

Final evaluation of the UN-REDD Viet Nam Programme



Prepared for:
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Prepared by:
Howard Macdonald Stewart, Vancouver & Steven Swan, Ha Noi

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The *overall objective* of the UN-REDD programme in Viet Nam was ‘to assist the Government of Viet Nam in developing an effective REDD+ regime in Viet Nam and to contribute to reduction of regional displacement of emissions.’ while also *contributing* ‘... to the broader goal of ensuring that ... by the end of 2012 Viet Nam (will be) ‘REDD+ ready’ and able to contribute to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation nationally and regionally.’ Programme outcomes to support achievement of the objective were:

- 1. Improved institutional and technical capacity for national coordination to manage REDD activities in Viet Nam;
- 2. Improved capacity to manage REDD and provide other Payment for Ecological Services (PES) at district level in support of sustainable development planning and implementation; and
- 3. Improved knowledge of approaches to reduce regional displacement of emissions.

This evaluation assessed the performance and results of Viet Nam’s UN-REDD programme, from its inception in September 2009 until its closure in June 2012, against the standard evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. It also sought to ascertain actual and potential impacts of the programme, and their sustainability. The other key objective of the evaluation was to promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing among the participating UN organizations and other partners.

RELEVANCE The UN-REDD programme in Viet Nam, and REDD+ in general, are highly relevant to Viet Nam’s international and domestic policy commitments. Lam Dong was an appropriate province for piloting REDD+ because of its high level of forest cover, high localised rates of deforestation in the recent past, the relatively high capacity of its forestry sector, and a progressive and relatively open provincial government. But as a ‘best case’ pilot, Lam Dong had the limitation of being unrepresentative of the broader national situation.

DESIGN Much was unknown about the global REDD+ mechanism at the time of programme design and remains so today. Many elements of the programme’s design were therefore ‘best guesses’ drawn from a generic template. The goal of making Viet Nam ‘REDD ready’ by 2012 was recognised as being ill defined and overly ambitious early in implementation. The timeframe was too short, capacities in the forestry sector too low and international negotiations too inconclusive for this goal to be realistic. Focused on fewer activities, the programme could have been more effective. More robust initial analysis would have better informed subsequent design and policy formulation processes supported by UN-REDD and other REDD+ readiness activities.

Reliance on a prospective World Bank financed project (FCPF) as the source of analytical inputs to Viet Nam’s readiness process was a reasonable assumption in 2009. But UN-REDD should have adapted once it became clear that FCPF was not going to proceed on schedule. Though design limitations of UN-REDD were acknowledged early, the intervention logic remained

mostly unchanged. Procedural and (possibly financial) disincentives discouraged design modifications by the three UN partners.

The unique Vietnamese context was not adequately reflected in the programme's design. While some programme activities attempted to build on experience in the forestry sector, the programme should have engaged more with other on-going field-based sustainable forest management initiatives. The programme opted instead to promote novel REDD+ architecture.

The programme was largely supply-driven and political imperatives drove hasty implementation over a tight timeframe. The GoV partner, civil society and other key stakeholders were not much involved in programme design. A systematic roadmap for achieving REDD+ readiness was not developed. Civil society's role in programme implementation was confined to participation in the National REDD+ Network and sub-technical working groups supported by the programme and/or as subcontracted service providers to the programme. Subcontracting NGOs as service providers was efficient but engendered weaker ownership of resulting processes and products than if they had been more equal partners in the readiness process.

IMPLEMENTATION The programme was essentially an extended inception phase for a much larger 'Phase 2' and it will enhance the results of this second phase. But from the perspective of a final evaluation, the programme can also be seen as a costly, hastily assembled pilot, loosely administered by the UN system though well managed by its PMU. Its results were satisfactory though limited by the need to work on planning the larger Phase 2 programme.

Programme delivery was complicated by working with three more or less independent UN organisations, each with different *modus operandi*, organisational cultures and visions of UN-REDD. The three UN organisations may feel that the challenges of working together were mostly addressed over the life of Phase I. The GoV partner is concerned that these problems have *not* been adequately resolved and that working with the 'three UNs' imposes unacceptable transaction costs. These costs were controlled in Phase 1 mostly by remarkable personal efforts from individuals involved, rather than being resolved at the institutional level.

The programme brought a number of Vietnamese partners into programme implementation. Remaining challenges include:

- identifying of incentives to encourage the engagement of other potential partners;
- enhancing the involvement of key partners outside the host office; and
- ensuring good communications between central and provincial level administrations;

The programme made valuable contributions to the GoV's adoption of robust coordination mechanisms: a National REDD+ Network, sub-technical working groups and the Viet Nam REDD+ Office. The effects of these outputs were limited by the widespread over-commitment of many participants in different activities supported by UN-REDD. UN-REDD's vigorous communication activities may have inadvertently reduced the effectiveness of national coordination, at least in the first half of the programme, when UN-REDD was sometimes seen by other partners as being synonymous with the country's national REDD+ programme. Overall there was insufficient interaction between UN-REDD and other initiatives focussed on improving forestry management, including other REDD+ activities.

The UN-REDD programme's Project Management Unit (PMU) assured day to day management of the programme but was not designed to engage and coordinate activities of the rapidly expanding community of development partners and service providers investing in REDD+. UN-REDD's diffuse leadership was focused on technical problems and under pressure to 'produce outputs' in the absence of a coherent 'road map' or broad ownership among government and non-government stakeholders. The result was a "Ready – Fire – Aim" approach. The Viet Nam REDD+ Office, with UN-REDD support, exercised greater leadership over time. This leadership was stronger in specific technical areas than in overall coordination and strategic vision.

OUTPUTS UN-REDD's most remarkable contribution to Viet Nam's REDD+ readiness at the national level was their support for national coordination capacity. A National REDD+ Action Programme emerged following preparation of a far longer and rather different background document proposed by UN-REDD consultants. Their contribution to development of an initial framework for a national system of measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) GHG emission reductions and enhanced removals from REDD+ was among the more technically sound and valued outputs. Like much other work on specific instruments, work done on the MRV framework does not yet include prescriptions of how to MRV GHG emission reductions, nor has the programme developed the required national capacity to operate a practical system.

UN-REDD 're-learned' key lessons about some outputs that shouldn't have needed re-learning:

- Avoid using obscure jargon when reaching out to diverse stakeholders at multiple levels.
- Avoid elaborate FPIC processes when there is not yet anything to consent to.
- Appropriate BDS cannot be established until a range of policies and measures are in place.
- Premature discussion of benefits with poor villagers can create problematic expectations.

The programme also generated rich lessons about the challenges of integrating the three UN's operational procedures and these were adjusted somewhat. But gains were mostly in terms of learning to work together rather than significant changes to the way the three UN's operate.

OUTCOMES 1& 2 – CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT The UN-REDD Viet Nam programme was not alone in underestimating the challenge of making a country 'REDD ready'. While the programme did *not* result in national 'REDD readiness', it *did* enhance Viet Nam's capacity for accessing future results-based financing, and greatly facilitated development of Phase 2.

Capacities were developed at national, provincial, district and village levels. Some of the largest capacity development efforts aimed to enhance awareness and understanding of REDD+ issues. The results were mixed. Most capacity development under the programme remains vested in a small group of individuals. Understanding of the concepts and potential of REDD+ diminishes sharply outside the Viet Nam REDD+ Office. Capacities for consultative dialogues on forest management and governance issues have been strengthened. The REDD+ readiness process in Viet Nam has witnessed unprecedented levels of involvement from civil society players in national-level policy dialogue. At sub-national levels, awareness of the REDD+ mechanism has been enhanced, though understanding is sometimes distorted. Capacity developed at all levels, has been mostly capacity to *understand* REDD+ rather than capacity to *implement* REDD+.

National ownership or commitment to REDD+ is hard to gauge. A small group of NGOs, service providers, participants in the different working groups network, and the Viet Nam REDD+ Office are committed. It's not clear that UN-REDD outputs have much national ownership outside this group. The evaluation *can* confirm that some national and sub-national stakeholders, outside this group, at least partially *understand* REDD+, thanks in large part to the UN-REDD Phase 1 programme, but not that they necessarily support it.

REDD+, with direct support from UN-REDD, has been integrated into the Forest Development and Protection Master Plan of Lam Dong province. REDD+ is also recognised in Viet Nam's new national strategies for 'Green Growth and Development' and Climate Change. REDD+ approaches still need to be woven into many other existing policies, plans, programmes, practices and processes.

The programme has developed interesting and *potentially* valuable approaches to working at sub-national levels, such as a process of intensive consultation with communities assumed to be forest dependent. Their value was diminished by uncertainty about how the national government will actually reduce GHG emissions and/or enhance removals under a national REDD+ programme.

Villagers involved in UN-REDD awareness building activities now know about potential impacts of climate change, the carbon and oxygen cycles in forest ecosystems and the role of trees in carbon sequestration. Whether such awareness building was *necessary* to achieve an 'effective REDD regime' is less clear. A simpler approach could have built on local stakeholder's understanding of existing forest protection activities. On the other hand, UN-REDD's support for mapping of twenty years of change in forest cover in the two pilot districts was appreciated as a valuable contribution to improved forest management.

Sub-national level capacities remain insufficient to effectively operate a future provincial REDD+ programme. Without further analysis of required policies and measures, the actual capacities required to implement REDD+ in Viet Nam remain unknown. In the absence of further REDD+ readiness investments, some of the capacities already developed by UN-REDD in Lam Dong would erode faster than national capacities. But facilitators trained by the programme to work at the village level are an important, and potentially, sustainable capacity development result.

OUTCOME 3: Very modest results to date reflect the lack of a clear plan at the time of project design. For more significant progress in Phase 2, it will be necessary to address fundamental issues not addressed in Phase I, such as analysis of regional stakeholders. The rationale for including this outcome in Vietnam's national UN-REDD programme is not clear.

GENDER ISSUES The participation of women was visible at the national and sub-national levels in most parts of the programme, particularly awareness building activities at local levels. But there was no discrete strategy for gender mainstreaming to guide programme activities. UN-REDD consultants are currently assessing the options for handling gender issues in Phase 2.

SUSTAINABILITY None of the programme's outputs are sustainable in the long-term without further investments in the REDD+ process; and Vietnam has secured tens of millions of USD in such investments during and since the UN-REDD programme's implementation. However, Viet Nam continues to show strong commitment to REDD+, forest protection and climate change mitigation. From the GoV's perspective, REDD+ is another *potential* mechanism for attracting investment in the forest sector, but has not yet demonstrated its cost-effectiveness.

The National REDD+ Action Programme, REDD+ Steering Committee, Viet Nam REDD+ Office, National REDD+ Network and sub-technical working groups are all crucial for establishing a sound foundation for others to build upon. Yet human resource limitations pose significant risks to the institutional sustainability of these efforts. Capacity development by the programme was invested in too few people to ensure self-sustaining REDD+ readiness efforts. The sustainability of the UN-REDD programme's efforts in Viet Nam are threatened by persistent uncertainties surrounding negotiation of long-term financing for results-based action under REDD+.

To date, none of the programme's technical outputs have been formally endorsed nationally. All require further political process to see their technical contents embedded in national policy or regulatory frameworks.

Qualified political commitment to REDD+ is reflected in the Prime Minister's approval of the National REDD+ Action Programme. The GoV's Action Plan on Climate Change and national Climate Change and Green Growth strategies all acknowledge the role of forests in mitigating climate change. At local levels, it is benefits, not raised awareness, that will enhance commitment to sustained improvement in forest protection.

Sustainability of UN-REDD results is also threatened by weak co-ordination capacities within and outside the GoV. Yet this co-ordination will be needed to mainstream REDD+ into activities that drive deforestation and degradation, such as perennial cash cropping and aquaculture. The programme engaged with private sector stakeholders implicated in these activities, but belatedly and superficially. Although a more diverse collection of stakeholders was engaged at sub-national levels, key players, such as forest owners (particularly State forest management boards), were inadequately engaged during programme implementation.

IMPACTS Viet Nam is not REDD+ ready but the Phase 1 programme *has* achieved the rapid introduction of new, complex REDD+ concepts to a number of stakeholders. The programme has helped establish a partial foundation of institutions and capacities, *some* of the key elements of national REDD+ architecture. Viet Nam has good prospects to access FCPF Carbon Fund financing, for example, based on its readiness track record to which UN-REDD made significant contributions.

There have not yet been significant, tangible social or environmental improvements, though there is potential for positive social impacts from BDS.

CONCLUSIONS about the performance of the UN-REDD are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1 - Summary of evaluation ratings of programme performance

Criteria	Ratings	Comments
Agency Coordination and implementation		
Overall Quality of Project Implementation	MS	See discussion in text, section 3
<i>Agency coordination</i>	MU	“
<i>Programme Supervision</i>	MS	“
<i>Efficiency</i>	MS	“
Programme Outcomes¹		
Overall Quality of Project Outcomes	MS	See sub-ratings & discussion, section 4
<i>Relevance of Outcomes</i>	R	See sub ratings & discussion, section 2
<i>Effectiveness of Outcomes</i>	MS	See sub ratings & discussion, section 4
Sustainability & Impacts		
<i>Sustainability of Outcomes</i>	ML	See sub ratings & discussion, section 5
<i>Impacts of Outcomes</i>	M	See sub ratings & discussion, section 6
Overall Programme Results	MS	

RECOMMENDATIONS Much experience gained in the Phase 1 programme is reflected in the design of Phase 2. The first set of recommendations below is intended primarily for these future UN-REDD activities in Viet Nam, although they are also relevant for programmes emerging in other countries. These recommendations focus on areas where the evaluators feel the Phase 1 experience may not yet have sufficiently influenced plans for the future. The last five recommendations are intended more for UN-REDD programmes in other countries that may be in a position to benefit from the Vietnamese experience. Here again however, these recommendations could prove to be of value for the second Phase of UN-REDD activities in Viet Nam – depending on how much flexibility exists in their programme.

Agency coordination and implementation; outcomes; overall programme results: Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S) Moderately Satisfactory (MS), Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), Highly Unsatisfactory (HU).

Sustainability: Likely (L); Moderately Likely (ML); Moderately Unlikely (MU); Unlikely (U).

Relevance: relevant (R) or not relevant (NR).

Impact: Significant (S), Minimal (M), Negligible (N).

Recommendations for UN-REDD in Viet Nam, and other countries

1. Adopt more “demand driven” programme implementation and a relationship of service provider and client between the UN-REDD programme and its diverse national stakeholders. This will mean finding ways to reduce or remove institutional disincentives to flexibility among the three UN partner organisations, thereby enhancing the programme’s ability to adapt UN-REDD activities to evolving national requirements. For example, do not set overall budgets for each partner for the full life of the programme; instead allocate funds for specific project activities every year or two years, based on past performance, evolving circumstances and emerging needs. Adapt normative products to provide guidance where this is required but tailor them carefully to specific national and sub-national circumstances.
2. Adopt a single, available and knowledgeable focal point for the three UN organisations that can regularly speak with one voice to government counterparts and other stakeholders involved in REDD+. This can significantly reduce the transaction time imposed on the GoV partner by the three UN partners. It would require these organisations to dedicate time and effort to this harmonisation process, then to exercise the discipline needed to ensure its effectiveness.
3. Vigorously support development of the necessary national capacity for engaging and coordinating a broad, multi-sectoral community of REDD+ participants. The national REDD office and their UN supporters will need to be able to proactively reach out to a wide range of stakeholders and identify incentives for them to engage in REDD+. In the process, they will need to minimise the use of arcane REDD+ jargon and ‘off the shelf’, unadapted REDD+ messages and methods.
4. Acknowledge the risks inherent to piloting REDD+ activities and establish the mechanisms needed to mitigate and manage these risks and present stakeholders with a balanced appraisal of the risks and benefits of all aspects of REDD+ readiness. Managing expectations in the face of persistent uncertainties is a key imperative.
5. Address regional ‘leakage’ issues through a discrete regional initiative that complements national programmes and other REDD+ readiness initiatives.

Recommendations for UN-REDD in other countries, and for Phase 2 in Viet Nam

6. Help country-led REDD readiness processes to define the rationale and scope for specific national REDD+ activities, based on clear identification of the national drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Identify possible national and local level policies and measures that can address these drivers. Carefully gauge the relative costs and benefits of preferred policies and measures and clearly determine different stakeholders’ interests and roles in implementing them.
7. Carry out systematic analysis of the national context. Identify key entry points into existing national policy and sub-national, country specific practices. Define where REDD+ can cost-effectively strengthen the performance of existing policies and measures. Ensure that experience from such existing policies and practices informs national REDD+ programmes.

8. Develop robust and comprehensive theories of change and associated results chains for each desired outcome of the national UN-REDD programme. Use well designed consultative processes to ensure the validity of intervention logic and broad stakeholder ownership of the programme.

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9. Ensure that programme communications activities and management arrangements maintain a clear and unequivocal distinction between the emerging national REDD+ programme and the temporary financial and technical assistance provided by UN-REDD.

10. Apply mandatory requirements of UN programmes such as FPIC only after extensive consultation with diverse national and sub-national stakeholders; then carefully adapt mandatory requirements to local circumstances.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The UN-REDD programme rapidly introduced new, complex REDD+ concepts to a range of stakeholders and enhanced Viet Nam's capacity to access future results-based financing. Although Viet Nam is not yet REDD+ ready, UN-REDD helped introduce *some* of the key elements of national REDD+ architecture.

Uncertainties about the global REDD+ mechanism at the time of programme design led to a variety of programme design flaws. But more robust initial analysis of the Vietnamese context would have led to better design. Adaptation of programme approaches should have been more extensive after implementation began, especially once delay in the FCPF project was evident. Institutional disincentives to such changes and the supply driven nature of the programme limited the ability of the three UN organisations to adapt UN-REDD more effectively to the Vietnamese context.

The programme was essentially an extended and mostly effective inception phase for a larger 'Phase 2'. Considered in isolation, 'Phase 1' could also be seen as a costly, hasty, supply driven initiative that was weakly administered by the UN system, but well managed day to day and achieved mostly satisfactory results.

Programme delivery was complicated by working with three more or less independent UN organisations, each with significantly different *modus operandi*, organisational cultures and visions of REDD+. Improvements during implementation came mostly because individuals learned to work together rather than the organisations making significant changes. The three UNs feel the challenges of intra UN co-ordination were mostly addressed during Phase I; the GoV believes they have *not* been adequately resolved.

UN-REDD's PMU assured programme management but lacked sufficient capacity to engage and coordinate a wide community of REDD+ participants.

The programme contributed to robust national REDD+ mechanisms including a National REDD+ Network, sub-technical working groups and the Viet Nam REDD+ Office. Positive effects of these outputs were limited by widespread over-commitment of many participants and insufficient interaction with other initiatives that are also focussed on improving forest governance and changing land use practices.

At all levels, capacities to understand REDD+ have been enhanced more than capacities to implement it.

Sub-national capacities remain insufficient to effectively operate a future provincial REDD+ programme. While UN-REDD helped develop village level awareness about the role of forests in climate change, this may not have been needed or appropriate. Support for mapping twenty years of forest cover change in pilot districts, on the other hand, made a valuable

contribution to forest management. Facilitators trained by the programme to work at the village level are an important, sustainable capacity development result.

UN-REDD re-learned some lessons that were well known internationally, such as: avoid obscure jargon, initiate work on FPIC when there is something to consent to, and on BDS when the necessary national policies and measures are in place.

Very modest progress towards Outcome 3 reflects uncertainties at the time of project design. The rationale for including this outcome in Vietnam's national UN-REDD programme is not clear.

The sustainability of UN-REDD results is weakened by ineffective co-ordination capacities within and outside the GoV. These capacities will be needed to mainstream REDD+ into activities driving deforestation and degradation such as perennial cash cropping and aquaculture. The programme engaged too little with private sector stakeholders.

While an institutional foundation has been established for REDD+ activities, human resource limitations undermine its sustainability. UN-REDD capacity development was invested in too few people to ensure self-sustaining REDD+ readiness efforts. Most national level capacity development was vested in a small group of individuals.

National commitment to REDD+ is difficult to gauge, outside of 1) a small group of NGOs and service providers, 2) participants in the different working groups and the REDD+ Network, and 3) the national REDD+ office. REDD+ has been integrated into the (almost approved) Forest Development and Protection Master Plan of the province of Lam Dong and recognised in Vietnam's strategies for 'Green Growth and Development' and climate change. Yet REDD+ is not yet woven into other policies, plans, programmes, practices and processes.

The GoV is strongly committed to the objectives of REDD+ but none of the programme's outputs are self-sustaining. From the GoV perspective, REDD+ is a potential mechanism for attracting forest sector investment that is yet to demonstrate its cost-effectiveness. Financial sustainability depends on international agreement for long-term financing for REDD+.

The programme has developed *potentially* valuable approaches but their value is diminished by uncertainties about how the government would proceed once REDD+ generates payments. Qualified political commitment to REDD+ is reflected in Prime Ministerial approval of a framework national action programme. But most of the programme's technical outputs require further political process before they are formally endorsed, nationally or provincially. Sustained effective REDD+ implementation will require clarification of the forestland tenure issues that UN-REDD was not designed to address.

Viet Nam's political dialogue and capacities related to climate change need further development before mitigation can be mainstreamed into various national policies or sub-national operations. REDD+ also needs further definition internationally before it can be integrated into sectors outside forestry. Political risks need to be reduced before Ha Noi will dedicate public resources to the cross-sectoral mainstreaming needed for sustained impacts; they

will not take ownership of UN-REDD initiatives until payment for REDD+ activities is established.

Recommendations

Much experience gained in the Phase 1 programme is reflected in the design of Phase 2. The first set of recommendations below is intended primarily for these future UN-REDD activities in Viet Nam, although they are also relevant for programmes emerging in other countries. These recommendations focus on areas where the evaluators feel the Phase 1 experience may not yet have sufficiently influenced plans for the future. The last five recommendations are intended more for UN-REDD programmes in other countries that may be in a position to benefit from the Vietnamese experience. Here again however, these recommendations could prove to be of value for the second Phase of UN-REDD activities in Viet Nam – depending on how much flexibility exists in their programme.

Recommendations for UN-REDD in Viet Nam, and other countries

1. Adopt more “demand driven” approach to programme implementation and a relationship of service provider and client between the UN-REDD programme and its diverse national stakeholders. This will mean finding ways to reduce or remove institutional disincentives to flexibility among the three UN partner organisations, thereby enhancing the programme’s ability to adapt UN-REDD activities to evolving national requirements. For example, do not “lock in” overall budgets for each partner for the full life of the programme; instead allocate funds for specific project activities every year or two years, based on past performance, evolving circumstances and emerging needs. Adapt normative products to provide guidance where this is required but tailor them carefully to specific national and sub-national circumstances.
2. Adopt a single, available and knowledgeable focal point among the three UN organisations that can regularly speak with one voice to government counterparts and other stakeholders involved in REDD+. This can significantly reduce the transaction time imposed on the GoV partner by the three UN partners. It would require these organisations to dedicate time and effort to this harmonisation process, then to exercise the discipline needed to ensure its effectiveness.
3. Vigorously support development of the necessary national capacity for engaging and coordinating a broad, multi-sectoral community of REDD+ participants. The national office will need to be able to proactively reach out to a wide range of stakeholders and identify incentives for them to engage in REDD+ activities. In the process, they will need to avoid the use of arcane REDD+ jargon and ‘off the shelf’, unadapted REDD+ messages and methods.
4. Acknowledge the risks inherent to piloting REDD+ activities and establish the mechanisms needed to mitigate and manage these risks and present stakeholders with a balanced appraisal of the risks and benefits of all aspects of REDD+ readiness. Managing expectations in the face of persistent uncertainties is a key imperative.
5. Address regional ‘leakage’ issues through a discrete regional initiative that complements national programmes and other REDD+ readiness initiatives.

Recommendations for UN-REDD in other countries, and for Phase 2 in Viet Nam

6. Help country-led REDD readiness processes to define the rationale and scope for specific national REDD+ activities, based on clear identification of the national drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Identify possible national and local level policies and measures that can address these drivers. Carefully gauge the relative costs and benefits of preferred policies and measures and clearly determine different stakeholders' interests and roles in implementing them.
7. Carry out systematic analysis of the national context. Identify key entry points into existing national policy and sub-national, country specific practices. Define where REDD+ can cost-effectively strengthen the performance of existing policies and measures. Ensure that experience from such existing policies and practices informs national REDD+ programmes.
8. Develop robust and comprehensive theories of change and associated results chains for each desired outcome of the national UN-REDD programme. Use well designed consultative processes to ensure the validity of intervention logic and broad stakeholder ownership of the programme.
9. Ensure that programme communications activities and management arrangements maintain a clear and unequivocal distinction between the emerging national REDD+ programme and the temporary financial and technical assistance provided by UN-REDD.
10. Apply mandatory requirements of UN programmes such as FPIC only after extensive consultation with diverse national and sub-national stakeholders; then carefully adapt mandatory requirements to local circumstances.