

***UNDP South Sudan  
Community Security  
&  
Arms Control Project  
Joint Review by UNDP – BCPR and DFID***

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*UNDP South Sudan Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) Programme*

**Executive Summary**

**1. Stabilisation Context**

Although galvanised by independence, South Sudan remains deeply fragmented, with inter-ethnic tensions impairing efforts to establish good governance, and also raising the prospects for new conflict and turmoil.

Competing tribal interest continue to make strong parochial demands on public appointments and resources. Whilst the government has sought to accommodate these interests, thereby creating a degree of breathing space, the current economic crisis limits the financial resources available for funding the resulting large public payroll. Diminishing finances increase competition for access to state resources, and heighten existing perceptions of marginalisation amongst less powerful ethnic groups, thereby placing further stress on the fragile network of political accommodations that bind South Sudan's polity together.

Against this backdrop, popular expectations of the government remain (unrealistically) high, and the window of opportunity for the GoRSS to prove that it is committed to improving service delivery, and greater political and ethnic inclusiveness, is finite. UNDP / CSAC's operating environment, both in policy and programme terms, is challenging, and will become more so if the political, ethnic and economic tensions that fuel instability escalate.

**Implications for UNDP's Stabilisation Programming**

UNDP's current approach to stabilization centres on support to state building. The approach combines SSRF resources with CSAC's conflict-mitigation and institutional capacity building capabilities, and applies both to support the extension of state authority, and to its ability to deliver security and basic services for its citizens (thereby laying the foundation of a basic social contract).

Whilst the approach is sound, the gains at community level (realised and potential) are at risk if violent tensions recur at state and national levels. Ultimately, the long-term effectiveness of CSAC and other UNDP programmes will depend on the extent to which the emergent challenges at state and national levels are successfully addressed. UNDP's notion of state building must therefore expand to include strategic support for the government's attempts to address the structural drivers of instability.

This report suggests several areas in which UNDP support could have significant impact. **There are two primary recommendations. The first is support for initiatives to build inter-ethnic dialogue and consensus on contested governance issues**, including the design and implementation of a national

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<sup>1</sup> The findings expressed in this report represent the independent views and opinions of the mission team based on discussions, observations and field visits with key stakeholders and beneficiaries.

visioning and constitutional review process (capitalising on UNDP / CSAC's unique 'reach' across South Sudan's geography, and access to key interlocutors at national, state, county and community levels). Support should also be provided for a more systematic role for elders and religious leaders in conflict prevention and resolution; for instance, UNDP could provide discreet support to the SSPC (or other national entity) to support a panel of high-level, trusted South Sudanese intermediaries tasked with framing and guiding the national discourse, and advising the President on the management of the tensions and conflicts most likely to impede the process. UNDP's support would be informed by successful regional and international models, and by its expertise in supporting such initiatives.

**The second recommendation is to continue CSAC's orientation towards conflict transformation**, or the "software" of peace, by building on its current assets and accomplishments to establish reliable systems from the payam to state levels to anticipate violent tensions, and to manage and resolve them before the eruption of large-scale conflict. This orientation will involve CSAC reaching a critical mass of implementation on the ground in areas particularly prone to violence.

## **2. Implications for CSAC programming**

CSAC has performed well with respect to each of its four Outputs. The project has performed particularly well in relation to the provision of conflict-sensitive development assets (police posts, prisons, water points etc.), and strengthening of national counterpart institutions. This report includes specific observations and recommendations for each of the four Outputs.

In terms of broader strategic focus; as the majority of planned infrastructure is now completed, CSAC's focus should be on consolidating conflict mitigation capacities at local level, and seeking to scale these activities up in order to achieve critical mass of impact. Whilst CSAC's proposed 'Conflict Transformation Approach' for the next phase provides a sound basis for achieving this, this report makes several recommendations to enhance its impact.

These include a greater emphasis on increasing the conflict mitigation capacities of, and improving the coordination between, all relevant state and non-state actors at local, state and national levels. The ultimate goal would be the establishment of an effective architecture for early warning and response to emergent conflicts, with priority given to the states that are worst affected by violence, such as Jonglei and Wunlit.

In practical terms, it will be important that UNDP adopts a clear strategic approach to combining the respective 'hardware' and 'software' capacities of SSRF and CSAC. The prospect of 'hardware' should provide the focus for collaboration between conflicting groups, whilst the 'software' (being the CSAC-provided training of local actors and facilitation) provides the means through which local conflict mitigation processes are organised.

It is also important that UNDP seeks critical mass across its portfolio of programmes addressing conflict, security and governance across 10 states. Collectively, these initiatives should engage with local

government, police, judicial services and traditional authorities at all levels. The report recommends that CSAC expand its remit to provide training in conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive development planning across UNDP's broader programme, particularly at state level.

## **I. Introduction, Methodology, Scope of Review and Structure of Report**

1. The political and economic situation of South Sudan has evolved significantly in the first year since independence, with new risks and opportunities at both the national and local level. This review identifies specific recommendations for CSAC, building on its current achievements, enhancing its relevance to the objectives of state building and peace building in South Sudan, and continuing to contribute to their achievement. Given the new challenges and opportunities, the review details strategic actions that should be assisted by UNDP at the national level. These actions will allow the local and targeted initiatives assisted through CSAC to achieve coherent and effective results, as well as lasting impact as the national situation evolves.

2. The analysis and the "programme framework" detailed below are based on conversations with several interlocutors—UN staff; bilateral partners; government officials; police; and local and community leaders—in the capital Juba, Upper Nile State, and East Equatoria state between October 28 and November 12, 2012. In addition, an extensive "documentation review" of the impact of CSAC initiatives, and of the efforts of bilateral partners, government, and non-governmental organizations, was also conducted by the review team.

3. CSAC has worked in 55 counties across South Sudan's 79 counties. The review team visited only a small number of project sites in 5 counties. As a sample for evaluation purposes, this does not qualify as statistically significant. This report is therefore not presented as an evaluation of CSAC. Assessing CSAC's overall impact would require a separate mission, with a clearly-defined ToR to address a statistically significant sample of locations and projects, and baseline information and indicators against which progress / impact can be measured.

4. The report provides a set of forward-looking and contextualized recommendations for the strengthening and expansion of the work that has already been done through CSAC. It begins with an analysis of the current context of South Sudan in Section II, and then moves on to a review of the implications of this analysis for UNDP programming in general, and CSAC in particular, in section III. Section IV provides a brief overview, by output, of the current achievements of CSAC, and the areas that need further development and strengthening, as well as specific recommendations in this regard. Section V then provides recommendations for the next—conflict transformation—phase of CSAC. The final section of the report provides specific recommendations for additional wider areas of work by UNDP at the national level that will ensure sustainability and impact for CSAC and other UNDP initiatives.

## **II. The Evolving Context of South Sudan**

5. Following independence, the loss of the unifying principle of opposition to Khartoum has allowed a number of internal drivers of conflict to expand and provide new challenges to the country's unity. Despite efforts by the South Sudan's top leadership to engage with these challenges, they have continued to mount in the short-term, and may overwhelm progress made in several areas of peace consolidation and state building if not addressed. The challenges with specific implications for UNDP's programmes are detailed below:

#### *Accommodation of Parochial and Ethnic Leaderships and Interests*

6. The national government has sought to accommodate the various representations and interests of parochial or ethnically motivated groups and militias within the ruling establishment and the SPLA itself. This approach has involved the inclusion of leaders within the structure of the state and the bureaucracy, as well as militia members within the SPLA. In the short-term, this approach has won critical breathing room for the government and maintained peace. However, as this process is conducted on the basis of informal negotiations and the power dynamics in Juba, and is opaque, it has generated tension over access to the state and its resources among groups and individuals who harbour perceptions of exclusion. Some appointments are made on the basis of political expediency rather than specific competencies. This has contributed to delays in the implementation of key programmes, and also created resentment among talented younger South Sudanese looking to play a role in the new dispensation. With the seat of the government being in Juba, the influx of other communities into the city has created concern among local residents of the town and of the Central Equatoria state, and could be a potential flashpoint.

#### *The Impact of "Austerity"*

7. The suspension of South Sudan's oil exports due to the conflict with Khartoum has had a significant impact on the country's short-term economic prospects, and puts the government's "accommodation" policy at risk. Recent internationally mediated agreements between the north and south should lead to the resumption of exports in the near term. However, state finances are currently exhausted, and frustrations could rise among members of the civilian administration as well as the ranks of the SPLA and police before exports fully resume and sufficient revenues are realized over a period of six months or more. Efforts to maintain confidence, and strengthen political cohesion through dialogue, will be critical during this period. Tensions have already increased, with allegations of heavy-handed responses by state security agents against perceived political opponents and activists.

#### *The Necessity for National Dialogue and National Reconciliation*

8. The president and vice-president of South Sudan have recently acknowledged the importance of creating a unifying concept and identity for South Sudan that is not tied to the opposition to the north. A national "visioning" process will be critical to realizing such an identity, and could also provide vital inputs into the constitutional review process. However, the remoteness and inaccessibility of many parts

of the country will pose significant challenges to ensuring broad-based inclusion.

9. Efforts towards reconciliation will have to be carefully managed, as the wounds inflicted by the South Sudanese on each other during fifty years of war are significant, and many members of the current leadership were involved. More people died in intra-South Sudan conflict than in depredations by the north. The forcible disarmament of several ethnic militias by the SPLA between 2005 and 2012 may have been tactically necessary but has also complicated the task of reconciliation, and led to several rounds of violence at the state and local levels.

10. South Sudan has not yet systematically exploited the potential of the media, or education, for nation building. Media institutions are weak, lacking in capacity and basic infrastructure<sup>2</sup>, and often politically influenced. There is no media “code of conduct,” nor programming that attempts to enhance social cohesion in a commercially viable manner. These are significant lacunae, in that radio and cell-phones reach all parts of the country. In addition, the very few institutions of higher learning offer little in terms of curricula for public servants and government officials on transforming conflict within and among institutions and groups. School and university syllabi have not yet developed significant themes around national unity and integration.

#### *Oil, a curse or a blessing?*

11. In the short-term, the resumption of oil exports will enhance South Sudan’s stability, as greater revenues allow for the “accommodation” of disaffected groups. However, without a strong framework for national unity and with continuing inter-ethnic competition, significant tensions could emerge over the allocation of revenues, especially in the absence of a clear and widely accepted framework in this regard. Tensions could not just emerge at the national level, but also at the state level, where post-independence expectation levels are high, and if powerful state governors are seen as appropriating most of their share of the national allocation for parochial gain.

12. South Sudan should be supported, especially in the context of the constitutional review, to develop appropriate procedures for the allocation of oil revenues, including transparency. Simultaneously, national, state, and county governments should be assisted in ensuring environmental sustainability and due consultation with communities where oil and other mineral resources are being mined. The experiences of other oil-producing African countries should provide invaluable pointers in this regard, both in terms of lessons learned as well as “best practices.”

#### *Recurring violence at state and local levels*

13. Traditional cycles of violence related to cattle rustling in at least six states—Lakes, Warrap, Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, and East Equatoria—have acquired significant new dimensions over the past

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<sup>2</sup> CSAC and SSRF are supporting state radio services through an interactive radio programme on small arms and community security and provision of essential infrastructure, respectively.

year. According to Jonglei officials, 3, 000 people were killed in inter-ethnic violence in the state in 2011, and 612 Murle in revenge killings by Nuer Lou in December alone (according to UNMISS estimates). Tribal groups are better organized and armed, target women and children to a greater degree, and no longer respect the traditional limits on the use of armed violence. Their operations are supported by itinerant militias, such as that of David Yau-Yau in the Jonglei state, and the rebellion of the late George Athor in 2010 which the national government had brought under control through a mix of force and accommodation. More significantly, there have been recent allegations that state or county executives, as well as SPLA factions, have supported armed activities by members of their own ethnic groups at worst, or have remained as bystanders and not moving to stop the violence at best.

14. National and international responses to heightened inter-ethnic violence have primarily built on the traditional South Sudanese methodology of peace conferences. However, despite initial successes, agreements reached during such conferences are rarely systematically monitored or implemented (support for implementation is not included, for instance, in national, state, and county budgets), and are often overwhelmed by new rounds of seasonal violence abetted by resource scarcities or itinerant militias, or by changes in the tactical calculations of the leaders of the major ethnic groups. One observer has described them as “ceasefire feasts.” The peace agreements around the Wunlit and Jonglei conflict clusters, for instance, are extremely fragile as a result and increasingly challenged by the participants in these processes. In addition, there are instances of youth evolving their own structures that are no longer necessarily loyal to the traditional clan elders.

15. Efforts to enhance community security in other ways, including through UNDP’s CSAC programme, have had some initial successes, but now need to be scaled up so that they can reach a critical mass of impact to affect these drivers of violence in a significant way. Similarly, efforts to extend the authority of the state by building physical infrastructure or providing alternatives to violence need to be linked more directly to concrete incentives against violence, or to sustaining agreements reached during peace conferences or preventing conflict in other ways.

16. While the South Sudan National Police Service has brought down the level of criminality in several areas, it has little ability to engage with organized armed violence. Police posts, especially in remote rural areas, are only occasionally manned, and often abandoned as officers are forced to live off of the land, and have little mobility due to the lack of vehicles, or difficulty of getting fuel where vehicles exist. In many areas there is no police presence.

17. Similarly, after some initial progress, DDR efforts have slowed because of the necessity of continued mobilization due to conflict with Khartoum and the oil crisis, disagreements within the SPLA on the best *modus operandi* for demobilization, and a perceived lack of models appropriate to the South Sudanese context. The recent constitution of a new DDR Council should help expedite the political steps leading to the requisite consensus. However, where the reduction of violence is concerned, it will be a while before the impact of these steps is felt.

### *The Challenge of Leadership*

18. While the president and the vice-president have increased their calls for national unity and dialogue, other members of the government at both the national and state levels have been less engaged in any sustained manner, especially in the context of promoting inter-ethnic confidence. There have been positive examples of locally led grass-roots initiatives, but these have not always been supported from senior political levels. At a more institutional level, politically based appointments have resulted in a dearth of competencies for organizational leadership and management. Key institutions, including those responsible for the coordination of peace and security efforts, are affected. A systematic programme for equipping these leaders with the relevant skills and capacities is therefore needed.

19. The national parliament, which has been awarded an important role in the transitional constitution of South Sudan, currently lacks any capacity to exercise substantive leadership on major issues (though some committees are making notable progress). Members are elected on the basis of a PR system, and lack basic outreach and engagement with their constituencies. However, there have been instances where MPs have been brought into local conflicts in their constituencies to assist with peacemaking and stabilization initiatives. Properly assisted, the parliament could exercise strong leadership in developing the policies and initiatives necessary to sustaining peace in South Sudan.

20. The issue of leadership will be especially critical as South Sudan seeks to convert its transitional constitution into a permanent one. Issues such as land, allocation of natural wealth, and decentralization of central authority will all cause great contention. An inclusive process of constitutional reform, possibly using the modus operandi for local consultations developed through the CSAC programme, should not only lead to a widely accepted draft, but also pave the way for a peaceful election in 2016, when the euphoria of independence will no longer serve as glue with which to ensure a poll free of violence. There is a considerable risk that the next national elections could further inflame inter-ethnic and tribal tensions, especially if the ruling establishment is perceived as attempting to perpetuate the power of certain groups or individuals. Unless an effective early-warning-and-response system is instituted nation-wide, despite the significant challenges of logistics and infrastructure, the potential of spoilers to disrupt the next elections will remain high.

21. The development of leadership should not just be encouraged at the national level, but also at the community level. Given that in the foreseeable future, the South Sudan state is going to continue to be constrained in terms of its outreach to communities, the latter should be supported in developing greater cohesion, and with community leaders taking forward joint initiatives to secure livelihoods and safety at the community level.

### **III. Implications for CSAC, and for UNDP programming**

22. UNDP's current approach to stabilization in South Sudan, and indeed that of the broader group of development partners, remains centred on the notion of "state-building," where the state's authority and ability to deliver security and basic services for its citizens is extended, and a social contract therefore built with the latter. However, the structure and functions of the state in South Sudan have



been increasingly contested both among members of the ruling SPLM (and the SPLA), as well as among the leaderships of several ethnic groups, who have significantly different views with regard to how it should evolve than does the SPLM/SPLA. The lack of progress towards defining a coherent post-independence national unifying principle further aggravates these differences. Much useful work on peace-building at the level of communities will be lost if violent tensions continue to recur at state and national levels, or if increased state fragility prevents greater engagement with communities.

23. For UNDP, the notion of “state capacity” will therefore have to expand to include, in the first instance, not just as the hardware of roads, policing posts, and communications, but also “software” along the following lines:

- i) Development of sufficient mutual confidence and trust, and the ability for collaboration across inter-ethnic lines, among the leaderships of the primary ethnic groups, especially at the national level, but with continued support for similar initiatives at the community level also.
- ii) Leadership and management capabilities for senior managers and staff in key government institutions;
- iii) A significant expansion and consolidation, drawing on existing traditional, civic, and government capacities, of conflict management capabilities at the national, state, county, *payam*, and boma levels, with a focus on areas worst affected by large-scale and cyclical violence, and building on the achievements of the CSAC initiative in this regard.
- iv) Development of a pool of South Sudanese technical and managerial expertise that could be drawn upon to address gaps in work of state institutions, or creating unsustainable substitution effects, especially key commissions and ministries, without disrupting the organizational coherence of these institutions (this is especially critical given the appointment of high-level functionaries for reasons of political accommodation rather than technical competence);
- v) Adjustment of governmental and traditional processes of planning and budgeting to accommodate provisions for effective local policing and basic infrastructure, and for community participation, including through greater mutual coherence among these processes, and scaling up on the initiate work done through CSAC in this regard.

24. In order for it to be applied effectively and realistically, support for this “software” will need to have the following characteristics:

- a. Given national sensitivities, and the complexity of the issues involved as well as the remoteness of many parts of country, South Sudanese nationals with the relevant technical competence, credibility, and legitimacy will have to provide substantive leadership for its development and application where necessary;

- b. In order to ensure the widest level of “institutionalization” and sustainability, and to reach an effective critical mass on the ground, this support will have to be provided through resident development agencies, albeit in close collaboration with the resident UN mission and other political representations; a “political” intervention by the UN and the international community might also invite resistance and a lack of buy-in;
- c. It will have to build on a review and the results of efforts that are already on-going in this regard;
- d. It will have to be based on a sufficiently deep understanding of conflict dynamics on the part of the South Sudanese who are leading its development and implementation, as well as those providing support.
- e. Substantive assistance from the international community will have to be discreet and based on quiet accompaniment, and focus primarily on availing “best practices” and relevant experiences, and facilitation and training where requested; it will also have to be carefully coordinated to achieve maximum impact.

25. For CSAC, the implications are three-fold:

- a. CSAC has performed well, particularly in relation to the conflict-sensitive provision of development assets such as police posts (and related equipment), prisons, water points and tools for mechanized agriculture. With the majority of planned infrastructure completed, or nearing completion, greater emphasis should be placed on the development of the “software” for peace at the local level at which CSAC works. This includes the skills, capacities, and aptitude of key institutions and individuals—both traditional and modern—at the state, county, *payam*, and boma levels for conflict transformation, i.e. the peaceful management of conflict, and for implementation of conflict-sensitive development.
- b. To achieve a critical mass of violence prevention through local-level initiatives, all relevant local actors—communities, elders, officials of the SSPC and the B-CSSAC at the state levels, police, local SPLA commanders, leaders of religious institutions, and members of “peace cadres”—will need to be brought together into a new, more effective, architecture for early warning and response to emerging tensions. This architecture should allow actors to work together, share information, and jointly and anticipate and respond to emerging tensions. Given the size and remoteness of the country, this should initially be done for the states that are worst affected by violence.
- c. The continued building or consolidation of hardware will have to be closely linked to software. Development assets and other resources should be provided as a “dividend” for the peaceful resolution or management of conflict, and provide a basis for communities to work across lines of ethnic division. Where possible, support for community security and local development should be directed towards the

sustainability of peace agreements around larger “conflict clusters,” especially the so-called Jonglei and Wunlit clusters.

#### **IV. Observations and recommendations regarding CSAC’s current Outputs**

##### ***Existing Gains***

##### **Output 1: The GOSS CSSAC Bureau is fully operational and active, integrating gender dimensions in to policy development.**

26. Initial progress has been extremely encouraging; a national policy on small arms has been drafted<sup>3</sup> and submitted for enactment into law, and a national public information strategy (focusing on the small arms bill, community security and conflict resolution) has commenced its pilot dissemination phase. The Bureau has also engaged with various regional and international forums.

27. However, the lingering uncertainty over the leadership of the Bureau is a cause for concern. The previous Director of the Bureau was relieved of his duties. The current Director has not been permanently appointed; consequently, his authority is limited, and his ability to set and maintain strategic direction is constrained.

28. This compounds the capacity and resource constraints experienced by Bureau staff at state level, undermining their effectiveness as a partner for CSAC, local government counterparts and communities alike.

29. The review concludes that the constraints imposed by the current climate of austerity, together with the continuing uncertainty surrounding the leadership of the Bureau limits its effectiveness to the extent that CSAC’s Targets for Output 1 are likely to be only partially achieved.

##### **30. The recommendations for Output 1 are:**

- a. **Request resolution of uncertainty over CSAC Bureaus leadership:** UNDP and the CSAC donors should discuss an appropriate request to Government to resolve the lingering uncertainty over the Bureau’s leadership before the CSAC CT phase begins.
- b. **Enhance collaboration between national partner institutions:** In the interim, the role of the pending UN P4 secondment to the Bureau should include a focus on working with the UN Technical Adviser to the SSPC in order to enhance collaboration between the CSAC Bureaus and the SSPC.
- c. **Build on existing gains:** Given the leadership, resource and capacity constraints affecting Bureau operations at state level, CSAC should consider focussing immediate attention on developing

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<sup>3</sup> With significant support from CSAC-provided international advisers

operations in states where its capacities are strongest, and are therefore likely to provide the greater 'return' on the capacities built.

- d. Establish legal frameworks on small arms and light weapons control:** The Bureau should continue to be supported in signing and ratifying regional and international protocols, treaties and conventions on small arms and light weapons control with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These efforts will help catalyse and strengthen its own national (draft) legislation process and ensure any future civilian disarmament process is conducted within the rule of law, but also within a coordinated and harmonized manner amongst South Sudan's neighbours.
- e. Support implementation of the national legislation on SALW control:** An implementation strategy should be developed, which draws on the comparative advantage and mandates of key line ministries, commissions and bureaus, as well as other external UN and NGO partners. The relationships and entry points that the Bureau and CSAC programme have built at county and sub-county level should be leveraged to ensure effective articulation and implementation at these levels, where the presence of small arms is the greatest.
- f. Promote systems and processes for voluntary civilian disarmament:** While the situation may not be ripe for national voluntary disarmament campaigns at this juncture, the Bureau should begin to develop strategies, policies and other guidelines on voluntary civilian disarmament, and establish meaningful coordination forums at the national level amongst key security actors. Focus should be on identifying and developing key systems and processes that can effectively manage voluntary disarmament processes under the 'right' conditions as opposed to measures that merely respond to short-term considerations.
- g. Weapons management, storage and stockpiling:** Since other partners are investing in supporting the Bureau on stockpile management issues, UNDP should support the Bureau's capacity to coordinate, with other partners, stockpile management issues including: conducting assessments for stockpile management needs for all organized forces; training organized forces in stockpile management; construction of new safe storage facilities for weapons; supporting gun marking processes; disposal of obsolete weapons as well as weapons collected from civilians; developing guidelines for registration and licensing of civilian held weapons, and providing training to the police and other relevant government institutions to implement the registration.
- h. "Disarming the minds":** Support a national campaign that informs, educates and sensitizes communities across South Sudan, particularly areas that are conflict prone, inaccessible or otherwise marginalized, on issues directly related to arms use and possession, disseminate laws and policies on SALW to communities, and prompt public debate among communities and local leaders on the unhelpful cultural practices that promote violence and indignity. However, changes in attitudes, behaviours and mind-sets will not be seen overnight and will therefore

require sustained, multi-year timelines, and development of indicators to assess the effectiveness of the engagement. The latter is challenging, but can be achieved through periodic perception-mapping surveys that measure changes in community-identified behavioural indicators; however, this is largely dependent on the establishment of robust baseline information, either at an early stage of the process or done retrospectively). CSAC may also consider using ‘champions’ such as, prominent political leaders, singer, artists, or community and opinion leaders can help advance the agenda and raise prominence of the issues.

- i. **Capacity building and local ownership:** Targeted and sustained support for “capacity building” should be focused on the Bureau’s State Inspectors, with particular emphasis on leadership development, coordination, oral and written communication, budgeting, and planning and advocacy. This, along with coordinated advocacy from CSAC’s board members, will help ensure local ownership of the programme.
- j. **Research and Analysis:** The Bureau should be supported to engage in targeted research and publication on core issues related to its mandate as a means to influence national, state and local policy and programmes, and to create an evidence and knowledge base whereby it can advance the agenda for community security. South Sudan is experiencing a unique situation as a new country in a very fragile environment and lessons learned from its experience will help in state building in other contexts (e.g. studies on current efforts to address inter-communal violence; dynamics between inter communal violence and political violence; lessons from the peaceful disarmament process in Lakes, Unity and Warrap versus the forceful disarmament process in Jonglei).

## **Output 2: Improved security environment allows for development at the community level with specific attention to women’s security needs**

31. CSAC has performed well, particularly in relation to Targets 2, 4 and 5, where conflict-sensitive development projects have undoubtedly delivered security benefits within and between certain communities<sup>4</sup>. The CSDP’s have also contributed significantly to CSAC’s state-building, peace-building and social contract objectives by directly supporting, in a very practical fashion, the extension of state authority, delivery of services, and functional state-citizen relations at the local level. Whilst most of these advances require further consolidation and development, they provide a sound basis for further progress.

32. In Eastern Equatoria, the review team conducted separate interviews with the Deputy State Governor, the Torit County Commissioner, and the State Police Commissioner. Each official reported that CSAC had contributed to falling levels of criminality and cattle raiding, particularly in areas where CSAC police posts have been established, where increased levels of public confidence are evidenced by

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<sup>4</sup> The review team visited a very small sample of participating communities. A more detailed evaluation would be required to assess breadth and depth of impact.

the construction of new residential and commercial properties in many locations.

33. The team visited the CSAC police post and water point at Canary *payam* in Kowtow County, where the County Police Commissioner said that the establishment of police posts and radio communication facilities at Chahari, and in the neighbouring Budi county (between which there is a long history of cattle raiding), had enabled the respective police forces to monitor and communicate threats of impending cattle raids between the locales. They are able to pre-empt raids, and warn local citizens to herd and protect their cattle. Consequently, the raids have proven less profitable for the instigators, and incidents have sharply declined.

34. Police and community members reported that levels of banditry and petty criminality have also declined, and that local residents previously displaced to the surrounding hills for security reasons are returning, constructing *tukls*, cultivating crops, and establishing small roadside shops.

35. The Commissioner's analysis was confirmed during a separate meeting with community elders and women's representatives. The elders reported that not only had security improved, but that the re-establishment of formal policing and judicial processes was providing valuable support to the local traditional structures and procedures, in particular, providing ready access to police and judicial responses to crimes not typically dealt with by traditional structures and processes.

36. Community elders also reported that, since the establishment of the police post, local government officials, including the *payam* Administrator, had started relocating to the area, and were constructing accommodation adjacent to the police post, further boosting local confidence. The women's representatives reported that the improved security meant that their freedom of movement had increased, and that they were more confident about venturing further afield for farming activities.

37. **Given the operational environment, it is reasonable to expect that there are a number of challenges.** The team visited a CSAC-supported police post in a nearby area known as *Hakuma Mafi* (Arabic for "Government Is Not Here"), which, since the establishment of the police post, is now known as *Hakuma Fi* ("Government Is Here"). The police contingent has largely abandoned the post (with the exception of 1 or 2 officers); this is in part due to the fact that there is no available water source at the post (the nearest reliable source being 5km distant), and no accommodation for resident officers<sup>5</sup>. However, it should also be recognized that, whilst important, these issues exist within a broader set of contextual constraints in relation to policing in rural areas, and are unlikely to be the only factor influencing the decision of to abandon the post. CSAC's engineering team will assess the site for water-harvesting options in 2013.

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<sup>5</sup>CSAC test-bored for water at 5 locations, but without success. Further attempts will be made to resolve the problem.

38. The team encountered similar operational challenges at CSAC-supported police posts in Upper Nile state, including radios that staff had not been trained to operate<sup>6</sup>, motorbikes they had not been trained to ride and, somewhat inevitably, a lack of fuel for cars, motorbikes and tractors (the latter for the mechanized farming projects). CSAC is clear that the on-going care and operation of equipment is the responsibility of local government, but it is evident that, in the current ‘austerity climate’, most local authorities will be unable to fuel or maintain equipment. Retaining trained police staff will remain a challenge. Officers trained by CSAC are frequently redeployed; realistically, there is little that the project can do to influence this. However, efforts could be made to co-ordinate with training programmes provided by other donor agencies, such as the DFID-funded Security and Access to Justice Programme, which was running a week-long motorcycle training programme for police officers whilst the review team was visiting Torit.

39. **None of these challenges should detract from the positive impacts the project is having.** The **CSAC Turn-key Facility**, which ensures that all CSAC-supported infrastructure is fully provisioned with the equipment necessary for the users to start working effectively immediately on receipt of the asset, appears to be a successful component of the project. Most operational challenges of the type encountered by the review team are to be expected, and should be easily remedied once a basic audit of project status has been conducted, and a plan to address these issues established<sup>7</sup>.

40. Perhaps more challenging is the fact that most respondents in state and county administrations said that they had not been able to budget for the on-going operation and maintenance of CSAC-provided infrastructure and equipment. Most blamed the current austerity regime, understandably, but the review team also concludes that CSAC could apply a more systematic focus to supporting planning and budgeting at county level.

41. Evidence relating to the impact of specific measures to address women’s security concerns is, at this stage, purely anecdotal. As with the other activities related to Output 2, the project would benefit from a more systematic collection of qualitative data to illustrate impact.

**42. The recommendations for output 2 are:**

**a. Increase support to county planning and budgeting:** The CSAC consultation methodology has demonstrated its ability in using participatory, consultative and conflict-sensitive processes to identify targeted development projects. CSAC should focus on integrating this methodology through the Local Government Planning and Budgeting Guidelines, thereby institutionalizing its process to ensure government budgetary allocations to support conflict-sensitive and participatory planning. Leveraging the comparative advantages of CRMA (data collection), CSAC (analysis) and SPFM (budgeting/planning) would help achieve this aim.

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<sup>6</sup>Some SSP staff had been trained by the project to operate Codan radios, but several posts had received Kumaq radios. Also, several of the Codan-trained staff had been re-posted to Jonglei, thus removing capacity that the project had provided.

<sup>7</sup>The project is already conducting police audit surveys and is devising lists of problems to be addressed.

- b. Focus on usability, utilization and sustainability of the assets provided:** Through supporting government budgeting and planning processes, CSAC should continue to monitor and evaluate projects that have been completed, as well as those that are on-going, in order to ensure effective end-user usability, utilization, sustainability and impact. Focus should be placed on ensuring that the assets provided have sufficient institutional integration to be effectively managed and sustainably implemented through respective line ministries. For example, mechanized farming projects should have responsible management arrangements in place for farmers to access spare parts and maintenance for tractors, and police should be deployed at posts with adequate food rations to sustain deployments. Where lessons have been learned in second phase states (Unity, Lakes and Warrap), efforts should be made to rectify shortcomings in phase one states (Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria and Upper Nile).
- c. UNMISS (UNPOL) and support to police training:** Wherever possible, UNPOL should provide co-location, mentoring and training support to the SSPS deployed in CSAC-constructed police posts, particularly in the areas of advanced radio operation and community policing. Conversely, wherever possible, UNDP CSAC should engage with UNPOL in the design phases of its police/prisons projects to identify areas where UNPOL can offer co-location support in order to ensure maximum support to CSAC-supported policing projects. In addition, CSAC's Police Audit Survey Tool can help identify key emerging issues based on comparative analysis of the Tool's findings and support broader policy-level policing issues.

**Output 3: Capacity of the SSPRC is enhanced in supporting peace building, conflict transformation and mitigation at county and lower levels, reflecting the variety of leadership, including women, at county level.**

43. Progress against this output has been reasonable. CSAC has supported the Peace Commission (PC) to conceptualize a strategy, methodology and staff selection process for an innovative "peace training" programme, which is based on the experience of CSAC's pilot training exercises in Eastern Equatoria, Warrap and Jonglei during 2011. The programme, which is the foundation of CSAC's proposed "conflict transformation" strategy, will support the establishment of mechanisms for government-led, community-driven conflict transformation processes that are closely linked to similar traditional instruments, and which deliver the timely and effective management and mitigation of conflict through the graduated development of inter-ethnic and cross-community confidence-building measures and dialogue.

44. The methodology revolves around local "peace cadres" or committees at the community level, comprised of members trained in conflict transformation, and equipped with practical tools that support their role in mitigating and mediating local conflicts.

45. The draft training toolkit has been developed and is currently being piloted. It will be finalized based on the lessons derived from the pilot phase. "Peace cadre" training exercises are in progress in 2



counties each in the Lakes, Warrap, and Upper Nile states. Initial exploratory missions have been completed in Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria states, and plans for rollout in Unity state have been completed.

46. However, as the purpose of the output is to ‘enhance the capacity of the PC to support peace building, conflict transformation and mitigation at county and lower levels, it must be acknowledged that the PC’s limited capacity at state level constrains its ability to assume a lead role, and a systematic development of this capacity may be required.

47. The project’s “peace cadre” and conflict mitigation model, which builds on existing conflict management processes, is an innovative departure from the standard approach of ‘teaching conflict resolution’ from manuals developed externally. Whilst it requires considerable levels of effort to understand local roles and responsibilities (which should be regarded as a positive investment), ultimately, its sustainability relies heavily on: a) the willingness of those equipped with conflict transformation skills to remain engaged with the model<sup>8</sup>; and b) the capacity of a national institution (the PC) to sustain the model in the aftermath of the CSAC project.

48. The PC appears relatively well resourced (in terms of salaried staff) at the national office in Juba, and benefits from the assistance of seconded UNDP CSAC Technical Advisers (1 P4; IUNV), but is constrained by a comparative lack of capacity at state and county levels. **In an ideal scenario, the PC, and its staff at the state level, would have clear linkages and operational relationships with the state peace commissions, and with the proposed “peace cadres” at the county, *payam*, and boma levels.** In addition, the PC should constitute the apex of an early-warning-and-response system through which emerging tensions are identified and addressed based on these operational relationships. The draft national peace policy, currently awaiting legislation, will provide the legal basis for such a role on the behalf of the PC. CSAC should ensure that it is able to support the strengthening of the PC along these lines.

**49. Recommendations for Output 3 are:**

- a. **Define SSPC mandate:** CSAC should assist the SSPC to define its mandate as a policy development institution, and strengthen its capacity to provide technical advice to national initiatives, such as the development of the national reconciliation process that has been advocated for by the Vice-President, as well as local processes, such as that currently underway in Jonglei. SSPC’s strength does not lie in project implementation, and the institution should withdraw from that arena.
- b. **Supporting the SSPC in coordination:** The proliferation of international, national and local organizations working on conflict mitigation and peace building prevents the effective

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<sup>8</sup>The project addresses this by providing training for approximately 60 potential cadre members, and works on the assumption that a group of 15 – 20 motivated individuals will remain.

coordination and utilization of resources, and undermines the efforts of the SSPC to implement its mandate. Given its mandate as the focal point on peace building, UNDP should continue to support the SSPC to coordinate actors working in the areas of the Commission's mandate at both national and state levels (this should include a database of actors and activities). Additionally, national, state and local peace building initiatives should avoid establishing ad hoc or parallel structures, but rather invest in the longer-term strengthening of the Peace Commission's mandate and technical functionality.

- c. **Support the SSPC and state governments to develop clearer roles and responsibilities:** This should include forums for coordination (per previous recommendation), and for joint planning and information, within the context of a multi-year State Peace building Plan (SPP).
- d. **Support SSPC to develop capacity of local administrations:** CSAC should assist the SSPC to develop and deliver training in conflict-sensitive development planning for state, county and *payam* administration staff involved in budgeting and planning processes.
- e. **Align budgets and SPPs:** CSAC should support SSPC and state governments to align state budgets to implement SPPs, and use them as the coordinating documents for external support in the areas of peace and security.
- f. **Reaching Critical Mass and Scale:** The joint SSPC-UNDP Conflict Transformation Facilitation approach puts forth a compelling methodology and approach to local conflict mitigation and peace building. If the pilot phase yields success, significant resources will be required, both in terms of staff and activity costs, to bring the initiative to scale. In addition, an integrated 'hardware' component, whereby micro-level projects can be implemented to meaningfully address resource-based conflicts, will be necessary to actualize peace and to cement the peace building link. This provides yet another opportunity for communities (and UNDP) to influence local budgeting and planning processes.
- g. **Capacity and institution building:** Government needs to augment the capacity of the SSPC by appointing individuals based on their competencies and the ability to take on the mantle and challenge of peace building. Leadership, managerial, mediation and other functional competency trainings should be further explored for individuals who have first demonstrated a commitment to their roles/responsibilities.
- h. **Support SSPC – CSAC Bureaus collaboration:** This should include regular coordination, and joint planning and implementation of activities, as well as joint participation in regional and international forums.

**Output 4: Operational Capacity of County governments in conflict prone counties improved through infrastructure & equipment etc.**

50. Reasonable progress has been made by CSAC on its share of the task of establishing “county support bases” (CSBs). However, UNMISS, which is responsible for establishing the peacekeeping component of CSBs, has been somewhat slower.

51. According to UNDP South Sudan, austerity measures have resulted in higher prices due to lower availability of materials, which is impacting on the costs of CSAC’s civil works. Austerity measures are also likely to inhibit local governments’ ability to maintain and actually use the infrastructure/portals being provided as part of CSBs, thereby raising possible concerns over their sustainability, and suggesting the need for UNDP to instigate a discussion about sustainability with key stakeholders (government, non-government and donors, for example);

52. However, there is a lot of potential in the concept of shared platforms for development actors, particularly given the high costs of operating locally in South Sudan and the need for stronger coordination at the county level and below.

**53. Recommendations for output 4 are:**

a. **Ensure actualization of the CSB concept (and not merely its components):** While the CSB concept can be disaggregated into its two sub-components—platforms (implemented by UNMISS) and portals (implemented by UNDP CSAC)—its full actualization will be void without delivery of both components in a timely manner. As such, and given the advanced stage of the CSB portals, the DSRSG/RC/HC should lobby UNMISS to prioritize completion of the CSB platforms to enable UNCT and INGOs to provide services to the under-served remote counties as per the original design of the concept.

**V. On the Consolidation of Existing Gains**

54. As CSAC plans the transition to its next phase, it is important that it consolidates existing gains, and remedies the outstanding challenges, some of which are alluded to in the previous section. CSAC programme staff will have to define the best approach, but an indicative list of actions in this regard might include:

- a. **Multi-year funding for CSAC.** The consolidation of the programme’s initial gains, and the implementation of the conflict transformation approach, will require sustained funding for a minimum of three years beyond 2012. If they do not wish to risk losing the investments already made, donors should provide this support. CSAC and its institutional partners require a degree of predictable funding if they are to *responsibly* engage community structures in local security initiatives.
- b. **Document existing gains.** It is important that success is contextualised. CSAC staff at state level should be tasked with producing ‘end of phase’ summary reports that record the specific conflict and security challenges that each CSDP sought to address, how the CSDPs have impacted on the

issues, and how the local communities have experienced those impact. This detailed evidence of impact has also been requested by CSAC's donors. CSAC is currently undertaking steps to assess and collate this data.

- c. **Address instances of 'elite capture' relating to CSAC resources and equipment.** The issue arose in several locations, variously related to cars, bikes, boats, tractors and 'community' mechanised farming initiatives. Whilst the review team's sample, and depth of engagement, was too limited to assess the extent of the problem, it is clearly one that warrants thorough examination, documentation, and a focussed effort to address the main instances. This may also warrant a review of the community consultation model, and follow-up procedures;
- d. **Fast track the operationalization of CSBs.** The UNMISS CSBs will be important to the implementation of the next phase of CSAC. UNDP and CSAC should work with UNMISS to agree on the priority CSBs, and schedule their completion during the coming dry season;
- e. **Add two additional P-3 level staff to increase monitoring of state and country level activities** in order to achieve desired results;
- f. **Enhance focus on women's security priorities.** As mentioned in previous sections, evidence relating to this action is currently anecdotal. The review team received clear feedback from CSAC donors that they require documented evidence of project impact; CSAC should develop an approach to collecting and documenting qualitative accounts of the impact of project activities on the security circumstances of women. The engagement approach, and the identification of a simple set of practical indicators, should be developed in collaboration with the state SSPC representatives, and in consultation with community members in selected project locales. The review notes the data collected on the women's tractor group in Eastern Equatoria, but recommends that such data be collected in a more systematic manner, across a more representative sample of projects.
- g. **Review management support to CSAC teams at state level.** State-level staff of CSAC reported that they could benefit from closer support from headquarters to Juba, especially in terms of field visits by Juba-based managers. This will also help ensure that efforts at state level were evolving according to the project's overall approach, especially given that CSAC is a complex programmes that is required to deliver inter-connected outputs in challenging environments across 6 states.
- h. **Convey CSAC's "conflict transformation" methodology, and the states targeted for this support, to key international actors,** including the World Bank's Point of Contact on its pending Community-Driven Development Initiative. The Bank's standard post-conflict CDD modality is based on similar community-engagement and community-led prioritisation principles to those employed by CSAC. The review team has no specific information about the Bank's South Sudan programme, but recommends that UNDP coordinate, or at very least consult with, the Bank about potential complementarities (and avoid duplication of effort in same areas.

- i. **Convey breadth, depth and inter-connectedness of UNDP programming to relevant actors.** CSAC's conflict transformation methodology sits within UNDP's broader programme, many elements of which CSAC informs and complements. However, it is clear that awareness of this range of activities, and the extent to which they do, or should, interrelate, is limited, even within the structure of UN agencies in South Sudan. A matrix of UNDP projects, and their synergies with CSAC, is attached at Annex A. CSAC / UNDP should ensure that all UNDP projects / UN Agencies have access to this matrix. Further, CSAC should examine options to disseminate this information beyond the UN network, including direct distribution to national donor agencies, the EU and through channels such as the South Sudan NGO Forum. Once the information is disseminated, UNDP / CSAC might consider hosting a series of short presentation workshops to brief its development partners on the content of the matrix.

## VI. Observations and recommendations regarding CSAC's proposed Conflict Transformation Phase

### On the Strategic Vision

55. UNDP and SSPC propose to develop CSAC's "software" components through a "conflict transformation" (CT) approach. The review team believes that the approach provides the conceptual basis of a broader programme in which UNDP's array of programming resources can cohere in support of an overarching strategy that combines community security, peace building and state building objectives in the most conflict-prone states.

56. In addition to CSAC, UNDP currently has a suite of programmes and projects addressing conflict mitigation, security and governance issues across the 10 states, including: the Crisis Mapping and Risk Analysis project; the Stabilization Programmes (funded through SSRF); the Access to Justice and Rule of Law programme, the Support to States Programme, and the IGAD and DDR initiatives<sup>9</sup>. Collectively, these initiatives engage with local government, police and judicial services, traditional authorities and communities at each level from national to state to boma.

57. CSAC's CT approach aims to provide community-level engagement, and training in conflict analysis and participatory conflict-sensitive development planning, in order to enhance the collective efforts of UNDP, its local government counterparts, and communities, to reduce violent conflict, improve community security, strengthen state structures, and establish functional relations between citizens and local government (hereafter referred to as 'the social contract').

58. The review presents the following recommendations in support of this aim. The recommendations relate to:

- Expanding the strategic vision of the Conflict Transformation approach
- Addressing inter-ethnic and trans-boundary disputes
- Combining software & hardware in support of the social contract

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<sup>9</sup> A list of relevant projects, and links to CSAC, is attached as Annex A

59. **Expanding the strategic vision of the Conflict Transformation (CT) approach:** The current CT approach proposes a *'government-led, community-driven ... conflict transformation process where community members are selected and trained in conflict analysis, transformation and facilitation skills ... applying them within their communities'*.

**Recommendations:** The scope of the vision should be extended beyond the community level, to reflect that CSAC, with its national partner institutions, will:

- a. Provide information, analysis and training<sup>10</sup> to UNDP's broader programme of support to crisis prevention and recovery, governance and poverty reduction at national and sub-national levels;
- b. Increase CSAC's current training and technical assistance to, communities and local authorities in support of the participatory identification, planning and implementation of conflict-sensitive development projects (CSDPs), and community security initiatives.
- c. Through the SSRF facility, provide access to material resources necessary for the implementation of CSDPs.
- d. Develop local capacities for inter-ethnic confidence building through peace cadres, with support from local authorities and traditional leaders.

60. **Addressing inter-ethnic and trans-boundary disputes:** The cyclical nature of violent conflict in South Sudan's worst-affected areas, the fragility of peace agreements, and the impact of greater inter-ethnic tension at the national level, makes it imperative that the fragile local gains supported through CSAC are resilient and reach a critical mass of impact, in order that they are not wiped away by every fresh eruption of violence.

61. This resilience will require greater capacity on the part of those trained on ground, especially in order to work with each other to manage conflicts and implement development initiatives in a conflict-sensitive manner. CSAC's proposed CT approach addresses this requirement, but does so mainly at community level. The approach proposes that communities will be supported to work on cross-county inter-ethnic and inter-tribal disputes. Whilst community engagement is vital, the review team suggests that the longer-term sustainability of such efforts, as well as the attainment of critical mass, can only be achieved through the institutionalization of conflict mitigation capacities within the county and state administrations.

**Recommendations:**

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<sup>10</sup>Trainings would be tailored to the requirements of audiences, but could be drawn from a menu that provides, for example, the basic elements of conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity, conflict-sensitive development planning and local peace building.

- a. State and county officials should be systematically supported by SSPC and B-CSSAC representatives to include community security and conflict mitigation efforts in their plans and budgets;
- b. State and county officials should have full knowledge of the location and profiles of “peace cadres” and other local peace-making and confidence-building assets, and vice-versa, and should be prepared to deploy and support their efforts appropriately;
- c. CSAC, the SSPC and the CSAC Bureau should facilitate the efforts of peace cadres, and state, county and local officials, to identify practical approaches to defusing potentially violent tensions, manage recurring conflict, and planning and implementing conflict-sensitive development initiatives;
- d. CSAC and its institutional partners should work to ensure that these approaches are not applied on a one-time basis (a significant limitation of “peace conferences”), but can be used repeatedly, proactively, and collaboratively by the concerned actors, which will require longer timelines and multi-year funding
- e. Practical support in this regard might include communications capabilities and logistics required by the actors to coordinate and respond jointly in case of tension or violence; the establishment of common procedures and guidelines through which these actions are undertaken; and the inclusion of joint conflict mitigation initiatives into local government plans and budgets.

62. **Combining software and hardware in support of the social contract:** CSAC’s ‘software’ training should be provided alongside the operational and material means through which those trained can accompany each other (and also be accompanied by CSAC) in applying their skills, both in terms of addressing violent tensions, as well as in developing and utilizing physical development assets in a collaborative manner, thereby providing the tangible resources with which local government and communities put the ‘social contract’ into practice. Thus far, this link has been provided by the SSRF, which delivers some of the ‘conflict-sensitive’ infrastructure projects identified by communities participating in CSAC-led consultations.

63. Whilst the CSAC / SSRF collaboration has delivered some excellent infrastructure, feedback from donor consultations **suggests that the strategic link should be made stronger, in order to ensure that the identification, planning and delivery of conflict-sensitive development projects becomes an integral part (indeed, the focus of) state-citizen dialogue**, thereby supporting the “social contract” aspiration, and engaging conflicting communities in the joint planning and delivery of development initiatives.

## VII. Recommendations for wider UNDP programme

64. The longer-term effectiveness of CSAC and other UNDP programmes will depend largely on the extent to which the emerging challenges at the national level, as identified in Section II, are addressed. Six potential areas of UNDP support, which could be implemented through on-going programmes or via a new national-level initiative on conflict prevention, will be critical in this regard:

**Support for a national “visioning” process:** UNDP can provide comparative “best practices,” informal confidence-building and facilitation as requested and appropriate, technical assistance on specific issues, and the infrastructure for community-level consultations built through CSAC in service of a nationally-led process of dialogue that would build inter-ethnic confidence, attempt to establish a shared and transformative national agenda and identity, and garner popular inputs and participation into the constitutional review and other critical governance processes.

**Support the establishment of a national “elders’ forum:”** Building on regional and international models in this regard, UNDP could assist the SSPC or a relevant national institution to in turn support the constitution and work of a panel of high-level, trusted, intermediaries such as the Archbishop of Juba or the Chief Justice. The “elders” will play both public and private roles in “confidence-building,” provide a reference point for a national discourse that stands above partisan politics, and assist with the management of tensions and conflicts at the national level.

**Capacity development of Parliamentarians:** UNDP should support the development of capacities of parliamentarians for both conflict transformation and for the effective exercise and management of basic parliamentary procedure, including more systematic engagement with their constituencies. A strong parliament will bring greater balance and nuance to political competition at the national level, and could also be an effective forum for building consensus and managing political conflict.

**Media and education:** In partnership with UNSMISS and UNICEF, UNDP should explore the possibility of using UN-assisted radio and education programmes to creatively promote a more cohesive national identity, and to integrate conflict transformation into high school, colleague, and public administration curricula. A shift in the popular discourse and attitudes may also prompt different behaviour by the leadership or at a minimum dampen public tension.

**Collaborative leadership:** Building on innovations in other post-conflict or transitional situations such as Kenya and Nepal, UNDP should support leadership development for senior political, civic, and institutional leaders, encompassing both conflict transformation as well as techniques for constructive leadership amidst conflict or competition. Leaders could accompany each other in applying these skills. Accompanying this initiative should be the formation of a pool of South Sudanese technical and managerial expertise at the junior-to-mid-level that could be drawn upon to address technical or competency gaps in work of state institutions without disrupting the organizational coherence of these institutions. A senior manager reporting directly to the president or the vice-president could manage the pool.



***Oil, land, and extractives:*** While Norway and other donors are assisting with the development of strategies for the allocation of oil wealth UNDP can support the formulation and implementation of strategies to ensure environmental sustainability and community participation. Especially key will be national and local mediation capacities for instances where claims to customary land conflict with appropriation or titling for commercial use. A tripartite negotiating framework for communities, governments (national, state, country) and the private sector with regard to repatriation of benefits to communities, appropriate compensation, and conflict-and-environmentally-sensitive commercial use could be of tremendous benefit to South Sudan at this crucial juncture.

***National peace architecture:*** As indicated under the recommendations for CSAC, the SSPC, the B-CSSAC; state representatives of both bureaus; state peace commissions, state and country law enforcement officials; local “peace cadres;” and religious and traditional institutions should be linked together into a national peace architecture that can provide effective early warning and response for emerging tensions, and manage and resolve on-going conflicts.

65. Within UNDP, the conduct and development of confidence-building and partnerships with key national actors as well as UNSMISS in order to achieve the above will require the direct leadership of the Resident Representative, the Country Director, and other senior managers. To support this leadership, a Senior Peace-building Advisor (P-5) should be recruited to help integrate diverse UNDP programmes into national level strategies and impact; provide effective partnership with other UN agencies, UNSMISS, and resident donors; and engage national and local actors at all levels to open entry points for the development and implementation of the initiatives detailed in paragraph 62.

Annex A: UNDP Project Synergies with CSAC

Project	Unit (within UNDP)	Overview	UNDAF Outcome	Government Counterpart	Areas for Collaboration/Engagement
Stabilization (SSRF Round 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Crisis Prevention &amp; Recovery</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Joint-UN State-level stabilization projects, with UNDP as lead agency and UNOPS and WFP as PUNOs</li> <li>▪ Focus is on medium-to-large scale infrastructure, premised on extending state authority and law enforcement in conflict-prone regions</li> <li>▪ Operational in four states: Eastern Equatoria; Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap</li> <li>▪ \$17M investment per state</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Violence is reduced and community security improves</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ State and Local Governments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ All infrastructure works were identified through the CSAC County Consultation process</li> <li>▪ Both projects are contributing to the same UNDAF Outcome (violence is reduced and community security improves)</li> <li>▪ Currently working with CSAC to develop a joint outcome-level monitoring framework</li> <li>▪ CSAC's Radio Programme on SALW control will be aired through the SSRF-funded Jonglei State Radio Station once fully completed</li> <li>▪ Further consideration can/should be made on developing a common UNDP programme on community security and stabilization</li> </ul>
Crisis Mapping & Risk Analysis (CRMA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Poverty Reduction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Data collection, mapping and information management on basic services and socio-economic threats through county-level consultations</li> <li>▪ Key objective is to support evidence-based planning and budgeting</li> <li>▪ Supported the establishment of an Information Management Working Group, whereby stakeholders can input data on newly constructed services (police posts, water points, etc) among other related data to support coordination and avoid</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Core governance and civil service functions are established and operational</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National Bureau for Statistics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Currently working with CSAC to harmonize consultation tool-kit to support county-level budgeting and planning through use of conflict-sensitive analysis</li> <li>▪ Further linkages can/should be explored to manage and disseminate the CSAC consultation findings in order to inform programming of other external NGO, UN and government actors.</li> </ul>

		duplication of resources.			
Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration of Ex-combatants (DDR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Crisis Prevention &amp; Recovery</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Re-design of reintegration programme, based on lessons learned from CPA period DDR programme.</li> <li>Two-pronged strategy focusing on both individual benefits for ex-combatants and community driven benefits, to boost absorptive capacity</li> <li>Capacity development support for line ministries for services outreach: vocational training, small business development, agriculture, formal education, social and psychosocial re-integration</li> <li>Support implementation of community based programme for WAAFG</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Violence is reduced and community security improved</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DDR Commission</li> <li>Ministry of Defence</li> <li>Associated line ministries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Specific programme areas need to be considered once the new DDR programme is established, with particular focus on the 'communal environment' in which reintegration is taking place, given the large number of SALWs in civilian hands and armed (youth) groups.</li> </ul>
Access to Justice & Rule of Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support development and promulgation of essential legislative framework, including new constitution</li> <li>Support increasing access to the statutory justice system, in line with the Judiciary Action Plan</li> <li>Align traditional justice mechanisms with human rights norms</li> <li>Support the deployment of a functional professional police service</li> <li>Support the creation of functional and secure prisons respecting the rights of prisoners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Criminal justice system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Judiciary</li> <li>Ministry of Justice</li> <li>Human Rights Commission</li> <li>Ministry of Interior (police and prisons services)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Currently working with CSAC's Conflict Facilitation Training initiative to deliver trainings in customary law to traditional chiefs.</li> <li>Working to channel key policy-level policing issues that are impacting on the success of CSAC-supported policing projects to national-level government counterparts (MoI, IGP, etc)</li> <li>Exploring opportunities to utilize RoL-supported "Crime Statistics" data, among other areas, in support of outcome-level monitoring of police stations/posts</li> </ul>
Support to States Project (Rapid Capacity Placement)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poverty Reduction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deployment of 100+ International UNVs into front line service delivery ministries at State-level</li> <li>Providing critical capacity building,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Core governance and civil service functions are established and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</li> <li>Relevant State-line</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Currently working with Finance and Planning specialists (and the CRMA project) to develop a coherent UNDP strategy to</li> </ul>

Initiative)		knowledge/skills transfer and institutional support	operational	Ministries	support county-level budgeting and planning
Deployment of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Civil Service Support Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Presence across all 10 states</li> <li>▪ Deployment of 160+ civil service officers from IGAD member states across all 10 states in state line ministries</li> <li>▪ Providing critical capacity building, knowledge/skills transfer and institutional support</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Core governance and civil service functions are established and operational</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ministry of Labor, Public Service and Human Resources Development</li> <li>▪ Civil Service Commission</li> <li>▪ Local Government Board</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ -</li> </ul>