Project by HCENR; * Strong support to many Project activities by UNDP; and, * Continuous emphasis and focus on climate change, climate change adaptation and resilience to climate variability. |

To summarize, the Project has made important progress towards the overall Objective in a short amount of time with limited resources, especially at the village level. Moreover, the Project can be considered highly relevant, and sufficiently efficient and effective. Finally, despite a slow start, the Project has reached a high percentage of female beneficiaries through good gender targeting.

The Evaluation did observe several weaknesses related to the implementation, achievements and sustainability. These are notably:

* The Project implementation has focused on responding to urgent needs, and as such the strategic approach underpinning activities is not sufficiently clear. The actions appear focused on directly overcoming village level challenges, rather than being part of a long-term programme. This weakness is evident at village, State and national levels;
* Although capacity building at the village level has covered many technical needs, local beneficiaries need diverse support, for example related to developing business and organizational skills, to planning, to accessing credit and to accessing government services;
* The project has successfully contributed to increased production and income at the site level. These changes may ultimately lead to environmental or social problems. Insufficient attention has been paid to assessing and mitigating such problems;
* The project approach to gender has had some success and the number of women beneficiaries is high. However, it is not based on a proper gender assessment, and there is little evidence that women are sufficiently involved as decision-makers;
* Knowledge management and lesson learning have been weak. There has been no thorough documenting of baselines, nor of the Project’s economic, ecological and social impacts; and,
* Decision makers at State and national level are not adequately informed of the Project or its rationale. In fact, reaching sustainability at State level may require a greater range of support.

At this mid-term, these weaknesses lessen the prospects for success, sustainability and replication. However, the Evaluation is confident that they can be overcome if corrective measures are taken.

**Recommendations**

This Evaluation sets forth a series of recommendations in Chapter 7. These are mostly directed at the Project Management Office, UNDP and Government. They suggest undertaking a rapid gender assessment, developing the strategic nature of the Project at all levels, and establishing a system to document changes and lessons. They also include recommendations to strengthen the PMO and to extend the Project into 2014. There is a recommendation to increase the government contribution which has suffered greatly due to recent budget crises. And there is a recommendation to UNDP that all adaptation projects in the natural resources sector should be molded into a single strategic, long-term approach, with phases and an acceptation that it may take ten years of support for an area to reach full dependence. Finally, there are several recommendations pertinent to future similar projects.

# 1. Introduction to the Project and the Evaluation

## 1.1 Background to the Project

Sudan’s [Initial National Communication (INC](http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/sudnc1.pdf)) was submitted to the UNFCCC in July 2003. It provided an assessment of the likely impacts of climate change on several sectors and concluded that climate change, including decreasing annual rainfall, increasing rainfall variability and increasing average annual temperatures, was causing challenges. These notably included a reduction in ecosystem integrity, a decrease in biodiversity, a decline in crop and gum yields, frequent spells of drought, forced changes to planting dates, outbreaks of disease and insect infestations. In turn, these lead to increased risks of food shortage and famine, and contribute to poverty.

An examination of Sudan’s ecological zones indicated that the majority of the country is quite vulnerable to changes in temperature and precipitation. These changes could lead to shifts in the distribution of these ecological zones, in the productive capacity of rain-fed agriculture, and thus, in the security of the nation’s food supply. Moreover, given that over 80% of the population is directly dependent on agriculture or natural resources, there are high levels of vulnerability to climate change.

The INC identified agriculture, water and health as the highest priority sectors. Moreover, the INC identified five agro-ecological regions across the country, and identified one State in each region as a priority State for intervention and demonstration, namely: River Nile State, North Kordofan State, Gedarif State, South Darfur State and Equatorial State.

Following on closely from the INC, during 2005 – 2007, the Government of Sudan, with support from GEF/LDCF and the United Nations Development Programme, prepared its National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA, 2007). The NAPA identified priorities for urgent and immediate action in each of the five priority States and priority sectors. In total, the NAPA identified five ‘highest priority interventions’ and twenty-seven ‘high priority’ interventions. The current Project – “*Implementing NAPA Priority Interventions to Build Resilience in the Agriculture and Water Sectors to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change in Sudan*” (hereafter referred to as “the NAPA Implementation Project”, or simply the “Project”) – responds to the NAPA and addresses several of the NAPA highest priority interventions.

## 1.2 Purpose of the Evaluation

In accordance with UNDP/GEF policies, all GEF-funded projects implemented by UNDP are subject to a mid-term and a final independent evaluation. These evaluations reflect on achievements, results, and longer term impacts. Where possible, they propose corrective measures for the project. According to the Terms of Reference for this evaluation (TOR)[[2]](#footnote-2), the specific purpose for this Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) is to undertake at the end of the third year of implementation an evaluation which determines progress being made towards the achievement of outcomes and, if need be, identifies corrections. The evaluation is to be undertaken in accordance with the “GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy”.

The main audience for the MTE is the Project management and Project sponsors in Sudan – in order for these stakeholders to learn lessons and modify implementation of this Project, and of future projects. However, given the relatively new nature of projects to support adaptation to climate change, it was considered that this MTE may provide lessons of interest to a broader regional and even global audience, for example through the UNDP and GEF networks.

According to the TOR, the MTE is tasked with assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of Project implementation. The MTE is to highlight issues requiring decisions and actions. The MTE is to present initial lessons learned about project design, implementation and management. Findings of this MTE are to be incorporated as recommendations for enhanced implementation during the remainder of the Project’s duration.

The MTE is tasked with exploring several technical issues, including:

* Assessment of resilience of food production systems and food insecure communities in the face of climate change through adoption of improved technologies;
* The strength of the institutional and individual capacities to implement climate risk management responses in the agricultural sector;
* The state of knowledge management and lessons learning, for example for the further capturing, documentation and up-scaling of emerging best practices;
* Alignment to the objectives and approaches of the LDCF;
* The Project’s institutional and management arrangements;
* Ownership over the Project; and
* Prospects of sustainability of Project outcomes.

The MTE provides an opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional and productive capacity building programmes in support of adaptation, communication and awareness-raising in the domain of climate change. The MTE is also useful in gauging the level of integration of climate change risk considerations and adaptation into the government policy and planning processes – both at State and national level. Notably, the evaluation aims to inform some specific management practices intended to conserve/develop natural resources in support of adaptation to climate change. Finally, the MTE may assess the community based approaches adopted through the project, in terms of institutional, organizational, financial and management capacity within a workable adaptation model.

## 1.3 Evaluation Methodology

The Evaluation Team (ET) consisted of two experts with significant and pertinent international and national expertise. The international expert and team leader was entirely independent of and external to the Project. Although the national expert had been involved in some earlier project activities, he can be considered fully independent of and external to the Project for the purpose of this MTE.

Guided by the TOR, the ET followed a logical approach with distinct techniques and standard tools to assessing the relevance, connectedness and coherence of design elements and performance relating to the Project. Following initial consultations, an ‘Evaluation Issues Checklist’ was prepared (see Annex 2). This Checklist provided the technical structure to the MTE and to all data collection. It also played the role of questionnaire. The Checklist was constantly referred to (at data collection phase, at analytical phase, and during report preparation phases), in order to ensure that adequate coverage was being given to relevant issues, and to ensure that nothing was overlooked.

Key data collection steps were: a desk review of documents; semi-structured interviews with a comprehensive range of interlocutors and stakeholders at federal, state and local levels; field visits covering the four programme target areas to observe the Project intervention sites; and, focus group discussions with beneficiary groups and technical experts. At the community level, participatory techniques were combined with other approaches to gather as much information and data as possible. Systematic triangulation[[3]](#footnote-3) was employed to verify hypotheses and findings.

The desk review covered: (a) the relevant background documentation on the Project; (b) Project planning, management and design documents; (c) Project outputs. See Annex 3 for a full list of documentation reviewed. The desk review was important as it provided a full technical guidance, including related to progress on different activities. Moreover, a search was made for local strategic and policy issues as well as the community related aspects and changes that may directly or indirectly affect the Project.

The list of partners and stakeholders interviewed is provided in Annex 4 and the Evaluation mission itinerary is presented in Annex 5. In total, 41 persons were interviewed. This included: (a) Project staff directly involved in the planning and implementation of the Project at all levels; (b) selected representatives of UN and other international partners; (c) government partners (the line Ministries, relevant technical departments and institutions, most notably at State level); and, (d) research institutions, academia, community leaders and farmer representatives.

In addition, ‘focus group’ meetings were held, in order to ensure a large number of stakeholders could be consulted in the short time available. Focus groups were also used to generate group creative thinking. These focus group meetings were held with many beneficiary groups and with the ‘Technical Committees’ established by the Project in each State. In total, thirteen focus group meetings were held, involving over 200 participants.

Following data collection, the ET held a one-day internal session to review findings, to authenticate findings, to collate lessons learned, to formulate recommendations and to identify any gaps. This was followed by two short de-briefing sessions; one with government and the other with UNDP. The objective of these informal sessions was to hold candid and critical discussions and/or remarks. In putting together the key elements of the report, due consideration was also given to the context to the evaluation in the target areas.

Limitations

The authors are confident that the findings and conclusions reached in this report are accurate and fair. However, it is recognised that the evaluation was subject to the following constraints:

* Time and human resources. The Project covers several villages in four States, with activities over several years, and involving a vast number of participants and beneficiaries. Accordingly, the ET were only able to witness a small percentage of the activities and could not review all data. It was only possible to meet a fraction of the project beneficiaries. In South Darfur State, this was compounded by the volatile security situation, meaning most project sites could not be visited;
* The MTE focussed on meeting direct partners and beneficiaries. Given time constraints, it was therefore not possible to meet many representatives of actors in climate change in Sudan that are not directly involved in the project. Notably, very few international development partners and no NGOs active in climate change were consulted.

## 1.4 Structure of the evaluation

The TOR provided a draft outline for the report. The structure of the report respects that outline, with some modifications to account for important issues that emerged during the evaluation. This evaluation report is structured into the following Chapters:

* This first Chapter, the **Introduction**, outlines the Project background and the purpose and methodology of the Evaluation;
* The second Chapter then presents the **Project Development Context** and gives a background to climate change, food security and poverty alleviation in Sudan. It also summarises the scope of the Project;
* This is followed by a review of **Project Formulation** – both the design process and the Project’s design documents;
* The fourth Chapter of the report assesses **Project Implementation** and the processes that are affecting the achievement of intended results. It provides an analysis of Stakeholder Involvement. It also includes an assessment of the Implementing and Executing Agencies performance and a rapid assessment of financial management;
* The fifth Chapter reviews and evaluates the **Project Results to Date** under each of the three main component Outcomes, assessing the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the Project to date. It also comments on the prospects of sustainability and gender issues. Overall progress is assessed in this Chapter;
* The final Chapters of the report provide a **Conclusion,** summarise **Lessons Learnt** and draw together the **Recommendations** in order to increase the likelihood of sustainable impact.

# 2. The Project Development Context and Project Outline

## 2.1 The Development Context

### 2.1.1 The socio-economic context

In the 2000s, the sudden shift from a rather restrained national economy into an oil boom-type economy led to an increased consumption of imports. Though investment in physical infrastructure, following oil revenues, was visible, unfortunately little was done in support of other important sectors of the economy namely, environment, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, industry, education, trade and productive capacity building. In addition, many resources were allocated to strengthen the security sector in order to attend to various conflicts across many areas in the country. The multiple impacts of conflicts, of low development and climate change led to the failure of many livelihoods and exacerbated poverty. The limited ground and surface water resources have not been effectively used to re-construct rural economies - which have been undermined by both the conflicts and the deteriorating state of the environment. This was exacerbated by the lack of resources and technical knowhow to put in place appropriate infrastructures and adopt the right resource management systems. Finally, the secession of the Republic of South Sudan (in 2011) further complicated a difficult economic situation, with oil revenues dropping off steeply and inflation reaching over 46%.

### 2.1.2 The environmental context

In 2005, UNEP conducted a comprehensive post conflict environmental assessment of Sudan. UNEP’s findings ascertained a strong two-fold linkage between conflict and environment. There is sufficient evidence that the long history of conflict has left its toll on the state of the environment; whereas overexploitation, poor governance, competition over limited resources and poverty have also severely degraded the natural resources, and presumable fed conflicts. UNEP’s environmental assessment indicated serious degradation of the natural resource base, namely, severe land degradation and loss of productivity over many areas, encroachment of soil erosion, massive deforestation, heavy competition for highly limited water and grazing resources, poor biomass energy supply and limited food security. This has been further compounded by the impact of climate change which has undermined the traditional adaptive strategies of rural communities.

One key impact of the above-described state of the environment has been the “resource displacement” groups – many large groups that have been forced to abandon agriculture and animal husbandry and to seek permanent shelter in shanty areas at the periphery of the urban centers. This leads to unemployment. Many of these groups have remained at the edge of urban areas for several years, with still a number of unmet demands.

### 2.1.3 The political context

The political context under which the Project is currently operating is both complex and unpredictable. The on-going conflict in Darfur and the Blue Nile areas have drained much of the national wealth which could otherwise be used to address a situation of food insecurity and rampant poverty (poverty rates are at 70%). Further, the secession of South Sudan has removed a large portion of the oil revenues - which constituted a large segment of the national budget.

In these circumstances, while social scientists tend to focus on the provision of basic services and improved livelihoods through development interventions and adaptive research, the politicians view the present political turmoil as one of basic rights and distribution of wealth and power. The NGOs and international actors on the other hand continue to preach consensus building, empowerment and shared understanding. In fact all the above are important.

One key result of the fragile political situation is the highly decentralized nature of decision-making in Sudan. As a result, the State level Governments play a very strong role in priority setting, policy implementation and budget allocation. This makes State Governments the key partners in any development project.

### 2.1 4 The security context

The breakout of violence in a number of hot spots as a result of the failure to resolve outstanding issues and due to differences in interpretation and opinion, in addition to the international pressure in providing emergency relief and resolving political differences, have curtailed the government capacity to reinstate a post conflict good governance system; both the structure and the practice. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005, brought temporary peace to the country, yet security skirmishes quickly re-emerged and were sustained, particularly in Darfur, South Kordofan, the Blue Nile and the North-South buffer zones. Unfortunately, such security upheavals have perpetuated tribal conflict over the already limited resources, to the detriment of sound environmental protection, rehabilitation, conservation and balanced use of available resources.

The conflict does not directly affect three of the four locations for pilot activities in this Project. Notwithstanding, it is a drain of resources and erodes the capacity of the government to earmark resources for poverty reduction and adaptation to climate change. At the fourth location for pilot activities, South Darfur, occasional security skirmishes impede the NAPA Project staff from having direct access to some Project sites.

### 2.1.5 Governance of the agriculture sector

The challenging political and economic contexts have had major negative impacts on governance of the agriculture sector in Sudan. At the national level, capacity to develop and implement policy is particularly weak. Nationally, the sector is plagued by inefficient regulation, inappropriate monopolies, entrenched interests, inadequate research, weak links between research and investment, and weak extension systems. At the State level, capacity varies from State to State, and in some States the ministries and technical departments have developed more effective policy implementation capacity and extension systems.

### 2.1.6 The UNDP Country Programme

The *UNDP Country Programme (2009 - 2012*) and the *UNDP Country Programme Document, 2013 – 2016* (draft) both present UNDP activities in Sudan as supporting a transition from a post-conflict to a classic development situation. Accordingly, an increasing number of standard ‘development’ projects are presented, with a decreasing emphasis on humanitarian or early recovery projects. Notwithstanding, UNDP and other development partners, and some government partners, still operate to some extent in a ‘humanitarian’ *mode* – i.e. focusing more on provision of direct support to beneficiaries rather than long-term capacity development.

Another aspect of the previous conflict and humanitarian situation was the focus by UNDP on downstream and grass roots. In response, the latest Country Programmes contain an increasing emphasis on ‘upstream’ activities, meaning more emphasis on national institutions, capacity development and policy support. It is in this context that this NAPA Implementation Project was developed and is implemented. Managerially, in the UNDP Country Office (CO), the NAPA Implementation Project lied within the Climate Change Unit under the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme during the *Country Programme* 2009 – 2012. However, the draft *Country Programme* 2013 – 2016 establishes an *Environment and Energy Programme*, including climate change and this Project. The establishment of this Programme demonstrates both UNDP’s commitment to environmental issues – including climate change, and the ‘normalization’ of the UNDP programme, following many years of post-conflict interventions.

The NAPA Implementation Project is designed to contribute to the UNDP Country Programmes in many ways. In addition to helping adaptation to climate change, it is to alleviate poverty, support governance, develop management capacity and improve food security. Finally, the NAPA Implementation Project is one of the only UNDP Projects in Sudan currently implemented through the national implementation modality (NIM) – almost all other projects are directly executed, although this situation is expected to evolve rapidly in the coming years.

## 2.2 Overview of the Project

The NAPA Implementation Project responds to the NAPA, addressing many of the highest NAPA priorities. The goal, objectives and outcomes of the Project are summarized in Box 1.

|  |
| --- |
| The goal of this project is to contribute to reduce the vulnerability and increase the adaptive capacity of Sudan’s agriculture sector to climate change impacts.  The objective is to implement an urgent set of adaptation-focused measures that will minimize and reverse the food insecurity of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, thereby reducing vulnerability of rural communities resulting to climate change, including variability.  The Outcomes:   * Resilience of food production systems and food insecure communities in the face of climate change; * Institutional and individual capacities to implement climate risk management responses in the agriculture sector strengthened; * A better understanding of lessons learned and emerging best practices captured and up-scaled at the national level. |

Box : Summary of Project Logical Framework (source: Project Document)

According to the Project Document, the Project is financed by the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) for Adaptation to climate change (USD 3,300,000), the UNDP Sudan Country Office (USD 500,000) and the government of Sudan (USD 3,000,000, in-kind). The Project is implemented by the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR). In terms of project ‘supervision’, UNDP is the GEF Implementing Agency and provides strategic, technical and administrative support to the HCENR. The Project Document was signed in late 2009 and the Project Inception workshop held in March 2010. The Project is planned to run for 48 months until end-2013. Accordingly, this MTE takes place at a crucial moment, when key activities are beginning to show tangible results and the Project is gaining visibility.

The Project design covers five locations representing the dominant agro-ecological zones with visible climate change impacts and the areas the most affected by recurring food insecurity. The five concerned States are Central Equatorial, Gedarif, North Kordofan, River Nile and South Darfur, and the Project budget was initially allocated equally across these five States. However, following the secession of the Republic of South Sudan from Sudan[[4]](#footnote-4), Central Equatorial State no longer lies in Sudan – it is now within the Republic of South Sudan[[5]](#footnote-5). Accordingly, Project activities in Central Equatorial State have stopped, and, following thorough consultations, it was decided to distribute the funds from Central Equatorial State across the four States remaining in Sudan. The ET fully supports this decision.

In each of the five States, a number of selected interventions were designed to support highly vulnerable populations in need of urgent and immediate adaptation to increasing climate vulnerability and to climate change. In addition, ideally, the Project was to leave behind strong and viable grassroots institutions capable of running the main project activities, sustaining its outcomes and taking the right decisions. Moreover, the income generated from agriculture and livestock production due to Project interventions should lead to increased local investment potential, so encouraging further engagement of the private sector and financial institutions. Finally, in the longer term perspective, the Project should leave behind a visible impact of adaptation to climate change and a replicable model that can be disseminated to similar ecosystems.

# FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

# 3. Project Formulation

This Chapter looks at the Project formulation phase and at the outputs of the Project formulation phase. It assesses the Project design documents – notably the Project Document. This Chapter looks at the approach to Project design; the problem analysis; the Project strategy; the Project’s logical framework; the Project’s ownership, partnerships and linkages; the management arrangements (including monitoring); and the approach to sustainability and replicability.

## 3.1. Approach to the Project Design

The Project design originated in the process to prepare the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), during 2004 – 2007. Preparation of the NAPA was a nationally driven, scientific and participatory process to assess the context, identify key issues, identify representative zones and outline immediate measures to respond to climate change. Accordingly the Project design process was nationally driven, sufficiently scientific and participatory.

Following the NAPA approval in 2007, the detailed Project design process proper started in 2008 with support from a GEF PPG grant. PPG grant funds were used during 2008 – 2009 to select priorities, to perform more in-depth background studies and consultations, to validate the project approach, to secure the project financial package and to develop the detailed Project design. This Evaluation saw no evidence of weaknesses during this phase.

Overall, **the approach to the Project design can be considered successful.** However, one significant aspect is the length of this design phase. In effect, a major part of the studies and consultation were undertaken during 2005-2006, almost five full years before Project activities commenced, meaning many factors on the ground had evolved significantly. And, despite this lengthy period, as will be seen later, important gaps remained in the Project design documents. Hence the lengthy design and appraisal period was not a way to guarantee strong project design.

A major issue during Project design was to determine the *number* of pilot sites, with stakeholder opinions ranging from one to five. It is a common feature of internationally funded projects that administrative pressures push to include many sites. It is also felt that increasing the number of sites may help secure co-financing, and that a broader geographical coverage may increase national visibility. However, the downside can be that the project has insufficient resources to adequately cover all the selected sites. This issue is explored later.

## 3.2. The Problem Analysis

The design documents provide an overview of the political and socio-economic context, the changing climate, the rural development context and the interactions between these factors. This overview is provided at the national level and concisely for the five Project States/sites. It clarifies the challenges facing farmers and pastoralists and the links to climate change and climate variability. The documents provide a discussion of the impacts of climate change on agriculture and food security. They also provide a discussion of the *root causes* of these impacts and of the *barriers* to progress. One missing element would be a description of the federalized nature of governance in Sudan, and of the respective roles/responsibilities of the various levels of government.

Hence, almost all the elements of a problem analysis are present. However, these are provided in an unstructured manner: elements of the problem analysis can be found at different points in the Project documents, and the linkages between the problems are not clarified. No hierarchy of problems is provided. Finally, the problem analysis remains general – leaving the detailed problem analysis for the project implementation phase.

**The problem analysis in the project documents can be considered adequate** – although, in view of the complexity of the Project, a more thorough logical analysis may have facilitated a better elaboration of a Project strategy and logical framework.

## 3.3 The Project’s Strategy

The Project documents provide many elements of the Project strategy. Firstly, the project is to implement the findings of the NAPA – in itself a quasi-strategic document. Secondly, clear information is provided on how the project is aligned to national policy and priorities, as well as to the approaches and priorities of UNDP. Thirdly, the document clearly set out the approach to geographical targeting. This ensures that the Project will benefit appropriate communities and regions, notably poor farmers and pastoralists in areas affected by climate. This also ensures the *representative* nature of the project – it is to cover sites in each of the five eco-regions of Sudan, meaning lesson learning is also representative of the entire country. Finally, the documents carefully distinguish how the project will address adaptation to climate change and build resilience to climate variability at the community level, amidst the many other development challenges faced in the target areas.

Some aspects of Strategy are less clear. For example, although it is clear why five States are involved, less clarity is provided on what could be considered a successful intervention in one state. As a result, as we will see later, this Evaluation feels the resources were spread too thinly across too many States. Also, the Project document states that this project is the “first step” towards a programme approach, but there is no elaboration of this approach and no understanding as to how this Project lies within such a programme. Thirdly, given the federalized nature of Sudan, more clarity should have been provided as to which levels of governance are to be targeted by the different elements of the project, and how these different levels of intervention would be mutually supportive. Finally, one aspect of the Project strategy is almost absent: the Project response to the problem analysis (the root causes and barriers), i.e. no explanation is provided of how the various Project activities respond to the described problems and barriers.

Overall**, the articulation of the Project strategy has to be considered inadequate** in the Project design documents - although this is not considered a major weakness as this could have been easily addressed in the early stages of project implementation.

## 3.4 The Project’s Logical Framework

Table 1 provides a summary analysis of the main elements of the Project’s Logical Framework (the Goal, Objective and Outcomes).

Table : Review of the Project Goal, Objective and Outcomes

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Result** | **Summary Analysis** |
| Project Goal: to contribute to reduce the vulnerability and increase the adaptive capacity of Sudan’s agriculture sector to climate change impacts. | This Goal is very relevant, as it covers both ecological and socio-economic issues. It is in line with the government and LDCF objectives.  The Goal is sufficiently clear. However, as stated, the goal is very general and arguably can be achieved very easily. Consequently, it would be essential to develop an indicator for this goal. However, given the many related and inter-related issues, it would be hard to develop an indicator with clear *attribution* to the Project. |
| Project Objective: to implement an urgent set of adaptation-focused measures that will minimize and reverse the food insecurity of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, thereby reducing vulnerability of rural communities resulting to climate change, including variability. | This Objective is very relevant. It covers both ecological and socio-economic issues. It is in line with the government and LDCF objectives. The connection to climate change is strong and clear. The targeting is also clear.  However, as formulated, the objective is neither quantifiable nor precisely defined. No information is provided on what is meant by ‘*set o*f’ or by ‘*minimize’* or ‘*reducing’*. Consequently, it would be essential to develop indicators and targets for this objective.  One thing missing from this objective is sustainability. The measures may be implemented successfully, but will the impact be sustainable? |
| Outcome 1: Resilience of food production systems and food insecure communities in the face of climate change. | This is the central pillar of the Project and this is very relevant.  As formulated, Outcome 1 is neither quantifiable nor well-defined. No information is provided on how many communities are to be supported, and what level of resilience will be achieved. Consequently, it would be essential to develop indicators and targets for this objective.  In fact, as formulated, Outcome 1 would be sufficient to achieve the Objective and (in turn) the Goal. Hence, in the logical framework, the roles of Outcomes 2 and 3 are not clear or appear somewhat peripheral.  There is an alternative interpretation. It can be understood from the Project document that, to some extent, the aim of this Project is to develop/pilot *models* of adaptation to climate change/increased resilience to climate variability. This approach was supported by several stakeholders interviewed by the ET. This approach is not clearly presented in the Project document – it is an understanding developed by the ET based on information provided.  If this hypothesis is valid, it may be understood that Outcome 1 is the piloting/demonstration; Outcome 2 aims to ensure sustainability of models; and Outcome 3 aims to ensure dissemination/replication of models.  If this hypothesis is valid and Outcome 1 is the piloting/demonstration, then the Project document should provide a clear description of the full process to establish this model, and should provide a definition of what is meant by ‘model’. In the Project document, although many aspects of this model are considered or touched upon, many are missing, as are the methods to monitor the model and capture results. |
| Outcome 2: Institutional and individual capacities to implement climate risk management responses in the agriculture sector strengthened. | This Outcome is relevant. However the Outcome is not well defined, and its description is a little confusing. Capacity development is clearly important, but, given the broad range of capacity deficits in Sudan, there is a need for more description of which capacity. Improved indicators would also be needed.  The description of the Outputs under this Outcome suggests some confusion or overlap with Outcome 1. |
| Outcome 3: A better understanding of lessons learned and emerging best practices captured and up-scaled at the national level. | As formulated, this Outcome is relevant. Adaptation is a relatively new sector, and it is essential to learn lessons and capture best practices, both for national and international dissemination.  However, it is noted that this Outcome also contains ‘national upscaling’. First, this seems a different matter than lesson learning. Second, the outputs and activities do not provide a clear approach for national upscaling. This Evaluation team wonders if that really was the intention of this project document. |

To summarise findings from Table 1:

* The project logical framework has many strong points. Results are all relevant. However, formulation is often too vague, with inadequate indicators;
* The project logical framework does not clearly articulate the theory of change: the end point of the project is not sufficiently clear, and it is not clear how the Outputs add up to the Outcomes, or how the Outcomes add up to Objective.

Finally, the logical framework does not align to the problem analysis. There is no explanation as to how the root causes and barriers in the problem analysis are to be addressed. In fact, the flow from problem analysis through strategy through to logical framework is somewhat flawed in the Project Document.

## 3.5 The Project’s Ownership, Partnerships and Linkages

As described above, the Project design came out of the NAPA process, which was nationally driven and participatory. This driveness/ownership applies both technically (i.e. the Project is aligned to national and local priorities) and procedurally (i.e. all the concerned national and local decision-makers were involved). This ownership and driveness is reflected in the Project design. This covers most effectively all concerned agencies in the five State governments, as well as key national bodies;

The Project is also designed to involve beneficiaries – farmers and pastoralists – in an appropriate manner. The sites have been identified, and representatives of the farmers and pastoralists had been consulted through the NAPA and the PPG.

Notwithstanding, in the Project document there is limited analysis of the potential partnerships or linkages with some stakeholder groups, including:

* related international projects, for example those supported by other UN agencies, other international development partners, or even other UNDP projects;
* national government agencies, notably the national ministries responsible for agriculture, livestock and water management;
* international and national NGOs, such as Oxfam, Novib, Practical Action and the Sudanese Environment Conservation Society; and,
* the Locality Governments.

This is not to say that these organizations should have been in the design of the Project, however some consideration and analysis of their potential role and related activities may have been pertinent.

## 3.6 The Project’s Management Arrangements (including Monitoring)

The Project document clearly sets out the Project management arrangements. It sets out roles/responsibilities for government agencies, notably the Ministry of International Cooperation[[6]](#footnote-6) (MIC) and HCENR, but also the five concerned State governments. It sets out roles/responsibilities for UNDP, the Project Manager, the five regional Coordinators, and the five regional Technical Committees. Further, the decision-making and financial management is clear. The document states that UNDP’s national implementation procedures are to be followed, and these were well understood and known by all concerned. In terms of procedures and parties, the document clearly sets the foundation for results-based and adaptive management of the Project.

The Project document also clearly and thoroughly describes the approach to monitoring. Key events and monitoring activities are elaborated: for example the inception workshop, the quarterly and annual reporting and planning, the tri-partite process, learning and knowledge management etc. Adequate funds are allocated to this.

A weakness in the Project monitoring framework – and this impacted upon management – is the absence of suitable indicators and targets. Section III of the Project document, the ‘Project Results Framework’, provides indicators, baseline values and target values for the Project Objective and each of the three Project Outcomes. However, almost all of these indicators seem poorly selected[[7]](#footnote-7). Several of these do not satisfy the basic role of an indicator – they do not *indicate* the result they are supposed to. Moreover, there is confusion across the indicators, baseline values and targets in many cases. These indicators cannot be used to assess progress, nor as an input to project management and decision-making.

## 3.7 The Approach to Sustainability and Replicability

To the extent that LDCF projects, with the mandate to implement NAPAs, are to address *urgent and immediate adaptation needs,* it may not be necessary to ensure replicabilty – what counts is that the communities are aided and can adapt. Moreover, sustainability, may only need to apply at the community level – if the community can continue after the project with a development that is adapted to climate change, there is not necessarily a need for sustainability at other levels of intervention.

However, this Evaluation feels that, to the extent feasible, sustainability and replicability have to be addressed more broadly by these LDCF projects. This is also in line with UNDP Sudan’s strategy of moving upstream and addressing governance at various levels[[8]](#footnote-8). At a minimum: (i) village level interventions have to be fully sustainable, and not subject to later political changes at village level or dependent on support at higher levels; (ii) local government level interventions have to have a sustainable impact, leaving local governments able to continue essential support to villages, and able to undertake some replication. Moreover, if possible, higher levels of government – meaning decision-making agencies at State level and national ministries, should also benefit from sustained support, so that they can continue to facilitate the actions of lower government agencies and villages, and that they can replicate (subject to budget availability).

The Project document does not provide an adequate description of this. As discussed above, Outcomes 2 and 3 seem to be concerned with sustainability and replicability, but the details of this approach are not articulated. The Project document also has short sections on sustainability and replicability, however, these provide general statements and few specifics. More consideration would have been necessary on a strategy to achieve sustainability and replicability, with indicators, and, if needed, Project budget would have been allocated to this.

## 3.8 Other Pertinent Issues of the Project Design

### 3.8.1 Gender considerations

The importance of the gender dimension of climate change impacts, adaptation to climate change and increasing resilience to climate change is well known. Sudan, which has experienced many years of instability and conflict, has specific gender challenges, with, for example, a large number of women headed households. Hence, a thorough addressing of gender dimensions is essential for a climate change adaptation Project.

The Project document does describe how, at the site level, women make up a large number of the beneficiaries at many of the sites. However, the Project document does not: (i) provide a proper analysis of the overall gender situation; (ii) provide details of the Project approach to gender; and, (iii) describe the role of women as decision-makers, or how the Project will support this role within the Project.

### 3.8.2 Alignment to LDCF

The project document gives a clear justification as to how this Project is aligned to LDCF and contributing to overall LDCF objectives. Notably, it explains how the following key LDCF criteria are met:

* clear focus on adaptation to climate change and climate resilience;
* contribution to food security and agricultural production;
* focus on sub-Saharan Africa;
* full respect of national driveness and participatory approaches;
* targeting the key affected sectors of water, agriculture and livestock;
* drawing fully from the well-defined findings of the NAPA; and,
* contribution to regional and global lessons learning (through the Adaption Learning Mechanism).

### 3.8.3 Comparative advantage of UNDP

The Project Document gives a clear and compelling argument for the role of UNDP as GEF Implementing Agency for this Project. This is based on UNDP’s expertise across the region on the subject matter, UNDP’s past involvement in Sudan on related issues, and the capacity of the UNDP CO in Sudan to technical and administratively support the Project.

## 3.9 Conclusion

Overall the Project design phase was relatively good. Moreover, the Project design documents have many strong points, and cover all essential issues and are adequate for implementing this Project. Although the above sections highlight many gaps and weaknesses, it is recognized that a project development process, particular in the GEF context, is complicated, and project documents are never ideal. Ideally, some issues would have been addressed more thoroughly during the design phase. Perhaps the most important ‘weakness’ in the Project design was the number of sites – five states. As will be seen later, this Evaluation feels that this Project did not have sufficient resources to properly implement a Project across five states.

***Notwithstanding those gaps and weaknesses, this Evaluation concludes that the Project design activities and the Project design documents provide a good basis for implementing the Project.***

# 4. Project Implementation

Chapter 3 assessed the Project design phase and the Project design itself. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss processes, progress and achievements during Project implementation. Note, given that one State, Central Equatorial State, has dropped from the Project, *from this point onward this Evaluation refers to only the four remaining States.*

## 4.1 Implementation Arrangements and Modalities

The section looks at the effectiveness of the Project management arrangements and at the entities involved in implementing the Project, and assesses their suitability. The organizational structure for the Project is illustrated in Figure 1 below[[9]](#footnote-9).

|  |
| --- |
| **Project Board**  **Senior Beneficiary:** Min. of Environment,HCENR, MIC, UNDP, State Mins. of Agric (in NK, RN, SD and in Gedarif)  **Physical Development; State Ministries of Agriculture in North Kordofan, Equatoria, Nahr Al Neil, and South Darfur States; and the State Council of Environment in Gedarif State**.  **Executive: MIC**  **Senior Supplier: UNDP**  **Project Assurance**  UNDP Programme Officer  **Project Support**  **Finance/Admin Officer**  **Project Organisation Structure**  RT Committee  RPC  River Nile State  RT Committee  RPC  Gedarif State  RT Committee  RPC  N. KordofanState  RT Committee  RPC  S. Darfur State  RT Committee  RPC  Equatoria State  **Project Manager**  **Deputy Project Manager** |

Figure : Project Organizational Structure

### 4.1.1 Project Board

The Project Board is the ultimate decision making body. It is chaired by the Ministry of Environment. Board members include UNDP, HCENR, and the Ministry of Agriculture from each of the participating States.

The high level and broad membership of the Board mean that (i) it can take decisions effectively, as proven on several occasions and (ii) it can be a vehicle for raising awareness on the Project’s achievements. However, the Board’s high level and broad membership also mean it is very difficult to organize meetings. Initial plans were to hold four meetings per year, but in fact only five meetings have been held since the Project started. Until present, this has not been a major limiting factor, and, when held, the Project Board’s meetings have been well organized, productive and efficient. Another potential role of the Project Board would be to ensure that the government contribution to the Project is forthcoming in a timely manner, a role that has not yet been exploited.

### 4.1.2 UNDP

UNDP is ultimately responsible to GEF for the successful implementation of this Project. UNDP’s involvement is through the UNDP Sudan Country Office with some support from the UNDP regional centre in Bratislava.

UNDP Bratislava’s inputs are strategic. They played a critical role in getting the Project approved and started. Since start-up, UNDP Bratislava has undertaken two monitoring missions to Sudan to provide strategic guidance and support, and is helping to mobilize follow-up funding. Guidance is also provided through the PIR process (see below). The role of UNDP Bratislava has been greatly appreciated.

UNDP Sudan has several roles in the Project: (i) it takes the lead on Project supervision and technical back-up. This includes, for example, overseeing quarterly and annual reporting and attending annual planning/review meetings; (ii) it is a Project co-financer; (iii) it provides direct support to the Project’s activities – attending workshops, mobilizing expertise, etc; (iv) it holds the project funds, releasing these on a quarterly basis to the Project in line with procedures and regulations; (v) it facilitates linkages with international development partners and other UN agency programmes.

Overall, the involvement of the UNDP Sudan Country Office has been positive and adequate. In particular, the first three of the above five roles have been greatly appreciated. A weakness has been with the process to release Project funds which has experienced unacceptable delays (this is discussed below).

### 4.1.3 HCENR

Although not clearly illustrated in Figure 1, the HCENR is the national implementing agency and is the lead Sudanese agency involved in the Project. HCENR is responsible to the government for the success of the Project. HCENR provides the Project with physical facilities. It houses and oversees the Project management office (see below). There is a close and regular interaction between HCENR and Project staff. A senior HCENR staff member is responsible for approving budgets, workplans and payments – a role performed smoothly. HCENR, on behalf of government, also facilitates the Project’s activities in the four states, ensuring good linkages with the State level HCENRs and with concerned State ministries.

At the national level, HCENR faces more challenges mainstreaming the Project. First, given the unpredictable, project-based nature of most donor-funded adaptation support, it is not fully clear how this Project is anchored into the HCENR workprogramme. For example, HCENR is currently preparing a medium-long term National Adaptation Plan with support from UNEP, and the technical links between the two initiatives do not appear strong. Second, collaboration across Federal agencies in Sudan is very challenging, and as a result the HCENR does not seem to have effectively linked this Project with the initiatives of other national agencies. These observations may reflect the current capacity of the HCENR to implement the rapidly growing mandate related to climate change.

### 4.1.4 Project Management Office

The Project Management Office (PMO) is housed in the HCENR and consists of three full-time staff (a Project Manager and a Deputy Project Manager, both technically competent, and a Finance/Administrative Assistant) and one part-time secretary. The PMO is responsible for day-day running of the Project. The PMO has substantive, managerial and administrative functions. In addition to organizing all activities, to processing procurements and payments, and to preparing financial reports, it takes a lead in technically designing and technically overseeing many Project activities, and helping to identify/mobilize inputs, and coordinating stakeholders, and developing the networks. PMO also participates in many activities. PMO regularly visits the many Project sites, holding a continuous dialogue with State stakeholders and local beneficiaries. The PMO is greatly appreciated by all stakeholders.

The PMO does an admirable job in keeping the Project on track and maintaining productive linkages with a large number of stakeholders. Given that the Project covers four States and a large number of technical issues, this Evaluation of the opinion that the PMO is greatly overstretched and understaffed. Indeed, the administrative burden on the PMO probably accounts for the time of one of the technical staff, meaning there is little PMO technical capacity to provide support to four states. The PMO is expected to support more than twenty villages, on a very diverse range of complex technical, social, economic and ecological issues. With more staff, the PMO would be able to provide a more comprehensive support to activities, and this would overcome some of the weaknesses found in the Results (see Chapter 5).

### 4.1.5 Regional Technical Committee (TC)

Each of the four States has established a Technical Committee, facilitated by the Project, consisting of representatives of the concerned technical government departments, local experts and community representatives. The TCs are responsible within the Project for discussing technical issues, setting priorities, preparing workplans, resolving conflicts, supervising activities etc. The Evaluation feels that the four TCs have done an admirable job and have been a main agent in the Project’s successful implementation. Moreover, the TC members and the TCs as a group are *beneficiaries* of the Project’ capacity building. The TC members are now all very familiar with climate change adaptation and increasing resilience to climate change, and of their roles in helping communities to adapt to climate change. The TCs can be considered an important capacity development.

### 4.1.6 Regional Coordinators

The Project activities in each State are coordinated by a Regional Coordinator (RC), appointed by the State Ministry of Agriculture, with costs covered by both the State Ministry and the Project. The RCs have played a critical role in the Project implementation – facilitating, coordinating, advising, mobilizing, trouble shooting etc. The role of the Regional Coordinator has been critical at both State level (facilitating the TCs and overseeing capacity development) and site level (continuously supporting site level activities).

The Project chose to have RCs nominated by State Governments rather than recruited through an open process. This has had several advantages and some disadvantages. The advantages are that the RCs are connected into government processes, are able to mobilize government support, and can facilitate steps towards replication and sustainability at the State level. This approach assures a good level of government buy-in and anchoring at the State level. The RCs are immediately trusted and embraced by the State Government and its technical departments. Without this, it is unlikely that the Project could have been so successful, so quickly. However, political instability at State level means that Minister’s are regularly changed, and, as a result in some States the RCs were also changed regularly. This has led to confusion and delays in three of the States. For example, Gedarif State has had five RCs, and this has undermined continuity and credibility.

### 4.1.6 Input Mobilization

The vast majority of the activities have taken place at the village and site level, in line with workplans prepared by the RCs and processed through the TCs. For the majority of Project delivery, activities have been implemented by State level contractors. In most cases these contractors are a subsidiary of a State government technical departments and/or are represented on the TC. This has proven very effective and efficient in delivering inputs, as evidenced by the unanimously positive opinion of the site beneficiaries. There remains, however, a danger of a technical conflict of interests: the TC as a group approves workplans consisting of activities, many of these activities are to be implemented through contracts to individual TC members. There is a danger that the TC gives higher priority to activities that are to be sub-contracted to TC members, or it could appear they are doing this. A system to oversee the TC to ensure activity prioritization is not affected by TC membership would be welcome. It is noted that there is no danger of a TC member approving actual contracts to itself or to another TC member.

### 4.1.7 Financial Management

The Project is nationally implemented following UNDP’s quarterly advance procedures. At the end of each quarter, the PMO/HCENR submits to UNDP a progress report for the previous quarter with financial figures, together with a proposed workplan for the coming quarter with a request for finances to cover the proposed activities. This request can only be processed by UNDP if at least 80% of the funds allocated to the previous quarter have been expended. After approval of the request, UNDP transfers the funds to a special Project bank account held by PMO/HCENR. Subsequently, national procedures are used to procure inputs with these funds. As most inputs are procured at the State levels, the State procedures are used, and, based on these procedures, payments are made from the national PMO/HCENR to the State level contractors and service providers.

In addition, at the end of each year, PMO/HCENR submits to UNDP a progress report for the previous year, along with an Annual Work Plan (AWP) for the coming year. This AWP has to be approved for the year before the quarterly workplans in that year can be approved. The AWP is based on the Project Document (approved in January 2010).

Great delays have been experienced in the transfer of funds from UNDP to PMO/HCENR. These delays have led to some activities being cancelled, as, due to their seasonal nature, by the time funds became available it was too late for the activity. The main reason for the delay seems to be the burdensome procedures of UNDP. First, processing of the request cannot start until the quarter has started. Second, processing the request involves a large number of people in UNDP. Then there is the 80% rule (see above). Finally, at the beginning of the year, it is necessary to approve both the AWP and the quarterly workplan, whereas many stakeholders feel the pre-approved Project document should remove the need to approve the AWP. **It seems very unlikely that delays can be significantly reduced unless these procedures are changed. These delays have been a source of tension and a reason for slow delivery and possibly reduced impact.**

**To summarize sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7, the Project implementation and management has been smooth overall, and this Evaluation feels the arrangements are the most appropriate possible.**

## 4.2 Planning, reporting, monitoring and adaptive management

### 4.2.1 Inception phase

The Project start date can be considered to be December 2009 (date of signature). The Project Document places great emphases on the Project Inception period - a lesson learnt from previous UNDP/GEF projects in many countries. In particular, given the lengthy period taken to identify, design, appraise and start-up GEF/LDCF projects, it is necessary at Project Inception to review the Project approach and the Project strategies, and to ensure that all stakeholders are appropriately on board.

The Inception Workshop was held in March 2010. The principal aims of the workshop were: (i) to inform Project stakeholders about Project goals, objectives, outcomes, and implementation arrangements; and (ii) to train Project stakeholders on Project procedures for planning, monitoring, managing and mobilizing resources. The Inception Workshop was well organized and provided a good opportunity to introduce and disseminate the Project and build the Project network. This Workshop was followed by a second Planning Workshop in July 2010 to further train stakeholders on the roll-out of the Project implementation strategy. This approach to train and mobilize stakeholders seems to have been highly successful, contributing to the future cohesion and smooth Project implementation.

However, the Inception Phase was a missed opportunity to reflect more strategically on the Project and to make any necessary amendments/additions to the Project Document, or to further develop the Project strategy. For example, as described in Chapter 3 above, the Project Document did have some weaknesses related to strategy, logframe and indicators – these are key issues that could have been addressed during the inception period – a missed opportunity that this Evaluation feels contributed to some weaknesses in implementation.

### 4.2.2 Project planning

Project planning has both top down with bottom up aspects. In each village, priorities are established and requests are forwarded for support to the RC and TCs. The RC and TCs review the requests, and, further to consultation with the villages, prepare State level quarterly workplans in line with their available budget. These quarterly workplans are forwarded to the national PMO. Further to consultation between the PMO and the RCs, the four State workplans are combined into one overall workplan, with the national level activities included into this overall workplan. This overall workplan is submitted through the HCENR to UNDP, where, subject to consultation if necessary, it is approved, and funds are released to support the activities at village, State and national level. The above process is repeated for the annual workplans. However, given that it is quarterly workplans that lead to fund release, most emphasis has been placed on the quarterly workplans. At the State level, the TCs are responsible for overseeing the technical aspects of the workplan.

This approach has proven very efficient at preparing workplans that respond to the needs of villagers in a timely manner, which is a considerable achievement given the number of layers and stakeholders involved. However, the approach seems to have been less effective at ensuring that the workplans have a *strategic* nature. This would possibly be seen more in annual workplans or plans over a longer period, and require more guidance from national level experts, and draw more clearly from international and national best practices. Making the workplans strategic whilst maintaining their participatory nature, would require a more intensive technical interaction, backed up by a range of pertinent expertise, between PMO, RC, TC and communities. The limited staff in the national PMO means they can only play a minor technical role in the development of workplans, and in bringing international and national best practices to the Project sites.

### 4.2.3 Logical framework

The Project logical framework was reviewed in Chapter 3 and seen to be weak in many ways. The logframe has not been revised during project implementation, hence the weaknesses persist. These are mainly: (i) dominant nature of Outcome 1 and peripheral nature of Outcomes 2 and 3; (ii) vague formulation of many results; (iii) confusion across Outcome 1 and Outcome 2, particularly when it comes to awareness raising and capacity building; and, (iv) absence of good indicators. Consequently, the logical framework has not been used extensively as a management tool.

Efforts have been made to improve indicators in the two most recent versions of the AWP. However, this does not seem to have been a formal process (it was not discussed by Project Board, and it is not included in annual PIR reports) and it is incomplete. The indicators are greatly improved. Yet, too many of the revised indicators focus on *process* rather than *impact*, and reporting on these new indicators has been very incomplete.

### 4.2.3 Project Monitoring and Reporting

As described above, UNDP, the Project Board, the PMO, the HCENR and the RC each have a role in Project monitoring. Each of these has participated in activities at State and village level, and all have regularly visited village sites to observe agricultural/water management practices and measures being implemented[[10]](#footnote-10). Overall, this has led to an effective and constructive monitoring, which includes continuous provision of technical guidance. Monitoring has been strong and effective.

Reporting has been less systematic. Reports from villages to the TCs/RCs vary greatly from village to village, and in many cases some written reporting is complemented with oral reports. At the next level, reports from the States (TC/RC) to the PMO are not comprehensive, with reports in many cases being submitted late or orally, or both.

National level reporting by the PMO consists of: (i) quarterly progress reports to UNDP; (ii) annual progress reports to UNDP; and, (iii) annual Project Implementation Reviews (PIR) to UNDP and GEF. This constitutes a large number of reports, with complex formats, and overall this is considered a burden on the PMO. Moreover, questions remain about the usefulness of these reports. The PIR does provide a mechanism for some interaction between UNDP Bratislava and the Project, but this could be achieved more easily through alternative channels. Critically, there seem to be few links between the reports and decision-making. Reports contain lots of description but little analysis. The reports seem to be prepared as a requirement, rather than as a useful management mechanism. Finally, the Project’s statistical documents seem weak. For example, prior to the MTE, there was no simple complete list of beneficiaries, numbers, type of benefits and related activity – which would be an essential input into both project reporting and technical reporting. Most reporting seems to be anecdotal, and, as a result, can be confusing.

### 4.2.4 Technical monitoring, back-stopping and reporting

The Project is supporting a large and diverse set of activities in a diverse set of social, economic and ecological contexts. Hence, technical monitoring, i.e. a systematic process to back-stop and monitor and document the activities and their impacts, is essential. This would require the regular involvement of high level experts to visit and interact technically with the villages, and systematic reporting on progress, including failures. The Evaluation feels this has been weak, and this point is taken up later in Chapter 5, under Outcome 3.

### 4.2.5 Adaptive management

Adaptive management is the use of monitoring results, and the following of indicators, to reflect upon the Project progress at multiple levels, to identify shortcomings, challenges and opportunities, and then to identify revised strategies and activities, and then to communicate these revisions to appropriate project stakeholders.

There have been many examples of adaptive management in the Project, for example: (i) changing the sites in Darfur in response to the security situation; (ii) changing the inputs to many villages in response to the requests from the villages; (iii) changing the Project design in River Nile State (in response to economic and ecological considerations) and in Gedarif State (in response to budget availability). Hence, adaptive management is strong in the Project. However, a formal approach to adaptive management, involving indicators, reports, the PMO and the PB is not always evident, indeed it is probably largely absent.

## 4.3 Stakeholder Participation and Partnerships

### 4.3.1 Communities

Community members are the key stakeholders. There is strong evidence to suggest that community members have greatly participated in the project, both as beneficiaries and as decision-makers. Given the large number of community level beneficiaries, much participation has been through the village development committees (VDC) and the community/farmer leaders. The VDC have benefitted from the Project and are significantly more robust than before the Project. VDC members and farmers have benefitted from training, technical advice and material inputs. Farmers, in particularly VDC members and community representatives, have been firmly involved in Project planning and decision-making. All the community members met by the ET had a clear understanding of the Project and its objectives.

### 4.3.2 State Governments

State Governments play a key role in developing policy and implementing policies, plans and projects. The State Governments are the critical entry point for projects of this nature. Accordingly, the four concerned State Governments and their technical departments are the second most important set of stakeholders. These have been firmly involved, firstly as members of the TC. As such, they have benefitted from ongoing capacity development and some training. Also, they have been involved as decision-makers on the TC. Finally, many government technical departments have been involved as sub-contractors, thereby developing their capacity by on-the-job training.

Until present, the higher levels of State Government have been *less* involved. That is, the financial decision-makers and Ministers have not been greatly involved, with some exceptions in South Darfur, where the former Minister of Agriculture was closely involved for over one year.

### 4.3.3 Technical specialists

A number of technical specialists have been involved, notably from many stations under the national Agricultural Research Corporation (ARC). In addition there has been involvement from many State level universities, and centers under the ARC based at the state level. In most cases the technical specialists are involved in activities in one State, although a small number have been involved in all four states. These experts have brought technical expertise on water management, agricultural crops, agricultural practices, livestock practices, rangeland management and other issues to the project.

The Project has brought less expertise on the social, economic and business aspects of agricultural production/water management/climate change to the sites. Also, it has brought less expertise on knowledge management, lesson learning, and participatory planning to the States and the sites.

In addition, it is noted that knowledge transfer supported by the Project has been mostly *from State to site*, there has been much less knowledge transfer from national (or international) to State or from national (or international) to site. This is probably a shortcoming.

### 4.3.4 National Government agencies

Despite the federalized nature of Sudan, the national governments have a key role to play, on issues such as: national policy development, research, inter-state activities and programmes, resource mobilization, and budget allocation. However, it is generally acknowledged that inter-agency collaboration amongst national agencies is challenging, and also that national–state coordination is also challenging.

The only national government agencies involved in this Project are: the HCENR, the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development (MEFPD) and the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MFNE). HCENR has been heavily involved, as discussed in previous sections. The MEFPD and MFNE have been involved through the Project Board Meetings. It is noted that national level technical ministries responsible for agriculture, livestock and water resources *have not been* involved in the project, neither has beneficiaries nor has decision-makers.

### 4.3.5 Development partners

This includes national and international NGOs, UN agencies, and other donors. These partners may be supporting similar projects and activities, either nationally or at one or more of the States. Generally, linkages with other development partners have been limited. It is noted that: (i) UNEP is currently developing the National Adaptation Programme (NAP), however linkages between the UNEP supported NAP and this Project are limited; (ii) IFAD is implementing similar projects in River Nile and Gedarif States, but collaboration has been mostly limited to information exchange. In addition, many partners are working on climate change – the African Development Bank, the Norwegian Government, Oxfam, FAO to name a few – but there is little evidence of coordination.

### 4.3.6 Gender

Women are key Project stakeholders. Women can be involved in the project as beneficiaries or as decision-makers. Women can be involved at several levels: village, State or national. There is strong evidence that women have been involved as beneficiaries at the village level, in all states. There is good evidence that women have been involved as decision-makers at the village level in two of the four states (i.e. South Darfur and North Kordofan). There is much less evidence that women have been involved as decision-makers at State level. The TC members are almost entirely men, and there is little evidence of gender awareness or gender assessments at the State level[[11]](#footnote-11).

## 4.4 Financial Status

The original budget for LDCF/GEF and UNDP funds is summarized in Table 2 below.

Table : Original budget allocation across Project Outcomes (‘000s US$) – LDCF and UNDP funds only

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **Total** |
| 1. Piloting[[12]](#footnote-12) | 526 | 796 | 549.5 | 428.5 | 2,300 |
| 2. Capacity Building | 164 | 170 | 160 | 106 | 600 |
| 3. Replication and sustainability | 64.5 | 104.5 | 109.5 | 121.5 | 400 |
| 4 (project management) | 133.75 | 123.75 | 123.75 | 118.75 | 500 |
| **Total** | **888.25** | **1,194.25** | **942.75** | **774.75** | **3,800** |

The original projected Project co-finance (all from Government, excluding UNDP) is listed in Table 3.

Table : Original envisaged government co-financing ('000s US$)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **Total** |
| Amount | 737.5 | 995 | 715.5 | 552 | 3,000 |

### 4.4.1 Delivery

Table 4 provides information on delivery of LDCF and UNDP funds until end-2012, and forecasted delivery until end-2014, compared to the original budget in the Project document.

Table : Showing delivery of UNDP and LDCF Funds ('000s US$)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013\*** | **2014\*** | **Total** |
| **Project document budget** | 888.25 | 1,194.25 | 942.75 | 774.75 | 0 | 3800 |
| **Actual Delivery/forecasted delivery (\*)** | 615 | 687 | 898 | 999 | 504 | 3800 |
| **Percentage delivered** | 70 | 58 | 95 | n/a | n/a | n/a |

Delivery in 2010 was 70%. This is considered good, as it is standard for Projects to start-slowly.

Delivery in 2011 was only 58%. This is poor. There are several reasons for this. Two key reasons were beyond the control of the Project management and UNDP and government. First, activities at one of the five sites (South Equatorial state) were suspended (as discussed before), thus almost 20% of activities were placed on hold. Second, the security situation in Darfur worsened, meaning that activities in South Darfur were delayed and downscaled. These two reasons probably account for a drop of at least 25% in delivery. Without these reasons, delivery may have been over 75% and so reasonable. This assumption is validated by the fact that delivery in 2012 was up to 95%.

At the end of 2012, totally delivery of LDCF and UNDP funds was $2.2million, or almost 63% of the total budget.

Due to the above-mentioned challenges in 2011, and to delays beyond the influence of the Project team, and to other standard delivery challenges, at the beginning of 2013 almost US$1.5 million remained for future activities. Based on the original schedule, all this should be delivered in 2013. This seems difficult given absorption capacity. More importantly, it seems unadvisable, given the complexity of required activities and the need for careful preparation and planning. It is very unlikely the Project could achieve its full objective by end-2013. Accordingly, it has been proposed to extend activities into 2014. This suggestion is supported strongly by this Evaluation.

### 4.4.2 Co-Financing

Table 5 provides information on the co-financing mobilized until end-2012, and compares it to the commitments in the Project document (see Annex 6 for details).

Table 5: Co-financing mobilized to the Project (including government, UNDP and local contributions), in USD1000’s.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **Total** |
| **Project document commitment** | 905.25 | 1128.75 | 827.25 | 2,861.25 |
| **Government co-financing mobilized** | Not available | na | na | 220.115 |
| **UNDP expended** | 38.280 | (-0.162) | 207.084 | 238.2 |
| **Local contribution (State government and communities)** | na | na | na | 794.2 |
| **Total co-financing** | na | na | na | 1,252.516 |
| **Percentage (actual co-financing compared to Project Document commitment)** |  |  |  | 43.8 |

From Table 5, it can be seen that there has been a great contribution by the local Governments and communities. This totals approximately $794,000, and was not envisaged in the Project document. This is far greater than anticipated, and this demonstrates real commitment and uptake by the local communities. UNDP’s cash co-finance has been directly managed by the Project and is mostly on schedule with the planned levels in the Project Document.

However, co-financing falls short of the commitments in the Project Document in several ways:

* total amount of co-financing delivered as of end-2012, as a percentage of the commitment made in the Project document, lies at 43.8%. This is considerably less than the 63% of UNDP/LDCF funds delivered over the same period;
* national government co-financing delivered is only $220,115. The Project document has a commitment of government co-financing of $3 million (including both national and state governments);
* total co-financing delivered at end-2012 is only $1.25 million, out of a total of $3.5 million to be delivered by the end of the Project.

The gap in Government contribution has been explained by the tight budgetary constraints that the government has faced since the separation of South Sudan, and, the ET was informed, for many other projects the Government Counterpart Cost Sharing Contribution was almost nil.

### 4.4.3 Distribution across Outcomes, type of input and efficiency of use of funds

By Outcome

Table 6 summarizes the forecasted allocation of LDCF and UNDP funds across the three Outcomes (and Project Management) as defined in the Project Document.

Table : Showing original budget allocations across Project Outcomes

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4 (project management)** | **Total** |
| Amount | 2,300 | 600 | 400 | 500 | 3,800 |
| Percentage of total | 61% | 16% | 10% | 13% | 100% |

Hence, in the Project Document, 61% was allocated to site level activities in order to increased adaptive capacity, 16% was allocated to capacity building, 10% to knowledge management and upscaling and 13% to project management.

Data on the actual expenditures across Outcomes has not been recorded. Data is recorded on budget use by input type (see Table 7, below). However, it can be noted: (i) this Evaluation has observed that by far most budget has been expended at the site level, to Outcome 1 type activities; (ii) the evaluation has noted that some budget has been allocated to capacity development, knowledge management and project management. Hence, the Evaluation is satisfied that the Project has respected the allocation across outcomes as planned in the Project Document. More importantly, the Evaluation is satisfied that the majority of the funds under this Project have directly benefitted communities, farmers, pastoralists and other local beneficiaries, in line with LDCF guidance.

By Input Type (budget lines)

Table 7 summarizes the main expenditures by budget lines until end-2012.

Table : Main budget expenditures by type of input

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Item** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **Total** |
| Service Contracts - Individuals | 48 | 70 | 62 | 180 |
| Svc Co - Training and Educ Serv | 370 | 567 | 545 | 1482 |
| Unrealized Loss | 50 | 0 | 190 | 240 |
| **Sub-Total** | **468** | **637** | **797** | **1902** |
| Other | 147 | 50 | 101 | 298 |
| **Overall Project Total** | **615** | **687** | **898** | **2200** |

From Table 7, it can be seen that three budget lines (Service Contracts – Individuals, Svc Co - Training and Educ Serv, and Unrealized Loss) account for US$1.9 million, or 86%, of all expenditure until end-2012. The first of these (*Service Contracts – Individuals*) mostly covers the PMO staff and national level consultants. This covers less than 10%, and seems very reasonable considering the level of management and technical support. The second of these (*Svc Co - Training and Educ Serv*) covers the many contracts to provide support to villages (i.e. irrigation pumps, seeds, water harvesting modifications, tools, irrigation systems, solar pumps, gas stoves) etc. This accounts for 78% of expenses so far. This is the delivery to the villages, and it is appropriate that such a large percentage is accounted for in services to the villages.

The third item (*Unrealized loss*) relates to unfortunate losses the Project unavoidably incurred due to massive fluctuations in exchange rates during 2011. In fact, quarterly advances are made based on requests, and the funds are transferred to the project bank account and into local currency. During 2011, after such a transfer had occurred, but before the services/goods were purchased, the government devalued the currency by almost 100%, meaning the value of local currency was almost halved. In many cases contracts had to be cancelled, and the money was returned to UNDP – however, the money returned was worth far less in US$ than the money that had been advanced.

Efficiency

Annex 7 provides a table summarizing the number and type of beneficiary. By end-2012, in total, an estimated 7,176 men and 3,756 women have benefitted from the Project, a total of 10,932 direct beneficiaries for a total expenditure of US$2.2 million. By number, 34% of the direct beneficiaries are women. On average, this is $201/beneficiary. This appears a reasonable figure, but the evaluation was unable to compare this with other internationally supported projects in Sudan, nor to assess whether the amounts paid for inputs by the Project were reasonable.

## 4.5 Other Implementation Issues

### 4.5.1 The Strategic approach to implementation

The Evaluation observed that the Project approach is very responsive to the needs of the communities - whilst maintaining a strong focus on climate change adaptation and/or resilience to climate variability. This is an achievement, as often bottom-up planning can mean technical aspects are neglected. Moreover, the Project approach is appreciated for being very *action-oriented*. Stakeholders at all levels unanimously stated this as one of the reasons for the Project’s success, compared to other Projects that spend much time and resources to assess and to plan, but show little action. A key result of this, as will be seen later, is the great trust built between the Project and the beneficiaries – and this was developed from a low starting point.

However, as seen above, there is little evidence of a long-term or strategic thinking behind this responsive, action-oriented approach. Even if all activities are responsive and developed rapidly to address short-term needs, it is possible for the Project managers to have, “hidden in their pocket”, a long-term strategy which guides short-term activities. As a result of this absence of strategy, it is not clear where the Project aims to be by Project end, and how this fits into the greater scheme of the NAPA implementation and adapting to climate change in Sudan. Discussions with some stakeholders – notably UNDP senior management – revealed some elements of a strategic thinking, but this is not formalized into documents nor widely discussed.

Moreover, after working with local beneficiaries for up to two years and more, it should now be possible to engage with them in a long-term and strategic manner. That is, whilst still responding to urgent needs, it should now be possible to engage in strategic assessment and planning processes with farmers, villages and state level stakeholders. This could be done effectively and rapidly. Some of the discussions held during this Evaluation with the local beneficiaries suggested they are ready for this, and are even requesting it.

### 4.5.2 Risk assessments

Recently UNDP introduced the ‘Risk Log’ as a tool to support Project Management. The tool is based on the risks identified in the Project Document. Annually, Project Management reports on the status of these risks. If necessary, it proposes remedial measures. Finally, new risks may be identified during project implementation and added to the Risk Log. For this Project, this Evaluation found no evidence that the Risk Logs were useful. The Project document identified four risks. The annual reports reported on two of these. It is not clear how the selected risks are risks, nor why other potential risks were not included. This seems to be undertaken as a bureaucratic exercise rather than a planning or management exercise. This is not leveled as a criticism - the Risk Log seems superfluous to requirements given the other management tools available.

## 4.6 Conclusion

Overall, the Project has been implemented effectively and efficiently, in accordance with the workplan and budget. Notably, implementation has been overall very strong and effective on a day-day basis, achieving impressive local results. Box 2 provides some of the keys to this success. However, there have been some minor weaknesses and these are described in the above sections. Notably, until now, considerably less attention has been paid to strategic aspects at national, State and community level.

|  |
| --- |
| * Initial focus on action, rather than on planning and assessment; * Focus on actions that have a visible impact for beneficiaries; * Project activities are designed to be simple and aligned to local needs and manageable; * Use of committed regional coordinators, embedded in State government, to provide continuous support and to link villages to national Project management; * Use of multi-sector, State level Technical Committees to ensure good backstopping and linkages; * Continuous support and dialogue by the PMO with all levels; * Strong overall support to Project by HCENR; * Strong support to many Project activities by UNDP; and, * Continuous emphasis and focus on climate change, climate change adaptation and resilience to climate variability. |

Box : Listing key factors in the Project success at village and site level

# 5. Project Results to Date

This Chapter reviews the Project’s achievements to date under each of the 3 substantive Outcomes and it reviews cumulative progress to achieving the Project Objective.

A result is defined by GEF as ‘*a describable or measurable development change resulting from a cause-and-effect relationship’*. The main focus for UNDP/GEF mid-term evaluations is the Outcome level. This Evaluation assesses the extent to which the Outcome level results have been achieved so far and the contribution to the Project Objective. Each Outcome and the Objective is evaluated according to its ‘relevance’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’.

The Project Document and its logical framework describe the Project by theme, sector and subsector (through the Outcomes and Outputs). However, in practice, the Project has been implemented as four ‘integrated’ sub-projects: one in each participating State. Hence, the following sections, after describing the background in line with the logical framework, mostly describe the results on a State-by-State basis.

## 5.1 Outcome 1: Resilience of food-production systems and food-insecure communities enhanced in the face of climate change.

Background

Outcome 1 is the central pillar of this Project. Through Outcome 1, thousands of remote and marginalized people are to benefit from adaptation to climate change and increased climate resilience, notably through improved natural resource management and agricultural practices.

As stated in the Project Document, the baseline situation includes declining rainfall and changing wet seasons, and subsequent direct impacts on agricultural production (including livestock) and food security, and indirect impacts on livelihoods, health, economic development and even conflict and security. The Project-driven alternative, as described in the Project Document, is sustainably increased agricultural production and improved livelihoods in the targeted communities/villages/sites in four different agro-ecological zones. As the detailed nature of the challenges varies from zone to zone, so the Project interventions vary from zone to zone.

Achievements

The Project has made great achievements under this Outcome. Box 3 highlights many of the successful measures and the progress at sites in the four States. Annex 7 provides information on the number of beneficiaries, their gender and the types of support they have received.

|  |
| --- |
| **Increasing resilience, increasing food security and adapting to climate change in Sudan**  Project interventions to build the resilience of food production systems have focused on introducing and testing the viability, efficiency and effectiveness of simple and improved technologies – usually as part of a package. For example, the Project, at different sites, has introduced micro-scale irrigated agriculture (through development of boreholes), improved water harvesting and storage, and supported direct pumping from the river. It has made available improved seeds, and developed a number of highly marketable horticultural crops. It has improved the health and productivity of livestock. These interventions have significantly reduced vulnerability and enhanced local food security.  The Project has also supported actions to improve national resources and enhance ecosystem resilience. It has created shelterbelts around villages and farmlands to protect against desertification, it has re-seeded to improve rangelands, and it has reduced the demand for wood fuel by supporting the distribution of improved stoves and gas cylinders. All activities have increased adaptive capacity, all respond to locally identified needs, and all have been implemented in a highly participatory manner with strong contribution from local communities. Beneficiaries are universally appreciative. At most sites, awareness raising, training and some organizational support have surrounded all actions (see Outcome 2), and the focus on women has been quite strong. In many sites, the Project has recognized the importance of financial security in sustaining results. The support to community based revolving funds, which are currently working efficiently and expanding, is a good example of this. Efforts are now needed to improve institutional management skills (e.g. financial bookkeeping) and to link community based institutions with the commercial banks and micro-finance lending entities.  In Gedarif State, the project has worked with four communities in Sabaa village. It has helped establish, or re-establish, four Village Development Committees (VDC) that are responsible for planning and decision-making within the project. Under the VDCs, several thematic groups are active, for example initiating and managing forestry activities and accessing gas stoves. The Project has also initiated revolving funds (RFs). The VDCs, groups and RF now function with little support from the Project. The Project has also provided a great deal of training to farmers, covering a diverse range of issues, such as the use of improved seeds, animal breeding, and rangeland improvement. It has raised understanding of climate change. The project is fully understood and greatly appreciated by the beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries report a great increased in food security and improved livelihoods through:   * 200 women and 500 men have benefited from improved water harvesting over 1800 feddan[[13]](#footnote-13); * 90 women have benefited from gas stoves; * 1000 men and 1000 women have benefitted from training; * The State government reports that it has expanded elements of the Project approach to 200,000 feddan; and, * Large numbers have benefitted from improved rangelands (due to seed broadcasting), more resilient harvest (due to use of early maturing seeds) and improved revenue (due to improve animal health and husbandry measures).   In North Kordofan State, the Project has managed to reach a number of beneficiaries in six affected villages with successful investments in capacity building of VDCs. It has piloted micro-scale, irrigated agriculture to fully replace traditional dry farming and produce high market value horticultural crops. It has helped improve animal production through simple, improved, feeding regimes. It has protected villages and agricultural enclaves via the erection of living shelter belts. It has also contributed to biomass conservation through the introduction of gas stoves and cylinders. The project is fully understood and greatly appreciated by the beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries report a great increase in food security and improved livelihoods through:   * potato production – a first in the area – reaching 16 tons/feddan; * improved nutritional feeding using local ingredients has increased milk production from 0.3 liters/day/goat to 3.0 liters/day/goat; * sheep have gained 240 grams per day, and the incidence of twins increased from 10% to 23% across the flock. The above results have encouraged the private sector to invest in nutritional supplies - placing mills at the village level to supply improved feeding ingredients for the animals, and; * farmers from outside the project sites have gotten engaged in livestock production using improved rations   In River Nile State, the Project initially worked with four villages, recently expanded to six. The Project has helped establish or strengthen a VDC in each village. The VDC is responsible for planning and decision-making within the Project. The Project has also developed/strengthened two RFs in each village, one for irrigation pumps (for men) and one for gas stoves/cylinders (for women). The project has provided ongoing extension support to the village, focusing mostly on technical issues related to agriculture, livestock and water and water management. It has raised understanding of climate change and about the importance of shelterbelts. The Project is fully understood and greatly appreciated by the beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries report a great increased in food security and improved livelihoods through:   * 4000 men and 500 women have benefitted from the introduction of cash crops on irrigated land through use of diesel pumps – multiplying their income by a several factors. 1220 feddan have been converted to multi-cropping systems; * the government has provided 200 pumps, in addition to the 60 provided by the Project; * 705 women have obtained gas stoves, thereby reducing time spent collecting wood, and conserving forest and improving health; * 26 km of shelterbelt have been established to protect several villages from sand dunes; and, * Many families have benefitted from solar powered drinking water, improving health but also providing water to home gardens which are a way to increase resilience.   In South Darfur State, the project has worked with farmers in 20 villages (only six in the first year). It has provided ongoing extension support to the villages, focusing mostly on technical issues related to water harvesting, agriculture, home gardens and livestock. It has also established five successful demonstration sites. Working through existing farmer groups, it has facilitated the integration of good science into local natural resource management practices. It has raised understanding of climate change and how to adapt. The project is fully understood and greatly appreciated by the beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries report a great increased in food security and improved livelihoods through:   * 702 women and 377 men have benefited from improved water harvesting techniques, access to improved (early maturing) seeds and to improved tools (covering 2777 feddan); * The established home gardens and the rehabilitated rangelands; and, * A large number of people have benefited from improved revenue due to improved animal health and husbandry measures. |

Box : Highlighting Project progress at the site level in the four States

As discussed below, there are many reasons to be optimistic about the sustainability and potential upscaling of the measures described in Box 3. The total number of local, direct beneficiaries is estimated to be over 10,000 - each of these has seen some improvement in climate change adaptation, and some improvement in livelihood and/or food/security. In general, almost all the interventions have supported local communities to adapt to falling rainfall, to shortening rain seasons and to increased water scarcity.

Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness

In terms of relevance, under Outcome 1, all inputs, activities and outputs are closely related and relevant to adapting to climate change and increasing resilience to climate variability. All the targeted sites are priorities in terms of helping poor, remote and marginalized communities adapt to climate change. The activities under Outcome 1 are all very relevant.

With regards to efficiency, under Outcome 1, almost all inputs and outputs mobilized by the Project are well planned, delivered in a timely manner, and involve the appropriate stakeholders. The exceptions are mostly due to delays with UNDP releasing funds, as discussed above. On the whole, the Project activities involve the concerned technical partners at State level, and so can be considered integrated into the workprogramme of State technical agencies. More efficiency could be generated by increased partnership with other projects (e.g. with IFAD in River Nile and Gedarif States). Overall, the Project under Outcome 1 can be considered efficient.

One problem has been encountered in Gedarif State. Initially, the State proponents were expecting a much larger support from GEF/LDCF, and had planned to build a dam. The cost of the dam is estimated to be $1.2 million, and 4,000 people would benefit. These costs cannot be covered by the Project. This confusion has been the source of some tension. So far, the Project has undertaken a feasibility study for the dam, and is now lobbying the State government to cover the investment costs.

The Project under Outcome 1 can be considered very effective, so far. Considerable achievements have been made at site/village/community level, and the number of beneficiaries is impressive. However, until now, most support has focused on technical issues related to water, agriculture and harvesting, in the future more support on social, economic and financial aspects will be needed. In general, the strategic nature of activities at the site level needs more elaboration. This is related to the need for long-term support to be provided to the villages, and to the sustainability of impact. Overall, the project under Outcome 1 can be considered effective.

Prospects of Sustainability

Under Outcome 1, the Project has worked with a large number of beneficiaries across Sudan in a diverse set of circumstances. Notwithstanding, at the local level, many achievements of the project appear permanent. On the whole, the practices developed by the Project lead to quick improvements in food security and livelihoods, hence they are appreciated by the communities. They are also understood by the communities. Local communities have become very supportive of the Project and the introduced technologies and practices. Even if local capacity is limited, it should be sufficient to continue many of the practices. Hence, generally, the prospects for sustainability seem strong.

Notwithstanding, the Evaluation has observed two local issues that may undermine the full and comprehensive sustainability. First, although the project has undertaken some institutional strengthening at the local level (through the VDC and RF), more is needed. This is needed, for example, in terms of developing business management capacity, financial management capacity, greater organizational and governance capacity. Until this is undertaken, the communities will still be fragile and in some way dependent on outside support.

Second, the Project’s interventions have already led to impressive increases in agricultural production and revenue. This revenue is likely to be partly reinvested into a further expansion of agricultural production. This could lead to a positive cycle of more land being farmed, more produce, more animals, more water abstracted, more revenue, more investment, etc. Farmers are also keen to increase production through the use of agro-chemicals. There is a possibility that this cycle will place an unsustainable environmental pressure on resources, either at the local level (the village) or at a broader level (across the entire the groundwater aquifers or the river systems or the rangelands). This *pressure* is currently not being monitored.

Outcome 1 Indicators and Targets

Table 8 provides the indicator and target for Outcome 1 from the Project document,

Table : Outcome 1 indicator and target

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Indicator** | **Target** |
| Innovative coping mechanisms and practices with respect to adaptation to climate change risks to food security will be field- tested in 5 high-risks areas. | The following adaptation measures in five agro-climatic zones are implemented:   * Measures to enhance communal water storage systems, water supply and reduce vulnerability to water scarcity (and flash-flood frequency); * measures to improve animal production and to increase adaptive capacity to climatic change; * measures to improve crop production and to increase adaptive capacity to climatic change; * measures to enhance rangelands productivity; * measures for sand stabilization to combat sand dune encroachment on arable lands; * A micro-credit, revolving loan and livestock fund established in target communities to build adaptive capacity and livelihood resilience; |

At a basic level, these targets can be considered to have all already been met. However, given that there is no *quantitative* target, this is not very useful way of measuring success. During project implementation, the Project team has developed more specific targets.

Finally, the indicator/targets in Table 8 do not capture the true success under this Outcome. The true success is in the understanding and attitudes and practices of the local communities, not in the demonstration of technologies or practices.

## 5.2 Outcome 2: Institutional and individual capacities to implement climate risk management responses in the agriculture sector strengthened

Background

The Project Document is not fully clear on what is expected under this Outcome. For example, it is stated that “*In contrast to the current situation where no local, regional and national entities have the capacity to adequately integrate climate change risks into policy and programming, under this Outcome, training programmes will be implemented at various levels such that relevant agencies’ and stakeholders’ awareness of climate change risks are enhanced and incorporated into development plans*”. This suggests that under this Outcome capacity will be built at all levels to support the demonstration and piloting of Outcome 1, and help assure sustainability and replication. However, a detailed look at the Outputs and activities implemented under this Outcome suggests that the scope of this Outcome is the capacity building required *at local levels* to ensure that the piloting/demonstration can take place. This Evaluation takes this latter interpretation – i.e. the aim of this Outcome is to build capacity at village and local levels of government to *directly* surround and support the climate adaptation interventions in Outcome 1. It is noted that some capacity development took place under Outcome 1, hence the overlap and possible confusion across Outcomes 1 and 2.

Achievements

At the Village level, significant capacity has been built regarding agricultural practices, water management, and other natural resource management issues. These are covered in the discussion of Outcome 1. The numbers of trained beneficiaries are provided in Annex 7. As a result, at the village level, many of the beneficiaries are reaching a level of empowerment and are able to take increasing control of their lives.

There have also been considerable achievements at the State level in all four states. One key achievement has been the creation of active and effective integrated TCs. In each state, the TCs consist of a cross-cutting group of committed, capable experts and planners, who are able to work together on planning, problem solving, project implementation, resource mobilization, etc. This represents a key form of capacity for adapting to climate change, a basis for sustainability, replication and expansion.

Further, at State level, many *individuals* have benefitted from capacity building – notably the extension workers. For example, in South Darfur, 30 government extension workers have been involved full time in the Project, and have developed a strong understanding of adapting to climate change and extending this knowledge to communities. Likewise, the many sub-contractors, involved in, for example tree planting, or terracing, etc, have benefitted from on-the-job training provided under the Project, and are now more capable.

Some important gaps remain in both individual and institutional capacity. Firstly, at both village and State level, business management and organizational capacity remains weak. Villages have no long term, strategic approach to climate resilience. Villages are unable to mobilize resources, to plan effectively over the mid-term, to manage financial resources in a transparent and accountable manner, to interact with higher levels of government. It is not clear that villages could adapt to new challenges. At the State level, the project’s capacity building achievements remain quite small relative to challenges and needs (i.e. the State ability to help communities to adapt to climate change is not yet strong). Finally, one important level of Government is the *Locality*; agencies at this level may have an important role to play in replication and sustainability. Until now, this level of government has not been involved in the Project.

Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness

In terms of relevance, under Outcome 2, all inputs, activities and outputs are closely related and relevant to adapting to climate change and increasing resilience to climate variability. Capacity building has focused on the correct issues (natural resource management in face of climate change) and on the appropriate stakeholders (villagers and State technical agencies). The activities under Outcome 2 are very relevant.

With regards to efficiency, under Outcome 2, almost all inputs and outputs mobilized by the Project are well planned, delivered in a timely manner, and involve the appropriate stakeholders. The exceptions are mostly due to delays with UNDP releasing funds, as discussed above. On the whole, the Project activities are developed jointly with the concerned technical partners at State level, and so can be considered integrated into the workprogramme of State technical agencies. More coordination with the programmes of other development partners (FAO, IFAD, UNEP etc) would be beneficial.

The Project under Outcome 2 can be considered somewhat effective so far. Although certain achievements have been made, particularly at site/village/community level, much more needs to be done at State and other levels. The strategic nature of activities, even at the site level, needs strengthening. Until now, most capacity development has focused on technical issues related to water and harvesting, in the future more support to the social, economic and financial aspects will be essential.

Prospects of Sustainability

Sustainability is considered in a comprehensive way, covering economic, environmental, institutional and adaptation sustainability. At the site/community level, and as discussed under Outcome 1, there is a good chance the communities will continue with the improved practices, and that their institutions (VDC) will remain active - mainly due to economic benefits. Capacity has been developed and is being applied. However, more business/organizational/financial strengthening would be beneficial, and some additional technical skills can be developed. Most sites/communities have not yet reached a situation where they can continue independently (i.e. they have not yet *graduated*).

At the State level, some important steps towards sustainability have been taken with government agencies. Capacity has been built with technical agencies, notably with extension workers, and there is good reason to believe that this will continue to be approved. A groundswell of support has evolved for (i) adapting to climate change and (ii) supporting the new agricultural and natural resource management practices, and this should go some way towards sustaining State level activities. However, many challenges remain to reaching sustainability at State level. Notably, financial resources have not been allocated, and the top-level decision makers (Ministers of technical agencies and decision-makers in financial agencies) have not been adequately involved.

It is noted that there are also some barriers at the national level to local/state sustainability. These barriers are *beyond the Project*. They include: weaknesses in the micro-finance system; need for resource mobilization; weak governance over the agricultural sector (see Section 2.1.5); and weak inter-agency coordination (amongst governmental agencies and amongst development partners). The removal of those barriers would help create an enabling environment for sustainability.

Outcome 2 Indicators and Targets

Table 9 provides the indicator and target for Outcome 2 from the Project document.

Table : Outcome 2 indicators and targets.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Indicator** | **Target** |
| Institutional and individual capacities to respond to climate change risks and plan for adaptation are in place through trainings and workshops.  50% of organizations and / or population with access to climate change impact information and adaptation options at the national level and in five pilot areas. | At staff from least 2 organizations that provide extension services attend training workshops held in each of the five vulnerable zones for extension staff.  At least 10% of the project site’s farmers and pastoralists population received targeted training on climate change risks and adaptation options.  Perceived change in vulnerabilities by community members in the target areas. |

## 5.3 Outcome3: A better understanding of lessons learned and emerging best practices, captured and up-scaled at the national level

Background

As described in the Project Document, “*this outcome aims to ensure that the implementation of project activities … provides important lessons on what does and does not work in improving resilience of vulnerable communities in Sudan to increased climatic variability and climate change. The systematic compilation of these lessons will form a crucial input to informing Sudan’s plans and strategies to adapt to climate change over the coming years. The project, ….., will play a pivotal role in involving relevant stakeholders, enhancing local knowledge and capacities, which will in turn enable Sudan to scale up and replicate these interventions. This knowledge management component will be implemented in close synergy with the UNDP ‘Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM)’ initiative*.”

There are two aspects to this Outcome: lesson learning and upscaling. The specific outputs associated with this Outcome are:

* National menu of best practices available for replication;
* Preparation of a national adaptation policy;
* Lessons codified and disseminated through the ALM, and;
* Lessons codified and disseminated throughout Sudanese Institutions.

It is clearly stated that most of these Outputs would be delivered towards the end of the Project. However, clearly, the work to systematically prepare these Outputs should commence early in the Project, soon after start-up.

Achievements – lesson learning

From Outcomes 1 and 2, we can see that some lessons are emerging, and there are many examples of good practices and good approaches. Undoubtedly, some knowledge regarding adapting to capacity will be generated. These lessons include both natural resource management practices and institutional approaches to developing adaptive capacity.

The Project has also established a good working relationship with the ARC – an umbrella body for a range of Sudanese institutions working on issues related adapting to climate change, which could be responsible for some dissemination. The Project also produced the well-received document “*NAPA Best Practices in Sudan Documentation Study*” (see Box 4).

|  |
| --- |
| Based on studies undertaken in early 2012, the Project has produced the “*NAPA Best Practices in Sudan*  *Documentation Study*”. This document provides a good overview of many of the practices introduced by the Project and some of the impacts. This is an excellent document for sharing information on the Project and communicating with mid-level decision-makers. This document has an important role to play in communication and advocacy.  However, this cannot really be considered a document of best practices from the Project, because:   * It comes too early in the Project; * It is not sufficiently scientific and not based on a clear baseline; * It does not record failures, only successes; and, * In many cases the practices discussed were not introduced under this Project. |

Box : Best practices report

However, this evaluation feels that at present there is little evidence that the concerned Outputs will be delivered, or the Outcome achieved. This is because:

* No systematic approach to capturing lessons has been established. No methodology for lesson learning has been created. The current information on emerging best practices is mostly ‘anecdotal’ and it is not sufficiently scientific (see Box 4);
* There is no strategy in place to prepare or contribute to a national adaptation policy; and,
* No linkages have yet been established with Sudanese institutions or the ALM.

Achievements – Upscaling learning

It is noted that the Outcome also refers to upscaling at the national level. One success has been recorded here. The Project’s approach to consultation and prioritization has been replicated in the parallel ongoing HCENR/UNEP initiative to develop the NAP. Moreover, the four State level TC’s, developed with Project support have been used by HCENR/UNEP as a vehicle for planning, and they have been used as a resource to disseminate to other States.

Notwithstanding, this Evaluation feels that this Project should focus upscaling efforts at the State level, and not at the national level. It is understood that there are many issues that need to be addressed at national level (e.g. policy, resources, some research), however, these are complex and large issues upon which it is *not feasible to expect this project to have an impact*. Consequently, the project should focus on replication at the State level. Indeed there have already been some Project achievements at the State level with regards to replication, for example:

* In South Darfur, the Government has provided extension workers who can be used for replication. The Government has also extended practices to new areas, and it has provided tractors and vehicles and other tools to upscale activities;
* In North Kordofan and Gedarif, the Government has developed an Action Plan for management of drylands during a changing climate, and they have established local laws restricting land-use to respect climate change; and,
* In River Nile the Government has expanded the supplying of diesel pumps, and in Gedarif State the Government has expanded certain project approaches over 200,000 feddans.

Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness

In terms of relevance, under Outcome 3, all planned inputs, activities and outputs are closely related and relevant to adapting to climate change and increasing resilience to climate variability. If implemented, the activities under Outcome 3 are very relevant.

With regards to efficiency, this seems to be weak regarding Outcome 3. As discussed, the priority under Outcome 3 would be to ensure lessons are learnt and knowledge managed. The system to do this lesson learning and knowledge management has not been established. This should have been done soon after the Project started. This should have included a sufficiently scientific approach to ensure the outputs would be of international standard. In fact, for each intervention, it would be necessary to clearly describe the baseline (institutional, socio-economic, environmental and climate change). It would then be necessary to clearly describe the efforts of the Project, and to measure the impacts and effects. These impacts/effects would cover institutional, socio-economic, environmental, climate change and possibly other factors. A standard format for each intervention would be necessary. It is also important to document failures – as these are valuable sources of learning.

As mentioned above, some progress has been made with regards to ‘upscaling’, particularly at the State level. This has been achieved efficiently.

Effectiveness is also undermined by the lack of efficiency.

As mentioned above, some progress has been made with regards to ‘upscaling’, particularly at the State level. This has been effective.

Prospects of Sustainability

The issue of sustainability does not apply to lesson learning and knowledge management. These are achievements to be made once, during the project.

The issue of sustainability does apply to ‘upscaling’, or replication/dissemination. As mentioned above, this Evaluation recommends the Project to focus on upscaling at the State level rather than the National level. However, at this stage, even the prospects for sustainable State upscaling appear weak. There is insufficient evidence that senior decision makers in the four States are sufficiently involved with the Project or informed of its achievements and importance to assure the upscaling.

It is noted that there are some barriers at national level to local/state sustainability. These barriers are beyond our project. They include: weaknesses in the micro-finance system; need for resource mobilization; strong governance over the agricultural sector; and inter-agency coordination. The removal of those barriers would help create an enabling environment for sustainability.

Outcome 3 Indicators and Targets

Table 10 provides the indicator and target for Outcome 3 from the Project document.

Table : Outcome 3 indicators and targets

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Indicator** | **Target** |
| Food security policies and programmes modified to scale-up tested adaptation measures under the Outcomes #1 and #2; development of national policy for food security in the face of climate change | At least five knowledge products containing critical lessons learned and good adaptation practices from the five pilot agro-ecological zones. |

The link between the indicator and the target is not clear. The target is weak because it does not capture the ‘quality’ of the knowledge products. Somehow, the target should cover quality, for example, by measuring if the knowledge products are being used by stakeholders outside of the Project. The target may also capture the need for modified policies and programmes.

At present no knowledge products have been produced. Likewise, with regards to modified policies and programmes. This may come from the final year of the Project.

## 5.4 Cumulative Progress towards the Project Development Objective

The Project Objective is *“The objective of the project is to implement an urgent set of adaptation-focused measures that will minimize and reverse the food insecurity of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, thereby reducing vulnerability of rural communities from increasing climatic variability and climate change*”[[14]](#footnote-14).

Summary of Progress towards the overall Objective

Village level The Project has made great progress towards the overall Objective in a short amount of time with limited resources at the village level. Impressive achievements have been made with a large number of people in diverse socio-economic and ecological conditions. A large number of people have been helped to adapt to climate change and increase resilience to climate change. Positive impacts on socio-economic conditions and food security are evident. In many ways the changes are sustainable – there are good reasons to believe that the villages/communities will continue many of the improved practices, and that VDCs and RFs will continued. There is also evidence of the Project helping to change ‘attitudes’, for example with regards to forestry, agriculture, climate change and utilizing new agricultural techniques.

However, with regards to a strategy of *piloting* a comprehensive village-level approach to adaptation, more needs to be done. Firstly, the achievements so far can best be considered a first phase – with the focus on natural resource management measures and practices. A second phase in adaption would need to focus on organizational, economic and financial practices of the communities in the face of climate change, addressing issues such as credit, market access and insurance. Such a phased approach would realistically take at least a decade to roll out, meaning *these same communities should continue to receive support*, albeit of a different scope and nature, for several years. Second, the paradigm of a village-level ‘*model’ to be piloted* has not been sufficiently elaborated. The model should be clearly defined, tested, and then readied for dissemination to other states. This model would include the ‘phased approach’. The development and rolling out of this full model, ultimately across all affected States in Sudan, could be a main element in a ‘national adaptation programme’ in natural resource sectors, accompanied by capacity development and addressing weakness in the enabling environment.

State level Some progress towards the overall Objective has been achieved at the State level, on building State level capacity to support communities to adapt to climate change. In four States, the TC is now a key resource for delivering support to adaptation, and the TC members each have more individual capacity. The individual capacity built is mostly sustainable, and the TC as a group has some sustainable elements. There is also some evidence of changing attitudes, for example, there is now a full understanding of climate change, and a better understanding of the value of participatory approaches and inter-agency cooperation.

However, at State level, much more needs to be done to achieve sustainability. Unless decision-makers in the States are convinced, and financial allocations are changed, it is likely that the impacts in the States will fade. Moreover, political instability, meaning officers are regularly transferred to other assignments, will also undermine State level sustainability. More has to be done on capacity building and institutional development at several levels, and on lesson learning and knowledge management.

National level A little progress towards the overall Objective has been recorded - in terms of strengthening NHCENR and ACR, although this has been quite limited. It is recognized that national level is not the priority for this Project, however, some work at National level is essential. This would be mostly related to collaborating with other international and national agencies, and to ensuring there is a proper lesson learning process, and on targeted efforts to facilitate follow-up and resource mobilization. Lesson learning and knowledge management – Outcome 3 – have fallen short so far.

Summary Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness

As seen from the above sections, the Project is very relevant. Almost all activities are focused on climate change adaptation and climate resilience.

The Project is also highly efficient. There has been a very good targeting of project sites and beneficiaries. The processes to mobilize inputs have been well planned and ordered. Project activities are quite well integrated into government technical department workplans at the State level. The only weaknesses in efficiency stem from (i) less than optimal coordination with potential partners, at the village and State level; (ii) certain delays in the release of funds, meaning some activities were delayed or cancelled.

Project effectiveness has been adequate, so far. The project has had a major effect at the village level, and this is greatly appreciated. However, as seen, the strategic nature and long-term approach to the project, both at village and State level, is not sufficiently strong. This will be necessary if the project’s effectiveness is to be optimized, and if sustainability is to be secured at the various levels.

Overall Indicators and Targets

Table 11 provides the indicator and target for the Project Objective from the Project document,

Table : Overall Objective indicators and targets

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Indicator** | **Target** |
| Food security policy has been modified to fully integrate climate change adaptation measures (e.g. climate-resilient crop and livestock production, and climate risk-sensitive rangeland and water resource management strategies) | 10% of village population in which pilot measures are implemented are engaged and participate in the process; a local leadership council established in each village targeted in the project to support community management of natural resources in the face of climate change; lessons-learned through implementation inform national food security policy resilient and adaptive to climate change |

The target is mostly achieved. However, this only relates to Outcome 1, and does not capture adequately all three Outcomes. Moreover, as formulated, the target does not relate to the Indicator.

## 5.5 The Gender Dimension of the Results

The Project Document does not set out an approach to gender, and the early Project progress reports reveal that gender was not then a major issue. However, in later reports, more attention was paid to gender, in particular to ensuring that women benefit from activities, and that activities are designed to support women.

As can be seen from the Table in Annex 7, a large number of women have benefitted from the Project, approximately 35% of beneficiaries. Moreover, a quick review of the inputs and activities show that many activities are oriented towards women’s needs – notably the provision of gas stoves and of drinking water. Women have been particularly involved in South Darfur and North Kordofan States. For example, in North Kordofan, the local Project champion, a women, has both benefitted greatly from the project and become an agent of positive change in the State, helping women to be more recognised, more involved and receive more support.

Despite the great number of female beneficiaries, there is little evidence of women being involved as *decision-makers*. In two States (North Kordofan and South Darfur), there is evidence of women being decision-makers *at the village level*. But, even in those States, there is little evidence of women being involved as decision-makers *at the State level*. Finally, there is little evidence of a strategic approach to the gender dimension, and there is little evidence of the project utilizing specialist advice on addressing gender issues. This may be a missed opportunity for learning lessons related to climate change, adaptation and gender in Sudan.

# 6. Conclusions and Lessons Learnt

## 6.1 Conclusions

This Evaluation finds that the Project has made considerable achievements at this point. The Project is well focused on local priorities – food security, poverty reduction and climate change - and the Project targeting has been good. The rate of Project implementation has been adequate.

Overall, stakeholder involvement has been very good. The Project has managed to build around an array of stakeholders that include the State Ministries responsible for Agriculture, Animal Resources, Electricity, Water, Health and Environment. This also includes Universities, Agricultural Research Stations, CBOs, Local Governorates and village leaders. However, at village, State and national level, a stronger collaboration with the programmes/activities of other development partners, including UN agencies, would be beneficial.

Amongst the most notable achievements are:

* Developing the trust of a large number of beneficiaries, increasing understanding of climate change, and changing attitudes to natural resource management practices;
* Promulgating appropriate technologies, demonstrating technologies in new locations and even introducing new technologies;
* Helping more than ten thousand people to adapt to climate change, increase resilience to climate variability and overcome poverty;
* Creating a network of technical stakeholders in each of the four States (the Technical Committee members);
* Initiating organizational strengthening at the village level; and,
* Contributing to the body of national, regional and global knowledge on how to adapt to climate change.

The Project approach, which has focused on action at the site/community, and on action rather than planning, has been a main factor in generating the Project momentum and success. Finally, despite a slow start, the Project has reached a high percentage of female beneficiaries through good gender targeting.

The Evaluation found several weaknesses related to the implementation, achievements and sustainability. These include:

* The Project implementation has focused on responding to urgent needs, and as such the strategies underpinning activities and the long-term nature of the Project have not been sufficiently elaborated. This weakness is evident at village, State and national level. At village level, this would involve piloting a long-term, multi-phased approach to establishing village level adaptive capacity;
* Capacity building at the village level has covered most technical needs, however, local beneficiaries need support in developing business and organizational skills. Improved planning, greater access to micro-credit and improved access to government services are essential;
* The project has successfully contributed to increased production and income at the site level. These changes may ultimately lead to environmental or social problems. Insufficient attention has been paid to assess the likelihood of such problems in the future, and to establishing mitigation strategies if necessary;
* The project approach to gender has had some success and the number of women beneficiaries is high. However, it is not based on a proper gender assessment, and there is little evidence that women are sufficiently involved as decision-makers;
* Project knowledge management has been weak. There has been no thorough documenting of baselines, nor of the economic, ecological and social changes motivated by the Project. This information would be essential for replication and lesson learning; and,
* Decision makers at State and national level are not adequately informed of Project justification, Project successes and the need to act to help communities adapt to climate change.

Currently, these weaknesses do undermine the prospects of sustainability and replication. However, if corrective measures are taken, this Evaluation is confident that the Project can overcome the weaknesses.

## 6.2 Lessons Learnt and Best Practices

The Project approach to work first and directly with communities, to respond to locally identified needs and to show quick results, before undertaking a detailed assessment and planning, has been very successful. This is an important lesson. This has built the confidence of local beneficiaries, it has demonstrated the usefulness of the Project interventions to State stakeholders, and it has generated momentum. All-in-all, it has built a strong basis for future cooperation and progress.

This “result-on-the-ground approach” has been accompanied by a continuous dialogue between the Project staff, the State counterparts, and the local communities. This continuous dialogue, constructed around locally important issues and the introduced practices, and backed-up by scientific and technical understanding, has further built trust. Moreover, this has helped broadly build understanding of climate change adaptation and resilience. This is another important lesson.

Overall, there is some evidence of real adaptation to climate change and of increased resilience at the local level – however, this finding is qualified by the need for much better documentation.

The Project ran an inception workshop followed, several months later, by a planning workshop. A main focus of these workshops was to build the Project team and to develop the capacity needed to implement the Project. These activities seem to have contributed to a smooth implementation (despite the delays caused largely by external factors). This is a good practice.

The transfer of international and national knowledge and best practices to villages has been limited due to the small size of the PMO and the large geographical scope of the Project. A larger PMO, with access to a broader range of expertise and skills, to cover a smaller geographical scope, would allow a more thorough approach, increase chances of sustainability, and allow for more thorough lesson learning.

Finally, in some areas, increased system resilience has been achieved by the shift from traditional dry-land farming to small-scale irrigated horticultural farming.

# 7. Recommendations

## 7.1 To the Project Team and the Project Board

Outcome 1

1. Consider developing a rapid system for assessing the potential environmental and social impacts of the Project’s impacts at the site level. The changes in agricultural practices and the increased production levels, caused by the Project, may impact groundwater quality and quality, surface water quality and quantity, rangelands integrity and degradation of cultivated land. A system to rapidly assess this, and to identify mitigation measures, should be established. Likewise there may be social impacts of the Project, and these should also be at least monitored.
2. Undertake a rapid gender assessment of all the sites. This should assess: (i) the gender dimension of the impacts of climate change; (ii) the impacts so far of the Project on gender; (iii) proposed activities to improve the gender aspects of the Project, with potential interventions at State or local level. A gender expert would be required for this.

Outcome 2

1. Develop the *strategic* nature of the approach to supporting villages/communities through to the Project end and beyond. The aim should be for the villages that are currently supported to ‘graduate’ beyond the need for international Project assistance on agricultural practices, and thereafter to serve as a resource to neighboring villages. Specifically, a rapid village assessment and planning process should be used in the currently supported villages/communities to determine: (i) the village’s aims for the coming three year period; (ii) the priority interventions for the Project in the village over the coming 12 months to ensure sustainability and ‘graduation’.

It is likely that, as a result of this planning, the Project will re-focus its support to these villages, and provide more capacity building, organizational development, business development and financial management (and, as a result, provide *fewer* direct agricultural inputs). Potential outputs at the village level could include: participatory, transparent village development plans; increased transparency in the revolving funds; local bye-laws to formalize practices; clear village business development plans; requests for finance to micro-finance organizations; support from villages to the lobbying of State Government for improved services. (However, it is unlikely that these villages will become fully climate resilient with the timescale of this Project. Subsequent to this Project, additional support to further develop financial sustainability and insurance schemes in the face of climate change is likely to be necessary.)

1. Develop the *strategic* approach at State level, or Project ‘exit strategies’. The *exit strategy* should set out the activities to be supported by the Project so that, by Project end, in each State there will be a mechanism for a continued programme of assistance from States to villages to adapt to climate change. In the remaining 12 months, to implement the exit strategy, the Project may support: capacity building for the existing Technical Committees; activities to develop high level support and the support of decision-makers – possibly through the development of more media products and lobbying by the Project. Clear targets and indicators should be developed.

Outcome 3

1. Establish a thorough system to document changes at the site, to clearly document all economic, social and environmental developments. This will include a clear description of the baseline, a clear description of the Project inputs, and a clear description of the pertinent economic, social and environmental situation after the Project. This way, Project achievements and failures will be clearly documented to create international standard best practices and lesson learnt documentation – strong evidence of adapting to climate change. The first step will be to develop a simple monitoring protocol at the site level.

It is noted that this could be costly to develop and implement.

1. Continue to focus *up-scaling* efforts at the State level, and ***do not attempt*** national level upscaling. In general, the Project should not attempt national level interventions or capacity building. However, one exception can be considered: improve collaboration with UN agencies and international development partners at the national level. This could begin with a dialogue with UNEP on UNEP’s programme to develop the NAP. Joint activities with UNEP could be planned – for example the above-mentioned gender assessment. Through this Project, for example, UNDP may work with other development partners to support a national conference on climate change and climate change adaptation in the arid, semi-arid and rain-fed areas of Sudan.
2. It is noted that many of the six above recommendations will place high demands on the technical and administrative capacity of the PMO. In order to meet these demands, it will be advisable to strengthen the PMO, for example: (i) with one full time officer to work on knowledge management and communications; and/or (ii) with several short-term national experts covering issues such as gender, business development, CBO-strengthening, etc; and/or (iii) with short term inputs from international experts to ensure the best international practices are being imported to Sudan through the Project – for example in areas where there are no experienced national experts.

## 7.2 To UNDP

1. Approve an extension of the Project until the end of 2014, at no additional cost. This is to allow for delays caused mostly by external issues (i.e. secession of South Sudan and instability in Darfur).
2. Fully confirm the re-allocation of the funds initially allocated to Central Equatorial State equally across the four existing States.
3. Urgently find a way to issue funds more timely at the beginning of each quarter, or for somehow to avoid the Project being in the situation of not having the funds needed to support urgent seasonal activities. Due to these delays, UNDP is seen as un-caring and out of touch, and this takes the shine off an otherwise strong performance from UNDP.

1. Based on the detailed work under this Project, and involving the stakeholders from this Project (who are now good partners), undertake a proper analysis of the *root causes* of climate vulnerability and the *barriers* to climate change adaptation and increasing climate resilience (covering rural areas and agro-pastoral based livelihoods). This has not been properly done before, and it will feed into the design of the UNDP Programme and future Projects to support adaptation to climate change. This analysis may be funded by this Project, or by other Projects under development.

The Project Document contained an incomplete analysis of root causes and barriers. The Project Design has not really attempted to address root causes and barriers. However, now, after three years of experience, and with a good interaction with a large number and a diverse set of villages across Sudan, it is possible to do a proper analysis. Starting at the village level, and working up through locality, state and national level, this analysis could determine just why, exactly, villages are either *unwilling* or *unable* to adopt natural resource management measures that would help them adapt to climate change. The financial, policy, informational and other barriers could be clearly understood, as a basis for designing future interventions.

1. Ensure that all UNDP supported adaptation projects in the natural resources sector fit into a single strategic approach. This could include a programme of phases, where during, say, a ten-year period, villages are (i) first supported with direct agricultural practices (ii) then supported with planning and assessment (iii) and finally provided with financial and risk management capacity. After ten years, the villages would be fully resilient and sustainable. Yet, after only two-three years, each village could already function as a node for replication to other villages. The capacity of State governments would be developed by involving them in this support to the villages. State government would expand and replicate. Lessons learnt and findings would feed back to identify the necessary changes in the national and state enabling environment. This strategic programme approach is firmly in line with UNDP forthcoming Country Programme and new focus for activities.

## 7.3 To Government

1. Ensure the Government contribution, as committed to in the Project Document, is secured, since due to scarcity of resources, the Government has not yet been able to honor its commitments.

## 7.4 For Future Projects

1. For Projects of this nature, ensure that there is at least one extra full-time professional member of the national project office (preferably two more). This could be used to ensure comprehensive back-up is given to Project activities and local beneficiaries, for example, to provide technical back-up, or knowledge management, or oversee M&E. If the PMO has adequate technical capacity, it can provide the required diverse support activities, covering a large range of natural resources, economic and organizational issues, and ensuring that activities are designed and implemented in line with national and international best practices. It is recognized that this would probably require either reducing the number of intervention sites, or increasing the overall project budget.
2. Ensure that, during the project inception phase, the project team and project sponsors devote time to strategically reflect upon any key project issues that were not resolved at the time of the preparation of the project document. At inception phase, *in parallel* to getting the project underway as quickly as possible, ensure there is a good consideration of outstanding strategic issues. An alternative would be to hold the ‘mid-term review’ much earlier in the project implementation, say after 1 year.
3. For nationally implemented projects, UNDP should determine a way to release quarterly funds more rapidly, or allow for some form of ‘buffer budget’ to cover the costs of activities in the first weeks of a quarter before the Quarterly Workplan is firmly approved.

# Annexes

**Annexes**

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## Annex 1 - Terms of Reference for the Mid-Term Evaluation

* See separate file

## Annex 2 - Evaluation Issues Checklist

The Evaluation followed the following outline in the data collection, collation and analysis:

**1. Project design and its relevance**

Assess the problem addressed by the project and the project strategy. Does the logframe make sense? Do the project strategy and project log-frame respond to the problem?

Does the project document identify the underlying problems, and does it develop a strategy that responds to them?

Assess appropriateness of the objectives, outcomes, outputs, planned activities and inputs as compared to cost-effective alternatives.

How are the M&E framework and indicators in the prodoc – assess the usefulness?

Answer the following:

* Is the project relevant to national/local development priorities;
* Are the concerned stakeholders involved;
* is the community, local and country **ownership** and **drivenness** appropriate. How is participation and commitments of government, states, local authorities, and communities;
* is the project aligned to the UNDP mission in the country (to build its capacities in the focal area of adaptation to climate change);
* is the project aligned to the LDCF adaptation guidelines (Demonstrating increases in adaptive capacity and resilience for climate change and assess whether and how the engagement of communities has had a particular contribution and added value to community adaptation to climate change);

**2. Project outcomes, outputs and indicators**

What have been the major achievements of the project so far – and what are the indicators of this success? Assess progress towards project goal, objective and outcomes.

Have the practices introduced at the sites been **rigorously** **assessed** technically – are they economically, financially and environmentally sustainable?

What is new about this the achievements at the site? What is different or innovative? What is the value added? Is there innovation in terms of research? Institutional approach? Inter-government relations? Financial sustainability? Or the package of achievements?

Is the work on revolving funds and developing local associations sufficient? Is it well designed/planned?

What is the likelihood of sustainability of project results? Will the project activities continue after the project has finished? How do we know? Will the project impacts continue after the project has finished? How do we know? Will the project activities/impacts be replicated after the project has finished? To where? If not, why not?

What have been the major issues affecting (positively/negatively) project success so far?;

What can be recommended to improve project impact, continuation of activities/impacts, sustainability of activities/ Impacts?

What has been the efficiency of outputs/activities?

Assess the level to which the project has followed guidelines of the LDCF Strategic Priority on Adaptation and recommend ways to further strengthen this linkage.

Assess the quality, appropriateness and timeliness of the project with regard to:

* Satisfying the following GEF objectives;
* Delivering global environmental benefits; and
* Achieving financial and environmental sustainability for the project intervention.

**3. Management and planning arrangements**

What is the implementation structure? Evaluate the adequacy of the project implementation structure, including the effectiveness of the Project Board, partnership strategy and stakeholder involvement.

At the local level, is the planning and implementation of activities sufficiently participatory?

Who are the main partners of the project? Are there any missing partners?

What was the role of the inception workshop?

How are national level decisions taken inside the project? How are state level decisions taken.

What has been the co-financing? In each state? At national level?

How are the project linkages (i) across the four States (ii) from local to State to National level?

Has the project successfully mobilized international best practices and experience?

Assess financial accountability and efficiency - assess efficiency against the so far achieved results, including an assessment of the National Implementation Modality and the cost effectiveness of the utilization of LDCF resources and actual UNDP co-financing for the achievement of project results; Assess the contribution of in-kind co-financing to project implementation and to what extent the project has been able to leverage additional funding so far. How effective has been the use/mobilization of contractors/consultants?

How is Monitoring and evaluation? Is it leading to adaptive management? What are the roles of: HCENR, UNDP, Project Office, Regional Coordinators in M&E?

## Annex 3 – List of Documents Reviewed and Reference Documents

**Background documents**

*National Adaptation Programme of Action* (Government of Sudan, 2007)

*UN Common Country Analysis* (United Nations, Sudan, 2007)

*Sudan Poverty Reduction Strategy, the 5-Year Plan, 2007 – 2011* (Government of Sudan)

*Water Resource Management in Humanitarian Programmes in Darfur: The Case for Drought Preparedness (*UNEP, February - March 2008)

C*oncept Note for UNEP Support to Preparing National Adaptation Programme* (NAP) (UNEP, 2009)

*Revised Programming Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change for the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)* (GEF Council Paper no: GEF/LDCF.SCCF.8/Inf) (GEF, 2010).

Mid Term Review of the UNDP Country Programme, 2009 - 2012 (UNDP, 2012)

‘*On the Hoof, Livestock Trade in Darfur*” (UNEP, 2102)

*Accessing Resources under the LDCF Fund* (GEF, 2012).

*UNDP Country Programme Document, 2013 – 2016* (UNDP, draft, 2013)

*Northern Kordofan State Council for Environmental Conservation Review Report* (March 2013 - in Arabic)

*Country Programme Action Plan Between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the United Nations Development Programme, 2013-2016* (UNDP/GoS, Draft, 2013)

**Project Planning documents**

*NAPA Project GEF CEO Endorsement* (2009)

*NAPA Project Document (*2009*)*

*Minutes of the Local Project Appraisal Committee* (2009)

*The Inception Workshop,* March 2010

*The Planning Workshop,* July 2010

*The Project Annual Workplans (*ATLAS format - 2010, 2011, 2012)

*Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the Project Board, August 2010*

*Project Implementation Review* (2011)

*The Annual Progress Report 2011*

*The Project Annual Work Plan 2012*

*Minutes of the Steering Committee Meeting, January 2012*

*Project Implementation Review* (2012)

*The Annual Progress Report, 2012*

*Minutes of the Project Board Meeting, December, 2012*

*The Project Annual Work plan, 2013-*

*Proceedings of the NAPA Project Board April, 2013*

**Project Outputs**

*Proceedings of the Workshop on Research and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Drylands of Western Sudan* (2011)

*Best Practices Report* (2012)

**Other**

Project Proposal for CIDA financing “*Implementing Priority Adaptation Measures to Build Resilience of rainfed farmer and pastoral communities of Sudan, especially women headed households to the adverse impacts of Climate Change”*

Project PIF for GEF/LDCF financing: “*Climate risk finance for sustainable and climate resilient rainfed farming and pastoral systems”.*

Project concept for: “ *Integrated Watershed Management Approaches to Water Harvesting in Darfur to Address Climate Change Induced Water Shortages*”.

## Annex 4 – List of People Met and Interviewees

**National Government**

Hassan Abdelgadir Hilal, Minister, Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development

Dr. Babiker Abdalla Ibrahim, Under Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development and GEF OFP

Prof. Saadeldin Ibrahim Izzeldin, Former Secretary General, Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources

El Khitma Elawad, Acting Secretary General, Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources

Ismail A Elgizouli, Sudan UNFCCC Focal Point, Head of HCENR Climate Change Unit

Rehab Ahmed Hassan, HCENR Climate Change Unit

Hassan Gaffar, Acting Director General, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Finance and National Economy

Ekhlass Mohammed Ali, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Finance and National Economy

Mohamed Ersa, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Finance and National Economy

**Project Team**

Dr. Mutasim B. Nimir, Project Manager

Adil M. Ali, Deputy Project Manger

Mohamed Ahmed Yousif, Finance and Administrative Officer

**International Organizations**

Mey Ahmed, UNEP Climate Change Focal Point, UNEP Sudan Office

Samah Elbahri, UNEP Sudan Office

**UNDP**

Amin Sharkawi, Deputy Country Director

Pontus Ohrstedt, Team Leader

Hanan Mutwakil, Programme Officer

**Other**

Ahmed AlWakeel, Professor of Ecology, Expert

Faisal El-Hag, Livestock Specialist, Drylands Research Centre, Agricultural Research Corporation

Abdel Rahman Khidir Osman, Water Harvesting Research Institute, Drylands Research Centre, Agricultural Research Corporation

Mekki Abdellatif, Water Harvesting Research Institute, Drylands Research Centre, Agricultural Research Corporation

Noureldin Ahmed Abdalla, Director of Planning and Market, Meteorology Department (Coordinate of Sudanese Climate Change Network)

**Gedarif State**

Gawahir Daood Adam, State Project Coordinator

Focus Group Meeting with Technical Committee (approx. 8 members)

Focus Group Meeting with Project Community Stakeholders (7 members)

**North Kordofan State**

Amin Hussein Habani, Ministry of Animal Resources

Mohammed Babikir El Jack, Director Forestry Department

Hafiz El Duri, Bara Locality

Abdel Bagi Ahmed, Kordofan University

Ms. Rihab Eid Ali, Department of Horticulture

El Gilani Adam, Agricultural Research Corporation (ARC)

El Tigani Mukhtar, Director Ministry of Agriculture, a.i

Jamal El Nair Jar El Nabi, Ground Water Resources

Abdel Rahman El Taeib, Finance Department of the Ministry of Agriculture

Focus Group Meeting with 60 community members in Foja

Focus Group Meeting with 35 community members in Abu Dalam

Focus Group Meeting with 25 community members in Humara

Focus Group Meeting with 44 community members in Humeurat

**River Nile State**

El Rasheed Moubarak, State Project Coordinator

Abd El Lataif, Deputy State Project Coordinator

Gamal Elkheir Khalifa, Director, Agricultural Research Station, River Nile State

Mohamed Ibrahim, Forest Officer, Botana Area Development Project (IFAD)

Mohamed Hassan, Community Mobilizer, Community Watershed Management Project, Nile Basin Initiative (Sudan Component)

Focus group meeting with Technical Committee (approx. 8 persons)

Focus group meeting with Village Committee, Balook village (approx 10 persons)

Focus group meeting with Village Committee, Shababit village (approx 10 persons)

Focus group meeting with Village Committee, Gersi village (approx 10 persons)

**South Darfur State**

Abdulrahman Tahir, State Project Coordinator

Emam Malik Ali, Director General, Agricultural Service Station

Director, Forestry National Corporation

Husein Bagadi Fadali, Expert, South Darfur State

Focus Group Meeting with Technical Committee (6 persons)

Focus Group Meeting with Farmer Representatives, Farmer leaders and Farmers Union (approx 20 persons)

Focus Group Meeting with Agriculture Extension Workers (6 persons)

## Annex 5 – The Evaluation Mission Itinerary

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Destination** | |
| 17th March (02:20) | Arrival in Khartoum (Mr. Fenton) | |
| 17th March | Meetings with Key Stakeholders in Khartoum | |
| 18th March | Meetings with Key Stakeholders in Khartoum  Travel to Ed Dammer, River Nile State | |
| 19th March | Visit to village and community sites in River Nile State | |
| 20th March | Visit Project sites and meet with stakeholders in four villages  Meetings with Technical Committee  Meeting with regional project staff  Return to Khartoum | |
| 21st – 23rd March | Travel to South Darfur (Dennis Fenton)  Meet with Project Staff  Meet Stakeholders  Meeting Technical Committee  Visit to one farm site near to Project Office  Return to Khartoum | Travel to North Kordofan (Abu Diek)  Meet with Project Staff  Visit Project sites and meet with stakeholders in six villages  Meeting Technical Committee  Return to Khartoum |
| 24th - 25th (morning) | Meetings with Governmental Institutions, international development partners and national experts  Depart for Gedarif State (Dennis Fenton) | |
| 25th (Afternoon) - 26th | Gedarif State (Dennis Fenton)  Meeting State Project Coordinator  Meeting with technical committee  Meeting with Project Stakeholders | |
| 27th | Preparation of initial findings (evaluators working together) | |
| 28th | Presentation to Government and Project team  Presentation to UNDP  Wrap up meeting with PMU | |

## Annex 6 – Details of Co-financing until end-March

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Contributor/Contribution** | **Sudanese Pounds** | **USD[[15]](#footnote-15)** |
| HCENR   * Office rent * Management contribution (staff etc) * Vehicles   Total | 72,000  86,400  600,000  758,400 | 216,570 |
| Ministry of Environment   * contribution in meetings | 9,000 | 2,045 |
| IRC El Obied:   * Hall rental * Guest house   Total | 3,000  3,600  6,600 | 1,500 |
| **Total National Government** | | **220,115** |
| UNDP |  | 238,201 |
| **Total UNDP** | | **238,201** |
| Nile State (all local contributions: TC time, office space, transport, local community commitments) |  | 141,400 |
| North Kordofan State (all local contributions: TC time, office space, transport, local community commitments) |  | 120,750 |
| Gedarif State (all local contributions: TC time, office space, transport, local community commitments) |  | 333,300 |
| South Darfur State (all local contributions: TC time, office space, transport, local community commitments) |  | 198,750 |
| **Total Local Contributions** | | **794,200** |
| **1,102,082** | | **1,252,516** |

## Annex 7 – Tables Summarizing the Number of Type of Project Beneficiaries

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Activities - State** | **Males** | **Females** | **Remarks** |
| **River Nile** | | | |
| Diesel Pumps | 4000 | 500 | Women contribute in harvesting some crops |
| Shelter-belts: seedlings and drip irrigation | All villagers benefit | | 25km x 20m  1km x 10m |
| Agricultural extension | All villagers in 7 villages benefit | | 42 hectares |
| Veterinary services |  |  | Thousands of animals have benefitted |
| Gas stoves and cylinders |  | 705 |  |
| Solar energy for pumping drinking water |  |  | 3 units provided |
| Training | 10 | 10 | On agriculture, and on IT issues |
| **North Kordofan** | | | |
| Rehabilitated wells, diesel pumps and solar pumps for drinking water | 1799 | 1810 | Women farming groups benefit like men groups |
| Shelter-belts: seedlings and drip irrigation | 173 | 100 | Km x 10m |
| Agricultural extension | 1799 | 1810 |  |
| Veterinary services |  | 770 | Thousands of animals have benefitted |
| Gas stoves and cylinders |  | 154 |  |
| Training | 36 | 19 | On agriculture, and on IT issues |
| **Gedarif** | | | |
| Water harvesting, plowing and terraces | 0500 | 0200 | Women role in harvest |
| Seedlings | 0500 | 0200 |  |
| Agricultural extension | 98 | 32 |  |
| Gas stoves and cylinders |  | 90 |  |
| Training | 1000 | 1000 |  |
| **South Darfor** | | | |
| Water harvesting (SD) | 0377 | 0702 | Women role is very significant in farming |
| Seedlings |  |  | 190kg provided |
| Agricultural extension | 60 | 134 |  |
| Improved stoves and training |  | 204 |  |
| Training | 250 | 1104 | On stove manufacturing.  On field training |

In total, an estimated 7,176 men and 3,756 women have benefitted from the Project. In total, that is 10,932 direct beneficiaries.

## Annex 8 – Result of Technical Committee Brainstorming Summarizing Project Achievements and Challenges from the Perspective of Technical Committee Members

**1. Gedarif State**

1. Which local development priorities does the project contribute to:

Water management;

Agriculture production and livestock production;

Food security and poverty reduction;

In a word: climate change.

2. Achievements, indicators and Innovation:

Agriculture and forest: Rain water harvesting; Early mature crops and forage seeds and forest seeds/seedlings; Capacity building and raising awareness; Assuring People’s participation; tools;

Livestock: race improvement, increase feed availability, capacity building.

Poverty/migration reduction: through tools and handicraft development;

Water supply system: *designed* a small earth dam.

Conserve ecosystem: forestry work, gas cylinders through revolving funds;

Research: on early maturing crops and models for yield/weather.

3. Partners

The organizations represented on the Technical Committee cover all the key government technical agencies and sectors;

IFAD, ongoing project, implements some complimentary work (in same villages) – and replicate some of this project’s work;

Health Department was on the Committee (due to the early idea to build a dam which may have had health implications) but are not involved now;

4. Major Problems/challenges

Availability of water – IFAD made hafir, but it needs maintenance;

Rainfall fluctuation – and they must adapt project timing to this (seeding);

UN reduced amount of funding to this project – at the beginning – they expected US$2.9 million (there is a UNFCCC annex with this listed). Yet they got only US$600,000. They had to adapt to this : so they started with the other activities. However the dam was the main and central activity;

Delays in fund arrivals - have had to change timetables – e.g. started doing water harvesting instead of dam – now they have done a study for the dam, but they lack the finance. They are now seeking resources now – and there will be a resource mobilization workshop in Khartoum (with diverse potential partners);

Delays in funds arrivals from Khartoum.

The shortage of forest inputs in the community, for forestry/energy – need more funding for energy (gas cylinders) and for forest fencing/patrolling equipment - in order to protect the forests. Also, they need more seeds for rangelands and forestry;

Accessibility is a challenge, especially in rainy season;

Needs: 2 tractors, water tanks, drip irrigation system…

5. Future (after the Project has finished)

There is a village steering committee, it will takeover leadership;

Community groups exist on different issues (revolving funds/gas; food processing; - but will still be short of water)

Hydraulic structures prepared by project - needs maintenance and management – villages can take this on;

Tools are in village (but a tractor is needed);

They believe some other communities will also adopt the practices (e.g. replication via IFAD)

Livelihood/income improvements are clearly obvious (village representative statement: he guarantees that all people around are very interested, e.g. when gas/seedlings are distributed, other people are requesting this);

Possible role of micro-finance;

6. Recommendations to improve project in final period

More support to water harvesting;

Provide micro-finance after pertinent training;

Early warning techniques;

Expand the green cover range and forest (fencing and patrols) and using water harvesting;

Capacity building for community on food processing, rural women, energy alternatives (improved stoves), low drip irrigation, etc.

Communities continue to set the priorities (and ideas come out of the training and awareness sessions).

2. North Kordofan State

1 Relevance of the project:

The TC informed that the NAPA project fits well in the policies and priorities adopted by the State Government of Northern Kordofan with respect to the areas north of latitude 18 N where the authorities strictly prohibited field crop production in fragile ecosystems. Instead the policy encourages the rational use of ground water resources in support of micro irrigated agriculture to raise lucrative marketable horticultural crops in those areas. Not only that, but also the government has articulated a comprehensive Action Plan in areas north of latitude 18 to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change.

2 The innovative nature of the project:

The project remains innovative in:

Changing traditional low value shifting cultivation in fragile ecosystems to permanent micro scale irrigated agriculture;

Introduction of the Gas Cylinders in order to conserve the wood biomass;

Fish farming to avail high value protein diets (a fish farm was established in Foja village);

Tap the vIntroduction of Jatropha as a hedge and life fencing tree; and

Solar power for water pumping and lightening.

3 Achievements:

Through enhancement of the production system resilience and creation of adaptive options to affected populations un marginal lands, the project achieved a remarkable success in coming up with a diversified system of livelihoods. These include vegetable production and attainment of cash returns to farmers; livestock fattening that led to increased market prices of sheep, milk and incidents of twins; biomass conservation; erection of effective shelterbelts needed for protection of loose soils and agricultural land; creation of a viable revolving fund as a nucleolus for community based micro financing system; establishment of strong institutions that adopt decisions through consensual grassroots democracy; and demonstrated an appropriate adaptation approach to climate change that could be documented, disseminated and replicated.

4 Problems:

The members of the TC listed some problems as follows:

Slow release of funds to the project from UNDP side;

Lack of enough cultivable land which is governed by local land rights and customary law;

High diesel cost which warrant replacement by solar powered systems;

Lack of government counterpart funds;

infestation of *tota absoluta* pest on tomatoes; and

Absence of a system of integrated water resource management.

5 Sustainability:

The members of the TC of the opinion that the project has effectively demonstrated successes in a number of areas, which presumably laid solid foundation for future sustainability. These include, among others: (a) strong community based organizational set up which is capable of institutional and financial resource management; (b) the prescience of an effective revolving fund; (c) good marketing prospects of diversified products, including off seasonal supply; (c) strong awareness among communities on the effects of climate change; (d) plenty of groundwater resources; (e) improved productive capacity; and (f) supply of improved animal feeds are now completely community based.

6 Replicability:

It is realized that in order to ensure replicability some further efforts are yet to be made. These include:

Consolidation of activities;

Identification and better documentation of best practices;

The presence of a state based advocacy strategy;

Presence of dissemination networking;

Availability of resources; and

Active engagement of the private sector.

7 Coordination

The presence of an actively engaged TC and the technical support provided by various departments entail that the coordination system is strong, viable and effective. However, the TC members hinted out that better coordination among UN agencies and donors is required.

8 Recommendations:

The main recommendations as spelled out by the members of the TC can be listed as follows:

The launching of a project consolidation phase to ensure that planned outcomes are better captured, documented, disseminated and replicated;

The execution of a socio-economic and environmental impact assessment studies;

Introduction of integrated water resource management system;

The health component has to be addressed;

Documentation of best practices should be improved; and

The state authorities should aggressively advocate for the objectives and outcomes of the project in order to engage Governorates and localities in similar ecosystems.

3. River Nile State

1. Which local development priorities is the project contributing to:

Meeting food security (state) strategy

Reduce misuse of natural resources

Improve production capacity of farmers;

Improving animal health (state priority)

2. Achievements, indicators and innovation:

Conservation of biomass and protection of forest (decreasing no. of legal claims regarding forest intrusion; sacks of charcoal sold)

Awareness raised on value of forest (demand for seedlings) and on food security (demand for land for agriculture);

Increased revenue (total revenue in the six villages);

Innovative: use of gas for cooking and provision of irrigation infrastructure/ needs assessment relying completely of the needs of the people/very rigorous and continuous technical follow-up/introduction of solar energy/criteria for village selection: vulnerability/introduction of new animal breeds;

3. Partners:

Multi-disciplinary, included all partners, including CBOs;

4. Major Problems??

Number one, transportation;

Poor local government counterpart contribution (GCCC) – from State Government;

Slow release of budget from UNDP (but thanks to UNDP all the same);

5. Future (after the project):

The elements of sustainability are: (1) reasonable revolving fund component (2) capacity built (3) VDC are viable (4) achievements in water irrigation supply systems (v) strong partnerships;

replication: (1) government should allocate seed money for basic physical infrastructure (eg canal) into new areas (2) government should link all villages into micro-finance facility (iii) new microfinance company to start this year in the State could help (4) government should continue awareness and advocacy campaign. (Minister of Ag, \finance, livestock…. Etc>>

6. Recommendations to project improve impact in final year:

(1) expand geographical project and enhance provision of basic inputs (2) integration of livestock and agriculture (3) consolidate agriculture and livestock and forestry extension programmes (4) make more resources available to the project (v) enhance technical capacity of both beneficiaries and government departments (6) improve donor coordination (FAO/UNDP/IFAD….etc) (7) approach of NAPA project to be clearly documented and disseminated.

4. South Darfur State

1. Which local development priorities does the project contribute to:

Food security

Peace building (reducing natural resource conflicts)

Poverty eradication

2. Achievements, indicators and Innovation:

Community contributes to the project (getting this to happen is an achievement and an indicator);

Community is involved in planning and activities:

Community convinced (they were initially suspicious)

The awareness of climate change amongst farmers (and understanding) has grown;

The farmers are accepting the new practices and technologies;

The increased production and revenue;

The increased use of water

They have established an example/model that works;

This project is different than others because it is multi-sectoral;

The techniques introduced are simple and can be replicated by the farmers;

They have availed one vehicle from the Ministry

3. Partners

Women have been greatly involved;

Missing partner: health sector – and this is connected to water management;

There are 21 Localities in Darfur. They have technical departments (directly under State government). These have not been involved. The logistics and lack of transportation makes it difficult to involve these;

Ministry of Animal resources is a missing partners;

There have been joint activities with World Vision.

4. Major Problems

Transportation

Water harvesting techniques have been rather limited, need to expand, eg into (i) check dams (ii) bore holes.

There is some jealously from villages not involved in the project. They are accused of favoritism;

Insecurity is a challenge.

5. Future (after the Project)

Water harvesting practices will continue, for sure;

Ministry will continue to support farmers (and will continue to support extension workers);

Note that 600 village committees have already been registered (one village may have several committees – for water, forestry, horticulture, etc);

It is not difficult to continue – the practices are rather simple and low cost;

Government has already supported replication, and should continue to do so;

6. Recommendations

Please continue the project, it is still in its infancy;

Please provide more assets, and more sophisticated inputs, and seeds;

Provide more training for the extension workers;

Provide rain gauges – to be used by extension workers.

1. Figures from CEO Endorsement Request. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See Annex 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. All issues, minor and major, were explored through several pathways and several sources of information. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. July 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. South Sudan is not yet a signatory to the UNFCCC or a member of GEF, and so cannot receive LDCF funds. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. MIC’s roles and responsibilities have since been taken on by the Department for International Cooperation, inside the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Some additional discussion of these indicators, and examples, is provided under the relevant Sections in Chapter 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See the Country Programme (2009-2012) and the draft Country Programme (2013-2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Source: adapted from the UNDP Project Document [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The exception is Darfur State, where the volatile political and security situation has greatly reduced opportunities to visit sites. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Women as beneficiaries is discussed in Chapter 5 below, with available statistics provided. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The short description of these three Outcomes is based on the Evaluation’s hypothesis - see Table 1 in Section 3.4 above. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. One feddan equals 0.42 hectares. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. This is taken from the text of the Project Document. The Results Framework has a variation, as follows: “*to implement an urgent set of priority adaptation measures for improving food security in the face of climate change in five vulnerable zones in Sudan are implemented covering about 1 million ha*” [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Using April 2013 exchange rate [↑](#footnote-ref-15)