



# **Final**

## **Programme Evaluation**

### **Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP)**

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## Acronyms

AAP	Africa Adaptation Programme
APR	Annual Progress Report
BDP	Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
BERA	Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy, UNDP
CAI	Climate Action Intelligence
CC	Climate Change
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CDG	Capacity Development Group
CDNA	Capacity Development Needs Assessment
CO	Country Office, UNDP
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality
DIMC	Data and Information Management Component
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community for West African States
EEG	Environment and Energy Group, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGCA	Global Gender and Climate Alliance
HQ	Headquarters
ICFJ	International Center for Journalists
ICPAC	IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Center
IGAD	The Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa
ILCD	Institutions and Leadership Capacity Development
IRTSC	Inter-Regional Technical Support Component
ITCP	The International Centre for Theoretical Physics
KICG	Knowledge, Innovation and Capacity Group, UNDP
KM	Knowledge Management
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LRP	Leadership for Results Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCBP	Media Capacity Building Project
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NER	National Evaluation Report
NEX	National Execution
NIM	National Implementation Modality
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Co-operation Directorate
OSC	Operations Subcommittee (of AAP Programme Board)
PDP	Professional Development Programme
PEI	UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative
PMU	Project/Programme Management Unit
PPAS	Programme and Project Assurance Support Component
PPIS	Programme/Project Implementation Services
Prodoc	Programme/Project Document
QPR	Quarterly Progress Report

RB	Regional Bureau, UNDP
RBA	Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP
RBAS	Regional Bureau for RB Arab States, UNDP
RBx	Regional Bureaux, UNDP
RTA	Regional Technical Adviser
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference for African Development
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP CO	UNDP Country Office
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
WFP	World Food Programme

**Countries:**

BFA	Burkina Faso
CG	Congo
CMR	Cameroon
ETH	Ethiopia
GAB	Gabon
GHA	Ghana
KEN	Kenya
LSO	Lesotho
MAR	Mauritius
MOZ	Mozambique
MUS	Morocco
MWI	Malawi
NAM	Namibia
NER	Niger
NGA	Nigeria
RWA	Rwanda
SEN	Senegal
STP	São Tomé and Príncipe
TUN	Tanzania
TZA	Tunisia

## Terminology

Programme: Overall/global programme = one AAP programme

Project: Country level intervention = 20 AAP country projects/national projects

The use of logframe terminology is not uniform across the various AAP Prodocs and logframes. The table below shows the terminology used in the evaluation and how it refers to the key documents.

Evaluation report	AAP overall Prodoc			20 AAP country Prodocs	IRTSC revised logframe	MCBP logframe	Evaluation ToR	
	National Component		IRTSC				Nat. comp.	IRTSC
	Front page	Log-frame						
Goal	Goal							
Objective	Objective			Project objective				
Outcome	Outcome	Output	Output	Output	Objective	Outcome	Output	
Output			Activity	Activity result	Outcome	Output		Output
Activity				Action		Activity		

## List of contents

1	Executive/analytical summary .....	6
1.1	Brief description of programme .....	6
1.2	Context and purpose of the evaluation .....	6
1.3	Conclusion summary .....	7
1.4	Performance rating.....	12
1.5	Overview of lessons learned/recommendations .....	14
2	Introduction .....	18
2.1	Purpose of the evaluation .....	18
2.2	Methodology of the evaluation .....	18
3	AAP and its development context.....	20
3.1	Challenges the programme seek to address .....	20
3.2	Goal, objectives and intended outcomes/results of the programme.....	20
3.1	Programme start and its duration .....	23
3.2	Main stakeholders.....	23
4	Findings.....	25
4.1	Programme timeline, formulation process and inception period.....	25
4.2	Programme management, coordination and implementation modalities .....	29
4.3	Coordination with partners and linkages to other interventions .....	36
4.4	Administrative systems and procedures .....	38
4.5	Budgets and spending .....	39
4.6	Monitoring and evaluation, indicators and baselines .....	42
4.7	Activity implementation and attainment of outputs .....	48
4.7.1	National Component.....	48
4.7.2	IRTSC.....	52
4.7.3	MCBP .....	64
4.7.4	PPAS.....	66
4.8	Attainment of outcomes, objective, and goal.....	68
4.9	Sustainability and replicability.....	75
5	Performance assessment, lessons and recommendations.....	80
5.1	Performance rating/assessment .....	80
5.2	Lessons learned and recommendations for future UNDP programming .....	83
5.3	Recommendations for immediate AAP follow-up.....	86
	Annexes.....	88
	Annex 1: AAP evaluation conclusions at a glance.....	89
	Annex 2: AAP lessons at a glance .....	94
	Annex 3: AAP country project analysis sheets.....	97
	Annex 4: Terms of Reference.....	129
	Annex 5: Evaluation Programme .....	130
	Annex 6: Stakeholders consulted.....	131
	Annex 7: Documents consulted .....	133
	Annex 8: Inception Plan.....	135

## 1 Executive/analytical summary

### 1.1 Brief description of programme

The government of Japan financed the UNDP Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP) with USD 92 million. AAP was implemented in 20 African countries in 2009-2012. Originally intended as a 3-year programme, Japan granted a one-year no-cost extension in 2011. The goal of AAP was: *Enhancing the adaptive capacity of vulnerable countries, promoting early adaptation action and laying the foundation for long-term investment to increase resilience to climate change across the African continent.*

The objective of AAP was: *20 countries in the African continent adjust their national development processes to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities.* AAP aimed at delivering the following five outcomes in the 20 countries:

1. *Countries have introduced dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change*
2. *Countries have built leadership and developed institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels*
3. *Countries are implementing climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors*
4. *Financing options to meet national adaptation costs have been expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels*
5. *Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities is being generated and shared across all levels*

Each country project had its own objective in accordance with the national context; they had the same outcomes as the overall AAP programme. While the activities in all country projects often had similarities, they were selected and formulated in accordance with the national context.

The national projects were provided with technical support and capacity building from an Inter-Regional Technical Support Component (IRTSC) and from UNDP Practice Teams.

Furthermore, the Media Capacity Building Project (MCBP) aimed at building the capacity of journalists in AAP countries to enhance the media coverage of climate change related issues.

### 1.2 Context and purpose of the evaluation

The final AAP Programme Evaluation assesses to what extent the goal, outcomes and results had been achieved, and the key factors that have hindered or facilitated the success of the programme. Based on the key findings, lessons are drawn out to provide recommendations that may help sustain the results of AAP and improve future UNDP interventions. The evaluation applies the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency (incl. timeliness), and sustainability. The “impact” criterion is not included, although the evaluation covers outcomes and results. Given the policy nature of AAP, it is difficult to attribute impact directly to the programme and it is still

too early to assess the impact of changed policies and plans. The evaluation was carried out as a distance evaluation from the home office of the Evaluation Team and relied on tools such as phone/Skype interviews, emails and questionnaires for stakeholder consultations. Furthermore, the consultant team reviewed available AAP programme documentation and data. The evaluation of the AAP country projects is a meta-evaluation based on AAP country project evaluations and monitoring data.

### **1.3 Conclusion summary**

AAP was a very ambitious programme in several ways. Firstly, it represented a novel and innovative approach to climate change adaptation moving away from project based interventions towards a more fundamental shift by transforming government approaches. Not surprisingly, this required changing mindsets, enhancing the understanding of the crosscutting nature of climate change, and building capacities to enable governments to embrace a new paradigm. Secondly, the sheer scale of AAP, covering 20 countries across Africa, many of which are classified as LDCs, was in itself an ambitious endeavour. Thirdly, formulating and implementing country projects with a transformative objective within a three-year time frame is very ambitious. The combination of these three high ambitions in one programme appears very bold, and the expected objective and several of the expected outcomes of AAP were unfeasible to achieve within the available time frame; indeed, had it not been for the one-year no-cost extension granted by the Government of Japan; AAP would have failed to deliver its intended outputs.

#### **Ownership**

Due to the short time frame available for AAP, country project formulation was done over a short period by consultants engaged by UNDP HQ and UNOPS. While national stakeholders (governments and COs) were consulted, their engagement in the formulation process appears somewhat limited and the initial understanding of the AAP concept at the country level was low. Furthermore, AAP had to compete with other national priorities and projects for attention. As a result, national stakeholders initially did not feel a strong ownership of AAP in many countries, which in turn affected the pace of country project implementation. Low ownership at the high levels of government continued to be a challenge throughout the programme.

The management structure and budget allocations of AAP were not sufficiently aligned with the structure of UNDP and departmental mandates. Furthermore, the Programme Board met only once a year, and was thus not able to provide sufficient strategic guidance to AAP and unblock institutional and managerial blockages. RBA and RBAS initially engaged in AAP to a limited extent; this contributed to the slow country project implementation up till late 2011. Another issue related to the structural setup of AAP is that IRTSC was external to UNDP. This, combined with the initial limited involvement of RBA and RBAS, created barriers for IRTSC coordination and collaboration with COs, as well as limited collaboration and integration with other UNDP programmes. The combined introduction of the Operations Subcommittee (OSC) and pressure from the Government of Japan resulted in a much stronger RBx involvement, which in turn significantly enhanced programme delivery at the country level in 2012.

#### **Capacity**

The time frame necessary for country project formulation, inception and establishment of the IRTSC was significantly underestimated in the AAP design. In-country capacity

and understanding of the AAP concept was not adequately assessed and overestimated during programme design, and as a result support needs were underestimated. This led to significant delays in country project implementation, especially during the inception phase.

It also led to an inadequate definition of the mandate and role of IRTSC, which was originally intended to respond to country project requests for technical support. However, IRTSC identified critical/strategic support areas which countries had not identified themselves and launched the stream 2 activities to address these. Furthermore, IRTSC had to provide a significant amount of project management support to enable countries to implement, but this was at the expense of IRTSC's capacity to provide technical support. While the no-cost extension was critical to the delivery of AAP, it also meant that IRTSC was forced to reduce its budget for support activities. Earlier knowledge of the extension would have enabled IRTSC to plan its resource use differently, and instead of spending funds on activities the country projects could have covered themselves IRTSC could have asked countries to refund the costs of these. While IRTSC largely achieved its outcome of providing technical expertise and capacity development to the 20 AAP countries, IRTSC was not fully able to deliver its intended outputs and meet the associated targets, as it could not provide full support to all countries in all areas. Furthermore, by design (i.e. in the intended outputs) as well as implementation, IRTSC support had a bias towards supporting work targeting the technical level (e.g. the provision and analysis of climate data) rather than the political level (e.g. the use of climate data and analysis in decision processes). IRTSC did not fully engage in support for activities that specifically worked on changing policy and planning mechanisms and targeting decision-makers. Nonetheless, country projects found most of the support received of good quality, relevant and implementable, although it was in a number of cases found to be provided late, although some Francophone projects found that language barriers affected the support provided (some task managers did not speak French).

### **UNDP cross-practice collaboration**

AAP was a frontrunner in UNDP in relation to cross-practice collaboration involving several Practice Groups, and UNDPs institutional structure was not geared to provide incentives for cross-practice collaboration. The provision of cross-practice support faced significant coordination challenges. As a result, the cross-practice support provided was less than originally intended, although the Gender Team engaged significantly in AAP in 12 countries and the Knowledge Management Group worked closely with IRTSC on KM, by combining financial and staff resources from AAP with other sources. Most cross-practice support was provided as bilateral collaboration between EEG/IRTSC and one other Practice Group. Multi-practice collaboration was piloted in one country (Lesotho) in 2012, and there AAP provided UNDP with a unique opportunity to test integrated multi-practice support and collaboration, although coordination challenges and time constraints made it impossible to fully develop, test and refine the approach.

### **Administrative aspects**

While the use of UNOPS for administration of the regional components helped speeding up procurement and recruitment of consultants, administrative and programme management inefficiencies with both UNDP and UNOPS (i.e. cumbersome and time



consuming administration procedures) were a significant cause of delays and contributor to low initial spending.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

AAP lacked a clear overall programme monitoring framework and the overall AAP Prodoc and its logframes were too generic to provide guidance for robust monitoring. The monitoring setup was fragmented with each country and CO responsible for monitoring their respective country projects. IRTSC was only mandated to compile overall programme progress reports and did thus not have the instruments to develop an overall monitoring framework, which could go beyond output and activity monitoring and capture outcomes, impact and lessons learned. The lack of such information makes it difficult to document the outcomes and impact of AAP. Furthermore, country projects were not sufficiently supported in terms of developing solid and outcome oriented monitoring systems. Monitoring was used mainly for reporting purposes and seemingly not used as a management tool. Moreover, the absence of a requirement to have an external mid-term review meant that an opportunity to take stock of key challenges and revise/reorient the programme design was partially lost, although the light-touch mid-term review did provide guidance on solving some of the critical programme management issues towards the end of the programme.

### **Results**

National component: While country project spending was very low in 2009-2010, it picked up significantly in 2011-2012, and at the programme completion almost all funds had been spent. While the initial low spending was to a large extent a result of the above-mentioned short-coming in the programme management and implementation modalities and administrative inefficiencies, it should also be acknowledged that policy programmes which focus on transforming government practices cannot be expected to display a linear spending curve. The pattern of low initial spending until the national capacity and understanding reached a certain level of maturity, after which spending rates and implementation increased significantly, appears normal and comparable to the experiences of the UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI). Nonetheless, a full year of implementation under AAP was virtually lost due to the rushed design phase and delayed establishment of IRTSC and country project management units. One concern, however, is whether the accelerated spending in the last year of AAP, was at too fast a pace to allow proper planning and strategic spending of all the resources towards the achievement of the AAP objective and outcomes; this appears to have been an issue in a number of countries.

Overall, the national component partly achieved its intended outcomes. These outcomes were generally very ambitious and could in most countries probably not be achieved within the available time frame. Nonetheless, significant results were achieved, although AAP appears to have been more successful in reaching the technical level than the policy level. For example, the countries were enabled to access and analyse climate data and other relevant information, but a gap in relation to having senior officials using available information in their decision-making remains. All countries have formulated policies and developed adaptation plans or strategies, e.g. in relation to specific sectors, although not all have yet been approved. However, most countries appear not to have sufficient mechanisms to implement these (other than traditional donor financed projects). National institutional structures for coordination were established in all

countries, but with the reported low ownership of high-level government (e.g. due to low awareness of the socio-economic impact of climate change and competition for attention with other development priorities), their ability to effectively coordinate and convene ministries and others seems more uncertain. Ten countries created government budget lines for climate change, although actual fund allocation is unclear in most countries. Six countries secured donor funding, but with funding being limited to government's own funds and traditional donor funding, there seems not to be a significant change in terms of having a variety of financing options. Sharing between countries appears to have been mainly IRTSC led and a culture of sharing between countries does not appear to have been fully adopted.

There was a strong country interest in engaging in pilot interventions under AAP, but these were not always sufficiently designed to inform policy. One question would be whether there is a need for a programme like AAP to implement on-the-ground interventions or whether it would have been better to link up to existing initiatives and focus on bringing the experiences from these up to the policy level. In cases/countries, where there is a need for an AAP type of policy programme to engage in pilots (e.g. to create buy-in and ownership, or when there is a lack of existing interventions that can inform policy), such pilots should be carefully designed to inform policy.

MCBP: While complementary to the national component and addressing an important area in relation to climate information access, awareness raising and policy-making, MCBP was effectively implemented as a stand-alone project with its own specific target group (journalists and media), which differed from the target groups of the other AAP components. Within a short time frame, MCBP delivered its intended outputs and achieved its intended results of building journalist capacity and enhancing media coverage of climate change issues.

Objective: The objective of AAP was: *20 countries in the African continent adjust their national development processes to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities*. The target for this objective was: *20 African countries adjust national development processes to fully incorporate climate change*. The 20 AAP country projects laid the foundation for integrating climate change issues in national development processes. A number of countries have also integrated climate change in policies and plans. However, they are generally still not fully able to integrate and implement climate change in their development processes across sectors without further support. Hence, the Evaluation Team assesses the objective to have been partly achieved. However, it should be acknowledged that the objective entails a significant transformation of national capacities and practices; hence it would not be realistic to expect AAP would achieve this within the stipulated time frame.

Goal: The goal of AAP was: *Enhancing the adaptive capacity of vulnerable countries, promoting early adaptation action and laying the foundation for long-term investment to increase resilience to climate change across the African continent*. AAP has contributed to the attainment of this goal over time and laid a foundation, which future initiatives can build upon, by increasing information access and knowledge, enhancing government coordination capacities, and facilitating adaptation mainstreaming into policies.

However, while AAP generally has made good progress towards its intended objective and outcomes, and created a foundation for future work, there is one question that

needs further consideration. It is understandable that AAP usually has environment ministries as the main national entry points, given a) that these are usually the designated ministries for climate change, and b) the focus on increasing the access to climate change information. But environment ministries often have limited ability to coordinate other sector ministries and ensure climate change mainstreaming across sectors and in development plans. The mandate and leverage to coordinate ministries usually lies with planning and finance ministries, but these were rarely a main entry point for AAP.

### **Sustainability**

Considering that AAP did not have sufficient time to fully achieve its intended objective and fully engrain the AAP approach in government practices, the long term sustainability of the results achieved as well as the continuation of the transformative processes initiated are areas of major concern (except for MCBP – the journalists trained are likely to continue using the skills imparted). While efforts have been made at the global level to ensure funding for the continuation of the processes and results achieved under AAP funding has so far not been secured. The situation is similar at the country level, where there in many countries is no funding available for continuation of the AAP initiated process, or even to maintain the results achieved (e.g. data management systems). Hence, there is a real risk that the momentum and results in many countries will be lost.

A clear and comprehensive sustainability or exit strategy was never developed for the overall AAP programme, nor for most of the country projects. Moreover, while tools and guidelines were developed under AAP (mainly at the national level), a comprehensive set of tools and guidelines covering all aspects of the AAP approach, which could be used to transfer the knowledge and methodologies of AAP was not developed. IRTSC has implemented some activities to facilitate more long-term sustainability and sharing of experience (such as a regional lessons learned workshop and a repository of AAP documents on the AAP website and Teamworks), but these are not sufficient to ensure sustainability. With IRTSC being external to UNDP and the staff leaving AAP at both regional and country level, the experience, knowledge and approaches developed under AAP are unlikely to be fully internalised by UNDP.

Nonetheless, there are areas where the AAP approach and results will be utilised by UNDP; RBA intends integrate climate change adaptation issues into their new regional programme and RBA is leading the development of a new regional project on climate adaptation in consultation with RBAS and BDP building on AAP, to be launched at TICAD 5. RBAS is developing a regional programme for coastal zone management building on the AAP experiences from Morocco, which will be submitted to TICAD 5 for funding. The Gender Team and Poverty Group will continue their AAP work under other projects. At the country level, some countries are considering means to continue the processes initiated under AAP or to replicate AAP, but so far the AAP process has not been taken over by other projects. Hence, the sustainability of AAP seems at the best to be patchy and only likely to be achieved in specific thematic or geographic areas.

In any case, even if further funding is secured for continuation of the processes initiated under AAP, there will be an implementation gap of 6-12 months, and UNDP has not allocated internal resources to cover such gap and maintain a low level of implementation. Hence, key staff at all levels of AAP will have left by the time further

funding is secured, so much of the AAP experience and knowledge will not be readily available for new initiatives on climate change adaptation mainstreaming, planning and policy-making. Time and resources would have to be spent on recruiting new teams at HQ, regional and country levels and these teams would need a start-up period.

### **The regional dimension**

Although a regional programme, AAP focused on building national capacity, and regional capacity building was limited to regional partnerships to strengthen data access for countries. AAP did not engage with any of the regional or sub-regional institutions, such as ECOWAS, ECCAS, the East African Community or SADC to enhance their capacity to advance and strengthen the climate change adaptation mainstreaming agenda in Africa. Hence, an opportunity seems to have been lost in terms of building the capacity of African regional institutions to a) create sound regional adaptation frameworks, b) support countries in mainstreaming adaptation in their policy-making and planning processes, and c) create a regional platform for sharing and collaboration between countries.

### **Final remarks**

While AAP did not fully achieve its intended objective, it laid the foundation for a continued process to transform government policy and planning to better integrate and address climate change adaptation issues. As one could expect, the results vary from country to country. AAP was conceived as a very ambitious programme setting out to transform government practices in 20 countries, of which many are LDCs, within a short time frame. Seen in this light, the intended objective was not realistic within the given time frame and in such a large number of countries. Hence, AAP's performance and results should not be judged on its inability to fully deliver its objective, but rather on the results achieved. These generally appear satisfactory, although administrative inefficiencies, a rushed project formulation process and shortcomings in the programme management setup and implementation modalities affected programme implementation and the delivery of results. However, the sustainability of the achieved results and integration into UNDP of the approach and experiences of AAP is of major concern.

## **1.4 Performance rating**

The overall assessment of AAP's performance is that it was generally satisfactory, but due to shortcomings in the programme design, inefficiencies, and especially concerns regarding the sustainability, not fully satisfactory. The table below provides the Evaluation Team's assessment rating against the main evaluation criteria.

**Table 1: Assessment of AAP performance**

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Sub-criteria</b>	<b>Explanation</b>	<b>Score (1-5)*</b>
<b>Relevance</b>	Relevance for national and regional needs	Climate change will increasingly become a barrier to economic and social development	5
	Relevance for UNDP mandate	The poor are particularly vulnerable to climate change, which will increase the occurrence of disasters/crises. Climate change is closely linked to environmental degradation and energy	5
	Relevance for global agenda and Japanese priorities	Climate change is a major global concern, and significant funding for	5

		adaptation is expected to be provided	
	Addressing critical constraints	African countries do not have the capacity to effectively plan and implement adaptation actions	5
	Relevance of Prodocs (global programme and country projects)	Insufficient capacity assessments and consideration of national context, unrealistic timeline, overly ambitious objective and outcomes	2
			<b>4**</b>
<b>Effective-ness</b>	Achievement of objective: <i>countries adjust national development processes to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities</i>	Objective not fully achieved, but a foundation has been created in many countries. Fully reaching the objective not feasible in a 3-4 year time frame	3
	Achievement of outcomes:	Outcomes 1,3 and 4 not feasible in 3-4 year time frame	
	1. Long-term planning mechanisms	Partly achieved. Tools and plans in place, but sufficient mechanisms for future planning/implementation seem not in place	(3)
	2. Built leadership and developed institutional frameworks	Partly achieved. Institutional structures established, but often low high-level ownership and uncertain functionality	(2)
	3. Implementing policies and measures	Partly achieved. Policies not yet being implemented and implemented measures are mainly stand-alone projects	(3)
	4. Financing options expanded	Limited achievement. Six countries have accessed project funding from traditional donors. Some government funds allocated	(2)
	5. Knowledge on adjusting development processes generated and shared	Partly achieved. Countries produced and disseminated knowledge products. A culture of sharing between countries was not fully adopted	(2)
	IRTSC: Technical expertise and capacity development support provided MCBP: Improved beneficiaries' understanding and capabilities	Largely achieved, although project management support needs posed a limitation to technical support Outcome achieved, journalist use skills imparted. Media coverage of climate change in AAP countries increased	(3) (5)
	Delivery of planned outputs	Varied picture, in some countries output delivery was much better than in others	3
			<b>3**</b>
<b>Efficiency (incl. timeliness)</b>	Timeliness of country project implementation	Significant delays due to rushed design, capacity constraints and low ownership	1
	Timeliness of technical support/capacity building	Limited support available in first year. Some support was provided late	2
	Cost-effectiveness	Some inefficiencies in country project spending. Significant resources spent on pilot projects, which were not always fully linked to policy processes	2
	Conduciveness of administrative procedures	A major reason for delays in implementation. Staff recruitment and procurement generally delayed.	1
	Responsiveness of management/coordination/oversight structure to address critical/emerging issues	Management structure and mandates inadequate. Board unable to address critical issues, OSC rectified this constraint	2
	Ability of M&E system to guide implementation and capture results/change	Output and reporting focused. Not used as a management tool and not fully capturing impact/results	2

	Ability to engage and collaborate with partners	Partnerships/collaboration mainly a national level, and to varying degrees. Limited collaboration with other initiatives at global/regional level	2
			<b>2**</b>
<b>Sustain-ability</b>	Ownership and commitment of stakeholders	Low initial ownership among RBx, COs and national stakeholders. Improved over time.	3
	Sufficiency of stakeholder capacity	National stakeholders not able to continue AAP process without support	2
	Integration of AAP processes in systems/planned continuation of processes (country level)	Some COs and countries have plans to continue AAP or elements of AAP in future or existing projects, but funding has generally not been secured for this	2
	Absorption/mainstreaming of approaches (UNDP)	AAP staff leaving UNDP. Currently no funding secured for follow-up. Seemingly patchy use of AAP results/approach in other programmes	2
	Replicability/upscaling potential	Relevant approach across Africa, but few guidelines/tools developed	3
			<b>2**</b>
<b>OVERALL</b>			<b>3**</b>
* Rating: 1 = very low/unsatisfactory 2 = low/below expectations 3 = medium/meets expectations/satisfactory 4 = high/above expectations 5 = very high/excellent performance			
** Criterion scores and the overall score are not calculated arithmetically; they are qualitative assessments based on sub-criteria scores			

## 1.5 Overview of lessons learned/recommendations

AAP has generated several relevant lessons for future UNDP programming. Based on these several recommendations emerge for future programmes. The main ones are:

### Formulation, inception and planning

- Adequate time should be available for a thorough programme formulation process, inception phase, and project staff recruitment
- National stakeholders should be fully involved in programme/country project formulation and fully understand the programme approach and objectives in order to ensure full ownership.
- Regional thematic programmes should be jointly formulated by BDP and RBx. Country projects should be jointly formulated with COs.
- A stakeholder capacity needs assessment and an analysis of national priorities should be carried out as part of the programme/country project formulation and be used in the country selection process, guide the programme management setup, and form the basis upon which resources are provided for support.
- At least some of the staff recruited should have prior experience and knowledge of policy work.
- Novel approaches should be tested in a limited number of countries before they are rolled out on a large scale.
- Policy and institutional transformation processes take time and need to be continued after programme completion. Objectives and outcomes must be realistic to achieve within the available time frame. A long-term objective for the

transformation process should be established during programme design. Short-medium term programme objectives for different phases can then be established; this way it can be clearly established how far a given programme can get the transformation process.

- A clear sustainability, exit, or continuation strategy should be a standard element of all Prodocs and be part of implementation already from the inception phase
- The Prodoc, logframe, management setup and stakeholder mandates should be carefully reviewed at critical points in time. Revisions/changes should be made, even if – or especially when – substantial changes or redesign are required.

### **Programme management and coordination**

- Programme management modalities, and implementation roles must be aligned with the existing UNDP structure, reporting lines and mandates to ensure effective participation, ownership and collaboration of all the involved Bureaux. The unique strengths and roles of BDP and RBx must be recognised and utilised.
- The mandates of, and the instruments available for, programme related units must be clearly articulated and reflect the support needs of country projects, both in terms of project management and technical support.
- It is important to make sure that programme support units are not isolated from UNDP. UNDP housing or secondment of permanent UNDP staff to such units could facilitate collaboration and UNDP learning. Better integration with UNDP can facilitate coordination with related initiatives, reduce the risk of duplication and enhance the opportunities for ensuring post-programme sustainability. This should be build into the programme management structure or into the Logframe.
- Cross-practice collaboration is another potential way to ensure better integration in UNDP while enhancing the level and broadness of the support available to a programme. It is critical to set up an effective management system for this, and to ensure there are in-built incentives that promote collaboration.
- The advantages and disadvantages of having national project managers on UNDP contracts versus government contract should be examined by UNDP.
- A high-level Programme Board is insufficient to provide the needed guidance. A technical committee with all the key actors should be established to address implementation bottlenecks.

### **M&E**

- It is very difficult to capture the impact and changes resulting from/attribution to policy programmes. A comprehensive analysis of UNDP experiences with this from several programmes and the development of a policy outcome oriented M&E framework/methodology and tools should be undertaken.
- A strong outcome oriented M&E system with clear mandates and a well-designed logframe, should be established to capture the results and lessons. Such a system can move M&E be a strategic programme management tool. Sufficient resources should be allocated to build the capacity of country projects in this regard.

### **National demands versus strategic needs**

- Technical support should be demand-driven and in line with national priorities and identified needs, but some times country demands and interests may to some extent conflict with transformative approaches. There can be critical bottlenecks, which are not readily identified at the country level. Regional

identification and provision of strategic support needs is important to ensure effective implementation of innovative approaches.

- Support for identification and securing of financing is in high demand at the country level, but can distract attention from dealing with the more fundamental and difficult aspects of transforming government approaches to policy-making, planning, budgeting, and spending (of their own resources). Nonetheless, the ability to access innovative financing means of funding can potentially enable countries to make better use of both the resources available in country as well as new international climate financing mechanisms, when combined with a strengthening of country systems for planning, budgeting and financing. Pros and cons should be assessed before including financing as a component.
- There is often a strong national interest in pilot interventions. However, these are only relevant in policy programmes when they are clearly linked to policy and planning approaches and processes. Nonetheless, pilot projects can be a lever to muster ownership of policy programmes. To avoid duplication and ensure effective use of programme resources, it should be assessed whether existing projects in the country can be used to provide the necessary knowledge to inform policy processes before it is decided to engage in pilot interventions.

### **AAP approach**

- A component focusing on building regional/sub-regional capacity should be included in regional programmes. This can enable regional programmes to better establish strategic partnerships, and potentially provide vessels to facilitate post-programme continuation by building regional capacity to support countries and provide a platform for sharing of experiences and promoting trans-boundary cooperation.
- Environment ministries generally have limited leverage over other sector ministries. Planning and finance ministries are usually above sector ministries in the government hierarchy and have specific mandates to coordinate these. Hence, they can be strong entry points, as can key development sector ministries (e.g. agriculture, infrastructure and local government). This is a critical consideration that should be taken into account in the design and institutional setup of all programmes promoting mainstreaming or integrated approaches.
- Comprehensive and implementable guidelines and tools covering all aspects of the programmes approach and lessons should be integrated in all innovative programmes, to ensure that experiences and approaches can be upscaled and replicated, and processes can be continued beyond the programme's life span.
- It is more difficult to reach high-level decision-makers than the technical level, so the tools used by AAP and other mainstreaming programmes (implemented by UNDP and other agencies) to engage the policy level should be reviewed so get a clear picture of best practices. Based on the findings, a toolbox for engaging decision-makers should be developed and tested.

### **Recommendations for immediate AAP follow-up**

- Enrol relevant IRTSC (and MCBP) staff as consultants to identify and analyse available tools and guidelines for adaptation mainstreaming and develop a toolbox or guide for adaptation mainstreaming based on this analysis and AAP approaches and experiences. This could be done under the auspices of PEI (or other relevant programmes), which already has experience with developing



policy mainstreaming guidelines and tools. This would also allow for cross-fertilisation of the experiences and approaches.

- Maintain contact with IRTSC, MCBP and AAP country project staff, to make sure they can easily be reached if/when AAP processes are continued.
- Make sure that all remaining AAP financial resources are explicitly utilised to cover critical activities to cover the gap period until further funding is secured to ensure the continuation of the processes initiated and the sustainability of the results achieved (whether under AAP or other initiatives).
- Undertake an in-country assessment in 2014 or 2015 of the status of the AAP results and processes, to learn about the sustainability of AAP. Make a similar assessment of the actual use of AAP experiences and approaches in regional programmes and within UNDP.

## 2 Introduction

### 2.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The AAP Programme Evaluation assesses to what extent the goal, outcomes and results had been achieved against the logical framework (results framework), and the key factors that have hindered or facilitated the success of the programme. Based on the key findings of the evaluation, experiences and lessons are drawn out to provide conclusions and recommendations that may help sustain the results of AAP and improve future interventions of UNDP.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) defined the scope of the evaluation as follows: *each of AAP's components will be evaluated using the following criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, timeliness, and sustainability.* These criteria generally correspond with the five OECD/DAC criteria for good evaluation practice; UNDP's "Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results" specifies that UNDP evaluations generally should apply the OECD/DAC criteria. It should be noted that the "impact" criterion is not included, although the evaluation covers the related aspects of outcomes and results. In this context it should be kept in mind that UNDP defines impact as changes in human development and people's well-being. Thus, the direct impact of AAP would be associated with the national projects, for which the Evaluation Team only carried out a meta-evaluation/synthesis. Furthermore, given the policy nature of AAP, it can be difficult to attribute impact changes directly to the programme and it is still too early to assess the impact of changed policies and plans. The added criterion of timeliness, which is linked to efficiency, has been an important aspect considering the delays in formulating the national programmes, which resulted in an extension of the programme.

The ToR defined a range of issues for the evaluation to address (see annex 4). These were organised along the main lines of:

- The outcomes and outputs achieved under each component, the extent to which AAP achieved its objective, and whether the results achieved are sustainable
- The processes of AAP, such as programme management, coordination, oversight and administration; programme formulation and implementation; quality of capacity building technical advice and support provided
- The monitoring and evaluation framework

### 2.2 Methodology of the evaluation

The AAP programme evaluation comprises three interlinked main elements:

- A direct evaluation of the overall AAP programme management
- A direct evaluation of the three inter-regional components of AAP
- A meta-evaluation/synthesis of the findings from monitoring data and individual evaluations of AAP country projects

The programme evaluation is a final/post-implementation evaluation. AAP implementation was completed by 31 December 2012, and at the time of the evaluation most programme staff had left the programme. Hence, the evaluation was carried out as a distance evaluation from the home office of the Evaluation Team and relied on tools

such as phone/Skype interviews, emails and questionnaires for stakeholder consultations. Furthermore, the consultant team reviewed available AAP programme documentation and data.

The distance evaluation method had some limitations, especially in relation to the meta-evaluation of the national component and AAP country projects. These are described in the Inception Plan (Annex 8), but a significant challenge was that the scope and detail of the available national evaluation reports varied significantly, thus making it difficult to analyse across the country projects.

Annex 6 provides a list of the consulted stakeholders. Given the inter-regional scope and complexity of the AAP programme, its large numbers of stakeholders and the time frame available for the evaluation, the stakeholders were prioritised to ensure that a representative sample of stakeholders was consulted. Two questionnaires were circulated to stakeholders:

- A questionnaire to 20 country projects for assessment of the support they had received from the Inter-Regional Technical Support Component (IRTSC) and UNDP Practice Teams. Responses were received from 16 countries (filled by national project managers and/or UNDP Country Office staff)
- A questionnaire to 24 journalists (four team leaders, 20 trainers) for assessment of the support and training they had received under the Media Capacity Building Project (MCBP). Responses were received from ten journalists

Annex 7 provides an overview of the key documentation and reports, which were consulted. In relation to the meta-evaluation of the national projects, the Team focused on available national evaluation reports (eight countries, final or draft reports) and monitoring data compiled by the Inter-Regional Technical Support Component (IRTSC).

The analysis of findings was an iterative process throughout the evaluation. This enabled the team to discuss initial findings with stakeholders as the evaluation progressed.

The programme of the evaluation is presented in annex 5.

### 3 AAP and its development context

#### 3.1 Challenges the programme seek to address

The Programme Document (Prodoc) of the UNDP Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP) articulated the challenge the programme sought to address as follows:

*“Africa is particularly vulnerable to climate change. It will exacerbate the economic, political and humanitarian stresses that countries in the region already face, and greatly reduce their capacity to eradicate extreme poverty. The poorest segments of society will be the most severely affected because they are also the least able to adapt. Responding to the threat of climate change will require concerted action on an unprecedented scale. Systematic action will be required across all levels of development planning and implementation (regional, national, sub-national, and local) if development in a number of countries is not to be reversed.”*

*Some African countries have identified key vulnerabilities and priority adaptation measures, and others have initiated demonstration adaptation projects. However, countries continue to face a number of challenges including the following: (i) adaptation initiatives are limited in scope and scale, and their impacts are neither cohesive nor sustainable; (ii) institutional capacities, relationships, policies and practices to assess and manage climate change risks are not developed sufficiently to create an enabling environment, with corresponding political and social champions to support the formulation and implementation of efficient solutions to a problem that has complex multi-sectoral effects; (iii) limited knowledge of the most appropriate adaptation policies and measures hinders countries from preparing themselves with the necessary institutional capacities to support climate risk management; (iv) limited financing options to sustain scaled-up adaptation remains a constraint; and (v) it is difficult for countries to learn from each other about their experiences with different approaches to adaptation.*

*Under its \$92 million programme “**Supporting Integrated and Comprehensive Approaches to Climate Change Adaptation in Africa**” supported by the Government of Japan, UNDP will assist 21 (now 20, see chapter 4.1) countries across the African continent in incorporating climate change risks and opportunities into national development processes to secure development gains under a changing climate. The Programme will help countries establish an enabling environment and develop the capacity required at local and national levels to enable them to design, finance, implement, monitor and adjust long-term, integrated and cost-effective adaptation policies and plans that are robust within a wide range of possible changes in climate conditions.”*

#### 3.2 Goal, objectives and intended outcomes/results of the programme

The goal of AAP was defined as follows: *Enhancing the adaptive capacity of vulnerable countries, promoting early adaptation action and laying the foundation for long-term investment to increase resilience to climate change across the African continent.*

The programme objective in the results framework/logframe of AAP was defined as follows: *21 (now 20) countries in the African continent adjust their national development processes to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities.*

Under the overall AAP programme framework, 20 individual country projects were implemented. Each country project had its own Prodoc specifying the country project objective, which was aligned with the overall AAP programme goal and objective (see table 1 below).

**Table 2: AAP country project objectives**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Project Objective</b>
Burkina Faso	<i>Burkina Faso has adjusted development processes to incorporate the risks and opportunities linked to climate change.</i>
Cameroon	<i>Cameroon has the institutional, individual and systemic capacity to address climate change risks and opportunities through a national approach to adaptation.</i>
Congo	<i>To mainstream climate change adaptation into core development policy, strategies and plans of the Republic of Congo.</i>
Ethiopia	<i>To establish an integrated approach to Ethiopia's management of climate change opportunities and risks.</i>
Gabon	<i>To promote the establishment of an institutional framework for coastal zone management that allows resilient development in Gabon.</i>
Ghana	<i>Ghana has broadened and improved institutional capacity and financing mechanisms for addressing climate risks, and has demonstrated positive impacts in linking disaster risk reduction and climate change through the implementation of early warning systems.</i>
Kenya	<i>To strengthen Kenya's institutional and systemic capacity and leadership to address climate change risks and opportunities through a national approach to adaptation.</i>
Lesotho	<i>By the end of the project, participating individuals, institutions and communities will have the technical knowledge, skills, information and resources to plan for and implement effective and timely climate change responses.</i>
Malawi	<i>To enhance Malawi's existing climate initiatives by strengthening capacity for long term investment in, and management of, climate- resilient sustainable development.</i>
Mauritius	<i>To integrate and mainstream climate change adaptation into the institutional framework and into core development policy, strategies and plans of the Republic of Mauritius.</i>
Morocco	<i>To manage and reduce climate change risks in Morocco's oasis production systems through the introduction of innovative approaches to adaptation and strengthening local capacities, through a territorial approach.</i>
Mozambique	<i>Mozambique mainstreams climate change adaptation mechanisms in policy, development and investment frameworks.</i>
Namibia	<i>Namibia has the institutional, individual and systematic capacity to address climate change risks and opportunities through a national approach to adaptation.</i>
Niger	<i>To mainstream climate change adaptation across key sectors and into development processes in Niger.</i>
Nigeria	<i>Nigeria has a coherent governance system for climate change adaptation, has empowered children to manage climate change impacts and has demonstrated positive adaptation benefits in the agricultural sector.</i>

Rwanda	<i>Rwanda has the institutional, individual and systemic capacity to address climate change risks and opportunities through a national approach to adaptation.</i>
São Tomé and Príncipe	<i>São Tomé and Príncipe has the institutional and individual capacity to address climate change risks and opportunities through a national approach to adaptation.</i>
Senegal	<i>To mainstream and integrate climate change adaptation into policy, governance, and core development objectives through institutional frameworks, policy reform, capacity building, awareness raising and financial mechanisms.</i>
Tanzania	<i>Tanzania mainstreams climate change adaptation mechanisms in planning, market/fiscal/financial and implementation processes.</i>
Tunisia	<i>To strengthen the resilience of development efforts in the face of climate change, particularly in coastal zones.</i>

AAP aimed at delivering the following five outcomes in the 20 countries covered by the programme:

- 1. Countries have introduced dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change*
- 2. Countries have built leadership and developed institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels*
- 3. Countries are implementing climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors*
- 4. Financing options to meet national adaptation costs have been expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels*
- 5. Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities is being generated and shared across all levels*

Hence, while each country project had its own objective in accordance with the national context, they all had the same outcomes as the overall AAP programme, although in some cases countries (e.g. Burkina Faso, Lesotho) would only have four of these. While the activities in all country projects were aligned to the same outcomes and hence often had similarities, they were selected and formulated individually for each country.

The programme was delivered through four main components:

- 1. National component – 20 AAP country projects*
- 2. Inter-Regional Technical Support Component (IRTSC) – technical support and capacity building for the country projects*
- 3. Media Capacity Building Project (MCBP) – capacity building of journalists in AAP countries to enhance the media coverage of climate change related issues*
- 4. Programme and Project Assurance Support Component (PPAS) – technical and managerial support and quality assurance for country projects provided by UNDP*

The intended outcome of IRTSC was: *Inter-regional technical expertise and capacity development support provided to 20 countries.*

The MCBP component had a different target group than the other components of AAP, and had the following intended outcome: *Greatly improved the target beneficiaries' understanding and capabilities in climate-change mitigation, adaptation and response.*

### 3.1 Programme start and its duration

The AAP programme was a part of the Japan-UNDP Joint Framework for Building Partnership to Address Climate Change in Africa, which came out of the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) in May 2008. The final AAP Prodoc was signed in November 2008. The programme became effective on 15 December 2008 and implementation was originally intended to complete on 14 December 2011. However, in March 2011 the Government of Japan granted a one-year no-cost extension, and the AAP programme implementation ended on 31 December 2012. The MCBP component was conceived later than the overall programme, and was implemented in November 2010 – June 2012.

### 3.2 Main stakeholders

AAP has a range of stakeholders at the global, regional and country levels. The table below gives an introduction to the main stakeholder categories.

**Table 3: Main AAP stakeholders**

Stakeholder	Involvement in AAP
National governments	Primary stakeholders and beneficiaries of AAP. Focal point ministries/departments (usually environment ministries or meteorological departments) were implementing/executing country projects under UNDPs national execution (NEX) modality. Other ministries, departments and sub-national governments were involved in mainstreaming and piloting activities. Represented at the AAP Programme Board by two African countries and one Arab country
Government of Japan	The donor providing funding for AAP as part of its commitment under the TICAD IV framework
UNDP	Grant recipient of the funding from the Government of Japan and implementing agency with the overall responsibility for AAP
Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP	Lead UNDP Bureau for AAP. Overall responsible for programme funds and provision of programme and project assurance support (Component 4, PPAS). Co-chair of the AAP Programme Board
Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA), UNDP	Line managing and supporting UNDP Country Offices in 18 AAP countries Sub-Saharan Africa. Co-chair of the AAP Programme Board
Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS), UNDP	Line managing and supporting UNDP Country Offices in 2 North African AAP countries. Co-chair of the AAP Programme Board
Bureau for External Relations and Policy (BERA), UNDP	Responsible for UNDP relations with the Government of Japan. Member of the AAP Programme Board
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP	Member of the AAP Programme Board
20 Country Offices (COs), UNDP	Responsible for oversight and provision of support to AAP country projects, including recruitment of project managers, procurement, disbursement of funds
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	Subcontracted by UNDP to administer IRTSC and MCBP, including provision of office facilities, staff and consultant recruitment,

	procurement, and financial management
Inter-Regional Technical Support Component (IRTSC), UNOPS	Programme unit dedicated to providing technical (and project management) support to country projects and reporting on overall programme progress
United Nations Volunteers (UNV)	Provision of volunteer staff for IRTSC and 9 country projects. Member of the AAP Programme Board
World Food Programme (WFP)	Implementation of projects with AAP funding in Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Implementation of projects with AAP funding in Ethiopia and Nigeria
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)	Implementation of projects with AAP funding in Kenya and Nigeria
Regional/subregional meteorological centres	Provided with equipment and capacitated by AAP to act as data and information points for country projects
Journalists in 20 countries	Trained under MCBP in climate change issues – undertaking climate change related journalism, e.g. writing articles, preparing radio shows and implementing workshops. 24 trained to train other journalists (ToT)




## 4 Findings

### 4.1 Programme timeline, formulation process and inception period

The overall programme design of AAP was carried out in 2008 and led by the UNDP Bureau of Policy Development's (BDP) Environment and Energy Group (EEG). The Government of Japan provided UNDP with an opportunity to engage in a large-scale climate change adaptation programme for Africa to be implemented over a three-year period. BDP consulted the UNDP Regional Bureaux (RBx) for Africa (RBA) and Arab States (RBAS) to conceptualise AAP. The RBx organised conference calls with potential UNDP Country Offices (COs) to get initial feedback and an understanding of the country support needs. The idea of AAP was to have country programmes, which had similar objectives, outcomes and approaches, but with country specific activities. The AAP global Programme Document (Prodoc) was signed in November 2008. 21 countries were selected for the programme; the number was later reduced to 20 as Zambia opted not to sign the necessary agreements. The country selection process was carried out in mid 2008; all African countries were ranked on the basis of the following criteria: Government of Japan priority country (list of priority countries – 30% weight), priority given to climate change by government (climate change integrated into PRSP or similar document – 10%), priority given to climate change by UN country team (climate change integrated into UNDAF – 10%), enabling environment (joint assessment by RBX/RTA – 30%), climate change risk (country risk ranking in published literature – 10%), and complementarity with other UNDP activities (climate change adaptation portfolio – 10%). The design of AAP country projects was led by EEG, who was responsible for the deployment of consultants for their formulation in collaboration with UNOPS.

Considering the experiences from other policy initiatives, such as the UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative, as well as the magnitude and ambition level of AAP, the three year implementation period for the programme appears very short, not least when considering that this period included the design and inception of 21 country projects. According to the timeline provided in the Prodoc, the country project design was planned completed by the end of March 2009, leaving a 33 months period for the implementation of country projects up till end 2011. It was also planned to recruit the Programme Manager and Institutional and Leadership Development Expert already by mid December 2008. However, as depicted in the timeline below, AAP experienced significant delays from the onset.

**Figure 1: Timeline of on the Initiation of the AAP from 2008 to 2011 (source: Baumwoll, 2013)**



Firstly, the IRTSC Programme Manager was not recruited until September 2009, almost a full year into the programme. To the understanding of the Evaluation Team, this delay was caused by the time usually required to recruit project staff had not been factored adequately into the programme design, but also by administrative inefficiencies, such as the late provision of office facilities and equipment by UNOPS. The other IRTSC experts were recruited in 2010 and 2011. Hence, the country project formulation in 2009 was lead by the Regional Technical Advisers (RTAs) of the GEF Finance Team (BDP/EEG), but their assistance was withdrawn in May 2010, after which the main technical support from UNDP was provided by the Practice Groups. The Gender Team provided support since 2010, and later support was brought in from the Capacity Development Group, the Poverty Group and the Knowledge Management Group under the overall coordination of the Environment and Energy Group (EEG). Furthermore, the cross-practice strategy was at the time of AAP inception a novel concept in UNDP, so time was needed to further conceptualise and operationalise cross-practice in AAP. With only two years to provide cross-practice support, several of the intended cross-practice activities and outputs were delayed, downscaled or cancelled.

Secondly, as shown in the figure only one AAP country Prodoc had been finalised and signed by April 2009; the other country Prodocs were only signed in late 2009 or in 2010. All the country inception workshops were held in 2010. Furthermore, in a number of countries the recruitment of project staff and establishment of the project manament units were considerably delayed. As a result, country project implementation started in late 2010 or early 2011, leaving only approximately one year for implementation.

**Table 4: Completion of country project design and inception (source: Baumwoll, 2013)**

Country	Prodoc signed	Inception Workshop
Burkina Faso	October-09	January-10
Cameroon	December-09	May-10
Congo	April-10	August-10
Ethiopia	April-10	April-10
Gabon	March-10	March-10
Ghana	December-10	March-10
Kenya	March-10	March-10

Lesotho	May-10	March-10
Malawi	May-10	May-10
Mauritius	December-09	April-10
Morocco	January-10	April-10
Mozambique	October-09	March-10
Namibia	September-09	February-10
Niger	April-09	April-10
Nigeria	April-10	October-10
Rwanda	April-10	August-10
Sao Tome	March-10	March-10
Senegal	March-10	June-10
Tanzania	May-10	April-10
Tunisia	December-09	February-10

The reasons behind these substantial delays appear to be several, but the most significant ones include:

- Due to the short time frame, country project formulation was lead by consultants recruited by BDP and carried out over a short time span. As a result, the designs did not fully take national capacity and context into account and stakeholder involvement in the formulation process was somewhat limited
- Varying and often low government institutional and staff capacity, both in terms of technical and managerial aspects
- Difficulties among government staff and project management unit staff with understanding the approach and scope of AAP as a programme to transform policy and planning processes, as well as of the required steps to make the country projects functional
- Capacity constraints at UNDP COs
- Competition with other programme and projects for staff time and attention within both government and COs
- Initial low ownership of AAP among RBx, COs, and governments. RBA and RBAS did not feel they had been sufficiently involved in the programme formulation
- Slow and cumbersome approval, recruitment, and procurement procedures (both government and UNDP CO), although some COs appear to have been better at handling these than others
- Tunisia, Nigeria and Niger experienced a period of political instability and conflict, which meant that their Governments for a period were not fully functional or able to carry the implementation of AAP forwards.

Due to the above, the countries needed more, and more proactive, support from IRTSC and UNDP HQ than envisaged in the Prodoc.

Due to the significant delays, UNDP requested the Government of Japan to approve a one-year no-cost extension of AAP; this was approved in March 2011. However, spending rates generally remained low throughout 2011. In response to this, the Operations Subcommittee (OSC) was established to provide closer oversight and support to AAP in December 2011 to address operational bottlenecks. This, combined with pressure from the UNDP Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy (BERA) and the Government of Japan led to a much closer involvement of RBA and RBAs in AAP, which further translated into a stronger support to, and commitment from, COs. As a result programme spending at country level increased dramatically in 2012.

Component 3, the Media Capacity Building Project (MCBP) was not part of the initial AAP design and thus not included in the Prodoc, but was launched in November 2010. It was generally implemented according to plan and implementation was completed by the end of July 2012. However, the 1.5 years time frame for MCBP was generally perceived by the MCBP team and trained journalists as very tight and not adequately allowing for post-training follow-up and support to consolidate and expand the results achieved.

The novelty of the cross-practice approach (which thus required time to be conceptualised and planned) and coordination challenges resulted in much cross-practice work only being carried out in the last year of implementation.

### **Conclusion:**

- Country project formulation was done in a short time frame and by consultants. National stakeholder involvement appears somewhat limited
- In-country capacity was not adequately assessed and hence overestimated during programme design, and as a result support needs were underestimated. Furthermore, the time frame did not match the ambition level of the programme. The time frame needed for country project formulation, inception and establishment of the IRTSC was significantly underestimated in the programme design, which led to delays as well as rushed processes
- While RBA, RBAS and COs were consulted during the AAP programme and/or country project formulation, they did not feel sufficiently involved in the design and thus did not feel ownership for the programme. As a result, RBA and RBAS did not significantly engage in the first three years of implementation, nor did all COs
- Political instability delayed country implementation in Tunisia and Nigeria

### **Lessons:**

- A capacity needs assessment at the country level should be carried out during the initial programme design (already during the formulation of the overall regional programme), and a) be part of the country selection process, and b) guide the structure, mandate, tools and resources allocated for project management and technical support
- Country project formulation should not be rushed; sufficient time should be allowed to ensure full national stakeholder involvement, understanding and ownership
- Country projects that are set on transforming policy and planning practices and institutions require close support, sensitisation and capacity building already at formulation and during the inception period, to ensure proper understanding of the concept and approach and national ownership
- A three-year time frame is insufficient for designing and implementing initiatives that are set on transforming policy and planning practices and institutions. Similarly, three month is insufficient for the formulation of country projects. At least a full year for country project formulation and inception is needed (e.g. to allow time for consultations). Similarly, programme implementation should run for at least 5 years, and/or be planned with a clearly stated anticipation of or follow-up phase or follow-up activities


- Administrative, recruitment and procurement processes take time in UN organisations (UNDP and UNOPS), this must be factored in when planning the timeline of a programme to ensure that the technical support is available from the onset of the programme implementation and when needed by countries
- Regional thematic programmes should be co-formulated by BDP and RBx, to ensure a technical content of international best practice, regional and CO ownership, and full understanding of the situation on the ground. Country projects should be co-formulated with COs
- When recruiting project management units of policy programmes, at least some of the staff recruited should have prior experience and knowledge of policy work, as it in many ways differs from the implementation of on-the-ground projects
- With large-scale regional programmes, there is a real risk that political instability will affect implementation in some countries

## 4.2 Programme management, coordination and implementation modalities

The AAP management setup is depicted in the figure below.

Overall strategic guidance for AAP fell under the AAP programme board. The board was co-chaired by BDP/EEG, RBA and RBAS. Furthermore, it comprised representatives from the following: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Bureau for External Relations and Policy (BERA), two participating RBA countries (2 representatives), RBAS countries (1 representative), BDP practice groups (Poverty Group, Gender Team, and Knowledge, Innovation and Capacity Group (KICG)), and UNV. It is noted that the majority of Board members are from within UNDP. The Board approximately met on an annual basis.

**Figure 2: AAP organizational chart (source: IRTSC)**



To ensure that more in-depth support and guidance was available to AAP, the mid-term review (MTR) recommended establishing an Operations Subcommittee (OSC). The OSC became operational in December 2011 comprising representatives from RBA, RBAS, BDP/EEG, BERA, and IRTSC. The OSC met on a monthly basis to discuss implementation progress and needs for intervention.

### **National Component**

All 20 national projects were implemented under the UNDP National Execution (NEX)/National Implementation Modality (NIM). Hence, the projects were implemented by the National Government with support from the UNDP CO. A National Project Board oversaw and provided strategic guidance to the project. The overall implementation management responsibility rested with a Project Director (a government official) who would supervise the work of the project management unit (PMU), which was located at the executing Government agency, usually the Ministry of Environment or Meteorological Department. The UNDP CO recruited a national project manager, who reported to the Project Director and held the responsibility for day-to-day management of project implementation. The CO would also handle project related procurement. In 2011, IRTSC facilitated the posting of UNV volunteers with nine national projects.

### **Inter-regional Technical Support Component (IRTSC)**

UNDP had subcontracted UNOPS to administer IRTSC. Hence, IRTSC staff were recruited by UNOPS, the IRTSC office was located in the UNOPS office in Dakar, and IRTSC related procurement was handled by UNOPS. Technically, IRTSC reported to BDP/EEG. The intended role of IRTSC was to provide technical support, capacity building and promote sharing along the five IRTSC outcomes defined in the Prodoc. It was also intended to assist in the early analysis and design of national projects. However, it was not tasked to provide project management support and oversight, nor to design and manage programme M&E (other than of its own activities). It was, however, tasked with the responsibility to compile overall programme progress reporting based on inputs to be provided by the country projects. As depicted in the table below, the staffing of the IRTSC was gradually increased.

**Table 5: IRTSC staffing**

<b>Staff</b>	<b>Arrival</b>
Programme Manager	Sep 2009
Knowledge Management (KM) Component Manager	Jan 2010
Data and Information Management Component (DIMC) Manager	Sep 2010
Institutional Leadership and Capacity Development (ILCD) Component Manager	Jan 2011
Monitoring and Reporting Manager	Jan 2011
Operations Manager	May 2011

In addition to the above staff members, the IRTSC team comprised a number of consultants, United Nations Volunteers (UNV), and administrative and financial support staff. Furthermore, short-term consultants were engaged in specific activities.

In 2010 it became evident that country projects needed project management related support, e.g. in relation to development of work plans, monitoring, reporting and procurement. Therefore, in early 2011 seven anchor consultants were engaged on retainer contracts, each providing ongoing support to two or three countries. However,

for financial reasons and difficulties faced by the consultants in communicating recommendations to government staff as they were not AAP staff, this system was discontinued and each of the Component Managers were allocated an additional role as Task Managers providing project management support to around five-six countries. This enabled the IRTSC to continue facilitating project implementation, but proved time consuming and came at the expense of the provision of technical/component support. Furthermore, in addition to reactive technical support based on requests from the country project (stream 1 support), IRTSC introduced in 2011 core strategic areas (mainly related to the ILCD component) where all or most country projects needed support but were unable to articulate their needs, and developed approaches/tools to address these (stream 2 support).

The work areas covered by the IRTSC were the following:

- Data and information management support (DIMC)
- Institutional leadership and capacity development support (ILCD)
- Knowledge management support (KM)
- Information management (intranet and website)
- Project management support – *not envisaged in Prodoc*
- Procurement support (using UNOPS procurement systems) – *not envisaged in Prodoc*
- Communication (largely covered under/in collaboration with the MCBP component)
- Programme monitoring and evaluation (incl. the preparation of programme progress reports) (M&E)

### **Media Capacity Building Project (MCBP)**

This component was administered by UNOPS and reported financially to the AAP Programme Manager. However, it had its own project management team, and as a means to enhance AAP presence in East Africa, it was housed at the UNOPS office in Nairobi. Its core function was to plan and manage the implementation of activities targeting journalists to increase climate change adaptation coverage in African media. It also covered communication aspects of ITRSC, which was in some ways separate from the media capacity building, although it involved some collaboration in relation to the AAP newsletter called the Baobab Coalition Journal. The team included the MCBP Regional Project Manager and the Baobab Coalition Journal Editor. A New York based Communications Adviser did not report formally to the MCBP Regional Project Manager, but worked closely with the MCBP team and was financed under MCBP. The International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) was subcontracted to assist with developing and facilitating the technical contents of training workshops, identifying journalists to be trained and handling MCBP monitoring and evaluation. Four journalists were identified and trained as Team Leaders who then each lead the planning of training workshops in their respective regions (five countries each).

MCBP collaborated loosely with some country programmes and the IRTSC. Furthermore, the UNDP Gender Practice Group provided some gender expert inputs.

Experts (e.g. climate change experts) were engaged to provide inputs for the training workshops.

### **Programme and Project Assurance Support Component (PPAS)**

The management of this component comprised of the following main elements:

- Tasks carried out by the AAP team within BDP/EEG, such as overall programme monitoring and reporting to the donor, overall financial reporting, ensuring compliance with donor requirements, coordination with other UNDP departments and with Practice Groups, support for the AAP Programme Board and OSC, policy inputs, and communication and awareness raising of AAP in UNDP and outside such as side events at international/global events. A small team was recruited by BDP/EEG to provide fulltime assistance to AAP
- Tasks carried out by BERA regarding relations with the Government of Japan
- Technical support and leadership provided by the GEF finance Team of BDP/EEG for the formulation of country projects (2009)
- Cross-practice – technical support provided to AAP by UNDP Gender, Poverty, Capacity Development Groups, and the Knowledge Management Group in HQ and Regional Centres (the latter two groups merged into KICG in July 2012). EEG/BDP was in charge of facilitating and coordinating the inputs from the other Practice Groups. Each Practice Group developed its own work plan for AAP support (2011-12)
- Project management support for COs and leverage provided by RBA and RBAS in their respective regions. Each had an appointed staff member responsible for liaising and coordinating support for AAP and AAP country projects
- Overall administration and financial management

### **Key programme management issues**

Until 2012, there was not a strong structure for overall coordination and management of the programme, and the setup proved insufficient to ensure effective implementation of AAP, especially in relation to the principal component, the National Component and its 20 country projects. As the mid-term review (MTR) carried out in late 2011 pointed out, the management setup was fragmented and this had significant impacts on the delivery and timeliness of AAP at several levels. Furthermore, the Government of Japan expressed very strong concerns about the slow delivery of AAP. This prompted two major changes, to which all AAP stakeholders interviewed attribute the significantly accelerated implementation and spending of AAP in 2012:

- The OSC was introduced and provided a platform for effective and regular coordination among UNDP bureaux and IRTSC as well as problem solving vis-à-vis UNDP procedures, and enabled quick identification and removal of stumbling blocks to implementation
- RBAS and RBA assumed a proactive role in convening COs and supporting the implementation of AAP country projects

Prior to the changes in 2012, the main shortcomings issues affecting the programme included:

- The involvement of RBx and to some extent COs in the AAP programme design and formulation of country projects was insufficient to ensure they felt strong ownership and had a strong understanding of AAP. This appears to have affected the ownership of UNDP COs and RBx
- Programme reporting lines did not follow UNDP's line reporting structure. In relation to AAP, the managerial responsibility of RBx over COs was not utilised in AAP. Without this connection, it proved difficult for IRTSC as a UNOPS based unit



to communicate effectively with CO senior management and follow-up on reporting due to the lack of a formal reporting line through the RBx

- No RBx access to AAP financial resources, including resources to cover staff positions or administrative overheads. There were no budget allocations for staff or administrative costs for RBA and RBAS. With a UNDP structure providing limited core funding for Bureaux and an expectation of these to raise funds for their operational costs, there was little incentive to invest staff resources in AAP
- Infrequent meetings of the Programme Board. The MTR report mentions that *“Meeting on an annual basis has meant that there are prolonged periods between identification of problems or roadblocks and subsequent consultations and decisions.... in general, the variable participation of Board members further hampered problem solving”*
- National government and CO staff capacity constraints and competition with other projects and economic development priorities for attention. This, combined with initial difficulties in understanding the AAP concept meant that in some countries AAP was not a government priority

Significant shortcomings in the programme management setup, which were not (fully) rectified included:

- The lack of a dedicated regional management and operation support unit for AAP with a clear mandate and the necessary instruments. There was a discrepancy between the technical support mandate and instruments provided to IRTSC vis-à-vis, a) the actual support needs at country level, and b) the programme monitoring, reporting and knowledge management obligations of IRTSC. To overcome these shortcomings, IRTSC had to make several adjustments and changes to accommodate the project management support needs as it best could. But this came at the expense of the capacity to provide, and financial resources available for, the intended technical/thematic support. However, the formal mandate of IRTSC was never adjusted to reflect the actual situation
- ITRSC was external to UNDP, especially RBA and RBAS. The subcontracting of UNOPS to handle all the administrative, financial management and procurement aspects of IRTSC is rational due to its more efficient procedures compared to UNDP. Nonetheless, a closer affiliation of ITRSC with RBA in some way would have facilitated collaboration with COs from the onset of the programme. Reportedly, there are other programme management units, which are administered by UNOPS, but housed at UNDP
- Cross-practice collaboration, especially with several Practice Groups at multiple levels (HQ, Regional Centres, country level) was a novel approach to UNDP, and had mainly happened as collaboration between two practice groups at a time. An attempt to develop a common framework for AAP cross-practice was never fully agreed upon by all Practice Groups or endorsed by the Programme Board. Multiple reporting lines also made it difficult to coordinate and collaborate. Much of the cross-practice support was provided as a bilateral collaboration between two Practice Groups, i.e. EEG/IRTSC and one other group. To the knowledge of the Evaluation Team, systematic cross-practice collaboration involving more than two groups was piloted in Lesotho in 2012, but did not take place in other contexts. At the time of AAP implementation, UNDP's structure was not conducive for cross-practice work and did not provide incentives that encouraged collaboration. This meant that there were no clear modalities for the

coordination of the work of the Practice Groups and the coordination and planning of inputs could have been better. This affected the timeliness of their delivery, and a number of planned inputs could never be implemented. The ongoing structural change in UNDP towards an issue based architecture will probably mitigate such constraints in the future

- In several countries, a limiting factor for engaging various government agencies in AAP was a lack of high-level buy-in and ownership (e.g. due to low awareness of the socio-economic impact of climate change and competition for attention with other development priorities). The ministries implementing AAP were usually environment ministries, which rarely (if ever) are powerful ministries. They often have limited capacity and leverage over other ministries, and thus can generally not effectively coordinate these to ensure climate change mainstreaming. One specific example of this is Burkina Faso, where the national project evaluation found that the UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) had been more effective at mainstreaming environment due to its use of the planning ministry as entry point. AAP was in Lesotho with the Lesotho Meteorological Services and faced the same challenge. In Mozambique, the involvement of the Ministry of Finance and sector ministries was limited. In Nigeria, efforts were made to engage the Ministry of Finance, but integration was not fully achieved, and as a result sector ministries would not have resources to implement adaptation activities.

It should be acknowledged that country capacity and buy-in varied significantly. Countries like Morocco, Namibia and Mauritius reportedly showed strong commitment to AAP and a good understanding of the concept. In the case of Morocco and Tunisia, the UNDP programmes have historically had a strong focus on environment, so there was already a commitment to working on the issues AAP sought to address.

### **Conclusion:**

- The AAP programme management structure and budget allocations were not sufficiently reflecting the existing UNDP reporting lines and departmental mandates. This resulted in limited involvement of RBx, insufficient coordination between stakeholders within UNDP, and slow country level implementation until 2012
- Until the introduction of the OSC, the Programme Board annual meetings were not sufficient to unblock institutional and managerial blockages
- The combined introduction of the OSC and pressure from the Government of Japan, resulted in a much stronger RBx involvement, which in turn dramatically enhanced programme delivery at the country level in 2012
- There was a mismatch between the mandate and instruments of the IRTSC and a) the actual country support needs and b) its duty to report on progress and results. While the IRTSC proactively instituted several changes to overcome this, the fundamental issues were never formally addressed. As a result, the provision of much needed project management support came at the expense of the provision of technical support
- ITRSC was external to UNDP, especially RBx. This appears to have created some barriers for IRTSC coordination with COs
- AAP was a frontrunner in UNDP in relation to cross-practice collaboration involving several Practice Groups, and UNDPs institutional structure was not

geared to provide incentives for cross-practice collaboration. The provision of cross-practice support faced significant coordination challenges. As a result, the cross-practice support provided was less than originally intended

- Competition for attention with other priorities and projects combined with an initial limited understanding of the AAP concept often resulted in low government ownership of AAP, in particular in the first years of AAP implementation and at the high levels
- A lack of high-level buy-in limited the ability to engage various government agencies in AAP. It has at least in some countries been difficult for environment ministries and meteorological departments to ensure climate change mainstreaming across sector ministries and in development plans. A more robust institutional setup should in some countries have been discussed with the countries, e.g. by involving planning ministries, which are stronger in promoting mainstreaming across sectors. AAP could have benefited from closer collaboration with PEI, which has a model for engaging planning and finance ministries

#### **Lessons:**

- Programme formulation processes, programme management modalities, and implementation roles must be aligned with the existing UNDP structure, reporting lines and mandates to ensure effective participation, ownership and collaboration between the involved Bureaux. The unique strengths and roles of BDP and RBx should be recognised and utilised
- For large and complex programmes with multiple implementers, a high-level Programme Board is insufficient to provide the needed oversight and guidance in a timely manner and in sufficient detail. A committee with all the key actors represented that meets more regularly to address implementation bottlenecks is needed
- The mandates of, and the instruments available for, programme related units must reflect the support needs of country projects, both in terms of project management and technical support – care should be taken to ensure that one does not come at the expense of the other
- Technical and/or project management support units such as IRTSC should not be kept too separate from UNDP. UNDP housing or inclusion of UNDP staff in such a unit could facilitate collaboration and UNDP learning
- To ensure that cross-practice support yield the intended results and effectively contributes to a more integrated approach it is critical to set up an effective management system for this, and to ensure there are in-built incentives and instruments that promote coordination and collaboration
- Prodocs, logframes, mandates, instruments, and roles should be carefully reviewed at critical points during implementation (e.g. during inception and mid-term) and necessary revisions should be made, even if – or especially when – substantial changes or redesign are required. Prodocs and logframes should never be “cast in stone”, but include mechanisms that allow necessary revisions to enhance the likeliness of achieving the intended goals, objectives and results
- The implications for national ownership of having national project managers on UNDP contracts rather than government contracts are not clear to the Evaluation Team, but the pros and cons of UNDP contracts versus government contracts would be worthwhile to examine further

- It can be difficult for environment ministries and meteorological departments to ensure climate change mainstreaming across sector ministries and in development plans. It is important to ensure a robust institutional setup, e.g. by ensuring the full involvement of planning and/or finance ministries, which are stronger in promoting mainstreaming across sectors

### 4.3 Coordination with partners and linkages to other interventions

In addition to the core AAP implementing and executing institutions (UNDP, National governments) and sub-contracted agencies (UNOPS, ICFJ), AAP had a range of partnerships at both the regional and national levels. WFP, UNICEF and UNIDO were included in the AAP Prodoc and implemented projects with AAP funding in four countries, namely Ethiopia (WFP, UNICEF), Kenya (WFP, UNIDO), Malawi (WFP), and Nigeria (UNICEF, UNIDO), but there was no overall regional level collaboration. Nonetheless, these projects were thematically relevant and providing well-defined contributions to the achievement of AAP outcomes at the country level. Close coordination appears to have taken place in Malawi and Nigeria. In Nigeria, UNICEF was lead on one component under outcome 2 of the AAP country project. According to the national project evaluation, the coordination in Nigeria between UNDP, UNICEF and UNIDO generally worked well (e.g. in relation to a joint communication strategy), although not uniformly so. In Ethiopia the national evaluation report found that “*the coordination with WFP was smooth but not satisfactory*”. Reportedly in some countries, the partners ran their own projects seemingly with limited coordination with the AAP country projects, effectively meaning that AAP was mainly a vessel for channelling funds from the donor. Some administrative issues, e.g. in relation to poorly compatible financial reporting requirements of UNDP and WFP and a long and slow fund transfer path from UNDP NY to WFP country offices, created some challenges.

In relation to regional institutions, AAP’s partnerships were mainly in relation to strengthening the capacity of sub-regional meteorological centres (e.g. Agrhymet) to act as hubs providing data and information for the countries to access under the Data and Information Management Component (DIMC) of IRTSC.

MCBP maintained loose partnerships with a range of institutions, such as the national AAP project management units and COs and national media houses in the 20 AAP countries.

There are several global and regional initiatives in relation to a) climate change adaptation, and b) climate change and environment mainstreaming. Of particular relevance for AAP would be the two UNDP-UNEP collaborations: the Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) and the Climate Change Adaptation and Development Initiative (CC DARE), which work in a number of AAP countries. PEI is also focusing on mainstreaming into policy and planning processes, and in several countries PEI is also covering climate change mainstreaming. CC DARE is focusing on short term adaptation initiatives, e.g., in relation to planning and access to knowledge and experience. The linkages between AAP and CC DARE were seemingly limited, although AAP in Mozambique completed activities initiated under CC DARE. In relation to PEI, some AAP tools have built on elements of the PEI approach, and there were some meetings, but no closer collaboration or sharing took place at the regional/programme level between IRTSC and the Poverty-Environment Facility of PEI. In Mozambique, AAP and PEI undertook joint training and coaching. The COs, governments and project management

units in Malawi, Burkina Faso and Namibia ensured a good coordination between AAP and other relevant interventions, but such coordination seems not always to have been the case at country level. In Niger, AAP did joint implementation with the national adaption programme for agriculture. In Mozambique, AAP capitalised on the experience of the Joint Programme on Environmental Mainstreaming and Climate Change Adaptation.

AAP collaborated with the UNDP Boots on the Ground initiative in some countries, e.g. in relation to capacity building on climate finance. Furthermore, the Climate Investment Fund has provided resources to some of the countries in which AAP worked, and reportedly there was a good cooperation.

The seemingly limited strategic partnerships and ad-hoc collaboration at the regional level is not surprising considering the focus of the AAP components, which all focused directly on building country level capacity. None of the AAP components had an explicit focus on, or mandated role in relation to, building the capacity of existing regional or sub-regional institutions (e.g. the African Union, SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, the East African Community) to a) support countries in relation to policy-making, planning and implementation in relation to climate change adaptation, and b) establish regional plans, strategies and frameworks for climate change adaptation. Such a regional component could possibly also have helped AAP with further collaboration and joint development of tools and approaches with other regional initiatives.

#### **Conclusion:**

- Without components specifically focusing on building the regional and sub-regional capacity, there was limited scope for regional partnerships and collaboration beyond strengthening data access
- An opportunity seems to have been lost in terms of building the capacity of African regional institutions to create sound regional adaptation frameworks and support countries in mainstreaming adaptation in their policy-making and planning processes. Such strengthening could have contributed to the post-AAP sustainability of the results achieved and replication of the lessons learned
- Coordination with WFP, UNIDO and UNICEF appears to have been better in some countries than in others. There was no coordination at the regional/global level
- In some countries, AAP was well coordinated with other initiatives. In other countries, coordination and collaboration with other initiatives appears to have taken place in an ad-hoc manner, thereby enhancing the risk of duplication and overlaps with the large number of other climate change initiatives.

#### **Lessons:**

- A component dedicated to working with regional or sub-regional institutions, will enable regional programmes to better establish strategic partnerships and can potentially provide vessels to facilitate post-programme continuation of the processes initiated
- When coordination and collaboration mainly taking place in an ad-hoc manner, there is a risk of duplication and opportunities for transferring lessons, replication and post-programme sustainability can be lost

#### 4.4 Administrative systems and procedures

The national component was following UNDP procedures and the national execution (NEX) modality with national governments being responsible for programme implementation with assistance from COs. National project managers were recruited directly by COs, but housed by the Governments. Procurement followed NEX procedures, with some procurement being handled by Governments and other by the COs.

The ITRSC and MCBP regional components were administered by UNOPS (human resource management, procurement, financial management) in accordance with UNOPS procedures, with financial resources being managed by IRTSC, including funds for cross-practice activities. Project staff and consultants were recruited by UNOPS, including the consultants involved in the country project formulation. UNOPS also handled all procurement for the regional components, except in relation to funds allocated for cross-practice activities, which the Practice Groups handled themselves. Furthermore, procurement carried out by ITRSC on behalf of country projects was handled by UNOPS.

Moreover, some funds were retained by BDP/EEG for the AAP team and cross-practice activities.

The mid-term review noted that administrative issues were an important cause of the significant delays in AAP implementation:

*“As known, AAP experienced significant delays from a range of items: complications with transferring resources to UN entities, UNDP and UNOPS processes, internal administrative weaknesses; physical set-up; recruitment delays for available experts and slow formulation and implementation of the Country projects. The first full year of implementation spans from late 2010 – early 2011.”*

*“Some regional programming components have encountered serious recruitment delays...”*

This statement illustrates that the administrative inefficiencies that affected AAP implementation were caused by all the implementing partners, whether UNDP, UNOPS and governments. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged by the interviewed stakeholders that UNOPS procedures are generally much more flexible and fast than those of UNDP and that this facilitated the work of IRTSC; this was the rationale behind sub-contracting UNOPS for the administration of the regional components.

Administrative inefficiencies that affected AAP include:

- Belated recruitment of the IRTSC team, which was only in place and fully operational more than a year into implementation
- Delayed provision by UNOPS of office space and equipment for the IRTSC, and reportedly poor IT services (equipment and support)
- Slow UNDP and government procurement and recruitment procedures, which among other things caused delays in establishing country project management units. It should be noticed that some COs reportedly are much more efficient in their use of the procedures than others
- Late recruitment of national project management staff

- CO and national government capacity constraints causing delays in procurement
- Lack of direct access to UNDP's Atlas financial reporting system for country project management units (e.g. Lesotho)
- Disbursement delays
- MCBP had difficulties with locating new vendors that would agree to UNOPS payment rules

In order to overcome some of the administrative challenges and speed up implementation, IRTSC recruited an operations manager. Beyond facilitating the work of the IRTSC, this also enabled the IRTSC to assist country projects with procurement or even procure on their behalf, taking advantage of UNOPS procedures and capacity to speed up procurement processes that would otherwise be handled by COs or government procurement systems. An added advantage was that this enabled countries to benefit from UN discounts on specialised equipment, such as automated weather stations, and provided them with access to expert advice in the procurement of these.

#### **Conclusion:**

- Cumbersome and time consuming administration procedures combined with capacity constraints were a significant cause of delays experienced in implementation
- The use of UNOPS rules and the recruitment of an operations manager helped speeding up procurement related matters

#### **Lessons:**

- While it is beyond the reach of a programme to change cumbersome administrative processes, actions can be taken at the programme level to use the processes more effectively, and thereby reducing delays

### **4.5 Budgets and spending**

The table below shows the cumulative spending of each AAP component. Spending across all components was very low through 2009, reflecting the slow start up of the programme and late establishment of IRTSC. The spending under the national component was negligible, reflecting that most country project designs were still not ready. The spending rate of PPAS was higher than under the other components, reflecting the lead role of BDP/EEG's GEF Finance Team in the formulation of country programmes. In 2010, IRTSC was operational and the spending picked up, but remained low in the national projects, reflecting that they were still in the inception stage. In 2011, the MCBP was added to AAP, and national projects started implementing reflected in the significant increase in spending under these components. In 2012, spending under the national components increased significantly, and by project completion countries had almost spent their budgets fully.

**Table 6: AAP component spending (as of 21 Dec 2012)**

Comp.	Budget USD	2009 USD	2010 USD	2011 USD	2012 USD	2009 %	2010 %	2011 %	2012 %
Nat.	67,815,424	203,297	6,486,109	29,568,220	62,065,092	0	10	44	92
IRTSC	11,741,719	886,933	4,452,877	8,978,863	-	8	38	76	-
MCBP	2,500,000	-	-	1,456,251	-	-	-	58	-
PPAS*	4,286,607	570,013	1,170,522	2,526,502	3,748,428	13	27	59	87

HQ**	5,773,903	12,088	758,999	2,260,381	4,252,475	0	13	39	74
<b>Total</b>	<b>92,117,653</b>	<b>1,672,330</b>	<b>12,868,506</b>	<b>44,790,216</b>	<b>80,501,109</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>87</b>

\* GEF Finance Team, cross-practice and BDP/EEG technical support and UNV costs

\*\* UNDP administrative costs

It should be noted that the figures presented for 2012 are up till 21 December, so the accounts for ITRSC and MCBP were not available. What can be said though, is that the unexpected no-cost extension granted by Japan in March 2011 meant that the effective budget available for IRTSC activities was affected by an extra year of staff and running costs. Hence the annual budgets available for IRTSC in 2011 and 2012 were similar to that of 2010, but with a bigger team, the annual running costs were higher in 2011-2012, leading to less funds being available for support activities during the period of active country project implementation. Due to the unexpected nature of the extension, the IRTSC had planned its budgets and work plans under the assumption that funds should be spend by end 2011. So throughout 2010 IRTSC spent some of its resources to support the country project formulation and inception, as many country projects did not yet have their financial systems in place and hence could not access their funds; the country projects were not requested to refund the funds spent. As a result, the IRTSC had to scale down its plans and budget for each of its support components, and the anchor consultant role was transferred to IRTSC staff to reduce costs. Furthermore, IRTSC in 2011-2012 asked country projects to co-fund support activities offered by IRTSC.

The figure below shows the spending under each country project. While the spending pattern varies between countries, there are some general trends. As mentioned above, spending was very low in 2009, when the projects were still under formulation (formulation costs were mainly covered under the PPAS/IRTSC component), in 2010, spending was still low as the programme designs were completed and inception workshops were held (several costs in this phase were covered by IRTSC/PPAS). Spending then increased dramatically as implementation took off, in most countries this change happened in 2011, in some in 2012.

**Table 7: AAP country project spending (as of 21 Dec 2012)**

	Budget USD	2009 USD	2010 USD	2011 USD	2012 USD	2009 %	2010 %	2011 %	2012 %
BFA	2,901,250	-	332,700	1,224,233	2,854,968	0	11	42	98
CG	2,975,000	-	254,458	1,166,845	2,931,549	0	9	39	99
CMR	2,600,000	-	314,736	930,213	2,639,650	0	12	36	102
ETH	6,482,749	-	455,781	1,686,306	5,461,156	0	7	26	84
GAB	2,465,000	-	256,156	1,032,841	2,219,740	0	10	42	90
GHA	2,754,000	-	658,787	1,363,948	2,447,576	0	24	50	89
KEN	5,486,726	8,899	276,536	3,125,367	4,857,536	0	5	57	89
LSO	3,108,000	12,996	348,394	1,057,325	2,812,915	0	11	34	91
MAR	3,000,000	21,842	223,100	1,643,832	2,831,453	1	7	55	94
MOZ	3,047,620	90,980	263,108	1,547,243	2,860,685	3	9	51	94
MUS	2,987,004	-	69,392	385,290	2,346,175	0	2	13	79
MWI	3,898,575	16,786	473,287	2,223,937	3,769,924	0	12	57	97
NAM	2,980,000	27,795	618,168	2,383,272	3,026,897	1	21	80	102
NER	3,000,000	-	653,215	2,338,855	2,704,484	0	22	78	90



NGA	5,475,000	-	97,235	1,940,902	4,820,087	0	2	35	88
RWA	2,957,925	23,999	121,734	947,713	3,129,325	1	4	32	106
SEN	2,975,000	-	350,900	1,709,654	2,592,349	0	12	57	87
STP	2,750,000	-	327,494	1,273,700	2,634,420	0	12	46	96
TUN	3,000,000	-	90,592	358,900	2,541,295	0	3	12	85
TZA	2,971,575	-	300,336	1,227,845	2,582,907	0	10	41	87

The low initial spending and delayed project implementation was understandably a major concern of UNDP and IRTSC in 2010 and early 2011 with only one year of implementation remaining. It should be mentioned, that the findings from the mid-term review of the PEI scale-up phase suggests that initiatives aimed at reforming policy and planning procedures take time to conceptualise and for people to understand. Therefore spending is low in the beginning and increases exponentially, once a certain level of project maturity is reached.

However, this does not fully explain the spending patterns and very steep spending curve experienced in most AAP country projects. The spending pattern also reflects the administrative inefficiencies and delays described above as well as the improved management resulting from the introduction of OSC and the proactive engagement of RBx. One concern, however, is whether the accelerated spending in the last year of AAP, was at too fast a pace to allow proper planning and strategic spending of all the resources towards the achievement of the AAP objective and outcomes; this appears to have been an issue in a number of countries. This reinforces the concern that a three-year period for the formulation and implementation of policy and planning transformation initiatives is insufficient. Nonetheless, the figures do show that much time was lost in 2009, due to the above-described administrative inefficiencies. So while the exponential spending pattern itself is not surprising, spending was effectively offset/delayed by a full year and the pace of spending towards the end seems to have been perhaps too high to fully ensure strategic use of the available financial resources. In Lesotho, the national evaluation report found that the accelerated spending resulted in incomplete planning of pilot projects and lack of feasibility studies.

Based on the documentation available to the Evaluation Team it is not possible to provide a full assessment of the cost-effectiveness of AAP. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence and some national evaluation reports suggest there were some inefficiencies in spending. The overall AAP Prodoc was quite generic and did not provide guidance to country projects on how to allocate their budgets. Reportedly, with the initial challenges in terms of understanding AAP, a number of country projects planned and budgeted with on the ground implementation of community development projects, which were not sufficiently linked to the intentions of AAP to inform and influence policy and planning processes. Other examples of budgeting issues at the country level include spending 38% of the project funds on project management and vehicles (Niger), which do not seem necessary for a policy and planning initiative, or budgeting for staff resources, which were never provided to AAP. In a couple of cases, funds were reallocated under the national components; the resources allocated for Zambia were reallocated to other countries when Zambia pulled out of AAP. Some of the funds for Cameroon were also reallocated, reportedly due to poor performance. On the other hand, the national evaluation report found that funds were well administered in

Morocco and only 10% were spent on project management; in Mauritius, 28% were spent on project management.

#### **Conclusion:**

- Country project spending was very low in 2009-2010 but picked up significantly in 2011-2012, and at the programme completion almost all funds had been spent
- The unexpected no-cost extension forced the IRTSC to reduce its budget for support activities and ask countries to co-fund support activities. Earlier knowledge of the extension would have enabled IRTSC to plan its resource use differently
- IRTSC spent a proportion of their funds on activities the country projects could have covered themselves. IRTSC could have asked countries to refund the costs of country activities paid by IRTSC
- Administrative and programme management inefficiencies were a significant cause of low initial spending, but not the full explanation. Equally important was the time it took to conceptualise and understand AAP at the country level
- The low initial spending is what one can expect from transformative policy programmes, although inefficiencies delayed spending by a year
- While the accelerated spending rates towards the end of the programme were impressive, it has seemingly also meant that not all funds were spend strategically towards the AAP objective and outcomes
- The level of funding provided to each country was too high to match the original time frame available and national absorption capacity

#### **Lessons:**

- Initiatives aiming at reforming policy and planning procedures take time to conceptualise and for people to understand, so spending can be expected to be low in the beginning and increase exponentially, once a certain level of project maturity is reached
- While no-cost extensions can be an important means to enable a programme to achieve the intended results, the increased running costs can force activity levels to be downscaled. These implications can be particularly significant, when extension are given provide at a late stage of implementation as budget adjustments for the remaining time will need to be more dramatic. Planning in advance of extensions will better allow programme implementers to adjust strategies and budgets

#### **4.6 Monitoring and evaluation, indicators and baselines**

In late 2011, the MTR found that the AAP M&E system was fragmented and lacked a strong function to ensure overall coordination and management:

*“The disconnect between countries and the regional hub is reflected in the reporting template designed to “measure” how countries are progressing on their agreed work plans. As the IRTSC is neither mandated to monitor country projects nor financially equipped to do so. In this quasi-measurement reporting, country projects themselves outline their achievements, specific issues/constraints against AAP National Programme Results and Indicators on a quarterly basis. No validation, comparative baseline or verification of the reporting is included. The analysis then serves country projects as a basis for self-measuring their quarterly and overall achievement in percentages. The*

*consolidation of separate national achievements needs to be articulated and viewed with an eye toward regional implications. Integration with AAP overall results is essential.”*

*“Since country projects self-monitor their activities as opposed to the IRTSC monitoring country projects, a review of the country reports fails to give one a picture of the potential for replication, which is the purpose of a regional programme.”*

The situation described in the MTR did not change during the final year of AAP implementation, and to a large extent, the monitoring information captured and reported is output and activity oriented.

There was no unit fully tasked with the responsibility for overall programme monitoring, or with the mandate to ensure that the monitoring system at all levels was sufficiently geared to capture impact and outcomes. In general terms, the monitoring roles were defined as follows:

- AAP team, BDP/EEG HQ – to prepare progress reports for the Government of Japan based on information received from IRTSC. To prepare back-to-office reports after missions
- IRTSC – to prepare progress reports for UNDP HQ and UNOPS, based on progress reports submitted voluntarily by country projects. To monitor and report on progress of its own activities. To prepare back-to-office reports after missions
- Country project management units – to design country monitoring systems and monitor country project progress and prepare project reports for the Government and CO
- COs – to monitor and report on AAP country projects
- MCBP – to monitor and report on its progress to IRTSC. To prepare back-to-office reports after missions
- Cross-practice teams to prepare progress reports in relation to their own plans. To prepare back-to-office reports after missions

It is noted that the COs and country projects were expected to submit their monitoring/progress reports to IRTSC, which is external to UNDP and BDP/EEG, but not to the RBx. Hence, reporting from the country level to the regional and global levels was based on voluntariness rather than formal reporting obligations. Reportedly, this could some times create challenges for the IRTSC and BDP/EEG AAP team in retrieving the needed data to monitor progress and prepare progress reports. However, the COs and country project management units were seen as being very cooperative and mostly submitting the needed reports, albeit at varying quality and some times lately.

As can be seen, the M&E mandates of both the AAP team at BDP/EEG and IRTSC were to gather information and prepare fairly similar progress reports in different formats and travel reports. As a result of the above setup, there was a lot emphasis on reporting and a very large volume of progress reports, back-to-office reports and monthly consultant reports were produced under AAP.

However, their mandates did not include the development of a strong joint programme monitoring framework. Nor did they include the provision of support and strategic guidance to country projects or the other regional components on how to: a) establish

strong outcome and impact-oriented indicators, b) prepare good baselines to monitor against, c) agree on tangible target, and d) measure the indicators. In the questionnaire survey conducted for the programme evaluation, some country projects indicated that M&E support needs were not met, and the support given focused on regional reporting needs and did not address country needs.

Furthermore, the overall AAP logframe/results framework provided in the Prodoc provides little guidance on outcome monitoring and tracking change; the higher-level indicators for outcomes and impact were quite broad and generic and not phrased in a way that can be easily measured. Moreover, the responsibility for providing information on the progress against these was allocated to evaluations, so there were no obligations of the implementers to gather the needed information and track whether the intended change was achieved. The shift of the verification responsibility to the final evaluations was also the case for most of the activity level indicators for both the national projects and IRTSC. Moreover, there was a tendency of the indicators, baselines and targets being largely repetitions or mirrors of each other, a few examples are given in the table below. No risks and assumptions were included in the logframes of the Prodoc.

**Table 8: examples of indicators, baselines and targets from AAP Prodoc logframes (National Component and IRTSC)**

<b>Output:</b>	<b>Indicator:</b>	<b>Baseline:</b>	<b>Target:</b>
21 countries with improved leadership capacities and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels	Countries have leadership and comprehensive institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks / opportunities	Country institutional frameworks not well adapted to manage climate change risks / opportunities	21 countries have adjusted their institutional frameworks to better manage climate change risks/opportunities
21 countries with climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors	Countries have in place climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors	Countries have in place climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors	Countries have in place climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors
<b>Activity:</b> Best practices, experiences and technologies are identified and exchanged among countries on implementing climate-resilient policies in priority sectors	<b>Quality Criteria:</b> Availability of information on country experience in designing and implementing climate-resilient policies	<b>Baseline:</b> Availability of information on country experience in designing and implementing climate-resilient policies	<b>Target:</b> Availability of information on country experience in designing and implementing climate-resilient policies

It is noticeable that the Prodoc's M&E framework did not include an independent mid-term review. However, in late 2011, i.e. towards the end of the programme, a light touch mid-term review process was initiated by IRTSC to assess programme performance and address key challenges. This exercise comprised internal reviews of most of the country projects carried out by IRTSC staff and a light touch external mid-term review of the overall programme.

Similar shortcomings were also the case in country project Prodocs, e.g. the Lesotho Prodoc, where several activities did not have indicators specified and there was a lack of baseline information. A more fundamental issue found by a number of national evaluation reports is that monitoring was output rather than results oriented. The shortcoming of the monitoring system actually impacted on the extent to which evaluators could confidently assess the results of AAP. Some country projects evaluations have with reference to lack of baselines or indicators refrained from providing an assessment of the extent to which country projects have achieved their intended outcomes or objective. Other country logframes comprised a very large number of/too many activities (e.g. Mauritius). Some countries (e.g. Mozambique and Mauritius) subsequently revised their logframes and indicators and/or activities.

Acknowledging the shortcomings of the logframe in the overall AAP Prodoc, a consultant was contracted in March 2011 to revise the IRTSC logframe with the IRTSC Programme Manager and Component Managers; but the revised logframe was endorsed by the board in mid 2011. This revised logframe provided a more detailed framework for the IRTSC activities and the related indicators, means of verification and risks and assumptions, but it did not provide targets for the activities, neither did it provide baselines. The focus was on physical progress and outputs, but it did not contain indicators to capture what the results of the support would be, e.g. in terms of people utilising the skills and tools imparted, and what it would mean for the country project implementation.

Only limited technical support was offered within the framework of AAP for developing and implementing country project monitoring. The ITRSC monitoring team did generally not have the capacity or role to visit countries or provide training on how to develop systems to monitor the outcomes of policy and planning interventions. Nonetheless, the anchor consultants assisted with introducing an M&E reporting system developed by IRTSC to the country projects. The original intention was to use the UNDP Atlas reporting system for monitoring, but it was only used to a limited extent by country projects and did not yield sufficient information. Its main tasks were to gather information provided by the countries. The IRTSC introduced some common tables and formats for the countries to use, and tracked the results achieved against each of the five programme outcomes, but much of the information received and presented would focus on outputs rather than outcomes and change. Furthermore, progress monitoring was based on self-evaluation of the country projects, where they each assessed their progress in percentage; it should be noted that the percentage is based on a soft qualitative assessment, not on quantitative data based on clearly defined measures.

This is also reflected at the lower levels of monitoring. For example, in relation to training conducted, the number of people trained was tracked and the satisfaction of participants would be tracked through questionnaires at the end of training/workshops, but the actual change that the new skills meant for the way people carried out their jobs was not assessed. An exception from this was the reflections on changes in peoples work as a result of the first professional development programme (PDP) training module, which was built into the following modules. But this did not seem to feed into the monitoring system.

These limitations in the monitoring framework means that it so far has not been possible to fully capture the lessons learned or the outcomes/delivery against the goal

and objectives of the programme and to what extent such changes can be attributed to AAP. For example, the system seems not to fully have captured the results in terms of e.g. changed government practices and budgets, or the functionality of climate change committees/coordinating bodies created and their ability to influence government and sector ministries. Nonetheless, some outcome related elements are captured in the IRTSC results monitoring tables, such as the influence of national projects on the formulation of policies and plans. Seen in the light of the above, it is not surprising that some of the interviewed stakeholders have indicated that the actual change in policy and planning practices achieved is not clear to them beyond anecdotal evidence, e.g. as captured in the Baobab Coalition Journal articles or policy briefs. IRTSC and the AAP team in BDP/EEG are well aware of this shortcoming, and have as a result hired a consultant to undertake a lessons learned study based on document review and extensive consultations (by email and phone/Skype) with country project implementers.

It is acknowledged by the Evaluation Team that it can be extremely difficult to monitor impact of policy programmes. It is also acknowledged that it is difficult to develop standardised monitoring tools, which are general enough to enable cross-country analysis and comparison, while being specific enough to capture the outcomes of 20 country programmes, each with their own set of results, outputs and types of interventions.

It is the impression of the Evaluation Team that the monitoring system in AAP served as a reporting tool, but not as much as a management tool, neither at the global nor at the country level. This is by no means unique to AAP, but a very common situation, and understandable considering the way the AAP monitoring framework and mandates were set up.

### **MCBP**

The MCBP had its own logframe with its own outcome, and with its own implementation team, its M&E was effectively separate from the other components of AAP. Considering it had media as its specific focus and not government planning, this is rational. The MCBP logframe is logically structured with clear targets and activities linked to each output. Interestingly, it included indicators and means of verification at the outcome level, but not at the output level. There are no baselines nor risks and assumptions established in the logframe. Being a smaller project with a well-defined scope, the complexities of monitoring MCBP was generally less challenging. From an outcome perspective, the most important monitoring element was the Internet monitoring of the monthly change in the climate change articles in national media across Africa. Furthermore, prizes and other recognition received by participating journalist, and their climate change articles were monitored. The progress against each activity was monitored and documented.

### **PPAS**

The PPAS component did not have specific targets and indicators one can monitor against in the Prodoc. It can be difficult to identify in advance relevant targets and indicators for a component, which to a large extent focuses on responding to emerging needs for support and programme administrative aspects. Nonetheless, for the cross-practise element of PPAS, there was scope to develop a programmatic approach and a logframe, which could guide the implementation of cross-practice support and ensure

their mutual alignment. A cross-practice strategy was drafted but it was never adopted, and the associated logframe appears not to have been put in use. Hence, monitoring of the progress in relation to cross-practice appears confined to progress reports from the practice teams and the overall progress reports prepared by IRTSC. It also appears to primarily focus on activities and outputs rather than the results achieved. An analysis of the cross-practice experiences from AAP is under preparation to capture lessons learned, in particular in terms of institutional lessons for UNDP.

### **Conclusion:**

- The absence of a clear overall AAP programme monitoring framework, the fragmented and the weak mandate and instruments of the IRTSC vis-à-vis overall AAP programme monitoring hampered the development of an overall monitoring framework, which could go beyond outputs and activity monitoring and capture outcomes, impact and lessons learned. The lack of such information makes it difficult to document the outcomes and impact of AAP
- The Prodoc and its logframes were too generic to provide guidance for robust monitoring
- Country projects were not sufficiently supported to develop solid and outcome oriented monitoring systems
- The absence of a requirement to have an external mid-term review meant that an opportunity to take stock of key challenges and revise/reorient the programme design was partially lost, although some country projects revised their logframes. The light-touch mid-term review did provide guidance on solving some of the critical programme management issues, but only came towards the end of the programme
- Monitoring was used mainly for reporting purposes and seemingly insufficient to serve as a management tool
- MCBP's logframe and monitoring generally appears adequate considering the size as well as the narrow scope and focus of the component

### **Lessons:**

- A strong, sophisticated and outcome oriented M&E system at programme level with clearly spelled out mandates and instruments, and a well-designed logframe, is necessary to adequately capture the results and lessons of a complex and large regional programme
- A strong, sophisticated and outcome oriented M&E system is necessary, if M&E is to move beyond feeding information to progress reports, and be utilised as a strategic programme management tool
- To ensure that good and valuable outcome oriented monitoring data is produced, it is important to establish the instruments and allocate sufficient resources to build the capacity of country projects
- It is difficult to capture the impact and changes resulting from/attribution to policy programmes. A comprehensive analysis of UNDP experiences with this from several programmes and the development of a framework/methodology could help guiding future programmes

## 4.7 Activity implementation and attainment of outputs

### 4.7.1 National Component

A large range of activities was implemented by the 20 country projects, which lead to different outputs. The national project evaluation reports provide more detailed analyses of these. Some common trends and types of outputs were identified and tracked in the progress reports and achievement tables compiled by IRTSC under each of the five AAP outcomes (these outcomes were called outputs in country Prodocs/logframes).

#### **Outcome 1**

*Countries have introduced dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change.*

##### Output 1.1: Technical studies and databases have been completed

This output was generally implemented in all countries. Most countries procured and installed hardware and software to generate, access and analyse climate information. Nine countries installed automated weather stations. Furthermore, all 20 country projects carried out different thematic studies on a range of topics to inform policies and plans; a few examples include risk assessment for agriculture, climate change impact on water resources, and coastal vulnerability.

##### Output 1.2: National planning mechanisms are established

All 20 countries have developed adaptation plans and/or strategies, e.g. national adaptation plans, sector adaptation plans, climate change and disaster risk reduction, national environmental action plans, and coastal adaptation strategies. However, not all of these have been approved (yet), and the extent to which these can be attributed to AAP is not clear to the Evaluation Team. Nonetheless, study results and data have been provided to governments to inform policies and plans. A number of the studies and climate data generated have reportedly either been taken into account in (or at least informed) policies and plans. In a number cases the information has not yet been applied in the policies/plans but is expected to be so.

##### Output 1.3: Technical capacity is developed

A broad range of stakeholders have been trained on climate analysis in the 20 countries, including environment ministry staff, sector ministry staff, local government staff, meteorologists, researchers, students, and communities. Training appears mainly to have targeted technical people, but in some countries parliamentarians have also been trained. A number of the people trained have reportedly put the training into use, mainly in relation to technical staff analysing data, but the training has reportedly in some cases also influenced planning processes.

#### **Outcome 2**

*Countries have built leadership and developed institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels.*

##### Output 2.1: Awareness and action on climate change adaptation have increased.

In all 20 countries, a range of leaders have been targeted, including parliamentarians, government committee members, high-level government staff, private sector, local



government, local/village leaders, academia, and civil society. They have been engaged through awareness raising activities, such as training, workshops, events, newsletters, media and meetings. Reportedly, the sensitisation has led to follow-up actions, such as increased sharing and sensitised people further sensitising communities or NGOs engaging in climate change awareness raising.

#### Output 2.2: National planning mechanisms are established

New climate change institutional structures have been established in all 20 countries, incl. commissions and councils on climate change, inter-ministerial working groups on climate change adaptation, parliamentary taskforces and/or networks, national climate change secretariats and government-donor working groups. Reportedly, these new institutions were a result of AAP support and facilitation. Furthermore, AAP has contributed to the design of new climate change government programmes or strategies in several countries.

### **Outcome 3**

*Countries are implementing climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors.*

#### Output 3.1: Climate change adaptation policies have been approved

AAP have provided support or inputs to all AAP countries in the formulation of climate change related policies, plans and strategies. Reportedly, 19 countries (except Cameroon) have made significant progress, although a number of these are not yet finalised, approved or adopted. AAP has provided support/inputs to a range of policies and plans, such as: climate change policies, climate change action plans, adaptation strategies, green economy strategies, and coastal management laws. Furthermore, AAP has in a number of countries provided inputs (e.g. studies and guidelines) to strategies for policy implementation.

#### Output 3.2: Development policies and plans address adaptation

AAP has assisted 15 countries in mainstreaming/integrating climate change into policies and plans, such as: national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, national sector policies/plans, local development plans, environmental plans, and EIA processes. Moreover, AAP has supported 16 countries in incorporating climate change resilience into investment plans and approaches.

#### Output 3.3: Adaptation measures are implemented in various sectors

The extent to which governments are implementing adaptation measures in priority sectors is not clear to the Evaluation Team, but this output is very ambitious for a three-year programme. AAP has in all 20 countries implemented adaptation pilot projects. The rationale behind implementing pilot projects under AAP is two-fold, firstly pilot projects can inform policy and planning processes, and secondly, pilot projects can demonstrate tangible ways of implementing new climate change policies and plans.

### **Outcome 4**

*Financing options to meet national adaptation costs have been expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels.*

The anticipated outputs under this outcome included: climate-resilient investment plans, climate-resilient budgets, market/fiscal/financial mechanisms to sustain/upscale adaptation measures, and innovative financing instruments explored and piloted.

However, the implementation under this outcome was limited by a number of capacity constraints faced by countries, e.g. in relation to developing appropriate strategies and planning appropriate activities. Nonetheless, 17 countries carried out activities to assess the costs of implementing adaptation measures, although in most cases the countries did not reach the stage at which they had made such an assessment. Activities included: developing adaptation investment plans for sectors, planning to include adaptation costs for sectors in NAPAs, workshops and training to build the capacity to assess adaptation costs, and planning/carrying out studies on the economic impact of climate change. Most countries organised or participated in workshops on climate change financing (accessing new financing sources and mainstreaming climate change into national budgets). Furthermore, AAP supported the establishment of entities, mechanisms and/or plans to facilitate the access of a number of countries to climate change adaptation funding, such as accreditation of national implementing entities under the Adaptation Fund, establishment of economic facilities and funds, and development of investment plans and strategies. In ten countries, national budgets now include a line item on adaptation; however, the amount of funds allocated in most countries is not clear to the Evaluation Team, and in some countries the amounts appear modest. Nonetheless, in Ethiopia 2% of the regional budgets is now allocated to environmental actions. 12 AAP countries prepared proposals for donor funding, which is a considerable achievement.

## **Outcome 5**

*Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities is being generated and shared across all levels.*

### Output 5.1: Knowledge products on mainstreaming climate change into development are accessible

The country projects produced a range of knowledge products. Ten countries developed technical products such as study reports, guidelines/manuals, toolkits, position papers, fact sheets, and policy briefs. Furthermore, a wide range of communication products were produced by all country projects, including newsletters, websites, documentaries, radio programmes, videos, documentaries, and outreach materials (e.g. booklets, leaflets, posters, t-shirts).

### Output 5.2: Countries are sharing experiences on climate change adaptation

The 20 AAP country teams participated in regional forums, conferences and workshops, such as those arranged by IRTSC. Some AAP country teams made exchange visits to other AAP countries.

### Output 5.3: Project results and experiences are being widely disseminated

All AAP countries have developed communication plans for wider dissemination and awareness raising. Communication materials were disseminated through multiple channels, such as events (e.g. fairs and exhibitions), workshops, meetings and on project websites. Furthermore, country project related documents were uploaded on the UNDP Teamworks intranet site; the use of Teamworks is described in more detail in the IRTSC section. In Lesotho, a communications officer was employed by the project in 2012.

## **Key challenges**

As previously described, country project implementation was significantly delayed due to capacity constraints as well as a low understanding of the AAP concept and focus on

policy and planning rather than traditional project implementation. Reportedly, this meant that the activities planned did not always correspond fully to the intended outcomes. One key issue appears to be that many countries were not sure how to engage with the planning ministries and politicians; one example given by an interviewee was a case where it was planned to engage parliamentarians through a half-day seminar, with limited follow-up action to ensure that the message was received and internalised by the parliamentarians. It should be acknowledged that it can be difficult to engage the political level, and it is comparatively easier to engage in more technical and tangible activities (such as improving data collection and management), and reportedly there has been a tendency among countries to focus on the latter.

A related issue is that many countries wanted to engage in pilot and demonstration projects, and reportedly a substantial part of country budgets under outcome 3, *“countries are implementing climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors”*, was spent on such activities. In Lesotho, the AAP project focus was shifted from strategy and policy development to pilot project implementation at the request of Government. This interest in pilot projects is understandable, as countries are already experienced with implementing such activities and they produce tangible and visible results. It should be acknowledged that such interventions can be very relevant in policy programmes, provided they are systematically used to a) inform policies and b) clearly demonstrate the linkage between policies, plans and on-the-ground implementation and the impact of mainstreaming climate change into policies and plans. However, this linkage was not always sufficiently made in the country projects (e.g. in Niger and Lesotho), although there are examples of country projects, where this reportedly was done well, such as Namibia and Morocco. Considering the plethora of on-the-ground climate change adaptation interventions, one question would also be whether there is a need for a programme like AAP to implement on-the-ground interventions or whether it would have been better to link up to existing initiatives and focus on bringing the experiences from these up to the policy level.

As one would expect with a large number of countries across Africa, of which some are in the LDC group and others are mid income countries, the country projects delivered at different paces. Furthermore, in some countries political instability stalled implementation for a period of time (Tunisia, Niger, Nigeria).

### **Conclusion:**

- Most countries installed systems to gather and analyse climate information and undertook thematic studies. All countries developed adaptation plans and strategies with inputs from AAP. A number of the studies and climate data generated have reportedly either been taken into account in, or at least informed, policies and plans
- A broad range of stakeholders were trained in climate analysis in all countries. Mainly people at the technical level were trained, but in some countries parliamentarians were also trained. The skills were put into use, mainly in relation to analysing data, but the training has in some cases influenced planning processes
- A range of leaders in government and outside government were targeted by awareness raising activities
- Climate change institutional structures were established in all 20 countries, with support from AAP

- AAP have provided support or inputs to all AAP countries in the formulation of climate change related policies, plans and strategies
- AAP has assisted 15 countries in mainstreaming/integrating climate change into policies and plans
- AAP has supported 16 countries in incorporating climate change resilience into investment plans and approaches
- All countries have implemented adaptation pilot projects. There was a strong country interest in engaging in pilot interventions under AAP, but these were not always sufficiently designed to inform policy. One question would be whether there is a need for a programme like AAP to implement on-the-ground interventions or whether it would have been better to link up to existing initiatives and focus on bringing the experiences from these up to the policy level
- The anticipated outputs under outcome 4 (innovative financing) were not fully delivered due to country level capacity constraints
- 17 countries carried out activities to assess the costs of implementing adaptation measures, although in most cases the countries did not reach the stage at which they had made such an assessment
- AAP supported the establishment of entities, mechanisms and/or plans to facilitate the access of a number of countries to climate change adaptation funding
- In ten countries, national budgets now include a line item on adaptation
- Country projects developed communication plans and produced a range of both technical (e.g. guidelines, briefs) and communication knowledge products (e.g. leaflets, posters). Communication products were disseminated through a variety of channels

#### **Lessons:**

- There is often a strong national interest in engaging in pilot interventions, which are visible, tangible and comparatively easy to implement. However, pilot interventions in policy programmes are only relevant when clearly linked to, and informing, policy and planning approaches and processes. Before it is decided to engage in pilot interventions, it should be assessed whether existing projects can be used to provide the necessary information
- Innovative financing is a challenging area for country projects to engage in due to capacity constraints

#### **4.7.2 IRTSC**

The activities and outputs of IRTSC comprised both technical support and project management support. In the Prodoc, IRTSC had five intended outputs, and subsequently output 6 was introduced in 2010 to reflect the need for IRTSC to provide project management support. The intended outputs were:

1. Access to the best available data and information on climate variability and impacts is facilitated to support dynamic, long-term national planning and decision-making mechanisms
2. Support is provided to institutional and leadership development in a manner responsive to the unique circumstances and needs of each country
3. Best practices, experiences and technologies are identified and exchanged among countries on implementing climate-resilient policies in priority sectors

4. Innovative financing options are identified and key partnerships are facilitated at the national, sub-regional and regional levels
5. Region-wide knowledge and learning mechanism are established to raise awareness, engage stakeholders, inform decision-makers, and promote exchange and cooperation between countries
6. AAP is being effectively implemented and managed in accordance with IRTSC objectives and commitments

Outputs 1, 2, 3 and 5 were covered by the three technical components of IRTSC (DIMC, ILCD, KM), which each had their own Component Manager. Output 6 was in 2011 covered by anchor consultants, while in 2010 and 2012 it was covered by IRTSC Component Managers. Output 4 was given lower priority and did not have a dedicated Component Manager.

In 2011, it was realised that the IRTSC would not have the capacity to provide the full suite of support to all countries. Based on the progress made in each country and an assessment of their capacity, the countries were classified into three categories according to the level of challenges they faced and hence their likelihood of completing implementation by the end of 2012: low risk (9 countries), medium risk (4 countries), and high risk (7 countries). It was decided that they would not be prioritised until they showed signs of improvement. By the end of 2012, all of the high-risk countries had moved out of this category.

IRTSC was initially conceived primarily as a reactive mechanism, which should respond to support needs articulated by country projects. However, the IRTSC identified some common and crucial areas of support needs for moving the country projects forward, which the country projects had not articulated themselves. Hence, in late 2010 IRTSC introduced a strategy where support was provided through two streams:

- Stream 1 provided technical and project management support upon requests from country projects
- Stream 2 comprised a number of strategic capacity building interventions, which IRTSC offered to countries

### **Stream 1**

Most of the support was provided under stream 1 in response to needs identified by, and requests from, the country projects. While there were common areas of support and approaches, the support would vary from country to country. In 2010 a helpdesk was launched; this was an email address to which countries could submit their needs, and then the helpdesk would forward the requests to the appropriate expertise, whether an IRTSC staff member, UNDP HQ, or a consultant. The use however, was lower than anticipated, as country projects would often send their requests to a person they knew rather than an anonymous email address. In 2011, a total of 90 requests was received, of which approximately half came from three countries (Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mauritius). In 2012, the introduction of Task Managers meant that most support requests went directly to them instead of the helpdesk.

### **Stream 2**

Under stream 2, a number of capacity building support products were offered to the country projects on a cost-sharing basis. The majority of these fell under the ILCD

component. UNDP Practice Groups (Capacity Development Group) and consultants were involved in the development of the products and their implementation. The products offered were:

- Climate data analysis workshops (DIMC) – 7 countries
- Climate Action Intelligence (CAI) (ILCD) – 5 countries
- Leadership for Results Programme (LRP) (ILCD) – 4 countries
- Integrated Planning Framework (IPF) (ILCD) – 1 country
- Comprehensive Capacity Development Needs Assessment (CDNA), with the UNDP Capacity Development Group (ILCD) – integrated in IPF
- Professional Development Programme (PDP), module 1 and 2 (module 3 and 4 were not implemented) (ILCD) – 19 countries
- UNDP Teamworks online platform training (KM) – 17 countries
- Regional knowledge management workshop (KM) – 17 countries

### **The data information management component (DIMC)**

DIMC was related to output 1: *Access to the best available data and information on climate variability and impacts is facilitated to support dynamic, long-term national planning and decision-making mechanisms.*

Assistance was given to countries in relation to the development of strategies for data collection and analysis, and use of the generated information in national decision-making processes. Support was also given to the establishment of data management systems. This included support to the procurement of technical equipment weather stations, IT hardware and software, often through direct procurement through UNOPS. Training was provided in relation to the use of equipment, accessing data at the sub-regional and regional levels, and analysis of the data generated or accessed. Capacity building was also provided in relation to making the climate change information generated from data analysis accessible to decision-makers.

DIMC was the only area of AAP which also worked at building regional level capacity; this was done in relation to establishing regional data management systems and training staff on their use, e.g. with Agrhymet in West Africa.

Partnerships were established with the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) and the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ITCP) for training of regional and country level staff, and the development of tools, e.g. for the assessment of water resources. Training was provided mainly through national workshops, but there was also a regional workshop in Nairobi in collaboration with ICPAC.

DIMC also included guidance on applying climate change information, e.g. by upscaling the experience from Burkina Faso with weather index insurance to ten other countries. However, the support for linking climate data analysis into policy and decision-making procedures seemingly only happened to a limited extent; most activities under DIMC were targeting the technical level. Decision-makers in policy and planning processes appear only to have been reached to a limited extent under this component.

A total of 12 countries were given support to different degrees under DIMC, in accordance with their specific needs/requests. The table below shows how country project management units/COs assessed the DIMC support received. Most of the

support provided was assessed as being of high quality and very relevant. However, the support was frequently seen as being provided too late. Approximately two-thirds of the support provided/skills imparted was subsequently put into use in project implementation.

**Table 9: Overall rating of DIMC support by country projects (12 countries)**

Table 9: Overall Rating of DIME support by country projects (12 countries)				
	Rating			Average
Quality				
Value	2 High quality	1 Medium quality	0 Poor quality	1.60
Number of entries*	18	4	3	
Relevance				
Value	2 Very relevant	1 Partly relevant	0 Not relevant	1.77
Number of entries*	22	2	2	
Timeliness				
Value	1 Timely	0 Too late	0.5 Too early	0.48
Number of entries*	12	13	-	
Use				
Value	1 Yes	0 No	0 Not implementable	0.65
Number of entries*	17	6	3	

\*Each entry indicates one support activity type received by one country. Hence, one country can have several entries. Some entries were not fully filled by all countries.

### **Institutional leadership and capacity development component (ILCD)**

ILCD was related to output 2: *Support is provided to institutional and leadership development in a manner responsive to the unique circumstances and needs of each country.*

Most of the activities under this component fell under stream 2:

- The Leadership for Results Programme (LRP) targeted key leaders at all levels. The approach was originally developed for creating HIV/AIDS awareness and transforming peoples' attitudes. It had the format of a five-day workshop and worked on getting people in touch with their beliefs and leadership attitudes
- Professional Development Programme (PDP) was a four-module programme focusing on four themes: optimising project implementation effectiveness (addressing administrative problems, interpersonal skills and relationships), leadership of the climate change agenda (effective leadership,) and identification of needs and planning individual capacity development. Only modules 1 and 2 were provided, the others were cancelled due to funding, capacity, and time constraints
- Climate Action Intelligence (CAI) was a process and methodology to map all actors (institutions and projects) working on climate change adaptation in a country to facilitate coordination. CAI was piloted in Kenya and then rolled out in four other countries. Plans to further expand to other countries in 2011 were cancelled. CAI never gained full ownership and momentum in Kenya to move significantly forward after the training, but better results were reportedly achieved in Malawi, Ethiopia and Senegal where the CAI was internalised

- Comprehensive Capacity Development Needs Assessment (CDNA) was a joint initiative with the UNDP Capacity Development Group. Reportedly due to slow progress in its development the capacity needs assessment was instead integrated in IPF and remaining funds for CDNA were reallocated for other activities
- Integrated planning framework (IPF) targeted COs and was a systematic process for aligning and simplifying the support and management processes across a number of in-country projects. This approach was piloted in Niger and Lesotho
- Support provided by the Gender Team was provided under ILCD

All countries were given support to different degrees under ILCD, in accordance with their specific needs/requests. The table below shows how country project management units/COs assess the ILCD support received. Most of the support provided was assessed as being of high quality, very relevant and provided on time. However, more than one-third of the support was seen as of medium or poor quality, and approximately one-third was seen as partly or not relevant. Most of the support provided/skills imparted was subsequently put into use in project implementation.

**Table 10: Overall rating of ILCD support by country projects (20 countries)**

	Rating			Average
Quality				
Value	2 High quality	1 Medium quality	0 Poor quality	1.47
Number of entries*	11	6	2	
Relevance				
Value	2 Very relevant	1 Partly relevant	0 Not relevant	1.58
Number of entries*	13	4	2	
Timeliness				
Value	1 Timely	0 Too late	0.5 Too early	0.74
Number of entries*	14	5	-	
Use				
Value	1 Yes	0 No	0 Not implementable	0.84
Number of entries*	16	2	1	

\*Each entry indicates one support activity type received by one country. Hence, one country can have several entries. Some entries were not fully filled by all countries.

### **The knowledge management component (KM)**

KM was related to two outputs:

- Output 3: *Best practices, experiences and technologies are identified and exchanged among countries on implementing climate-resilient policies in priority sectors*
- Output 5: *Region-wide knowledge and learning mechanism are established to raise awareness, engage stakeholders, inform decision-makers, and promote exchange and cooperation between countries*

The KM support activities were based on an analysis of the KM plans in each country Prodoc and identified common aspects and a KM needs survey/self assessment in each country. The main areas of support were:



- Providing access for country project staff to a platform for knowledge and information sharing and storage of documentation. The UNDP Teamworks platform was used for this, and 17 country projects were provided with access and training on its use
- Training on development and dissemination of knowledge, information and best practices. A regional training workshop was held with 17 country projects participating; based on request, this was followed by two national workshops. Countries were also supported in documenting best practices
- Provision of inputs to the development of communication plans (seven countries)
- Provision of inputs to national capitalization of experiences workshops (five countries)
- A “Handbook on Capitalisation of Experiences” was prepared in 2012 in cooperation with the Dakar based regional organisation Innovation Environnement Développement Afrique (IED Afrique) and published on the AAP website in January 2013

Due to time and budget constraints, the activity level of KM was less than planned. The component did not get to the level of involving decision-makers and ensuring they had access to knowledge for informed decision-making.

Generally speaking, building a good understanding knowledge management and the creation of a culture of sharing is a process that takes time. Furthermore, since the sharing of lessons does not yield immediate benefits in people’s day-to-day tasks, it often takes second priority compared to tasks, which are directly related to peoples’ immediate work. Given the relatively short implementation framework for KM under AAP (2011-12) it is not surprising, that the actual use of Teamworks (which is also a UNDP tool rather than Government tool), by country project stakeholders generally appears somewhat limited. Poor Internet connectivity for Government staff is a further hindrance to the use of web-based tools such as Teamworks. As such, the sharing of experiences among countries appears to have been largely limited to exchanges at regional workshops. All countries produced knowledge management products. Reportedly, some countries developed knowledge management products of a high quality (e.g. Morocco and Tunisia). Nonetheless, some countries have reportedly received Teamworks and knowledge management concepts well and the general awareness of the value of sharing experiences has been raised.

A total of 19 countries were given support under KM. The table below shows how country project management units/COs assess the KM support received. Most of the support provided was assessed as being of high quality, very relevant and put into use subsequently. This sentiment is somewhat surprising, considering the limited use of Teamworks by country projects. While most of the support was provided timely, a significant number of responses indicated it was provided late.

**Table 11: Overall rating of KM support by country projects (19 countries)**

	Rating			Average
	Quality			
Value	2 High quality	1 Medium quality	0 Poor quality	1.83
Number of entries*	15	3	-	

Relevance				
Value	2 Very relevant	1 Partly relevant	0 Not relevant	1.84
Number of entries*	16	3	-	
Timeliness				
Value	1 Timely	0 Too late	0.5 Too early	0.61
Number of entries*	11	7	1	
Use				
Value	1 Yes	0 No	0 Not implementable	0.88
Number of entries*	15	1	1	

\*Each entry indicates one support activity type received by one country. Hence, one country can have several entries. Some entries were not fully filled by all countries.

### Innovative financing

In relation to output 4 (innovative financing options are identified and key partnerships are facilitated at the national, sub-regional and regional levels), IRTSC made the strategic decision in 2011 not to focus on this. The rationale was: a) the limited capacity of IRTSC to provide support in all areas to 20 countries, b) other UNDP initiatives provide support in this area, and c) the understanding that countries would need more knowledge about their actual implementation needs before engaging in fund raising. One challenge in this regards, was that there was a significant country project interest in getting support to identify innovative funding opportunities. Some support was provided in the area of innovative finance, in six countries workshops were held in collaboration with EEG, e.g. on climate financing and economic analysis. Furthermore, needs assessments of national finance needs were carried out in 17 AAP countries by the UNDP Cross-practice Team.

Six countries were given support in relation to innovative financing. The table below shows how country project management units/COs assess the support received. The support provided was mostly seen as being of high quality and was always found very relevant, and generally provided on time. Interestingly, in more than half the cases, it was not put into use.

**Table 12: Overall rating of financing support by country projects (6 countries)**

Table 12: Overall rating of financing support by country projects (6 countries)				
	Rating			Average
Quality				
Value	2 High quality	1 Medium quality	0 Poor quality	1.80
Number of entries*	4	1	-	
Relevance				
Value	2 Very relevant	1 Partly relevant	0 Not relevant	2.00
Number of entries*	6	-	-	
Timeliness				
Value	1 Timely	0 Too late	0.5 Too early	0.80
Number of entries*	4	1	-	
Use				
Value	1 Yes	0 No	0 Not implementable	0.40
Number of entries*	2	3	-	

\*Each entry indicates one support activity type received by one country. Hence, one country can have several entries. Some entries were not fully filled by all countries.

### Policy and planning support

Two countries, Lesotho and Mauritius, were supported by IRTSC in relation to policy and planning processes; this work included support for defining policy frameworks, policy framework reformulation, impact and vulnerability assessments, mainstreaming, strategy development and policy and planning studies. IRTSC did not appear to have a strategy for directly engaging in support for country projects in relation to influencing policy and planning processes. For a programme, which sets out to transform policy and planning processes this seems surprising, but perhaps understandable in the context of the short programme implementation period and significant needs for support for programme formulation and inception management. However, considering that PEI has already developed a methodology and tools for such work, further collaboration could have helped ensuring further and more strategic support for this.

Only two countries were reportedly provided with specific policy related support. The table below shows how country project management units/COs assess the policy support received. While the support was seen as relevant, the quality has apparently varied and the support was provided late. The support was put into use in project implementation.

**Table 13: Overall rating of policy support by country projects (2 countries)**

	Rating			Average
Quality				
Value	2 High quality	1 Medium quality	0 Poor quality	0.67
Number of entries*	1	-	2	
Relevance				
Value	2 Very relevant	1 Partly relevant	0 Not relevant	2.00
Number of entries*	3	-	-	
Timeliness				
Value	1 Timely	0 Too late	0.5 Too early	0.00
Number of entries*	-	3	-	
Use				
Value	1 Yes	0 No	0 Not implementable	1.00
Number of entries*	3	-	-	

\*Each entry indicates one support activity type received by one country. Hence, one country can have several entries. Some entries were not fully filled by all countries.

### Coverage of technical support vis-à-vis programme outcomes

The table below shows the alignment between the five AAP programme/national component outcomes and the five IRTSC outputs. Generally, the IRTSC outputs are well aligned with the AAP outcomes, except in relation to providing support for the actual formulation and implementation of planning mechanisms and policies. Hence, there appears to be an inherent bias towards a) supporting the technical level rather than the political level, and b) towards the provision of data and inputs and experience sharing rather than directly assisting country projects with the tackling the critical challenge of establishing functional mechanisms for mainstreaming climate change adaptation into

formulating and implementing policies and plans. Hence, by design, the IRTSC seems not to be intended to provide support in some of the most critical and difficult aspects for the achievement of AAP's objective.

**Table 14: Alignment between AAP outcomes and IRTSC outputs**

No	AAP outcome	IRTSC output	Alignment
1	Countries have introduced dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change	Access to the best available data and information on climate variability and impacts is facilitated to support dynamic, long-term national planning and decision-making mechanisms	Aligned with the need for data, but not with support for the actual development and introduction of planning mechanisms
2	Countries have built leadership capacities and developed institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels	Support is provided to institutional and leadership development in a manner responsive to the unique circumstances and needs of each country	Aligned
3	Countries are implementing climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors	Best practices, experiences and technologies are identified and exchanged among countries on implementing climate-resilient policies in priority sectors	Facilitating exchange of experience between countries, but not including actual support to influencing/changing the formulation and implementation of policies
4	Financing options to meet national adaptation costs have been expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels	Innovative financing options are identified and key partnerships are facilitated at the national, sub-regional and regional levels	Aligned
5	Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities is being generated and shared across all levels	Region-wide knowledge and learning mechanism are established to raise awareness, engage stakeholders, inform decision-makers, and promote exchange and cooperation between countries	Aligned

### **Project management support**

The provision of project management support by IRTSC was captured in output 6 as defined in the revised IRTSC logframe (not included in the Prodoc): *AAP is being effectively implemented and managed in accordance with IRTSC objectives and commitments.*

A very significant proportion, if not the majority, of the support provided by the IRTSC was project management related. This was due to a number of issues as described earlier, including difficulties with understanding the AAP concept and what it required,

limited capacity (staff resources) and low initial ownership of COs and governments, and administrative bottlenecks and delays. The main activity types included:

- Assistance to all countries with planning and conducting inception workshops
- Peer review (2011) and final (2012) workshops for all countries
- Ongoing in-country and distance support and mentoring by anchor consultants and Task Managers to address key bottlenecks
- Light touch country mid-term reviews by Task Managers
- Procurement assistance (see above under DIMC component)

The provision of project management support came at the expense of the capacity (staff time and financial) to provide technical support. One Component Manager expressed that he had in 2010 focused exclusively on the provision of project management support (incl. Prodoc finalisation, facilitating Prodoc approval and signing, ToR preparation support, inception workshops, assistance to work plan preparation) and not done any work in relation to his component.

All countries were given project management support, in accordance with their specific needs/requests. The table below shows how country project management units/COs assessed the project management support received. The support provided was assessed as being of either high or medium quality, similarly, most of the support was seen as very relevant, but one-third was seen as only partly relevant. The support was mostly provided timely, but also relatively frequently seen as being provided too late. Most of the support was put into use in project implementation.

**Table 15: Overall rating of project management support by country projects (20 countries)**

	Rating			Average
Quality				
Value	2 High quality	1 Medium quality	0 Poor quality	1.51
Number of entries*	39	29	3	
Relevance				
Value	2 Very relevant	1 Partly relevant	0 Not relevant	1.65
Number of entries*	49	23.5**	1	
Timeliness				
Value	1 Timely	0 Too late	0.5 Too early	0.67
Number of entries*	45.5**	22.5**	-	
Use				
Value	1 Yes	0 No	0 Not implementable	0.86
Number of entries*	60	8	2	

\*Each entry indicates one support activity type received by one country. Hence, one country can have several entries. Some entries were not fully filled by all countries.

\*\* When a country has given more than 1 entry, the secondary one is given the value 0.5

### Delivery of intended outputs

The table below provides an assessment of the extent to which IRTSC has delivered its intended outputs.

**Table 16: Assessed delivery of IRTSC outputs**

<b>Output</b>	<b>Prodoc target</b>	<b>End of programme status</b>
1. Access to the best available data and information on climate variability and impacts is facilitated to support dynamic, long-term national planning and decision-making mechanisms	1. 20 countries have access to detailed climate change data and its impacts 2. 20 countries have developed robust alternative development scenarios which incorporate climate change	1. Achieved in 11 countries supported upon request, DIMC support enabled countries to establish and use data management systems and have enhanced the regional capacity to provide data 2. Partly achieved, DIMC provided relevant training to some countries, e.g. on vulnerability maps, impact assessment. Target only partially within the control of the IRTSC, as it hinges on country project performance
2. Support is provided to institutional and leadership development in a manner responsive to the unique circumstances and needs of each country	20 countries have access to relevant technical expertise and capacity development support for developing institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks/opportunities	Largely achieved, PDP training provided to 19 countries. Other training, incl. LRP provided to some countries on the basis of requests
3. Best practices, experiences and technologies are identified and exchanged among countries on implementing climate-resilient policies in priority sectors	Significant amounts of information readily available	Partly achieved. Systems established for knowledge sharing, but countries are only sharing experiences to some extent
4. Innovative financing options are identified and key partnerships are facilitated at the national, sub-regional and regional levels	Information readily available in at least 21 African countries	Not achieved. Support only provided to six countries
5. Region-wide knowledge and learning mechanism are established to raise awareness, engage stakeholders, inform decision-makers, and promote exchange and cooperation between countries	A wide range of knowledge is easily available to African countries	Partly achieved, see output 3

The tables below shows how country project teams assess the overall support received. As can be seen, the stakeholders found the support quality and relevance was good. The support was also generally found to be implementable and yielding results in terms of improving country project implementation. While the support timeliness was generally perceived as being sufficient more than one third of the countries felt that the overall timeliness of the support provision was poor (i.e. provided late). Considering the delays with programme implementation, the establishment of IRTSC and mobilisation of

Practice Teams, this is not surprising. Some Francophone projects found that language barriers affected the support provided (some task managers did not speak French).

**Table 17: Overall rating of support provided by IRTSC, Practice Teams and consultants by country projects (16 countries)**

	Rating (number of responses)					Average rating
	4 Very good	3 Good	2 Sufficient	1 Poor	0 Very poor	
<b>Quality</b>	3	8	3	1	-	<b>2.87</b>
<b>Relevance</b>	5	5	4	2	-	<b>2.81</b>
<b>Timeliness</b>	1	5	4	6	-	<b>2.06</b>
<b>Implementability</b>	3	6	3	4	-	<b>2.50</b>
<b>Results</b>	1	8	4	3	-	<b>2.44</b>

### **Conclusion:**

- While IRTSC was intended to respond to country project support requests, some critical support needs were not identified by countries themselves. Therefore, IRTSC identified critical/strategic support areas and launched the stream 2 activities to address these
- The provision of project management support came at the expense of technical support. As pointed out in the mid-term review, it would have been advantageous to separate project management and technical support, e.g. by having dedicated staff allocated for project management support, or ensuring that RBx/UNDP Regional Service Centres are tasked and resourced to provide such support
- Country projects found the majority of the support received of good quality, relevant and implementable. However, while support timeliness was generally found sufficient, in several cases it was provided late, and language barriers affected the support for Francophone country projects
- KM laid the initial foundation for sharing of experiences, but the culture of sharing was not fully built up within the time frame of AAP
- By design and implementation, IRTSC had a bias towards supporting the technical level rather than the political level. IRTSC did not fully engage in directly supporting country projects in activities that specifically worked on changing policy and planning mechanisms and targeting decision-makers
- IRTSC partly delivered its intended technical outputs and partly met the targets stipulated in the Prodoc

### **Lessons:**

- In the design of innovative regional programmes, it is important to have a clear strategy, defined responsibilities and staff resources for the provision of project management support to ensure it does not conflict with technical support
- Imparting a good understanding of knowledge management and building a culture sharing experiences takes time. It is also difficult, when government institutions do not have mechanisms that give staff incentives to engage and invest in knowledge sharing
- While technical support should be demand-driven and in line with national priorities and identified needs, it should be kept in mind that there may be critical bottlenecks, which are not readily identified at the country level. Hence, a

regional identification and provision of strategic support needs can be important to ensure effective implementation of innovative approaches

#### 4.7.3 MCBP

The two main areas of work under MCBP were a) training and support to journalists, and b) AAP communication.

The main activities targeting journalists were:

- Online monitoring of the number of articles produced on climate change in the 20 AAP countries
  - Development of training materials
  - Training workshops:
    - Training of four sub-regional team leaders to conduct four regional workshops (80 participants) and support national trainers
    - Training of 20 national trainers to lead national workshops for journalists
    - Training of 448 journalists
- Topics covered: techniques in pitching climate change, climate change, actors in the field of climate change, digital media, climate changescience, resources for reporting climate change, gender.
- Meetings with Editors-in-Chief and Managing Directors of five media outlets in each country
  - Media resources made available on AAP website
  - Development of a guide to Climate Change Journalism in Africa


Feedback collected from the participants by MCBP at the end of the workshops generally shows a high level of appreciation of modules provided. The questionnaire survey conducted by the Evaluation Team received too small a number of responses to be statistically reliable, but confirms of the level of appreciation and indicates use of the skills imparted:

- 7 journalists found the relevance of the training very good, 3 found it good (none found it only to be sufficient or poor)
- 7 journalists found the quality of the training very good, 3 found it good (none found it only to be sufficient or poor)
- 6 journalists found the implementability of the training very good, 3 found it good (none found it only to be sufficient or poor)
- 4 journalists found the overall support very good, 5 found it good, 2 found it sufficient (none found it poor)
- 8 journalists indicated they had formed or joined climate change related networks (e.g. journal groups), 1 had not joined any network
- Several respondents provided comments stating that the training had increased their understanding of climate change issues

Furthermore, during the life span of MCBP, the media coverage of AAP increased significantly, as can be seen in the figure below.

**Figure 3: Media coverage of AAP (source: MCBP completion report)**





The communication activities targeted non-technical people in order to make the approach, work, experiences and results of AAP easy to understand and more widely accessible, including to decision-makers. The other purpose was to create a sense of community among AAP stakeholders by sharing stories. The main AAP communication activities were:

- Four printed editions of the Baobab Coalition Journal
- 15 Baobab Coalition Journal email newsletters (sent to 2-3000 people)
- AAP corporate communication products, including an 8-page booklet and five four-page brochures

Some of the outputs and several of the targets in the Prodoc logframe were subsequently revised in MCBP work plan. The table below shows an assessment of the delivery or the intended outputs in the revised logframe.

**Table 18: Assessed delivery of MCBP outputs**

Output	Target	End of programme status
1. Survey and analysis of existing media coverage of climate change in 20 AAP countries, and by regional media in Africa	Online monitoring of available media in all 20 AAP countries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor relevant regional media</li> <li>• Monitor agenda setting media (print, online, TV &amp; radio) in 20 AAP countries</li> <li>• Monitor output of AAP workshop participants</li> </ul>	Generally achieved, online monitoring of articles in 20 countries undertaken on a regular basis. Outputs of MCBP workshop participants was tracked
2. Communication tools and education packages on climate change to assist media professionals developed	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Existing messages and tools about climate change and environmental issues analysed</li> <li>2. Additional tools and media approaches developed</li> <li>3. Complementary training materials prepared</li> </ol>	Achieved, strategy, tools and training package developed. Additional training materials collected and disbursed
3. Improved awareness and understanding of climate change created	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Media personnel and key stakeholders trained</li> <li>2. Journalism guide developed</li> <li>3. Climate change networks created</li> <li>4. Engage editors in improving and expanding climate change related coverage</li> <li>5. Media Resource Directory: one-stop</li> </ol>	Achieved, journalists in 20 AAP countries trained, journalism guide developed, editors approached, Media resource directory on AAP website. A number of trained journalists

	online climate change resource for journalists and other climate change stakeholders	have established or joined networks
Create online resource for climate change journalists and stakeholders	Create resource on AAP website, centralizing relevant climate change materials for journalists and researchers	Achieved, media resource materials compiled. Resources available on AAP website
Production of climate change journalism guide	Guide to Climate Change Journalism in Africa	Achieved, guide delivered

### Conclusion:

- MCBP generally delivered its intended outputs within a short time frame
- MCBP created significant amount of media coverage of AAP

#### 4.7.4 PPAS

The principal types of project related support activities (excluding task related to administration, financial management, reporting, liaison and coordination, and donor relations) carried out under the AAP component are:

- BDP/EEG leading the country project formulation process, i.e. managing consultants preparing country Prodocs
- Technical support provided by the GEF finance Team of BDP/EEG prior to the establishment of IRTSC
- Technical support provided by UNDP Practice groups
- Project management support for COs provided by RBA and RBAS

Considering that the support provided by RBA and RBAS fell within their core mandate and tasks, and that the technical support for the country formulation process, including the support from the GEF Finance Team is already described elsewhere, this section will focus on the support provided by the Practice Teams.

### Gender Team

The Gender Team was involved in AAP from 2010. Furthermore, the Gender Team took advantage of an existing programme, the Global Gender and Climate Alliance (GGCA) and used financial resources from both programmes (as well as Gender Team core funds) to create synergies and outputs that benefited both programmes. Hence, the Team used AAP resources to recruit two regional experts/consultants in Dakar and Johannesburg, and with GCC funding a network of national gender consultants was established. In Kenya joint resources were used to develop guidelines on integrating gender in programme implementation, which are now being mainstreamed into the national environment policy framework. The Gender Team supported 12 AAP countries, based on country interest. The main areas of support provided were the development of a gender training module for AAP, training workshops on gender sensitisation, assistance to COs in drafting ToRs, review of reports and gender analyses, training materials (e.g. in relation gender and agricultures and food security, energy access, climate financing), policy analysis, and policy briefs and some case studies (e.g. on the contribution of women to adaptation, women and flooding) for advocacy. Furthermore, the team contributed with a gender session in the MCBP journalist training workshops. Reportedly, there was a very positive response to the support provided, a high and increasing country demand for support from the Gender Team.

### **Knowledge Management Group (now KICG)**

The Knowledge Management Group's Regional Teams in Dakar, Johannesburg and Cairo collaborated with IRTSC, e.g. in relation to setting up Teamworks access for the country project management units and training them on its use. The focus was on identifying ways for country project to document their results and peer exchange. Due to location, collaboration was particularly close with the Regional Team in Dakar, e.g. in relation to the final regional workshop in Dakar.

### **Poverty Group**

The Poverty Group produced a toolkit for linking climate change and poverty reduction, which targeted planning and finance ministries, to assist them in conceptualising and assessing the links between climate change, growth and human development, i.e. to identify the impact of climatic shocks on the economic sectors, economic growth, and different aspects of poverty, such as incomes, health and education. It also aims at helping with the targeting of poor in order to protect them from further poverty and use adaptation measures for poverty reduction. The toolkit was tested in Lesotho. The Poverty Group also developed a methodology for costing the necessary adaptation interventions for keeping countries on the growth and poverty reduction path. This methodology will be tested in Kenya in 2013 with non-AAP funding.

### **Capacity Development Group (now KICG)**

The planned Comprehensive Capacity Development Needs Assessment (CDNA) under IRTSC stream 2 was lead by UNDP Capacity Development Group. As described above, this activity was subsequently integrated in IPF and remaining funds for CDNA were reallocated for other activities.

### **Environment and Energy Group (EEG)**

AAP falls under this group in UNDP. In addition to the programme management, coordination and administrative tasks, the group also provided cross-practise related technical support to countries in three ways:

- EEG provided support to improve activities related to outcome 4 (innovative financing), where countries showed slow progress
- EEG played a critical role in coordinating work between Practice Groups, i.e. in relation to the integrated multi-practice approach that was piloted in Lesotho
- Provision of climate policy related advice, based on requests forwarded from IRTSC
- Supporting the Climate Action Intelligence (CAI) process in Lesotho

### **Lesotho integrated support – piloting multi-practice collaboration and coordination**

In mid 2012, Lesotho was selected as a pilot country to develop and test a more integrated approach to cross-practice support. Based on a needs-assessment of the country Prodoc a cross-practice support strategy was designed, which was coordinated and led by EEG. Activities included the Poverty Group's toolkit for linking climate change and poverty reduction, EEG's support to the CAI implementation (e.g. training), and economics workshop, and attempts to support inter-ministerial coordination and sharing of information and data (this proved very difficult). The multi-practice pilot in Lesotho was innovative and novel in UNDP, and coordination remained challenging.

### **Conclusion:**

- Most cross-practice support was provided as bilateral collaboration between EEG/IRTSC and one other Practice Group
- The Gender Team was able to combine AAP resources with other sources, and to build on earlier work and other projects, and thereby to engage to a significant degree in AAP and support 12 countries
- The Knowledge Management Group's support was closely integrated with the KM support provided by IRTSC
- AAP enabled the Poverty Group to develop and test a toolkit linking climate change and poverty reduction, and to develop a methodology to assess adaptation financing needs
- AAP provided UNDP with a unique opportunity to test integrated multi-practice support and collaboration, although coordination challenges and time constraints made it impossible to fully develop, test and refine the approach

#### **Lessons:**

- Cross-practice work is doable, relevant and can add significant value, provided coordination hurdles can be overcome

### **4.8 Attainment of outcomes, objective, and goal**

*Outcome 1: Countries have introduced dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change.*

Indicators:

- *Countries have long-term planning mechanism to manage the uncertainties of climate change*
- *Countries have conducted long term planning exercises to manage climate change*

Targets:

- *20 countries have tools available*
- *20 countries have conducted long term planning exercises*

Important progress against the targets of this objective was made. Tools, in particular in relation to climate data collection and analysis, were put in place in all countries and are being used. Furthermore, all countries have developed adaptation plans or strategies, e.g. in relation to specific sectors, although not all have yet been approved. However, whether the countries now have sufficient mechanisms to implement these plans and the ability of countries to update, revise and prepare further plans seem not to be the case, certainly not in all 20 countries. One finding from the AAP workshop held in Dakar in December 2012 was the following: *"All countries reported significant progress in establishing databases, however, there was still some work to be undertaken to bridge the gap between having information available and having senior officials use it to inform their decision making."* The assessment of eight country projects (Annex 3) showed that countries have in general partly achieved this outcome, albeit with significant variation (Namibia largely achieved outcome 1, Morocco achieved it at local level, Nigeria made considerable progress, whereas progress in Niger on this outcome was limited). Hence, the Evaluation Team assesses outcome 1 to have been partly achieved. It should be noted that the outcome was ambitious and probably not realistic to achieve within the time frame available.

*Outcome 2: Countries have built leadership and developed institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels.*

Indicator: *Countries have leadership and comprehensive institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks / opportunities.*

Target: *20 countries have adjusted their institutional frameworks to better manage climate change risks/opportunities.*

Progress has been made against this outcome. National institutional structures for coordination have been established in all countries. However, with the reported low ownership of high-level government (e.g. due to low awareness of the socio-economic impact of climate change and competition for attention with other development priorities), their ability to effectively coordinate and convene ministries and others seems to be more uncertain and to vary between countries. The assessment of eight country projects showed that countries have in general partly achieved this outcome, albeit with significant variation (Namibia and Morocco largely achieved outcome 2, Lesotho and Burkina Faso only made limited progress). Hence, the Evaluation Team assesses outcome 2 to have been partly achieved.

Outcome 3: *Countries are implementing climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors.*

Indicator: *Countries have in place climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors.*

Target: *20 countries have put in place some policies and measures.*

The target for this outcome has largely been met and the indicator is largely achieved, with all countries having formulated policies, plans and strategies, although a number of these are not yet finalised, approved or adopted. The extent to which governments are implementing climate change policies and adaptation measures in priority sectors is not clear to the Evaluation Team, but given the novelty of the policies established and that many are not yet approved, this appears to be largely limited to donor financed projects, including AAP pilot projects. Furthermore, with several other climate change initiatives going on in the countries, these changes cannot be attributed solely to AAP. Nonetheless, given that the indicator and target have been met, the team assesses outcome 3 to have been partly achieved. The assessment of eight country projects showed that countries have in general partly achieved this outcome, albeit with significant variation (Namibia largely achieved outcome 3, whereas Nigeria, Lesotho and Burkina Faso made only limited progress, and Niger did not achieve this outcome). Beyond the implementation of stand-alone projects, the outcome was very ambitious, and probably overly so, for the 3-4 year implementation period.

Outcome 4: *Financing options to meet national adaptation costs have been expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels.*

Indicator: *Countries have a variety of financing options to meet national adaptation costs*

Target: *20 countries have at least 1 alternative source of financing available to help meet national adaptation costs*

The target under this outcome is partly met. Ten countries have government budget lines for climate change, but actual fund allocation is unclear in most countries. 12 countries have submitted proposals for donor funding, six countries have secured approved donor funding. However, the indicator has not been achieved, as funding is limited to government's own funds and donor funds, so there is no significant change compared to before AAP in terms of having a variety of financing options. The assessment of eight country projects showed that countries have in general partly achieved this outcome (Nigeria and Burkina Faso only made limited progress and

Lesotho did not achieve this outcome), but this included most of the country programmes perceived to be the strongest. Hence, the Evaluation Team assesses that only limited achievement was made against outcome 4. The outcome was very ambitious, and probably overly so, for the 3-4 year implementation period, not least when considering that the international community has so far not lived up to its commitment of providing significant new funding for adaptation.

*Outcome 5: Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities is being generated and shared across all levels.*

*Indicator: Countries are sharing knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate risks/opportunities*

*Target: Significant exchange going on between countries on how to adjust development policies to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities*

The countries produced a range of both technical and communication knowledge products, which were disseminated in country, on websites and at regional events. Sharing between countries appears to have been mainly IRTSC led, e.g. through regional workshops and Teamworks. However, a culture of independent sharing between countries does not appear to have been fully adopted. The assessment of eight country projects showed that countries have in general partly achieved this outcome, albeit with significant variation (Namibia and Morocco largely achieved outcome 5, whereas Nigeria made only limited progress). Hence, the Evaluation Team assesses that outcome 5 has been partly achieved.

### **IRTSC and PPAS**

The intended outcome of IRTSC and PPAS/cross-practice support was: *Inter-regional technical expertise and capacity development support provided to 20 countries.* The target for this outcome was: *Relevant technical expertise and capacity development support readily available to countries.*

Overall, support was provided to country projects, requests were responded to, and the support provided was generally relevant, of good quality and implementable. Most of the knowledge and approaches imparted to country projects were put in to use in project implementation. In some cases, country achievements at the outcome level can be directly attributed to the support provided; for example, the support by the Gender Team reportedly contributed to 11 countries mainstreaming gender into national adaptation plans, and in Kenya gender guidelines on integrating gender is being mainstreamed into Kenya's environment policy framework.


However, IRTSC and UNDP Practice Teams did not have the capacity to provide support in all areas to all countries, some support was provided quite late, and policy and financing support seems to have been somewhat limited.

The Evaluation Team assesses that the outcome was largely achieved.

### **MCBP**

The intended outcome of MCBP was: *Greatly improved the target beneficiaries' understanding and capabilities in climate-change mitigation, adaptation and response.* As shown in the figure below, the media coverage (number of articles available online) increased significantly during the implementation of MCBP.

**Figure 3: Media coverage of climate change in AAP countries (source: MCBP completion report)**



While it is difficult to attribute this change specifically to MCBP as there is much global attention to climate change, the questionnaire survey suggests that the trained journalists have internalised the knowledge imparted and use it actively in their work:

- Eight journalists (out of ten) indicated that their number of printed articles have increased after the training
- Nine journalist indicated that they used the skills imparted in their work; of these, six indicated that the training had influenced the way they work with climate change, and 7 indicated that the training had influenced their work with other topics

Furthermore, some of the trained journalists have won or been nominated for awards and scholarships.

Hence, it is the opinion of the Evaluation Team that this outcome was achieved.

### **Achievement of AAP objective**

The objective of AAP was: *20 countries in the African continent adjust their national development processes to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities*. The target for this objective was: *20 African countries adjust national development processes to fully incorporate climate change*.

The 20 AAP countries have during the implementation of their AAP country projects laid the foundation for integrating climate change issues in their national development processes. Several countries have also integrated climate change in policies and plans. However, they are generally still not fully able to integrate and implement climate change in their development processes across sectors without further support. Furthermore, the results achieved under AAP appear not yet fully sustainable, and there is a risk of losing them, unless the process started by AAP is further supported. The assessment of eight country projects showed that countries have in general partly achieved their objectives (Namibia largely achieved its objective). Hence, the Evaluation

Team assesses the objective to have been partly achieved by AAP. It should be noted that the objective was overambitious and not realistic to achieve within the time frame available.

### Contribution to AAP Goal

The goal of AAP was: *Enhancing the adaptive capacity of vulnerable countries, promoting early adaptation action and laying the foundation for long-term investment to increase resilience to climate change across the African continent.*

AAP has contributed to the attainment of this goal over time and laid a foundation, which future initiatives can build upon, by increasing information access and knowledge, enhancing government coordination capacities, and facilitated adaptation mainstreaming into policies. The question however, is the extent to which this foundation is solid enough to remain on the medium-long term.

### Overview of achievement of AAP goal, objective and outcomes

Table 19 below provides an overview of the assessed achievement of AAP objectives and outcomes, and contribution the AAP goal. Table 21 provides the assessed objective and outcome achievements the eight countries covered in detail by the meta-evaluation (please refer to Annex 3 for explanation on the assessment).

**Table 19: Assessed achievement of AAP goal, objective, and outcomes**

Goal		End of programme status
Enhancing the adaptive capacity of vulnerable countries, promoting early adaptation action and laying the foundation for long-term investment to increase resilience to climate change across the African continent		AAP has contributed to the attainment of this goal by laying a foundation (information access, knowledge, coordination capacity, facilitated mainstreaming), which future initiatives can build upon
Objective	Target	End of programme status
20 countries in the African continent adjust their national development processes to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities.	20 African countries adjust national development processes to fully incorporate climate change	Partly achieved. 20 countries have laid the foundation for integrating climate change issues in their national development processes, but are not fully able to integrate and implement climate change
AAP outcomes	Target	End of programme status
1. Countries have introduced dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>20 countries have tools available</li> <li>20 countries have conducted long term planning exercises</li> </ul>	Partly achieved. Tools for climate data collection and analysis in place and used. Countries have plans, but not sufficient mechanisms for future planning and implementation
2. Countries have built leadership and developed institutional frameworks to	20 countries have adjusted their institutional frameworks to better	Partly achieved. Institutional structures for coordination established,



manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels	manage climate change risks/opportunities	but low high-level ownership, and ability to coordinate ministries seems uncertain and varying
3. Countries are implementing climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors	20 countries have put in place some policies and measures	Partly achieved. Target largely met, but policies generally not yet being implemented and implemented measures are mainly stand-alone projects
4. Financing options to meet national adaptation costs have been expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels	20 countries have at least 1 alternative source of financing available to help meet national adaptation costs	Limited achievement. Six countries have accessed project funding from traditional donors. Some countries have added government budget lines for climate change, but fund allocation unclear
5. Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities is being generated and shared across all levels	Significant exchange going on between countries on how to adjust development policies to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities	Partly achieved. Countries produced and disseminated technical and communication knowledge products. A culture of sharing between countries was not fully adopted.
<b>IRTSC Outcome</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>End of programme status</b>
Inter-regional technical expertise and capacity development support provided to 20 countries	Relevant technical expertise and capacity development support readily available to countries	Largely achieved, although IRTSC and UNDP Practice Teams did not have the capacity to provide support in all areas to all countries, and policy and financing support has been limited
<b>MCBP Outcome</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>End of programme status</b>
Greatly improved the target beneficiaries' understanding and capabilities in climate-change mitigation, adaptation and response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved understanding of the target beneficiaries on climate change issues</li> <li>Improved coverage of climate change issues by local media</li> <li>Improved understanding of climate change issues among key policy- and decision-makers</li> </ul>	Achieved, trained journalists report continued use of skills imparted and increased engagement in climate change journalism. Overall media coverage of climate change in AAP countries increased significantly

**Table 20: Meta-evaluation assessment of performance achievement of objective and outcomes by eight country projects**

Country	Objective	Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Outcome 3	Outcome 4	Outcome 5
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	Partly achieved, limited	Partly achieved	Partly achieved, limited	Partly achieved, limited	Partly achieved, limited	N.A.

	progress		progress	progress	progress	
<b>Lesotho</b>	Partly achieved	N.A.	Partly achieved, limited progress	Partly achieved, limited progress	Not achieved	Partly achieved
<b>Mauritius</b>	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved
<b>Morocco</b>	Partly achieved	Achieved at local scale	Largely achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Largely achieved
<b>Mozambique</b>	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved
<b>Namibia</b>	Partly achieved, considerable progress	Largely achieved	Largely achieved	Largely achieved	Partly achieved	Largely achieved
<b>Niger</b>	Partly achieved	Partly achieved, limited progress	Partly achieved	Not achieved	Partly achieved	Partly achieved
<b>Nigeria</b>	Partly achieved	Partly achieved, considerable progress	Partly achieved	Partly achieved, limited progress	Partly achieved, limited progress	Partly achieved, still long way to go

It should be kept in mind, however, that AAP country projects did not work in isolation, and several other climate change initiatives were implemented at the same time. Hence, the achievement of the national component outcomes can in many countries not be attributed explicitly to AAP. For example, in Mozambique, some activities were implemented jointly with PEI, and activities initiated under CC DARE were completed by AAP.

### Conclusion:

- AAP has contributed to its goal
- AAP has partly achieved its intended objective
- The objective was overambitious compared to the time frame available and not feasible to fully achieve
- National component outcomes were partly achieved. Outcomes 1, 3 and 4 were very ambitious and not realistic to fully achieve within the available time frame
- Each of the first four national component outcomes was very ambitious and comprehensive. Attempting to deliver all of them at the same time appears unrealistic for several countries, and a sequential approach could perhaps have improved the delivery against them
- IRTSC has largely achieved its intended outcome
- MCBP achieved its intended outcome
- Tools, in particular in relation to climate data collection and analysis, were put in place in all countries and are being used
- There is a gap in relation to having senior officials using available information in their decision-making
- All countries have developed adaptation plans or strategies, e.g. in relation to specific sectors, although not all have yet been approved
- Countries appear not to have sufficient mechanisms to implement plans and update, revise and prepare further plans, certainly not in all 20 countries

- National institutional structures for coordination have been established in all countries. However, with the reported low ownership of high-level government, their ability to effectively coordinate and convene ministries and others seems to be more uncertain and to vary between countries
- All countries have formulated policies, plans and strategies, although a number of these are not yet finalised, approved or adopted. The extent to which governments are implementing climate change policies and adaptation measures in priority sectors is not clear, but given the novelty of the policies this appears to be largely limited to donor financed projects, including AAP pilot projects
- Ten countries have government budget lines for climate change, but actual fund allocation is unclear in most countries. Six countries have secured approved donor funding. Funding is limited to government's own funds and donor funds, so there is no significant change in terms of having a variety of financing options
- The countries produced a range of technical and communication knowledge products, which were disseminated in country, on websites and at regional events
- Sharing between countries appears to have been mainly IRTSC led and a culture of sharing between countries does not appear to have been fully adopted

#### **Lessons:**

- To make sure that expectations to a transformative and policy oriented programme are realistic, it should be made clear in the design that such processes take time. Programme objectives and outcomes should be realistic within the given time frame, and it should be clear in the Prodoc that transformation is not a one-off thing but a long-term process that will need to be continued in some way
- It can be difficult to reach decision-makers compared to reaching the technical level. It may be necessary to develop specific tools for this
- Identifying, developing and accessing innovative financing option is difficult for countries, and would often need technical support from the regional to move beyond applying for traditional donor project funding

#### **4.9 Sustainability and replicability**

The sustainability of AAP comprises two dimensions, to which replicability and upscaling are closely linked:

- The extent to which the outcomes and results achieved by the 20 AAP country projects and MCBP will be maintained and the changed practices and approaches will be continued – the results sustainability of AAP
- The extent to which UNDP a) has tangible plans to continue supporting the process initiated under AAP, and b) has internalised the approaches and lessons generated by AAP and use them in its future work, e.g. in relation to IRTSC and PPAS/cross-practice work – the institutional sustainability of AAP

#### **Results sustainability**

In principle, the vision and ambition of AAP to move adaptation work beyond stand-alone projects and to try and address fundamental institutional constraints and mainstream/integrate adaptation work into government practice, has the potential of enhancing long-term sustainability beyond programme completion. However, the

process of institutional change that AAP embarked on is a complex long-term process and requires sustained momentum.

With only 1-2 years of effective implementation, AAP laid the ground and provided countries with a framework to build upon, e.g. in terms of collection and analysis of data and by establishing or strengthening government climate change management and coordination structures. But AAP by no means completed this transformative process and more support is reportedly needed in terms of further engaging the political level. Hence, with AAP being completed without an established follow-up phase or exit strategy (neither for the overall AAP programme nor for the majority of country projects), the question is to what extent the results achieved have been adequately consolidated and engrained in government practice.

Not surprisingly, the evidence available suggests that in some countries post-programme viability is more likely to be achieved than in others, but it is the overall impression of the Evaluation Team that most, if not all, countries would need more support or there is a risk that the achievements will not be sustained. Reportedly, the national ownership of AAP has increased significantly from the initial low level, but the question is whether national stakeholders have fully internalised the tools and skills obtained and are able to continue the process. Furthermore, limited high-level government ownership remained a challenge for AAP. Hence, another question is whether national governments are willing to invest their own resources in the process and to sustain the government coordination structures established under AAP. Reportedly, in some countries (e.g. Morocco and Tunisia) discussions are going on to find means to continue or replicate AAP, but so far the AAP process has not been taken over by other projects.

The sustainability of AAP country projects is also related to the more mundane question of future maintenance and updating of data systems and hardware installed. To address this issue, AAP has in some countries (e.g. Mauritius) entered MoUs with universities and research institutions for the future operation and maintenance of the established data systems. Other countries have asked for support for post-AAP maintenance of the data systems, and there is a real risk that several countries will not be able to maintain their systems. Similarly, the nascent AAP community of practice and sharing, e.g. through Teamworks appears unlikely to continue after AAP without further support.

Another challenge is that with the disbanding of national project management units much of the knowledge and AAP experience may not be readily available for future continuation of the AAP process. Reportedly, the only country where it is certain that the AAP project management unit will continue with a new environmental project is Kenya. Nonetheless, several COs have reportedly expressed a strong interest in continuing AAP follow-up activities under other projects (existing or new).

MCBP has been effective in building the capacity of the trained journalists and while there would have been scope for continuing this work to further deepen, enhance and expand the results (and journalists expressed the need for such support), it is expected by the Evaluation Team that the journalists will continue with using the skills imparted in their future work. Moreover, the team leaders and trainers under MCBP are all African journalists, who now have the knowledge to conduct further workshops.

### **Institutional sustainability**

Although it has been clear that the AAP implementation period was too short to ensure full sustainability of the AP process, no clear and comprehensive sustainability or exit strategy was provided in the Prodoc or subsequently elaborated. While there have been efforts to ensure further funding for a second phase or to ensure that AAP process could be transferred to other programmes or projects, they do not seem to have taken place in time to ensure continuity of AAP. Nonetheless, there appear to be some opportunities to attract donor interest in a continuation of the work under AAP. UNDP is in dialogue with the Government of Japan, and the next Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD 5) will take place in June 2013. UNDP will communicate the results of AAP at this event as an element of the discussion on future Japan-UNDP cooperation. However, even if further funding is secured for a continuation of the work under AAP, there will be an implementation gap of at least 6-12 months. UNDP has not allocated internal resources to cover such a gap and maintain a low level of implementation.

With the AAP structure of having the IRTSC external to UNDP, and some of the UNDP staff being on consulting contracts specifically tied to AAP, key staff will have left for other opportunities by the time further funding is secured. Hence, much of the AAP experience and knowledge will not be readily available for a possible follow-up programme, and it is uncertain to what extent the lessons, tools and approaches will be internalised by UNDP (other than those from the work of the Practice Teams). As described above, the same issue will affect AAP country projects, where national project staff have left AAP. Hence, time and resources would have to be spent on recruiting new teams at HQ, regional and country levels (which AAP experience show takes a long time and will cause further delays). These new teams would need a start-up period rather than being able to “hit the ground running”. Furthermore, the separate programme structure of AAP has also meant limited collaboration and integration with other relevant UNDP programmes, such as PEI, CC DARE, and GEF.

In the absence of a comprehensive sustainability strategy, IRTSC has implemented some activities to facilitate more long-term sustainability and sharing of experience. These include:

- A final workshop for all AAP countries in Dakar in December 2012
- Creating a comprehensive online repository of resources (e.g. guidelines) and documents produced under AAP on the AAP website. The website will be functional and maintained up till the end of 2013
- A qualitative lessons learned study capturing best practices from country projects (work in progress at the time of the evaluation)

Furthermore, a number of guidelines and tools were developed under AAP could contribute to long term sustainability, including:

- Country-specific guidelines and tools developed under AAP country projects
- Internal AAP guidelines for country projects developed by IRTSC
- Concepts for stream 2 initiatives developed by IRTSC and consultants
- The earlier mentioned Handbook on the Capitalization of Experiences
- The toolkit for linking climate change and poverty developed by the Poverty Group
- The guide to Climate Change Journalism in Africa developed by MCBP

However, these resources only capture specific elements of AAP's approach and most of them are either internal guidelines or country specific. A comprehensive set of tools and guidelines covering all aspects of the AAP approach, which could be used outside AAP was not developed. Such a comprehensive toolbox could be a very useful tool for upscaling and replication of AAP's approach.

While overall institutional sustainability of AAP results may not be fully achieved, there are some areas, where lessons from AAP will be, or may be, transferred and utilised by UNDP:

- RBA intends integrate climate change adaptation issues into their new regional programme on energy and environment; in this context RBA intends to build on the legacy of AAP
- RBA is leading the development of a new regional project on climate adaptation (e.g. for developing a weather index insurance system) in consultation with RBAS and BDP building on AAP, to be launched at TICAD 5
- RBAS is currently developing a regional programme for coastal zone management, which will be submitted to TICAD 5 for funding; RBAS is planning to use AAP experiences from Morocco in this programme
- The Gender Team will continue its work under AAP with its network of national consultants with funding from other sources. The Gender Team is in the process of developing a universal step-by-step guide on gender sensitive climate change policy making, financing, planning and programming, and indicators (to be completed in 2013)
- The Poverty Group methodology for costing adaptation interventions will be piloted in Kenya in 2013, using the project management unit established by AAP

However, the above efforts will not be sufficient to keep the momentum going without further support or to ensure that the experiences gained are effectively transferred and absorbed by UNDP or others.

As described earlier, the lack of a component supporting regional institutions (beyond data management), meant that the potential to build a long-term regional function, which could have provided some support for countries and promote knowledge sharing post-AAP was not harnessed.

### **Conclusion:**

- AAP has created the foundation and framework for further work on mainstreaming adaptation in to government policy and planning processes, but has not completed this transformative process and more support is needed in terms of further engaging the political level
- There is a real risk that the momentum and results in many countries will be lost
- The sustainability of AAP seems patchy and only likely to be achieved in specific thematic or geographic areas
- In some countries discussions are going on to find means to continue or replicate AAP, but so far the AAP process has not been taken over by other projects
- There is a real risk that several countries will not be able to maintain the established data management systems
- The journalists trained by MCBP are likely to continue using the skills imparted

- A clear and comprehensive sustainability or exit strategy for AAP was not developed
- The efforts to ensure further funding for a second phase or to ensure that AAP process could be transferred to other programmes or projects did not take place in time to ensure continuity
- Even if further funding is secured for a continuation of the work under AAP, there will be an implementation gap of at least 6-12 months; UNDP has not allocated internal resources to cover such gap and maintain a low level of implementation. Hence, key staff at all levels of AAP will have left by the time further funding is secured, and much of the AAP experience and knowledge will not be readily available for a possible follow-up programme, and it is uncertain to what extent the lessons, tools and approaches will be internalised by UNDP. Time and resources would have to be spent on recruiting new teams at HQ, regional and country levels and these teams would need a start-up period
- The separate programme structure of AAP has also meant limited collaboration and integration with other relevant UNDP programmes
- IRTSC has implemented some activities to facilitate more long-term sustainability and sharing of experience, but these are not sufficient to ensure sustainability
- Guidelines and tools were developed under AAP, especially at the country level, but a comprehensive set of tools and guidelines covering all aspects of the AAP approach, which could be used outside AAP was not developed
- While overall institutional sustainability of AAP results may not be fully achieved, there are some areas, where lessons from AAP will be transferred and utilised by UNDP. However, these efforts will not be sufficient to keep the momentum going or to ensure that the experiences gained are effectively transferred and absorbed by UNDP or others
- The lack of a component supporting regional institutions meant that the potential to build a long-term regional function, which could support countries and promote knowledge sharing post-AAP was not harnessed

#### **Lessons:**

- A sustainability/exit strategy should be developed already in the programme design or inception phase, and be implemented early enough to avoid gaps between phases or loss of results
- Programme structures should not be entirely external to UNDP, but sufficiently attached to existing UNDP structures to ensure the UNDP internalises experiences and approaches
- Development of a comprehensive and implementable set of guidelines and tools covering all aspects of a programmes approach and lessons should be integrated in all innovative programmes

## 5 Performance assessment, lessons and recommendations

### 5.1 Performance rating/assessment

Chapter 1.3 provides a summarising analysis of the detailed conclusions presented in each chapter. Based on the conclusions and findings, table 21 below provides the Evaluation Team's assessment rating against the main evaluation criteria. Table 22 provides the assessments score for the eight countries covered in detail by the meta-evaluation (please refer to Annex 3 for the justification of the ratings). It should be noted, that three of the countries (Namibia, Morocco, Mauritius) covered are considered by stakeholders to be among the best performing country projects.

AAP is assessed as very relevant. Climate change is increasingly becoming a major challenge and potential barrier to future economic and social development in Africa. The poor are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as crises caused by drought or flood, so it is important for African countries to build their adaptive capacity and resilience. Climate change remains high on the global agenda, and Although global adaptation funding commitments have not been met, significant and increasing funding is being directed towards climate change adaptation. African government systems and capacities are not adequately equipped to deal with the challenge of climate change, which cuts across sectors, in a planned and integrated manner. Moreover, the capacity to effectively absorb and utilise climate funding needs to be built.

Overall, the effectiveness of AAP appears largely satisfactory. Not surprisingly, the effectiveness varies considerably between countries. While the intended objective was not fully met, this objective was very ambitious and covering many countries and unfeasible to achieve in three years. Many outcomes were not fully delivered, but they too were quite ambitious and to expect full delivery across all 20 countries, of which many are LCDs, would be very difficult, if at all possible.

The efficiency and timeliness in the implementation of AAP however, was not satisfactory with administrative inefficiencies including slow staff recruitment and procurement, although implementation has been efficient in some countries. Furthermore, the management setup was not fully aligned with the UNDP structure, had gaps in the mandates (e.g. of IRTSC) vis-à-vis programme implementation and until the introduction of the OSC did not provide sufficient guidance and support to AAP. One result of these inefficiencies was significant implementation delays.

The sustainability of AAP is also not satisfactory. As described earlier, sustainability of AAP remains uncertain and currently seems patchy, although in some areas, AAP initiated work and processes will be continued. Nonetheless, not all countries are likely to be able to sustain the results achieved under AAP, neither is it likely that UNDP will be able to fully absorb and integrate the AAP approach in its work. AAP did not produce a comprehensive set of guidelines and tools, which can be used for upscaling or replicating AAP.



The overall assessment of AAP's performance is that it was generally satisfactory, but due to shortcomings in the programme design, inefficiencies, and especially concerns regarding the sustainability, not fully satisfactory.

**Table 21: Assessment of AAP performance**

Criterion	Sub-criterion	Explanation	Score*
<b>Relevance</b>	Relevance for national and regional needs	Climate change will increasingly become a barrier to economic and social development	5
	Relevance for UNDP mandate	The poor are particularly vulnerable to climate change, which will increase the occurrence of disasters/crises. Climate change is closely linked to environmental degradation and energy	5
	Relevance for global agenda and Japanese priorities	Climate change is a major global concern, and significant funding for adaptation is expected to be provided	5
	Addressing critical constraints	African countries do not have the capacity to effectively plan and implement adaptation actions	5
	Relevance of Prodocs (global programme and country projects)	Insufficient capacity assessments and consideration of national context, unrealistic timeline, overly ambitious objective and outcomes	2
			<b>4**</b>
<b>Effective-ness</b>	Achievement of objective: <i>countries adjust national development processes to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities</i>	Objective not fully achieved, but a foundation has been created in many countries. Fully reaching the objective not feasible in a 3-4 year time frame	3
	Achievement of outcomes:	Outcomes 1, 3 and 4 not feasible in 3-4 year time frame	
	1. Long-term planning mechanisms	Partly achieved. Tools and plans in place, but sufficient mechanisms for future planning/implementation seem not in place	(3)
	2. Built leadership and developed institutional frameworks	Partly achieved. Institutional structures established, but often low high-level ownership and uncertain functionality	(2)
	3. Implementing policies and measures	Partly achieved. Policies not yet being implemented and implemented measures are mainly stand-alone projects	(3)
	4. Financing options expanded	Limited achievement. Six countries have accessed project funding from traditional donors. Some government funds allocated	(2)
	5. Knowledge on adjusting development processes generated and shared	Partly achieved. Countries produced and disseminated knowledge products. A culture of sharing between countries was not fully adopted	(2)
	IRTSC: Technical expertise and capacity development support provided	Largely achieved, although project management support needs posed a limitation to technical support	(3)
	MCBP: Improved beneficiaries' understanding and capabilities	Outcome achieved, journalist use skills imparted. Media coverage of climate change in AAP countries increased	(5)
	Delivery of planned outputs	Varied picture, in some countries output delivery was much better than in others	3
			<b>3**</b>

<b>Efficiency (incl. timeliness)</b>	Timeliness of country project implementation	Significant delays due to rushed design, capacity constraints and low ownership	1
	Timeliness of technical support/capacity building	Limited support available in first year. Some support was provided late	2
	Cost-effectiveness	Some inefficiencies in country project spending. Significant resources spent on pilot projects, which were not always fully linked to policy processes	2
	Conduciveness of administrative procedures	A major reason for delays in implementation. Staff recruitment and procurement generally delayed.	1
	Responsiveness of management/coordination/oversight structure to address critical/emerging issues	Management structure and mandates inadequate. Board unable to address critical issues, OSC rectified this constraint	2
	Ability of M&E system to guide implementation and capture results/change	Output and reporting focused. Not used as a management tool and not fully capturing impact/results	2
	Ability to engage and collaborate with partners	Partnerships/collaboration mainly a national level, and to varying degrees. Limited collaboration with other initiatives at global/regional level	2
			<b>2**</b>
<b>Sustainability</b>	Ownership and commitment of stakeholders	Low initial ownership among RBx, COs and national stakeholders. Improved over time	3
	Sufficiency of stakeholder capacity	National stakeholders not able to continue AAP process without support	2
	Integration of AAP processes in systems/planned continuation of processes (country level)	Some COs and countries have plans to continue AAP or elements of AAP in future or existing projects, but funding has generally not been secured for this	2
	Absorption/mainstreaming of approaches (UNDP)	AAP staff leaving UNDP. Currently no funding secured for follow-up. Seemingly patchy use of AAP results/approach in other programmes	2
	Replicability/upscaling potential	Relevant approach across Africa, but few guidelines/tools developed	3
			<b>2**</b>
<b>OVERALL</b>			<b>3**</b>
* Rating: 1 = very low/unsatisfactory 2 = low/below expectations 3 = medium/meets expectations/satisfactory 4 = high/above expectations 5 = very high/excellent performance			
** Criterion scores and the overall score are not calculated arithmetically; they are qualitative assessments based on sub-criteria scores			

**Table 22: Meta-evaluation assessment of performance of eight country projects**

Country	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
<b>Burkina Faso*</b>	5	3	4	3
<b>Lesotho</b>	4	2	2	2
<b>Mauritius</b>	4	4	3	3
<b>Morocco</b>	4	4	4	3
<b>Mozambique</b>	4	3	2	2
<b>Namibia</b>	4	4	4	3
<b>Niger</b>	4	2	2	2

<b>Nigeria</b>	4	3	2	2
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\*Rating taken from national evaluation report (not assessed by the Evaluation Team). These ratings appear higher than the rating levels applied by the Evaluation Team for other countries.

## 5.2 Lessons learned and recommendations for future UNDP programming

Considering the innovative nature of AAP as well as the novelty of its approach to climate change adaptation policy-making and cross-practice work, AAP has generated a number of relevant lessons for future UNDP programming. Based on these lessons and concerns related to sustainability, some key recommendations emerge for future programmes.

### Formulation, inception and planning

- It should be ensured that adequate time is available for a thorough programme formulation process and inception phase.
- For transformative and policy oriented programmes, it is important to ensure that national stakeholders are fully involved in programme/country project formulation and fully understand the programme approach and objectives in order to ensure full ownership.
- Regional thematic programmes should be jointly formulated by BDP and RBx, to ensure a technical content of international best practice, regional and CO ownership, and full understanding of the situation on the ground. Country projects should be jointly formulated with COs.
- A thorough stakeholder capacity needs assessment as well as an analysis of national priorities should be carried out as part of the programme/country project formulation and be used in the country selection process, guide the programme management setup, and form the basis upon which resources (financial and human) are provided for both technical and project management support.
- People with the right skill sets should be recruited at both regional and country level, at least some of the staff recruited should have prior experience and knowledge of policy work, as it in many ways differs from the implementation and management of traditional/on-the-ground projects.
- The time-consuming UNDP/UNOPS recruitment and procurement procedures should be taken into consideration when planning the timeline of a new programme to ensure that technical support is available from the onset of the programme implementation and when needed by countries.
- When planning innovative programmes and novel approaches, a phased approach where the approach and tools are tested in a limited number of countries (e.g. 5-6) before it is rolled out on a large scale should be used. This will better allow for a) testing and refining the approach, b) the establishment of appropriate support mechanisms and sufficient support capacity, and c) the avoidance of “reinventing the wheel” simultaneously in several countries.
- Policy and institutional transformation processes take time, usually longer time than the typical 3-5 years time frame donors can provide funding for. Hence, it is important to make sure that the expectations, objectives and outcomes are realistic to achieve within the available time frame. It should also be clear in the Prodoc that transformation is a long-term process that will need to be continued in some way after the programme is completed (whether through a follow-up programme phase or not). Realistic expectations from the onset of a programme can reduce the risk of needing unplanned no-cost extensions; which on one hand

can enable a programme to better achieve the intended results, but on the other hand force activity levels to be downscaled due to increased running costs. A long-term objective for the transformation process, which UNDP would like to support, should be established during programme design. This long-term objective should be specific for UNDP support and more narrowly defined than an overall goal. Short-medium term programme objectives for different phases can then be established; this way it can be clearly established how far a given programme can get the transformation process. This will also be a useful tool for timely fundraising for programme follow-up.

- A clear sustainability, exit, or continuation strategy (including necessary programme and post-programme actions) should be a standard element of all Prodocs and be part of implementation already from the inception phase; it is critical that such a strategy is implemented early enough to avoid gaps or losing momentum, as these could lead to the loss of the results and experiences gained.
- A Prodoc and the associated logframe and implementation modalities should not be seen as “cast in stone”, as it is very likely that revisions or at least adjustments are needed as programme implementation progresses. Hence the Prodoc, logframe, programme management setup and stakeholder mandates, instruments, and roles should be carefully reviewed at critical points in time (e.g. during inception and mid-term). Necessary revisions/changes should be made, even if – or especially when – substantial changes or redesign are required.

### **Programme management and coordination**

- Programme management modalities, and implementation roles must be aligned with the existing UNDP structure, reporting lines and mandates to ensure effective participation, ownership and collaboration of all the involved Bureaux. The unique strengths and roles of both BDP and RBx must be recognised and utilised.
- The mandates of, and the instruments available for, programme related units must be clearly articulated and reflect the support needs of country projects, both in terms of project management and technical support and care should be taken to ensure that one does not come at the expense of the other.
- While it can be useful to have programme support units separate from UNDP, e.g. to take advantage of UNOPS procurement systems, it is important to make sure that they are not isolated from UNDP or seen as entirely external, as this can impact negatively on a) collaboration with UNDP COs, and b) internalisation and continuation by UNDP of the experiences gained and approaches developed. UNDP housing or secondment of permanent UNDP staff to such units could facilitate collaboration and UNDP learning.
- Better integration with UNDP can facilitate coordination and collaboration with related initiatives, which would reduce the risk of duplication and enhance the opportunities for transferring lessons and ensuring post-programme sustainability. Such strategic coordination/collaboration should be build into the programme management structure, e.g. through board representation, and/or into logframe outcomes, outputs and activities.
- Cross-practice collaboration is another potential way to ensure better integration in UNDP while enhancing the level and broadness of the support available to a programme. However, to ensure that cross-practice support yields the intended results and effectively contribute to a more integrated approach, it

is critical to set up an effective management system for this, and to ensure there are in-built incentives and instruments that promote coordination and collaboration.

- At the national level, the implications for national ownership of having the national project manager on a UNDP contract rather than a government contract is not clear to the Evaluation Team. The advantages and disadvantages of both options should be examined further by UNDP.
- For large and complex programmes with multiple implementers, a high-level Programme Board is insufficient to provide the needed oversight and guidance in a timely manner and in sufficient detail. A technical committee with all the key actors represented that meets more regularly to address implementation bottlenecks should be established.

## **M&E**

- It is very difficult to capture the impact and changes resulting from/attribution to policy programmes. A comprehensive analysis of UNDP experiences with this from several programmes and the development of a policy outcome oriented M&E framework/methodology and tools should be undertaken to help future programmes.
- A strong, sophisticated and outcome oriented M&E system at programme level with clearly spelled out mandates and instruments, and a well-designed logframe, should be established to adequately capture the results and lessons of a complex and large regional programme. Such a system can move M&E beyond feeding information to progress reports, to be utilised as a strategic programme management tool at both programme and country project level (e.g. in relation to adjusting logframes, work plans, budgets and programme management setup and mandates). Sufficient resources should be allocated to build the capacity of country projects in this regard.

## **National demands versus strategic needs**

- Technical support should be demand-driven and in line with national priorities and identified needs, but some times country demands and interests may to some extent conflict with transformative approaches; this issue seems to be linked to the capacity to understand and implement policy programmes, as these appear less concrete than more traditional on-the-ground investments. AAP showed that there can be some critical bottlenecks for policy programmes, which are not readily identified at the country level. Hence, a regional identification and provision of strategic support needs is important to ensure effective implementation of innovative approaches.
- Support for identification and securing of financing is in high demand at the country level, but can distract attention from dealing with the more fundamental and difficult aspects of transforming government approaches to policy-making, planning, budgeting, and spending (of their own resources). Nonetheless, the ability to access innovative financing means of funding can potentially enable countries to make better use of both the resources available in country as well as new international climate financing mechanisms, when combined with a strengthening of country systems for planning, budgeting and financing. Pros and cons should be assessed before including financing as a component.

- There is often a strong national interest in engaging in pilot interventions, which are visible, tangible and comparatively easy to implement. However, pilot interventions in policy programmes are only relevant when they are clearly linked to, and informing, policy and planning approaches and processes; they should be not an objective or outcome in their own right. Nonetheless, it should also be kept in mind, that pilot projects can be a lever to muster support for, and ownership of, policy programmes, especially during the early phases. In areas such as climate change adaptation, there is often a plethora of existing initiatives. So to avoid duplication and ensure effective use of programme resources, it should be assessed whether existing projects in the country are able provide the necessary knowledge to inform policy processes, or can be supported to generate such information, before it is decided to engage in pilot interventions. The AAP CAI approach can be used for the identification of relevant existing initiatives that can be used to inform policy.

### **AAP approach**

- A component dedicated to working with regional or sub-regional institutions can enable regional programmes to better establish strategic partnerships. It can potentially provide vessels to facilitate post-programme continuation of the processes initiated by building the capacity of regional institutions to support countries and provide a platform for sharing of experiences and promoting trans-boundary cooperation. A component focusing on building regional/sub-regional capacity should be included in regional programmes.
- While environment ministries are usually the national focal points for climate change and it is relevant to build their technical capacity, they generally have limited leverage over other sector ministries. Planning and finance ministries are usually above sector ministries in the government hierarchy and have specific mandates to coordinate these. Hence, they can be strong entry points for policy programmes that promote mainstreaming of integrated approaches across sector policies and development plans, as can key development sector ministries (e.g. agriculture, infrastructure and local government). This is a critical consideration that should be taken into account in the design and institutional setup of all programmes promoting mainstreaming or integrated approaches.
- The development of a comprehensive and implementable set of guidelines and tools covering all aspects of the programmes approach and lessons should be integrated in all innovative programmes. This will help ensuring that experiences and approaches can be upscaled and replicated, and processes can be continued beyond the programme's life span.
- It has proven more difficult to reach high-level decision-makers than the technical level, so the tools used by AAP and other mainstreaming programmes (implemented by UNDP and other agencies) to engage decision-makers and the policy level should be reviewed so get a clear picture of what works and what does not. Based on the findings a toolbox for engaging decision-makers should be developed and tested.

### **5.3 Recommendations for immediate AAP follow-up**

The following section will provide a few pragmatic recommendations for UNDP. Most of these are made to facilitate the internalisation of the AAP experiences and approach, and to reduce the negative impact of the inevitable gap period before further funding can be secured. Recommendations for immediate AAP follow-up action:

- Enrol relevant IRTSC (and MCBP) staff as consultants to identify and analyse available tools and guidelines for adaptation mainstreaming and develop a toolbox or guide for adaptation mainstreaming based on this analysis and AAP approaches and experiences. This could for example be done under the umbrella of PEI's Poverty-Environment Facility (PEF) in Nairobi (or other relevant programmes), which already has experience with developing relevant policy mainstreaming guidelines and tools. This would also allow for cross-fertilisation of the experiences and approaches of both initiatives.
- Maintain contact with IRTSC, MCBP and AAP country project staff, to make sure they can easily be reached if/when AAP processes are continued. Some work has already been done in this regard by collecting people's personal email addresses to ensure continued access to Teamworks.
- Make sure that all remaining AAP financial resources are explicitly utilised to cover critical/priority/sustainability activities to cover the gap period until further funding is secured to ensure the continuation of the processes initiated and the sustainability of the results achieved (whether under AAP or other initiatives).
- Undertake an in-country assessment in 2014 or 2015 of the status of the AAP results and processes, to learn about the sustainability of AAP. Make a similar assessment of the actual use of AAP experiences and approaches in regional programmes and within UNDP.

## **Annexes**



## Annex 1: AAP evaluation conclusions at a glance

The following list comprises the conclusion bullet points of the different chapters of the evaluation report.

### Programme timeline, formulation process and inception period

- Country project formulation was done in a short time frame and by consultants. National stakeholder involvement appears somewhat limited
- In-country capacity was not adequately assessed and hence overestimated during programme design, and as a result support needs were underestimated
- Furthermore, the time frame did not match the ambition level of the programme. The time frame needed for country project formulation, inception and establishment of the IRTSC was significantly underestimated in the programme design, which led to delays as well as rushed processes.
- While RBA, RBAS and COs were consulted during the AAP programme and/or country project formulation, they did not feel sufficiently involved in the design and thus did not feel ownership for the programme. As a result, RBA and RBAS did not significantly engage in the first three years of implementation, nor did all COs
- Political instability delayed country implementation in Tunisia and Nigeria

### Programme management, coordination and implementation modalities

- The AAP programme management structure and budget allocations were not sufficiently reflecting the existing UNDP reporting lines and departmental mandates. This resulted in limited involvement of RBx, insufficient coordination between stakeholders within UNDP, and slow country level implementation until 2012
- Until the introduction of the OSC, the Programme Board annual meetings were not sufficient to unblock institutional and managerial blockages
- The combined introduction of the OSC and pressure from the Government of Japan, resulted in a much stronger RBx involvement, which in turn dramatically enhanced programme delivery at the country level in 2012
- There was a mismatch between the mandate and instruments of the IRTSC and a) the actual country support needs and b) its duty to report on progress and results. While the IRTSC proactively instituted several changes to overcome this, the fundamental issues were never formally addressed. As a result, the provision of much needed project management support came at the expense of the provision of technical support
- ITRSC was external to UNDP, especially RBx. This appears to have created some barriers for IRTSC coordination with COs
- AAP was a frontrunner in UNDP in relation to cross-practice collaboration involving several Practice Groups, and UNDPs institutional structure was not geared to provide incentives for cross-practice collaboration. The provision of cross-practice support faced significant coordination challenges. As a result, the cross-practice support provided was less than originally intended
- Competition for attention with other priorities and projects combined with an initial limited understanding of the AAP concept often resulted in low government ownership of AAP, in particular in the first years of AAP implementation and at the high levels
- A lack of high-level buy-in limited the ability to engage various government agencies in AAP. It has at least in some countries been difficult for environment ministries and meteorological departments to ensure climate change mainstreaming across sector ministries and in development plans. A more robust institutional setup should in some countries have been discussed with the countries, e.g. by involving planning ministries, which are stronger in promoting mainstreaming across sectors. AAP could have benefited from closer collaboration with PEI, which has a model for engaging planning and finance ministries

### Coordination with partners and linkages to other interventions

- Without components specifically focusing on building the regional and sub-regional capacity, there was limited scope for regional partnerships and collaboration beyond strengthening data access

- An opportunity seems to have been lost in terms of building the capacity of African regional institutions to create sound regional adaptation frameworks and support countries in mainstreaming adaptation in their policy-making and planning processes. Such strengthening could have contributed to the post-AAP sustainability of the results achieved and replication of the lessons learned
- Coordination with WFP, UNIDO and UNICEF appears to have been better in some countries than in others. There was no coordination at the regional/global level
- In some countries, AAP was well coordinated with other initiatives. In other countries, coordination and collaboration with other initiatives appears to have taken place in an ad-hoc manner, thereby enhancing the risk of duplication and overlaps with the large number of other climate change initiatives.

#### **Administrative systems and procedures**

- Cumbersome and time consuming administration procedures combined with capacity constraints were a significant cause of delays experienced in implementation
- The use of UNOPS rules and the recruitment of an operations manager helped speeding up procurement related matters

#### **Budgets and spending**

- Country project spending was very low in 2009-2010 but picked up significantly in 2011-2012, and at the programme completion almost all funds had been spent
- The unexpected no-cost extension forced the IRTSC to reduce its budget for support activities and ask countries to co-fund support activities. Earlier knowledge of the extension would have enabled IRTSC to plan its resource use differently
- IRTSC spent a proportion of their funds on activities the country projects could have covered themselves. IRTSC could have asked countries to refund the costs of country activities paid by IRTSC
- Administrative and programme management inefficiencies were a significant cause of low initial spending, but not the full explanation. Equally important was the time it took to conceptualise and understand AAP at the country level
- The low initial spending is what one can expect from transformative policy programmes, although inefficiencies delayed spending by a year
- While the accelerated spending rates towards the end of the programme were impressive, it has seemingly also meant that not all funds were spent strategically towards the AAP objective and outcomes
- The level of funding provided to each country was too high to match the original time frame available and national absorption capacity

#### **Monitoring and evaluation**

- The absence of a clear overall AAP programme monitoring framework, the fragmented and the weak mandate and instruments of the IRTSC vis-à-vis overall AAP programme monitoring hampered the development of an overall monitoring framework, which could go beyond outputs and activity monitoring and capture outcomes, impact and lessons learned. The lack of such information makes it difficult to document the outcomes and impact of AAP
- The Prodoc and its logframes were too generic to provide guidance for robust monitoring
- Country projects were not sufficiently supported to develop solid and outcome oriented monitoring systems
- The absence of a requirement to have an external mid-term review meant that an opportunity to take stock of key challenges and revise/reorient the programme design was partially lost, although some country projects revised their logframes. The light-touch mid-term review did provide guidance on solving some of the critical programme management issues, but only came towards the end of the programme
- Monitoring was used mainly for reporting purposes and seemingly insufficient to serve as a management tool
- MCBP's logframe and monitoring generally appears adequate considering the size as well as the narrow scope and focus of the component

#### **Activity implementation and attainment of outputs**

- National Component:

- Most countries installed systems to gather and analyse climate information and undertook thematic studies. All countries developed adaptation plans and strategies with inputs from AAP. A number of the studies and climate data generated have reportedly either been taken into account in, or at least informed, policies and plans.
- A broad range of stakeholders were trained in climate analysis in all countries. Mainly people at the technical level were trained, but in some countries parliamentarians were also trained. The skills were put into use, mainly in relation to analysing data, but the training has in some cases influenced planning processes
- A range of leaders in government and outside government were target by awareness raising activities
- Climate change institutional structures were established in all 20 countries, with support from AAP
- AAP have provided support or inputs to all AAP countries in the formulation of climate change related policies, plans and strategies
- AAP has assisted 15 countries in mainstreaming/integrating climate change into policies and plans
- AAP has supported 16 countries in incorporating climate change resilience into investment plans and approaches
- All countries have implemented adaptation pilot projects. There was a strong country interest in engaging in pilot interventions under AAP, but these were not always sufficiently designed to inform policy. One question would be whether there is a need for a programme like AAP to implement on-the-ground interventions or whether it would have been better to link up to existing initiatives and focus on bringing the experiences from these up to the policy level
- The anticipated outputs under outcome 4 (innovative financing) were not fully delivered due to country level capacity constraints
- 17 countries carried out activities to assess the costs of implementing adaptation measures, although in most cases the countries did not reach the stage at which they had made such an assessment
- AAP supported the establishment of entities, mechanisms and/or plans to facilitate the access of a number of countries to climate change adaptation funding
- In ten countries, national budgets now include a line item on adaptation
- Country projects developed communication plans and produced a range of both technical (e.g. guidelines, briefs) and communication knowledge products (e.g. leaflets, posters). Communication products were disseminated through a variety of channels
- IRTSC:
  - While IRTSC was intended to respond to country project support requests, some critical support needs were not identified by countries themselves. Therefore, IRTSC identified critical/strategic support areas and launched the stream 2 activities to address these
  - The provision of project management support came at the expense of technical support. As pointed out in the mid-term review, it would have been advantageous to separate project management and technical support, e.g. by having dedicated staff allocated for project management support, or ensuring that RBx/UNDP Regional Service Centres are tasked and resourced to provide such support
  - Country projects found the majority of the support received of good quality, relevant and implementable. However, while support timeliness was generally found sufficient, in several cases it was provided late, and language barriers affected the support for Francophone country projects
  - KM laid the initial foundation for sharing of experiences, but the culture of sharing was not fully built up within the time frame of AAP
  - By design and implementation, IRTSC had a bias towards supporting the technical level rather than the political level. IRTSC did not fully engage in directly supporting country projects in activities that specifically worked on changing policy and planning mechanisms and targeting decision-makers
  - IRTSC partly delivered its intended technical outputs and partly met the targets stipulated in the Prodoc
- MCBP:
  - MCBP generally delivered its intended outputs within a short time frame
  - MCBP created significant amount of media coverage of AAP
- PPAS:

- Most cross-practice support was provided as bilateral collaboration between EEG/IRTSC and one other Practice Group
- The Gender Team was able to combine AAP resources with other sources, and to build on earlier work and other projects, and thereby to engage to a significant degree in AAP and support 12 countries
- The Knowledge Management Group's support was closely integrated with the KM support provided by IRTSC
- AAP enabled the Poverty Group to develop and test a toolkit linking climate change and poverty reduction, and to develop a methodology to assess adaptation financing needs
- AAP provided UNDP with a unique opportunity to test integrated multi-practice support and collaboration, although coordination challenges and time constraints made it impossible to fully develop, test and refine the approach

#### **Attainment of outcomes, objective, and goal**

- AAP has contributed to its goal
- AAP has partly achieved its intended objective
- The objective was overambitious compared to the time frame available and not feasible to fully achieve
- National component outcomes were partly achieved. Outcomes 1, 3 and 4 were very ambitious and not realistic to fully achieve within the available time frame
- Each of the first four national component outcomes was very ambitious and comprehensive. Attempting to deliver all of them at the same time appears unrealistic for several countries, and a sequential approach could perhaps have improved the delivery against them
- IRTSC has largely achieved its intended outcome
- MCBP achieved its intended outcome
- Tools, in particular in relation to climate data collection and analysis, were put in place in all countries and are being used
- There is a gap in relation to having senior officials using available information in their decision-making
- All countries have developed adaptation plans or strategies, e.g. in relation to specific sectors, although not all have yet been approved.
- Countries appear not to have sufficient mechanisms to implement plans and update, revise and prepare further plans, certainly not in all 20 countries.
- National institutional structures for coordination have been established in all countries. However, with the reported low ownership of high-level government, their ability to effectively coordinate and convene ministries and others seems to be more uncertain and to vary between countries.
- All countries have formulated policies, plans and strategies, although a number of these are not yet finalised, approved or adopted. The extent to which governments are implementing climate change policies and adaptation measures in priority sectors is not clear, but given the novelty of the policies this appears to be largely limited to donor financed projects, including AAP pilot projects
- Ten countries have government budget lines for climate change, but actual fund allocation is unclear in most countries. Six countries have secured approved donor funding. Funding is limited to government's own funds and donor funds, so there is no significant change in terms of having a variety of financing options
- The countries produced a range of technical and communication knowledge products, which were disseminated in country, on websites and at regional events
- Sharing between countries appears to have been mainly IRTSC led and a culture of sharing between countries does not appear to have been fully adopted

#### **Sustainability and replicability**

- AAP has created the foundation and framework for further work on mainstreaming adaptation in to government policy and planning processes, but has not completed this transformative process and more support is needed in terms of further engaging the political level
- There is a real risk that the momentum and results in many countries will be lost
- The sustainability of AAP seems patchy and only likely to be achieved in specific thematic or geographic areas

- In some countries discussions are going on to find means to continue or replicate AAP, but so far the AAP process has not been taken over by other projects
- There is a real risk that several countries will not be able to maintain the established data management systems
- The journalists trained by MCBP are likely to continue using the skills imparted
- A clear and comprehensive sustainability or exit strategy for AAP was not developed
- The efforts to ensure further funding for a second phase or to ensure that AAP process could be transferred to other programmes or projects did not take place in time
- Even if further funding is secured for a continuation of the work under AAP, there will be an implementation gap of at least 6-12 months; UNDP has not allocated internal resources to cover such gap and maintain a low level of implementation. Hence, key staff at all levels of AAP will have left by the time further funding is secured, and much of the AAP experience and knowledge will not be readily available for a possible follow-up programme, and it is uncertain to what extent the lessons, tools and approaches will be internalised by UNDP. Time and resources would have to be spent on recruiting new teams at HQ, regional and country levels and these teams would need a start-up period
- The separate programme structure of AAP has also meant limited collaboration and integration with other relevant UNDP programmes
- IRTSC has implemented some activities to facilitate more long-term sustainability and sharing of experience, but these are not sufficient to ensure sustainability
- Guidelines and tools were developed under AAP (especially at the country level), but a comprehensive set of tools and guidelines covering all aspects of the AAP approach, which could be used outside AAP was not developed
- While overall institutional sustainability of AAP results may not be fully achieved, there are some areas, where lessons from AAP will be transferred and utilised by UNDP. However, these efforts will not be sufficient to keep the momentum going or to ensure that the experiences gained are effectively transferred and absorbed by UNDP or others
- The lack of a component supporting regional institutions meant that the potential to build a long-term regional function, which could support countries and promote knowledge sharing post-AAP was not harnessed

## Annex 2: AAP lessons at a glance

The following list comprises the lessons bullet points of the different chapters of the evaluation report.

### **Programme timeline, formulation process and inception period**

- A capacity needs assessment at the country level should be carried out during the initial programme design (already during the formulation of the overall regional programme), and a) be part of the country selection process, and b) guide the structure, mandate, tools and resources allocated for project management and technical support
- Country project formulation should not be rushed; sufficient time should be allowed to ensure full national stakeholder involvement, understanding and ownership
- Country projects that are set on transforming policy and planning practices and institutions require close support, sensitisation and capacity building already at formulation and during the inception period, to ensure proper understanding of the concept and approach and national ownership
- A three-year time frame is insufficient for designing and implementing initiatives that are set on transforming policy and planning practices and institutions. Similarly, three month is insufficient for the formulation of country projects. At least a full year for country project formulation and inception is needed (e.g. to allow time for consultations). Similarly, programme implementation should run for at least 5 years, and/or be planned with a clearly stated anticipation of or follow-up phase or follow-up activities
- Administrative, recruitment and procurement processes take time in UN organisations (UNDP and UNOPS), this must be factored in when planning the timeline of a programme to ensure that the technical support is available from the onset of the programme implementation and when needed by countries
- Regional thematic programmes should be co-formulated by BDP and RBx, to ensure a technical content of international best practice, regional and CO ownership, and full understanding of the situation on the ground. Country projects should be co-formulated with COs
- When recruiting project management units of policy programmes, at least some of the staff recruited should have prior experience and knowledge of policy work, as it in many ways differs from the implementation of on-the-ground projects
- With large-scale regional programmes, there is a real risk that political instability will affect implementation in some countries

### **Programme management, coordination and implementation modalities**

- Programme formulation processes, programme management modalities, and implementation roles must be aligned with the existing UNDP structure, reporting lines and mandates to ensure effective participation, ownership and collaboration between the involved Bureaux. The unique strengths and roles of BDP and RBx should be recognised and utilised
- For large and complex programmes with multiple implementers, a high-level Programme Board is insufficient to provide the needed oversight and guidance in a timely manner and in sufficient detail. A committee with all the key actors represented that meets more regularly to address implementation bottlenecks is needed
- The mandates of, and the instruments available for, programme related units must reflect the support needs of country projects, both in terms of project management and technical support – care should be taken to ensure that one does not come at the expense of the other
- Technical and/or project management support units such as IRTSC should not be kept too separate from UNDP. UNDP housing or inclusion of UNDP staff in such a unit could facilitate collaboration and UNDP learning
- To ensure that cross-practice support yield the intended results and effectively contributes to a more integrated approach it is critical to set up an effective management system for this, and to ensure there are in-built incentives and instruments that promote coordination and collaboration
- Prodocs, logframes, mandates, instruments, and roles should be carefully reviewed at critical points during implementation (e.g. during inception and mid-term) and necessary revisions should be made, even if – or especially when – substantial changes or redesign are required. Prodocs and logframes should never be “cast in stone”, but include mechanisms that allow

necessary revisions to enhance the likeliness of achieving the intended goals, objectives and results

- The implications for national ownership of having national project managers on UNDP contracts rather than government contracts are not clear to the Evaluation Team, but the pros and cons of UNDP contracts versus government contracts would be worthwhile to examine further
- It can be difficult for environment ministries and meteorological departments to ensure climate change mainstreaming across sector ministries and in development plans. It is important to ensure robust institutional setup, e.g. by ensuring the full involvement of planning and/or finance ministries, which are stronger in promoting mainstreaming across sectors

#### **Coordination with partners and linkages to other interventions**

- A component dedicated to working with regional or sub-regional institutions, will enable regional programmes to better establish strategic partnerships and can potentially provide vessels to facilitate post-programme continuation of the processes initiated
- When coordination and collaboration mainly taking place in an ad-hoc manner, there is a risk of duplication and opportunities for transferring lessons, replication and post-programme sustainability can be lost

#### **Administrative systems and procedures**

- While it is beyond the reach of a programme to change cumbersome administrative processes, actions can be taken at the programme level to use the processes more effectively, and thereby reducing delays

#### **Budgets and spending**

- Initiatives aiming at reforming policy and planning procedures take time to conceptualise and for people to understand, so spending can be expected to be low in the beginning and increase exponentially, once a certain level of project maturity is reached
- While no-cost extensions can be an important means to enable a programme to achieve the intended results, the increased running costs can force activity levels to be downscaled. These implications can be particularly significant, when extension are given provide at a late stage of implementation as budget adjustments for the remaining time will need to be more dramatic. Planning in advance of extensions will better allow programme implementers to adjust strategies and budgets

#### **Monitoring and evaluation**

- A strong, sophisticated and outcome oriented M&E system at programme level with clearly spelled out mandates and instruments, and a well-designed logframe, is necessary to adequately capture the results and lessons of a complex and large regional programme
- A strong, sophisticated and outcome oriented M&E system is necessary, if M&E is to move beyond feeding information to progress reports, and be utilised as a strategic programme management tool
- To ensure that good and valuable outcome oriented monitoring data is produced, it is important to establish the instruments and allocate sufficient resources to build the capacity of country projects
- It is difficult to capture the impact and changes resulting from/attribution to policy programmes. A comprehensive analysis of UNDP experiences with this from several programmes and the development of a framework/methodology could help guiding future programmes

#### **Activity implementation and attainment of outputs**

- National Component:
  - There is often a strong national interest in engaging in pilot interventions, which are visible, tangible and comparatively easy to implement. However, pilot interventions in policy programmes are only relevant when clearly linked to, and informing, policy and planning approaches and processes. Before it is decided to engage in pilot interventions, it should be assessed whether existing projects can be used to provide the necessary information
- IRTSC:

- In the design of innovative regional programmes, it is important to have a clear strategy, defined responsibilities and staff resources for the provision of project management support to ensure it does not conflict with technical support
- Imparting a good understanding of knowledge management and building a culture sharing experiences takes time. It is also difficult, when government institutions do not have mechanisms that give staff incentives to engage and invest in knowledge sharing
- While technical support should be demand-driven and in line with national priorities and identified needs, it should be kept in mind that there may be critical bottlenecks, which are not readily identified at the country level. Hence, a regional identification and provision of strategic support needs can be important to ensure effective implementation of innovative approaches
- PPAS:
  - Cross-practice work is doable, relevant and can add significant value, provided coordination hurdles can be overcome

#### **Attainment of outcome, objective, and goal**

- To make sure that expectations to a transformative and policy oriented programme are realistic, it should be made clear in the design that such processes take time. Programme objectives and outcomes should be realistic within the given time frame, and it should be clear in the Prodoc that transformation is not a one-off thing but a long-term process that will need to be continued in some way
- It can be difficult to reach decision-makers compared to reaching the technical level. It may be necessary to develop specific tools for this
- Identifying, developing and accessing innovative financing option is difficult for countries, and would often need technical support from the regional to move beyond applying for traditional donor project funding

#### **Sustainability and replicability**

- A sustainability/exit strategy should be developed already in the programme design or inception phase, and be implemented early enough to avoid gaps between phases or loss of results
- Programme structures should not be entirely external to UNDP, but sufficiently attached to existing UNDP structures to ensure the UNDP internalises experiences and approaches
- Development of a comprehensive and implementable set of guidelines and tools covering all aspects of a programme approach and lessons should be integrated in all innovative programmes



### Annex 3: AAP country project analysis sheets

This annex provides an overview of key aspects of eight AAP country projects, based on the national evaluation reports (NER):

1. Burkina Faso (based on draft NER)
2. Lesotho
3. Mauritius
4. Morocco (based on draft NER)
5. Mozambique (based on draft NER)
6. Namibia
7. Niger
8. Nigeria (based on brief draft NER)

Based on the information available in the evaluation report, the Evalaution Team made assessed performance ratings on the criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. The following rating scale was used:

- 1 = very low/unsatisfactory
- 2 = low/below expectations
- 3 = medium/meets expectations/satisfactory
- 4 = high/above expectations
- 5 = very high/excellent performance

## Burkina Faso

Question	Finding
Objective <i>Burkina Faso has adjusted development processes to incorporate the risks and opportunities linked to climate change</i>	The objective is consistent with global Prodoc. <b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b> The draft CC law and sustainable development strategy as well as improved capacity (albeit still not sufficient) contribute to building the foundation for adjusting the development processes to incorporate the risks and opportunities linked to climate change. Development processes not adjusted.
Outcomes	AAP Outcome 5 was covered by 3 other UNDP assisted projects, hence it was not included in AAP Burkina Faso.
1. <i>Burkina Faso has established dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to cope with the inherent uncertainties of climate variability and climate change.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthened capacity for scenario planning, not least at University of Ouagadougou (but government planning capacity strengthened to a much lesser extent). Key products and mechanisms such as the Threshold 21 model (T21) not mainstreamed.<sup>1</sup></li> <li>Improved quality and effectiveness of meteorological services (real time data and forecasting). A pilot activity showed good use of these for agriculture in pilot villages, but funding to upscale this not yet in place.</li> </ul>
2. <i>Burkina Faso has strengthened leadership capacity and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and exploit related opportunities in an integrated manner at local and national levels.</i>	<b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A number of institutions were strengthened, notably The Permanent Secretariat of National Council for Sustainable Development (SP- CONEDD), The Department of Meteorology and University of Ouagadougou, but government capacity remains insufficient.</li> <li>Planning frameworks not yet revised, partly due to capacity issues, partly because some actors feel varied climate has been a fact in BF for decades, and planning already reflects this.</li> <li>The capacity to manage CC risks in an integrated manner and a decentralized approach at both local and national levels was not created.</li> </ul>
3. <i>Burkina Faso is implementing climate-resilient policies and measures in NAPA priority sectors.</i>	<b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preliminary drafts of the planned CC law and Sustainable Development Strategy have been prepared.</li> <li>A CC municipal planning guide has been developed, but no municipal development plan has yet used it.</li> </ul>
4. <i>Capacity to mobilise financial resources to meet national adaptation costs are developed at national and local levels.</i>	<b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Permanent Secretariat of National Council for Sustainable Development (SP- CONEDD) was strengthened to mobilise CCA funds, but no funds were mobilised although three follow-up proposals said to have good potential prepared.</li> </ul>
Outputs	<b>Partly achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most outputs realised.</li> <li>Quality of outputs varies greatly from fully satisfactory to not satisfactory.</li> <li>National Evaluation Report (NER) quotes Impressive 95-100% implementation rate, both physical and financial, with most</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> "Threshold 21 (T21) is a dynamic simulation tool designed to support comprehensive, integrated long-term development planning. T21 integrates economic, social, and environmental factors in its analysis, thereby providing insight into the potential impact of development policies across a wide range of sectors, and revealing how different strategies interact to achieve desired goals and objectives." Promoted by millenium-institute.org

	<p>progress in 2012. Nevertheless noted that some equipment not yet delivered.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retrospective and prospective data on long-term climate trends, risks and opportunities produced.</li> <li>• Installation of 16 additional automatic meteorological stations, thus significantly improving real time the data reporting and prediction capabilities. Staff uses these tools, produce and disseminate information they generate.</li> <li>• A number of resource persons have been trained across 26 institutions, and some of these institutions received much needed IT equipment.</li> <li>• 6 pilot villages had improved cartography, partly based on satellite images, Solar PV kits, and improved agro-meteorological advice.</li> <li>• Environmental education in was tested in 8 post-primary and secondary schools.</li> <li>• Work ongoing to secure external funding for CCA activities, both from climate funds and classic donors and agencies such as UNDP.</li> </ul>
Main types of activities planned and implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training, workshops, information campaigns, analysis of climate trends, scenario planning, procurement of ICT equipment, solar PV equipment and meteorological equipment.</li> </ul>
Key implementers/stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SP-CONEDD, Ministry of Environment, and Environmental Cells in core and sector ministries</li> <li>• Many other stakeholders from various ministries, Meteorological Agency, universities and national, regional and local emergency councils also involved.</li> </ul>
Coordination with national, regional partners/other initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good coordination with 2 other UNDP assisted climate related projects financed by GEF and Danida (shared same steering committee).</li> <li>• Weaker coordination with other ministries. Environmental Cells tended to be weak. Ministry of Finance less involved than in PEI.</li> </ul>
Monitoring and evaluation framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Actual use of M&amp;E system not addressed in national project evaluation. It recommends stronger monitoring of certain activities e.g. construction of Solar PV systems.</li> </ul>
Administration/financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The National Adaptation plan is considerably delayed, mainly due to slow procurement processes.</li> <li>• Costs of workshops, information campaigns, training, implementation of works in most cases said to be in line with existing national practice – some exceptions cited, mainly for University Costs, which were on consultancy basis.</li> </ul>
Main constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Too ambitious time frame.</li> <li>• Available human resources limited.</li> <li>• The ProDoc is in English.</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The sustained delivery of services, information and support remains in most cases unfunded, in some cases unplanned, and hence uncertain.</li> <li>• New internal and external resources are required and three projects are being formulated for funding in this regard.</li> </ul>
Main lessons learned, recommendations and replicability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective institutional change requires time and buy-in from key stakeholders</li> </ul>
Assessment	Ratings from NER. Ratings appear higher than the rating levels

	applied by the Evaluation Team for other countries.
• <i>Relevance</i>	<b>5</b> “Globally relevant, this project fully meets the challenges of ACC, it was implemented with good overall efficiency.”
• <i>Efficiency</i>	<b>4</b> Costs of workshops, information campaigns, training, implementation of works are competitive in light of national standards – but some exceptions cited. Impressive 95-100% implementation rate, both physical and financial, with most progress in 2012. Nevertheless noted some delays and quality issues.
• <i>Result (effectiveness)</i>	<b>3</b> Institutions were strengthened but key products such as the T21 model not mainstreamed and used as expected.
• <i>Sustainability</i>	<b>3</b> Three follow-up projects under formulation to pursue key outcomes.

## Lesotho

Question	Finding
Objective <i>By the end of the project, participating individuals, institutions and communities will have the technical knowledge, skills, information and resources to plan for and implement effective and timely climate change responses</i>	The objective is aligned with the global Prodoc, but less ambitious in terms of policy development. <b>Partly achieved.</b> “The project opted finally to develop more demonstration projects on the ground instead of focusing on contributing to policy making.” This further reduced the ambition regarding policy.
Outcomes	Lesotho has opted for 4 of the 5 “standard” outcomes by excluding the outcome related to planning mechanisms. Nonetheless, data management activities are included under outcome 4
1. (Global outcome 2) <i>Leadership capacities and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner, including a decentralised approach, at the local and national levels are strengthened.</i>	<b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b> Lesotho Meteorological Services was considerably strengthened, the Department of Environment and the Environmental Health Department to a lesser extent. However, the capacity to manage CC risks in an integrated manner and a decentralized approach at both local and national levels was not created.
2. (Global outcome 3) <i>Climate-resilient policies and measures in energy and health sectors implemented and community-based adaptation action promoted.</i>	<b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pilot project were not very strategically linked to policy but contributed to learning and thus prepared some preliminary work to actually inform specific policies. Policies not yet developed with exception of an initial policy paper in the energy sector, which was rejected, as well as a review of the health sector CCA capacity.</li> <li>• Community based adaptation piloted but not mainstreamed.</li> <li>• “The output [outcome] statement was overly ambitious as regards to the government capacity to mainstream CCA issues and to actually develop policies, as there was insufficient groundwork at the beginning of the project.”</li> </ul>
3. (Global outcome 4) <i>Financing options to meet national adaptation costs, including PPP and private participation, expanded at the local and national levels are developed.</i>	<b>Not achieved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The work carried out by AAP on the economics of climate change in Lesotho indicates that the country is likely to face substantial economic losses from climate change and the cost of adapting will be considerable.”</li> <li>• Financing strategy not developed.</li> <li>• “Evidently the issue of financing CCA is a critical issue, but it must also be linked to a vision and an understanding of the government regarding CCA and the corresponding policies. While policies that do not obtain financing may not allow implementation of the adequate measures, conversely accessing the funding source without a clear policy or plan on how to spend the funds adequately can lead to a multiplication of small-scale projects that only benefit the direct beneficiaries but do not revert into more strategic planning and action across the government ministries.”</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A key workshop on CC financing has been postponed to February 2013.</li> </ul>
4. (Global outcome 5) <i>Knowledge on adjusting national and sub-national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks is increased and opportunities thus generated are shared across all levels.</i>	<p><b>Partly achieved.</b></p> <p>The knowledge on what <i>needs</i> to be adjusted has been substantially increased with better knowledge on climate and weather including early warning, solar and wind data and CC related health vulnerability. More limited progress has been made on increasing the knowledge on <i>how</i> to adjust. Sharing across all levels appears limited.</p>
Outputs	<p><b>Partly achieved.</b></p> <p>After a slow start, “over the last year of its life AAP managed to develop an intense activity that achieved significant results.”</p> <p>Seven pilot projects initiated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Solar Lights and fuel efficient stoves in 2 Districts.</li> <li>2. Water supply system using Solar PV arrays and a solar pump</li> <li>3. Community Electricity Project.</li> <li>4. Household Water Storage Hygiene Project.</li> <li>5. Wind Turbines as a source of electricity for rural health clinics.</li> <li>6. Youth Group’s solar irrigation and greenhouse. Not completed.</li> <li>7. Solar irrigated agriculture pilot project. Not completed.</li> </ol> <p>Knowledge:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Created the technical capacity and database within LMS that is capable of translating global generalities of climate change to location specific analysis of CC outcomes. Started process of analyzing economic impact of location specific information on CC – sector by sector.</li> <li>• Developed GIS based wind and solar atlases and installed measuring equipment to refine and continually up-date atlases.</li> <li>• Developed GIS based vulnerability maps for the health sector that map climate-sensitive diseases and provide location specific information on potential health issues.</li> </ul> <p>Communication:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developed a CCA information communication strategy.</li> <li>• Innovative climate change outreach programme with youth groups and using Youth Climate Change Ambassadors to engage with communities and local government.</li> <li>• Developed and distributed climate change promotional material.</li> <li>• Established relationship with local media providing press releases and facilitating TV coverage of key events.</li> </ul>
Main types of activities/actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training, workshops, studies, procurement of server and “a wide range of different activities across primarily two sectors: energy and environmental health”</li> <li>• “Furthermore there are a very high number of activities, which are grouped together under common outputs [outcomes], but do not necessarily contribute all to the output [outcome] statement nor are they mutually supportive.”</li> </ul>
Key implementers/stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Department of Lesotho Meteorological Services (LMS) of the Ministry of Energy, Meteorology and Water Affairs was the</li> </ul>

	<p>implementing agency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Other key stakeholders were the Department of Energy, and the Ministry of Health, Environmental Health Division.</li> </ul>
Coordination with national, regional partners/other initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The lack of a clearly defined arrangement for the setting up of the project team means that much back-and-forth discussions took place between the LMS and the UNDP, when a clear line of responsibility should have been defined from the start.”</li> <li>• “The issue of coordination is a specific challenge. By placing the project within a Department (the LMS) of the Ministry, the AAP was not able to ensure coordination with the other sectors, except for those that were nominally identified as the key partners in the project (e.g. health and energy). However even within the ministries there are different sensitivities to the issues of CC and CCA and the ownership and commitment from all government ministries is not yet very apparent.”</li> </ul>
Monitoring and evaluation framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “There were major difficulties in setting up a proper M&amp;E system for the project, and this was actually not done.”</li> <li>• “A clear gap is the absence of an official M&amp;E support function in the terms of reference of the IRTSC in Dakar.”</li> <li>• “The original project document only contains a skeleton results framework, and many activities do not have a corresponding indicator to ensure it is monitored.”</li> <li>• “Some activity statements pre-suppose the existence of a level of familiarity and capacity in dealing with CCA issues that simply does not exist in the country. An example of this is the output [outcome] 4 statement “Key stakeholders generate, gather, document and disseminate CC and Health and Energy CCA knowledge across all levels and influence policy and programmatic responses for adaptation in priority sectors at local, national and international levels” with the corresponding indicator 3: Number of lessons learnt and innovations replicated elsewhere in Africa through AAP partner and adaptation learning network. These statements show a lack of initial baseline capacity assessment, as the country was not in a position based on its limited experience and capacity for CCA to internationalize their experience and play a mentoring role for other countries.”</li> <li>• “There were no initial base-lines for capacity development or no pre and post training questionnaires given to the participants to appraise any change in their level of awareness, aptitudes and skills of the subject matter, making it impossible to provide a quantitative appraisal of the training results.”</li> <li>• “With hindsight it would indeed be useful to invest into proper M&amp;E training for project staff at the onset of the project, so that a clear Results Framework and proper monitoring and reporting tools are being used.”</li> <li>• “Other UNDP funds, such as the MDGF, has a substantial allocation for M&amp;E capacity development and the MDGF Secretariat was officially tasked to provide M&amp;E support to the partners in the project countries. A similar approach would yield better results for regional programmes.”</li> </ul>
Administration/financial management	<p><b>Administration</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Project efficiency was very poor up to 2012 largely because of three constraints: 1) Late and inadequate project staffing; 2)</li> </ul>

	<p>Complex procurement and financial procedures; 3) No delegation of authority to the project team.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Protracted process to contract the project staff”</li> <li>• “The annual work plans kept reviewing and adapting the annual targets to reflect a more realistic approach to the expected project results.”</li> <li>• “There was no direct delegation of responsibility to the project office, and the office was not established as an entity that could readily work in autonomous fashion for administrative, financial and procurement matters. This unfortunately entailed an additional layer of supervision from the LMS that oversaw the budget and signed on all the financial commitments ... , in addition to having the UNDP actually undertake the financial disbursements. This system was very heavy and did not allow a quick start-up of the project team.”</li> </ul> <p><b>Finance</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “All purchase orders and financial transactions had to be undertaken through LMS and all payments had to be made directly to suppliers by UNDP. This approach has caused considerable delays and complicated accounting and budgeting procedures – considering that some payments were directly undertaken by IRTSC and reported back to the Lesotho project with significant delays.”</li> </ul>
Main constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Appears that project design was overly ambitious.”</li> <li>• “Financial and procurement issues were overlooked during the project design.”</li> <li>• “While AAP was successful in boosting its expenditures by 71% over an 18 months period, this was also at the expense of incomplete planning for the projects, lack of feasibility studies regarding the project locations and materials, because of the tight time-frame for implementation. So when AAP started to implement the pilot projects, these were not as carefully studied as should have been.”</li> <li>• “Lack of technical expertise from LMS to provide specifications of the Wind and Solar equipment.”</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The project managed despite a very slow start and many constraints to achieve some promising results. However there is a need to have these outputs converge into consolidated outcomes, particularly by ensuring these elements are incorporated into sector decision-making.”</li> <li>• “AAP’s sustainability strategy is linked to the ownership and commitment of the government of Lesotho to take CCA seriously and address CC issues. A first step was achieved by incorporating for the first time CC into the country’s national development strategy for the next five years. This will eventually lead to incorporating CCA measures into the various government ministries and budgeting for the relevant measures that need to be taken.”</li> <li>• “However this requires a level of knowledge and ownership on CCA that may not be spread across all the government ministries. The AAP started a number of innovative approaches and projects, but as there is no policy framework or strategic vision on the future of CCA in the government, these initiatives are not likely to be</li> </ul>



	<p>sustainable unless they are incorporated into the wider government planning and budgeting process.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Few of the achievements of the AAP are sustainable unless they are taken to the next level.”</li> <li>• “While some of the legacy of the AAP will remain (such as the LMS capacity development and use of the new technical equipment for climate modelling), the interest and commitment from the political levels of the government is not evident.”</li> </ul>
Main lessons learned, recommendations and replicability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “CCA is not merely a technical process. It is a multi-faceted process that is technical, political, social, cultural and economic. Working with a technical department (LMS in this case) does not provide the platform to ensure the desired level of coordination across the ministries. CC coordination and implementation of not purely technical but rather policy-related activities should sit at a Principal Secretary or Ministerial level.”</li> <li>• Important that project manager has a broad background in project management</li> <li>• “To ensure national ownership and reflect the capacity of the national partner, hire a national consultant working in an inclusive manner with the national stakeholders.”</li> <li>• “The Government should have a clear vision on CC and coordinate and implement at a higher level, something that would allow a whole-of-government approach.”</li> </ul>
Assessment	Rating
• <i>Relevance</i>	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>Lesotho faces serious economic and social CC related challenges and has been identified as one of those countries most vulnerable to CC worldwide. Design was overambitious and not based on a detailed assessment of the national context.</p>
• <i>Efficiency</i>	<p><b>2</b></p> <p>Very little progress up to 2012 with marked acceleration towards the end</p>
• <i>Effectiveness</i>	<p><b>2</b></p> <p>Foundations have been laid for further work towards objective.</p>
• <i>Sustainability</i>	<p><b>2</b></p> <p>Few of the achievements of the AAP are sustainable without further support.</p>

Note: “It did not appear that CCA was particularly high in the agenda of the government when the project started. Rather, it was welcomed as an additional source of funding to implement specific projects”

## Morocco

Question	Finding
Objective <i>To manage and reduce climate change risks in Morocco's oasis production systems through the introduction of innovative approaches to adaptation and strengthening local capacities, through a territorial approach</i>	The objective is consistent with global Prodoc. <b>Partly achieved</b> Broadly achieved in 2 pilot municipalities and good national progress, including introduction of early warning system.
Outcomes	Not evaluated in national evaluation due to absence of indicators.
1. <i>Establishment of dynamic mechanisms for long-term planning to manage risks associated with climate change</i>	<b>Achieved at local scale</b> Achieved in the pilot municipalities of Fezna and Asrir with potential for upscaling.
2. <i>Strengthening the leadership and institutional frameworks governing the integrated management of climate risks</i>	<b>Largely achieved</b> Particularly at water basin agencies (ABH), Directorate of Meteorology and the 2 pilot municipalities although more work remains firstly to mainstream for the Oases, secondly to apply in other parts of Morocco affected by CC, such as coastal regions.
3. <i>Implementation of adapted policies and measures</i>	<b>Partly achieved</b> Good experience in pilot municipalities. Mainstreaming would still require institutions and policies for mainstreaming as well as strengthened capacity to mobilize sufficient financing and responsive international community providing financial support
4. <i>Exploration of financing options to cover the costs of adaptation</i>	<b>Partly achieved</b> Short-term financing secured for the two pilot municipalities. Capacity to mobilise CCA financing needs further strengthening.
5. <i>Generation and dissemination of knowledge relevant to the adjustment of national development processes</i>	<b>Largely achieved</b> Both knowledge generation (climate models, early warning system etc.) and dissemination, the latter highly praised by all stakeholders according to NER
Outputs	<b>Largely achieved.</b> Most outputs broadly achieved, highlights: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adaptation models of good quality developed for water and energy</li> <li>• The analysis of climate scenarios by the Directorate of Meteorology was more detailed (10km) than previous models used in Morocco.</li> <li>• Ten new Meteorological stations constructed and their maintenance procedures and budgets secured.</li> <li>• Early drought and flood warning system established and handed over to the basin agencies that will manage it.</li> <li>• Capacity built at many levels including in the two pilot municipalities.</li> </ul>

Main types of activities planned and implemented	Studies, workshops, pilot activities in 2 municipalities, establishment of additional meteorological station, communication activities.
Key implementers/stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The National Water and Environment Secretariat in the Department of Environment (DOE) of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment was the managing entity for the project.</li> <li>• The municipalities of Fezna and Asrir were targeted for testing adaptation models.</li> <li>• Operational partners included water basin agencies (ABH), Directorate of Meteorology, The Water and Agriculture Offices of the government, University and two Oasis development programmes.</li> <li>• There was cooperation with a number of government ministries, and with Provinces (Zagora, Errachidia, Guelmim, Tinghir).</li> </ul>
Coordination with national, regional partners/other initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National coordination was effective and had good local knowledge.</li> <li>• Several activities were co-financed with other projects and partners including one innovative public private partnership with a consortium of local companies concerning municipal public solar powered lighting.</li> <li>• The local level environmental actors and the 2 oasis projects ensured good integration in the field.</li> <li>• Both national and municipal partners welcomed the participatory approach applied, which included co-financing and co-management with various partners and the sharing of written and video documentation including via internet.</li> <li>• The support from, and availability of, the UNDP team, including participation in stakeholder consultations, was much welcomed.</li> </ul>
Monitoring and evaluation framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of outcome indicators</li> <li>• Activity monitoring by DOE, supported by UNDP and key actors such as basin agencies, ensured timely execution (with exception of start-up delay).</li> <li>• Quarterly and annual reports of good quality produced and annual review held by the project committee.</li> <li>• The formats required by UNDP were different from those required by the regional coordination in Dakar, which lead to some double work.</li> </ul>
Administration/financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partners appreciate that UNDP left the project time to get organised despite time pressures.</li> <li>• Financial resources were sufficient and well administered (with the support from UNDP) with focus on results rather than disbursements. Some activities require supplemental financing, which is being mobilized.</li> <li>• 10% of funds spent on project management, which is modest compared with several other countries.</li> <li>• Both national director and coordinator had the required capacity and experience.</li> </ul>
Main constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The choice of the municipalities of Fezna and Asrir to pilot activities was seen as controversial because they already benefited from other support; hence some felt it was favouritism. The NER supports the choice while noting the importance of explaining that the project aims to test innovative approaches for replication/upscaling.</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The programme has led to the establishment of a network of actors</li> </ul>

	<p>around a shared vision on the issues of CC and the implementation of adaptation measures for the oases. This network has a better understanding and ability to coordinate between institutions and a greater ability to mobilize finance for adaptation models and to strengthen advocacy for Oasis issues.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Upscaling requires high-level support for further enlargement of the above group of actors and mobilization of domestic as well as international financing.</li> <li>• A follow-up activity is planned to pilot integration of CC issues in 4 municipal development plans, which should lead to the production of a methodological guide for other municipalities.</li> </ul>
Main lessons learned, recommendations and replicability	<p>Some success factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint initial planning including co-financing – with enough time allowed for this crucial stage</li> <li>• Transparency, information sharing and ensuring readability of technical documentation</li> <li>• A strategy of integrating different and complementary projects and programs, to ensure the coherence of the actions and avoid situations of competition or duplication</li> <li>• UNDP TA throughout the process.</li> <li>• The “no regrets options” approach to adaptation (inspired by IPCC) has worked very well.</li> </ul> <p>Recommendations from NER:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen the capacities of Regional Observatories of the Environment and Sustainable Development to collect, disseminate and manage CC adaptation information.</li> <li>• Create an “Oasis actors network” of elected and institutional partners to lobby for and coordinate actions taken for the benefit of Oasis.</li> <li>• Generalised adaptation should be progressive. A spatial analysis is required to identify areas that may have pre-requisites for co-building adaptation approaches (e.g. political stability, ability to cooperate, project management skills).</li> </ul>
Assessment	
• <i>Relevance</i>	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>Oases are highly vulnerable to CC and the responses globally appropriate.</p>
• <i>Efficiency</i>	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>Reportedly well administered and efficient</p>
• <i>Effectiveness</i>	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>Generally significant achievements, especially at the local level</p>
• <i>Sustainability</i>	<p><b>3</b></p> <p>Good technical and planning foundations for sustainability, but funding remains a challenge.</p>

## Mauritius

Aspect	Finding
Objective <i>"To integrate and mainstream climate change adaptation into the institutional framework and into core development policy, strategies and plans of Republic of Mauritius" (ROM)</i>	The objective is consistent with global Prodoc. <b>Partly achieved.</b> Climate change bill has been drafted. Integration and mainstreaming of CCA into the institutional framework and development policies, strategies and plans not yet done.
Outcomes	
1. <i>Dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change introduced.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "In the past climate change activities were implemented in an ad hoc basis with limited interaction among stakeholders. AAP has created a common platform enabling all stakeholders to discuss climate change in an integrated fashion for the benefit of the country."</li> <li>• Revised Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines and Integrated Coastal Zone Management guidelines</li> <li>• Review and formulation of Climate Resilient Policies and Capacity Building.</li> <li>• Formulation of a national climate change adaptation strategy, policy framework.</li> <li>• Development of an Inundation, Flooding and Landslide National Risk Profile.</li> <li>• Maps, Strategy Framework and Action Plans for Disaster Risk Management.</li> <li>• Environmental data is collected by various sources. There is a need for a clearing house to collect, verify, control quality, validate, and collate and disseminate the data.</li> </ul>
2. <i>Leadership capacities and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local, regional and national levels strengthened.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> Training and capacity building undertaken but results not assessed.
3. <i>Climate-resilient policies and measures in priority sectors implemented.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> Mainstreaming Climate Change in the Development Process of the Agriculture, Tourism, Fisheries Sectors in the Republic of Mauritius and the Water sector in particular for Rodrigues.
4. <i>Financing options to meet national adaptation costs expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> A climate change action and investment plan prepared but not yet funded.
5. <i>Knowledge on adjusting national development</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> Awareness campaign carried out. a number of research activities

<i>processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities generated and shared across all levels.</i>	undertaken. Results and actual use unclear.
Outputs	<b>Achieved.</b> Reasonable to good progress on all 25 output targets. A number of tasks were carried out by international consultants, often with inadequate collaboration with local stakeholders, and hence limited capacity building.
Main types of activities/actions	A very large number of activities were planned, and most of these were carried out, including: Consultancies, research, capacity building, training, pilot projects, policy development.
Key implementers/stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MOESD)</li> <li>• “A wide range of organizations in public and parastatal sectors and NGO sector was brought to work together under the AAP.”</li> </ul>
Coordination with national, regional partners/other initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There appears to have been tensions between MOESD and UNDP during most of the project period.</li> <li>• “AAP has created a common platform enabling all stakeholders to discuss climate change in an integrated fashion for the benefit of the country.”</li> </ul>
Monitoring and evaluation framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus was on output and activities, rather than objectives and outcomes.</li> <li>• Weak M&amp;E affected effectiveness, e.g. “continuity of undertaking capacity building/training and public awareness campaigns by forms of exhibitions, knowledge fair etc. without assessments of effectiveness.”</li> <li>• Lack of proper financial monitoring. Reporting system with separate reports for physical and financial progress respectively.</li> <li>• It is stated that reporting was seen as necessary mainly when funds were to be requested.</li> <li>• Some monitoring was carried out by the steering committee.</li> </ul>
Administration/financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Slow procurement.</li> <li>• Serious delays (see constraints and sustainability sections) resulted in only ~10% of budget disbursed by end of 2011, rising to over 90% by end 2012, hence most implementation was in 2012. The introduction at the request of UNDP of fortnightly financial reporting was a key tool in improving financial reporting and boosting expenditure in 2012. The evaluators call for further “increasing transparency of financial expenditure incurred by UNDP.”</li> <li>• 28% of funds spent on project management, which appears to be high.</li> </ul>
Main constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “There was a consultative process led by UNDP for designing the AAP. ... However, the Evaluation Team understands that ... the project design appeared to be a more general model for the region and it was not fine-tuned to fit into local context of Mauritius.”</li> <li>• Unclear division of responsibility at project management level between Project Coordinator and Project Manager. Lack of appropriate response and actions by both Executing Agency &amp; UNDP when the project progress was slow in the first year of the project.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited experience in managing large number of stakeholders in a relatively new field (climate change).</li> <li>• Too many activities</li> <li>• The Meteorological Service contribution was a challenge, particularly on climate change data issues, owing to severe staff shortages and existing rules on financial charges for detailed daily data.</li> <li>• A major drawback appears to be the limited participation of Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, both during activities planning and during trainings and workshops.</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ROM, as a Small Island State, has recognized that climate change and sea level rise is a key issue that should be addressed with utmost seriousness and vigour to ensure the sustainable development of the country. It is, therefore, very high on its agenda.</li> <li>• “The delay in commencing the project has definitely jeopardized achievement and sustainability of some project objectives at least partially”.</li> <li>• “Many training of trainers workshops have been held to empower a group of scientists to train others and create thus, a multiplying effect.”</li> <li>• Key research projects started late and funding for completion of some not secured.</li> </ul>
Main lessons learned, recommendations and replicability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The coral farming demo project in both Mauritius and Rodrigues have been completed successfully. Coral farming on a larger scale, to address the problem of coral degradation and preserve coral species, looks promising”. Could be worthwhile to promote in sea and fisheries policies.</li> <li>• Meteorological data should be freely available for public sector as a matter of national policy.</li> <li>• Capacity building and sensitization activities should be evaluated and a database of trained staff established to avoid unnecessary repetitive training.</li> <li>• “Climate change should be integrated in the school curriculum both at the primary and secondary school levels and become examinable”.</li> <li>• Climate Change Impact Modelling: “It is crucial that Mauritius invests in a dynamic system to develop a customized system to understand and analyse the multi-sectoral impacts of climate change, develop institutional and systemic capacity to manage climate change risks, and facilitate development of adaptation and mitigation policies. T21 or an alternative modelling tool should be explored.”</li> <li>• Logframe should be reviewed at inception stage.</li> </ul>
Assessment	
• <i>Relevance</i>	4 As a small island state, CC is a survival issue.
• <i>Efficiency</i>	3 Delays, high proportion of funds spent on project management.
• <i>Effectiveness</i>	4 Most results achieved.
• <i>Sustainability</i>	3 Highest-level support to CCA but follow-up funding not yet secured

Note: NER did not assess the achievement of the objective and outcomes: “The Results & Resources Framework given in the Project Document looks extraordinary complex ... absence of indicators at outcome and objective level is ... hindering assessing achievement at outcome and objective levels.”



## Mozambique

Aspect	Finding
Objective <i>Mozambique mainstreams climate change adaptation mechanisms in policy, development and investment frameworks</i>	The objective is consistent with the global Prodoc. <b>Partly achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“AAP strongly contributed to set the basis for the mainstreaming of adaptation in planning and investing instruments of public and private institutions.”</li> <li>“Partially, successful integration has already taken place at both national and subnational levels.”</li> <li>Enhanced institutional and technical capacity, national strategy for climate change in place, but did not mainstream climate change outside environmental programs.</li> </ul>
Outcomes	
1. Long term planning mechanisms to cope with climate change in Mozambique strengthened.	<b>Partly achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“Quality information has been generated and climate change has been mainstreamed in planning instruments but the originally targeted instruments, the governments 5 year plan, PQG 2010-2014 and Mozambique’s Action Plan for the Reduction of Poverty, PARP 2011-2014 were not supported by the AAP due to the late start of implementation. Moreover, the Mid-Term Expenditure Framework that was published in 2012 did not include climate change considerations. ... climate change remains relegated to environmental concerns including only Ministry for the Coordination of the Environment (MICOA) and the National Disaster Management Institute (INGC) as responsible institutions and leaving key sectors such as infrastructure and energy out.”</li> <li>A National Strategy on Disaster Risk Reduction (ENARC) and a National Climate Change Strategy have been developed</li> </ul>
2. Leadership and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities harmonized, coordinated and strengthened.	<b>Partly achieved.</b> Institutional coordination arrangements adopted through national climate change strategy, but still room for further coordination between MICOA and INGC and for much stronger involvement of Ministry of Finance.
3. Climate-resilient policies and measures implemented in priority sectors and through demonstration projects.	<b>Partly achieved.</b> “Did not succeed in mainstreaming climate change in sector planning and investment instruments but it contributed to set the stage for it by the information and decision-making tools prepared.”
4. Financing options to meet national adaptation costs expanded at the provincial and national level and integrated into sectors.	<b>Partly achieved.</b> The national investment instruments did not include adaptation costs and there is not yet a climate finance strategy. Nonetheless, the national CC strategy includes a proposal of a financial strategy for adaptation to blend funding from external (bilateral, multilateral) and internal sources.
5. Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to incorporate climate change risks/opportunities generated and shared.	<b>Partly achieved.</b> “The concept and proposal of a Knowledge Center was developed and the basis was set to enhance tertiary education curricula and best practices and data sharing through a short course simulation and the creation of web-pages managed by INGC and MICOA. These achievements, although significant, represent only concepts and tools

	that have yet to become operational.”
Outputs	<p><b>Largely achieved.</b></p> <p>“Despite the initial problems the project teams managed to complete almost all activities achieving important milestones.” It should be noted that this refers to the revised targets of 2011.</p> <p>Highlights of successful outputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “A decision support system and early warning system for the Zambezi basin that includes an information management system with a web-based graphical interface and a river basin model. The decision support system will serve as an important scenario analysis tool for water resource management in the Zambezi River and can be expanded to include other river basins.”</li> <li>• National Strategy on Disaster Risk Reduction (ENARC) and the National Climate Change Strategy.</li> </ul>
Main types of activities/actions	<p>Activities focused on generation of information for decision making, training and technical advice e.g. to mainstream climate change in planning instruments (including T21 model), institutional analysis and support to coordination mechanisms, acquisition of computer server for climate modelling, awareness raising, support to sub-national planning mechanisms etc.</p> <p>Five pilot/sub projects were supported:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. MICOA, mainstreaming of climate change in district land use plans.</li> <li>2. Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM), design and simulation of a short course on climate change.</li> <li>3. National Meteorology Institute (INAM), digitalization of historical climate data.</li> <li>4. National Water Directorate (DNA), enhancing rainwater collection and water supply and sanitation facilities.</li> <li>5. Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN), drought resistant crops for food security.</li> </ol> <p>The limited time available prevented the effective use of the lessons learned.</p>
Key implementers/stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (INGC) and MICOA were co-project managers. This arrangement led to some confusion and contradiction.</li> <li>• Other key stakeholders were Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD), DNA, INAM, UEM and SETSAN.</li> </ul>
Coordination with national, regional partners/other initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project governing structures (board, national project director) were established only after one year of project implementation. The project steering committee was never formed.</li> <li>• AAP capitalized on the experience of the Joint Programme on Environmental Mainstreaming and Climate Change Adaptation.</li> <li>• Key sector ministries, Ministry of Public Works and Housing and Ministry of Energy not adequately involved.</li> </ul> <p>Examples of collaboration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• With the environmental and climate change working group of donors.</li> <li>• With the Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) on joint trainings and coaching of MPD and MICOA and other technical staff.</li> </ul>
Monitoring and evaluation framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “As the project was working with other initiatives at national and subnational levels ... it was not possible to establish a clear attribution of the results observed.”</li> <li>• “The project document did not include indicators for the project objective. ... The initial outcome and output indicators of the AAP</li> </ul>

	<p>Mozambique were weakly formulated ... and were therefore not useful as management tools. Collection methods, time frame and means of verification were indicated sketch-wise. ...”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “During the first quarter of 2011 the PMU undertook a review of the indicator framework and introduced important modifications that greatly improved the quality of the indicators at output level. The reviewed indicator framework permitted a more systematic reporting as reflected in the 2011 annual report that consistently referred to the targets and the indicators. Despite the improvements introduced by the review of the monitoring system, no appropriate instruments for monitoring data collection and analysis were ever developed and monitoring remained rather unsystematic. ...”</li> <li>• “As required for UNDP implemented projects, a management component for the AAP Mozambique was activated in ATLAS, including indicators and risk and issues log. However, the indicators in the management component of ATLAS were the same as in the framework and the monitoring schedule and logs were not updated regularly since neither the project coordinator nor the chief technical advisor were granted access to ATLAS. However, the CO assigned a program officer to support in the management component of ATLAS. The lack of SMART quality indicators at outcome level and/ or impact indicators that would link with the UNDP country program outcome indicators made reporting of the contribution of the AAP Mozambique to the CP [Country Programme ](ROAR) difficult and time-consuming. ...”</li> </ul>
Administration/financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid 2011 a project director was finally appointed. “The appointment of the permanent secretary of MICOA as project director provided the PMU with the political leverage needed to resolve conflicts and effectively coordinate implementation. This, together with activation of the board and the earlier appointment of AAP focal points in all participating institutions, was crucial for the much better implementation pace from 2011 onwards.”</li> <li>• “There was insufficient attention to operational issues, such as bank accounts, procurement procedures and conditions for field activities. Field activities were particularly affected as neither the UNDP CO nor the implementing partners carefully calculated the administrative requirements before project implementation.”</li> </ul>
Main constraints	<p>Programme design overambitious:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The logic of the project design involved links and feedback between the outcomes and planning and decision-making processes in the country. ... This design logic would have involved careful timing and agile implementation of all the activities and a near perfect coordination with Mozambique’s planning and decision-making time frames. Moreover, the project set out to achieve outputs [outcomes] that were beyond its capacity, such as the approval of fiscal reforms, the modification of sector plans and adoption of finance strategies. These issues should have been properly addressed as risks.”</li> <li>• “The implementation time frame responded to the logic of the donor but not to the national realities.” Delays made an already ambitious project design unrealistic. In 2011, as a response the indicator framework was made less ambitious and more operational.</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “There is a strong commitment among AAP stakeholders to continue action on climate change. MICOA was strengthened as the</li> </ul>

	<p>coordinating agency of the state in matters of climate change and is leading the implementation of the climate change policy. MPD will continue enhancing capacity and efforts to include climate change in investment instruments. ...”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The institutional coordination structure is not yet functional and there are still two strategies for climate change adaptation (“disaster risk reduction” or “environmental”), one led by the INGC and the other by MICOA. ...”</li> <li>• “The Ministry of Finances and other line ministries, such as the MOPH have only been marginally included in the mainstreaming and the MPD has yet to include climate change in investment instruments. Hence, there is risk of maladaptation if not enough effort is made to widen the institutional base for adaptation.”</li> <li>• “The sustainability of the achievements would still require external financial support to consolidate the achievements in institutional coordination and technical capacity development. There are already commitments to continue this support by donors such as the World Bank, the AfDB, GEF and others.”</li> </ul>
Main lessons learned, replicability and recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A strategic environmental and climate vulnerability study in the province of Cabo Delgado produced a sustainable investment opportunity map that can guide investors to adapt their business to the changing environmental conditions and could become a model decision-making support tool in other provinces and outside Mozambique.</li> <li>• “National implementation projects of mid financial size should be able to focus on a concrete strategic outcome/ outputs of the country program, provided this is well aligned with national priorities and not allow resources to be dispersed trying to score results in many areas. ...”</li> <li>• “Monitoring and evaluation should not be considered a requisite to be included in the project document but rather as a core of the project management. ...”</li> <li>• “Risks assessments and their mitigation measures need to be conducted more carefully and updated during project implementation. Risks should be formulated in a more specific manner ... that will also facilitate the design of feasible mitigation measures.”</li> <li>• Need to undertake a capacity assessment.</li> <li>• Need to take operational/admin stuff (and time needs) into account in design.</li> <li>• Need to ensure coaching and training on admin matters.</li> </ul>
Assessment	Rating
• <i>Relevance</i>	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>Highly relevant given Mozambique’s vulnerability to droughts and floods including sea level rise, however design did not adequately reflect national realities.</p>
• <i>Efficiency</i>	<p><b>2</b></p> <p>Significant delays but logframe was revised and most revised outputs realized.</p>
• <i>Effectiveness</i>	<p><b>3</b></p> <p>Major results realized, institutional structure still not functional.</p>
• <i>Sustainability</i>	<p><b>2</b></p>

	Achievements not consolidated but need further support and financing sources need to be included in national planning instruments.
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Note: "The project document underlined that *Gender consideration shall cut through all programme intervention areas and approaches: and all activities shall be planned and implemented in a gender sensitive and cognizant manner.* ... the only gender-specific activity implemented by the project was the conduct of one training on Gender and Climate Change. Setting the basis for a better collection and management of gender segregated socio-economic data and its use for development measures and initiatives may be the greatest gender-related contribution of the AAP in Mozambique."

## Namibia

Aspect	Finding
Objective <i>Namibia has the institutional, individual and systematic capacity to address climate change risks and opportunities through a national approach to adaptation</i>	The objective is consistent with global Prodoc. <b>Partly achieved. Considerable progress.</b> Laid good foundations and contributed with fast-tracking the development of several sectoral policies, such as the National Policy on Climate Change for Namibia, but tools not yet mainstreamed and further strengthening still desirable.
Outcomes	
1. <i>Dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to cope with the inherent uncertainties of climate change introduced, with a focus on managing flood risks.</i>	<b>Largely achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Built systems and capacity to access and analyse CCA relevant data, such as early warning system.</li> <li>• Disaster risk reduction plan finalized.</li> <li>• Climate risk management plan developed.</li> <li>• Tools developed, incl. gender specific risk assessment and community information.</li> </ul>
2. <i>Namibian leadership and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities strengthened, including a decentralised approach.</i>	<b>Largely achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CCA management needs identified, models for enhancing institutional frameworks to address CCA management needs developed.</li> <li>• Enhanced understanding and capacity to manage CC at top decision makers' levels.</li> <li>• Establishment of Regional Climate Change Coordination Committees.</li> <li>• Seemingly still need for further consolidation.</li> </ul>
3. <i>Climate Change-proof national and sectoral policies: design, test and implement priority CCA measures (flooding and settlement/sanitation and health), and promote community-based adaptation action.</i>	<b>Largely Achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "This output [outcome] progressed CCA by developing long-term planning frameworks for adaptation, strengthening the CC policy Disaster Preparedness policy, encouraging greater community support for CCA and establishing demonstration activities on adaptation to reduce CC damages due to floods and health effects."</li> <li>• "Community Based Adaptation promoted through nation-wide application of tested community CCA toolkit."</li> <li>• Work remaining on sector policies.</li> </ul>
4. <i>Financing options to meet national adaptation costs expanded at local and national levels, building on ongoing IFF work.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investments and Financial Flow assessment in Namibia was carried out.</li> <li>• A financing strategy was done with focus on multilateral funding.</li> <li>• Funds secured from UNFCCC.</li> <li>• Work still remaining on fiscal instruments and potential for private sector financing.</li> </ul>
5. <i>Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities generated and shared across all</i>	<b>Largely achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outreach/communication materials developed and information (e.g. from research and studies) disseminated through various channels. Event and opportunities for sharing were provided such as the CCA Ambassadors Programme and the Youth Action Programme; the project forged some meaningful cross- and inter-sectoral partnerships.</li> </ul>

<i>levels.</i>	
Outputs	<p><b>Achieved.</b> The project has attained most of the outputs/results indicators in the logframe.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finalised the National Policy on Climate Change and the Strategy and Action Plan for Namibia.</li> <li>• Improved governance at high decision-making level resulted in moral and technical support to climate change adaptation-related initiatives such as the Green Fund Bidding.</li> <li>• Development of a T21 Dynamic Systems modelling to undertake cross-sectoral analyses of climate change adaptation and impact.</li> <li>• A Climate Risk Management Plan for Oshana Region was developed</li> <li>• Developed a GIS-based and gender-specific climate risk assessment decision-making tool.</li> <li>• Established a climate change adaptation ambassadorial forum and offered appropriate training to technical staff from various institutions in Namibia.</li> <li>• Produced policy briefs for parliamentarians and decision-makers. This was complemented by training for the Parliamentary Committee on Economics, Natural Resources and Public Administration Committee.</li> <li>• Established the Climate Change Adaptation Youth Action Programme and completed an outreach strategy.</li> <li>• Compiled and translated a community information toolkit on climate change adaptation for all regions.</li> </ul>
Main types of activities/actions	Studies, training and capacity development, policy development, small-scale projects related to climate change abatement and adaptation, biodiversity, international waters protection, persistent organic pollutants reduction and land degradation.
Key implementers/stakeholders	<p>Implemented by Department of Environmental Affairs in Ministry of Environment and Tourism.</p> <p>The other core stakeholders in implementing the project were Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry; Ministry of Works; Transport and Communication (Namibia Meteorological Services); Office of the Prime Minister; National Planning Commission; Ministry of Finance; 12 Regional Councils. It has drawn the attention of members of Parliament, tertiary institutions, schools, youth clubs, developmental institutions, NGOs and traditional authorities.</p>
Coordination with national, regional partners/other initiatives	<p>Extensive coordination at both national and regional level. Promoted and contributed to existing initiatives. UNDP/GEF funded programmes identified capacity needs for the implementation of UNCBD, UNCCD and UNFCCC conventions, and AAP outcomes responded to most of the capacity needs identified.</p>
Monitoring and evaluation framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baseline information for results-indicators was not accurate.</li> <li>• There were no clear indicators that could help PMU in formulation of a replication approach.</li> <li>• The PMU documented all the actions and activities that have been undertaken since project inception.</li> </ul>
Administration/financial	Said to be well-administered and efficient without major delays.

management	No issues raised in Auditor General's 2011 report. Spending on obj. 1 was 156% of budget.
Main constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The time frame of the project was, by design, not proportionate to the nature of outputs versus desired results. Most delays due to over-ambitious time-frame and unrealistic planning documents</li> <li>• Targeted stakeholders felt overwhelmed by numerous AAPNAM-related consultations and activities that were implemented at once and in a short-time (2 years).</li> <li>• Technical studies conducted in parallel hindered opportunities to inform each other.</li> <li>• There was no mid-term evaluation. Such an evaluation could have measured project implementation progression and recommended possible alternatives.</li> <li>• Appraisal of Small Grant proposals took long, resulting in delayed signing of agreements and disbursement of tranches for implementation.</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Many outputs appear sustainable as they are mainstreamed in existing organisations and there seems to be awareness of the need for CCA – although high-level participation lacking in NCCC could be an area of concern.</li> <li>• Good integration in institutions and policies, but the sustainability of outputs can only be ensured through continued capacity building and technical support to the various institutions identified to take over responsibilities.</li> <li>• The PMU prepared a sustainability plan and an exit strategy.</li> </ul>
Main lessons learned, replicability and recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation duration was very short compared to the nature of expected results. This inhibited the cascading of the technical studies and project activities</li> <li>• Imperative to review the Project Document with key stakeholders at the inception of the project to confirm the relationship of the proposed output and activities with the ground reality</li> <li>• Designing and developing public IFF mechanism is a national multi-stakeholders endeavour, recommended to take programmatic approach to project financing with designated sectoral experts.</li> </ul> <p><b>Best practices:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Threshold 21 (T21) a Systems Dynamics based model to support national development planning by integrating economic, social and environmental factors into a single framework highly embraced by the NPC designated host, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Namibia among others.</li> <li>• Improved governance at high decision-making levels resulting in moral and technical support to climate change adaptation related initiatives such as the Green Fund Bidding and training of the Parliamentary Committee on Economics, Natural Resources and Public Administration</li> </ul>
Assessment	Rating
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Relevance</i></li> </ul>	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>Desertification and flash flooding are key threats, which programme addresses.</p>



• <i>Efficiency</i>	<b>4</b> Said to be well administered and efficient and with clean audit report.
• <i>Effectiveness</i>	<b>4</b> Generally significant achievements against ambitious outcomes.
• <i>Sustainability</i>	<b>3</b> Plan and partial financing in place, relatively well integrated in policies and institutions, but further support needed.

Notes:

- NER: "The overall rating for the AAPNAM project is "successful"."
- Relatively rich country, GNI/Cap 4700\$ (WB 2011) e.g. ~8 times Burkina Faso, hence success may not be easily transferable to poorer countries.

## Niger

Aspect	Finding
Objective <i>To mainstream climate change adaptation across key sectors and into development processes in Niger</i>	The objective is consistent with global Prodoc. <b>Partly achieved.</b> Started to create foundations but a long way to go remains.
Outcomes	
1. <i>Dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to manage the inherent uncertainties of climate change introduced.</i>	<b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b> Technical studies undertaken, but parties have limited capacity to exploit and use them. A modern and viable system to collect, analyse and disseminate climate data and information has not been established. The regional Niger Basin Office is one of the few utilising climate data. Capitalisation of learning was limited.
2. <i>Leadership capacities and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local, regional and national levels strengthened.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> Planners competences have been strengthened, but decision makers have only been marginally involved and there has been limited information sharing.
3. <i>Climate-resilient policies and measures implemented in priority sectors implemented.</i>	<b>Not achieved.</b> Due to delays, the pilot projects were done in parallel with the drafting of the CC policy. The CC policy was drafted with inspiration from the technical studies. The policy is not yet adopted, nor translated into sectorial policies.
4. <i>Financing options to meet national adaptation costs expanded at the local, national, and regional levels.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> Capacities of key players strengthened, but need further strengthening. National budget not realigned towards CCA, no new financing options created.
5. <i>Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities generated and shared across all levels.</i>	<b>Partly achieved.</b> Sensitisation activities towards general public have been done and support to academics has improved their knowledge. The envisaged mechanism for documenting and sharing lessons learned has not been established.
Outputs	<b>Partly achieved.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ~80% of activities realized, (while 94% of funds spent) and most resulting in the planned output.</li> <li>• The analysis of climate scenarios used 12 regional models and was more detailed (50*50) than previous global models used in Niger's 2<sup>nd</sup> national communication (350*350 downscaled to 150*150). This is an important step forward and will facilitate the work on the 3<sup>rd</sup> national communication to IPCC.</li> <li>• Some key strategic activities from the Prodoc not included in work plans and never realized.</li> </ul> <p>Regarding pilot projects for outcome 3:</p>

	<p>20 micro projects financed, 17 of these together with the National CC Adaptation Programme for agriculture, PANA. 8 were grain banks, 7 other agricultural projects including soil restoration projects, 1 was on radio communication, 1 on sowing for women, and 3 were on renewable energy (including one on cooking stoves).</p> <p>Findings on the micro projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There were too many projects</li> <li>• The projects were not strategic, but rather chosen to give visibility to the project.</li> <li>• Some projects repeated previous approaches such as Zai.</li> <li>• Many projects done by user committees with minimal financial oversight.</li> <li>• Evaluator visited the 3 renewable energy projects and found only one still functioning.</li> </ul>
Main types of activities/actions	Studies, training, workshops, pilot projects, drafting of CC policy
Key implementers/stakeholders	<p>Led by the National Environment Council for Sustainable Development (CNEDD), located in the Prime Minister's Office. This ensured strong national ownership, but key decision makers' attention was focused on a number of major short-term crises (see constraints section) rather than on this long-term programme.</p> <p>Other key implementing partners:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Executive Secretariat for Rural Development Strategy</li> <li>• Ministry of the Environment and the Fight Against Desertification</li> <li>• Ministry of Agricultural Development</li> <li>• Ministry of Livestock and Animal Industries</li> <li>• Ministry of Water</li> <li>• Directorate of Meteorology</li> <li>• The Commission of Climate Change and Variability</li> </ul>
Coordination with national, regional partners/other initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Probably due to the location in the Prime Minister's Office, the interministerial coordination and institutional anchoring is evaluated as good.</li> <li>• The joint implementation with the national CC adaptation programme for agriculture is cited as a good practice model.</li> <li>• Good collaboration with researchers and universities.</li> <li>• Minimal collaboration with regional agencies such as Agrhyment.</li> </ul>
Monitoring and evaluation framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Framework not much used in implementation.</li> <li>• M&amp;E was limited and focused on activities rather than results.</li> <li>• No progress reports from 15 of the pilot 20 projects.</li> </ul>
Administration/financial management	<p>Financial management was problematic:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 38% of the budget was spent on programme management including vehicles.</li> <li>• Some cases of excessive workshop and per diem costs.</li> <li>• Some expenses questioned in 2011 audit. After audit report, operation mode changed to DIM</li> <li>• Commingling of finance for micro projects and equipment between AAP and PANA.</li> </ul>
Main constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Niger went through a political transition with a constitutional coup in 2009, a military coup in 2010 and presidential elections in 2011 leading to a revision of national policies and frequent changes of government directors including the project "owner" the Secretary-General of CNEDD.</li> <li>• Extreme climatic events required that scarce human resources be</li> </ul>

	<p>used for emergency responses:  2010: severe drought and hunger  2011-2012 serious flooding.  This may also have affected the funds invested in the pilot projects.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project document is in English only.</li> <li>• Very low HR capacity in general and PMU staff had limited experience with UNDP procedures.</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The programme has no explicit exit strategy.</li> <li>• The high degree of national ownership is an important foundation.</li> <li>• For all the 5 outcomes, there is a moderate to high risk that they will not be sustainable. The key issue is whether there will be adequate follow-up on the many recommendations made, some of which are quite fundamental.</li> </ul>
Main lessons learned, recommendations and replicability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The joint implementation with the national CC adaptation programme for agriculture and the implication of UN Volunteers in monitoring is cited as a good practice model.</li> <li>• Urgent need to support creation of a viable system to collect, analyse and disseminate climate data. Should be financed by core funding from the national budget supplemented with donor funds.</li> <li>• Collaborate with Agrhymet on capacity building, strengthening of Niger Department of Methodology and preparation of third national communication.</li> </ul>
Assessment	Rating
• <i>Relevance</i>	<b>4</b> Niger is extremely vulnerable to climate change, but design not adapted to national context and outcomes unrealistic.
• <i>Efficiency</i>	<b>2</b> Serious concerns about financial management and cost effectiveness.
• <i>Effectiveness (results)</i>	<b>2</b> Limited progress, partly but not fully explained by serious national constraints. Pilot projects not strategic.
• <i>Sustainability</i>	<b>2</b> High national ownership but serious concerns about follow-up

Note: Despite shortcomings, national actors are satisfied with the way the project was implemented and the benefits they have derived from it.

## Nigeria

Aspect	Finding
Objective <i>Nigeria has a coherent governance system for climate change adaptation, has empowered children to manage climate change impacts and has demonstrated positive adaptation benefits in the agricultural sector</i>	The objective is consistent with the global Prodoc. It is, however, somewhat ambiguous whether the empowerment of children and the adaptation in agriculture was meant to be generalised or just piloted. Not addressed in the National Evaluation Report (NER) <b>Partly achieved.</b> There has reportedly been progress, particularly towards improving the governance system through documentation, policy, action plan and coordination. Children's empowerment and agricultural adaptation have been piloted.
Outcomes	
1. <i>Dynamic, long-term planning mechanisms to cope with the inherent uncertainties of climate change introduced</i>	<b>Partly achieved, considerable progress:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "The main results achieved ... were the finalisation of the National Policy on Climate Change Adaptation and the National Strategic Plan of Action for Climate Change Adaptation. ... the adoption of the policy by the National Executive Council which is chaired by the President showed the engagement process was effective."</li> <li>• The ability of the Department of Climate Change to demonstrate how the T21 modelling could be used as an advocacy tool to stimulate change was testimony.</li> <li>• CC Policy and Strategy not yet incorporated at state level.</li> <li>• "Procurement of high powered servers to be used in the establishment of an Integrated and Comprehensive E-infrastructure to Support Data and Information Management for Adaptation Planning in Nigeria. Once the servers are installed and operationalised, more reliable and accurate information will be generated to enrich the policy decision-making process. These initiatives will however need to be boosted by an M&amp;E framework that ensures all sectors and agencies are collecting the needed information on a timely basis."</li> </ul>
2. <i>Gender-sensitive leadership and institutional frameworks to manage climate change risks and opportunities in an integrated manner at the local and national levels strengthened</i>	<b>Partly achieved:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selected senior leaders have been trained and capacity has been built at national level and in pilot states.</li> <li>• The gender aspect appears to have been more prominent than in several other countries. Highlights: development of teachers' guidance pack on gender; gender sensitive leadership training and development of adaptive farming practices emphasising gender equality and youth employment.</li> <li>• Another landmark observed was the establishment of the Science Committee on Climate Change. The committee was charged with the responsibility of bridging and promoting the use of available scientific knowledge and capabilities to enhance the policy process. The work of the committee complemented that of the Climate Change Research Group.</li> <li>• In spite of these positive gains, it was obvious that some of the key activities in capacity building were unimplemented and that the institutional frameworks appear largely uncharged.</li> </ul>
3. <i>Climate-resilient policies and measures implemented in priority</i>	<b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Through UNICEF's initiative the State Ministries of Education and Water Resources in Cross River and Niger states had been</li> </ul>

<i>sectors Implemented</i>	<p>supported to start a review of existing policies and programmes and to ensure climate change adaptation measures are integrated into sectoral plans and programmes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not much progress reported in other ministries at state and national level.</li> </ul>
4. <i>Financing options to meet national adaptation costs expanded at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels</i>	<p><b>Partly achieved. Limited progress.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The development of the National Climate Change Trust Fund and the establishment of the Environment Sustainability Group, which is expected to continue dialogue and consult different stakeholders on how to sustainably fund climate change adaptation initiatives.</li> <li>• CCA not fully included in Medium Term Expenditure Framework.</li> </ul>
5. <i>Knowledge on adjusting national development processes to fully incorporate climate change risks and opportunities generated and shared across all levels</i>	<p><b>Partly achieved. Still long way to go.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A communication strategy had just been developed, but yet to be fully implemented.</li> </ul>
Outputs	<p><b>Partly achieved.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Several training activities led to positive changes in the behaviour and attitudes of the staff involved. The level of community level interventions initiated in the two pilot States of Cross River and Niger further showed the training influenced the beneficiaries.</li> <li>• A number of planned activities were not realized/completed including moving to the state level. Activities not realized included assessment of capacity gaps and development of a medium term capacity building plan and strategy. These are critical areas of work that will require to be looked at in future.</li> </ul>
Main types of activities/actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity needs assessment, skills development, strengthening of coordination structures, strategy development, procurement of servers, pilot projects in small/hydro power linked with conservation agriculture (UNIDO) and empowerment of children through school gardening/environmental clubs (UNICEF).</li> </ul>
Key implementers/stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Special Climate Change Unit (SCCU) of the Ministry of Environment was the managing agency and was upgraded to a department in MOE.</li> <li>• The funding of the project was managed by UNDP and tranches released to the participating partners – UNICEF and UNIDO – periodically for respectively implementing the education and water resources activities in Cross river and Niger States and the agriculture activities in Benue State.</li> <li>• Other stakeholders included various federal ministries, Nigeria Meteorological Agency and State governments of Benue, Cross River and Niger States, particularly state ministries of agriculture, education and water resources.</li> <li>• NGOs and academia were involved to a limited extent.</li> </ul>
Coordination with national, regional partners/other initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The coordination was best with the ministries that benefited from pilot activities, notably agriculture, education and water resources.</li> <li>• “In spite of efforts made to engage with the Ministry of Finance and also train budget and planning officers, the process of integration was not fully achieved. The implication is that most sectors would not have the resources to implement core activities even if they</li> </ul>

	<p>succeeded to review their plans and programmes as envisaged.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The Joint Task Force made up of UNDP, UNIDO and UNICEF met regularly to review project progress, agree work plans and provide timely solutions to implementation issues”.</li> </ul>
Monitoring and evaluation framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There were no indicators at objective level.</li> <li>• NER does not contain discussion of how the results framework of the Prodoc was used.</li> <li>• The monitoring system for the school pilot component is cited as the most effective.</li> </ul>
Administration/financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The inception workshop was held Oct. 2010, 7 months after Prodoc was approved.</li> <li>• Slow government approval processes, delays in procurement of inputs</li> <li>• The NER does not provide a basis for commenting on the financial management.</li> </ul>
Main constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A very large country with multiple layers of government with varied levels of effectiveness and popular legitimacy. Each state has higher population than many of the AAP countries. Managed by selecting three pilot states and by strong involvement of UNDP, UNICEF and UNIDO.</li> <li>• The NER consistently mentions a two year planned project period and states this was overambitious.</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The fact that the national adaptation policy was approved at the highest level combined with the sobering illustrative effect of the 2012 flooding, indicate that the need to not only mitigate but also adapt has now been understood.</li> <li>• “Recognising that Climate Change is no longer an environmental issue but cross cutting for socio economic development. The need to finding lasting solutions beyond the AAP has begun to gain grounds at high policy levels and among Civil Societies, the Media and women leadership” It is thus likely that adaptation work will continue.</li> <li>• Some unfinished activities both at federal and state level will now depend on national financing and some of these may never deliver intended results. In some cases, notably DOE and Benue state, funds for follow-up activities in 2013-14 budget have been allocated.</li> </ul>
Main lessons learned, replicability and recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Given the limited involvement of civil society, NER recommends: “it is important to identify and engage such groups to support the community-based interventions. Working with civil society groups bridges the gap between them and the public institutions and promotes trust.</li> </ul>
Assessment	Rating
• <i>Relevance</i>	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>Nigeria has high population density, the rural population depend on agriculture, and Nigeria has been described as one of the most highly vulnerable countries to climate change in the world.</p>
• <i>Efficiency</i>	<p><b>2</b></p> <p>Very late start-up, slow procurement and several actions not completed.</p>
• <i>Effectiveness</i>	<p><b>3</b></p> <p>Prodoc outcomes and outputs unrealistic, given the enormity of the task with a huge and very populous country. Several gaps, but</p>

	successfully reached presidential level.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Sustainability</i></li> </ul>	<b>2</b> Positives: policy, strategic plan of action, presidential interest. Negatives: some unfinished activities depend on national financing and may never deliver intended results.



## **Annex 4: Terms of Reference**

See attached file

## Annex 5: Evaluation Programme

Task	Completion
Ensuring access to AAP documentation	Continuous
Organising/planning work	Continuous
Inception Plan	25 Jan 2013
Start of Evaluation	9 Jan 2013
Preparation of analysis tables	25 Jan 2013
Dissemination of journalist questionnaires	23 Jan
Dissemination of country project questionnaires	28 Jan
Document review (overall programme, 3 regional components)	25 Jan
Stakeholder interviews	20 Feb
Format for country project analysis	15 Feb
Draft report sections on overall programme and regional components	22 Feb
Draft report sections with final country monitoring data	27 Feb
Review of national evaluations and documents from AAP countries	5 Mar
Draft report sections on national projects across chapters	7 Mar
Draft executive summary	7 Mar
Submission of draft evaluation report	7 Mar
Development of presentation of evaluation for AAP Board Meeting	20 Mar
Presentation of findings at AAP Programme Board meeting	22 Mar
Submission of second draft evaluation report	24 Mar
Final evaluation report	8 Apr

## Annex 6: Stakeholders consulted

### Persons interviewed

Person	Organisation	Division/unit	Institution/Position
Seon-mi Choi	UNDP	RBA	Policy Specialist (Environment and Climate Change)
Pedro Conceicao	UNDP	RBA	Economic Advisor
Shigeki Komatsubara	UNDP	RBA	TICAD Advisor
Celine Moyroud	UNDP	RBAS	Programme Advisor
Nidhi Sharma	UNDP	RBAS	Programme Analyst
Charles McNeill	UNDP	BDP/EEG	Programme Advisor
Mihoko Kumamoto	UNDP	BDP/EEG	Technical Specialist
Jennifer Stephens	UNDP	BDP/EEG	Climate Specialist
Ryan Laddey	UNDP	BDP/EEG	Knowledge Management and Reporting Analyst
Veerle Vanderweerd	UNDP	BDP/EEG	Director, Environment & Energy Group
Jennifer Baumwoll	UNDP	BDP/EEG	Research Analyst
Usman Iftikhar	UNDP	BDP/EEG	Policy Advisor
Lucy Wanjiru	UNDP	BDP/EEG	Programme Specialist (Gender and Environment)
Jennifer Colville	UNDP	BDP/EEG	
Marc Lepage	UNDP	BDP/KICG, Regional Centre, West and Central Africa	Knowledge Management Team Leader
Solange Bandiaky	UNDP	BDP/Gender Team, Regional Centre, West and Central Africa	Consultant
Jacqueline Frank	UNOPS	MCBP	Regional Project Manager, MCBP
Michelle Betz	ICFJ		Journalist
Luke Dunstan	UNOPS	IRTSC	Baobab Coalition Journal Editor
Charles Dickson	UNDP/UNOPS	IRTSC	AAP Communications Advisor
Kristin Helmore			Results and Learning Consultant
Joyce Yu			MTR Consultant
Ian Rector	UNOPS	IRTSC	Program Manager
Joseph Intsiful	UNOPS	IRTSC	Manager, Data and Information Management Component
Luke Mawbey	UNOPS	IRTSC	Consultant, Information and Technology
Candida Salgado Silva	UNOPS/UNV	IRTSC	UNV, Monitoring and Reporting
Simon Hagemann	UNOPS/UNV	IRTSC	UNV, Monitoring and Reporting
José Levy	UNDP	IRTSC	Manager, Knowledge Management
Keith Cundale	UNOPS	IRTSC	Manager, Institutions and Leadership

Donato Serena	UNOPS	AFO/SNOC	Associate Portfolio Manager
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### **Questionnaires**

- 20 AAP country projects/UNDP COs – 16 responses received
- 24 journalists trained by MCBP (4 Team Leaders, 20 Trainers) – 10 responses received

## Annex 7: Documents consulted

### Overall AAP

- Summaries of AAP Board Meetings
- UNDP, Inter-Regional Project Document: Africa and Arab States Regions
- UNDP, Quarterly Reports Regional components (Q1, Q2, Q3 2011)
- Financial report, as of 21 December 2012
- Celebrating our Successes, AAP Country Conference (Dakar, 12-16 Nov 2012), draft report

### National Component

- AAP national project evaluation reports – Burkina Faso (draft), Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique (draft), Morocco (draft), Namibia, Niger, Nigeria (draft), Ethiopia (draft)
- Achievement tracking documents – Excel
- AAP national project documents for 20 countries
- AAP national MTR reports ToR
- AAP national component progress report, November 5<sup>th</sup> 2012
- AAP Operations Sub-committee Meeting – summaries
- Country Report, Light Touch Mid-term Review for 16 countries
- Light Touch Mid-term Review – Problem identification matrices for 17 countries
- Light Touch Mid-term Review – ToR
- Summary of Key Communication and Issues, Climate Change Adaptation in Africa, 24 June 2008, Mihoko Kumamoto

### IRTSC

- AAP Monthly Progress Reports, 2011
- BTOR (Q1 2011)
- AAP Inter-Regional Technical Support Component Results Framework – Draft, 8 February, 2011
- UNDP Niger Climate Change Service Delivery Review Briefing Note, 9 February, 2011
- AAP Monthly Progress reports (Q1 2012)
- Leadership for Results Programme documents, Congo
- Force Action Climate Programme documents, Congo
- IRTSC, 20 Monthly Progress Reports (Q2 2011)
- IRTSC, 30 Monthly Progress Reports, (Q3 2011)
- IRTSC, 30 Monthly Progress Reports (Q4 2011)
- IRTSC, 14 Monthly Progress Reports (Q1 2012)
- IRTSC, 28 Monthly Progress Reports (Q2 2012)
- IRTSC, 28 Monthly Progress Reports (Q3 2012)
- AAP Annual Work Plan, 2011
- UNDP, Annual Report 2010 - Summary Overview for Board Meeting, February 2011
- 'Basic Needs Capacity Building Response Table', compiled Excel document, May 12<sup>th</sup> 2012
- AAP National Progress Report Components, 2011
- AAP Briefs and other presentations, 2011
- IRTSC Country contacts for 20 countries
- AAP Financial expenditure summary, September 2011
- Glossies, Data and Information Management - Supporting Decision Making
- UNDP, AAP Mid-Year Summary Report, June 2011
- IRTSC, 72 Monthly Progress Reports
- IRTSC, Quarterly Progress Reports, 18 countries (Q1 2011)
- IRTSC, Quarterly Progress Reports, 17 countries (Q2 2011)
- Meeting Summary - AAP Peer Evaluation & Planning meeting, November 25<sup>th</sup> 2010
- UNDP, AAP Project Documents for 20 countries
- UNDP, AAP Quarterly Progress Report, January – March 2011
- AAP Inter-Regional Technical Support Component Results Framework
- AAP National Programme Results and Indicators
- CAI: AAP Climate Action Intelligence Programme: 14 documents
- Climate change workshop reports

- UNDP, AAP Project Validation and Implementation Guidebook DRAFT, February 10<sup>th</sup> 2011
- General strategic AAP documents
- Knowledge management documents
- UNDP, NEX/NIM Reporting Requirements & AAP Project-to-Programme Reporting Framework, PowerPoint
- UNDP, AAP Quarterly Progress Report, April – June 2010
- AAP related PowerPoint presentations
- IRTSC – BTORs, 2011
- BTORs, in-country missions (Q1, Q2 2011)
- UNDP, DRAFT - AAP 2011 Mid-Term Review, January 2012
- IRTSC – APP Monitoring and evaluation reports
- Quarterly Progress Reports, (Q1, Q2, Q3 2011 + Q1, Q2, Q3 2012)
- UNDP, AAP 2011 Annual Report, Prepared by the AAP Inter-Regional Technical Support Component
- Advisory Note for AAP Countries Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP) Project Closure
- UNDP, Example Template Terms of Reference for Final Evaluation Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP)
- UNDP, Final Evaluations of AAP - ToR
- UNOPS, AAP Quarterly Report (Q2 2011)
- UNDP, IRTSC Operations Plan for 2012, January 2012
- UNOPS, Highlight and activity reports (Q2, Q3, Q4 2011)
- UNOPS, Semi-annual progress report, Ian Rector, January-June 2012
- UNDP, Inter-regional project document, Improving Public Awareness of Climate-change Issues in Africa: Capacity Support for Local Media through South-South Cooperation
- Inter-Regional Project Document: Africa and Arab States Regions
- AAP and UNDP Guideline documents
- AAP Quarterly reports (Q1, Q2, Q3 2012 + Q3 2011)
- UNDP, Annual Report 2011', Marco Corsi, Simon Hagemann, Cândida Salgado Silva, February 2012
- AAP Total budget report (Excel document), 2009-2012, report as of December 21<sup>st</sup> 2012
- UNDP, AAP 2011 Mid-Term Review, draft

#### **MCBP**

- South-South Cooperation Media Capacity Building Monthly reports
- Media Capacity Building Quarterly Reports
- South-South Cooperation Media Capacity Building BTOR
- Media Capacity Building Project reports and articles
- Articles by trained journalists on CC
- Radio interviews and programs
- Testimonials and other presentations
- AAP Journalist Orientation Workshop reports
- Mission report summaries

#### **PPAS – UNDP Cross-practice**

- UNDP, 2011 Annual Report For PPIS and cross-practice Areas
- Quarterly reports for cross-practice strategy (Q2, Q3 2011 + Q1, Q2, Q3 2012)
- UNDP, Reporting template for Project Component: Integrated Approach/Cross-practice Strategy
- UNDP, AAP Integrated technical assistance strategy - "Highlighting the UNDP cross-practice Initiative", July 2010 – December 2011
- CPS and CC programme frameworks
- Meeting reports, BTOR and annexes for Lesotho mission
- Briefing and concept notes, speech draft (Lesotho)
- Other presentations on CC (Lesotho)

## **Annex 8: Inception Plan**

See attached file