EVALUATION REPORT OF THE
REDUCTION OF HUMAN POVERTY PROGRAMME
IN NAMIBIA
(2006-2013)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
Namibia

24 June 2013

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Executive Summary

The overall objective of the final evaluation of the Reduction of Human Poverty Programme (2006-2013) was to evaluate the degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently revised. The Reduction of Human Poverty Programme was based on the priorities of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework – 2006 to 2013 (UNDAF) and is an integral part of national priorities. It directly addresses the triple threats (i.e. HIV/AIDS, food insecurity and weakening service delivery capacities) by improving capacities at national, regional and local level for integrating Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), National Development Plans (NDPs) and supporting the country towards the achievement of Vision 2030. Hence, the projects executed under this programme were aimed at contributing to the ongoing efforts towards poverty reduction goals and achieving MDGs in Namibia.

The programme focused on capacity development for pro-poor development, characterized by transparency, accountability and enhanced service delivery across the entire public service (Offices, Ministries and Agencies - O/M/As) of the Government of Namibia (GRN). Drawing insights from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Southern Africa Capacity Building Initiative (SACI), the programme had three components that were purposively selected for capacity enhancement, namely support to the policy framework and institutional capacity development on national development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (NPC); transformational leadership (O/M/As) and strengthening the national statistical system to ensure effective planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of national development plans (CBS/NSA).

The objectives of the assessment were (a) to assess to what extent the project has contributed to solve the needs and problems as identified in the National Statistical Plan III; (b) to assess project’s degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently revised; (c) to assess to what extent the project has attained the desired results to the targeted beneficiaries; and (d) to identify and document best practices and lessons learned on programmatic outputs and processes with the aim to support the sustainability of the project.
The rationale behind this evaluation was to give a trustworthy and credible account of the progress and impact of the programme. To achieve this, the evaluation had to consider the views and needs of the identified stakeholders, which included O/M/As of GRN in general. The methodological approach used, sought to establish what happened during this process, i.e. from design, implementation (capacity strengthening) and monitoring of the programme. For this reason, the inquiry was based on multiple qualitative methods for triangulation and verification of information. The techniques included: desk research and a review of existing reports and secondary data; policy and situation analysis and face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The overriding objective was to elicit stakeholders’ views and opinions concerning programme performance or lack of it. The generic standard OECD DAC evaluation framework/criteria; focusing on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact was employed.

Of the three components evaluated, the findings indicate a mixture of successes and failures. The support to the policy framework and institutional capacity development on national development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (NPC) has been successful in that the intervention has been relevant, efficient, effective and that the impact has been trickled down to the ultimate beneficiaries through NDP 3 (and subsequently NDP 4) which addressed and influenced policies and programmes that are aimed at poverty reduction. The lessons learnt and best practices from NDP 3 have been incorporated into NDP 4 and subsequent programmes, hence, it can be concluded that the outcomes of this intervention can be sustainably employed.

The strengthening of the national statistical system to ensure effective planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national development plans by CBS/NSA can also be regarded as a relatively successful. This is evidenced by regular, timely and well-defined statistics that are guiding evidenced-based planning and helps identify vulnerable areas and people for targeting. Regions have also been empowered to generate own statistics for planning and other purposes. The successor to CBS, NSA is relatively new and still building its structures, systems and developing its human capital and monitoring and evaluation aspects of national developments plans are work in progress. However, this intervention has been relevant, effective, and efficient and the outputs from NSA are having
an impact on poverty reduction initiatives. The gains obtained through the intervention will be sustainably employed in building and strengthening NSA in fulfilling its mandate.

From the three interventions, the transformational leadership component has been the least as successful. Its overall success is mainly hampered by the lack of leadership and the delays in aligning procedural, system, structural and legislative areas to the outcomes of the BPR. The transformation or the paradigm shift required to facilitate the subsequent interventions was limited to top management, whereas it was supposed to be cascaded to all levels of the O/M/As. Owing to this shortcoming, the people/staff driving the BPR within O/M/As have not undergone the required shift and are failing to appreciate potential benefits from the process. The leaders who have attended the transformational workshop are not consistent in providing leadership of BPR within their O/M/As and this affects the progress negatively. To date, very few O/M/As implemented BPR process and even for them the implementation has mostly resulted in administrative or process gain for the O/M/As – very little, if anything has trickled down to customers to address poverty reduction areas. In view of these findings, the transformational leadership intervention has been relevant, but its impact was limited to the benefit of O/M/As. Considering this outcomes against the agreed objectives, it is evident that this intervention has not been effective or efficient. Its sustainability is also questionable, unless the recommendations made as part of this report are considered for implementation.

Some of the recommendations include the provision of leadership through the creation of an aspirational vision for BPR, getting buy-in and organisation wide-involvement, providing ongoing support to the process, create an enabling environment and ensure integration within affected O/M/A and with other O/M/As as there is a strong interdependence, Enlarge the current parochial view of BPR and its abilities to an holistic view to see beyond the process mapping and bottleneck solving-ability of BPR. Use project management to implement BPR and provide a budget to acquire resources needed for implementation.

In conclusion, the UNDAF programme has been relevant however; the mixed results are affecting the overall effectiveness and efficiency negatively. While the interventions aimed at NDP/NPC and CBS/NSA have been relatively successful, the impact of transformational leadership through BPR has not resulted in improved or innovative service delivery and has not trickled down to address poverty reduction. While the other two components are sustainable, there are doubts on the sustainability of transformational leadership intervention.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aids</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>BPR</td>
<td>Business Process Reengineering</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<td>GRN</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Namibia</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>IMR</td>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Integrated Results Based Management</td>
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<td>KRC</td>
<td>Kavango Regional Council</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>Ministry of Mines and Energy</td>
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<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>Ministry of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>NLFS</td>
<td>Namibia Labour Force Survey</td>
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<td>National Planning Commission</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Namibia Statistics Agency</td>
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<td>NSFAF</td>
<td>Namibia Students Financial Assistance Fund</td>
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<td>Population and Household Census</td>
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<td>O/M/A</td>
<td>Offices, Ministries and Agencies</td>
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<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>OPM (ECU)</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister (Efficiency and Charter Unit)</td>
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OVC  Orphans and Vulnerable Children
SACI  Southern Africa Capacity Building Initiative
UN  United Nations
UNAM  University of Namibia
UNDAF  United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The overall objective of the final evaluation of the Reduction of Human Poverty Programme (2006-2013) was to evaluate the degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently revised. It seeks to measure programme results and any potential impacts (short, medium and long term) generated by the programme. Consequently, the final evaluation assessed the extent to which the set objectives for the programme have been achieved. The evaluation further examined the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. It sought to generate credible and useful information, including documenting good practices and lessons learnt - all which may inform future development programmes.

It is the understanding of the consultancy team that the primary audience or users of the evaluation findings is the UNDP in Namibia and the GRN, among other stakeholders. The beneficiary (GRN) benefit from the evaluation in that it receives an objective and a holistic assessment on the status of the programme focus areas, including its efficacy in terms of the agreed goals and fulfilling of the objective (i.e. whether those affected by poverty in Namibia, are benefiting from the investment or intervention). Consequently, the evaluation findings may be designed (and used) to make a judgment about the Reduction of Human Poverty Programme, or one of its components; to provide a basis for making improvements- and using lessons learnt, can be used to design future interventions.; or simply to generate knowledge. In this context, the evaluation may be used to increase understanding of user needs, to fulfill requirements for accountability; to determine whether anti-poverty processes are having the envisaged impact; to judge the effectiveness of a project and to assess the outcomes of the project, focusing on the impact that it has had on its intended users.

In keeping with the above, the evaluation focused on three projects under the Reduction of Human Poverty Programme namely:

- Support to the policy framework and institutional capacity development for national development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation;
- Transformational Leadership; and
- Strengthening the national statistical system to ensure effective planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national development plans.
The details of the programme interventions are elaborated under 2.3. It is fundamental for all institutions that were involved in the ‘Reduction of Human Poverty Programme’ to know the return on huge resources invested in terms of the impact that the programme and all its projects had on its intended users. This report consists of six chapters, which are summarised below:

✈️ Chapter One introduces the project and gives background information on the evaluation;

✈️ Chapter Two describes the ‘Reduction of Human Poverty Programme’ and explains, what was being evaluated, who sought to benefit and the challenges that the programme was to address;

✈️ Chapter Three gives an overview of the evaluation scope, evaluation objectives, evaluation criteria and the evaluation questions used to elicit the data to inform the analysis made by the consultancy team;

✈️ Chapter Four explains the evaluation approach and methodologies used to elicit the data needed for the assignment and data analysis techniques used;

✈️ Chapter Five discusses key findings, including lessons learned and good practices; and

✈️ Chapter Six offers specific recommendations.

2.1 Poverty Overview in Namibia: A summary

There seems to be a consensus that poverty in Namibia is of a structural nature and that it requires an incessant, holistic and multi-sectoral approach. The strategies to alleviate or eradicate it should take into account the historical root causes, interlinking challenges of HIV/AIDS, vulnerability to drought and flood hazards, the interrelatedness of poverty and the range of government ministries, partners such as UN agencies, universities and other role players involved in the poverty alleviation efforts. The Ministry of Health and Social Services (MoHSS) suggested that “a social development policy framework should clarify the nation’s understanding and its approach to poverty so that a coordinated approach could be developed where people rather than the public services play the pivotal role (2013:51).”

Confronting unemployment, socio-economic inequalities, poverty, human resource capacity gaps/skills shortage and narrow industrial base is indeed the preoccupation of GRN as reflected by a robust policy framework and related cross-sectoral policies and programmes. The evidence for this is reflected in the national development plans (starting from the transitional development plan formulated at independence [1990-1995], National Development Plan (NDP) 1 [1995/6-2000/1] to NDP 3 [2007/8-2011/12] and now NDP4 [2012/13-2016/17]; in which emphasis has been placed on the themes of reducing economic inequalities, promotion of economic growth, increasing employment and eradication of poverty. Furthermore, statistical trends reveal impressive progress in a number of social indicators. For example, the latest statistics from the Population and Household Census, (PHS) (2011) reveal that a significant section of the population has been plucked out of poverty since independence: 70% of the population experience extreme poverty in 1993/94 and this dropped to 29% in 2009/10. Furthermore, the Gini-coefficient has improved from 0.7 at independence to 0.58 in 2009/10. Human Development Index has also recorded significant progress over the last 5 years, e.g. life expectancy has increased from 60 years in 2007 to 63 years in 2012 (PHS, 2011).
While these trends are pleasing, there is still much to be done. For example, Vision 2030 target for Gini-coefficient is 0.55 by 2015, whereas it is currently at 0.58. More concerted efforts are needed in a number of areas, for instance, through inclusive economic growth, more efforts towards job creation, etc. Such efforts can also entails acceleration of policies that target young people, women, and investment in health, education and related social protection interventions (e.g. conditional cash transfers, etc.). The PHC report of 2011 indicated the latest unemployment rate as 36.9%. However, the 2012 Namibia Labour Force Survey (NLFS) put the figure at 27.4%. (In 2008, the NLFS used a different methodology hence the unemployment rate was estimated at 51.2%). Further disaggregation of the PHC (2011) and NLFS (2012) unemployment data by geography, gender and age reveals that it is the rural areas, women and youth who are experiencing high unemployment levels. In fact 49%-56% of youths (15-24 age groups) are said to be unemployed. The same data sources reveal a clear relationship between education and unemployment - better education is associated with low unemployment rates. Other indicators: 16% of population lives in improvised housing units, while 80% of the population has access to safe drinking water only 49% have access to sanitation facilities. Some sections of the population remain vulnerable to drought and flood hazards (disasters) and this might cause them to relapse into poverty. With its historical background and the magnitude of social and economic challenges facing Namibia, various role players have been partnering in addressing such. Many of such partners have been operating under the United Nation banner and the reduction of human poverty programme is a concerted effort to deal with the underlying and proximate causes of poverty in Namibia.

2.2 UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2006 -2013

The Reduction of Human Poverty Programme is based on the priorities of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2006-2013), which itself is informed and an integral part of national priorities as identified through NDP 3. It directly addresses the triple threats (i.e. HIV/AIDS, food insecurity and weakening service delivery capacities) by improving capacities at national, regional and local level for integrating MDG, NDPs and supporting the country towards the attainment of Vision 2030. The programme responds to objectives set out in Namibia’s strategies and policies.
It was predicated on the understanding that building effective and accountable public institutions is arguably the core challenge for sustainable poverty reduction (World Bank, 2000). In other words, promotion of access to basic education, health, potable water and other social and infrastructure services is a pro-poor agenda. However, achieving these requires government to be active in facilitation and direct delivery of services. The reasoning is that where O/M/As is weak, policy making and resource allocation is not transparent and decisions are often skewed in favour of the elite at the expense of the poor and the broader society. The programme was devised by drawing insights from UNDP’s experience of capacity development, including the UNDP-SACI methodology whose focus was on capacity transformation for effective service delivery. Key themes included changing the mindset by shifting from business-as-usual approach, to change management processes and organisational performance (e.g. transformational leadership, BPR, etc.), leadership and management skills through promotion of coordinated and integrated planning (e.g. national development planning), strengthen policy-management interface and new policy making (e.g. evidence-based policy-making).

Thus the problems and issues the programme sought to address in Namibia revolved around the above outlined issues. The whole spectrum of O/M/As mainly at national level in Namibia was targeted. There was limited capacity building activities at sub-national level. Given the constitutional role of the Prime Minister (PM) as the leader of government business in parliament, and responsible for leading, supporting and overseeing the efficient functioning of the public service (O/M/As), the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) played an important role in the UNDP-supported programme. While the OPM was the major driver, the OPM (ECU), led the transformational leadership component. The NPC led the component dealing with capacity development for national development planning and the CBS dealt with the component for strengthening the national statistical system. The programme components are elaborated below:

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1 UNDP SAC (2007): Capacity Transformation for Effective Service Delivery
2.3 Reduction of Human Poverty Programme

The programme consisted of the following interventions:

Component One

Support to the policy framework and institutional capacity development for national development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; focussing on:

- Support the development and implementation of the NDP 3; and
- Exploration of pro-poor economic and social policy options, through support to economic modelling exercises and Poverty and Social impact assessments.

Component Two

Transformational Leadership focussing on:

- Technical assistance to facilitate the transformation of the public service into an efficient, effective and equitable deliverer of public service;
- Institutional capacity development;
- Facilitate global benchmarking; and
- Support the development and implementation of monitoring and evaluation frameworks to track institutionalisation of results based management.

Component Three

Strengthen the national statistical system to ensure effective planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national development plans, by focussing on:

- Support national capacity initiatives for poverty monitoring and analysis;
- Technical assistance for NPCS. Support capacity development initiatives of the Central Bureau of Statistics;
- Development and utilisation of NamInfo; and
- Economic reviews for policy advocacy and implementation.
CHAPTER 3: EVALUATION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

3.1 Scope of the Project

As noted, the Reduction of Human Poverty Programme\(^2\) is based on the priorities of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2006-2013) and is an integral part of national priorities. It directly seeks to address the triple threats (i.e. HIV/AIDS, food insecurity and weakening service delivery capacities) by improving capacities at national, regional and local level. In carrying out the assessment, the month of April and May was used to collect data in O/M/As. All (except five) the 19 O/M/As which had identified functional/service areas for possible BPR (under the transformational leadership component) were visited. Officials from NPC and CBS (now NSA) provided information on component one and three, respectively. While the study was primarily conducted in Windhoek, a visit was undertaken to Kavango region to have discussions and observations with the Kavango Regional Council on the assistance received from CBS/NSA. Students from institutions of high learning were also consulted to get their views on the performance of Namibia Students Financial Assistance Fund (NSFAF). All components, aimed at the outcomes of the study (relevancy, impact, sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency) were assessed at all time.

3.2 Evaluation Objectives

The objectives of the assessment were (a) to assess to what extent the project has contributed to solve the needs and problems as identified in the National Statistical Plan III; (b) to assess project’s degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised; (c) to assess to what extent the project has attained the desired results to the targeted beneficiaries; and (d) to identify and document best practices and lessons learned on programmatic outputs and processes with the aim to support the sustainability of the project.

\(^2\) The specific objectives and details on the scope of the project are outlined in the Terms of Reference attached as Appendix 1.
3.3 Evaluation Criteria

As proposed in the proposal, the Consultants used the generic standard OECD DAC evaluation framework/criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. The evaluation framework diagrammatically presented in Figure 1:

**Figure 1 Evaluation Framework: Conceptual and Analytical Framework**

The rationale behind this evaluation was to give a trustworthy and credible account of the progress and impact of the programme. The Consultants were to account for **what has worked, what has not, and what lessons has been learnt**, and then asks the question: “what do the results tell us?” From these results, the Consultants were to make recommendations for future direction by:

- Assess to what extent the project has contributed to solve the needs and problems as identified in the National Statistical Plan III;
✓ Assess project’s degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised;
✓ Assess to what extent the project has attained the desired results; and
✓ Identify and document best practices and lessons learned on programmatic outputs and processes with the aim to support the sustainability of the project

3.4 Evaluation Questions

Detailed questions for each of the three components of the programme are depicted in Appendices 2 – 4.
CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODS

4.1 Introduction

The selected methodology was based on the purpose of the evaluation. Thus the approach used sought to analyse the programme intervention logic (log frame). The log frame was used as an important element for the results-based management of the programme (i.e. by moving from input [budget-driven] to output [results-oriented], benchmarking operations, performance analysis, etc.). In other words, the thrust was to assess the programme design, implementation and tangible results the programme delivered (i.e. development outcomes). The inquiry sought to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability- including the extent to which efforts was made efforts towards enhancing partnership, coordination, cross-cutting issues in development and national ownership of the programme.

In short, the theory of change was used. Theory of change describes the road map…from one point to the next; the types of interventions (programmes) needed to achieve certain outcomes or a long-term goal. It explains the assumptions that were made by stakeholders to describe the change process…e.g.’ was the capacity-gap analysis accurate?’ It formulates actions needed to achieve the stated goal. It identifies measurable indicators of success. It defines all the building blocks (outcomes, results, accomplishments) required to achieve a given long-term goal- and in this case, reduction of human poverty in Namibia. The theory asks: “what happened” and “how and why it happened”, so that each outcome is evaluated in terms of how well it was met and what processes were in place that brought it about. To do this, a number of methodological approaches were deployed to facilitate triangulation and verification of information. The focus was on use of qualitative methods. The techniques included: desk research and a review of existing reports and secondary data; policy and situation analysis; face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The overriding objective was to elicit stakeholders’ views and opinions, which invariably often includes perceptions.

Evidence was gathered at three levels:

- Key institutions (Offices/Ministries/Agencies of the GRN) and individuals at the policy level;
✓ Institutions (Regional Councils) and individuals at sub-national/Regional level; and
✓ Students (beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries of NSFAF).

As indicated above the sample was drawn from the O/M/As that benefitted or received assistance as part of UNDAF programme. See the list of respondents on Appendix 5.

4.2 Data collection methodologies

✓ Systematic desk review of documents:

A comprehensive documentary review was undertaken. This included project documents, progress reports, existing independent evaluations, etc. Refer to Appendix -2- for more information.

✓ Stakeholder mapping/analysis and engagement

This was done to identify the persons, groups or institutions connected to the project design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes. See below
Table 1 Implementing agencies, stakeholders and partners consulted

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<tr>
<th>Government Ministries</th>
<th>UN Agencies</th>
<th>Other Partners/Stakeholders</th>
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<tr>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Polytechnic of Namibia</td>
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<td>Ministry of Education (MoE)</td>
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<td>NIPAM</td>
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<td>Ministry of Finance (MoF)</td>
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<td>Students from higher institutions of education (Polytechnic, UNAM and Triumphant College)</td>
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<td>Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration (MHAI)</td>
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✔ Data Collection Procedures and Instruments

A semi-structured interview guide (Appendices 2 - 4.) was used to guide interviews. Cooper and Schindler (2010) opine that semi-structured interviews allow informants the freedom to express their views in their own terms and can provide reliable, comparable qualitative data. The purpose of this evaluation was to elicit rich data on relevancy, impact, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the UNDAF programme, hence was the semi-structure interview deemed suitable as a data collection instrument.

↔ In-depth key informant interviews:

Interviews/consultations were done with UNDP officials, national, and regional level personnel such as Undersecretaries, directors and deputy directors.
The key informants were purposively selected sample based on their relative understanding and knowledge of the project, performance/progress reports of their O/M/As. Triangulation of information from different sources was also employed as a means for validation of information.

↔ **Semi-Structured interviews**

Semi-structured interviews with key informants were also carried out at various levels including, UNDP, O/M/As at national and regional level and other relevant stakeholders. This was done to elicit detailed insights and understanding of the project, progress, challenges/problems and prospects for the future.

↔ **Focus group discussion**

This was done with the MME officials. The Ministry had done well in the BPR and the approach was used to have a shared view on approaches they used to re-engineer their services successfully.

↔ **Case study**

The case study highlights challenges encountered by Triumphant College student as she tries to access NSFAF. The case study seeks to demonstrate that while immense progress has been made in trying to enhance efficiency of the NSFAF, challenges remain.

↔ **On-site/field visits to regional councils**

This was done with one Regional Council Official. The intention was to draw some useful insights at sub-national level and Kavango regions was visited.

✓ **Ethical Consideration**

Ethical considerations guided by voluntary participation, informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity and the fact that no potential for harm, whether emotional or physical is inflicted on the respondents.
4.3 Data management and analysis

The data collected was of a qualitative nature and this was be drawn from both secondary and empirical sources. The collation and analysis of the data was organized in a tabular form (drawn from appendices 2-4 which deals with guiding questions for the evaluation). Thus the analysis of the data was aimed at understanding the processes, outcomes and impact (What happened, how and why it happened), making conclusions, identifying best practices, drawing lessons and offering recommendations.

4.4 Review limitations

The evaluation process was mainly affected by three factors:

✓ Making appointments with O/M/As was sometimes an immense challenge. Letter of introduction sent out to O/M/As by UNDP and OPM ameliorated the situation;

✓ Documentation (project document, periodic progress reports especially on the BRP) on Component Two of the programme (Transformational leadership) was well organized to be able to track progress. However, information was scant for Component One (Support to the policy framework and institutional capacity development on national development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation ) and Component Three (Strengthen the national statistical system to ensure effective planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national development plans); and

✓ Qualitative data collection method has its inherent weaknesses, such as inability to test and validate already constructed theories about how and why phenomena occur, inability to collect sizable data and generalize findings and time consuming data analysis. Since these are inherent weaknesses of the selected methodology and the fact that qualitative data collection was the most suitable method, the Consultant had to work around these weaknesses.
CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION FINDINGS

5.1 Conceptual considerations

The findings of this evaluation have to be understood within the framework of UNDP’s Southern Africa Capacity Building Initiative (SACI) and its notion of capacity development. The SACI methodology and tools were customized and applied to the Namibian context (guided by the need to reduce human poverty), and by definition, capacity development is defined as: “…an endogenous course of action that builds on the existing capacities and assets, and the ability of people, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems…and achieve objectives”3

The question is: is there evidence that the transformational leadership, support to the national development planning process, and support to the development of national statistical system transformed the GRN’s capacity to effectively and effectively deliver public services?

5.1.1 Specific findings

5.1.1.1 Programme performance

Under programme performance, the consultants looked at relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability

Relevance (defined as he extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donor’s policies.

Drawing insights from, and customising the UNDP’s SACI work in the region, the programme was a response to the GRN’s request for development support. The rationale and context of the programme was therefore premised on the need to deal with interlocking challenges of poverty, vulnerability to flood and drought hazards, capacity erosion triggered by HIV/AIDS, underdeveloped human resource skills and capacities/low human resources

capacity, and lack of effective policy environment, instruments and systems promoting public sector performance. As is often the case, the outlined factors reinforce and feed on one another in a way that disables a country’s sustainable development efforts. They militate against effective and efficient service delivery. It was clear that they would not enhance a robust service delivery model for the country and thus, they posed a threat to national development priorities (NDPs), achievement of MDGs and Namibia’s Vision 2030.

For instance, Vision 2030 specifically highlights the need to prioritise tackling inequalities, enhancement of social protection and welfare of the vulnerable populations, human resources development, knowledge, information and technology and institutional capacity building. One of its objectives is to “Develop a…competent and highly productive human resources and institutions…achieving efficient and effective delivery of customer-focused services which are competitive…internationally”\(^5\). This objective is particularly consistent with MDGs, e.g. MDG 1 (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), e.g. through efficiency in providing services to vulnerable children; UNDAF Outcome 1: Strengthening the capacity of government and civil society institutions to deliver and monitor essential health, education and special protection services; NDP 3 also identifies specific directions and targets focusing on eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, affordable and quality health care; equality in income distribution; among others. It is evident that Namibia’s national development goals (NDP), the MDGs and the support given by UNDAF are aligned to address poverty and other social ills.

Therefore, a closer examination of components of this programme reveals its robust relevance to the Namibian context. The transformational leadership training component sought to instil ‘new ways of thinking’ and strengthen policy-management interface in that it targeted Ministers/Deputy Ministers of Government, permanent Secretaries/Accounting Officers within O/M/As. The training sought to ensure that leadership adopt a systems approach in the identification of problems, enhance their capacity to identify quick wins when exploring solutions, that they benchmark their business processes and performance to best practices internationally, that they should utilise available capacity and be continuous be engaged in a learning process. The expected outcome centred on enhanced service delivery. Through a business process re-engineering (stream lining processes, people, systems and

\(^5\) Vision 2030:41
procedures, identifying bottlenecks, etc.) services would also be enhanced (through improvement in quality, acceptability, accessibility, availability). It also involved tackling gaps through training, deployment of UNVs to meet urgent capacity gaps, utilisation of new ICT, etc. The support to the development and implementation of NDP3 and crafting of pro-poor economic and social policy options component sought to feed into pertinent short, medium and long-term development planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation agenda provided by Vision 2030. Vision 2030 was launched during NDP 2, and NDP 3 was designed to technically link with this vision through improved coordination of efforts, services and activities across government and development partners, establish in-built Integrated Results-based Management (IRBM) approach covering a robust M &E system at all levels of O/M/As and regions, foster programme-budgeting approach, information management system, ICT and linking performance management system with organizational goals. Finally, the component dealing with strengthening the national statistical system was a realisation that successful national development policies rests with evidence-based decision-making and this included the need to revitalise the statistical services, and improving their capacity to carry out national-level, sub-national/regional level work, including more focused surveys.

In view of the afore-mentioned, it is our view that the rationale and context of the projects executed under the Reduction of Human Poverty Programme was well thought out.

Effectiveness (denotes actual achievement of objectives or factors and processes affecting achievement of objectives)

Led and supported by the OPM (ECU), the Business Process Re-Engineering (BPR) as an integral part of the SACI methodology was a critical element of the transformational leadership component. The BPR was the cog for streamlining processes within certain identified functional (service) areas in O/M/As. The criteria for selecting or identifying service areas for BPR was based on changing rules, procedures, structure and budget in O/M/As. Piloted in 5 ministries [Quick Wins], the process was then rolled out through-out the public service after training of officials on the SACI methodology- including training of trainers. A wide range of problems ranging from lack of commitment, lack of buy-in and lack of support particularly from some PSs who should have led and closely supervised the process effectively. The PSs even acknowledged this weakness during a session on BPR in
Consequently the results have been very modest. It is only after a Cabinet retreat in early 2013 that some momentum is now gathering pace. Since 2007, the following has been the progress:

- Of the 5 Pilot Ministries, 4 were endorsed for implementation;
- 59 service areas were identified and 51 selected for BPR;
- Only 8 had been endorsed for implementation by the Management Committee of Senior Civil Servants by 2011;
- 146 staff trained on BPR;
- 19 trained as Master Trainers (core group in the O/M/As); and
- OPM: Job evaluation/grading system.

Although a number of weak points were identified (e.g. absence of baselines, indicators and targets) in NDP 3, the integration of monitoring systems from the onset (of a plan’s formulation) meant that accountability of individuals and institutions (at all levels from the national, sector, sub-sector, ministries, regions and departments, to other lower level entities) for specific results are established in a more systematic and structured manner. Officials from the NPC stressed that with UNDP support, officials in O/M/As (focal persons) were introduced to both M & E in general and also how the specific NDP 3 M & E system worked. In addition, because of lessons drawn from NDP 3, e.g. components of IRBM system are now fully embedded in NDP 4.

Supporting the national statistical system - through expanding CBS to the regions enhanced data collection and analysis for regional planning. This was done through the deployment of GIS/Statistician (although in some regions high staff turnover often affected their performance). Today, Regional Development Planners/Development planners (e.g. in Kavango Region) are now able to interpretation of data, e.g. IMR, labour force rates, etc. From CBS’s expansion to the regions, it is clear that the success of development policies/poverty reduction efforts in achieving their aims will be improved by the use of statistics. Revitalising statistical services, and improving their capacity to carry out national-level, macro-census type work, as well as smaller, more focused surveys as experienced in Kavango, is vital.
**Efficiency** (defined as programme progress compared to plans)

This evaluation did not attempt a cost-benefit analysis to establish whether or not the project had ‘value-for-money’. What the Consultants did was a subjective analysis aimed at determining whether the desired results had been attained. Using this line of reasoning, for the O/M/As who have implemented BPR, shortened processes and greater customer satisfaction has ensued. The successful implementation of BPR in the MGECW is a case in point. However, to achieve Vision 2030 and NDP4 objectives, including reducing human poverty- Namibia needs to tackle some of the factors which make it less competitive such as inefficient government bureaucracy. In this connection, the BPR efforts need to be redoubled.

5.2 What was done: Attainment of project outputs?

In some areas, the project has been able to attain some outputs as captured in Appendix 3.

**Impact** (to the consultants’ understanding, this refers to what has happened as a result of the programme. What difference has been made, if any? How many people have been affected, etc.)?

In our evidence gathering with O/M/As, a number of strides were made by the programme in terms of changing the national development planning, implementation, changing the mindsets of decision-makers and improvement of workflows within O/M/As with the view to enhance efficiency and effectiveness was however limited. The strengthening of the CBS, culminating in the establishment of the NSA, was considered by officials “as part of long-term efforts dating back to the 1990s when a number of European partners (e.g. agencies such as SIDA) helped in the setting up of the CBS”. The following are the key areas highlighted:

5.2.1 Support to the policy framework and institutional capacity development for national development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation

This has been successful in that the intervention has been relevant, efficient, and effective and that the impact has been trickled down to the ultimate beneficiaries in that NDP 3 (and subsequently NDP 4) have addressed and influenced policies and programmes that are aimed poverty reduction. The lessons learnt and best practices from NDP 3 have been
incorporated into NDP 4 and subsequent programmes, hence, it can be concluded that the outcomes of this intervention can be sustainably employed. The following are the highlights of themes and issues introduced during the crafting of NDP 3:

- NPC received assistance in drafting NDP 3 and a foreign consultant was hired to fill in institutional capacity gaps and help in the formulation and conclusion of the report;
- The conceptualisation and planning of NDP 3 (use of IRBM) was designed to be more focused and result-oriented, cross-cutting issues were also able to be captured by different sectors in a coordinated manner, the process was found to be consultative (allowing everyone from different sectors to give inputs towards achievement of common outcome/result);
- In addition, an effective M & E system to monitor performance of NDPs was introduced and this was backed by trained personnel in M &E;
- The M & E system also allowed for tracking progress during implementation of projects and programmes. If targets were at risk of not being met, the system was able to identify the O/M/As not performing (i.e. within the same thematic area/group- in the process, accountability and objectivity on reporting was also ensured;
- However, the designed M & E system described above was not 100% operational during NDP 3. For example, sectors took long to submit their reports to Thematic Working Groups (TWG) and coordinating institutions also taking long to submit collated TWG reports to NPC- all indicative of lack of commitment/dedicated NDP 3 personnel in O/M/As. The system is now fully established under NDP 4. It is important to note that the development of NDP 4 was an-in house issue/NPC/GRN, without outside experts and donor/NDP support, etc. This was made possible, thanks, partly due to lessons drawn from the NDP3 process (especially NDP 3 mid-term review report). As part of strategies and actions to realise NDP 4 outcomes- emphasis on few goals (others have however argued that the few goals are a summarised version of the goals under NDP 3), sectoral plans (drawn from Thematic Areas in IRBM approach used in NDP 3, and referred to as Annual Execution Sectoral Plans in NDP 4), “a dedicated persons/units committed to M&E at all levels of government,” accountability of individuals, O/M/As during plan, synchronized data collection and analysis capacity that will provide adequate information to ensure that accurate data is provided during planning process. All these measures draw from NDP 3 experiences;
✓ The production of income and expenditure survey reports, poverty deprivation index reports, etc. all helped in presenting a strong case for pro-poor budget and policies of government from 2011;

✓ The poverty assessment reports in all regions, not only defined poverty from an income side but it went further (through participatory approaches) – by directly asking the people how they define poverty. Equally important the people were asked how they can contribute to finding solutions/solution development;

✓ An Action Plan/Programme was not able to be developed from these Poverty Assessment Reports. Nonetheless, the reports did inform NDP 3; and

✓ Support on poverty analysis resulted in some major policy changes, e.g. reduction of the tax and Vat threshold as a contribution towards reducing inequality and poverty.

5.2.2 Transformational leadership

Modest achievements were made, particularly in the BPR, a major plank of the transformational leadership component.

Hammer and Champy (1993) view reengineering as the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance such as cost, quality, service and speed. BPR is said to improve organisational performance by assuring a higher quality product at lower cost, larger added value and faster response time; elevate efficiencies and gain a competitive advantage in this everlastingly developing and changing world (Goksoy, Ozsoy and Vayvay, 2012).

However, for the O/M/As that have implemented BPR, there was impact. Please refer to Appendices 3.1 for more details. However, the following are some of the show-case services which have been successfully re-engineered:

✓ MGECW- Grants to women projects- the management of these grants have immensely improved as reflected by the increase in number of beneficiaries, particularly the OVC;

✓ MTI- Company registration is now much faster and efficient; and

✓ MME- processing of mining licences and claims has been cleared.
This component of the transformational leadership programme has been riddled by a number of challenges. It is instructive to highlight some of them considering that the BPR is the cog of the transformational leadership component:

- Limited buy-in and ownership in O/M/A especially by top management leading to slow progress in streamlining processes and procedures in the identified areas. BPR considered as added responsibility (without remuneration) and staff is not fully committed. Many O/M/As jolted into action only when a memo from the Cabinet secretary is sent out seeking progress reports;
- Resistance to change (inadequate commitment to change by PSs). They should play an active role in BPR within their O/M/As by chairing;
- Slow progress in writing BPR reports, late clearing of reports submitted for consideration, lack of implementation of endorsed recommendations for the BPR, all reflecting limited commitment by the PSs. This has resulted in discontentment among staff;
- Lack of dedicated senior staff serving on O/M/As BPR committees (with junior staff sometimes asked to lead the process);
- Perceptions are still high that corruption and patronage politics permeates the entire O/M/As leading to unsuitable appointments and skewing of public resource expenditure. “In the absence of meritocracy and delays in making key appointments across the board, BPR, although an excellent policy initiative- it is bound to hit a brick wall because it seeks to unravel certain malpractices. For this reason, noble ideals such as accountability, transparency and ‘new ways of doing business’ become utopia”, opined one senior official;
- Difficulty in common understanding, interpretation of SACI methodologies, including BPR. “…the terminology used (e.g. re-engineering) is scaring some people, including some PSs”, suspects one senior official;
- Staff not dealing with identified functional area is sent to BPR training workshops;
- Changes in legislation (e.g. Public Service Act) and policy sometimes required, e.g. OPM- need to change staff rules so as to bring them in line with BPR, e.g. if one is promoted, assumption of duty should be within 1 month (in line with BPR), not 2 months (current rules); and
- Lack of a performance-oriented culture within O/M/As.
5.2.3 Strengthening the national statistical system to ensure effective planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national development plans

This could be regarded as a success in a number of ways. Regular, timely and well-defined statistics that are guiding evidenced-based planning and helps identify vulnerable areas and people for targeting. Regions have also been empowered to generate own statistics for planning and other purposes. The following are the positive impact of the intervention:

✓ CBS established regional structures (though with contract staff, i.e. GIS officer and Statistician) to support regional councils and other sub-national structures. By expanding to the regions since 2007, CBS registered its presence and relevance as an institution, and illuminated the relevance of data for planning purposes at sub-national level. These positive attributes will be transferred/shift to the successor institution (NSA);

✓ Statistical personnel established at regional level are able to conduct surveys/studies which serve as tools for highlighting the case for supporting and targeting the poor in resource allocation by Regional Councils, e.g. Kavango. With the technical/statistical support, Kavango Regional Council was able to conduct poverty map the entire region and also supported other institutions (O/M/As) with statistical needs. For instance, they assisted the OPM (emergency unit) during flooding by identifying areas for putting up camps and food distribution centres. Many private individuals and commercial entities have also approached them for assistance. KRC was also able to conduct its own customer satisfaction survey, which provided guidelines on customer needs, areas which needed improvement for service delivery, etc. Given their importance, some of the staff ended up being hired by Regional Councils;

✓ Training on sampling methodology, data analysis and dissemination under NamInfo;

✓ While the poverty reports produced by the CBS were mandatory, the support provided meant that the production of these reports was timeous;

✓ Gains from the capacity building activities supporting CBS has resulted in the generation of data and indicators of development, e.g. IMR;

✓ NamInfo data base it is for dissemination of data. Although good, it is not user-friendly. For this reason, critics have not seen much value in its utility. Although the data-base is quite informative in a number of areas, it is weak on updating and dissemination. NamInfo needed to do more than just relying on CDs, etc. For instance, at constituency and regional level, the CDs do not work simply because of
computer application problems. Training on NamInfo is still needed as only one person under the former CBS knows how to operate it. Considering that NamInfo is modelled along DevInfo, an UN-endorsed database system for monitoring human development, NamInfo needs to improve on how it organizes, stores and presents data. By correcting these weaknesses, it is anticipated that NSA will, among other issues, accelerate the process of putting this data on web-site, for ease of access; and

- UNDP-support to the CBS built up on and complemented other previous donor initiatives, e.g. SIDA’s support towards the establishment of CBS in the 1990s. To NSA officials (formerly with CBS), establishment of NSA, and subsequent absorption of CBS into this new institution (NSA) meant that gains made were transferred to NSA. Consequently, NSA has emerged as a more autonomous entity, thanks to the preceding capacity building interventions under CBS. This status as an autonomous, lead and custodian of national statistics is in line with the UN Goal that countries should have independent and autonomous statistical agencies by 2015.

The progress itemized above reflects efforts to support evidence-based decision-making (through statistics/data). The role of statistics in formulation of economic and social development policies, their implementation strategies and monitoring and evaluation was, through the above stated interventions, were successfully illuminated. The establishment of NSA in 2011 shows that the GRN recognizes the importance of high quality and timely statistics for evidence-based planning and decision-making, as the nation moves towards Vision 2030.

**Sustainability** (This relates to the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. To what extent will activities, results and effects be expected to continue after UNDP intervention has ended?

The impact of the programme highlighted above has, in some way, shown the potential for sustainability of the three components of the programme.

On the transformational leadership component, questions remain. For instance, the sustainability of BPR seems to hinge on changes in people’s attitudes and practices. It is accepted that this takes time. There are positive signals though. For instance, since 2013, embedding BPR in strategic and annual plans of O/M/As has been made a requirement.
Given its mandate which is to strengthen the public sector, NIPAM will play a central role in the development of human resources in O/M/As through tailor-made training, including BPR. OPM (ECU) is also a co-facilitator at NIPAM. It is our understanding that NIPAM was borne out a Cabinet resolution in 2000. However, the UNDP-supported SACI methodology introduced in 2004/5 probably gave impetus to the establishment of the institution. A UNDP official driving the SACI in Namibia ended up heading NIPAM in 2011. An official in the OPM (ECU) who used to be one of the major drivers of the BPR also joined NIPAM in 2012. These developments enhances the embedding of ideas and practices promoted by the BPR, for instances. It is promising to note that in 2012, NIPAM trained 73 officials on BPR, 10 of which were from a private company. While NIPAM might be correctly positioned to support GRN initiatives through training and development, the commitment of staff to be trained at NIPAM and the willingness and attitudes towards local training as opposed to training outside Namibia need to be further investigated.

The evidence of sustainability of support given to the national planning process seems to be found in the process of formulating and quality of NDP 4. There is consensus in O/M/As that NDP 4 is a huge improvement from NDP3. Significantly, capacity to develop NDPs without external assistance (e.g. NDP4) is good progress. This, in our view, is evidence of sustainability. There are pointers of sustainability.

5.3 Best practices

These are either positive or negative experiences, knowledge or understanding obtained during the implementation of a development intervention or initiative. A simple test used is that the experiences, knowledge or understanding should be:

- Significant (have a direct impact on development);
- Valid (being factual and technically correct); and
- Applicable (identify specific designs or decisions that reduce the potential of failure or reinforce positive actions).

Drawing from the above guidelines, it is our considered view that the framework behind the SACI/BPR was premised on the need to getting the foundations right- particularly how the institutions (O/M/As) could re-engineer themselves for effective implementation of pro-poor programmes and general service delivery. The approach used in the transformational
leadership component involved targeting first, Ministers of Government and their Permanent Secretaries during 2005/6, second, in 2007 piloting it in 5 ministries, with the BPR being the over-arching pillar of the programme. Strategically led and supported by the OPM (ECU), in 2008 it was then rolled out to the entire O/M/As (with a core-group of trained trainers supposedly leading the process in their respective O/M/As). In our view, the desired outcomes could not be satisfactorily achieved, not because the technique and processes adopted were faulty. The approach was well thought out, practical and workable, but there were other problems already explained elsewhere in this report.

The training themes and terms used under transformational leadership such as enhancement of ‘soft skills’, ‘working silos’, ‘systems approach’, are all crucial in the transformation of bureaucracies. They are less technocratic and designed to equip and develop ‘soft skills’ so as to be able to tackle challenges related to service delivery.

The few O/M/As which did well in BPR constantly explored options for service delivery in the context of decentralization, use of ICT, etc. to enhance service delivery (e.g. internet, cutting red tape, e.g. MoJ on Legal Aid, MGECW on grants to OVCs, NSFAF on access to public information.

Having drawn insights from the BPR, some O/M/As decided to engage consultants to streamline their operations in certain areas (e.g. Ministry of Justice on magistry and Ministry of Education on recovery of loans under the NSFAF, and MoF on Tender Board). This complemented efforts of the OPM (ECU).

After successfully driving the BPR under MGECW, the PS was transferred to the MRLGHRD where she plans to cascade the SACI methodology at regional level. To date 42 staffs have been identified for training in BPR. This is an indication that the process which worked at the previous Ministry was deemed as a good practice that can be transferred to another Ministry.

At the PS/Senior Management meeting held in early 2013, a decision was made that BPR has been included in the performance agreements of PSs. This is logical given the importance of BPR in enhancing service delivery of O/M/As. It also ensures that the PSs who were not very
much engaged in the process are jolted into action. As evidence, most O/M/As who had outstanding reports are now at various stages of preparation and implementation.

**Table 2: Example of good practice: MME’s BPR experience**

| As part of strategy to tackle the back-log with the processing of 420 Exclusive Processing Licences (EPLs), the MME first convened a workshop for all stakeholders in the mining industry as part of consensus building and diagnosis of the problem. Thereafter, it designed interventions, of which BPR was a critical component. The process also involved active participation of the PS and the management team- with on-the-spot support from the OPM (ECU), including inputs from the stakeholders in the industry. It also involved abolishing of certain posts, upward revision of mining licence fees which were ridiculously low, engagement of temporary employees (UNAM students) in processing the applications, etc. Less focus was given to issues which were of a statutory nature, e.g. a mining claimant needs to have an Environmental Impact Assessment report first- thus not much can be done to process the application until this report is ready. The MME convenes meetings with mining industry stakeholders every other year. More significant, the process was driven by the Directorate from the Mining Development Division and yet the back-log problem fell under the Mineral Rights Division. Thus the issue was more about understanding the process, and not so much about which Directorate was responsible. Thus a mixture of commitment and support from the PS, management and OPM (ECU), management ingenuity and creativity (e.g. abolishing certain posts and revising of the costs of providing a particular service (e.g. mining licence application fee) and constant communication with stakeholders, and an understanding of the BPR concept- all offered a template of good practice. A new PS who arrived in 2012 was given orientation by management and the performance of the ministry in relation to the BPR did not decline (sustainability).

The NPC did not have adequate M&E with NDP 3; hence introduction of performance planning principle, i.e. Integrated Results Based Management (IRBM) approach under the later NDPs is considered an effective technique or method for delivering particular outcomes. It ensures systematic performance tracking and reporting in order to improve accountability for results by the responsible individuals and O/M/As.

As far back as 2005, the NPC had collaborated with the MRLGHRD in establishing the Directorates of Planning at Regional Councils. As the CBS decentralized to the regions few years later, the rationale was that the GIS officer and Statistician would work under and support these Directorates of Planning. In our view it was a good practice to build on institutions established earlier. The importance of statistics for regional development planning was recognized, but in our view, it was good practice to build on institutions
established earlier. The set-up promoted evidence-based decision-making at Regional Councils, and linking the GIS/Statistician with the Directorate of Planning at Regional Councils was a good decision.

5.4 Lessons learnt

These are developmental and social issues related to the project. They are techniques, methods, processes, activities that are more effective at delivering a particular outcome than others. To qualify as good practice, they should be more effective and lead to the desired outcomes with fewer problems or complications. In short GP are the most effective ways of accomplishing tasks based on procedures that have proven to be workable, practical, verifiable and repeatable.

- MGECW- Firstly the Ministry’s directorates (in particular the Directorate of Child Welfare) understood the BPR concept. It was of value to the performance of their work. They also had a shared passion for the BPR since the first BPR training in 2008. The drivers of the programme were pro-active in seeking support of the OPM (ECU) - hence effective (through coverage and impact) in the administration of OVC grants and grants for income generating activities. The deployment of an M&E expert to the Directorate also strengthened its capacity. With strong motivation to improve further, the MGECW continues to fine tune the process, e.g. piloting a decentralized system of disbursing these grants with Khomas regional council. Also exploring ways of improving disbursement of special maintenance grants to disabled children. Discussions are also underway to see how medical doctors can quickly expedite the certification of under 16 year old disabled children;

- With experience, the CBS learnt the value of producing timely data/statistics to the decision-making process. For example, the Review of Poverty and Inequality in Namibia based on the expenditure data from the 2003/04 NHIES was produced by the CBS in 2008. While useful, the data was no longer up to date, however, subsequent surveys are also benefiting from this experience;

- As CBS went regional, perhaps a clear MoU with Regional Councils would have helped in order to deal with personalities who work in ‘silos’, etc. For instance, and unlike Kavango Regional Council, in some regions some CBS staff (GIS/Statistician)
was not integrated well and were considered ‘outsiders’. Thus their technical expertise was often not maximized;

✓ Perhaps UNDP/GRN agreeing on detailed key performance areas and deliverables (in terms of quantity, quality and time) can be helpful in enforcing performance and execution within aforementioned constraints;

✓ Success of programmes of this nature are contingent on the involvement and support of decision makers and strong leadership (examples are the O/M/As who have successfully implemented the BPR and are now enjoying the fruits);

✓ BPR is has so much potential in addressing many facets of O/M/As performance, however, the lack of appreciation results in it being used for rudimentary function, i.e. identification of bottlenecks. This approach results in one-sided approach to solving bottlenecks, without considering the ripple effect this has on other areas of operations. An integrated approach works best;

✓ The interdependencies within and with other O/M/As is something that cannot be taken lightly if these interventions are to succeed. As a point in case, the Tender Board relies on Ministries for the timely advertising, adjudication and awarding of tenders.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusions

Building on accumulation of evidence over the years, the UNDP and other organisations, such as the World Bank has argued that poverty reduction depends on improvements in the quality and accessibility to poor people. Given this background, there is no doubt that this intervention to reduce human poverty in Namibia has been relevant. The programme supported the strengthening of institutions to address development issues and reduce poverty. The intervention also supported O/M/As to enhance their performances by identifying and eliminating bottlenecks and related impediments through the BPR. The lessons learnt and the practices adopted and adapted from the drafting of NDP 3 have been gainfully employed in the drafting of NDP 4. The latter document, which is an outflow of NDP 3 (supported by UNDAF intervention), is considered to be targeting areas that are aimed at eradicating poverty. NDP 4 is succinct and is aligning the developmental objectives of the Government and it emphasises the coordination, monitoring and evaluation role of NPC to ensure that projects are implemented. The relationship between the MoF (as the entity responsible for the Budget) and NPC (as the entity responsible for national planning) has been enhanced. In view of these developments, the assistance given to NPC in the drafting of NDP 3 can be considered to be relevant, effective, and efficient and had a meaningful impact on the intended stakeholders. Although, NDP 3 has been succeeded by NDP 4, the lessons learnt and the valuable practices carried over, will ensure sustainability of the gains made.

The fact that NSA (successor to CBS) has plans to maintain the presence of statisticians at regional level, albeit in a reduced format and less the GIS expert due to budgetary constraints, is an indication that such services are in demand. Kavango Regional Council is even considering creating these positions (or at least that of the GIS expert) on its structure (funds permitting). This stems from the appreciation of the value created by these positions in the region; not only for the regional council, but the entire region. Considering the benefits accrued from this intervention, it can be argued that it was relevant, effective, efficient, and impactful and will be sustainable.
In spite of the challenges experienced with the transformational leadership intervention, we can conclude that the idea was well conceived and that some parts of the implementation are commendable. However, this intervention suffers from the lack of leadership (create an aspirational vision, get buy-in and organisation wide-involvement, provide ongoing support to the process, create enabling environment, ensure integration within O/M/A and with other O/M/As, etc.), parochial view of BPR and its abilities (i.e. what BPR can do beyond process mapping), lack of project management, no budgetary provision and the lack of enforcing deadlines. Some O/M/As made progress and has implemented processes that are not reliant on structural or legislative changes, however, these are minimal and mostly impact on the administrative processes of the O/M/As. In addition to the abovementioned shortcomings, structural and legislative changes need to be effected to ensure that the outcomes of the intervention impacts broader stakeholders to address issues that have a direct bearing on poverty reduction. It is encouraging to note that some longstanding enablers, such as Government jobs evaluation and regrading process has been completed and implemented effective 1 April 2013. Subsequent to this, the performance management system will now hopefully find traction and it will be advisable that the performance management system be considered as an important key success factor in the attainment of the overall transformational leadership objective. These processes are fundamental to implementing new or redesigned processes. In view of the above, it can be concluded that the transformational leadership intervention has not been overall successful however, the intervention was relevant. The lack of success can be attributed to the fact that right things (effective) were not done hence the resources were inefficiently employed. Given the minimal success rate of the intervention, it has not made any meaningful impact on the objective of poverty reduction in Namibia. One can only talk of sustainability once a project or an intervention has been successfully implemented and this is not the case with this intervention. We have offered some recommendations on how this project can be streamlined and rescued.

6.2 Recommendations

The SACI-customised programme for Namibia was and is extremely relevant to the Namibian context. Strengthening institutions in the long-term and for this reason, it takes years to embed capabilities. It is recognized that capacity building of O/M/As into effective and efficient service delivery organisations is a complex and difficult process, both technically and politically. For instance, some interest may want to block change, e.g. stream-
lining processes such as tenders, etc. (World Bank, 2000). The key recommendations are as follows:

1. The programme has potential for making more gains from the way it was designed. However, there is need to enhance ownership during the planning phase. Instilling ‘new ways of thinking’ or ‘changing rules of the game’ require long-term high level commitment particularly of upper echelons of the GRN, in-depth knowledge and extensive support and assistance. Perhaps enhancing ownership through mobilization of key stakeholders for change at various levels (including, but not limited to OPM and PSs) in O/M/As during the design and implementation phases would help. It was good that the transformational leadership component targeted Ministers/PSs/Accounting officers, but extending this to middle management and other levels may have contributed to improved ownership, thereby guaranteeing success.

It was our observation that most of the key actors/drivers of the programme were Director/Deputy Director level. In fact, many Deputy Directors particularly felt they could have done more with the support of top management (PSs/Deputy PSs/Under Secretaries/Directors). During the planning process of this UNDP-supported programme (Transformational leadership) only the top management was involved. The challenge has been to cascade these ideas to middle management (the main drivers of the programme) and ensure that top management actively provide guidance and support during implementation. Literature from previous evaluations seems to highlight this aspect as a persistent problem in O/M/As. Finding the missing links is possibly a further discussion point for consideration by OPM/UNDP.

2. Enhance conceptual understanding of the programme. The link between different elements/activities of the Reducing Human Poverty Programme and the overall poverty reduction agenda were often missed. One official at the director level asked, “What has BPR got to do with poverty?” Often BPR was viewed as a stand-alone activity, separate from themes under transformational leadership training, such as promotion of a culture of accountability, ‘new ways of doing business’, etc. Thus from our interviews it was apparent that some officials could not see how these ‘soft
skills’ could discernibly improve development conditions, people’s lives or contribute towards the poverty reduction agenda. In view of this reality, it is necessary to package future programmes in such a way that from the onset, conceptual issues can be clearly linked to practical outcomes.

For others, it was even more difficult to see the connection with the other components of the programme (i.e. support to the development of NDP 3 and strengthening of the national statistical systems). This should not be surprising because programmes of this nature are about changing processes, attitudes, knowledge, etc. and for this reason it takes time to inculcate a new value system.

3. Equipping the lead agency (OPM-ECU) with more tools to execute BPR more effectively is needed. This should then be followed by the O/M/As. Hammer and Champy maintain that BPR had a wider significance than mere processes; it applies to all parts of an organisation and it has a lofty purpose. For BPR to be successful, it requires a) consistency between the organisation’s business strategy and vision, and a clear understanding of customer, market, industry, and competitive directions, b) a management commitment to implement fundamentally different ways of conducting business, c) a business case that is founded on proven analytical approaches, and d) a project team with the capacity to evolve from simply conceptualizing change to actually developing and implementing it (Farrell, 1994). Our investigation revealed that some of the aforementioned fundamentals were not in place, not wholly understood or were not consistently applied. There was no evidence that customer feedback was obtained prior to the implementation of the BPR and this raises the question on what the BPR outcomes are premised. As mentioned earlier, leadership or management involvement in the BPR process is haphazard or inconsistent to say the least. This creates a disconnect between project team staff and decision makers within the O/M/As; this prevails despite the fact that BPR is included as a key performance area in the performance evaluation of Permanent Secretaries. By design, BPR requires change in existing processes and designation of radically new ones and it is unavoidable that some certain factors make this change feasible. We refer to these as enablers and the following are perquisite to achieve the stated objectives (relevancy, impact, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability) of this intervention. It is critical
that in this work, the OPM (ECU) consider the following (Love and Gunasekaran, 1997):

- Role of Information communication technology (ICT) in BPR;
- Structural enablers;
- Cultural enablers;
- Human resources as enablers; and
- Business process and TQM.

4. Strengthen (enhanced analytical skills, incentives, functioning and monitoring powers, commitment and ownership of the programme) the institutions spearheading the capacity development agenda (i.e. OPM-ECU). From our discussions, the OPM (ECU) expressed difficulties in working with O/M/As, for example with the setting of targets, monitoring and providing feedback to the relevant PSs. The small size of the unit was also highlighted. In contrast the NPC system (IRBM) monitoring systems has an in-built mechanism for compliance and reporting. While the system started with some hitches under NDP 3, NPC officials attribute the good performance of NDP 4 to capacity of the system to make O/M/As accountable.

Thus the OPM (ECU)”s internal staff capacity needs to be strengthened through more powers for monitoring and quality assurance, recruitment, including training in tools to foster client (O/M/As) ownership and commitment. This unit previously resorted under of Office of the Cabinet Secretary (who had more clout with PSs, but is now reporting to the Office of the PS in OPM (who is on par with other PSs). However, they have access to the Cabinet Secretary when they require his intervention, but the fact that the office is no longer under this office can have perceptual issues, particularly for meeting BPR deadlines.

5. The current approach of working across the entire O/M/As and supported by a team of about 6 officials from the OPM (ECU) under the transformational leadership component seems unwieldy. The transformational leadership, particularly the BPR should continue, possibly in a phased approach, with limited coverage (few O/M/As at a time) and focusing of few selected service areas. The service areas for BPR have different levels of complexities. For instance, using the same BPR principles, we observed that another UN agency (WFP), in partnership with GRN/MoE identified
one service area which needed strengthening (Namibian School Feeding Programme, NSFP) which needed strengthening.

6. The following practical steps are recommended to catapult BPR into action and achieve the desired results:
   ✓ provision of leadership through the creation of an aspirational vision;
   ✓ getting buy-in and organisation wide-involvement, providing ongoing support to the process; create an enabling environment;
   ✓ ensure integration within affected O/M/A and with other O/M/As;
   ✓ enlarge the current parochial view of BPR and its abilities to an holistic view and look beyond the process mapping and solving of bottlenecks’ ability of BPR;
   ✓ use project management to implement BPR; and
   ✓ provide an enabling budget to acquire resources needed for implementation.

7. Appropriate sequencing of the activities may also be worthwhile considering, i.e. first transformational leadership training possibly up to grassroots level. Thereafter, BPR…to enhance capacity of individual, systems, organisation. The objective would be to build commitment first, even if bureaucratic capacity is low.

8. To deal with the problems highlighted above, the capacity building initiatives should also be dealt with in parallel with other programmes such as incentivizing O/M/As officials. The two are not exclusive because incentives (financial and non-financial) also contribute in shaping the actions of public officials (WB, 2000). It is for this reason that; for instance, the job evaluation exercise done by the GRN should not only be commended, but be constantly fine-tuned.

9. Introduction of a Performance Management System (PMS) across O/M/As should be a priority. In fact, the adoption of the IRBM for the formulation and implementation of NDP 3 had actually envisaged an Integrated Personnel Performance System (PPS)-meant to be integrated into the overall programme performance system. In this, an employee’s role and performance was to be linked, with the organizational programme performance (results) at all levels. This noble objective is yet to be realized in O/M/As although the entrenchment of a culture of performance management in the public sector is underscored in NDP 4. It is critical to note that, to
be effective, capacity building initiatives and incentivizing O/M/As officials should also be done in tandem with the introduction of a PMS, covering all grades and professional disciplines, possibly in a phased approach. An effective PMS promotes individual performance, development and positive O/M/As outcomes (i.e. efficient and effective delivery of services).

10. To ensure the success and value for money from any e-governance initiative, BPR is a pre-requisite. This is because BPR defines or allows for stream-lining of systems and procedures- it defines business process flow before IT/computerisation/or automation.

11. The support to the development of NDP 3 covered a wide range of critical social and economic thematic areas. However, while it is accepted that NDP 3 had many goals (21), there are concerns that while NDP 4 identified three overarching goals (as noted earlier, others argue that effectively these are summarised versions of the 21 goals under NDP 3), it gave strong prominence to economic issues and in the process thematic social and cross-cutting issues in NDP 3 (e.g. HIV/AIDS, gender, rural development, sanitation, disaster preparedness, environmental sustainability, etc.) were either lost, absent or given less emphasis. Lack of evidence of citizens’ participation in its formulation (NDP 4) has also been raised. It is recommended that remedial action be considered in order to address these gaps or concerns raised in the approach/process used in NDP 4. For example, platforms such as NDP 4 periodic reviews or future UNDP-support programmes such as the proposed UNPAF may offer this opportunity. That UNDP is an important development partner for Namibia and it must continuously engage important stakeholders on developmental issues and the role it can play.

12. The support to the development of NDP3 and strengthening the national statistical system also resulted in strengthened institutional capacity in other areas such as development planning and evidence-based decision making. There is now a huge body of knowledge and evidence on poverty, its multi-dimensional definition and its spatial distribution across regions in the country. Based on the evidence from poverty assessment reports, etc. Poverty Action Plan/Programme targeting the regions is recommended. It is accepted that evidence from a wide range of poverty reports did filter into and inform the formulation of pro-poor budgets, for instance. Nonetheless, supporting and drawing poverty alleviation strategies, programmes and activities
based on evidence/data/information generated directly (e.g. poverty assessment reports) at sub-national level/regional/community level would be helpful. This approach may also address issues raised in recommendation 10, above.

13. It is our understanding that NamInfo is modelled along DevInfo, a database developed under the auspices of the UN. “DevInfo is a tool for organizing, storing and presenting data in a uniform way to facilitate data sharing at the country level across government departments, UN agencies and development partners…it has features that produce tables, graphs and maps for inclusion in reports, presentations and advocacy materials”. In its current form, NamInfo is handicapped and it is recommended that it enhances its capacity to organize and store up-to-date, time series data covering a wide range of social development indicators in Namibia. This data should also be easily accessible on-line to all end-users interested in the Namibian development agenda. Once NamInfo is operational, it is important that its availability is announced to the potential users (as an unknown system will not be of benefit to users) and UNDP can offer assistance in publicizing its existence and users.

14. That future UNDP/UNDAF assistance be characterised by milestones to which all parties must commit and which must be satisfied before the programme can move to the next phase. This will avoid the wholesale implementation of programmes and ensure that fundamental blocks (basic issues are in place) before moving onto the next stage of programme. This approach will ensure that in the event a programme experiences insurmountable challenges in its earlier phases, the programme can be terminated and the expenses limited to the resources spend to date; and

15. That future UNDP/UNDAF programmes must have a clear handing over phase, which must be preceded by an assessment on the capacity and ability of sponsee to fulfil obligations as per agreement. However, UNDP must continue to assess progress as per agreed milestones and engage sponsee on remedying anomalies.

In conclusion, the capacity building programme offered a number of tools for improving service delivery need to be enhanced. Huge progress has been made. However the latest Global Competitive Report, 2012/13 (WEF, 2012) identified sixteen most problematic factors for doing business in Namibia and the top six (ranked in order of importance) were
inadequately educated workforce, access to financing, corruption, restrictive labour regulations, inefficient government bureaucracy and poor work ethics in national labour force. For this reason, it is plausible to suggest that the rewards from the support given since 2005/6 (of which transformational leadership training and BPR are part) are yet to be fully realised. It is understandable because these issues deal with processes which take time to be inculcated in O/M/As. There is however logic in strengthening the institutions first (O/M/As) because State institutions are the foundation of social service delivery. Some gains have been made and this should be continued and supported in order to consolidate achievements made.
REFERENCES


Policy and strategic documents: Vision 2030, NDPs, particularly information from the NDP 3 review process.


Hand-Over Note on Poverty & HIV and AIDS Programmes For the UNDP Assistant; Resident Representative (Poverty & HIV/AIDS) (2010).

Project Quarterly Progress Reports, Annual Work Plans/Reports.

Project Reports, e.g. Business Process Re-Engineering Reports.

Workshop Report on Reviewing Business Process Mapping and Re-Engineering in the Public Service (1-4 December 2011)
Transformational Leadership- New Ways of Thinking: Post Intervention review and issues to address in the Combined Session/Workshop for Government of Namibia Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Permanent Secretaries.
Report from the First Team Building Session for Permanent Secretaries and Senior Accounting Staff (2006).
Situation Analysis on Social Development in Namibia (MoHSS, 2013).
List of Appendices

Appendix 1:

TERMS OF REFERENCE

FINAL EVALUATION:
Reduction of Human Poverty Programme

1. BACKGROUND

The Reduction of Human Poverty Programme is based on the priorities of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2006-2013). It directly addresses the triple threat, by improving capacities at national, regional and local level for integrating the Millennium Development Goals, National Development Plans and supporting the country towards the achievement of Vision 2030. It responds to the objectives set in Namibia’s major polices and strategic development frameworks and aims to assist the country to meet its international obligations.

Projects executed under the Reduction of human poverty aimed at contributing to ongoing initiatives of national poverty reduction goals and achieving the MDGs.

COMPONENT ONE
Support to the policy framework and institutional capacity development on national development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Key Strategic Areas:
1) Support the development and implementation of the NDP3.
2) Exploration of pro-poor economic and social policy options, through support to economic modelling exercises and Poverty and Social impact assessments.

COMPONENT TWO
Transformational Leadership

Key Strategic Areas:
1) Technical assistance to facilitate the transformation of the public service into an efficient, effective and equitable deliverer of public service.
2) Institutional capacity development.
3) Facilitate global benchmarking.
4) Support the development and implementation of monitoring and evaluation frameworks to track institutionalisation of results based management.

COMPONENT THREE
Strengthen the national statistical system to ensure effective planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national development plans.
Key Strategic Areas:
1) Support national capacity initiatives for poverty monitoring and analysis.
2) Technical assistance for NPCS.
3) Support capacity development initiatives of the Central Bureau of Statistics.
4) Development and utilisation of NamInfo.
5) Economic reviews for policy advocacy and implementation.

2. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL EVALUATION

The final evaluation will focus on measuring programmatic results and potential short-term impacts generated by the project. The overall objective is to measure whether the project has achieved its intended results.

The specific objectives are as follows:

1. Assess to what extent the project has contributed to solve the needs and problems as identified in the National Statistical Plan III.
2. Assess project’s degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised.
3. Assess to what extent the project has attained the desired results to the targeted beneficiaries.
4. Identify and document best practices and lessons learned on programmatic outputs and processes with the aim to support the sustainability of the project.

3. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The Consultant, will have the overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of the deliverables. Specifically, the consultant is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the United Nations’ Office of the Resident Coordinator:

- **Inception Report**: to be submitted after a desk review, 9 -10 days after the signing of the contract. This report will be 4 to 8 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. This report will be used as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the consultant and the Evaluation Reference Group.

- **Draft Final Report** to be submitted 8-10 days after the completion of the field visit. The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 15 to 25 pages in length. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 3 pages that includes a brief description of the project, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and substantive recommendations.

- **Final Evaluation Report** to be submitted within 5 – 10 days after reception of the final comments and suggestions on the draft final report. The final report will be 15 to 25 pages in length. It will also contain an executive summary of no more than 4 pages that includes a brief description of the project, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations.

4. METHODOLOGY APPROACH AND SPECIFIC TASKS

In all cases, consultants are expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents, and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form judgments.
Consultants are also expected to use interviews, surveys or any other relevant quantitative and/or qualitative tool as a means to collect relevant data for the final evaluation. The evaluation team will make sure that the voices, opinions and information of targeted citizens/participants of the project are taken into account.

The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the desk study report and the final evaluation report, and should contain, at minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques.

The selected Consultant will carry out following specific tasks:

- Desk review all relevant documents
- Map of stakeholders
- Prepare the detailed work plan for the final evaluation
- Prepare an inception report
- Conduct meetings and interviews with key project informants and beneficiaries at national and regional level; and analyze of data collected
- Visit the regional statistical offices
- Prepare the draft evaluation report
- Present the draft evaluation report to the stakeholders and incorporate comments, feedback and recommendations
- Finalize the evaluation report by integrating agreed comments and recommendations from the stakeholders’ meeting
- Submit the final evaluation report

5. QUALIFICATIONS
The consultants should have the following qualifications:

- Education: Master’s degree in Social Sciences, economics, or other relevant fields. Whatever the degree the candidate holds, she or he must have a strong understanding and experiences in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating programmes.

- Experiences: At least five years of experience in conducting evaluation of complex programmes and working on wide range of statistics and policy design. Understanding and knowledge of the UN system.

- Language: Excellent knowledge of written and spoken English.

- Competency: Good skills in grasping the very complex project situation in a short time frame. Excellent analytical skills in writing evaluation reports with constructive and practical recommendations. Good audience-oriented communication, teamwork and presentation skills.

6. APPLICATION
Interested individual consultants must submit the following documents/information to demonstrate their qualifications:

a) Statement of Interests and Technical Proposal
- Explaining why the consultant is the most suitable for the work as per requirements of the TOR (2 pages maximum);
- Giving brief information on similar tasks implemented (2 pages maximum)
- Describing how the consultant will approach and conduct the work (3 pages maximum).
- Please include the suggested number of days required;
- A detailed budget for this assignment as well as the rate of the consultation fee.
b) Curriculum Vitae of the core team
Applications should be sent to UNDP, Klein Windhoek, UN House, Stein Street, 1st Floor indicating clearly the consultancy title “Final Evaluation: Human Poverty Reduction Programme”. Deadline for submission: 8 February 2013

7. SELECTION PROCESS

Consultants will be evaluated using the following criteria and points:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Weight Max</th>
<th>Point</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Experience in developing evaluation methodologies and carrying out evaluations of complex programmes, including the drafting and finalization of the evaluation reports especially in the areas of statistics</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Experience in/knowledge of statistical planning and policy design</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Familiarity with the UN System and One UN initiatives</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English.</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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Appendix 2: List of Supporting Documents Reviewed

The following documents were reviewed as part of the desk review exercise.

- Policy and strategic documents: Vision 2030, NDPs, particularly information from the NDP 3 review process;
- Reduction of Human Poverty Programme Document (2006-2010);
- Independent Evaluation of the UNDP Country Programme Document (2006-2010);
- Hand-Over Note on Poverty & HIV and AIDS Programmes For the UNDP Assistant; Resident Representative (Poverty & HIV/AIDS) (2010);
- Project Quarterly Progress Reports, Annual Work Plans/Reports;
- Project Reports, e.g. Business Process Re-Engineering Reports;
- UNDP Southern Africa Capacity Initiative (SACI): SACI Methodology: Capacity Transformation for Effective Service Delivery;
- UNDP (Windhoek) Southern Africa Capacity Initiative (SACI) Meeting (Nov 2004);
- UNDP: SACI Terms of Reference: Mid Evaluation (2007);
- UNDP: Namibia ‘Quick Wins’ for Efficient, Effective and Accountable Public Service, Office of the Prime Minister (2007);
- UNDP: Business Process Re-Engineering Training Workshop Report (21-26 September, 2008);
- UNDP: Business process Re-Engineering Training Workshop Report (17-21 August, 2009);
- Workshop Report on Reviewing Business Process Mapping and Re-Engineering in the Public Service (1-4 December 2011);
- NSFAF SACI Working Document: Ministry of Education (2007);
- Civil Service College (Singapore): Benchmarking Visit to Singapore for Senior Government Officials from Africa (2007);
- Transformational Leadership- New Ways of Thinking: Post Intervention review and issues to address in the Combined Session/Workshop for Government of Namibia Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Permanent Secretaries;
- Report from the Second Team Building Session for Government Ministers (2006);
- Report from the First Team Building Session for Permanent Secretaries and Senior Accounting Staff (2006);
- Situation Analysis on Social Development in Namibia (MoHSS, 2013);
- NDP 3: Mid-Term Review Consultancy Report (2011);
- NDP 3: Review Findings, UNDP Retreat (Presented by Ms. Maureen Matomola, 2010);
- NDP 3: 2007/8-2011/12 Mid-Term Review (Windhoek; and
- Desk study of similar evaluations done elsewhere.
Appendix 3: Progress Made Towards the Attainment of Programme Outputs

The programme has been able to attain some of its expected outputs as captured in the table below.

Appendix 3.1 Transformational leadership

- Technical assistance to facilitate the transformation of the public service into an efficient, effective and equitable deliverer of public service;
- Institutional capacity development
- Facilitate global benchmarking.
- Support the development and implementation of monitoring and evaluation frameworks to track institutionalisation of results based management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>PROGRESS MADE</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1. Transformational leadership training | • Starting with the higher echelons of the Namibian public service-ministers, deputy ministers, permanent secretaries and chief accounting officers participated in team building/transformational leadership sessions during 2005/6.  
  • There were also three sessions held to guide and synchronise the implementation of Vision 2030, MDG, NDP3 and related government programmes |
| 2. Business Process Re-Engineering (BPR) | • In 2007, with the guidance of the OPM (Efficiency and Charter Unit), five Ministries were selected to pilot the BPR, and to date 4 had their BPR reports approved for implementation. In 2008, the BPR was then rolled out across O/M/As, again guided by the OPM-ECU. To date, many areas have been identified for BPR but 62 have so far been selected as eligible for BPR.. Of this figure, only 8 had been endorsed for implementation by the Management Committee of Senior Civil Servants/Permanent Secretaries. In 2008, training in BPR started across O/M/As commenced and to date 146 staff has so far been trained. A core group of 19 Master Trainers across O/M/As have been trained as Master Trainers  
  Below is a more detailed status of the BPR on selected O/M/As. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O/M/As</th>
<th>Key identified Functional Achievements</th>
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Below is a more detailed status of the BPR on selected O/M/As.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Service) Areas identified for BPR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>On recruitment and misconduct, the process has, on average, been reduced from 6 months to three months. However, Public Service Act will need to be revisited if the minimum one month period required for advertising a post (before the selection process starts) is to be reduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment and misconduct</td>
<td>Job evaluation/grading system. This was done and changes were effective April, 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic and Documents</td>
<td>The EDRMS report ready for Permanent Secretaries’ consideration and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record Management System (EDRMS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| MoE | • Namibia Students Financial Assistance Fund (NSFAF)  
• National Council for Higher Education (NCHE)  
[capacity and funding formula]  
• Hostels  
• MoE structure  
• School Feeding Programme | endorsement.  
- The NSFAF was endorsed for implementation.  
- For example MoE, (NSFAF)-awards, payments and recovery: improved dissemination of information about the fund (including setting up web-site), tracing mechanisms of defaulters, etc. through IT (computerisation) MIS (linking with Social Security, MHAI). A consultant was hired to help put in mechanism to increase debt recovery rate. Moving the system from manual and decentralising the processing of applications to |
the regions has impacted positively. An on-line tracking system of applications is set for August 2013.

- Based on our observations (after paying two visits to the NSFAF Head Offices) discussion with two students and authorities at Poly-technic of Namibia, huge challenges remain e.g. during our two day visit to the NSFAF head offices, the offices were inundated with students with various complains, disbursement of funds is always late, errors in
- To date **awards** (distribution of application forms is a problem), **payment** (e.g. almost 4 months to process a payments to institutions such as UNAM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoF</th>
<th>Tender Board process focusing on capital projects</th>
<th>The Tender Board is one of the O/M/As which has managed to prepare BPRs report and have it endorsed for implementation.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement process</td>
<td>As part of the efforts to tackle bottle-necks identified under the BPR, IT, procurement and evaluation experts have been hired in an effort to circumvent malpractices such</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Assessment of tax</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Medical Aid registration process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

amounts due to students.
as corruption.

- Other changes needed to enhance efficiency involve changes to the legislation. In fact there are plans to make it an independent entity or parastatal, separate from the MoF.

- Yes, BPR has made a significant impact on the workflow and processes of the Tender Board. BPR has been used to streamline the tender process and has resulted in the reduction of the days it took from advertising to awarding a tender. However, he explained that the Tender Board is reliant on
OMAs to advertise, evaluate and award tenders and when there are delays in the processes of OMAs the gains made by the Tender Board through the BPR will be of no use. The OMAs budget for projects and provide specifications for advertisements. Tender Board’s responsibility is to advertise tenders for 21 days and collect submitted tenders and give back to the OMA for shortlisting, where after recommendations are made to the Tender Board for decision. Tender Board consist of
PSs and Tender Board Secretariat. As you can see the Tender Board (TB) depends on others to be able to do its work and keep to the streamlined processes. We can say that most bottlenecks are with the OMAs. People do not understand the workings of the Tender Board; hence it is wrongly accused of any delays. For instance, the TIPEEG tenders are to benefit SMEs who may not have all the supporting documents in place and their inclusion may result in delaying the finalization of the tender.
| MHA1 | • Processing of visas and permits | • Although part of the BPR piloting ministries, its BPR report has not been finalised yet. The process started well but has slackened and there are perceptions that the PS does not consider it a priority. Delegating a junior officer (training officer) and staff changes have been sighted as part of the challenges. The performance of the Ministry has been described by one official in the OPM (ECU) as “a worst-case scenario”.
 |
| MTI | • Registration on companies | • The quest to improve the registration process had actually stated in 2004 through |
initial studies and benchmarking with countries such as SA, Singapore and Mauritius. The MTI has utilised the BPR concept to enhance its operations and has even done this without support from the OPM (ECU). To date the registration process has now moved from a manual system to an Integrated Company Registration System (ICRS) which creates an on-line capturing, updating and approval of all manual process into an on-line system that will, in the future create a paperless automated system
(this is work in progress, and as part of the e-governance programme led by the OPM, it will be based on a new law. An ICT bill is currently under consideration).

Because of this process, it now takes 5 days to register a close corporation - from 10 to 14 days. Benchmarking has shown that this process takes 3 hours in Singapore, 5 days in SA, 10 days in Botswana and over 50 days in Angola.

| OAG        | • Auditing process  
|            | • Review process  
|            | • Distribution of work and reporting |
| MET        | • Issuing of hunting permits as well as  
|            | • The issuing of hunting permits |
• scientific research permits
• Park management
• Game capture

and scientific research permits has since been dropped from BPR because the bottlenecks were considered insignificant.

• A BPR report focusing on game capture was approved by the PS in March 2013 and will be implemented as soon as it is approved by a committee of PSs. Streamlining this service area will ensure that previously disadvantaged farmers benefit from the wildlife industry.

• BPR simply added impetus to on-going work on how to improve park management. To date, focus has
been on finding ways to improve tourist entrance/accessibility to parks, payment of fees, etc. particularly given the manual system at hand. A costly N$4 million feasibility study by a consultant at Etosha National Park now completed and a pilot study will be rolled out at Etosha. Making reference to BPR methodology and tools has been a successful strategy used by the MET when presenting a case, say for additional funding from cabinet/government.

| MME | • Processing of Exclusive Prospecting Licences  
|     | • Mining license renewal and  
|     | • Initially, the MME did not see any weakness in |

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application its processes, but after having gone through the BPR training, it was able to tackle its backlog on mining licence. Through BPR, the backlog on processing of Exclusive Prospecting licences, Mining Licences Renewals and Applications declined from 420 to zero in 2011

| MFA | • Application of visas  
|     | • Flight clearances  
|     | • Use of VIP lounge at Hosea Kutako International Airport  
|     | • Issuing diplomatic identification documents  
|     | • Postings abroad  
|     | • Recalls of home-based staff  
|     | • Reconciliation of mission accounts  
|     | • Medical aid claims for home-based staff |
| MGECW | • Child welfare grants  
|      | • Grants to women’s projects |
|      | Use of modern communication |
(Income Generating Activity Grants)

- As the capacity for centralised data collection and analysis increased, it meant reduced administrative burden on staff.
- Time to process applications for OVC grants has now been reduced from five months to two months.
- The number of
OVCS supported under these grants increased exponentially, and target were even exceeded. E.g. in 2008, 100000 OVCs were served and the figure moved up to 120000 in 2009, 124351 in 2011 and 145000 in 2012.

- Time taken to process grants for income generating activities reduced from 16 to 6 months
- Because of the success of the BPR on its OVCs grants administration, the focus of the ministry is now shifting beyond number of beneficiaries (coverage) to impact and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Other Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| MHSS         | Development of Ministry’s Strategic Plan  
Revision of Ministry’s organizational structure  
Revision and redesigning of general management systems | BPR now part of the MoJ plan.  
Motivated by the BPR, the Legal Aid Directorate set standards for itself: application for legal aid used to take 30 days to process and it is now down to 14 days.  
Consultants were engaged to work on other areas identified for BPR (magistracy and Master of the High Court) |
| MoJ          | Lower courts (Magistracy)  
Costing of trials- civil and criminal  
Criminal case process  
Master of the High Court  
Guardian fund process (services rendered to orphans)  
Legal Aid  
Processing of Legal Aid applications and recommendations for grant of legal aid | MoJ now part of the MoJ plan.  
Motivated by the BPR, the Legal Aid Directorate set standards for itself: application for legal aid used to take 30 days to process and it is now down to 14 days.  
Consultants were engaged to work on other areas identified for BPR (magistracy and Master of the High Court) |
| MoLSW        | Directorate: labour Services                                                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
| MLR | - Land registration  
     - (Communal Areas)  
     - Resettlement process  
     - Examinations  
     - Deeds registration | - Progress has stalled since 2007 due to less commitment from PS and Directorates responsible for the identified service areas, staff changes. Reports only ready in February 2013 and presented to management. OPM gave a June 2013 deadline |
|----|------------------|----------------------------------|
| MRLGHRD | - Build Together Programme  
         - Food-for-Work  
         - Disaster management  
         - Recognition of traditional leaders  
         - Filing system/Flow of information within the Ministry  
         - Consultation process with regards to decentralisation | - Report for the Build Together Programme was approved for implementation.  
- For each Directorate, BPR has been included as part of 2013 annual plan, including strategic plan. |
| MWT | - Decentralisation/assignment of further powers to Accounting Officers as related to, inter-alia: | - The filling in of vacancies, processing of misconduct cases |
Filling of vacancies, particularly the recruitment of foreign expatriates for technical skills not found locally.

Processing of misconduct cases

Training of ministerial employees re special leave

- Synchronizing the implementation of capital projects in government.
- Database of benefits to be accrued by Namibia from various membership of national, regional and international organisations

is the responsibility of the OPM, although other human resources activities such as leave processing, etc. is done at ministerial level.

Synchronising the implementation of capital projects in government was the originally selected service area identified for BPR. This has now been revisited to read: Government Capital Construction Project Cycle.

- Lack of commitment and understanding of the BPR concept has hindered progress. The Ministry argues that because of an array of
problems, complexity of the type of work it does, etc., progress has been slow and would have done better with more and close support from the OPM (ECU). The BPR report is now ready to be present to senior Management Committee.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MYNSSC</th>
<th>Development of sports codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECN</td>
<td>Voter registration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Integrated national planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation systems in place**

Using the IRBM approach, huge progress was made, particularly in the M & E system. However, there were challenges. In some cases, O/M/As were not able to develop or determine baseline and targets for some NDP goals and sub-sector goals in NDP3. In the absence of indicators, baseline and targets, it became difficult to understand how the responsible O/M/A implemented activities of such sub sector. The basis for assessing progress of the sub sector became difficult.

**Ministerial and regional plans with clear goals and target on service delivery improvement in place (number of ministries with plans)**

Our findings were limited to elements of IRBM approach noted above.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>on service delivery improvement)</th>
<th>M&amp;E system for ongoing evaluation of service delivery in place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Our findings were limited to the elements of the IRBM approach noted above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministries using result-based management tools (i.e. Balance Score Card, performance based budgeting)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• For the first time in the development planning process, the introduction of IRBM introduced the notion of Key Result Areas (KRAs) [National Priorities, i.e. the Vision 2030 Objectives], NDP3 goals and programmes/activities, performance indicators, baseline and targets to facilitate systematic monitoring and reporting. That these KRAs be results-oriented. Thus accountability of individuals and institutions for specific results are set right during planning stage. Then during implementation a structured M &amp; E system put in place for systematic performance tracking/monitoring and reporting to decision-makers at all levels—thus improving accountability for results by respective individuals, O/M/As, sectors/sub-sectors. Since KRAs, NDP3 goals are assigned to specific thematic groups/sub-sectors, each sub-sector will identify sub-sector goals, indicators, baselines and targets assigned to it. Given these systematic linkages, contribution and ownership of all outcomes and impact across sub-sectors or O/M/As became very clear. To complement this, MIS and ICT were in built to ensure that timely, accurate and reliable information was made available. However, some of the elements of the IRBM system were not fully understood or implemented under NDP3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In fact, we found out that the process has not yet been well understood especially in bigger O/M/As. However, in smaller O/M/As like the Office of the Auditor-General, the balance score card and performance-based budgeting was being utilised.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant good practices from world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Drawing lessons from Singapore’s public service… but seems lessons from such visits where not shared with other O/M/As</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Public Service Institutions Adopted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3.2 Support to the Policy Framework and Institutional Capacity Development

- Support the development and implementation of NDP3
- Exploration of pro-poor economic and social policy options, through support to economic modelling exercises and poverty and social impact assessments

Table 4: Attainment of Outputs- Policy Framework and Institutional Capacity Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>PROGRESS MADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support the development and implementation of NDP3</td>
<td>• Lead consultant hired and led the development of a new planning approach, i.e. the Integrated Results-Based Management (IRBM). This was a move away from the sector-specific approach used in NDP 1 and NDP 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Involvement of top management in the formulation and monitoring NDP 3 was however minimum....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration of pro-poor economic and social policy options, through support to economic modelling exercises and poverty and social impact assessments</td>
<td>• Income and expenditure surveys was done through support from consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Poverty mapping, i.e. geographical location of poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The income and expenditure surveys also went further by analysing multi-dimensional aspects of poverty, i.e. through Index of Multiple Deprivation Reports (at regional and national level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• An exploration of how tax policy can be used as a tool to target poverty resulted in the zero-rating of the basic food items.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3.3 Strengthen the National Statistical System in Namibia

- Support national capacity initiatives for poverty monitoring and analysis.
- Technical assistance for NPCS.
- Support capacity development initiatives of the Central Bureau of Statistics.
- Development and utilisation of NamInfo.
- Economic reviews for policy advocacy and implementation.

Table 5: Attainment of Outputs - Strengthening National Statistical Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>PROGRESS MADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support national capacity initiatives for poverty monitoring and analysis.</strong></td>
<td>• Poverty Reports (2003/4) and 2009/10 produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NHIES (2003/4) and 2009/10 produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical assistance for NPCS.</strong></td>
<td>• MDG reports (second and third) prepared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• MDG 7 Report prepared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Human Development Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support capacity development initiatives of the Central Bureau of Statistics.</strong></td>
<td>• Technical support seconded from 2006-2010- advisor, funding deployed at regional level. GIS/Statistician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development and utilisation of NamInfo</strong></td>
<td>• Support on training on sampling, data collection and dissemination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NamInfo Project Coordinator and administrator established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NamInfo data base established- a useful data base, e.g. A Land Degradation Monitoring System (LDMS) for Namibia has been developed and hosted in the NamInfo System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establishment of statistical offices at regional level- supporting regional councils/regional focal groups trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on how to use NamInfo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Economic reviews</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>for policy advocacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendices 4: Guiding questions used during interviews and discussions**

**Appendix 4.1- Transformational leadership**

Table 6: Questions- Transformational leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th><strong>Evaluation Questions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Transformational leadership</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td><strong>Major Evaluation Question- Relevance</strong>&lt;br&gt;[consistency with country requirements/needs/priorities- including global priorities and partners/donor policies]</td>
<td>← Technical assistance to facilitate the transformation of the public service into an efficient, effective and equitable deliverer of public service;&lt;br&gt;← Institutional capacity development.&lt;br&gt;← Facilitate global benchmarking.&lt;br&gt;← Support the development and implementation of monitoring and evaluation frameworks to track institutionalisation of results based management.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source/Evidence (Means of Verification)</th>
<th><strong>Survey Method</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP, OPM, MoF, MoE, MGECh, MHSS, Min of Trade and Commerce, Min of Home Affairs and Immigration, MoL, Regional Councils, UNAM, NIPAM, Polytechnic, Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
<td>Interviews, review of project documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project document, Workshop reports; Progress Reports (e.g. UNDP Regional Service Centre team/UNDP Country Office/OPM, Efficient and Charter Unit implementation review of Permanent Secretary Recommendations of 2007), NDPs, Business Process Re-Engineering Training Workshop Reports; Progress Reports (Quarterly and Annually), etc.</td>
<td>Visits to Regional Councils (Interviews)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Was the technical assistance to facilitate transformation of the public service, institutional capacity development, global benchmarking and setting up a results-based management system a rational one?

Did UNDP make the best use of available evidence and best practice in the assessment of capacity gaps and programme design? e.g. Adequate assessment of capacity needs/Baseline surveys?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Major Evaluation Question- Effectiveness</th>
<th>UNDP, OPM, MoF, MoE, MGECW, MHSS, Min of Trade and Commerce, Min of Home Affairs and Immigration, MoL, Regional Councils, UNAM, NIPAM, Polytechnic, Anti-Corruption Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project document, Workshop reports; Progress Reports (e.g. UNDP Regional Service Centre team/UNDP Country Office/OPM, Efficient and Charter Unit implementation review of Permanent Secretary Recommendations of 2007), NDPs, Business Process Re-Engineering Training Workshop Reports; Progress Reports (Quarterly and Annually), etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How effective were the interventions you took in developing the gaps in people's capacities, putting in systems and processes for effective service delivery, global benchmarking and results-based management?</td>
<td>Interviews, review of project documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What changes, if any, was achieved, e.g. from business process re-engineering:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) OPM (e.g. Efficiency Charter Unit/Public Service Management Unit):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recruitment and misconduct Processes (including organizational review, policy formulation and review)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How effective was the OPM in supporting Pilot Ministries (technical backstopping) in service delivery, benchmarking and mounting of a result-based management system? What did the OPM do?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) MoE (Namibia Student Financial Assistance Fund- NSFAF) (e.g. changes in award, payments and loan recovery- Policy revision? Is the information, application</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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forms now readily available, e.g. electronically? Media awareness, stakeholder workshops (students, universities)? Planning, implementing and review of Namibia’s HR strategies?

c) MoF: Tender Board (focusing on capital projects)- (e.g. capacity building, training on recruitment, procurement, establishment of data base, provide more funds, project M&E system strengthened, transparency and fairness in adjudicating, etc.).

d) Min of Home Affairs and Immigration: Processing of visas and permits (Training on customer care, etc., computerization, linkages of systems, comparison with best countries in visa/permit processing, etc.)

e) Min of Industry and Trade: Registration of companies/Close Corporation Registration/Investment promotion. (e.g. Training in customer care, information on how to register a company now easily, accessible, even at regional level, one stop shop/investment centre, policy review?)

What promoted the achievements of results?
What has worked (Project achievements/successes/progress) i.e. development outcomes?
Any examples of significant capacity gains?

What elements of good practice do they reflect/What factors contributed to this change?

What undermined the achievement of results?
What has not worked?
Why have certain aspects of the programme not been achieved as planned (challenges/failures)?

What where the ways/mechanisms to monitor and evaluate capacity building results?
### Lessons learnt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.3</th>
<th>Major Evaluation Question- Efficiency [Where the interventions an efficient use of resources?]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP, OPM, MoF, MoE, MGECW, MHSS, Min of Trade and Commerce, Min of Home Affairs and Immigration, MoL, Regional Councils, UNAM, NIPAM, Polytechnic, Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project document, Workshop reports; Progress Reports (e.g. UNDP Regional Service Centre team/UNDP Country Office/OPM, Efficient and Charter Unit implementation review of Permanent Secretary Recommendations of 2007), NDPs, Business Process Re-Engineering Training Workshop Reports; Progress Reports (Quarterly and Annually), etc.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.4</th>
<th>Major Evaluation Question- Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP, OPM, MoF, MoE, MGECW, MHSS, Min of Trade and Commerce, Min of Home Affairs and Immigration, MoL, Regional Councils, UNAM, NIPAM, Polytechnic, Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project document, Workshop reports; Progress Reports (e.g. UNDP Regional Service Centre team/UNDP Country Office/OPM, Efficient and Charter Unit implementation review of Permanent Secretary Recommendations of 2007), NDPs, Business Process Re-Engineering Training Workshop Reports; Progress Reports (Quarterly and Annually), etc.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>Major Evaluation Question- Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP, OPM, MoF, MoE, MGECW, MHSS, Min of Trade and Commerce, Min of Home Affairs and Immigration, MoL, Regional Councils, UNAM, NIPAM, Polytechnic, Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project document, Workshop reports; Progress Reports (e.g. UNDP Regional Service Centre team/UNDP Country Office/OPM, Efficient and Charter Unit implementation review of Permanent Secretary Recommendations of 2007), NDPs, Business Process Re-Engineering Training Workshop Reports; Progress Reports (Quarterly and Annually), etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, Min of Home Affairs and Immigration, MoL, Regional Councils, UNAM, NIPAM, Polytechnic, Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project document, Workshop reports; Progress Reports (e.g. UNDP Regional Service Centre team/UNDP Country Office/OPM, Efficient and Charter Unit implementation review of Permanent Secretary Recommendations of 2007), NDPs, Business Process Re-Engineering Training Workshop Reports; Progress Reports (Quarterly and Annually), etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**What measures have been put in place to ensure that gains made in results-based management, global benchmarking and business process re-engineering (e.g. in terms of quality, coverage, accessibility, acceptability and availability of services), setting up of the results-based management systems, etc. are not only lost, but are replicated in all ministries?**
## Appendix 4.2 Support to the Policy Framework and Institutional Capacity Development

### Table 7: Questions - Support to the Policy Framework and Institutional Capacity Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
<th>Support to the policy framework and institutional capacity development on national development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support the development and implementation of the NDP3;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration of pro-poor economic and social policy options, through support to economic modelling exercises and Poverty and Social impact assessments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Sources/Evidence (Means of verification)</th>
<th>Data collection method/tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils</td>
<td>Interviews (semi-structured and structured), Systematic review of documents, Visits to two Regional Statistics Offices and Regional Councils (Interviews)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.1 Major Evaluation Question - Relevance [in relation to development priorities at national and sub-national level]

How relevant was UDDP support in the development and implementation of NDP3 and exploration of pro-poor economic and social policy options (modeling exercises and poverty and impact assessments)?

Are the interventions priority areas in filling the ‘gaps’ in efforts towards reduction of human poverty?

Did the design of the programme target the right institutions and personnel and what was their level of participation during design and implementation?

| UNDP, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils | Project documents, NDP 3, Progress Reports, Mid-term evaluation report, etc. |

### 2.2 Major Evaluation Question - Effectiveness [Expected achievement of objectives when the project was designed]

| UNDP, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils | Project documents, NDP 3, Progress Reports, Mid-term evaluation report, etc. |

<p>| Interviews (semi-structured and structured), Systematic review of documents, Visits to two Regional Statistics Offices and Regional Councils (Interviews) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.3 Efficiency</strong></td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils</td>
<td>Interviews (semi-structured and structured), Systematic review of documents, Visits to two Regional Statistics Offices and Regional Councils (Interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Results in relation to resource utilization]</td>
<td>Project documents, NDP 3, Progress Reports, Mid-term evaluation report, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.4 Impact</strong></td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils</td>
<td>Interviews (semi-structured and structured), Systematic review of documents, Visits to two Regional Statistics Offices and Regional Councils (Interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Positive or negative effects of the project, direct or indirect]</td>
<td>Project documents, NDP 3, Progress Reports, Mid-term evaluation report, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.5 What has happened</strong></td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils</td>
<td>Interviews (semi-structured and structured), Systematic review of documents, Visits to two Regional Statistics Offices and Regional Councils (Interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as a result of the programme or project?</td>
<td>Project documents, NDP 3, Progress Reports, Mid-term evaluation report, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.6 What real difference</strong></td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils</td>
<td>Interviews (semi-structured and structured), Systematic review of documents, Visits to two Regional Statistics Offices and Regional Councils (Interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has it made to</td>
<td>Project documents, NDP 3, Progress Reports, Mid-term evaluation report, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| NPC/NPCS/NSA/Regional Councils?  
New structures? Leveraging? | UNDP, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils  
Project documents, NDP 3, Progress Reports, Mid-term evaluation report, etc. | Interviews (semi-structured and structured),  
Systematic review of documents,  
Visits to two Regional Statistics Offices and Regional Councils (Interviews) |
|---|---|---|
| **2.5** Major Evaluation Question- Sustainability  
[Where gains have been made, are these likely to be sustained?] | Do you see the achievements made in development and implementation of NDP3, and investigation of pro-poor policies (economic modeling and poverty and social impact assessments, etc.) progressing even further without UNDP help?  
What measures have been put in place in terms of strategy, funding, etc. to sustain achievements made?  
Do you see the markers/achievements/good practices learnt e.g. in NDP3 being reflected in NDP4 document? |
### 4. Key Evaluation Questions

**4.1 Major Evaluation Question - Relevance**

[Did you UNDP do the right thing? What is the relevance or significance of the support regarding local and national requirements and priorities?]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source/Evidence (Means of Verification)</th>
<th>Survey Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, MHSS, MGECW, MoL, NPC, NPCS, NSA, Regional Councils</td>
<td>Interviewing UNDP staff and reading government reports among others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**a)** What motivated UNDP to strengthen the national statistical system to ensure effective planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national development plans?

UNDP Management, UNICEF, UNFPA

**b)** How was the support from UNDP of benefit to you?

NPC, Regional Councils, etc.

### 4.2 Major Evaluation Question - Effectiveness

[Have the objectives of the project/programme been achieved?]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source/Evidence (Means of Verification)</th>
<th>Survey Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**a)** What was achieved on Support national capacity initiatives for poverty monitoring and analysis?

UNDP, NPC, etc.

**b)** What Technical assistance for was given to NPCS?

UNDP, NPC, etc.

**c)** Can you explain the capacity development initiatives that were targeted at the Central Bureau of Statistics?

UNDP, NPC, etc.

**d)** One of the outputs included the Development and utilisation of NamInfo. Can you explain the progress that was made?

UNDP, NPC, etc.

**e)** It was the goal of the programme to research and produce Economic reviews for policy advocacy and implementation. Can you explain what progress was made?

UNDP, NPC, etc.
**4.3 Major Evaluation Question- Efficiency**  
*Are the objectives achieved in a cost-efficient manner?*

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) How much money had been budgeted for, and how much of it was spent under each intervention?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Are you happy with the way the money was utilized by UNDP and its government counterparts?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Are there any instances, in which there should have been some alternatives for the achieving the same results with less inputs/funds?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.4 Major Evaluation Question- Impact**  
*What happened as a result of the project? What difference has the programme effected to beneficiaries?, How many institutions or people have benefitted?*

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) How has the national capacity initiatives for poverty monitoring and analysis benefitted NPC, etc.?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Looking at the Technical assistance that was given to NPCS, how can you demonstrate that that was put to good use?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Looking at the Central Bureau of Statistics, How did the Bureau benefit?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) One of the outputs included the Development and utilisation of NamInfo. Can you explain how it was used etc.</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) It was the goal of the programme to research and produce Economic reviews for policy advocacy and implementation. Can you explain how the reviews were used to facilitative evidence-based decision-making?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.5 Major Evaluation Question- Sustainability**  
*What is the current status of the interventions, especially after UNDP assistance came to an end? Is there any probability of continued long-term benefits?*

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<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) What is the current of the poverty monitoring and analysis initiatives started through the project?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Looking back do you think that the Technical assistance that was given to NPC can continue to be utilised?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Method</td>
</tr>
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<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>Looking at the Central Bureau of Statistics, what was continued after the end of the project?</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d)</td>
<td>Explain the current status of the NamInfo. Can you explain how it is being used and how the government has ensured its continued updating and use, etc.</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e)</td>
<td>It was the goal of the programme to research and produce Economic reviews for policy advocacy and implementation. Can you explain how the reviews continue to be used by the government to facilitate evidence-based decision-making</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f)</td>
<td>Of all these initiatives, which ones have been taken over by the government and other stakeholders</td>
<td>UNDP, NPC, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews, Reviews of documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix 5: List of Respondents**

Table 1: List of People Consulted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>POST DESIGNATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>T. Tjihambuma</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>S. Mwilima</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Assistant Resident Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>M. van Turah</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Programme Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>O. Chinhamo</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Programme Manager (UNV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>F. Mubiana</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>National Poverty Reduction Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Livinia Shikongo</td>
<td>Mrs</td>
<td>Former Assistant Resident Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>S. Mbangu</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Chief: National Development Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>J. Ashipala</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Deputy Chief: National Development Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>A. Haiphene</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Chief: National Development Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>T. Andima</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Director: Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>S. Demas</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer (NIPAM), formerly Director: NPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>A. Hishekwa</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Director: Alien Control, Citizenship and Passport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>C. Sikopo</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Director: Parks and Wildlife Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>E. Hamunyela</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Director: Parks and Wildlife Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>N. Iipinge</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Director: Resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>R. Kakololo</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer: NIPAM, formerly Chief Policy Analyst: OPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>O. Mwazi</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Director: Spatial Data, Surveys, Cartography and Regional Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>P van Heerden</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Deputy Director: Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>K. Kauaria</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Under Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>P. Amunyele</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Under Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>S. Van Eijden</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>S. Iyambo</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>J. Shingenge</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Bursar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>L. Shikongo</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>K. Kangungu</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Director: NSFAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>P. Daringo</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Deputy Director: Legal Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>H. Haliongo</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Director: Legal Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>F. Isaak</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Tender Board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| O/M/As          | UNDP (Namibia)                  | NPC                     | NIPAM                  | MET                     | MLR                     | NSA                     | MRLGHRD                | MWT                     | Polytechnic of Namibia | MGECW                  | MoE                     | MoJ                     | MoF                     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>S. Nauyoma</td>
<td>Mr Deputy Director: Planning</td>
<td>Kavango Regional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>H. Itamba</td>
<td>Ms Deputy Director</td>
<td>MME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>M. Gahutu</td>
<td>Ms Chief Mineral Economist</td>
<td>MME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>A. Andreas</td>
<td>Ms Mineral Economist</td>
<td>MME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>J. Alfeus-Nakale</td>
<td>Ms Mineral Economist</td>
<td>MME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Sabina</td>
<td>Ms Student</td>
<td>Triumphant College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Korny</td>
<td>Mr Student</td>
<td>Polytechnic of Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>G. Menetti</td>
<td>Mr Deputy Auditor-General</td>
<td>Office of the Auditor- General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>A Tjipura</td>
<td>Mr Chief Human Resource Practitioner</td>
<td>MoHSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>