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# **UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), CAMBODIA**

## **INDEPENDENT/EXTERNAL MID-TERM REVIEW REPORT**

### **FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROGRAMME (SDP)**

*Prepared by:  
Arusha Stanislaus  
Yim Kim Chhean*

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

APR	Annual Progress Report
A2I	Access to Information
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CMDG	Cambodian Millennium Development Goals
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSO	Civil Society Organization
D&D	Decentralization and Deconcentration
ET	Evaluation Team
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoInfo	Ministry of Information
MoP	Ministry of Planning
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NCDDS	National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development Secretariat
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NEC	National Election Committee
ProDoC	Project Document
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
RRF	Result Resource Framework
WB	World Bank
SDP	Strengthening Democracy Programme
ToR	Terms of Reference

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In particular, the ET is pleased to note the transparent manner in which UNDP encouraged the evaluation to take place. Questions, that at times were difficult to answer, particular with respect to activities that had limited success were responded to with clarity, honesty and acknowledgement of difficulties in implementation. It was clear to the Evaluation Team that being the flagship governance programme of the UNDP portfolio, it was critical to UNDP Senior Management that a thorough and probing evaluation was needed, which in turn would hopefully clearly identify good practices, gaps and challenges as well as inform future programs and strategies for implementation.

## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 1.1 The UNDP Strengthening Democracy Programme (SDP) in Cambodia (2011-2013) provided for an independent, external mid-term review. The review took place over the course of approximately three weeks in September of 2013.
- 1.2 The TOR for the MTR outlined several objectives. They were: a) to assess SDP's progress towards the achievements of the project outputs and contributions to the overall expected outcome of the project and the aligned goals of the CPAP; b) Assess factors and constraints that impeded progress towards achieving expected outputs and outcomes; c) to analyze the SDP's implementation strategy, including the utilization of partners, and; d) to make specific recommendations on required adjustments at the mid-term point of implementation in order to progress more efficiently and effectively to achieve expected outputs, outcomes with specific reference to the goals of the CPAP.
- 1.3 In carrying out the assessment the team consulted secondary sources (reports and commentaries on progress of democracy in Cambodia, UNDP documents, NGO reports including those of COMFREL, IFES, NDI etc.), face to face consultations with key stakeholder and beneficiaries of the project, donor agencies and other multi-lateral institutions such as SIDA, WB, DFID, UN Agencies, local NGOs / academia working on issues of strengthening democracy, and relevant government Ministries. Additionally, two provincial visits were undertaken and interviews with beneficiaries of the project added to the depth of understanding of the project's effectiveness to date.
- 1.4 Although quantifiable data would have been beneficial to the overall evaluation, such data was not easily available. As a result, much of this evaluation rests on qualitative assessments, interviews and consultations being the primary resources for the findings contained in this report.
- 1.5 The stated outcome of the project corresponds with Outcome 3 of the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP): 'Effective mechanisms for dialogue, representation and participation in democratic decision-making established and strengthened'.

There are 4 corresponding indicators linked to this particular Outcome 3: a) percentage of women elected as commune councillors to increase from a baseline of 14.9% to 30% by 2015; b) % of citizens' concerns recorded in a public forum, from a baseline of zero in 2010 to 30% by 2015; c) % of sub-national councils publicly disclose information on expenditures from a baseline of 'none' to 30% in 2015. And finally, indicator 4 expects that by 2015 a MDG Committee will be formed in the Cambodian Parliament by the end of the project.
- 1.6 The ET would conclude that due to many variables the Programme is not expected to realize many of the indicators that correspond to the formal expected Outcome at the end of the project cycle in 2015, nor will the project meet most of the deliverables set forth and activities that are aligned to it.
- 1.7 **Nevertheless despite constraints, the project has clearly opened up space for future sustained engagement, particularly in the area of media and democracy and civil society participation. It is recognized as the flagship 'democracy building' project in Cambodia by most partners, and if anything, the ET heard some frustration that given UNDP's historically prominent role in leading the way for reforms, that more was not achieved.**

- 1.8 The most critical variable that constrained implementation was the inability to secure anticipated non-core resource mobilization targets set forth at the design stage of the project. This RM was projected at a ratio of 1:3 core to non-core for a total budget that exceeded \$15 million over the project life cycle. This has severely hampered the project's ability to implement activities as planned.**
- 1.9 The ET would, however, see this, as an of illustration of donor partners in general retreating from Cambodia over the past few years, due to changing domestic priorities in foreign aid support, rather than viewing the lack of donor interest as an indicator of dissatisfaction with the SDP.**
- 1.10 However, another key variable that would explain gaps in implementation is clearly linked to the political landscape, where the Cambodian Peoples' Party has in essence dominated the executive and legislative branches, rendering it very difficult to 'persuade and promote' a furthering of democratization. Again, this 'difficult' political operating context could be another initiator of partners moving away from Cambodia, at least with respect to supporting the governance sector.**
- 1.11 In hindsight, therefore, at the time of conceptual design, the project's situational analysis, setting forth the context and rationale for engaging in a programme on Strengthening Democracy, was well conceived.
- 1.12 The analysis, for example, notes that per the Constitution, promulgated in 1993, the RGC set out a framework of principles and the rule of law, that were by far the most liberal in the region, and indeed globally, in guaranteeing inalienable civil rights and setting a platform for a multi-party, pluralistic democratic society. Moreover, the project notes that the RGC has put good governance at the center of its Rectangular Strategy, recognizing its importance in attaining the CMDGs.
- 1.13 Nonetheless, despite extremely liberal laws governing the political and civil rights system, the project notes with caution that Cambodia remains a highly hierarchical society symbolized by entrenched patron-client relationships. And while institutions required for the governing of a pluralistic society have been established, its functioning remains suspect and fraught with the entanglement of traditional norms, low levels of trust, a general fear and / or disinclination to participate in the political process and a weak media and a lack of a vibrant, demand-driven civil society.
- 1.14 Therefore in rightly assessing the political context in which Cambodia is governed, noting the absence of a true multi-party system, the project and UNDP has refocused its goals to prioritize 'people, participation and a democratic culture.'
- 1.15 The most critical variable is the political context in which the programme is being implemented. The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has essentially dominated the political landscape for over 3 election cycles, and thereby ensuring a super majority in both the national legislature and at the commune council level. The lack of a viable opposition (until this most recent election in July 2013, where the CNRP surprised many observers by taking over 60 seats), has made working with the parliament, and especially the Committees extremely difficult, as well as with other institutions such as the Commune Councils and National Elections Commission.
- 1.16 The pre-cursor to the SDP, was the Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Processes in Cambodia (SDEP). This project aimed to move beyond the 'electoral event' and electoral related assistance, to support the evolution of a 'democratic culture and information, and to enable citizens to exercise their civic rights and

understand their rights under the Constitution. Nevertheless, the project's main focus was on building institutional capacity, transparency and accountability. This programme was funded for four years at approximately \$6.5 million.

- 1.17 Within UNDP's Governance Cluster of Programmes, included was a project which focused exclusively on support to the legislature—LEAP. This was phased out in 2009, along with the dedicated programmes that for almost two decades had supported the structural and legal framework of the heralded Commune Councils.
- 1.18 Therefore, at the time of this evaluation, UNDP's governance programming appears to have narrowed, or in more strategic terms, to have consolidated. This may be related to perhaps reflecting the changing scope of required interventions and to also reflect the changing priorities of donor partners as well as a recognition of the evident intransigent political landscape, which required a refocusing away from institutional strengthening, which had been the main focus in many previous programmes including the SDEP.
- 1.19 In fact, the designers of the programme, the SDP, were correct in identifying a common feature which influenced all aspects of Cambodia's Democratic environment, and this was the absence of information, both from a supply side and demand driven context. A well informed public, knowledgeable about their constitutional and civic rights and responsibilities, would, in the rationale of the formulation team, have a greater ability to influence the political as well as policy arena. Therefore the majority of the deliverables and activities under the two main components, focus on issues of Access, Freedom, Knowledge, Information, Civic Rights and other similar terms that convey this common thread woven throughout the project. Given the political landscape, as well as the prior focus of interventions, this new approach to focus on the demand side of democracy is something that the ET firmly concurs with.
- 1.20 The results of these changing contexts produced a programme document in the form of the SDP. The term 'programme' is relevant in the context of this mid-term evaluation; while other similar initiatives have been called 'projects', and a 'programme' approach refers mainly to the clustering of multi-sectoral interventions, in many respects, although focusing only on governance, this SDP intervention was structurally designed to reflect a programmatic approach to implementation.
- 1.21 The resulting project framework, intended outputs and activities therefore represented an amalgamation of activities, focus areas and beneficiaries that may have produced better results if focused on more discretely, perhaps bundled (since several seemed to the ET as repetitious, contributing to the impression of a programme that 'has bitten off more than it could chew'), or if the strategy and scope were more tightly linked. The ET in evaluating the complete list of deliverables outlined in the programme, reached the conclusion that the programme may have attempted too much in 'covering' the gaps in democratic deficits in Cambodia. This resulted in perhaps a less strategic document that could have been more coherently structured and to date, more successful in implementation. **However, this conclusion should be to some degree juxtaposed with the earlier acknowledgement that the scope of the project was linked to a successful resource mobilization strategy that did not materialize as planned.**
- 1.22 In terms of results, it is clear to the evaluators that the 'communicative and outreach' portions of the programme were the most successful. We include in this conclusion the Loy9 programme produced by BBC Media in Action (and funded generously by

Swedish SIDA), Equity TV, which although government run, by all accounts did report on issues relevant to the citizenry at large, and the engagement of civil society at the provincial levels (especially those focused on Indigenous Peoples') to better understand their civic and constitutional rights.

- 1.23 Yet, while the BBC Media in Action clearly would be the ET's choice as the most successful output of the programme, UNDP needs to assess the viability, sustainability as well as cost of continuing to fund a programme, where although outreach was commendable, the BBC remains an international organization with clearly established talent, skills, expertise etc. As such, the building of national capacity of the media seems to have fallen short of programme expectations, especially given that focusing on local media development in the context of utilizing this mechanism to further democratization was a key theme of the project. There may be better strategies available for more productive and cost-effective methods to build this capacity.
- 1.24 **Local capacity would require a clear focusing on developing the ability of the media to function within established international norms, despite the political difficulties. Tailored training of media outlets, exchange visits, international meetings held in Cambodia that bring peers, especially those from SE Asia, are just some of the potential areas to explore over the remaining two years of the project.**
- 1.25 While the need to enhance 'women's participation' was consistently reinforced, little if any concrete activities were seen by the ET. Again, this could be a result of the diffusive nature of activities, where a bundling would have generated a more coherent understanding of the true nature of a particular activity. **The ET, however, has learned that funding was not allocated to this component, which in the opinion of the Evaluation Team was an unfortunate decision within the overall strategic context of the programme.**
- 1.26 **The programme did not fare all that well in helping build national capacity, whether in the communications area or elsewhere, and especially where it was needed the most in building a 'culture of democracy'. Coordination among selected civil society organizations did not materialize as well as they could have. Again, the funding gap was prohibitive. Yet as we look ahead, in the view of the ET this should remain a priority over the next two years.**
- 1.27 The core funding of the project was set at \$4.5 million, with another \$10 million to be mobilized. Clearly at the mid - point of the programme, the conclusion would be reached that this was an unrealistic figure, and as a consequence the assessment of results by the evaluation team would naturally speak to this relationship. It is recommended that a thorough review of the remaining budget is undertaken, measured against a reprioritized programme over the next two years. It is doubtful that greater RM efforts could achieve substantial result for the remaining two years of the project cycle, therefore efforts should focus on gains that will have future sustainability and in turn, development partner interest.
- 1.28 The Results and Resources Framework corresponded to the requirements of UNDP's rules and guidelines. Again, however, the RRF could have benefitted from a more compact set of deliverables and activities, especially when measured against the expected outputs (2), and the larger Outcome. When measured against outputs versus



inputs (financial and otherwise), the ET concludes that there appears to be an imbalance in assessing of needs. This may be due to the large differentiation in focus between Components 1 and 2, where the latter maintained earlier priorities to focus on the parliament. But clearly budget over-runs did occur, particularly in the media component area, which accounted for a large part of the spending to date.

- 1.29 Outcomes per the UN Results Guidelines make it clear that not just one agency---that which is the leading implementer of the programme is solely responsible for achievement towards reaching the stated Outcome. In other words, other UN agencies, the governments, civil society and other development partners have their share of responsibility. Nevertheless, it has always been difficult to qualify or quantify the actual percentage of input provided by each of the actors involved, and as a result to provide for attribution or culpability. Regardless, as stated above, it is doubtful that the Outcome set out, will be achieved over this project cycle, which has just two years remaining.
- 1.30 On Monitoring and Evaluation, Risk Analysis and Quality Management Matrices: On the whole compliance with UNDP rules and guidelines were adhered to. It is interesting to note that in the Risk Analysis matrix, many of the conclusions reached by the ET, such as lack of funding and political will were mentioned as potentially negative obstacles to implementation. Clearly the project designers did anticipate these obstacles.
- 1.31 The management team (at the time of this review, a total of 3) was both competent and eager to deliver on expected results but was hampered by both financial constraints and a general lack of cohesion within the larger UNDP portfolio of programmes. For example, although the SDP calls for greater linkages with other projects within the portfolio, the ET did not see clear evidence that this was consistently applied. One particular point to be raised may reflect on the overall analysis of the MTR. One of the disadvantaged groups mentioned as needing capacity help was MSM (Men who have Sex with Men). The ET would conclude, while laudable, again, this might be an example where the project strayed away from its mandate, and where the issue of MSM, could potentially have been better managed by a sister UN agency such as the WHO, or UNAIDS. The promotion of women in decision making may have benefited from a partnership with UN Women, or another programme within UNDP's portfolio.
- 1.32 The implementation of the programme was further hampered by the lack of staff capacity, whose presence and recruitment was outlined at the onset of approval of the project. For example, one of the key senior members of the project was expected to be an International Chief Technical Advisor---this recruitment did not take place. There were other positions as well, including an International Parliament and Gender Specialist, and other national experts in media, youth and in the area of political parties. Presumably, the inability to secure the required short fall in resource mobilization affected these recruitments.
- 1.33 Advisory board members met frequently and those that the ET spoke with were happy with the regularity of communication and response from UNDP. Most if not all members acknowledged the difficulties of implementing reform within a political environment as it prevails currently in Cambodia.
- 1.34 The partnership strategy of the programme did not materialize in the view of the ET. Much was stated about utilizing the capacity of CSOs, becoming more involved in regional groupings and forging South-South cooperative partnerships. Productive

linkages with sister UN agencies, such as OHCHR, UN AIDS, UN Women etc., were all mentioned as critical to achieving goals. Two UN agencies, UNICEF in particular did sit on the advisory board of the SDP, however, with respect, in particular to the Youth Strategy, UNICEF's involvement appeared more advisory than active involvement in implementation. However, with respect to partnerships, the ET will continue throughout the analysis in the rest of this evaluation, to note the lack of clear and coherent engagement with CSOs, which are clearly a very important group both as implementers of activities and as beneficiaries of training.

## **II. INTRODUCTION**

- 2.1 Over the past nearly two decades, Cambodia's economy has been among the fastest growing in the world, certainly outpacing any post conflict country during this time. Factors contributing to this economic growth include liberal investment policies, large public and private flows of capital, restoration of peace and security that for the most part has held, and stable macroeconomic conditions. As a result Cambodia has registered very impressive gains in Human Development Indices, in particular in the areas of education, life expectancy, and gross national income per capita.
- 2.2 Despite these impressive gain, adjusting for differences in inequality, Cambodia's overall HDI score of .543 falls to .402. This 25% adjustment of inequality driven loss, is the largest of any country in East Asia and the Pacific. Cambodia's Gender Index is ranked 98<sup>th</sup> out of 148 countries in the 2012 Global Human Development Report. Gains have been made with respect to greater political participation, and primary education, but with regard to secondary or higher-level education, Cambodia does not fare very well. Maternal mortality rates are also far below general averages for the region as well as countries having similar development trajectories.
- 2.3 One interesting point, however, that should inform the SDP programme, especially with respect to its Youth strategy, is the fact that the gender difference in the labor market is very small. Approximately 79% of Cambodian women are integrated in the market, compared to 86% of men. These differences as well as averages are far higher than other countries in East Asia and the Pacific. It would be worth a larger study for UNDP to understand and dissect the reasons why these averages for women are so comparatively high, and the common link, which the ET thinks is very plausible, is movement and migration of Youth, either into urban areas, or crossing borders to find employment, suggesting that job creation for these very large young population should be a key development priority for the RGC.
- 2.4 As interesting is the conundrum that this strong and sustained growth over the past 20 years has occurred within an environment of a lack of democratic pluralism.
- 2.5 The atmosphere in Phnom Penh 20 years ago could have hardly been more different than on September 24, 2013, when the new parliament was inaugurated—with all members of the opposition party boycotting the proceedings.
- 2.6 At that time in 1993 the promulgation of the Constitution marked the end of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)'s mandate in the country which also marked a formal end to the peace process, after almost two decades of civil war, and the creation of one of the most outwardly liberal political systems in the country.
- 2.7 As a result of these constitutional and political promises, donor funds poured into Cambodia. Many new programs were formulated with many focusing on consolidating democracy, particularly through the new system of devolution through the Commune Council System. So too, was the focus on training a new cadre of civil servants and establishing a functioning and lively parliamentary system.
- 2.8 Twenty years onwards there is much debate whether the Constitution has lived up to its promise of creating multi-party liberal democracy. For many who set out two decades ago in creating this document, the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and the enabling environment essential for the flourishing of a multi-party system

- have dissipated. Cambodia appears to have morphed into a de-facto one-party state and become a ‘guided’ democracy.
- 2.9 The continued demonstrations in the street by the CNRP, Cambodia’s opposition party offer little hope that the political stalemate will end soon. Having said that, the surprising results of the recently concluded election in June 2013, where the CNRP gained 68 seats, is perhaps a harbinger of a more pluralistic political system in the near future.
- 2.10 Dissenters, however, particularly those in control of the government will point not to lapses or deficiencies in democracy but instead to the impressive gains in growth that have seen Human Development Indicators also rise rapidly.
- 2.11 All in all, Cambodia for its promises of 20 years ago remains a conundrum where inequality is clearly present, and evident. Politically, little pressure on the RGC is expected that would usher in reforms, and this is perhaps due to the emergence of non-traditional donors such as China, that prefer to focus on ‘hard assistance’, rather than the soft, policy and rule of law oriented assistance that the traditional donor community has consistently promoted.
- 2.12 UNDP and other actors working on the democratic space in Cambodia have tended to focus on establishing institutions, such as parliament, the NEC, the Commune Councils. However, the political landscape is such that organizations like UNDP and others have in recent times had very little leverage to pressure the government or influence significant capacity or policy oriented changes. This is due mainly to the lack of a viable opposition.
- 2.13 Nevertheless, there is now a recognition of this impasse and a shifting of priorities to work on catalyzing a ‘culture of democracy’---that is to bypass traditional institutions, and to instead to work on public and civic education, education of youth, civil society organizations and the utilization of media platforms. The SDP is an example of such a shift in prioritization, and when designed in 2010, recognizing the political landscape in which they were to operate in, made a conscious effort to focus more on those outside the mainstream, the marginalized, the voiceless, and by utilizing new and innovative techniques to reach those often not reached. To date it has been an admirable effort conceptually, nonetheless, there are some design flaws as well as impediments to implementation that if rectified can achieve a great deal over the final two years of the programme cycle.

### **III. PROGRAMME OUTCOME STATUS AND OVERALL RESULTS**

- 3.1 The SDP is geared towards strengthening formal / informal mechanisms for dialogue, representation and participation and ensuring that national and sub-national institutions are more accountable and responsive to citizens.
- 3.2 The SDP outlines two major reinforcing components. A) Interaction and accountability of elected bodies to citizens through strengthened democratic processes and b) strengthened civil society and media as conduits for citizens' participation.
- 3.3 The key institutions that the project envisions working with are; parliament, local councils, NGOs focusing on voter education, and civil society and media that promoted democratic / civic engagement
- 3.4 The Outcome result per the CPAP is Outcome 3; 'Effective mechanisms for dialogue and representation and participation in democratic decision-making established and strengthened'.
- 3.5 Responsible counterpart ministries within the government are the Ministry of Information and the Parliament.
- 3.6 An immediate sweep of the programme document will reveal while intentions to spur democratic dialogue is the main underpinning, as with many other similar endeavours inputs often 'crowd out' the ability to deliver sustainable and realistic and quality outputs.
- 3.7 There are two main components to the project as described above; however, within those two, there are 35 related activities. The first output focuses on 'supporting both chambers of parliament, and raising awareness on the CMDGS, and other socio-economic issues; parliamentary engagement with constituents; develop institutional mechanisms for dialogue at sub-national levels;
- 3.8 The second output which has 25 'aligned' activities, focuses on building capacities of civil society and marginalized groups to more actively participate in the democratic process; media strategies to deepen knowledge on democratic participation are emphasized; special emphasis on enhancing women participation in politics and decision-making; and establishing a policy framework to ensure Freedom and Access to Information.
- 3.9 It is the conclusion of the ET while clearly the activities are geared towards deepening knowledge on constitutional and civic rights, the programme as a whole would be considered as far too over-stretched in its ambitions to achieve its immediate outcome, and to promote this 'culture of democracy'.
- 3.10 Moreover, given the 1:3 ratio in core to non-core resource mobilization targets, achieving the stated objectives in a four year period should be considered ambitious.
- 3.11 Under Output 1 (also known within the Prodoc as Component 1), there are a number of deliverables, which essentially make up the bulk of the substantive measurable indicators of the project.
- 3.12 The deliverable speaks to the lack of parliamentary engagement with the public, either during debate, or during Q & A sessions, or through constituency visits. Implementation of the activities suggested, such as a Youth Parliament, Issue-based dialogues, Support to the Gender Committee and greater engagement with regional bodies, has not taken place, presumably due to the gridlock in the Assembly itself.

- 3.13 Nevertheless, it is the firm contention of the ET that the project re-engages in this area notwithstanding political stalemates. For example, activities called for greater South-South cooperation. There are many regional parliamentary groupings within the ASEAN region; exposure visits encourage greater communication, discussion of comparative experiences and exchange of ideas. Similarly an annual Youth Parliamentary event annually would be a wonderful mechanism through which MPs are bound to engage with the citizenry and especially with a population where 2/3 of the population is under the age of 25. UNDP should strongly pursue this area of focus.
- 3.14 Deliverable 1.2 focuses on ‘Institutional Mechanisms for public dialogue and representation to be strengthened at Sub-National levels. After discussion with the project team it was evident that very little if any of the 8 related activities were even begun. These activities ranged from improved mechanisms for greater Access to Information, to supporting pilots that create feedback mechanisms and evaluation of services by citizens. Given that the Commune Council Organic Law has been in place for over a decade, clearly the visioning of the project designers in improving mechanisms for implementation were the overall objective of Strengthening Democracy. Nonetheless, perhaps due to lack of resources as well as the lack of political will, the project faced many difficulties in initiating this scope of work.
- 3.15 Output 2 of the project focus on ‘Strengthening civil society and media as conduits for citizens’ participation in democratic processes and decision making’. Essentially the SDP envisioned creating capacity within intermediary groups who are also disenfranchised such as youth, indigenous peoples’, disabled peoples’, and other CSOs, to assist their constituencies in claiming rights and to better engage in democratic processes.
- 3.16 Much of the capacity building measures were oriented around South-South cooperation and learning exchanges. Linking of groups, to form greater coalitions around issues of basic issues of rights and good governance were part of the overall strategy, as well as building internal capacities of CSOs, who are by all accounts not firmly established in influencing either policy or politics, or well representing their constituents.
- 3.17 It is clear that the capacity building efforts through the SDP, focusing for examples on people with disabilities had positive consequences. This is borne out by testimonials carried out at the provincial level. Nevertheless, the implementation of activities, those that spoke to creating learning networks, and like-minded coalitions, as well bringing the concerns of the groups to the policy arena, did not materialize. The ET would conclude that the activities themselves appear as ‘one-off’ events, and if not part of an overall strategy of building coalitions for influencing policy, may not be as effective within a larger objective of promoting a ‘culture of democracy’. The ET suggests that in the remaining two years of the project, the coalition building aspect of the Output’s strategy be focused on, and in bringing these groups together form a collective agenda for strengthening strategies of deepening democracy and becoming more influential in both the policy and political arena.
- 3.18 Deliverable 2.2 responds to a need to ‘develop approaches to enfranchising and empowering indigenous and marginalized groups through civil society organization’. The focus on developing the communicative capacity of IPs is based on the UNDP corporate policy on Communication for Empowerment (C4E).
- 3.19 Community ownership of communication systems is deemed critically important to voicing the concerns of IPs within society, as these groups tend to live in the margins

of greater society, in very rural areas, and in general have been discriminated against without recourse of grievances.

3.20 The UNDP strategy was to implement a grant scheme to develop capacity within these groups to better utilize the media, along with imbuing them with knowledge of their civic and constitutional rights, including that of the electoral process.

3.21 An excerpt of an interview with IP groups in the provinces:

Through the discussions/interviews with key stakeholders at sub-national levels almost of them could understand the concept of the grant based project and key activities such as (i) conducting of training courses to focal persons on democracy, human rights and election processes; (ii) conducting of community forum; (iii) radio talk shows and radio spots; and trained as observer during election campaign and on election day.

The grant scheme increased the participation of IPs during the registration period for voting and during the national elections, knowledge was gained through training about their rights and the process involved in participating in a national and local election.

Through the findings from interviewees (both direct and indirect beneficiaries from grantees) the EIC materials such as video spots, posters, t-shirts, CDs, handbooks and storybooks on civil education were significantly important and were designed to be easily understood by SDP grantee beneficiaries. Clearly, the project through this scheme initiated a process about human rights, and as importantly introduced them to ‘demand democracy’, in learning to hold their local commune councilors accountable.

The radio spots have been broadcast in at least 3 IP languages such as Kreong, Tompon, and Pnong, and, although statistics of listenership are not available, the beneficiaries we spoke to conveyed to the ET that the radio talk show helped raise their concerns, understandings and suggestions related to the issues themselves and in turn the link to the election process. IP, disabled persons and groups that represent them and youth representatives were through the grant scheme, given opportunities to discuss concerns with representatives from the Provincial Election Committee – PEC and Commune Election Committee –CEC).

3.22 Clearly, the grant schemes had the positive effect of generating interest in the area of political participation to marginalized groups---in this particular excerpt, Indigenous Groups. Hopefully, such schemes could be sustained and regularized, and in turn, become a catalytic event for greater change.

3.23 However, UNDP, and the SDP, should carefully consider the sustainability of grants, as they have for the most part been useful as a catalytic process which if not followed through with, can render the whole exercise incomplete in many ways.

3.24 As such in earlier sections, the ET had cautioned against ‘one-off’ small projects (in the range of \$100,000 or less), for their intrinsic lack of sustainability without an overall comprehensive strategy---in this case to ‘deepen democracy’, and to promote a ‘culture of democracy’. Coherence and collaboration as part of such an overall strategy, whether it is to build capacity to articulate policy needs, or remind local councilors of rights of the citizenry is critical to building coalitions for change.

**3.25 Nevertheless, a significant number of indigenous peoples’ and people with disabilities were registered to vote through the grant assistance. This is very commendable and bodes well for sustaining these efforts, and for future participation in local and national elections by such marginalized groups.**

- 3.26 Moreover, grant schemes tend to become competitive for scarce resources particularly among national groups, which at times may not be conducive for building consensus and good will for a greater public good. One of the interviewees who was awarded a portion of one of the SDP grants, noted this fact, and reflected on the ‘relative waste of energy spent’ building capacity within his own organization to deliver the results he was responsible for. In other words, despite an overall willingness to engage for the greater good, there was an opportunity cost to the organization in engaging with UNDP in this very specific manner.
- 3.27 And finally, one problem is finding a common language to conduct training. This may seem somewhat trivial, but for IPs (including the 3 mentioned above), language is a critical marker of their identity. Moreover, while the SDP focused on the political aspects of IP participation in their own decision-making, many IP issues tend to be focused on natural resources, on indigenous education, or access to or confiscation of land. Again, the ET suggests that the SDP and UNDP management look at a more comprehensive strategy of merging democratic deepening goals with other issue based goals in dealing with this particular marginalized group. On the other hand, there are other organizations that deal singularly with Indigenous Peoples Rights and Development, including several regional entities. One consideration could be to ‘farm out’ the activity in the future.
- 3.28 The focus and associated activities with respect to deliverable 2.3—“Delivering youth oriented, non-formal civic education by establishing media platform, programmes and community outreach’, are, in the ET’s estimation the most successful of all the goals of the project to date. A 2010 UNDP study on Knowledge, Attitudes and practices (KAP) on Youth Civic Participation, revealed much on the general lack of youth awareness on participating in civil discourse and in a democratic society. In many ways, this conclusion could be reached in many countries, including those in the developed world. However, given Cambodia’s fairly recent (two decades) entry into the community of democratic nations, educating young people should command high priority.
- 3.29 This necessity is further amplified when the demographics of Cambodia are taken into consideration. Over 66% of the nation’s 13.5 million people are categorized as youth (ranging from 15-30). Other UN definitions of ‘youth’ place a limit at age 24. Nevertheless, the fact the Cambodia’s population is young, is very much a larger development concern, including assessing disparities between rural and urban communities, elites versus non-elites, assessments of the educational sector and the requirements of sustainable human capital for a developing nation to continue to grow, compete globally and to reduce inequality.
- 3.30 The activities within the output derived primarily from the partnership with BBC World Service Trust, a BBC related entity, yet financially independent body. Activities were guided by the findings of the KAP study. The Commune Elections of mid-2012 and the National Elections of 2013 were the basis for engaging youth in better understanding their civic rights as well as their responsibilities.
- 3.31 The ET concludes that the innovative aspect of ‘edutainment’ programming produced by Loy 9, was very much a success in that it combined aspects such as tele-dramas, call in shows, issue-based programming, entertainment, and other ‘incentivized’ designs that clearly attracted a large audience. The ET speaking casually with members of the public noted that a majority knew about and enjoyed watching the program, including those who were beyond the age of the target group.



- 3.32 While official attribution with respect to political / electoral participation has yet to be statistically investigated, preliminary feedback indicates a very positive relationship between viewership and those who became more engaged in what the project termed ‘deliberative democracy’.
- 3.33 Unofficial research findings by the BBC Media Action tell a compelling story. Well over ½ of the youth demographic, had either seen one episode, or listened into a radio show, and well over 60% self-identified as ‘regular audience’ members. The Radio reach with respect to audiences exceeded 500,000 listeners---a significant number in a country where there is a large rural population, whose primary source of information would be through radio.
- 3.34 Again, while the ET cautions that these findings are still ‘unofficial’ at the time of this evaluation, further evidence of impact is apparent when questions such as ‘do you know what the National Assembly does?’, are posed to those who are active listeners versus casual or essentially non-viewers of the programs. The listeners appeared to considerably out-perform the non-listeners. While further drilling is needed into establishing causality, these are early encouraging findings.
- 3.35 The ET’s conclusion that the Loy 9 programmatic lineup, and UNDP/SDP’s partnership with the BBC Media in Action group, has had a large role to play in reaching the original outcomes envisioned in the SDP, still needs to be met with serious deliberation with respect to future engagement of this type, in this or any other future programmatic initiative.
- 3.36 Additionally, as important with regard to continuing partnerships, or changing course of programmatic strategy in the case of youth, will be the mid-term and end term evaluation of the KAP studies that UNDP intends to carry out. Such studies will have an influence of UNDP’s Youth Multimedia Civic Education initiative.
- 3.37 The cost of production on an annual basis was close to \$1 million that were met with UNDP core project funds and with generous assistance from SIDA (\$1 million to date). Given the overall resource mobilization difficulties, such a cost structure without guaranteed non-core resources is clearly not sustainable. Secondly, one of the main objectives of the SDP was to build national capacity of media entities. While the BBC Media Action has employed Cambodian nationals in all aspects programme production, including as hosts of talk-shows etc., the building of capacity in local media production to take on such types of programming, have clearly not taken place. As such, given particularly the financial constraints described above, the ET would suggest that UNDP consider an exit strategy at the end of the programme cycle in 2015, or concurrently engage in helping build capacity within local media entities with the assistance of the BBC Media Action, to take over some of the typology of programming contained in Loy 9 that has clearly proven to be successful. Having recommended this, however, the ET also recognizes the dearth of privatized television / radio channels in Cambodia, and of the 7 local TV channels, the majority have some if not a large link to the government. Nonetheless, given the ratings possibilities of a Loy 9 type program, it is something to carefully consider.
- 3.38 The other media based platform that the SDP supported was a carryover from several previous projects---Equity TV. Equity TV was an hour long program produced and broadcast by a government run television station, which focused on issues of national interest.

- 3.39 Without the benefit of having access to the thorough statistical follow up the Loy 9 program has undertaken with regard to interests and viewership, Equity TV nonetheless had appeared to have some positive aspects to it. These conclusions are based on interviews with mostly UNDP staff. Unfortunately, sometime in 2012 due to a showing of footage of illegal logging that was ‘immediately’ deemed to be a screening of a television feed of an unrelated incident Equity TV was abruptly stopped by the government with accusations and blamed leveled at UNDP.
- 3.40 The ET does not consider this incident (and neither does UNDP management) to be a blemish on the SDP, or something that would affect future engagement of UNDP with the RGC. However, the fact that this controversy did occur speaks to the larger questions of how UNDP engages with the government, especially on issues of development interest that would at times be naturally provocative and pushing boundaries.
- 3.41 One of the byproducts of Equity Weekly was to produce a new programming concept termed ‘MDG TV’, which would focus on exchanging ideas and information (with viewer feedback) on progress towards achieving the CMDGs. It appears that this concept was initiated, and while the ET is unsure whether the abrupt cancellation of Equity TV was a significant reason, the team would continue to support advocacy on the CMDGs, in other formats if possible.
- 3.42 Deliverable 2.4 ‘Supporting Mechanisms for women’s enhanced participation in politics and decision making at the national and sub-national level’ has regrettably had very little activity to date. Again, as with other deliverables in the program, much of the activities would take place through partnership with CSOs. But as the ET has learned and conveyed throughout this evaluation, the availability of a deep, ingrained and politically active CSO community is not evident as yet in Cambodia, although CSOs that work with women have a larger presence as well as a great regional presence to be able to provide the capacity support and partnership the SDP envisioned.
- 3.43 It is quite possible that women did benefit indirectly through the Loy 9 program, or through the Grant Scheme Concept which focused on IPs, DPs and Youth. However, this would be insufficient to claim that the project was able to deliver on this very strategic area of development support.
- 3.44 Nevertheless, for reasons due to staff capacities as well as over-stretched programmatic resources this very critical aspect of the project’s objective has seemed to have had little impact. The ET would strongly urge that during the revision of strategies and priorities that far more emphasis is placed on raising the profile of women, irrespective of an imminent election. Women as decision-makers go far beyond a political categorization and Cambodia as a whole in terms of building its required future human capital would benefit immensely.
- 3.45 Deliverable 2.5 essentially focused on Equity TV which has been discussed earlier. One aspect that the ET can reinforce is that there has been more than one deliverable related to the setting up of media platforms for citizen feedback, public information broadcasting etc. In the interest of making this and other future project documents ‘tighter’ with regard to coherence and a cohesion of strategy between components and activities, the ET feels that this particular output could have been subsumed into some of the others set forth in the project document.

- 3.46 The final deliverable under Component 2 is ‘Advocacy and policy/legal support provided for development of improved national enabling framework for access to information’.
- 3.47 It is clear throughout the project document that the project design / formulation team considered the availability of information as well as the ability of the public to access their representatives were serious ‘democratic deficits’ in Cambodia.
- 3.48 The basis for focusing on this area, A2I (in other countries perhaps termed Freedom of Information Acts), was an initiative UNDP supported in 2010, which assisted a coalition of CSOs to advocate for advancing the A2I policy framework, into actual legislation. This working group termed MONASRI, was to team up with the SDP and other key stakeholder over a 3-5 year period to conduct consultations with policy makers and legislators, and generally advocate with the public for legislation to be passed. Activities included holding national conferences on the subject, as well as arranging for study tours of policy makers and legislators to allay any doubts on the benefits of passing such legislation.
- 3.49 In speaking with the advisory group, UNDP management as well as the project team, it appears that except for one consultation, not much else has taken place within this deliverable. Explanations as to specific reasons for the lack of progress centered primarily on the lack of political will of the RGC and the ruling party, particularly given their overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, to seriously consider A2I as a priority.
- 3.50 It is the recommendation of the ET that the SDP in the remaining two years of this programme’s cycle, refrain from conducting further activities on A2I. There are several reasons for such a recommendation. First, clearly the country is still in a political crisis (witnessed most recently by a demonstration led by the CNRP that brought out 20,000 protesters to the streets). Given the general lack of cooperation evidenced by the ruling party, it would appear that the timing, and the political landscape for focusing on Freedom of Information in general with respect to legislation, is not conducive. Finally, despite five other ASEAN countries having passed A2I type legislation, most recently in Indonesia, there would appear to be far more pressing democratic gaps and challenges for UNDP and the SDP to focus on in terms of prioritization. A2I legislation is often a very contentious political issue, and often requires extensive consultations, and fairly stable and mature democracies to not only be passed but to be actively enforced. The ET does not believe Cambodia at the present moment is at this stage of maturity.
- 3.51 However, the ET does simultaneously encourage the utilization of opportunities if they do arise to expose legislators to A2I. This would be most easily facilitated if regional conferences are held, particularly within the ASEAN grouping that may focus on such a subject. If such an opportunity arises, the SDP should take advantage and arrange for learning visits. This recommendation is very much in keeping with the strategy echoed throughout the project document of using South-South cooperation as a key lever to influence the deepening of democracy within Cambodia.
- 3.52 There is also another opportunity for UNDP to get more involved in ‘aspects’ of Access to Information. The World Bank will begin implementation early next year on Social Accountability Framework. The ET met with the WB during two weeks of consultations, and learned that the WB is interested in UNDP playing an implementing role with the SAF. This could, potentially, be a good entry point for UNDP to re-engage once again in the Commune System, however, not as the primary lead as the agency was for so many years, but in a smaller role, that would still achieve several objectives

outlined within the SDP. The ET offers no recommendation either way that UNDP become involved in the SAF; however, it does recommend that UNDP engage in discussion internally with respect to the pros and cons of engaging with the SAF.

#### **IV. Underlying Factors Affecting Outcomes in the UNDP Strengthening Democracy Programme**

- 4.1 As noted previously an ‘Outcome’ as per defined in UNDP’s programming guidelines is a goal that is expected to be achieved not solely by the project itself, but also by all the partners involved, including the government.
- 4.2 The ET has concluded that the SDP programme will not achieve the outcome set forth in the project document due to several design, strategic, external environmental as well as implementation factors.
- 4.3 On the design of the overall project. While it has been noted that the rationale for the strategic focus on ‘deepening democracy, fostering a ‘culture of democracy’, were the right strategic decisions for a Strengthening Democracy Programme at this point in time in Cambodia, the ET would conclude that while the conceptual idea was completely justified, the strategic method in which the project was constructed lent itself to a greater critical analysis than perhaps is warranted.
- 4.4 To begin with, the ET will firmly support the notion that the programme had too many areas of coverage that could simply not be supported with the a) funding element on hand; b) the existing staff capacity; and c) the external environment that had a large influence on the project’s success to date.
- 4.5 Two components are an average and a modest strategic framework for a project of this size. However, there were 35 or so activities in total that were expected to be achieved, which takes a considerable amount of planning, staffing and funding. In other words, the ET would conclude that the design was not realistic.
- 4.6 Moreover, many of the ‘deliverables’ seemed to have little working coherence with one another, although conceptually, as noted, issues of freedom of expression, freedom of information etc., were imbued throughout each of the deliverables. There could have been a better effort at identifying common activities, consolidating them, and producing a much tighter, strategic, and eventually, a far more manageable project.
- 4.7 Much of the implementation of the project, rested on South-South cooperation and consolidating a network of CSOs to actively participate in activities, including training and building capacity. Moreover in the final deliverable under Component 2 on promoting A2I legislation, an extant team MONSARI was expected to play a large role in advocacy. The ET would conclude that the project suffered to a large extent by the inability to identify and bring this CSO grouping together.
- 4.8 Having said this, the ET would conclude that the project probably over-estimated the depth of capacity and the vibrancy of the CSO/NGO sector in Cambodia. Having met with some of the partners during our consultations, the ‘capacity’ on an experiential level appeared less than adequate to fulfil the active partnership responsibilities that were expected by the SDP.
- 4.9 The fact that little South-South cooperation took place, although clearly a key implementation strategy of the SDP was problematic. Despite the difficult political landscape, there would have surely been some entry points, either with CSO networking, or media networking, or even working with parliamentarians, or committee members that could have benefitted from a South-South strategy of

learning and exchange. It is critical that this part of the implementation strategy is clearly ensconced in the remaining two years of the project.

- 4.10 The ET has previously praised the management team for their professionalism and dedication. Nevertheless, staff capacity to actually achieve the deliverables, were simply not commensurate with the actual needs of the project. This needs to be revisited, particularly so if the project is to be downsized (as recommended by the ET), or, on the other hand, if one area is going to be strengthened, such as working with parliament, hiring of a parliamentary technical support staff would be in the best interest of the project.
- 4.11 Funding was a key constraint and the inability or lack of opportunity to raise more funds (except for SIDA), and bringing in active partners that would provide technical support at the very minimum, affected implementation. The rationale for funding, especially in a world of retreating donor agencies, must be addressed in a serious and comprehensive manner.
- 4.12 And finally, despite the ET's findings of lapses in implementation, the external environment clearly played a large role in limiting the ability to execute work plans. This was a significant constraint and must be singularly noted. Having said this, the ET believes that UNDP and SDP could and should have been somewhat bolder in 'pushing' boundaries, as indicated to us by some donor partners, who were quite willing to come along, but noted that UNDP traditionally plays that role of forging new paths.

## **V. MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION**

- 5.1 The Management team of the SDP consisted of three persons; A Programme Manager, a civil society coordinator, and one person who handled administrative support.
- 5.2 The ET has stated before, and will once again, that the team performed well given the constraints they faced. The ET in speaking with donor partners, advisory board members and other project beneficiaries found that the team was considered professional, responsive and willing to work with others to get things done. Report were handed in in a timely manner and compiled for ease of access and other quality management requirements adhered to. These are all hallmarks of a competent team. We say this having evaluated many other projects, including some in Cambodia, where such positive feedback was not as effusive.
- 5.3 Nevertheless, as noted, the project indeed suffered from a larger lack of capacity. At least five other professionals, both international and national were to originally be part of a larger team implementing this programme. The ET is not quite sure why these approved positions were not filled. However, at the same time, given the resource constraints and the political landscape, we are not convinced in hindsight that filling of these positions without a more strategic implementation plan, would have benefited the project in any event.
- 5.4 The ET also believes that internal issues within UNDP's management and portfolio structures could have contributed to some lack of direction with regard to implementation. The current Assistant Country Director of Governance has only been on the job for approximately one year, and there are other internal staffing issues that are beyond the scope of analysis required by the TOR of this evaluation.
- 5.5 The constraints with respect to implementation have been dealt with thoroughly in other sections and therefore we will not repeat what has already been said. This was a well-conceived project that had some clear structural design flaws and implementation constraints, including that of funding. This final conclusion should be ample for the overall rethinking of how to reprioritize programming for the next two years.

## **VI. PROJECT PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY**

- 6.1 The project's partnership strategy is as follows: 'UNDP will partner with a range of government and non-government organizations, including the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Information, Ministry of National Assembly, the Senate, the National Elections Committee, the Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia, Civil Society Organizations and other grassroots networks'.
- 6.2 Additionally, the project notes that 'UNDP will endeavour to closely partner with other entities involved in promoting democratic governance.....such as the EU, The WB, PACT, API, EU/GZIZ SPACE Programme, SIDA, the ADB, IRI, IFES, NDI, OXFAM, COMFREL, and NICFEC. Additionally the SDP intended to work with other UN Agencies such as UNICEF, OHCHR, UNESCO, UNCDF, UNFPA, UN Women and the UNV.
- 6.3 The range of partners indicated manifests a commitment to implement a broad-based, inclusive partnership friendly programme. However, in evaluating the actual implementation of the programme up to this mid-term, it is evident that the project was not being as strategic as it should have been in setting out a clear and attainable and productive partnership strategy.
- 6.4 The only active partners that the ET was able to discern were SIDA (who contributed at least \$1 million dollars to the Loy9 programme), and Oxfam which has a small financial contribution to one of the provincial training outputs.
- 6.5 The lesson to be learned here, however, is not whether one agency, or CSO is a better partner due to its generosity in resource giving, but how productively and usefully it works with the project to achieve objectives.
- 6.6 The one case in point that will be consistently underscored by the ET is the commitment by the project to build capacities of the CSO community in Cambodia and bring them in as true partners in implementation. This did not happen, and is one of the more significant programme deficits thus far.
- 6.7 All partners in a project have their own mandates, and their own agendas. Finding common ground and common goals should be the first task of establishing a partnership strategy. It appears in this case that during formulation this aspect was not as emphasized as it should have. And in rephrasing the programme for the next two years, UNDP/SDP should clearly identify partners that will not necessarily only provide resources of a financial nature, but through their own presence and knowledge and networks, contribute to the larger goal that all development actors in Cambodia are seeking, and that is to deepen and strengthen democracy.
- 6.8 And there are clearly opportunities available. For example with respect to building capacities of women in decision-making, there are several regional and national NGOs focusing on this critical area. Furthermore this is a core mandate of UN Women. Bringing these groups together around a common goal should not be as difficult a task as perhaps trying to push for A2I legislation. Being strategic is the underpinning consideration that the ET would like to make with respect to partnerships.



## **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MID-TERM ADJUSTMENTS**

### **General**

- 7.1 The SDP should continue to operate while trimming activities in keeping with its budget constraints. While not thus far achieving the goals it set out in 2011, it has done much in terms in opening up opportunities for ‘deepening the culture of democracy’, which was the key goal that underpinned all activities.
- 7.2 With this in mind, the ET recommends that the SDP and UNDP Management revise its targets and objectives that they wish to achieve over the next two years and focus on a few key areas that would carry over to the next phase of Democratic Strengthening in Cambodia.
- 7.3 It is clear to the ET, that despite 20 years of institution building, a constitution that is based on the best of those around the world, that democracy has been receding, not improving in Cambodia. Nonetheless, donors such as UNDP and their partners have an obligation to continue to press on, to provoke debate and discussion, and lead the way for other like-minded donors to follow. UNDP is still considered the ‘neutral’ partner, particularly in sensitive areas like governance, and the organization must take better advantage of this prominence.
- 7.4 It has been illustrated that the activities are far too many with respect to the financial and capacity expectations of the SDP. Thus, the ET would recommend a revisiting of the RRF, and the annual work plans to ensure consolidation and aggregation of activities, rather than continue to implement a diffusive programme as it currently stands.
- 7.5 As noted in the ‘Introduction’ section, Cambodia has had mixed results with respect to Human Development Gains. This also poses a philosophical as well as historical guide for UNDP and partner organizations to consider. How do you deal with a government that is guided by an extremely liberal constitution, yet in application, a nation that is still led by those with close sympathies to single party systems? Where does the role of democracy come into play, while growth is the one of the highest in the region? Are there trade-offs? These are questions that the ET cannot answer, yet, have significant influences with respect to relating democracy, growth and inequality.
- 7.6 UNDP/SDP should carefully weigh the need for added staffing with respect to a revised RRF, for the next two years. Emphasis should be placed on adding capacity in priority areas over the next two years.

- 7.7 The Loy 9 programme and the partnership with BBC Media Action should continue. However, it cannot be sustained without commitments from donor partners, for additional funding that will enable core funding to be moved towards new prioritized activities. Thus a thorough budget analysis of funding versus activities needs to take place by UNDP management.
- 7.8 Furthermore, UNDP has to reach a decision on whether to continue to fund such activities in the future, given, a) the funding aspect and b) the fact that not much capacity is being built within national media outlets. A clear and smooth exit strategy should also be part of the deliberations with respect to the partnership with BBC Media Action.
- 7.9 The ET recommends that the engagement with disabled people and MSM be discontinued within the overall context of reprioritization. Working with marginalized groups is clearly within UNDP's mandate. However, there are other entities, perhaps better equipped to deal with the needs of MSM and People with Disabilities.
- 7.10 UNDP/SDP should continue to work with IPs. However, a comprehensive strategic plan, encompassing the work of other UNDP programmes, and other UN and non-UN programs should inform this planning.
- 7.11 The A2I component should be phased out, with the exception as noted earlier of providing exposure to other systems in other countries wherever possible. However, a targeted focus on attempting to push for A2I legislation in the ET's view is a non-starter.
- 7.12 The need to link up with sister UN organizations as well as UNDP's own structures is critical to ensure greater coherence. The ET has noted, this has not occurred, and perhaps has contributed to the critical analysis of the implementation strategy. It is imperative for UNDP to ensure that all units are working together, not as singular projects, but as one portfolio of programmes.
- 7.13 With respect to media, building capacity to report independently and to understand their rights and responsibilities is critical.
- 7.14 The Direct Implementation System should continue. The ET has not commented on this as yet, however, it is clear the NEX is not a viable option with respect to the current conditions in Cambodia and will lead to even greater gridlock with respect to implementation. Having the DIS, in this sense then, allows UNDP a lot more flexibility to engage in 'pushing boundaries' and leading innovation. This is was clear conveyed to the ET by donor partners that UNDP has been too timid in its approach to furthering democratic engagement, and that many donors do look to UNDP to set agendas, where then they can follow. The next two years must be seen and utilized as an opportunity to follow through on this mandate.

### **Specific Recommendations for the Remaining Two Years**

- 7.15 Youth, Media, CSOs and Parliamentary engagement are the key aspects of a revised programme, in the opinion of the ET.

- 7.16 It is recommended that despite the parliamentary gridlock that is on-going, that the SDP continue to focus on influencing parliamentary groupings and committees, especially taking advantage of South-South regional gatherings and conferences. In this respect, the ET would encourage the ‘advocacy’ element of parliamentary engagement, rather than the constituent-legislator relationship originally envisioned in the programme. Moreover, UNDP should work with the parliament even if there is no viable opposition in committees.
- 7.17 It is highly recommended that the SDP focus on the goal of Women’s Political Participation and Decision Making in the overall context of deepening democracy. Sustained efforts should be made to engage with like-minded partners such as UN Women and other civil society organizations.
- 7.18 Working with the Women’s Forum in Parliament (already in the RRF) would be an excellent entry point that could benefit from other agencies also working on the same capacity issues of Women MPs. The ET strongly suggests this as a key priority area to shift funding towards.
- 7.19 The strategy of convening and consolidating a consortium of Civil Society Organizations has not occurred. The role of civil society as an instrument of deepening democracy cannot be over-stated. In this regard, the ET would strongly recommend that the SDP get back to its original objectives of identifying civil society entities that are ‘engaged in democracy building’, undertake specific capacity building, and devise strategies on how best to utilize them as partners in future activities.
- 7.20 The focus on Youth should continue to be a foremost priority. However, as with Loy 9, now that the ‘electoral cycle’ is over, programs and strategies should shift to issues of employment, education and other development issues.
- 7.21 And finally UNDP should now start discussion with partners on the next phase of sustaining and deepening democracy in Cambodia, with the intent of enabling true partnerships of implementation as well as in securing funding commitments.
- 7.22 The ET would not recommend as large, ambitious and diffusive a programme as the current SDP for the next phase. The new project should be very strategic, interlinked with other UNDP programmes as well as relevant partners, and prioritize critical areas for support.

## ***ANNEXES***

- ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)
- ANNEX II. MISSION SCHEDULE
- ANNEX III. WRITE UPS for FIELD INTERVIEWS ON SDP GRANTEES
- ANNEX IV. LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED/INTERVIEWED
- ANNEX V. LIST OF DOCUMENTS/MATERIALS REVIEWED

## ***ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)***

### **• Assignment Information**

Post Title	Mid-Term Review Consultant
Practice Area	Democratic Governance
Post Level	Consultants
Duration of the Assignment	25 working days beginning from September- October 2013
Duty Station	Phnom Penh & Field Visits to provinces
Cluster/Project	Democratic Governance Cluster/Strengthening Democracy Programme (SDP)
Supervisor	SDP Project Manager/Governance Team Leader

### **• Project Description**

In order to promote Democratic Governance in Cambodia, UNDP has developed the Strengthening Democracy Programme (SDP) for implementation within the new country programme cycle 2011-2015. The programme was designed to strengthen the formal and informal mechanisms for dialogue, representation and participation of youth, people with disabilities, indigenous people, women, and media in Cambodia's current democratization process and to ensure that national and sub-national institutions are more accountable and responsive to the needs and rights of all people living in Cambodia. To achieve the delivery of these results, SDP focuses on two key outputs:

Output 1: Increased interaction and accountability of elected bodies to citizens through strengthened democratic processes and practices at national and sub national levels.

Output 2: Strengthened capacity of civil society, media, and political parties, to act as conduits for citizen's participation in democratic processes and decision making.

Since its inception in 2011, SDP has been implementing major initiatives as follows:

- 1- Multi-media youth education campaign initiative (Loy9) in partnership with BBC Media Action to promote youth civic awareness and participation;
- 2- Equity programme in partnership with TVK (Equity Weekly and Equity News);
- 3- Grant schemes to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to implement a civic/voter education campaign to promote awareness and participation of people with disabilities and indigenous people in democratic election process. Current grantees are Khmer Youth Association/Cambodian Indigenous Youth Association (KYA/CIYA), Cambodian Disabled People Organization (CDPO), and Building Community Voice (BCV).

After over two years of the project implementation, UNDP Cambodia wishes to commission a Mid-Term Review (MTR) to assess how effective its programmatic activities and strategy have been in achieving target outputs and, thus, contributing to

Democratic Governance and CPAP outcomes and in making recommendations to improve the project performance in response to Cambodia's development needs.

- **Objectives and Scope of the MTR**

The main purpose of the MTR is to assess whether the project is on course in line with outputs and outcomes of UNDP CPAP 2011-2015 and to make recommendations to improve the project performance as well as suggestions for steering SDP's future strategy, e.g. adjusting project scope and approaches, work plan, partnership, cost-effectiveness and sustainability. MTR is also intended to provide UNDP Cambodia management team, relevant stakeholders and the project board with an independent review on progresses achieved through the implementation of SDP in contribution toward the expected development results especially in light of socio-political changes that Cambodia has undergone in recent years.

Specifically, the objectives of the MTR are to:

1. Assess SDP's progress towards the achievements of the project outputs and contribution to the progress toward the outcome of Democratic Governance and CPAP;
2. Assess factors affecting the achievements SDP's outputs and outcomes;
3. Assess SDP's strategy used in achieving its intended outputs and contribution to the outcome, including partnership.
4. Drawing on the review's findings, lessons learnt, and make recommendations on specific courses of action to improve the project efficiency and effectiveness through undertaking immediate remedial measures and prompt adjustments of the SDP project document and framework to reflect on current project context and situation with strong connection to the country programme action plan (CPAP) and UNDP Corporate Strategic Changes and Focus.

In particular, the MTR is required to answer the following main questions:

- What are key achievements of the project against its expected outputs?
- To what extent the grant schemes, the multi-media youth education campaign and the Equity Programme contributed to achieve the project outputs?
- What are the factors that influence the performance of the project such as partnership, coordination with relevant agencies, and funding resources?
- What are the recommendations for adjustment and for future direction of SDP?

In line with the above objectives, the scope of the MTR will:

- 1) Review progresses and assess the quality of the outputs achieved by SDP as of 2013 and will cover its activities at both national and local levels as appropriate;
- 2) Analyze the extent to which the delivery of the project outputs has so far contributed to the achievement of the outcome of democratic governance as stated in the project document;
- 3) Review and assess whether the project uses a proper strategic approach that contributes to the capacity development of national stakeholders engaged in the project implementation;

- 4) Assess whether the current project design including its intended results and output formulation, the project scope and the project management arrangement allow the project to move in the right direction to bring about the expected results, and its alignment of the present project context to the CPAP perspective and UNDP Corporate Strategic Changes and Focus;
- 5) Produce the outputs and deliverables as required in the Tore.

### • Expected Outputs and Deliverables

The MTR national consultant will assist the international consultant to deliver the following outputs:

1/ A high-quality result-oriented mid-term review report, including lessons learnt, and recommendations for coming project improvement. This MTR report will be used as the inputs for the CPAP Mid-Term Review.

2/ A high-quality and result-oriented SDP project document/RRF updated to reflect on the current context of the project.

<b>Deliverables/Outputs</b>	<b>Estimated Duration to Complete</b>	<b>Target Due Dates</b>	<b>Review and Approvals Required</b>
a) An inception report describing the MTR methodology and the work-plan	1 working day	4 September 2013	SDP Project Manager / DG Cluster Team Leader
b) Briefing, survey review, MTR draft report and debriefing presentation to UNDP	19 working days	September-October 2013	SDP Project Manager / DG Cluster Team Leader and other key stakeholders
c) Finalization of the MTR report	3 working days	7 October 2013	SDP Project Manager / DG Cluster Team Leader
d) SDP Prodoc/RRF updates	2 working days	15 October 2013	SDP Project Manager / DG Cluster Team Leader

The final MTR report, incorporate comments from project team, partners and other key stakeholders, should follow the UNDP evaluation report format.

### Methodology

As the MTR's focus is on achievement of outputs and their corresponding contribution to CPAP outcome results, it is envisioned that the MTR methodology will take both a quantitative and qualitative approach, which will encompass key methods including:

- Desk review of relevant documents such as project document, progress reports, research studies relating to Cambodia's context and situation;
- Discussions with UNDP management and programme staff;
- Interviews and group discussions with SDP's partners and stakeholders;
- Field visits to observe SDP's activities on the grounds;
- Consultations and debriefing meetings including presentation of initial findings, lessons learnt and key recommendations to stakeholders.

The national consultant will assist the international consultant in designing a review plan and submit an inception report outlining the detailed review work-plan indicating the methods to be used and information sources to be looked at for addressing the reviewing questions.

Logistical assistance will be provided by SDP team, who will also provide the national consultant with relevant documents including CPAP 2011-2015, project documents, progress reports and relevant studies.

### **The final report/output structure**

#### **1. Project mid-term review report**

A high quality MTR report shall be prepared according to the UNDP evaluation report format with the maximum of 50 pages and contents described below:

**Title and Opening Pages:** should provide the following basic information:

- Name of the evaluation intervention
- Timeframe of the evaluation and date of the report
- Country of the evaluation intervention
- Names and organizations of the evaluators
- Name of the organization commissioning the evaluation
- Acknowledgements

**Title of contents:** should include boxes, figures, tables and annexes with page references.

#### **List of acronyms and abbreviation**

#### **Executive summary**

#### **Introduction**

**Description of the intervention:** should provide the basis for report users to understand the logic and assess the merits of the evaluation methodology and understand the applicability of the evaluation results. The description needs to provide sufficient details for the report users to derive meaning from the evaluation.

**Evaluation Scope and Objectives:** the evaluation report should describe in detail the selected methodological approaches, methods of analysis; the rationale for their



selection; and how within the constraints of time and resources, the approaches and the methods employed yielded data that helped answer the evaluation questions and achieve the evaluation purposes. The description should help the report users judge the merits of the methods used in the evaluation and the credibility of the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

**Data analysis:** the report should describe the procedures used to analyse the data collected to answer the evaluation questions. It should detail the various steps and stages of analysis that were carried out, including the steps to confirm the accuracy of data and the results. The report also should discuss the appropriateness of the analysis to the evaluation questions. Potential weaknesses in the data analysis and gaps or limitations of the data should be discussed, including their possible influence on the way findings may be interpreted and conclusion drawn.

**Findings and conclusions:** the report should present the evaluation findings based on the data analysis, and structure around the evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact), and conclusions drawn from the findings.

**Recommendations:** the report should provide practical, feasible recommendations directed at the intended users of the report about what actions to take or decisions to make. The recommendations should be specifically supported by the evidence and linked to the findings and conclusions around the key questions addressed by the evaluation. They should address the sustainability of the initiative and comment on the adequacy of the project exit strategy, if applicable. Recommendations should also provide specific advice for future or similar projects or programmes.

**Lessons learned:** as appropriate, the report should include discussion of lessons learned from the evaluation, which would include new knowledge gained from the particular circumstance, intervention and context outcomes, which are applicable to a similar context. Lessons learned should be concise and based on specific evidence presented in the report.

**Report annexes:** suggested annexes should include the following to provide report users with supplemental background and methodological details that enhance the credibility of the report:

- Terms of Reference (ToR)
- Itinerary
- List of persons interviewed
- Summary of field visits
- List of documents reviewed
- Set of evaluation questions and summary of results

Main text excluding annexes should not exceed 50 pages.

## 2. Updated Project Document

A high quality and result-oriented SDP project document updated to reflect the current context of the project. The report will follow UNDP template, which includes mainly the project updated result resources framework and the relevant indicators, the project management, and the project M&E plan.

- **Institutional Arrangement**

The national consultant will perform his work with the international consultant under the overall direction of and report to the SDP Project Manager and Team Leader of UNDP Democratic Governance Cluster with project oversight support from a Programme Analyst.

The national consultant will need to bring his/her own personal computer to conduct this assessment. When necessary, a driver along with a vehicle may be arranged by the SDP project if field visits are required (outside Phnom Penh).

A review group will be established to ensure the quality of the MTR. The group will assist the Democratic Governance Team Leader in reviewing the inception report, the draft report and updated project document.

- **Duration of the Work**

The consultancy will be required to work for approximately 25 working days over a period beginning from September to October 2013.

- **Duty Station**

The duty station for this assignment is Phnom Penh, Cambodia. During the assignment, the national consultant is expected to be available for all consultations as outlined above.

- **Monitoring and Progress Controls**

The national consultant will be accountable to UNDP for the timing and quality of outputs and advice. To deliver the expected outputs, s/he will work closely with the international consultant and DSP project and Democratic Governance Cluster teams. The national consultant will be paid upon receipts of the expected outputs with acceptance from UNDP.

- **Minimum Qualifications of the Individual Contractor**

Education	Master's degree in political science, public policy, development studies, economics, sociology or a related social science
Experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Minimum 5 years of research experience in Mid-term review, project evaluations, strategic planning, preferably in the areas of democratic governance;</li><li>• Sound knowledge of democracy and good governance, youth development, and media and substantive research experience;</li><li>• Prior evaluation experience would be an asset.</li></ul>
Competencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Possess strong analytical skills and the ability to conceptualize, articulate and debate about governance issues with a positive and forward-looking attitude;</li><li>• Demonstrated ability to communicate effectively with various partners including government, civil society, private sector, UN and other development donors;</li><li>• Sound organizational and time management skills;</li><li>• Strong interpersonal skills and ability to work with people from different backgrounds to deliver quality products within short timeframe;</li><li>• Be flexible and responsive to changes and demands;</li><li>• Be client oriented and open to feedback</li></ul>
Language Requirements	Full proficiency in English and Khmer (written and spoken)

- **Criteria for Evaluation of Level of Technical Compliance of Individual Contractor**

Consultant shall submit CV/P11 together with a short note detailing the proposed methodology to conduct the assignment.

<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>	<b>Obtainable Score</b>
Relevant education and number of years of as required in the ToR	10 points
Proven relevant technical skills in democracy and good governance, youth development and media	20 points
Prior development project/programme formulation and evaluation experience is required Fully conversant with Project Management Cycle (PCM) based evaluation work	30 points
Prior experience with UNDP project evaluation in Cambodia	30 points
Proposed methodology	10 points
Total score	100 points

## ANNEX II. MISSION SCHEDULE

Date	Time	Activities	Venue	Responsible/ Focal Persons	Remark
Mon 09 <sup>th</sup> Sept	9:30 a.m.-10:30 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Velibor Popovic, Assistant Country Director and Governance Team leader a.i	UNDP B#2	Socheath	Completed
Tue 10 <sup>th</sup> Sept	08:30 a.m.-09:30 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. Napoleon Navarro, Deputy Country Director Programme	UNDP B#2, Nap Office	Socheath	Completed
	10:30-11:30 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. Colin Spurway	BBC Office, No. 58 Street 306, Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Morn/Sokchea	Completed
	2:30-3:30 p.m	Meeting with Ms. Denise Shepherd-Johnson	#11, Street.75, Sangkat Sras Chark ,Khan Daun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Morn/Sokchea	Completed
Wed 11 <sup>th</sup> Sept	11:00-12:00 a.m.	Meeting with Dr. Vandara Chong	# 225, Pasteur (51 Street),Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Morn/Sokchea	Completed
	2:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.	Meeting with Ms. Isabelle DEVYLDER	No. 53, Street 51, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, B#5	Morn/Sokchea	Completed
Thu 12 <sup>th</sup> Sept	08:30-09:30 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. Koul Panha	No. 138 St. 122, TeukLaak I, ToulKork, Phnom Penh	Morn/Sokchea/Socheath	Completed
	10:00-11:00 a.m.	Meeting with Dr. Hang Puthea	No. 16B, St. 348, Bkk 3, Chamkarmon, Phnom	Morn/Sokchea/Socheath	Not Available

*Strengthening Democracy Programme (SDP)*

			Penh		
	02:00-3:00 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Ran Sopheak Pagna	No. 49A St. 384, ToulSvay Prey I, Chamkarmon, Phnom Penh	Morn	Completed
	3:30-4:30 p.m	Meeting with Ms. Prak Sokhany	Phnom Penh Center, Building F, Ground Floor, Coner Sihanouk (274) & Sothearos (3) Bvld, TonleBassacChamkar Morn, Phnom Penh,  Kingdom of Cambodia.  Tel: +(855)23 210 380  Email: ccsp@ccspcambodia.org  Website: ccsp@ccspcambodia.org	Morn/Sokchea	Completed
Fri 13th Sep	10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.	Meeting with Ms. Viphou Phuong	No. 27-29, Street 75, Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Socheath	Reschedule
	03:30-04:30 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. NimolSoth	#38 SamdechSothearosBlvd. Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Morn/Sokchea	Completed
Mon 16 <sup>th</sup> Sept	08:30-09:30 p.m.	Meeting with Ms. ThidaKhus	#6S, Street 21, SangkatTonleBassac, Khan Chamkarmon, Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Socheath	Not Available

*Strengthening Democracy Programme (SDP)*

	2:00-3:00 p. m	Meeting with H.E. KemGunawadh	#62, PreahMonivongBlvd.Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Socheath	Not Available
Tue 17 <sup>th</sup> Sept	09:30 a.m.-10:30 a.m.	Meeting with H.E. LengVy	MoI/NCDD , Ministry of Interior (MoI), #275, Norodom Blvd., Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Socheath	Completed
	10:30-11:30 a.m.	Meeting with H.E. Mrs. Dr. Shin Chum Bo	Minitstry of Interior, NorodomBlvd.Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Socheath	Not Available
Wed 18 <sup>th</sup> Sept	10:00 – 11:00 p.m.	Meeting with Ms. Narmada Acharya	No. 221, Street 51 BoeungKeng Kang I, Phnom Penh	Morn/Sokchea	Cancel
	2:00-03:00 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. Andreas and Jeudy	Embassy of Sweden, Phnom Penh Tower, 10th floor, #445, Monivong Blvd. Phnom Penh	Socheath	Completed
	04:00-05:00 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Lay Khim/ Mr. Thira Ouk	4th Floor, #64, OknhaIng Bun Hoaw, Str. 108 Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Socheath	Completed
Thu 19 <sup>th</sup> Sept	08:30-9:30 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. NginSaorath	Wat Than, Norodom Blvd, TonleBassac, Phnom Penh	Sokchea	Completed
	10:00a.m.-11:00 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. PheapSochea	No. 69Z, Street 450, SangkatToulTumpuon, Phnom Penh	Sokchea	Completed
	2:00-3:00 p.m	Meeting with Mr. Mak Chamroeun	No.135A St.259, Toek La-ak I, Toulkork, Phnom Penh	Sokchea	Completed

*Strengthening Democracy Programme (SDP)*

	03:30-04:30 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Robert Patterson	No. 8, Street 352, BoeungKeng Kang I, Chamkarmon, Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Morn/ Sokchea	Completed
20-22th Sep		Grantee field visit	Kampong Cham, Ratanakiri	Morn/Sokchea	Confirmed
Mon 23rd Sept	9:00-10:00 a.m	Meeting with Ms Maria FARIELLO	EU Office, No. 100 A, PreahNorodom Boulevard Khan Daun Penh, 12207 Phnom Penh PO Box 2301 Cambodia	Socheath	Pending Con.
	10:30-11:30 a.m.	Meeting Mr. Sin Sorya	UNDP office , Buidling 2	Sokchea	Confirmed
	2:00-3:00 p.m	Meeting with Ms Janelle Plummer	World Bank Office, 113 Norodom Blvd. Phnom Penh	Socheath	Confirmed
	4:00-5:00 p.m	Meeting with Mr. Ros Sopheap	No. 86, Street 288, Sankat Olympic, Khan Chamkarmon, P.O. Box 2684	Sokchea	Confirmed

### ***ANNEX III. WRITE UPS for FIELD INTERVIEWS ON SDP GRANTEES***

#### **Write Ups for Field Interviews on SDP Grantees**

**Instruction:**

- This interview guide is only applicable to **Provincial Stakeholders** that have participation in the SDP Grantees project team and their respective organization.
- The interview may be done through face-to-face interaction.

<b>No.</b>	<b>Questions</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Relevance</b>		
1	Are the project outputs addressing local needs as outlined in participation of human rights, democracy and community voice?	<p>KYA/CIYA: According to the findings from the field visited process, in general grantee's project has significantly implemented the project activities with participation not only the IP but also Khmer citizens in the targets. The local authorities said that the number of voter (IP) in each target has increased if compare to the commune election and national election in the past mandate due to the clarification from the project activities dissemination through community forums and speakers by Provincial Election Committee, District Representatives, Commune Chiefs/Councils, Village Chiefs and another NGO Representatives.</p> <p>BCV: The coordinated and collaborated with a number of local NGOs and IP groups in established of Community Producer Groups and Listening Cubs.</p> <p>CDPO: The cooperation with National Election Committee, NICFEC, COMFREL and other NGOs as well as youth with disabilities through monthly radio talk shows and public forums on voter registration and voter list verification.</p> <p>The projects (grantee projects) have contributed to increasing the engagement of citizens with local authorities, given people and opportunity to raise problems and local issues on the democratic and election process.</p>
<b>Efficiency</b>		
2	What did you feel about the project?	Through the discussions/interviews with key stakeholders at sub-national levels almost of them could understand the concept of project and key



		<p>activities such as (i) conducted training courses to focal persons on democracy, human rights and election process; (ii) conducted community forum; (iii) radio talk show and radio spot; and focal persons as observer during election campaign and election day.</p> <p>To increase the participation of IPs during the registration period for voting and during the national election through provided awareness about their rights and the process involved, through IP communication (IEC materials) and the project beneficiaries to get more interesting in election especially on the process of election for the remote areas.</p>
3	What did you feel about the project?	The highlighted activities and outputs that emerged during the course of project implementations are to increasing the participation of IP and disable people and youths in the election process through the awareness of their rights and process to vote from the SDP grantee activities.
4	How well are the messages of the SDP grantee disseminated?	<p>Through the findings from interviewees (both direct and indirect beneficiaries from grantees) the EIC materials such as video spots, posters, t-shirts, CDs, handbooks and storybooks on civil education were significantly important and easily touch the SDP grantee beneficiaries feeling to get more interesting and understanding in human rights, local democratic especially on the process of national election.</p> <p>The mass media such as radio spot have been broadcast (IP languages such as Kreong, Tompon, and Pnong) was coverage over the IP community in the target province and radio talk show has voice out an IP representatives to raise their concerns, understandings and suggestions related the election process (IP, disability and youth representatives have opportunities discussed with representatives from Provincial Election Committee – PEC and Commune Election Committee –CEC)</p>
5	Do you feel that more activities / training that you were given by the project can be useful for you, or would you prefer other types of support?	In participated with the project have provided training and capacity building to some commune councilor members, district staff and target beneficiaries, especially the project have to help access to necessary information including practical experiences, human rights information and challenge, and other related important issues. Liking between local authorities and citizens for

		dialogue and debate.
<b>Effectiveness</b>		
6	How did the project change, or not change your views on democracy, voting, participating and holding your representatives accountable.	The SDP grantee projects have basically achieved in the part of increasing the participation of IP during the registration period for voting and during the commune election of 2012 and national election of 2013 through providing awareness about their rights and the proves involved, through IP friendly methods of communication (EIC materials). The most significant change of the projects is the attitude and behavior change of the target groups. Moreover, the project activities have created opportunity and provided capacity of community people and confidence in the relevant participating and decision making.
7	What do you feel about the important of being part of the democratic process? Do you think it makes a difference? Would you want to get more involved by joining a district council, or commune council, or other institution to make sure your voice and that of your people are heard?	<p>To empower citizens to participate effectively in democratic governance and election process in the period elections. It work to increase understanding of democratic rights and responsibilities, especially among the poor, women, youth, disadvantaged people and ethnic minorities.</p> <p>For young generations (IP in the rural communities) are limited to understand of the democratic governance and especially election process to share and discus their options and concerns through discussion in face-to-face meetings, forums and broadcast media.</p> <p>They do know how to organize and mobilize themselves, how to participate with commune council monthly meetings, community forums and how to share and care each other. Through the promoting community voice have share information and strengthen relationship with local authority in all level in order to make them understand how to protect their identity, culture and land by using media (through established of VBC's Community Media Producers and Community Listening Clubs). Being part of joining with local authorities (district, commune and village), they are always provide space and opportunity to share and exchange knowledge, skills and information among themselves to discuss their challenges they faced and found out a better solution.</p> <p>People are now more confident to voice out their concern and issues to commune councils and other local authorities through consultation meeting,</p>

		workshop and public forum, in particular in the CCs meeting and in voter registration and national election process. This shows that people have spirit of solidarity among them and to make sure their voice people were heard.
8	What are the areas that need more urgent improvement?	Field visit found that some of grantee's beneficiaries (staff and community) are still lack of relevant skills and knowledge about the project activities and implementation. Moreover, the project no monitoring systems and mechanisms in order to fix out some gaps during and after implementing the project activities in order to sustainability.
<b>Impact and Cross-Cutting Issues</b>		
9	If a politician was in front of you right now, what kind of things would you tell him about how he/she could help improve your lives?	To give opportunity and empower citizens to participate effectively in accountability of elected officials to voter constituencies established, as well as local elected councilors especially increased information and evidence to effectively influence national assembly and local elected officials' performance. Enhancement and empowerment of voters through increased knowledge and understanding of democratic rights, responsibilities and local democratic governance to rural community.

## **ANNEX IV. LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED/INTERVIEWED**

### **RGC Representatives:**

1. H.E LengVy Director General of General Department of Local Administration of Ministry of Interior (MOI) and SDP Board Member;

### **UNDP Country Office:**

2. Ms. Setsuko Yamazaki Country Director at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
3. Mr. Napoleon Navarro Deputy Country Director (Programme) at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
4. Mr. Velibor Popovic Democratic Governance Team Leader (a.i) at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
5. Mr. HengSocheath SDP Project Manager at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
6. Mr. Chun Sophat Programme Officer (M&E) at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
7. Mr. Moeun Morn Youth and Civil Society Liaison Officer at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
8. Ms. KhimSokchea Project Finance Assistant at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);

### **United Nations Agencies:**

9. Dr. Chong Vandara National Programme Officer for Youth Sexual, Reproductive Health, Life-Skill and HIV Prevention Programme at the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Phnom Penh;
10. Ms. Denise Shepherd Johnson Chief of External Communication Section at the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF);
11. Mr. NimolSoth National Programme Officer at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
12. Ms. Isabelle Devylder Programme Officer for Cambodia at the United Nations Volunteer, Phnom Penh;

### **Development Partners:**

13. Mr. Andreas Johansson First Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights at Embassy of Sweden (SIDA);
14. Mr. Erik Vallin First Secretary for Democratic Governance at Embassy of Sweden (SIDA);
15. Mr. JeadyOeung Programme Officer at Embassy of Sweden (SIDA);
16. Mrs. Viphou Phuong Senior Programme Officer at Embassy of the United Kingdom, Phnom Penh;
17. Ms. Janelle Plummer Senior Governance Specialist at the Work Bank Country Office, Phnom Penh;
18. Ms. Maria Fariello Governance, Democracy and Human Rights at European Union (EU), Phnom Penh;

**NGOs/Implementing Partners:**

- |                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| 19. Ms. PheanSophon       | PEM Project Manager at Oxfam America, Phnom Penh office;   |
| 20. Mr. Ouk Thira         | Extractive Industry Officer at Oxfam America, Phnom Penh office;   |
| 21. Mr. KoulPanha         | Executive Director at Committee for Free and Fair Election in Cambodia (COMFREL);                                  |
| 22. Mr. Robert Patterson  | Country Director at International Foundation for Election System (IFES);   |
| 23. Ms. YimSokunmealea    | IFES Programme Coordinator at International Foundation for Election System (IFES);                                 |
| 24. Mr. Colin Slpurway    | Project Director at BBC Media Action, Cambodia;  |
| 25. Mr. SothyroSamoeun    | Project Manager at BBC Media Action, Cambodia;   |
| 26. Mr. NginSaorath       | Executive Director of Cambodian Disabled People's Organization (CDPO);   |
| 27. Mr. HuyKhy            | Programme Officer at Cambodian Disabled People's Organization (CDPO);  |
| 28. Mr. PheapSochea       | President of Cambodia Indigenous Youth Association (CIYA);   |
| 29. Mr. Lay Chantha       | Assistant to President of Cambodia Indigenous Youth Association (CIYA);  |
| 30. Ms. Sao Sokha         | Administration and Finance Officer of Cambodia Indigenous Youth Association (CIYA);                                |
| 31. Mr. MakChamroeun      | President of Khmer Youth Association (KYA);  |
| 32. Ms. RosSopheap        | Executive Director at Gender and Development for Cambodia and Deputy Chair of CPWP Steering Committee Secretariat; |
| 33. Mr. Ran SopheakPagna  | Community Media Support Coordinator at the Building Community Voices (BCV);  |
| 34. Ms. Pry Phally Phuong | Executive Director of the Building Community Voices (BCV);   |
| 35. Mr. Sin Sorya         | Director of the Khmer Institute of Democrat (KID);   |

**UNDP/SDP Grantee Sub-National (Kampong Cham and Ratanakiri provinces):**

- |                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| 36. Mr. Soy Sakhorn      | Director of Representative Safe-help Disable Organization in Bateay District (RSDOB) and CDBO Network;          |
| 37. Ms. ChavSreycha      | Project Officer of Representative Safe-help Disable Organization in Bateay District (RSDOB) and CDBO Network;   |
| 38. Mr. Houn Chan Sokhin | Finance Officer of Representative Safe-help Disable Organization in Bateay District (RSDOB) and CDBO Network;   |
| 39. Mr. KreNarim         | Field Facilitator of Representative Safe-help Disable Organization in Bateay District (RSDOB) and CDBO Network; |
| 40. Mr. My Mom           | Loy9 Youth Group Representative of BBC Media Action, Kampong Cham province;                                     |

41. Mr. Chan Plem	Ratanakiri Project Assistant of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
42. Mr. Pat Thealai	Volunteer of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
43. Mr. LapanVouen	Community Radio Producer Group of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
44. Mr. ChrekBunthath	Community Radio Producer Group of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
45. Mr. MourmThourn	Community Radio Producer Group of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
46. Mr. MorBer	Community Radio Producer Group of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
47. Ms. KakathSamath	Listening Club Representative of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
48. Mr. MousHsub	Listening Club Representative of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
49. Mr. MengSen	Listening Club Representative of Building Community Voices (BCV), Ratanakiri province;
50. Mr. Nun Sokhunthea	Provincial Project Coordinator of Cambodia Indigenous Youth Association (CIYA), Ratanakiri;
51. Mr. ChaySopheal	District Councilor of Ochum District, Ratanakiri province;
52. Mr. Bean Sokun	Commune Election Committee (CEC) at Ochum Commune, Ochum District, Ratanakiri province;
53. Mr. Meas Ton	Provincial Coordinator of Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (NICFEC), Ratanakiri province;
54. Mr. Dam Sokheng	General Manager of Radio Station Khmer Eysan at Ratanakiri province;
55. Mr. ChounPhinnara	Provincial Coordinator of Committee for Free and Fair Election in Cambodia (Comfrel), Ratanakiri;

## ***ANNEX V. LIST OF DOCUMENTS/MATERIALS REVIEWED***

- UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP 2011-2015);
- UNDP Strategic Plan for 2014-2017;
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2011-2015);
- United Nations Evaluation Groups (UNEG), Standards for Evaluation in the UN System, dated: April 2005;
- The Evaluation Policy of UNDP, First Regular Session 2011, dated: Feb 2011;
- UNDP Types of Evaluation (Thematic Evaluations Assess UNDP Performance);
- RGC, National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) Update 2009-2013, dated: July 2010;
- RGC, Mid-Term Review of National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP 2009-2013), dated: April 2012;
- RGC, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
- RGC, on the National Program for Sub-National Democratic Development (NP-SNDD) 2010-2019, dated: May 2010;
- Strengthening Democratic Programme (SDP) ProDoc;
- Strengthening Democratic Programme (SDP) AWP 2011, 2012, 2013-2014
- SDP Annual Project Reports 2011, 2012 and Quarterly Progress Reports;
- UNDP ProDoc for Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Process in Cambodia 2006 – 2010;
- UNDP Final Project Report for Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Process in Cambodia (SDEP), dated: January 2011;
- SDP Program Board Meeting Minute; dated: October 2012;
- UNDP Country Governance (Outcome Evaluation 2006-2009);
- UNDP/TVK Equity Program (A New Wave of Political Broadcasting in Cambodia), dated: August 2010;
- CDPO ProDoc for Political Rights of Person with Disabilities (PvDs) and Disability Access in Election of National Assembly; dated: August 2012;
- CDPO Project Completion Report, dated August 2013;
- CDPO Accessible Elections for Persons with Disabilities in Cambodia, dated: 2013;
- BVC Project Document (ProDoc) on Supporting Indigenous People's Voice, dated: August 2012;
- Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) for full Grant to LNGOs/CBOs between UNDP and BVC, dated: August 2012;
- BCV/UNDP-SDP Quarterly Progress Reports 2012, 2013;
- BBC Media Action Phase I ProDoc;

- BBC Media Action Phase II DroDoc (The Multimedia Initiative for Youth Civic Education in Cambodia, dated: September 2013;
- BBC Country Case Study (Support to Media Where Media Freedoms and Rights are Constrained, dated: August 2012;
- BBC Youth Civil Participation in Cambodia (Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices, and Media) baseline study, dated: November 2010;
- BBC Media Action/Loy9 Annual Project Report 2012 and Semi-Annual Progress Report 2013;
- KYA/CIYA ProDoc of (Together to Increase Indigenous People Participation in National Election in 2013), dated: August 2012;
- KYA/CIYA Final Project Report of (Together to Increase Indigenous People Participation in National Election in 2013), dated: August 2013;
- KYA/CIYA External Final Evaluation of (Together to Increase Indigenous People Participation in National Election in 2013), dated: August 2013;
- UNDP, Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators, 2002, <http://www.undp.org/eo/guideline-foroutcomeevaluator>;
- UNDP, Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation for Development Results, 2009. <http://www.undp.org/HandbookonPlanning,MonitoringandevaluationforDevelopmentResults>;
- UNDP Project Evaluation Guidelines First Round, February 2008. <http://www.undp.org/ProjectEvaluationGuidelinesFirstRound>;
- UNDP website: [www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org)
- World Bank website: [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)