OUTCOME EVALUATION:
UNDP HAITI RECOVERY PROGRAMME 2010-2012

REVISED INCEPTION REPORT

Christian Bugnion, Associate Expert, RLAC
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I. INTRODUCTION

UNDP’s corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people’s lives. UNDP defines an outcome-level result as “the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change in the country, a particular region, or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups”.

As an outcome-level evaluation therefore, the primary focus of this evaluation will be on the programme outcomes as defined above. However, in order to understand whether everything was done to contribute to the achievement of outcomes, the evaluation will also assess how well the interventions were designed and planned; what activities were carried out; what outputs were delivered; how processes were managed; what monitoring systems were put in place; and how UNDP interacted with its partners.

This report represents the first deliverable of this outcome evaluation. The report outlines the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection, as well as a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The report constitutes a desk study and review of background documents submitted to the evaluation consultant, and proposes specific lines of inquiry about the Recovery programme to be used as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the consultant and the evaluation commissioners.

II. Evaluation Scope and Objectives

The purpose of the outcome evaluation of the recovery programme is to assess UNDP’s contribution towards progress made in achieving the stated outcome of the 2009-2012 CPAP:

“Living conditions of crisis affected population improved” with a particular focus on a) Earthquake affected physical infrastructure rehabilitated and b) Livelihoods of affected population improved.

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1 UNDP (2011); Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p 3.
The Recovery programme encompasses some 6 “projects” that were implemented between 2010 and 2012. Initially the TOR listed 9 “projects”, but a revision by the Country Office clustered the interventions into six categories or “projects”. In fact, over 126 interventions were financed under the Cash for Work (CFW) project with different implementation modalities across a wide range of recovery interventions, but they have all been included into a single “project” albeit with different project identification numbers. The reported total value of the interventions amounts to US$ 147 million.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NR</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>START DATE</th>
<th>END DATE</th>
<th>AMOUNT US$</th>
<th>DONORS</th>
<th>MAIN NATIONAL PARTNERS (4)</th>
<th>DEPT/MUNC, NGO/CBO</th>
<th>Geographical areas of intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>62941</td>
<td>Cash for work Relevement</td>
<td>01/01/2010</td>
<td>01/12/2012</td>
<td>$40,900,000</td>
<td>Bahrain, Benefica Foundation, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Central Emergency Relief Fund (GERF), Chad, Chinese</td>
<td>Ministere d'environnement, agriculture, travaux publiques, DINEPA</td>
<td>Over 100 NGO/CBO partners</td>
<td>National - 43 communes dans 6 departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>63239</td>
<td>Relevement Coordination</td>
<td>01/03/2010</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>$1,024,975</td>
<td>EU, BCPR, TRAC</td>
<td>MPCE, MTPTC, UCLBP, AGENCE ONU</td>
<td>National - policy level/coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>76983</td>
<td>Debris I</td>
<td>01/01/2011</td>
<td>30/10/2012</td>
<td>$16,950,000</td>
<td>FRH</td>
<td>Mairie de Port au Prince, Delmas, CEPHAPE, UJAPH, EDM, FONEDECO, GTIH</td>
<td>Carrefour Feuilles, Delmas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>79471</td>
<td>Debris II</td>
<td>01/05/2012</td>
<td>30/10/2012</td>
<td>$24,830,500</td>
<td>FHR</td>
<td>Mairie de Port au Prince, Petion Ville, CHF International, JPHRO, Viva Rio</td>
<td>Petion Ville, Fort Nationale, Port au Prince</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>79379</td>
<td>Carmen</td>
<td>01/10/2011</td>
<td>31/07/2013</td>
<td>$3,300,000</td>
<td>PNUD</td>
<td>Mairie de Port au Prince, Delmas, Leogane, Handicap International, UMCOR</td>
<td>Carrefour Feuilles, Canapé-Vert, Fort National, Delmas 75 ainsi qu’à Leogane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>79750</td>
<td>16/6</td>
<td>11/09/2011</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td>$50,500,000</td>
<td>30 FRH, 19 CIDA, 1.5 Korea</td>
<td>Primature, UCLBP, Mairie de Port au Prince, Marie de Petion Ville, Geskio, UMCOR</td>
<td>Villa Rosa, Morne Hebo, Jean-Baptiste, Bois Patate, Morne Hercule, Nerette, Morne Lazarre, Jalousie, Fort-National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** $147,205,475
The various projects have been implemented through the development of Annual Work Plans under the CPD, and do not have an individual project document. Therefore fuller documentation and information is being obtained on the exact dates of implementations and amounts disbursed under each project as well as the precise geographical targeting of each project and the outputs and outcomes achieved from UNDP CO. A chronogramme was established by the country office (included as annex) that shows the sequencing of the interventions since the earthquake in January 2010 until the end of 2012.

The objectives of the recovery programme outcome evaluation are:

a) to identify the outputs produced and the contributions to results at outcome level and positive or negative changes produced along the way, including expected and unexpected results;
b) To identify the key lessons learned;
c) To identify good practices on the specific practice area of the recovery programme.

The evaluation will be based on the five criteria laid out in the OECD-DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance,\(^2\) which defines the following:

**Relevance:** The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.

**Effectiveness:** A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.

**Efficiency:** An economic term which signifies that development aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results; and generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted.

**Impact:** The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

**Sustainability:** Assessing the probability that the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after the programme cycle.

In the case of the outcome evaluation of the recovery programme, considering the three-year time frame under which it has operated, it may not be possible to already appraise the impact of the programme. However to the extent possible, the evaluation will try to infer, using contribution analysis, the likely contribution of UNDP to the existing changes that have taken place.

As per the TOR, the evaluation will specifically:

(1) Provide evidence to support accountability of projects and programmes;
(2) Provide evidence of the contribution of these projects to the stated outcome;
(3) Identify current areas of strengths, weaknesses and gaps, especially with regard to:
   (i) The appropriateness of UNDP’s partnership strategy;
   (ii) Impediments to achieving the expected results;
   (iii) Adjustments to be made;
   (iv) Lessons learned for the next disaster response;
   (v) Lessons learned on improved linkages between recovery and development programming.

It is important to note the timing of this evaluation. The Government of Haiti is leading a transition process whereby the humanitarian coordination structure is being gradually transferred to the National Aid Coordination structure. The recommendations of this evaluation will help to feed into this process.

Given that an outcome evaluation necessarily has different levels of analysis, the lines of inquiry of the evaluation will be centered on the following areas:

1) Whether the outcome was achieved and any progress towards achievement;
2) Whether the integrated approach used by the CO was most effective given the context;
3) Exogenous factors affecting the outcome including the specific aid architecture in Haiti (Bilateral, multi-lateral donors, HRF, etc.);
4) Linkages between UNDP’s outputs and interventions to the outcome statement;
5) The quality of UNDP’s partnership strategy;
6) Outstanding opportunities that UNDP can use to improve future recovery programming.

III. CONTEXT AND RATIONALE

Haiti before the earthquake of 2010 was ranked 161 out of 180 countries in the Human Development Index. It was struggling with a very difficult situation of widespread poverty and had been severely affected by hurricanes during 2008 that caused widespread flooding. Even before the crisis, development remained a particular challenge for the country.

The main objective of the Recovery Programme was to support the achievement of the CPAP outcome “living conditions of crisis affected populations improved”. While the CPAP was established in April 2009 and covered a four year period until the end of 2012, the earthquake of January 10, 2010, created havoc amongst the population and virtually obliterated the development efforts that had been on-going until that time. With over 200,000 dead and 2,5 million people displaced and crisis affected (or one fourth of the country’s population), enormous humanitarian needs had to be responded to in the quickest possible mode. Both the Haitians and the United Nations Offices in Haiti were affected, and UN staff were equally
affected by the earthquake. Given the level of physical destruction, and in line with UNDP’s Early Recovery Cluster lead role, UNDP had to quickly mobilize resources to undertake recovery efforts, that were needed both to diminish the pressure on the affected population and provide them with a source of income through large scale participatory cash for work schemes creating short term employment. UNDP quickly moved to contribute to laying the foundations to the reconstruction of Haiti through an innovative approach to using rubbles as agents of development (with Debris Leogane in October 2010). In addition and at the same time as the CPAP was being rolled out, political changes were taking place in the country and a new President was elected in March 2011, slightly more than a year after the earthquake. During the early post-earthquake emergency period several new mechanisms were created to address the reconstruction efforts. The PARDH (Plan d’Action pour le Relèvement et le Développement d’Haïti) was the guiding national framework for a period of 18 months. Specific institutions, such as the CIRH (Commission Intérimaire pour la Reconstruction d’Haïti) were created to oversee and coordinate the international response. As part of the UNDP mandate, the recovery programme contained a strong component on capacity development of national institutions, in order to enhance national capacity and ownership in line with good practice and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Busan. However the period was one of political instability that affected institutions such as the CIRH as its mandate was not renewed at the end of October 2011 and most of 2012 was spent without knowing which institutions would be responsible for ensuring aid coordination. Finally the government presented the CAED as the new coordination structure for aid flow to Haiti. This however shows the complexity of the recovery effort, as UNDP had to assist both the affected population, as well as support the government ministries and institutions despite their limitations and lack of resources in establishing the national vision as a driving force behind the recovery efforts.

The evaluation will therefore have to be particularly sensitive on the differences between the outcomes that affected directly the population (such as the HIMO/Cash for Work projects), and the ability of the government institutions to benefit and increase their capacity on the basis of the support provided by the UNDP recovery programme.

The rationale for the evaluation is to better understand UNDP’s contribution to recovery programming in Haiti and also identify synergies and opportunities for programming in future disasters, as well as suggesting linkages for future development programming.

IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE RECOVERY PROGRAMME AND STRATEGIES

The carefully planned outputs and activities under the CPAP 2009-2012 were abruptly changed on 12 January 2010 when the earthquake struck. The massive amount of human and physical
damage called for an immediate multi-sectoral response according to the UN reform process, with the humanitarian clusters addressing the cluster-specific needs. While Haiti was still recovering from a particularly damaging hurricane season in 2008, the earthquake of January 2010 shattered any hope for reaching the path of sustainable development.

UNDP plays a key role in recovery and is the Early Recovery cluster lead in the UN system. This means that UNDP had to urgently develop quick impact activities since the size of the damage, the amount of physical destruction and the volume of rubbles were beyond any previous situation that the UNDP had to address in the past. As such, there may have been no time to develop detailed project proposals through the regular project development process. Rather, interventions were developed rapidly to address the urgent needs on the ground and seek the necessary funding to implement the actions. As such, the overarching objective of the projects that form the Recovery programme from 2010 until 2012 is the CPAP outcome statement of “improving the living conditions of crisis affected populations”. With 1.5 million IDPs living in camps after the earthquake, priorities were quickly identified and a substantial part of the Recovery programme, both in terms of financial resources and in terms of priority efforts, focused on the Debris Management projects (that addressed the issue of rubble removal and reconstruction of the neighbourhoods) and the 16/6 project, set on developing properly planned neighbourhoods and in providing the IDPS with a durable housing solution that enabled them to leave the camps.

The interventions of the recovery programme under the CFW modality addressed the vulnerability of the various areas outside of the capital, Port-au-Prince, through a poverty and risk reduction intervention that included building the resilience of the populations and of their livelihoods to the threats of natural disasters. Haiti was and remains a highly disaster prone country, one of the highest in the region. The Recovery efforts to reduce vulnerability and mitigate the consequences of a natural disaster through proper prevention and preparedness is both in line with good practice in Disaster Risk Reduction and follows the recommendations of the Hyogo framework for action (HFA ten year plan 2005-2015). This was covered under the Cash for Work modality which was used throughout the territory of Haiti.

The architecture of the six recovery “projects” does not reflect the initial CPAP design given the massive natural disaster. There are no linear processes in this context, but a range of activities were gradually developed, the first one being a large Cash for Work programme. The majority of the interventions were likely developed and guided both by need, national priorities and by UNDP’s mandate as Early Recovery Cluster lead. But efforts were made despite the earthquake in order to ensure that each intervention would still be contributing to the outcome statement of “improving living conditions of the crisis affected population”. Noteworthy that in the
original CPAP of April 2009, this outcome statement was placed under the 3rd UNDAF outcome and under the Crisis Prevention and Recovery programme.

The Recovery programme’s theory of change was not one that was prepared in advance and followed a sequential progression. Rather the theory of change was developed using a learning by doing approach that sought as an initial recovery strategy: 1) to inject cash into the local economy and the population (first phase of the Cash for Work programme) 2) to identify an uncovered needs area where UNDP could bring some added value in its capacity as Early Recovery Cluster lead. With the change of senior management in summer 2010, six months after the earthquake, UNDP’s theory of changed evolved to gradually incorporate longer term aspects objectives such as poverty reduction, production based temporary employment (cash for production instead of cash for work), and capacity development through the partnership with government institutions at national and local level in the selection and vetting of the projects to be implemented. The evolution of the different interventions from UNDP reflect this incremental approach of development concerns into the recovery phase, while ensuring responsiveness to needs.

The theory of change (TOC) covers therefore two different periods: the immediate post-crisis early recovery from January 2010 to August 2010 during which time the TOC was that IF money could be rapidly injected into the local economy and IF destitute, traumatized and crisis affected population could have some activity to occupy them and provide some sort of income, THEN the living conditions of the crisis affected population would improve.

From September 2010 as the immediate emergency needs subsided and more attention was given to recovery and reconstruction, UNDP as cluster lead for Early Recovery (ER) started tackling critical issues such as the removal of the massive amounts of rubble that were generated by the earthquake. Haiti had an unprecedented amount of 10 million cubic meters of rubble, equivalent to 40,000 olympic swimming pools. The rubble impeded access to many areas, and was an impediment to both humanitarian response and longer-term development assistance. With the introduction of income generation schemes that targeted production (e.g. being paid by the results in rubble collection and removal rather than by working days) UNDP used a results-based management approach to the creation of thousands of temporary employments that benefited women as well as men, with an overall participation from women of some 40%. In addition, developmental concerns were introduced into the planning for recovery activities and national and local authorities participated in the selection and vetting of the interventions. UNDP found itself in a unique situation (there is no other example of such large amount of rubble generated) and had to use some innovative programming to tackle the challenge of leading the recovery process. At the time various Debris (rubble) management projects were developed, first in Leogane (October 2010) and then in Port-Au-Prince (January
and then further interventions were developed that benefited from the experiences undertaken and culminated with the 16/6 project (September 2011) that reflected the knowledge gained by UNDP in its other recovery interventions. The TOC became then that IF recovery interventions could be geared towards development concerns, and IF the government and donors were supportive of the innovative interventions undertaken, and IF the interventions were successfully undertaken, THEN the living conditions of the crisis affected population would improve. The main change from the early recovery TOC is the concern for longer-term programming and the introduction of sustainability concerns into the planning of the interventions so that they would could be owned by government and contribute to an improved development plan that would incorporate the lessons of the recovery interventions.

The adopted integrated approach, from the formulation of the Debris Programmes to the 16/6 Project, including CARMEN, allowed the CO to set the base of development during the early in the recovery phase giving answers to different needs across different aspects of the recovery process.

The outcome statement of “improving the living conditions of crisis affected population” is quite a wide outcome. For the purposes of planning UNDP interventions, this outcome was understood as 1) providing temporary employment through various CFW and CFP modalities as a poverty reduction mitigation measure during the recovery phase, and 2) ensuring a comprehensive response as ER cluster lead through proper coordination and participation in the three thematic working groups of a) rubble management, b) housing, and c) livelihoods that in turn provided the inputs for the various rehabilitation and recovery efforts.

V. PROPOSED EVALUATION PLAN AND METHODOLOGY

This section presents the evaluation plan and proposed methodology based on the foregoing outline of the recovery programme context, rationale and strategy; as well as analysis of the evaluation terms of reference (TOR) as provided by the evaluation commissioners. The figure below provides a diagrammatic representation of the proposed evaluation design showing the research issues associated with each programme element.

Figure 1: Evaluation design
As provided in the evaluation terms of reference (TORs), the outcome evaluation will contribute to identifying and reporting on the outcomes of the Recovery programme. The evaluation will undertake an analysis at three different levels:

1) At the output level, based on the reports and documentation and data available from the UNDP and partners on the projects that are part of the recovery programme;

2) At the outcome level, with two different but complementary lines of inquiry: a) through the projects’ national institutions and counterparts, in order to identify and capture change in capacity development, and b) with a sample of direct beneficiaries, to identify and capture changes for the affected population.

3) A meso-analysis that will combine the findings under points 1) and 2) will provide the overall framework. Since there may be differences of attribution for certain results, the evaluation will also consider the use of contribution analysis in order to identify the
enabling factors, direct or indirect, expected or unexpected, that contributed or impeded the achievement of the outcome.

**Outcome evaluability and constraints and limitations of the evaluation**

The evaluability of the programme is challenging given that there is no clear theory of change and logic model to support the recovery programme. The evaluation therefore reconstructed the intervention model together with UNDP staff. The magnitude of the earthquake profoundly changed not only the CPAP priorities and UNDP’s involvement in Haiti, but that of the government and of the international development actors. Therefore the early planning process for the UNDAF and CPAP was largely invalidated by the earthquake and the emergency humanitarian needs that become the overriding priorities. Nonetheless the outcome statement did remain as the guiding principle of the recovery programme’s objective.

A number of limitations affect the evaluation:

1) **Data gaps**: No project documents were established for the recovery interventions given the need for a timely response. UNDP used the Annual Work Plan modality under the CPAP in order to agree with the government on the interventions that had to take place. However since the situation changed profoundly after the earthquake and the initial CPAP planning was no longer followed, it is particularly difficult to appraise how each intervention was linked to the objectives. There are no project evaluations of the recovery interventions, and very little data was shared to provide evidence regarding the results of the interventions. Thus the evaluation requested the Country Office to provide a list (shown above) of the interventions covered and their results, as far as possible, both in terms of quantitative and qualitative achievements.

2) **Timing and preparation time**: the evaluation mission was fielded quickly without having had access to the complete set of information regarding the interventions. This was driven by the need to be on the ground early in order to take advantage of the presence of key staff from UNDP that are leaving the country soon and who have provided critical insights and explanations on the rationale and implementation modalities, otherwise not detailed in the documents available. A large number of key staff had already left and substantial Skype interviews are required to retrace the knowledge management stream in the recovery process.

3) **Some initial preparations were not completed prior to fielding the mission, leading to a less efficient use of time** (e.g. retaking the security certificates basic and advanced, sorting out the logistical support needed for the mission, obtaining a complete list of the stakeholders to be interviewed) so that some lead-time was necessary to have the evaluation fully operational.

To address these issues the evaluation opted for an approach substantially based on qualitative methods in the absence of quantitative data to be analysed. As mentioned under point 2) above a substantial number of Skype calls will be required to interview key staff that shaped the vision and the operations of the recovery programme.

**Sampling strategy**: The evaluation will also identify with the country office a limited number of interventions that will be visited based on their learning value and the opportunity to obtain
feedback from local institutions and direct beneficiaries. This will also provide direct on-site observation data to support and triangulate data from other sources. The sampling strategy is being discussed with UNDP Country Office in order to see which projects provide the highest learning value for the outcome evaluation. The evaluation will therefore use purposive sampling. The Debris Leogane has already been identified as a good example for a field visit. Another visit is planned for one of the areas of Port-Au-Prince and a third area outside of the capital city will also be visited to see how UNDP responded in early recovery outside of the most affected areas in Port-Au-Prince and the surrounding areas.

Data validation: The evaluation will use triangulation (e.g. confirmation from three different sources) in order to sustain a finding and ensure credibility and accuracy. A clear distinction will be made between the interpretation of the data (subjective) versus the triangulated findings (objective and factual).

**Evaluation methodology**

The methodology will use a mix of methods but will use largely key informant interviews (KII) with UNDP staff, national counterparts and local stakeholders at government, institution and NGO level to inform the evaluation. The evaluation will use semi-structured interview format in carrying out KII. The key informants for the evaluation are:

- UNDP CO staff and senior management, including the staff on post between 2010 and the end of 2012;
- Government staff from counterpart ministries and institutions, notably: MTPTC, MPCE, DINEPA, Ministry of Agriculture, of Commerce, of Women, of Youth, Mayors of Leogane, PAP, PV, Delmas, direction départementale de l’environnement, MARNDR, CAED and STC;
- All participating UN agencies both at the political and strategic levels (Head of Agencies) as well as at the technical level, particularly with WFP, ILO, UN HABITAT, UNOPS. If possible an interview with the HC and Resident Coordinator should take place.
- A selection of international and local NGOs that have implemented recovery projects with UNDP. Purposive sampling of these NGOs is being made based on the learning value. Initial informants have been identified as: Transversal Haiti, CRS, EDM, CHF international, World Vision, CEPHAPE, UJAPH, GTIH, FONHEDECO, PIRIOU, AHAAMES Léogane, et les opérateurs privés Digicel, Miyamoto.
Beneficiaries will be selected on purposive sampling in the project areas that will be visited to obtain direct feedback through either focus group and/or individual household interview techniques.

A phased approach using mix methods will be adopted to carry out the evaluation as follows:

1. **Documentary and data review**: Documentary analysis, including analysis of the associated programme documents, UNDP and partner UN agency country programs, periodic planning and M&E reports, annual programme reports, Government policy and strategy papers, etc. The list of documents appears as an annex to the inception report but remains limited with relatively little information on the individual project results. See the annex for a list of documents provided.

2. **In-country field work**: Interviews of key stakeholders through individual/group interviews of final beneficiaries, institutional beneficiaries, implementing partners and other relevant stakeholders such as civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), bilateral and multi-lateral donors. The interviews have been determined through consultation with the UNDP Country Office and programme staff based on purposive sampling in view of the learning value offered by the sample. A limited sample of projects sites, institutions and beneficiaries will be visited for in-situ observations. Semi-structured interviews using a questionnaire guide will be a major data collection methods.

3. **Data analysis, interpretation and presentation**: Primary and secondary data obtained will be used to provide relevant information for assessing the programme status and for decision making by the UNDP senior management and programme staff. The preliminary findings from the analysis will be presented to the commissioners of the evaluation in order to obtain further inputs, validation and triangulation of information and a brief will be provided on the last day of the field mission containing the preliminary findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned. Further analysis and interpretation are likely to take place after the field mission is completed, in order to address expectations and based on the feedback from the validation session (debriefing) that will be held on the last day of the mission.

4. **Draft report and final report**: A draft report of the evaluation findings, lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations will be submitted to the Country Office and evaluation commissioners for comments. All comments will be addressed in the final evaluation report.

The following table provides the evaluation matrix and guide for the data collection tools and sources for the evaluation criteria as defined in the TOR. The tentative and indicative list of key
information providers and stakeholders (shown above) will have to be reviewed and discussed with the UNDP country office. UNDP will be responsible for setting up the appointments and facilitating the interviews and visits to relevant sites/locations and all logistical arrangements for the mission.

**Evaluation Matrix**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>What to look for</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Collection methods</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Relevance                     | - How relevant were UNDP’s recovery interventions?  
- Could there have been alternatives or better approaches?  
- How appropriate was UNDP’s partnership strategy?                                                                                                         | - Responsiveness to the situation analysis  
- Did UNDP clearly communicate its intent?                                                                                                               | - UNDP staff  
- Development partners  
- Government partners  
- Civil society partners                                                                                                                              | National plans and reports on national priorities (e.g. PARDH)  
KII with UNDP staff, development partners and government partners, civil society partners |
| Effectiveness                  | - Was the stated Outcome achieved?  
- What progress was made?  
- What changes were brought to the main beneficiaries?  
- To what extent has UNDP contributed to the outcome?  
- To what extent did the other UN agencies contribute to the outcome?  
- How effective was UNDP’s partnership strategy?  
- What could have been done better?                                                                                                                      | - What changes can be observed as a result of UNDP’s interventions?  
- Importance of the approach and methods used to implement the projects  
- Interaction between partners                                                                                                                         | - Programme documents  
- Annual Work Plans  
- Evaluation reports  
- MDG progress reports  
- Human Development Reports  
- Stakeholder interviews                                                                                                                               | - Stakeholder interviews (KII) with counterparts  
- Document review  
- Beneficiary interviews  
- On-site visits to sample projects                                                                                                                      |
| Effectiveness of clustered interventions | - In neighbourhoods of multiple initiatives (Debris, 16/6, CARMEN) were interventions designed to complement each other?  
- Were results more positive in these areas?                                                                                                             | - Evidence of cross project learning and multiplier effect  
- Dynamics of stakeholder engagement (institutions and CSOs and affected population)                                                                     | - UNDP Progress reports and annual reviews                                                                                                         | - Stakeholder interviews (KII)  
- Document review  
- Beneficiary focus groups  
- On-site visits to sample projects                                                                                                                      |
| Efficiency                    | - Were resources focused on the set of activities that were expected to produce significant results?  
- Were the projects Implemented within deadline and cost estimates?                                                                                      | - Effective mechanism for monitoring implementation  
- Funding strategy and use of resources                                                                                                                 | - Programme documents  
- Annual Work Plans  
- Evaluation reports  
- ATLAS reports  
- Government partners                                                                                                                                    | - Desk reviews of secondary data  
- Interviews with government partners, development partners and |
### Criteria | Evaluation questions                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Data sources                                                                 | Collection methods                                                                                                                                 |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sustainability | - Were initiatives designed to have sustainable results given the identifiable risks?  
- Did they include an exit strategy?  
- Was UNDP able to incorporate development related concerns into recovery planning?  
- How has UNDP approached the scaling up of successful initiatives?  
- Has government taken up on these initiatives?  
- Was the innovative integrated approach used in Haiti conclusive to creating sustainable development conditions?  
- Is it replicable to other post disaster context elsewhere in the world? | - trigger effects from UNDP intervention  
- replicability | - UNDP staff  
- Programme documents | - Desk reviews of secondary data  
- Interview UNDP programme staff  
- KII with national counterparts and implementing partners |

### UN Values:  

**Gender equality**  
- what was achieved in terms of mainstreaming gender?  
- any good practices to be replicated?  
- Can results of the programme be disaggregated by sex? Evidence of gender empowerment?  
- Project documents  
- Evaluation reports  
- UNDP staff  
- Government partners  
- Beneficiaries | Desk review of secondary data  
- Interviews with UNDP staff and GoH partners  
- Observations from field visits  
- Project documents  
- Evaluation reports  
- UNDP staff  
- Government partners  
- Beneficiaries  
- Desk review  
- Interviews  
- Observations |

**Human rights principles and Social Inclusion**  
- Did UNDP recovery portfolio include HR and social protection principles?  
- any good practices to be replicated? | -- evidence of social protection into programming and in beneficiary targeting | Documents:  
- Evaluation reports  
- UNDP staff  
- Government partners  
- Beneficiaries | Desk review  
- Interviews  
- Observations |

### VI. QUALITY ASSURANCE AND STANDARDS

The evaluation will benefit from the support of the Country Office and the Evaluation will be placed under the overall supervision of Inka Mattila of the Evaluation Area of the Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean in Panama. At the UNDP CO level, the focal point for the evaluation will be Monique Pierre Antoine, Programme specialist, who will ensure that
the proper support is provided to ensure the success of the evaluation mission, and Rita Sciarra. The RSCLAC will provide feedback on the evaluation outputs in line with the required quality standards. The TOR indicate that an Evaluation Management Team (EMT) under the UNDP M&E Specialist would be set up, and this needs to be clarified by UNDP.

The evaluation will follow the required quality standards as mentioned in the TOR, particularly the UNEG Evaluation Standards, Ethical Standards for Evaluations, and the guidance from the UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation for Development result, as well as the UNDP outcome-level evaluation companion guide book.

The general approach used by the evaluation is participatory and utilization-focused, as described in the book by M.Q. Patton “Utilization-focused Evaluation”, 3rd edition, Sage publication, that remains a reference in the world of development evaluation.

VII. TIMELINES AND SCHEDULE OF DELIVERABLES

The evaluation will be undertaken in a period from 14 October to 14 December. Based on the agreed schedule as per the TOR, the consultant will submit the following outputs as per following schedule of deliverable:

| a) Draft inception report | 19 October 2013 |
| b) Final inception report | 23 October 2013 |
| c) First draft report | 20 November 2013 |
| d) Final report | 4 December 2013 |

VIII. PROPOSED REPORT STRUCTURE

The evaluation will a report between 30 and 40 pages in length excluding Annexes. The proposed report structure is shown below.
I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and Context
1.2. Purpose and objectives
1.3. Evaluation methodology
1.4. Limitations

2. Description of Development Challenge

2.1. General overview of trends
2.2. Government policies and strategies

3. Description of the programme

3.1. UNDP strategy and logic model
3.2. Programme Results Framework
3.3. UNDP Projects and activities

4. EVALUATION FINDINGS

4.1. Relevance
4.2. Effectiveness
4.3. Efficiency
4.4. Sustainability
4.5. Potential impact

5. CONCLUSIONS

6. GOOD PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEXES:

1. List of documents reviewed
2. List of individuals interviewed
3. Evaluation calendar/agenda
4. Data collection instruments
5. Evaluation Inception report
6. Terms of reference