**Executive Summary**

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**Introduction**

This report presents the key findings and recommendations of the Terminal Evaluation on the Early Recovery and Rehabilitation for Central Mindanao (ERRCM) Project. The Project is the successor of the StRIDe-Mindanao Project implemented in December 2008 to November 2010.

The ERRCM Project aims to contribute to the efforts of national and local governments in facilitating the return or resettlement and early recovery of populations displaced by the armed conflict in Central Mindanao from August 2008 onwards and to establish foundations for sustainable peace and development in affected communities. It is designed to support the rebuilding process of IDPs in the context of restoring their social, psychological, and economic development.

The Project begun in January 2011 and officially ended in December 2012. It is supported by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with a total budget of PhP222,321,133.14 which covered 30 IDP sites both ARMM and Non-ARMM. The Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) acted as the Overall Implementing Agency (OIA) as well as the Lead Implementing Agency (LIA) for the non-ARMM areas, while the ARMM Regional Government (ARG) acted as the LIA for the ARMM areas. Operations management of the project are coordinated by Project Coordinating Office (PCO).

This evaluation assesses project’s contribution in supporting communities transitioning from relief to recovery, rehabilitation and development; helping restoration of socio-economic life; and enhancing the capacity of target communities in resettlement and return areas to fully participate in long-term recovery and development. The evaluation results were expected to: (a) inform the ERRCM stakeholders on the performance of the project; and, (b) generate lessons learned and recommendations for current and future programming of IDP assistance for recovery, rehabilitation and development initiatives in conflict-affected and vulnerable areas of Mindanao.

Ascertaining the extent of contribution of ERRCM Project, the evaluation seeks to answer the following objectives: (a) assess the A**chievement of Project Results** – The extent to which the overall Project objectives and outputs/results were achieved and the degree to which the Project contributed to UNDAF, CPAP and Mindanao Peace Outcomes; (b) **Project design and management** – The management processes used in the implementation of the Project including the M&E framework/processes and risk assessment/management; (c) **Stakeholder Participation and Partnership** – Networks and partnerships in support of the implementation of the Project; (d) **Ownership** – The degree of Governmental/community ownership developed and the likelihood of continuation and prospects of sustainability of Project outcomes and benefits after completion of the project; (e) **Sustainability** – Key factors that will require attention in order to improve prospects for sustainability of project outcomes and the potential for replication of the approaches; (f) determining **Programme performance** based on Overseas Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Cooperation (OECD-DAC) criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities; and (g) **Lessons Learned** **and Recommendations** –main programmatic and institutional lessons that were learned and which can be applied in future project implementation related to early recovery, rehabilitation and development of IDPs.

Quantitative and qualitative methods of evaluation design were employed in assessing the contribution of the project to early recovery, rehabilitation and development of IDPs in Central Mindanao. Quantitative method was used in determining the level of satisfaction of the respondents on the process of subproject implementation of community development projects. Pre-structured questionnaire was developed, piloted and evaluated statistically using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Cronbach Alpha to define the best linear combination of indicators of each factors, and fulfill the requirement of internal consistency of the items of survey instrument respectively. Qualitative methods were also employed in assessing the performance contribution of the Project using “Utilization-Focus Evaluation” and “Contribution Analysis”. Qualitative data were categorized into: (a) secondary data such as Project documents; accomplishment reports, LSP terminal reports and partnerships agreements; and, (b) primary data which include results of key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussion (FGDs), and field visit observations.

There were three (3) methods of analysis used in making sense of the data; (a) descriptive statistics such as percentage and mean; (b) systematic reviews; and, (c) thematic content analysis. Finally, triangulation of findings was done to verify the theories of change and assess the overall project performance using OECD-DAC criteria.

**Key Evaluation Findings**

***Operating Context***

According to the study of World Food Programme (WFP) and World Bank (WB), “people of Mindanao have long been hit by cycles of violent conflict and displacement, and these have intensified in the past decade. “All Out War” in 2000 and hostilities in 2008 each led to the displacement of nearly a million individuals. Tens of thousands were displaced by military operations in 2003 and, more recently, thousands of families had to leave their homes when fighting escalated in some parts of Zamboanga Sibugay and Basilan in October 2011.” [[1]](#footnote-1) The recurrent conflict in those identified affected areas had been part of the daily life of IDPs in the past years.

1. **1976 – 2000**. From relatively low intensity conflict between 1976 and 2000 to “All Out War” in year 2000 which resulted to the displacement of more than 930,000 individuals.
2. **2003 – 2007.** The military operations in 2003 displaced at least 411,000 individuals. Many people were affected from year 2005-07.
3. **2008**. Collapsed of GPH-MILF negotiations over the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MoA-AD) which resulted to “fire fighting between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and some elements of the MILF that caused displacement of 107,224 families (or 511,000 persons).
4. **2009.** Continued armed skirmishes and military presence, IDPs fled from their communities and returned to Evacuation Centers or to host communities. In August 2009, figures from the DSWD on the number of IDPs ranged from 327,645 IDPs to 383,410 persons.
5. **Rido.** Theprevalence of rido and rivalry among local politicians has caused fears and uncertainties among IDPs. The vulnerability of the civilian population was starkly demonstrated in the “Maguindanao Massacre” of November 26, 2009, where election-related clan violence which resulted to family displacements.
6. **Effects**. Displaced people were consistently worst off and least secure compared to the rest of the population and they were the least optimistic about the future. The impact of displacement does not end when people return home. Returned households were almost as vulnerable as those who were still displaced and their problems of food insecurity, income poverty and poor access to services were almost severe.
7. These cycles of conflict in Central Mindanao had destroyed people’s lives and livelihoods. Thousands of families have been uprooted from their hopes, relationship of the affected families have been ruined, infrastructures were destroyed, unemployment and diaspora increased, and human dignity of the IDPs worsened.
8. Relief, recovery, rehabilitation and development of the displaced families are not only an issue of humanitarian assistance. IDP rebuilding process is a multi-faceted development issue.
9. **2012** **to future.** The recovery, rehabilitation and development initiatives of the government, NGOs, donors and others actors for IDPs will support to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

***Assessment of Project Outputs Performance***

Overall assessment of the project output performance both the ARMM and Non-ARMM indicated a 97% weighted accomplishment covering the six (6) components.

1. Component 1. Physical delivery rate (PDR) was almost 100%, mainly due to: (a) weighted accomplishment of core shelter of 99.03%; (b) shelter repair assistance of 100%; and, (c) level 1 and level 2 potable water systems (PWS) PDR of 99.43% and 96% respectively. Both ARMM and Non ARMM areas succeeded in achieving the end targets of core shelters (CS), shelter repair assistance (SRA), PWS 1 and 2. It can be noted that there were subproject interventions in CS, latrine and shelter repair assistance which exceeds the end target.
2. Component 2. ARMM and Non ARMM Desks effectively delivered the basic services and facilities to the target beneficiaries by 100%.
3. Component 3. ARMM and Non ARMM Desks successfully delivered the end targets by 100% for start-up support for early recovery (SSFER) and bio-intensive gardening (BIG), while quick impact livelihood (QIL) yields a weighted accomplishment of 87.18%.
4. Component 4. Non ARMM Desk delivered 100% of the planned intervention except for North Cotabato where DRR training was not effectively achieved. Also, 48 actual beneficiaries of DRR and CP training had exceeded the 30 target beneficiaries. The analysis, however, is limited only in Non ARMM Desk as *ARMM desk failed to provide necessary data as they were on the process of validating their report.*
5. Component 5. Both ARMM and Non ARMM Desks achieved almost 100% of deliverables. Specifically, North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte indicated 100% delivery rates of planned interventions. Also, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao had achieved 100% of the deliverables.
6. Component 6. Overall assessment on the financial performance of the project for two-year operations indicated a 95% delivery rate. Non-ARMM Desk financial performance showed a 38% actual expenditure which exceeds the planned budget of 37%. While the ARMM Desk financial performance exhibited a 56% actual expenditure based on the planned budget. On the other hand, the PCO’s financial performance was in accordance with its shared budget of about 7 percent.

***Assessment of Project Design and Management***

1. The ERRCM’s Project fund was made available only after the end of the ACT for Peace Programme implementation. The MinDA, as the Project’s OIA, essentially followed the National Implementation Modality (NIM) guidelines consistent with the Paris Declaration. However, it was during the pre-implementation phase, the ARG invoked its authority to directly implement projects implemented in the ARMM areas as stipulated in EO 125 and EO 125-A (amendment). Therefore, the Project agreed on the 60-40 fund sharing scheme for ARMM and non-ARMM areas, respectively, whereby the fund allocation for ARMM areas was downloaded to the ARMM Desk through the PCO.
2. The Project operated as an independent project with very lean human resource and logistics complements (i.e. only 12 staff complement and no budget for capital outlay).
3. The non-ARMM LIA ensured coordinated efforts with both the Project Steering Committee (PSC) and PCO that resulted to smooth implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects and activities.
4. Locating the PCO and Non-ARMM Desk at MinDA office facilitated fast action on urgent matters and had strictly adhered to the government procurement processes.
5. Limited staffing of MinDA and ERRCM Project (both ARMM and Non-ARMM Desks), however, caused the delays in the submission of reports.
6. *Resource Management*.As a general guide, the policies, rules and procedures of the National Execution Manual and the provisions of the NIM were followed.
7. *Project staff selection.* Project staff assigned in ARMM Desk are recommended by the ARG as the LIA for ARMM, while MinDA handled the screening and hiring of staff for non-ARMM Desk including the PCO. However, the OIA as represented by the National Programme Director (NPD) signed all the employment contracts of the ERRCM Project Staff.
8. *Levels of Authority.* The LIAs together with the PCO, ARMM Desk and non-ARMM Desk followed the levels of authority by virtue of NPD Approval.
9. *Monitoring and Evaluation.*Systems, structures, and tools were covered in the design stage of the project but implementing partners were not ready to implement the designed M&E tools given their existing capacities. Furthermore, the Project lacked a more *harmonized and* comprehensive M&E framework between the ARMM and Non-ARMM Desks to assess and measure progress of the Project in achieving its intended results, including achievement of Project outputs and contribution towards the Programme outcomes/output under the UNDP CPAP and Mindanao Working Group (MWG) Shared Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Outcomes in Mindanao.
10. *Knowledge Management.* Given the need to oversee and manage 30 ERR sites, it is important for the ARMM LIA and Non-ARMM LIA to put in place strong systems for collecting and recording data and information related to the status. One knowledge product that was distributed to project partners and donors is the “Coffee Table Book” which captures the stories of the IDPs.
11. *Risk Management.* The project contained risk management guidelines which identified a series of security, organizational, strategic, operational, political, financial and regulatory risks and mitigation/ management strategies

***Satisfaction of the Respondents in the Process of Subproject Implementation***

**Level of Satisfaction of the Respondents in the Process of Subproject Implementation.** The extent of beneficiaries’ satisfaction of subject implementation varied according to the design and process of implementation. In general, target beneficiaries from ARMM and Non-ARMM areas were “very highly satisfied” with the installation of core shelter with sanitation facilities. This was attributed to the beneficiaries’ satisfaction on social preparation as their needs were considered; transparent and systematic selection of beneficiaries, and their involvement in the monitoring and evaluation process. Among the provinces considered, Maguindanao was reported to have a “very high level” of satisfaction in the process of project implementation.

**Level of Satisfaction of the Respondents of the Disaster Risk Reduction.** As an overall assessment, ARMM and Non-ARMM beneficiaries have different levels of satisfaction on the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). It was found that beneficiaries from North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte have higher levels of satisfaction compared to Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. The data suggested that Non-ARMM beneficiaries were satisfied with the capacity of local government institutions in DRR. The higher level of satisfaction further implies that there was an improvement to anticipate, cope and recover from the negative impacts of complex disasters, improvement of the capacity of setting the risk management systems to regularly monitor hazards and risks shared effectively with communities, improvement in the availability and accessibility of DRR information, capacity in generating the information on disaster risks and how to reduce and respond to them, presence of readily available and accessible DRR information to key stakeholders, satisfaction in the conduct of community based training, capacity to provide public education and the improvement in the capacity of the local government to support communities to adapt to actual or expected climate change at the local level. On the other hand, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur were less satisfied as they were constrained with some significant scope of improvements and resources. The lower levels of satisfaction were also attributed to the unique dynamics in this area.

***Assessment of Project Outcomes Performance***

1. **Rebuilding Families through Building Homes and Communities**

* Return and resettlement of the IDPs have resulted to re-uniting the members of the IDP families; restoring and establishing relationships among neighbours.
* IDP families were restored in a collective community which are equipped with safe and sufficient quantity and quality of water for drinking and other personal or domestic hygiene and individual family or communal toilet.
* They felt secured and safe. Collective response of the IDPs pointed out to the benefit of winning the wage of gaining back their “human dignity.”

1. **WASH for Early Recovery**

* The communities have access to water and sanitation facilities. There is an indication of improved capacity to operate and maintain the facilities based on their initiatives of crafting the rules and regulations; creation of peoples’ organization (PO) called BAWASA, and imposition/collection of user’s fee.
* Community participation was observed in all stages of the implementation cycle from designing to the post construction operation and maintenance.
* There is an increase awareness of good hygiene behaviour and conscious use of safe water and sanitation facilities.

1. **Health Bridge Early Recovery, Peace and Development**

* Conflicts between contending groups were minimized. Peace advocates were supported by healthcare workers and groups with more power or freedom of action.
* IDP families were already concerned on their wellbeing. Their health services were provided by trained health workers and as a result, it develops self-confidence and appreciation on the importance of a healthy family.

1. **Indigenous Drivers of Economic Recovery.**

* The IDP beneficiaries continued to carry out their economic activities which include reviving farms; running microenterprises; and, keeping mutual help of associations running.
* The short and long-term livelihood assistances substantially contributed in increasing the motivation of the IDP families in cultivating their farms, installing agri-marts, trading agricultural products, and restoring the market infrastructure at the community. This suggested an improvement in the economic development capacity of the IDPs. The other benefits that were observed, include: food sufficiency, improved capacity of agribusiness planning and management, food always in the home (FAITH).

1. **Gender Equality**

* Gender equality was integrated in the process of defining responsibilities and opportunities of women and men at the IDP sites.
* There is an increased participation of women in the decision-making.
* It is also evident that there is equality in livelihood opportunities between men and women.

1. **Women Empowerment**

* Women participation was integrated in the decision-making processes which mean that their concerns and protection risks are addressed in the community's overall response and in their negotiations with external stakeholders.
* It is also indicated that there is an explicit attention to the participation of women in the rebuilding process of the IDP communities. Women-led community based organizations and leadership in the community development were in place.

1. **Trauma, Mental Health & Psycho-social Well-being**

* Psychosocial interventions and strategies of healing the individual from trauma are still inadequate; there is a need to continuously provide concrete actions to address these ‘invisible wounds’ as an integral component of paradigms of assistance and development employed by relief and development interventions in post-conflict transition.

1. **Rebuilding Social Cohesion**

* There is an increase in the number of community based-people’s organizations (CBPOs) at the IDP sites. These CBPOs provided avenues of restoring relationships among families; increased the sense of belongingness at the community level; promoted access of information and facilitated bonding and bridging of individuals within and outside the IDP communities.
* Increased trust and confidence within the community has led to improved relationships among Muslims, Christians and Lumads.
* There is an increased participation in Culture of Peace education and in building the local constituency for peace.
* Interactions and exchange during inter-faith dialogues, consultations and celebrations have facilitated better identification and implementation of projects that addressed the human security needs of the community (health-related and community economic development projects).
* Developing the culture of trust and confidence is a long process and it requires more time.
* The intervention provided an opportunity for the beneficiaries to discuss issues relevant to their development such as the formulation of “ground rules” of the BAWASA, NASA, and livelihood assistance associations. With this, it contributed in reducing the vulnerability of the IDPs through access to information.

1. **Improvement in the Stakeholders Participation and Local Governance Capacity**

* Findings revealed that there is an improvement in the governance capacity of MLGUs and BLGUs in the processes of early recovery, rehabilitation and development of the IDP communities.
* The involvement of MLGUs as implementing partners contributed significantly in improving their capacity to incorporate the needs of the IDP communities in their resource allocation and programming of activities, and monitoring and evaluation. This is particularly true in the Non-ARMM Desk where the modality of implementation is a combination of NGOs and MLGUs as implementing partners.
* LGUs have shown an improvement in their capacity on DRR by preparing and updating their disaster management plans or contingency plans, creation of disaster response team, improvement in the capacity of the responsible individuals and government level to deliver DRR strategies through trainings.
* IDP community leaders have exercised indigenous practices of resolving local conflicts brought about by boundary disputes and inter-household quarrels.

***Stakeholder Partnership and Participation***

There are critical success factors to consider in the design of partnership agreements, alliances and convergence of recovery and development initiatives, which include: (a) competence; (b) transaction costs; (c) timeliness; (d) transparency; (e) extent of participation; (f) communication; and, (g) integrity. Failure to adhere to these criteria will affect to the quality of the project.

1. **ARMM partnership and participation arrangement**. The NGOs were given the role in implementing the project for both the soft and hard components. This partnership mechanism showed advantages and disadvantages. On the aspect of advantages, it maximized the local capabilities and talents of the local NGOs who are familiar working in conflict-affected and vulnerable areas. Majority of them had the competence of integrating and practicing conflict and gender sensitivity in the subproject implementation; and, exposed to participatory processes of planning and implementation. However, NGO partnership in project implementation compromised the extent of participation of the LGUs. Having more NGO players demanded clear roles and responsibilities, and agreed coordination mechanism to ensure quality of the project. As a consequence of the absence of a clear shared responsibility, it is difficult to locate accountability among the project implementers.
2. **Non-ARMM partnership and participation arrangement**. The NGOs were responsible in the implementation of the soft components such as social preparation, training, and organizing of the IDPs into registered POs from Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) and/or DOLE. The MLGUs were responsible in the implementation of the hard components (e.g. construction of core shelters, BHS and BnB, etc). They were also required to provide financial counterpart to the total project cost. PLGUs were commissioned to build up the capacity building for MLGUs and BLGUs in terms of DRR. As a consequence of an optimal mixed of implementation partnerships, it resulted to greater benefits to IDPs. Supervision in the implementation of the project was strictly observed; quality of the materials and construction was in adherence to the standard quality. Most importantly, the needs of the IDP beneficiaries were integrated in the Provincial and Municipal development planning.
3. The role given to LGUs and extent of participation was critical in instilling ownership, improving governance capacity, and ensuring continuity in the utilization of the facilities and sustainability.
4. Convergence and alliances with NGAs and other donors with IDP assistance, peace and development initiatives in the area were also observed for both ARMM and Non-ARMM areas. The Project initiative of returning and resettling the IDPs provided an avenue of opportunities to DSWD, AFP, WFP, ASF and other development actors to channel their assistance to Project’s ERR sites.

***Ownership and Sustainability***

1. **Ownership.** LGU-NGO partnership approach used by Non ARMM Desk enabled the LGUs to engage in direct operation of the project. The primary LGU counterpart was delivering the hard components such as the construction of BnB, BHS, school facilities and the like which contributed to the institution of effective partnering, mandating, facilitating and endorsing roles leading to the development of community and institutional level of ownership. Meanwhile, ARMM Desk centered on NGO partnership approach where it provided limited participation of LGUs but promoted ownership at the community level. It facilitated successful coordination and project endorsements to the community and concerned regional line agencies. The two (2) effective approaches used in project implementation generated diverse interest and responsible behaviour indicating hierarchic sense of ownerships.

1. **Sustainability.** It is also important to note different dimensions of mechanisms installed in ARMM and Non-ARMM Desks to maintain the operations, services and benefits of the project. These included community and institutional dimensions. Community dimensions included the concept of direct community involvement, relevance of project objectives to the priorities set by LGUs, acceptability and satisfaction of IDPs’ needs, capacity development, financial and non-monetary counterparts were success criteria to ensure the operational sustainability of the project. In Non-ARMM areas, self reliant and self sustaining communities were established through the shared commitments and partnership of PLGUs, MLGUs and other regional line agencies that introduced functional sustainability. Limited participation of the PLGUs and MLGUs in the ARMM areas still established accountability and responsibility to attain the long term viability of project outcomes in Central Mindanao.

***Cross-cutting Themes***

**Conflict Sensitivity Promotes Participation in Early Recovery.** Project implementation, monitoring and evaluation both by design and process are anchored on the principle of “Do No Harm”. Conflict-sensitive approaches were incorporated in understanding the dynamics of community. Conflict sensitivity was observed in the selection of sites, beneficiaries, and subproject implementation especially in those areas where there is potential clan conflicts (rido)

**Gender Sensitivity.**  Mainstreaming of gender sensitivity in the whole process of project implementation was observed. Both men and women were involved in the needs analysis, selection of beneficiaries, capacity building which included training and organizing of POs, implementation, control of funds and decision-making processes of IDP community development.

**Environmental Sustainability**. It was addressed by the Project through tree planting and practice of sustainable farming system in partnership with POs, BLGUs, MLGUs, NGOs, donors and other actors.

***Factors Influencing Project Performance***

**Facilitating Factors.** These were factors that contributed positively in achieving the Project’s end targets effectively and efficiently.

1. **Integrated Project Design**. The integrated design of the Project based on the lessons learned from the predecessor project (StRIDe) and ACT for Peace Programme contributed largely to the well-designed plan of ERRCM Project.
2. **Strong Partnership and Coordination.** Empowering the LGUs in partnership with CSOs, NGAs, donors and other actors created an avenue of pooling the resources and expertise available in the areas. Concerted effort positively affects the achievement of project objectives.
3. **Conflict-sensitive and well-grounded CSOs.** The peace-oriented civil society organizations and institutions contributed in the rebuilding process of the IDP communities in terms of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity and gender equality in the design and implementation of subprojects.

**Hindering Factors.** These were factors that contributed negatively in achieving the Project’s end targets effectively and efficiently.

1. **Inaccessibility of the IDP sites.** Accessibility of ERR sites remained to be a challenge of providing development assistance in affected areas of Central Mindanao. The poor condition of road infrastructures affected negatively in the timeliness of project implementation.
2. **Natural Disaster.** External factor like typhoon and other unfavorable climatic condition negatively affected in the effectiveness of the implementing partners including mobility of LIAs in the conduct of monitoring and evaluation. This factor was beyond the control of project management.
3. **Armed Conflict.** The unsettled peace negotiation between the GPH and MILF, and the potential clan conflicts (rido) often led to eruptions of armed hostilities which affected the Project operations negatively.

***Overall Assessment of the Theories of Change***

The Project substantially contributed in the early recovery, rehabilitation and development of the ERR sites. The IDPs benefited from the social, economic, institutional, psychological and human development intervention. These include:

1. Accessed to integrated health services had contributed to the individual and community transformation as a consequence of:

* Achievement of outputs in the implementation of core shelter with sanitation facilities; basic services specifically the construction of BHS, BnB, and water supply projects.
* Conduct of psychosocial training, barangay health workers training, sanitation and proper hygiene, and play therapy for children.
* Organization of women associations and other formal groups such as NASA and BAWASA in the IDP communities.
* Formulation of ground rules in the utilization of water supply, core shelter and BnB to ensure equity and fairness in access.
* Adequate supply of water; promotion of sanitation and proper hygiene.
* Equitable access of water facilities, and maintained assets without any discrimination on the basis of economic, social, gender, age, belief and ethnicity.
* Organization of Peoples Organizations (POs) for water systems in the ERR sites had place special efforts and resources needed for capacity building for operation and maintenance of water, sanitation and hygiene facilities in order to ensure sustainable service provision.
* Uplifting of human dignity and quality of life. It was observed in the ERR sites the proper and safe disposal of human excreta. Indication on cleanliness, hygiene, collection and environment friendly disposal of liquid and solid waste were effectively in place in the ERR sites.
* Improvement in the level of awareness of IDP families on proper hygiene contributed in preventing water and excreta related diseases through the widespread adoption of safe and hygienic practices.

1. Increased community participation of women, poor and vulnerable at all stages of the project cycle. With this accomplishment, the Project contributed in promoting women’s health rights.
2. Quick Response Team (QRT) was capacitated from Provincial, Municipal and Barangay Local Government Units.
3. Improved capacity of the IDP beneficiaries on economic development, particularly in the:

* Restoration of economic development infrastructure in the ERR sites. This included the restoration of farm through seeds distribution, farm machineries and implements; duck raising; bakeshop; mini-marts; agri-trading; machineries and equipment, and other micro-economic enterprises.
* Organization of livelihood associations for both men and women.
* Conduct of training on business planning in Non-ARMM covered IDP beneficiaries.
* Improvement in the capacity to operate micro-economic enterprises that is gender sensitive.
* Improvement in the knowledge and skills of small business planning and management.

1. Improvement in rebuilding social cohesion as a necessary input in the ERR sites’ production activities.
2. Contributed in promoting peace constituency and improved capacity in conflict management of the LGUs and ERR beneficiaries:

* Developed/updated Contingency Plan
* Improved capacity in peace negotiation
* Improved capacity in conflict management
* Resolved clan conflicts (potential Rido).
* Improved coordination of LGUs (i.e. PLGUs, MLGUs and BLGUs) specifically in Non-ARMM areas in the form of financial counterpart and administrative support.
* Organized POs in ERR sites to maintain and operate infrastructure for basic services and livelihood as well as to ensure equality in access, continuity in access and sustainability.
* Increased number of participation and improved capacities of local NGOs in implementing human security; peacebuilding and conflict transformation activities of IDP beneficiaries.

***Overall Assessment Using OECD-DAC Criteria***

The Project substantially achieved its planned outputs and attained some of the noticeable outcomes. About 97% of the numerical targets were delivered and the level of satisfaction in the subproject implementation of the components is very high across the four (4) provinces which are attributed to the participatory process and tangible benefits of Project interventions.

Of the seven (7) factors using OECD-DAC criteria of evaluating the ERRCM Project, the weighted mean score of 5.6 indicated **“very high**”. This was primarily attributed to a “very high” rating of the Project in terms of (a) *Relevance and Appropriateness - 6*, (b) *Efficiency - 6, (*c) *Coverage – 6, and, (d) Linkages - 6.* Meanwhile, the Project was rated *“good”*based on the criteria of Effectiveness - 5, Coherence - 5, Connectedness – 5, and, Sustainability - 5. The **very high rating** of the project was due to the following achievement:

* Appropriateness of approach, strategies, implementation frameworks and activities in the rebuilding process of the IDPs;
* Improved human security of the ERR sites;
* Improved capacity in DRR and management of the LGUs;
* Rebuilt social cohesion and harmonious relationship among IDP families;
* Instilled a strong sense of ownership with the IDPs, LGU partners and stakeholders over the assets and gains realized in almost two-year of intensive recovery and reconstruction;
* Optimal utilization of funds;
* Enhanced partnerships between ERR communities, government, donor agencies, and implementing partners;
* Interventions which benefited significant number of IDP families;
* Coherence in the strategic thrust and priorities communicated in the Mindanao 2020, and support to the national government in providing conflict-sensitive community-based and driven development initiatives in improving the human security of conflict-affected population or IDPs in pursuit of achieving sustainable peace and development.

***Contribution to Mindanao Peace Outcomes***

**Mindanao Peace Outcome 1**: Human security in Mindanao conflict-affected and vulnerable communities enhanced.The Project outputs indicated positive changes that led to substantial contribution in enhancing human security in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities.

* Substantially contributed in enhancing human security in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities through promoting and increasing people’s awareness, improving access to basic services especially to vulnerable groups like women and children, increasing appreciation of and access to economic development initiatives through collective undertakings.

**Mindanao Peace Outcome 2:** Mindanao peace constituency broadened and citizen’s participation in the peace process strengthened.The Project significantly contributed to the strengthening of a Mindanao peace constituency.

* The Project significantly contributed to the strengthening of a Mindanao peace constituency through the formation of POs and strengthening of partnership and collaboration with CSOs, MLGUs, PLGUs, donors, and NGAs that were actively engaged in the entire process of early recovery, rehabilitation and development to their constituents.

**Mindanao Peace Outcome 3**: Social cohesion and harmonious relationships strengthened within and among communities and sectors.The Project contributed substantially in rebuilding the relationship between the Christians and Muslims through the promotion of COP education in the IDP communities.

* Contributed substantially in rebuilding the relationship between the Christians and Muslims through the promotion of COP education, and conduct of peacebuilding dialogue in the ERR sites. Community leaders were capacitated to resolve and manage conflict. Clustered barangays indicated a harmonious relationship, had restored respect and trust. Improvement in vertical relationship was also manifested as a result of strong partnerships with the LGUs and Regional Government Agencies in the rebuilding process of ERR sites and improving the capacity of the LGUs in DRR.

***Lessons Learned***

1. Integrated project design of early recovery, rehabilitation and development initiative must address to the multifaceted development needs of the IDP. Parochial interventions are not sufficient interventions for early recovery, rehabilitation and development of the displaced families.
2. Conflict sensitivity is primordial in rebuilding and reconstruction of IDP communities. Identifying the most vulnerable groups, assessing their priorities, and strengthening the capacity of IDP communities to plan and manage local development projects are fundamental design prerequisites for early recovery and rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure and development activities.
3. Participatory approach of project design, subproject implementation, monitoring and evaluation for recovery and development yield quick tangible results. Empowering the IDPs can be more efficient, gaining organizational legitimacy, gathering local support, and preventing youth from engaging in destructive activities.
4. Devising flexible project management approaches at the community level should consider the wide variety of timelines, capacity levels, levels of access to resources, geographic distances, logistical requirements, and conflict dynamics.
5. In a climate of great flux and insecurity, it is important to have continuity of project personnel. This allows key actors to obtain deeper history and context, which supports the learning and application of better practices throughout the project life. The criteria and mechanics of selecting the Local Service Provider (LSPs) are vital in ensuring the quality of projects and services delivery.
6. Sustainability of demand-driven projects is greater when local government administrations are involved in planning, appraisal, execution, monitoring and evaluation. Integrated implementation through local government bodies could prevent the pitfalls of parallel institutions that have affected many social funds. At the same time, local governments are susceptible to local political influence and often face capacity constraints.
7. Implementation approaches that create community ownership are easily accepted which in turn help ensure community contributions and maintenance support in the long term. Communities are usually involved in interventions such as community-based drinking water, community building, school classrooms and toilets, BnB, community economic enterprises, and restoring cultural or religious sites. Empowering the IDP communities promotes ownership and sustainability of assets and gains of the recovery and rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure interventions. Beneficiaries’ participation in the design, process of subproject implementation and control of resources contributed significantly in making them accountable to their decisions.
8. Sustainability is inherent on community participation, local government bodies, national government agencies, NGOs, and other groups; responsiveness to community demands; adequate social capital (or capacity to promote peacebuilding through development at the community level); linkages and collaboration with other livelihood financing, and technical assistance projects; and, workable operations and management plans that are fully owned by the communities with support from local governments.
9. Early recovery, reconstruction and long-term development are essentially governance concerns. Where governance is weak or absent, conflict affected, conflict-vulnerable and post-conflict areas become more vulnerable to recurrence of conflicts or potential conflicts. Restoring governance is crucial in post-conflict and conflict affected areas. There are varying perspectives of what this entails.
10. Managing recovery and rehabilitation of IDP communities for long-term development is vital in sustaining the enthusiasm of duty bearers and peace advocates. Achievement of Project outcomes generated high degrees of expectations from the communities, leaders and government officials, which may be frustrated in the absence of immediate follow through. Realistic follow through plans based on the lessons learned may include redefining the strategic recovery and development activities, and limiting its scope to governance, while basic social services and economic development may continue to be spearheaded by national government with support from donors with community-based development models that can work best in conflict-affected and post-conflict areas.

***Recommendations***

1. **Conduct of Early Baseline Study for Proper Targeting**. The IDP interventions should focus on reform rather than merely restoration of pre-existing systems, following a rigorous analysis of the circumstance and location of the IDPs. This will typically require carrying out in-depth needs assessments during the early stage, if possible even before the formal end of hostilities.
2. **Social Cohesion Promotes Early Recovery and Rehabilitation.** Rebuilding social cohesion in internally-displaced families and communities is a vital aspect of recovery, rehabilitation and development of the affected population. The rebuilding process of the IDP families and communities needs to be deliberately pursued and nurtured, and cannot be left to chance. The competence of providing services to strengthen social cohesion would be better delivered by NGOs, academe and other peace networks, rather than by government agencies and personnel. It should be noted, however, that it is the responsibility of the government to deliver the mandated social, economic, environmental and developmental administration services.
3. **Basic Social Services.** Basic social services remain as the core in the early recovery and rehabilitation of IDP communities in conflict-affected/vulnerable areas. Delivery of basic services need to be anchored on the principles of participation, rights-based, gender sensitivity, cultural and conflict sensitive and inclusivity in order to achieve optimal benefits of the intervention. Education and health sectors, by their nature, greatly shape and are influenced by social norms and interactions. As such, the overarching need for conflict sensitivity in all assistance programmes and projects is particularly acute for these sectors. Initiatives with demonstrated direct developmental effects, such as those that improve access to water and sanitation and those which foster complementarities between large-scale and small-scale projects, should be promoted.
4. **Community Economic Development.** Community economic development should be based on economic advantage. This would require understanding the economic context of the IDP communities which include among others the identification of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats leading toward the determination of the comparative advantage of the area; alignment of the economic intervention with the industry priorities of the provincial and regional governments. Subsector industry analysis is imperative in order to produce products that can be scaled-up into the larger market.
5. **Local Governance Capacity.** Local government institutions are the frontline in the early recovery, rehabilitation and development. Continuous capacity building of LGUs is imperative for the early recovery and sustainability of basic social services and economic development of the conflict-affected areas and IDPs in Mindanao.
6. **Disaster Risk Reduction and Management**. Continuous capacity building of LGUs on disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM), achievement of Millennium Development Goals and conflict-sensitive and peace-promotive (CSPP) processes are imperative, thus, they are mainly responsible for the IDP communities’ resiliency.
7. **Research Opportunities.** The following are some of the possible researchable areas in the context of building disaster resiliency of the IDP communities:

* **Business-Sector Motivators.** There is a need to investigate factors most likely to motivate businesses of all sizes to collaborate with the public sector to build disaster resilience in different types of communities. There are a number of impediments to business participation in private–public collaboration of all types, including disaster resilience. The barriers include private–public sector cultural differences, concerns about information sharing, and wariness of government mandates and regulations. What is not clear is how to overcome such challenges and increase incentives for business participation in disaster-loss–reduction activities.
* **Integrating NGOs.** Providing support to research on how to motivate and integrate community-based, faith-based, and other NGOs—including those not crisis oriented—into resilience-focused collaboration.
* **Changing Emergency-Management Culture.** Support to research on how the emergency-management sectors can be moved toward a “culture of collaboration” that engages the full fabric of the community in enhancing resilience.
* **Learning through Support of Collaboration.** There should be research that focuses on demonstration projects that quantify risk and outcome metrics, enhance disaster resilience at the community level, and document good practices.New efforts to support and nurture community-level resilience-focused private–public collaboration could include research and demonstration projects aimed at enhancing disaster resilience at the community level and documenting best practices.

1. **Support to Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.** Future programming of IDPs in conflict-affected and vulnerable areas in Mindanao should be rationalized within the ambit of supporting the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

1. http://www.wfp.org/content/conflict-and-displacement [↑](#footnote-ref-1)