**BUILDING CAPACITY FOR SUSTAINABLE LAND USE AND MANAGEMENT IN ANGOLA Project**

**GEF PIMS 3379**

**UNDP 0052416**

**Final Evaluation, FIRST DRAFT**

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**Southern Africa, Angola**

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**Executing Agency: Ministry of Environment**

**Project Partners: Ministry of Agriculture, Provincial Government of Huambo & University of Agronomy in Huambo**

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**Acknowledgements**

*We walk to heaven backward*

*“And we shall succeed not in spite of but through our failures:*

*We advance to the truth by experience of error; we succeed through failures. We know not how to do right except by having done wrong. We know what is right, not positively, but negatively, we do not see the truth at once and make towards it, but we fall upon and try error, and find it is not the truth. We grope about by touch, not by sight, and so by a miserable experience exhaust the possible modes of acting until nought is left, but truth, remaining. Such is the process by which we succeed; we walk to heaven backward.”*

*John Henry Newman 1801-1890*

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**Executive Summary**

**Project Summary Table**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Project Title | Building Capacity for Sustainable Land Use and Management in Angola | | |  |
| GEF Project ID | ? |  | At endorsement (US$) | At completion (US$) |
| UNDP Project ID | 3379 | GEF financing | 750,000 | 675,000 |
| Country | Angola | IA/EA Own | 400,000 | 751,000 |
| Region | Southern Africa | Government | 750,000 | 350,000 |
| Focal Area | OP 15 LD | Other | - | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| FA Objectives (OP/SP) | LD | Total co-financing | 1,150,000 | 1,101,000 |
| Executing Agency | UNDP | Total project costs | 1,900,000 | 1,776,000 |
| Other partners involved | Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture | Project Document signature | | 11/2007 |
|  |  | Operation closing date | Proposed 10/2010 | Actual: 12/2012 |

**Project Description**

The Building Capacity for Sustainable Land Use and Management in Angola project (SLM project) was conceptualized as early as 2006 by the UNDP Country Office (UNDP CO) Angola. The context of its development and subsequent implementation is important because the country was emerging from 30 years of conflict with few services and infrastructure in place, internally displaced people and an agricultural sector that had been largely destroyed in many areas. There was little experience of projects such as the SLM project; indeed it was the first such GEF project and government institutions were in a state of transition which has in some instances carried on through the project with institutional changes taking place in the main project partners (*e.g.* the Ministry of Agriculture and Urban Environment became the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment. Both Ministries are important stakeholders but the Ministry of Environment retained the execution of the project).

Overall project cost was US$ 1,900,000, with US$ 750,000 from GEF (including US$ 25,000 PDF A and financed through the GEF Operational Programme 15, Land Degradation [OP15]), and US$ 1,150,000 from co-finance: US$ 400,000 from UNDP and US$ 750,000 planned co-finance from the Government of Angola (US$ 350,000 in cash and US$ 400,000 in kind).

Evaluation Rating Table

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Project aspect | Rating | GEF description | TE description |
| **Monitoring and Evaluation** | **Moderately Satisfactory** | There were moderate shortcomings | The established UNDP-GEF monitoring and evaluation procedures for MSPs were carried out very well. However, the design included the addition of the SLM Portfolio Projects Monitoring and Evaluation Tool Kit. The Tool Kit is designed to simplify design and implementation of M&E for projects within the LDC SIDS portfolio. This was meant to be filled out by the UNCCCD FP. There is no record of this being done. |
| **UNDP and Executing Agency implementation / execution, coordination, and operational issues** | **Moderately Satisfactory** | There were moderate shortcomings | The execution of the project has been weak. In particular the lack of focus on outcomes 2, 3 and 4 and the failure to provide in-kind co-financing (for instance).The Implementing Agency (UNDP) has in many instances performed the role of executing agency. Implementation of the project has at times been very challenging and the UNDP CO has provided good project assurance and done a very capable job. |
| **Overall results (attainment of objectives)[[1]](#footnote-1)** | **Moderately Satisfactory** | There were moderate shortcomings | With three of the four outcomes performing so poorly the project has not achieved its objective (see section 3.3.1). However, outcome 1 has performed well (see para. 95) and as this was over 70% of the GEF financing (and considering outcome 5) it is plausible to say that the project had shortcomings at the systemic level but has performed well at the technical level. |
| *Outcome 1: Individual and institutional capacity for SLM developed* | *Satisfactory* | *There were only minor shortcomings* | *Not applicable* |
| *Outcome 3: National Action Programme completed* | *Moderately satisfactory* | *There were moderate shortcomings* | *Not applicable* |
| *Outcome 3: National Action Programme completed* | *Moderately satisfactory* | *There were moderate shortcomings* | *Not applicable* |
| *Outcome 4: Medium Term Investment Plan being financed and implemented (and linked to TerrAfrica)* | *Unsatisfactory.* | *There were major shortcomings in the achievement of the project objectives in terms of effectiveness and efficiency* | *Not applicable* |
| *Outcome 5: Adaptive management and learning in place (project effectively managed)* | *Satisfactory.* | *There were only minor shortcomings* | *Not applicable* |
| **Relevance** | **Relevant** |  | The project was intended to provide targeted capacity building in SLM which includes mainstreaming SLM into national economic development processes in LDC and SIDS in line with the GEF OP15 LD. The SLM project’s intention to mainstream SLM into PRSPs, MDGs, NSSD, and other national frameworks particularly by integrating SLM into rural development agendas, and developing credible investment plans and strategies to motivate donors (national and international alike) to invest in SLM in the countries made it very relevant by a number of measures. The project outcomes are also aligned with the UNCCD, UNFCCC and the UNDP UNDAF and CPAP as well as the Angolan Constitution and the GoA programme of rural development and food security as well as emerging urban SLM issues |
| **Effectiveness** | **Moderately Satisfactory** | There were moderate shortcomings | The interventions in outcome 1 have been very effective, targeted capacity building, awareness raising and partnering with key players working in development and SLM have ensured that SLM is both firmly on the development agenda and that there are mechanisms in place for the delivery of technical services, applied research and development. However, the components targeted at the systemic level to address the inequalities and inefficiencies in land management have been less successful. The outcomes were perhaps too narrow in that they prescribed a number of outputs or deliverables. These components amounted to only 19% of the GEF financing but were critical to achieving the objective. The TE concludes that given the transitional state of governance in Angola these outcomes might have been more effectively targeted at direct institutional capacity building rather than focusing on the outputs (NAP, IFS, *etc.*). |
| **Efficiency** | **Moderately Satisfactory** | There were moderate shortcomings | At the provincial and technical level the project has been very efficient. However it has not been efficient in addressing the adaptive challenge of mainstreaming SLM and developing an enabling environment that is supportive of SLM. While the project strategy was basically sound, the LFM had a number of weaknesses particularly in outcomes 2, 3 and 4. Outcome 2 and 3 were essentially the same with the NAP development and approval being a target or verifiable objective of a larger outcome which was either mainstreaming or strengthening the enabling environment for SLM. Furthermore, the Project Document mentions a substantive position at the central level to drive these components but there is no budget and ToR. The MTR reiterated the need to have a position at the central level but this was unlikely due to the budget limitations. In the event the UNDP CO provided this as best as possible (and did a good job) but this was not sufficient and should have been the role of the Executing Agency and the PB which has not functioned well. |
| **Sustainability** | **Moderately Likely** | Moderate Risks | There will be an element of sustained take up of the initiatives particularly at the provincial(s) level but these will be much reduced in their scale and impact because there is likely to be a chronic shortage of financing and they will not be fully supported by the types of institutional changes and supportive enabling environment that are necessary for SLM. |
| **Financial risks** | **Moderately Unlikely** | Significant Risks | There are substantial risks that key outcomes will not carry on after project closure, although some outputs and activities should carry on. At the technical level and with the transfer of skills, there is likely to be a continued benefit although this will be severely hampered because of the lack of basic funding for things such as tree nurseries, tools, etc. At an institutional level it is hard to see how these outcomes will continue without further financial support. |
| **Socio economic risks** | **Moderately Likely** | Moderate Risks | There are moderate risks but expectations that at least some outcomes will be sustained. This principally refers to outcome 1 which although vulnerable financially is likely to be driven at the local level by the likely economic benefits and livelihood security factors that stem from SLM. The NAP too is an output that is likely to be accepted as a normative document and formed a substantive part of outcome 3 and there are further indications such as the Land Law, the willingness of the University of Huambo and the provincial Government to become involved in SLM as well as the CSOs and local communities and the linkages to other projects involved in SLM activities that suggest that there is an element of sustainability about these outcomes which is not matched in outcome 2 and 4. |
| **Institutional frameworks and governance risks** | **Moderately Unlikely** | Significant Risks | There are substantial risks that key outcomes will not carry on after project closure, although some outputs and activities should carry on. The gains made by the project, and indeed those by other players in SLM in Angola remain extremely vulnerable. The impact on the enabling environment has been low and institutionally it would seem there is still low capacity to carry through on the sorts of reforms and policy development that is necessary. It is likely that in the short to medium term there will need to be continued support from external agencies and donors in order to capitalize upon the gains from the SLM project. |
| **Environmental risks** | **Likely** | Negligible risks to sustainability | There are negligible risks to sustainability, with key outcomes expected to continue into the foreseeable future. The benefits that amount to land users are likely to encourage rather than discourage SLM in the event of any natural hazard such as drought or floods. Furthermore, such events are more likely to encourage supportive action from government agencies. |

**Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons**

The SLM project has been a difficult project to both implement and execute. Despite some shortcomings, the project design as set out in the Project Document was a reasonable design and under the circumstances was probably the only design that would meet the GEF (OP 15 LD), UNDP, Government of Angola, Provincial Stakeholders expectations, but it was also ambitious and with the benefit of hindsight it might have benefited from having a substantive position, within the PMU and based in Luanda, in order to drive outcomes 2, 3 and 4. However, there was, and remains, a strong justification for a GEF-financed intervention with considerable potential (and realization of) global environmental benefits (GEBs).

In particular it was, in the opinion of the TE, important to focus on the local (provincial-level) technical aspects of land degradation. This is an important point because GEF LD projects have become increasingly sophisticated in particular in mainstreaming experience in what might be loosely termed the *enabling environment.* However, it is important to place this in the context of Angola emerging from a protracted civil war and while it will be possible to “fast track” this process based on experience from elsewhere, there is still a very real need to build solutions to land degradation through experimentation and negotiation and the building of relationships between the different “players”.

The project LFM could have been better organized to reflect outcomes and outputs. For example outcomes 2 and 3 are essentially the same, outcome 3 effectively being an output or a target or the outcome 2 indicator.

Outcome 4 could have easily been re-phrased to reflect a broader flow of finance to SLM and a balancing of investments in the root causes of land degradation. Instead the outcome is very specific and essentially describes an output. Amongst other things this makes it hard to include other means of SLM financing in the indicator because it is too specific.

There have been delays encountered during the project execution but most of these have been documented in the MTR with a final delay of approximately a year in carrying out the TE but this was due to factors beyond anyone associated with the projects control.

Project execution has been weak and on a number of occasions the Implementing Agency has had to provide the kind of support which should have been given by the Executing Agency. While this has been necessary and timely it has also been disruptive to the projects progress. A point picked up in the MTR and echoed by the TE is that the project design appears to have been influenced by other project experience without giving recognition to the fact that Angola was emerging from thirty years of civil war and described by the MTR as: “*countries under political and economic transition require a lot of support to develop systemic capacities in order to support and drive SLM mainstreaming activities and this is a major task or rather a project on its own”.*

Outcome 1 at the provincial level and largely a technical capacity building intervention has been very successful whereas outcome 2, 3 and 4 have been less than successful. Effectively out of all these outcomes only outcome 3 has delivered a tangible output in the form of the NAP which has still to be ratified by Parliament. The IFS was both delayed by the NAP and by a lack of action. The TE would have been sympathetic if, for instance, the overseas training provided by the GM had been replicated by the recipients on their return; it was not.

However, the TE considers that the project has been both implemented and executed under extremely trying conditions logistic challenges, institutional changes within the Executing Agency and difficulties with inter-sectoral communication and coordination have all combined to make this a very challenging project.

Land degradation is likely to emerge as a key issue in the development of Angola in the coming years, arguably it is already recognized as such by leading players and the GoA. However, the means by which to address the challenges are not yet in place. Furthermore, land degradation is likely to manifest itself in many different and cross-cutting forms; for example from the resettlement of internally displaced people and moves to secure land tenure through to food and energy security for both urban and rural people, or as has been the case in the SLM project, in very immediate threats to infrastructure development.

The TE makes two recommendations directed at the UNDP CO:

* UNDP CO should move as quickly as possible to develop the sustainable charcoal production project that is presently being conceptualized. This project should have a strong resource management component (*i.e.* sustainable production of wood, access to land for production, resource tenure, *etc.*) which will ensure that it remains clearly within the SLM domain.

Charcoal is a useful focus for both climate change and land degradation because it requires the sustainable production of wood, it provides for rural livelihoods, improved charcoal production reduces the health risks for producers, it reduces transport costs and fuel consumption, provides a cleaner energy than burning wood and it is a renewable energy supply, amongst others.

Developing a sustainable system for its production will provide a focus for ensuring it is socially, economically and ecologically sustainable therefore it would fit closely with the UNDP CPAP.

* UNDP Angola gives careful consideration to developing an Energy and Environment Cluster as part of its country programme. Sustainable land management will underpin all of the development gains in reducing poverty and improving governance. Unless development *per se* in Angola is based upon the sustainable use of renewable land resources any development gains remain extremely vulnerable and might be undermined. The GEF OP15 Land Degradation provides a very broad framework for addressing land degradation ranging from technological interventions through sustainable use and livelihoods to rights-based management.

Two lessons are drawn from this:

* When starting from a very low baselines carefully targeted financial, technical and capacity building interventions can have a dramatic effect. Furthermore, the impact of these interventions can be greatly extended by building a coalition of partners who are working in similar areas. However, this applies to outcome 1 of the SLM project which was at a level and a scale where these inputs were being accessed directly by the beneficiaries and the benefits were very immediate. In many sense outcome 1 was very traditional development assistance and it has worked very well and will probably continue to work very well, but it remains very vulnerable without a supportive enabling environment. Therefore projects need to be effective at different scales.
* The second lesson is probably better said by the MTR which noted that: “countries under political and economic transition require a lot of support to develop systemic capacities in order to support and drive SLM mainstreaming activities and this is a major task or rather a project on its own. A lot can be learned from the levels of investment and efforts that were associated with the development of National Conservation and Coordination Strategies’ and associated investments that led to the establishment of environmental coordinating agencies in many countries. While the rest of the world may have moved on and institutions matured this is not the case for post conflict countries in transition. Transition takes time and setting goals for achieving improved coordination and building systemic capacities within a 3 year time frame is not realistic”.

In such instances expectations of what a project might deliver at the systemic level need to be tempered. In a drive to make projects more accountable (and possibly to deliver on wider programmatic expectations) there is a tendency to narrow down outcomes to what are effectively outputs or targets because it is difficult to describe the necessary changes in for instance the enabling environment. Therefore, as was the case in the SLM project the outcomes became, not measurable changes in circumstance, but discrete and quite sophisticated outputs or as the MTR points out too sophisticated to be supported by the systemic capacities of a country recovering from 30 years of civil war.

In this case it might have been better to have a less well-defined enabling environment outcome which would have been directed at building those systemic capacities in order to be able to mainstream SLM into economic and sectoral development.

**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

# 

# 1 Introduction

1. Evaluation is an integral part of the UNDP-GEF project cycle management. The Final Evaluation (FE) is guided by its Terms of Reference and UNDP-GEF Project Monitoring and Evaluation Policies and Procedures. The evaluation process is independent of both UNDP and GEF and the opinions and recommendations in the FE report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the GEF, UNDP, Government of Angola (GOA) or the Project Management Unit (PMU), however, once accepted the FE becomes a recognized component of the project’s project cycle and documentation.

## 1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

1. The GEF recognises that all GEF projects by their very nature are addressing complex systems and issues. As a result there is a high level of uncertainty when it comes to predicting the outcomes of interventions. Therefore the GEF works through a process of adaptive management on the understanding that project‘s designs and planning processes are invariably based upon a number of assumptions which may, or may not, hold true. Therefore the FE, as part of the monitoring and evaluation process, is tasked with elements of audit and adaptive management and will necessarily consider:

* The performance of the Project – has it done what it said it would do?
* The effectiveness of the interventions – having done what it set out to do, has it worked?
* The impact of the Project – what are the outcomes now, and in the future, of the Project’s intervention.

1. Through this process the FE iidentifies the strengths and weaknesses within the project, the critical issues and can propose remedial actions or changes in the strategy where necessary. As already stated, the FE is an integral component of the GEF project cycle management and as such is intended not simply to audit the performance but importantly to ensure the project outcomes remain adaptive and experience and lessons shape future interventions both in Angola and within the global portfolio.

## 1.2 Scope & Methodology

## 1.2.1 Scope of the evaluation

1. The ToR will guide the FE in assessing the projects:
2. Performance; its design and the progress towards results
3. Adaptive management; its work planning, finance and co-financing, monitoring systems, risk management and reporting as well as assessing how much the project has been able to challenge any assumptions made during the design phase based upon experience and understanding and if this has been incorporated into the projects strategy
4. Management arrangements; have these been efficient and effective.
5. The FE will consider the contribution of the entire project partners and stakeholders.

## 1.2.2 Methodology

1. The process of evaluation begins with a study of the considerable project documentation and background literature that is associated with any UNDP-GEF project. Following on from this is a period of interviews and consultations with key project partners and stakeholders during the in-country mission.
2. The in-country mission consisted of focused meetings and discussions (in person and by electronic communications) with the UNDP Country Offices in Luanda, PMU and the UNDP/GEF Regional, key GOA Ministries and other stakeholders[[2]](#footnote-2) starting with a briefing of the purpose and the *process* of GEF monitoring and evaluation. The subject of these meetings will focus on (but not be limited to) determining a number of key questions, based on the project’s intended outcomes, which may be expanded by the consultants as deemed appropriate. These would include:

* Assessing overall performance against the project objective and outcomes as set out in the Project Document, project’s Logical Framework Matrix (LFM) and GEF Increment, and other related documents;
* Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the project;
* Analyzing critically the implementation and management arrangements of the project;
* Assessing the progress to date and achievement of the outcomes;
* Reviewing how appropriate the planned strategies and plans for achieving the overall objective of the project within the timeframe were;
* Assessing the sustainability of the project’s interventions;
* Listing and documenting initial lessons concerning project design, implementation and management;
* Assessing the project relevance to national priorities (including achieving gender equality goals);
* Providing recommendations to strengthen the outcomes, ensure sustainability and provide lessons learned from the process of implementing the project.

1. At the end of the country mission the FE will provided feedback to key project partners and if in the form of a brief aide memoire left with the UNDP CO and PMU outlining the FEs understanding of the project, the strengths and weaknesses, conclusions, critical issues and recommendations[[3]](#footnote-3).
2. GEF project evaluation requires the evaluators to provide ratings for the key components of the project on a six-point rating scale ranging from Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory and the likelihood of the project outcomes being sustainable post GEF funding on a similar rating scale ranging from Highly Likely to Highly Unlikely.

# 2 Project description and development context

1. The Building Capacity for Sustainable Land Use and Management in Angola project (SLM project) was conceptualized as early as 2006 by the UNDP Country Office (UNDP CO) Angola. The context of its development and subsequent implementation is important because the country was emerging from 30 years of conflict with few services and infrastructure in place, internally displaced people and an agricultural sector that had been largely destroyed in many areas. There was little experience of projects such as the SLM project; indeed it was the first such GEF project[[4]](#footnote-4) and government institutions were in a state of transition which has in some instances carried on through the project with institutional changes taking place in the main project partners (*e.g.* the Ministry of Agriculture and Urban Environment became the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment. Both Ministries are important stakeholders but the Ministry of Environment retained the execution of the project).
2. Overall project cost was US$ 1,900,000, with US$ 750,000 from GEF (including US$ 25,000 PDF A and financed through the GEF Operational Programme 15, Land Degradation [OP15]), and US$ 1,150,000 from co-finance: US$ 400,000 from UNDP and US$ 750,000 planned co-finance from the Government of Angola (US$ 350,000 in cash and US$ 400,000 in kind).
3. In GEF terms it was a medium-sized project (MSP) and importantly it was planned as a pilot project, recognizing that the issue of SLM is affecting a much greater area than that covered by the project. There was a clear rationale for a GEF intervention through OP15 and the Project Document makes a compelling case for both the scale of the challenge and the necessity of the GEF intervention and incremental costs, which need not be repeated here.
4. The Implementing Agency was the UNDP CO and the project was nationally executed through the Ministry of Environment (ME) and a Project Management Unit (PMU) based in Huambo. A project Board (or steering committee) consisted of the UNDP, Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) and their provincial Directorates.
5. The project was designed as a multi-tiered project. The largest component, outcome 1, was focused as a pilot at the provincial level raising awareness, building capacities for SLM and gaining practical experience. A second component (outcomes 2 and 3) dealt with mainstreaming SLM and addressing the enabling environment. The third component, closely linked to outcome 3 focused on mobilizing financial resources for SLM. These strategic components were largely to be driven by the ME in Luanda. The fifth component was focused on project management.
6. Therefore the project involved both a technical and capacity building approach at a local level and addressing the main barriers to SLM at a more strategic scale.

## 2.1 Project start and duration

1. UNDP and GEF signed an agreement on the SLM project as early as 2004 with an expected completion date of 2009. The project design phase (PDF) began as early as 2006 with a concept produced by the UNDP CO. The Project Document stated an anticipated start date of October 2007. However, the Project Document was not signed until August 2008. In the event UNDP CO could not advance the payment and the project actually started in ???? with a planned implementation period of four years. The Inception Workshop was held in April 2009. The MTR was carried out between June to July 2010 and the project closed in ???? 2012. However, due to factors beyond the control of the UNDP CO and the project partners a terminal evaluation (planned for ????) was unable to take place. The present evaluation is taking place in July to August 2013 and the planned closure of the project is now December 2013.

## 2.2 Problems that the project sought to address

1. The SLM project was designed to address three direct causes of land degradation; unsustainable agriculture, deforestation/unsustainable use of forests, and overgrazing of rangelands which have contributed to overexploitation of the soil, leading to erosion, soil exhaustion and desertification. The key threats to SLM were identified as declining fertility and productivity of agricultural lands, forest clearing for unsustainable agriculture, overgrazing and forest pasture destruction or degradation by fire, and climate change. The key barriers to addressing the root causes in order to remove the threats were considered to lie in the inadequate capacity of the government system to provide knowledge based, affordable techniques and incentives for SLM. Land managers therefore have limited knowledge on SLM techniques, have few incentives for adopting improved practices and have almost no extension services to support their efforts. Consequently, there are poor linkages between SLM and rural development initiatives, resulting in insufficient livelihood alternatives to subsistence cropping and to use of forests for timber and fuel wood and to meet energy requirements. The government authorities responsible for planning have limited capacity for cross-sectoral planning.

## 2.3 Immediate and development objectives of the project

1. The Project Goal or development objective was given as:

*“Improved capacity in SLM contributes to ecosystem health and functionality while at the same time enhancing the livelihoods of particularly the rural populations”.*

1. The immediate objective was given as:

*“Capacity developed for sustainable land management for key SLM stakeholders and sustainable land management principles mainstreamed into national policies, plans and processes.”*

## 2.4 Baseline Indicators established

1. Baseline indicators were established during the PDF phase and included in the project’s log frame matrix (LFM) which accurately characterized the baseline situation. The baselines was further validated and expanded during the inception phase and workshop. These indicators were further refined and validated during the Inception Workshop. Annex 6 provides the TEs assessment of the project’s outcomes against these indicators.
2. A number of the indicators are weak in the sense that they are really targets, a point that was also picked up in the Inception Workshop. However, the TE does not consider this to be a problem because there were sufficient indicators provided and the project reporting continued to use the original framework (see section 3.3.5).

## 2.5 Main stakeholders

1. The project implementation involved a multiplicity of stakeholders from government institutions, development partners, civil society organizations (CSOs) and local communities. Most significantly the Ministry of Environment (including the Huambo Provincial Office); and the Ministry of Agriculture was also a key stakeholder providing co-financing[[5]](#footnote-5) through Huambo Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, facilitating technical assistance and pilot project information, participating in community awareness raising activities, and in producing information material on sustainable practices of SLM and natural resources. The third key stakeholder was (and remains) the Faculty of Agrarian Sciences in Huambo.
2. However, the TE considers that the project has gathered around it a coalition of provincial stakeholders who have embraced the project and worked closely with it, indeed sufficiently so that the TE has tried to account for this by describing the leveraged co-financing. These include a number of local communities, CSOs and the FAO and NGOs DW and ADRA amongst others.

## 2.6 Expected Results

1. The project proposed four outcomes linked to the LDC – SIDS Portfolio Sustainable Land Management Programme in order to address these root causes, barriers to SLM and to provide direct technical inputs to strengthen land management. The first outcome was the analysis and preparation of an acceptable set of intervention techniques, which were to be turned into field training modules, for new extension agents, with-in participatory demonstration training programmes. This was coupled with applied research and promotion of farmer innovation in SLM. The second outcome addressed the institutional need for Government to monitor land degradation and devise best practices from the set of SLM initiatives in country. The third and fourth outcomes addressed the broader picture of the National Action Plan (NAP) via co-finance; and starting the Country Framework for TerrAfrica, in particular the development of an Integrated Financing Strategy (IFS) in the Global Mechanism (GM) framework and template. These were to be built into a database to allow government to coordinate the SLM efforts and to integrate best practice into the developing CSIF and NAP process within the UNCCD and TerrAfrica frameworks.
2. In order to achieve this the project proposed four plausible outcomes:

Outcome 1: *Individual and institutional capacity for SLM developed*

Outcome 2: *SLM mainstreamed into economic and sectoral development*

Outcome 3: *National Action Programme completed*

Outcome 4: *Medium Term Investment Plan being financed and implemented (and linked to TerrAfrica)*

1. A fifth outcome addressed issues of project and adaptive management:

*Outcome 5: Adaptive management and learning in place (Project effectively managed)*

# 3 Findings

1. The SLM project has been a difficult project to both implement and execute. The project design as set out in the Project Document was a good design and under the circumstances was probably the only design that would meet the GEF (OP 15 LD), UNDP, Government of Angola, Provincial Stakeholders expectations, but it was still very ambitious. There was, and remains, a strong justification for a GEF-financed intervention with considerable potential (and realization of) global environmental benefits (GEBs), not least of which has been introducing the idea of striving to build ecosystem and social resilience into land use planning.
2. In particular it was, in the opinion of the TE, important to focus on the local (provincial-level) technical aspects of land degradation. This is an important point because GEF LD projects have become increasingly sophisticated in particular in mainstreaming experience in what might be loosely termed the enabling environment. However, it is important to place this in the context of Angola emerging from a protracted civil war and while it will be possible to “fast track” this process based on experience from elsewhere; there is still a very real need to build solutions to land degradation through experimentation and negotiation (between stakeholders) in Angola.
3. There have been delays encountered during the project execution but most of these have been documented already in the MTR and are addressed below for context.

## 3.1 Project Design / Formulation

1. The project’s design was on the whole well-thought through, well-researched and intelligent. On a number of occasions, and by different individuals, the TE was reminded of how participatory the process had been and by very different informants. It is important to stress that this project was designed in an environment in which such projects were a relatively new experience.
2. However, it would appear that the project design, while it recognized the complexities of driving the mainstreaming and larger enabling environment reforms, was overly optimistic or misjudged the project’s potential to really influence change at this level within the timeframe and the highly dynamic institutional environment. Indeed, the Project Document is confusing in this aspect because it makes mention of a “*staff member based at MINUA[[6]](#footnote-6) in Luanda*”[[7]](#footnote-7). This was reiterated in the MTR; “*The SLM capacity Building Projects requires a fulltime officer based in Luanda to be tasked with the responsibility of driving mainstreaming and coordination activities as well as maintaining regular contact with key Government Ministries*”[[8]](#footnote-8). But, there appears to be no budget for this position and there were no ToR prepared[[9]](#footnote-9). Clearly this was an important position, although financially these components were only 19% of the GEF financing they were critical to the successful outcome of the overall strategy as it was set out in the LFM.
3. The TE takes the view that it would be easy to criticize the design, implementation and execution of the SLM project based upon this issue alone. However, the TE will argue that this would be, to some extent, unfair and more importantly, it would be missing some important lessons and underestimating the value and impact of this project; that is, it is necessary to embark upon these journeys before it is possible to accurately understand what the destination will look like and indeed, how it is possible to get there. In many ways this is the value of GEF projects and to a large extent, the comparative advantage of UNDP (see section 3.1.6).

## 3.1.1 Analysis of LFA (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)

1. The project’s strategy was reasonable and the Project Document was on the whole a good one. The pilot element of the project at the provincial level; building capacities through practical demonstration and the introduction of specific technological approaches to addressing land degradation and making land use more sustainable were, in the opinion of the evaluation, entirely necessary. Similarly, the up-scaling of experience and addressing the larger enabling environment challenges were also a necessary part of any intervention strategy. An interesting aspect of this project is that it has combined the increasingly sophisticated approach (one that has moved from purely technical interventions to reduce land degradation to one that takes a more holistic approach including issues of land tenure, authority and responsibility and what might be broadly described as the enabling environment) while starting from a very low baseline where there was very little understanding or awareness of SLM. In the event, the component dealing with technical approaches to land management (the largest component by financing) has proved the more successful, whereas those components dealing with the enabling environment have been more challenging and less successful.
2. The project LFM could have been more efficiently organized in as much as some of the outcomes could have been better phrased or combined with other outcomes. For instance outcome 3 (NAP) could have been included in outcome 2 which might have used the “old fashioned” terminology of an “enabling environment” and 4 (IFS) could have been included in a larger outcome on financing SLM. Essentially there were four components that should have been described in the LFM. Technical transfer of SLM skills, creating an enabling environment, financing of SLM and monitoring the whole system in the future.
3. The indicators chosen in the LFM (see Annex 6) are to some extent descriptive of the indicator (*i.e.* they are outputs or targets), rather than an indicator *per se.* However, the TE is not concerned too much with this as they describe components of reasonably efficient indicators. An interesting point is that this was also picked up on during the Inception Workshop when a number of indicators[[10]](#footnote-10) were moved to become targets[[11]](#footnote-11).
4. Therefore, under the circumstances, the approach described in the Project Document was ambitious but not unrealistic. As happens with similar SLM projects, the experience which will eventually provide the impetus for reforms and mainstreaming takes time to build (see Annex 7 & 8). Therefore the technical challenges (*e.g.* tree planting, *etc.*) are taken up and successfully completed whereas those components addressing adaptive challenges take much longer than a three to four year project cycle.

## 3.1.2 Assumptions and Risks

1. Risks were reported through the standard UNDP project reporting procedure and entered into ATLAS. There are examples where the project has responded quite reasonably to risks. For instance the risk that there was insufficient technical experience (risk 6) was overcome recruiting technically qualified consultants to fill knowledge gaps and provide experience even though such people were hard to find with experience of SLM in Angola.
2. However, the project design did not identify the weak institutional capacity at the central level and the likelihood of institutional changes *(e.g.* the creation of the ME from the MINUA) and the possible disruptions this might have on the running of the project. A clear articulation of this risk might have strengthened the case for providing a substantive Technical Assistant within the institutional context (*i.e.* in Luanda and working directly with the Execution Agency) to provide specific capacity building at this level.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Risk description** | **Degree** | **Mitigation / Comment** |
| 1 | The existing stable political situation breaks down due to the lack of available resources for the local population | Negligible | The level of government / donor investment into SLM suggests this is negligible |
| 2 | Present political commitment to sustainable land management in overall national development diminishes | Negligible | The President/Cabinet stated that overcoming land degradation must be the first priority for all districts. There is strong political support for the NAP which will provide a coordinating framework for SLM |
| 4 | Sustainable land management partners reluctant to comply by the requirements of coordinated effort to attain meaningful sharing of good practices | Minimal | Government is increasing leadership of donor inputs. Donor themselves are increasing aid coordination mechanisms. The project itself invests in a national level SLM coordination mechanism and a knowledge sharing mechanism and network. |
| 5 | The local leaders at district level fail to mobilize and involve the beneficiaries through participative methodologies | Minimal | The population is very receptive to their official leaders in Angola (tradition).  The project itself is investing in local level capacity building which will include cultivating the support of local leaders |
| 6 | That expertise is unable to assemble training packages for SLM extension, that can be successful in the Angola context | Minimal | The project is supporting targeted applied research to involve intellectuals in supporting SLM initiative. It is also investing in collation of lessons learnt from other countries. |
| 7 | That government and extension services are unable to integrate support packages into their extension process. | Moderate | This is a major change for extension, but has proven successful elsewhere. Project investing considerable resources to ensure integration. |
| 8 | That local level economic growth fails to provide adequate return on investment in improved practices; thus land managers refuse to invest in improved practices despite the training and the extension package | Moderate | Angola is going through an economic boom largely based on oil and minerals. The government is highly aware of the inequities in the country and is committed to addressing it by investing proceeds from oil into rural development. The NAP and its action plane will provide a strong framework to ensure this happens. Involvement of targeted applied research and lessons from other countries will ensure selection of techniques that can be supported by returns from local economies, as far as possible. |
| 9 | Insecurity of land and resource tenure acts as a negative incentive and discourages land managers from investing in improved practices despite the training and extension package | Moderate | The government has formulated a new land policy and is mobilizing huge resources to implement it. Involving targeted applied research on the issue as well as incorporating lessons from other countries will also help mitigate. |

## 3.1.3 Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design

1. Lessons and experience from other projects and the region were influencing the project’s design, although this is implicit rather than explicit in the Project Document. So much so that section 2.5.3 (p. 17, para. 59 – 60) raises the issue of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) which provides an indication regional thinking, *vis a vis,* a range of issues such as land and resource tenure, devolution of responsibility and authority, *etc.,* were being “added to the mix”. However, settling on the three part strategy (localized technical capacity building, mainstreaming and addressing SLM financing) was a reasonable approach to import because there was very little experience existing within Angola given the transition from civil war to peace (see Project Document, p. 30, Table 2).
2. The project’s design also included the SLM Portfolio Projects M&E Tool Kit. The Tool Kit is designed to simplify design and implementation of monitoring and evaluation for projects within the LDC SIDS portfolio. It presents carefully selected compulsory and optional indicators for measuring impact and performance (see section 3.2.5).

## 3.1.4 Planned stakeholder participation

1. It is clear that there was a broad participation during the design of the project. This fact was remarked upon by a range of stakeholders (CSO, NGO and institutional) during the TE and it is reasonable to assume that the project has been very inclusive of these stakeholders. The TE attributes this to a number of factors including the attitude of and process followed by UNDP, the inclusion of very capable NGOs during the design and implementation and the role played by the PMU. The TE recognizes that some institutional stakeholders feel that they have been excluded from the project, in particular from the Project Board (PB) which at times has led these stakeholders to regard the project as being a “UNDP project”. However, the TE attributes this to a misunderstanding of the role of a GEF project and a desire by the ME to have the PMU within the Ministry. This was further exacerbated by the GEF requirement to report in English and not Portuguese. The benefits of having the PMU within the ME are probably outweighedby the constraints. Contrary to what the TE was told, this would unlikely lead to cost savings as the ME would need to either take on extra staff or increase the workload of existing staff, a situation that has destroyed many a project.
2. The Project Document gives an extremely detailed matrix of stakeholders[[12]](#footnote-12). The TE argues that perhaps it was too detailed or too inclusive and there is an argument for a more detailed analysis of the potential roles, both supportive and the unintentionally obstructive, that stakeholders might play as the project unfolds. “*A common finding for many donor-supported projects is that over-optimistic assumptions are made at the outset about the institutional environment to support project objectives at “purpose”* [outcome] *level, with the consequence that objectives, or timescales for meeting them, often prove unrealistic*”[[13]](#footnote-13). While the accounting of the stakeholders is extensive, the means to engage with the principle stakeholders is extremely limited. The MTR describes this very well: “*countries under political and economic transition require a lot of support to develop systemic capacities in order to support and drive SLM mainstreaming activities and this is a major task or rather a project on its own”[[14]](#footnote-14).*

## 3.1.5 Replication approach

1. Once again the replication of the projects experience has been considerable at the provincial level. The TE is of the opinion that considerably more replication (*e.g.* the expansion of demonstration sites) would have taken place driven by the Huambo Provincial Government except that provincial budgets prevent this from happening. However, the project built the capacities of agricultural extension workers. Training and the addition of SLM training to existing training courses has expanded the project’s scope to agricultural extension workers, FAO farmer field schools (seven additional schools), CSOs, an SLM component in teaching at the University of Agrarian Science (Huambo), *etc.* This appears to have taken place in a very structured way that is likely to ensure sustainability although it is clear that the demand for this capacity building far outstripped the project’s resources to supply it and there are serious questions about whether the provincial government can finance them in the future[[15]](#footnote-15). That said, the project, as a pilot, has demonstrated that the SLM capacity building is much in demand and the project has produced (along with some of the partners) valuable training materials which will endure beyond the project.

## 3.1.6 UNDP comparative advantage

1. The UNDP CO arrangement has significant advantages for supporting a project such as the SLM project. The Country Programme Action Plan clearly recognizes the cause and effect relationships between governance, poverty and the environment. While UNDP Angola does not have a specific Environment Programme (environment is nested in the Poverty Cluster) the CPAP still places environmental issues as a high priority as does the Poverty Cluster.
2. UNDP also has considerable logistical and other support resources (not least of which were the TRAC funds that supported the SLM project sometimes ensuring that activities took place when there was a hiatus in either counterpart financing or a delay in the GEF funds).
3. While it was on occasion commented to the TE that some institutional stakeholders regarded the SLM project as a “UNDP project” the TE does not share this view but rather considers this as a misunderstanding of the UNDP playing it’s natural and legitimate role of project assurance. Indeed the UNDP has carried out this role very skillfully imparting ownership of the process and outcomes with (mostly at the provincial level) local institutions and organizations while maintaining a balance of oversight to keep the project on track. The MTR also recognized this stating; “*The SLM capacity Building Projects requires a fulltime officer based in Luanda to be tasked with the responsibility of driving mainstreaming and coordination activities as well as maintaining regular contact with key Government Ministries. Currently this role is partially played the UNDP Environment Officer with limitations due to a heavy workload and demand on her time from other UNDP Country Office projects*”[[16]](#footnote-16).
4. This continuous presence and varying degrees of support as needed has been a feature of this project and a considerable advantage to implementing the project given the specific circumstances in Angola, that is, an early stage of transition from conflict to peace and the rebuilding of infrastructure, services and governance.
5. By this measure the UNDP has considerable comparative advantages as an Implementing Agency due to its operational arrangements and country presence and has developed considerable human, intellectual assets as well as a level of what might be termed loosely “social capital” with project partners and stakeholders through the implementation of this project. Such social/institutional networks have value, particularly when addressing an adaptive challenge (see Annex 7) such as SLM.

## 3.1 7 Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector

1. The Project Document lists a number of projects which were either planned or ongoing[[17]](#footnote-17) all of which could be included in a broadly SLM/environment sector. Furthermore, during the Inception Phase the project used the Integrated Financing Strategy developed by the GM to meet the requirements of outcome 4 (Medium Term Investment Plan being financed and implemented (and linked to TerrAfrica)).
2. In addition to these the SLM project has, largely due to the guidance of the UNDP Environment officer and the PMU Project Coordinator built strong linkages, indeed a broad coalition of partners, with other initiatives involved in various aspects (technical, social and governance) land management. Most notable are the involvement with the FAO project working with a land tenure law which has explicitly recognized communal lands, the NGO ADRA (community empowerment and participation) and DW (mapping, GIS and technical aspects) amongst others. Therefore, the SLM project, despite its relatively small size has strong linkages with other SLM initiatives in Angola.

## 3.1.8 Management arrangements

1. The management arrangements for implementation and execution were set out in the Project Document[[18]](#footnote-18). The TE has to admit that figure 6 on page 43 remains something of a mystery in terms of explaining the management arrangements.
2. UNDP CO Angola is the Implementing Agency. The project is executed through a National Execution modality (NEX) project under the ME[[19]](#footnote-19) “*in cooperation with DPUA, Huambo, in close collaboration with MINDAR (at national and provincial levels)*”[[20]](#footnote-20). The PMU is directly contracted by the UNDP CO but under the Provincial Office (Huambo) of the ME.
3. The Project Board (Steering Committee) is made up of the significant project partners; Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, Huambo Provincial Directorate of Environment, Huambo Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and the University of Huambo Faculty of Agrarian Science. The PB is co-chaired by the UNDP and the ME.
4. While the PMU has functioned efficiently and effectively at the provincial level the project has faced serious challenges in moving this progress up a level to the national institutional arena. In a large part this has been due to the ineffectiveness of the PB (see section 3.2.2), a point that was also raised in the MTR with the majority of its recommendations intended to address this barrier. In the event it has been the UNDP Energy and Environment Officer who has played this role to ensure that the project kept moving. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was drafted during the inception phase but was not signed until after the MTR. The MTR stressed how important the MoU was to ensuring efficient collaboration and project governance. While the TE agrees in part with this, it is also important to stress that these challenges are systemic and embedded at the institutional level and a likely result of the transitional nature of governance in Angola. Therefore the project was able to move the process forwards but not able to actually resolve the issues. With hindsight it is easy to say that this should have been anticipated by the project design. However, hindsight is a luxury rarely afforded to project designers, indeed the TE believes that this may have been a necessary, albeit frustrating and time-consuming process for the project to follow.

## 3.2 Project Implementation

1. The challenges to implementing the SLM project have been complex and many and have placed a considerable burden upon the UNDP CO and in particular the Energy and Environment Officer.
2. As has already been mentioned a number of variations were made to the LFM during the inception phase. The principle reason behind this was to make it more accessible to the project partners and also in part to aid with translation. However, the original LFM remained the principle contractual and monitoring and evaluation document for the project. It was the latter which was reported in PIRs *etc.*, while the PMU appears to have used the adapted LFM. The TE has no issue with this arrangement because the changes did not fundamentally alter the outcomes or indicators and the Implementing Agency reporting was based on the original LFM.
3. The partnership arrangements have been particularly challenging. The PB has not functioned effectively and at times this has slowed the progress of the project. In many instances UNDP has had to step in and carry out activities that should really have fallen to some of the partner institutions, for instance in obtaining a MoU for the PB or other organizational tasks that would normally be the role of the Executing Agency, indeed at times the project has resembled a DIM (directly implemented) modality project. If this had not happened then the project would almost certainly have fallen behind and the CO has provided important and necessary support given the context of economic, political, institutional transition, changes in project focal points, *etc.*
4. By way of example, the MoU that was to be signed between the five partners on the PB at the beginning of the project had only been signed by the UNDP at the mid-term point. It took strongly worded recommendations from the MTR and considerable efforts on the part of the UNDP Environment and Energy Officer to eventually obtain not one copy of the MoU but five original copies signed by each partner.
5. The MTR raised these issues suggesting that the Ministry of Environment did not fully understand its role as an Executing Agency and the TE would agree with this statement. This was further exacerbated by weak internal and external communications within the Ministry and between Ministries (*e.g.* the Ministry of Agriculture). This has been a significant barrier to achieving outcomes 2, 3 and 4 of the project and also extends to the provincial level, for example; “*the Provincial Directorate of Urbanism and Environment which is the government counterpart for the project at provincial level has no written mandate from central government. As a result the project is largely perceived as an ‘independent’ UNDP initiative although it is housed by the Directorate of Urbanization and Environment. This situation hampers the institutionalization of the project and undermines the sustainability of the initiative*”[[21]](#footnote-21).
6. In summary these issues are not shortcomings of the project *per se*, rather they are a reflection of the larger challenges faced by land management in Angola (see section 3.1.4, para. 37 & 38). Arguably the project was intended to address these challenges but then one has to be realistic about what can be achieved with four years and with such small financial resources.
7. Therefore the UNDP CO has provided significant logistical support to the project throughout its lifetime as well as providing significant financial support through CO TRAC funds. Clearly the CO considers this an important project containing key elements that are at the core of the Country Programme Action Plan and underpinning the two principle clusters of poverty and governance. The Implementing Agency has been supporting a *process* of which the SLM project has been a small but important part. However, when it comes to measuring the success of the project there is a conflict between *project* and *process* which is in large part due to the project time frame.

## 3.2.1 Adaptive management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)

1. Given the dynamic nature of the institutional (and indeed the political) environment the SLM project has made remarkably few changes to the original design. This does not mean that the PMU and the Implementing Agency have not been adaptable, but adaptations have largely been on a tactical and not a strategic scale (*e.g.* using UNDP TRAC funds to finance provincial workshops to drive the NAP participation process).
2. The development of the IFS as a mid-term investment strategy (MTIS) was, albeit largely externally driven (as the GM’s IFS is now broadly recognized as the vehicle for financing SLM), adapting the outputs to some extent.
3. The project had an internal review[[22]](#footnote-22) rather than a full mid-term review as part of a regional assessment of GEF-financed SLM projects. The format of this review did not follow the normal format for a UNDP-GEF evaluation/review report, rather it focused on some specific issues that were (and continued to) challenge the project. These were mostly related to mainstreaming activities (outcomes 2 and 3) and the difficulties encountered by the project in moving from the provincial (and technical aspects of SLM) to the wider national systematic development of SLM policies and capacity building. Initially the internal review was intended to prepare the project for its MTR but in the event it was decided not have a full MTR and rather use the recommendations of the internal review. All things considered this was a wise, pragmatic and adaptive decision.
4. There are a number of quite specific recommendations in the MTR to which the project has to some extent responded to, but it is questionable as to how much the project could adapt given that the budget component for outcomes 2, 3 and 4 amounted to just 19% of the GEF financing the IFS was entirely co-financed, and more importantly this (adaptation) was the role of the Execution Agency and in-kind co-financing was not forthcoming. The MTR recognizes this by stating that: “*Further to this UNDP should in the context of its strategic plan for Environment look at addressing some of the systemic capacity challenges identified by this project which are beyond the scope and capacity of the project*”[[23]](#footnote-23).

## 3.2.2 Partnership arrangements

1. Strategic oversight for the SLM project was provided by the PB. Co-chaired by the ME and UNDP it included representation by the Provincial Directorate of the ME, the MA and Provincial Directorate and the University of Huambo, Faculty of Agrarian Science. The PB also supervised and monitored project activities, progress and approved work plans and budgets. A MoU was drafted which outlined the resource commitments and the roles and responsibilities of the key partners UNDP, ME, MA, the University and the Provincial Government). The objective of this MoU is to establish co-operation and collaboration aiming at defining the terms of the partnership to support the implementation of the SLM project in Huambo Province and at a national level. The MoU was signed by the UNDP but none of the other partners would sign the document. It was only after the MTR and considerable lobbying by the Implementing Agency that the MoU was finally signed
2. As has been noted already in this report, the project has performed well at the provincial level. However, when it has had to address wider, systemic challenges progress has been less satisfactory. The PB or Steering Committee should play a critical role in ensuring the realization of the project’s outcomes. However, the MTR noted that: “*the steering committee itself has proven to be an ineffective structure through which to facilitate cross sectoral planning and communication. Mainly because roles tend to be individualized, thus information does not reach the institutions that government focal points represents. There seems to be no mechanisms in place for reporting and information sharing. Significant efforts are required to improve coordination within the government structures at national level including between national and local government structures. A robust communication and awareness raising strategy is also necessary to ensure that information goes beyond project focal points and is institutionalized*”[[24]](#footnote-24).
3. The MTR further added: “*There are some challenges with regards to the function of the steering committee, UNDP and the project team expressed a sense of frustration at the level of support and leadership role provided by the Ministry of Environment. As co-chair of the steering committee the Ministry of Environment is delivering to the expectation of the project team and partners. The steering committee has failed to meet at required intervals due to the non-availability of the project focal point from the Ministry of Environment which in-turn undermines the effectiveness of this committee and project delivery as a whole. A meeting held with the Ministry of Environment as part of this project review indeed confirmed issues raised by the project team as it became apparent that* [the] *focal point was not familiar with the project although he has been playing this role for over year*”[[25]](#footnote-25).
4. The TE found that these issues had persisted. While elements of outcomes 2 and 3 had made some movement forwards, outcome 4 had not been achieved and there had been continued inertia at this level. In discussions with the Focal Point it was apparent that there was far too much attention to protocol and little of substance regarding the process, outputs and outcomes of the project.

## 3.2.3 Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management

1. At the PMU and the Implementing Agency level there was constant monitoring of the overall project and adaptations were taking place, only on a tactical level rather than the strategic (output and outcome level) level that are necessary to identify adaptive management at the project level. This is not an implied criticism, but recognition of how dynamic the project was at these levels. Unfortunately much of this adaptive management or dynamism was directed at addressing issues that had little strategic bearing on the progress of the project, they were essentially matters of protocol (*i.e.* the format of financial reporting or the minutiae of workshop arrangements, *etc.*).
2. However, if a measure is needed then the use of the internal review report[[26]](#footnote-26) provides sufficient evidence that monitoring and evaluation activities were used for adaptive management. In this instance the Implementing Agency and regional Coordination Unit (RCU) used an opportunity presented by a regional review of SLM projects to provide monitoring and evaluation for the project and a set of recommendations. This took place ahead of the MTR and subsequently replaced the MTR. While the report does not follow the normal format for an MTR it provides critical analysis of the most pressing problems facing the project which are subsequently addressed (as best possible) in the 2010 Annual Report.
3. However, the project’s LFM had a number of weaknesses which would have, amongst the other challenges facing the project in a transitional environment (see Annex 6) made it difficult to track change. It is likely that these weaknesses have led to a lot of the very positive (and legitimate achievements[[27]](#footnote-27)) being under*-*reported.

## 3.2.4 Project Finance

## Table 1 GEF fund (US$) by outcomes in Project Document and variation

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome** | **Project Document** | **Terminal Evaluation** | **% of total** | **Variation** | **Project spending by year** | | | | |
| **2009** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** |
| **Outcome 1** | 512,500 |  | 71% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Outcome 2** | 90,000 |  | 12% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Outcome 3** | 0 |  | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Outcome 4** | 47,500 |  | 7% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Outcome 5** | 75,000 |  | 10% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Totals** | 725,000 |  | 100% |  |  |  |  |  |  |

1. At the time the TE took place budget execution was XXX. The project has been subject to independent audit.
2. Annual budgets and work plans were produced by the PMU and approved by the PB.
3. A budget revision was made in XXXX between outcome X and outcome X. The justification being XXXXXX. The TE agrees with this justification.
4. The UNDP CO received 100% of the GoA cash co-financing at the beginning of the project and administered this fund throughout the project. This appears to have worked well because the in-kind co-financing has not been delivered upon. GOA in-kind co-financing was intended to cover the cost of staff participating in the project, the cost of renting and maintenance of the project’s facilities in the pilot province and at national level; cost of logistics for conducting several different workshops and training sessions as well as review meetings[[28]](#footnote-28). In the event this amounted to a shortfall of US$ 400,000. Annex 2 provides an account of the co-financing as described in the Project Document. The MTR reported that:

*“A number of issues emerged around GoA’s in kind contribution to the project. The project records so far do not reflect the governments in kind contribution and it is envisaged that the level of support may be reduced due to budgetary constraints. The GoA was meant to provide 80 000USD in kind contribution towards the operations of the PMU (for functional office space and equipment), however there was no provision of equipment by the time the project team came on board. Consequently UNDP CO diverted part of the GoA cash contribution towards purchase of equipment and other office expenses estimated at US$ 60 000”[[29]](#footnote-29)*

1. While the GoA in-kind co-financing has not materialized it is worth noting that the project has been very successful in leveraging additional in-kind contributions from a variety of sources. Indeed this has not been adequately reported. The Project Document provides a robust assessment of the baseline and incremental costs of the GEF financing[[30]](#footnote-30). However, since implementation there have been additional activities by FAO, DW, ADRA and Huambo Provincial Government which need to be recorded as project co-financing.

## Table 2 Additional leveraged co-financing (US$)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Source** | **Amount** | **Cash** | **In-kind** | **Description** |
| **ADRA** | 9,785 | 9,785 | Un-quantified | Training and monitoring |
| **DW** | 39,000 | 39,000 | Un-quantified | Atlas of Huambo Province |
| **FAO/PESA** | 34,310 | 34,310 | Un-quantified | Food Security Special Programme |
| **DPOTUA** | 98,328 | 98,328 | Un-quantified | Santa Iria Project |
| **Total** | 181,328 | 181,438 | Un-quantified[[31]](#footnote-31) |  |

## 3.2.5 Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation

1. The Project document provides a robust monitoring and evaluation framework. In addition to the established UNDP-GEF monitoring and evaluation procedures for MSPs the design included the SLM Portfolio Projects Monitoring and Evaluation Tool Kit. The Tool Kit is designed to simplify design and implementation of M&E for projects within the LDC SIDS portfolio. It presents carefully selected compulsory and optional indicators for measuring impact and performance. The indicators are contained in the Annual Project Review Form to be completed annually by each MSP Project Team by 1st November (starting 2007 for this project; completed in August 2007), and submitted through the UNDP CO to the Global Support Unit in Pretoria. The form should be filled in during the project inception phase by the UNCCD Focal Point with assistance and collaboration with key project partners.
2. In the event the Toolkit was not used. The TE surmises that the ill-health of the UNCCCD FP responsible for carrying out this monitoring may have contributed to this. But it also highlights the very individualized roles within the Executing Agency and the institutional setup as a whole. There was a very reasonable justification for the FP being unable to complete the monitoring and evaluation Toolkit, but it is also not unreasonable to expect a qualified person to be deputized or delegated to complete this role in the FPs absence.
3. Project monitoring and evaluation was undertaken by the PMU at one level through quarterly progress and financial reports and an annual report based on the work plans and budgets. As standard UNDP-GEF monitoring the PMU also produced Project Implementation Reports (PIR) on an annual basis.
4. The PB reviewed work plans, budgets and progress reports in line with UNDP-GEF monitoring and evaluation procedures.
5. The UNDP CO provided verified PIRs and Annual Reports to the UNDP-GEF and the GSU (LDC-SIDS portfolio Project). In addition to this the UNDP Environment and Energy FP provided continuous support and oversight to the PMU with regular meetings (in person and by electronic communications) and regular (as many as three per year) field visits. This amounted to considerable oversight of the project.
6. While the implementation of the monitoring and evaluation plan has been followed with a high degree of efficiency and effectiveness by the PMU and the Implementing Agency the PB, as a steering committee and in its role in assisting with project assurance has been challenging. In the MTR it was reported that both UNDP and the PMU “*expressed a sense of frustration at the level of support and leadership provided by the Ministry of Environment*”. Despite the signing of the MoU and the recommendations made during the MTR these sentiment were still held by the time of the TE.
7. The TE shares the opinion expressed in the MTR that these issues are largely due to institutional weaknesses and key positions (*e.g.* Focal Points) being strongly individualized as well as a lack of internal and inter-institutional communication. There appears to have been undue attention to issues of protocol and procedure rather than monitoring and evaluation. Admittedly there are challenges with the language of GEF reporting (in this instance the language was English) and accessibility to information. But this cannot explain all of the challenges faced by the project *per se*, for instance the issue of financial reporting is set out in the Project Document, it is the same for all UNDP-GEF projects and the sharing of information on other ME and MA activities, *etc.*
8. The MTR made a number of very reasonable recommendations by the MTR which largely appear to have been followed by the Implementing Agency. While the situation does appear to have improved to some extent the TE is of the opinion that this was not sufficient to provide the sort of “joint planning and reporting [that] is critical for the delivery of project of this nature and partners should [have been] required to report on their activities relevant to the SLM project in steering committee meetings”[[32]](#footnote-32).
9. It is highly likely that this inertia has been a contributing factor to the poor performance and impact of outcomes 2, 3 and 4.
10. The projects monitoring and evaluation was satisfactory, however, the failure to return the SLM Portfolio Projects Monitoring and Evaluation Tool Kit brings the rating down to a MODERATELY SATISFACTORY rating.

## 3.2.6 UNDP and Executing Agency implementation / execution coordination, and operational issues

1. The issues surrounding the implementation and execution of the SLM project have been discussed at length throughout the preceding sections because they have largely impacted at all levels. The TE reiterates that “a *common finding for many donor-supported projects is that over-optimistic assumptions are made at the outset about the institutional environment to support project objectives at “purpose”* [outcome] *level, with the consequence that objectives, or timescales for meeting them, often prove unrealistic*”[[33]](#footnote-33).
2. However, the TE does not imply criticism of the design or of the project *per se*. The Consultant has encountered similar situations on a number of recent evaluations of GEF OP15[[34]](#footnote-34) projects[[35]](#footnote-35) in recent years and considers that these challenges have been part of the learning process rather than a failure of projects *per se*.
3. In this instance the Implementing Agency has on a number of occasions played the role of the Executing Agency, and this should not be understated in terms of the efforts and investments made by the UNDP CO. The challenges of internal institutional communication and direction within the Executing Agency and the distribution of responsibilities across different sectors (*e.g.* environment and agriculture) coupled with the difficulties of coordinating national and provincial agendas and needs has meant that the Executing of the SLM project has not been as efficient or effective as it could have been. Arguably opportunities to drive outcomes 2, 3 and 4 have been missed as a result. The MTR provided a number of quite reasonable recommendations to resolve these issues and there is evidence that the PMU and the Implementing Agency have tried hard to follow these recommendations. There are signs that they have had some effect, for instance the MoU was finally signed following the MTR. But they have not had the significant and necessary impact on the project.
4. This is indeed a difficult balancing act between keeping a project operational and opening the Implementing Agency up to accusations of too much control and for the avoidance of doubt the TE feels that the Implementing Agency has acted responsibly in this respect, indeed it is one of the comparative advantages of the Implementing Agency that it has a continuous presence “on the ground”, considerable organizational and logistical resources at its disposal and cross-cutting programmes in poverty and governance that are broadly aligned with, and underpinned by, the objectives of environmental security and sustainability. Furthermore, the Implementing Agency has diligently monitored and reported in a very constructive and candid way.
5. Neither can this be considered a fault of the project’s design. Any such project would have required these four broad outcomes, that is focused attention upon the impact of land degradation (outcome 1) and a broader strategy to address the inefficiencies and inequalities in the enabling environment (outcomes 2, 3 and 4).
6. The answer probably lies in the “enabling environment”. The term *enabling environment* has numerous interpretations and can be extremely broad; or focused very closely on the legal, bureaucratic, fiscal, informational, political and cultural factors that might impact on the stakeholders to engage in the process (Brinkerhoff 2004[[36]](#footnote-36)) of developing a functionally efficient system for sustainable land management. In this instance it was much broader than the outputs and outcomes of the project because the Executing Agency is part of the enabling environment.
7. The focus on protocol rather than process and the institutional weaknesses and poor communication mean that the TE can only rate this component as unsatisfactory. However, the Implementing Agencies role in keeping the process moving must also be taken into account and this has been largely satisfactory. Therefore the TE settles on a MARGINALLY SATISFACTORY rating.

## 3.3 Project Results

## 3.3.1 Overall results (attainment of objectives)

1. The UNDP-GEF Guidelines (2012) place considerable emphasis on the achievement of project outcomes. These and the other reporting requirements will be addressed in the First Draft of the TE Report. A further assessment of the project’s objective and outcomes is provided in Annex 6.
2. **Outcome 1: *Individual and institutional capacity for SLM developed*: Satisfactory.** The project has achieved most of its successes in this area which was by far the largest component by the GEF financing. However, these achievements have largely been at the provincial level and thus (in GEF global terms at least), much localized. But this should not distract from the achievements of the project at this level. The project has worked with, and been instrumental in, building a coalition of, *inter alia;* provincial state institutions (*e.g.* the Faculty of Agrarian Science), NGOs (*e.g.* Development workshop), other agencies (*e.g.* FAO), in order to focus on various aspects which are affecting land management. It has worked well with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the Provincial Government in implementing field-based initiatives and enjoys considerable support amongst these stakeholders. The PMU has been effective and efficient in executing the project and has enjoyed considerable support from the UNDP CO. In terms of achieving the outcome the project has clearly placed SLM on the agenda and built lasting capacity amongst these partners and stakeholders, including working with the provincial government on urban SLM issues. While these gains remain vulnerable due to financial constraints they represent considerable achievements and their vulnerability is in some part as a result of the poorer performance of outcomes 2 and 4.
3. **Outcome 2: *SLM mainstreamed into economic and sectoral development*:** **Moderately Unsatisfactory.** While there has been activity towards this outcome it is hard to see any progress. Changes in central government institutions, problems related to a transitional process, poor communications between provincial and central government levels and weaknesses in *inter* and *intra-*institutional communication and collaboration have militated against a successful outcome which would include SLM principles and incentives being drafted into a suite of policy and regulatory documents at a national level. The project has worked closely with the FAO which has been implementing a project working with the GOA to develop land law and this contains some important provisions for SLM such as the recognition of communal land tenure and a provision to recover large farms that are inactive. However, the evaluation would expect to have seen greater involvement at the central level to drive SLM-related reforms across a suite of enabling legislation. There is no sign that this has taken place and arguably it would have taken a much larger project to achieve this.
4. **Outcome 3: *National Action Programme completed:* Moderately satisfactory.**There was an unstated (but reasonable) assumption in the original project design that the NAP would be completed at an early stage in the project because it is necessary to have the NAP in order to develop the Integrated Financing Strategy (IFS) and develop a national monitoring system. In the event this was not the case and the development of the NAP has been a lengthy process. A NAP has now been produced and is awaiting signature and validation by Parliament. Initially the process of developing the NAP appears to have had a very narrow participation with little opportunity public consultation. At one point the document was even considered to be “confidential” by the Ministry of Environment. However, the project was able to open the process up to a broader institutional and public participation through regional workshops covering eighteen provinces and collating the feedback from these workshops for inclusion in the document. Given the need for a broader spectrum of participation of government (at central and provincial levels) agencies, CSOs, donors and land-users involved in developing the document, the project has played a considerable facilitation role in developing the NAP. However it is important that efforts are continued to ensure that the document is validated as soon as possible and a national monitoring system is designed and put in place.
5. **Outcome 4: *Medium Term Investment Plan being financed and implemented (and linked to TerrAfrica):* Unsatisfactory.**This outcome was entirely co-financed. The medium term investment plan was to have been the Integrated Financing Strategy (IFS) based upon the Global Mechanism (GM) format. However, the development of the IFS was (and remains) largely dependent upon the NAP being in place (see above). While there was some training overseas (Lisbon) on developing the IFS it is not clear to the TE how this was then utilized within the project. The lack of progress in this area cannot all be attributed to the delays in developing the NAP. It is not unreasonable to have expected to see some sort of preparation in place so that the IFS could be rapidly developed following acceptance of the NAP by the GoA. Furthermore, the TE questions just how realistic the IFS development could have been given that it would need quite sophisticated and transparent accounting national systems in place.
6. ***Outcome 5: Adaptive management and learning in place (project effectively managed):* Satisfactory.** Whilst the GEF will approve projects with a management component, it is not results based management best practice to include an outcome for such a component in a project log frame. Management actions are activities within the project to steer the project towards its desired goals. Therefore (project) management is included as a component but not as an outcome. However, if management structures have been influenced at national / regional levels as part of the intervention, and these structures are beyond the direct and immediate control of the project (and likely to be sustained), this can be considered by the evaluator as a legitimate outcome of the project.
7. In this instance the TE considers that due to the UNDP CO involvement and a willingness to try and support the PMU past the closure of the project using CO funds there are grounds to consider this as an outcome. The PMU has developed considerable trust and respect at the provincial level amongst many stakeholders which, given the specific circumstances of this project (*i.e.* starting from a very low baseline with little awareness or organization for SLM) is an important outcome of the SLM project. Furthermore, there is a strong argument and considerable local support across a range of stakeholders for continued engagement in SLM by the UNDP. The CO is actively looking at ways that it can remain engaged in the process and utilize the considerable assets that have been built up in the PMU.
8. Clearly with 3 of the outcomes performing so poorly it is reasonable to conclude that it is unlikely that the project has achieved its objective. However, such a conclusion ignores the very real successes that the project has achieved at the provincial level and that it has, at this level at least, come from a very low baseline and placed SLM very firmly on the agenda. Furthermore, it is worth considering that outcome 1 was over 70% of the total GEF fund and outcomes 2, 3 and 4 were only 19%. Indeed when one uses this analysis it is becomes apparent that far greater resources would have been needed to drive these outcomes, particularly so given the transitional nature of government and all of the uncertainties that this entailed.
9. Therefore, the TE concludes that the overall result, the attainment of the objective has been MODERATELY SATISFACTORY.

## 3.3.2 Relevance, Effectiveness, & Efficiency

### 3.3.2.1 Relevance

1. UNDP coordinates and provides technical support for the implementation of the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States (LDC SIDS) Targeted Portfolio Project to Build Capacity for Sustainable Land Management. The GEF OP15 recognizes the need for targeted capacity building in SLM which includes mainstreaming SLM into national economic development processes in LDC and SIDS. The SLM project’s intention to mainstream SLM into PRSPs, MDGs, NSSD, and other national frameworks particularly by integrating SLM into rural development agendas, and developing credible investment plans and strategies to motivate donors (national and international alike) to invest in SLM in the countries made it very relevant by a number of measures.
2. Furthermore, a cursory look at other GEF projects being implemented in Angola place the SLM project in a regional and global context (Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem and the Environmental Protection and Sustainable Management of the Okavango River Basin). At a national level the project documents notes that the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors contributed only 8% to GDP in 2004. Development in these sectors presents a great opportunity especially in rural areas and a huge potential for supporting the rehabilitation and resettlement schemes. The forestry and agriculture sectors provide significant contribution through informal and subsistence sectors. In 2007, US$ 91.3 million was invested in agriculture, of which US$ 80 million was provided by the Government. Agriculture has become a priority sector for public investment and the country’s largest employer with 4.8 million people representing 89% of all jobs, the sector thus has a key role to play given its importance for poverty reduction[[37]](#footnote-37).
3. Angola ratified a number of international environmental agreements during the 1990s, and a great deal of progress has been made since the end of the war in promoting the implementation of such instruments. It ratified the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1997, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1998, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2000. On 1 March 2007, the National Assembly of Angola (Parliament) authorized the Government to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC. The Angolan Constitution makes ample provision for environmental management. Article 12/2 states that “The State promotes the protection and conservation of natural resources, overseeing its exploration and use in benefit of the entire community, whilst Article 24/2 elaborates that “The State adopts measures necessary for the protection of the environment and national flora and fauna species in all the national territory and the maintenance of ecological balance. A series of additional articles focus on the promotion of environmental sustainability, including paragraph a) of Article 112 which stipulates that the government shall, during the exercise of its administrative duties, “elaborate and promote the execution of the economic and social development plan of the country”, which includes environmental management programmes and plans[[38]](#footnote-38).
4. Furthermore, the impact of land degradation on urban development and infrastructure has been an emerging issue with which the project has engaged in a very positive way.
5. The UNDP CO in Angola has two programmatic clusters, Poverty and Governance. The Environment and Energy Focal Point is housed within the Poverty Cluster, but it could just as easily be housed within the Governance Cluster because it is highly likely that the inefficiencies and inequalities in the administration and governance of land in Angola are a major contributing factor to land degradation. Furthermore, land and its sustainable use underpins social and economic development, therefore this project is very relevant to the UNDP CO CPAP although the CPAP and UNDAF do not specifically target land degradation (see section 3.3.4) SLM underpins social and economic development and arguably requires an equitable and efficient system of governance in order to make land use sustainable.
6. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the project objective and outcomes were very RELEVANT at the country level, to UNDP and to GEF.

### 3.3.2.2 Effectiveness

1. The effectiveness of the intervention has been clearly demonstrated through outcome 1. Small, targeted financial, technical and capacity building increments have worked well. Part of this has been due to the high caliber of the PMU and the support given to it by the Implementing Agency and part has likely been due to the selection of good partners, the building of trust at this level and the partnerships.
2. When it came to addressing the larger systemic issues surrounding the enabling environment the project has been less effective. In this case there is little to show in terms of mainstreaming, the NAP has not yet been approved and the IFS has had little if any progress. Given these findings it is not unreasonable to conclude that the intervention has had little effect on the enabling environment, a factor noted in the MTR with a number of quite reasonable corrective actions recommended but which have, by the end of the project had little effect on moving this process forwards.
3. However, it is important not to overlook the important linkages that have been made through the project with other actors involved in SLM in Angola. The coalition of different CSO, NGOs and provincial actors and the individual positions within the central agencies as well. It takes time to build of a network, particularly so in a country in transition from civil war to peace. The PMU has played an important role in this process at the provincial level and the Implementing Agency at the national level.
4. A reasonable and fair assessment of the effectiveness is MODERATELY SATISFACTORY.

### 3.3.2.3 Efficiency

1. Notwithstanding the comments by the TE in section 3.1.1 regarding the arrangement of the projects LFM, there has been a degree of efficiency in which the project has been carried out. Once again, it becomes necessary to separate outcome 1 from outcomes 2, 3 and 4. The project had systems in place for financial accounting, the LFM was used for monitoring progress and performance and the PMU was reporting in a coherent and timely fashion. These reports were compiled into the PIR and Annual Report providing an accurate assessment of the progress.
2. But when it came to the PB there appears to have been a very slow progress or inefficiency. It has been difficult to get the PB to meet periodically, attention of the PB has been largely focused on matters of protocol (*e.g.* providing Portuguese translations of project reports, providing a different format for financial reporting to that agreed in the Project Document, *etc.*) and the poor or lack of delivery on the GoA in-kind co-financing.
3. Furthermore, it has been very difficult to get any movement on the outcomes 2, 3 and 4. So much so that the TE considers whether, with the benefit of hindsight, the project strategy was the most effective and efficient route to achieving the necessary changes in the SLM enabling environment. The MTR recommended the project to “*augment the capacity of the project to interact with central government by locating a project officer in Luanda within the Ministry of Environment. The officer should be charged with the responsibility of facilitating and coordinating mainstreaming and communication and awareness raising activities*”. The Project Document also suggests a “*staff member based at MINUA in Luanda*”[[39]](#footnote-39) but without any ToR or budget allocation. While both the original suggestion and the MTR recommendation make good sense, there was no budget available for this position.
4. Because of the arrangement of outcomes in the LFM it gives the appearance of a larger failure of outcomes, because outcome 3 is really an output of outcome 2 and arguably outcome 4 could also be included in outcome 2 or separated out into an outcome addressing the systemic financing of SLM.
5. Given that the project has been very efficient in regards outcomes 1 and 5 but much less efficient when it comes to outcomes 2, 3 and 4 a reasonable and fair assessment of the effectiveness is MODERATELY SATISFACTORY.

## 3.3.3 Country ownership

1. The shortcomings in the execution of the project, to some extent, mask a very strong country ownership of the project’s outcomes. As well as the numerous international Conventions, the Constitution and global policy agreements (see paras. 99 and 100) land degradation is nationally recognized as an immediate and serious challenge. A number of legal and policy instruments provide significant legitimacy for the SLM project including the Environmental Framework Law (1998), the National Environmental Management Plan (NEMP) and the ongoing revision of the Land Law provide a credible country ownership at the national level.
2. At the provincial level there is clear ownership of the objectives and outcomes as can be demonstrated by, amongst other measures, the level of leveraged co-financing and in-kind support provided by the Provincial Government.
3. The SLM project is resonating with a great many local (and national) challenges to communities, CSOs and provincial governments. Issues such as the resettlement of displaced people, the damage caused to infrastructure as well as food security issues and environmental hazards such as flooding. All of these have provided an impetus for strong country ownership of the outputs, outcomes and objective.
4. It is important to recognize that the ME was established midway through the project and it takes considerable time for a large institution to establish a role and working relationships as well as the necessary administrative and policy framework for its functional operation with the project and with other partners and stakeholders. This may account for the poor inter-sectoral communication and liaison which has affected the project. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that there was strong country ownership but this is not necessarily reflected in the performance of the project’s execution (*e.g.* the poor performance of the in-kind co-financing).

## 3.3.4 Mainstreaming

1. There is little in the direct sense of linkages between SLM and the UN Development Assistance Framework for Angola (UNDAF) and the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP). However, while land degradation, environmental degradation is not made explicit in these two documents it is reasonable to surmise that it is implicit. That is sustainable land management and natural resource utilisation underpins the social and economic development that is central to these country programmes. The UNDAF states that, “*environmental protection is a matter of concern for the Government, and the UN agencies will support the development of strategies for the protection and sustainable use of natural resources, such as Land, Water and Bio-Diversity, as well as mainstreaming environmental protection strategies at a national level and in various sectors. The need for climate change adaptation is also a recognized priority which will also be supported by UN agencies, namely through natural disaster mitigation strategies and programmes”[[40]](#footnote-40).*
2. It is likely that the UNDAF and the CPAP were dealing with very urgent concerns in the immediate post conflict situation. The CPAP identifies, *inter alia,* biodiversity, deforestation, floods, burning of woodlands, a high demand for fuel wood, increasing water resources insecurity, soil erosion, desertification and the impact of global climate change as threats to the development of Angola[[41]](#footnote-41) and goes further to identify food insecurity especially in rural areas as being a serious threat especially as these areas have a high *per centage* of children and elderly. All of which are key elements of the GEF OP 15.
3. However, there is no specific programme for the environment. Within the UNDP CO environment and energy is nested within the Poverty Cluster, presumably a reflection of the CPAP programmes and yet the issues the project has been addressing are central to both these components (governance and poverty). SLM is about poverty, it is about governance, and indeed it is arguably the inefficiencies in pricing and tenure, costs and benefit and authority and responsibility at the systemic level that drive the process of land use to become unsustainable.
4. Therefore the SLM project, like many such projects is a microcosm of all of the challenges facing development in Angola. Going forwards this will likely become increasingly apparent that other programmes cannot be considered sustainable if the renewable land resources are being discounted in order to sustain them.

## 3.3.5 Sustainability

1. The Project Document stated that, “*sustainability has been a major consideration throughout the development of this project. The design of the project centers on “capacity building” and “mainstreaming”, hence institutionalizing sustainability. The project builds on the already existing “baseline”, and will not introduce new organizations, systems or programmes. By strengthening the extension services and capacity for applied research the project is building capacity at the local level ensuring that SLM is embedded at local level where land managers benefit from the project initiatives and therefore sustain them*”[[42]](#footnote-42). The TE broadly agrees with this statement and recognizes that there will be an element of sustained take up of the initiatives particularly at the provincial(s) level but these will be much reduced in their scale and impact because there is likely to be a chronic shortage of financing and they will not be fully supported by the types of institutional changes and supportive enabling environment that are necessary for SLM. The 2012 UNDP GEF Guidelines for terminal evaluations requires the evaluators to assess (and rate) the sustainability of project outcomes against four criteria listed below.
2. Based upon the four criteria below the project is rated in terms of sustainability of outcomes to be MODERATELY LIKELY.

### 3.3.5.1 Financial risks

1. MODERATELY UNLIKELY, that is, there are substantial risks that key outcomes will not carry on after project closure, although some outputs and activities should carry on. At the technical level and with the transfer of skills, there is likely to be a continued benefit although this will be severely hampered because of the lack of basic funding for things such as tree nurseries, tools, *etc.* At an institutional level it is hard to see how these outcomes will continue without further financial support. In many ways this might be a reflection in the stage that Angola is in transitioning from civil war to peace. However, it would be unrealistic to expect many of the outputs and outcomes to persist without further external financing. A contributing factor to this has been the failure to draft an IFS. The Project Document stated that, “*the project will assist in developing a Medium Term Investment Plan (MTIP), based on the National Action Plan (NAP) and further priorities identified. The MTIP will leverage funds and will therefore ensure financial sustainability of SLM activities for the medium term*”. In the event he project appears to have assisted as far as possible with the IFS development but in the end it could not write the IFS itself. In the short term much will depend upon the UNDP COs (and other NGOs and donor agencies) willingness to continue to support in part this process.

### 3.3.5.2 Socio-economic risks

1. MODERATELY LIKELY, that is, there are moderate risks but expectations that at least some outcomes will be sustained. This principally refers to outcome 1 which although vulnerable financially is likely to be driven at the local level by the likely economic benefits and livelihood security factors that stem from SLM. The NAP too is an output that is likely to be accepted as a normative document and formed a substantive part of outcome 3 and there are further indications such as the Land Law, the willingness of the University of Huambo and the provincial Government to become involved in SLM as well as the CSOs and local communities and the linkages to other projects involved in SLM activities that suggest that there is an element of sustainability about these outcomes which is not matched in outcome 2 and 4.

### 3.3.5.3 Institutional and governance risks

1. MODERATELY UNLIKELY, that is, there are substantial risks that key outcomes will not carry on after project closure, although some outputs and activities should carry on. The gains made by the project, and indeed those by other players in SLM in Angola remain extremely vulnerable. The impact on the enabling environment has been low and institutionally it would seem there is still low capacity to carry through on the sorts of reforms and policy development that is necessary. It is likely that in the short to medium term there will need to be continued support from external agencies and donors in order to capitalize upon the gains from the SLM project.

### 3.3.5.4 Environmental risks

1. LIKELY, there are negligible risks to sustainability, with key outcomes expected to continue into the foreseeable future. The benefits that amount to land users are likely to encourage rather than discourage SLM in the event of any natural hazard such as drought or floods. Furthermore, such events are more likely to encourage supportive action from government agencies.

## 3.3.6 Catalytic Role & Impact

### 3.3.6.1 Catalytic role

1. At the provincial level the project has had a significant catalytic because it has provided significant capacity building to a number of very active CSOs, shared training with other NGOs and been involved in establishing farmer field schools and training provincial agency extensions workers in SLM. The TE was presented with powerful evidence of this by two CSOs (AJAPA and ASAD), the first being a youth organization and the second being an association for the handicapped. Both organizations had in depth knowledge of SLM methodologies and were able to convey a powerful awareness message. It was also a salient reminder that agriculture and SLM is important to all sections of rural and indeed many sections of urban society in Angola. In the instance of AJAPA a young woman (orphaned during the war) deputized (a startling example of the ability of this CSO to delegate roles) by the Director who was unable to attend the meeting due to ill health, spoke at length of the associations work and then further about her own smallholder plot and the ways in which she farmed and the willingness to invest time in informing others about SLM.
2. Without reaching for platitudes, both interviews were strong evidence that this project, under outcome 1, has played a catalytic role at many levels from CSOs, the Faculty of Agrarian Science, other NGOs and the ministry of Agriculture and FAO Farmer Field Schools.
3. Providing a catalytic role at the higher agency levels has been more problematic and it has had a much lesser impact at this level. For example training was provided abroad for both the ME and the MA in developing the IFS. However, this training was not then repeated on their return to Angola, thus there was no “multiplier” effect that can be recognized as catalytic

### 3.3.6.2 Impact

1. The impact of the project is less clear cut. There is sufficient evidence throughout this report and was well-documented in the MTR, that the project has had a profound impact at the provincial level***: “****Through pilot activities the project has built the capacity of urban planners, extension officers, University students and communities on techniques for addressing land degradation as well as contributed to implementation of national policies. A number of short term training programmes have been delivered with the university targeting students and various stakeholders in the province. The Faculty of Agriculture has also created a Centre for Sustainable Land Management which will support SLM curriculum development and the generation of material for use by field practitioners, researchers and communities on rangeland and forestry management. Further to delivering training with the University the project has established links with the FAO Special Programme for Food Security specifically through farmers’ schools to promote action learning for the implementation of sustainable land management techniques.*
2. *The project has further influenced urban land use planning by providing information on the status of land and environment in Huambo through the production of a provincial atlas and working with a number of municipalities such as in Santa Iria undertook land rehabilitation activities to halt gully erosion and the erosion of river banks. Some of these initiatives have been replicated by nearby provinces with wide spread tree planting initiatives and meetings with local communities and authorities on sustainable charcoal production and rangeland management. The project has within the limitations of the institutional framework, been able to influence land use planning at municipal level and management of natural resources at local level”[[43]](#footnote-43)*.
3. However, in adaptive management it is sometimes as important to focus on what has not worked in order to understand the driving forces which can be utilized to effect positive change in the future.
4. At the systemic level, on the surface there has been little impact at least as measured by the project’s log frame matrix. Indeed the NAP is one of the few tangible outputs from the project and this has yet to be validated. Therefore it is not unreasonable to assess the impact at the level of outcomes 2, 3 and 4 as poor.
5. However, it is less easy to arrive at a reason for this poor performance, or at least a reason that is fair and can be accepted by all of the project stakeholders. It would be too easy to state that the project design was too ambitious. Arguably these (2, 3 and 4) outcomes had some fairly modest, albeit underfunded, targets.
6. Perhaps, as discussed in section 3.2.6, the answer lies partly in the “enabling environment”. The term *enabling environment* has numerous interpretations and can be extremely broad; or focused very closely on the legal, bureaucratic, fiscal, informational, political and cultural factors that might impact on the stakeholders to engage in the process (Brinkerhoff 2004[[44]](#footnote-44)) of, in this case, developing a functionally efficient system for sustainable land management. In this instance it was much broader than the outputs and outcomes of the project’s log frame matrix because the Executing Agency and other Ministries are also a part of this enabling environment. In some ways there is a conflict between the need to describe SMART[[45]](#footnote-45) indicators and targets and the need to facilitate an adaptive change[[46]](#footnote-46) in institutional stakeholders.
7. In the opinion of the TE the project has had an impact upon this institutional culture, albeit a small one, but change in these circumstances will be unlikely to follow a linear progression. A measure of this can be seen by the ME showing a keen interest in the way in which institutional divides (for instance between the ME and the MA) have been overcome in other countries.

# 4 Conclusions, Lessons & Recommendations

1. The SLM project has been a difficult project to both implement and execute. Despite some shortcomings, the project design as set out in the Project Document was a good design and under the circumstances was probably the only design that would meet the GEF (OP 15 LD), UNDP, Government of Angola, Provincial Stakeholders expectations, but it was also ambitious and with the benefit of hindsight it might have benefited from having a substantive position, within the PMU and based in Luanda, in order to drive outcomes 2, 3 and 4. However, there was, and remains, a strong justification for a GEF-financed intervention with considerable potential (and realization of) global environmental benefits (GEBs).
2. In particular it was, in the opinion of the TE, important to focus on the local (provincial-level) technical aspects of land degradation. This is an important point because GEF LD projects have become increasingly sophisticated in particular in mainstreaming experience in what might be loosely termed the *enabling environment.* However, it is important to place this in the context of Angola emerging from a protracted civil war and while it will be possible to “fast track” this process based on experience from elsewhere, there is still a very real need to build solutions to land degradation through experimentation and negotiation and the building of relationships between the different “players”.
3. The project LFM could have been better organized to reflect outcomes and outputs. For example outcomes 2 and 3 are essentially the same, outcome 3 effectively being an output or a target or the outcome 2 indicator.
4. Outcome 4 could have easily been re-phrased to reflect a broader flow of finance to SLM and a balancing of investments in the root causes of land degradation. Instead the outcome is very specific and essentially describes an output. Amongst other things this makes it hard to include other means of SLM financing in the indicator because it is too specific.
5. There have been delays encountered during the project execution but most of these have been documented in the MTR with a final delay of approximately a year in carrying out the TE but this was due to factors beyond anyone associated with the projects control.
6. Project execution has been weak and on a number of occasions the Implementing Agency has had to provide the kind of support which should have been given by the Executing Agency. While this has been necessary and timely it has also been disruptive to the projects progress.
7. Outcome 1 at the provincial level and largely a technical capacity building intervention has been very successful whereas outcome 2, 3 and 4 have been less than successful. Effectively out of all these outcomes only outcome 3 has delivered a tangible output in the form of the NAP which has still to be ratified by Parliament. The IFS was both delayed by the NAP and by a lack of action. The TE would have been sympathetic if, for instance, the overseas training provided by the GM had been replicated by the recipients on their return; it was not.
8. However, the TE considers that the project has been both implemented and executed under extremely trying conditions logistic challenges, institutional changes within the Executing Agency and difficulties with inter-sectoral communication and coordination have all combined to make this a very challenging project.

## 4.1 Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project

1. Given that this is a terminal evaluation any corrective actions are provided for the benefit of future such projects.
2. The TE has repeatedly said that the design of the project was reasonable but it had a number of weaknesses and that these have been a critical factor in the poor achievement of outcomes 2, 3 and 4. These were largely related to creating an enabling environment.
3. The term *enabling environment* has numerous interpretations and can be extremely broad; or focused very closely on the legal, bureaucratic, fiscal, informational, political and cultural factors that might impact on the stakeholders to engage in the process (Brinkerhoff 2004[[47]](#footnote-47)) of providing a functionally efficient system for land management that is at the same time socially, economically and ecologically sustainable.
4. “*Getting more specific about the enabling environment requires, first, elaborating a comprehensive set of influential environmental factors; and second, clarifying the nature of their impacts on various development actors*” (Brinkerhoff 2004[[48]](#footnote-48)). “Unpacking” the complexity of factors was beyond the scope of the project’s designers, not least because of the timescales involved and the cross-cutting nature of collective action that is needed. Moreover, it takes time for institutions and the individuals within those institutions to fully comprehend the role that SLM can and will play in the larger transitional process that is taking place in Angola. Until there is this broad comprehension of the role that key institutional actors will play, a role that may yet still have to be defined, it is likely that there will be rapid gains with the technical aspects of capacity building but the scaling up of these will likely be constrained by the weak and sometimes obstructive enabling environment, as has been the case of the SLM project.
5. Therefore the SLM project would have benefited from having a much more focused approach to building this enabling environment within the institutional framework. Quite clearly this was on the minds of the designers when they hinted at a substantive position based in Luanda and in the recommendations of the MTR which suggested that this position should be created. Unfortunately there was no budget for this because this was a fairly modest pilot project.

## 4.2 Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project

1. Land degradation is likely to emerge as a key issue in the development of Angola in the coming years, arguably it is already recognized as such by leading players and the GoA. However, the means by which to address the challenges are not yet in place. Furthermore, land degradation is likely to manifest itself in many different and cross-cutting forms; for example from the resettlement of internally displaced people and moves to secure land tenure through to food and energy security for both urban and rural people, or as has been the case in the SLM project, in very immediate threats to infrastructure development.
2. The UNDP has considerable comparative advantages (see section 3.1.6.) as an Implementing Agency due to its operational arrangements and country presence and has developed considerable human, intellectual assets as well as a level of what might be termed loosely “social capital” through the implementation of this project. Such social/institutional networks have value, particularly when addressing an adaptive challenge (see Annex 7) such as SLM.
3. Furthermore, its core business is addressing the challenges of governance and of poverty alleviation; the first being a key driver of land use and the latter being, in many instances, an outcome of the inequalities and inefficiencies within the enabling environment. Therefore it is in a unique position to “keep the process moving forwards”. Already the CO is considering developing a project (albeit under Climate Change) to develop sustainable charcoal production on the basis that this encompasses all aspects of SLM. In this way it is able to keep its “assets” in place and remain engaged with developing SLM in Angola
4. While it is understood that the Implementing Agency for the GEF 5 is the FAO in Angola, SLM is at the core of the UNDP Country Programme because it encompasses elements of governance and addresses many of the root causes of rural poverty and sustainable livelihoods, in short SLM underpins social and economic development and this project has collaborated already with the FAO project.
5. In sum it is important that the UNDP CO remains engaged in the process of addressing land degradation in Angola, not just because this is an emerging issue but also to support the Poverty and Governance Clusters.
6. However, for this to be effective it may be necessary to have an Environment and Energy Cluster to support and underpin the other two programme areas and to facilitate (along with other partners) the development of environmental governance in Angola in order to reduce land degradation and the consequences of land degradation.

## 4.3 Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

1. There are two recommendations drawn from the last section and these are essentially validating the plans of the UNDP CO.
2. Firstly, the UNDP CO should move as quickly as possible to develop the sustainable charcoal production project that is presently being conceptualized. This project should have a strong resource management component (*i.e.* sustainable production of wood, access to land for production, resource tenure, *etc.*) which will ensure that it remains clearly within the SLM domain.
3. Charcoal is a useful focus for both climate change and land degradation because it requires the sustainable production of wood, it provides for rural livelihoods, improved charcoal production reduces the health risks for producers, it reduces transport costs and fuel consumption, provides a cleaner energy than burning wood and it is a renewable energy supply, amongst others.
4. Developing a sustainable system for its production will provide a focus for ensuring it is socially, economically and ecologically sustainable therefore it would fit closely with the UNDP CPAP.
5. Secondly, UNDP Angola gives careful consideration to developing an Energy and Environment Cluster as part of its country programme. Sustainable land management will underpin all of the development gains in reducing poverty and improving governance. Unless development *per se* in Angola is based upon the sustainable use of renewable land resources any development gains remain extremely vulnerable and might be undermined. The GEF OP15 Land Degradation provides a very broad framework for addressing land degradation ranging from technological interventions to rights-based management.

## 4.4 Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success

1. The SLM project has demonstrated that, when starting from a very low baselines as it was, carefully targeted financial, technical and capacity building interventions can have a dramatic effect. Furthermore, the impact of these interventions can be greatly extended by building a coalition of partners who are working in similar areas. However, this applies to outcome 1 of the SLM project which was at a level and a scale where these inputs were being accessed directly by the beneficiaries and the benefits were very immediate. In many sense outcome 1 was very traditional development assistance and it has worked very well and will probably continue to work very well, but it remains very vulnerable.
2. However, and this is probably better said by the MTR which noted that: “*countries under political and economic transition require a lot of support to develop systemic capacities in order to support and drive SLM mainstreaming activities and this is a major task or rather a project on its own. A lot can be learned from the levels of investment and efforts that were associated with the development of National Conservation and Coordination Strategies’ and associated investments that led to the establishment of environmental coordinating agencies in many countries. While the rest of the world may have moved on and institutions matured this is not the case for post conflict countries in transition. Transition takes time and setting goals for achieving improved coordination and building systemic capacities within a 3 year time frame is not realistic*”.
3. The problem is located in the three components of the project that the TE has been referring to as the *enabling environment.* The term *enabling environment* seems to have fallen out of fashion, possibly because it is somewhat vague and certainly it is difficult to define in terms of log frame planning. But the weakness lies in the LFM which has three basic functions; a planning tool, a “contractual” or audit function, and a monitoring and evaluation (adaptive management) function. The first function allows the project to define its strategy, the second function provides a clear articulation of what the project is going to provide and the third function allows the project to track its performance and effectiveness in addressing a challenge and if necessary.
4. In a drive to make projects more accountable there is a tendency to narrow down outcomes to what are effectively outputs or targets because it is difficult to describe the necessary changes in for instance *the enabling environment.* Therefore, as was the case in the SLM project the outcomes became, not measurable changes in circumstance, but discrete and quite sophisticated outputs or as the MTR points out too sophisticated to be supported by the *systemic capacities* of a country recovering from 30 years of civil war.
5. In this case it might have been better to have an enabling environment outcome which would have been directed at building those systemic capacities in order to be able to mainstream SLM into economic and sectoral development.

# Annexes

### Annex 1 ToR

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sources of co-financing | Name of co-financer | Type of co-financing | Amount confirmed at CEO endorsement /approval (US$) | Actual amount materialised at midterm (US$) |
| Government | ME & MA | Cash | 350,000 | 350,000 |
|  |  | In-kind | 400,000 | 0 |
| Implementing Agency TRAC funding | UNDP CO Angola | Cash | 400,000 | 400,000 |
|  |  | In-kind |  |  |
|  |  | Totals |  |  |

### Annex 2 Project co-financing

### Annex 3 List of persons interviewed & itinerary

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Date | Time | Activity | Location |
| 14/Aug Wednesday | 04:50 | Arrival in Luanda, transfer to the Hotel  Chegada a Luanda | Hotel? |
|  | 11:00 | Briefing with Poverty Cluster | UNDP |
|  | 12:00 | Briefing with Senior Management: Mr. Samuel Harbor Country Director and Mr. Olaf Juergensen, Deputy Country Director | UNDP |
|  | 14:00 | Security Briefing, Mr. Filipe Rodrigues, UNDSS | UN Building 8TH Floor |
| 15/Aug Thursday | 10:00 | Meetings with Ministry of Environment Central Government: Kamia Carvalho National Director, Mr. Carlos Cadete, Min Amb Planning Department | MinAmb |
|  | 12:30 | Meeting with Mr. João Vintém UNCCD Focal Point | MinAmb |
| 16/ Aug Friday |  | Work Session |  |
| 17/Aug Saturday | 07:00 | Travel to Huambo by road. | Huambo |
|  |  | Check in at the hotel | Huambo |
| 18/Aug Sunday | 15:00 | Visit to Sta. Iria Valley |  |
| Monday | 11:00 | Meeting with Mr. Joaquim Lauriano, Project Focal Point, Dir. CETAC, Ms. Suzana Capitia, Chief Department of Environment Directorate |  |
|  | 14:30 | Meeting with stakeholders:Mrs. Maria de La Sallete ADRA Director/Huambo, Mr Francisco Carranza, Coordinator FAO Terra, Mr Moisés Festo, Project Coordinator DW |  |
| 20/Aug Tuesday | 10:00 | Meeting with University (Faculdade de Ciências Agrárias) Mr Guilherme Pereira, Deen of the Faculty, Mr Ambrósio Furtunato, Deputy Deen, Mr Romilson Gouveia, Chief of Academic Department, Mr. Andre Bongo, Publication and Marketing Department. | Huambo |
|  | 12:30 | Meeting with Mrs. Virginia Lacerda Quartin, Consultant | Huambo |
|  | 14:30 | Meeting with Partners, Mr. Afonso Sumbelele, Coordinator ASADEF (Solidaity Between Handicap People Association), Ms. Adelina Satito, Activist Representing Mr. Julião Paulo CoordinatorAJAPA (Youth Association), | Huambo |
| 21/Aug Wednesday | 15 | Travel to Luanda | Huambo |
| 22/Aug Thursday | 05:30 | Transfer to the Airport |  |

### Annex 4 List of documents reviewed

### Annex 5 Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

### Annex 6 Objective and outcomes rating

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Result | Indicator | Baseline value | Final Evaluation comments & assessment |
| ***Objective:***Capacity developed for sustainable land management for key SLM stakeholders and sustainable land management principles mainstreamed into national policies, plans and processes. | Decision makers at national and local levels and the public, especially rural farmers have high levels of awareness of the importance of SLM and are adopting SLM principles in decision making and land management respectively | SLM not reflected in any of the polices  Capacities for sustainable resources management depleted during the war, little exists today and it is not coordinated well adequately | **SATISFACTORY:** The NAP is now finished and at a stage of validation before being approved. The TE believes that this would have been far less inclusive and participatory in its formulation if it had not been for the SLM project. This included carrying out workshops in other provinces. At the provincial level there is widespread and significantly raised awareness of SLM. At the national level a document on SLM principles and procedures developed and final document is available for general use. Key partners in government institutions have been sensitized to apply SLM principles and practices. |
| SLM reflected in National Policies, Laws, Development & Investment Plans (e.g. sustainable charcoal reflected in energy policy, a CBNRM policy adopted, etc.) | Some decision makers starting to recognize importance of SLM, but too few and they have not yet found means to integrate it into development policies | **MODERATELY SATISFACTORY:** At the provincial level (SATISFACTORY) as extension agents have been trained in SLM principles and there is adequate coordination. At the national level there has been little in the way of developing policies and mainstreaming SLM into other policies. The inclusion of a CBNRM policy was probably unrealistic during the lifetime of this project. However, the new Land Law recognises and gives rights to communities for community lands. |
| Decrease in soil erosion at pilot sites accompanied by an increase in agricultural productivity | No baseline given | **SATISFACTORY:** Many of the pilot sites were successful and there is clear evidence that the Provincial Government recognises the importance of SLM especially in relation to urbanisation (*e.g.* the Santa Iria site) whereas communities and farmers are also demanding of further SLM assistance and interventions |
| Recovery of forests at pilot sites start to become evident as reflected in improved rates of regeneration for key species, slower rates of deforestation, improvement in tree population index, better species composition and community indices. | No baseline given | **UNKNOWN:** It is not clear whether this monitoring took place. |
| The national SLM Committee / Task Force embraces NAP Investment plan process and integrates it with developing CSIF planning framework for SLM. | NAP under preparation but not yet approved and does not have a financing plan yet | **UNSATISFACTORY:** The NAP investment plan was the IFS. While two key people were received overseas training in IFS formulation this has not transferred back to the development of an IFS in Angola. In the event the IFS was not developed and there does not appear to be any impetus from the UNCCD Focal Point to revitalise this.  The indicator is essentially a target or descriptive of the indicator not strictly an indicator *per se.* |
| Outcome 1: Individual and institutional capacity for SLM developed | One strong institution (MINAMB) acting as the national agency for SLM and has established an inter-ministerial mechanism for SLM coordination in the country | There’s no institution currently charged with the responsibility of SLM or coordinating mainstreaming of SLM into polices and developments plans | **MODERATELY SATISFACTORY:** The Ministry of Environment is emerging as the key institution for SLM but there is little evidence to demonstrate that it is able to play a broad coordinating role with other policy sectors.  The indicator is essentially a target or descriptive of the indicator not strictly an indicator per se. The indicator might have been re-phrased “SLM institutionalised with inter-agency coordination and policy direction and regulation provided by a lead agency”. But it is not a big deal |
| 75% of extension service staff have skills, expertise and resources to provide SLM technical support to rural communities; SLM extension packages formulated based on demonstrated cost-benefits and best practices, and are being piloted in one Province, reaching at least 85% of land managers/farmers in the province. | There are very few technical officers or land managers with SLM specific skills, and the few skills that exist are not up to date or based on the reality in Angola | **SATISFACTORY:** There is every indication that the project has reached this target with the Farmer Field Schools, extension services *etc.* and through mobilizing key partners to adopt SLM practices.  The indicator is clearly a target. The indicator could have reasonably stated “provision of accessible SLM technical services”. This would have made it easier to measure using the targets that are stated as an indicator |
| Guidelines, Manuals, Protocols outlining Best Practices and toolkits in SLM developed and used | No guidelines or manuals on SLM or SLM extension currently available | **SATSIFACTORY:** A number of guidelines, best practices and toolkits have been produced and the project has partnered with other actors in the field (*e.g.* DW and the Atlas) providing good value for money.  As above this is really a measure of the indicator stated above |
| Revamped agricultural extension service, recommending sustainable land management practices following participatory extension approaches | Extension service is weak and has no specific tools to deal with SLM | **SATISFACTORY:** The project has worked well with the agricultural extension services imparting the concept of land use and farm planning and introducing SLM methodologies within the extension service  As above |
| Farmer and land manager’s own innovation recognized, documented and disseminated  An SLM teaching curriculum available for colleges and universities | Currently a lot of farmers innovating on their own (out of circumstance) but this is hardly recognized or documented; and there’s little farmer to farmer sharing. In addition, there’s almost no applied research being carried out on | **SATISFACTORY:** A study on traditional and existing SLM knowledge has been conducted and published, the inclusion of SLM activities in the FAO Farmer Schools has been very successful. The Huambo University Faculty of Agrarian Science has developed an SLM module and there are a number of graduate students and staff now pursuing SLM research and applied management oriented research and other activities.  As above but the formal (University) element could have been captured in the indicator…. “provision of accessible SLM technical services  *through formal and informal means*”. The applied research and traditional knowledge could then have been separated from this as a different indicator “*traditional farming systems and applied research informing SLM policy, legislation and application”* or something along those lines. |
| Outcome 2: SLM mainstreamed into economic and sectoral development | Relevant policies contain specific sections on and follow principles of SLM. | No SLM policy in place, relevant policies do not reflect SLM adequately and no guidelines for mainstreaming SLM | **MODERATELY SATISFACTORY:** A manual of principles and norms of SLM, containing guidance information for adequate land, forest, and grazing land use was produced and distributed to key institutions in the country. However, there has been nothing in the way of revision of legal or other normative documents to include and address issues of SLM. The FAO (with which the project has been working closely as a project partner) has been working on drafting a new Land Law which is at the consultation stage this has significant and generally positive implications for SLM. |
| Acts & regulations pertaining to SLM updated and harmonized. | NAP not yet passed in Parliament | **MODERATELY SATISFACTORY:**  See above and the NAP is still not approved by Parliament  Indicator would have been better phrased as “*legal framework for SLM*” but when one considers this the outcome might have been better phrased as “*enabling environment supportive of SLM*”. The TE does note that it is much easier to be wise after the fact and recognises the difficulties and inevitable compromises that occur when project LFM are being developed. |
| Investment projects (e.g. in agriculture) are routinely scanned for adherence to SLM principles |  | **UNSATISFACTORY:**  While the guidelines produced by the project and the raised awareness will likely influence future investment projects there is nothing that compels investors or institution and agencies to include SLM in future projects  This is really a target and could have been included in the indicator above |
| An effective collaborative framework among all stakeholders in the SLM incorporate 100% of relevant sectors and players | Provinces are not engaged in NAP process currently | **MODERATELY SATISFACTORY:** The project has brought together a broad coalition of stakeholders and partners. At the provincial level this has proved to be very effective and satisfactory. However, on the national stage there is little to suggest that there is effective collaboration between agencies and institutions to address land degradation. Much of the experience has been replicated in two Provinces (Huambo and Kwanza Sul).  Possibly there has been some degree of compromise involved in the development of this indicator. It is essentially a target or a description a component of an indicator. But the TE questions whether this had more to do with decentralisation and the devolution of decision making. It is notable that the baseline states that the provinces are not involved in the NAP preparation. |
| A functional M and E system and an approved CSIF/ Investment Plan; Key ministries (finance and planning) are part of the collaborative framework and are aware of economic costs and benefits of SLM; political support for SLM at national level exists and pushes the SLM agenda forward | 1 outdated National Forest Management Plan;  No soil conservation guidelines / manuals | **UNSATISFACTORY:**  No national monitoring and evaluation system exists and there is little evidence to suggest that there is a collaborative framework at the national agency level. There is no IFS.  National level monitoring and evaluation of land degradation merits a separate outcome. There is “a lot going on” in this indicator, including problem statements. It would have been useful to separate some of these issues out into either separate outcomes or at the very least outputs, for instance there are elements of finance included here that would have been better packaged with outcome 4. An indicator can have positive and negative extreme values thus finance can be supportive of SLM as in an IFS or unsupportive of SLM as in financing of agricultural projects not based upon ecosystem resilience. This confusion is reflected in the baseline which relates very little to the indicator. |
| Outcome 3: National Action Programme completed | NAP approved and adopted as an SLM coordination mechanism and disseminated. | Draft NAP exists, not approved or widely recognized as a coordinating mechanism | **MODERATELY SATISFACTORY:** The NAP has not yet been approved although a document exists for approval. The project has ensured that there has been a wide participation in the drafting of the document and ensured that there is a broad cross-section of views included in it.  This outcome is too specific. This could have been packaged with outcome 2. It is essentially part of mainstreaming. |
| NAP Monitoring mechanism in place | The few stakeholders doing anything on SLM are not coordinated | **UNSATISFACTORY:**  There is no NAP monitoring mechanism in place.  Monitoring at the national level could have been an outcome in itself, which is an ability to track change, provide surveillance and effect change (adaptive management) to the system at national, provincial and local levels. |
| Outcome 4: Medium Term Investment Plan being financed and implemented (and linked to TerrAfrica) | Completed and adopted MTIP, based on SLM principles | No MTIP therefore no MTIP financing or monitoring | **UNSATISFACTORY:**  There is no IFS. Two individuals from ME and MA received training abroad in IFS development but there is no sign that this training was used to further the IFS development.  The outcome is too specific. It could simply have read “investment in SLM”. The outcome could then have been part of the indicator and the IFS could have been a target |
| 80% Financing for MTIP committed |  |
| MTIP monitoring and review system in place |  |
| Angola on the TerrAfrica work programme |  |
| Outcome 5: Adaptive management and learning in place (Project effectively managed) | Project Outputs and targets achieved | No project | **SATISFACTORY:** While the GEF will approve projects with a management component, it is not results based management best practice to include an outcome for such a component in a project log frame. Management actions are activities within the project to steer the project towards its desired goals. However, if management structures have been influenced at national / regional levels as part of the intervention, and these structures are beyond the direct and immediate control of the project (and likely to be sustained), this can be considered by the evaluator as a legitimate outcome of the project. In this instance the TE considers that due to the UNDP CO involvement and a willingness to try and support the PMU past the closure of the project using CO funds there are grounds to consider this as an outcome. The PMU has developed considerable trust and respect at the provincial level amongst many stakeholders which, given the specific circumstances of this project (*i.e.* starting from a very low baseline with little awareness or organisation for SLM). Furthermore, there is a strong argument and considerable local support across a range of stakeholders for continued engagement in SLM by the UNDP. The CO is actively looking at ways that it can remain engaged in the process and utilise the considerable assets that have been built up in the PMU.  While the TE has taken the view that this is a reasonable outcome although it could have been better phrased. However, the indicators should have reflected some continuity post project, even given the circumstances it could reflect UNDPs willingness to look for ways that the PMU can be integrated into future SLM related projects |
| Project Monitoring reports prepared |  |
| Project audit |  |
| Lessons learned disseminated |  |

### Annex 7 Technical & Adaptive Challenges

**Technical challenges:**

* A technical challenge is a challenge that can be addressed with existing expertise, protocols and operations.
* Implementing solutions to technical challenges often falls to someone with the authority to address them.
* Technical training (*i.e.* using a manual and new equipment) can resolve the problem.

**Adaptive challenges:**

* Encounter situations for which solutions lie outside the current way of operation, and possibly, thinking.
* Applying existing procedures and understanding does not provide the solution needed.
* Stakeholders must be involved in developing and implementing solutions.
* Solutions lie not in the application of expertise, but rather from a process of learning and adapting.
* Addressing adaptive challenges requires trying solutions that are new and maybe quite different.
* Inherent in addressing adaptive challenges are the need to become comfortable with not knowing what the next move might be, dealing with uncertainty.
* It is necessary to think (institutionally, individually, collectively…) what we should continue to do, what we should start to do and, critically, what we might need to stop doing…
* Addressing adaptive challenges may require the transfer of *power* (the ability to make decisions and to influence future events) from one party to another.
* Normally require *expert thinking*, which is the ability to solve non-rule-based problems.
* Addressing adaptive challenges requires solutions that are new and maybe quite different.
* Inherent in adaptive work is the need to become comfortable with not knowing what the next move might be.
* Adaptive challenges require time for adaptive solutions to have an effect and stakeholders cannot expect to react too quickly because of the discomfort that comes with not knowing.

*Adapted from: Heifetz, Ronald A.; Leadership Without Easy Answers (Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1994)*

### Annex 8 Key features of an enabling environment

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Category of environmental factors | Key enabling features (source: Brinkerhoff, 2004) |
| Economic | * Non-distortionary policy framework. * Encouragement of free markets and open competition. * Supportive of investment (including physical security). * Low transactions costs, credible commitment |
| Political | * Democratic system that supports pluralism, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. * Processes that encourage participation, social contract, and state legitimacy. * Rule of law, contract enforcement, respect for human rights and property rights. |
| Administration | * Efficient service delivery capacity. * Low levels of corruption. * Institutional checks and balances. * Decentralization. * Civil service meritocracy. |
| Socio-cultural | * Presence of social capital and trust. * Tolerance of diversity. * Norms of inclusiveness, equity, and fairness. * Belief in the value and efficacy of individual effort. |
| Resources | * Policies and investments in health, education, workforce development, information technology, science and research. * Adequate funding and institutional capacity. |
| Legal | * Alignment of regulatory framework with policy objectives. |

1. Outcome ratings are not required to be given by the TE but they have been included here to explain how the TE has arrived at its conclusion and because there has been a wide discrepancy between various outcomes [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For a full list of persons consulted see Annex 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The FE was unable to meet with the Ministries of Environment and Agriculture and the UNDP CO at the end of the field mission because the flight from Huambo to Luanda was cancelled and the evaluator and UNDP GEF Focal Point had to return to Luanda by vehicle late at night. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. There had been a GEF-financed Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (BSAP) project but the nature of the SLM project was one which required establishing a PMU outside of Luanda and required localised (Provincial) technical interventions as well as broader strategic interventions (*i.e.* it was operating at different scales in a province and at a central level, there was considerable investment in other institutions, *etc.*). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. In the event the in-kind co-financing did not materialise [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ministry for Urban Issues and the Environment [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Project Document, section 4.2.2, p. 43, para. 149 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. SLM project MTR, p. 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Project Document Section 6.6 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. For example: “75% of extension service staff have skills, expertise and resources to provide SLM technical support to rural communities; SLM extension packages formulated based on demonstrated cost-benefits and best practices, and are being piloted in one Province, reaching at least 85% of land managers/farmers in the province.” [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Inception Workshop Report, P. 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Project Document, p. 33, Table 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Unsworth, S., Focusing aid on good governance: Can foreign aid instruments be used to enhance “good governance in recipient countries? “ : 23rd February 2005, GEG Working Paper 2005/18, university College Oxford Department of Politics and International Relations. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. SLM Project MTR Report, p. 20 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. This issue is largely due to the shortfall in provincial budgets [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. UNDP SLM project, MTR, p. 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. see Project Document, p. 30, Table 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Project Document, section 4.2.2, p. 43 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Formerly the Ministry of Urban Issues and Environment (MINUA) and in the Project Document [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Project Document, p. 42, para. 149 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. SLM Project MTR, p. 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Building Capacity for Sustainable Land Use and Management in Angola, Internal Review Report, First Draft, Prepared by: Masego Madzwamuse [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. SLM Project MTR, p. 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. SLM Project MTR, p. 12 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. SLM Project MTR, p. 15 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Building Capacity for Sustainable Land Use and Management in Angola, Internal Review Report, First Draft, Prepared by: Masego Madzwamuse [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The term used here reflects that sometimes projects achieve good things but they have little to do with the focus of the project but in this instance the achievements reflected an SLM gain (*e.g.* the support to a coalition of NGOs, CSO and provincial government stakeholders resulting in a loose coalition) [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Project Document, p. 40, para. 147 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. MTR Report SLM Project, p. 17 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Project Document, section 4, paras. 135 - 145 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. The PMU has not quantified the in-kind component of this co-financing but it is reasonable to assume that it is significant [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. SLM MTR Report, p. 15 [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Unsworth, S., Focusing aid on good governance: Can foreign aid instruments be used to enhance “good governance in recipient countries? “; 23rd February 2005, GEG Working Paper 2005/18, university College Oxford Department of Politics and International Relations. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. As well as Biodiversity projects [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *E.g.:* <https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=casim+multi+country+capacity+building+project+terminal+evaluation&rlz=1C1GGGE_en-gbPT421PT421&oq=casim+multi+country+capacity+building+project+terminal+evaluation&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#q=multi+country+capacity+building+project+terminal+evaluation+undp+gef> [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2004), The Enabling Environment for Implementing the Millennium Development Goals: Government Actions to Support NGOs. Paper presented at: George Washington University Conference “The Role of NGOs in Implementing the Millennium Development Goals” Washington, DC, May 12-13, 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. ANGOLA COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER UPDATE 2008-2009; ORSB DEPARTMENT. June, 2008. African Development Bank. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ADB-BD-IF-2008-159-EN-ANGOLA-CSP-UPDATE-VERSION-FX.PDF [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Source: Project Document [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Project Document, section 4.2.2, p. 43, para. 149 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. UNDAF p. 21 <http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/UNDAF-AO-2009_2013-En.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. CPAP, section 2.10 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Project Document, p. 33, para 131 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. SLM Project MTR Report [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *Ibid* [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Specific, Measurable, Achievable, relevant and Time-bound [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. See Annex 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *Ibid* [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. *Ibid* [↑](#footnote-ref-48)