



**Government of Mozambique**



**United Nations Development Programme**

**SUPPORT TO THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE  
AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM) IN  
MOZAMBIQUE**

**PNUD PROJECT Nr: 00052192**

**PROJECT EVALUATION**

**Final version: September 22<sup>nd</sup> 2011**

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## **Acknowledgements**

The consultant is grateful to the Government of Mozambique, to the National APRM Forum and to UNDP for the support during this evaluation; more particularly to the following personalities: the Chair of the National Governing Council, Professor Lourenço do Rosário; the representative of the Government Focal Point, Dr. Lourenço Sambo; the former director of the Technical Unit, Dr. Sandra Patel; the APRM Secretariat Director, Dr. Momade Saíde (and his staff); to the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative, Ms. Naomi Kitahara; the Governance Manager, Mr. José Macamo, to the project officer, Ms Habiba Rodolfo, and to the UNDP Administrative Team (Ms. Tília Ferrão, Eunice Taíbo and Etelvina Martins).

The consultant would also like to express his special recognition to Dr. Kevin Curnow, who contributed to this evaluation at an initial phase, and to all interviewees for their time and patience to discuss their experiences of the APRM process.

Despite all these valuable contributions, the consultant is responsible for the final opinions and findings presented in this report.

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGIR	Programme of Action for a Responsible and Inclusive Governance
AMODE	Mozambican Association for Democracy/Associação Moçambicana para a Democracia
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
CIP	Center for Public Integrity
CRR	Country Review Report
CSA	Country Self-Assessment
CSAR	Country Self-Assessment Report
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
FDC	Community Development Fund/ Fundo para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade
Fmr.	Former
GMD	Mozambican Debt Group/Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
LDH	Human Rights League/Liga dos Direitos Humanos
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MASC	Civil Society Support Mechanism
MP	Member of Parliament
MPD	Ministry of Planning and Development
NGC	National Governing Council
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPOA	National Programme of Action
PARP	Poverty Reduction Action Plan
PQG	Five-Year Government Programme/Programa Quinquenal do Governo
PRODOC	Project Document
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the evaluation of the project *Support for the Operationalization of the APRM process in Mozambique*, coordinated by UNDP. The project became effective after the signing on 17 November 2006 by the Government of Mozambique with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), of the financing agreement involving several other partners of technical cooperation as the Governments of France, Germany (GTZ), Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain (DFID). The Administrative Implementation of the Project was initiated on the same date after the signing of the project finance agreement, but it was considered to be fully operational from July 2007 onwards, when all the equipment and staff were on site. The project has also followed the creation of bodies for the operationalization of the APRM, such as the National Forum and the National Focal Point. The implementation was coordinated by a Technical Unit and was initially planned to end in December 2008, but due to delays in the implementation it was operationally closed on 31 January 2010, after Mozambique became the 11<sup>th</sup> country to be peer-reviewed at the 11<sup>th</sup> Summit of the APRM Forum that was held in Sirte, Libya, on 30 June 2009. The English version of the Country Review Report has been already published and a Portuguese version is underway and will be used for the dissemination process all over the country.

The evaluation covers the period from the start up to the formal end of the project in January 2010, and its objectives are:

- Assess the context in which the Project document was developed, and the degree of efficiency and effectiveness of the project in meeting the objectives and achievements for which it was designed;
- Review the implementation of the project from the date of its commencement until the date at which the evaluation begins;
- Assess the impact and sustainability of the project
- Examine the relevance of the project in terms of realizing the objectives of APRM within the framework of the African Union
- Identify successes in project implementation, as well as the factors which have contributed to these results; and
- Record lessons learned from project implementation and the reality on the ground.
- Identify challenges to project implementation and make recommendations on possible ways forward;

The evaluation methodology consisted of a review of relevant documentation, such as the project document, annual work plans and reports, audit reports, the country APRM report; interviews with relevant stakeholders, such as the National Forum members, technical unit staff, civil society organizations, donors and government representatives. Two provinces were visited (Sofala and Nampula), in which civil society organizations and national forum members were interviewed, and interviews with the former Maputo Province governor, who participated in the review process was also carried out. Interviews were conducted between November 2010 and April 2011.

The evaluation comes to the following conclusions/Results:

- **The project** is relevant because it is aligned with the African Union and NEPAD objectives and constitutes a response of the invitation made to UNDP to work with the NEPAD Secretariat to ensure sustainable funding of the APRM. It is also part of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan 2006-2009 and its extension 2009-2010.
- **The project strategy** is sound because it comprises a set of outputs that can consistently contribute for setting up the necessary conditions for the sustainability and ownership of the process. However, the project should have paid more attention to the provincial level, which in terms of the management of the project was relatively overlooked during the process. Individual-based arrangements were adopted instead of more consistent organizational ones.
- **The results framework** of the project is generally consistent and adequate, because it presents a solid combination of outcome, outputs and activities. Nevertheless, the lack of a more detailed situational analysis affected to some extent the accuracy of the planning and budgeting of the project, which undermined the implementation of some activities, such as mobilization and capacity development of civil society.
- **The overall performance of the project is considered good, due to the good quality of the final APRM Country Review Report, which is considered an accurate and profound analysis of the country situation.** The report results have been also considered consensual, which is a remarkable element due to the sensitive issues it raised and also provides a strong underpinning for the preparation of a relevant National Programme of Action (NPA). The Project was fully implemented, although the initial period of 25 months (from November 2006 to December 2008) had to be extended in more than 13 months, due to the delay in the beginning of the Project, to the rescheduling of the Country Review Mission by the Continental Secretariat, the recruitment of new staff after part of the initially recruited technical staff left the project, and to the inclusion of new activities. This also had budgetary implications, since the initially estimated Project budget of USD 1,889,085 had to be revised in 2009 to USD 2,819,537.
- **Regarding implementation**, 3 out of 9 outputs were fully accomplished in time; 3 were fully accomplished with delay and 2 were accomplished with most of the expected results and 1 output was only partially/poorly accomplished.
- A set of aspects can be considered at the core of the **overall impact of the project**: ownership, consensus and the relevance of the results of the APRM process; and the consensus among many actors of the relevance of the exercise itself. The inclusion of the APRM review results in the Government plan is another impact, although the included activities do not still represent a significant change in policies to address the findings of this exercise.
- **Concerning the sustainability of the project**, whilst the operationalization of the process at this phase was successful and the Government and the country have taken measures to ensure that project achievements outlive its implementation, financial constraints are still the biggest obstacle to the sustainability of the APRM process. Hence, external support is needed to complete the full cycle of the APRM process, namely the implementation of the National Programme of Action as well as its monitoring.
- Despite a generally successful implementation, the **project faced some constraints**, such as limited time and budget, deficient flow of information, limited technical capacity,

relatively weak mobilization of civil society, the language barrier, centralized execution modalities and weak provincial mechanisms for implementation, lack of retention of technical staff of the technical unit (due to deficient working conditions/professional prospects) and a combination of procedures and deficient planning that caused delays in the disbursement of the funds. **Outside the scope of the project**, the decisions taken by the Continental Secretariat about the timing of the process (the scheduling of the Country Review Mission) and the problems of coordination, representativeness and capacity of the civil society also contributed to the performance of the project.

- On the positive side, the **successful completion of the APRM process was due to factors such** as: Government commitment to a participatory process; a credible leadership of the National Forum, an effective and representative Project Board and the flexibility of donors to accommodate requests of additional funding for the unplanned or underestimated expenditures.
- **Three set of lessons** can be drawn from the implementation of this project, namely, the need of ensuring proper resourcing for the whole process; the importance of building capacity in different actors to participate more effectively at all stages; and the importance of having stable structures, mechanisms and procedures to sustain the capacities created along the process.

Resulting from the evaluation of the implementation as well as the lessons learnt from the various elements that contributed to its performance, the main recommendations of the evaluation, including for the way forward, are:

- Ensure that the Secretariat of the APRM has the proper resourcing, with particular emphasis on a more stable technical staff, as well as the necessary autonomy to carry the process on.
- Enhancement of the Government commitment to the process implies mainstreaming the process into the overall country planning and budgeting mechanisms. This approach is being adopted by the Government in the design of the PARP. This process should go further integrating the APRM recommendation into the planning and budgeting methodologies at all levels. In this context, all the participatory fora and mechanisms involving civil society, such as the National and Provincial Development Observatories and the local councils should be informed and capacitated to participate actively in the implementation process. This is to avoid that broader principles of mainstreaming the APRM recommendations can only be reflected on national plans and became diluted or absent in local plans.
- On the side of the civil society, the representation of the organizations and the participation should be through the thematic areas. The method of selection should also be more transparent, to avoid the criticism on the legitimacy of the representatives.

The evaluation also comes to the conclusion that external funding is still necessary for the full operationalization of the APRM cycle and recommends that particular attention should be given to the following aspects: project design, funding modalities, focus of the support (monitoring of the implementation of the National Programme of Action) and a clear phasing-out strategy to guarantee the sustainability of the results achieved:



- On the design aspects, a future project should include strategies to mitigate the impact of resources constraints: time, budget and information. To avoid undermining the process and discredit the good results achieved up to this point, it is important to plan realistically and, if necessary, negotiate and agree the final plan with the Continental Secretariat and also national stakeholders. A more profound situational analysis would also inform about the existing capacities, the capacity development needs, the present and potential constraints, the issues to take into account in engaging the various stakeholders and the resources needed to achieve the objectives defined for each stage. This could result in a well-balanced project that combines realistically the national capacities and constraints. Involving national stakeholders in the process of designing future projects, apart from meeting the participation criteria, can also ensure public awareness and consolidate the existing ownership of the APRM process.
- With regards to monitoring, the project should support the creation and strengthening of a multi-layered structure mainstreamed within the existing participatory mechanisms, namely the development observatories and local councils, but with higher level of specialization and with enhanced capacities.
- From a project/funding perspective, consider adequate funding and execution modalities: budget support, project funding, decentralization of funding to the local level, adoption of organizational forms for local level implementation, instead of the individual-based mechanism used by the current project,

Finally, all project components that demand project funding should have a realistically plan of phasing out this modality of funding in favor of local sources up to 2014, be them either the state budget or any autonomous civil society mechanism. The phasing out should be negotiated and agreed upon among all the relevant stakeholders (civil society, government, parliament, judiciary and donors).

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a self-monitoring mechanism, created in 2003, voluntarily acceded to by the member states of the African Union (AU). Through the sharing of experiences, the reinforcement of successful and best practices, the identification of deficiencies, and the assessment of the needs for capacity building. The APRM facilitates the attainment of objectives of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In this regard, it fosters the adoption of appropriate laws, policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration.<sup>1</sup>

The four main pillars of the APRM are:

- Democracy and Good Political Governance;
- Economic Governance and Management;
- Corporate Governance; and
- Socioeconomic Development.

The operationalization of APRM comprises five stages, namely:

- Preparation of the Country Self-Assessment
- Country Self-Assessment (CSA)
- Country Review Mission (CRM)
- Preparation of the draft Country Review Report (CRR)
- Tabling of the Final Country Review Report

Mozambique adhered to the APRM in March 2003. The operationalization of the process was interrupted in 2004 due to the coming general elections. The process was resumed in August 2005, after the inauguration of the new Government, with the designation of the Minister of Planning and Development as the National Focal Point. In July 2006 the Council of Ministers created the National Forum, comprising representatives from the public and private sectors, civil society, national and sub-national government representatives, parliament and the academia. The National Forum was formally inaugurated in August 2006.<sup>2</sup> The establishment of these bodies created the basic conditions for the implementation of the process.

The design of the project aimed at the Operationalization of APRM in Mozambique as part of the efforts to create the conditions for the materialization of this process. In this regard, the project became effective after the signing on 17 November 2006 by the Government of

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<sup>1</sup> Government of Mozambique & United Nations Development Programme (2006). Support to the Operationalization of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Mozambique. Project Document.

<sup>2</sup> APRM (2009). Country Review Report: Mozambique. May 2009.

Mozambique with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), of the financing agreement involving several other partners of technical cooperation as the Governments of France, Germany (GTZ), Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain (DFID). The Administrative Implementation of the Project was initiated on the same date after the signing of the project finance agreement, but it was considered to be fully operational from July 2007 onwards, when all the equipment and staff were on site. The implementation was initially planned to end in December 2008, but due to many reasons, to be explained ahead, the project was operationally closed on 31 January 2010, after Mozambique became the 11<sup>th</sup> country to be peer-reviewed at the 11<sup>th</sup> Summit of the APRM Forum that was held in Sirte, Libya, on 30 June 2009. The English version of the Country Review Report has been already published and a Portuguese version is underway and will be used for the dissemination process all over the country.

This report presents the final evaluation of the project support for the operationalization of the African Peer Review (APRM) in Mozambique, which is foreseen in the project document as **activity 10**. According to the Terms of Reference, the evaluation will cover the period from the start of the project until end of the project in January 2010, and its objectives are:

- Assess the context in which the Project document was developed, and the degree of efficiency and effectiveness of the project in meeting the objectives and achievements for which it was designed;
- Review the implementation of the project from the date of its commencement until the date at which the evaluation begins;
- Assess the impact and sustainability of the project
- Examine the relevance of the project in terms of realizing the objectives of APRM within the framework of the African Union
- Identify successes in project implementation, as well as the factors which have contributed to these results; and
- Identify challenges to project implementation and make recommendations on possible ways forward;
- Record lessons learned from project implementation and the reality on the ground.

To achieve the above mentioned objectives, the evaluation is expected to cover all activities carried out by the project, and it should include, but not be limited to, the examination of the following:

- Assess the results of the activities implemented by the project compared to those key outputs foreseen in the project work plans;
- Assess the project strategy and design as described in the Project Document including the adequacy of results framework;
- Assess factors outside the scope of the project, which impacted on the performance;
- Assess impact of the project on the institutions, groups, individuals that benefited from its support;
- Assess the project management arrangements and the degree to which they have contributed to the achievement of project results

- Assess the role of the Technical Unit for the Implementation of the project, specifically in terms of execution modalities; and
- In view of the assessment findings, make recommendations for future support to the APRM in Mozambique and provide guidance on its major design features.

The evaluation is also expected to address the following issues and make recommendations:

- The continuing relevance of the support to the operationalization of the APRM in Mozambique and its monitoring (approach, objectives, implementation modality) in view of any developments in the country context since the time of project design and approval; and
- The impact and sustainability of the project, giving an assessment of the likelihood that the project results will endure after the project has ended.

### **1.1. Evaluation Methodology**

The project evaluation consisted of a review of relevant documentation, such as the project document, annual work plans and reports, audit reports, the country APRM report; 28 interviews with relevant stakeholders, such as the National Forum members, technical unit staff, civil society organizations, donors and government representatives (see annex). Two provinces were visited (Sofala and Nampula), in which civil society organizations and national forum members were interviewed, and interviews with the former Maputo Province governor, who participated in the review process was also carried out. Interviews were conducted between November 2010 and January 2011. An additional and crucial interview with the former advisor of the Focal Point, which was not possible to schedule during the field work was conducted in April 2011.

The evaluation was carried out by one national consultant, but at the beginning of the process an international consultant provided the framework for data collection.

The results of the report were formally validated on August 18<sup>th</sup> 2011 in a formal presentation to the stakeholders – APRM National Forum representatives, the government focal point representative, UNDP deputy representative and the project staff, research institutions, former technical unit staff and the current APRM national secretariat staff. The comments provided by these stakeholders were incorporated in this final version of the report.

### **1.2. Organization of the Report**

The report is organized in 5 sections, including this introduction. The other four sections focus on the evaluation itself, namely: the second section presents the project review, more concretely the design context, strategy, results framework and the relevance in realizing the objectives of the APRM, the implementation, and its impact. The third section presents the factors that have influenced the implementation and the performance of the project. The fourth section presents the lessons learnt, and the fifth section presents the recommendations and the way forward in the support to the operationalization of the APRM in Mozambique.

## **2. PROJECT REVIEW**

### **2.1. Context of Project Development and Its Relevance within the Framework of the African Union**

As stated in the project document – PRODOC (see page 9) the project responds to the United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/RES/57/2 and A/RES/57/7 that considered the APRM an important and innovative tool and urged the United Nations to support individual countries involved in the process within the framework of NEPAD. It is also in line with the formal invitation made to UNDP to work with the NEPAD Secretariat to ensure sustainable funding to the process, at the end of the first APRM Forum Summit held in Rwanda in 2004. At the national level the project was aligned with Government's Five Year Plan (2005-2009), the Poverty Reduction Strategy. With a 50% of its budget being supported by external partners and still daunting challenges to face in capacity development, Mozambique would clearly need support to carry out such a complex and expensive process as the APRM. In this context, the project responds to a formal request of support made to UNDP by the national focal point, the Minister of Planning and Development, in 10 March 2006. NEPAD has been a priority for the UN system, because it is considered an endogenous process aimed at developing the continent. The support to the APRM was part of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan 2006-2009 and its extension 2009-2010.

Donors' support to the process is in line with high profile topics of the current development agenda, particularly the growing concern about domestic accountability, aid effectiveness alignment with national processes, programmes and mechanisms, improvement in the performance assessment of development interventions, and the importance of good governance in development.

### **2.2. Project Strategy, Design and Results Framework**

The focus of the project was to support the operationalization of the APRM in Mozambique by developing national institutions, raising public awareness about the process and ensuring civil society participation in the process. The project main outcome indicators as described in the project document are: a) The Country Review Report finalized and published; b) National and Technical Unit established and maintained after project closure. To attain its objectives, the project strategy consists of a combination of the following elements: a) 10 outputs, including the evaluation of the project; b) an approach built on the complementarity with the existing similar mechanisms and governance assessments, as the Government and Development partners annual review, and wider participation of all the relevant stakeholders, including marginalized groups, to ensure ownership and relevance of the APRM results to the national programmes; c) a set of outputs and activities aimed at developing capacities, public awareness and civil society participation to ensure that project results endure after the project closure. In this regard, it is expected that the government will be able to maintain

APRM structures and take the final responsibilities for the implementation of the Programme of Action after the end of the project. Moreover, the networks of partnership between the government, civil society and the private sector established during the process or resulting from it are expected to outlive the project closure.

The **project strategy** is sound because it comprises a set of outputs that can consistently contribute for setting up the necessary conditions for the sustainability and ownership of the process. The outputs are also in line with the project outcome that is to create the basis for the country to carry out future evaluations with its own resources. Moreover, the project approach is appropriate, because it combines the avoidance of duplication of similar efforts and seeks to establish complementarities with the existing review mechanisms and processes. Nevertheless, the project should have had paid more attention to the provincial level, since most of the population lives at the local level and the strategy should have explicitly taken this into account. In this context, the setting up of stable structures in the provinces was not considered; rather there was an individually-based arrangement, the provincial antennas that worked on a semi-voluntary base. During the evaluation some interviewees acknowledged the resource constraints, but they considered that there should have been formalized provincial structures, or at least, based on the philosophy of seeking complementarities, agreements should have been made with the existing structures in the province (development observatories, local consultative councils) to perform this task.

**The results framework** is generally consistent and adequate. The combination between the outcome, the outputs and the activities is solid. However, despite the presentation of a brief situational analysis and the foundational factors that informed the project design, the assumptions for the intervention envisaged in the project are not explicitly presented. Some of the key activities – such as the implementation of the communication strategy, travel expenses of the National Forum, the budgeting of the National Programme of Action, the expenses with the validation seminars and additional consultancies – were not initially included in the project document or their budget was underestimated. This demanded a later plan and budget revision during the implementation phase. Moreover, in the PRODOC only outcome indicators are presented and not intermediate results (outputs) indicators. The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework<sup>3</sup> that the evaluation had access to later, presents indicators for all outputs, but some of them are mere transformation of activities into indicators and are of difficult measurement (see annex 6.1). Although this probably did not affect the final results, lack of intermediate indicators may have influenced the underestimation of some budget lines in the original PRODOC, such as the communication strategy, civil society capacity development and work in the provinces. If key indicators had been defined in advance – for example number of meetings in provinces, workshops for APRM dissemination, etc. – some of these problems could have been foreseen and corrective measures, like mobilization of funds among donors, could have been taken with more time than it actually happened. Only in the course of the implementation the Project Board and the Technical Unit realized that additional resources would be needed for these areas that are essential to a successful Country Review Mission. Constrained with the

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<sup>3</sup> UN Mozambique (2009). Revised Annual Work Plan – 2009 for the Support to the Operationalization of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Mozambique.



pressure to conclude the process in time, ad-hoc measures were taken, which impacted on the level and quality of participation. For example, meetings with the Country Review Mission at the local level included more than one province (Nampula/Cabo Delgado/Niassa, Tete/Manica; Gaza/Inhambane)<sup>4</sup> and this limited the possibility of each province presenting its own concerns. This was also a limitation to a wider participation of the districts representatives in the process.

### **2.3. The Relevance of the Project in Realizing the Objectives of the APRM**

The project has been aligned to the APRM objectives as defined in the four focus areas of this exercise. Through the operationalization of the APRM structure in the country, the project is a contribution to the attainment of the APRM objectives in the context of the NEPAD, namely the adoption of appropriate laws, policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, and sustainable development. The Country Self-Assessment of the four APRM thematic areas and the country review were clearly aimed at providing inputs for the reflection about the above mentioned issues.

### **2.4. General Review of the Implementation**

The overall performance of the project is considered good, due to the good quality of the final APRM Country Review Report, which is considered an accurate and profound analysis of the country situation<sup>5</sup>. The report results have been also considered consensual, which is a remarkable element due to the sensitive issues it raised and also provides a strong underpinning for the preparation of a relevant National Programme of Action (NPOA). The Project was fully implemented, although the initial period of 25 months (from November 2006 to December 2008) had to be extended in more than 13 months, due to the delay in the beginning of the Project, to the rescheduling of the Country Review Mission by the Continental Secretariat, the recruitment of new staff after part of the initially recruited technical staff left the project, and to the inclusion of new activities. This also had budgetary implications, since the initially estimated Project budget of USD 1,889,085 had to be revised in 2009 to USD 2,819,537. An additional amount of USD 930,453 was provided to the project to cover expenses with the Review Mission and for APRM dissemination, but only USD 2,549,000 had been actually disbursed. Moreover, up to the formal end of the project in 31 January 2010, the total spending since 2007 had been USD 2,461,138.<sup>6</sup> In sum, despite a generally successful implementation, the project faced some constraints stemming from the management, design and strategy as well as from factors beyond its control.

This section will present a review of the implementation of the project through the analysis of 9 of its 10 outputs (the tenth output is the evaluation of the project, which is the main

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<sup>4</sup> Unidade Técnica/Fórum Nacional (2009). *Relatório da Missão de Revisão*.

<sup>5</sup> DFID (2010). *End of Project Report*. 20<sup>th</sup> May 2010.

<sup>6</sup> Unidade Técnica (2010). Relatório Final de Gestão do Projecto de Operacionalização do MARP 2006 – 2010.

object of this report), the challenges to implementation, the successes and the elements that contributed to these results.

## 2.5. Review of the Implementation by Output

### *Project output 1: National Forum Established to oversee the operationalization of the APRM*

The output has been accomplished. The project became effective after the establishment of the National Forum, which was formally inaugurated by the Council of Ministers on 7<sup>th</sup> August 2006. Therefore, whilst it did not support the establishment of the National Forum *per se*, the project has funded the functioning of this body, including the payment of the attendance subsidy for its members. The National Forum comprised 59 members, mainly drawn from the Agenda 2025<sup>7</sup> membership, which can be considered a representative sample of various societal groups such as civil society, public and private sector, academia, media, local government representatives and the Parliament. Generally it is considered that the Forum has played an important and positive role that was crucial for the success of the APRM process, coordinating and overseeing the country self-assessment, supporting the Country Review Mission, and in the dissemination of the process as well as in providing guidance to the Technical Unit in issues related to the project management.

According to the project document, the focus of UNDP support would cover the costs of up to 15 meetings of the national forum, namely an attendance fee payable per meeting of the regular members (USD 100), and of the four thematic coordinators (USD 200), over a period of 30 months. The government was supposed to fully take over the funding of the National Forum operational costs initially from December 2008 on, and after the revision of the project duration, from January 2010 on. From 2006 to 31 December 2009 the National Forum held a total of 9 meetings; 6 ordinary and 3 extraordinary meetings.<sup>8</sup> Although the meetings held were below the initially planned number, due to resources constraints<sup>9</sup>, there are no evidences that this has affected the overall performance of this body in playing its role throughout the APRM process. The National Forum was restructured, to be leaner and more sustainable (the number of its members was reduced from 58 to 36). After the end of the project the National Forum only held one meeting, related to its restructuring, and so far its subsidies are still funded through the extension of the UNDP project.

Therefore, generally this output has been accomplished. Nonetheless, some interviewees raised some concerns about the selection process of the National Governing Council (“Direcção Executiva”), which was considered non-transparent and government-driven, because there was not previous information about the election process, hence the only list that has been presented ended up being elected, and there was not much space for the presentation of alternative lists. The representativeness of civil society has also been questioned, since there were no clear selection criteria for its representatives. This can have

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<sup>7</sup> The Agenda 2025 was a participatory and comprehensive attempt to design a Country Vision for 25 years.

<sup>8</sup> Fórum Nacional do MARP (2010). *Relatório de Balanço 2006-2009*

<sup>9</sup> DFID (2010). *End of Project Report*. May 20<sup>th</sup> 2010.



influenced the relative suspicion of part of the civil society towards the process, which was seen as government-led and that sometimes the APRM ended up being confused with a government rather than a country assessment.

Representativeness of civil society has been a disputable issue, since the National Forum comprises members drawn from civil society. Whilst some interviewees argued that the representativeness of civil society is questionable, others consider this claim unfounded, since most of the National Forum members are from formally registered and recognized civil society organizations. Actually the controversy over the representativeness of civil society in participatory bodies (for example, in the National Electoral Commission and in the Development Observatories) is a recurrent issue in the country and to some extent is not surprising that it surfaced also in this process. However, although it is clear that it must be taken into account in the analysis of the process, the fact that it is a structural problem of a still relatively weak civil society should not be overlooked to avoid circumscribing it to the role played in the APRM process.

### ***Output 2: Secretariat established to support the APRM Focal Point***

This output has been accomplished. As above-mentioned, the Council of Ministers appointed the Minister of Planning and Development as the APRM focal point in August 2005. A secretariat was also established in the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD) in the first quarter of 2007, comprising two staff members from MPD and one from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Cooperation.<sup>10</sup> One senior staff member (the economic advisor to the Minister of Planning and Development) was appointed to liaise with the National Forum, the donors and the Continental Secretariat in a more permanent way. The representative of the focal point was also member of the Project Board and participated actively in the whole process. Other ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance have been involved in the process from the government side.<sup>11</sup> Since the Secretariat was supposed to be funded by the government, there was not a direct financial contribution of the project to its functioning.

In sum, the Focal Point Secretariat has been established and functioned throughout the process, coordinating the APRM in the country, providing updated information to the Council of Ministers and liaising with donors. After the end of the project, a Unit responsible for the APRM process, with a status of a National Directorate, was created in the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD). This unit, which is provisionally using the facilities and resources inherited from the Technical Unit is chaired by an Executive Director appointed by MPD, and is resourced with other technical staff funded by the state budget.

### ***Output 3: Technical Unit Established to coordinate and manage the operationalization of the APRM***

This output has been accomplished. The Technical Unit was formally established in January with the appointment of its Executive Director. The Unit became fully operational only in

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<sup>10</sup> Relatório MARP IV Trimestre 2009.

<sup>11</sup> DFID (2010). *End of Project Report*. May 20<sup>th</sup> 2010.

July 2007, after the hiring of its technical staff. This caused a three-month delay in the beginning of the implementation of the project activities.<sup>12</sup> After the creation of the necessary conditions for its functioning, the Technical Unit performed fairly its role of coordinating and managing the operationalization of the APRM process in Mozambique, and it has contributed for the good quality of the final output.

Despite this general positive assessment of the Technical Unit, some concerns were raised on its staffing and functioning. For example, some stakeholders mentioned that the executive director was appointed without a competitive process<sup>13</sup>, which raised some concerns among civil society and donors about the transparency of the selection and the adequacy of the selected person, due to her unknown record of working experience in similar positions or with civil society. Stemming from this there are mixed opinions about the performance of the Executive Director during the course of the implementation of the project. For some interviewed stakeholders the performance was very good, since in some cases the Executive Director was able to find creative solutions to minimize the budget constraints and delays in the disbursements that affected the implementation of the project. For others interviewees the lack of transparency in the selection process resonated in the excessively defensive position of the Executive Director when confronted with lack of proper financial planning and circumventing of project procedures regarding spending. According to this perspective, the Technical Unit, under the management of the Executive Director, sometimes was not effective in presenting timely and consistent plans (including financial) that could have avoided the disbursement delays that plagued the implementation of the project. The recruitment of the rest of the team (two thematic areas assistant-coordinators, a civil society officer, a communication officer, an administrative assistant and a driver) followed the regular procurement procedures, although it took longer than expected (it was only concluded in June 2007), as mentioned before. Since November 2008 the unit faced a serious problem of lack of personnel. Stemming from the precariousness of the contracts (the staff had one-year renewable contracts) and salaries' relatively lower levels in comparison to the market average for similar positions, 4 out of 7 of its staff members abandoned the unit.<sup>14</sup> From the old team only 3 remained (Executive director, financial assistant and one coordinator of one of the thematic areas), and had to face the workload of the preparation and assistance of the Country Review Mission, held in February and March of 2009. This reduced dramatically the capacity that had already been created and contributed also to undermine the institutional memory of the process.

***Output 4: Support Mission undertaken to review the state of preparedness and ensure a common understanding of the APRM***

This output was successfully accomplished. The Support Mission was undertaken in August 2006, headed by Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat and with support of the Continental APRM Secretariat, a member of the Panel of Eminent Persons of the APRM. The Support Mission

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<sup>12</sup> Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto, 24/07/2007.

<sup>13</sup> There is no agreement about this issue, because it is also claimed that the director was selected from a short list of three CVs.

<sup>14</sup> Acta Reunião Direção Executiva do Fórum Nacional do MARP 07/07/2009.

concluded that the country had the necessary conditions to carry out the implementation of the APRM process. Resulting from this mission, on 24 August 2006 the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Technical Assessment Missions and Country Reviews was signed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique (Armando Guebuza) and the Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, on behalf of the President of the APRM.<sup>15</sup> Additional missions were carried out in June and August 2007.<sup>16</sup>

The implementation of the activities leading to the accomplishment of the aforementioned output was fully under the responsibility of MPD and its costs were covered by the state budget.<sup>17</sup> Apart from an initial support mission undertaken in August 2006<sup>18</sup>, other two support missions were fielded in 2007.<sup>19</sup>

***Output 5: Civil society mobilized at national, provincial and district level to ensure civil society participation in the APRM***

This output was partially achieved. The implementation of the activities related to this output was under the responsibility of the Technical Unit and should be completed before the research institutions/consultants started the preparation of the four thematic Country Self-Assessments.

The implementation of this output was planned for the second quarter of 2007, but was only implemented in the fourth quarter due to the delay in the recruitment of personnel.

Although there has been a relatively substantial participation of civil society at central and local level in the APRM process, mainly thanks to the existing civil society coordination mechanisms, especially the G20<sup>20</sup>, the implementation of this activity was problematic, mainly due to budgetary constraints and the way the National Forum, the Government and the Project Board managed this issue.

There has been an initial work of civil society sensitization and mobilization carried out by the NGO FDC (Fundo de Desenvolvimento da Comunidade) with its own funds in 2006, before the beginning of the project. To ensure the necessary level of preparedness, civil society organizations were divided on the four thematic areas and capacitated to participate with a sound degree of knowledge of the specific area. After the country adhesion to the APRM, FDC, whose President (Graça Machel) is a member of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, has proactively initiated the process of preparing the Mozambican civil society to participate effectively in all stages of the APRM process in the country. There was an expectation that after the approval of the funding FDC would be reimbursed of the expenses

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<sup>15</sup> APRM (2009). Country Review Report: Mozambique. May 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Unidade Técnica (2010). Relatório Final de Gestão do Projecto de Operacionalização do MARP 2006 – 2010.

<sup>17</sup> Unidade Técnica (2010c). Relatório Primeiro Trimestre de 2010 (1 a 31 de Janeiro de 2010).

<sup>18</sup> Fórum Nacional do MARP (2010). *Relatório de Balanço 2006-2009*

<sup>19</sup> Relatório MARP IV Trimestre de 2008.

<sup>20</sup> G20 is a civil society platform created to ensure participation in the Development Observatories and has chapter at central and local levels.

incurred in 2006 and invited to continue the sensitization. However, concerns with transparency and fairness led the Project Board to decide not to engage FDC and rather to open a bidding process.<sup>21</sup> Since FDC could not fund the process alone, it eventually gave up and this, according to some interviewees, created frustration in many civil society organizations that had been already mobilized to participate in the process. The option of involving FDC was later considered in July 2007, when it became clear that the available budget of USD 150,000 was far below the estimated budget of USD 342,000 necessary for an effective mobilization of the civil society. In this regard, the National Governing Council, through the Project Board, considered the possibility of working with FDC without a bidding process. This solution had the advantage of resuming the contacts and networking already made with the provincial civil society forums, which were the mechanisms envisaged for the dissemination of the APRM and mobilization of civil society. In this regard, the Project Board urged the Technical Unit to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with FDC.<sup>22</sup> Due to the limited budget, the solution finally adopted was to use the G20 network as the provincial APRM focal points, called antennas, but engaging individuals and not organizations, with the responsibility of disseminating the process at the local level (provinces and districts). With this approach, at the local level around 80 districts were covered.<sup>23</sup> However, there was a gap between the efforts of divulging the APRM combined with backstopping from the central entities that were coordinating the review. In sum, no consistent capacity development activities were carried out to create relevant capacities in civil society organizations to participate more effectively in the process.<sup>24</sup>

There is the impression that the Government tried to control even the process of civil society mobilization and capacity development to participate actively in the process. Hence, the interruption of the process initially led by FDC and its later resume by the government is seen in this line of thinking, and it is also considered that it contributed to de-mobilize part of the civil society. However, it is also acknowledged that the final decision to resort to the structures previously used by FDC (the G20) was an acknowledgement that civil society should lead the role of creating its own capacity to participate in the APRM process. Moreover, the representation of civil society in the National Forum was also considered an element that contributed to the mobilization of civil society actors. In this context, it was expected that the organizations represented in the forum would be active in the dissemination of the APRM process. The evaluation did not find evidences of this contribution, but some interviewees linked to the National Forum stressed that this aspect should not be overlooked in the analysis of the mechanisms established to mobilize the civil society.

In sum, the civil society participated in the process. Nevertheless, the combination of resource constraints and the adequacy of the approach to sensitize and mobilize the civil society have limited the effectiveness of the project in mobilizing and creating the necessary

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<sup>21</sup> see Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto, 05/04/2007.

<sup>22</sup> Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto, 24/07/2007.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with the former Executive Director.

<sup>24</sup> Interviews.

capacities to ensure the participation of civil society in the APRM process. Hence, this result was achieved but with limitations.

***Output 6: Self-Assessment and Programme of Action finalized and submitted to the APRM Secretariat***

This output was hard to achieve, It resulted from the following activities: a) selection of the research institutions that would prepare the four thematic Country Self-Assessment (CSA), the preparation of the CSA and provision of inputs to the Programme of Action; b) seminars in the provinces with participation of civil society representatives at the central and local levels, National Forum members, one member of the Technical Unit and a representative from UNDP to validate the four thematic Country Self-Assessment; c) with the inputs from the two previous processes, and with the support of the Technical Unit and the research institutions/consultants the National Forum prepares the Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) and the Programme of Action to the APRM Secretariat, after its translation to English. The recommendation of the project document was to allow for some flexibility in the finalization of the Self-Assessment and the Programme of Action to ensure that these documents are broadly acknowledged and supported by all stakeholders, particularly the civil society.

The procurement of the research institutions was considered transparent, although, due to the novelty of the process, the technical proposals did not always reflect what was expected and further clarification and work with the research institutions was needed to ensure that the process would run smoothly. Three organizations were selected to carry out the Self-Assessment: Economic Governance and Management; Corporate Governance (Austral-COWI); Democracy and Political Governance (Higher Institute of Foreign Relations – ISRI); Economic and Social Development (Cruzeiro do Sul). In the context of the project, during the preparatory phase of the CSAR, the research institutions participated in a seminar in South Africa with institutions that had been involved before in the APRM process. They also participated in a Seminar to revise the questionnaire in Algeria, organized by the Continental Secretariat. According to an interviewee of one of the research institutions, both events were important to enhance their capacities to carry out the CSAR.

The self-assessment was carried out during 7 months, between 2007 and 2008, and the Technical Unit and some National Forum Members participated in the supervision of the field work. Due to resource constraints, some missions were joint, involving research institutions, members of the National Forum and of the Technical Unit, and combining the mobilization and the consultation for the CSAR. This was a strategy adopted to rationalize the existing scarce resources, which could have affected the independence of the research. However, no evidences in this regard are available.

The thematic Self-Assessment reports were validated in 11 two-day seminars in all provinces, with representatives of civil society and of the 128 districts.<sup>25</sup> The validation

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<sup>25</sup> Unidade Técnica do MARP (2010a). *Relatório balanço das Actividades do Fórum Nacional*, pp. 17-8. See also DFID (2010). *End of Project Report*. May 20<sup>th</sup> 2010..

process was considered generally successful, because the provincial antennas helped mobilize the same people that had been contacted during the self-assessment process. Nonetheless, this cannot be generalized to all provinces. Interviewees claimed that in some cases it was difficult to ensure the participation of the same audiences in the consultation and validation processes.

The CSAR containing the four-thematic areas reports, and integrating the inputs of the validation process, was submitted to the APRM Secretariat in April 2008 and the draft National Programme of Action in August 2008. The output was produced although with a delay, as in other components of the project.

There was a consensus among the research institutions, the National Forum and the project management that the limited time for research and an unrealistically low budget were among the obstacles to the process.

The validation process was also affected by these two factors. Mainly in the provinces, in some cases the participants had access to the report only at the meetings. Some interviewees mentioned that there were examples of provinces in which the process was not even well-structured in terms of sequential stages, since the research has come before the dissemination workshop. In some meetings people, even academics, at the stage of the evaluation process were still trying to contribute presuming that it was the initial phase of the research. In sum, the validation meeting sometimes was confused with dissemination and research.

Discontinuity was other problem. For example, many districts were not included in the feedback regarding the self-evaluation. The process/seminars when were at the provincial level all the districts were included, but the replication of the process at the district level was limited. For example, in Nampula only 11 districts held seminars (Interview).

The English translation of the first version of the one thousand-page CSAR was done in only 7 days, involving 7 translators, which compromised its quality.<sup>26</sup>

After the delivery of the report by the research institutions, the National Forum, in its 4<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting created a Writing and Revision Team (Grupo de Redacção e Revisão)<sup>27</sup>, involving the Technical Unit, to revise the documents, integrate the contributions of the validation process and prepare the report to be sent to the Continental Secretariat. During the process of the preparation of the final Self-Assessment report, there was some disagreement and also misunderstanding on the role the research institutions should play. For example, some institutions understood that it was not their role to revise the report integrating aspects that did not result from their research, whilst the Technical Unit argued that it was part of their work to present a final document integrating all the comments and inputs taken from the validation process. The reluctance in doing so was justified by the idea that the report revised in these conditions would not reflect exactly the original findings.

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<sup>26</sup> Unidade Técnica do MARP (2010c). Relatório do Primeiro Trimestre de 2010 (1 a 31 de Janeiro de 2010).

<sup>27</sup> Unidade Técnica do MARP (2010a). Relatório balanço das Actividades do Fórum Nacional.



There was some disagreement on the responsibilities for the translation of the CSAR to English. The research institutions took over this responsibility and demanded the reimbursement of the related costs, which the APRM Technical Unit refused to pay, allegedly because it was supposed to be part of the institutions' responsibilities and the project had no resources for this activity. Eventually the institutions ended up writing off the translation expenses.

The budgeting of the National Programme of Action was delayed, due to lack of clarity on who was responsible for its preparation.

The combination of inadequate planning and budgeting were the main constraints of the Country Self-Assessment. The limited time for the CSA was because it was tied to the timing of the Review Mission, which had been scheduled to be carried out still in 2008. However, changes in the Panel of Eminent Persons and internal issues of the Continental Secretariat ended up delaying the mission, which only took place in February/March 2009. According to some interviewees, the pressure on the Government to accomplish the APRM political agenda (timing of the outputs, such as President's presentations to the Heads of State Forum, etc.), was done at the risk of undermining the quality of the Self-Assessment. Nevertheless, at the end the CSAR was considered of good quality, as a result of a continuous dialogue between the National Forum, the research institutions and the support of the Technical Unit, which circumvented the difficulties faced throughout the process. The validation stage was also important, because it contributed to fill in the gaps of the consultation process, and was an opportunity to confront the initial findings with the reality as perceived by the various stakeholders that participated in the seminars.

***Output 7: Country Review Mission undertaken to ascertain the country Self-Assessment and the Programme of Action***

The output was generally achieved. The Country Review Mission (CRM) took place from 7 February to 3 March, 2009, and was led by Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Lead Panelist for Mozambique. The review team comprised also independent experts in the four APRM thematic areas; experts from strategic partner institutions like the African Development Bank (AfDB), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and members of the Continental Secretariat. The work of the CRM in the country was facilitated by the National Focal Point, the National Forum and the Technical Unit.

Aware of the civil society criticism to the inclusiveness of the process voiced after the conclusion of the CSAR, the CRM demanded that the CSAR should be widely distributed before its commencement, to ensure that there has been a wider participation. This was presented as a condition to field the mission. According to the National Forum Report on the Review Mission, responding to this demand, the Technical Unit has made a considerable effort to distribute the CSAR all over the country. Still according to the same source, "the quality of the interventions of participants' from different social strata, in all meetings held

in the country during the Review Mission, contributed to dissipate the wrong perception that the report content was unknown.”<sup>28</sup> The mission held meetings at the central and local levels, and had the opportunity to take up the criticism presented by some civil society organizations about the process, as mentioned on previous sections.<sup>29</sup>

From the project management perspective, supporting this mission was a challenge. First, because it was initially expected to be fielded in April, afterwards in July 2008 and actually it began in February 2009. This affected the quality of the Country Self-Assessment, due to the limited time available for this exercise. Second, because the project document has planned for a CRM of about 10 to 15 people and the mission actually comprised 17 people. Third, it was not known in advance that the mission would visit all the provinces. Besides, there was not much clarity on the magnitude of the logistical support that would be needed, and of the responsibilities of each stakeholder. Consequently the budget for this output was underestimated (about a tenth of the real needs<sup>30</sup>). Only in the Project Board Extraordinary Meeting of 28 May 2008, the Government and UNDP decided to prepare the mission jointly and to mobilize additional funds. There has been lack of communication between the Government, UNDP and the Continental Secretariat regarding the preparation of the CRM, which, at the end, did not compromise its overall result, because appropriate corrective measures were timely taken.

Hence, generally the CRM was considered successful, and the mission itself praised the Government, the APRM structures, the civil society and citizens for the commitment to the process and the high level of representation and candidness “at the consultative and interactive meetings”. However, the Mission made remarks on the limited copies of the CSAR available for the participants, which although acknowledging that are due to “a shortage of funds”, considered this situation “frustrating not only to stakeholders, but also to the Commission and the CRM”, it also noted that the CSAR English version was badly translated.<sup>31</sup>

#### ***Output 8: Country Review Report finalized and submitted to the APRM Forum***

This output was accomplished with considerable delay. The finalization of the Country Review Report was initially planned to be in the second quarter of 2008. However, due to the slippage in other activities, and mainly in the scheduling of the CRM, this activity was completed in May 2009 and the Country presented the report to the APRM Forum in Libya, on 30 June 2009. The activity was completed with a 12 month delay, in comparison to the previously planned in the project document.

In the presentation of the report, only two issues, pertaining to the privatization of the land and the definition of the armed conflict that ravaged the country for 16 years as “civil war” were objected by the Government. Apart from that, the Government accepted most of the

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<sup>28</sup> Unidade Técnica do MARP (2009). Relatório de Trabalho da Missão de Revisão. Page 6.

<sup>29</sup> APRM (2009). Country Review Report: Mozambique. May 2009.

<sup>30</sup> Unidade Técnica (2010b). Relatório Final de Gestão do Projecto de Operacionalização do MARP 2006-2009. Page 5.

<sup>31</sup> Idem, page 74.



recommendations made by the Review Team and by the APRM Forum. The final report is consensually considered a genuine result of the various contributions about the country situation in the four thematic areas, reflecting a comprehensive and relevant exercise that can inform future country programmes and policies. In this regard, the project has been successful, since the APRM process has been fully operationalized, despite the weaknesses pointed out throughout this section.

***Output 9: Public awareness of the APRM raised to ensure participation in the process***

This output was only partially and poorly achieved. The public awareness was supposed to span all stages of the process. A communication strategy was developed in the second quarter of 2007, with a six month delay, to ensure that public awareness and participation in the process. The budget available for the implementation of this strategy was only USD 150,000, against needs totaling USD 1 million. This financial gap impacted negatively on the project performance in this area. For example, seminars to capacitate journalists were postponed due to logistic problems even in Maputo.<sup>32</sup>

Generally the performance of the project in achieving this output has been poor. Most of the interviewees acknowledge that the implementation of the communication strategy was not effective, despite being a crucial element of the process. To ensure the minimum public awareness, the negative effect of the limited implementation of the communication strategy has been mitigated through a massive media advertisement (newspapers, radio and TV) in key stages of the process. The project also created the APRM Webpage.<sup>33</sup> In the case of the CRM, funds were made available for media advertisement at all levels, including through the local media. In the third quarter of 2009 the project received an additional funding of USD 330,000 from Norway, which would partially be used to disseminate the final report and the National Programme of Action after its approval in Libya.<sup>34</sup> However, the final version of the report was only sent to the Country in the fourth quarter of 2010 and only in English. Consequently, even facing budgetary constraints the country had to prepare its Portuguese version and mobilize funds for its printing and dissemination, which occurred after the end of the project. This delay in the finalization of the report from the Continental Secretariat undermined the dissemination process, and this is among the challenges the APRM process has to face in the near future to become a continuous and consolidated process, as expected.

## **2.6. Impact on the Institutions, Groups and Individuals**

The main institutions, groups and individuals that benefited from the programme are basically the Government and other institutions, the National Forum and the Technical Unit, the research institutions, the civil society and the provincial focal points.

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<sup>32</sup> Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto 13/12/2007.

<sup>33</sup> Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto 28/01/2009.

<sup>34</sup> Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto 26/09/2009.

Impact on Government can be seen as its capacity to manage the APRM process and embark on a consultative process with the society that, despite some weaknesses, has been considered effective and relevant, and its results provide a solid foundation for future decision making on key issues of state building, governance, and development. This capacity is being consolidated with the institutionalization of the APRM secretariat to assist in the management of the process on a permanent basis.

The National Forum benefited from the establishment of routines and mechanisms that contributed to make its functioning more stable and predictable, which can be seen as a signal of its institutionalization. This was also favored by the existence the Technical Unit, which through its support to the National Forum created the basis for a technical and stable structure that is important for the functioning of a representative body like the Forum. The establishment of the Secretariat that is provisionally functioning as a joint body supporting the National Forum and the Focal Point is a step forward for the sustainability of the process. However, it is important to bear in mind that the staff turnover of the Technical Unit mentioned before has reduced dramatically the consolidation of the technical capacity for the management and future monitoring of the National Programme of Action. In this regard, it can be said that the project contributed to consolidate the National Forum per se as an APRM stable structure, but its impact on the creation of its permanent technical capacity to manage the process was limited, due to the reasons already mentioned. Unless measures are taken to conserve the experience documented throughout the process, combined with the allocation of permanent, qualified and capable staff, most of the institutional memory gathered throughout the process can be lost and this can weaken the National Forum, and the institutionalization of the process in the country.

In institutions like the Legislative, which was represented in the National Forum, the impact of the APRM process and of the project is limited. From the 4 Members of Parliament that participated in the process as thematic areas coordinators, only 1 is still in the current legislature, due to the relatively high turnover in the legislative branch. However, it is worth mentioning that the Assembly of the Republic is historically an institution with a reasonable risk of loss of institutional memory, due to its potential renovation each five years, when legislative elections are held.

The research institutions involved in the CSAR, in the context of the project participated in seminars in Mozambique and abroad on the APRM, which, combined with their practical experience of the consultation and validation processes allowed them to gain technical capacity to carry out similar processes. In this regard, these institutions are probably in better conditions now to manage complex assessment processes than before, and this provide them with better credentials to continue doing their ordinary work. As one interviewee put it: taking into account the budget constraints these institutions were not expecting to have a financial gain from their participation in the process; rather, they were pursuing the possibility of putting in their records the participation in the APRM process to gain experience in this type of initiatives. This idea has been confirmed by at least two institutions, and the net result of this can be considered the experience gained in carrying out a complex exercise like the APRM CSAR. Hence, in this regard the project can be considered successful.

Lack or deficiency in civil society mobilization and capacity development resulted in a limited impact in terms of civil society ability to participate. There was not a visible influence of civil society in the preparation of the report, partially because the institutions and organizations were not much demanded (Interviews). However, as mentioned before, the idea that the civil society did not participate properly should be qualified, since actually civil society actors gave their contributions during the process. Rather, what should be stressed is that there was not an organized and articulated participation of civil society similar to the practice in other processes, with particular emphasis on the Development Observatories and the design of the Agenda 2025. It is expected that the role of the civil society will (should) be bigger in the process of implementation of the Programme of Action and its monitoring. In the process of monitoring the implementation of the Programme of action, institutions and organizations have to be much more prepared than they are now.

Finally, the impact on individuals can be analyzed from two perspectives: from the perspective of those who at some point of the process have been involved, either through the APRM structures or through the mobilization process itself; and as ordinary individuals. The first group of individuals comprises the National Forum members, the Technical Unit staff and the Provincial focal points. The National Forum members interviewed during this evaluation are unanimous in acknowledging that the process was a learning opportunity that contributed to improve the knowledge about the country and opens a wide range of possibilities to envisage well-informed solutions for the various challenges the country faces, some of them as identified in the CSAR. Part of these members has left but others are still members of the National Forum, and will probably contribute to the institutionalization of the process in the country. The impact on the Technical Unit staff and provincial focal points is somewhat similar. However, the contribution of the former is difficult to foresee, mainly regarding those who left the process and pursued other professional paths. Finally, the project impact on the provincial focal points has been in the learning component as mentioned before, but also on their capacity to mobilize and manage complex processes as the APRM. This capacity, to some extent, has spilled over the organizations they represent, although its consolidation depends on the future organizational setting that will be adopted in the next phases of the process, namely the dissemination and monitoring of the National Programme of Action. In sum, the impact at the individual level was the creation of capacities to contribute to the APRM process, which can be integrated into the organizational capacities in the cases the people involved continue being involved in the APRM structures, or can be rather diffuse, when it relates to individuals who know about the process, but are not currently involved, nevertheless are still a repository of knowledge and can potentially be mobilized in the future if necessary. This diffuse capacity adds up to the existing country capacity allocated in formal organizations and institutions, like the Government, the National Forum and the APRM National Secretariat.

## **2.7. Overall impact and Sustainability of the Project**

A set of aspects can be considered at the core of the overall impact of the project: ownership, consensus and the relevance of the results of the APRM process; and the consensus among many actors of the relevance of the exercise itself.

The broad consensus around the results and the relevance of the APRM exercise can be illustrated through three examples. The first is the warning on the potential disruptive effects of social inequalities, increasing poverty and social exclusion and reduction of the space for the political dialogue, pointed out in the report as potential causes for future social instability. The results of the Households Survey (IOF) that shows the increase in the poverty index as well as the popular demonstrations in the cities of Maputo and Chimoio in September 2010, reacting to the food and transportation price increases are examples of the relevance of the CSAR findings. The CRR also alerts to the excessive control of the ruling party over the state apparatus. Although this issue has been raised before the APRM, it gained another status with its inclusion in the report and was a theme of a lively discussion in the Parliament in 2010. At that time the Government dismissed these accusations but steps were taken by the ruling party to dismantle party cells in the public service.

The second example has to do with the relevance of this exercise in influencing policy change. There is not an explicit reference to the APRM in the Government Five-Year Programme 2010-2014 (PQG)<sup>35</sup> but to the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) programmes, among the instruments it is based upon. This is probably due to the fact that the Government Programme was approved in April 2010; which was before the formal delivery of the Country Review Report, dated July 2010. No reference is made to the NPOA in the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) 2011-2014, approved in May 2011.<sup>36</sup> Rather, the document refers to the PQG. Some activities included in the areas of Democratic and Political Governance, Economic Governance and Management, and Socioeconomic Development are included in both PQG and PARP, but often with a different phrasing, which blurs the linkage with the APRM NPOA. Actually the NPOA comprises a set of policies in these areas that have been implemented for years, such as public financial reforms, public sector reforms, promotion of median, small and micro-enterprises, improvement of infra-structures, reform of the anti-corruption legislation, employment promotion, among many. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that those policies included in the NPOA that are the continuation of previous government policies are fairly represented in the Government plans. Other policies that represent a substantial change in the ongoing approach are not clearly reflected in the government planning instruments. For example PARP reference to the Central Office for Combating Corruption (GCCC) activities and its role in the legal reform of this area is only limited to the implementation of less controversial legislation approved in the last five years<sup>37</sup>, and it does not mention the institutional autonomy of this body, indicated as one of the required actions of the objective 4 of the Economic Governance and Management. It is also striking that this activity is under this pillar, while in other government planning instruments (PQG and PARP) is under the political governance pillar. In sum, whilst there are evidences that NPOA activities are

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<sup>35</sup> República de Moçambique (2010). *Programa Quinquenal do Governo para 2010-2014*. Maputo, Abril de 2010. See page 4. Accessible at: [http://www.pap.org.mz/downloads/programa\\_quinquenal\\_do\\_Governo\\_2010\\_1014.pdf](http://www.pap.org.mz/downloads/programa_quinquenal_do_Governo_2010_1014.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> Republic of Mozambique (2011). *Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) 2011-2014*. Approved at the 15<sup>th</sup> Regular Session of the Council of Ministers. Maputo, May 3, 2011. Accessible at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11132.pdf>.

<sup>37</sup> See pages 14-15.

included in government instruments, the approach adopted and the activities selected do not provide a clear picture of the level of influence of the APRM process on policy change.

Finally, in line with the principle of avoiding the duplication of the existing review mechanisms and processes, the CRR and the Programme of Action have been appropriated by donors, which are using it to propose performance indicators for the PARP and in the broad political dialogue with the Government (Interviews). Donors are also using the APRM results in the review of their country programmes. For example, the methodology of the Mid-Term Review of the European Commission's European Development Fund (EDF), includes the APRM processes among the sources to assess the country performance in governance. The country office carried out its first mid-term review of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF in which the CRR was used. These examples show that there is some consensus on the relevance of the APRM exercise and that its results are relevant to be used. This in turn increases the ownership of the APRM exercise, which is seen as an exercise done by Mozambicans to solve their own problems.

The opportunity the APRM provided for individuals and organizations to express their opinions and the inclusion of these inputs in the Programme of Action, which also is expected to inform Government Plans and processes, is per se a good signal that participation can be an important tool to influence development and governance. However, the real impact of this process is still to be seen through the implementation of the National Programme of Action, which has to be more explicitly reflected in the Government and country plans and programmes. In this regard, participation of civil society in its monitoring is important to ensure that the issues raised are properly addressed by the Government and various actors. At this point, it can be said that the various actors and stakeholders that have been involved throughout the process have learnt about how to participate in similar processes and also were made aware of their weaknesses. This was well-reflected in interviews held with civil society organizations or individuals, who, despite being critical to the space given to the civil society in the process, still acknowledge that more capacity development and better self-organization is needed to enhance the participation of the civil society in the next stages of the APRM process.

From the project perspective the impact can be understood as the creation of the national capacity to carry out the APRM, through its contribution to the process of institutionalization of the relevant structure (e.g. the National Forum and the Technical Unit/National Secretariat), and the public awareness raising about the importance of this exercise. In sum, the project contributed to the creation of the national capacity for the operationalization of the APRM process in Mozambique, through the successful completion of this first stage, which consisted on the Country Review and preparation of the National Programme of Action. In this regard, the project objectives have been attained. However, the consolidation of the capacity created in this phase depends on the steps that will be taken to ensure that the Programme of Action is implemented and that it addresses properly the issues raised in the review report. This has to do with the sustainability of the project results.



## 2.8. Sustainability

The operationalization of the APRM process relied on donors' funding. Even though, the conditions offered by the project were not competitive enough to ensure staff stability up to the end of the review process and the production of the Programme of Action. Besides, challenges still lie ahead, mainly the dissemination of the Programme of Action, its mainstreaming into country policy programmes and plans, its implementation and monitoring by government/state and non-state actors. Consequently, sustainability means ensuring that the process will keep on running, and that the country will be able to carry out subsequent reviews to update the information and knowledge about the country situation. Are these conditions created? What has been (or is being) done to ensure the sustainability of the process?

In August 2010 the national forum was restructured to reduce its members from 58 to 36 members, organized in thematic areas, to foster better specialization and enhance their capacity for monitoring the implementation of the Programme of Action. This restructuring was a follow up on the Government recommendation to ensure that the Forum has a smaller size but of more motivated and committed people, who can guarantee its better functioning.<sup>38</sup> The representativeness was not compromised but only the number of the representatives has changed. All the civil society organizations that were represented are still in the Forum. It is expected that the forum members will be more active in monitoring the implementation of the national action plan. Whilst in the first phase the research institutions did the technical work of the review process, in the new setting the forum members have to do the work, with the support of the National Secretariat. Some interviewees raised concerns about the adequacy of the current membership, taking into account that it was originally drawn from the Agenda 2025. In this regard it is questioned how representative this Forum still is and also that it inherited the perverse practice of the Agenda 2025 of being remunerated to participate in the meetings, which is unsustainable. There are also doubts about the qualifications of the Forum members to face the challenges of the implementation and monitoring of the National Programme of Action, as well as the preparation of the next round of the APRM process. An alternative that was presented is that to ensure sustainability the National Forum should be a combination of part of the existing members and new ones that could provide the necessary technical contribution to face the forthcoming challenges.

After the end of the project in January 2010, the Government and the APRM National Forum created the APRM National Secretariat in May 2010. The Secretariat is a permanent body that took over the role formerly performed by the Technical Unit (which was essentially a project implementation unit) and is responsible to assist the National Forum and the Government. It is also be responsible for the preparation of quarterly basic information on the implementation of the APRM process to be presented by the Focal Point to the Council of Ministers. The government and the APRM National Forum philosophy was to create a professional, permanent and well-functioning body able to assist in the implementation of the Programme of Action and its monitoring.<sup>39</sup> The Ministry of Planning and Development,

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<sup>38</sup> Acta Reunião Conselho do Projecto, 14/12/2009.

<sup>39</sup> Acta Reunião Conselho do Projecto, 14/12/2009.

on behalf of the Government, allocate some people to the Secretariat – a driver, an administrative staff and a senior technical staff member, with a status of National Director, which is currently the Secretariat Executive Director, and a janitor. Two staff member of the former technical unit have migrated to the new secretariat – one of the technical area and other of the administrative area – to ensure the transition. Their contracts were funded through the UNDP project, and finished in December 2010. However, due to their experience in the process it was agreed that they could be hired for specific assignments.

Since its creation the secretariat has been supporting the APRM National Forum, the focal point (the ministry of planning and development), the prime minister and the government on issues related to the APRM. Focal points were created in all ministries, and the APRM provincial antennas (focal points) were reactivated.<sup>40</sup> Following the reception of the final version of the CRR and Programme of Action, with its plan matrix comprising activities to be implemented by the executive, legislative, the judiciary and civil society organizations, the National Secretariat has coordinated the translation of these documents to Portuguese. The next step will be the dissemination of the final report and Programme of Action, whilst an M&E system to monitor its implementation is being designed, with UNDP support.<sup>41</sup>

The Government is contributing for the recurrent expenses of the Secretariat but most of the expenses of the APRM operationalization are being funded by the UNDP project that has been extended. Even with this support, there are still budget constraints. For example, the estimated budget for 2011 is around USD 525,000 but only USD 100,000 were available. This budget will hardly cover only the costs of the dissemination of the report and the National Programme of Action. Therefore, funding for the APRM process in the country is still a concern.

The independence of the current Secretariat is another matter of concern for most interviewees because: the possibility of lack of transparency since the Secretariat is led by a public servant; lack of independence in the monitoring of the National Programme of Action, because in a government-dominated Secretariat it is supposed that the Government will monitor the implementation of its own programmes and plans, which is seen as running counter the spirit of the APRM that privileges civil society participation also at this stage. Furthermore, it was argued that in this situation the civil society could not be able to contribute for the improvement of governance in the country, due to its limited role in the monitoring of the implementation of the APRM recommendations; hence, endangering the continuity of the process.<sup>42</sup> These aspects led to some ambiguity in the real status of this secretariat. Whilst it is currently working as a joint secretariat supporting the Government and the National Forum, it is still considered that this arrangement was not fully accommodated by all parties because it is also considered not aligned with the APRM principles for similar bodies. In this regard the National Secretary is only a transitory

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<sup>40</sup> Source: Interview.

<sup>41</sup> Idem.

<sup>42</sup> Acta Reunião do Conselho do Projecto 26/06/2009.

arrangement that the Government put at the service of the National Forum, which can still structure a secretariat of its own, more autonomous from the Government.

At the decentralized level the people that participated in the process at the beginning are leaving. The National Secretariat started the activation of the former provincial focal points and a seminar was held in 2010 to discuss their role. The consolidation of this capacity at the local level will depend on the contractual arrangement that will be adopted and also on the implementation modality: through individuals or via a stable organizational setting. The second option seems more sustainable. So far there is not any formal decision on the format to be adopted in the provinces for the operationalization of the APRM. The choices to be made in this regard depend also on the availability of financial resources.

In sum, the Government and the country have taken measures to ensure that project achievements outlive its implementation, but financial constraints are still the biggest obstacle to the sustainability of the APRM process.

## 2.9. Summary of the Project Review

Generally the performance of the project can be considered good and highly acceptable, despite the various challenges faced throughout its implementation. The table below summarizes the project review of its design elements and the implementation. The scoring adopted is explained below.

PARAMETER	PROJECT ITEM	SCORE/RATE	OBSERVATIONS
<b>Project Design</b>	Relevance within the African Union	5	
	Relevance for APRM objectives	5	
	Strategy	4	
	Results Framework	4	
<b>Project Implementation</b>	Output 1	4	
	Output 2	5	Accomplished but with little participation of the project
	Output 3	3	
	Output 4	5	
	Output 5	3	
	Output 6	4	
	Output 7	4	
	Output 8	5	
	Output 9	2	
<b>Project Impact</b>		3	
<b>Sustainability</b>		1	
<b>Overall Project</b>	<b>Average of all Scores</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Accomplished with Delay</b>



**Scoring:**

Excellent – Fully consistent/fully accomplished, in time, and with the expected result (5)

Very Good – accomplished, with delay (4)

Good - accomplished in time, with most of the expected results (3)

Fair – accomplished only partially (2)

Unsatisfactory – not accomplished (1)

Totally unsatisfactory – not implemented (0)

### **3. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE**

Many factors have influenced the project performance. In this section some of them will be analyzed, more specifically: the challenges to project implementation, the elements that contributed to the successful aspects, the project management arrangements and the role of the technical unit and execution modalities. The section also presents the factors outside the scope of the project that affected its performance.

#### **3.1. The Challenges to Project Implementation**

Time and budget have been the main challenges and constraints to the process, and affected almost all the components. The revision of the duration of the project in 13 months, as well as the increase of the original budget have been attempts to mitigate the negative effects of these two elements. In some cases the project managed to circumvent the existing barriers successfully but in others it did not. Apart from these two paramount challenges, there were other barriers to be crossed, such as poor flow of information, limited technical capacity, language barrier, inappropriate involvement of civil society, and knowledge/awareness about the process. This subsection analyses which challenges the project faced, and how it dealt with them.

##### *3.1.1. Time and Budget Constraints*

The main challenges to project regarding timing and budget constraints can be summarized as follows:

The research component had less time than other components of the process. The time was a great constraint for the final quality of the work carried out. The research institutions had to domesticate the questionnaire produced by the Continental Secretariat for the CSAR survey and at the end the result was not what was expected. This compromised the quality of the data gathered and at the end of the field research the survey data were simply discarded. The budget of this component has been also underestimated. This led to some disagreements between the project management and the research institutions on the expenses to be incurred by each party.

Budget limitations compromised the implementation of the communication strategy implementation.

Replicating the process and keeping the momentum at the local level. At this level the process had some discontinuities. For example, when the seminars were held at the provincial capitals all districts were included, but the replication of the process at the district level was limited by resource constraints (human and financial). For example, in Nampula only 11 districts (out of 21) held seminars (Interviews).

The agenda of the APRM was tied to the continental agenda and this restrained the possibility of broader consultations. There was time for consultation in the thematic areas, but time for people to make their comments and provide a well structured feedback was not enough.

### *3.1.2. Deficient Flow of Information*

The deficient flow of information between the Continental Secretariat, the Government and UNDP regarding the CRM created some difficulties in the preparation of the logistics of this stage of the process, as mentioned in the review of the implementation. Government and UNDP did not have timely accurate information on the CRM, which implied a disproportional effort to prepare the logistic of the mission, including mobilizing additional funds.

Flow of information throughout the APRM process from the central and local level has also affected the level of engagement of the provinces. As one interviewee in a Province mentioned, the information did not flow as expected or with the same speed as in Maputo. The focal points were only activated when there was a specific event (normally seminars). During the idle moments there was an almost complete blackout of information. Provinces knew about the approval of the Country Review Report and also of the handing over of the final version of the report to the government only through the media. Despite these steps implied further activities of divulgation at the local level, and consequently the focal points should be prepared, no formal communication from Maputo was sent to the provinces. Hence, keeping the momentum and consequently the commitment at the provincial level was a challenge. Due to this situation, combined with unsatisfactory remuneration (to be analyzed ahead), some provincial focal points ended up abandoning the process, and this will undermine the continuity of the next steps.

Flow of information at the local level was also a challenge. In the districts the invitations to the APRM seminars were normally sent to the district government authorities, which also tended to disseminate the information mainly through the local government structures. For example, in Nampula the contact with the communities was considered relatively weak. Consequently, most of the participants were from the state structures. There were concerns this would bias the consultation process to favor the government,<sup>43</sup> but at the end this communication flaw did not have much influence on the final product of the consultation process. Although the final result was positive, it is important to take into account that the management of the processes itself (the way the various stages are implemented) is very important for the relevance, ownership and reliability of the APRM. Hence, for the sake of ensuring a broader participation, more attention should be paid to this aspect in future.

### *3.1.3. Limited technical capacity*

Few research institutions with capacity to carry out the country self-assessment were available. This reduced the competitiveness in the bidding for the CSA, and this might have

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<sup>43</sup> Interviews.

affected the quality of the CSARs in some areas. According to one National Forum member and a thematic area coordinator, in the meeting held with the research institutions during the selection process, to clarify some aspects of their proposals, it became clear that they did not have a consistent idea of the scope of their work. Nevertheless, due to the delay and the limited time for the process it was decided that the proposals should be approved anyway and that the technical unit and the thematic areas coordinators should take the responsibility of providing the necessary guidance to the research institutions.<sup>44</sup> In some cases there were no options at all. For example, for corporate governance only one organization, the consulting firm Austral-COWI, presented a proposal and was consequently selected. There were some concerns about the quality of the CSAR of this thematic area and a lot of reviewing was done to ensure the necessary quality. Although the project allowed for the possibility of sub-contracting other entities to complement the capacities of the winning bidders, this solution was not feasible due to budget limitations.<sup>45</sup> Lack of preparation of civil society in some specialized areas like corporate and economic governance reduced the possibility of enrichment of the CSA through the contributions gathered in the validation and consultation seminars. An interviewee noted that people in the provinces might have faced an intellectual challenge, because there was a lot of information to be processed in a short time period. Consequently, since the discussions in the seminars were in the plenary instead of in the work groups, in some cases the debates were too much generalist.

#### *3.1.4. Involvement of civil society*

Apart from the budget constraints, there were also gaps from the civil society that added up to the difficulties faced in the mobilization and sensitization (output 5). Interviewees considered that there is too much ad-hoc work, lack of organized processes to ensure that positions presented in the process reflect the organizations' thinking or the civil society position. In this regard, even the civil society representatives in the National Forum did not align with the positions on some civil society organizations outside the Forum. For example, after the Country Self-Assessment Report was published, there was a statement of the Center of Public Integrity (CIP) raising some concerns about the inclusiveness of the process. This position was considered by some members of the National Forum, a particular position of CIP<sup>46</sup> (source: interview with a National Forum member). An interviewee argued that due to the lack of articulation in the civil society and of capacity development, the civil society ended up being "towed" by the National Forum. During the visit of the review team, the civil society issued a position document explaining its thinking about the process.<sup>47</sup> The document was released in the newspaper *Notícias*. The national Forum released a formal response criticizing this position paper, which, according to an interviewee, seemed that this body was not open enough to criticism. It also shows that there was some space to question the representativeness and legitimacy of civil society interventions that were voiced inside and outside the National Forum. In sum, the relation between the National Forum and part of civil society has been somewhat tense. This reflects the existence of structural problems of

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<sup>44</sup> Acta da Reunião da Direcção Executiva do Fórum Nacional, 23/07/2007.

<sup>45</sup> See Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto, 24/07/2007

<sup>46</sup> Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto, 21 de Maio de 2008; and interviews.

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.pambazuka.org/pt/category/socialmovements/54916>

civil society to participate in some forums and processes, largely discussed in many studies.<sup>48</sup>

Generally the approach adopted in the mobilization of civil society was not free from criticism. For example, an analysis of the first version of the CSAR on Political and Democratic Governance made by a national research institution (The Institute for Economic and Social Studies – IESE) argues that there is the wrong assumption that civil society is a homogeneous actor, which leads to inappropriate generalizations of particular positions presented by actors grouped under the so-called civil society.<sup>49</sup> The transposition of this assumption to the governance forums where the so-called civil society participates aggravates the problem. These are more structural problems and it would be unfair to expect these problems to be solved with the APRM process or it would be too optimistic to expect them not to appear during the process. Hence, the problems related to civil society participation and representation in the APRM are not different from what happens in other processes and forums, and ended up compromising also the effectiveness of its mobilization and consequently the role it played throughout the process.

### *3.1.5. The language barrier*

Some interviews noted that the imminent persons and the CRM when they came to Mozambique they interacted with people in English, and these limited the possibilities of interaction between both parties. The language was also a challenge in dealing with the APRM reports. As mentioned, the translation of the CSAR was done in a rush and its quality was considered poor. This needed an additional editing effort from the Technical Unit to ensure that the translated report would not distort the original contents. An English version of The CRR was sent only in May 20 2009, and the Country had to make comments quickly in time for the presentation at the Heads of State Forum in June 2009.<sup>50</sup> Contrary to other countries, where the Continental Secretary has produced a final Country Review Report and Programme of Action in English and in the country official language, in the case of Mozambique only an English version was produced. This demanded an additional effort from the National Secretariat to produce a Portuguese version for the dissemination process.

### *3.1.6. Knowledge about the process*

When the APRM process began it was not well known even in Maputo. The National Forum highlights the lack of information in the public service among the main constraints of the

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<sup>48</sup> There is a considerable literature analyzing the participation in the local council and in the Development Observatories, see Francisco, António (2010). "Sociedade Civil em Moçambique: Expectativas e Desafios." In Luís de Brito et al (2010). *Desafios para Moçambique 2010*. Maputo: IESE; MASC (2008). *Governance Monitoring and Advocacy in Mozambique: Baseline Study*. Maputo: Civil Society Support Mechanism; FDC (2008). *Índice da Sociedade Civil em Moçambique 2007*. Maputo: Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade.

<sup>49</sup> See Brito, Luís, Chichava, Sérgio and Pohlman, Jonas (2008). *Algumas Considerações Críticas Sobre o Relatório de Autoavaliação de Moçambique na Área da "Democracia e Governação Política"*. [http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/outras/MARP\\_rev\\_3.pdf](http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/outras/MARP_rev_3.pdf), accessed on November 11<sup>th</sup> 2010.

<sup>50</sup> Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto 26 de Junho de 2009.

process.<sup>51</sup> Initially the APRM was confused with an assessment to the Government instead to the country. It was also not clear who should drive the process, and there was a tendency to think that this should be government-led. This raised concerns about the transparency of the process. An interviewee (a member of the National Forum), mentioned that when the mobilization seminars began a lot of people questioned what APRM was. Some people were confusing it with MASC (the civil society support mechanism, funded by DFID and Irish Aid). Even among the media professionals the process was not well-known. Eventually there was training for journalists, which were considered partners in the mobilization process.<sup>52</sup> The overlapping of the APRM with key electoral events (sensitization campaigns about the elector registration, the electoral campaign and the elections) related to the 2008 municipal and 2009 general elections, added more confusion to the low awareness about the process.<sup>53</sup>

### **3.2. The Successes in Project Implementation and the Factors that Contributed to these Results**

Successful aspects can be considered the completion of the process despite the challenges faced, sense of ownership, the relevance of the report and the consensus around it<sup>54</sup>, which favored its adoption as a reference document in the four thematic areas, even by donors, in the political dialogue with the Government. The reasons for these successes are explained below.

The completion of the process was possible because of the Government commitment with a participatory process, and the management of the project that allowed for the discussion of the implementation problems through the Project Board, which was representative enough (comprising the National Forum, the Government Focal Point Representative, UNDP and the Technical Unit) to find sustainable and feasible solutions. The management of the Technical Unit contributed to find appropriate solutions in a context of the implementation of a complex project facing time and resource constraints. Finally, the flexibility of donors to provide additional resources to accommodate unplanned or underestimated expenses, such as mobilization of civil society and the communication strategy, allowed the project to implement activities that were crucial to the success of the process.

The ownership, the consensus around the results and the use of the APRM report as a reference document stem from the good quality of the CSAR. This can be credited to the consultative process, to the autonomy of the APRM bodies, and to the commitment and flexibility of the Government to learn as the process evolved and take adequate measures. For example, the involvement of civil society, although initially defective, was later on acknowledged has a crucial element for the success of the process. Hence, the adoption of the existing civil society mechanism to promote and manage the process in the provinces was an appropriate step to ensure ownership, participation and address the impossibility of creating new structures and mechanism in a limited time span.

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<sup>51</sup> Unidade Técnica do MARP (2010a). Relatório balanço das Actividades do Fórum Nacional.

<sup>52</sup> Acta Reunião do Conselho do Projecto, 23/07/2007; Relatório do MARP, 4º Trimestre de 2009.

<sup>53</sup> Unidade Técnica do MARP (2010a). Relatório balanço das Actividades do Fórum Nacional.

<sup>54</sup> There were only two polemic issues: the definition of the war that ravaged the country for 16 years if it was a destabilization or civil a war and land privatization.



In sum, the Mozambican experience shows that flaws in specific stages of the APRM process do not necessarily result in a failure of the whole process. As mentioned before, the mobilization, preparedness and participation of the civil society as well as the quality of the Self-Assessment have been questioned by some CSOs. However, the final report managed to reflect the main issues and there is a large consensus on its quality and relevance. This is probably because the different stages of the APRM are complementary and provide opportunities for check points and corrective measures stemming from errors and gaps in specific phases. In this regard, weaknesses that might have occurred during the self-assessment research can be corrected through the validation process, and the weaknesses and omissions of the CSAR can be corrected through the Country Revision Mission. At each of these stages there is a participatory process that even not involving the same actors tended to complement instead of contradicting previous findings. The architecture of the mechanism seems to have mitigated reasonably well the effects of the challenges the process faced, among them the limited timeframe and resources, and the relatively weak capacity of the civil society to participate in a more structured manner in the process.

The National Forum leadership, represented by a prestigious academician and four pillar leaders from the Legislative branch, including also a Member of Parliament from the opposition, played an important role in articulating and liaising with different actors and stakeholders, as well as in supervising the work of the Technical Unit, the body responsible for the operational issues of the implementation of the project.

### **3.3. The Project Management Arrangements**

The project management structure and procedures provided the necessary elements for a flexible management able to deal with the implementation problems as they were arising. According to the project document, there was a Project Board responsible for monitoring and directing the utilization of project funds and the overall implementation of the project), and comprised the representative of the National Forum, Ministry of Planning and Development (as the focal point) and the representative of the UNDP. It was also responsible for analyzing and approving the quarterly reports prepared by the Director of the Technical Unit, whose minutes, with its conclusions and decisions, should be shared with all stakeholders. The approval of reports, which included a quarterly financial report, was the condition for further the disbursement of the fund for the following quarter.

The project has funding from five sources/donors, namely, France, GTZ, Norway, DFID, and UNDP. To avoid transactions costs it was decided to use standard management procedures, in this case it was adopted the UNDP procedures. This arrangement, in principle, responded well to its purpose, eliminating cumbersome and multiple processes of reporting and request of funds.

The UNDP financial arrangements, based on Quarterly FACE forms, combined the reporting of funds spent in previous quarters and the advancement of funds for the implementation of project activities. The FACE form, attached to the Quarterly Reports, should be circulated to the Board members and approved in quarterly Board meetings. In this arrangement good planning is crucial to ensure the continuous flow of resources.

Therefore, in terms of its architecture, the reporting and the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Project structures were consistent, and provided the necessary linkage between the performance of the project, compliance with the rules agreed upon in the project document and the elements for the continuous flow of resources (in this case of the funding) for the implementation of the project. The Board meetings were held with regularity and project implementation issues were discussed and, whenever necessary, appropriate measures were taken. In this regard, issues related to the revision of the project plan and budget to include missing activities, the mobilization of additional funds, the decision to involve civil society mechanism in the mobilization and consultation process at the local level to strike the balance between the know-how and the financial constraints were all taken by the Project Board.

However, in regards to financial management, a central element in the implementation of the project, the performance was not always good. A good example is the analysis of the problems faced in the disbursement of funds

In this regard, the project planning in some cases failed to include key activities in the plans and budget, which affected the flow of funds and consequently the implementation of key activities, as already mentioned. In some cases, there were delays in donors' disbursement of funds, either due to internal donors' problems, lack of information or deficient reporting from the project. Although during the implementation of the project specific meetings were held to inform the donors about the implementation process and the financial constraints, some donors considered that the flow of information on the project has sometimes been problematic. In some cases invitations to meetings were done with short notice. These gaps affected the response of some donors to the project needs. For example, a donor noted that despite Government's intentions to request an increase in the funding, due to the plan and budget revision of the project, there was not any formal request, although there was a real possibility of provision of additional funding. Another donor argued that after the completion of the time for his support, and after the presentation of the Country Review Report in Libya, no additional funding was provided because there was not any information on the status of the process and the way forward. According to the actors involved in the implementation, delays in disbursements were caused by the UNDP financial procedures, which were considered cumbersome and not aligned with the dynamics and complexities of the APRM process.<sup>55</sup> This was pointed out as among the reasons for the delay in the implementation of the activities. With regards to this point, there has been a combination of some factors that caused the discontinuities in the flow of resources and consequently affected the implementation of the project. The first is the deficient planning and reporting from the Technical unit; the second was the workload of UNDP that prevented it to respond swiftly to the disbursement requests even when the quarterly reports had been approved by the Project Board; the third is a problem of project design, more specifically the omission of some activities in the initial plan of the Project Document that demanded further revision of

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<sup>55</sup> The examples mentioned in this regard refer to the funding of seminars in the provinces and expenses for the consultation and validation processes. Some interviewees argued that the UNDP procedures are not flexible to respond timely to demands of a programme with a limited timeframe and an intense process of implementation. consequently, often the activities were delayed because the funds were not released in time even after the submission of the financial reports.



the plan and request of funds; some difficulties of donors in honoring their commitments in time; and, finally, difficulties of the Technical Unit to follow the agreed procedures, although it had benefitted from specific training on the UNDP procedures. This shows that despite the agreement on financial management procedures, included in the project document, their execution was not fluid and all stakeholders involved in the management of the project at some point had difficulties in sticking to the originally agreed. Hence, the implementation of the financial procedures has affected the execution of the project, and, in this aspect, the performance of the project was not good.

### 3.4. Role of the Technical Unit and Execution Modalities

The technical unit was created in February 2007 only started functioning in June 2007, when the whole technical staff was hired. The Executive Director started working in February 2007. Generally **the technical quality of the staff was good in their technical areas and contributed to the successful implementation of the programme.** Without the technical unit the programme would not have been implemented. Its assistance was important for the implementation of the project and for all the Review process. The Technical Unit assisted the National Forum in the coordination of the APRM and also organized events to capacitate the research institutions for the CSAR. However, the role of the Technical Unit was more visible in administrative than in technical issues. On the latter it was claimed that it resorted too much to external assistance to perform some of its tasks. For example, external consultancy was hired for the analysis of the early versions of the CSAR, which should have been done by the Technical Unit staff.

Concerning the project execution modalities, the Technical Unit faced some challenges that are worth mentioning.

The first is related to the modalities of allocation of funds for the component of sensitization and mobilization of the civil society. The channeling of funds through the Technical Unit instead of a mechanism with participation of the civil society is considered one of the main causes for the low performance of this component. The main argument is that neither the Government nor the Technical Unit had appropriate and sufficient experience and expertise to work with civil society.<sup>56</sup> Whilst this was consensual among civil society actors, there was not a full agreement on the engagement of FDC as the coordinator of this set of activities. The decision taken on this – to involve the provincial focal points – may have been a good intermediate solution, but it also raised other problems, mainly the volatility and instability of the contracts with individuals and their limited capacity to respond to the challenges of disseminating the process and mobilizing the civil society at the local level. An interviewee mentioned that in some provinces the focal points were not well-known and this could have limited their capacity of mobilizing the various local actors to participate in the process.

Secondly, at the provincial level there were complaints about the excessive centralization of the process, which caused some dissatisfaction of the provincial focal points, which

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<sup>56</sup> Interviews.

controlled directly the funds for the payment of the expenses with the seminars.<sup>57</sup> There was not any provincial planning. The process was driven from Maputo. Sometimes the provincial focal points faced difficulties in organizing the logistics of the meetings. Consequently, fewer events were organized at this level. Moreover, it was not clear if district focal points would be remunerated, and this uncertainty caused some disappointment. The combination of lack of a continuous flow of information and the resources constraints caused some of the focal points to leave, hence undermining the continuity of the process.<sup>58</sup> The coverage of the districts was also affected.

### 3.5. Factors Outside the Scope of the Project

Work plans were fully implemented, although some activities had to be changed regularly. The original deadlines defined on the Project document were not met. In some cases the activities from one quarter had to be implemented in other quarter. The plans had to be reviewed either because of the disbursements delay or because of the continuous postponements of the Country Review Mission by the Continental Secretariat. Whilst the project management succeeded in mitigating the effects of the delays in the disbursement adjusting the sequence of the activities, in the case of the delays caused by the continental secretariat not much could be done. After finalizing the CSAR under pressure to meet the original target to field the Country Review Mission early 2008, the Country had to wait until the Continental Secretariat had finalized the process of re-composition of the panel of eminent persons. This delayed the process in almost one year. The Continental Secretariat also demanded that the CSAR should be translated into English, while this has not been either planned in the project or discussed before. These examples suggest that either the support missions did not fulfill the objectives of informing correctly about the stages of the process, or the communication between the Continental Secretariat and the national entities, including the project management, was problematic. Even after the presentation and approval of the CRR, the Continental Secretariat took almost a year to send the final version of the Country Review Report and the respective Programme of Action, and only sent the English version. This delayed the commencing of the divulgation and preparation of the country for the implementation of the Programme of Action. These factors, whose control was beyond the scope of the project, affected its implementation considerably. Other factor outside the scope of the project have been indicated in previous sections, namely the overlapping with the electoral calendar and the confusion stemming from its activities with those of the APRM activities, the structural problems of civil society and their influence in the capacity of this arena to participate more actively in the various stages of the process, are among the examples of this type of factors.

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<sup>57</sup> Acta da Reunião do Conselho do Projecto, 13/12/2007.

<sup>58</sup> Interview.

## 4. LESSONS LEARNT FROM PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Three set of lessons can be drawn from the implementation of this project, namely, the need of ensuring proper resourcing for the whole process; the importance of building capacity in different actors to participate more effectively at all stages; and the importance of having stable structures, mechanisms and procedures to sustain the capacities created along the process.

Concerning resourcing, it is evident that a project of this nature should combine a clear and realistic timing, adequate financial and human resources. Only human resources were available, and, even though, with the problems of staff retention experienced by the Technical Unit. The timing was also unrealistic and this caused the delays in the implementation of the project. Actually, the lesson that can be learnt from the experience of the implementation of this project is that good planning, along with other elements that will be mentioned ahead, is a key element for a successful implementation of a complex initiative like the APRM. Most of the financial constraints the project faced were due to deficient planning, stemming from deficiencies in the management and some gaps in the project design, more specifically lack of "smart"<sup>59</sup> indicators at the output/intermediate level. This prevented the project management from foreseeing the resources needed to attain some intermediate results. The other factor is ensuring a continuous flow of information among the actors involved at the various stages of the process. As mentioned throughout the report, lack of timely and relevant information has prevented some donors from providing additional funding to the process. "Information black out" between the stages of the APRM process, and particularly after the presentation of the CRR and Programme of Action, created some uncertainty about the continuity of the process, which in turn reduced the incentive and momentum of some donors to continue funding this exercise, despite their interest to do so. At this point, the Government will have to re-commence the negotiation with donors to fund the next stages of the APRM, which will need an additional effort that could have been spared if there would have been a continuous flow of information. Nonetheless, it is fair mentioning that the information black out is also caused by the deficient communication from the Continental Secretariat to the National entities.

The generally weak participation of civil society in CSAR and in the preparation of the Programme of Action is a consequence of a failure in the adoption of a sound approach of capacity development for the various actors involved in the APRM. This was more visible in specialized areas like Corporate and Economic Governance, where contributions were limited, because no capacity existed to discuss these matters on a well-informed basis. This obviously limited the capacity of participation, which tended to be more passive, and, in the case of the CSAR on corporate governance, the general impression that it was of questionable quality probably has also stemmed from the absence of well-informed contributions from key stakeholders. Hence, adopting a model of capacity development that fosters specialization of the stakeholders in key elements of the review can contribute to the

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<sup>59</sup> Specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound.

good quality of the results of this exercise. This will also be important at the forthcoming implementation stage, because it will allow the stakeholders to monitor the programme on a more informed basis.

The “brain drain” of the Technical unit and the relative loss of institutional memory show the importance of having stable structures, mechanisms and procedures to sustain the capacities created along the process. Short-term contracts, uncertainty about the professional future and lack of information about the perspectives of the programme are among factors that reduce the incentives of the staff to remain in the process, even after a considerable effort of capacity development. Competitive remuneration and clear information about the professional prospects available to the staff is a good way of stimulating the retention of the human resources; therefore, to render the capacity development investment more sustainable.

The provincial level also provides lessons on the sustainability of the created capacities. Despite the participation of provincial governors in the National Forum, the involvement of the provinces, apart from the financial limitations, was constrained also by the management mechanisms and execution modalities. The solution to involve the provincial focal points was an intermediate solution taking into account the budget and time limitations, which also caused some hesitation from the project management to choose the right approach to engage the civil society. Despite the good work done by the provincial focal points, the coordination of the process at this level lacked an organizational support that could be able to reach out the lowest levels and also to manage a complex process of consultation like the APRM's. The problems of communication between the central and local level also suggest that the Technical Unit, or a similar type of a technical body aimed at assisting the review process, should be better represented at the provincial level and not working with the provinces remotely. Lack of a permanent structure and deficient information flows create discontinuities, and the individuals mobilized to assist in the process cannot be able to keep the momentum and the commitment, and, as witnessed in real cases, they can abandon the process. Taking into account the forthcoming challenges regarding the implementation and monitoring of the National Programme of Action, the existence of permanent structures at the local level is important for the success of the process and is also a way of ensuring that the recommendations of the APRM exercise are correctly implemented.

Finally, most of the problems faced during the implementation could have been foreseen if in the project design a more detailed situational analysis could have been done. Some of the obstacles such as existing research capacities in some areas (e.g. corporate governance) and weaknesses of civil society organization and participation are recurrent and could have been easily identified and taken into account in the project planning.

## **5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE SUPPORT TO THE APRM IN MOZAMBIQUE**

The challenges the project faced and the lessons learnt from its implementation shed some light on what could be the issues to pay attention in the next stages of the APRM, as well as on the potential support to the process by donors. This section focuses on the how to address the challenges and enhance the factor that contributed to the successful implementation of the project, and also analyses the prospects for future support in terms of donors' potential involvement and design features of future support projects.

### **5.1. Addressing Challenges to Implementation and Enhancing Success Factors**

Many challenges to the project and factors that influenced on its success have been presented throughout this report, among them: the resources' limitation, flow of information, implementation modalities, weakness of civil society, public awareness about the APRM, government commitment, donors support', and the architecture of the process. This subsection presents how to address the challenges and enhance the positive factors that influenced the implementation of the project, whose effects, as will be clear, are intertwined.

On resourcing, staff recruitment and retention should be given a particular attention. In the transitory phase two staff members of the former Technical Unit have transited to the National Secretariat with UNDP funded salaries. A National Director with a public service contract leads the secretariat and it is still necessary to recruit the technical staff for the forthcoming challenges of disseminating the CRR and the Programme of Action as well as its monitoring. For the future it is necessary to avoid loose contractual arrangements and non-competitive remuneration that created motivational problems and threatened the stability of the Technical Unit and its institutional memory. The present round of the APRM will be only concluded after the implementation of its recommendations, planned for the period between 2010 and 2014. Therefore, this is the second stage of the operationalization of the APRM process in the country and it could be considered a phase of capacity development. Unattractive remuneration packages and differences in salaries between technical staff and the management can create motivational problems, which can compromise the successful implementation of the next phase of the APRM. An alternative solution to consider is to grant a special status to the National Secretariat in which its staff, including the director, has a competitive remuneration, while the secretariat functions are gradually integrated into the national monitoring and evaluation system, managed by public servants.

Enhancement of the Government commitment implies mainstreaming the process into the overall country planning and budgeting mechanisms. This approach was adopted by the Government in the design of the PARP. This process should go further integrating the APRM recommendation into the planning and budgeting methodologies at all levels. In this context, all the participatory fora and mechanisms involving civil society, such as the National and Provincial Development Observatories and the local councils should be

informed and capacitated to participate actively in the implementation process. This is to avoid that broader principles of mainstreaming the APRM recommendations can only be reflected on national plans<sup>60</sup> and became diluted or absent in local plans.

From a project perspective, this has implications on the funding of the process, which could be from the state budget, but with variable execution modalities. For example, the current funding of the National Secretariat, through the state budget and project funds, under the secretariat management could continue, but initiatives to strengthen civil society could be managed by an autonomous mechanism. Potential alternatives are: using existing civil society capacity development mechanisms and programmes such as MASC (the Civil Society Support Mechanism), or AGIR (Programme of Action for a Responsible and Inclusive Governance), funded by the Swedish Development Agency, to include activities related to the APRM in their plans, hence aligning their interventions with the needs of capacity development for this exercise. Decentralization of the funding is important, because of the scope of the activities at this level. The provincial focal points (or other structures to be created at this level), will deal with many actors and structures at provincial and lower levels (district, administrative posts, and potentially at the community level), and the centralization of the funding was among the main constraints of the participation and inclusiveness of the APRM at the local level. The allocation of the responsibility to an individual instead to an organization is also problematic, because of the workload and also the volatility of this type of contractual arrangement. A focal point organization should be considered, either for project management or for the Programme implementation purposes.

On the side of the civil society, the representation of the organizations and the participation should be through the thematic areas. The method of selection should also be more transparent, to avoid the criticism on the legitimacy of the representatives. Due to the importance of the APRM process it could be adopted the same method of selection used for the National Electoral Commission that is based on clear and publicized rules and stages, in which candidates are scrutinized by civil society platforms and networks with a legally recognized status. The difference with the National Electoral Commission is that the final choice of the civil society should be automatically accommodated by the Government, nominating the proposed representatives. This solution is not free of weaknesses and can also be criticized but it is more transparent than the current method of selection.

Finally, it is important to plan carefully each stage of the process and assure its consistency. As mentioned, the reasons for the overall success of APRM, despite some weaknesses at certain stages, was the architecture of the process that has been designed to make the different steps complementary and with a potential do correct mistakes at specific points. Therefore, to ensure the final consistency, each component of the process, be it from the project point of view to create the capacities for the implementation of the APRM, or in the actual implementation of the process, must be seen in that perspective. This means that whilst the focus should be on the final results, it is crucial to know what insurmountable

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<sup>60</sup> Only formally, as is the case of the Agenda 2025, whose recommendations are barely referred to in plans and development programmes, but there are no clear indications that it is being taken into account in the implementation of these instruments.



obstacles exist at each stage and how can be corrected with complementary measures along the implementation process.

## **5.2. Relevance of Supporting to the Operationalization of the APRM in Mozambique**

As mentioned on the previous subsection, the project only supported the first phase of the operationalization of the APRM process, whose focus was on the Country Review and preparation of the National Programme of Action. The second phase of the operationalization process is the implementation and monitoring of the Programme of Action, which has its own challenges.

The APRM process in Mozambique provided complementary governance assessments that are expected to inform the design of government policies, plans and programmes, the Government and Donors Joint Annual Review process, the design and review of donors' programmes. The National Programme of Action comprises a comprehensive set of activities spanning many areas, some of them already addressed in the ongoing country programmes, others still to be included on the ordinary plans and others will need specific plans. The complexity of the programme demands a wide and effective dissemination to build public awareness, combined with mobilization of relevant stakeholders to monitor its implementation.

The relevance of the issues raised in the CRR and turned into the National Programme of Action (NPOA) is consensual and some donors are already funding related areas (e.g. public sector reform, decentralization, anti-corruption, legal reform, electoral processes, etc.).<sup>61</sup> To consolidate the credibility, ownership and relevance of the process it is crucial to ensure that the main concerns raised during the review process are turned into concrete and effective interventions. At this point the dissemination process should have commenced and the design of the M & E process should have been concluded. The government has already shown its commitment allocating human resources to the National Secretariat and funding part of its recurrent costs. This has been an extra pressure on the government limited resources. The activities of the Secretariat will demand a staff with strong technical qualifications and experience. These people are not likely to be found in the public service and, based on the first phase; good professionals would need an attractive remuneration, which can only be possible through a specific funding mechanism. At this stage of the process, in which the existing structures are not consolidated yet, Government funding of the Secretariat, apart from being insufficient, also poses concerns about the autonomy of this body to monitor the implementation of the NPOA. This obviously delays the taking over of the whole process in the country. Besides, the Government M & E capacity is still weak, and it would be unrealistic to expect the Programme of Action to be adequately monitored within the defined timeframe without a fully operational National Secretariat. Realistically, to ensure that the full cycle of the APRM is operationalized, additional donor funding will be necessary.

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<sup>61</sup> See the final version of the African Peer Review Mechanism (2010). Republic of Mozambique: APRM Country Review Report No 11. APRM Secretariat, July 2010.

Part of the donors that funded the project is committed to support the APRM process; either because it is on their priorities, or it deals with issues of their development aid portfolio. There is a consensus on the importance to support the country in the implementation of the National Programme of Action. For example Norway expressed its commitment to the process, because it acknowledges the importance of the APRM to Mozambique and to many dialogue forums between donors and government. Despite the information black out that followed the presentation of the Review Report to the Forum of the Heads of State, DFID is still interested, because the APRM highlights issues related to the justice sector, corruption and others in which DFID is engaged.<sup>62</sup> A proviso flagged by the donors is that support to the APRM should not continue being a stand alone, rather it should be in line with the alignment and coordination principles already in use in the Mozambican development aid setting. UNDP, which is in a better position to be informed about the challenges of the operationalization of the APRM in Mozambique, is still supporting the secretariat, hence signaling its commitment to the process.

In sum, it is justifiable and relevant to support the APRM process in Mozambique, and there is some willingness from some donors to fund it under some circumstances.

Taking into account the review of past experience in the operationalization of the APRM in Mozambique, the next (closing) sub-section proposes the design features, objectives, monitoring and implementation modalities of the potential future project.

### **5.3. Major Design Features of Potential Future Support**

The project objectives should be the consolidation of the capacities created in the first phase in the operationalization of the APRM process in Mozambique, and the setting up of the conditions for monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the APRM National Programme of Action. In the next phase, it is important to have a strong secretariat that can support the implementation of the Programme of Action in all branches (executive, judiciary and legislative), as well as its monitoring. The main outcome of the project could be the creation of the conditions in the country to implement the full-cycle of the APRM exercise and prepare the second round of the country review.

On the design aspects, a future project should include strategies to mitigate the impact of resources constraints: time, budget and information. As thoroughly described, the country has carried out this first round of the APRM under severe time constraints and financial limitations. During the process it was often difficult to balance the national and continental agenda. The prevalence of the latter, for understandable reasons (the country had to abide by the rules) had compromised the quality of the process at some stages, raising some concerns about the reliability and inclusiveness of the process among some actors, which fortunately have been waived by the final quality of the Country Review Report. In the future, to avoid

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<sup>62</sup> Interview with Anne Beathe Tvinnereim, Norwegian Royal Embassy/Mozambique; and Teresa Mendes, DFID Mozambique.

undermining the process and discredit the good results achieved up to this point, it is important to plan realistically and, if necessary negotiate and agree the final plan with the Continental Secretariat and also national stakeholders. A situational analysis would also inform about the existing capacities, the capacity development needs, the present and potential constraints, the issues to take into account in engaging the various stakeholders and the resources needed to achieve the objectives defined for each stage. This could result in a well-balanced project that combines realistically the national capacities and constraints (and how to address them) and the needs to achieve broader continental objectives and be in line with the rules of the APRM process. Involving national stakeholders in the process of designing future projects, apart from meeting the participation criteria, can also ensure public awareness and consolidate the existing ownership of the APRM process. Involvement of national stakeholders at all levels, in the monitoring and evaluation of the National Programme of Action can clarify the intended and expected linkage between the APRM recommendations and the national plans and programmes, and, consequently, confirm the relevance of this exercise for the country and its citizens.

With regards to monitoring, the project should support the creation and strengthening of a multi-layered structure mainstreamed within the existing participatory mechanisms, namely the development observatories and local councils, but with higher level of specialization and with enhanced capacities. Previous experiences show how the Development Observatory meetings can be generic, non-informative and with weak or no relevance for accountability. The Local council's agenda at the district level have been also captured by the excessive focus on the District Development Funds. The APRM recommendations are closely linked to the issues discussed in the Poverty Observatory sessions and local councils (e.g. socio-economic development). Therefore, creating new structures is redundant and not viable, because of resources limitations and also because the existing mechanisms are weak but still have some implantation at the local level. Further, it would violate the APRM principle of avoiding duplication of existing mechanisms. The National Secretariat has launched a tender to recruit technical assistance for the design of the APRM M & E system.<sup>63</sup> The latter will include a definition of the roles of the National Forum members; clarify the information flows, territorial levels of monitoring, actors involved and reporting periodicity.<sup>64</sup> The APRM M & E system should combine the processes and mechanism of reporting and flow of information within public entities (the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary), and from civil society to the public entities. Methods and techniques such as budget monitoring, Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) and performance audits could aggregate more objectivity, realism and relevance to the monitoring exercise. The forthcoming system should be linked to the ongoing initiatives as the Governance Monitoring initiative (involving CIP, GMD, LDH and AMODE), and the AGIR<sup>65</sup> programme, funded by Sweden. A project supporting this initiative should clearly capture these elements on its outcomes,

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<sup>63</sup>On the day the formal presentation of this report was made (August 18<sup>th</sup> 2011), the National Secretariat Director informed that the tender was cancelled because the best proposal had a budget beyond the resources available for this component. This is an issue deserving a special attention to ensure the continuation and consolidation of the process.

<sup>64</sup> Source: Information provided by the National Secretariat Executive Director.

<sup>65</sup> Programme of Action for a Responsible and Inclusive Governance.

outputs and performance indicators. It should also integrate the civil society on the monitoring of the project itself.

The project implementation modalities should follow the rationale already described, of decentralization of funds, management based on organizations not individuals, and permanent mechanisms established at provincial and district level.

Finally, all project components that demand project funding should have a realistically plan of phasing out this modality of funding in favor of local sources up to 2014, be them either the state budget or any autonomous civil society mechanism. The phasing out should be negotiated and agreed upon among all the relevant stakeholders (civil society, government, parliament, judiciary and donors).

## 6. ANNEXES

### 6.1. Summary of the Implementation of the Project Based on the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

Project Expected Outputs	Indicators, baselines and targets	Analysis of the Indicators	Implementation/Results Analysis
1.0 National Forum established to oversee the operationalization of the APRM	1.3. Meetings of the National Forum organized (quarterly meetings)	Inaccurate indicator, although the project document quantifies the number of meetings	Implemented, but with limitations, due to budget constraints
	<b>Baseline:</b> Development of national institutional capacity and involvement of all key stakeholders in the country in the APRM process is key to the success of APRM in Mozambique – institutionalized structure required	Baseline capture the situation at the beginning of the project, but it could be more objective (e.g.	Not applicable
2.0 Secretariat established to support the APRM Focal Point	2.2 Engage staff for the Secretariat	Good indicator	Implemented
	2.3 Secretariat of the national APRM Focal Point equipped	Good indicator	Implemented
	<b>Baseline:</b> Development of national institutional capacity needed for the liaison between the Government and the APRM National Forum, continental Secretariat and APR Forum. – institutionalized structure required	Baseline capture the situation at the beginning of the project, but it could be more objective (e.g. no structure to support the Government and the National Focal Point established in the country)	Not Applicable
3.0 Technical Unit established to coordinate and manage the operationalization of the APRM	3.2. Technical Unit Staff engaged	Good indicator	Implemented with delay. Staff engaged only during part of the project implementation
	3.3. Technical Unit Equipped (Technical Unit operational)	Good indicator	Implemented with delay and the unit faced future problems due to “brain drain”.
	3.4. Technical Unit Staff trained & exchange experience visits promoted	Good Indicator	Implemented with delay

Project Expected Outputs	Indicators, baselines and targets	Analysis of the Indicators	Implementation/Results Analysis
	<b>Baseline:</b> Development of national institutional capacity and involvement of all key stakeholders in the country in the APRM process is key to the success of APRM in Mozambique – institutionalized structure required	Baseline does not capture objectively the situation at the beginning of the project.	Not applicable
4. Support Mission undertaken to review the state of preparedness and ensure a common understanding of the APRM	4.1. Support Mission Undertaken in 2007 (Source: Relatório de Gestão 2006-2010)		
5. Civil society mobilized at national, provincial and district level to ensure civil society participation in the APRM	5.1. Civil Society mobilized at the National, Provincial and District levels by the 2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2007 (Source: Relatório de Gestão 2006-2010)	This indicator would have been more accurate if it had defined quantitative targets and qualitative targets. As it is now it is of difficult measurement	Only partially implemented. Generally this output was among the weakest in quantitative (e.g. districts included) and qualitative (capacities to participate) terms
6.0 Country Self-Assessment a	6.6 Finalize and translate the Final Country Self-Assessment and the Programme of Action	Good Indicator	Implemented with delay. The Quality of the translation was not good.
	<b>Baseline:</b> Development of national institutional capacity and involvement of all key stakeholders in the country in the APRM process is key to the success of APRM in Mozambique – institutionalized structure required	Baseline does not capture objectively the situation at the beginning of the project.	Not applicable
7. Country Review Mission undertaken to ascertain the Country Self-Assessment and the Programme of	7.1. Provide logistical support (field visits)	Inaccurate (similar to an activity)	Implemented
	7.2. Provide translation service	Inaccurate (similar to an activity)	Implemented
	7.3. Organize meetings with the National Forum (stakeholders consultation)	Inaccurate (similar to an activity)	Implemented



Project Expected Outputs	Indicators, baselines and targets	Analysis of the Indicators	Implementation/Results Analysis
Action	7.4. Organize meetings as requested by the Country Review Mission (Field visits and stakeholders consultation)	Inaccurate (similar to an activity)	Implemented
	<b>Baseline:</b> Need to ensure participation of all APRM process stakeholders and to undertake First Assessment of the democratic governance prevailing situation in the country as well as development of the first APRM National Programme of Action. No previous assessment had been undertaken.	Capture objectively the situation at the beginning of the project.	Not applicable
8.0 Country Review Report finalized and submitted to the APRM Forum	8.1. Translate the Country Review Report as prepared by the APRM Secretariat (Portuguese version of the Country Review Report )	Inaccurate (similar to an activity)	Implemented with delay (delay of the Continental Secretariat) but with problems of translation.
	Organize meeting of the Government of Mozambique to consider the draft Country Review Report (comments of the Government of Mozambique to the Mozambique Country Review Report)	Inaccurate (similar to an activity)	Implemented with delay
	<b>Baseline:</b> Need to review democratic governance prevailing situation in the country and of remedial actions to be taken as well as lessons learned for exchange of experiences with other APRM country partners – No previous assessment undertaken by the Peers	Capture objectively the situation at the beginning of the project.	Not applicable
9. Public awareness of the APRM raised to ensure participation in the process	9.2 Implementation of the communication strategy	Indicator too vague and of difficult measurement	Only partially implemented. Results completely achieved
	<b>Baseline:</b> APRM process public awareness needs to be enhanced	Ambiguous! Does not capture objectively the situation at the beginning of the project.	Not applicable

## 6.2. List of Interviewees

#	Name	Function/Organization/Institution	Date of Interview
1.	Momade Saíde	Executive Director/ APRM Secretariat	November 15 <sup>th</sup> 2010
2.	Fernanda Munguambe	APRM Technical Unit Staff	November 15 <sup>th</sup> 2010
3.	Luís Magaço	Director Austral Cowi	November 16 <sup>th</sup> 2010
4.	Lutero Simango	National Forum Member/Legislative-MP	November 16 <sup>th</sup> 2010
5.	Graça Samo	National Forum Member/Civil Society	November 16 <sup>th</sup> 2010
6.	Alfredo Gamito	National Forum Member/ MP	November 16 <sup>th</sup> 2010
7.	Arlete Patel	Fmr. Executive Director Technical Unit	November 17 <sup>th</sup> 2010
8.	Anne-Beathe Tvinnereim	Norwegian Embassy/Mozambique	November 17 <sup>th</sup> 2010
9.	Paulo Cuinica	Head/G20	November 17 <sup>th</sup> 2010
10.	Teresa Mendes	Programme Officer DFID Mozambique	November 17 <sup>th</sup> 2010
11.	Virgínia Videira	National Forum Member/ fmr. MP	November 17 <sup>th</sup> 2010
12.	António Gaspar	Director Center of Strategic Studies	November 18 <sup>th</sup> 2010
13.	Dipac Jaiantilal	Researcher Cruzeiro do Sul	November 18 <sup>th</sup> 2010
14.	Marechal Nhavoto	APRM Technical Unit Staff	November 18 <sup>th</sup> 2010
15.	Albino Francisco	FDC	November 18 <sup>th</sup> 2010
16.	Dinis Matsolo	National Forum Member and Reverend	November 19 <sup>th</sup> 2010
17.	Natividade Bule	National Forum Member/Private sector	November 19 <sup>th</sup> 2010
18.	Telmina Pereira	National Forum Member/fmr. Governor	November 19 <sup>th</sup> 2010
19.	Lourenço do Rosário	President/National Forum	November 19 <sup>th</sup> 2010
20.	Odete Muchanga	APRM Focal Point/Nampula Province	November 22 <sup>nd</sup> 2010
21.	Carlos Coelho	National Forum Member/Media	November 22 <sup>nd</sup> 2010
22.	Eugénio Fernandes	Provincial Focal Point/Sofala	November 24 <sup>th</sup> 2010
23.	Oswaldo Petersburgo	National Forum Member/Youth Repres.	November 25 <sup>th</sup> 2010
24.	Sophie Guarda	Embassy of France	December 17 <sup>th</sup> 2010
25.	Habiba Rodolfo	Programme Officer/UNDP	December 21 <sup>st</sup> 2010
26.	Naomi Kitahara	Deputy Resident Representative/UNDP	January 25 <sup>th</sup> 2011
27.	José Luís Macamo	Governance Manager/UNDP	January 25 <sup>th</sup> 2011
28.	Lourenço Sambo	Former Advisor to the APRM Focal Point	April 16 <sup>th</sup> 2011