**Final version 3.0** 

# **UNDP South Sudan**

Review of Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative (RCPI)

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Abbreviatior	ns and Acronyms
AU	African Union
BMU	Business Management Unit of UNDP
CB	Capacity Building
CBTF	Capacity Building Trust Fund
CES	Central Equatoria State
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRMA	Crisis Risk Mapping Analysis
DFID	Department for International Development (UK International Aid)
DP	Development Planning
EES	Eastern Equatoria State
FMIS	Financial management Information System
GIZ	German Government International Technical Assistance
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HRM	
ICT	Human Resources Management Information Communications & Technology
IGAD	Inter-Government Authority on Development
JDT	Joint Donor Team
MDA	
MDG	Ministries, Departments and Agencies Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoLPSHRD	Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resources Development
NBG	Northern Bahr El Ghazal
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PA	Public Administration
PFM	Public Finance Management
PMS	Performance Management System
RCPI	Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative
RSS	Republic of South Sudan
SC	State Coordinator
SP	Strategic Partnership
SS	South Sudan
SSEPS	South Sudan Electronic Payroll System
SSRF	South Sudan Recovery Fund
ТА	Technical Assistance
UM	Urban Management
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
U-S	Under-Secretary
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WBG	Western Bahr El Ghazal
WES	Western Equatoria State

# **Executive Summary**

#### 1 Introduction

This is the Draft Final Report of an independent review of the UNDP South Sudan (SS) Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative (RCPI) undertaken, commissioned by UNDP and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and undertaken by a two-person team of external consultants.

The UNDP-managed South Sudan (SS) RCPI Phase I (RCPI 1) started in March 2010 with the support of the Government of Canada through CIDA. In addition to CIDA funding, the RCPI is also supported through the Strategic Partnership (SP) and the Global Fund. RCPI 1 builds upon similar initiatives in other sub-Saharan Africa countries where civil servants and United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) have provided urgently needed Technical Assistance (TA) in post conflict states. The programme began under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) worked through the Referendum on Separation (January 2011), and Independence (July 2011). Through this period of transition RCPI UNVs/specialists have worked towards two objectives of State-building:

- 1. Immediate 'gap filling' of essential Public Administration (PA) positions in order to resurrect and maintain embryonic government functions
- 2. Human, Organizational and Institutional capacity building of evolving State structures\_through training, facilitation and other contextually-contingent organizational development interventions including:
- One-to-one counterpart training and mentoring
- Structured classroom-based group training and workshops
- Organizational restructuring, development of systems and procedures; strategy and policy formulation
- Drafting of new and revised legislation.

#### 2 Objectives of the Review

The in-country fieldwork and stakeholder consultations for this review were undertaken in the period 14-29 June 2012. Two lines of enquiry, an assessment of the RCPI approach, and the impact of RCPI interventions framed the review.

- 1. Critique the RCPI approach and suggest measures to improve the design and implementation of RCPI 2 and other similar post-conflict initiatives
- 2. Assess the contribution of RCPI 1 to building organizational and institutional capacity at the State level, particularly in the areas of Development Planning (DP), Public Finance Management (PFM) and Urban Management (UM).

The findings, lessons and recommendations presented here are expected to improve implementation of RCPI 1, and inform the design of a potential successor RCPI 2 and other similar programmes for post-conflict environments.

#### 3 Approach and Research Methodology

Given the brevity of this assignment (10 days field work), four representative states were visited: CES, NBG, WBG and WES. However the findings and recommendations apply to the full programme. Conventional methodological processes were used.

- Consultations with partners / beneficiaries
- Documentary research
- Internal consultations.
- Inception Report to Presentation of Initial Findings.

The review began with an Inception Report and concluded with a presentation of preliminary findings to staff from UNDP and CIDA. This was in line with the iterative approach to the mission, testing and refining, findings and recommendations along four themes:

- *The validity of the rationale for the RCPI.* Reviewing the prevailing socio-economic and historical context at the time when RCPI was conceptualized (2009).
- The effectiveness of the RCPI approach to capacity building. Consideration of the operational features of the approach: speed of mobilization of UNVs, volume and quality of UNVs deployed, gender equity across the UNV cohorts<sup>1</sup>.
- *Perceived Impact*. Plausible and credible contribution of the RCPI UNVs, in particular to DP, PFM and UM.
- *Counterfactual*. What would have happened if RCPI had not been in place?

#### 4 Historical and Contextual Analysis: Critiquing the Rationale for RCPI

#### 4.1 Political History and the Post Conflict Development Context: Rationale for the RCPI Approach

The review examined the conditions that prevailed when the programme was formulated towards the end of the CPA in 2009. It ranges over the challenge which faced the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) at the onset of the peace, to build a functioning state: approximately 2 million people killed in the second war (and 0.5 million in the first); more than a generation living through a time when service to the nation largely meant participation in war or resistance; four million people in SS displaced internally and externally at least once (and often repeatedly) during the second war, and 600,000 had fled the country altogether as refugees<sup>2</sup>

A number of donor programmes had already been working in this post-CPA landscape. The evidence from these programmes confirmed a picture of immense needs, widespread and high expectations for a peace dividend, and very weak institutional capacity, particularly at the sub-national level. These circumstances pointed to the urgent need for external Technical Assistance (TA) to build Public Administration (PA). But the conditions on the ground were unfavorable for foreign TA: poor infrastructure for living and working, and concerns about internal insecurity and the capacity to provide medical support in the event of an emergency.

Typically, international TA from bilateral and multilateral ODA partners was characterized by brief inputs: 'in and out, as quickly as possible', usually less than a week in the field. UNDP's decision in 2009, to offer resident international specialists, i.e. TA co-located with local counterparts, working within government was radically different. It was grounded in the expressed needs of local partners, and filled a breach on the frontline of development. In taking this step UNDP drew on experience in other post conflict countries, (notably Mozambique, Rwanda and East Timor). Nonetheless in the South Sudan context, it was a bold response to a challenge of different scale and nature, compounded by geography and incipient, often unreported, internal and cross border conflict.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We touch on the question of value for money though this was not strictly in our brief.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan <u>http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml</u>

In our view UNDP's decision to establish the RCPI, and CIDA's endorsement of this approach, was justifiable and valid. It was a creative if ambitious move in the circumstances of 2009, a pioneering mechanism to fill gaps in PA and build deeper organizational and institutional capacity in the inchoate nation of South Sudan.

# 4.2 The Contents of the Approach & Core Functional Analysis

The review found four clear, credible policy and analytical threads<sup>3</sup> leading to the formulation of RCPI.



#### **Figure 1: Four Policy and Analytical Threads**

### 5 Data Analysis: Quantitative data

#### 5.1 Recruitment, Deployment and Early Departures

In its conceptualization the programme was envisaged to place *"up to 154 qualified UNVs in key public sector institutions"*<sup>4</sup>. In the event the programme placed 125 UNVs over the review period. These figures and proportions give an indication of the profile of the programme:

• A peak of 93 serving UNVs in country <sup>5</sup> was attained in May 2012 26 months after the start of the programme.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For further detailed description (and costing) the government's functional priorities for institutional development see GoSS' *Government Priority Core Functions Rapid Capacity Development Plan May 2011.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> RCPI Quarter 3 Progress Report, July-September 2010. The target figure is rounded to150 in subsequent RCPI documents.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> These figures are based on information in documents provided by UNDP UNV Office

- 33 UNVs departed prematurely.
- Only 10% of the UNVs are women, despite the initial objective of gender parity.
- No UNVs came through the TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) modality, which was meant to draw up to 15 specialists from the Diaspora in Canada back to South Sudan.
- Unsurprisingly, Central Equatoria (which includes deployment in national ministries) has the most UNVs and Unity State the least<sup>6</sup>.
- Despite the considerable variations in the living conditions of UNVs across states (say WES vs. NGB &WBG, the former being relatively better than the latter two) deployment per state is fairly even.
- The bulk of these UNVs were at the State level, with the majority under the Democratic Governance Support to the States project (PFM, Revenue Authorities, Development Planning, Public Sector Specialists, Statistics and Urban Management).
- An estimated 5% of the personnel were deployed at the national level with key central<sup>7</sup> government ministries

#### 5.2 Per Capita Costs

The annual cost of the RCPI programme is circa \$11 million. 125 UNVs in total were deployed over the review period. The most placed in any particular month were 17, in August 2010, six months after the start of the programme. 33 RCPI UNVs left before the formal end of their contract term. The maximum on the ground at any one time were 93. It is difficult to arrive at a definitive (or even an averaged) figure for per capita unit costs when the deployment numbers are so dynamic.

- 1. Using the deployment the deployment figure of 125 UNV (the actual total deployed not taking into account premature departures) the per capita cost is \$88,000 p.a.
- 2. Using the deployment figure as 93, the peak around which the numbers have plateaued, the per capita TA cost is approximately \$120,000.

Looking to the future, with better recruitment, selection, deployment and retention (owing to the implementation of recommendations in this report) it should be possible to stabilize numbers on the ground at between 110 - 120 UNVs. The per capita costs would then be \$90,000 to \$100,000.

#### 6 Qualitative Data Analysis: Findings and Recommendations from Field Research

This quantitative data presented above was complemented by the qualitative research into a range of areas of sub-optimal performance in RCPI that emerged out of consultations with internal and external stakeholders. These issues are explored in Section 6 of the Report. The main findings and recommendations are:

#### Recruitment, Internal Bureaucracy and Attrition

1. UNDP needs to re-engineer the system by which it recruits UNVs generally and in particular for Rapid Response facilities such as RCPI. Among other reforms, it needs to advertise UNV vacancies dynamically on the Internet, on the regular UNDP employment opportunities website or via a dedicated UNV website. There are compelling reasons for this: it is consistent with a Rapid Response facility; it will allow for better self-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A number of UNVs were moved from Unity State during the period under review due to insecurity related to the on-going, undeclared and often unreported war between the north and South Sudan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Placements have been made in: The Office of the President, Ministry of Health, Police HQs, MoFEP, Peace & Reconciliation Commission, and in the Human Rights Commission.

selection by potential candidates to reduce the subsequent transaction costs of selection; it will be using a medium contingent with the times and the professional habits of the age group that make up the bulk of the UNVs (30-50)

- 2. RCPI needs to be seen as parallel UNV fast stream by UNDP South Sudan (running alongside general UNV recruitment) and the UNV Programme Office should be strengthened with additional administrative support
- 3. We recommend that the UNV Programme Office seeks advice from UNV HQ on ways of improving the understanding and recording of causes of early departures and that this issue be considered transparently in the next iteration of the performance management system of RCPI 2

#### Demographic Profile of UNVs: Gender Imbalance and Preponderance of UNVs from 'the South'

- 4. The issue of finalizing a MoU with UNMIS to cover medical care for all RCPI volunteers should be resolved prior to the mobilization of RCPI 2. Among other implications, it should be pointed out to UN HQ that not having this provision in place is instrumental in constraining recruitment of women TA.
- 5. Women UNVs should be preferentially posted to States where the prevailing living conditions are relatively safer.
- 6. UNDP should advertise in media that reaches the professional communities in the geographical areas from which the majority of successfully deployed UNVs come i.e. from Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia.

# Technical Oversight and Management: The organization of the RCPI portfolio; Performance Management System; State level Coordination and Equipment Grant

- 7. A more even distribution of projects across the thematic policy areas within the UNDP Office in Juba to enable improved technical and management oversight. This reorganization should be aligned with the conceptual framework in the new UNDP Country Policy, the Government's National Development Plan and themed common threads from State Development Plans.
- 8. RCPI 2 should have a tighter schedule of monitoring field visits.. A visit to a state should be of a week's duration, and each state should be visited once every 4 months<sup>8</sup>.
- 9. That in the budget for RCPI 2, an allocation of 1%-1.5% of the unit costs (say \$1000 to \$1,800) is attached to each UNV placement to cover the purchase of project related equipment (e.g. office printer, digital camera, copier). The decision on the use of these funds would be taken by consensus, involving three parties: the UNV in post, the appropriate government supervising officer and the UNDP project manager covering that deployment.
- 10. There is increasing policy interest in the issue of the potential contribution of Diaspora to their country of origin<sup>9</sup>, and we suggest that this issue is examined more rigorously by UNDP and the UNV HQ if it is to feature in RCPI 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> There is of course no assurance that this would mean each specialist would be seen every four months, since some UNVs are likely to be away on 'R & R' (Rest and Recreation). But it would ensure regular contact with the project client and relevant stakeholders.

- 11. That the inclusion of national UNVs as an integral component of the RCPI is reviewed fundamentally before inclusion in RCPI 2
- 12. We recommend that the items on the 'Checklist of Preconditions for Deployment' are taken as essential and non-negotiable to the deployment of RCPI UNVs, and that this list is presented as an integral element of the RCPI 2 to potential donors.

I Induction	IV Office Infrastructure		
<ol> <li>Political Economy of South Sudan</li> <li>Outline of National Development Plan and Govt. priorities</li> <li>UNDP CPAP</li> <li>Emergency &amp; security procedures</li> <li>Chain of Command</li> <li>Medical &amp; Health Briefing – Do's and Don'ts</li> <li>Cultural norms and context</li> <li>Basic language training &amp; option of \$600 for further language training, ideally early in the posting</li> <li>Introduction to the professional role likely to be played by incoming TA</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Adequate office space, with air conditioning, with regular supply of power.</li> <li>Provision for a generator if no external power available</li> <li>Office equipment: desk, laptop, printer, photocopier (with spares &amp; supplies)</li> <li>Internet</li> </ol>		
II Policy & Organizational Background Documents	V Living Quarters		
<ol> <li>National Development Plan</li> <li>State Development Plan</li> <li>Departmental Strategy / Plan</li> <li>Organizational organogram</li> <li>Working rules and conditions of relevant MDA</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Private room with a secure front door, window, and private flush toilet</li> <li>Basic Utilities: Running water &amp; regular supply of electricity</li> <li>Room furnished with Bed and side table, mattress, pillows, mosquito net, writing table, 2 chairs, wardrobe &amp; mirror, fridge, fan and/or a/c.</li> <li>Access to equipped common kitchen</li> <li>Internet connectivity</li> <li>Secure compound with 24/7 security</li> </ol>		
III Management Arrangements	VI Medical		
1. UNDP structure			

#### Table 1: Checklist of Preconditions for Deployment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Among other research, the ongoing Ramphal Commissions on Migration and Development explore this issue. In the UK, the government's Department for International Development (DFID) has joined with Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) to support the Diaspora volunteering Alliance (<u>www.diasporavolunteeringalliance.org</u>).

2.	Mentoring and monitoring visits for 1 week every 4 months	1.	MoU with local UNMIS Medical Clinic
3.	Clarity and consistency over 'working advances <sup>10</sup> ', swiftly applied.		
4.	Publish Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each state monthly		
5.	Clarity and consistency over R & R arrangements		

#### 7 Findings: Assessment of Impact in Focal Areas

There is unequivocal, across the board endorsement of the RCPI programme by government. This extends from the national to the state level: from the Office of the President to State Ministers, senior public servants and counterparts. This view is based on the fundamental strength of the programme: that RCPI UNVs are resident TA, located on government premises, subject to the conditions and constraints within which government operates, at hand to address technical problems and emerging policy issues, influencing public sector reform in large and small ways through formalized capacity building and day to day conduct.

Stakeholders identified 6 key catalytic and developmental roles performed by RCPI UNVs

- Gap filling: Performing / demonstrating regular & essential PA tasks
- Capacity Building: mentoring & training; developing systems, policies & laws
- Policy & operational linkages across State MDAs through UNV peer group
- Troubleshooting, resolving problems with other donor supported projects
- Scoping out and laying the foundations for other (donor) projects
- RCPI provides horizontal & vertical linkages: with other states & national Government via the larger peer group & UNDP Juba

Beyond this positive overview of the contribution of RCPI we note:

- 1. Effectiveness despite additional demands. RCPI UNVs worked through an exceptionally fluid and historic time in South Sudan's evolution into nationhood: from the Referendum to Independence, through changing priorities of government / of a Governor, often serving under changing ministers and supervisors. This period of transition has been marked by additional responsibilities and unforeseen demands related to official ceremonies. Despite these challenges RCPI has delivered impressive results.
- 2. Alignment with government and absence of external policy noise. There is a prevalent sense within government that RCPI UNVs work with and in government, substantively and qualitatively distinct from other ODA bilateral TA. The RCPI programme is anchored in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and technical support is clearly aligned with government priorities. State governments acknowledge and commend this fit.

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$  Funds paid by UNDP towards project running costs, such as strategic planning or training workshops

- 3. **Deeper, longer formal training.** Several state government officers ministers and senior civil servants spoke of workshop fatigue. There was a pervasive sense of frustration and disappointment with short workshops sponsored donor / consultant, and being presented as 'capacity building' exercises. The plea was for longer, more structured training of a minimum of three months, and up to a year. UNDP RCPI UNVs were seen as well placed to deliver this form of training and capacity building. The implication is that this should be developed into an integral feature of the RCPI programme.
- 4. Counter factual. When respondents in Government were asked how they would have fared without RCPI, the general response was that the scenario was inconceivable, especially at the State. Myriad initiatives and improvements in State Governments are credited with benefitting directly or indirectly from the presence of RCPI specialists. Even projects which clearly belong to other donors, such as the electronic financial management system being rolled out by consultants working for USAID, or the Electronic Payroll System Pension implemented by contractors engaged by CBTF, have apparently been assisted by RCPI personnel. A typical comment was "When we hit a problem, they are here, with us. They help us solve the problem"

#### **Impact Areas**

We asked government stakeholders to specify areas of state building and governance where RCPI specialists are deemed to have made significant contributions. These responses are presented below:

#### 1. Public Finance Management

- State annual work-plans and budgets completed and approved by State assemblies
- Regular and timely State expenditure reports prepared
- Internal Audit Units established
- Catalytic role in the implementation of FMIS and the regular monthly preparation of financial expenditure reports
- Significant progress towards more effective budget management /execution, reducing opportunities for wastage
- National Ministry of Finance has witnessed significant improvement in the timeliness and regularity of the monthly submission of expenditure reports

#### 2. Revenue Authorities

- Seminal role in the establishment of State Revenue Authorities and supporting legislation
- Revenue generation strategies developed
- Revenue oversight systems being established and strengthened: reduction in cases of cash mismanagement by Tax Officials since payments made through the bank and records are being captured in the system.
- Taxpayers education and sensitization improved
- RCPI has had a great impact on increasing non-oil based local revenue collections. E.g. the State revenue collection has increased by an average of 138 % in NBG by 360% in WES; and by 75% in CES

#### 3. Public Sector Reform and Management

- State staff screened and payroll cleaned with the ongoing assistance of on the ground UNVs complementing the work of CBTF
- State employee databases established
- Ministry and departmental structure charts, Civil Service Code of Conduct, and State Training Policies developed
- JDs defined and training in basic admin skills

#### 4. Statistics and Development Planning

- Extensive involvement of States in the drafting of the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2011-2013
- State Medium-Term Strategic Plans developed
- Increased use of socio-economic statistics in planning and target setting across MDAs because of training of statisticians / statistics contact points in ministries

#### 5. Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Communications

- State Government network connectivity improved
- State websites established
- Enhanced State personnel capacity in use of ICT
- ICT training centres established

#### 6. Urban Management

- State urban management plans and policies developed
- Urban planning and management regulatory and procedural framework improved
- New residential plots surveyed and demarcated for returnees and local residents, over 10,000 plots demarcated in WBeG
- Enhanced State personnel capacity in urban planning and management

#### 7. Rule of Law and Access to Justice

- Transformation of Armed Forces to Police Service all the State Police Commissioners visited spoke of the critical and invaluable role of UNVs in affecting this change
- Development of Strategic Plans, policies, rules and regulations for Police Service, including Code of Conduct
- Two key areas in A2J: training of Traditional Authorities and awareness raising & capacity development work with CBOs.

#### 8 Implementation Challenges

#### Lessons Learnt

Though the impact of RCPI has been remarkably well received the implementation and gains have not been without challenge. The main findings in this respect were.

- 1. *Poor Work Environment*, notably the lack of office space and supporting infrastructure, in particular power and Internet connectivity.
- 2. *Insufficient technical Supervision of RCPI UNVs*, relatively weak government technical supervision of RCPI UNVs compounded by infrequent visits by UNDP Juba.
- 3. *Weak Counterparts*. Many of the state government counterparts are over the retirement age and/or have limited academic and technical qualifications.
- 4. *Frequent changes within government ranks & political control over expenditure*. Public Administration is politicized and there are frequent movements of Ministers, transfers of technical staff and restructuring of state ministries. Fiscal discipline remains a major challenge in the States, as most of the expenditure is done without disregard of the approved budget.
- 5. *The vicious circle of a weak education base*. Weak existing capacity means that the base on which to develop capacity building initiatives is poor.
- 6. *Gender imbalance in capacity building*. Two related features characterize the public service women feature badly on both counts: Poor literacy<sup>11</sup> rates among women, inhibiting their potential to enter the public service; and hence a marked differential in the employment rates and seniority positions between men and women.
- 7. **The Ambiguous Role of the Public Sector in a post conflict context**. The civil service is not just about delivering development and services but also seen as a post-Independence provider of protected employment.
- 8. *Insecurity.* Continuing intra-state and North- South conflict pose risks to the project and constrain the implementation of project activities
- 9. *Poor donor coordination and aid harmonization*. A recurring theme is the poor coordination and harmonization of ODA, especially at the State level.
- 10. **Uneven institutional development**. One of the major impediments to capacity building is the lack of a coherent framework and plan for institutional development for the country. There are weak sectoral linkages between the 'centre' and the states, and across states, which mean that developments are often not apace.

#### Macro level design issues for RCPI 2

National and state government stakeholders are unanimous in their plea for further extended RCPI support. When we asked respondents to look beyond RCPI 1 and identify potential areas of future support, government officials suggested two lines of growth:

- Specialization within technical areas, especially in the areas of Accountability, PFM and Urban Management
- Piloting support at County level to consolidate government policy on decentralization, in particular by embedding accountability and PFM systems to cover the County and Payam levels

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> A commonly accepted definition of adult literacy is the ability to read and write at the age of 15 or over.

Both these programming directions are consistent with the development trajectory of South Sudan. There are two other related design issues that should also be taken into account in the RCPI 2 design process:

- There is a need to consider mechanisms within RCPI 2, and ideally within Government, that ensure better inter-state learning so that the development of policies by RCPI specialists (or indeed by any other TA) is coherent and standardized across States, and that external programme such as the RCPI do not inadvertently leave behind problems of inconsistent policy and legislative frameworks.
- Technically framed capacity building initiatives led by TA need to be located within broader government / state institutional development plans.

# **Main Report**

# **1** Introduction: Description of Intervention

This is the Draft Final Report of an independent review of the UNDP South Sudan Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative (RCPI) undertaken by a two-person team of external consultants. The review was commissioned by UNDP and CIDA to seek an independent, external assessment of the RCPI. The in-country fieldwork and stakeholder consultations for this review were undertaken in the period 14-29 June 2012.

The UNDP-managed South Sudan (SS) RCPI Phase I (RCPI 1) started in March 2010 with the support of the Government of Canada through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In addition to CIDA funding, the RCPI is also supported through the Strategic Partnership (SP) and the Global Fund.

RCPI 1 builds upon similar initiatives in other sub-Saharan Africa countries where civil servants and United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) have provided urgently needed Technical Assistance (TA) in post conflict states.

In the context of South Sudan RCPI 1 has covered a particularly turbulent and fluid period of history with broad and urgent demands on Public Administration as the country transited from a fragile peace under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), to a Referendum on Separation (January 2011), and Independence (July 2011). Through this period of national gestation, though negotiation, uncertainty and celebration, UNVs have been required to fulfill a role combining two objectives of State-building:

- 1. Immediate 'gap filling' of essential Public Administration positions in order to resurrect and maintain embryonic government functions.
- 2. Deeper organizational and sustainable institutional capacity building of evolving State structures, through training, facilitation and other contextually-contingent organizational development interventions such as:
  - One-to-one counterpart training and mentoring
  - Structured classroom-based group training and workshops
  - Organizational restructuring, development of systems and procedures; strategy and policy formulation
  - Drafting of new and revised legislation.

# 2 Terms of Reference and Review Objectives

The scope and objectives of the review changed subtly between in the lead up to the mission, becoming sharper and narrower; more strategic and forward looking in in focus. A three person team was reduced to two persons, and field visits were intensified from 3 to 4 states to be covered within 10 days in order to get a better sense of the national impact of the programme and to draw out conclusions based on a broader base of evidence. This was in line with the intent that the *"While only selected states will be visited during the field work, the findings and recommendations of the review will apply to all the ten states of South Sudan."* <sup>12</sup>

The final Terms of Reference (ToR) specified two objectives:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> ToR of External Review of Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative (RCPI) May 2012

# 1. Critique the RCPI approach and suggest measures to improve the design and implementation of RCPI 2 and other similar post-conflict initiatives

The review is expected to document lessons from RCPI 1 as a capacity building mechanism to inform the design and implementation of similar initiatives in South Sudan and other similar *(sic)* post-conflict environments. Besides informing the imminent design of RCPI 2, the review findings are expected to influence the conceptualization of a similar personnel-placement African Union (AU) capacity building initiative currently being considered. (The design of the AU initiative will also draw on the experience of the IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in Southern Sudan<sup>13</sup>).

# 2. Assess the contribution of RCPI 1 to building organizational and institutional capacity at the State level, particularly in the areas of Development Planning, Public Finance Management (PFM) and Urban Management.

The review is expected to focus particularly on the impact of RCPI 1 at the State level, assessing the contribution, or lack of, to capacity building in three areas. The emphasis on technical areas of Development Planning, Public Financial Management and Urban Management is logical. It is where government needs and demands have converged with the majority of UNV resources at the sub-national level.

These two objectives point to two lines of enquiry, the first focusing on an assessment of the RCPI *approach*, and the second on the *impact* of RCPI interventions. The first question can be addressed with more confidence than the second. It requires a critique of the historical justification and rationale for engagement in SS beginning in 2010, and the corollary question of the effectiveness of the business processes within UNDP required to implement a 'Rapid Capacity Placement initiative in a post-conflict, 'post-colonial' milieu.

The second strand to this review, a considered assessment of the impact of RCPI is more contentious. RCPI interventions are located in an 'open system' (see Diagram 2 below) with a range of variables and factors contributing to human resource development, organizational development of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and institutional capacity building in government. In this context it is unreasonable for a single modality or agency to lay exclusive claim to capacity building. But this is not to say that it is impossible to ascertain plausible attribution to capacity building from a particular source. We look next at the approach taken to address these ToR.

- Food Security and environmental protection
- Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and,
- Economic cooperation and integration

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the current member states are: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The IGAD mission is to assist and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation in the following areas:

The IGAD initiative has supported the GoSS / RSS by placing nearly 200 civil servants from IGAD Member States on secondment in SS government structures to mentor and coach the Southern Sudanese civil servants. Each placement is for an initial period of two years. The seconded civil servants are "twinned" with Southern Sudanese Civil Servants to ensure the direct transfer of skills and on-the-job training. The overall objective of the IGAD programme is the same as that of RCPI: rapid capacity enhancement support to strengthen the institutional capacity of GoSS institutions to deliver services.

#### Figure 2: Locating the RCPI within UN SS Policy Frameworks & Broader Capacity Building Context

UN Development Assistance Framework for SS (UNDAF)

UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2012

NB: These thematic results areas are also covered by ODA from other donors besides UNDP

Thematic Focus Capacity Building Support Modalities	Poverty Reduction & MDGs.	Democratic Governance	Crisis Prevention and Recovery	Funding Sources
Conventional UNDP approach through projects and using fully professionalized TA RCPI using UNVs	1. Global Fund Projects to promote the achievement of	1. Support to States Programme (incl. support to PFM & State Revenue Authorities)2.Local	<ol> <li>Access to Justice</li> <li>Support to Police &amp; Prisons Services</li> <li>Community Security &amp; Arms</li> </ol>	UN Funds Strategic Partnership Global Fund Other agreements with bilaterals CIDA (largest single funder) Strategic Partnership Global Fund
Other CB in these thematic areas, notably by MDTF,CBTF and bilateral aid programmes (USAID, DFID, GIZ), through commissioned projects using private consultants & TA	MDGs	Government Recovery Project	control	ODA from the respective agencies

Capacity-building Outputs and State-functioning & State-building Outcomes

Not attributable solely to any one modality or funding source

# 3 Approach and Research Methodology

Conventional methodological processes were used in this review, though given the brevity of this assignment, - two weeks with less than 10 days for State visits - the approach was necessarily short, sharp and strategic.

1. Consultations with partners / beneficiaries: Interviews and group discussions were undertaken with government stakeholders concerned with Public Finance Management, Development Planning, Urban Management, Rule of Law, Law Enforcement, Local Government and ICT.

These meetings were tightly sequenced and began with a meeting with the senior politician most closely involved with the RCPI programme, usually the State Minister of Finance<sup>14</sup> followed by meetings with other relevant Ministers and Commissioners: The Minister for Physical Infrastructure & Urban Management; Commissioner for the State Revenue Authority and State Commissioner of Police.

The discussions with groups of senior public servants of particular technical areas were held in the germane State Minister's or Commissioner's office, ensuring that the views expressed were strategic and formally substantiated, and reflected the validity and contribution of the RCPI programme as whole.

These discussions were complemented with private interviews with supervisors and counterparts of individual UNVs to obtain a more nuanced and anecdotal picture of the contribution of individual UNVs.

- 2. Documentary research. We drew on internal UNDP documents on the RCPI and UNDP's approach to capacity building internationally and in South Sudan; reports on other capacity building programmes in SS such as the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF); and external public policy and academic literature on development interventions in post-conflict countries.
- **3.** Internal consultations. Interviews and group meetings were held with key UNDP staff and group discussions / workshops with UNVs in all the states visited.

Further, data on deployment and related issues of recruitment and mobilization was sought from the UNV Office and UNDP's Business Management Unit (BMU) in the course of the consultancy. Both units provided valuable material in this respect.

4. **Inception Report to Presentation of Initial Findings.** The review began with the submission of an Inception Report outlining the research approach and scope of enquiry. This was presented to UNDP within 5 days of the start of the review, inviting a constructive critique.

At the end of the fieldwork, principal findings and emerging recommendations of the review were presented to a workshop, which among other participants included senior staff from UNDP and CIDA. Observations made at this event were taken into account in drafting the recommendations contained in this report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The exception was Western Equatoria State where we began with a meeting with the Deputy Governor

The approach throughout was iterative, with a view to testing and validating our assumptions, emergent findings and potential recommendations as we progressed through the review.

Field visits covered four states: Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria State. During these visits, and also in meetings at the national level, three lenses framed our enquiry:

- *The validity of the rationale for the RCPI.* This entailed reviewing the prevailing socio-economic and historical context at the time when RCPI was conceptualized (2009).
- **The effectiveness of the RCPI approach to capacity building.** Consideration of the operational features of the approach, bearing in mind the main design principles promised by approach: speed of mobilization of UNVs, volume and quality of UNVs deployed, gender equity across the UNV cohorts, and assessed broadly and comparatively, the value for money of this approach to state building and capacity building.
- **Perceived Impact**. Plausible and credible contribution of the RCPI UNVs to the suggested results areas of PFM, Development Planning and Urban Management.

# Table 2: Lines of Enquiry

Programming Rationale for the RCPI	Effectiveness of the Approach	Perceived Impact of RCPI UNVs
approach		
<ul> <li>fragility support the programming logic that South Sudan needed a Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative?</li> <li>Did the development context at that time justify development assistance focused in the</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Did RCPI really mobilize personnel swiftly?</li> <li>If not what were the issues in terms of recruitment? Where were the bottlenecks?</li> <li>How could the constraints and challenges be better addressed?</li> <li>What was the monthly rate of mobilization?</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Are there concrete examples of improvements in PFM, Development Planning &amp; Urban Management in the States in which RCPI personnel were placed?</li> <li>Do the government stakeholders ascribe these gains to UNDP-UNV assistance?</li> </ul>
Was it appropriate to focus on the three thematic areas of Democratic Governance &	<ul> <li>Were the UNVs of the quality expected?</li> <li>Did RCPI achieve gender equality within its numbers? If not, why not?</li> <li>What performance management and organizational learning systems were used to</li> </ul>	
What was the policy and analytical basis for this decision? Was this rationale sound with reference to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Change (2008), which stress the importance of Government ownership in development processes?	<ul> <li>ensure that the performance of UNVs was monitored and ineffectual / dysfunctional placements removed?</li> <li>What HRD tools were designed to monitor and stimulate UNVs to move from a gap filling to a capacity development role?</li> </ul>	
How and why did the programming focus evolve to the current RCPI profile with a preponderance of projects in PFM?		
How has this policy concentration been perceived by Government partners, especially at the sub-national level? What have been the plausible gains (even if not directly attributable)?		

*Counter-factual:* What would have occurred if RCPI UNVs had not been in place?

# 4 Historical and Contextual Analysis: Critiquing the Rationale for RCPI

#### 4.1 Political Histories and the Post Conflict Development Context: Rationale for the RCPI Approach

The RCPI straddles a period of historic change in SS. The programme was formulated towards the end of the CPA in 2009, launched in March 2010, reaching its numerical peak in 2011, the year in which the Referendum was conducted and Independence<sup>15</sup> achieved on 9 July 2011.

Political freedom came after two civil wars, the most recent of which was the Second Sudanese Civil War from 1983 to 2005 between the central Sudanese government ('the North', now officially the 'Republic of the Sudan') and principally the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). This 22-year war, the bloodiest war in the world of the last years of the 20th century, was inherently a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil War of 1955 to 1972.

The Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political arm of the SPLA emerged from war as the predominant nationalist liberation movement, and concluded the CPA negotiations with the North in 2005. This peace agreement set out a framework for decentralized democratic governance, the sharing of oil revenues between the North and the South, and a timetable for a referendum to determine whether South Sudan would become independent.

The scale of the sacrifice, and challenge facing the SPLM-based government of Government of South Sudan (GoSS) at the onset of the peace, to build a functioning state is illustrated by a stark mix of statistics: approximately 2 million were killed in the second war (and 0.5 million in the first); more than a generation living through a time when service to the nation largely meant participation in war or resistance. Conservative estimates suggest that four million people in southern Sudan were displaced internally and externally at least once (and often repeatedly) during the second war, and 600,000 fled the country altogether as refugees<sup>16</sup>

All this in a country roughly the size of France with a population of less than Paris<sup>17</sup>, and with barely developed transport, communications and physical infrastructure to underpin and stimulate social and economic development (e.g. less than 50 km of asphalt road in the entire country<sup>18</sup> at the signing of the CPA).

Re-visioning the context of 2009, the picture was thus: the liberation-movement led military Government of South Sudan was shepherding a devastated country towards the Referendum on Separation. There was no certainty of a peaceful Independence, no clarity over future government resources. The development context in 2009 at the time of the conceptualization of the RCPI (and largely still valid today) contained elements typical of a devastated, post-conflict state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> South Sudan is the 193<sup>rd</sup> member state of the United Nations, the most recent member of that body.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan <u>http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Area comparison: France: 674,843 vs. RSS 619,745 sq. km. The population of South Sudan is estimated at 9 million vs. population of Central Paris of 10.3 million (The population of the larger metropolitan area of Paris is even higher);

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Three States (outside of Juba, Central Equatoria) were visited in this review: Western Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal. Between them the three state capitals had barely 50 km of asphalt roads.

A literature review of the common characteristics of post conflict countries<sup>19</sup> highlights six features:

- i. Population redistribution, with concentrations in urban areas where there is more access to food and better security, against a relative decline in rural habitation.
- ii. Out-migration of transferable, globally marketable skills from the country. Though a proportion of these may return many don't, including some of best managers, planners and decision makers.
- iii. An emaciated private sector, functioning inefficiently and hampered by poor infrastructure and insecurity.
- iv. Government revenues devastated for a variety of reasons: the effect of the conflict on the country's GDP; the reduced capacity to collect revenue. The usual consequence of this is that tax and revenue policy is skewed to emphasize aggressive revenue collection (through customs, excises and income taxes) rather than to stimulate long-term economic growth.<sup>20</sup>
- v. Skewed and inefficient government expenditure, with increased spending on the military and suboptimal investment in infrastructure, education and health; workers are paid infrequently and/or poorly and pensions often partially or not paid at all.
- vi. A large budget deficit usually financed from domestic resources, with accompanying inflation. And erosion of the purchasing power of salaries usually leads to the growth of institutional corruption practiced at all levels of the public administration.

In the particular context of South Sudan, this situation was further compounded by the absence of robust internal PFM systems; weak internal PFM capacity, and the lack of clarity among senior politician and senior administrators on their respective roles with respect to custodianship of MDA budgets and funds.

All of these conditions were present in South Sudan in 2009 (and indeed have remained valid through the lifecycle of the RCPI programme to a lesser or greater extent). Institutional capacity to govern and deliver public services was extremely weak due to an out-migration of technical skills and absence of any investment in education during decades of war; the destruction of infrastructure, and absence of legitimate systems of governance; high levels of illiteracy, particularly among women; an utterly emaciated local private sector.

A number of donor programmes entered this post-CPA landscape. Of the pooled funds three are notable: the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), the South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) and the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF) because of their interest in tackling the formidable obstacles to building State capacity and the ability of the nascent Public Administration to offer effective governance and basic services, especially at the sub-national focus.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See Haughton, J (1998) "The Reconstruction of War-torn Economies", Harvard Institute for International Development, & Le Warne, S and Snelbecker, D (2004) "Economic Governance in War torn economies: Lessons Learned from the Marshall Plan to the Reconstruction of Iraq". Both these papers were prepared for USAID.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The IMF estimates that the average country will see revenues decline by 2% of GDP. See Gupta, S, et al, 2005, Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-conflict Countries, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC

The UNDP had direct links with two of these by virtue of the UN's presence on the Oversight Committee of MDTF and UNDP's mandate to administer the SSRF. UNDP initially had indirect 'intelligence' from the CBTF 1, the first phase (2006-2009) being managed by UNICEF. UNDP was invited onto the Steering Committee of CBTF 2 in 2010.

Initiative	Funds	Period
World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) <sup>21</sup> . Despite not being a contributor to the fund, UN Agencies (including UNDP) were invited as key members of the MDTF's Oversight Committee.	Total budget of approx. \$550 million	2005-2009 (Extended to end 2012)
South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) <sup>22</sup> administered by UNDP.	Total budget of approx. S116 million	2008- 2012
The Joint Donor Team's (JDT) <b>Capacity Building Trust Fund</b> ( <b>CBTF</b> ) <sup>23</sup> Phases 1 & 2. CBTF 1 Managing Agent: UNICEF CBTF 2: UNDP invited onto Steering Committee (despite not being a financial contributor)	S10 to \$12m p.a.	2006- 2009 CBTF I 2010-2012 CBTF II

#### Table 3: Projects with Capacity Building Dimensions that informed the RCPI

<sup>21</sup> The strategic objectives for the MDTF-SS cover five key areas:

i. Establishing **an effective core of public sector administration**, including core capacity to plan and finance GOSS programs with key accountability mechanisms

- iv. Supporting **preparation of programs**, including agriculture and private sector development to facilitate the transition from subsistence-based livelihoods to a development-oriented economy
- v. Harmonizing development assistance

ii. Preparing selected **investments to consolidate the peace** and generate social capital through access to basic services with rapid scale-up of education programs

iii. Putting priority sector programs in place, incl. basic infrastructure (roads, electricity, water) education, and health

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The SSRF was established in May 2008 to support SS's recovery and bridge the gap between the short-term emergency/humanitarian aid and longer-term development assistance. Under the overall authority of SSRF <u>Steering</u> <u>Committee</u>, chaired by the GoSS/RSS and co-chaired by the UN Deputy Resident Coordinator, the SSRF is a pooled funding mechanism intended to channel funds to support GoSS recovery priorities and provide immediate benefits for the population while laying the foundation for sustainable development

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The (CBTF) Phase I began post-CPA with a focus on supporting GoSS with the creation of a civil service and a decentralization framework enabling the establishment of accountable local government. From mid-2006 the CBTF modified its focus to respond to its core mandate of supporting capacity building and institutional strengthening projects for the GoSS. From 2010 CBTF 2 has focused mainly on public sector reform through human resources capacity building (e.g. Core Skills training) and the development of key systems of governance & PA (Electronic Payroll System, new Pension scheme, IT support to the Bank of Sudan)

The evidence that came back from the implementation of the large volume of projects through these aid instruments consistently confirmed a picture of immense needs, widespread and high expectations for a peace dividend, and very weak institutional capacity, particularly at the sub-national level. Insecurity and poverty continued to affect a large majority of the population and estimates suggested that in the post CPA period around three million people (including thousands of ex-combatants) would be returning to their communities. Reintegration would need to occur at a time when the basic rule-of-law was still very weak. Service delivery across all sectors remained inadequate, hampered by the absence of functional infrastructure and working, accountable and transparent systems for resource management.

The common challenge faced by these funds, and other multilateral and bilateral aid projects were the imperative to improve governance: planning, management and implementation capacity. Projects reported a shortage of skilled personnel in virtually all sectors, with the situation at state level particularly precarious due to limited capacity in the State Ministries of Finance, Local Government and Law Enforcement, Legal Affairs, Police and Prisons, Health, Education and Agriculture.

These circumstances pointed to the urgent need for external TA, which could be distributed evenly across the country, to bolster and build a new accountable and credible Public Administration. But the conditions on the ground were not amenable to large injections of foreign TA for two basic reasons: the absence of habitable and secure infrastructure for living, and concerns about internal insecurity, and medical support in the event of an emergency.

In this environment (and indeed, to the present time, as evidenced from the responses during this review) the foreign TA from bilateral and large multilateral was characterized by brief inputs: 'in and out, as quickly as possible'. TA in the form of private consultants and ODA agency staff typically spent no more than a week (often less). They would arrive, install new software or run a short 'training' workshop, stay in whatever passed for the best local hotel, and swiftly return to Juba.

Against this backdrop UNDP's decision in 2009 to offer resident TA, co-located with local counterparts, working within government, was radical. It was grounded in the expressed needs of local partners, and filled an empirically affirmed breach on the frontline of development. In taking this step UNDP drew on experience in other post-conflict countries (Mozambique, Rwanda and East Timor). Nonetheless in the South Sudan context, it was a bold response to a challenge of different scale and nature, compounded by geography and incipient, often unreported, internal and cross border conflict.

In our view UNDP's decision to establish the RCPI, and CIDA's endorsement of this approach, was justifiable and valid. It was a creative if ambitious move in the circumstances of 2009; a pioneering mechanism to fill gaps in PA and build deeper organizational and institutional capacity in the inchoate nation of South Sudan.

The RCPI gained further legitimacy within months of the programme's inception.

Nine months after the launch of the RCPI, the Referendum on Separation was held (Jan 2011). The Referendum was a key element of CPA. It offered the people of the South the choice to decide whether they wished to separate and become an Independent nation. The results of this plebiscite are given in the Table 3 below. The returns demonstrated an overwhelming desire to forge a new country: entrench new governance and a new system of public administration, distinct from the Khartoum model, to deliver the fruits of Independence.

#### Table 4: South Sudan Separation Referendum\* 9-15 January 2011

Registered voters: Total votes cast % Voter turnout				3,947,646 3,851,994 97.6%
	Results	Number of Votes		of
	Separation	3,792,518	98.83	%
	Unity	44,888	1.17%	)

Issue: Unity or Separation from the Republic of Sudan

\*For the referendum to be considered valid, a minimum voter turnout of 60% was required. This requirement was met, thus validating the outcome.

Source: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ssd.html

More than half (69 out of 125, i.e. 55%) of the eventual total numbers of UNVs placed through the RCPI were on the ground across the ten States by the time of Referendum. The participation of RCPI UNVs in the conduct of the Referendum was seen as a key partnership-affirming act. Several state government stakeholders that we interviewed spoke of the invaluable technical support provided by RCPI UNVs during the lead up to the Referendum, and after. Two observations were consistently made to us:


- 1. RCPI UNVs had played an important role in organizing, installing and supporting the systems of Law and Order essential for a peaceful and credible plebiscite
- 2. State Government's saw UNDP's support via the RCPI and other programmes as clear and practical evidence of a genuine and meaningful partnership, forged through a historic period of change.

The trust that grew from this relationship ensured that RCPI UNVs would be invited into pivotal and politically sensitive roles in State Governments to lead processes of institutional capacity development, not as outsiders, but as insiders within the public sector. The value of this formal compact - and psychological contract within - goes beyond RCPI 1. It is a weighty point in the positive column of a 'pros and cons' assessment of the case for RCPI 2.

#### 4.2 The Contents of the Approach & Core Functional Analysis

Having considered the developmental rationale and conceptual foundations for the RCPI Approach, the Review then looked at the policy foundation validating the **content** of the approach, i.e. the RCPI's programmatic focus of the RCPI

We found four clear, credible policy and analytical threads<sup>24</sup> leading to the formulation of RCPI.



#### Figure 3: Policy Foundations of RCPI Programme Focus

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> For further detailed description (and costing) the government's functional priorities for institutional development see GoSS' *Government Priority Core Functions Rapid Capacity Development Plan May 2011*.

# 5 Data Analysis: Quantitative data

#### 5.1 Recruitment, Deployment and Early Departures

- 1. In its conceptualization the programme was envisaged to place "up to 154 qualified UNVs in key public sector institutions"<sup>25</sup> across the country to rapidly revive and scale up PA performance and service delivery. In the event, due to a mixture of internal and exogenous constraints, issues with sponsorship funding, recruitment, accommodation for UNVs at the State level and general insecurity, the programme placed 125 UNVs over the review period. A peak of 93 serving UNVs in country <sup>26</sup> was attained in May 2012, over two years after the start of the programme.
- At least 33 UNVs departed prematurely. The explanation for these early departures ranged from the structurally understandable ("project complete") to the teasingly imprecise ("project / UNDP did not extend") – which begs the obvious question: Why? Below are the list of reasons given for premature departures:
  - 'Reached maximum years of serving with UNV'
  - 'Project complete'
  - 'Lack of Funds'
  - 'Got a better offer with UNDP'
  - 'Got a better offer'
  - 'Project didn't extend'
  - 'Further Studies'
  - 'Personal'
  - 'UNDP did not extend'
- 3. The programme achieved 'on the ground' successful deployment of 74% (93 staying the course /125 deployed). In other words over 25% of placements left early. Recruitment against original target was 80% (125 recruited and deployed / original target of 154).
- 4. Only 10% of the UNVs are women, despite the initial objective of gender parity.
- 5. No UNVs came through the TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) modality, which was meant to draw up to 15 specialists from the Diaspora in Canada back to South Sudan. This avenue to recruitment failed completely.
- 6. Unsurprisingly, Central Equatoria has the most UNVs and Unity State the least<sup>27</sup>. Despite the considerable variations in the living conditions of UNVs across states (say WES vs. NGB &WBG, the former being relatively better than the latter two) deployment per state is fairly even.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> RCPI Quarter 3 Progress Report, July-September 2010. The target figure is rounded to150 in subsequent RCPI documents.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> These figures are based on information in documents provided by UNDP UNV Office

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> A number of UNVs were moved from Unity State during the period under review due to insecurity related to the ongoing, undeclared and often unreported war between the north and South Sudan


#### 5.2 Per Capita Costs

The annual cost of the RCPI programme is circa \$11 million. 125 UNVs in total were deployed over the review period. The most placed in any given month were 17, in August 2010 six months after the start of the programme. 33 RCPI UNVs left before the formal end of their contract term. The maximum on the ground at any one time were 93.

It is difficult to arrive at a definitive (or even an averaged) figure for per capita unit costs when the deployment numbers are so dynamic. We offer two ways of considering this issue:

- 3. Using the deployment the deployment figure of 125 UNV (the actual total deployed not taking into account premature departures) the per capita cost is \$88,000 p.a.
- 4. Using the deployment figure as 93, the peak around which the numbers have plateaued, the per capita TA cost is approximately \$120,000.

Looking to the future, with better recruitment, selection, deployment and retention (owing to the implementation of recommendations in this report) it should be possible to stabilize numbers on the ground at between 110 - 120 UNVs. The per capita costs would then be \$90,000 to \$100,000.



#### Figure 4: Cumulative Deployment of UNVs since start of RCPI





Figure 5: Monthly Deployment over the Project Cycle

Figure 6: Representative Deployment of RCPI UNVs across States (as at December 2011)



Month	Placements	Departures	On the ground
Mar-10	7	0	7
Apr-10	4	0	11
May-10	4	0	15
Jun-10	3	1	17
Jul-10	8	1	24
Aug-10	17	1	40
Sep-10	12	1	51
Oct-10	5	0	56
Nov-10	9	1	64
Dec-10	5	1	68
Jan-11	2	1	69
Feb-11	4	2	71
Mar-11	4	0	75
Apr-11	1	0	76
May-11	1	1	76
Jun-11	2	1	77
Jul-11	3	1	79
Aug-11	5	3	81
Sep-11	4	4	81
Oct-11	6	0	87
Nov-11	3	0	90
Dec-11	2	0	92
Jan-12	1	4	89
Feb-12	2	0	91
Mar-12	3	4	90
Apr-12	2	2	90
May-12	3	0	93
Jun-12	3	4	92
Total	125	33	

#### Table 5: RCPI UNVs Placement & Departures: Month by Month Analysis

The bulk of these UNVs were at the State level, with the majority under the Democratic Governance Support to the States project (PFM, Revenue Authorities, Development Planning, Public Sector Specialists, Statistics and Urban Management). An estimated 5% of the personnel were deployed at the national level with key central<sup>28</sup> government ministries, and these Juba-based UNVs are captured within the numbers for Central Equatoria in the diagram below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Placements have been made in: The Office of the President, Ministry of Health, Police HQs, MoFEP, Peace & Reconciliation Commission, and in the Human Rights Commission.

# 6 Qualitative Data Analysis: Findings and Recommendations from Field Research

This quantitative data presented above was complemented by the qualitative research into six areas of suboptimal performance in RCPI which emerged out of consultations with internal and external stakeholders of the programme. The findings and headline recommendations related to these six themes are presented below, and explored further in this section.

#### Figure 7: Key Findings and the Accompanying Recommendations

<b>Recruitment &amp; Attrition:</b> Anachronistic MIS; Internal Bureaucracy; 25% Attrition	<ul> <li>Changes essential before RCPI 2</li> <li>Improve MIS &amp; processes of recruitment in UNV HQ Bonn</li> <li>Additional Admin support for UNV Office in Juba</li> </ul>	
<b>Demographic Profile of UNVs:</b> Gender Imbalance; Prepondernace of UNVs from the 'South';	<ul> <li>Recognise all UNVs in hard postings are from 'the South'</li> <li>Improve gender balance; place women in relatively easier locales?</li> </ul>	
Technical Oversight & Management	•Sharpen M & E; Increase frequency and length of field visits	
Reorganising the RCPI Portfolio; Perf.	•Improve cross fertilisation of ideas across states	
Mngmt; State level Coordination; Equipment Grant	<ul> <li>Assign 1-1.5% of the budget per placement for equipment grants</li> </ul>	
The Failure of TOKTEN	•Re-examine assumptions and look at other similar models	
National UNVs in RCPI	•Review and possibly discard this component from RCPI 2	
	<ul> <li>Improve living conditions; establish min. checklist</li> </ul>	
Pre-conditions for deployment	<ul> <li>Institutionalise UNMIS emergency &amp; medical care</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Improve Policy briefings, induction &amp; lang training</li> </ul>	

#### 6.1 Recruitment and Attrition

#### **1** Anachronistic Management Information System (MIS)

The process of finding potential candidates for deployment in South Sudan (or indeed in any other country, postconflict or otherwise) is based on an MIS and advertising strategy, which is anachronistic and inappropriate for a 'Rapid Capacity Placement' initiative. It is particularly baffling to understand how these processes can be associated with an organization based in Bonn.

The current process works by trawling a database of pre-registered CVs stored in the global HQ for UNV in Bonn. Many of the serving UNVs reported submitting an application 3 years prior to being contacted by the Bonn UNV office. Others reported finding emails enquiring about their potential availability in their Spam folders, given the lapse in time since their initial registration with UNDP. In the present system no UNV vacancies are advertised on the UNDP general recruitment website, and no dedicated website has been established for a facility which claims - and needs to be - dynamic and 'rapid'.

#### 2 Internal Bureaucracy

When potential candidates are identified a batch of CVs are sent from Bonn to Juba. Administrative weaknesses at both ends compound the delays. An inadequately staffed support office in Juba means that the terms of reference and candidate specifications are not as tight as they could be. The result is a large volume of CVs plucked out from the Bonn database using imprecise electronic tags.

These CVs are now considered in Juba by senior technical staff and the Business Management Unit (BMU). Every rejected CV has to be explained to Bonn. For the outside observer this appears to be an exercise in redundancy: explaining why a candidate with a background as 'Charity Fund-Raiser' has been turned down for a position as Local Government Finance expert in Jonglei State; or a retired 'Wall Street Banker' for a 'Revenue Authority Specialist' vacancy in Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

Figure 7 below outlines the business process chart that links the UNV HQ to UNDP Juba to deliver the RCPI. Prima facie, there is nothing in this workflow analysis, which indicates that the RCPI lies at the front line of a shortened system to deliver rapid response. Indeed the SS RCPI is merely another locale of demand for the UNV HQ. To an extent it is also just another strand of business in the work of the UNV Programme Office in Juba which manages deployment to the RCPI alongside conventional UNV placements with the family of UN agencies.

These conditions lead us to recommend:

13. UNDP needs to re-engineer the system by which it recruits UNVs generally and in particular for Rapid Response facilities such as RCPI. Among other reforms, it needs to advertise UNV vacancies dynamically on the Internet, on the regular UNDP employment opportunities website or via a dedicated UNV website. There are compelling reasons for this: it is consistent with a Rapid Response facility; it will allow for better self-selection by potential candidates to reduce the subsequent transaction costs of selection; it will be using a medium contingent with the times and the professional habits of the age group that make up the bulk of the UNVs (30-50)

14. RCPI needs to be seen as parallel UNV fast stream by UNDP South Sudan (running alongside general UNV recruitment) and the UNV Programme Office should be strengthened with additional administrative support.

#### 3 Attrition

Given that 25% of the RCPI UNVs deployed leave before the normal end of their contracts it is in the interests of all parties to the agreement, the Government of South Sudan, future and present UNVs and UNDP, to accurately discern and articulate the causes for early departures. Some early terminations are perfectly reasonable, such as national UNVs moving to better positions within UNDP SS. Nonetheless there is scope to probe and improve human resources management in this area, to prevent mismatches that are costly in many ways, financial, human and ultimately, delaying the process of institutional capacity building.

15. We recommend that the UNV Programme Office seeks advise from UNV HQ on ways of improving the understanding and recording of causes of early departures and that this issue be considered transparently in the next iteration of the performance management system of RCPI 2




Figure 8: Locating the RCPI within UNDP's UNV System

# 6.2 Demographic Profile of UNVs

There are two self-evident from the field visits: the very low proportion of women (10% of the UNV numbers) and the minimal presence of UNVs from Western / 'northern' countries, especially in states where the living conditions are difficult. Both features need to be confronted openly. The first needs to be tackled remedially; the second may mean reading the current and going with it.

## Gender Imbalance

There are undoubtedly a range of exogenous and internal issues that affect the low representation of women in RCPI. Of these there are two constraints that can be addressed in the design of RCPI 2:

- Relatively insecure housing and poor accommodation conditions<sup>29</sup>.
- Poor medical cover. There is currently no arrangement with UNMIS Medical corps to treat RCPI UNVs, an extraordinary omission that the UNDP office has been trying to address with UN HQ for over 3 years. Though this is a general failure affecting all UNVs, it is of particular concern to women, and especially to a pregnant UNV volunteer. (We encountered a non-RCPI woman UNV who spoke on this matter. This had been a major issue of concern for her and had determined her choice of posting and living quarters).

The issue of low representation of women is a recurring theme in RCPI quarterly reports, and we acknowledge that UNDP SS has grappled with this matter through the project life cycle. We recommend:

- 16. The issue of finalizing a MoU with UNMIS to cover medical care for all RCPI volunteers should be resolved prior to the mobilization of RCPI 2. Among other implications, it should be pointed out to UN HQ that not having this provision in place is instrumental in constraining recruitment of women TA.
- 17. Women UNVs should be preferentially posted to States where the prevailing living conditions are relatively safer.

# Preponderance of UNVs from 'the South'

One of the empirical findings of this review is that most of the serving UNVs - and all in the harsher locales - are from developing countries in the 'South', notably from sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Perhaps it is dangerous to make too much of this. But equally it would be foolish to ignore the visible evidence that these technical specialists bring with them a level of professional adaptability and tolerance to physical discomfort which allows them to perform to a remarkably high standard, despite the challenges of a trying environment. We suggest taking this empirical evidence at face value and recommend that:

 $<sup>^{29}</sup>$  In Northern Bahr el Ghazal the review team stayed in the same compound / camp as UNV volunteers. There were no private bathrooms and the toilets were pit latrines. These ablution blocks were between 30 to 50 meters from the bedroom. It was common for the men to walk partially clothed – in the dark - from the washrooms back to their living quarters.

18. UNDP should advertise in media that reaches the professional communities in the geographical areas from which the majority of successfully deployed UNVs come i.e. from Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia.

## 6.3 Technical Oversight and Management

#### The organization of the RCPI portfolio

There is a seeming incongruity in the way the present portfolio of projects is organized with the bulk of the deployments (clustered under the 'Support to the States' project) falling under the MDG theme. One of the implications of this current asymmetrical spread is that a single project manager in the MDG component is over-burdened with technical and management responsibilities. Yet many of the PFM and Rule of Law projects under the Support to the States project could justifiably be placed under the Democratic Governance theme. While there are sound reasons for how the current arrangements came into being, we suggest that the portfolio is re-organized when planning for RCPI 2. We recommend:

19. A more even distribution of projects across the thematic policy areas within the UNDP Office in Juba to enable improved technical and management oversight. This reorganization should be aligned with the conceptual framework in the new UNDP Country Policy, the Government's National Development Plan and themed common threads from State Development Plans.

#### Performance Management System

A related matter of concern for the review team is the need to increase the frequency of monitoring and support visits to the States. This issue was highlighted by UNVs in meetings in all 3 outlying states visited. Technical specialists generally welcomed the idea of more visits by a technical project manager from UNDP Juba. This view was also strongly supported by Government representatives who commented on the technical value of the visits by the Juba based UNDP Project Manager (in particular of the Support to the States project). These visits provided an opportunity to reflect strategically on the institutional development and capacity building aims of RCPI and to consider remedial measures.

In reviewing this area we looked at the conceptual framework for the current performance management system (PMS) for RCPI TA. This HRM instrument is technically sound. It provides a comprehensive template for guiding TA towards capacity building. The main weakness with the PMS lies with its implementation. The point repeatedly made by RCPI UNVs was that regular and lengthier visits by the project manager would not only improve performance monitoring of individual TA but would be useful in strategizing broadly, strengthening the partnership and resolving issues between State Government and UNDP, and ensuring that hitches in support systems – such as working advances – are quickly dealt with. A critical further advantage was seen as the facilitation and cross-fertilization of ideas across States, carried by a dynamic project manager. We therefore recommend:

20. That a tighter schedule of monitoring field visits is established to be carried into RCPI 2. A visit to a state should be of a week's duration, and each state should be visited once every 4 months.

#### State level Coordination

The current system of appointing a UNV from within the peer group to act as a voluntary State Coordinator (SC) appears to be functioning effectively without imposing additional financial costs on the programme. The appointment of a designated deputy / alternative to assume the role when the serving SC leaves is neat arrangement and ensures effective cover when the SC is away, and smooth succession on a yearly basis.

About 10% of the time of a SC is taken up in coordination duties. SCs felt able to carry this burden alongside their regular professional responsibilities. This allocation of time and effort is based on a group of between 10-12 UNVs on the ground. However, should the numbers increase then there would certainly be a case for reviewing the present arrangements, and possibly appointing a local administrative officer to support the SC and the UNV team.

#### **Equipment Grant**

Without exception, every State we visited took the opportunity to thank the review team for the capital, infrastructure and regular pieces of office equipment provided by UNDP. Often\_times these items had come not through RCPI, but from other UNDP projects. The formal protocol for the support – small or large - didn't matter. The point that was emphasized was the enormous difference made, for example by a printer (\$300), Internet connection (\$3000 p.a.), or rehabilitation of a classroom / teaching block (\$30,000).

Material support to complement TA is a constant refrain in all development projects, and especially so in post-conflict environments. More often than not the costs involved are marginal compared to per capita costs. Standard equipment can significantly amplify professional impact and influence wider development gains. And yet it is a subject that generates overly cautious responses from donors, from being considered off-limits, to provoking suspicions of financial laxity.

We recommend:

21. That in the budget for RCPI 2 an allocation of 1%-1.5% of the unit costs (say \$1000 to \$1,800) is attached to each UNV placement to cover the purchase of project related equipment. The decision on the use of these funds would be taken by consensus, involving three parties: the UNV in post, the appropriate government supervising officer and the UNDP project manager covering that deployment.

# 6.4 The Failure of TOKTEN

The failure to recruit even a single technical specialist from the SS Diaspora in Canada needs further examination by UNDP if only for its implications for similar programmes to RCPI mounted in other countries. One of the structural flaws in the scheme was that the UNV system does not allow a citizen of a country to work as an international volunteer in their country of origin.

In retrospect the failure by UNDP (and partners) to appreciate the irony of this stricture is striking and hard to fathom. Popular culture and indeed development discourse is replete with conversations about the psychological and socio-economic benefits of reversing migratory routes in a post-colonial age,

whether in search of roots, a moral impulse to 'give something back to the country of origin', or a shrewd pecuniary urge to profit from doing business in nascent economies.

Like other aspects of recruitment and selection pertaining to the UNV programme, UNDP's rules for UNVs in this regard are out of synch with contemporary culture and practices<sup>30</sup>. In this case effectively means that if a migrant settled in a new land holds dual nationality they would have to spurn the nationality of their country of origin if the wished to return there to serve as an UNV. We note:

22. There is increasing policy interest in the issue of the potential contribution of Diaspora to their country of origin<sup>31</sup>, and we recommend that this issue is examined more rigorously by UNDP and the UNV HQ if it is to feature in RCPI 2.

We acknowledge that a resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of UNDP South Sudan. But as with other issues raised in this report (e.g. Web-based advertising of UNV positions; establishment of an MoU between UNDP SS and UNMIS to cover the health care of UNVs) it is imperative these matters are taken up internally and a concerted and transparent attempt is made to progress corporate changes in the UN system an integral aspect of preparing for RCPI 2.

## 6.5 National UNVs in the RCPI Programme

This is a sensitive issue. We note two observations made by stakeholders: Firstly, that the performance of this group of UNVs, originally engaged under the LG project, is not of the same quality and standards as that of international TA. We reject this comparison as unfair, given the structural differences in the two sets of professionals; for a start the rewards system for foreign UNVs are considerably higher.

Nonetheless there are reasons for reviewing and probably discarding this component from RCPI 2. The findings from this review suggest that some of the best performing national UNVs moved onto other jobs within UNDP before the end of their RCPI contract. Secondly, as the legislative and institution building process of establishing local government gathers pace, there is likely to be a need for the same kind of sector-specialist international TA at the sub-state level, as currently deployed by UNDP at the state level. Thus the general 'local government' advisor role (currently done by national UNVs) is likely to disappear, and translate into formal positions within government in the sub-state County and Payam structures. We recommend:

#### 23. This component is reviewed fundamentally before inclusion in RCPI 2

#### 6.6 **Preconditions for Deployment**

Several issues were raised in discussions in every state on the subject of defining minimum working and living conditions for deployment. We were struck by the modesty of aspirations and the constructive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Even the UK Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, an institution more noted for conservatism than innovative HRD policies, has for nearly 20 years now actively sought to recruit and place officers in countries where they historical cultural and familial links.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Among other research, the ongoing Ramphal Commissions on Migration and Development explore this issue. In the UK, the government's Department for International Development (DFID) has joined with Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) to support the Diaspora volunteering Alliance (<u>www.diasporavolunteeringalliance.org</u>).

spirit of these discussions, which aptly reflected the stoicism of RCPI UNVs working wholeheartedly in difficult conditions.

Below we offer a checklist of essential conditions to be considered before deployment, based on the distillation of discussions across all four states. We accept the observation made by external stakeholders (notably CIDA) that it may be difficult to meet all these conditions in all cases. However, our field visits suggest that these conditions do prevail in UNMIS or UNICEF compounds where non-RCPI UNVs are often based. Therefore,

24. We recommend that the items on this checklist are taken as essential, non-negotiable pre-condition to the appointment of RCPI UNVs, and that this list is presented as an integral element of the RCPI 2 to potential donors.

# Table 6: Checklist of Preconditions for Deployment

I Induction	IV Office Infrastructure
<ol> <li>Political Economy of South Sudan</li> <li>Outline of National Development Plan and Govt. priorities</li> <li>UNDP CPAP</li> <li>Emergency &amp; security procedures</li> <li>Chain of Command</li> <li>Medical &amp; Health Briefing – Do's and Don'ts</li> <li>Cultural norms and context</li> <li>Basic language training &amp; option of \$600 for further language training</li> <li>Introduction to the professional role likely to be played by incoming TA</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Adequate office space, with air conditioning, with regular supply of power.</li> <li>Provision for a generator if no external power available</li> <li>Office equipment: desk, laptop, printer, photocopier (with spares &amp; supplies)</li> <li>Internet</li> </ol>
II Policy & Organizational Background Documents	V Living Quarters
<ol> <li>National Development Plan</li> <li>State Development Plan</li> <li>Departmental Strategy / Plan</li> <li>Organizational organogram</li> <li>Working rules and conditions of relevant MDA</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Private room with a secure front door, window, and private flush toilet</li> <li>Basic Utilities: Running water &amp; regular supply of electricity</li> <li>Room furnished with Bed and side table, mattress, pillows, mosquito net, writing table, 2 chairs, wardrobe &amp; mirror, fridge, fan and/or a/c.</li> <li>Access to equipped common kitchen</li> <li>Internet connectivity</li> <li>Secure compound with 24/7 security</li> </ol>
III Management Arrangements	VI Medical
<ol> <li>UNDP structure</li> <li>Mentoring and monitoring visits for 1 week every 4 months</li> <li>Clarity and consistency over working advances, swiftly applied.</li> <li>Publish Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each state monthly</li> <li>Clarity and consistency over R &amp; R arrangements</li> </ol>	2. MoU with local UNMIS Medical Clinic

# 7 Findings: Assessment of Impact in Focal Areas

#### 7.1 Overview

There is unequivocal, across the board endorsement of the RCPI programme by government. This extends from the national to the state level: from the Office of the President to State Ministers, senior public servants and counterparts.

Six themes feature in the comments of stakeholders reflecting on the impact and value of the programme. All revolve around an appreciation of the fundamental strength of the programme: that RCPI UNVs are resident TA, located on government premises, subject to the conditions and constraints within which government operates, at hand to address technical problems and emerging policy issues, influencing public sector reform in large and small ways through formalized capacity building and day to day conduct.



Alongside this positive assessment of the contribution of RCPI UNVs, a number of associated issues emerged from our interviews and documentary research relating to RCPI performance and impact:

- 5. Effectiveness despite additional demands. RCPI UNVs worked through an exceptionally fluid and historic time in South Sudan's evolution into nationhood: from the Referendum to Independence, through changing priorities of government / of a Governor, often serving under changing ministers and supervisors. This period of transition has been marked by additional responsibilities and unforeseen demands related to official ceremonies. Despite these challenges RCPI has delivered impressive results.
- 6. Alignment with government and absence of external policy noise. There is a prevalent sense within government that RCPI UNVs work *with* and *in* government, substantively and qualitatively distinct from other ODA bilateral TA, notably those making sporadic visiting inputs to government. There are two further threads worth elaborating here. Firstly, the design of the RCPI programme is anchored in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). The areas of technical support are clearly aligned with government priorities, and State governments acknowledge and commend this fit. Secondly, the specialists are seen as 'policy neutral'.

There is no sense of a particular policy agenda being pursued by UNDP. In fact this perceived absence of a particular ODA-promoted policy bias (often associated with bilaterals) has led to some ironic consequences. RCPI specialists have offered models of public sector institutions and public sector management from their own countries, from Rwanda and Uganda, India and Nepal. These have been adapted locally. In one case, in NBG, the state has set up a direct capacity building compact with the Government of Rwanda, with the ensuing costs to be met wholly by the two parties.

- 7. Time to build social capital. There was a general acknowledgement that the influence and impact of a specialist grows with time in post. The first year is period of earning professional and personal trust, necessary to the development of social capital: networks and relationships with politicians and senior civil servants essential to influencing institutional change. Reciprocally, this initial time is important for building a nuanced understanding of the local context. The second year was generally accepted as being more productive and impact-full.
- 8. Attrition: uncertainty over the future of RCPI. The lack of confidence in and certainty over future funding for the RCPI meant that many UNVs had begun to look at alternative employment. This potential for accelerated attrition was likely to be compounded by recruitment of UNV specialists by international consulting companies being commissioned by bilateral ODA agencies to implement projects, particularly at the State level.
- 9. Deeper, longer formal training. Several state government officers ministers and senior civil servants spoke of workshop fatigue. There was a pervasive sense of frustration and disappointment with short workshops sponsored donor / consultant, and being presented as 'capacity building' exercises. The plea was for longer, more structured training of a minimum of three months, and up to a year. UNDP RCPI UNVs were seen as well placed to deliver this form of training and capacity building. The implication is that this should be developed into an integral feature of the RCPI programme.

- **10. Value for Money (VfM).** As stated earlier, the per capita unit cost of a RCPI UNV is between \$88,000 and \$120,000 depending on the number of specialists deemed to have been successfully deployed. It is not for us to pronounce on whether this definitively constitutes 'value for money' for donors who contribute to the RCPI. A judgment on VfM is based in part on a donor agencies own internally defined comparators. But the points below may help in informing this decision.
- **11. Counter factual.** When respondents in Government were asked how the governance systems and public administration would have fared without RCPI, the general response was that the scenario was inconceivable, especially at the State. Myriad initiatives and improvements in State Governments are credited with benefitting directly or indirectly from the presence of RCPI specialists. Even projects which clearly belong to other donors, such as the electronic financial management system being rolled out by consultants working for USAID, or the Electronic Payroll System Pension implemented by contractors engaged by CBTF, have apparently been assisted by RCPI personnel. A typical comment was *"When we hit a problem with the software or with trying to understand what to do next, we call on them* (the RCPI UNVs). They are here, with us. They help us solve the problem"

"We were driving back from a project visit one day and he (the RCPI UNV) saw a group of people. He asked us to stop so that we could investigate. We discovered that they were IDPs. I told him that they were none of our business. He said 'No, it is Police matter. We are responsible for human rights and community security and these people need to be looked after'. We drove to the UNHCR compound where he argued stubbornly with the officers for long until they agreed to investigate. Eventually they made provision for those people. This man has taught us all the meaning of Human Rights. Everyone in the Police here knows that this man is sincere and serious. He has changed us all."

#### **Counterpart to RCPI UNV**

"I have been given a promotion, but really it is because of his work."

Head of State Police referring to the same RCPI UNV

#### 7.2 Impact Areas

We asked government stakeholders to specify areas of state-building and governance where RCPI specialists are deemed to have made significant contributions. These responses, drawing in all cases on interviews with State Ministers of Finance, are captured thematically below. The points in each list benefitted from discussion in group meetings usually held in a relevant Minister's Office where senior civil servants responsible for the affected technical areas were also present. These issues were cross checked with the UNVs own account of their role and outputs, made in the State level workshops involving all UNVs in post at the time of the review mission.

## Table 7: Plausible Direct Contribution by RCPI Programme: Impact Areas Identified by Government Stakeholders<sup>32</sup>

#### 8. Public Finance Management

- State annual work-plans and budgets completed and approved by State assemblies
- Regular and timely State expenditure reports prepared
- Internal Audit Units established
- Catalytic role in the implementation of FMIS and the regular monthly preparation of financial expenditure reports
- Significant progress towards more effective budget management /execution, reducing opportunities for wastage
- National Ministry of Finance has witnessed significant improvement in the timeliness and regularity of the monthly submission of expenditure reports

## 9. Revenue Authorities

- Seminal role in the establishment of State Revenue Authorities and supporting legislation
- Revenue generation strategies developed
- Revenue oversight systems being established and strengthened: reduction in cases of cash mismanagement by Tax Officials since payments made through the bank and records are being captured in the system.
- Taxpayers education and sensitization improved
- RCPI has had a great impact on increasing non-oil based local revenue collections. E.g. the State revenue collection has increased by an average of 138 % in NBG by 360% in WES; and by 75% in CES

#### **10.** Public Sector Reform and Management

- State staff screened and payroll cleaned with the ongoing assistance of on the ground UNVs complementing the work of CBTF
- State employee databases established
- Ministry and departmental structure charts, Civil Service Code of Conduct, and State Training Policies developed
- JDs defined and training in basic admin skills

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Below we locate some of these developments directly in the original Results Matrix for RCPI

#### **11. Statistics and Development Planning**

- Extensive involvement of States in the drafting of the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2011-2013
- State Medium-Term Strategic Plans developed
- Increased use of socio-economic statistics in planning and target setting across MDAs because of training of statisticians / statistics contact points in ministries

#### **12. ICT and Communications**


- State Government network connectivity improved
- State websites established
- Enhanced State personnel capacity in use of ICT
- ICT training centres established

#### 13. Urban Management

- State urban management plans and policies developed
- Urban planning and management regulatory and procedural framework improved
- New residential plots surveyed and demarcated for returnees and local residents, over 10,000 plots demarcated in WBeG
- Enhanced State personnel capacity in urban planning and management

#### 14. Rule of Law and Access to Justice

- Transformation of Armed Forces to Police Service all the State Police Commissioners visited spoke of the critical and invaluable role of UNVs in affecting this change
- Development of Strategic Plans, policies, rules and regulations for Police Service, including Code of Conduct
- Two key areas in A2J: training of Traditional Authorities and awareness raising & capacity development work with CBOs.



#### Figure 10: RCPI and Human, Organizational and Institutional Capacity Building

Result Areas	Key Project Activities	Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
Development Planning, Budgeting and Statistical Management RCPI specialists supporting the result: 8-Development Planning Specialists: (CES, Lakes, Jonglei, WBG, NBG, Unity, UNS); 10-Statistics Specialists (CES, EES, WES, Lakes, Warrap, WBG, NBG, UNS, Unity, Jonglei)	<ul> <li>Provided technical support to the States in preparing state annual plans and budgets using Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning guidelines</li> <li>Conducted training on integrated planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation for State and county officials</li> <li>Supported participation of the States in development of the Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) (2011-2013)</li> <li>Provided technical support to the States in preparing State Strategic Plans, in line with the SSDP</li> <li>Supported State Ministries of Finance in</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>State annual work-plans and budgets completed and approved by State assemblies</li> <li>10 State annual work plans and budgets were completed, and of those 9 (all except Unity) were approved by state legislative assemblies</li> <li>State Medium-Term Strategic Plans (being) prepared</li> <li>All 10 States had preparation of State Strategic Plans underway covering 2012-2014</li> <li>Five states (WBG, NBG, EES, CES and WES) are currently finalizing, and remainder will be completed by end of March 2012</li> <li>Increased use of socio- economic statistics in planning and target setting</li> <li>Data analysis and</li> </ul>	Framework for more coherent priority setting and prudent fiscal management being put in place	Collaboration with other UN agencies and spending agencies on statistical analysis; Involvement of development partners, including UN agencies, NGOs and UNMISS in the planning process	<ol> <li>There is improved coordination in planning and budgeting, and aligned activities have strengthened annual and medium-term budget planning, leading to improved budget credibility</li> <li>There is improved evidence- based decision making by political leaders and technical staff. Both sets of government official increasingly use statistics and CRMA outputs e.g. maps etc.</li> <li>There is increased participation and ownership of working documents formulated and supported by CRMA and statistics trainings</li> <li>The states have prepared strategic plans and the approval process is ongoing at various levels. Thus there is improved integrated planning and budgeting as the strategic plans contribute directly and indirectly to the achievement of national objectives and vision</li> </ol>

# Table 8: Impact in Relation to Results Areas in Original RCPI Project Document

Result Areas	Key Project Activities	Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
	<ul> <li>strengthening</li> <li>statistical analysis</li> <li>and the use of</li> <li>statistics and other</li> <li>empirical evidence</li> <li>in planning</li> <li>Supported the roll- out of Arc-Reader</li> <li>to counties (a</li> <li>CRMA tool used for</li> <li>conflict sensitive</li> <li>planning)</li> <li>Trained key State</li> <li>Planning Staff on</li> <li>the Integration of</li> <li>statistics into the</li> <li>Planning process</li> <li>Undertook data</li> <li>collaboration with</li> <li>CRMA at the Payam</li> <li>and County level</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>mapping tools rolled out in all 10 States to input to strategic planning, annual plans and budgets</li> <li>Statistical units established in different State Ministries in WBG and Warrap.</li> </ul>	Outcomes		
Financial Management	Trained State     Ministries of	Regular and timely State     expenditure reports	Improved accountabilit	Partnership with USAID	1)Through the implementation of FMIS and the regular monthly
RCPI specialists supporting the result:	Finance officials (DGs, Accounts and Budget Departments staff) in budget execution	<ul> <li>Prepared</li> <li>All ten states are now able to prepare monthly expenditure reports for the first</li> </ul>	y and transparency in the use of public resource,	contractor Deloitte in support FMIS implementatio n in the States	preparation of financial expenditure reports, significant progress has been made towards more effective budget management /execution and
7 - Financial Management Specialists (WES,CES, EES, Lakes, WBG, NBG,	<ul><li>and financial</li><li>management</li><li>procedures</li><li>Trained State</li></ul>	<ul> <li>time</li> <li>7 states (all with the exception of Lakes, Unity and Upper Nile)</li> </ul>	and improved compliance with Public Financial	USAID contractor Booz & Co. supporting the	this is reducing opportunities for expenditure wastage of resources and consequently increasing focus on service delivery concerns

Result Areas	Key Project Activities	Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
Warrap)	<ul> <li>Ministries of Finance treasury officials in Cash Management procedures (petty cash, payment procedures)</li> <li>Trained Accountants in the different state line ministries in basic accounting</li> <li>Trained State staff on procurement practices to be established in all ministries</li> <li>Prepared organograms and TORs for Audit Unit Staff</li> <li>Trained officials of the Internal Audit Units on auditing</li> <li>Supported the preparation of financial reports and expenditure analysis</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>consistently produced timely budget execution reports</li> <li>3 states (CES, NBGS and EES) have started the preparation of final accounts</li> <li>National MOFEP is now able to access information in real time on actual expenditures at State level</li> <li>Internal Audit Units established</li> <li>In two states – Lakes and NBG</li> <li>Audit unit structures agreed, and TORs for Auditors and procurement staff prepared</li> </ul>	Management Laws, rules and regulations	electronic payroll system in the states	<ul> <li>2) The cleanup of the payrolls at the state level is increasing efficient use of public resources through paying only those that are currently recognised as government staff</li> <li>3) Improved reporting on financial use has provided records on the financial status of the states and this will be the basis for the preparation of final accounts. This will assist in providing a more accurate picture of the overall financial state governments.</li> <li>4) Reduced wage bills and increased productivity of state staff on payroll</li> <li>5) There is improved transparency, accountability and fiscal disciple as the internal audit function is being strengthened in all government spending agencies.</li> </ul>
Revenue Generation and	<ul> <li>Conducted revenue analysis and</li> </ul>	State Revenue     Authorities (SRA)	Increased State	N/A	1) There has been great impact on increasing non-oil based

Result Areas	Key Project Activities	Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
Management RCPI specialists supporting the result: 5 Revenue Specialists (NBG, WES, Jonglei, Lakes, CES)	<ul> <li>projections for the draft Strategic Plan, annual work-plans and budgets</li> <li>Support the State Ministries of Finance in drafting and enacting relevant tax laws, procedures and systems</li> <li>Provided technical support to the establishment of State Revenue Authorities</li> <li>Provided technical advice on the establishment re- structuring of State Revenue Authorities and tax directorates</li> <li>Supported the State Revenue Authorities in the recruitment and training of their staff</li> <li>Introduced systems for the registration of taxpayers and banking of tax</li> </ul>	established and strengthened • Revenue Authorities have been established (WES, Lakes) or strengthened (NBG, Jonglei, CES), through: support to drafting and enacting SRA Acts, Income Tax Acts and procedural bills (NBG, Lakes); organograms and TORs drafted (NBeG, CES); launching of Integrated Tax Management Systems (ITMS); establishment of tax offices in 5 counties • Revenue generation strategies developed • Revenue generation strategies have been prepared for five states (NBG, WES, Jonglei, Lakes, CES) • State revenue collection increased • State revenue collection has increased by an average of 138 % in 5 states: NBG by 360%;	resource mobilization, and reduced reliance on national transfers as sole source of income		local revenue collections in the states. For instance the State revenue collection has increased from 75%-360% varying from state to another. 2) There is improved predictability of the resources availability in the state and medium term expenditure planning and budgeting is being embraced 3) The ownership and sustainability in the management of the revenues is being developed and strengthened through training of the tax officers 4) Increased State resource mobilization, and reduced reliance on national transfers as sole source of income.
	proceeds into State	Lakes by 189%; Jonglei			

Result Areas	Key Project Activities	Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
	<ul> <li>accounts</li> <li>Facilitated taxpayer education campaigns</li> <li>Trained tax department officials on tax audit and recovery techniques</li> <li>Trained State officials on tax computation and reporting</li> <li>Supported introduction of tax surveillance teams to minimize tax evasion</li> <li>Supported introduction of formal tax structures and systems at the State and County levels</li> </ul>	by 128%; WES by 100%; CES by 75% • Taxpayers education and sensitization improved • Bi-weekly radio programme on tax awareness instituted; Taxpayers' sensitization and training workshops conducted in four major Counties			
Public SectorReformRCPI specialistssupporting theresult:6-Public Sector	<ul> <li>Supported state government in developing employee databases</li> <li>Conducted training of trainers for staff of Public service on</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>State staff screened and payroll cleaned</li> <li>State Public Service in WBEG state downsized by half from 18,000 to 9,000</li> <li>Public services in Jonglei reduced by 356</li> </ul>	Reduced wage bills and increased productivity of state staff on payroll	USAID contractor Booz and co. supporting the electronic payroll system in the states	1) The frameworks and structures have been put in place for effective and efficient functioning of the state ministries e.g. ministries have been established, staffing structures have been drafted and approved, standing orders

Result Areas	Key Project Activities	Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
Specialists (WES, EES, Lakes, Jonglei, WBG, Warrap)	<ul> <li>database management</li> <li>Supported the screening, verification and cleaning of state civil service.</li> <li>Technical support to roll out payroll systems</li> <li>Developed training manual on basics of public service</li> <li>Develop Recruitment and Selection Guideline for the State MoLPSHRD</li> <li>Develop Human Resource Develop Human Resource Development Manual for the State MoLPSHRD</li> <li>Provided training on basic concepts and skills of leadership, management and effective public service</li> <li>Trained Establishment Officers which were</li> </ul>	as pensioners, under qualified unqualified staff were laid off, resulting in state saving of SSP 716,821 • State employee databases established in Warrap state, and data management software acquired by state • Roll-out of payroll system supported • Technical assistance to the roll-out of the payroll system (WBG)			are in place and strategic trainings are on course. 2) The trainings carried out have raised the level of participation and ownership of the state machinery by government counterparts to deliver services and has also enhanced their performance in other related functional areas e.g. organizing and leading the training of the administrative and records management officers.

Result Areas	Key Project Activities	Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
	deployed to Line Ministries to ensure that HR Policies are adhered to				
Information Communication Technology (ICT) RCPI specialists supporting the result: 8-ICT Specialists (WES, CES, Lakes, Jonglei, WBG, NBG, Unity, Warrap)	<ul> <li>Provided technical support to design and launch state ministry websites</li> <li>Technical support provided to develop state mailing systems</li> <li>Trained state ministry officials in standard computer software (i.e. Microsoft Word, Excel and PowerPoint.</li> <li>Training of various state ministry officials in computer skills.</li> <li>Support VSAT installation and maintenance.</li> <li>Support in the installation, implementation and maintenance of the new Government payroll</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>State Government network connectivity improved</li> <li>VSATs provided to Governors' offices, and State ministries to facilitate communication between State ministries and with Juba [in 6 states]</li> <li>Wireless networks set up in five Ministries in Jonglei state which supports daily operations and communications including Internet connection, printing, and scanning</li> <li>State websites established</li> <li>Eight states now have websites established and operational</li> <li>Enhanced State personnel capacity in use of ICT</li> </ul>	Increased communicati ons and information access by State government officials, and improved capacity for use and management of computerize d State systems (FMIS, SSEPS etc.)	USAID contractor Booz and co. supporting the electronic payroll system in the states (USAID)	<ol> <li>New ICT has contributed to improved efficiency and effectiveness in the performance and execution of the mandates of the respective ministries</li> <li>ICT has contributed to the timely reporting by state ministries to the national government especially to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.</li> <li>There is increased visibility of state governments and quick access to information through the established state websites</li> <li>The training of the government counterparts has raised confidence in the sustainability mechanisms that were suggested during the design of RCPI</li> </ol>
		Computer training			

Result Areas	Key Project Activities	Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
	system Provided ICT technical support to implementation of FMIS and electronic payroll system (SSEPS)	done in seven States in basic computer packages to enhance information sharing and data management • ICT training centres established in Unity, Central Equatoria & Jonglei states.			
Urban Planning and Management RCPI specialists supporting the result: 3- Urban Management Specialists (WES, UNS, Warrap); 4- Civil Engineers (EES, Jonglei, Akobo, NBG)	<ul> <li>Trained officials in urban planning, including the development of building and construction guidelines.</li> <li>Supported State Ministry of Infrastructure to develop urban management plans, policies and neighborhood layout plans</li> <li>Supported planning, surveying and demarcation of plots in accordance with the planned layout plans (focus on five states with high returnee</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>State urban management plans and policies developed</li> <li>Five states (Warrap, NBG; Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity) now have urban management plans</li> <li>Western Equatoria has developed a policy on urban planning</li> <li>Urban planning and management regulatory and procedural framework improved</li> <li>Policy guidelines, Building Regulations, Building Regulations, Building control guidelines, infrastructure planning guidelines, and land administration</li> </ul>	Improved planning and resulting living conditions in urban areas	USAID on the demarcation and allocation of plots for returnees; UNICEF on water and sanitation projects; UNMISS on some elements of road works	<ul> <li>1)The settlement of the returnees has contributed to reduced political and insecurity through reduced inter and intrahousehold conflicts</li> <li>2) Increased participation and ownership of the good and modern land management practices</li> </ul>

Result Areas Key Project Activ	vities Outputs (2011)	Interim Outcomes	Partnerships	Review Mission Comments
<ul> <li>populations)</li> <li>Trained MOPI on GPS, Total Station and Leveling Surve instrument us the attendant software pach</li> <li>Trained State officials in MO engineering computer sof such as AutoO assist in draw town plans</li> <li>Trained State staff on prope project documentation preparation of contract bid documents.</li> <li>Technical assistance in maintenance program or construction equipment</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>New residential plots surveyed and demarcated for returnees and local residents</li> <li>ages.</li> <li>28,000 plots surveyed and demarcated for returnees in five states with the largest influx (Warrap, NBG, AD to Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity).</li> <li>Residential MOPI reighborhood layout plans for reintegration of returnees in done in</li> </ul>			

# 8 Implementation Challenges

## 8.1 Lessons learnt

Though the impact of RCPI has been remarkably well received the implementation and gains have not been without challenge. Below we highlight the main findings in this respect.

**11. Work Environment.** One of the major challenges is lack of the office space and supporting infrastructure, in particular power and Internet connectivity. This is particular the case outside of Juba in the outlying states. Many state government ministries are themselves in an embryonic state, often recently created out of a department in another ministry (e.g. State Ministry of Public Service, which would formerly have been a department of the State Ministry of Finance). Hence the MDA itself will lack adequate office space, furniture, computers and printers, access to reliable power and very limited Internet access, constraining the performance of all staff.

It is noticeable that in all states the ICT advisor is located in the Governor's Office. This is often the only venue in the state with reliable modern infrastructure, and even here, internet connectivity is not always assured.

- 12. Technical Supervision of RCPI UNVs. Given the endemic weakness of institutional and organizational structures, there is relatively weak government technical supervision of RCPI UNVs. Quality assurance of the work done at the state level by the UNVs and the relevant sector ministries is therefore dependent on weak internal self-regulating mechanisms. This is one of the reasons why increased mentoring and technical supervision from project managers / professional supervisors from UNDP Juba could have significant impact. It would allow cross-state benchmarking of performance; weak performing MDAs in one state pushed to perform as well better performers from another states.
- 13. **Counterparts.** Many of the state government counterparts to RCPI UNVs are over the retirement age. Often the older counterparts, who have spent decades in the bush during the war, have limited academic and technical qualifications. These are not ideal conditions for the transfer of specialized technical skills and organizational development. Often this is coupled with the poor working ethics and culture, translating into low productivity levels by the state counterparts

"For the first six months I would come in at 8 a.m. and there would be no counterparts or colleagues there. They would come at around 11 and leave by about 1 PM. They would ask

'Why do you come early? There is no work'. Or they would say 'It was raining this morning....I was waiting for the rain to end before I came to work'.

So for six months all I did was come at 8 and finish at 5 and do the best I could.

Now people come to work every day on time. I feel one of my main contributions has been to establish a work culture."

RCPI UNV, Advisor to a State Police Service

14. **Changes within government ranks.** The Lack of stability among the technical staff is a common characteristic across states. Public Administration is highly politicized. (There is no national Civil Service Commission yet). There are frequent movements of Ministers, transfers of technical staff and restructuring of state ministries. All these changes affect the target group of personnel undergoing coaching, mentoring or training, thus compromising the sustainability and effectiveness of the capacity development initiatives being conducted by the specialists.

Ironically, RCPI specialists also reported cases where State governments have been unable to appoint staff in key position, where people with the necessary skills are just not available.

15. The vicious circle of a weak education base. Weak existing capacity means that the base on which to develop capacity building initiatives is poor. UNVs report generally poor record keeping in ministries, which affects their ability to prepare sound working documents, and intelligent capacity building plans to guide the operations of their respective state activities. The problems do not end there; it is a wider phenomenon indicative of the weak literacy base of the country. For example the business community do not keep records, and this has consequences for assessment and tax collection

A further problem, especially in the states that are located in the north of the country i.e. NBG and WBG is that traditional official language of the area has been Arabic. Most of the public sector workers are learning English anew.

16. **Political control over expenditure.** While there have been significant improvements in public financial management, budget execution particularly in areas of fiscal discipline remains a major challenge in the States, as most of the expenditure is done without proper regard to the approved budget with some sectors spend more than their approved budget allocations.

In a PA operating in a post-liberation militarized culture, control over government expenditure remains the prerogative of senior politicians, with the power of the Governor paramount. Essentially, systems of internal accountability and control are weak. This situation is compounded by the absence of tight procurement rules and regulations.

- 17. **Gender imbalance in capacity building.** Two related features characterize the public service in South Sudan and women feature badly on both counts:
- Poor literacy<sup>33</sup> rates which provide a weak platform for competencies essential to running an effective public service
- A differential in the employment rates and seniority positions between men and women.

Though there are no definitive figures on adult literacy rates in South Sudan there are approximations which point to the scale of the challenge. The estimates vary.

The UNDP website puts the literacy figure at 36.7% but also gives no indication of the language of literacy, and disguises suggests significant differences in the literacy rates of men and women. Disaggregating the average adult literacy rate by sex, the CIA World Fact book puts the figures as Male 40% and Female 16%. (Language not specified).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> A commonly accepted definition of adult literacy is the ability to read and write at the age of 15 or over.

The proportional differences in literacy and formal employment for men and women vary from state to state and are compounded by variety of factors: the extant of conflict; culture; the geographical proximity to neighboring nations<sup>34</sup> and opportunities therein.

These entrenched historical differences in the literacy rates between men and women are mirrored among public servants in PA at the national and sub-national level. The evidence from the field visit during this review mission suggested that men dominate the senior positions and professional cadre in MDAs, and especially so at the State levels.

In NBG, WBG and Western Equatoria we met no women among the senior administrators in the Ministries of Finance, the State Revenue Authority, or in the State ministries responsible for Urban Management. Across the country only one Secretary General is a woman, in Central Equatoria (who we had the benefit of meeting), symptomatic of the condition at the top of the management pyramid in the public service.

These differences are likely to take time to even. The variation in school enrolment between male and female children stood at 30% in 2008-09. This gap has begun to narrow annually among school-going children with the progressive gains of peace and political independence, but the historical imbalance within the existing adult population will need to be tackled systematically through an investment of targeted and sustained language training interventions if there is to be a serious attempt at broadening and deepening the human resource base within the Public Service and across SS generally.

18. The Ambiguous Role of the Public Sector in a post conflict context. We had several meetings with senior government officials who reflected on the tension they confronted: a civil service ostensibly designed to deliver services but also seen as a post-Independence provider of employment in a protected civil service.

These conditions are not unique to SS. Most (if not all) post-colonial states have gone thrown this stage. The consequences for RCPI and other development programmes may not be immediate, but they are significant in terms of assessment of eventual 'development outcomes' against which the programme is evaluated. High recurrent expenditures on a bloated labour force means little or no state government resources are allocated by states to development activities. No amount of capacity building can compensate for this. Further, this sometime means that funding of development interventions is passed to the international partners, with implication for deeper institutional ownership and sustainability.

- 19. **Insecurity** The conflict in Upper Nile during the RCPI project cycle meant that some specialists had to be moved to alternative States. Intra-state (particularly in Jonglei) and North- South conflict pose risks to the project and constrain the implementation of project activities.
- 20. **Poor donor coordination and aid harmonization.** A recurring theme in SS is the poor coordination and harmonization of ODA, especially at the State level. Much of the external assistance is determined and directed from Juba, but government too has contributed to this dysfunctional condition because of an absence of clear State Strategic Development Plans (SDPs) and State government led aid management frameworks. RCPI UNVs and UNDP more broadly have played an important role in facilitating the development of SDPs, so state policy development frameworks and empirical data also due to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Typically people from greater Equatoria would find their way into an English medium educational system in Uganda or Kenya, while those from Bahr el Ghazal were more likely to have an education with an Arabic base.

assistance of RCPI statisticians – when RCPI 2 is designed and implemented. The challenge remains to ensure States are assisted with developing ODA coordination mechanism to prevent continuing competition and duplication of ODA supported activities at the state level, and that donors participate constructively in such arrangements.

- 21. **Experience & Social Capital as foundations for effectiveness** In the areas where UNDP has made significant impact (Local Revenue enhancement in Aweil), it is normally the case that the specialists has served in the location for more than one year and s/he has built relationships with state counterparts, s/he has earned their trust and confidence, understands the context and is able to take advantage of every little opportunity to support the institutionalization of the necessary reforms.
- **22. Uneven institutional development.** One of the major impediments to capacity building in SS is the lack of a coherent framework and plan for institutional development for the country. There are weak sectoral linkages between the 'centre' and the states, and across states, which mean that, developments are often not apace. A state may develop a law on local taxation derived from a RCPI UNV-inspired Rwandese framework, which might then inform the drafting of similar legislation in a neighbouring state, WBG. Then, the national government alters the assignment of revenue raising powers between the tiers of government, and many of the provisions of the state law become redundant.

# 8.2 The Future: Macro level design issues for RCPI 2

National and state government stakeholders are unanimous in their plea for further extended RCPI support. This is indicative of the scale of the need, and consistent with evidence from other countries that have required external assistance at this point in their nation building<sup>35</sup>. The range of recommendations in this report, drawn from a critique of RCPI 1 should help in the design of the next phase of this programme. When we asked respondents to look beyond RCPI 1 and identify potential areas of future support, government officials suggested two lines of growth

- Specialization within technical areas, especially in the areas of Accountability, PFM and Urban Management
- Piloting support at County level to consolidate government policy on decentralization, in particular by embedding accountability and PFM systems to cover the County and Payam levels

Both these programming directions are consistent with the development trajectory of South Sudan. There are two other related design issues that should also be taken into account in the RCPI 2 design process:

- There is a need to consider mechanisms within RCPI 2, and ideally within Government, that ensure better inter-state learning so that the development of policies by RCPI specialists (or indeed by any other TA) is coherent and standardized across States, and that external programme such as the RCPI do not inadvertently leave behind problems of inconsistent policy and legislative frameworks.
- Technically framed capacity building initiatives led by TA need to be located within broader government / state institutional development plans.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> See Annex 1. East Timor with a population of just 1 million required over 2000 TA specialists for more than 5 years after Independence

### Annex 1: Comparative Intervention Analysis

Source: USAID- GoSS Functional Capacity Prioritization Study December 2009

	Botswana	Mozambique	Timor-Leste	S Sudan
Year	1966	1987	2002	2005
Area sq km	281,730	799,380	14,874	640,000
Population	546,000	12,895,000 (*87)	953,000	8,200,000
Adult literacy	40%	28% (1982)	50% (2004)	15%
Governmental structures and experience	Administrative structures in place	Structures rebuilt on socialist models	Native administration only	Poor structures and processes, little experience
Infrastructure	Limited	3 large ports, 3 railways, 75% roads impassable during rains	70% destroyed	Very limited, much cut off during rains
Assistance Strength (pax)	3,000	5,000 by 1990; 1,000 remain	2,000 UN 1999- 2002; 300 remain	150
Length of intervention	20-25 years	20-25 years, ongoing	Ongoing	TBD

#### TABLE 1 COMPARATIVE INTERVENTION ANALYSIS.

Compared to other post-conflict environments, the Southern Sudan reconstruction is severely underresourced. See Annex II for further details of these and other interventions.

When compared to the other post-conflict regions, Southern Sudan is substantially larger in geographic area (with the exception of Mozambique), has a greater illiteracy problem (even *within* the civil service), fewer governmental start-up structures, less infrastructure and the legacy of 40 years of war (from 1955-1972 and 1982-2005). Assistance provided to countries with deep reconstruction need includes:

- Technical assistance provided for a few years or for discrete short assignments. TA provides expertise in areas such as law, public administration reform, policy and financial management.
- 2) Functional assistance provided for more than 10 years, with the role and number of external providers changing as in-country capacity improves. Assistance includes accountants, statisticians, lawyers and department staff working in particular jobs while mentoring and providing on the job training to counterparts.
- 3) Social service providers provided for more than 10 years, with role and number of external providers changing as in-country capacity improves *working within the government structure*. Providers include doctors, midwives, veterinarians, agricultural extension workers and teachers.

Nai	me	Specialty/Designation	Agency or Contact
		UNDP Staff and Managemen	t
1.	George Conway	Country Director a.i	UNDP
2.	Mandisa Mashologu	Team Leader –Poverty	UNDP-
	-	Reduction and MDG	mandisa.mashologu@undp.org
3.	Amanda Serumaga	Team Leader-Democratic Governance	UNDP
4.	Daniel Kir	Programme Analyst	UNDP
5.	Kartik Sharma	Rule of Law Officer	UNDP
6.	Guyson Adikobaa	Programme Analyst	UNDP
7.	Franco Cube	Programme Analyst	UNDP
8.	Rachael Quast	UNV Programme Officer	UNDP
9.	Martin Dramani	Programme Analyst	UNDP
10.	Marevokaze Nowak	COMMS	UNDP
11.	Jerrase Yak	COMMS	UNDP
12.	Francis Luwangwa	Project Manager	UNDP francis.luwangwa@undp.org
	Challa Kumsa	Head of BMU	UNDP
14.	Silvia Mantilla	External Relations	UNDP
		Donors	
15.	Caroline Delany	Head of Cooperation	CIDA-
	,		caroline.delany@international.gc.ca
16.	Martin Jornrud	SWE Embassy	SIDA
		Government - National Leve	
17.	Venustoe	Director in charge state Affairs- Office of the President	Office of the President-0956377330
18.	Aggrey Tisa	Economic Advisor	Office of the President
		rnment - State Level Leaders and N	lational Staff
19.	Hon. Sapana A. Abuyi	Deputy Governor	Western Equatoria State - 0955028234
20.	H.E Jacob Aligo Lo Lado	Minister	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Central Equatoria State
21.	H.E Ronald Ruay Deng	Minister	Northern Bahr el Ghazal
22.	H.E Morris Yel Akol	Minister	Ministry of Finance, Western Bahr el Ghazal
23.	Hon. Clement Juma	Minister	Physical Infrastructure and Public
	Mbugoniwia		Utilities- Western Equatoria State
24.	Hon. Charity Gaba Timothy	Secretary General	Central Equatoria State
25.	James Hupai Andrea	D/Statistics	0924874373
26.	James Richard Ramadan	Director-Tax Revenue	Western Equatoria State
27.	Henry Abayosa Atilio	Director-Non Tax Revenue	Western Equatoria State
	Adam Saki Bakheit	A/Director-Tax Revenue	Western Equatoria State

# Annex 2: People Interviewed

29. SGT.Major Gnot Gnot Akoc	Joint Operation Centre	Northern Bahr el Ghazal - 0955368413			
30. Major General Akot Deng Deng Akot	Commissioner of Police	Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
31. Arun Atuer Jok	Director Statistics	Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
32. Mareng Chuor Deng	Commissioner of Revenue Authority	Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
33. Stephen Andreza Ujika	Director General	Ministry of Finance, Western Bahr el Ghazal			
34. Hawad Abass	Chairman	Civil Service Commission			
35. Major General Mayom Deng Biar	Head of Police	Western Equatoria State			
36. Clement Philemon B.	Director General	Public Service Commission-Western Equatoria State			
37. Dimitri Manae Lokoca	Director General	Physical Infrastructure and Public Utilities- Western Equatoria State			
38. Terazine Fied bank	A/Director	Physical Infrastructure and Public Utilities- Western Equatoria State			
39. Filbert Threrezine	Director	Human Resource Development- Ministry of Public Service			
	UNVS at the State Level				
40. Johannes Wolff	Revenue Specialist	Johannes.wolff@undp.org-CES			
41. James Tatu Guma	Planning Associate	James.tatu@undp.org -CES			
42. Sammy Odolof	CSSAC Bureau	Sammy.odolf@undp.org -CES			
43. Elizabeth Okotchi	Development Planning Specialist	Elizabeth.okotch@undp.org -CES			
44. Solomon Welle	ICT Specialist	Solomon.welle@undp.org-CES			
45. Maluac Lueth Luac	Planning	0956147887			
46. Lamin Syl Kamora	Rule of Law Officer	Lamin.kamara@undp.org			
47. Mbai Joshua	Statistician	Joshua.mbai@undp.org-Western			
		Bahr el Ghazal			
48. Hari Prasad Shrestha	Revenue Specialist	0956043024- Western Bahr el Ghazal			
49. Charles Wakera	Financial Specialist	0955549805-Western Bahr Ghazal			
50. Rogers Musyoki	ICT Specialist	<u>Rogers.musyoki@undp.org</u> – Western Bahr el Ghazal			
51. Teklehaimanot Meshesha	Statistician	Teklehaimanot.meshesha@undp.org			
52. John Oziegbe	Rule of Law Officer	John.oziegbe@undp.org			
53. Stuart Brooks	Rule of Law Officer	Stuart.brooks@undp.org			
54. Melania Mujutywa	Economist	Melania.mujutywa@undp.org			
Snayanewako		Central Equatoria State			
55. Sunra Lambert-Baj	Peace, Community and Security Specialist	Sunra.lambert@undp.org			
56. Bisasa Erickson	Statistician	Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
57. Ephrem Israel	Economist/Planning Specialist	Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
58. Philip LEE	Financial Management Specialist	Northern Bahr el Ghazal			

59. Sydney Samboko	Civil Engineer	Northern Bahr el Ghazal				
60. Aldo Jaboss Abwang	Finance Specialist	Western Equatoria State-095555996				
61. Eric Naigambi	Law Enforcement Officer	Western Equatoria State- 0955705705			te-	
62. James Ojok	Public Sector Reform	Western 095556174	Equatoria	State	-	
63. Moses Komolafe	Statistician/Development Planning Specialist	Western Equatoria State - 0955484444			-	
64. Olympio Attipoe	Revenue Specialist	Western 0955714276	Equatoria	State	-	
65. Afewerki Gidey	Rule of Law Officer	Western 0913002318	Equatoria 7	State	-	
66. Zinaw Zeleke	ICT Specialist	Western 0955557204	Equatoria	State	-	

#### Appendix 3: Image of Living Conditions

Among the stark images from the field review, one of the abiding ones is of the living conditions of RCPI volunteers in circumstances which even other UN programmes do not tolerate. In WBG the majority of UNVs have been on a site without running water and electricity over a year beyond promise of changed conditions by Jan 2011 Referendum. In NGB the situation is similar as mentioned earlier.

The picture below is of a typical room in one of the camps.

