

**End of Programme Evaluation for the National Programme
for Managing Climate Change in Malawi and the Malawi
Africa Adaptation Programme**

FINAL REPORT

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAP	Africa Adaptation Programme
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CC	Climate Change
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CCP	National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DCCMS	Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
DFID	Department for International Development
EAD	Environmental Affairs Department
ENRM	Environment and Natural Resources Management
EU	European Union
DCCMS	Department of Climate change and Meteorological Services
DODMA	Department of Disaster Management Affairs
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FICA	Flemish international Cooperating Agency
GD	Government-Donors Group
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIS	Geographical Information System
GOM	Government of Malawi
HQ	Headquarters
IDA	International Development Association
LDC	Least Developed Country
MEPD	Ministry of Economic Planning and Development
MGDS	Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
MoAFS	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MoE&CCM	Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Management
MEPD	Ministry of Economic Planning and Development
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MoDPC	Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Programmes of Action
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
PEI	Poverty-Environment Initiative
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
TC	Technical Committee
TOT	Training and Trainers
TPR	Tripartite Review meeting
TRAC	Target for Resource Assignment from the Core
SC	Steering Committee
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNFCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

1: Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

The National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi had as its primary aim the mainstreaming of Climate Change issues into the broad national development agenda, as well as into sectoral policies and programmes. This process was expected to raise the national capacity to anticipate and deal with these issues. The Programme ran from April 2010 until the end of December 2012 and was supported by a set of collaborating partners; namely DFID, Japan, Norway and DFID.

The two constituent components of the Programme were:

- The National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi (CCP)
- Building Capacity for Integrated and Comprehensive Approaches to Climate Change Adaptation in Malawi, which was the national component of the multi-country Africa Adaptation programme (AAP).

The Ministry of Economic Planning and Development provided national-level coordination of the Programme, with technical management by the Environmental Affairs Department, while a broad range of Line Ministries and Departments participated in its implementation.

1.2 Conclusion

The Programme (CCP and AAP) was moderately effective. There were many deliverables and a partially effective coordination system.

Efficiency was maintained in terms of use of financial resources, but timing of the programme showed a lag of nearly 60% over the intended two-year duration. Much of this inefficiency was due to the initial over-ambitious design of the project. Other contributory factors included weak reporting and results tracking, the relatively weak contribution of the Steering Committee and the absence of clear financial and management structures to cover the entire Programme.

The Programme built on a number of previous Government attempts to specify its approaches to Climate Change and made the approaches and the system far more explicit. It will form the explicit or implicit base upon which many future programmes and activities can be built. It was therefore relevant both at entry and on completion.

Sustainability of the benefits attained is not yet secure. Government has very limited resources to cover its many priorities and it seems unlikely that the broad range of activities necessary in CC adaptation and (to a lesser extent) mitigation can be appropriately supported from this source. At the same time, development partners,

which have provided substantial support for the CCP and AAP, seem to be mainly moving in a “downstream” direction, with a tendency to move major resources into programmes for which NGOs and CSOs will be the major players. There is some danger that the work, which has been delivered under CCP and AAP may not be adequately built upon under this emerging approach from development partners.

1.3: Lessons

Lesson One: Varied Performance of Coordination System Elements

The Programme drew together several bodies to help track progress and coordinate its activities and their relationship to other CC initiatives in the country and region. The Technical Committee became very active and convened more than 20 times before project closure (and continued thereafter). It made an important contribution to monitoring activities, advising on quality and drawing together knowledge and linkages from a broad range of Government, academic, international agency and Civil Society Organisations.

The Steering Committee, which was intended to operate at Principal Secretary level and to meet on a quarterly basis has been far less effective. It met only five times during the three years of the project, which was not enough to provide a consistent sense of direction or to ensure coordination at senior levels of Government.

A Development Partners working group also on occasional basis, with varying levels of attendance. It provided some capacity to keep abreast of new proposals and activities assisted by the international community, which was helpful for considering how the Programme could relate to these and perhaps be extended into future areas of donor focus.

Lesson Two: Stronger Management and Financial Accountability Structures Were Needed

Programme implementation included many stakeholders from Government, the UN Country Team, World Bank, development partners and others. The management structure was not clear or strong enough to ensure delivery on the very broad range of activities undertaken. In principle, a small management unit was located in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development¹. However, several development partners noted that the staff of this unit were UNDP employees and did not have an overview of what other implementing agencies were doing or any authority to manage their performance. Further, the financial structure and accountability of the Programme was fragmented and uncoordinated. UNDP provided some TRAC funds from its own resources. Other funds from bilateral partners and the broader UN system were channelled through the One Fund. Some partners funded World Bank

¹ In 2013, after project closure, this Unit moved to EAD.

components directly through TerrAfrica, outside of the oversight of UNDP or the Management Unit.

In view of these various financial channels and systems, it proved extremely difficult for any party to gain an overview of financial progress. Coupling this with the lack of any management structure with authority over the entire Programme, it is clear that this could not be efficiently or effectively managed. The system of Committees provided support and could recommend that certain actions should be taken, but had no authority to act in the event of non-performance. In the absence of a coherent overall management structure, several implementing partners delivered very late, sometimes with knock-on effects on other Programme components.

The lesson to be derived is that a Programme needs an effective and authoritative management structure, coupled with financial transparency so that progress can be monitored and corrected in the event of delays, particularly where these interact to prevent other components from working.

Lesson Three: Challenges Posed by Programme Design.

The Programme was designed as a set of loosely connected outputs, to be delivered by a broad variety of stakeholders. There was no detailed consideration of the chains of cause and effect, which were expected to lead from the use of inputs to generate outputs, which would themselves interact with other forces in more or less complex ways to contribute towards outcomes.

Whilst the AAP had a results framework, which had some of the elements of a formal logical framework, the value of this was minimised by the description of all levels of results as outputs, even when they are quite clearly outcomes. Further the indicators selected by the Programme for use in monitoring progress towards long terms objectives are in many case not monitorable or evaluable. This being the case, it is perhaps not surprising that there is no attempt to monitor any of the indicators in Progress Reports. These are rather a generally partial and haphazard update on the status of outputs and suggestions as to when they might be received.

With regard to the CCP, there are three official outcomes, one of which (gaps filled) is actually an output, since it is within the project's capacity to deliver it directly. Reporting, however, does not focus on the outcomes, but on the outputs, which are evidently expected to contribute towards their realisation.

Overall, there are far too many outputs, with no sense of priority between them or the relative contribution which each would make towards intended outcomes, or the longer-term objective. The design stage is usually considered to be the most appropriate time to plan out how outputs or outcomes will be used and progressed towards making their intended long-term benefit. If this is not done at the earliest stage, there is a danger that issues of use and sustainability will be crowded into the closing months of a programme incorporated in some more or less speculative

“handover” plan. Neither the project design, nor the subsequent reporting has looked at this issue in any detail.

A clear role for the project coordinators and managers was to monitor performance of deliverable and consider where they can be located and how supported to generate the human and financial resources necessary to contribute towards the Programme outcome. The various levels of progress reporting do not look into these more important issues, but imply focus on outputs delivered, or which should have been delivered.

Project reporting has been systematically weak. In addition to the over-focussing on output level, there is a serious lack of consideration of any sense of direction achieved by the Programme. Reports should systematically refer back to the original project document, to enable a serious assessment of how the original concept is being addressed. This has not been done and entire components are simply never reported on. Even if these components were later dropped or were combined with related activities, it is important for such changes to be included in reports, so that the entire programme can be monitored and evaluated, including elements which did not come to fruition or which moved in directions other than those originally anticipated.

Lesson 4: High Production of Deliverables, which Needed Clearer Planning of Use and Sustainability

The Programme has succeeded in producing a large number of deliverables, many of which are of high quality. Challenges remain in promoting their full and effective usage. It should be ensured that, for example, Land Use Plans will be used by intended stakeholders for planned purposes and that funding and other necessary support will be provided from committed sources.

Lesson 5: Multi-Stakeholder Programme Proved Difficult to Coordinate and Manage

The Programme suffered from a plethora of reporting systems, budget and financial procedures and management reporting lines. The Management team in MEPD were not involved in most of these systems and had little opportunity to influence processes, still less to manage what was happening. Even within the One UN partners, there was not close coordination, while the World Bank stayed largely outside of the broader aspects of the Programme, since its financial resources were independent of other components and institutions. In the meantime, Government systems affecting CC were under substantial revision and not in a fully harmonious manner, so that Government’s contribution to setting directions for the intervention was inconsistent.

Lesson 6: Challenges to Delivery from Ineffective Support Systems

The Programme was substantially undermined by ineffective systems to provide its basic services. Procurement, recruitment and financial tracking were ineffective, leading to hold ups in recruitment of consultants and in procurement of goods and services; while basic systems such as Daily Subsistence Allowances did not keep pace with changing costs (such as hotels), so that stakeholders were unable or unwilling to attend meetings. It seems that all players in the system ran into one type of difficulty or another, so that none was able to deliver everything on time.

Lesson 7: “Delivering as One” Not Fully Effective

Whilst the One Fund Window worked well, collaboration and coordination between the UN partners was rudimentary. The “joint” elements did not encompass detailed planning around shared deliverables, but unfolded as a series of discrete activities with limited collaboration in terms of movement towards outcome levels. Decisions were often made at individual agency HQs and passed back down the line, leading to time delays, frustration among partners and limited national participation and ownership.

Lesson 8: National Ownership has been Partial

There were numerous international consultancies, several of which delivered very late. Whilst some claim to have incorporated “on the job” training of national experts, others were even put together on other continents and brought to Malawi at the last moment. Most claim to have fully involved local counterparts to the extent possible, while the national institutions express a different viewpoint and state that they have not been involved. A more recent and positive measure, of posting a (USAID) REDD+ Adviser in the relevant Ministry is probably an advantage and parallels the UNDP-sponsored CC Adviser in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.

Lesson 9: Government Departments have Begun to Work Better Together

It is widely agreed by those in Government institutions (and those who interact with them) that cooperation between them has not always been a strong point. Further, there has been a reluctance to share scientific and other information pertinent to issues that cut across the remit of several agencies. The Programme has brought together a broad range of agencies to work together on the production of strategies, plans, draft policies and many other activities. Although the specific exercises have not always worked smoothly, there is a broad recognition that this is a beneficial process for the effectiveness of Government performance and that it should be built upon further.

Lesson 10: More Scope Needed for Private Sector Engagement

There has been inadequate recognition that the private sector is likely to be an important player in the development and implementation of responses to CC. As well as such obvious areas as the supply of hardware for solar and wind power and other technologies, it is also possible that some private forest estates could play an important role in the national approach towards and benefits from carbon finance actions.

Lesson 11: The Concept and Practice of District CC Information Centres Has Made a Good Start and Needs Further Support

The Centres show potential, but need to be further supported, strengthened and more widely available. Where they are well located and have access to an existing District employee, such as a Community Librarian, they have begun to perform a useful function. Where they are reliant on part-time assistants to open and run them, they do not look very useful. They need more resources and a clearer scope of work. Given the poor situation of District level finances, the possibility of taking this work further will depend on creation of a detailed plan.

Lesson 12: Articulation of Government and Civil Society Activities Needs to be Stronger, Particularly at District Level.

There is substantial overlap between the work of District Councils in connection with CC and the Environment and that of various NGOs and CSOs. It seems that several of the development partners, which have supported the Programme are now gravitating towards NGO/CBO activities at District and Village level. This places emphasis on an extension of the Programme to try to ensure that these activities build upon work that has already been done

1.4: Recommendations Based on the Lessons Learned

Recommendation 1: UNDP and Government should ensure that projects are appropriately designed for their purposes and available resources.

UNDP and Government Should Pay More Attention to Producing Project Designs, which:

- Are focussed on limited and clear objectives, towards which a sustainable contribution can be delivered within a "fundable" time frame
- Are not simply an aggregation of disconnected outputs
- Are based on a clear results chain, linking causes and effects
- Have a usable and useful system of monitoring towards carefully selected progress indicators
- Have from the design phase a clear plan for sustainability and scaling up as necessary.

Recommendation 2: UNDP and Government should pay detailed attention to developing and implementing stronger programme/project reporting systems.

These will ensure that the focus of reporting is on indicators and targets, which show the extent to which progress has been made towards the intervention's long-term objectives. Reporting on outputs will be only a subsidiary activity, supporting the assessment of higher-level achievements. Such a reporting system is best based on a detailed Logical Framework and/or a Theory of Change concerning how the intervention is expected to contribute towards impacts in the long-term.

Recommendation 3: UNDP and Government Should Strengthen the System of Committees and Working Groups in the CC sector.

UNDP and Government should review the working of the Coordination and Steering Group system during the course of the Programme and recommend ways of making it more effective. Specifically, the Steering Group needs to become a viable body, fully engaged in Steering activities in the sector. It needs also to be in a position to regularly digest and respond to the findings and recommendations of the Technical Group, which has more detailed and regular overview of all that is occurring in the sector.

Recommendation 4: Government should take the lead in developing an effective approach to managing and coordinating complex interventions.

Future multi-partner/multiple implementer Programmes need several oversight mechanisms:

- Transparent financial system covering the entire programme. There are various options in the country, including a SWAp approach, Multi-Donor Trust Funds, Basket Funds, etc.
- The funds could be managed in different ways: including through an Independent Management Unit, an appropriately senior level of the Government Financial System approved by Funders, an appropriate UN or international banking agency.
- Programme management should have one institution with ultimate responsibility and the authority to take corrective actions if any part of the intervention is not working, particularly where this may have "knock on" effects to other activities.

Recommendation 5: Government should lead the development of programming in the CC sector, in keeping with its emerging set of policies, strategies and investment plans.

In keeping with broad international agreements on development cooperation, Government should discuss with its development partners the establishment of an

effective system through which Government can take a strong lead on the management of Climate Change activities. The current tendency is for the development assistance landscape to be dominated by unpredictable and changing emphases across the key international partners, with little national leadership to ensure coherence and systematic progress along official policy and strategy priorities. This should also enable a coherent relationship to be established and developed between Government and Civil Society Sectors.

2: Introduction and Objectives of the Evaluation

2.1: Introduction

The National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi had as its primary aim the mainstreaming of Climate Change issues into the broad national development agenda, as well as into sectoral policies and programmes. This process was expected to raise the national capacity to anticipate and deal with these issues. The Programme ran from April 2010 until the end of December 2012 and was supported by a set of collaborating partners; namely DFID, Japan, Norway and DFID.

The two constituent components of the Programme were:

- The National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi (CCP)
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National-level coordination of the Programme was provided by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, with technical management by the Environmental Affairs Department, while a broad range of Line Ministries and Departments participated in its implementation. Seven districts were selected for pilot activities, namely; Chikhwawa, Karonga, Kasungu, Mulanje, Nsanje, Salima and Zomba. The activities of the Programme are described in more detail in Section 4 of this report.

2.2 Objective of the Evaluation

The objective of the evaluation is to assess how far the project had progressed towards meeting its objectives by its closure and to what extent impact has resulted. It should draw out the lessons learnt from the Programme and provide recommendations to the Government of Malawi and UNDP to improve any future programmes or activities in the Climate Change area.

Under guidance from the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and in collaboration with the UNDP Malawi Country office, the evaluation assesses:

- The extent to which the CCP and the AAP achieved the objectives and outcomes defined in their Project Documents (PDs)
- The contribution of GoM and UNDP towards progress made concerning the outcomes
- The effectiveness of project implementation and of the funding arrangements

- Challenges and lessons learnt from implementation, which can be used to inform future programme design, implementation and management.

The evaluation covers the period from March 2010 to December 2012.

3: Methodology

3.1 Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation uses the main “DAC criteria” to analyse and assess performance. These criteria² have been broadly accepted as providing an appropriate evaluation framework for assessing the most important aspects of international development activities. The criteria to be used will be:

- **Effectiveness**
The extent to which the Programme’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
- **Relevance**
The extent to which the Programme’s objectives were (and still are) consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities as well as partners’ and donors’ policies.
- **Sustainability**
The continuation of benefits from the Programme after it has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.
- **Efficiency**
A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) have been converted to results

3.2 Data Collection

The evaluation used mixed methods to collect primary and secondary data, on the basis of a Preliminary Evaluation Matrix. The first data source was systematic documentary review. Sources included programme management documents, Minutes from meetings of Committees and Groups with advisory or management roles (notably the Climate Change Steering Committee, the Climate Change Technical Committee and the Government – Donor Partners Working Group on Climate Change), technical reports or papers.

The second data source was semi-structured interviews with selected stakeholders in Government, the UN system and the Development Partners. Under this approach,

² GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS IN EVALUATION AND RESULTS BASED MANAGEMENT. OECD-DAC. Paris 2002.

key topics were specified to be addressed, whilst open space was allowed for discussants to raise their own issues.

3.3 Data Analysis

Data sets from documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews were first analysed internally (e.g., analysis of all individual interview outputs on a specific theme) and then compared with each other to ensure triangulation of emerging findings and lessons. This enabled verification and identification of potential biases within each method.

3.4 Programme of Work

Since the overall time available for the evaluation was 22 days, including 18 days in Malawi, the evaluation was essentially a one-phase exercise. Within this, discernible “sub-phases” were: preparation, initial document review, introductory interviews, assembly and analysis of key documents, documentary analysis, interviews, draft report preparation, mission closing workshop of initial findings, responses to report, revision and preparation of final report.

The evaluation team consisted of one person, Dr. David Todd, guided and assisted by EAD, the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and UNDP Country Office. UNDP Country Office assisted with initial stakeholder contacts, local transportation, field visit logistics, meeting locations and closing workshop venue.

4: Key Findings on Programme Achievements

4.1 Introduction to Presentation of Key Findings

This Section presents the narrative of what has happened with the Programme in a summary and tabular form. It looks at how the Programme was designed, particularly in terms of its intended objectives, outcomes and indicators. It then assesses achievements against the design.

The so-called DAC³ Definitions specify a number of concepts, which are central for the purposes of a final evaluation, since they have been almost universally adopted by international development agencies, including UNDP. As shown in Tables 1 to 4 below, this evaluation has noted a substantial degree of confusion between the results levels expected to be achieved by different elements of the programme. This confusion makes it somewhat difficult to evaluate the programme on the basis of the original programme documents. In particular, the use of fundamental terms such as

³ GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS IN EVALUATION AND RESULTS BASED MANAGEMENT. OECD-DAC. Paris 2002.

outputs and outcomes is completely inconsistent and often incorrect according to the agreed DAC definitions. Furthermore, the use of indicators, which can be used to track progress towards specific goals, particularly medium to long-term goals, is minimal and, where present, confused.

The evaluator has therefore attempted to organise the available information into some form of results chain or hierarchy, in order to assess progress. Sometimes, this has required redefining the existing reporting system component. In other cases, existing reporting components have simply been reordered. Where necessary in the following Tables, the nature of the results elements in the original Programme Design are flagged and commented upon, in order to clarify the assessment made if achievement.

4.2 *Key Findings*

The key findings are presented in Tables 1 to 4 below.

Table 1: Achievements of CCP Against Its Specified Outcome 1		
Outcome 1: Strategic Framework, National Programme, Phase 1 implementation Plan, Coordination Arrangements and Funding Modalities endorsed and National Capacities strengthened.		
Indicator	Evidence of Achievement by End 2012⁴	Comment
		This “outcome” is a compendium of results, which are themselves outcomes. For example, the preparation of a Strategic Framework is an output, since the Programme can directly deliver it. However, an endorsed Strategic Framework is an outcome, since it requires action from stakeholders outside of the project to be realised. In this analysis, “strengthened national capacities” are taken as the ultimate outcome, with the other elements treated as indicators of progress towards this end.
1: Strategic framework endorsed by key stakeholders	TORs for a consultancy to formulate the Strategic National Climate Change Response Framework had been developed and advertised and a consultant had been identified.	Several project outputs should constitute inputs into the development of this Framework. It is therefore necessarily one of the final deliverables of the Formulation Phase. <i>Preparation of the Framework had not started by the intended Closure date. Process carried over into extension period.</i>
2: National Action Programme funded	The National Action Programme is not specified in the Programme Document (including its Results Framework – Annex 1) and has not been discussed in Progress Reports. It is therefore unevaluable.	<i>Not defined. Unevaluable. It appears that this Programme element was absorbed into the concepts of the Project Implementation Phase and the National Climate Change Investment Plan. If that is so, the transition has not been documented and there is no new Results Framework against</i>

⁴ The programme has an approved “no cost extension” period until the end of June 2013, which is outside the period covered by this evaluation.

		<i>which it could be assessed .</i>
3: Phase 1 implementation plan endorsed	Four-year programme developed (2013 to 2016) and discussed at the Sector Working Group and the Technical Committee, both of which endorsed it.	<i>Programme document not signed by Closure date and outside period covered by this evaluation. Process carried over into extension period.</i>
4: Effective coordination system	The Programme is coordinated by a Steering Committee, with members from Government, development partners, academia and the private sector. It is supported by a Technical Committee, with members from the same range of institutions, but with the capacity to devote attention to specific technical issues. A pre-existing Government-Donor Partners Working Group on Climate Change also oversees implementation and has the role of informing stakeholders concerning new CC-related interventions under preparation and implementation. Part of the coordination system, consisting of these bodies, is operating effectively.	<p>The Technical Committee (TC) has become highly active and provides detailed attention to many aspects of the Programme. It is also receiving information of related activities outside of the Programme (e.g., USAID Vulnerability Assessment briefing at 18th Technical Meeting). After early difficulties related to the changing Government architecture relating to CC, the Steering Committee (SC) commenced working. However it has not been effective, since it has only met three times during the course of the Programme, which has not been sufficient to ensure effective oversight. The Government-Donors group (GD) was revived by the Programme and AAP, which involved several donors and Agencies. It has not met as regularly as intended (quarterly) and attendance by donor representatives has been variable; but it has performed a useful coordination function.</p> <p>Overall, the coordination system has become stronger over time and can be regarded as partially functional</p> <p><i>Overall, this indicator has been partially achieved.</i></p>
Overview: Evidence of contribution towards	<p><i>Contributions towards an enhanced “enabling environment” to strengthen national capacity in the field of Climate Change.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate Change Policy drafted • National Climate Change and Environment 	Evidence of strengthened capacity is extremely difficult to verify at anything beyond output level. This is because the outputs (e.g. existence of a policy, number of trained personnel) need to be used effectively in order to generate the outcome of strengthened capacity. To ascertain that this

<p>strengthened national capacities</p>	<p>Communication Strategy developed and launched</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Directory of Malawian Institutions with CC-related activities completed • Climate Change web site developed and running • Draft strategy on “Climate Change Learning” developed, in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) • National Climate Change Programme – Implementation Phase (2013 to 2016) developed and endorsed by Steering Group and Technical Committee • Meteorology Policy drafted by the Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services. • Malawi Delegation to the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) received training and support • Capacity development activities, guided by national climate change training plan • Investigation of possibility for a CC and Environment Sector Wide Approach supported • Coordination structure for CC activities developed, partially effective and sustained, now dealing with range of Government and donor-supported activities. 	<p>is the case would require extensive research. Further it cannot be expected that major improvements will be generated in a two or three year period, since this is a medium to long-term process.</p> <p>Given these restrictions, a more evaluable question is: what is the evidence that the “enabling environment” has been enhanced in a manner and to an extent that represents a significant contribution towards the process of strengthening national capacity to address the issues arising from Climate Change?</p> <p><i>Although some activities were not completed during the Programme period under evaluation, the evidence shows that the programme has made a significant contribution towards the establishment of a strong enabling environment, which can reasonably be expected to promote strengthened national capacity to address the issues associated with Climate Change.</i></p>
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Table 2: Achievements of CCP Against Its Specified Outcome 2		
Outcome 2: Core Information Gaps Filled		
Indicator	Evidence of Achievement by End 2012⁵	Comment
		This is a very vague “outcome,” which has been conceived as an aggregation of specific “outputs”. There is no consideration of whether there might be other “core” gaps or of the capacity to use the information generated. In conventional (DAC) evaluation terms, this is an output, since the programme can directly deliver it.
1: Climate Atlas	The World Bank executed preparation of a Climate Atlas was proceeding through an international consultancy, but no deliverable had been received.	<i>Preparation of the Atlas</i> had started by the intended Closure date but <i>was not complete</i> . Process carried over into extension period.
2: Land Cover and Land Use Diagnostics	The FAO-executed land-cover mapping exercise had been conducted and was under validation by the end of 2012.	The original exercise was completed, but a later requirement to validate the data for a second year meant that the revised scope of work would carry over into the extension period. <i>The work as originally conceived was completed.</i>
3: Technical and Economic Assessments of	This World Bank implemented component was substantially completed, but further work on the investment plans would	<i>The work on investment options was commenced, but not completed during the Programme period.</i>

⁵ The programme has an approved “no cost extension” period until the end of June 2013, which is outside the period covered by this evaluation.

Land Use Options for Adaptation and Mitigation	carry over into the extension period.	
4: Updated Crop Yield and Crop Suitability projections.	The Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services (DCCMS) developed a Weather Crop Model (with support from FAO). Further data collection is in progress to update and start using the model.	<i>The work on crop models was commenced, but not completed during the Programme period.</i>
Overview on “Gap Filling”.	Progress towards this “outcome” was slower than anticipated, with none of the components completed by project-end. For one component, this was as a result of additional work.	<i>This “outcome” did not proceed as intended and delivery of all of its components will stretch into the extension period. This raises some questions concerning the sustainability and usability of the deliverables, which are for the most part highly technical.</i>

Table 3: Achievements of CCP Against Its Specified Outcome		
Outcome 3: Adaptation and Mitigation Interventions.		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-Term Adaptation and Mitigation Interventions Designed and Investment Proposals Formulated and Funded • Immediate Adaptation and Mitigation Interventions Piloted 		
Indicator	Evidence of Achievement by End 2012⁶	Comment
1: Tools for Facilitating Community and Farm-Level Adaptation	<p>The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development has produced a “Handbook on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Best Practices in Malawi” (October 2012).</p> <p>District Climate Information Centres have been established, with FAO assistance, in Seven Districts. There is no systematic information on their usage.</p>	<p>The Programme Document is not specific on the expected range of results.</p> <p><i>Conclusion: Partially completed.</i></p>
2: Investment Plan for Hydrology and Water Resources Monitoring and Flood Forecasting	<p>Water flow monitoring framework developed.</p> <p>Land Use Options study for all major watersheds in Malawi produced.</p>	<p>It cannot be said that an Investment Plan had been developed by programme closure, but some of the elements that might contribute towards this were delivered.</p> <p><i>Conclusion: Partially completed.</i></p>

⁶ The programme has an approved “no cost extension” period until the end of June 2013, which is outside the period covered by this evaluation.

System		
3: Portfolio of Carbon Finance Investment Projects	A consultancy report was submitted to the World Bank in late 2012 and a workshop was held on the “Scoping of Opportunities and Institution Assessment for Malawi’s Engagement in Carbon markets”. There is no report of development of a portfolio.	<i>Conclusion: Partially completed.</i>
4: Strategic Investment Plans for Selected River Basins or Watershed Zones	<p>A Land Use Options study for all major watersheds in Malawi was produced</p> <p>The World Bank gained approval for the Shire River Basin Management Project. This has \$6.5 million of GEF support and a \$125M IDA loan. The programme is to be “climate-proofed” through Vulnerability Assessments, building on earlier NAPA recommendations. Given the magnitude of this programme, it is likely that the contribution of the CCP to its formulation was small.</p>	<p>In addition to the Options Study, which provides information relevant to the development of Investment Plans, a small contribution may have been made towards investment in one River Basin, although there is no documentation to suggest that this part of a Strategic Investment Plan.</p> <p><i>Conclusion. Partially completed.</i></p>
5: Overview		<i>This outcome appears to have had partial achievement of all of its components. However, it is also very poorly covered in Progress Reports, so it is possible that achievements have been under-reported.</i>

Table 4: Achievements of AAP		
Outcome 1: Dynamic long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change introduced ⁷ .		
Indicator	Evidence of Achievement by End 2012⁸	Comment
1: National-level multi-sector and sector plans adequately incorporate risk-based responses to climate change uncertainties.	<p>No evidence presented in progress reports.</p> <p>Progress reported against the outputs of the following potentially relevant activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Study of hazard mapping capacity and effectiveness of scenario based tools for long term planning: <i>one report produced.</i> • Six Government Departments (Water, Surveys, Meteorology, Disaster, Forestry and Land Resources) <i>networked for data sharing.</i> • Seven automated weather stations were <i>installed</i> in pilot districts. • 30 officers from 12 Government Ministries and Departments were <i>trained</i> in “the basics” of GIS. 	<p>The indicator provided in the Programme Document has not been referred to in Progress Reports and no attempt appears to have been made to assess progress towards it. Rather, monitoring and reporting have focussed on a set of deliverables at output level. The advantage of these is that they can be directly assessed. The disadvantage is that they provide very partial information on progress towards the indicator, still less towards the outcome.</p> <p><i>No relevant data on progress towards indicator. Some activities relevant to it completed, with deliverables.</i></p>

⁷ Although presented as an “output” of the Programme, this is clearly an outcome, since it is a result, which builds upon specific project outputs.

⁸ The programme has an approved “no cost extension” period until the end of June 2013, which is outside the period covered by this evaluation.

2: District integrated climate change adaptation plans completed in 3 districts.	<p>No evidence presented in progress reports.</p> <p>Progress reported on the following potentially relevant activity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Handbook <i>produced</i> (by Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development) on best adaptation and mitigation practices adopted by communities on the basis of projects supported by a variety of Government agencies and NGOs. 	<p>The indicator provided in the Programme Document has not been referred to in Progress Reports and no attempt appears to have been made to assess progress towards it. Rather, monitoring and reporting have focussed on a deliverable at output level. The advantage of this is that it can be directly assessed. The disadvantage is that it provides minimal information on progress towards the indicator, still less towards the outcome.</p> <p><i>No relevant data on progress towards indicator. One activity relevant to it completed, with deliverable.</i></p>
3: Overview on Outcome 1.		<p>The outcome (referred to as an output in the Programme Document) incorporates several elements, for which the Programme Document provides two indicators. It is not possible to state to what extent there has been progress towards this outcome, since no relevant information has been presented in Progress Reports. It is therefore only possible to make a very general assessment.</p> <p><i>Some progress in areas relevant to the outcome.</i></p>
<p>Outcome 2: Leadership capacities and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels strengthened.</p>		
Indicator	Evidence of Achievement by End 2012	Comment
1: % of sector Ministries coordinating their adaptation	<p>No directly relevant information presented in Progress Reports. Relevant action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Six Government Departments (Water, Surveys, Meteorology, Disaster, Forestry and Land Resources) <i>networked for data sharing.</i> 	<p>It is not possible to assess progress towards this indicator, in the absence of systematic information. However, it is clear that one relevant step has been taken, although there are no data on the extent to which data sharing has been practiced or found useful/effective.</p>

actions.		<i>One relevant step completed.</i>
2: % of parliamentarians able to understand climate change and the implications for their constituents.	<p>No relevant information in Progress Reports. However:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 60 parliamentarians trained as trainers for their constituencies. 	<p>It is not possible to assess progress towards this indicator, in the absence of systematic information. However, it is clear that one relevant step has been taken, although there are no data on the extent to which parliamentarians have understood the issues and implementations of CC for their constituents; or of any measures they may have taken on the basis of this knowledge.</p> <p><i>One relevant step completed.</i></p>
3: Number of parliamentary reports submitted on CC adaptation.	No relevant information in Progress Reports.	<i>Unevaluable. Not reported.</i>
Overview on Outcome 2:	<p>This outcome has three indicators, which very partially cover the areas in which achievements were expected. A number of other relevant activities have been conducted and a number of achievements have been reported as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity needs assessment undertaken and report produced • Training needs assessment conducted, plan developed and included in report. Training courses conducted. 	<p><i>A number of relevant outputs have been delivered. The extent to which they have contributed towards achievement of this intended outcome cannot be specified, in the absence of data. An M&E framework, which is said to have been adopted, has not produced an outcome focus in Progress Reports, which report almost entirely on outputs.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M&E framework and reporting format adopted by AAP partners. • Coordination structure operationalised: Steering Committee, Technical Committee, supported by Government-Development Partners Working Group. 	
Outcome 3: Climate-resilient policies and measures implemented in priority sectors.		
Indicator	Evidence of Achievement by End 2012	Comment
1: % of district staff able to plan, implement and monitor climate adaptation measures.	No evidence.	<i>Unevaluable. Indicator not used in reporting.</i>
2: % of target districts with functional climate adaptation M&E system.	No evidence.	<i>Unevaluable. Indicator not used in reporting.</i>
3: Number of tested CC adaptation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 22 community demonstration projects implemented by communities in 7 target districts. (Reported under Outcome 5). 	<i>Partially achieved. Demonstration projects implemented. No evidence presented on effectiveness of “demonstration”</i>

measures with scale up plans in place.		element or scale-up plans.
Overview on Outcome 3.	<p>No direct evidence, but some additional relevant actions reported at output level:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CC incorporated in Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II as Key Priority Area • Study and Report on gaps in existing CC-related policies completed. Recommended both a standalone CC policy and mainstreaming of CC into other sectoral policies. • Climate Change policy forum workshop recommended inclusion of the following policy instruments: overarching Response Framework, CC Policy, Investment Plan, NAMA and NAP. • Work on Climate Change Policy not finished. • Meteorological Policy not finished. 	<p>Several relevant outputs completed or under way. <i>Good progress towards appropriate policies and measures in Programme period.</i> Poor selection of indicators in Programme Design has reduced possibility of specifying progress made.</p>
Outcome 4: Financing options to meet national adaptation costs expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels.		
Indicator	Evidence of Achievement by End 2012	Comment
1: Financing Plan for CC Adaptation developed and	Draft Finance Plan completed and under stakeholder consultation. Will continue under Implementation Phase of	<i>Partially completed.</i>

presented to cabinet by MoF and DPC in collaboration with Sector Ministries.	CCP.	
2: Number of applications regarding innovative financing mechanisms prepared to fund adaptation.	<p>No direct information reported. One relevant activity completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team drafting Investment Plan trained and used knowledge in process. 	<i>Started.</i> Supporting activity undertaken.
Overview on Outcome 4.	Preparatory work undertaken and completed.	<i>Partially completed</i> , particularly at national level.
Outcome 5: Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate CC risks and opportunities generated and shared across all levels.		

Indicator	Evidence of Achievement by End 2012	Comment
1: Number of policy briefs, and best practice guides prepared and disseminated based on lessons learned.	<p>No direct evidence. Relevant outputs reported as delivered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National knowledge symposium held and reported. • 22 demonstration projects implemented, but results/experiences not yet for dissemination • CC Action Intelligence Database on actors and activities completed and used. 	<p>Partially completed.</p>
2: Number of media briefs on CC adaptation prepared and disseminated by priority line ministries of GoM.	<p>Not directly reported. Relevant outputs reported as delivered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CC Communication Strategy developed and use began. Follow up in Implementation Phase of CCP. • Website prepared and running, but with gaps. 	<p>Partially completed.</p>
Overview on Outcome 5	<p>An additional important output has been the establishment of 7 CC Information Centres in the pilot districts.</p>	<p>Several relevant outputs completed or under way. <i>Good progress towards expanding the knowledge base.</i> Incomplete selection of indicators in Programme Design has reduced possibility of specifying overall progress made.</p>

5: Analysis of Findings According to DAC Evaluation Criteria

Section 4 has presented the achievements of the Programme against its intentions, as stated in various relevant documents. In order to understand the key factors underlying this performance, including challenges faced, this section adds to the documented results by exploring what Programme stakeholders have seen as the elements promoting or hindering achievement. It does this according to the four DAC Criteria, which are applied to most interventions in international development, including by UNDP.

5.1: Efficiency

Efficiency is a measure of how economically resources and inputs, such as funds, expertise and time have been converted to results.

In terms of funds, the programme as a whole has produced, or is expected to produce, most of its intended deliverables within the available budget and can therefore be considered efficient in this respect. In terms of expertise, there has been some overlap of work, notably between FAO and World Bank in the field of Integrated Land Use and Climate Change. When the FAO work in this area was delayed, the World Bank began the activities on its own. Later, the FAO consultants arrived and duplicated some of the same work. This was a challenge imposed by the subdivision of substantive technical work among different implementing bodies.

The timelines of the programme design were not realised. Although both CCP and AAP were intended to last 24 months, they each ran for 38 months, a time over-run of nearly 60%. In terms of efficiency, this is the main issue that requires analysis.

Programme Design

Stakeholders who followed the Programme from its early days state that it was intended that the engagement of more than one donor and several Government agencies to implement the Programme would be a great strength, but that it did not really work out this way. To a large extent, the enthusiasm for the Programme was driven by champions in all the key bodies, but as staff changed in several bodies at different times, the structures were not strong enough to maintain the momentum throughout the system. With hindsight, development partners in particular felt that the programme might well have worked more effectively with fewer players both on the Government and development partner side.

An implication of this experience is that it is not necessarily good to design programmes with interlinked components by different parties, since this can lead to

delays. Further, programmes with many consultancies are likely to experience delays, given the challenges facing the procurement systems of several agencies.

With hindsight, the Programme design did not promote efficiency (or effectiveness). Some stakeholders are of the view that it might have been better to have a completely different structure. For example, there could have been a Multi Donor Trust Fund with an Independent Management Unit. Whilst the Programme claimed to be Government executed, the staff members of its management team in Government are UNDP employees. So, according to some participating bodies, management has not really treated all partners equally. With a truly independent management structure, it would have been possible to put all of the money into one basket and give all partners equal access to it on the merit of their proposals. This would have opened it up to a broader range of ideas and experience.

With regard to the CCP, some funding partners initially expressed concern over how well the Programme would work, given its partnerships between such bodies as FAO and WB, each of which has its own ways of operating, management system and financial procedures. To avoid difficulties, donors decided to put a portion of the funds through the One UN Fund, with the rest going to the World Bank via the TerrAfrica programme. During the design phase, donors also raised the issue of how WB and FAO would report to an overarching management system. This was never really resolved and the final approved Programme document was not clear on this aspect.

Looked at from a Government perspective, the donors wanted to have UNDP, FAO and WB as implementers. The Ministry was supposed to coordinate the activities, of all implementing stakeholders, but it had no knowledge of the funding details of the FAO and WB components, which were not transparent, but were concluded between the donors and the agencies concerned.

The engagement of several Ministries was regarded as bringing an advantage in terms of risk sharing. At different times, a particular Ministry may be ahead or behind schedule, but overall the programme will still produce results; and the slower components can catch up later. This could be said of the whole Programme, that with its focus on many deliverables, even when some were delayed, others were coming on line.

Start Up

Although the Programme is under National Execution, the Management Team in MEPD had UNDP contracts. Following the May 2010 signatures of both documents; a unit was established with some staff by July 2010. This team was the main driver of

the Programme. In the MEPD⁹, a finance officer was shared with the Environment-Poverty Initiative, which was already underway. The PS of MEPD Chaired the Programme Steering Committee.

Whilst institutional issues were being resolved, 2010 was used mainly for Capacity Development and training, and most activities did not really begin until early 2011. The consultancy team preparing the capacity/training programme drew on the earlier 2004-5 GEF Capacity Needs Assessment. At this early stage an inventory of CC activities was undertaken, using Spanish funds. Parts of the on-going PEI institutional framework were also adapted and used.

The AAP was beginning to start up at the same time as CCP was under preparation and the two were aligned with each other to ensure complementarities and avoid overlap. UNDP drew on some AAP design aspects for development of the CCP. The original intention to run AAP from 2009 to 2011 was not met and it did not start until 2010. It was expected to start in January 2010, but funding only arrived in November 2010, so implementation did not really start until early 2011, with first activities with partners in April 2011. The Work Plan had to be revised to include amended activities and timescale.

During the initial Steering Committee meetings strong disagreements were reported between EAD and MEPD, which hindered the start-up period. These were slowly overcome and EAD became fully engaged. DCCMS is another agency, which sees CC as a central part of its mandate, particularly since it participates in all CC international procedures (as does EAD separately) on behalf of the country. Many agencies with established mandates in different aspects of CC were reluctant to see substantial changes, which might threaten the status and activities they currently control.

It is clear that the start up period was a difficult one, both in terms of initial access to funds and of overcoming weak collaboration between key Government agencies. These difficulties were overcome, but were on factor delaying the time efficiency of the Programme.

Coordination and Management

The National CC Steering Committee was intended to meet quarterly. However, since its Government participants are at Principal Secretary level, it has proved difficult for the Committee to meet regularly. In fact, by project closure, the Committee had met on only five occasions during the period covered by this

⁹ (Formerly Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation – MoDPC)

evaluation, by which time the Technical Committee had held more than 20 meetings. This indicates that the Steering Committee has not been able to play its intended role in ensuring Programme efficiency and effectiveness.

Preparation for the changes of location of the Programme¹⁰ in Government and the internal rivalries and initial poor collaboration have not helped things to move quickly and smoothly. There was considerable tension among Ministries and Departments to manage the programme. Roles were shared out, with EAD providing Secretariat functions for the Steering Committee and DCCMS Chairing the Technical Committee.

Some stakeholders voiced the opinion that, when the programme management role was in MEPD, that Ministry approved funds and they flowed easily to EAD, which was in the same establishment. Another advantage of MEPD stated by some participants in the Programme is that it is a central entity focussed on development, and can take a neutral position between the bodies competing for CC funds. With the planned change of responsibility to the new Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Management, some stakeholders believe that it will be less likely that they will flow easily to other bodies, outside of that Ministry. It is clear that governmental structures and systems for environmental management in the country are still evolving and that there are differing viewpoints as to what would be the most effective approach. No clear key performance indicators have been established, which would enable an “evidence based” assessment of the relative performance of different configurations. A consistent perspective among Government stakeholders is that the recent experience of Departments working together has been new and has helped to break down barriers. For example, DCCMS is now working closely with the Ministry of Agriculture on issues such as meteorology and crops. If such processes continue, the recent reforms will have made a positive contribution to overall environmental management.

Processes among collaborating donors were reported to have sometimes proved time consuming and difficult to understand for those engaged as partners, particularly when it came to extending the Programme. It is notable that, as with Government, changes of personnel among development partners led to loss of institutional memory and delays in achieving approval for any changes.

Several key stakeholders stated that the collaboration of WB, FAO and UNDP has not really worked. Both the FAO and WB elements became delayed. The WB work was mainly consultancies and there seem to have been procurement delays, which led to

¹⁰ Shortly after the project completion date, CC programmes were placed under the new Ministry of Environment and Climate Change.

delayed outputs, with knock-on effects on the programme. Further, the FAO activities were intended to feed into those of the WB, so that delays there meant WB did not start follow-up work on time. The original Programme champions among the development partners moved on after the initial concept had been developed and the Programme did not receive enough attention after they left to keep it moving.

Even the working relationship between UNDP and FAO has not been fully effective. While the One UN approach was promising, there seemed to be difficult programming issues between the two and their systems have not yet been well harmonised.

Within the overall Programme design, the WB did not strongly participate in the overall framework. It was mainly engaged with its own work, which was conducted by several consultants. The World Bank stated, including to the Technical Committee that it was held up by FAO, which did not provide it with the data it needed to start up its own studies. The FAO country office was unable to progress as expected and had to submit many aspects of its work to HQ for approval, leading to additional delays. The Steering and Technical Committees consistently reminded FAO that its products were needed and eventually the Land Cover/Land Use study was conducted using local consultants, but largely driven from HQ in Rome.

The WB hired consultants, who did good land use studies, with strong presentation and reports, but national ownership of the process is not clear. The WB was also to produce a Climate Atlas and was on track to produce this report after the project period. Although technically strong work has eventually been produced, the view expressed by some national partners is that the process was driven by international consultants, with a relatively low level of national engagement or ownership. They point to the fact that UNDP is now trying to take these documents around the Ministries as part of the Phase Two implementation programme in order to build ownership and use.

Finance, Procurement and Recruitment

Some specific issues were reported relating to UNDP funding modalities. One Ministry noted that while the UNDP Financial Year is the Calendar Year, at the beginning of each year in the Programme, it took three to four months before funds were actually disbursed. The Ministry produced Work Plans, which were approved, but then could not start its activities for months. So, in an intended three-year project, 9 months were lost because UNDP did not release the funds to the Ministry. Whenever the Ministry did its Mid Year Review, the project was always running late.

Another recent issue raised by Government Ministries concerns difficulties in attending meetings under the project, because the UNDP Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) is very low. The Malawian Kwacha devalued and costs of hotels and travel rose, but the UNDP DSA did not keep pace. The Government rate is almost three times as high as the UNDP rate, which often does not even cover the cost of staying in a lodge. This situation has led to some drop off in participation of Government officers in the activities of the Programme.

Financial management aspects were very challenging. Different components cut across different financial systems. This was part of the experiment, to see to what extent these challenges could be overcome.

5.2: Effectiveness

Introduction

Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which a Programme's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance¹¹.

An examination of the original stated objectives of the CCP and the AAP shows that they are complementary and to some extent overlap. The CCP had three objectives and the AAP had one, as follows:

Programme Objectives

CCP Objectives:

- "1: To develop an evidence-based strategic framework, comprehensive funded program for managing response to climate change in Malawi
- 2: To develop a strategic response to the challenges that climate change poses for sustainable economic development and national food security in Malawi
- 3: To address the problems that some of the communities are currently facing due to the impact of climate change by piloting few projects that the country has had on adaptation and mitigation".

AAP Objective:

¹¹ This section addresses the Inception Report's Key Question 1: "To What Extent Did the Programme Achieve Its Objectives?"

“ To enhance Malawi’s existing climate initiatives by strengthening capacity for long term investment in, and management of, climate resilient sustainable development”.

Achievement Against Specific Objectives

Building on the presentation of findings provided in Section 4, achievements are first assessed against the specific questions raised by the CCP and AAP objectives, which have been subdivided as necessary to improve their evaluability.

Objective-based Question	Extent to which the Objective was Achieved by Completion
1: Is there now an evidence-based strategic framework to manage response to CC?	<i>No.</i> Carried over into next CCP Phase. However, much of the evidence on which such a framework could be developed has been assembled by elements of the CCP and AAP.
2: Is there now a comprehensive funded program to manage response to CC?	<i>No.</i> The original intention for a “National Action Programme” was not further defined or pursued. There is a proposed Four Year Implementation Plan for continuation of CCP and a draft Climate Change Investment Plan.
3: Is there now a strategic response to the challenges posed by CC?	<i>Partially.</i> By Programme end, a number of the elements necessary to develop such a response were in place. These included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coordination system • draft CC Policy • Communication Strategy • draft strategy on CC learning • proposed CCP Implementation Plan • Meteorology Policy • Climate Atlas • mapping of land cover and land use diagnostics • assessment of land use options • weather crop models.
4: Have community level CC problems been addressed in some	<i>Yes, but to a very limited extent.</i> Further, there is no reliable evidence of the extent to which the “problems” have been substantially resolved.

communities?	The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development has produced a “Handbook on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Best Practices in Malawi” under CCP. 22 community demonstration projects implemented by communities in 7 target districts under AAP.
5: Has capacity been strengthened to invest in climate-resilient sustainable development?	<i>Partially.</i> Workshop and consultancy study on carbon finance investment options, land use options study for all major watersheds, “Climate Proofing” of Shire River Basin Management Project, draft financing plan for adaptation investments. Support has been given
6: Has capacity been strengthened to manage climate-resilient sustainable development?	<i>Yes.</i> The coordination system, which has been established, is an important step towards enhancing management of national CC-resilient development. Capacity to manage has also been strengthened through a draft CC Policy, a CC Learning Strategy, a Communication Strategy, a draft Meteorology Policy, specific capacity development activities under a national CC training plan. Several technical outputs have also raised capacity to manage, including the CC Atlas, land cover mapping exercise, land use option plans, weather crop models, District level CC Information centres potentially raise capacity to manage in those locations.

Perceptions of Achievements

In terms of achievement, it is important to consider not only tangible outputs, but also how stakeholders perceive these; since this will influence their future engagement with activities in the Implementation Phase of the Programme.

Development partner’s perceptions of Programme achievements

Development partners engaged with the Programme place its achievements in the context of its starting point. They note that local CC expertise was mainly in academic institutions, and that the Government sector was not well organized to address CC issues. There were no policies or coherent approaches and the country’s attendance at international CC events was not well prepared or productive.

Compared with this position, development partners see that the Programme has contributed towards a substantial improvement. Many people have been trained at different levels on a broad range of issues. Information has been collected, compiled and published. Policies, strategies and plans have been drafted for adoption. The country is better able to negotiate in international fora. Overall, the Programme (CCP and AAP) has prepared the ground for a range of potential follow-up measures.

The development partners involved intended that the engagement of more than one donor and several Government agencies to implement the Programme would be a great strength, but it did not really work out this way. From their perspective, specific champions drove the initial enthusiasm for the Programme at the design stage; but as staff changed in donor bodies and the configuration of Government entities changed, the structures were not strong enough to maintain the momentum throughout. With hindsight, some partners feel that the Programme might well have worked more effectively with fewer players both on the Government and development partner side.

From the perspective of the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, which has taken over responsibility for the programme, this was a formulation phase, which helped put in place institutional structures, approaches, plans and necessary documentation. The deliverables have largely been achieved. Important frameworks have been put in place; such as the Communication Strategy, the CC Investment Plan (which has just been completed and only needs Peer Review before it can be rolled out) and the National CC Policy. These are all necessary instruments to help address CC in a systematic way.

The main strength of the Programme from a Government perspective is that it managed to design and deliver a consolidated national process; whilst working with various sectors and implementing partners, including several development partners. Although it faced some challenges, it raised much interest in CC, for which not all necessary tools are yet available. It brought together many stakeholders both on Government and development partners' side, which had a range of ideologies, interests and expectations. It was not possible to give everyone everything they wanted, but the ground was laid for partnerships.

The District CC Information Centres, which have been set up in pilot areas under AAP, currently consist of basic library facilities and computers. They have little information in vernacular languages and a high content of relatively technical documents. Those currently established will need further strengthening if they are to become fully effective. Furthermore, an approach needs to be developed, which

will enable this approach to be extended to the majority of Districts in the country, which have not yet been reached at all.

Many data sets have been updated, which the country could not have achieved without this assistance. If the next phase, the Investment Programme is successful, the products can be used to get to the field level with assistance based on accurate data and projections, to help ensure that land is put to the best use in a changing climate situation.

AAP originally developed 7 pilot Districts, in which field level adaptation demonstrations would be undertaken. These were also adopted by WFP for District CC Centres, which were used to sensitise populations at this level. So this was a linkage between AAP and CCP. FAO did not work with WFP on this directly, but did pick up on the same pilot areas for field level pilot projects.

After Programme closure, remaining work in AAP has been carried over into a second phase, as one of the 6 countries in which there will be a follow up, with work focussing on CC and Food Security.

One potentially important area, which has been virtually absent from the Programme, has been detailed engagement with the private sector. For example, some of the big private estates have expressed an interest in Carbon markets. The WB has tried to involve them, but they are not really in the Programme design.

5.3: *Relevance*¹²

Introduction

Relevance addresses the extent to which the Programme's objectives were (and still are) consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities as well as partners' and donors' policies.

Assessment

The Programme has been a catalyst to an active national approach to CC. An important aspect has been the establishment of a broad-based coordination system. When the CC Technical Committee was formed, this pulled together all the key stakeholders: different Government Ministries and Departments, NGOs, academics and the private sector. This Committee monitored progress of the ongoing activities,

¹² This section addresses Key Question 2 of the Inception Report: What is the Added Value of the Programme to the Country's Efforts to Address its Most Significant CC Challenges?

reviewed some proposed activities and received information from others. It has actively ensured that the Programme remains relevant to the changing landscape of CC activities in the country.

A Donor Coordination Committee, which had already been established, incorporated the Programme into its work and was moderately active.

Before the Programme, data on CC were weak and uncoordinated. There was relevant information on aspects of Disaster Risk Management, Climate Change, Sustainable Energy, Poverty-Environment linkages and Natural Resource Management. However, the material was located in many different places. There has often been a problem with Departments not sharing information. They have had a tendency to require formal Memorandums of Understanding before they will collaborate. The Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services holds the main body of data specifically relevant to CC.

The creation of the new Ministry of Environment and Climate Change seems promising, particularly in its watchdog role, which could not be so effective when linked to the Mining Sector. But it is small, underfunded and dispersed between buildings, so it is not yet well placed to deliver strong results.

In terms of topics of emerging relevance, the WB has worked on complex issues such as Carbon Markets scoping, where the responsible Department (Forestry) lacks capacity. Issues of Land Use and Adaptation, including modelling and economic analysis have also been addressed. These are very complex areas that cannot be led by Government at the moment. Furthermore, they are crosscutting issues and do not fall clearly under any one body. These are some of the reasons why production of the Climate Atlas was delegated to the World bank to manage, since the Survey Department and DCCMS could provide assistance to the project, but were not yet in a position to lead on it.

Although it was in principle good to bring together a range of partners and activities, this has not really introduced a relevant new multi-stakeholder approach, since the Programme is actually just a set of activities put together with no clarity on the nature of cooperation or on the complementarity of products.

In terms of the relevance of what has been achieved, the Programme has raised the profile of CC in Malawi to that of an important issue, which is now being considered by more Departments and Ministries. It has laid the foundation for many potential future investments, such as SWApS and other CC Investment Programmes.

Overall, the Programme has not had a strong emphasis on mitigation. However, the WB has been making some important new inputs here, with its work on REDD+ and carbon markets, neither of which was previously well known in the Ministries. Now, USAID has put in a REDD+ adviser for government, which can be seen as at least to some extent a result of the Programme.

Relationship of the Programme to Other Development Initiatives

Overall, the planning tools developed seem good and the CC Policy has gone to Cabinet. So there is new potential to mobilise funds for implementation and a framework against which Government can be held accountable. More could be done, but manpower and resources are in limited supply in the country. Whilst the Implementation Phase of the Programme is seen by development partners as remaining engaged with policies and structures, these stakeholders have shown a tendency of moving towards more tangible measures at field level, in such areas as forestry.

Meanwhile, UNDP is now preparing new programmes intended for GEF funding. The first of these aims at climate proofing local development agricultural benefits in two Districts, which have been affected by droughts and floods. A second project is expected to cover decentralised planning aspects of CC. The Poverty – Environment Initiative (a joint UNEP-UNDP activity) was already active in the country, under UNDP management.

In terms of the continuing relevance of the Programme to Government, the new Ministry of Environment and Climate Change can draw on the experience and strength of EAD, which has not changed its composition and expertise, but has simply moved institutional location. The new Ministry encompasses the Departments of the Environment, Forestry and the Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services, with improved focus owing to the separation from issues associated with Mining and Energy. The core functions at Departmental level have remained stable.

Concerning the relevance of the Programme to Malawi's engagement in international environmental affairs, it can be seen as building upon and strengthening efforts in a number of important areas. The country has already submitted to UNFCCC its NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) and NAPs (National Adaptation Plans). The NAMAs provide a basic road map of the areas in which actions would be appropriate; notably in agriculture, energy, waste management, land use/forestry and industrial processes.

The country needs to work out how to manage CC and to develop its vision in line with the global agenda and to anticipate future funding opportunities, such as the

new Green Climate Fund. All of the efforts to date need to be placed within a long-term strategy, which includes the NAMAs and NAPs, as well as the Policy and Investment Plan emerging from the programme. There are many funds out there for CC and it is probable that the various deliverables of the Programme will enable Malawi to learn how to effectively access the increasing range of financial resources earmarked for Climate Change.

The Programme has had particular relevance to the work of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. This Ministry has overall responsibility for District Councils, which is where benefits relating to CC adaptation ultimately need to be delivered. District Development Plans and Socio Economic Plans need to incorporate CC aspects. District Executive Committees have Environment Sub-Committees, which reach down to Area Development Committees and Village Development Committees, which have Village Action Plans. At this level, areas affecting villages, such as floods, droughts or other disasters should be addressed. All activities in a District ultimately come up to the District Commissioner. In the District level structure, the Director of Planning (from MLGRD) chairs the Environment Sub-Committee, which includes District Environment Officers from EAD.

The MLGRD is the central point for collaboration between development partners and the local government structure. Other Government Departments such as EAD should not go to District level without consulting the Ministry. The Ministry has conducted District level workshops, with contributions from other Ministries, to sensitise District Environment Sub-Committees to the CCP and AAP. Also, on behalf of the Ministry, Bunda College developed Training Manuals for District Staff, with support from FAO. The Ministry also engaged a consultant to conduct a Review of Adaptation/Mitigation practices in Malawi. This led to the production of a Best Practices Handbook. The Ministry also supported training of Parliamentarians under the Programme.

Another important area where the MLGRD has an important role to play is in ensuring that indigenous knowledge is systematically incorporated into approaches to CC. Knowledge on climate change and key events rests with local populations, who have seen changes in their own lifetimes and heard of past situations; for example, water bodies where people used to fish, but which are now dried up. It cannot be said that the Programme had any activities directly contributing towards such issues.

5.4 Sustainability¹³

Introduction

Sustainability refers to the continuation of benefits from the Programme after it has been completed. It therefore focuses on the probability of continued long-term benefits.

Sustainability in Government

Various Government Departments/Ministries are picking up on the Programme material and using it, but it cannot be said that Government is strongly driving the process. It is not the case that Government has identified what needs to be done and parcelled the work out between the various donors interested in the sector. Rather they have all gone their own way, or formed alliance among themselves.

Government should be able to specify what is needed where and be in a position to manage donors and NGOs. There is no clear evidence that it can currently play this role effectively, even though this has been advocated in the Implementation Plan. The Technical Steering Committee has tried to partially play this role, but cannot really manage players like EU and DFID.

Whilst the programme has produced many important elements, Government still lacks the capacity, resources or drive to market them. Development partners have specified major difficulties in working with Government. They find that there are many Government employees, which mean that salaries are very low. In such a situation, capacity building may be partly counter-productive, by raising the expectations of staff in terms of their roles, opportunities and salaries. Many leave for international agencies, NGOs, and the like, where they have better career prospects. Staff turnover is high, so that continuity of commitment to programmes is difficult to ensure. An important approach to addressing this challenge is an emphasis on strong support from Government and its partners for further Training of Trainers. Then those who receive training will need support to use it at field level.

¹³ This Section first addresses the Inception Report's Key Question 3: Has the Programme Influenced How Development Partners are Operating in the Field? It then moves on to its Key Question 4: What is the Sustainability of Any Gains to Which the Programme Has Contributed?

A Policy document has been prepared for initial submission to Cabinet, but questions remain concerning whether it can be effectively implemented. How will donors know which parts of it would be worth supporting and that the expected results can be delivered?

Sustainability Among Development Partners

One difficulty perceived by Development Partners with the Programme is that it is “mainly about documents and policies”, which does not give such a high profile or opportunity to showcase it in national funding arenas. A common theme among development partners is that Phase 2 must look for more tangible outputs. Most are now looking to explicitly address the needs of poor communities.

Co-funding also gives reduced opportunity for donor controls and reviews. In the Programme to date, development partners found some aspects of financial control transparency very difficult. UNDP audited its part of the Programme every year, but said it could not share this with donors, who would have to do their own audit. On the other hand, the World Bank has a different funding arrangement, under which its own audits can be shared with partners and accepted. The partners would therefore wish to find ways to ensure improved financial transparency when going forward.

The Programme has included an inventory of CC activities in country to discover who is doing what and where. It found that there were more than 200 actors undertaking more than 400 activities. Among the international development partners, several are working on CC scenarios, including conducting vulnerable analyses. It seems that all parties still want their own evidence. Once evidence is there, Government should be able to take the lead. However, it seems that several of the major development partners all want to put their money into NGO programmes to reach vulnerable people. Each has done its own vulnerability assessment, sometimes in overlapping areas, with its own baselines and studies.

Development partners indicated that, despite recent reforms in Government, the institutional issues in Malawi make it difficult to decide which Government Department should be given responsibility for any specific supported activity. In some recent donor project preparation activities, no decision could be reached as to which Government Department should manage the funds and in the end it was decided the partners decided to retain this responsibility themselves. Where Civil Society Organisations will be the main implementers, it is intended that they will report to District and central Government on results and collaborate in implementation with appropriate District institutions.

UNDPs Future Role

There will be a follow-up National CC Programme, which will be closely linked to environment and natural resources and DRM support programmes.

There is much unfinished business from the first Programme, including:

- Finalise policy framework
- Complete Investment Plan and obtain necessary finance
- Strengthen processes and strategies to reach communities. National structures and frameworks need to be moved down to the District level: to ensure coordination planning and implementation; and to gather information on what is working
- Develop comprehensive training plan and strategy.

UNDP is working to help pull all this together. It has some TRAC funds to help Government. Any new funds should be channelled through the system that has been put in place during the programme. UNDP does not have the resources or expertise to operate directly at field level, but will continue to work on planning, information and knowledge management, as well as on coordination. It aims to help the Government develop CC activities that are well informed, coordinated and achievement-oriented. UNDP is working with a GEF initiative to climate proof Government development programmes in such sectors as water, agriculture and infrastructure

The main problem anticipated is with possible lack of implementation, particularly when it goes down to District level. Even those Districts that are well coordinated have inadequate resources to implement. In this respect, the apparent move from development partners towards assisting (mainly NGO) implementation at this level may dovetail well with UNDP's work. The Programme has already established guidelines to which NGOs should conform on their dealings with communities. Government will need to ensure that these are followed and that communities are adequately protected; and do not become exploited by organisations coming in with money earmarked for CC.

UNDP's Governance Programme is trying to put CC into this agenda to mainstream it. There is a need to match Integrated Rural Development and Decentralised Government with CC issues, which are important throughout the country. .

The growing donor emphasis on NGOs poses challenges to coherence. CSOs tend to just go to Districts and implement their own programmes, without linking them to any District development priorities or plans. The inclusion of CSOs on the Technical

Committee may help somewhat, but will probably not reach District level. These programmes supported by donors should be linked into the District Environment Sub-Committee system.

The next UNDAF environment programme is targeting a total of around \$40 m for a five year period. TRAC funding of about \$10m is confirmed and the UNDAF and Work Plans still have substantial unfunded gaps. In CC, there were high expectations of financing from the Green Climate Fund, from REDD+ and other new means, but so far it has proven hard to fill the funding gaps. GEF possibilities are being explored and UNDP is helping the Government prepare three Project Preparation Grants for LDC Fund CC Programmes, for a total of about \$14m, with an additional energy programme of about \$1m. All of these will fit within the objectives of the National CC Programme document.

6: Conclusion

Based on the detailed findings presented in Section 4 and their analysis and assessment in Section 5, it can be seen that the Programme (CCP and AAP) was moderately effective. There were many deliverables and a partially effective coordination system.

Efficiency was maintained in terms of use financial resources, but timing of the programme showed a lag of nearly 60% over the intended two-year duration. Much of this inefficiency was due to the initial over-ambitious design of the project. Other contributory factors included weak reporting and results tracking, the relatively weak contribution of the Steering Committee and the absence of clear financial and management structures to cover the entire Programme.

The Programme built on a number of previous Government attempts to specify its approaches to Climate Change and made the approaches and the system far more explicit. It will form the explicit or implicit base upon which many future programmes and activities can be built. It was therefore relevant both at entry and on completion.

Sustainability of the benefits attained is not yet secure. Government has very limited resources to cover its many priorities and it seems unlikely that the broad range of activities necessary in CC adaptation and (to a lesser extent) mitigation can be appropriately supported from this source. At the same time, development partners, which have provided substantial support for the CCP and AAP, seem to be mainly moving in a “downstream” direction, with a tendency to move major resources into programmes for which NGOs and CSOs will be the major players. There is some danger that the work, which has been delivered under CCP and AAP may not be adequately built upon under this emerging approach from development partners.

7: Lessons Learned

Lesson One: Varied Performance of Coordination System Elements

The Programme drew together several bodies to help track progress and coordinate its activities and their relationship to other CC initiatives in the country and region. The Technical Committee became very active and convened more than 20 times before project closure (and continued thereafter). It made an important contribution to monitoring activities, advising on quality and drawing together knowledge and linkages from a broad range of Government, academic, international agency and Civil Society Organisations.

The Steering Committee, which was intended to operate at Principal Secretary level and to meet on a quarterly basis has been far less effective. It met only five times during the three years of the project, which was not enough to provide a consistent sense of direction or to ensure coordination at senior levels of Government.

A Development Partners working group also on occasional basis, with varying levels of attendance. It provided some capacity to keep abreast of new proposals and activities assisted by the international community, which was helpful for considering how the Programme could relate to these and perhaps be extended into future areas of donor focus.

Lesson Two: Stronger Management and Financial Accountability Structures Were Needed

Programme implementation included many stakeholders from Government, the UN Country Team, World Bank, development partners and others. The management structure was not clear or strong enough to ensure delivery on the very broad range of activities undertaken. In principle, a small management unit was located in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development¹⁴. However, several development partners noted that the staff of this unit were UNDP employees and did not have an overview of what other implementing agencies were doing or any authority to manage their performance. Further, the financial structure and accountability of the Programme was fragmented and uncoordinated. UNDP provided some TRAC funds from its own resources. Other funds from bilateral partners and the broader UN system were channelled through the One Fund. Some partners funded World Bank components directly through TerrAfrica, outside of the oversight of UNDP or the Management Unit.

In view of these various financial channels and systems, it proved extremely difficult for any party to gain an overview of financial progress. Coupling this with the lack of any management structure with authority over the entire Programme, it is clear that

¹⁴ In 2013, after project closure, this Unit moved to EAD.

this could not be efficiently or effectively managed. The system of Committees provided support and could recommend that certain actions should be taken, but had no authority to act in the event of non-performance. In the absence of a coherent overall management structure, several implementing partners delivered very late, sometimes with knock-on effects on other Programme components.

The lesson to be derived is that a Programme needs an effective and authoritative management structure, coupled with financial transparency so that progress can be monitored and corrected in the event of delays, particularly where these interact to prevent other components from working.

Lesson Three: Challenges Posed by Programme Design.

The Programme was designed as a set of loosely connected outputs, to be delivered by a broad variety of stakeholders. There was no detailed consideration of the chains of cause and effect, which were expected to lead from the use of inputs to generate outputs, which would themselves interact with other forces in more or less complex ways to contribute towards outcomes.

Whilst the AAP had a results framework, which had some of the elements of a formal logical framework, the value of this was minimised by the description of all levels of results as outputs, even when they are quite clearly outcomes. Further the indicators selected by the Programme for use in monitoring progress towards long terms objectives are in many case not monitorable or evaluable. This being the case, it is perhaps not surprising that there is no attempt to monitor any of the indicators in Progress Reports. These are rather a generally partial and haphazard update on the status of outputs and suggestions as to when they might be received.

With regard to the CCP, there are three official outcomes, one of which (gaps filled) is actually an output, since it is within the project's capacity to deliver it directly. Reporting, however, does not focus on the outcomes, but on the outputs, which are evidently expected to contribute towards their realisation.

Overall, there are far too many outputs, with no sense of priority between them or of the relative contribution which each would make towards intended outcomes, or the longer-term objective. The design stage is usually considered to be the most appropriate time to plan out how outputs or outcomes will be used and progressed towards making their intended long-term benefit. If this is not done at the earliest stage, there is a danger that issues of use and sustainability will be crowded into the closing months of a programme incorporated in some more or less speculative "handover" plan. Neither the project design, nor the subsequent reporting has looked at this issue in any detail.

A clear role for the project coordinators and managers was to monitor performance of deliverable and consider where they can be located and how supported to generate the human and financial resources necessary to contribute towards the

Programme outcome. The various levels of progress reporting do not look into these more important issues, but imply focus on outputs delivered, or which should have been delivered.

Project reporting has been systematically weak. In addition to the over-focussing on output level, there is a serious lack of consideration of any sense of direction achieved by the Programme. Reports should systematically refer back to the original project document, to enable a serious assessment of how the original concept is being addressed. This has not been done and entire components are simply never reported on. Even if these components were later dropped or were combined with related activities, it is important for such changes to be included in reports, so that the entire programme can be monitored and evaluated, including elements which did not come to fruition or which moved in directions other than those originally anticipated.

Lesson 4: High Production of Deliverables, which Needed Clearer Planning of Use and Sustainability

The Programme has succeeded in producing a large number of deliverables, many of which are of high quality. Challenges remain in promoting their full and effective usage. It should be ensured that, for example, Land Use Plans will be used by intended stakeholders for planned purposes and that funding and other necessary support will be provided from committed sources.

Lesson 5: Multi-Stakeholder Programme Proved Difficult to Coordinate and Manage

The Programme suffered from a plethora of reporting systems, budget and financial procedures and management reporting lines. The Management team in MEPD were not involved in most of these systems and had little opportunity to influence processes, still less to manage what was happening. Even within the One UN partners, there was not close coordination, while the World Bank stayed largely outside of the broader aspects of the Programme, since its financial resources were independent of other components and institutions. In the meantime, Government systems affecting CC were under substantial revision and not in a fully harmonious manner, so that Government's contribution to setting directions for the intervention was inconsistent.

Lesson 6: Challenges to Delivery from Ineffective Support Systems

The Programme was substantially undermined by ineffective systems to provide its basic services. Procurement, recruitment and financial tracking were ineffective, leading to hold ups in recruitment of consultants and in procurement of goods and services; while basic systems such as Daily Subsistence Allowances did not keep pace with changing costs (such as hotels), so that stakeholders were unable or

unwilling to attend meetings. It seems that all players in the system ran into one type of difficulty or another, so that none was able to deliver everything on time.

Lesson 7: “Delivering as One” Not Fully Effective

Whilst the One Fund Window worked well, collaboration and coordination between the UN partners was rudimentary. The “joint” elements did not encompass detailed planning around shared deliverables, but unfolded as a series of discrete activities with limited collaboration in terms of movement towards outcome levels. Decisions were often made at individual agency HQs and passed back down the line, leading to time delays, frustration among partners and limited national participation and ownership.

Lesson 8: National Ownership has been Partial

There were numerous international consultancies, several of which delivered very late. Whilst some claim to have incorporated “on the job” training of national experts, others were even put together on other continents and brought to Malawi at the last moment. Most claim to have fully involved local counterparts to the extent possible, while the national institutions express a different viewpoint and state that they have not been involved. A more recent and positive measure, of posting a (USAID) REDD+ Adviser in the relevant Ministry is probably an advantage and parallels the UNDP-sponsored CC Adviser in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.

Lesson 9: Government Departments have Begun to Work Better Together

It is widely agreed by those in Government institutions (and those who interact with them) that cooperation between them has not always been a strong point. Further, there has been a reluctance to share scientific and other information pertinent to issues that cut across the remit of several agencies. The Programme has brought together a broad range of agencies to work together on the production of strategies, plans, draft policies and many other activities. Although the specific exercises have not always worked smoothly, there is a broad recognition that this is a beneficial process for the effectiveness of Government performance and that it should be built upon further.

Lesson 10: More Scope Needed for Private Sector Engagement

There has been inadequate recognition that the private sector is likely to be an important play in the development and implementation of responses to CC. As well as such obvious areas as the supply of hardware for solar and wind power and other technologies, it is also possible that some private forest estates could play an important role in the national approach towards and benefits from carbon finance actions.

Lesson 11: The Concept and Practice of District CC Information Centres Has Made a Good Start and Needs Further Support

The Centres show potential, but need to further supported, strengthened and more widely available. Where they are well located and have access to an existing District employee, such as a Community Librarian, they have begun to perform a useful function. Where they are reliant on part-time assistants to open and run them, they do not look very useful. They need more resources and a clearer scope of work. Given the poor situation of District level finances, the possibility of taking this work further will depend on creation of a detailed plan.

Lesson 12: Articulation of Government and Civil Society Activities Needs to be Stronger, Particularly at District Level

There is substantial overlap between the work of District Councils in connection with CC and the Environment and that of various NGOs and CSOs. It seems that several of the development partners, which have supported the Programme are now gravitating towards NGO/CBO activities at District and Village level. This places emphasis on an extension of the Programme to try to ensure that these activities build upon work that has already been done

8: Recommendations Based on the Lessons Learned

Recommendation 1: UNDP and Government should ensure that projects are appropriately designed for their purposes and available resources.

UNDP and Government Should Pay More Attention to Producing Project Designs, which:

- Are focussed on limited and clear objectives, towards which a sustainable contribution can be delivered within a "fundable" time frame
- Are not simply an aggregation of disconnected outputs
- Are based on a clear results chain, linking causes and effects
- Have a usable and useful system of monitoring towards carefully selected progress indicators
- Have from the design phase a clear plan for sustainability and scaling up as necessary.

Recommendation 2: UNDP and Government should pay detailed attention to developing and implementing stronger programme/project reporting systems.

These will ensure that the focus of reporting is on indicators and targets, which show the extent to which progress has been made towards the intervention's long-

term objectives. Reporting on outputs will be only a subsidiary activity, supporting the assessment of higher-level achievements. Such a reporting system is best based on a detailed Logical Framework and/or a Theory of Change concerning how the intervention is expected to contribute towards impacts in the long-term.

Recommendation 3: UNDP and Government Should Strengthen the system of Committees and Working Groups in the CC sector.

UNDP and Government should review the working of the Coordination and Steering Group system during the course of the Programme and recommend ways of making it more effective. Specifically, the Steering Group needs to become a viable body, fully engaged in Steering activities in the sector. It needs also to be in a position to regularly digest and respond to the findings and recommendations of the Technical Group, which has more detailed and regular overview of all that is occurring in the sector.

Recommendation 4: Government should take the lead in developing an effective approach to managing and coordinating complex interventions.

Future multi-partner/multiple implementer Programmes need several oversight mechanisms:

- Transparent financial system covering the entire programme. There are various options in the country, including a SWAp approach, Multi-Donor Trust Funds, Basket Funds, etc.
- The funds could be managed in different ways: including through an Independent Management Unit, an appropriately senior level of the Government Financial System approved by Funders, an appropriate UN or international banking agency.
- Programme management should have one institution with ultimate responsibility and the authority to take corrective actions if any part of the intervention is not working, particularly where this may have “knock on” effects to other activities.

Recommendation 5: Government should lead the development of programming in the CC sector, in keeping with its emerging set of policies, strategies and investment plans.

In keeping with broad international agreements on development cooperation, Government should discuss with its development partners the establishment of an effective system through which Government can take a strong lead on the management of Climate Change activities. The current tendency is for the development assistance landscape to be dominated by unpredictable and changing emphases across the key international partners, with little national leadership to ensure coherence and systematic progress along official policy and strategy

priorities. This should also enable a coherent relationship to be established and developed between Government and Civil Society Sectors.

ANNEXES

Annex I

Terms of Reference for end of programme evaluation for the National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi and the Malawi Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP)

1. BACKGROUND

The Government of Malawi with support from its cooperating partners (Norway, DFID, UNDP and Japan) through the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development implemented the National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi which aimed at mainstreaming and addressing climate change issues in the national development agenda as well as other sectoral policies and programmes. The Programme was officially launched in April 2010 and ended in December 2012.

The Programme consisted of two complementary projects, namely; the National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi – formulation phase (CCP), and the Africa Adaptation Programme – Building Capacity for Integrated and Comprehensive Approaches to Climate Change Adaptation in Malawi (AAP-Malawi).

This programme was coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development but actual implementation was carried out by the relevant line Ministries and Departments such as: Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services, Department of Energy, Department of Fisheries, Department of Animal Health and Livestock Management, Department of Water Development, Department of Land Resources Conservation, Department of Forestry and others. The project's immediate focus were the seven pilot districts of; Karonga, Kasungu, Salima, Zomba, Chikhwawa, Nsanje and Mulanje.

As the programme came to an end, UNDP would like therefore to engage the services of a consultant(s) to conduct an end of programme evaluation.

2. OBJECTIVE OF THE ASSIGNMENT

The evaluation is being conducted to provide information on about the status of implementation of the project to show progress towards meeting its objective and its impact. The evaluation should come up with lessons learnt and recommendations to the Government of Malawi (GOM) and UNDP to improve future programming in a similar area.

The main users of the evaluation results include:

- Implementing Partners (Government Ministries and Depts), Implementing Agencies (WB, WFP, FAO);
- Donors and Development partners;
- UN/UNDP Country Team;
- Civil Society;
- Other Key Stakeholders.

3. SCOPE OF WORK

In the proposed assignment, the consultant is expected to work with and under the guidance of Ministry of Economic Planning and Development in collaboration with UNDP Malawi Country Office to take the following activities, among others, in fulfilling the objectives of the assignment:

- to determine the extent to which the National Programme for Managing Climate Change in Malawi (CCP) and the Malawi Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP) objectives and outcomes, as defined in the respective Project Documents, have been achieved;

- to assess UNDP and GoM's contribution towards the progress made on outcomes;
- to assess the effectiveness of the project's implementation and funding arrangements; and
- to document challenges and lessons learnt during the course of implementation to inform future decisions in program design, implementation and management of similar interventions.

The evaluation will assess the progress made by the project towards achieving the outputs and outcome and its impact. The analyses of performance of outputs and outcomes will be presented according to the following criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The evaluation will cover the period March 2010 to December 2012.

The evaluation should come up with lessons learnt and recommendations to UNDP to improve future programming in a similar area.

4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The consultant will be required to produce evaluation instruments that assess various aspects of the programme which will include but not limited to:

4.1 Project Conceptualization/Design:

1. Whether the problem the project addressed is clearly identified and the approach soundly conceived;
2. Whether the target beneficiaries and end-users of the results of the project were clearly identified;
3. Whether the objectives, outcome and outputs of the project were stated explicitly and precisely in verifiable terms with observable success indicators;
4. Whether the relationship between objectives, outcome, outputs, activities and inputs of the programme are logically articulated and;

5. Whether the project started with a well-prepared work-plan and reasons, if any, for deviations.

4.2 Project Relevance:

1. Whether the project was relevant to the development priorities of the country and;
2. Given the objectives of the project, whether the appropriate institutions have been assisted and how they have benefitted.

4.3 Project Implementation:

The Consultant will examine the quality and/or timeliness with regard to:

1. The delivery of inputs specified in the project document, including selection of sub-programmes/projects, institutional arrangements, interest of beneficiaries, the scheduling and actual implementation;
2. The fulfillment of the success criteria as outlined in the project document;
3. The responsiveness of the project management to significant changes in the environment in which the project functioned (both facilitating or impeding project implementation);
4. Lessons from other relevant projects if incorporated in the project implementation.
5. The monitoring and backstopping of the project as expected by the Government and UNDP;
6. The delivery of Government counterpart inputs in terms of personnel, premises and equipment; and
7. Project's collaboration with industry associations, private sector and civil society, if relevant.

4.4 Project Performance (efficiency/effectiveness):

1. Whether the management arrangements of the project were appropriate;

2. Whether the project resources (financial, physical and manpower) were adequate in terms of both quantity and quality;
3. Whether the project resources were used effectively to produce planned results (Were the disbursements and project expenditures in line with expected budgetary plans)?
4. Whether the project was cost-effective compared to similar interventions;
5. Whether the technologies selected (any innovations adopted, if any) were suitable;
6. The role of UNDP CO and its impact (positive and negative) on the functioning of the project.
7. Whether there is evidence to support accountability of programs and for UNDP to use in its accountability requirements to its partners;
8. Whether there is evidence of UNDP contribution to the outcome.

4.5 Results/Success of the Project (Effectiveness):

The overall outputs and their meaning are as defined in the project support documents and project documents that should form the main basis for this evaluation and details of the specific project impact to be provided are:

1. What are the major achievements of the project vis-à-vis its objectives, performance indicators and targets.
2. What are the potential areas for project's success? Please explain in detail in terms of impact, sustainability of results and contribution to capacity development.
3. What major issues and problems affected the implementation of the project and what factors could have resolved them.
4. Any underlying factors, beyond control, that influenced the outcome of the project.
5. Have there been any unplanned effects?

4.6 Recommendations and lessons learnt

1. What are the key lessons learnt from the design scope, institutional and implementation arrangements at district and central levels, partnership arrangements and sustainability plans?
2. What are the key recommendations for GOM, UNDP and DPs to consider during the rest of the programme period and in future?

5. EVALUATION METHODS

The Consultant should provide details in respect of:

1. Desk Review of project documentation. Review of key project documents such as approved program document, project monitoring documents, disbursement reports, progress reports, action plans, and other information available either in Ministry of Economic, Development and Planning, or UNDP offices.
2. Field visits and interviews: (i) visits to selected stakeholders to carry out in depth interviews, inspection, and analysis of the project activities; (ii) phone interviews and performance data surveys of institutions not visited in person; (iii) interviews with the implementing partners, implementing agencies, Ministry of Economic, Planning and Development including officials at district level and UNDP, DPs, donors, civil society and key stakeholders. For each of these interviews, the consultant should first develop and present their ideas for the content and format of the interview forms that will be applied to capture the information required, as well as the method to be used in administering them and tabulating the results.
3. Use of inductive qualitative evaluation approaches will be considered to show causal-effect linkages between interventions and outcomes/objectives.
The evaluator will be expected to develop and present detailed statement of evaluation methods/approaches in an inception report to show how each evaluation question will be answered.

6. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The Consultant will be accountable for producing at the minimum the following products:

- **Evaluation Inception Report:** The inception report should include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables. It should detail the evaluators' understanding of what is being evaluated and why by way of: proposed methods, proposed source of data and data collection procedures. The draft Inception Report is to be delivered max. 7 working days after commencement of assignment, and to be finalized including comments of stakeholders within 10 working days after commencement of assignment.
- **Draft Evaluation Report:** to be submitted to UNDP and Technical Committee for CC for initial comments, max. 4 weeks after commencement of assignment.
- **Final Evaluation Report:** Final and approved Evaluation Report, containing all areas addressed as stated above to be delivered max. 8 weeks after commencement of assignment.

7. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will comprise of an International expert with some evaluation experience.

7.1 Qualifications

- Education: Advanced university degree (Masters or higher level) in a discipline relevant to the assignment such as: Natural resources management, environment studies, development studies, geography, climate science, etc;

Competencies

- Experience: Minimum of 10 years professional experience in international development, environment, sustainable management of natural resources to poverty reduction, and/ or climate change policy related field;
- In depth knowledge and understanding of the current issues in climate change adaptation and mitigation, and how this relates to poverty reduction;
- Experience in conducting end of project /program evaluations or similar assignments;
- Experience in developing overarching national programmes, experience with UNDP and/or UNDAF formulations preferred;
- Skills in facilitation and coordination, including high level government consultation, with strong communication and inter-personal skills;
- Proven team leader, able to lead a team of national consultants;
- Sound judgment and strong client and results orientation;
- Demonstrated and strong analytical and report writing abilities required;
- Experienced in working with government and national stakeholders, with demonstrated ability to work under different settings and cultural environments, and work experience in Southern Africa preferred;

A proficiency in English with excellent communication skills demonstrated by an ability to express ideas clearly, logically and effectively both orally and in writing.

Annex 2: Persons Met

Bosscher, Nikolas. Flemish International Cooperation Agency.
Chamba, Paida. Member. Zomba Fish Farmers' Association.
Chilimba, Alfred. Treasurer. Zomba Fish Farmers' Association.
Kachiwanda, Yobu. Meteorological Broadcaster. Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services.
Kamdonya, Donald. Climate Change Adviser. Department for International Development.
Kamperewera, Aloysius. Director, Environmental Affairs Department. Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Management.
Kamphale, Yona. Director of Economic Planning. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.
Kavalo, Mutemwe. Programme Officer. Rural Development and Food Security. European Union.
Kitahara, Naomi. Deputy Resident Representative. UNDP.
Kululanga, Elleanor. Climate Scientist. Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services.
Laban, Silli. District Fisheries Officer, Zomba.
Makunganya, Smart. Chairperson. Zomba Fish Farmers' Association.
Mbamba, Rosebell. Food Security National Coordinator. FAO.
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Technical Steering Committee, 25th Meeting.
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