An independent evaluation of the "1,000 Micro-projects for socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-militia members and youth at risk in Côte d'Ivoire"

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**Abbreviations**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Comité d’Approbation des Projets</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDEX</td>
<td>Cabinet d’Etude pour le Développement et l’Expertise en Afrique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDDR</td>
<td>Commission Nationale de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAFN</td>
<td>Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles/Armed Forces of New Forces</td>
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<td>GAD</td>
<td>Groupes d’Autodéfense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit/German Society for Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated DDR Standard</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Micro-projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>NESH</td>
<td>The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NSD</td>
<td>Norwegian Social Science Data Services</td>
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<td>OIM</td>
<td>Office International de Migration</td>
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<td>ONUCI</td>
<td>Organisation des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>Ouagadougou Political Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNDDR</td>
<td>Programme National de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion</td>
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<td>PNRRC</td>
<td>Programme National de Réinsertion et de Réhabilitation</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PSCN</td>
<td>Programme du Service Civique National</td>
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<td>SIK</td>
<td>Senter for interkulturell kommunikasjon/Centre for Intercultural Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES</td>
<td>Security Council/Resolution</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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Executive Summary

English

This independent report evaluates the performance and the impact of the “1,000 Micro-projects for socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-militia members and youth at risk in Côte d’Ivoire” (from now on called the “1,000 Micro-projects” or “1,000 MP”), a project jointly run by the DDR Division of UNOCI and UNDP’s Post-Crisis Unit in Côte d’Ivoire. The focus has been on its impact on beneficiaries, communities and peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of procedures and mechanisms employed to identify, select and implement micro projects. The evaluation also assessed the project’s gender approach, and finally, sought to provide recommendations to guide the further implementation of micro projects.

The fieldwork in Côte d’Ivoire was conducted during two intensive weeks in October 2009. The study had a qualitative approach employing methods like document analyses, observation, informal conversations, group interviews, individual semi-structured interviews and workshop discussions. Field visits were made to a total of 49 micro projects and more than 150 beneficiaries of the “1,000 MP” were interviewed. Moreover, the evaluation team carried out informal conversations and semi-structured interviews with ONUCI and UNDP staff, PNRRC, PSCN, Cellule de 1000 Microprojets de la Présidence, leaders in the FAFN, local authorities and implementing agencies, as well as talks with representatives among international stakeholders such as the World Bank, European Union, GTZ, OIM, the Norwegian Royal Embassy, la Coopération Française, and Licorne. The methodological and ethical approach of the evaluation was approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD).

All in all, the evaluation team concludes that the implementation of the “1,000 Micro-projects” have proven effective with regards to its global objective to contribute to reinforcement of peace and security in the Côte d’Ivoire through the provision of socioeconomic reintegration options to former combatants, ex-militias members and youth at risk. Let us recall its main characteristics: timeliness, swift implementation, taking into account the need for economically sustainable projects, awareness of and active promotion of synergies between the various actors involved. The “1,000 Micro-projects” were a response to a critical and urgent situation and hence somewhat hastily put in place, however, based on a trial-and-error philosophy several weaknesses have been corrected along the way. The implementation has, thus, been flexible and attentive to the realities in the field.

However, some weak points remain. The evaluation particularly emphasizes the necessity to set up just selection criteria concerning the selection of beneficiaries as well as implementing partners. The process of choosing the economic activity of each micro project may improve through local assessments of current markets and viable activities in each location. We also underline the need to improve the dialogue with beneficiaries, revealing their real future plans, so as to establish durable business projects in line beneficiaries wishes and plans. The group size and group composition are also important factors to a successful implementation. Too big groups impacts on the project’s prospect to provide each beneficiary with a daily and meaningful activity, and limits the chances of providing each beneficiary with an adequate income. However, certain projects need a higher investment and due to the limited budget per beneficiary a relatively large number of beneficiaries are required. It is important to find the right balance between these two considerations. Monitoring and follow-up of the micro projects are another issue that needs to be further addressed. The evaluators acknowledge the
recent development which ensures the beneficiaries an additional follow-up of three months provided by the PNRRC. The evaluation stresses that too many different actors and structural levels are involved in the follow-up of the micro projects, and that the current organisation of the monitoring and follow-up may lead to pulverisation of responsibility as well as confusion related to who is responsible for what.

The “1,000 MP” has tried to fit into the existent DDR structure and taken into account the national counterpart and national partners. The present report indicates that the approach used by ONUCI/UNDP to reintegrate the various groups entitled to a support for reintegration, to the best of our understanding, has proved to be a possible strategy. The shortcomings often due to the urgency situation have been identified and possible solutions have been recommended. There are reasons to believe that a number of beneficiaries will prefer to go this quicker way to reintegration rather than a more classic approach. This is a possible option, but the less training there is before the income generating activities starts, the longer should an intensive on the job training and the following monitoring last. A possible next wave of micro projects should also use some resources on monitoring the existing projects in order to contribute towards the sustainability of the projects.

As we have seen above there is a unanimous opinion about the value of this approach on all levels. The funds are handled by a structure that is well known. There is no evident reason that the main international donor agencies could not finance a new wave of micro projects based on a strategy that takes into account the experiences from the phase that has just ended. But it is certainly not the only possible profile for reintegration. There should be room for some kind of variety in reintegration programmes, as such a variety could contribute to a higher percentage of success.

Beneficiaries and all other stakeholders expressed unanimously that the “1,000 Micro-projects” have impacted on the personal lives of the beneficiaries, their communities and on peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire. The “1,000 MP” appeared at the right time in order to calm down a situation threatening to explode, and has been effective in contributing to calming down the tense situation. However, the situation remains fragile, and with the upcoming election tensions may again rise to the surface. The approach of the “1,000 MP”, focusing on a rapid solution to an urgent situation, has gained results, but whether the approach is effective also with regards to long-term reintegration of ex-combatants and long-term peace and remains to be assessed. There are also a rather large number of demobilised ex-combatants as well as youth at risk with expectations of benefiting from the “1,000 MP” or similar initiatives, and it is clear that efforts need to expand. The evaluators believe the peace-building process in Côte d’Ivoire would benefit from a wide range of actors actively involved in the funding and the implementation of such programmes, and stress the necessity to harmonise efforts and ensure the maximum gain from the complementarities of each actor. We find that the “1,000 Micro-projects” have opened up the road for other reinsertion/reintegration programmes which have hesitated to launch their activities. It is our belief that the Government and its international partners for the DDR process have the capacity of reaching a better cooperation, so that more substantial resources can be mobilised for the DDR, peace and recovery.

**Lessons learned**
Based on the findings presented above the evaluation team notes the following major lessons:

**Organisation and coordination**
The advantage of a participatory approach, like the one used in the “1,000 Micro-projects,” is increased ownership of the project by the different stakeholders. Local ownership is an important factor of success.

Impact
- The approach of the “1,000 MP”, focusing on a rapid solution to an urgent situation, has gained results and positively impacted on beneficiaries and communities, and has contributed to a more peaceful environment in Côte d’Ivoire.
- Involvement in economic activities, honestly earning their living, has had a positive impact on how ex-combatants are perceived by their communities. The “1,000 Micro-projects” have contributed to restoring their self-esteem, dignity and hope for the future.
- The “1,000 Micro-projects” have created important meeting points between beneficiaries and other groups (suppliers, customers, craftsmen etc.). Such encounters emphasize the interdependence of different groups, and consequently contribute to improve social cohesion and mutual acceptance.
- Contracting local NGOs and providing them with technical assistance has contributed to the strengthening of capacities of such NGOs.

Programme design and implementation
- A learning-by-doing approach ensures a high level of flexibility. Activities and assistance that may seem appropriate in the initial phase may turn out to be inappropriate during the implementation. A flexible design allows smooth changes whenever necessary.
- As the prospective beneficiaries’ initial motivation is income rather than training, it is essential to provide them with an immediate source of income. On the job training rather than vocational training prior to starting up their own businesses may therefore be preferable to adult ex-combatants.
- Establishing work groups has the benefit of creating an environment in which individuals learn to consider other people’s opinions, interests and values.
- As acknowledged by the “1,000 Micro-projects”, monitoring and follow-up needs to be provided for more than three months.

Recommendations
The evaluation team makes the following recommendations for the implementation of the next phase of the project:

Organisation
- As the tasks and responsibilities of the CAP and the local committee do not correspond, the evaluation team recommends the set up a local project committee also in Abidjan.
- The project management at the central level should continue to sensitize the committees about their role and responsibilities.

Gender approach
- The evaluators emphasize all UN agencies’ obligation to fulfil and act according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. This Resolution addresses the disproportionate impact of conflict and war on women, and calls for a particular protection of girls and women affected by war and the adoption of a gender perspective
which includes consideration of women’s special needs during reintegration and post- conflict reconstruction (S/RES/1325 (2000), art. 8, a).

- The project should continue to sensitize actors about gender issues and draft a plan of action on how a gender approach may be mainstreamed at every stage of the implementation process. Mainstreaming gender will also need a close follow-up in the field.

**Impact**

- As unrest is still an element in the western part of the country the evaluators recommend the “1,000 MP” to assess the need and possibility to strengthen its presence in the area.
- As the implementation of the “1,000 MP” has proven effective as to calm down a tense conflict situation, we recommend that this lesson is shared with other Peace Keeping Forces. The possibility of employing a portion of the Peace Building Funds to implement similar initiatives should be discussed.

**Implementation**

**Selection of beneficiaries**

- The evaluation team encourages the “1,000 MP” to look into the possibilities of creating economical activities that may facilitate participation also of disabled persons.
- The evaluators recommend a drafting of more detailed selection criteria - specific to each target group - to guide those responsible of the identification and selection, as well as an unbiased monitoring of the process.

**Choice of economic activity**

- The evaluators recommend that an assessment of each local context is conducted before the typology of micro projects is decided. Such local market analysis should be updated and take into account new trends and developments.
- The evaluation team notes the need to improve the dialogue with beneficiaries while in the process of selecting economic activity. It is essential to take time to discuss the beneficiaries’ real future plans and to take these plans into consideration when selecting the activity.

**Group size and composition**

- The evaluators view the project’s aim not only to be providing people an income but also to give people something meaningful to do in their everyday life. We therefore recommend that no beneficiary be left idle, that group size be determined on the basis of the workload involved as well as the chances of a decent income.
- The evaluators recommend that the implementing partners as well as the local committees seek to unveil eventual conflicts at an early stage, and provide necessary assistance to mediate and solve the conflicts. This might be particularly needed in groups of mixed ethnicity or with both nationals and non-nationals.
- The evaluators have not compared results depending on group size but will in general recommend that individual projects and projects of smaller groups continue to be supported.

**Selection of implementing partners**

- The general recommendation here is that each prospective implementing partner should be assessed not only according to its technical expertise, organisational capacity, financial situation, intimate knowledge of the area, but also its commitment
to local social cohesion and peace. Furthermore, we recommend that the selection process is fully transparent and, as much as possible, gender sensitive.

Training
- The evaluators recommend that the project monitor the evolution of the beneficiaries’ training needs and attitudes toward training.

Reinsertion kit
- The evaluation team recommends the inclusion of beneficiaries in the process of selection and purchase of kits. Implementing partners should explain what kind of decisions should be made in order to use the amount available in a way that gives the maximum potential for success.

Monitoring and follow-up
- Based on the analysis above the evaluation team recommends a restructuring of the monitoring responsibilities. The evaluators proposed to organise the monitoring and evaluation in three structural levels:

1. The joint monitoring and evaluation team (OUNCI/UNDP) should only be responsible for conducting evaluations. According to interviews with the two of the team members this is in reality what is currently taking place.

2. The local committees should be in charge of the general monitoring of the micro projects as well as a monitoring of the implementing partners. The local OUNCI/UNDP representatives should act as members of the committee, and the site visits should be carried out jointly with other members. In the two locations where technical committees are in place, these should act in accordance with the local committees and should, in collaboration with implementing partners, provide technical assistance.

3. The implementing partners should be responsible for the day to day follow-up of micro projects and provide the beneficiaries with the necessary technical advice.
Le présent rapport indépendant évalue la performance et l’impact de « 1,000 micro projets de réinsertion socioéconomique des ex-combattants, et membres des ex-milices et jeunes à risque en Côte d’Ivoire » (ci-après appelé « 1,000 Microprojets » ou bien « 1,000 MP »), un projet exécuté conjointement par la Division DDR de l’ONUCI et l’Unité post crise du PNUD en Côte d’Ivoire. Le point central a été son impact aux bénéficiaires, aux communautés et à la paix et la sécurité en Côte d’Ivoire, aussi bien que de l’efficience et l’efficacité des procédures et des mécanismes utilisés pour identifier, sélectionner et exécuter les microprojets. L’évaluation a aussi touché l’approche de genre du projet, et enfin, cherché à formuler des recommandations pour guider l’exécution future des micro projets.

Le travail au champ en Côte d’Ivoire a été effectué pendant deux semaines intenses au mois d’octobre 2009. L’étude a eu une approche qualitative par des méthodes comme analyse des documents, observation, conversations informelles, interviews en groupes, interviews individuelles semi structurées et ateliers de discussion. Nous avons visité au total 49 microprojets et plus de 150 bénéficiaires des « 1,000 MP » ont été interviewés. En plus l’équipe d’évaluation a eu des conversations informelles et interviews semi structurées avec le personnel de l’ONUCI et du PNUD, PNRRC, PSCN, Cellule de 1000 Microprojets de la Présidence, leaders des FAFN, autorités locales et agences de mise en oeuvre, aussi bien que des entretiens avec des représentants parmi les agences internationales comme la Banque Mondiale, l’Union Européenne, GTZ, OIM, l’Ambassade Royale de la Norvège, la Coopération Française et Licorne. L’approche méthodologique et éthique de l’évaluation a été approuvée par le Service norvégien des données des sciences sociales (NSD).

Tout compris, l’équipe d’évaluation a conclu que l’exécution des « 1,000 Microprojets » a été efficace en ce qui concerne l’objectif principal, à savoir, de contribuer au renforcement de la paix et la sécurité en Côte d’Ivoire à travers la mise en place des possibilités de réinsertion socioéconomique aux ex-combattants, aux ex-membres des milices et aux jeunes à risque. Rappelons-nous ses caractéristiques principales : moment opportun, exécution rapide, compte tenu au besoin des projets économiquement viables, conscience et promotion active des synergies entre les acteurs de ce développement. Les « 1,000 Microprojets » étaient la réponse à une situation d’urgence critique, donc il a été lancé à la hâte. Cependant, basé sur une philosophie d’essayer et voir, certains points faibles ont pu être corrigés en cours de route. Donc l’exécution a été flexible et attentive aux réalités du terrain.

Cependant, il y a encore certains points faibles. L’évaluation souligne surtout la nécessité à fixer les critères de sélection en ce qui concerne la sélection des bénéficiaires aussi bien que les partenaires de mise en œuvre. Le processus pour choisir l’activité économique de chaque micro projet peut être amélioré par des estimations locales du marché courant et des activités viables en chaque localité. Nous soulignons aussi la nécessité d’améliorer le dialogue avec les bénéficiaires, pou qu’ils présentent leurs plans futurs réels, pour établir des projets commerciales viables conformément aux désirs et des plans des bénéficiaires. La composition des groupes et le nombre de participants sont aussi des facteurs importants pour une réinsertion réussie. Des groupes trop grands ont un impact sur la possibilité de chaque projet à fournir à chaque bénéficiaire une activité quotidienne intéressante, et réduisent les chances à assurer à chaque bénéficiaire une recette adéquate. Cependant, certains projets ont besoin d’un investissement plus important et compte tenu du budget limité par bénéficiaire, il faut dans des pareils cas un nombre de bénéficiaires relativement important. Il est important de trouver le bon équilibre entre ces deux considérations. Il faut aussi se pencher sur le suivi des microprojets. Les évaluateurs sont au courant du développement récent qui assure aux
bénéficiaires un suivi supplémentaire de trois mois, fourni par PNRRC. L’évaluation souligne que trop d’acteurs différents et niveaux structurels qui sont impliqués au suivi des microprojets, et que l’organisation courante du suivi peut avoir comme conséquence une pulvérisation des responsabilités ainsi qu’une confusion sur qui est responsable de quoi.

Le « 1,000 Microprojets » a essayé à trouver sa place dans la structure DDR existante et il a pris en compte les homologues nationaux et les partenaires nationaux. Le présent rapport, selon notre meilleure compréhension, indique que l’approche appliquée par l’ONUCI/PNUD pour la réinsertion des divers groupes, qui sont éligibles à un support à la réinsertion, s’est montrée à être une stratégie possible. Les défauts, souvent dus à la situation d’urgence, ont été identifiés et des solutions possibles y ont été recommandées. Il y a aussi raisons de croire qu’un nombre de bénéficiaires vont préférer à passer par ce chemin plus rapide de réinsertion que par une approche plus classique. Il s’agit d’une option possible, mais de moins de formation qu’il y a avant le début des activités génératrices des revenus, de plus devrait durer la formation sur le tas et le monitoring par la suite. Une vague possible des microprojets devraient aussi se servir de certaines ressources pour le monitoring des projets existants pour contribuer à la viabilité des projets.

Comme nous l’avons vu ci-dessus, il y a une opinion unanime sur la valeur de cette approche à tous les niveaux. Les fonds sont gérés par une structure qui est bien connue. Il n’y a pas de raison évidente pour que les principaux donateurs internationaux ne puissent pas financer une nouvelle vague des microprojets basés sur une stratégie qui prend en compte les expériences de la phase qui vient de se terminer. Mais il est n’est certainement pas le seul profil possible pour la réinsertion. Il devrait être une espace pour une variation par rapport aux approches des programmes de réinsertion, car une telle variation pourrait contribuer à un pourcentage de succès plus élevé.

Les bénéficiaires et toutes autres parties prenantes ont exprimé à l’unanimité que les « 1,000 Microprojets » ont eu un impact aux vies personnelles des bénéficiaires, leurs communautés et sur la paix et la sécurité en Côte d’Ivoire. Le « 1,000 MP » est venu au temps opportun pour calmer une situation qui a menacé à exploser. Il a été efficace dans sa contribution à calmer la situation tendue. Cependant, la situation reste fragile, et avec les élections qui s’approchent la tension peut de nouveau surgir à la surface. L’approche des « 1,000 MP », avec la concertation sur une solution rapide à une situation rapide, a obtenu des résultats, mais il reste à voir si l’approche est efficace aussi à une réinsertion des ex-combattants et la paix à long terme. Il y a aussi un assez grand nombre d’ex-combattants démobilisés aussi bien que des jeunes à risque avec un espoir de bénéficier de « 1,000 MP » au des initiatives semblables, et il est évident que les efforts doivent continuer. Les évaluateurs pensent que le processus de construction de la paix en Côte d’Ivoire pourrait bénéficier d’un grand nombre d’acteurs impliqués activement au financement et à l’exécution des pareils programmes, et ils soulignent la nécessité de harmoniser les efforts pour assurer un bénéfice maximum de la complémentarité de chaque acteur. Nous trouvons que les « 1,000 Microprojets » ont ouvert le chemin à d’autres programmes de réinsertion/réintégration qui ont hésité à lancer leurs activités. Nous sommes d’avis que le Gouvernement et les partenaires internationaux au processus DDR, ont la capacité à obtenir une meilleure coopération, pour permettre la mobilisation d’encore des ressources substantielles pour le DDR, la paix et le redressement.

La présente évaluation des « 1,000 Microprojets » a jeté de lumière sur beaucoup de leçons importantes sous forme des modifications à considérer dans des futurs microprojets, mais aussi sous forme des résultats positifs déjà obtenues. Dans les deux sections qui suivent nous avons
souligné quelques unes parmi les leçons les plus importantes et des recommandations faites par l’équipe de l’évaluation.

**Leçons apprises**

A la base des résultats présentés ci-dessus l’équipe d’évaluation note les leçons majeures qui suivent :

**Organisation et coordination**

- L’avantage d’une approche participative comme celle qui est pratiquée dans les « 1,000 Microprojets, » est une appropriation accrue du projet par les parties prenantes. L’appropriation locale est un facteur important pour obtenir un succès.

**L’impact**

- L’approche des « 1,000 Microprojets », qui vise une solution rapide à une situation urgente, a donné des résultats avec des impacts positifs pour les bénéficiaires et les communautés. Elle a contribué à un milieu plus pacifique en Côte d’Ivoire.
- Leur implication dans des activités économiques, le fait qu’ils gagnent leur vie par des recettes honnêtes, ont eu un impact positif sur la perception des ex-combattants par leurs communautés. Les « 1,000 Microprojets » ont contribué à rétablir leur amour-propre, dignité et l’espoir pour l’avenir.
- Les « 1,000 Microprojets » ont créé des points importants de rencontre entre les bénéficiaires et autres groupes (fournisseurs, clients, hommes de métier etc.) Des pareilles rencontres soulignent l’interdépendance des groupes différents et par conséquent elles contribuent à améliorer la cohésion sociale et l’acceptation mutuelle.
- Le fait d’avoir fait des contrats pour la mise en œuvre avec des ONG locales et d’avoir fourni à celles-ci une assistance technique, a contribué au renforcement des capacités de telles ONG.

**Plan du projet et l’exécution**

- L’approche d’apprendre en travaillant est garant d’un haut niveau de flexibilité. Les activités qui semblent appropriées à la phase initiale, pourraient se montrer inadaptées lors de l’exécution. Un plan flexible permet de faire des adaptations douces chaque fois qu’il y en a le besoin.
- Puisque la motivation initiale des bénéficiaires potentiels est d’avoir des recettes plutôt que de formation, il est essentiel de leur fournir une source immédiate des recettes. Il est donc possible que l’apprentissage en travaillant est une meilleure approche que l’apprentissage d’un métier avant d’établir leurs propres activités économiques est préférable lorsqu’il s’agit des ex-combattants adultes.
- L’établissement des groupes de travail a l’avantage de créer un milieu dans lequel les individus apprennent à considérer l’opinion, les intérêts et les valeurs des autres.
- Les « 1,000 Microprojets » ont déjà reconnu qu’il faut un suivi et une aide de mise en œuvre qui durent plus de trois mois.

**Recommandations**

L’équipe d’évaluation fait les recommandations suivantes pour l’exécution de la prochaine phase du projet :

**Organisation**

- Puisque les et les responsabilités du CAP et du comité local ne correspondent pas, l’équipe d’évaluation recommande de créer un comité local de projet à Abidjan aussi.
• La direction du projet au niveau central devrait continuer à sensibiliser les comités sur leurs rôle et responsabilités.

**Approche de genre**


• Le projet devrait continuer à sensibiliser les acteurs sur les questions de genre et de formuler un plan d’action sur comment une approche de genre peut être un élément central à tous les étapes et niveaux du processus d’exécution. Pour réussir à faire du genre un élément central, il faut un suivi étroit dans sur le terrain.

**Impact**

• Comme il y a de trouble dans le ouest du pays, les évaluateurs recommande que les « 1,000 MP » étudie le besoin et la possibilité à renforcer sa présence dans la zone.

• Comme l’exécution de « 1,000 MP » s’est montrée efficace pour calmer une situation conflictuelle tendue, nous recommandons que cette leçon sera partagée avec autre Forces de maintien de la paix. Il faudrait discuter la possibilité d’employer une portion des Fonds de Construction de la Paix ailleurs pour exécuter des initiatives semblables.

**Exécution**

**Sélections des bénéficiaires**

• L’équipe d’évaluation encourage le « 1,000 MP » à étudier les possibilités à créer des activités économiques susceptibles à faciliter la participation aussi des personnes infirmes.

• Les évaluateurs recommandent la rédaction des critères de sélection plus détaillés – spécifique à chaque groupe cible – pour guider les responsables de l’identification et de sélection, aussi bien qu’un suivi impartial.

**Choix d’activité économique**

• Les évaluateurs recommandent qu’une étude de chaque contexte local soit effectuée avant de décider la typologie des microprojets. Il faudrait mettre à jour des pareilles analyses du marché et prendre en considération des nouvelles tendances et développements.

• L’équipe d’évaluation prend note du besoin à améliorer le dialogue avec les bénéficiaires lors du processus de sélection de l’activité économique. Il est essentiel à prendre le temps pour discuter les plans futurs réels des bénéficiaires et les prendre en considération, autant que possible, lors de la sélection de l’activité.

**La composition du groupe et le nombre de participants**

• Les évaluateurs ne voient pas l’objectif du projet d’être seulement à fournir aux gens une recette, mais aussi à donner aux gens quelque chose d’intéressant à faire dans leur vie de chaque jour. Par conséquence nous recommandons qu’aucun des bénéficiaires ne sera laissé inoccupé, et que le nombre de participants à un groupe sera déterminé sur la base du volume de travail impliqué aussi bien que la possibilité de recevoir une recette décente.
- Les évaluateurs recommandent que les partenaires de mise en œuvre et les comités locaux à chercher à dévoiler des conflits éventuels aussitôt que possible et à fournir une assistance pour la médiation et la résolution des conflits. Cela pourrait être particulièrement nécessaire dans des groupes d’ethnicité mélangé ou bien avec des nationaux et des non nationaux.
- Les évaluateurs n’ont pas comparé les résultats selon le nombre de membres d’un groupe, mais recommandent en général que des projets individuels et les projets d’un petit nombre de bénéficiaires continuent à être appuyés.

Sélection des partenaires de mise en œuvre
- Ici la recommandation générale est que tout partenaire potentiel à l’exécution devrait pas seulement être évalué par rapport à son expertise technique, capacité organisationnelle, situation financière, profonde connaissance de la zone, mais aussi par rapport à son dévouement à la cohésion sociale et la paix locales. En plus, nous recommandons que le processus de sélection soit complètement transparent et, autant que possible, sensible à l’aspect de genre.

Formation
- Les évaluateurs recommandent que le projet suive l’évolution des besoins en formation des bénéficiaires et leur attitude envers la formation.

Le kit de réinsertion
- L’équipe d’évaluation recommande d’inclure les bénéficiaires au processus de sélection et l’achat des kits. Les partenaires de mise en œuvre devraient expliquer le genre de décision qu’il faut faire pour permettre une utilisation du montant disponible dans une manière qui donne une possibilité maximale au succès.

Suivi
- Basé sur l’analyse ci-dessus l’équipe d’évaluation recommande une restructuration des responsabilités de suivi. Les évaluateurs propose à organiser le suivi et l’évaluation en trois niveaux structurels :
  1. L’équipe conjointe de suivi et d’évaluation (ONUCI/PNUD) devrait uniquement être responsable pour la gestion des évaluations. Selon les interviews avec deux membres de cette équipe, cela est effectivement ce qui se passe actuellement.
  2. Les comités locaux devraient être en charge du suivi général des microprojets aussi bien que des partenaires à la mise en œuvre. Les représentants locaux de l’ONUCI/PNUD devraient agir en tant que membres du comité et les visites aux sites devraient se faire conjointement avec les autres membres. Dans les deux lieux où il y a des comités techniques, ceux-ci devraient agir conformément aux comités locaux et devraient, en collaboration avec les partenaires à la mise en œuvre, fournir une assistance technique.
  3. Les partenaires de la mise en œuvre devraient être responsables du suivi quotidien des microprojets et de fournir aux bénéficiaires les conseils techniques nécessaires.
1. Introduction

1.1 Objectives

The evaluation aimed to assess the performance and results of the “1,000 Micro-projects for socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-militia members and youth at risk in Côte d’Ivoire”. The focus has been on its impact on beneficiaries, communities and peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of procedures and mechanisms employed to identify, select and implement micro projects. The evaluation also assessed the project’s gender approach, and finally, sought to provide recommendations to guide the further implementation of micro projects.1

A comparative study of the efficiency of current approaches in order to facilitate a harmonisation of programmes aiming at reintegrating ex-combatants, ex-militia members and youth at risk, carried out by different donors as well as the Ivorian Government (PNRRC and PSCN), was included in the terms of reference as one of the objectives. However, based on discussions with ONUCI (Organisation des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire) and UNDP upon our arrival in Abidjan, it was decided that the limited time in the field did not allow an in-depth comparative study. Hence, this evaluation only addresses this issue to a limited extent.

1.2 Composition of the evaluation team

The Centre for Intercultural Communication (SIK) based in Stavanger, Norway, is doing consultancy (evaluations, monitoring, advising etc), research and teaching in Norway, in French speaking Africa and in Latin America, particularly in the domains of intercultural encounters, development, organisational development, conflict management, and issues relating to victims of war. SIK has an international network of experts, and has in this evaluation drawn on this network.

All members of the team have a personal experience working with reinsertion and reintegaration of either child soldiers and/or adult combatants, mainly in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Some of the team members have also experience from other countries related to reinsertion, conflict resolution and development work. We have been involved in research and publications related to reinsertion/reintegration and conflict resolution, and have been involved in a number of evaluations. The members of the evaluation team have different cultural and academic background. The team consisted of the following members:

- BALEKEMBAKA Musafiri Adolphe, citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo
- Ibrahim AG YOUSSOUF citizen of Mali
- Milfrid TONHEIM, citizen of Norway
- Kåre LODE, citizen of Norway

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1 See Terms of Reference (in French) in Appendix I
2. Methodology

2.1 Methodological approach

The evaluation draws primarily on qualitative research strategies, employing methods like document analyses, observation, informal conversations, group interviews, individual semi-structured interviews and workshops/discussions. The purpose of employing several methods to gather data is to allow respondents different modes of expression and to see whether the different sets of data material confirm or complement each other. The evaluation team consulted with all stakeholders in the “1,000 Micro-projects”; ONUCI and UNDP staff, Programme National de Réinsertion et de Réhabilitation Communautaire (PNRRC), Programme du Service Civique National (PSCN), Cellule de 1000 Microprojets de la Présidence, leaders in the Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles (FAFN), local authorities, implementing agencies, as well as beneficiaries. The team also met with international stakeholders such as the World Bank, European Union, GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), IOM (International Organization for Migration), the Norwegian Royal Embassy, la Coopération Française, and Licorne.

The field visits started with a workshop in Bouaké on the 2nd of October 2009. Participants included representatives from among beneficiaries, implementing partners, local authorities, PNRRC, Licorne, and ONUCI/UNDP. Key questions were discussed in groups as well as in plenary sessions.²

In order to more efficiently reach as many areas as possible, the rest of the fieldwork was conducted through two separate teams. Field visits were made to a total of 49 micro projects in Bouaké, Yamoussoukro, Daloa, Séguela, Vavoua, Issia, Guiglo and San Pedro. Two of these were community projects. The selection of sites ensured the inclusion of a great variety of micro projects, covering the following categories:

- Urban, semi urban and rural environments
- Ex combatants/militias, youth at risk and other vulnerable groups
- Male and female beneficiaries
- Various types of economic activities
- “Completed” projects and projects currently being implemented
- Success stories as well as struggling projects

More than 150 beneficiaries were interviewed. Their age span is from 18 to around 60 years of age. Most of these interviews were conducted through group conversations where the key focus was on the project’s performance and its impact on the life of the beneficiaries, their community, and local peace and security. Local ONUCI/UNDP representatives and implementing agencies were responsible for the logistics at each site, and informal conversations with these stakeholders were conducted. The evaluators also met with local authorities, including some village chiefs, in seven of the sites visited.

Three semi-structured interviews were conducted, in addition to many informal conversations, with ONUCI and UNDP staff members in Abidjan.

Despite the inclusion of a great variety of sites in the fieldwork, as ONUCI/UNDP were in charge of the logistics of the fieldwork the evaluation team can neither fully guarantee the

² Group presentations (in French) can be found in Appendix II
representativeness of micro projects nor the representativeness of respondents among the beneficiaries. The fieldwork in Côte d’Ivoire was conducted in weeks 40 and 41, 2009.

2.2 Ethical considerations

The data collection was carried out in line with research ethical guidelines developed by the National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH) in Norway. The methodological approach of the evaluation was approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) 2nd October 2009. The respondents were informed about the identity of the evaluators, the objectives of the evaluation, and their free choice to accept or refuse to participate. They were also made aware of the liberty to refuse to answer questions they found uncomfortable to talk about. Oral consents from all respondents were obtained. In order to ensure confidentiality, the data material and its presentation in the report is anonymised. However, a complete anonymity was never guaranteed to all respondents in official positions, like ONUCI and UNDP staff.

2.3 Verification of report

A draft was passed on to ONUCI and UNDP in Abidjan to allow them to verify details and facts referred to in the report. This took place without any prejudice to the content or the assessment of the evaluation team which has carried out its work in complete independence.

2.4 Reader’s guide

The report firstly gives a brief summary of the conflict and the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process in Côte d’Ivoire, followed by a short presentation of the “1,000 Micro-projects” and the project’s objectives. Thereafter the results of the evaluation is presented and discussed, starting with addressing its organisation and its gender approach. The report continues to present findings related to the project’s impact and then addresses the actual implementation of the project. Where appropriate, sections conclude with recommendations. Synergy and harmonisation of efforts in the field of reintegration is then briefly addressed. The report ends with the evaluation’s conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.

3. Background

Following its independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a rapid economic development. It became the world’s biggest producer of cocoa and had substantial production of coffee, pin apples, palm oil, sugar and timber. In this time of economic boost Côte d’Ivoire attracted hundreds of thousands of people from countries of the sub-region. However, the good times did not last and in the 80s and 90s the country faced an economic crisis as well as political unrest. Land ownership and national identity were at the core of the conflict. In the mid 1990s the concept of “ivoirité” was introduced, a concept that further restrained the relationship between nationals and non-nationals.

3 Copy of the approval letter (in Norwegian) can be found in Appendix III
In spite of several efforts to maintain social cohesion, the military-political crisis escalated in September 2002. The government lost control over the Northern part of the country which resulted in that the country was divided in two. Several peace treaties have been signed, none of which had any significant impact on the situation. However, the most recent treaty, the Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA) signed on March 4 in 2007, has created new hopes for a crisis recovery. Nevertheless, as the tense political situation continued the presidential elections planned to be held in March 2008 was postponed till November the same year. Due to the slow implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Accord, especially with regards to solutions to military problems, tensions surfaced through violent demonstrations, road blocks, and crime especially in the areas of Bouaké and Ségouéla. Despite the creating an environment more politically favorable towards a peaceful solution, there was still a high degree of frustration among combatants, militia members and other young people with little hope for the future. By the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, the ex-combatants became frustrated because of the deadlock, and took to the streets. The violent demonstrations were getting out of hands.

In order to tackle an emergency that could jeopardise the whole peace process, the Government, ONUCI and UNDP decided to launch the “1,000 Micro-projects”, subject of this evaluation. The “1,000 Micro-projects” was hence particularly a response to the lack of reintegration opportunities for the then growing number of demobilized combatants in and around Bouaké few months short of the elections planned to take place on the 30th of November 2008.

4. The DDR process in Côte d’Ivoire

The most recent and broadly accepted definition of DDR is provided in UN’s Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) of 2006. These standards define the DDR process as follows (IDDRS 1.10):

“Disarmament” is:
“the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.”

“Demobilisation” is:
“the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in individual centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.”

“Reintegration” is:
“the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.”

According to IDDRS, reinsertion is a short-term assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation and prior to the longer-term process of reintegration.
The Ivorian DDR programme was established in 2005, after the Pretoria agreement, under the auspices of Commission Nationale de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion (C.N.D.D.R.). The PNDDR/RC is the entity officially in charge of the national DDR process. However, immediate implementation did not take place, mainly due to continuing unrest as well as lack of funding. In late December 2008, the parties to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) signed the fourth supplementary agreement to the OPA, and the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration is to be completed under the terms of this agreement.

The implementation of the national DDR programme in Côte d’Ivoire has been slow. Except a ceremony of handing in arms by pro-governmental militia in Guiglo in May 2007 and a symbolic peace flame in Bouaké in the end of July the same year, the first stage of the DDR process, disarmament, has virtually been inexistent. Consequently, there is a large number of weapons still in circulation. The profiling of FAFN combatants took place between November 2007 and March 2008 and presented a total number of 32,777 profiles. The demobilisation process has had two phases; one from March 2008 to August 2008 and then a second phase from September 2009 to date. As of 28th October 2009 20,900 FAFN combatants are demobilised. Members of self-defence groups (GAD) who are currently profiled and dismantled are 37,451 and 13,643 respectively. Ex-combatants or ex-members of self-defence groups are either waiting to be integrated into the new national army or to be reintegrated back into a civilian life. Only a small fraction, perhaps less than one third, of the persons waiting has received any reintegration support. The national structures - the PNRRC and the PSCN - have so far not been able to fully implement their own reintegration programmes. This is explained by lack of funding, linked to distrust from important donors and to the polarisation of the political scene.

5. The 1000 Micro-projects

The “1,000 Micro-projects for socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-militia members and youth at risk in Côte d’Ivoire” (from now on called the “1,000 Micro-projects” or “1,000 MP”) were approved by the Peace Building Fund with a funding of $ 4 million in September 2008. The project is co-jointly run by the DDR Division of UNOCI and UNDP’s Post-Crisis Unit in Côte d’Ivoire. As indicated by its name the target groups are ex-combatants, ex-militia members and youth at risk, and it aims at launching 1000 small businesses run by the target groups. By September 2009, the project had reached 3483 beneficiaries out of 5000 targeted with 526 micro projects started. An overview of the “1,000 Micro-projects”, showing geographical locations as well as the number of beneficiaries in each location as of October 2009, is found in Appendix IV.

Each beneficiary benefits from a total of 420,000 FCFA which need to cover allowance for three months, constructions or rehabilitation of buildings/locations, training, reinsertion kit etc. The “1,000 MP” includes also 6 community-based projects. The reasoning behind the decision to include community-based projects is to avoid a perception that the support is only available for those who used arms during the conflict.

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4 « Elaboration et validation du programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réhabilitation Communautaire en Côte d’Ivoire », Yamoussoukro 2-6 May 2005
5 Numbers are according to PNRRC official numbers as of 28th of October 2009
5.1 The project’s objectives

The overall objective of the project is to contribute to reinforcement of peace and security in the country through the provision of socioeconomic reintegration options to former combatants, ex-militias members and youth at risk. Through the project’s reintegration assistance it seeks to contribute to achieve the following more immediate objectives:

1. Create the preconditions for a sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants and militias;
2. Reduce the use of weapons as an income generating tool;
3. Reduce unemployment and poverty rates;
4. Reduce intercommunity conflicts and criminality;
5. Promote within the communities new opportunities of professional reintegration;
6. Develop a new socioeconomic spirit and reinforce the capacities and competencies of beneficiaries;
7. Improve the living condition of the beneficiaries as well as the condition of vulnerable groups such as women, children affected by the conflict and HIV/AIDS affected groups.6

5.2 Coordination and organisation of the project

The “1,000 Micro-projects” is established through the partnership of several entities with various responsibilities7:

- ONUCI has, through its DDR Division, the overall responsibility of the daily management and follow-up of the project.
- UNDP is responsible for the management of the project’s funds.
- “Centre de Commandement Intégré” takes care of the disarmament and the voluntary demobilisation of ex-combatants and ex-militia members, under the supervision of the Impartial Forces.
- The Impartial Forces (ONUCI forces and Licorne) supervise the process of disarmament and demobilisation according to the modus operandi set up for this purpose.
- PNRRC delivers the demobilisation cards for the ex-combatants and ex-militia members according to the lists that were set up during the phase of profiling of the two categories.
- PSCN delivers a proof of enrolment of ex-combatants/ex-militiamen in this program

The institutional organisation of the “1,000 Micro-projects” consists of several levels of committees. The committee at the highest level is the Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage). This committee has the overall responsibility of the coordination and management of the Consolidation Funds for Peace, and is co-chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN and a representative from the Prime Minister’s Office.

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6 See Peace Building Fund’s Project Summary
7 Fonds de Consolidation de la Paix pour la Côte d’Ivoire, pp 6-7
There are two other committee levels, the Committee for Approval of projects (CAP) and the many Local Committees. These committees’ particular tasks and responsibilities as well as their composition are outlined below.

**Figure 1 - The institutional organisation of the implementation process**

The CAP consists of the following members:
- Head of the DDR Division of ONUCI
- Main advisor of the post-crisis of UNDP
- Coordinator of PNRRC
- Coordinator of PSCN
- Impartial Forces
- FAFN
- Cellule des microprojets de la Présidence

The Local Committee is composed by:
- Local authorities
- Local representative of OUNIC’s DDR section
- Local representative of UNDP
- Local representative of the PNRRC
- Local representative of the PSCN,
- and assisted by leaders within the FAFN or the militia groups
The first step in the process of getting support to install a micro-project is the making of a project proposal. This is done by the beneficiaries themselves, individually or in groups, and put forward to the PNRRC. The PNRRC is then responsible for verifying the identities of the beneficiaries in question, for example verifying whether they have a demobilisation card. Upon such a verification, the local committee makes a field visit and, based on an evaluation, it selects an implementing partner. Together with the chosen implementing partner the local committee makes another field visit, this time focusing on the technical aspects of the project. In collaboration with the beneficiaries, the implementing partner draws up the project file and hand it over to the local committee for approval. If the micro-project in question is approved and selected by the local committee, it is included in the list of pre-approved micro-projects and sent to the CAP in Abidjan for final approval.

The project administration has followed the implementation of the micro projects closely, and has made changes whenever necessary. In addition to evaluations and field visits carried out by the monitoring and evaluation team and other ONUCI/UNDP staff members, two workshops have been organised, one workshop in Yamoussoukro in August 2008 and another in Bouaké in March 2009. All the different stakeholders as well as beneficiaries have participated in these workshops, and together they have assessed the implementation of the project and revealed difficulties that should be addressed.

6. Evaluation results

6.1 Organisation of the project

The “1,000 Micro-projects” are co-jointly run by the DDR Division of UNOCI and UNDP’s Post-Crisis Unit, based on the UN concept of “integrated missions”. Informants within the two agencies expressed enthusiasm and satisfaction with this collaboration. As everything is jointly planned and implemented they find the project to benefit from the strengths and complementarities of each of the two collaborating parties.

Through its participatory approach the “1,000 MP” has included a wide range of stakeholders and actors at all levels of the organisation of the project. This process seems to have been quite challenging, particularly in the beginning, as many wanted to benefit from the project. However, within UNOCI and UNDP there is a unanimously view that it was necessary to include all stakeholders if the project should have any chances of succeeding. According to informants, it would for example have been impossible to succeed without involving national partners like the PNRRC and the PSCN. The advantage of this approach is increased ownership of the project by the different stakeholders. Nevertheless, ensuring full ownership of the project by a sincere, concerted and coordinated engagement of the national stakeholder is also mentioned as one of the major challenges ahead.

The price to pay when employing a participatory approach is often a complex structure and a time-consuming decision-making process. As the project easily could have been blocked without balancing the different interests the current organisation is viewed as a necessary compromise. Another disadvantage is that a complex structure may lead to a confusion related to roles and responsibilities of each actor. ONUCI/UNDP staff argue that each actor has clearly defined roles and responsibilities which are provided them through written documents and agreements. They acknowledge, however, that in the field the interpretation of these roles
varies. ONUCI/UNDP staff also points out that new actors, particularly among implementing partners, might not have received the same clear description of each level’s responsibilities. The need to clarify roles of different stakeholders is also underlined at the workshop in Bouaké. The evaluation team found the confusion to be greatest with regards to the responsibility of monitoring and follow-up. This particular problematic is addressed separately (see 6.4.7).

At the start of the project only 4 areas had established local committees.8 As of October 2009 every location, except for Abidjan, has a local committee. The presence of the Comité d’Approbation des Projects (CAP) in Abidjan is given as the reason why the capital does not have its own a local committee.

How well the local committees function seems to vary. In some committees the PNRRC is not represented. In others the local authorities are not really involved. It is clear that the absence and/or detachment of some members of the committees have a negative impact on its operations. Non-functional local committees also leave the implementing partners with a much too great responsibility.

Recommendations

• As the tasks and responsibilities of the CAP and the local committee do not correspond, the evaluation team recommends the set up a local project committee also in Abidjan.
• The project management at the central level should continue to sensitize the committees about their role and responsibilities.

6.2 Gender approach

According to a list of projects within the “1,000 Micro-projects”9, 25 of the total of 520 reinsertion projects are solely composed of women. Furthermore, women are part of 78 other groups, albeit a minority in these groups. All in all, women constitute 22% of all beneficiaries. With regards to the 6 community-based projects the picture is different: women constitute 303 of 780 beneficiaries, hence approximately 39%.

The number of female beneficiaries varies to some extent from implementing partner to implementing partner. The evaluation team notes that projects executed by national structures have a higher rate of female beneficiaries (28%) than those implemented by the international NGO. OIM, despite their devotion to mainstream gender in their operational activities,10 has only succeeded in including between 9-10% women in the micro projects they implement. Comparatively, women constitute approximately 32% of the beneficiaries in the reinsertion projects implemented by Cabinet KS Consultants, in the San Pedro area.

According to the Convention of the “1,000 Micro-projects” signed by ONUCI and the Ivorian Government 08.09.08, the project should take into consideration the specificities of female ex-combatants, include women and children affected by the armed conflict as well as groups affected by HIV/Aids (p 4), with a special focus on victims of gender based sexual violence.

8 See The Convention of the 1000 MP signed by ONUCI and the Ivorian Government 8 September 2008, page 9
9 Numbers are taken from the complete list of micro projects updated 31 July 2009
10 See for example OIM’s Gender Mainstreaming Initiative, 2001 at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-iom/organizational-structure/iom-gender
The target population may be divided into two categories. The main category is the direct beneficiaries which are composed of ex-combatants, ex-militias members and youth at risk. The second category, which put emphasis on women as one among other groups of youth at risk, is called indirect beneficiaries. This possibly explains the rate of female beneficiaries in the “1,000 MP”. ONUCI/UNDP staffs explain that the central level in Abidjan cannot influence the gender balance of beneficiaries as they are selected from either the PNRRC list of demobilised ex-combatants or lists of youth at risks handed over by local authorities. The number of women on the lists of youth at risk has not been available for the evaluation team and we may therefore not verify whether the rate of selected women reflects the rate of women in the lists of identified beneficiaries. With regards to the demobilised ex-combatants the PNRRC list shows only 6% female ex-combatants (interview with UNDP staff).

Both according to the workshop in Bouaké (02.10.09) and interviewees, women affected by war constitute a large and vulnerable group of the population. It seems then that in the initial implementing phase of the “1,000 MP”, a gender approach has not been used systematically. Some efforts have been carried out to raise awareness of gender issues among stakeholders in the field. The two seminars in Daloa and Bouaké are especially mentioned.

At the central level of ONUCI/UNDP in Abidjan there is a gender balance among staff members. With regards to ONUCI/UNDP representatives in the field, there are mainly men, with only a couple of exceptions. At the local committee level the gender balance is inexistent, as is also the case within the project’s national partners like the PNRRC, the PSCN, and the FAFN. Staff members among the implementing partners are also to a large extent male.

The fact that staff or committee members at almost all levels are predominantly men is likely to affect the selection of the beneficiaries. The evaluation team argues that the project would benefit from an increased gender balance, especially at the levels of implementing partners and local committees, as female members of these structures will be better equipped to ensure both female participation as well as consideration of their particular needs. The evaluators are aware of that the composition of the local committees is based on the inclusion of several important stakeholders, like the PNRRC and local authorities, structures that are male dominated, but maintains that action should be made in order to ensure a minimum female participation in the committees.

Recommendations

- The evaluators emphasize all UN agencies’ obligation to fulfil and act according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. This Resolution addresses the disproportionate impact of conflict and war on women, and calls for a particular protection of girls and women affected by war and the adoption of a gender perspective which includes consideration of women’s special needs during reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction (S/RES/1325 (2000), art. 8, a).
- The project should continue to sensitize actors about gender issues and draft a plan of action on how a gender approach may be mainstreamed at every stage of the implementation process. Mainstreaming gender will also need a close follow-up in the field.
6.3 The impact of the “1,000 MP”

6.3.1 Personal impact
All the beneficiaries as well as those who supervise them confirm the beneficiaries’ personal gain from participating in the “1,000 Micro-projects”. It gives them a meaningful activity, allows them to honestly earn their living, teaches them the demands and challenges related to the activity chosen, and also teaches them to consider and value others in the group. Moreover, their economical activity naturally creates relations and cooperation with others; customers and clients, suppliers of goods and equipment, landlords or landowners, neighbours etc. As a result, the project has contributed to restoring their self-esteem, dignity and hope for the future.

Assessment of economic gain is of course rendered difficult by the reluctance to declare income. Nevertheless, some beneficiaries express that they have gained a decent income. Others are still struggling to make their projects survive and are at this stage not able to take out any profit. Among the sites visited there are examples of projects that have been active for ten months without providing the beneficiaries with any income (ex an agricultural project in San Pedro). The low or inexistent income may be linked to the type of activity, the group size as well as the duration of the project. A more in-depth assessment of these aspects will be discussed when we address the implementation process. However, it is important to note that due to insufficient income, a rather considerable number of beneficiaries are involved in other economical activities as well. This is particularly the case with male beneficiaries. However, all beneficiaries agree that they would have been worse off without the project. Indeed, many of them say that without it they would be doomed to idleness and roaming the streets.

The beneficiaries state that their involvement in the “1,000 Micro-projects” have had a positive impact on how they are perceived by members in their communities. The increased acceptance by their communities seems to be closely related to the fact that they now are earning their living in an honest manner. Some of the female beneficiaries expressed that before the project, people would talk badly about them, hinting that they were prostitutes (for example in Bouaké). This had ended rapidly after the commencement of their activity in the project. It is, however, important to note that compared to other conflict contexts (such as Sierra Leone, Uganda and the DR Congo), stigmatisation of former combatants does not seem to represent a major difficulty in the Ivorian post-conflict situation. Several girls also noted that their participation in economical activities would increase their chances of getting married. This is also confirmed by staff members of ONUCI/UNDP.

The approach of the “1,000 MP”, focusing on a rapid solution to an urgent situation, has gained results, but whether the approach is effective also with regards to long-term reintegration of ex-combatants remains to be verified. The framework of providing beneficiaries with only three months support does not appear adequate considering a long-term reintegration process.

6.3.2 Community impact
The project started at a crucial moment, where people had almost stopped hoping for support, and it has consequently created a local environment of increased hope and anticipation. The “1,000 MP” have had a direct impact on local communities by creating work possibilities for the idle beneficiaries. As many of the micro projects are still in their infancy there are just a few examples of projects creating additional employment (ex agricultural project in Bouaké
and restaurant in Issia). However, the evaluation team believes this potential will increase in time. Besides creating direct employment, the micro projects contribute to increased local retail trade (ex second-hand clothes dealers in Yamoussoukro and Séguela). The project has brought fresh capital into local markets, with positive impact on the financial activity of local suppliers, wholesalers and craftsmen.

In some communities, the evaluators found community members, like village chiefs, engaged in assisting the micro projects to succeed. In such cases, the communities had contributed by for example giving the beneficiaries land to cultivate (ex in San Pedro and Bouaké) or by allowing them to use sheds and outhouses for their animal breeding (ex in San Pedro). Ownership of a micro project by the local community is viewed by the evaluators an important factor of success.

The micro projects create important meeting points between beneficiaries and suppliers, customers etc. Such encounters emphasize the interdependence of different groups, and consequently contribute to improve social cohesion and mutual acceptance. Moreover, many of the groups in the “1,000 MP” are composed of individuals of different ethnicity as well as of nationals and non-nationals. According to interviewees, there are also micro projects in which ex-combatants and ex-militia members work together. These mixed groups may pose a challenge to group cohesion and collaboration but have also the potential of effectively contributing to restoring mutual confidence and tolerance of diversity among the country’s population. The evaluation team met with some groups where this seemed to be the case.

6.3.3 Impact on peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire

Informal conversations with community members as well as staff members of implementing partners point to a decline in violent demonstrations, in crime and in violence against women. This decline seems to coincide in time with the implementation of the “1,000 Micro-projects”. The project has re-launched and promoted local economy through the creation of income generating activities, and provided a number of people with hope for the future. Jobless and frustrated ex-combatants, ex-militia members and youth at risk, who constituted a possible danger for peace and security, are now busy running their own small business projects. The “1,000 Micro-projects” have thus contributed to creating a more favourable environment for the general elections to take place.

Interviews with ONUCI/UNDP staff highlight Bouaké and Séguela as particularly good examples of areas where the project’s main objective - to reinforce peace and stability in Côte d’Ivoire - has been met. Bouaké experienced many violent demonstrations in the time before the start of the “1,000 Micro-projects” but this situation has entirely changed. Several informants have mentioned the involvement of the FAFN in the project as a crucial factor in calming down tensions. Local authorities, village chiefs and civil society at large have also played a positive role. Smaller villages where the traditional authority still prevails are mentioned as other examples of areas which have seen a great impact with a decreased level of insecurity.

The western regions, west of a line from the towns of Séguela and Guiglo, still experience continuing unrest and sporadic disturbances. However, the conflict in this area is argued to be of a different character than the conflict which in 2002 divided the country in two parts, the North and the South. Currently about 23,800 Liberian refugees are living mainly in the west of
the country.\textsuperscript{11} During the conflict, they were fighting on the government’s side against the FAFN. This could have been a good starting point for integration but the integration has not taken place. Apparently, these groups expect a certain reward which they deem they have not yet received. The population in the area does not feel comfortable with the situation and this uncertainty is a source of unrest and tension in the border area.

Beneficiaries we met with confirm the “1,000 Micro-projects” success in contributing to restoring peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire. They expressed that with a job and the ability to honestly earn their living they did not need or want to use arms as a source of income. One beneficiary aptly stated that because of the project, the youth would not again be easily manipulated to take up arms and fight on either this or that political side. However, the project has only reached about 3500 beneficiaries, and there remains a large number of demobilised ex-combatants waiting, perhaps impatiently, for reinsertion support like the “1,000 Micro-projects”.

There are also some other actors in the field of reintegration of ex-combatants, which all may also have contributed to calming down the situation. FAFN have implemented 20 micro projects in Zone 3 with a total of 78 beneficiaries. Despite the relative small number of beneficiaries, this contribution may have a great symbolic impact as it shows FAFN leaders’ devotion to assisting their ex-combatants. Another, and to our knowledge, the second largest actor within reintegration of ex-combatants in Côte d’Ivoire, is GTZ. Their reintegration programme targets both ex-combatants and youth at risk. It is very likely that their efforts also have had a positive influence on the general situation, however, GTZ is not present in all the areas with past unrest (ex Séguéla), and their current programme did not start before in May 2009. In an interview a GTZ Coordinator in Abidjan pointed to that the “1,000 MP” had had a larger influence on improving the security situation than GTZ’s own programme.

Both representatives from the World Bank and the European Union expressed concern that the ex-combatants and other groups helped through the “1,000 MP” may easily return to violence, road blocks etc. The short duration of the project may increase the number of failed projects leaving beneficiaries at worst even more frustrated and dangerous for society. This is indeed a possibility. However, it was probably even more risky not to do anything at all. In fact, there is a unanimous opinion at all stakeholders that the “1,000 MP” changed the situation. But it is necessary to consolidate the situation by an extension of the follow-up period and the launching of a new wave of projects in order to reach at least the large majority of those who have a good reason to think that they are entitled to benefit from the “1,000 MP”.

Despite the largely positive feedback on the projects impact on peace and security the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of May 2009 points to a situation of increased insecurity in Côte d’Ivoire. “[T]he security situation has deteriorated with (i) the increase in serious crime and criminality, (ii) the proliferation and circulation of light weapons, (iii) the non-mastery of movements of people and goods at the borders, (iv) the use of drugs and narcotics, (v) idleness of the youth, and (vi) the search for easy money” (PRSP 2009:22). Statistics from the first semester of 2008 show, however, that 75% of offences to the penal law registered by the National Police were registered in the district of Abidjan (ibid.). We have tried to get hold of more recent statistics from the National Police, particularly with registered offences in Bouaké, Séguéla and San Pedro, but we did not succeed. Our analysis is consequently mainly based on data collected from different groups of respondents.

\textsuperscript{11} United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire, 17 June 2009
Recommendations

- As unrest is still an element in the western part of the country the evaluators recommend the “1,000 MP” to assess the need and possibility to strengthen its presence in the area.
- As the implementation of the “1,000 MP” has proven effective as to calm down a tense conflict situation, we recommend that this lesson is shared with other Peace Keeping Forces. The possibility of employing a portion of the Peace Building Fund to implement similar initiatives should be discussed.

6.4 The implementation process

6.4.1 Selection of beneficiaries

The “1,000 Micro-projects” have reached in total 3483 beneficiaries; 2703 of which participate/d in reinsertion projects and 780 in community-based projects. The distribution among the main target groups are as follows; 31,6% ex-combatants, 23% ex-militia members, 23% youth at risk, and 22,4% are beneficiaries in the community-based projects. The selection of beneficiaries has consequently managed to create an equilibrium between the different main target groups in the project. The selection of female versus male beneficiaries is discussed in point 6.2.

Youth at risk includes, according to the policy documents of the “1,000 MP”, youth from 18 to 35 years of age. Related to ex-combatants and ex-militia members there are no such age requirement. During the fieldwork it became clear that among the youth at risk some beneficiaries were older than 35. In most cases only one or two of each group were older then the maximum age, and most often they only exceeded the maximum age with a few years. However, in one specific case, in Bouguedia close to Séguela, all the beneficiaries were more than 50 years of age, but still classified as “youths at risk”.

The “1,000 MP” Convention provides some general selection criteria (p 5). The evaluation team agrees to most of these but would like to comment on one of these criteria (no 6) which requires beneficiaries to be in a satisfactory physical, medical and mental shape. The evaluators find this criterion to have a discriminating character, possibly excluding one particularly vulnerable group among ex-combatants and youth at risk from participating in the project. Interviewees confirmed that there have been incidents where this has taken place. The fact that “nearly 90% of disabled persons who have attained working age are not exercising any professional activity,” and that they are to a large degree confronted with barriers and discrimination when seeking employment (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2009:46), clearly reflect their vulnerability.

The selection of beneficiaries to the “1,000 MP” is based on the provision of lists with potential candidates provided by structures outside ONUCI/UNDP. The PNRRC provides the list of demobilised ex-combatants and local authorities provide lists of youth at risk. The initial profiling of ex-combatants gave an unrealistically high number of demobilised, and according to several informants it was evident that the PNRRC list included others than just ex-combatants. With regards to the lists of youth at risk, interviewees said that local authorities

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12 Numbers are taken from the complete list of micro projects updated 31 July 2009
rely on leaders of youth movements/associations in order to compose the list. In the rural areas
the village chiefs are also in most cases strongly implicated. Consequently, the identification
of potential beneficiaries is currently dependent on a few individuals’ ability to make sound
and unbiased judgements, and the risk of favouring friends, family members and/or political
allies, instead of identifying the most vulnerable within each target group, is high. The
evaluators visited some sites where it is likely to believe that affinity had influenced the
selection process (ex such as in San Pedro and in Yamoussoukro). Moreover, ONUCI/UNDP
prefers that group members are formerly acquainted as this may improve the social cohesion
within the groups. However, one informant mentions this preference as potentially also
increasing a selection by affinity.

None of the beneficiaries interviewed had any objections to the mechanisms put in place to
identify and select participants in the “1,000 MP”. However, one group in the Bouaké
workshop underlined that the requirement to hold a demobilised-card\textsuperscript{13} posed a problem as not
all ex-combatants had received such an identity card. Another workshop-group pointed to the
project’s scarce inclusion of civilian groups also heavily affected by the conflict.

It is evident that the selection of beneficiaries is a delicate and rather politicised issue that
needs to be addressed in a tactful manner. However, the evaluation reveals that the current
selection process, particularly with regards to youth at risk, does not necessarily guarantee
that the most vulnerable individuals within the target groups are identified and selected, and the
evaluators find reasons to question the impartiality of those responsible for identifying and
selecting beneficiaries.

Recommendations
\begin{itemize}
\item The evaluation team encourages the “1,000 MP” to look into the possibilities of
creating economical activities that may facilitate participation also of disabled persons.
\item The evaluators recommend a drafting of more detailed selection criteria - specific to
each target group - to guide those responsible of the identification and selection, as
well as an unbiased monitoring of the process.
\end{itemize}

6.4.2 Choice of economic activity
The selection of economic activity is in general based on the wish of the beneficiaries. This is
confirmed through interviews where beneficiaries express that the choice of activity was their
own. However, we got the impression that in several cases the beneficiaries accepted whatever
project they were offered, as they were afraid to be deprived of this reinsertion opportunity.

The “1,000 MP’s” focus on rapid reinsertion limits the possible economic activities to only
those activities with the potential of providing a result within 3 months. The wishes of the
beneficiaries are further constrained by the list of viable economic activities provided by the
PNRRC on the basis of a study financed by UNDP and carried out in 2005 by Cabinet
d’Etudes pour le Développement et l’Expertise en Afrique (CEDEX), an organisation
contracted by the PNRRC. Informants refer to this list, but despite several attempts to get hold
of a copy it was never made available to the evaluation team, which could therefore not
evaluate the content and quality of this assessment.

However, the evaluators believe that a market analysis needs to be up to date and must take
into account local specificities related to the market, the quality of the soil, local competition,

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{13} Convention of the “1,000 MP,” p. 5
\end{footnote}
local skills etc. Mr. Daniel Kossomina Ouattara, National Coordinator at the PNRRC, confirmed this saying that on central level they had only made a general analysis of opportunities.

The sites visited show that in some cases the choice of economic activity reflects beneficiaries’ past knowledge and current capacities (ex hairdressers and tailors in Bouaké), while in other projects the beneficiaries start from scratch with no former experience of the activity chosen (ex chicken and pig farming in San Pedro). A rather considerable portion of the beneficiaries expressed that they were planning to change activity as soon as they had saved enough money.

Interviews with beneficiaries make it clear that a lot, maybe the majority, of beneficiaries are not doing what they really would like to do or what they picture themselves doing a few years from now. In Olienou, 25 km west of Bouaké, we found an example of a cattle breeding project for a group a 12 which after a short time had split and gone separate ways. The local ONUCI representative in Bouaké considered this project a failure. However, the evaluation team got reliable information that all beneficiaries had started their individual economic activities and had an income to live on. Our opinion is that if the original project gives the beneficiaries enough capital to start the activities of their choice, even though the original group is disrupted, the project should be considered to a success, not a failure.

The constraints on their choices, as discussed above, may be explanatory factors to the rapid change of activity. There is a need to explain and discuss advantages and disadvantages related to the activity of choice with beneficiaries and professionals. The discussion should also include the possibility of getting an adequate turnover. In Brobo, 25 km west of Bouaké the evaluators met with beneficiaries in two different projects, one selling cement and the other selling rice. There was a market for both products, however, the cement business had a slow turnover while the rice shop had fast turnover. Aspects like turnover and possible income need to be explained to beneficiaries.

**Recommendations:**

- The evaluators recommend that an assessment of each local context is conducted before the typology of micro projects is decided. Such local market analysis should be updated and take into account new trends and developments.
- The evaluation team notes the need to improve the dialogue with beneficiaries while in the process of selecting economic activity. It is essential to take time to discuss the beneficiaries’ real future plans and to take these plans into consideration when selecting the activity.

### 6.4.3 Group size and composition

The size of the groups was one of the project’s weaknesses most often mentioned by beneficiaries in informal conversations as well as during the workshop in Bouaké. They complained that the number of members of the group exceeded the possibility of income. In other groups it was evident that the size did not correspond to the workload. One example is a cybercafé in Yamoussoukro where only 1 person, in a group of 7 beneficiaries, actually worked. In several other projects the beneficiaries had organised themselves in shifts (ex car washing station in San Pedro, and chicken farming in a village outside San Pedro).
A certain level of cohesion and loyalty among group members is necessary. Sometimes the groups are composed of individuals who were trained together, belonged to the same fighting unit, or acquainted through the demobilising process. Others, however, consist of persons with no former relationship, who belong to different ethnic entities and even nationalities. Not surprisingly, some groups have split up because they lacked the required cohesion.

The evaluators note that the vast majority of the “1,000 Micro-projects” include many beneficiaries each. There are only about 20 micro projects with only one beneficiary and about 20 with two beneficiaries. Many of the suggested activities require more capital than the 420,000 FCFA per person mentioned above. Beneficiaries were therefore encouraged to join forces to establish certain projects. Working in groups may create an environment in which individuals learn to consider and heed different opinions, interests and values. Moreover, group projects may be easier to monitor than individual projects. However, beneficiaries should not be left with the impression that they must be part of a group to get a project.

Recommendations:
- The evaluators view the project’s aim not only to be providing people an income but also to give people something meaningful to do in their everyday life. We therefore recommend that no beneficiary be left idle, that group size be determined on the basis of the workload involved as well as the chances of a decent income.
- The evaluators recommend that the implementing partners as well as the local committees seek to unveil eventual conflicts at an early stage, and provide necessary assistance to mediate and solve the conflicts. This might be particularly needed in groups of mixed ethnicity or with both nationals and non-nationals.
- The evaluators have not compared results depending on group size but will in general recommend that individual projects and projects of smaller groups continue to be supported.

6.4.4 Selection of implementing partners
According to the “1,000 MP’s” quarterly report, 1 April to 30 June 2009, there are 22 implementing partners active in the project. These include a national governmental structure (the PNRRC), as well as national and international NGOs. The evaluators find that the “1,000 MP” has contributed to strengthening capacities of local NGOs by contracting with them and providing technical assistance.

In the initial phase of the project, a template for submitting projects was drafted and shared with all identified and potential partner NGOs. The “1,000 Micro-projects” provided assistance to prepare projects proposals. The local committees are responsible for the assessment, selection and prioritisation of proposals from potential implementing partners. However, the final decision is taken by the CAP.14 The evaluation team is not familiar with all the details of how the selection and prioritisation have been carried out in each location, but we do note that certain areas, like for example San Pedro and Séguela, have only one or two implementing partners, serving a rather wide variety of activities.

Recommendations:
- The general recommendation here is that each prospective implementing partner should be assessed not only according to its technical expertise, organisational capacity, financial situation, intimate knowledge of the area, but also its commitment

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14 Presentation of 1000 Micro Projects, Abidjan 29.09.09
to local social cohesion and peace. Furthermore, we recommend that the selection process is fully transparent and, as much as possible, gender sensitive.

6.4.5 Training
With its focus on rapid impact, the “1,000 MP” is based on a learning-by-doing philosophy, skipping the vocational training period usually seen in reintegration projects. The project is pragmatic enough to realize that the prospective beneficiaries’ initial motivation is income rather than training. However, the project does offer a course in civic education, simplified accounting and management of a small business, and HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention. Several participants at the workshop in Bouaké confessed that the beneficiaries were rather often not present during the training sessions. The data from the interviews with the beneficiaries show that some are satisfied with the level of training while others complained saying that the training received on how to run a micro project had not been good enough.

In several cases at least one of the beneficiaries had past experience in the selected economic activity, presumably with positive impact on the progression and quality of their work. Moreover, the implementing partners provide on the job training by professionals in the various activities. Generally, the beneficiaries seemed satisfied with this training.

Recommendations:
- The evaluators recommend that the project monitor the evolution of the beneficiaries’ training needs and attitudes toward training.

6.4.6 Reinsertion kit
There were a number of negative comments concerning the kits at the workshop that was organized in Bouaké (02.10.09): bad quality of some kits, kits that were not adapted to their intended use, kits that were incomplete, and long waiting between the sensitizing and the actual delivery of the kits. Some ex-combatants even refused to receive the kit that was given to them. Some sell the received kit and return to starting point but in some cases the beneficiaries use the capital from the sale to launch the economic activity of his or her choice (see also 6.4.2, second last paragraph). Nevertheless, many ex-combatants understood the emergency prevailing at the launching of the project.

Recommendations:
- The evaluation team recommends the inclusion of beneficiaries in the process of selection and transparent purchase of kits. Implementing partners should explain what kind of decisions should be made in order to use the amount available in a way that gives the maximum potential for success.

6.4.7 Monitoring and follow-up
On the basis of documents, observations and interviews the evaluators find that a large number of entities at several structural levels are involved in the monitoring and follow-up of micro projects.

1. a monitoring and evaluation team at the central level of ONUCI/UNDP is responsible for visiting the sites conducting evaluations at least ones during the three first months of the projects;
2. the local committees are responsible for a general follow-up of the micro projects in their area;
3. the implementing partners provide a technical follow-up and monitor each micro project they are in charge of;
4. local ONUCI/UNDP representatives conduct site visits and follow-up conversations with beneficiaries;
5. in Bouaké and Séguéla, which are the areas with the highest density of projects, a technical committee has been created in order to provide further technical assistance.

The reality in the field shows that there are additional monitoring structures other than these more formal levels of follow-up. An ONUCI informant states that some places the FAFN representatives want to be involved in the monitoring and follow-up, and other places we found that village chiefs are involved. Moreover, some implementing partners, like OIM in Guiglo and Séguéla, have in some cases contracted their implementing responsibility to another organisation and in these situations the OIM and their subcontractors carry out separate monitoring of activities. In other words, some micro projects receive follow-up from a vast number of different entities. The organisation of the monitoring responsibility does not appear to have created major problems so far, but the scattering of responsibility is likely to create an uncertainty among stakeholders about who is responsible for what. Furthermore, the numerous monitoring entities may make it difficult for the beneficiaries to know where to address their problems. It may also create a situation of contradictory advices and guidance.

Related to the quality of the follow-up, the general impression is that beneficiaries are satisfied. Many receive daily visits from their implementing partners and keep written track of these visits. However, the implementing partner in San Pedro explains that such a frequent monitoring of projects is not feasible in the rural areas. It is likely that this is also the case elsewhere. The implementing partner in San Pedro has attempted to get the village chiefs more involved in the daily follow-up, arguing that this is in line with Ivorian culture in which the village chief is highly involved in solving difficulties or conflicts among community members.

In some areas, the beneficiaries were reluctant to say anything about the quality of the monitoring. They were obviously very grateful for the project and therefore reluctant to criticize those who they saw as crucial in providing them with the project. Beneficiaries in projects which struggled to survive expressed a wish and a need for more assistance and a closer follow-up. Interviews with ONUCI/UNDP staff confirm that beneficiaries at times complain that they have not received the help they feel entitled to. These interviews further note that capacities and resources to perform the monitoring tasks vary from implementing partner to implementing partner. At the local committee level we find similar variations; some committees are highly engaged and involved while a few are more or less inactive with regards to their follow-up responsibilities.

According to interviews and statements at the workshop in Bouaké, insufficiency of funds and resources is the main reason why the committees and implementing partners sometimes fail to fulfil their monitoring obligations. This had been discussed in a seminar earlier this year and led to the decision of establishing the two technical committees in Bouaké and Séguéla. Members of these two committees receive funds to cover transportation, phone bills etc.

The duration of the follow-up was as well mentioned as one of the major problems faced. According to interviews, some projects disappear after the end of the initial 3 months because beneficiaries feel abandoned and give up. The possibility to extend the follow-up was discussed at the above mentioned seminar and the discussion resulted in the provision of 3
additional months of follow-up. The PNRRC was given the responsibility of the additional 3-6 months follow-up. As this is a recent change in the “1,000 MP”, the 3-6 months follow-up is not part of this evaluation. However, we would like to note that we find the additional 3 months of monitoring and follow-up invaluable in ensuring the project’s impact. If the PNRRC is not able to carry out a proper follow-up another possibility, backed by one of the groups in the workshop in Bouaké, is to give this responsibility to the implementing partners who already are familiar with the situation in each micro project.

Recommendations:

- Based on the analysis above the evaluation team recommends a restructuring of the monitoring responsibilities. The evaluators propose to organise the monitoring and evaluation in three structural levels:

  1. The joint monitoring and evaluation team (ONUCI/UNDP) should only be responsible for conducting evaluations. According to interviews with the two of the team members this is in reality what is currently taking place.

  2. The local committees should be in charge of the general monitoring of the micro projects as well as a monitoring of the implementing partners. The local OUNCI/UNDP representatives should act as members of the committee, and the site visits should be carried out jointly with other members. In the two locations where technical committees are in place, these should act in accordance with the local committees and should, in collaboration with implementing partners, provide technical assistance.

  3. The implementing partners should be responsible for the day to day follow-up of micro projects and provide the beneficiaries with the necessary technical advice.

7. Synergy and harmonisation of efforts

The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire was relatively short and the damage to the social fabric and the economy seems less serious than in countries at once poor and traumatised by a long lasting conflict. The Ouagadougou Political Agreement seems acceptable to the parties of the conflict and the whole national polity. The government has set up two structures (PNRRC and PSNC) to take care of the various aspects of the DDR process. The international community has a strong presence in Côte d’Ivoire, both multilateral and bilateral cooperation, both donor and technical assistance agencies. In short, Côte d’Ivoire has the potential needed to heal and get back to a normal situation.

However, the political scene may remain strained until the coming elections give the country a leadership with full legitimacy. This tension impacts nearly everything: relations between governmental structures, between the government and its international partners, within the international community, allocation of resources at all levels. A lack of trust (notably between part of the international community and the governmental structures in charge of the DDR process) resulted in a stalling of the process. These strained relations blocked the situation and the consequence was that very little was done in terms of reintegration. The urgency left little time for adequate planning; some of the usual steps for starting a project were therefore
skipped. As a result, general support for the project could not be secured, and the UN had to rely on its own limited financial resources.

7.1 National structures

PNDDR (Programme National de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion) was divided into structures in common accord between the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and the FAFN; PSCN (Programme National de Service Civique) and PNRRC (Programme National pour la Réinsertion et la Réhabilitation communautaire).

PSCN is primarily a structure for training, not necessarily for reintegration. Its objective within the present process of demobilisation and reintegration is that all those who have “touched arms”, the number of whom are approximately 40000, shall go through a civic education training. The World Bank pays for the training of the beneficiaries and their installation afterwards (interview with national coordinator 07.10.2009). However, the implementation is not organised by PSCN, but by GTZ.

In the particular setting of the “1,000 Micro-projects”, the PSCN issues a proof of enlistment of ex-combatants/ex-militias in this training program. This proof is used by the DDR section of ONUCI and the UNDP Post Crisis Unit during the process of identification of beneficiaries and verification of lists.15

The PNRRC is the government’s tool in the reintegration process. Among its responsibilities are:

- Do an analysis of opportunities for micro projects within a logical framework. This has to be general, with adaptation to the local situations when it is used in practical settings.
- Keeping and running the database in order to make it impossible to modify it or to handle the data in illegally.
- Issue the identification cards for those who are demobilised.16

The PNRRC is actively involved in the “1,000 MP”, through its presence in the CAP in Abidjan as well as in the local committees. Both PSCN and PNRRC are formally members of the Steering Committee of the “1,000 Micro-projects”.

In addition to these two agencies, there is yet another national structure called the “Cellule Micro-projects de la Présidence” which is also involved in the activities of the “1,000 MP”.

The evaluators recognise that there are political reasons to the creation of two separate structures with relatively similar tasks, however, we find it difficult to see the need for two governmental structures involved in the reinsertion activities. Most likely it would be easier to harmonise the efforts of actors responsible for the implementation of reinsertion/reintegration programmes if the two public structures had merged into one. Thus all agencies responsible for the implementation of major programs could relate to the same public structure and work according to a common framework.

15 Convention of the ”1,000 Micro-projects”, p. 7
16 Convention of the ”1,000 Micro-projects”, p. 7
7.2 International NGOs

We have not had the time and the possibility to look into the different approaches for reintegration currently being implemented in Côte d’Ivoire. We do not, for example, have sufficient information on their approaches and number of beneficiaries. However, we are aware that GTZ, CARE International, and Coopération Française are currently running projects targeting ex-combatants and youth at risks. Due to the lack of reliable information we may not comment on differences or whether these create difficulties or tensions. We would, however, underline the usefulness of a comparative evaluation in order to see whether it is possible to establish a framework that gives the maximum of synergy and a minimum of problems for the reinsertion process.

Some actors seem to think that instead of numerous programmes for reinsertion it would be more useful to finance work-intensive projects of various kinds, like rehabilitation of infrastructure which has suffered from the conflict or simply caused by lack of maintenance for a number of years. This will create a large number of meaningful jobs, particularly for young people. It is likely that this approach will contribute to reduce unrest and frustration among the youth. The experience shows that youth who do not have a hope for the future over time, is a potential source for armed conflict. Such work-intensive projects may also keep busy those who are waiting for reinsertion support promised them. Consequently, work-intensive projects are most surely a needed additional approach that should be implementing simultaneously with reinsertion and reintegration projects.

7.3 Donor agencies

Finally, we think that the main donor agencies like the EU and the World Bank, and also embassies, will be more at ease and be more confident to finance reinsertion and reintegration projects, if there is only one public structure to channel the activities. Furthermore, it is likely that a system that can guarantee a certain synergy between various approaches to the reinsertion and a common understanding of how the reinsertion activities could relate to the work intensive projects would make it easier for the donor agencies to use their resources in the most efficient manner.

As far as we can see, there are competent structures for reintegration and there are agencies which have funds available for both reintegration and long term programmes for boosting the economy. It looks like that at least some of the main conditions for lasting stability are present. However, it seems to be an urgent need to look into the reasons for the lack of trust between important actors in order to be able to focus on lasting solutions.

Recommendations

• In order to reduce expenditures and to improve the framework for reinsertion, the government should consider the merger of PNRRC and PSCN into one single governmental structure for reinsertion.
• We recommend the organisation of a comparative evaluation in order to see if it is possible to identify a formula that gives the maximum of synergy and a minimum of problems for the reinsertion process.
• We think that the organisation of work intensive projects will add a positive dimension towards the process normalisation in the country.
8. Conclusions

All in all, the evaluation team concludes that the implementation of the “1,000 Micro-projects” have proven both efficient and effective with regards to its global objective to contribute to reinforcement of peace and security in the Côte d’Ivoire through the provision of socioeconomic reintegration options to former combatants, ex-militias members and youth at risk. Let us recall its main characteristics: timeliness, swift implementation, taking into account the need for economically sustainable projects, awareness of and active promotion of synergies between the various actors involved. The “1,000 Micro-projects” were a response to a critical and urgent situation and hence somewhat hastily put in place, however, based on a trial-and-error philosophy several weaknesses have been corrected along the way. The implementation has, thus, been flexible and attentive to the realities in the field. However, as this evaluation has shown some weak points remain.

The evaluation particularly emphasizes the necessity to set up just selection criteria concerning the selection of beneficiaries as well as implementing partners. The process of choosing the economic activity of each micro project may improve through local assessments of current markets and viable activities in each location. We also underline the need to improve the dialogue with beneficiaries, revealing their real future plans, so as to establish durable business projects in line beneficiaries wishes and plans. The group size and group composition are also important factors to a successful implementation. Too big groups impacts on the project’s prospect to provide each beneficiary with a daily and meaningful activity, and limits the chances of providing each beneficiary with an adequate income. However, certain projects need a higher investment and due to the limited budget per beneficiary a relatively large number of beneficiaries are required. It is important to find the right balance between these two considerations. Monitoring and follow-up of the micro projects are another issue that needs to be further addressed. The evaluators acknowledge the recent development which ensures the beneficiaries an additional follow-up of three months provided by the PNRRC. The evaluation stresses that too many different actors and structural levels are involved in the follow-up of the micro projects, and that the current organisation of the monitoring and follow-up may lead to pulverisation of responsibility as well as confusion related to who is responsible for what.

The “1,000 MP” has tried to fit into the existent DDR structure and taken into account the national counterpart and national partners. The present report indicates that the approach used by ONUCI/PNUD to reintegrate the various groups entitled to a support for reintegration, to the best of our understanding, has proved to be a possible strategy. The shortcomings often due to the urgency situation have been identified and possible solutions have been recommended. There are reasons to believe that a number of beneficiaries will prefer to go this quicker way to reintegration rather than a more classic approach. This is a possible option, but the less training there is before the income generating activities starts, the longer should an intensive on the job training and the following monitoring last. A possible next wave of micro projects should also use some resources on monitoring the existing projects in order to contribute towards the sustainability of the projects.

As we have seen above there is a unanimous opinion about the value of this approach on all levels. The funds are handled by a structure that is well known. There is no evident reason that the main international donor agencies could not finance a new wave of micro projects based on a strategy that takes into account the experiences from the phase that has just ended. But it is certainly not the only possible profile for reintegration. There should be room for some kind
of variety related to approach of reintegration programmes, as such a variety could contribute to a higher percentage of success.

Beneficiaries and all other stakeholders expressed unanimously that the “1,000 Micro-projects” have impacted on the personal lives of the beneficiaries, their communities and on peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire. The “1,000 MP” appeared at the right time in order to calm down a situation threatening to explode, and has been effective in contributing to calming down the tense situation. However, the situation remains fragile, and with the upcoming election tensions may again rise to the surface. The approach of the “1,000 MP”, focusing on a rapid solution to an urgent situation, has gained results, but whether the approach is effective also with regards to long-term reintegation of ex-combatants and long-term peace and remains to be assessed. There are also a rather large number of demobilised ex-combatants as well as youth at risk with expectations of benefiting from the “1,000 MP” or similar initiatives, and it is clear that efforts need to expand. The evaluators believe the peace-building process in Côte d’Ivoire would benefit from a wide range of actors actively involved in the funding and the implementation of such programmes, and stress the necessity to harmonise efforts and ensure the maximum gain from the complementarities of each actor. We find that the “1,000 Micro-projects” have prepared the way for other reinsertion/reintegration programmes which had been hesitating to launch their activities. It is our belief that the Government and its international partners for the DDR process have the capacity of reaching a better cooperation, so that more substantial resources can be mobilised for the DDR, peace and recovery.

This evaluation of the “1,000 Micro-projects” has brought to light many important lessons both in the form of changes to be considered in future implementation of micro projects but also in the form of positive results already gained. The next two sections outline some of the main lessons and the recommendations made by the evaluation team.

9. Lessons learned

Based on the findings presented above the evaluation team notes the following major lessons:

Organisation and coordination
• The advantage of a participatory approach, like the one used in the “1,000 Micro-projects,” is increased ownership of the project by the different stakeholders. Local ownership is an important factor of success.

Impact
• The approach of the “1,000 MP”, focusing on a rapid solution to an urgent situation, has gained results and positively impacted on beneficiaries and communities, and has contributed to a more peaceful environment in Côte d’Ivoire.
• Involvement in economic activities, honestly earning their living, has had a positive impact on how ex-combatants are perceived by their communities. The “1,000 Micro-projects” have contributed to restoring their self-esteem, dignity and hope for the future.
• The “1,000 Micro-projects” have created important meeting points between beneficiaries and other groups (suppliers, customers, craftsmen etc.). Such encounters emphasize the interdependence of different groups, and consequently contribute to improve social cohesion and mutual acceptance.
• Contracting local NGOs and providing them with technical assistance has contributed to the strengthening of capacities of such NGOs.

Programme design and implementation
• A learning-by-doing approach ensures a high level of flexibility. Activities and assistance that may seem appropriate in the initial phase may turn out to be inappropriate during the implementation. A flexible design allows smooth changes whenever necessary.
• As the prospective beneficiaries’ initial motivation is income rather than training, it is essential to provide them with an immediate source of income. On the job training rather than vocational training prior to starting up their own businesses may therefore be preferable to adult ex-combatants.
• Establishing work groups has the benefit of creating an environment in which individuals learn to consider other people’s opinions, interests and values.
• As acknowledged by the “1,000 Micro-projects”, monitoring and follow-up needs to be provided for more than three months.

10. Recommendations

Based on the findings presented above the evaluation team makes the following recommendations:

Organisation
• As the tasks and responsibilities of the CAP and the local committee do not correspond, the evaluation team recommends the set up a local project committee also in Abidjan.
• The project management at the central level should continue to sensitize the committees about their role and responsibilities.

Gender approach
• The evaluators emphasize all UN agencies’ obligation to fulfil and act according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. This Resolution addresses the disproportionate impact of conflict and war on women, and calls for a particular protection of girls and women affected by war and the adoption of a gender perspective which includes consideration of women’s special needs during reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction (S/RES/1325 (2000), art. 8, a).
• The project should continue to sensitize actors about gender issues and draft a plan of action on how a gender approach may be mainstreamed at every stage of the implementation process. Mainstreaming gender will also need a close follow-up in the field.

Impact
• As unrest is still an element in the western part of the country the evaluators recommend the “1,000 MP” to assess the need and possibility to strengthen its presence in the area.
• As the implementation of the “1,000 MP” has proven effective as to calm down a tense conflict situation, we recommend that this lesson is shared with other Peace Keeping Forces. The possibility of employing a portion of the Peace Building Funds to implement similar initiatives should be discussed.
Implementation

Selection of beneficiaries
- The evaluation team encourages the “1,000 MP” to look into the possibilities of creating economical activities that may facilitate participation also of disabled persons.
- The evaluators recommend a drafting of more detailed selection criteria - specific to each target group - to guide those responsible of the identification and selection, as well as an unbiased monitoring of the process.

Choice of economic activity
- The evaluators recommend that an assessment of each local context is conducted before the typology of micro projects is decided. Such local market analysis should be updated and take into account new trends and developments.
- The evaluation team notes the need to improve the dialogue with beneficiaries while in the process of selecting economic activity. It is essential to take time to discuss the beneficiaries’ real future plans and to take these plans into consideration when selecting the activity.

Group size and composition
- The evaluators view the project’s aim not only to be providing people an income but also to give people something meaningful to do in their everyday life. We therefore recommend that no beneficiary be left idle, that group size be determined on the basis of the workload involved as well as the chances of a decent income.
- The evaluators recommend that the implementing partners as well as the local committees seek to unveil eventual conflicts at an early stage, and provide necessary assistance to mediate and solve the conflicts. This might be particularly needed in groups of mixed ethnicity or with both nationals and non-nationals.
- The evaluators have not compared results depending on group size but will in general recommend that individual projects and projects of smaller groups continue to be supported.

Selection of implementing partners
- The general recommendation here is that each prospective implementing partner should be assessed not only according to its technical expertise, organisational capacity, financial situation, intimate knowledge of the area, but also its commitment to local social cohesion and peace. Furthermore, we recommend that the selection process is fully transparent and, as much as possible, gender sensitive.

Training
- The evaluators recommend that the project monitor the evolution of the beneficiaries’ training needs and attitudes toward training.

Reinsertion kit
- The evaluation team recommends the inclusion of beneficiaries in the process of selection and purchase of kits. Implementing partners should explain what kind of decisions should be made in order to use the amount available in a way that gives the maximum potential for success.
Monitoring and follow-up

- Based on the analysis above the evaluation team recommends a restructuring of the monitoring responsibilities. The evaluators proposed to organise the monitoring and evaluation in three structural levels:

1. The joint monitoring and evaluation team (OUNCI/UNDP) should only be responsible for conducting evaluations. According to interviews with the two of the team members this is in reality what is currently taking place.

2. The local committees should be in charge of the general monitoring of the micro projects as well as a monitoring of the implementing partners. The local OUNCI/UNDP representatives should act as members of the committee, and the site visits should be carried out jointly with other members. In the two locations where technical committees are in place, these should act in accordance with the local committees and should, in collaboration with implementing partners, provide technical assistance.

3. The implementing partners should be responsible for the day to day follow-up of micro projects and provide the beneficiaries with the necessary technical advice.
11. Bibliography


The Convention of the “1,000 Micro-projects” signed by ONUCI and the Ivorian Government 8 September 2008


Appendixes

Appendix I

Evaluation du programme des 1000 microprojets pour la réintégration des ex-combattants et ex-miliciens en Côte-d’Ivoire
(17 août – 16 septembre 2009)

TERMES DE REFERENCE

1. Contexte

En juillet 2008 le Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) a approuvé un programme de 4 millions de $ pour le financement des microprojets dans le cadre de la réinsertion d'ex-combattants, d'ex-membres des groupes d'auto-défense et d'autres populations vulnérables en Côte d'Ivoire. Lancé à Bouaké en aout 2008, le programme, conjointement exécuté par l'ONUCI et le PNUD, a pour objectif de contribuer au renforcement de la paix et la sécurité en Côte d'Ivoire au moyen de solutions alternatives pour assurer la réinsertion socioéconomique des ex-combattants, des miliciens, des jeunes associés aux conflits armés et plus généralement les jeunes à risque. Plus spécifiquement cette assistance en matière de réinsertion contribuera à créer les conditions favorables pour une réintégration socio-économique pérenne des ex-combattants et ex-miliciens et contribuer à atteindre, entre autres, les objectifs spécifiques suivants : (i) Réduction de l’engagement des ex-combattants et d'ex-miliciens dans des activités illicites génératrices de revenus; (ii) réduction de l’usage des armes comme source de revenus; (iii) Réduction du chômage, de la pauvreté ; (iv) Réduction des conflits et de la criminalité intercommunautaires; (v) Promotion au sein des communautés de nouvelles opportunités de réinsertion professionnelles et la relance des activités socio-économique et le renforcement des capacités et des compétences des bénéficiaires ; (vi) Promotion de la cohésion sociale à travers la mise en œuvre de projets communautaires.

Depuis le lancement du programme, plus de 525 microprojets (dont 5 projets de réhabilitation communautaire) ont été lancés à travers 23 localités (Abidjan, Pedro San, Tabou, Lakota, Yamoussoukro, Issia, Guiglo, Bangolo, Daloa, Bouaké, Brobo, Séguéla, Bondoukou, Ferkessedougou, Korhogo, Odienné, Kani, Vavoua, Toulepleu, Bloléquin, Duékoué, Danané et Man), fournissant l'appui à plus de plus 3407 ex-combattants, ex-miliciens, femmes affectées par la crise, jeunes à risque et membres des communautés d’accueil. En même temps, avec l’assistance du PNUD, les programmes de réintégration à moyen et long terme ont été lancés et mis en place notamment par le Programme National de Réinsertion et Réintégration Communautaire (PNRRC) et, plus récemment, par le Programme de Service Civique Nationale (PSCN), avec l’appui du PNUD, de la Banque Mondiale et de la Commission de l’UE. La BM et l’UE, en collaboration avec le PSCN, interviennent à travers deux structures d’exécution, notamment Care Internationale et GTZ International Services.


L’une des contraintes à la réussite des 1000 MP reste la question de la coordination et la recherche de synergies avec les autres programmes de réinsertion financés par les bailleurs de fonds notamment l’UE, la BM, de la BAD. Cette coordination est d’autant plus importante que les fonds disponibles pour les 1000 MP restent modestes par rapport l’ampleur des besoins en réinsertion, et l’espoir suscité auprès de la population cible. D’où le besoin de travailler en synergie avec d’autres programmes et de rendre les effets de ces projets plus viables et plus profitables aux individus et aux communautés d’accueil, tout en poursuivant l’objectif sécuritaire et de stabilisation de l’environnement pré-électoral.

2. Objectifs de l’évaluation

Avec la participation des bénéficiaires, des communautés hôtes, des agences d’exécution et des structures de mise en œuvre, il s’agira d’évaluer :

- Les résultats atteints par le projet par rapport aux échéances et le plan d’action prévus;
- L'efficacité et l'efficience des procédures et mécanismes mis en place pour l’identification de projets, la priorisation et la mise en œuvre effective des projets;
- La stratégie proposée par le projet au regard de l’évolution du contexte politique et des nouvelles orientations en matière de DDR incluses dans le quatrième accord supplémentaire de l’APO;
- La pertinence et l’impact des microprojets dans la sécurité et la consolidation de la paix en Côte d'Ivoire;
- La prise en compte de l’approche genre dans la mise en œuvre des projets
- Les synergies et des complémentarités entre les 1,000 microprojets et le processus de DDR de manière plus générale et, en particulier, en ce qui concerne les projets réintégration à moyen et long termes en cours, en faveur des ex-combattants, des membres de milice et autres personnes associées;

Il s’agira aussi de :

- promouvoir une synergie et apprendre des expériences réussies en matière de réinsertion dans la région ;
- faire une étude comparative des approches et efficience en vue d’une meilleure harmonisation entre les différents programmes de réinsertion des ex-combattants, ex-miliciens et jeunes à risque actuellement mise en œuvre par les autres bailleurs de fonds (Banque Mondiale, Union Européenne, etc.) et le Gouvernement ivoirien à travers le PNRRC et le PSCN ;
- fournir des recommandations pour orienter le gouvernement, le Système des Nations Unies et les partenaires nationaux et internationaux à réorienter et ajuster plus efficacement les prochains projets et programmes de réinsertion et de réintégration.
3. Résultats Attendus

Le rapport d’évaluation (30 pages maximum + annexes) répondant aux objectifs spécifiques ci-haut définis et écrit en anglais sera préparé par le consultant. Il devra inclure :

- Un résumé exécutif en anglais et en français
- Une évaluation de la pertinence, de l’efficacité et de l’efficience attendues des 1000 microprojets et, si nécessaire, des recommandations sur la façon d’améliorer les procédures et les modalités de mise en œuvre, et rehausser le niveau d’exécution.
- Une série de recommandations quant à la mise en œuvre du reste des microprojets comme initialement conçu et quant aux conditions (exigences) et autres critères à privilégier dans le choix des microprojets à appuyer ultérieurement (éventuellement dans sa deuxième phase).
- Harmonisation des approches en matière de réinsertion par tous les partenaires et bailleurs de fonds impliqués dans la réinsertion.

4. Methodologie proposée

i. Revue documentaire (J 1)
ii. Consultations avec toutes les parties prenantes (« stakeholders)
iii. Visite sur le terrain
iv. Debriefing à l’ONUCI et au PNUD suite à la visite de terrain (J 15)
v. Rédaction du rapport d’évaluation et suivi éventuel des consultations (si nécessaire)
vi. Soumission du draft du rapport à l’ONUCI et au PNUD
vii. Commentaires sur le draft transmis au consultant
viii. Soumission de la version finale du draft par le consultant (J 30)

I.

5. Calendrier, programme et composition

Calendrier. L’évaluation se déroulera du 17 août au 16 septembre 2009, les deux premières semaines (du 17 au 31 Août) seront consacrées aux visites des microprojets et les deux semaines (du 1 au 16 Septembre) suivantes seront dédiées à la rédaction du rapport. L’équipe d’évaluation sera composée de 4 personnes avec à sa tête un chef de mission.


Logistique. Le PNUD et l’ONUCI fourniront l’appui logistique durant la mission afin de faciliter les déplacements et visites de terrain.

Appendix II

Atelier à Bouaké le 02.10.2009
Question 1 :
Quelle est la pertinence du projet par rapport :

a) à la consolidation de la paix au niveau local et national

**Groupe 1 :**
Niveau local
- Oubli du métier des armes
- Rapprochement des personnes d’horizon divers
- Diminution du banditisme et du braquage
- Occupation saine des ex-combattants

Niveau national
- Traitement équitable des ex-combattants du Nord et du Sud
- Apaisement des esprits
- Création de partenariat commercial

**Groupe 2 :**
Activités pour les bénéficiaires et les jeunes à risque
Sécurité pour éviter de circulation des armes
Retour à la vie civile

**Groupe 3 :**
Niveau local
- La baisse de l’insécurité à Bouaké
- La baisse des tensions sociales
- Le renforcement de la cohésion sociale
- Dialogue possible avec les ex-combattants
- Epanouissement individuel des acteurs (bénéficiaires)
- Rétablissement d’un équilibre social

Niveau national :
Réunification du pays
La libre circulation des biens et des personnes
Le regain de confiance entre le Nord et le Sud

**Groupe 4 :**
- Resocialisation des ex-combattants
- Baisse de la méfiance
- Espoir et dignité retrouvés

b) aux besoins des bénéficiaires

**Groupe 1 :**
- Les 1000 microprojets ont respecté les promesses faites aux bénéficiaires

Cependant des impertinences sont à relever :
- Le non respect du résultat du profilage fait par le PNRRC
- La non implication de certains bénéficiaires à l’achat des kits
- Le nombre élevé de personnes par kits groupés
- Le non respect des affinités dans les différents groupes
- La non prise en compte des bénéficiaires sur le plan social
- Création d’une activité transversale sans l’avis des bénéficiaires
- Délai de 3 mois de suivi ne tient pas compte du cycle de vie de certains projets
- Aucune lisibilité de certaines structures de mise en œuvre

**Groupe 2 :**
- Création d’activité
- Gérer des revenus
- Implication des bénéficiaires (conception du projet)

**Groupe 3 :**
- Se loger
- Se nourrir
- Se vêtir
- Scolarisation des enfants
- Se soigner
- Se marier

**Groupe 4 :**
- Un début de prise en charge en niveaux des ex combattants par eux-mêmes.
- Début de relance des activités économique

**Question 2 :**
Le projet contribue-t-il à la cohésion sociale, au rétablissement économique ?

**Groupe 1 :**
Oui

**Groupe 2 :**
- Valorisation de l’individu
- Travail en commun (cultures et religions diverse)
- Intégration dans le communauté d’accueil
- Projet communautaire

Rétablissement économique par le microprojet
- Apport financier par le tissu économique
- Relance des activités économiques
- Réduction de la pauvreté

**Groupe 4 :**
Cohésion sociale
- Stabilité au niveau social
- Baisse de la méfiance

Rétablissement économique
- Timide reprise des activités économiques

**Question 3 :**
Que peut faire le projet en direction des femmes (participation à tous les niveaux, bénéfice etc.)

**Groupe 2 :**
- Cellule pour le genre
- Femme dimension
  a. Mère
  b. Chef de foyer
- Opportunité pour tout métiers

**Groupe 3 :**
- Accroître les financements des projets de femmes
- Développer des activités de femmes (commerce et d’autres AGR)
- Formation et sensibilisation de genre

L’impact au niveau de femmes :
- Elles sont plus respectées
- Elles sont plus autonomes
- Elles sont moins l’objet de violence

**Groupe 4 :**
- Aide aux femmes pour la cohésion familiale
- Renforcement des capacités des AGR
- Renforcement de la sensibilisation sur la VIH/SIDA et enseignement alphabétisation
- Aides les veuves, les filler mères, et les déscolarisés
- Prise en compte des femmes resté sur place et devenu pauvre de fait de la guerre
- Reconstitution de capital initiale des femmes

**Question 4 :**
Quelles sont les forces et les faiblesses de la mise en oeuvre du projet ?

**Groupe 1 :**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Faiblesses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Ex-combattants sont situé sur son sort</td>
<td>Ex-combattants n’ont pas reçu leur badges de démobilisés</td>
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<td>Sélection</td>
<td>Tout le monde (ex-combattants) sans considération aucune peut être bénéficiaire</td>
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<td>Le non respect des affinités aux sein des groupes</td>
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<td>Sensibilisation</td>
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<td>Choix des localités de réinsertion</td>
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<td>Choix des localités limitées à 30 km de Bouaké</td>
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<td>Existence des populations vulnérables</td>
<td>Insuffisance de la prise en compte des populations civiles</td>
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<td>Profilage</td>
<td>Existence et adhésion des bénéficiaires</td>
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<td>Lourdeur administrative dans l’approbation des projets</td>
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<td>Phase de mise en œuvre</td>
<td>Existence des structures nationales de mise en œuvre</td>
<td>Durée de projet court</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation et constitution des groupes de bénéficiaires</td>
<td>Esprit de cohésion</td>
<td>Délai insuffisant pour la préparation de groupe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elaboration des projets</td>
<td>Implication réelle et effective du PNRRC</td>
<td>Changement brisque de contenu de projet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification des besoins</td>
<td>Visites effectives des sites</td>
<td>Les besoins ont été identifiés après l’élaboration des projets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation</td>
<td>Acquérir la connaissance relative aux différentes activités</td>
<td>Certains bénéficiaires n’ont pas suivi la formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La formation sur le terrain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation</td>
<td>Adhésion aux kits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suivi et encadrement</td>
<td>Compétence technique de structure de mise en œuvre</td>
<td>Délai de suivi insuffisant et moyens financier conséquent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Groupe 4 :**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Faiblesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Profilage et sensibilisation</td>
<td>Tient compte de l’activité précédente du bénéficiaire</td>
<td>Non disponibilité de kit demandé par certains bénéficiaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permet de faire une sélection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implique les bénéficiaires dans les choix de leur activité</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution des groupes</td>
<td>Cohésion au sein des groupes</td>
<td>Non prise en compte de la motivation des certains bénéficiaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entraide et création de liens entre les membres</td>
<td>Manque de confiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure de mise en œuvre</td>
<td>Implantation des structures dans les localités de réinsertion</td>
<td>Délai d’exécution court pour certaines activités</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connaissance du milieu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation</td>
<td>Initiation et renforcement des capacités</td>
<td>Bénéficiaires pas toujours disponibles pour la formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suivi</td>
<td>Suivi régulier des structures</td>
<td>Bénéficiaires occupé à plusieurs activités à la fois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disponibilité de certains bénéficiaires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mise en disposition des documents de suivi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 5 :**
Que faut-il faire pour créer un environnement favorable au projet?

**Groupe 1 :**
- La nécessité d’une bonne sensibilisation et l’implication de toutes les parties prenantes.
- La nécessité de respect du canevas d’intervention de la partie nationale
- La prise en compte réelle des conditions sociales des bénéficiaires
- La nécessité d’aller à la paix

**Groupe 2 :**
- Trouver d’autres financement pour la réinsertion des profils (filières)
- Accélérer de décaissement
- Clarifier les rôles des différents partenaires au projet (ONUCI, PNUD, PNRRC, structure de mise en œuvre)
- Renforcement de capacité aux méthodes de travail des bailleurs
- Revoir à la hausse l’appui institutionnelle
- Etablissement et respect d’un cahier de charge de mise en œuvre par le projet
- Renforcer la sensibilisation au profit des bénéficiaires
- Renforcement de la valeur de kit

**Groupe 3 :**
- Prendre en compte les projets de communauté accueil
- Etendre la sensibilisation à la communauté d’accueil
- Implication des décideurs politique pour la résolution des problèmes d’ordre administratifs
- Problème de douanement assurance et autres taxes de l’état pour les taxi moto

**Groupe 4 :**
- Pérennisation du projet : ajouter 3 mois, suivi d’effet financiers pour la structure
- Donne tout le financement en même temps
- Création d’une cellule d’écoute
Appendix III

Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS
NORWEGIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA SERVICES

Milfrid Tonheim
Senter for interkulturell kommunikasjon
Postboks 226
4001 STAVANGER

Vkt dato: 02.10.2009
Vkt ref. 22600/12/FRH
Dekes dato: 
Dekes ref:

TILRÅDING AV BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 15.09.2009. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

22600
Erstatning av "The 1000 Micro-projects Initiative for socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combatants and youths at risk in Côte d'Ivoire"  
Behandlingsansvarlig: Senter for interkulturell kommunikasjon, ned invitasjonens ene leder  
Daglig ansvarlig: Milfrid Tonheim

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet, og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger vil være regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsloven. Personvernombudet tilråder å presentere det gjennomføres.

Personvernombudets tilrådning forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemene, korrespondanse med ombudet, vedlagte prosjektvurdering - kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven-helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringssendtelen gis via et eget skjemefor på www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/forsk/avdeling/skjemefor/ 
Det skal også gis melding etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skriflig til ombudet.


Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 15.11.2009, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Veguig hilsen

Vigdis Namvedt Kvalheim
Gretthe Halvorsen

Kontaktperson: Gretthe Halvorsen tlf: 55 58 25 83
Vedlegg: Prosjektvurdering
Appendix IV

Micro-projects Overview

- 520 reinsertion projects for 2703 direct beneficiaries
- Total: 1099 FAFN Ex-combatants in reinsertion projects
- 759 Beneficiaries
- 235 Beneficiaries
- 6 Community-based projects for 780 direct beneficiaries
- 21 Structures/1709 Beneficiaries

Total: 803 Youth-at-risk 801 Ex-militia members in reinsertion projects