

End of Programme Evaluation

Public Sector Reforms Programme, Phase II *UNDP*

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End of Evaluation Report of the Public Sector Reforms Programme – Phase II

Subject: Final Report

Dear Ms. Keating,


Please find included the Final Report for the Evaluation of the Public Sector Reforms Programme, Phase II. The report was prepared in line with the contract signed on 11 April 2013 and amended on 17 May 2013. In accordance with the contract, this report is intended solely for the United Nations Development Programme.

We thank you for the support provided to us.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at alphan.njeru@ke.pwc.com or Dr. Michi Ebata at michi.ebata@ke.pwc.com or by telephone at (0) 20 285 5000.

Yours sincerely,

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CSOs	-	Civil Society Organizations
EMU	-	Efficiency Monitoring Unit
ERS	-	Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation
FBOs	-	Faith Based Organisations
GCG	-	Grand Coalition Government
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GoK	-	Government of Kenya
HOD	-	Heads of Department
ICT	-	Information and Communication Technology
IEC	-	Information, Education and Communication
ISC	-	Inspectorate of State Corporations
KACC	-	Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
KACSC	-	Kenya Anti-Corruption Steering Committee
KENAO	-	Kenya National Audit Office
KNBS	-	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
MDAs	-	Ministries Departments Agencies
MDGs	-	Millennium Development Goals
MED	-	Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate
MOF	-	Ministry of Finance
MTEF	-	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MTP	-	Medium Term Plan
NARA	-	National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement
NESC	-	National Economic and Social Council
NGOs	-	Non Governmental Organisations
ODM	-	Orange Democratic Movement

ODM-K-	Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya
OPM -	Office of the Prime Minister
PAS -	Performance Appraisal System
PC -	Performance Contracting
PCC -	Public Complaints Commission
PCD -	Performance Contracting Department
PESTLE-	Political, Economic, Social, Technological Legal and Environmental
PIC -	Public Investment Committee
PNU -	Party of National Unity
PPOA -	Public Procurement Oversight Authority
PRSP -	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PS -	Permanent Secretary
PS OPM-	Permanent Secretary Office of the Prime Minister
PSR&PC-	Public Sector Reforms and Performance Contracting
PSRS -	Public Service Reform Strategy
PSTD -	Public Sector Transformation Department
PwC -	Price Waterhouse Coopers
RFP -	Request for Proposals
SCAC -	State Corporations Advisory Committee
STI -	Science, Technology and Innovation
USAID -	United States Agency for International Development
UNDP -	United Nations Development Programme

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Evaluation objectives, scope and methodology

This is a terminal evaluation of the PSR programme whose purpose is, as stated in the TOR, to assess the degree to which the programme has achieved the objectives and results outlined in the project document and to extract lessons learnt and make recommendations. It is a forward looking evaluation with a focus on learning from the experience and improving future programmes. While recognizing the continuity of the public service reforms that the GoK has been carrying out, this evaluation is limited to Phase II which was planned to run from September 2010 through June 2013.

Relevance of the programme in the Kenyan context

The programme was relevant because it addressed itself to a key national priority defined in strategic policy documents. The evaluation reviewed several key Government strategic documents, , and found that the programme responds particularly to the Prime Minister's Strategic Plan, which provides or reinforces the mandates of the two departments responsible for PSR. It was also found to be relevant to the other stakeholders, in particular the development partners because it fitted in with their priorities for Kenya and their commitment to democratic governance, human rights and national institutional capacity strengthening.

Achievement of programme results

Despite the fact that the programme funding did not go the full three years originally envisaged, the programme was successful in initiating activities towards the delivery or actual attainment of the many of the outputs of the programme. Although there were some changes to the list of original outcomes the programme set out to achieve, ten outcomes have persisted and the Evaluation focused to assess the results achieved by the programme.

The programme successfully supported the implementation of the new Constitution, through its support to the work of the Task Force on Devolved Government, which is a critical dimension of the Constitution. The main output under this outcome was "legislative drafting and complimentary content unpacking of the new constitutional provisions. The driving force behind both the legislative programme and the clarification of constitutional implications for devolved government was the Task Force on Devolution, which produced its report "Final Report of the Taskforce on Devolved Government" after many consultations as expected and a significant legislative programme emerged

Citizens satisfaction with Government Service delivery was achieved during the period of programme implementation and from efforts supported by the programme. But measurement of citizen satisfaction at the national level is hard to measure, and when it has been done, the measurement interventions are by design few and far between. The evaluation infers from the enthusiasm and excitement among the stakeholders met, that customer satisfaction is being achieved.

There is evidence that partnerships were created between the public sector and different stakeholders – private sector, civil society, youth and others. While the positive response to these varying partnerships and the general consensus that they be continued suggest that the partnership strategy could be sustained, the fact that such partnerships were anchored in the OPM means that their continuity will depend on the institutional location and commitment within that location.

There already is considerable vertical synergy in planning in the Government of Kenya. All planning, budgeting and performance contracting are linked up as starting with Vision 2030 as the long term country development strategy, which informs and guides the national midterm (five year) strategy. Both Vision 2030 and the midterm plan inform the institutional (MDA) strategies and hence the institutional performance contracts which in turn, inform the departmental, and unit contracts. The framework for vertically linked-up government is already there. The programme was aiming to support strengthening of this planning and implementation framework and also improve horizontal linkage.

The PSR Phase II programme also aimed to achieve synergy in government functions and operations, measured by the extent of linked up government. Some of the intended activities in terms of linked up government have begun but are not yet complete. The performance management system has a number of components that are in the process of being implemented.

The programme has engendered a culture for Managing for Results in all MDAs, as measured by the functionality of MMUs/CPUUs in all MDAs. It could be assumed that to the extent that former local authority staff have since been absorbed into County Governments, the training provided to them will ensure an early grounding of this culture at County level. One of the beneficiaries of the PSR programme is PSTD which benefited in terms of its own institutional development through staff recruitment and training, and the implementation of its transformation strategy. However PSTD remains institutionally weak due to other factors related to the institutional environment in OPM.

Progress towards strengthened capacities of MDAs on Sector Performance Standards and automation of Performance Contracting is being made. Although the programme did not succeed in extending Performance Contracting as an accountability framework to the Judiciary and Parliament, local authorities including provincial and districts heads, Constituency Development Fund Coordinators and some Civil Society members were trained on effective implementation of Performance Contracts as an accountability framework. The training focused on enhancing Performance Management and improving public service delivery as well as promoting an appreciation among the local authority officials of the Citizens' Service Delivery Charter as an important tool for enhancing service delivery, in light of Sections 46 and 232 of the Constitution. Although not yet fully operational the PSR programme developed an automated performance management system to ensure that there is real time and continuous monitoring and evaluation of performance in Ministries and accounting departments. and consolidation of focused information pertinent to decision making, which project has vast potential to streamline the contracting process and improve service delivery to the citizenry. The Performance Contracting Department used the programme effectively in strengthening the Performance Contracting process and systems through international bench-marking, technological application, training and partnerships.

Kenya as Chair of the 7th Conference of Africa Ministers for Public Service (CAMPS) and focal point for performance management was able to show leadership of its designated role as a result of support from the programme. As per the Project document, the achievement of this outcome was to be measured by the strengthened leadership and management for improved public service delivery in Africa, and the development of a Performance Management guide. As such the PSR programme contribution facilitated other countries such as Tanzania, Lesotho, and Sierra Leone to come to Kenya and learn from the Kenyan experience. In addition, the Performance Management guidelines and tools which PCD participated in developing were approved at the 7th Conference of Africa Ministers for Public Service (CAMPS).

Utilisation of programme resources

The resources provided were efficiently and effectively utilised, with a high absorption rate (97%) and proper accountability. Resources committed however were not fully made available, leaving some planned activities unimplemented.

Sustainability of results

Because of the relevance of the programme to Government's own national priorities in public sector reforms, the home grown nature of performance contracting, the careful selection of programme intervention targets and the constitutional commitment to values that are only possible through extended public sector reforms, the results aimed for and achieved or partially achieved through this programme are by and large sustainable. However continued government and donor funding and knowledge sharing through a successor programme would contribute even more significantly to sustainability of results so far achieved.

Factors which facilitated or hindered the achievement of outcomes

Many of the outcomes of the programme have been or are in the process of being achieved. Much of the success is due to the relevance of the programme, its responsive design, level of government commitment, conducive reform environment and effective UNDP and donor coordination, among other factors. To the extent that success has been limited, it is due primarily to the implementation arrangements which followed the division of

responsibilities between PC and PSTD in OPM, which was mired in transition and coalition government conflict and rivalry. It is also due to the premature non-renewal of cost sharing agreements leading to anxiety about funding.

Conclusions, lessons and recommendations

PSR II was relevant, properly implemented and fairly successful in achieving its objectives of delivering or making progress towards delivery on outcomes. It also had limitations due primarily to the post conflict transitional context in which it was designed and implemented. It thus provides lessons regarding PSR in such contexts and opportunities and risks therein. It is recommended that a successor programme, more thoroughly thought out and designed, and rooted in the political economic analysis of Kenya, be designed and implemented.

Introduction and Background

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Introduction

The Government of Kenya (GoK) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kenya issued a request for proposals (RFP) inviting consultancy firms to submit proposals to conduct an end of term evaluation of the Public Sector Reforms Programme Phase II (PSR II). PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was duly selected and engaged to undertake the assignment which it undertook during April and May 2013.

The programme evaluated

The Government of Kenya has been carrying out public sector reforms since 2003. The reforms were spearheaded from the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) before the new Grand Coalition Government (GCG) came into power, at which point the function was relocated to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)¹. Development partners supported these reforms through different partnership modalities since the beginning. The latest of these programmes is the 2010 – 2013 Public Sector Reforms Programme – Phase II (PSR), which is the focus of this evaluation.

The programme is funded by three donors - Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department for International Development (DfID), through a Basket Fund managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The PSR programme was signed in September 2010 and was implemented by the Public Sector Transformation Department (PSTD) and the Performance Contracting Department (PCD) under the OPM. The programme was subsequently amended on March 29th 2011, with an addendum to extend support to the Task Force on Devolved Government (TFDG) under the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of Local Government, whose task was to map out and recommend a strategy for the implementation of devolution as mandated by the Constitution. The addendum provided for the original Basket partners to increase resources to the basket for this purpose, as well as for new donors to come in with supplementary resources outside the Basket.

Purpose of the evaluation

This is a terminal evaluation of the PSR programme whose purpose is, as stated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), to assess the degree to which the programme has achieved the objectives and results outlined in the project document and to extract lessons learnt and make recommendations, which might benefit any successor programme. It is a forward looking evaluation with a focus on learning from the experience and improving future programmes.

Hence the timing of the evaluation, which, although mandated in the programme, has acquired certain urgency due to the rapid changes in the national governance environment, as the implementation of the new constitution continues, and especially as elections have taken place and a new government has taken over. For any lessons from the programme to be helpful to the on-going change, the earlier they are shared the better.

In their last programme review meeting in 2012, the stakeholders emphasised their shared desire to see a “robust terminal evaluation” to ensure that the value addition of public sector reforms is recognised in the “new dispensation”, to leverage the opportunities provided by the transition for applying any lessons from the PSR II to the evolving system.²

This evaluation is intended for UNDP, the GoK, its development partners and other key stakeholders who were involved with the programme, who it is hoped will find it useful in helping them to look back and appreciate their successes during a fairly difficult time and draw inspiration from that as they develop future public sector reform programmes. The programme has reached many players in the public, private and civil society sectors. Different groups have participated in this programme differently - some as targets of change activities, some as

¹ The GoK structures, offices and some nomenclature have changed since the election. This evaluation will refer to institutions and offices by the names used during the life of the programme. For example the Office of the Prime Minister, which no longer exists will be referred to as such, not as “former”.

² See Aide Memoire, 23rd August 2012.

agents of implementation of parts of the programme and others as recipients of improved services. All demonstrated an abiding interest in knowing the extent to which their involvement contributed to the success or otherwise of the programme, and how the future will unfold vis-a-vis the objectives and activities the programme sought to promote and support.

An important indicator of the value of this evaluation is that, there is a strong expectation, according to all the documents reviewed and consultations conducted, that there will be a future programme and that this evaluation should, and thus has tried to, inform the nature, focus and scope of that future programme.

Evaluation scope and objectives

While recognizing the continuity of the public service reforms the GoK has been carrying out, this evaluation is limited to Phase II which ran from September 2010 through June 2013. Phase I was evaluated in 2011 and that report is one of the documents reviewed during the course of this evaluation. The direct stakeholders for this programme include, on the side of GoK, the former Office of the Prime Minister and the two departments responsible for the implementation of the programme, PSTD and PCD, and MDA's that were beneficiaries of the work of these departments. Civil society organisations, loosely defined, were been involved as service providers in the delivery of the programme.³

Development partners constitute the third stakeholder component for the programme. They funded the programme, presumably because it represented a means to attain their priorities as far as their support to Kenya is concerned, however those priorities are actually decided. These stakeholders have an interest in the evaluation, including its recommendations, as it has a bearing on their decisions and expectations⁴

Background and national context

The PSR programme was conceived and implemented during a momentous period in Kenya. Soon after Vision 2030 was launched in 2007 - with the ambition to "create a globally competitive and prosperous nation with a high quality of life by 2030"- the country was plunged into the 2008 post elections socio-political conflict that led to ethnic clashes, which left nearly 1500 people dead, over half a million internally displaced, caused widespread recriminations and real national anxiety for the future. Simultaneously, along with the rest of the world, Kenya had to also deal with the recession precipitated by the global financial crisis of 2008.

While Africa as a whole quickly recovered from the financial crisis to register an average GDP growth of 5 per cent between 2008 and 2012, Kenya's recovery was not quite as robust, as recognised by the Prime Minister's Strategic Plan, averaging 4 per cent for the same period. A more significant comparison is that to its East African peers, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda, with a combined average growth rate of 6.8% during the same period. Soon after the launch of the programme, the year 2011 saw the recovering economy experiencing several shocks resulting in inflation rising to up to 20% and the Kenya shilling depreciating sharply, forcing the authorities to take austerity measures which impacted more negatively on growth, at least in the short term.

At the same time, the processes of designing the new constitution and creation of significant national institutions was taking place, reaching its climax with the promulgation of the Constitution. The 2010 Constitution ushered in a set of reforms across the executive, legislative and judicial levels of government as well as establishing devolved government at County level. Constitutional provisions enshrining human rights, leadership and integrity, good conduct, equality and gender equity have elevated the standards of governance as well as expectations of transparency and accountability. A vigorous legislative process ensued and is still going on. The devolution process has created 47 new governments, dividing functions between national and county governments.

³ The programme committed to increasing (?) levels of participation by citizens as both stakeholders and beneficiaries, which raises the question of whether participation of organized civil society organisations, who are also often contractors (what do you mean?), is in and of itself, representative of the participation of the people. The evaluation can only note that some organisations appear to be more member supported and driven than others, and that in our opinion, the more member supported and driven the CSO is the more authentic it is likely to be in terms of at least representing the interests of the particular membership interests.

⁴ See discussion of sample selection in section.....

All these new, urgent and far reaching change processes were of course not taking place in a vacuum, as the state had to meet the challenge of keeping pace with the demands for delivering services to communities and citizens, of expanding and building infrastructure and of improving governance and accountability at all levels; all of which, it could be argued, became even more urgent against the above background. This is the context in which the Public Sector Reforms programme Phase II was conceived and designed.

While public sector reforms have been going on in Kenya since National Independence, the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) was the first programme to be formally launched as such in August 1993. It was not, however until the election of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government based on a campaign of reform and anti-corruption, that new momentum for change was introduced. In an effort to ensure effective implementation of its Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) the GoK adopted performance contracting as an important tool in its performance management strategy, and established the Performance Contracting Secretariat (PCS) in the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). The government introduced Results Based Management and, in 2004, Cabinet formally placed Permanent Secretaries/Accounting Officers and Boards of Directors of state corporations on performance contracts. In addition to performance contracts, citizens' service delivery charters and Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI) were also introduced.

In 2005, the Government launched the Results for Kenyans programme whose main objective was to improve service delivery and entrench Public Service values and ethics within the public service. In 2006, UNDP and other development partners (DFID, CIDA, SIDA, Denmark) came together to provide donor support to these government efforts in public service reforms. The achievements and lessons learned from these initial programmes became the basis for the continuation of public service reforms in the GCG, which in April 2008 merged the PCS and the Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat (PSRDS) which ran the Results for Kenyans Programme (RFK), into the Public Sector Reform and Performance Contracting Department.

This arrangement did not last long. Under the aegis of the Prime Minister's strategic plan which, among other things, shifted emphasis from reform to transformation in order to institutionalise change and raise the level of government performance, this department was split into two – Performance Contracting Department (PCD) and the Public Sector Transformation Department (PSTD), both located within the then OPM and responsible for public sector reforms. The PSTD has responsibility for the implementation of the Public Sector Transformation Strategy, which has three main components: service and transparency, cooperation and coordination across government, and Internal Effectiveness and Accountability. The PCD is responsible for deepening performance contracting in the public sector as a whole.

To support the implementation of these mandates, a new programme, the Public Sector Reform Programme Phase II was agreed with support from international donors.

Public Sector Reforms Programme Phase II

The Public Sector Reforms Programme, Phase II was launched in 2010, to support the GoK Public Sector Reforms programme through the PSTD and PCD. The PSR II was designed to provide this support through technical and financial support to specifically agreed upon components and outcomes as summarised below. In addition the PSR Programme, Phase II was amended in 2011 to support activities related to the implementation of the new Constitution, in particular the devolution process.

Summary of the Public Sector Reform Programme

The schedule below provides a summary of the main components of the Public Sector Reforms Programme, Phase II.⁵

⁵ This table is drawn from the original project document and annual work plan.

Table 1: Programme Summary

	COMPONENTS	Outcomes
PART A: Public Sector Transformation <u>Overall Outcome:</u> Transformation Programme Implemented in Selected MDAs	Service Delivery and Transparency	Citizens satisfaction with Government Service Delivery Enhanced Sustainable Public Sector Stakeholder Partnerships
	Cooperation and Coordination	Synergy in Government Functions and Operations
	Internal Effectiveness and Accountability	A culture of Managing for Results engendered in all MDAs and Counties PSTD strengthened to achieve its mandate and objectives
PART B: Performance Contracting <u>Overall Outcome:</u> Performance Contracting Deepened in the Public Sector	Outcome 1	Strengthened Capacity of MDAs on Sector Performance Standards and Automation of Performance Contracting
	Outcome 2	Real time monitoring and evaluation of performance by MDAs
	Outcome3	Awareness Creation and Stakeholder Engagement
	Outcome 4	Monitoring, Evaluation and Coordination of Performance Measurement
	Outcome 5	Strengthened Leadership and Management for Improved Public Service Delivery in Africa
	Outcome 6	Performance Management and Measurement Guide for Africa Developed

The programme was also designed to focus on GoK Public Sector Reform Flagships below.

1. Integrated Service Delivery
2. Deepened performance contracting in the Public Service
3. Enhanced Accountability for Performance Management Results
4. Institutionalisation of the sector performance standards
5. IEC and Knowledge Management
6. Establishment of the Kenya School of Government
7. Institutional Reform and Capacity Building
8. Rapid Results Approach (RRA)
9. Transformative Leadership

Through support to the outcomes in the project document, the programme actually supported all the above flagships.

The Purpose and Objectives of the Assignment

The Government of Kenya and the UNDP engaged PricewaterhouseCoopers to undertake an end phase evaluation of the PSR Programme Phase II. The overall objective of the consultancy was to assess the degree to which the programme achieved the objectives and results outlined in the project document and extract lessons learnt and make recommendations.

Specifically, the consultants were expected to:

- I. Assess the relevance of the Programme in the Kenyan context by determining the contribution of the programme to national reforms priorities on democratic governance and the programme's impact on various stakeholders
- II. Determine the extent to which the programme results were realised by assessing the achievement of the programme outcomes and outputs as per the project document.
- III. Assess the extent to which the programme resources were utilised for the realisation of the desired results
- IV. Analyse the extent of the programme contribution to the desired impact will contribute to the sustainability of the results management culture in the Public Service.
- V. Identify the factors which facilitated or hindered the achievement of the outcomes, both in terms of the external environment and those internal to the project and document lessons learned
- VI. Propose recommendations for future of the programme given the change in the system of government in Kenya after the March 2013 elections

Scope of Work

The scope of work as defined in the Terms of Reference consisted of the following;

- Extract the main performance targets and indicators from the project documents, and measure progress against those targets and indicators, (both qualitative and quantitative)
- Analyse the pattern of growth of the programme around the agreements, aide memoirs and AWP's,
- Assess the extent to which the work plans accurately interpreted and supported the main agreement documents.
- Analyse the past Aide Memoirs and Annual Review Reports to determine their effect on programme results
- Include in the analysis all activities that were carried out by the programme and funded by either GoK or development partners directly. This analysis should first establish what the specific target results were for those activities. Analyse the coherence of those activities with the Public Sector Reforms Project Document and the Annual Work Plans
- Identify key lessons learnt from the implementation of Public Sector Reforms programme
- Review and assess the Partnerships that have been created through the Programme with other government departments and agencies, civil society organizations and the private sector
- Prepare a draft report and discuss it with stakeholders including the GoK and Development Partners
- Prepare a final report, and present it to the major Government of Kenya and development partners

Evaluation Approach and Methodology

Evaluation Approach and Methodology

Evaluation process, approach and methods

The approach adopted by the evaluation team was open, transparent and consultative. We adhered to the principles of impartiality, objectivity and independence outlined in the UNDP's evaluation policy. In addition to observing these principles, we reinforced them by bringing in foreign experts as the Team Leader and one of the evaluation experts, as well as an expatriate resident, who had no vested interests in the outcomes of the evaluation. Moreover, our evaluation team brought substantial experience in similar programme evaluations, as well as experience in development programming, UNDP programming, results based management, governance and public sector reforms in Kenya.

At the two inception meetings, the team discussed the parameters of the evaluation which are limited to the second phase of the programme as made clear in the Terms of Reference. Through these discussions, it was agreed that this was a government owned and government led evaluation process. It was further agreed that this would be a forward looking evaluation, where the successes and failures of the programme were only important to the extent that they inform the future, and thus emphasis would be on learning lessons and deriving inspiration for recommendations for future programming and support. Guided by these instructions, the evaluation team then explained the steps and methods to be used in the process taking into account the tight deadlines in the assignment and to ensure that the government counterparts were fully engaged and committed to the process. These meetings were followed by subsequent meetings with UNDP regarding the programme and the process of the evaluation. Following these initial meetings, the evaluation team regularly communicated and consulted with UNDP and government counterparts informing them of the steps taken and sharing regular progress updates including alerts on challenges encountered in order to remedy them as quickly as possible.

In order to make an overall assessment of the Public Sector Reforms Programme, Phase II and to provide constructive recommendations, we used a combination of analytical methods. First, we were guided by the UNDP Evaluation Manual (which is closely referenced to the widely accepted and used OECD) criteria for conducting evaluations in order to arrive at conclusions for an overall assessment.⁶ We used these criteria to focus both the questions we posed to respondents and the review of the documents. The evaluation team feels that a fair basis for judgment was reached to satisfy all these criteria except impact, which would require a much longer post project period before carrying out an ex post evaluation. Below we introduce these criteria and briefly explain how they were applied:

Relevance

Public sector reform has been going in Kenya for a long time, in fact since independence, and public sector reform is a priority area for UNDP and many of the donors supporting PSR II. Meanwhile Kenya has been faced with very specific challenges as discussed earlier in this report, requiring specific responses and intervention. The criterion of relevance is appropriate here to assess the degree of consideration that went into conceiving a programme that addressed the needs of Kenya against the real possibility of simply an extension of an old programme or an easy choice for development partners since it's both follow-on and a priority for them. The evaluation assessed the relevance of the programme by examining the GoK's long-term strategic documents and those specifically designed to respond to both the socio-political crisis and the economic recession, to establish the extent to which PSR was regarded as a key strategy within the context of 2010.

Effectiveness

The key result areas defined as public sector reforms can be very diverse and varied and the temptation to seek numerous results is ever present. It is critical that the results framework developed, if achieved, would contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives that are being sought. OPM had a strategic plan to which

⁶ OECD DAC Network on Evaluation, Evaluating Development Cooperation: Summary of Key Norms and Standards, Second Edition, June 2010.

this programme was designed to respond and through that, would contribute to the achievement of the stated policy objectives of OPM vis-à-vis the public sector reforms programme managed by PSTD and PCD.

Efficiency

The programme management arrangements call for one overall implementer of the programme, two implementers and one designated authority. It also calls for direct procurement of goods and services by UNDP. Efficiency refers as well to time and resource utilisation as well as process efficiency. Hence since issues of the efficiency of this arrangement were raised, the evaluation team has made findings on this.

Sustainability

While sustainability might require a long term a perspective to evaluate as impact, there are sustainability indicators that can be assessed even at the inception of a programme and the ET has looked at these. They include capacity development for the two departments and others who may be key to the sustainability of the results of the programme, budgetary provisions for the components being supported, the degree of organisational institutionalisation in Government structures of PSTD and PCD, especially taking into account the fact that the OPM no longer exists, the legal framework related to both transformation and contracting and the existing or potential organisational effectiveness of government for the reforms. In making the assessment the evaluation team was aware that sustainability factors need not result from programme provision. But where they exist, the extent to which the programme leverages them is also a success factor.

Impact

This is a terminal evaluation, which is a centred on programme outcomes. The evaluation team evaluated the extent to which programme outcomes have been achieved, in terms of programme objectives. In the process some intermediate impact, such as the mind-set changes in the public service brought about by performance contracting improvements during this phase, have been observed. But the overall contribution of the programme to the impact that the two Government departments might contribute to overall Government impact can only be evaluated years after the programme has been closed through a an ex-post evaluation.⁷

Second, we carried out a desk review of documentation, including noting any missing or incomplete records, and using a document review guide to collect pertinent and consistent information across the varied sources of documents. We then used key informant interviews with staff members of the Performance Contracting Department and the Public Sector Transformation Department, UNDP and development partners involved in the management and funding of the programme. We used face to face interviews and focus group discussions to gather background information, to validate such information and to seek perceptions and observations about the work and success of the PSR programme, Phase II. In addition, we circulated a questionnaire to development partners that we were unable to meet with in person to collect their impressions of the programme and to ensure consistency.

Third, given the breadth of the programme and the wide ranging number of stakeholder and beneficiaries, it was important to identify a representative sample of key informants in order to collect sufficient perspectives about the programme. We identified five key stakeholders: UNDP and the development partners as the overall fund manager and key funders of the programme; the Government counterparts in the Public Sector Transformation Department and Performance Contracting Department as the implementing partners in the programme, focusing on the leadership and heads of sections of each Department; Ministries, Departments and Agencies as beneficiaries; State Corporations as beneficiaries; Civil Society and the private sector as key stakeholders.

Criteria were developed for selecting a representative sample.⁸ These criteria included the;

- Highest performing, least performing, most improved and most regressed of the MDAs and State Corporations according to the latest ranking, which is for of FY 2010/2011

⁷ Given the two year framework for the PSR programme, it may be difficult to establish impact and to attribute the impact to this particular programme. We will analyse the outputs, results and outcomes from the programme and attempt to reach justifiable conclusions based on correlation and counterfactual analyses.

⁸ See Inception Report for a fuller discussion of our sampling approach

- Sectoral representation including social, economic and regulatory
- Local authorities/Counties in close proximity to Nairobi given the time constraints
- Other social and economic actors in civil society and the private sector

In the end, in addition to the OPM, we met with the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Public Sanitation, Ministry of Immigration, the Kenya School of Government, the Capital Markets Authority, Agricultural Finance Corporation, ICT Board, the Kenya Alliance of Residents Associations, Youth Agenda, the National Taxpayers Association and the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, as well as Vision 2030 Delivery Secretariat. We also met with two of the core donors, CIDA and SIDA as well as with UNDP.

Fourth, we measured programme achievements against the objectives, outcomes and outputs outlined in the original project document, and annual work plans using the log frame indicators, and drawing on the annual reports which were submitted to UNDP and development partners, as well as the Mid-Term Evaluation of the programme.

Fifth, we considered three basic elements of project implementation: project design and management, monitoring and evaluation and finance and administration, and the extent to which the programme was able to put these effectively into practice.

Finally, on the basis of the information collected from various sources, the report draws key lessons and offers a number of practical recommendations for the choice, design and implementation of future programmes in support of PSR.

Structure of the Report

The structure of the report reflects these methods. After this introduction, chapter two explains the background of the project, its intended objectives and components. Chapter three considers each of the programme components to measure the achievements against the planned programme deliverables. Chapter four examines the core elements of project management which underpin implementation including monitoring and evaluation, and finance and administration. Lastly, chapter five presents key conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations for stakeholder consideration.

Limitations and challenges of the evaluation

The evaluation faced three challenges which potentially could have affected the evaluation – adequate time for both preparation and for carrying out the evaluation, the vicissitudes associated with the timing, i.e. the evaluation coincided with a major national transition, and the organisational fissures between the departments responsible for the implementation of the programme and hence key to the evaluation which was purposely Government led. Each of these is discussed briefly below.

The evaluation was proposed to be carried out in 25 days, a very short period for a big programme with lots of history and multiple players. The announcement of the award also came with a notification of urgency of commencement, giving virtually no time for preparation for the kick-off, which had to start before externally based members could be mobilised to arrive in the country. This limited preparation on the part of everyone meant that preparatory processes had to be fast tracked and carried out in parallel, urgent appointments sought and only secured with difficulty, and valuable time getting wasted.

While the concerns that the timing of the assignment, taking place as it did during the transition to a new system of government, to newly elected governments at national government and County level, and to newly appointed public servants at all levels were valid and potentially non-conducive to a sound evaluation, due to anticipated non-availability of key informants, the evaluation team notes that these concerns did not materialise to the extent feared, except for the part of the sample that related to the previous participants/beneficiaries of the programme who had since devolved to counties. The evaluation team was advised that it would be difficult to secure appointments with former local governments' personnel because of the difficulties of locating them and the sensitivities related to the introduction of PC in Counties, which sensitivities were yet to be assuaged.

The strength of an evaluation and the value of its output can only be as good as the commitment and support of the organisation which requested it. In a situation of short timeframes and urgent completion of assignments,

preparation and organisation becomes even more critical to enable the evaluators to collect the necessary information and documentation, and meet the necessary informants. In this regard, the evaluation benefitted from the open and frank discussions which characterised all key informant interviews and focus group discussions. UNDP was cooperative and engaged in the evaluation process and were available to assist throughout the assignment. In particular, their role in facilitating the process by coordinating and following up with development partners and the government counterparts was integral to the success of the evaluation. Throughout the evaluation, the Performance Contracting Department, management and staff members were also engaged in the evaluation process. Key staff members were available for interviews, documents were freely shared and arrangements were made for the various methods of collecting information.

The Public Sector Transformation Department faced challenges in providing the same level of facilitation and coordination due to the timing of the evaluation and with developments at County level. This led to a degree of imbalance in the collection of information gathered with those stakeholders who were linked to the programme through the PSTD. PSTD did however seek to and met with the evaluation team towards the end of the process to share further information and their perspectives on the programme. To mitigate for these initial delays, the evaluation independently identified and met civil society and the private sector representatives to fill the information gap and restore the balance. It is in this context that the team met Kenya Alliance of Residents Associations, Youth Agenda and the Kenya Private Sector Alliance for example.

Despite the fact that this was one programme, the division between the two departments not only affected the outcome of the programme, but also this evaluation. For purposes of illustration that, while the departments shared the same beneficiaries, when one side organised a meeting with an institution, the respondents in those institutions assumed that they were expected to concentrate on the components of the organiser. In the case of the appointments organised by PCD, the PCD officer introduced the team and the subject matter. While the ET did its best to cover both sides in every meeting, this was only possible in a few meetings because often the participants would have been predetermined by the assumptions referred to above.

Another challenge for the evaluation arose from the parameters of the evaluation which focused on phase II of the programme. While the evaluation team stressed these parameters, sometimes respondents were unable to distinguish between the first and the second phases of the programme. In order to address this, information collected from key informants was validated by the annual and other progress reports in order to differentiate the second phase results from the first phase.

Nevertheless, despite these challenges, the evaluation team made every effort to produce a sound assessment based on the information and time available. The data collected from documents, interviews and discussions provided a sufficient basis to enable us to offer what we hope are relevant and constructive recommendations for UNDP and the Public Sector Reforms Programme to improve how they approach this task and functions in future.

Main Findings

Main Findings

These findings are organized around the assignment objectives developed from the guidelines to the evaluation in the RFP and based on the Project document. For ease of reference these are restated here:

- Relevance of the programme in the Kenyan context
- Achievement of Programme Results
- Utilisation of Programme Resources
- Sustainability of impact
- Factors which facilitated or hindered the achievement of outcomes

Relevance of the programme in the Kenyan context

This evaluation assessed the relevance of Phase II of the Public Sector Reforms Programme in the Kenyan context by examining how much public sector reform was a priority at the time the programme was selected, agreed and designed, and for the programme's period of coverage. We find that the programme was relevant because it addressed itself to a key national priority defined in strategic policy documents. The evaluation reviewed several key Government strategic documents, either provided or independently accessed, and found that the programme responds particularly to the Prime Minister's Strategic Plan, which provides or reinforces the mandates of the two departments responsible for PSR.

Unlike many countries where public sector reforms are driven by availability of donor resources and thus by development partner priorities for the country, Kenya has adopted PSR as a key and formal strategy for the country's development and transformation. For example, each pillar of Vision 2030 has a list of sectoral strategies. The only sectoral strategy listed for the political pillar is public sector reforms. One then finds that the entire governance objectives contained in this pillar are predicated on the successful design and implementation of the PSR. The same thread of the strategic positioning of PSR is found in the Medium Term Plan 2008 - 2012. The selection and design of components is equally responsive and related to the strategic and programme priorities of the Government. We demonstrate below the relevance to specific GoK objectives and priorities in respect to national reforms and stakeholders.

Relevance to national reforms

According to the End of Phase Evaluation of the Results for Kenyans Programme Phase I, which concluded in March 2010, the programme contributed to a general improvement in the way Government manages for results and in laying the foundation for the institutionalization of Results Based Management (RBM).⁹ It also contributed to positive changes in the attitude and performance of civil servants over time, as they appeared to be more motivated. These changes translated into discernible incremental improvements in public service delivery in some areas such as the police stations, offices of chiefs and sub-chiefs, hospitals, etc. At the conclusion of the Results for Kenyans Programme therefore, the concept of Performance Management and focusing on outputs and outcomes was more widely understood and awareness of RBM values and approaches had been raised.

The GoK decided that the above achievements had to be consolidated through further reforms and requested the development partners to support a successor programme. The PSR II programme started in September 2010, one month after the promulgation of the new constitution of Kenya. This meant that the implementation period of the programme coincided with all the constitutionally mandated processes such as preparations for the general elections, preparation for the implementation of devolved governance structures, legislation and other constitution based reform processes, all of which, had been planned for in the MTP 2008 – 2010.

The programme demonstrated its relevance by the interventions that it supported, through the respective departmental components - the necessary policy and legislation for constitutional implementation; the necessary processes and programmes for the transformation to a new type of public servant envisaged in the constitution, including a new set of performance and ethical values and culture, new tools for performance,

⁹ PCD questioned the attribution of institutionalisation of RBM to RfK, because "it was notthe Results for Kenyans Programme Phase I that contributed to a general improvement in the way the Government manages for results" because "by the time there was support to Performance Contracting by the Donors in 2008, PC was already in place and institutionalized"⁹

evaluation and public feedback and innovative approaches to public sector and citizen interface. All these initiatives have been and continue to be instrumental and relevant to Kenya's response to both the post electoral socio-political crisis of 2008 and the effects of the global economic recession and to the long term transformation that the country is going through, introducing fundamental constitutional, institutional and values changes.

Relevance to various stakeholders

The PSR programme was designed to meet the needs of all the stakeholders of the programme – sponsors, implementers and beneficiaries. The key stakeholders, the Government and people of Kenya place a great deal of importance on public sector reforms as a strategy for their development. The programme design not only respected that commitment but also included focus on outcomes important to Kenyans at this stage of major transformation. Government and people discussion opportunities like the Prime Ministers Round Table Discussions, development of a more effective, accountable and responsive public sector, and people's feedback mechanisms to their government on a range of issues but especially on service delivery. For the GoK in general and OPM in particular this programme fitted in well with their public sector reforms mandate and strategic objectives.

The PSR programme is also relevant to the UNDP in that the current support provided by UNDP under the basket funds to the Public Sector Reforms Programme is within the framework of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2013. The specific UNDAF outcome is enhanced capacities of key national and local institutions for improved governance while the expected CPAP outcome is more efficient, effective and equitable public service delivery by institutions and systems for democratic governance. The Country Programme Output under the CPAP is deepening of efficiency, accountability and performance management of public institutions including their role in promoting good governance.

For the development partners that supported the programme, the programme resonated with their priorities in Kenya, for poverty reduction, promotion of democratic governance and human rights and enhancing state capacity. Development partners had supported the Results for Kenya programme and were committed to ensuring that the remaining activities in that programme were supported to completion, while at the same time positioning for support to the new dispensation. The addition of the dimension of implementation of the constitution to the programme provided those donors interested in devolution with an opportunity to contribute to the implementation of the constitution.

The programme was therefore, relevant to the stakeholders involved. However, this level of relevance at the beginning does not appear to have lasted throughout the life of the programme when donors, as some of the donors did not renew their cost sharing agreements and drifted off to other areas of support.

Achievement of programme results

The project document (PD) is designed around the two departments responsible for public sector reform in OPM during the period under review, PSTD and PCD. In the PD, each department is accountable for the implementation of six outcomes as shown in Table 1 above. The original PD was, however amended on 23rd March 2011, to include an outcome related to the implementation of the newly promulgated constitution, in particular devolution. It did so, largely through support to the Task Force on Devolution, under the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Local Government's Office and to provide for activities. This is reflected in the annual work plan 2010 – 2011. It is not clear how it became part of the work plan when it only came along five months later.¹⁰

The 2010/2011 AWP regrouped outcomes under three components. These components were¹¹

- Technical assistance for the implementation of the new constitution

¹⁰ It is possible, but not verified that the work plan, of which the copy available to the team is not dated, was developed after the addendum or the addendum was agreed much earlier and only formalised later. It has also been suggested that inclusion of support to implementation of the Constitution had been planned by PSTD, and support extended beyond the provisions of the addendum, to include support to other taskforces such as the one on Values and Ethics formerly under the Ministry of Justice, and other initiatives.

¹¹ The first component, related to constitution implementation was not departmentally aligned. The second two were by department, i.e. PSTD and PCD

- Transformation programme is implemented in selected MDAs
Performance contracting deepened in the public sector (PCD)¹²

While this evaluation will keep these components for purposes of terminological consistency, the evaluation views these as strategic objectives to be achieved through of a number of outcomes.

Also important to note is that the table, “Quality Management for Project Activity Results”, which provides the basis for the M&E framework, designated the outcomes in the project document as outputs, and designated outputs as activity results. In addition this table, which is an Atlas document, does not include the constitution implementation as an output, and does not reflect all the original outputs from the PD and the AWP. Such disparities make it difficult for the evaluation to follow the results chain and evaluate properly.

Meanwhile a mid-term review of the programme was carried out in June and July 2011. It focused on the original AWP and reported under the three components, which it renamed “overall outcomes”, and re-categorised the project document outcomes as sub-outcomes. There does not appear to have been any project document revisions, other than the addendum that provided for support to the implementation of the constitution, to capture all these changes. The “mid-term” evaluation, which could have captured and provided a baseline for these changes, did not do so. This evaluation maintains the terminology and log frame of the project document, including the addendum, which is approximately how the AWP 2010/2011 is formulated. It reports on outcomes, rather than the component results.

Therefore this evaluation determined the extent to which the programme results were realised by assessing the achievement of the programme outcomes through delivery of outputs as per the project document. In the following subsections, we present the evaluation findings in respect of the different PSR programme outcomes and outputs, under the two departments, PSTD and PCD. For ease of reference the original outcomes for each department are summarised below:¹³

The Public Sector Transformation Department was responsible for the following outcomes with the overall objective during this period of ensuring that the transformation programme is implemented in selected MDAs

- Kenya School of Government operationalised
- Citizens satisfaction with Government Service delivery
- Sustainable Public Sector Stakeholder Partnerships
- Synergy in government functions and operations
- A culture for Managing for Results engendered in all MDAs and Counties
- PSTD strengthened to achieve its mandate and objectives

The Performance Contracting Department was responsible for the following outcomes, with the overall objective during this period of ensuring that performance contracting is deepened in the public sector:

- Strengthened capacity of MDAs on Sector Performance Standards and automation of Performance Contracting
- Real time monitoring and evaluation of performance
- Awareness Creation for Stakeholder Engagement
- Monitoring, Evaluation and Coordination for Performance Measurement
- Management and Leadership for Improved Public Sector Delivery in Africa
- Performance management and measurement tools developed for Africa public services

¹² This component has also been referred to as “overall outcome” with outcomes under it sometimes referred to as sub-outcomes

¹³ Three of the original outcomes- Kenya School of Government operationalised; Awareness Creation for Stakeholder Engagement; Monitoring, Evaluation and Coordination for Performance Measurement; Management and Leadership for Improved Public Sector Delivery in Africa – were subsequently subordinated under other outcomes as outputs under these outcomes.

In implementing activities towards the achievement of these results, the two departments developed, or adapted many instruments and tools, some of which were used across the board but others were distinct to each department. Customer satisfaction surveys, citizens' Service Delivery Charters, quality policy statements and ISO Certification were performance indicators used in the PC system, whereas RRI's, ISDs etc. were PST instruments. Some of these tools were interchangeable and could be used in measuring progress towards an outcome listed under the other department. For example it was often mentioned that RRI's are an important tool for the MDAs to fast track the attainment of their performance targets. Customer satisfaction surveys, which are a feedback tool in performance contracting, fed into the PSTD outcome regarding the extent to which citizens are satisfied with government services.

Situations of transition bring their own dynamics to programme design and implementation. When that transition is a coalition government born out of indecisive or disputed election results, it is bound to have tensions that tend to cascade down to all levels of government, including (especially the senior) civil servants. Even when development partners do not take sides, which they often do, donor funded projects are not immune to the phenomenon. This programme was conceived at the peak of such a coalition government complete with suspicion and hostility (albeit with vigorous efforts at reconciliation) and with the certainty of forthcoming competitive elections.

While the project document makes no such contextual analysis in relation to the effectiveness of programme implementation, this political economic background had an effect and has to be borne in mind.

This section presents results summary under each outcome. This summary is supplemented by a more detailed presentation of results and evidence of achievement in Table 3

Outcome 1: Support to implementation of the new Constitution

This outcome, which was not in the PD, was introduced by the Addendum and incorporated in the AWP. It was not designated to either department, but later appears in documents as the responsibility of the PSTD. Indeed the PSTD became a member of the Task Force which was the main support objective of this Addendum. It is assessed here as an outcome to which both departments made contribution.

In its support to the work of the Task Force on Devolved Government, the programme made a significant contribution to the implementation of this critical dimension of the constitution. The main output under this outcome was "legislative drafting and complimentary content unpacking the new constitutional order". The driving force behind all this was the Task Force on Devolution. The Task Force produced its report as expected. The "Final Report of the Taskforce on Devolved Government" served as the key document guiding the preparation for the transition to devolution. The report made analysis of devolved government, its meaning and its implications, structural, process and values implications of devolution, and delineated legislation requirements for implementation of the devolution aspect of the constitution. It is on the basis of the report that a significant legislative programme was implemented.

The PSR phase II programme also contributed to the achievement of the following outputs: supported PCD to ensure that MDAs included an indicator on implementing the New Constitution in their Performance Contracts for 2011/2012; supported PSTD to provide technical support to the Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) on Human Resource Management (HRM) which contributed to the enhancement of the Human Resource Management Systems of the PSC; logistical support was provided to the Task Force on the National Values System for Kenya, which produced draft bills, a civic education report and a framework for national values; and technical support was also provided to the Judiciary on the Judiciary Transformation Programme.

Public Sector Transformation Component

Outcome 2: Citizens satisfaction with Government Service delivery Enhanced.

The Key outputs expected under this outcome were;

- streamlined accessible quality services to citizens
- Selected services improved in line with the national customer satisfaction survey
- MDAs performance in delivery of services evaluated by citizens, and
- Human Rights Based approach inculcated in public service delivery.

While the programme helped initiate some activities towards each of the above outputs, these had not progressed beyond the initial stages at the time of the evaluation and hence the outputs have not yet been achieved. This is in part just a function of time – the programme ran for less than three years – but also a function of the level of abstraction in articulating outputs. A tighter delineation of outputs would have shown that the level of achievement is much higher.

Under this outcome the programme interventions also resulted in the establishment of anticorruption boxes at MDAs; gender and children desks at police stations.

While the above output indicators were the ones outlined in the results framework under performance contracting, customer satisfaction surveys were also required, and they measure roughly the same target groups regarding satisfaction with the same government delivery agencies. We report them below in this section as they do offer some further insight into the level of satisfaction with government services in different sectors.

The national customer satisfaction survey concluded in March 2010 indicated that 63.4% of Kenyans were satisfied with government services. However, no such study has been undertaken ever since which is not surprising since annual surveys are difficult and expensive to conduct. However, MDAs are required as part of the PC process to undertake their own independent annual customer satisfaction surveys to establish their customers' satisfaction with their services and to identify service delivery gaps.

Results of the sampled MDAs that undertook customer satisfaction surveys during the last three years indicated varying trends - some were declining while others registered a steady increase in customer satisfaction between 2010 and 2012, as illustrated in the table below.

Table 2: Customer Satisfaction Survey Results (illustrative)

SN	MDA	2012	2011	2010
1	Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation	68%	85.3%	85%
2	Ministry of State for immigration & registration of persons	77%	75%	73%
3	Capital Markets Authority	72%	68%	61%
4	Ministry of State for Planning, National Development & Vision 2030 (Devolution and Planning)	68%	78%	
5	KSoG	86%	N/A	N/A
6	Ministry of Education	51%		

In discussing the individual MDA surveys, however, respondents pointed out that surveys do not appear to tally with the Performance Contracting Department's annual assessment and ranking of MDAs' performance. It was even suggested that neither surveys nor the PCD assessments reflect the actual perception of the people regarding service delivery. The 2011 Aide Memoire of the GoK/Partners Review meeting noted the "Inadequate engagement of the public including questionable objectivity of MDA customer satisfaction surveys."¹⁴

In addition, there is a limit to comparability because MDAs are not required to, and often do not, use the same consultants, and different consultants use different instruments to conduct the surveys. The evaluation was informed that PCD's degree of confidence in both the comparability of the results and their validity derive from the fact that the variables measured are standardised across MDAs. While such concerns could be due to perceptions not likely to be allayed by technical explanations, it points to the need for a common understanding of what these assessments mean and what the relationship is between a high PCD ranking for an MDA and the quality of its delivery to the customers during the same period. PCD explained that there is a lag between announcements and the year performance is actually measured.

Outcome 3: Sustainable Public Sector Stakeholder Partnerships

In the absence of a clear indication of what was referred to as sustainable partnerships the evaluation team looked at activities that brought together those actors who would normally operate in different spheres.

There is evidence that partnerships occurred of varying durations between the public sector and different stakeholders – private sector, civil society, youth and others. While the positive response to these and general consensus that they be continued suggest that the partnership strategy could be sustainable, the fact that key such partnerships were anchored in the OPM means that their continuity will depend on the institutional location and commitment within that location.

There were a number of outputs under this outcome.

The Prime Minister's Round Table (PMRT)

The evaluation team found that the PMRT overall were well appreciated and led to some changes in the way key stakeholders related and improvement in some areas of public and private sector interface. The PMRTs were attended by officials from the Office of the Prime Minister, and line ministries who took note of the emerging issues. Below are highlights of some of the outputs.

- 8 PMRT's discussions which brought different stakeholders together, specifically focussing on issues affecting women and youth, private sector, disabled people and civil society, were held.
- Two of the PMRT discussions were held in partnership with CIC and Ministry of Justice to engage stakeholders on the state of the economy and the status of implementation of the constitution
- Four were undertaken in four different areas in partnership with Kenya Investment Authority to discuss regional investment.
- The PMRTs thus discussed a range of topics including but not limited to taxation/VAT; traffic in the city; road blocks; etc.

One result that the evaluation noted was the observation that while the PMRT did not in and of itself result in either policy decisions or major initiatives, with respect to the private sector, it was helpful in providing both sides with information. It was reported that often issues that were being raised would have in most cases either already be provided for in the different MDA's strategic plans, in process or had bottlenecks that needed attention or cooperation across the public and private sectors. It was thus useful for information sharing and confidence building. However the above notwithstanding, there were some practical results, such as the fact that the PMRT on gender led to the directive of provision of sanitary towels in rural schools to reduce drop-out cases, to mention just but one example, or that unnecessary road blocks were removed, facilitating smoother

¹⁴ Aide Memoire: Joint Review Mission for the Public Sector Reforms and Performance Contracting Programme, 28th June 2011

transportation of goods. The private sector appreciated the usefulness of the PMRTs in coordinating government ministries in one place and providing a foundation for ongoing communication with the government in order to address business concerns and addressing bottlenecks such as the crisis with the Mombasa Port in 2012.

Although the PMRT was apparently a forum that was originally pushed for by the private sector and which progressively opened up to other sectors, there is a sentiment that it had become primarily a private sector driven forum. The youth PMRT was perceived to be useful, but follow up from the RT was difficult as the agreed matrix of indicators was not implemented by Line Ministries. On the other hand many associate the PMRT with initiatives and results across the board. It is probably a testimony to their success that all who participated identify some benefit as a result of participation, would like them to continue, and would like some improvement in the format of participation and follow up.

A view was expressed by some that the forum was not sufficiently strategic, as the agenda setting had become more casual and not one where strategic issues were identified, planned, for and then discussed at this high level opportunity. On the other hand some felt that there was a prosper mixture of strategic and problem solving approaches. For example one of the last PMRTs was on implementation of the Constitution, and was organised by CIC, AG's office – that is certainly seen as strategic. Although the evaluation was not able to confirm this, it sounded as though the other stakeholders concerns became marginalised even in the fora that were supposedly for them.

Strategic Partnerships

It is felt that new approaches to partnerships were created and that the example of the PMRT has been replicated to various levels in the private sector. The programme also promoted public sector partnerships with the civil society by involving the Kenya Alliance of Resident Associations (KARA) and other civil society organisations in the development of the devolution laws and policies, and in the training of civil society and filed based civil servants on performance contracting in partnership with PCD.

The programme also promoted dialogue and strategic partnerships with the private sector in addition to the Roundtables. The PSR programme also provided logistical support to the Competitive Partnerships Initiative and Communication Reforms with the Ministry of Information and Communication and the Ministry of Tourism, where a report was developed on how to actualize Public Private Partnership in the tourism and ICT sector and to foster dialogue between the public and private sectors. The PSTD also worked with the World Bank on issues concerning the Doing Business in Kenya for ease of doing business at the sub-national level and other investment climate reforms.

Although the programme enabled a number of stakeholders to participate in partnership fora through the PMRT, the sustainability of this concept is uncertain, especially with the new Constitution's abolition of the Office of the Prime Minister. It is not clear whether PMRT as a brand will continue even by another name. While the actual effectiveness during this period of implementation was not universally acclaimed, there was agreement on the potential these fora have for bringing stakeholders together from different levels and in particular for the development of partnerships across the board, based on the common desire to solve mutual problems and meet challenges. It was suggested that these would be even more effective if there was an advance agenda known beforehand to enable relevant line ministries to participate and to be prepared when they do.

PCD partnered with civil society in in delivering IEC capacity building. This was seen as a model for the future by many stakeholders, once the modality is fine-tuned and regularised. The PSTD was also involved in supporting and partnering with the Transitional Authority as well as partnering with the Kenya School of Government. This has well-positioned the PSTD for creating partnerships with the County governments established after the March 2013 elections.

To the extent that only some partnership activities did take place, but even then as events or one-off processes rather than as institutionalised processes, this outcome was only partially achieved.

Outcome 4: Synergy in government functions and operations

Although the activities under this outcome were yet to be implemented, taken as a whole all the PSR II activities and outputs, if successful, would lead to linked up government.

There already is considerable vertical synergy in planning. All planning, budgeting and performance contracting is linked up as it starts with Vision 2030 as the long term country development strategy, which informs and guides the national midterm (five year) strategy. Both Vision 2030 and the midterm strategy inform the institutional (MDA) strategies and hence the institutional performance contracts which in turn, inform the departmental, and unit contracts. The framework for vertically linked-up government is already there. The programme was aiming to support strengthening of this and also improve horizontal linkage.

PSR Phase II programme aimed to achieve synergy in government functions and operations, measured by the extent of linked up government. Some of the intended activities in terms of linked up government have begun but were not yet completed. The performance management system has a number of components that are in process of being implemented. Below are some of the tools and approaches that were developed.

Although not yet finalized, the Integrated Performance Management System and Real Time Monitoring and Evaluation System are the other tools aimed at linking up the Performance Management and leverage resources. With the performance Management System, MDAs shall be able to load and view their performance throughout the year and likewise, higher level offices shall be able to log on the Performance Management System to view, monitor and evaluate the different MDAs and counties' performance and take necessary action if required. The Performance Management System has been successfully piloted however, it is not able to interface with the already existing sector/Institutional Management Information Systems such as IFMIS to mine and import indicator data from them, and hence jeopardizing the extent of linked up government.

Further, PCD provides data on several indicators to the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES) from which NIMES picks indicators relevant for tracking on a macro level. This provides further evidence of a linked up government in terms of monitoring and evaluation.

Considering the above achievements in respect of the different outcome and output indicators, there is progress and but not yet on all outputs. The programme only partially achieved the outcome of enhancing synergy in government functions and operations.

Outcome 5: A culture for Managing for Results engendered in all MDAs and Counties

The PSR programme aimed to engender a culture for Managing for Results in all MDAs and Counties, to be measured by the functionality of Ministerial Management Units (MMUs) and Central Planning Units (CPUs) in all MDAs. To achieve this, the programme facilitated public service wide training of internal champions to spearhead the Rapid Results Approach as a key tool in the implementation of the transforming Kenya programme. The programme facilitated training of public servants from the central and local governments, government parastatals and Civil Society in Results Based Management, Capacity/readiness scanning, M&E, Project Planning Civic Dialogue; Values and Ethics and Performance Appraisal System. The cadre of staff trained ranged from senior to junior management staff who were expected to cascade the training received to their staff. This training built RBM capacity across government ministries and departments to support implementation of the Constitution and other identified national priorities on a continual basis in the respective MDAs.

The programme also facilitated PSTD as a coordinating and supervisory body to the MDA's internal RRI's, providing technical support to a network sharing mechanisms for M&E and ensuring sustainability of results achieved, as well as integrating performance management systems and IEC with over 240 RRI champions trained. The achievements detailed in Table 3 enhanced and reinforced the results management culture in those institutions as witnessed by the current adaptation, use and reference to Vision 2030; institutional and departmental strategic plans and performance contracts in different MDAs.

In addition, some of the MDAs consulted such as Ministry of Public Health, Capital Markets Authority and Ministry of State for Immigration & Registration of Persons had successfully internalised and applied the RRI approach in performance management. Although a number of public officers from the former Local Governments were trained on the Results based Management especially the RRI methodology, the evaluation was not successful in establishing the current Performance Management status and achievements of counties as it happened at a time when they were transiting into the devolved system of governance.

Considering the achievements of the above outcome and output indicators, the programme has engendered a culture for Managing for Results in all MDAs, as measured by the functionality of MMUs/CPUs in all MDAs. It could be assumed that to the extent that the former local authority staff has since been absorbed into counties, the training provided to them will ensure an early grounding of this culture at county levels.

Outcome 6: PSTD strengthened to achieve its mandate and objectives

PSR II programme strengthened the PSTD to achieve its mandate and objectives by facilitating the achievement of the following outputs.

- Development of a Strategic Plan for PSTD;
- Production of newsletters on reforms;
- Preparation and validation of the draft M&E framework for PSTD. The framework will be used to capture progress against PSTD's activities and results achieved for incorporation into the IEC strategy;
- Creation of a functional website (www.reformskenya.go.ke) to enhance awareness of PSTD activities;
- Hiring of two RRA Programme Officers and one Finance Officer to increase human resource capacity on RRA implementation and financial management; and
- The procurement of 3 servers and 15 desktops. Additionally 15 laptops that were purchased for the TFDG were transferred to PSTD.

Considering the achievements of the different outcome and output indicators above, the aim to strengthen PSTD to meet its mandate and objectives was partially achieved. Key respondents raised the issue of the institutional weakness of PSTD, which the programme addressed only in part through recruitment and other technical support. However it was noted that government funding support to PSTD increased every year of the programme. While the PSR programme recruited additional staff through UNDP, the job descriptions and recruitment process were useful in identifying the skills needed for the PSTD enabling additional secondments from within government to the PSTD highlighting the value seen in the department, as well its future sustainability. These gains however were offset by delays and the loss of PSTD staff to other parts of the government.

Performance Contracting Component

Outcome 7: Strengthened capacity of MDAs on Sector Performance Standards and automation of Performance Contracting

The achievement of this outcome was to be measured by how much Performance Contracting as an accountability framework had been extended beyond the Executive branch to the Judiciary and Parliament and tertiary institutions; and enhanced accountability for performance management results.

Although the programme did not succeed in extending Performance Contracting as an accountability framework to the Judiciary and Parliament, local authorities including provincial and districts heads, Constituency Development Fund Coordinators and some Civil Society members were trained on effective Implementation of Performance Contracts as an accountability framework¹⁵. The training focused on enhancing Performance Management and improving public service delivery as well as promoted an appreciation among

¹⁵ This is based on document reviews as the evaluation team was not able to interview former local authority participants to programme activities.

the local authority officials of the Citizens' Service Delivery Charter as an important tool for enhancing service delivery, in light of Sections 46 and 232 of the Constitution.

The above achievements contributed to enhancing accountability for performance management results however, this evaluation was conducted at a time when local authorities were transiting to the devolved system of governance and the evaluation team did not interview the trained governors and other local county official to augment its findings. The table below illustrates the performance against target in respect to the programme output indicators for the strengthened capacity of MDAs on sector performance standards outcome.

Considering the above outcomes and outputs, the programme partially achieved the “strengthened capacity of MDAs on Sector Performance Standards and automation of Performance Contracting” outcome.

Outcome 8: Real time monitoring and evaluation of performance

As per the programme document, the achievement of the real time monitoring and evaluation of performance outcome was to be measured by the increased level of customer satisfaction with, and access to, public sector services, and streamlined contracting process and improved service delivery to the citizenry as outcome indicators.

The evaluation established diverse levels of customer satisfaction with public services as evidenced by the steady improvement in the Ministry of State for immigration & registration of persons (77%, 75% & 73% in 2012, 2011, and 2010 respectively) and Capital Markets Authority (72%, 68%, and 61% in 2012, 2011, and 2010 respectively), while there was steady decline in the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (68%, 85.3%, and 85% in 2012, 2011, and 2010 respectively) and the Ministry of State for Planning, National Development & Vision 2030 (68% and 78% in 2012 and 2011 respectively). Customer satisfaction with Kenya School of Governance services was above average at 86% in 2012 while customer satisfaction with the Ministry of Education was below average at 51% in 2012.

Although not yet fully operational the PSR programme developed an automated performance management system to ensure that there is real time and continuous monitoring and evaluation of performance in Ministries and accounting departments and consolidation of focused information pertinent to decision making, which project has vast potential to streamline the contracting process and improve service delivery to the citizenry.

Going by the above achievements the PSR programme largely achieved its objective of Real time monitoring and evaluation of performance.

Outcome 9: Strengthened Performance Contracting process and systems

PSR II programme aimed to strengthen the performance contracting process and systems through benchmarking MDAs to international best practices in their operations; automation of Performance Management; and real time monitoring and evaluation of MDAs.

In addition to the real time monitoring and evaluation of performance achievements illustrated under outcome 4, the PCD automated the central evaluation process with support from the e-government department. The automated Performance Contracting system operates in such a way that by the end of the financial year, MDAs are provided with a password to log onto the PCD website and upload their achievements against targets, which data is processed by the system to give the MDA's overall score and rating. After registering their performance with the evaluation system, the MDAs proceed to present the associated evidence of performance to the PCD that considers the evidence to decide the final MDA score.

PCD also developed an Information, Education and Communication Strategy which was disseminated to over 350 participants through engaging the civil society groups and Ministry of Information and Communication officers to educate the masses on their rights to receive quality services from government officials. While this is a small number in a country context, it represents a start.

PCD partnered with Kenya Alliance of Residents Associations (KARA) to roll out the PCD Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy. Given its extensive national network, KARA was identified to be the lead agency to co-ordinate the invitation and participation of Civil Society Organizations during the training. In each of the training centres, KARA mobilized at least 40 participants from the Civil Society Organizations who attended the training. They also were part of the facilitators who facilitated the workshops.

The table below illustrates the performance against target in respect to the strengthened performance contracting process and systems output indicators.

Output 10: Performance management and measurement tools developed for Africa public services

As per the Project document, the achievement of this outcome was to be measured by the strengthened leadership and management for improved public service delivery in Africa, and the development of a Performance Management guide. As such the PSR programme contribution facilitated other countries such as Tanzania, Lesotho, and Sierra Leon to come and learn from the Kenyan experience. In addition, the Performance Management guidelines and tools which PCD participated in developing were approved at the 7th Conference of Africa Ministers for Public Service (CAMPS).

The outcome and output indicator targets for the development of Performance management and measurement tools for Africa public services were therefore achieved.

Detailed Analysis of Findings

Table 3 analyses results and results sustainability against each outcome, outputs and targets

Table 3 Detailed Findings

Outcome 1: Support to implementation of the new Constitution				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
Expert technical content and legislative drafting	Legislative drafting and complimentary content unpacking the new constitutional order	Confirm delivery with schedules provided	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Performance Contracts of MDAs were made to include an indicator on implementing the New Constitution in their Performance Contracts for 2011/2012. The Task Force on Devolved Government (TFDG) was facilitated to develop a report on devolution which recommended and informed the drafting of the devolution legislation. Specifically, the programme support contributed to the enactment of the following acts and bills. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011; ➤ County Governments Act, 2012; ➤ Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012; ➤ Transition to County Governments Act, 2012; and ➤ Public Financial Management Act, 2012 (jointly with Treasury). Technical support was provided to the Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) on Human Resource Management (HRM) to produce reports on Staffing the Senate; 	The clearer understanding of the constitutional understanding and legislation for the implementation of the constitution are critical steps in the short, medium and long-term implementation of the constitution and transformation of the governance system. This result is sustainable.

			<p>Staffing the National Assembly; Advising on Schemes of Services; and Implementing a Performance Management System. This support contributed to the enhancement of the Human Resource Management Systems of the PSC.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Logistical support was provided to the Task Force on the National Values System for Kenya, which produced draft bills, civic education report and a framework for national values. <p>Technical support was also provided to the Judiciary on the Judiciary Transformation Programme.</p>	
Outcome 2: Citizens satisfaction with Government Service delivery Enhanced				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
Level of citizen satisfaction with service delivery	Streamlined accessible quality services to citizens	<p>ISD framework implemented</p> <p>Pilot one-stop shop</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of a single window service delivery Web-Portal “hudumakenya.go.ke”; Architectural design & model for Citizen Service Centre; and Identification of a pilot site for the Integrated Service Delivery (ISD) programme. 	There is neither evidence nor serious conviction that this will take off soon.
	Selected services improved in line with the national customer	Significant gaps in customer satisfaction improved	Some progress made by the MDAs that undertake the PC required annual customer satisfaction surveys	This is on-going and there is evidence that the levels of satisfaction have been improving. This not only

	satisfaction survey			essential in terms of driving efforts for delivery improvement, but potentially sustainable the more robust and accurate the measures become.
	MDAs performance in delivery of services evaluated by citizens	Citizen scorecard piloted	Not achieved	
	Human Rights Based approach inculcated in public service delivery	Awareness and adoption of HRBA in service delivery raised	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Art 43 of the Constitution is one of the most progressive bills of rights the world over. HRBA training for Public servants was undertaken by Kenya National Commission on Human Rights in collaboration with PSTD. Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate was trained on how to mainstream HRBA indicators within the NIMES framework. • Efforts to mainstream Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) in public service delivery were initiated through training of 30 Trainer of Trainers, sensitization of 100 officers from MDAs and Civil Society Organizations on HRBA, development of draft manuals and guidelines on HRBA, and training of 20 officers of the M&E Directorate within the Ministry of Planning. • Collaboration between PSTD and the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and National Cohesion is on-going to clarify their respective roles with regard to HRBA 	Training and awareness raising are only a first step. Sustainability can only be achieved when there are institutional changes that ensure accountability for HRBA

			in Government.	
Outcome 3: Sustainable Public Sector Stakeholder Partnerships				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
a. Level of stakeholder participation b.	Public sector stakeholder partnership (PSSP) policy implemented	MDAs managing stakeholder engagements in line with the PSSP policy	<p>No evidence attributable to the programme in respect to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitating the rolling out the framework for stakeholder engagements to MDAs; and MDAs managing stakeholder engagements in line with the PSSP policy 	PSSP would lead to increased sustainability of a partnership strategy and approach. But this was not yet been implemented.

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Extent of resources leveraged through partnership			No additional resources were mobilised through partnerships either to contribute to, or as a result of this programme	
c. Number of programmes delivered through partnerships			<p>A number of programmes were delivered through partnerships:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 8 PMRT's discussions which brought different stakeholders together, specifically focussing on issues affecting women and youth, private sector, disabled people and civil society, were held. ○ Two of the PMRT discussions were held in partnership with CIC and Ministry of Justice to engage stakeholders on the state of the economy and the status of implementation of the constitution ○ four were undertaken in four different areas in partnership with Kenya Investment Authority to discuss regional investment. ○ The PMRTs thus discussed a range of topics including but not limited to taxation/VAT; traffic in the city; road blocks; etc. 	<p>Although the programme enabled a number of stakeholders to participate in partnership fora through the PMRT, the sustainability of this concept is uncertain, especially with the new Constitution's abolition of the Office of the Prime Minister. It is not clear whether PMRT as a brand will continue even by another name.</p>

			PCD partnered with civil society in delivering IEC capacity building. This is seen as a model for the future by many stakeholders, once the modality is fine-tuned and regularised.	This model is sustainable, particularly because the anchor CSO is embedded in society and has both advocacy and partnership as its modus operandi.
Outcome 4: Synergy in government functions and operations				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
a, Extent of linked up government	Managing for results framework implemented	Coordinated adoption of results framework in all MDAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported the 4th annual meeting of the African Community of Practice on Managing for Development Results, launch of the Kenya Chapter – Kenya Community of Practice (KCOP) and development of 3 year KCOP work plan in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning; Piloted the Integrated Performance Management System and its implementation of Performance Contracts in 31 MDAs; Held additional engagement sessions with other arms of Government including the Judiciary, Parliament, Commissions and other independent offices. Specifically the Commission on Administrative Justice and the Commission on Revenue Allocation implementation modalities of the IPMS; Reviewed the draft policy on Integrated Performance Management System and an 	The sustainability of this result will depend on the integrated approach to management for results and performance contracting, within a comprehensive performance management system.

			<p>attendant bill;</p> <p>Facilitated the inaugural meeting for the Policy Steering Committee which agreed to leverage lessons learnt during piloting of the IPMS.</p>	
	Institutional framework for coordination of Public sector reforms implemented	Governance framework and map of public sector reform in place	Not achieved	Only lessons can be learnt from the negative effect of lack of coordination to ensure built in sustainability in any future programme
	Kenya School of Government operationalized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KSoG implementation plan developed; <p>Curriculum developed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KSoG was created by an Act of Parliament. • Partially achieved 	KSoG will not, in and of itself achieve linked up government. Its training and consultancy interventions could help.
		Upgraded infrastructure & facilities to accommodate KSoG	Partially achieved	Sustainable because budgeted for
		Teaching staff recruited	Partially achieved	Sustainable
Outcome 5: A culture for Managing for Results engendered in all MDAs and Counties				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
Functional MMUs/CPUs in all MDAs	RBM institutionalised in MDAs and Counties	Implementation of RBM in wider public service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RBM Champions being supported to institutionalize RBM in their respective MDAs • Kenyan missions trained on RBM and readiness scan; 	These interventions are to episodic to result in cultural and institutional transformation. Sustainability would require both individual and group training as currently

				delivered by the programme and institution based change processes.
	Capacity of counties and MDAs built to deliver efficient and effective public service	Capacity Assessments concluded in MDAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity was built in the Civil Service for 304 internal coaches in MDA's in the Transforming Kenya Programme, specializing in the RRA; Public Service Commission supported to undertake a baseline survey on the compliance with Public Service Code of Ethics which will contribute to the development of a framework on the review of Code of Ethics to align it to the Constitution; Trained 40 officers from Commissions and Independent Offices on National Values and Ethics as enshrined in the Constitution; 	Same comment as above. If there is a sustained response to the capacity assessments, then sustainability in capacity could be achieved.
	Leaders driving delivery of Vision 2030 and improving organisational performance	Improving accomplishment of MDA and county goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trained 242 internal coaches in MDAs in the Transforming Kenya programme specialising in RRA; Refining the portfolio of RRI to be launched in Capital Markets Authority and 24 Ministries spearheading implementation of the Kenya Vision 2030 RRI Coaching on-going RRI implementation, including carrying out mid-term reviews as appropriate in Kenya 	The RRI, the training, the scans etc, are important inputs into the creation of a vision driven leadership leading effective organisations, systematic organisational and institutional development is an important input into that too. And there is no evidence of that.

			<p>Maritime Authority (KMA) launched 1st wave on March 30th, 2012; Kenya National Trading Corporation (KNTC), Ministry of Trade; Kenya Investment Authority (KenInvest); and Ministry of Finance;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity/readiness scan in 12 ministries, and 4 local authorities including Ministries of Co-operative and Education, City Council of Kisumu, County Council of Nyando, Municipal Council of Malaba and Town Council of Kakamega; • Training of 50 officers on capacity scanning, training of 60 officers in M&E; training of 240 Officers from MDAs in Advanced Facilitation and Project Management skills in collaboration with the UK National School of Government; leadership and integrity training for Permanent Secretaries and Senior Deputy Secretaries; • 400 women and 200 youth leaders trained in Civic Dialogue on transformative leadership in three constituencies, i.e. Kanduyi, Kimilili and Kathiani; • 40 persons with disabilities drawn from organizations within Central region 	
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			<p>sensitized on their constitutional rights;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developed a coordination framework for Persons with Disabilities (PWDs); 	
Outcome 6: PSTD strengthened to achieve its mandate and objectives				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
Extent to which PSTD mandate and objectives are achieved	PSTD has capacity to implement the transformation programme	Vacant positions filled and operational framework in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PSTD staff were trained as follows; 3 on project management and 1 on M&E in South Africa, 2 on Project Management in Dar es salaam, 4 on Records and Information Management in Arusha and 7 on Strategic Leadership at KIA. <p>Partially achieved.</p>	Training staff and filling vacancies is an important step towards sustainability. But donor funded positions without a clear exit strategy and sustainability plan makes PSTD vulnerable to donor decisions and Government budgetary shrinkage.
	<p>Transformation programme implemented</p> <p>Risk assessed and managed;</p> <p>Contingency plans in place</p>	M&E and risk management in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A consultant finalised the M&E framework; Work to align the transformation programme with constitution implementation is still on-going <p>Partially achieved.</p>	
	Public sector transformation programme recognised and understood by the citizen and the public	Service commitments complied with and continuously improved	Not achieved;	

		Significant increase in the number of suggestions for service improvement/innovation made by public servants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IEC Strategy for PSTD was revised but is not yet finalised; • Tracking reform initiatives and awareness levels through interviewing members of the public and service providers on their views and expectations on reform in sampled Counties. PSTD also produced newsletters on reforms. A draft M&E framework was developed but not finalised; Partially achieved.	
Outcome 7: Strengthened capacity of MDAs on Sector Performance Standards and automation of Performance Contracting				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
a. Performance contracting as an accountability framework extended to the Judiciary and Parliament b. Enhanced accountability for performance management results	Province and District heads placed on performance contracts	PC training conducted in all districts 4500 senior officers trained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducted capacity building program on effective implementation of performance contracting to 874 officers in all 175 Local Authorities; • Training and capacity building on performance contracting extended to provincial and district level staff countrywide where a total of 8200 officers including all provincial and district heads, Constituency Development Fund (CDF) coordinators and civil society. Fully achieved	Sustainability for this training which was implemented just before the major changes in governmental systems and incumbents is doubtful
	Legal framework	Performance contracting bill in place	Not achieved	
	Performance contracts extended to Judiciary, Parliament and other	All Judges, Magistrates & judicial staff trained on PC process and placed on	Not achieved	

	tertiary institutions	PC		
		All MPs and parliamentary staff trained on PC process and placed on PC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 80 officers from Parliament were trained on Performance Appraisal System; Partially achieved	Same as above
		Trained board of governors, principals and other staff members of the tertiary institutions	Not achieved	
Outcome 8: Real time monitoring and evaluation of performance				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
a. increased level of customer satisfaction with public sector services b. increased access to public sector service streamlined contracting process d. Improved service delivery to the citizenry	Compliance with service charters	Service Charters cascaded in all line ministries & awareness created; SDC standardized in MDAs	An IEC strategy was developed and communication on Performance Contracting in general and service charters in particular was made to citizens and the Public Officers	Internalisation of the behaviour implied by the service charters is essential for sustainability. It is generally agreed that there is progress towards sustainability, especially because PC is more or less mandatory.
	Public Complaints Standing Committee (PCSC) supported to	Standardized reporting tool implemented in all	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCD also hosted the Public Complaints Standing Committee (PCSC) -now Commission on Administration of Justice 	Needs to be associated with IEC to be sustainable

	address public complaints	MDAs	<p>during the training programme to train MDAs on complaints resolution.</p> <p>A complaints handling framework was developed and an on-line reporting and resolution of complaints system operationalised.</p>	
Outcome 9: Strengthen Performance Contracting and Systems				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	• Result	Sustainability of Result
<p>a. Benchmark MDAs to international best practices in their operation</p> <p>b. Automation of performance management</p> <p>c. Real time monitoring and evaluation in MDAs</p>	<p>PC benchmarked to international best practices</p> <p>Performance standards</p>	MDAs trained in sector performance standards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training on internationally benchmarked sector performance standards was conducted in the provinces 	PC processes in general have reached a level of sustainability because they are mainstreamed in the national planning and budgetary processes and are no longer projects per se.
	Performance Contracting M&E system implemented in MDAs	Performance Contracting M&E system in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The performance management guidelines for Africa public service and tools were approved at the 7th Conference of Africa Ministers for Public Service (CAMPS) • Automated Performance Management System (PMS) to ensure real time and continuous monitoring and evaluation of performance in MDAs developed 	The sustainability of this result is dependent on CAMPS, beyond the reach of the programme. The contribution was important

	Automated performance contracting process	Automated the PC process in the next cycle		
Output 10: Performance management and measurement tools developed for Africa public services				
Outcome Indicator	Output	Target	Result	Sustainability of Result
Strengthened leadership and Management for Improved public service delivery in Africa, Performance management and leadership guide developed	Decentralised oversight and implementation of activities among the member states	Broadened participation of member states; Strengthened capacity at African Union Commission and the chair person office	Achieved	Although the sustainability factors are external the GoK and to this programme, the potential, given the potential for peer commitment, is significant. The political commitment of CAMPS could catalyse adoption and implementation of performance standards.
	Guide developed for CAMPS	Performance management guide and measurement tools developed	Achieved	
	PCD has the capacity to implement Performance Contracting	Vacant positions filled and operations supported	Achieved	

Utilisation of Programme Resources

Under this assignment objective the evaluation assessed the extent to which resources were made available to the programme and the effectiveness with which these were utilised. The evaluation examined annual reports and audited financial statements.¹⁶

Programme resources

The original resource commitment to the PSR II programme at launch was USD13.6 million, of which the Government of Kenya was to contribute USD2.2million and development partners USD11.4 million over the three years to June 2013, to achieve outcomes as detailed in the table 4 below. As can be seen, the basket fund, which is the subject of this evaluation, was committed to a total of \$7,691,250, while the rest, \$3,725,000 represented the World Bank's Commitment

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¹⁶ Annual Reports 2011 and 2012 and Audited accounts and audit reports 2011 and 2012

Table 4: Original Financial Resources Commitment

S N	Outcome area	GoK	W B	BF*	Total
1	Support to the realisation of the new constitution	70,000	520,000	50,000	640,000
2	Citizens satisfaction with Government Service Delivery Enhanced	105,000	1,130,000	410,000	1,645,000
3	Sustainable Public sector Stakeholder partnerships	40,000	410,000	10,000	460,000
4	Synergy in government functions and operations	270,000	710,000	720,000	1,700,000
5	A culture of managing for results engendered in all MDAs and Counties	155,000	1,265,000	1,040,000	2,460,000
6	PSTD strengthened to achieve its mandate and objectives	1,055,000	1,160,000	1,495,000	3,710,000
7	Strengthened capacity of MDAs on Sector Performance Standards and Automation of Performance Contracting	250,000	1,175,000	-	1,425,000
8	Real time monitoring and evaluation of performance	62,600	400,000	-	462,600
9	Strengthened Performance Contracting Process and systems	162,500	531,250		693,750
10	Performance management and measurement tools developed for Africa public services	62,500	390,000		452,500
	Total	2,232,600	7,691,250	3,725,000	13,648,850

*Basket Funds

Funds committed and disbursed

However, not all the originally committed resources were allocated and disbursed during programme implementation as only USD5,351,472 was eventually disbursed by the different basket funding agencies out of the planned basket funds of USD7,691,250 (70%), creating a variance of USD2,339,778 as detailed in the table below.

Table 5: Committed and Disbursed

SN	Funding source	Committed	Disbursed	Variance
1	World Bank	3,725,000		
2	Basket Funds	7,691,250	5,351,472	(2,339,778)
3	GoK	2,232,600		
	Total	13,648,850		

It is not clear where the PD summary figure of \$11,041,350 comes from, as it does not appear to reflect the sum of any combinations of commitments.

The explanation provided by the fund manager for the variance between commitment and actual mobilisation, was that some of the basket fund development partners did not extend their cost sharing agreements. Various reasons were advanced for why full mobilisation did not take place. The one shared most widely was the obvious one, that the promulgation of the new constitution refocused priorities. This view begs the question, how a programme designed at the height of the constitution making process could not have anticipated the programmatic implications of its promulgation. Even the fact that an addendum to the programme, while demonstrating flexibility, had to be developed to include some constitution implementation outcomes, is in itself telling. Didn't the Government, the donors and UNDP know that the constitution would have immense impact on public sector reform? This led to the second explanation, that while donors signed up to this programme as a continuity from the dynamic and successful RfK programme, they soon found that this sequel lacked the dynamism of its predecessor and given all the choices provided by the emerging new era, their attention was drawn elsewhere. The third view was linked to the second, that Government leadership was lacking and that the programme Steering Committee hardly met, did not make strategic decisions and that meetings would be called and cancelled, because key convenors from GoK would not be present. This lack of GoK leadership was exacerbated, according to the views offered to the team, by the lack of coordination and collaboration between the two departments responsible for the programme.

The evaluation concludes that all these reasons, in combination, explain the waning of donor enthusiasm for the programme, in a context where other opportunities were arising. In transition situations spans of attention are notoriously short, especially donor ones, as they respond to new and rapidly shifting stimuli. But Government as well, especially one caught not only in transition but in coalition as well. It is not easy to maintain a whole government focus, because strategic considerations among coalition partners do not necessarily shift at the same time and in the same direction.

Be that as it may, the GoK believes that more resources would have been helpful in completing planned activities and starting new ones that might have optimised sustainability. Key evidence for this is the 2012/2013 work plan which called for \$1,634,000, which it hardly managed to mobilise. With delivery of those resources committed at 97%, it is clear the programme could have done more.

The fact that one of the donors increased resources to the programme in support of devolution in the addendum speaks more to the donor interest in the new constitution implementation related initiatives than it shows continued commitment to the programme. In any case, even with the additional resources, the overall resources disbursed remained lower than the original commitment.

Utilisation of funds

As at 31st December 2012, USD5,168,773 (97%) of funds disbursed by development partners under the basket fund arrangement had been utilised as per the PSR programme audited financial statements for the years ended 31st December 2011 and 2012. The following table shows the total funds disbursed against expenditure as at 31st December 2012.

Utilisation of basket funds as at 31st December 2012

Table 6: Total Expenditure

SN	Donor	Contribution (USD)	Expenditure as at 31st		Total (USD)	Utilisation (%)
			2012	2011		
1	SIDA	1,990,000				
2	CIDA	2,400,000				
3	DFID	961,472				
	Total	5,351,472	3,673,016	1,495,757	5,168,773	97%

Both the 2011 and the 2012 annual audits find that the utilisation of funds were in conformity with the approved project budgets; for the approved purposes of the project; in compliance with the relevant UNDP regulations and rules, policies and procedures and supported by properly approved vouchers and other supporting documents.¹⁷ As UNDP was responsible for procurement the implementation partner did not receive any advances and thus the audit applied only to UNDP and the implementation partner's procurement authorisation processes.

¹⁷ See 2011 and 2012 audit reports

Extent of the programme contribution to the sustainability of the results management culture in the Public Service

Given the time frame of less than three years, this programme cannot claim to have contributed significantly to the sustainability of the results management culture in the Public Service on its own. However, when seen as a continuity of the RfK programme, some of whose outcomes would not have been realised were it not for the PSR II, then its contribution is significant.

The single most important intervention related to the creation of a results management culture is performance contracting. PC is mainstreamed into all public sector planning and programming and is an important link in the planning and implementation framework for the country. The PSR II contributed to several aspects of the PC programme. To that extent it contributed to the sustainability of the results management culture in the public sector. In addition both components of the programme supported many interventions and activities that, if successfully carried through will contribute to the sustainability of the results management culture.

The PSR II programme, among other things, trained and coached public servants and the Civil Society staff at the top, middle and lower levels of management, including champions in performance management areas such as results based management, rapid results initiatives, service delivery charters, citizen score cards, ethics and values, capacity needs assessment and sector performance standards within the performance contracting.

The programme facilitated the development of legislation, policies and guidelines that entrench, support, and enforce a performance management culture in the public sector. Some of these include the Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011; County Governments Act, 2012; Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012; Transition to County Governments Act, 2012; Public Financial Management Act, 2012, and Performance Contracting Guidelines. A manual for mainstreaming values has also been developed, to be published and launched soon. Citizens' service delivery charters have become a regular expectation for all public sector institutions.

The programme also helped to develop, pilot and in some cases install various systems such as the Integrated Performance Management System; Real Time Monitoring and Evaluation System; Single Window Service Delivery Web-Portal "hudumakenya.go.ke"; and Integrated Service Delivery system.

A number of other positive and negative behavioural incentives such as annually ranking and recognising the best performing institutions, naming and shaming poor performers, undertaking customer satisfaction surveys, developing and disseminating IEC materials on performance management, promote the inculcation of performance management culture in the public service.

The Kenya School of Government was established by an Act of Parliament. The KSoG reviewed its old curriculum and introduced new offerings that are tailored to create a new type of public servant whose preoccupation is to contribute to positive change in all public service functions towards a culture of performance management and accountability for results at policy, planning, programming and service delivery levels.

As a result of the above interventions, the following sustainability enablers may be attributable to the PSR programme phase II.

- Performance contracting has become a way of life for the Kenyan Public Service and more and more MDAs are committing to it. Throughout the evaluation process the evaluation team met many people who had suggestions for improvement to or even critical of PC, but none who wanted it discontinued. Further, the annual ranking and public announcement of MDAs' performance results has promoted a performance culture in the public sector;
- Vision 2030 is well known and owned by many in the public service, private sector and the civil society in Kenya's urban and rural areas. Different MDAs, private sector and the civil society staff at all levels have varying knowledge, understanding and appreciation of how they contribute not only to the national development goals and objectives, but also their institutional, departmental and personal goals and objectives;

- The County forums are now included in the laws and hence are mandatory elements of governance. The county forums promote stakeholder participation in the county policy formulation, planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation;
- The participation of KARA in PSR programme helped to demystify the hitherto antagonistic relationship that existed between the Government of Kenya and Civil Society. As a result, KARA has helped to empower citizens to give feedback to government;
- To some extent, citizens are now equipped to monitor not only government service delivery, but also to know their public service delivery entitlements and demand for better services; and
- There is a change in the public servants attitude, values and ethics in respect to service delivery; hence the performance management culture is already inculcated in the way they go about their daily business.

To a large extent therefore, the PSR programme phase II contributed to the sustainability of a results management culture in the public service.

Factors which facilitated or hindered the achievement of outcomes

The following factors were considered to have facilitated or hindered the achievement of the PSR programme outcomes.

Funding and timing

A number of the programme interventions were partially/not implemented due to time and budgetary limitations as evidenced by the near full utilisation of the basket funds (97%) as at December 31, 2012. Whereas the timing for the implementation of activities such as unpacking the new constitution was appropriately responsive, the timing for implementation of activities such as the training of parliamentarians, senators, cabinet and the new principal secretaries in performance management came at a time when the programme was ending, with no financial resources to implement these interventions.

It was also observed that due to lack of resources, PC was not extended to other categories of public sector institutions, such Parliament, the Judiciary and teaching profession (with the exception of tertiary institutions). The main constraint was of resources, but also resistance, which, were resources available could have been addressed through more intensive IEC. It must be pointed out, however teachers have resisted performance contracting through their trade unions.

According to the 2012 annual report, both programme components planned activities all the way to June 2013. These included, for PSTD, the mainstreaming human rights based approach and operationalization of the new Bill of Rights. For PCD it was to build the framework for capacity development for performance management for the county governments. These initiatives would have directly responded to the imperatives of implementation of the new constitution. Other planned outputs which were not implemented had to do with physical equipment such as office equipment and vehicles, which were in early work plans, but whose actual value addition to PSR UNDP subsequently appeared unconvinced about, based on the resource constraints and the fact that these had not been prioritised in the AWP's..

Management and implementation arrangements

The programme was designed as a basket fund to ensure flexible response in a fast changing environment, providing an opportunity for development partners to respond quickly to needs and opportunities. It was nationally executed giving GoK full implementation authority and responsibility within the agreed parameters. The agreed PD gave UNDP responsibility to exercise direct procurement for the programme in response to specific requests from the implementing partners.

The implementation arrangements within GoK were that both PSTD and PCD were implementing partners for their respective components and the PSOPM was the “overall implementation partner” through whom the reporting was done and under whose authority disbursement and procurement were carried out.

This arrangement meant that there had to be two work plans, even though it would be transmitted on the same sheet and two reports. It also meant in practice independent interventions on the part of the two departments.

The evaluation found that the management arrangement was fraught with coordination, synergy and cost effectiveness challenges. These were raised by both the 2011 and 2012 joint reviews, and by the Mid-term evaluation. No improvement appears to have taken place over the course of the programme. The essence of the challenges was not just that the two departments are unnecessarily separated, but that even where they could work together they did not.

Although both departments have their individual mandates, and have carved out different goals and objectives, their primary *raison d’être* was clearly stated as public sector reforms, with one being responsible for the entire transformation strategy and the other for one of the strategy’s most portent and hitherto successful tools, performance contracting. Better synergy would have allowed the scaling up of lessons from the PC success, and the overall direction of reform to be more coherently understood beyond performance management.

At a more operational level, many of their activities such as training, could have been planned and implemented jointly using the same resources, hence avoiding duplication of effort and lowering the cost and staff fatigue that comes with every department implementing the activities by themselves. This was not possible as the departments rarely worked together and often functioned as competitors.

Although this situation was cited in the risk matrix, the proposed mitigation plan - “linked application of programmes approach” and “institutional/management and coordination framework for transformation....”- were never implemented, and the situation appears to have accounted in part for the lacklustre performance of the programme in comparison to its predecessor and contrary to its advance billing.

The other factor cited as problematic in this institutional arrangement was the status disparity between the heads of the two programmes, one being a PS while the other was a Secretary, which was alleged, meant reduced effectiveness of representation for the PSTD and hence its less robust showing. The evaluation team was not able to assess the critical fora where such skewed representation or non-representation would have mattered. While accepting that such disparity could impact on a department’s reach and robustness, it is important to note that these programmes were both under the authority of the Prime Minister and direct supervision of the PS OPM. If this did not help, then the problem must have been somewhere else. Also the complaint that the programmes had to go through the PS-OPM as an accounting officer, while cited as an issue, was not borne by the evidence, in that delays in payment do not appear to have had much impact on the programme. The PS –OPM did not have to approve every single payment, but had overall responsibility for approving work plans, procurement plans and of co-chairing Project Steering Committee meetings, joint review meetings, where strategic decision of the programme ought to have been made. This, as stated elsewhere was where the challenges really existed. Neither, for that matter has direct procurement by UNDP, which was also cited as a problem. Overall the programme has not had an expenditure problem

Strategic leadership

The programme was implemented during the coalition government regime and as such, it was inevitable for it to be impacted by the political differences and the inherent competition between the coalition partners, who by definition would be political rivals in forthcoming competitive elections. These dynamics filtered through to the PSTD and PCD departments hence making it difficult in some cases to collaborate.

Further, there lacked enough enthusiasm on the part of government to pursue and engage with development partners and other key stakeholders on a number of occasions as evidenced by the absence of high level government officials in meetings meant to discuss pertinent programme issues. Development partners in some cases read those signals as the government having different priorities from the PSR II.

National change process

While on one level the fact that the country was going through radical changes may have had a negative effect on programme implementation, it may also have served as stimulus for success. The atmosphere of societal reengineering that prevailed augured well for acceptability of ideas, with the result that a lot of the ideas that dominated the public sector reforms discourse before, during and after the programme had been launched found themselves in the constitution or in the subsequent legislation.

Basket fund flexibility

While the design stage of the programme could have better anticipated constitutionally driven programming imperatives and planned better for them, the flexibility that the basket fund modality offered enable one of the most successful additions to the programme, the support to devolution.

Government commitment to PSR

Whatever the problems of the OPM departments described in this report, one asset was the commitment and enthusiasm each for the implementation of their mandate and hence that portion of the programme that belongs to them. And.

UNDP coordination

UNDP donor coordination is often a tremendous source of value addition because of UNDP's expansive mandate, position of trust and ability to bring global lessons to a local situation. It is often detrimental when UNDP limited to fund management, as some of these advantages are not realised. In this case, in addition to its successful role as basket fund manager, UNDP provided both technical and financial support from the Country Office, as well as UNDP contracted staff working at OPM. UNDP embedded technical staff within PSTD, OPM. Such technical expertise and specialist skills embedded in PSTD includes RRI Coaches, Partnerships and Coordination Officer, Capacity Building Officer; Programme Management Division – Programme Associate and a Finance Officer. While this assisted PSTD with the delivery of its mandate, it clearly was not sufficient to ensure sustainability, considering that when the funding ran out, according to the PS OPM, some of those staff were let go without GoK mainstreaming the positions. The question asked by some of the key stakeholders, remains whether UNDP did enough to leverage its global network and expertise for the better design and implementation of the programme. And whether the fact that they were primarily a fund manager prevented them from ensuring a robust contextual analysis that could have assisted the programme to anticipate both the transition and coalition impact on the programme effectiveness as well as the need for a higher level of orientation towards constitutional implementation programming. The problematic implementation arrangement, while possibly inevitable could have been addressed from UNDP's experience of supporting transitional post conflict situations.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

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Conclusions

- Overall the PSR II was relevant in its focus, appropriate in its design, and aimed for relevant and realistic outcomes. It utilised virtually all the resources made available and could have used more.
- However, while it carried out a lot of activities, long term sustainability of the programme's achievements is in question, due primarily to the transitional circumstances in which the programme was carried out, but also the absence of specific sustainability strategies.
- The main factors which hindered successful implementation of the programme included, the transitional circumstances which necessitated focus on political reform and development of new national institutions, the institutional implications of the politics of coalition governing with its essentially two in one government, the weakening of donor commitment to the provision of resources and the lack of collaboration between the two PSR departments in the OPM.
- The success of Phase I, high level commitment to reform, flexibility of fund management modality, and committed leadership and staff in both departments contributed to the degree of success achieved in implementing PSR II.
- PSR II was successful in providing support to activities of the two departments in the OPM, but did not take the reforms much further than Phase I in strategic terms, as most of the more strategic outcomes were not achieved.
- There were too many things going on in the country and the focus of all stakeholders was dispersed. This reduced what would have been a robust public sector reform programme to a mere continuity exercise. The original enthusiasm of both development partners and government which led to the commitment to investing over \$11 million was allowed to lapse without too much resistance from any of the stakeholder groups – government, donors, or UNDP.
- The circumstances in which this programme was launched - transitions within transitions - given the programme's long term and strategic nature such circumstances were difficult, the issues complex and the expectation of success, even from the risk matrix, low. High level political will to drive the process makes a difference.
- The nature of the GCG affected programme performance. The creation of the two departments to lead reform, while ostensibly justified by the PM's strategic plan, was clearly a political balancing or strategizing act. The tenseness between the departments was palpable even to these evaluators. The limited success of the programme, including probably the lack of continuous advocacy for it, leading to resource attrition, was due in no small measure to the unhealthy and artificial separation of the responsible departments.
- There appears to have been a shift in interest in national PSR initiatives towards activities supporting the implementation of devolution and other newer constitutionally mandated processes. This may mean that, in spite of government's commitment to PSR, knowledge, technical and financial resources available for PSR could be reduced significantly. UNDP has a huge comparative advantage in PSR and could continue to be the nucleus for PSR among development partners, but with a more significant investment of its own resources than in the Phase II, where it was perceived as merely a fund manager who is sometimes in the way of real business and who adds no value to the substance.
- Public sector reform has been entrenched as key to the development strategy in Kenya, beyond responding to new global waves of reform that are unleashed from time to time and that come with new aid packages. The objectives of reform have been captured in the values of the Public Service clause in the Constitution of Kenya, and the Vision 2030 political pillar is anchored in public sector reforms. The

evaluation therefore concludes that public sector reforms in Kenya are mainstreamed in national strategies and as such any support to public sector reforms will always be relevant subject to it being properly attenuated to the particular stage and circumstance of the country at the material time.

Lessons learned

- Many countries that have adopted performance contracting as a performance management tool in Africa have not been able to sustain it. Its success in Kenya is due to the commitment at the highest level of government to it not as a fad with donor funding, but as an important tool in the strategy for addressing national priorities. It was introduced more systematically to support ERS, and revamped in the current context in which the country was going through difficult economic and political circumstances.
- Sustainability of important tools and strategies should be rooted in the Government's commitment to finance the core of the function and rely on development partners for supplementary activities. Kenya's commitment to fund its own PSR accounts for its relative continuity and eventual mainstreaming into national strategy.
- A post crisis environment is characterised by short term preoccupations and yet public sector reform is long-term in nature. In spite of this the programme did achieve results, due to the congruency between government priorities and the reform focus and design.
- Although successful the PSR II did not capture the environmental context in which it was developed and implemented. Political economic analysis embedded in the programme would have easily informed stakeholders about the nature of coalition governments and the problems to be anticipated. The programme might have strategized better for more effective programme implementation.
- While the robust focus of the PCD has been decried in some quarters, it is precisely because of that focus and tenacity that it is successful. It is also because of the political clout behind it that it can be what it is. Long term transformative programmes have to have political clout behind them until they have been accepted as normal.
- There is a lot to be said for the choice made by both donors and government to stay with PSR in Kenya for a decade. It has become completely institutionalised, including having its objectives put in the constitution. The lesson here is for the development partners to stay the course. Government has just committed to long term PSR, in the vision, in the MTP and in other strategic documents.
- UNDP has a huge comparative advantage in PSR. That it limited itself to managing the basket funding may have a perfectly logical basis but UNDP's global knowledge is only fully leveraged when UNDP is programmatically engaged.
- The need for a baseline when designing a programme is often underestimated or overlooked. The absence of a baseline in both the programme and many of the government assessments has shown how hard it is to formulate an opinion when the status quo ante is not clear
- The fact that after all the training reported in the reports of this programme, an evaluation cannot trace participants just because there has been a major transition shows the importance of keeping adequate records for monitoring and evaluation and follow up.

Recommendations

Recommendations

Recommendations

- Given its longstanding commitment to public sector transformation and investment of resources in effecting change to improve service delivery and given the current context of profound institutional change with devolved government, the Government take the opportunity to re-evaluate and redesign the public sector transformation programme/strategy to reflect on the preceding programmes, incorporate the lessons and rejuvenate the programme in a more focused and targeted manner.
- Although recommended after the Results for Kenya programme, the need to focus on outcomes and results has still not been realised. In this reconceptualization, the leading agents of change need to assess what is missing in government implementation and how to address the gaps between contracts and plans and the delivery of services for the citizens of Kenya.
- At the same time, earlier programmes focused on the entire government sector, it is time to re-evaluate this strategy and consider the idea of focusing or targeting on specific services most used by Kenyans, in particular, education, health and sanitation and infrastructure. These services are where Kenyans will feel the impact of change the most.
- In light of the long-term commitment to PSR on the part of the GoK, the strategic importance with which it is correctly viewed and given the need for additional resources expressed by the departments involved, it is recommended that development partners consider another, longer phase of support to public sector reform in Kenya. Such support should be based on the recognition of the commitment and focus not on advocacy for reform, but on innovation and institutionalization of learning.
- The success of performance contract raises the issue of sustainability. Support to PC should focus on how the approach can be institutionalised as the management approach for all MDAs, not a requirement for which PCD is responsible for policing.
- The organisational alignment for PCD and PSTD, regardless of where they end up being based, needs attention with a view to synergizing their functions such that there is seamless coordination within the reforms implementation institution.
- The PSR II coincided with the constitutional promulgation and thus had little time to examine how it could support implementation, which is one of the greatest challenges Kenya faces. It is recommended that the next PSR has a full component or two supporting implementation of the constitution, in particular devolution, public service values and the operationalization of HRBA at public service level.
- The unfulfilled objective of including parliament and the judiciary, should be pursued for both PC and transformative interventions already extended to the rest of the public sector. This will assure the sustainability of the reforms when all major arms of the state are not committed, but are reinforcing each in upholding the standards.
- Devolution is going to be a complex long term process requiring strong central government facilitative leadership. As will running a sophisticated democracy with a highly progressive bill of rights. There needs to be focus on strengthening the capacity of the centre of government – President's Office, Treasury, Planning, Public Service commission etc. to – to enable them to have the wherewithal to lead, manage, facilitate a complex hierarchy of governments, with a system of laws, conventions and agreements, and not just by exercising authority.
- Bench marking was successfully utilised in the formulation of the constitution and establishment of new institutions, development partners should support continued learning from implementation experience elsewhere.

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- Regardless of what happens to the future of PSR donor support, there needs to be documentation of the experience of PSR in Kenya, firstly because a lot of it is already there; secondly there is a strong element of being self-driven which is not found elsewhere and thirdly because in the opinion of this evaluation the degree of formal adoption of PSR as an on-going strategy is unique.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE END OF PROGRAMME EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS PROGRAMME - PHASE II

1. Project Description

Public Sector Reforms (PSR) are implemented by the Government of Kenya (GoK) under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). The reforms are funded by the government and development partners under the UNDP managed basket fund¹⁸. The PSR Phase II Programme was signed in September 2010 one month after the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya in August 2010. The programme is implemented by the Public Sector Transformation Department (PSTD) and the Performance Contracting Department (PCD) under the OPM.

In March 2011, after discussions between the Government and development partners, an addendum was made to the PSR programme towards the support on the Task Force on Devolved Government (TFDG) under the Ministry of Local Government. The overall mandate of the TFDG was to think through the implementation of the devolution process and advice on the draft policy and legal framework to devolving power, resources and responsibilities to the County Governments. The TFDG finalized its work in September 2011.

1.1. The Public Sector Transformation Department

The Public Service Transformation Department spearheads the *Transforming Kenya Programme* which is a national transformation programme with the mission of creating fundamental and sustainable change that meets the citizen's needs and aspirations. Overall, the theme "Transforming Kenya" is set within the context of the Constitution and is underpinned by the need to "get it right from the beginning": i.e. to establish a fit for purpose institutional, legal and policy framework which can translate the new Constitution into results for Kenyans as defined in Vision 2030 and meet citizen expectations of public service delivery. The programme also focuses on supporting the Vision 2030 Steering Committee in creating the foundation and driving the implementation of Vision 2030. The programme focuses on enhancing public service delivery across all government agencies. Buttressing the implementation of the programme is the component on public-private dialogue.

1.2. The Performance Contracting Department

The Government of Kenya introduced performance contracting system with the main goal of improving the performance of the public sector and consequently enhancing the quality of the services it offers, as well as ensuring accountability for utilization of public resources. Performance contracts help to improve service delivery to the public by ensuring that chief managers, institutional and departmental heads are held accountable for results, and that they in turn hold those below them accountable. Performance contracts are designed to address all management perspectives including financial stewardship, customer satisfaction, institutional capacity as well as operations and procedures. Such contracts assist in reversing the decline in efficiency of services, and ensure that resources are spent on attainment of the key policy priorities of the Government. Currently all chief officers in government ministries and departments, state corporations, local authorities and tertiary institutions have signed performance contracts.

1.3. UNDP and other development support to the PSR Programme

The current support provided by UNDP to the Public Sector Reforms Programme is within the framework of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2013. The specific UNDAF outcome is enhanced capacities of key national and local institutions for improved governance while the expected CPAP outcome is more efficient, effective and equitable public service delivery by institutions and systems for democratic governance. The Country Programme Output under the CPAP is deepening of efficiency, accountability and performance management of public institutions including their role in promoting good governance.

¹⁸ The development partners that supported the Phase II of the PSR Programme included Government of Sweden (SIDA), Government of Canada (CIDA) and the Government of the United Kingdom through the DFID.

The support of the development partners under the UNDP basket arrangement is guided by a Joint Statement of Intent of May 2011. The JSI provides the basis for the partnership and the principles of support for the PSR Phase II Programme. It is important to note that the PSR Phase II succeeded the activities supported by the Government of Kenya and the development partners under the Results for Kenya Programme implemented from 2004- 2008.

2. Objectives

The Government of Kenya and the UNDP seek to engage a firm to undertake an end phase evaluation of the PSR Programme Phase II. The overall objective of the consultancy is to assess the degree to which the programme has achieved the objectives and results outlined in the project document and extract lessons learnt and make recommendations.

Specifically, the consultants are expected to:

- i. Assess the relevance of the Programme in the Kenyan context by determining the contribution of the programme to national reforms priorities on democratic governance and the programme's impact on various stakeholders
- ii. Determine the extent to which the programme results were realised by assessing the achievement of the programme outcomes and outputs as per the project document.
- iii. Assess the extent to which the programme resources were utilised for the realisation of the desired results
- iv. Analyse the extent of the programme contribution to the desired impact will contribute to the sustainability of the results management culture in the Public Service.
- v. Identify the factors which facilitated or hindered the achievement of the outcomes, both in terms of the external environment and those internal to the project and document lessons learned
- vi. Propose recommendations for future of the programme given the change in the system of government in Kenya after the March 2013 elections

3. Scope of Services

- Extract the main performance targets and indicators from the project documents, and measure progress against those targets and indicators, (both qualitative and quantitative)
- Analyse the pattern of growth of the programme around the agreements, aide memoirs and AWP, s,
- Assess the extent to which the work plans accurately interpreted and supported the main agreement documents.
- Analyse the past Aide Memoirs and Annual Review Reports to determine their effect on programme results
- Include in the analysis all activities that were carried out by the programme and funded by either GoK or development partners directly. This analysis should first establish what the specific target results were for those activities. Analyse the coherence of those activities with the Public Sector Reforms Project Document and the Annual Work Plans
- Identify key lessons learnt from the implementation of Public Sector Reforms programme

- Review and assess the Partnerships that have been created through the Programme with other government departments and agencies, civil society organizations and the private sector
- Prepare a draft report and discuss it with stakeholders including the GoK and Development Partners)
- Prepare a final report, and present it to the major Government of Kenya and development partners

4. Expected Outputs

- A proposal indicating the detailed methodology based on these TORs to be used in the results evaluation process as well as a work plan for completion of work within five (5) days after recruitment
- Draft Evaluation Report for discussion including all annexes of detailed work done and discussions/focus meetings held
- Final Evaluation Report, in hard and soft copy (MS Word and Acrobat Reader) that should include at least include the following contents:
 - Executive summary
 - Introduction
 - The development context
 - Findings and conclusions
 - Lessons learnt
 - Recommendations

5. Methodology

The following are some of the proposed methodology that may be used by the firm. Additionally the firm can also incorporate other methodologies should they deem it appropriate in undertaking the assignment.

- Desk review of relevant documents including project reports produced during the life cycle of the project
- Briefing and debriefing sessions with PSTD, PCD and UNDP Kenya Senior Management and programme staff
- Focus Group Discussions/consultation meetings/interviews with key staff involved in management and implementation of the Public Sector Reforms programme; key staff of other government MDAs, Development Partners (UNDP, SIDA, DfID and CIDA), and other key stakeholders including the private sector, media, civil society, and citizens.
- Where necessary, field visits to selected regions/counties and discussions with major stakeholders

6. Proposed Target Completion & Location of Work

The consultancy will take approximately 25 working days spread out as follows:

Activity	Timeframe	Duty Station	Responsible Party
Inception report	2 calendar days	Home Based	Evaluation Team
Briefings with UNDP & GoK	1 calendar day	PSTD/PCD	UNDP

		Boardroom	PSTD&PCD Evaluation Team
Desk Review	3 calendar days	Home Based	Evaluation Team UNDP
Interviews including field visits	6 calendar days	TBC	Evaluation team UNDP
Preparation of main findings and recommendations	3 calendar days	Home based	Evaluation team
Wrap-up meetings	1 calendar day	PSTD/PCD Board room	UNDP PSTD&PCD Evaluation Team
Preparation and submission of 1 st draft of the evaluation report	5 calendar days	PSTD/PCD Board room	Evaluation team & UNDP
Feedback on draft reports from UNDP, PSR and Development Partners	2 calendar days	Home Based	UNDP, DPs PSTD&PCD
Finalization of evaluation report and submission	2 calendar days	Home Based	Evaluation Team

7. Qualifications of the Successful Service Provider

The consultancy firm is expected to have the following qualifications;

- Minimum 10 years of similar experience
- The professionals must have proven expertise in the use of standard data management software and statistical analysis packages
- Previous relevant experience in monitoring and evaluations of GOK/Donor funded programme of similar magnitude.
- Broader experience in programme management.
- Excellent knowledge of the local region.

N.B. the present RFP expects the proposal to include a team of experts in order to execute this assignment. The team is expected to be constituted by four (4) members including the team leader. The minimum requirements for each team member are described below.

Minimum required qualifications & competencies for the Team Leader

- Master's degree in a relevant field with (e.g. MBA) and/or Public Administration, and/or Governance and/or Development studies from a recognised university.
- At least 10 years' experience in one or more of the following areas: Public sector reform, Public sector management, and programme/project management.
- Professional in working with government partners
- Must be able to communicate effectively (verbally and written) in cross cultural, politically sensitive environment and present complex ideas to a non-specialist audience
- Excellent networking skills

Minimum required qualifications for the Team Members

- At least a bachelor's degree in relevant field e.g. Public Administration, governance, development studies
- At least 4 year experience in public sector reform, public sector management, and programme/project management.
- Ability to work with minimal supervision.
- High level written and oral communications skills in English and Kiswahili.
- Must be result oriented team player with excellent interpersonal skills, including enthusiasm, tact, diplomacy and high level of integrity.
- Concise and analytical skills
- Professional in working with government partners

8. Scope of Proposal Price and Schedule of Payments

- 20 % on submission and clearance of the inception report
- 40 % on submission and clearance of the draft report
- 40% on submission and clearance of the final report

Payment: Within thirty (30) days from the date of meeting the following conditions:

- a) UNDP's written acceptance (i.e., not mere receipt) of the quality of the outputs; and
- b) Receipt of invoice from the Service Provider.

9. Reporting arrangements

The firm will report to the Resident Representative of the UNDP Kenya Country Office or his assigned representative.

10. Travels

National travel is anticipated under this consultancy within Nairobi and possibly two other Counties e.g. Nakuru and Embu or any other such County with the same proximity as the two subject to confirmation of the client.

11. Key documents to be reviewed

The results will be measured based upon the following key programme documents:

- UNDP CPAP 2009-2013
- The Public Sector Reforms Project Document 2010-2013
- The Public Service Transformation Strategy being implemented by the PSTD
- The Joint Statement of Intent signed by development partners in 2011.
- Aide Memoirs produced following two Joint Reviews in June 2011 and August 2012
- The Annual Work Plans signed by the GOK and UNDP
- Project reports and any other relevant from PSTD and PCD

The following UNDP Evaluation Corporate Policy Documents will act as reference for the Consultants

- Handbook on monitoring and evaluation for results
- UNDP results management technical note

UNDP evaluation Policy

Appendix 2: Our Team

We maintained the core team as indicated in our Technical Proposal in response to the Terms of Reference.

Our Team is composed of the project implementation team and quality assurance members.

Key Project Implementation Team

Our team consists of professionals with extensive experience in public sector assignments, governance and anti-corruption, process mapping and IT automation. The table below shows our team composition, roles and responsibilities.

Name	Role	Responsibilities
Dr. Michi Ebata	Engagement Manager	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Communicate with and report to UNDP Kenya and the PCD/PST SecretariatProvide overall direction on the delivery of the assignment, coordination,Mobilise teamEnsure quality standards and all TOR requirements are met
Michi is a governance expert specialising in conflict and peacebuilding with over 12 years experience working in development for the UN, the private sector and research, with a focus on Africa.	Senior Manager, PwC Public Sector and Governance Expert	
Joseph Mugore	Team Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Mobilise and lead the team of researchers throughout the assignmentFinalise the work plan and division of responsibilities amongst team membersLead the design and finalisation of the data collection toolsConduct key informant interviews, review all research, lead analytical work and prepare reportsLead the stakeholders workshop discussion, including preparation of all materialsDraft, review, edit and finalise all reportsEnsure timely delivery of all outputs
Joseph's professional experience spans four decades; national and international; civil society, government, and multilateral; staff and independent consultant. Joseph established and led UNDP's Southern Africa Sub-Regional resource Facility (SURF), covering all UNDP practices. Led the governance work, with particular focus on public administration including support to anti-corruption efforts through strengthening of integrity systems in government.		
Benson Kavoo	Senior Manager, PwC	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Conduct interviewsReview and provide input to all draft and final data collection tools and reports
Benson is a lead advisor in Performance Improvement Services, Strategic Planning and Capacity Building as well as a focal point for Public Service Delivery improvement programmes. He has in-depth knowledge in governance and service delivery challenges	Senior public sector and evaluation expert	

facing Government and Non-Governmental institutions in Kenya and the region and has assisted many organisations to develop and implement performance improvement plans and strategies.

Anthony K. Mwanje

Manager, PwC Uganda
Evaluation Expert

Before joining PwC Anthony worked as Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist for the Local Government Sector Investment Plan (LGSIP) under the Ministry of Local Government (Uganda) where he facilitated the development of the Minimum National Standards of Service delivery for the sectors under the jurisdiction of Local Governments, participated in the revision of the Performance Assessment tool and manual for Local Governments and supported the development of LGSIP work plans, budgets, quarterly and annual reports.

- Provide oversight on the development of the design documents
- Conduct review of documents, participate in field work and selected interviews, lead focus group discussions, participate in stakeholder workshops

Quality Assurance Team

Overall quality assurance for the whole assignment will be provided by Alphan Njeru, who is the Advisory Leader for Kenya and Government and Public Sector Services Director.

Name	Role	Responsibilities
Alphan Njeru	Partner, PwC Quality Assurance	Ensure overall quality assurance on the assignment

Appendix 3: List of People Interviewed

Dr Mohamed Isahakia	Permanent Secretary	Office of the Prime Minister
Dr. Edward Sambili	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030
Erick Mutha Kiilu	Senior Economist, PC Secretariat	Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030
Benson Kimani	Chief Economist. Chair of PC Secretariat	Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030
Grace Kimit	Senior Economist, PC Secretariat	Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030
Aggrem Mugenya	Head, Business Development	Kenya School of Government
Joshua Ochuka	Administration Manager	Kenya School of Government
Festus Kitui	ICT Officer	Kenya School of Government
Eveline Wahome	Finance Manager	Kenya School of Government
Isaac G. Kamande	Chief Economist	Ministry of Education
Samuel Nthenge	Economist	Ministry of Education
Grace Ngaca	DDE	Ministry of Education
Luke Ombara	Ag. Director, Regulatory Policy and Strategy	Capital Markets Authority
Jairus L. Muaka	Assistant Manager Policy Analysis and Planning	Capital Markets Authority
Paul Kukubo	CEO	ICT Board
Lawrence Nduvo	M&E Manager	ICT Board
Nicholas Imbugwa	Programme Manager, Democratic Governance	Embassy of Sweden
Tim Colby	First Secretary, Development	High Commission of Canada
Professor Wainaina	Director, Social and Political	Vision 2030

Gituro	Pillar	
Emmanuel M Kisombe	Permanent Secretary	Office of the Vice President, Ministry of State for Immigration & Registration of Persons
Etyang	Deputy PS	Office of the Vice President, Ministry of State for Immigration & Registration of Persons
Mark K Bor, CBS	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Public Health & Sanitation
Mushimi F.K	Secretary Administration	Ministry of Public Health & Sanitation
Dr. Sharif	Director of Public Health	Ministry of Public Health & Sanitation
Raymond Ochieng	Transformative Leadership Coach	Office of the Prime Minister
Henry Ochieng	Programs Manager	The Kenya Alliance of Resident Associations
Mr. E O Achoch	Director, Transformative Leadership	Public Sector Transformation Department
Simon Maitha	Performance Contracting	Agriculture Finance Corporation
Sarah Washehe	Performance Contracting	Agriculture Finance Corporation
Juster Nkoroi,	Secretary	Performance Contracting Department
Mbarak Twahir,	Director, Performance Management	Performance Contracting Department
George Ombai,	Ag. Deputy Programme Director	Performance Contracting Department
Joram Gicheru	Programme Director	Performance Contracting Department
Emmanuel Lubembe	Secretary	Public Sector Transformation Department
Costa Mwikamba	Finance Officer	Public Sector Transformation Department
Jacqueline M. Oturi	RRI Coach	Public Sector Transformation Department
Betty Soita	Principle Programme Officer	Public Sector Transformation Department
Gemma Mbaya	Coordinator, PSD	Public Sector Transformation Department

Carole Kariuki	Chief Executive Officer	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
Caroline Othim	Programme Officer	National Tax-Payers Association (NTA)
Susan Mwongera	CEO	Youth Agenda
Alfredo Teixeira	Deputy Country Director	UNDP
Sheila Ngatia	Governance Team Leader	UNDP
Joyce Deloge	Programme Officer, Democratic Governance Unit	UNDP

Appendix 4: List of Documents Consulted

Aide Memoire, Public Sector Reforms Programme, Joint Working Review Meeting, 23 August 2012.

Aide Memoire, Joint Review Mission for the Public Sector Reforms and Performance Contracting Program, 28 June 2011.

Transforming the Public Service Implementation Report, July 2010 - April 2013

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Office of the Prime Minister, Public Sector Transformation Department, *Investment Climate Reforms Report*, 2012

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Promin Consultants, Final Report on *Nationwide Customer Satisfaction Survey*, Submitted to the Performance Contracting Department, OPM 2009

Stirling Consultants, Customer Satisfaction Survey Report 2011/2012 submitted to the Kenya Institute of Administration, May 2012.

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UNDP, Audit Reports for 2011 and 2012

UNDP, Country Programme Action Plan of the Government of Kenya, 2006 Annual Work Plan, 2006.

UNDP, The *Evaluation Policy of UNDP*, DP/2011/3, 2010

UNDP, Project Document and Annual Work Plan, *Support to Public Sector Reforms (PSR II)*, 2010.

UNDP, Public Sector Reforms Phase II, Annual Report 2011

UNDP, Public Sector Reforms Programme, Phase II, Signed Work plan, 2012-2013

UNDP, Support to the Implementation of Public Sector Reforms, Signed Work Plan, 2012-2013

Appendix 5: Sampling Table for Stakeholders Key Informant Interviews¹⁹

Please see below our proposed list of key informant interviews including the criteria for their selection.

1. Development Partners

UNDP DFID CIDA SIDA

2. Government and Civil Society

Organisation /Criteria	Programme Management	Component 1 Service and Transparency	Component 2 Cooperation & Coordination across Govt	Component 3 Kenya School of Government	Sector Importance
Public Sector Transformation Department	Management, Heads of 4 sections, finance head, M&E section				
Ministry/Department		Technical Advisory Group on Integrated Service Delivery Judiciary	Ministry of Planning, Vision 2030 Efficiency Monitoring Unit Public Financial Management Secretariat		Ministry of Education Ministry of Public Health
Public Officers as Beneficiaries		Participants in Relevant Workshops and Capacity Building	Participants in Relevant Workshops and Capacity Building		
State Corporation				Kenya School of Government Kenya Institute of Administration	
Local Authorities/Counties		Machakos Participants of Prime Minister's Roundtables with Youth, Civil Society, Private Sector	Kiambu		
Other ²¹					

3. Public Sector Transformation Department Stakeholders Key Informant Interviews²⁰

¹⁹ This is a preliminary list of suggested interview subjects pending confirmation from UNDP, PSTD and PCD.

²⁰ Some of the targeted interviewees overlap with the Performance Contracting Department and we will coordinate accordingly

²¹ In order to determine the impact of the programme, the main beneficiaries, citizens are key stakeholders. We are considering how we may reach this group given the time constraints.

4. Performance Contracting Department Stakeholders Key Informant Interviews

Organisation / Selection Criteria	Functional Section	Top Performing	Low Performing	Most Improved	Most Regressed	Sector Importance /Social	Sector Importance /Economic	Sector Importance /Regulatory
Performance Contracting Department	Management, Section Heads, Finance Head M&E Section							
Ministry/Department		Ministry of Planning	Ministry of Education	Ministry of Lands/Energy	Ministries of Roads/Agri.	Ministry of Public Health	Ministries of Transport or Trade	Ministry of Immigration
State Corporation		UNON	Industrial Development Bank	Kenya Seed Company			Kenya Rail Corp	Capital Markets Authority
(Choose from:)		Rural Electrification Authority		Agricultural Finance Corporation		KEMRI Kenya Technical Teachers College	Kenya Airports Authority Kenya Power and Lighting Company	Communications Commission of Kenya National Irrigation Board
							Kenya ICT Board	
Local Authorities/Counties		Machakos	Kiambu		Nairobi			

Appendix 6: Document Review Guide

SN	Evaluation issue	Documents to be reviewed	What to look out for and document
1	Public Sector Reforms project purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project document including logical framework and Results matrix 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purpose, goals and objectives of the Project; Planned Interventions, activities, outputs, outcomes and desired impact of the project; Key stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities in respect of the project; The different funding agencies and their financial commitments to the project; Baseline and target indicator values/status in respect of the project outcomes and outputs; Anticipated risks and mitigation measures;
2	Consistency of GoK's policy requirements, needs, priorities with the project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government of Kenya Constitution Vision 2030 National Development Plan GoK Evaluation Policy and related documents (NIMES, Sector MIS, etc) Sector Development and Strategic Investment Plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National reforms priorities on democratic governance Government of Kenya's public sector policy requirements, goals, needs and priorities; GoK's results management policy framework The current results management culture in government ministries, departments, agencies and local government; Existence and functionality of Sector Monitoring and Evaluation matrices, Management Information Systems and their linkage to the National Monitoring and Evaluation System
3	Consistency of Development partners' policies and priorities with the project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> United Nation's Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2013; and Development Partners' country development and cooperation strategies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Long and medium term goals, objectives, planned interventions; and Financial commitments of development partners to the Government of Kenya;
4	Realisation of programme results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project progress reports; Aide memoirs; Annual sector review reports; TFDG progress and final reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presence of updated results framework in sector progress and annual review reports; Actual indicators values/status in respect of the project outcomes and outputs at the end of the project; Quality of indicators in measuring programme results i.e. objectivity, usefulness, practicality, adequacy and timeliness;

SN	Evaluation issue	Documents to be reviewed	What to look out for and document
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative and unplanned indicators and their corresponding values/status directly attributable to this project; • Magnitude of over/under performance in respect to the various output and outcome indicators; • Reasons for over/under achievement of the output and outcome indicators; • Manifested risk and how it was managed; • Implementation challenges and who/how they have been managed; • Factors that facilitated and/or hindered the achievement of programme outcomes • Lessons learnt
5	Extent to which the programme resources were utilised	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project audited financial statements for all the years of implementation; • Quarterly, semi annual and annual financial reports; • Progress reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The committed and actual disbursements in total, and for each of the funding agencies; • Magnitude of the gaps between committed funds and actual disbursements by the project funding agencies, and explanations for variances; • Budget allocation to the different project components • The utilisation and absorption of funds disbursed; • Amount of unused funds • Expenditure variances and explanations/reasons for the variances; • Challenges and constraints in the utilisation of funds; • How the funds utilisation challenges and constraints have been managed; • Lessons learnt in respect to the effective and efficient utilisation of funds;
6	Sustainability of results management culture in the public service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisational structures of government ministries, departments and agencies; • Annual review reports; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence of results management positions in the government MDA and local government organisational structures; • Presence of results management staff in the government MDA and local governments • Presence and functionality of results Management Information Systems (software and hardware) in government ministries, departments and agencies; • Regularity of updating the results matrices and MIS, and results reporting;

Appendix 7: Interview Questions

Contribution of the programme to the national reforms priorities on democratic governance and the Programme's impact on various stakeholders

How has the Public Sector Reforms programme contributed to the GoK's national reforms priorities on democratic governance?

How are the Public Sector Reforms (PSR) Programme goals and objectives relevant in respect to your department and national goals, objectives and policies?

How has the PSR programme contributed to achievement of your department and national goals and objectives?

Assessment of the achievement of the programme outcomes and outputs as per the project document

Outcome: Expert technical content and legislative drafting

To what extent have the different MDAs unpacked the implementation of the new constitution as provided for in the schedules?

Outcome: Citizens satisfaction with Government Service delivery Enhanced

To what extent have the different MDAs unpacked the implementation of the new constitution as provided for in the schedules?

How has the PSR programme contributed to increasing the % of Kenyans satisfied with Government service?

How effective are the citizen score cards in improving service delivery?

How are public institutions using the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) in service delivery?

Outcome: Sustainable Public Sector Stakeholder Partnerships

How has this programme contributed to the increase in stakeholder participation in planning, budgeting, execution, monitoring and evaluation of government interventions?

How has the programme facilitated representation beyond civil society and PS organisations?

What (number/name) are the current active stakeholder partnership programmes?

Which MDAs have benefited from the framework for stakeholder engagements roll out?

What is the immediate effect of the stakeholder engagement framework roll out?

Outcome: Synergy in government functions and operations

To what extent is government linked up in respect to planning, budgeting, budget execution, monitoring and evaluation?

To what extent is the sector wide approach as a means to link up government is being utilised?

How has the PSR project improved the level of public service cohesiveness?

What evidence is available to support improved public service cohesiveness?

Outcome: A culture for Managing for Results engendered in all MDAs and Counties

How has the PSR programme contributed to the sustainability of results management culture in MDAs?

Outcome: PSTD strengthened to achieve its mandate and objectives

What is your understanding of your mandate?

To what extent have you achieved your mandate and objectives?

What has constrained/promoted you to achieve your mandate?

Overall outcome: Performance contracting deepened in the public sector

In the Kenyan context, how effective are performance contracts in improving individual and institutional service delivery?

Outcome: Strengthened capacity of MDAs on Sector Performance Standards and Automation of Performance Contracting

Has performance contracting been extended to the judiciary and parliament:

What difficulties did you encounter trying to extend this to the judiciary and parliament?

To what extent have MDAs become more accountable for results?

Outcome: Real time monitoring and evaluation of performance

How has real time monitoring and evaluation contributed to increased customer satisfaction?

How have standardised citizen's service delivery charters (SDCs) contributed to increased service delivery and customer satisfaction?

Outcome: Strengthened Performance Contracting Process and Systems

What are the selected international best practices in Performance Contracting?

Which MDAs have been benchmarked to these international best practices?

To what extent do you intend to consolidate the performance Management IT system with NIMES and others?

Outcome: Performance management and measurement tools developed for Africa public services

How has the programme contributed to strengthened leadership and management for improved public service delivery in Africa

Factors which facilitated or hindered the achievement of outcomes

How did the following factors facilitate or hinder the achievement of programme outcomes:

Programme funds

Programme structure/design

Programme and GoK Systems,

Programme and GoK leadership styles

Programme and GoK Staff/skills,

Programme and GoK Strategies

Programme and GoK organisational culture and shared values

Extent of utilisation of programme resources

What amount was originally planned for your programme component and how much was received?

What is the explanation for the variance between the amount planned and received for your programme component?

How much was utilised on implementation of your programme component?

What are the challenges and constraints in the utilisation of funds and how have these been dealt with?

Appendix 8: Interview Questions for Development Partners

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questionnaire is structured along the lines of the 6 objectives of the evaluation as defined by the Terms of Reference provided by UNDP. The subsequent questions are intended to unpack these objectives. Kindly provide responses to the following evaluation questions with respect to Phase II only. (Please provide/refer to evidence in all cases)

1. Contribution of the programme to the national reforms priorities on democratic governance and the programme's impact on various stakeholders

In your opinion, in what ways has this second phase of the programme contributed to the national reform priorities?

How are the Public Sector Reforms (PSR) Programme goals and objectives relevant and related to your organisation's goals, objectives and policies?

How has the PSR programme contributed to the achievement of your organisation's goals and objectives?

2. Assessment of the achievement of the programme outcomes and outputs as per the project document

How has the second phase of the PSR programme contributed to the linking up of government in respect to planning, budgeting, budget execution, monitoring and evaluation?

To what extent has the sector wide approach as a means to link up government been utilised during phase II?

How has this second phase of the PSR programme improved the level of public service cohesiveness?

In the Kenyan context, how effective are performance contracts in improving individual and institutional service delivery? Have they become more or less effective during phase ii?

3. Factors which facilitated or hindered the achievement of outcomes

How did the following factors facilitate or hinder the achievement of programme outcomes:

Programme funds

Programme structure/design

Programme and GoK systems

Programme and GoK leadership styles

Programme and GoK staff/skills

Programme and GoK strategies

Programme and GoK organisational culture and shared values

Others (Specify)

4. Extent of utilisation of programme resources

What was your organisation's original commitment to the PSR programme, phase II?

What amounts did your organisation disburse to the PSR programme, phase II?

What is the explanation for the variance in your contributions if any?

What were the challenges and constraints in the utilisation of funds and how were they dealt with?

What are your recommendations on respect to the management of future programmes?

5. Extent to which the programme contributed to the desired impact will contribute to the sustainability of the results management culture in the Public Service.

How sustainable are the achievements of PSR programme, phase II?

In your view, is the culture of results management embedded and sustainable in the public service?

6. Propose recommendations for the future of the programme given the change in the system of government in Kenya following the March 2013 elections.

What recommendations do you have with respect to the management arrangements, the components and dimensions of a support programme to public sector reform, the implementation arrangements and so forth?

What would you like to see done differently?

Closing Statement